Indo-Pacific Perspective 1
Introduction
A Rules-Based Order
for the Indo-Pacific?
Dr. Peter Harris, editor
t is the policy of the United
States government to ensure that
the Indo-Pacific megaregion re-
mains “free and open.” In no small
part, this vision rests upon the wa-
ger that a single rules-based order
can exist from the western reaches
of the Indian Ocean to the vast ex-
panses of the Asia-Pacific. How-
ever, developing and enforcing a
cohesive international rulebook for
the Indo-Pacific will be far from
simple. For the United States and
its allies, the urgent need to
cement a rules-based order in the
Indo-Pacific is driven, at least in
part, by anxiety surrounding the
rise of Chinayet this ongoing
movement in the balance of power
is also a major reason for why a
stable rules-based system will be
difficult to maintain. Then there is
the question of legitimacy. It is
possible for a rules-based system to
be truly fair and inclusive, or does
international order inevitably re-
flect the interests of some more
than others? Finally, it is not as-
sured that America’s presence in
the Indo-Pacific will continue to be
welcomed by regional govern-
ments.
This, the first “Indo-Pacific Per-
spectives” roundtable from the
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, will
offer some answers to these com-
plex geopolitical (and “geolegal”)
questions. As the name suggests,
this new series of roundtables will
showcase viewpoints from across
the Indo-Pacific megaregion (and
sometimes beyond). The goal is to
facilitate a dialogue between aca-
demics and policy practitioners
that will be of great interestand,
we hope, considerable useto an
international cast of scholars and
decision makers whose work fo-
cuses on the Indo-Pacific. In this
inaugural roundtable, the partici-
pants hail from the United States,
United Kingdom, Singapore, India,
I
1
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Indo-Pacific Perspective 2
and Indonesia. They are academ-
ics, expert analysts, and seasoned
policy advisers. Tasked with shed-
ding light on the concept of a rules-
based order in the Indo-Pacific,
they have provided a range of per-
spectives to clarify just how
fraught and contentious such an
order-building (and order-defend-
ing) project will be.
The roundtable begins with Nilan-
thi Samaranayake’s keen analysis
of US foreign policy toward the
Indo-Pacific. She points out that,
despite the inclusive rhetoric and
phraseology of a “free and open
Indo-Pacific,” America’s leaders
sometimes betray a preoccupation
with the Asia-Pacific at the ex-
pense of the Indian Ocean. For ex-
ample, US officials sometimes dis-
cuss the entire Indo-Pacific region
as bedeviled by maritime boundary
disputes, whereas such disagree-
ments are much more prominent
and consequential in the Asia-Pa-
cific than the Indian Ocean. If
states from India to Japan are to
remain committed to the idea of
belonging to a single Indo-Pacific
region, it will be important to clar-
ify the interests that these states
are supposed to share in common
with one another.
Benjamin Ho turns to analyze the
foreign-policy motivations of
China, America’s supposed rival in
the Indo-Pacific and another
potential driver of a rules-based
system for the region. According to
Ho, China’s leaders are open to the
broad concept of a rules-based in-
ternational order, even if they (un-
surprisingly) tend to support a dif-
ferent configuration of rules than
that put forward by the United
States. One of Ho’s major insights
is that Chinese leaders desire a
rules-based international system
that will help them to ward off ex-
ternal threats to domestic security.
This is the reverse of how interna-
tional order is discussed in the
Westthat is, as a straitjacket to
prevent domestic actors from up-
ending international security.
Laura Southgate agrees that
China has an interest in using in-
ternational rules as tools to serve
its national interestsand, moreo-
ver, that its growing power means
that Beijing must be taken seri-
ously as a rule-shaper in the re-
gion. This is true whether China
chooses to be an active “maker” of
new rules for the Indo-Pacific or
whether it is expected to be a mere
“taker” of rules made by others.
Simply put, China is so powerful,
and its interests are so expansive,
that China’s willingness to comply
with rules will be a decisive factor
in determining the success of any
rule-based order. Southgate pro-
vides a case study of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of
Introduction
Indo-Pacific Perspective 3
the Seato wit, Beijing’s summary
rejection of a 2016 ruling by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration
that held some of China’s maritime
claims in the South China Sea to
be incompatible with international
lawto illustrate the central im-
portance of China to the success of
rules old and new.
Kei Koga offers a complementary
analysis of Japanese foreign policy
toward the Indo-Pacific. He points
out Japan’s leaders were among
the first to articulate the existence
of a cohesive Indo-Pacific space.
Koga points to the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue (“Quad”) as Ja-
pan’s primary means of operation-
alizing and institutionalizing its
commitment to a free and open
Indo-Pacific, but makes the im-
portant observation that Japan
and the other Quad members (Aus-
tralia, India, and the United
States) cannot act imperiously to-
ward smaller regional actors. Koga
emphasizes the special importance
of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), noting
that Southeast Asia is the geo-
graphical center of the Indo-Pa-
cific. Without the endorsement of
ASEAN, Japan’s leaders seem to
have concluded, there can be no
hope of maintaining a rules-based
order to unite the Western Pacific
and Indian Ocean. Such interna-
tional-level considerations have
interacted with domestic politics to
shape Japanese policy toward or-
der-building, Koga argues.
Titli Basu uses her contribution to
bring India into the frame. Basu
makes the incisive point that the
coming multipolar world will be
anchored in a multipolar Asia; how
the competing powers of the Indo-
Pacific can manage to live along-
side one another will, in no small
measure, determine the fate of
global governance and security.
Basu argues that India must be
considered a major player in the
Indo-Pacific (and, by extension, the
rest of the world), but she insists
that India should not be regarded
as a mere “balancer.” This is some-
thing that US analysts are some-
times guilty ofvaluing India in
geopolitical terms as a bulwark
against Chinese expansion, but not
taking the time to consider how
Delhi intends to exert itself as a
shaper of regional and global order
in its own right.
Ngaibiakching provides a sweeping
analysis of the issues facing Indo-
Pacific nations, from the problem
of institutionalizing regional order
to the imperative of avoiding a new
“Cold War” between the United
States and China. She echoes both
Southgate and Basu in observing
the importance of power as a foun-
dation for rule making; agrees with
Koga that small and middle
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Indo-Pacific Perspective 4
powers will play a critical role in
shaping the emerging Indo-Pacific
order; and makes the forceful argu-
ment that multipolarity will not be
kind to the Indo-Pacific if it is not
accompanied by a firm commit-
ment to multilateralism on behalf
of the region’s major powers.
Finally, Dewi Fortuna Anwar of-
fers her unique perspective as not
just an eminent academician but
also a former policy maker in the
Indonesian government. Her de-
scription of ASEAN’s successes at
order-building, rulemaking, and
shared regional governance is an-
other powerful reminder that the
Indo-Pacific zone is far from mono-
lithic. Even if there is ample rea-
son to treat the Indo-Pacific as a
single megaregion, this must
surely be done while paying careful
attention to variation at the sub-
regional level.
What future is there for a rules-
based order in the Indo-Pacific? It
depends. Great powers like the
United States, India, and China;
middle and smaller powers like
Australia, Japan, and Indonesia;
regional blocs like ASEAN all of
these actors will have an impact
upon the development of rules for
the region. The contributions to
this roundtable shed valuable light
on the interests and decision-mak-
ing processes of some of the parties
involved. They suggest that a
rules-based order from the Persian
Gulf to Northeast Asia is possible,
and perhaps even inevitable, but
still as yet undetermined. ■
Dr. Peter Harris
Dr. Harris is an assistant professor
of political science at Colorado
State University, where his teach-
ing and research focus on interna-
tional security, international rela-
tions theory, and US foreign policy.
He serves as the editor for the
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs
new “Indo-Pacific Perspectives” se-
ries. Dr. Harris has two main re-
search projects underway: one fo-
cusing on great-power relations
during periods of major interna-
tional change (with a specific em-
phasis on USChina relations) and
another focusing on the environ-
mental protection of US military
bases, including overseas bases in
the Indo-Pacific, as well as instal-
lations in the US states and terri-
tories. He has conducted extensive
research into Diego Garcia, the
largest island of the Chagos Archi-
pelago (British Indian Ocean Terri-
tory), which is home to one of the
most important US military bases
in the world. He received his PhD
from the University of Texas at
Austin and holds additional de-
grees from SOAS, University of
London, and the University of Ed-
inburgh. His work has appeared in
Introduction
Indo-Pacific Perspective 5
journals such as the Journal of
Indo-Pacific Affairs, African Af-
fairs, Anthropology Today, Asian
Security, Chinese Journal of Inter-
national Politics, Environmental
Policy and Law, International
Journal, International Political So-
ciology, International Politics, Is-
rael Journal of Foreign Affairs,
Journal of Transatlantic Studies,
Marine Policy, National Interest,
Political Quarterly, PS: Political
Science & Politics, and Review of
International Studies. He is news-
letter co-editor for the Interna-
tional History and Politics section
of the American Political Science
Association.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed or implied
in JIPA are those of the authors and should
not be construed as carrying the official
sanction of the Department of Defense, Air
Force, Air Education and Training Com-
mand, Air University, or other agencies or
departments of the US government or their
international equivalents.