Air University Press

SAASS Theses

These SAASS theses were selected for publication from among those submitted to the faculty of SAASS, as one of the requirements for completion of a master’s degree in air and space power art and science. AU Press no longer publishes this series, but award-winning SAASS theses are now published in the Drew Papers series.

  •  AFD-171228-617-111.PDF

    AWPD-42 to Instant Thunder

    James R. Cody
    Major Cody analyzes the air war plans in World War II and the Persian Gulf War. His goal is to ascertain whether there is a continuity of thought reflected in American air planning over the years. He assesses Air War Plans Division-1/42 and Instant Thunder as to their importance to contemporary airpower theory. Major Cody concludes that there is a continuity of thought reflected in major air plans, particularly in the issues of strategic bombing, precision attack, and command and control. [James R. Cody / 2003 / 68 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: T-38]
  •  AFD-171229-208-052.PDF

    Balancing the Trinity

    Maj Susan E. Strednansky, USAF
    This study analyzes the role of the military commander in termination planning during operations other than war. First, the author assesses past and present political guidance, such as the Weinberger doctrine and the presidential directive on peace operations, as well as conditions that affect exit strategy planning. The conclusion is that most of the guidance is vague and that internal and external influences make the process of transforming political goals into viable military objectives very difficult . Next, the writer evaluates actual end-state development and the subsequent exit strategies in Somalia and Haiti operations. The results of the Somalia case study indicate that the military commander was not provided specific end-state conditions and had to determine a termination strategy as he was prosecuting the conflict. Although this approach worked for a brief period of time, political events eventually overcame military planning and US forces were withdrawn without accomplishing the political goals . Having learned from the Somalia operation, the Haiti planning was more thorough and looked specifically for concrete end-state conditions. Consequently, the military mission was more successful, though it is questionable what the political results of this intervention will be in the future. The final chapter states three conclusions: (1) if the political leaders do not provide a specific end state, the military commander will have to develop one and pass it up the chain of command for consideration and approval, (2) much better results can be expected from a military mission which is given an end state that was developed in coordination with both the political and the military establishments prior to commencement of hostilities, and (3) in all cases, the planning process will be difficult and fluid. [Maj Susan E. Strednansky, USAF / 1996 / 58 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]
  •  AFD-171227-727-265.PDF

    Bedding Down with C-O-T-S

    Christopher J. Bence
    Major Bence examines the feasibility for the United States Air Force (USAF) to obtain and field a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) cargo aircraft in order to meet the current and future airlift requirements of the United States. He discusses the current capacity, the three types of cargo, and the total force structure of the USAF. Major Bence offers five alternatives, including COTS—each embraces benefits and drawbacks—to increase airlift capacity. [Christopher J. Bence / 2000 / 80 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: T-7]
  •  AFD-171228-317-143.PDF

    Benign Weather Modification

    Maj Barry B. Coble, USAF
    Weather modification is a technology once embraced by the United States (US) military as a tool to help both wartime and peacetime missions. However, interest in the ability to modify weather has waned over recent years and is now nearly nonexistent. This study examines one aspect of weather modification, benign weather modification (BWM), for possible use in assisting military operations. After briefly reviewing the history and science of weather modification, this thesis bounds the aspects of weather modification being addressed. It then describes barriers to BWM, showing how they affect current weather modification policy in the military. Examples are shown of current civilian BWM techniques, their possible use by the military, and some military-unique needs for weather modification. After examining current weather modification and projected future BWM technology, the author concludes that military BWM use deserves another look. Increased reliance on precision guided munitions makes BWM a possible new tool in ensuring accurate targeting with minimal collateral damage. In addition, BWM offers the war planner a means to dictate battle space elements at a critical point in a conflict. At a minimum, the US military should conduct a more in-depth review of weather modification to see if technological advances offer opportunities for more “bang for the buck.” [Maj Barry B. Coble, USAF / 1997 / 45 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]
  •  AFD-180102-819-025.PDF

    Beyond Gunboat Diplomacy

    Maj James O. Tubbs, USAF
    Military intervention short of full scale war is not a new phenomenon as a means of pursuing national interests. With the end of the cold war, military intervention has taken a new twist in the form of peace operations. The United States Air Force (USAF) in particular is being used as a tool of national policy in peace enforcement operations with increasing regularity. The USAF was involved in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and maintained an air presence in both Turkey and Saudi Arabia to control the Iraqi repression of its civilian population. This involvement raised a fundamental question about when and how airpower should be used as an effective coercive force in peace enforcement operations. Peace enforcement is a military intervention in an ongoing conflict that uses military force to coerce one or more belligerents to comply with mandated restrictions. The purpose of this intervention is to create the proper security conditions such that other peace efforts such as humanitarian relief and diplomatic peacemaking can help the belligerents resolve the conflict without the use of force. This study uses Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq and the Unified Taskforce/United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNITAF/UNOSOM II) as case studies to examine how airpower influenced these peace enforcement operations. [Maj James O. Tubbs, USAF / 1997 / 63 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]
  •  AFD-171228-395-145.PDF

    Beyond the Battle Line

    Maj Gary C. Cox, USAF
    This study examines the development and usefulness of US air attack theory and doctrine during the interwar period, 1919–1941. This period represents more than 20 years of development in US Air Corps attack theory and doctrine. It was the first peacetime period of such development. Attack aviation during this time was a branch of aviation used to provide direct and indirect combat support to ground forces in the form of machine-gun strafing, light bombing, and chemical attacks. [Maj Gary C. Cox, USAF / 1996 / 54 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]
  •  AFD-171229-156-055.PDF

    Beyond the Industrial Web

    Maj Steven M. Rinaldi, USAF
    Economies are complex systems composed of a number of infrastructure elements. These elements, such as electrical grids, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) distribution networks, and telecommunications systems, are interconnected in a myriad of ways. As a result of this connectivity, an attack on one infrastructure element influences the others to varying degrees. When targeting an economy, an air planner must account for this connectivity and the downstream effects that naturally occur. Historically, however, air planners have overlooked the interrelated nature of a nation’s infrastructure and employed reductionist targeting techniques. Typically, they split an economy into individual target sets. Then, they select targets in each set in isolation from other targets, without anticipating the holistic effect of air bombardment. This is an inappropriate technique for targeting, as it overlooks the complex behaviors and characteristics of economies. In this thesis, we propose a new manner of targeting economies—a holistic approach that accounts for the linkages between infrastructure elements and their resultant synergies. We first establish a theoretical foundation for targeting based on complexity science. This discipline examines the nature of complex, interconnected systems such as economies. Next, we demonstrate that economies are indeed highly interconnected systems. These linkages cannot be ignored in the targeting process. Finally, we tentatively propose a computer algorithm capable of targeting multiple, interacting infrastructure elements. The technique employs a genetic algorithm coupled to standard industrial analysis programs. When implemented, this computer technique should dramatically improve the effectiveness of economic targeting. [Maj Steven M. Rinaldi, USAF / 1995 / 89 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]
  •  AFD-171228-835-119.PDF

    Bombing to Surrender

    Maj Philip A. Smith, USAF
    Major Smith examines the contribution of airpower to the 1943 collapse of Italy. His study is largely about competing airpower strategies during World War II. He presents his own view of this 50-year-old debate. Major Smith does not offer another absolute ruling, nor does he represent a bias toward one form of employing airpower over another, but his study attempts to document an important exception to the most current panacea target. He cites several broad works—Robert A. Pape's Bombing to Win: Airpower and Coercion in War, the United States Bombing Survey Reports, Ernest R. May's "Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy, and Frederick William Deakin's The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler, and the Fall of Italian Fascism—to identify examples where the psychological effects of airpower outweighed the physical damage caused by bombing. [Maj Philip A. Smith, USAF / 1998 / 88 pages / AU Press Code: T-51]
  •  AFD-171227-321-273.PDF

    Bombs over Bosnia

    Michael O. Beale
    Major Beale examines the role operations Deny Flight and Deliberate Force played in achieving a peaceful settlement to ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s. To help the reader understand the role Deny Flight and Deliberate Force played in getting a peace agreement signed, the author explains the political and historical context of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While Deny Flight was generally ineffective in its mission, Deliberate Force was, in the words of US Secretary of Defense William Perry, "the absolutely crucial step in bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table at Dayton, leading to the peace agreement." [Michael O. Beale / 1997 / 71 pages / ISBN / AU Press Code: T-13]
  •  AFD-180102-677-026.PDF

    Build-to-shelve Prototyping

    Lt Col Donald “Bud” Vazquez, USAF
    The lag between the fielding of systems and the development of conflict-winning employment tactics and doctrine is a historical fact we dare not neglect. Yet, DOD acquisition strategy appears to be on the path to-do just that. Foregoing the expense of producing weapon systems— an understandable expedient in the budget crunch— has been widely criticized because of its effects on the defense industrial base. Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s new approach, called “rollover plus,” recognizes the need for operational testing. What’s been missing from the debate about these alternatives is how any approach that severely limits the numbers of end items fielded also adversely impacts our ability to develop conflict-winning employment doctrine. [Lt Col Donald “Bud” Vazquez, USAF / 1997 / 63 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]
  •  AFD-171229-548-015.PDF

    Centralized Control of Space

    Maj Ricky B. Kelly, USAF
    The purpose of this paper is to determine to what extent and how the joint forces commander (JFC) should control support from space forces. Current Air Force doctrine, as delineated in Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, identifies the joint force air component commander (JFACC) as being responsible for both air and space for the theater. This statement follows the Air Force notion that air and space are an indivisible medium of warfare. On the other hand, Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, “Joint Doctrine; Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Space Operations,” states the Operations Directorate, J-3, on the supported commander’s (the JFC’s) staff functions in this role. Centralized control, similar to air, may have beneficial effects that allow joint commanders to take better advantage of space forces’ full potential. This study concludes by offering recommendations. [Maj Ricky B. Kelly, USAF / 1993 / 40 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]
  •  AFD-171228-823-143.PDF

    Charting the Nation’s Course

    Maj Patrick M. Condray, USAF
    This study analyzes how the processes used in the national security planning influence the results. It begins by discussing the nature of strategic planning for national security, eventually defining it as a disciplined effort involving the allocation of resources to programmed activities aimed at achieving a set of objectives by integrating major goals, policies, and action sequences into a cohesive whole. Two examples (the New Look of 1953 and the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] of 1997) are selected for comparison due to the many parallels of their respective historical situations. The next step in this study defines several alternative methods for conducting strategic planning, including how using those methods could influence the outcome. These differences are used to analyze both the New Look and the QDR. The New Look provides an example of a primarily sequential, top-down process while the QDR demonstrated the advantages and drawbacks of a primarily parallel process which had both top-down and bottom-up aspects. The final section discusses the implications of the different approaches, including the recommendation that any review contemplating major changes in national security policy follow a more sequential and top-down process with clear guidance given to participants. [Maj Patrick M. Condray, USAF / 1999 / 64 pages / ISBN: AU Press Code: ]
  •  AFD-171229-337-022.PDF

    Coalition Warfare

    Maj Peter C. Hunt, USAF
    Political circumstances often dictate that we employ military force as part of a coalition. The youngest military instrument, airpower, has been integrated into coalition forces during several major conflicts of the twentieth century. No historical evidence or current strategies indicate that the likelihood of working within a coalition will diminish. A fundamental question, then, is how air component commanders should be trained to understand and appreciate the nuances of coalition warfare. This thesis focuses on operational-level coalition air force interactions in three conflicts: the Korean War (1950–53), the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), and the Balkan Air Campaign (1992–95). [Maj Peter C. Hunt, USAF / 1998 / 73 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]
  •  AFD-171229-824-044.PDF

    Coercive Air Strategy

    Maj John I. Pray, USAF
    The purpose of this work is to provide the air planner with an air strategy that may, under certain defined conditions, be more likely to yield success than current air power theories. Our current stock of strategic ideas tend to rely on a unitary, rational actor assumption to describe the decision-making environments of our potential adversaries. We believe reliance on this simplistic assumption may skew the counterstrategy development process. We propose an alternate decision framework that identifies the importance of consensus decision making and the central role organizations often play in this complex process. This characteristically divisive environment presents many new opportunities to apply military force selectively in a compellent situation. To take advantage of the vulnerabilities created by these internal divisions, we propose a strategy that uses air power to surprise policy advocates in an opponent’s domestic coalition and force a bureaucratic shift. By targeting key organizations during windows of coercive opportunity, air power may be able to shape a new consensus and produce a policy change that furthers our interests. Central to our effort is the use of the Czechoslovakian crisis that gripped Europe in the summer and fall of 1938 for it highlights many of the same situational characteristics we see today and can expect to see in the future. Britain’s failure to know their opponent resulted in a missed opportunity to take advantage of a split in the German internal consensus that left them vulnerable to a coercive effort. [Maj John I. Pray, USAF / 1995 / 43 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]
  •  AFD-171228-173-146.PDF

    Command Dysfunction

    Maj Arden B. Dahl, USAF
    This thesis analyzes the factors and conditions of command dysfunction from the cognitive, or mental, perspective of command and control warfare (C2W). The author examines the limitations of rational decision making and the tension that exists between rational and intuitive processes. Next, this thesis examines the vulnerabilities of rational and intuitive processes in order to build a cognitive warfare framework. The framework consists of three categories: the command baseline, stressors, and deception. The stressor and deception categories act on the command baseline. The analysis also suggests that there are a number of possible interactions that exist between the stressor and deception categories. This thesis uses the framework to analyze evidence of command dysfunction in three historical campaigns. The historical analyses study the German command during the Normandy Invasion, the Allied command during the first week of the Battle of the Bulge, and the Israeli command during the first half of the Arab-Israeli October 1973 War. In addition to showing that there are interactions between stressors and deception, the analyses highlight the importance of understanding the adversary’s command baseline. This thesis concludes that effective C2W is not so much what is done to an adversary’s command, but rather what he does to himself, perhaps with a little help. [Maj Arden B. Dahl, USAF / 1998 / 120 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]
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