Integrated deterrence requires the alignment of the Department of Defense's policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence against competitors employing holistic strategies of coercion and aggression. In a complex multipolar world, how can the DoD align the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (D.I.M.E.) model alongside its nuclear capabilities to develop nuanced, tailored integrated deterrence strategies for state and non-state actors with varying nuclear capabilities and risk tolerances, such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran?
As these operations are tailored to specific states and regions, how should the military prioritize its focus, and which specific allies and partners should be integrated into these regional campaigns? Specifically, how does Security Cooperation contribute to integrated deterrence approaches tailored to specific adversaries and scenarios, and help build enduring advantages with allies and partners? Furthermore, might long-term irregular warfare campaigning optimize allied and partner participation as part of global collective security?
Within this whole-of-government effort, what is the specific role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in global and theater integrated deterrence, campaigning, and engagement? Are there operational, fiscal, and legal authorities and permissions that need to be changed or created for SOF to be effective in this framework? Crucially, where exactly does nuclear deterrence fit into integrated deterrence, and what is SOF’s role in that nuclear framework? How do SOF communicate U.S. counter weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) policy, and how can the CWMD mission fit into SOF’s overall strategy with partners, allies, and neutrals to effectively deter these disparate adversaries?
- Bergin, Capt. Connor T., "Beyond Brinksmanship: How Evolving Nuclear Deterrence Endangers Strategic Stability," AFGC thesis, 2025, 43 pgs.
- Bergin answers these topics by exploring the profound challenges of a fragmented, multipolar nuclear landscape where the US must simultaneously deter Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. He argues that multipolarity undermines the predictable, binary logic of Cold War extended deterrence, introducing unpredictable escalation pathways through overlapping alliances and asymmetric capabilities. To adapt to this crowded strategic arena, Bergin recommends shifting away from grand multilateral treaties to focus on developing flexible, region-specific arms control agreements targeting specific high-risk behaviors, while continually reaffirming extended deterrence commitments through joint exercises and integrated defense planning.
- Thrasher, Maj. Michael, "Doomed to Succeed? Understanding Nuclear Deterrence and Its Past and Future Roles in National Security," AF Global College thesis, 2024, 36 pgs.
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- Bishop, Bryce, "US Strategic Answer to North Korea and China Increasing Their Nuclear Capabilities," AF Global College thesis, 2024, 59 pgs.
- Clemmensen, Col. Andrew, "How Sustainable Are Defense and Deterrence Methods in Light of Iran's Attack," AF Fellow research, published by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 6, 2024.
- Phillips, David P., "Nuclear Redeployment: A Roadmap for Returning Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons to the Korean Peninsula," ACSC SANDS paper, 2024, 26 pgs.
- Stutzriem, Maj. Stephen E., "Fending Off: How Nuclear Modernization is Critical to Deterrence in an Era of Multi-Polar Great Power Competition," GCPME thesis, 2024, 46 pgs.
- Banner, Maj. Jeffery A., "Hunt Forward Operations as a Diplomatic Arm of the United States," AF Fellow Op-Ed (University of Texas, San Antonio, Cyber Warfare), 2025, 3 pgs.
- Banner argues that executing Hunt Forward Operations (HFOs) is a powerful form of security cooperation that acts as a direct strategic deterrent against adversaries like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. By deploying U.S. Cyber Protection Teams to work side-by-side with partner nations on their own networks, the U.S. can collect high-value threat intelligence and identify malicious activity before it reaches domestic networks. This collaborative defense sends a powerful message to adversaries, builds enduring trust with vulnerable nations, strengthens alliances like NATO, and effectively counters adversarial narratives that attempt to portray the U.S. as disengaged.
- Burgess, Maj. Thomas G., "Security Cooperation and Coalition Partnership in the Indo-Pacific," AFGC thesis, 2026.
- He answers this by evaluating whether current U.S. security cooperation policies are sufficient to build a formidable coalition against China's pacing threat in the Indo-Pacific. Using an analytical framework based on values, interests, and mutual security, Burgess concludes that current U.S. efforts are insufficient to build these enduring advantages. He demonstrates that while the U.S. verbally prioritizes the Indo-Pacific for deterrence, its actual resource allocation and military exports remain heavily skewed toward the Middle East, with two of the top three U.S. arms recipients located there rather than in the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, he argues this misalignment leaves the U.S. ill-postured to build the collective mutual security network required to effectively deter Chinese expansionism.
- Judd, Maj. Colby D., "Asymmetry in the West," AFGC thesis, 2025, 41 pgs.
- Judd directly applies this to US arms sales to Taiwan. He points out that while the US has sold billions of dollars in broad military equipment to Taiwan, future security cooperation must prioritize strictly asymmetric defense systems. Because Taiwan cannot match China's mass of ships and firepower, Judd argues they must be armed specifically with anti-ship missiles and defenses designed to fend off an amphibious landing, which will buy the critical time (approximately one week) needed for US and allied reinforcements to arrive.
- Patel, Maj. Milan S., "Strategic Thaw: How Russian-Chinese Partnerships in the Arctic Challenge U.S. Interests and Alliances," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- He highlights that security cooperation—such as the bilateral defense agreements, intelligence sharing, and joint military exercises the U.S. conducts with Arctic nations—builds an enduring advantage that counters the vulnerable "marriage of convenience" between Russia and China. Furthermore, he recommends that the U.S. rely on its allies and the private sector to develop necessary infrastructure, such as utilizing partner nations for icebreaker production and investing in multi-purpose satellites for domain awareness, ensuring that security cooperation directly accelerates the collective deterrence and defense posture needed to safeguard the Arctic.
- Stuard, Maj. Kathryn L., "Cooperate to Outcompete: Security Cooperation Impacts on Grey-Zone Conflict in the Indo-Pacific," AFGC thesis, 2025.
- Stuard answers this by arguing that the United States must integrate human security principles—such as addressing climate resilience, economic stability, and disaster preparedness—into its security cooperation strategies to outcompete China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Indo-Pacific. She notes that fragile nations often fall into financial dependency and are forced to make concessions to China, which ultimately compromises their sovereignty and exacerbates local instability. By elevating human security as a core pillar of security cooperation, the U.S. can address the root causes of instability rather than just the symptoms, establishing itself as an empathetic and reliable partner of choice. This holistic, non-kinetic approach builds regional goodwill and counters adversarial influence below the threshold of armed conflict, strengthening integrated deterrence by fostering an enduring network of likeminded allies.