



*INTERNATIONAL SECURITY I:
THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY*

SYLLABUS

AY 21

JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
PHASE I INTERMEDIATE LEVEL COURSE

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
21st Century Leaders for 21st Century Challenges

**AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
MAXWELL AFB, AL**

FOREWARD

This syllabus for the *International Security I* course for the Air Command and Staff College, Academic Year 2021 (November-December 2020), provides both an overview of the course narrative, objectives, and questions, as well as a detailed description of each lesson to assist students in their reading and preparation for lecture and seminar. Included herein is information about course methods of evaluation, schedule, and the fulfilment of joint professional military education core goals.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY I

COURSE OVERVIEW

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course explores the context of international security with a focus on US national security and the US national interest, as well as the tools at its disposal for the attainment of its security and interests. The course introduces broad frameworks by which the US national security can be conceived. These “traditions” of International Relations (IR) present distinct and contrasting perspectives on the causes of war, the conditions of peace, and in turn, what counts as national security. It highlights this by leveraging the debate over US grand strategy in the 21st century, and explores the instruments (DIME, from diplomacy, information, military and economics) by which national interests and objectives may be pursued and obtained. Finally, the course applies these traditions and tools in an effort to better understand and develop responses to challenges in the strategic environment, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea (‘the two-plus-three’) as well as global pandemics.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend four theoretical traditions of International Relations as they relate to war, peace, and the national interest.
2. Comprehend distinctions in competing approaches to US grand strategy as they inform the use of instruments in pursuing the national interest.
3. Comprehend the major challenges to the national interest and identify appropriate strategic responses to them.
4. Comprehend the challenge of a rising China to US national security and identify appropriate strategic responses to it.

COURSE QUESTIONS

1. How does each tradition of International Relations explain international security, the causes of war and peace, and the national interest?
2. How do the competing approaches to US grand strategy inform the use of instruments in pursuing the national interest?
3. What are the major challenges to the US national interest and how should the US respond to them?

COURSE ORGANIZATION AND NARRATIVE

International Security I: The Context of International Security (IS1) seeks to develop thoughtful, incisive decision makers at the operational levels of war with the ability to marry these decisions to higher levels of thought through an understanding of the complex relationships between policy, strategy, and the international environment, in which they are developed. This course emphasizes comprehension of the emerging strategic environment as a precursor to acting in the field. The course requires students to think critically about the American national interest, and the underlying assumptions that explain the causes of war and peace, as well as the development and execution of US grand strategy in the contemporary strategic environment.

IS1 has three phases intended to engage with existing theoretical frameworks containing varying definitions of the national interest and competing explanations for the causes of war and peace. The course introduces the complimentary ways that the American national interest is pursued through the instruments of power. Finally, the course examines potential challenges and threats to the US national interest in the current strategic environment.

Phase I of the course introduces four traditions of International Relations: realism, liberalism, constructivism, and institutionalism. These traditions lay a foundation for understanding behavior and outcomes in international politics, particularly as they relate to the national interest, conflict, and cooperation.

Phase II of the course introduces the concept of grand strategy and the instruments of power that are used to pursue it: diplomacy, information and soft power, military alliances and coalitions, and economic statecraft. Grand Strategy reintroduces the debate covered on day one, updating it to the current strategic environment, and featuring the competing grand strategies of retrenchment and engagement; this strategic debate is directly informed by the theoretical frameworks introduced in Phase I. The days on the instruments of power provide a broad introduction to each instrument, along with a few case applications that explore the implementation of that instrument.

Phase III of the course introduces potential challenges and threats to the US national interest in the current strategic environment: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, violent extremist organizations and global pandemics. Each challenge/threat is broadly assessed with primary documents, and context provided by experts in each area, as well as potential US responses using various instruments of power that adhere to a particular grand strategy. The phase pulls through the theoretical threads from Phase II and Phase I to encourage systematic thinking about potential challenges and threats to the US national interest, and how the US might go about pursuing its interests in the face of these challenges and threats.

In each of these phases, IS1 employs an approach that requires students to ground theoretical thinking about the world in the current international context. The course methodology uses the disciplines of philosophy, political science, history, and security studies to lay a theoretical foundation through which to consider international security, and obliges students to build on that foundation by incorporating contradicting logics. Finally, IS1 asks students to apply these frameworks by considering potential challenges and threats that could hinder the pursuit of its national interests, as well as strategies for the attainment of those interests (in whole or in part) given the context of the environment. This methodological approach illustrates how theory can explain the political context of the national interest, national security, the causes of war and peace, and the formulation of grand strategy and its tools of statecraft, and it gives students a better appreciation of how the debate over the US national interest generates particular strategic objectives that go on to influence military strategy, as well as influencing military objectives at the tactical and operational level of war.

JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME-1)

International Security I: The Context of International Security addresses Intermediate-Level College Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01E, signed 29 May 2015. The course supports the following Joint Learning Areas and Objectives, listed below with points of explanation:

Learning Area 1 – National Military Capabilities Strategy

- a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces to conduct the full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests.
 - Lessons IS1 – 510, 511 address the topic of US grand strategy broadly.
 - Lessons IS1 – 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519 incorporate economic and diplomatic statecraft, as well as international institutions and military alliances as resources to realize political ends.
 - Lessons IS1 – 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, and 527 discuss the current security challenges to US national interests in the form of the two-plus-three.
- d. Comprehend strategic guidance contained in documents such as the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Military Strategy, Global Force Management Implementation Guide (GFMIG), and Guidance for Employment of the Forces.
 - Lessons IS1 – 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508 and 509 directly relates the course to the National Security Strategy 2017 (NSS) and the Joint Operating Environment 2035 (*JOE 2035*).
 - Lessons IS1 – 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508 and 509 approach the US strategic environment from a theoretical standpoint..
 - Lessons IS1 – 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, and 529 each possess tie-ins to various strategic documents such as the NSS, NDS, and JOE.

Learning Area 3 – Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War

- a. Comprehend the security environment within which Joint Forces are created, employed, and sustained in support of JFCs and component commanders.
 - All course lessons seek to convey an understanding of the current security environment prone to war, and in which US grand strategy is developed and statecraft executed.
- e. Comprehend the relationships between all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole of government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security interests.
 - Lessons ISI – 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, and 519 address components of the whole of government approach, including diplomacy, economic statecraft, information, and the use of international institutions and alliances.

- Lessons ISI – 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529 consider how various instruments of power can be used to face contemporary challenges.

Learning Area 4 – Joint Planning and Joint Execution Processes

- f. Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, society, region, culture/diversity, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint force operations across the range of military operations.
 - Lessons IS1 - 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 509, and 510 present theoretical frameworks for understanding contemporary international politics, and the onset of war and peace.
 - Lessons IS1 – 510, 511 discusses US grand strategy broadly.
 - Lessons IS1 – 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, and 519 explore instruments of grand strategy, or statecraft.
 - Lessons IS1 – 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, and 529 cover how variations in society, culture, and religion can inhibit US strategic interests across the system.
 - Lessons IS1 – 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, and 529 indirectly address regional differentiation in security environments.

Learning Area 6 – Joint Operational Leadership and the Profession of Arms

- a. Comprehend the role of the Profession of Arms in the contemporary environment.
 - Lessons IS1 – 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, and 529 all indirectly approach the role of the Profession of Arms in the contemporary environment through exploration of its political peers, i.e. diplomacy, economic statecraft, institutions and information, and alliances.
- e. Communicate with clarity and precision.
 - All course lessons seek to engage student critical thinking, reasoning, and problem solving in order to develop thoughtful communicators.

JPME SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS

NOTE: IS1 IN BOLD

The CJCS memo, *Academic Year 2020-2021 Joint PME Special Areas of Emphasis List* also identifies emphasis areas which are addressed is IS1 as appropriate.

1. Globally Integrated Operations in the Information Environment

- a. Lessons IS1 – 514, 515, 516, and 517 discuss soft power and the role of information and strategic communication as instruments of power to serve within grand strategy in unity with the military instrument.

2. Strategic Deterrence in the 21st Century

- a. Lessons IS1 – 502, 503, 510, 511, 512, 513, 516, 517, 524, 525 and 527 discuss various aspects concerning the uniqueness of nuclear weapons and the challenges of nuclear proliferation and non-Western nuclear powers.

3. Modern Electromagnetic Spectrum Battlefield

4. Space as a Warfighting Domain

- a. Lesson IS1 – 511 has additional suggested readings on US space strategy.
- b. Lesson IS1 – 513 contains discussion of using space as leverage in diplomatic negotiations.

5. The Return to Great Power Competition

- a. Lessons IS1 – 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 523, 524, 525, and 526 incorporate exploration of the contemporary strategic environment utilizing historical case comparisons.
- b. Lessons IS1 – 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, and 519 provide tools to assist consideration of solutions to and processes of global competition, as well as an appreciation of the role of alliances and partnerships.

ACSC JPME PROGRAM OUTCOMES

NOTE: IS1 IN BOLD

1. Articulate the complexity and uncertainty of operational leadership in the profession of arms.
2. **Articulate the capabilities and limitations of military force, particularly airpower, in the effective integration of the instruments of national power.**
 - a. Phase III of the course encourages critical thinking focused on the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power, and their relation to current strategic environment. Students' ability to articulate the integration of the military instrument relies on their understanding of the utility of other instruments of national power.
3. **Analyze the effects of the global security environment on the achievement of operational objectives.**
 - a. The achievement of operational objectives for strategic success depends on officers' ability to comprehend the global security environment, its challenges and opportunities, as well as the interests of adversaries. Phase I of the course presents students with three theoretical traditions for understanding the global security environment. Each tradition addresses the environment through a distinct frame to aid students in identifying primary mechanisms driving state behavior.
 - b. The achievement of operational objectives for strategic success depends on officers' ability to identify the proximate causes of international disputes, conflict, and war. Phase II of the course addresses particular factors, or flashpoints, that increase and/or decrease the likelihood of conflict and war.
4. Apply military theory, operational art, joint concepts, and doctrine to develop effective warfighting plans for multi-domain operations.
5. Apply normative ethical principles in professional military decision making.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1. **READINGS.** Before lecture and seminar, students are expected to complete all assigned readings for the day. Students are encouraged to read the rationale given in the syllabus before reading the assigned books and articles. The syllabus also provides information on current strategic guidance, as it relates to the topic of the day, as well as suggestions for further reading. While students are not required to read those listed under this tab, they may wish to address it for further information concerning areas of interest related to the seminar or course assessment tools.
2. **LECTURES.** Students will attend (physical and/or virtual) course lectures relating to assigned readings and seminar. These presentations compliment the readings and seminar discussion, and therefore enhance knowledge of the course concepts. Lectures in the course provide historical and theoretical background to stimulate and enhance learning in seminar.
3. **SEMINAR PARTICIPATION.** Student participation in seminar discussions is vital to the success of the course. Students must prepare for each seminar by completing all of the assigned readings. Each member of seminar is expected to contribute to the discussion.
4. **WRITTEN ASSIGNMENTS.** There are two written, graded assignments in fulfillment of the requirements of the International Security I course. These are a midterm essay and a final position paper.
**Refer to writing rubric in the *ACSC Student Handbook* and *Tongue in Quill* **
5. **METHODS OF EVALUATION.** The two, above-mentioned written assignments will be worth, respectively 40 and 60 percent of a student's course grade.
Refer to grading standards as identified in the *OPME Student Handbook*

COURSE MATERIALS

There are two types of readings in this course: 1) readings from books issued from the ACSC Book Issue Room; and 2) selected chapters and articles posted to the course Canvas page.

ACSC provides students with copies of the following course books, which must be returned at the conclusion of the course:

- Kinzer, Stephen. *All the Shah's Men* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 2008).
- Freeman, Chas. *Arts of Power* (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 1997).

- Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001).
- G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press).
- Sigal, Leon V. *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
- Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010 [1979]).

Please refer any questions to Dr. Wes Hutto (Course Director, james.hutto.5@us.af.mil, Office 248) or Lt Col Jonathan Beach (Deputy Course Director, jonathan.beach@us.af.mil, Office 251).

**INTERNATIONAL SECURITY I: THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
COURSE SCHEDULE**

PHASE I: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE CAUSES OF WAR AND PEACE

DAY 1 – THE US NATIONAL INTEREST; AN ONGOING DEBATE

Date: 16 November

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Explore the term “national security.”
2. Identify the isolation-engagement debate in 20th century US foreign policy.
3. Identify continuities in the country’s pursuit of security.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-500 (L) COURSE INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW: This brief lecture will introduce course themes and concepts.

CONTACT HOURS: 0.5-hour lecture

IS1-501 (S) ISOLATIONISM AND ENGAGEMENT IN US FOREIGN POLICY

OVERVIEW: This course introduction provides a window into the recurrent debate concerning the US’ role in the world over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries. This debate begins over entry into the First World War and continues over its entry into the Second World War. As the documents from the US-Soviet arms race demonstrate, this debate is not relegated to decisions over war, but is implicit in decisions concerning great power competition, as well. Additionally, this debate is used to critique and support grand strategic decisions, such as the Cold War strategy of containment involved in the logic for the war in Vietnam. Finally, this debate has defined American politics concerning foreign policy in the last thirty years. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led some to declare an “end of history,” while emboldening others marginalized by American hegemony to fight back, spurring further debate over American global leadership and engagement.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. Arnold Wolfers, “ ‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (Dec. 1952), pp. 481-502. [EL]
 - Wolfers introduces the concept of national security, arguing that its political use is ambiguous in the sense that it means “security” means different things to different people.

2. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Patterson (eds.), *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914, 7th edition* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2005): 31-34; 115-119; 284-286, 290-291; 416-420; 521-523, 554-557. [EL]
 - These short primary readings demonstrate the continuity across US foreign policy over the last 116 years.

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

1. President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2017). [EL]
2. Department of Defense, *Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2018). [EL]
3. Department of Defense, *Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2016). [EL]

DAY 2 – REALISM

Date: 19 November

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Comprehend offensive realism and defensive realism.
2. Understand national security according to realism.
3. Comprehend realist predictions concerning the likelihood of future great power war and peace.
4. Comprehend realist predictions concerning the likelihood of war or peace with a rising China.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-502 (L) REALISM NOW AND FOREVER

OVERVIEW: Dr. James W. Forsyth’s lecture will address realism, broadly, and offensive and defensive varieties, specifically. States, regardless of their internal composition, goals or desires, pursue interests, however defined, in ways they deem best. Often this pursuit generates a security dilemma between states due to uncertainty and fear, and sometimes this leads to conflict and war. These wars are the continuation of political discourse by other means. How should states seek to avoid war according to realism? How does realism define national interest?

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS1-503 (S) OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE REALISM; CAUSES OF WAR

OVERVIEW: The tradition of realism develops around a concern about power and material capabilities. Relations between states are based on a system of self-help, and so each state can only expect the other to do what is best for itself. At its core, realism argues conflict is endemic among states that exist in an anarchic world, where they must fend for themselves. States are the essential actors who seek their “rational” self-interest, particularly their security interests, within the anarchical international environment. Great powers are the most important actors in the system. How do great powers seek security, and is it through power maximizing or power misery? What can these competing explanations of great power behavior tell us about the causes of war, the conditions for peace, and the US national interest?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co, 2001), 17-22; 29-54.
 - Mearsheimer begins the discussion of realist causes of war by suggesting that great powers are ‘power maximizers’, suggesting that the structure of the anarchic system drives national interests to their extreme. Bipolarity and balanced multipolarity are the most stable forms of international system, as the fear present in that system tends to be less acute, and so great powers will seek power to a lesser intensity. The

unbalanced multipolarity in Europe due to the rise of German power at the turn of the century generated much fear in the system, which led to the outbreak of the First World War.

2. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York, NY: Waveland, 2010), 123-128; 161-193.
 - Waltz extends the discussion of realist causes of war by suggesting that great powers are ‘power misers’, interested only in maintaining the power that they have, in order to maximize security. Bipolarity is the most stable form of international system, avoiding military interdependence between multiple great powers, as well as reducing the likelihood of miscalculation that preceded the First World War.
3. Keir A. Lieber, “The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 32, no. 2 (Fall 2007), pp. 155-191. [EL]
 - Lieber positions offensive realism against defensive realism against one another in an effort to explain the cause of the First World War. He argues that its onset was not the cause of miscalculation and military interdependence, but instead was initiated by Imperial Germany, interested in maximizing its power on the European continent.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING:

1. Nathaniel Heller, “The Prospect for Power Projections of the People’s Republic of China,” *Defense and Security Analysis* 19, no. 4 (2003): 329-367. [EL]
2. Paul M. Kennedy, “The First World War and the International Power System,” *International Security* 9, no. 1 (1984), pp. 7-40. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017, 1

DAY 3 – LIBERALISM; DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND EXPLANATIONS FOR LIBERAL INTERVENTION

Date: 20 November

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Understand the broad “family portrait” of liberalism and comprehend the democratic peace theory.
2. Understand national security according to liberalism.
3. Comprehend liberal predictions concerning the likelihood of future great power war and peace.
4. Comprehend liberal predictions concerning the likelihood of war or peace with a rising China.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-504 (L) LIBERALISM AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

OVERVIEW: Dr. Katherine Boehlefeld’s lecture will address liberalism broadly, and the democratic peace, specifically. The internal composition of states defines state goals, desires, and interests. Often, the way that states pursue these interests differs according to domestic factors. Security dilemmas are not inevitable, but rather dependent on the make-up of the interacting states. Democratic states do not make war on one another, but their policies are not always peace inducing and can sometimes lead to war. These wars are the continuation of domestic political discourse by other means. What can the democratic peace tell us about the causes of war, the conditions for peace, and the US national interest?

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS1-505 (S) LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM AND LIBERAL INTERVENTIONISM

OVERVIEW: The tradition of liberalism develops loosely around a set of shared characteristics within certain governments—individual freedom, political participation and representative government, private property, and equal opportunity. The behavior of states are determined by *the Primat der Innenpolitik* or the institutions and commitments made between governments and their domestic populace. One law-like finding of the liberal tradition is the phenomenon of relative peace between democratic governments. That is, the tendency of democracies to settle disputes short of conflict. As with realism, liberalism also sees states as the essential actors who seek their rational self-interest within the anarchical international environment. Unlike realists, these self-interests can often be expansive, as with Immanuel Kant’s and Woodrow Wilson’s vision of collective security. What are the primary causes of the democratic peace? What can they tell us about the causes of war, the conditions for peace, and the US national interest?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (December 1986): 1151-1169. [EL]

- Doyle introduces liberalism as a “family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics—for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity—that most liberal states share...” He demonstrates the distinct interpretations within this family portrait by exploring three contrasting liberalisms: liberal pacifism (democratic-capitalist governments promote an interest peace always), liberal imperialism (democratic governments promote an interest for expansion), and liberal internationalism (democratic interests align so as to promote peace between democracies).
2. John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” *International Security* 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 87-125. [EL]
 - Owen seeks to explain the causes underlying Kant’s discovery with liberal internationalism, the democratic peace. Owen argues that it is both the institutions that are created by democratic governments that create the space for free debate, along with the democratic ideology that quells war between its holders that constrain democratic governments to “abide” by the democratic peace.
 3. Ross A. Kennedy, “Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and an American Conception of National Security,” *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 1-31. [EL]
 - Kennedy explains Wilson’s entry into WWI not only as the result of a wish to democratize parts of Europe, but more broadly as an interest in changing the “balance of power system” on which European politics existed. While Kennedy argues that “The main issue for the president in 1915 and 1916 was not how to democratize Germany but how to end the war in a way that defeated power politics,” he suggests that in 1917, Wilson “became convinced that Germany’s autocratic government was so aggressive and militaristic in character that it could never be relied upon to keep its word,” leading him to request a declaration of war by Congress. Importantly, Kennedy leverages realist conceptions of the balance of power to explain how they affected Wilson’s calculations regarding intervention. The national interest now involved “more than simply defense against direct attack,” and “With his vision of collective security, Wilson taught Americans that their country had an interest in international conflict anywhere it occurred, regardless of its remoteness from the US.”

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING:

1. Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 513-551. [EL]
2. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace,” *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 624-638. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017, 1-2; 17; 19; 34; 40-42.

Summary NDS 2018, 1-2

DAY 4 – CONSTRUCTIVISM

Date: 23 November

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Understand constructivism as a critique and comprehend the components it uses to make it: primarily, the role of identities, norms, and ideas in the international system.
2. Understand national security according to constructivism.
3. Comprehend constructivist predictions concerning the likelihood of future great power war and peace.
4. Comprehend constructivist predictions concerning the likelihood of war or peace with a rising China.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-506 (L) CONSTRUCTIVISM

OVERVIEW: Dr. Wes Hutto’s lecture will address constructivism broadly, introducing the concepts of norms, identities, and institutions, and providing examples of how they work in world politics. The interests of states are socially constructed, meaning that they arise out of relationships and shared understandings of what constitutes legitimate interests, as well as what security means. This is largely why anarchy is “what states make of it.” What can constructivism tell us about the causes of war, the conditions for peace, and the US national interest?

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS1-507 (S) A CRITIQUE OF REALISM AND LIBERALISM AND THE ROLE OF IDENTITY

OVERVIEW: Constructivism is not so much a tradition as it is a critique of the realist and liberal traditions. What realism and liberalism have in common in explaining the world is the tangibility of their explanations. The traditions are concerned with material capabilities and institutional processes to determine the causes of war, conditions of peace, and the national interest. In contrast, constructivism points to the intangible aspects of these capabilities and processes: their meaning. In other words, the material world is socially constructed in ideas, norms, and rules. For something to be socially constructed means that an object is given particular meaning by way of the social interactions and relationships that take place around the object. Constructivism contends that the character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about how other states will act, what the values of other states are, and how those values inform national interests. Consequently, constructivism often presents itself as a critique of schools of thought that seek to describe the world using observable indicators without including the social meaning given to those indicators through norms, rules, and ideas. The same goes for international actors, like states. States also inhabit socially constructed roles and identities, which impact the way they behave in the system.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay," *International Security* 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 187-212. [EL]
 - Copeland summarizes and assesses the argument made by theorist Alexander Wendt: "Anarchy is what states make of it." In doing so, he outlines the constructivist dialectic, that structures and actors *make each other*. Unlike realists, taking the international system as a given, constructivists see the nature of the system as being tied to the interactions of the actors within it. If true, this means the security dilemma can be overcome through redefinitions of the self and other. Copeland takes issue with this, noting that state fear is about the future, rather than the present distribution of interests. The key difference between constructivism and realism is about past socialization versus future uncertainty.
2. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument," *European Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 4 (1995): 491-517. [EL]
 - Risse-Kappen doubles down on Owen's suggestion that liberal states must *perceive* each other to be liberal. Taking on Copeland's argument about uncertainty and fear of the future, Risse-Kappen asks the question: "Why is it that the security dilemma appears to be far less significant when democracies deal with each other, while it seems to govern their interactions with authoritarian systems?" In other words, why are democracies so certain about the future intentions of one another? He argues that democratic norms that generate a collective identity are key to understanding the democratic peace. A "collective understanding of [democratic] norms can be readily established" when governments come into potential conflict with one another. These understandings provide "a common basis for communicating their peaceful intentions to each."
3. Michelle Murray, "Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War," *Security Studies* 19, no. 4 (2010): 656-688. [EL]
 - Murray demonstrates that identity can work in the opposite direction as well. Applying constructivist logic, Murray argues that struggles over identity are at the center of power politics. She explores the case of German naval ambitions at the turn of the 20th century. Specifically, Germany's self-understanding as a great power drove it to abide by great power norms (power-maximization) and generated a security dilemma in Western Europe, eventually erupting in war.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING:

1. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425. [EL]
2. Theo Farrell, "Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 49-72. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017, 1-2; 34; 40-42.

DAY 5 – INSTITUTIONALISM

Date: 24 November

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Understand institutionalism, its connection to liberalism, and its response to realism.
2. Understand national security according to institutionalism.
3. Comprehend institutionalist predictions concerning the likelihood of future great power war and peace.
4. Comprehend institutionalist predictions concerning the likelihood of war or peace with Russia and China.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-508 (L) LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

OVERVIEW: Dr. Mary Hampton’s lecture will engage with liberal institutionalism to explain how institutions help promote and expand interstate cooperation. The international system is linked at many levels and in many areas by institutions and organizations. Institutions can be intergovernmental (IGO), non-governmental (NGO), and transnational, or even ad hoc in nature. All states, including the United States, must account for these institutions and organizations in their conduct of foreign policy. Choosing to ignore, bypass, accommodate, or consult these actors can be a matter of vital importance for the national interest.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS1-509 (S) INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE

OVERVIEW: The tradition of institutionalism contains realist, liberal, and constructivist components. The realist components of the tradition concede that power asymmetry is often necessary to manage cooperative enterprises. The liberal components of the tradition emphasize the impact of institutional process to determine the rules of negotiation and cooperation between states. These processes highlight the common interests (and complex interdependence) between rational actors, facilitating peaceful resolutions to international disputes. The constructivist components of the tradition emphasize the impact of institutional norms that endure absent of any written and formalized rules. The constructivist components are particularly important in this regard, as they suggest that norms of cooperation can withstand large changes in the system structure or fissures in the international distribution of power. Most importantly, the constructivist components of institutionalism suggest that under certain circumstances, the liberal international order can remain “liberal” following a hegemonic exit by the United States.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984): 31-85. [EL]
 - Keohane puts forward a liberal theory of hegemonic stability, in which the presiding hegemon constructs and maintains a global political economic order. This is something that cannot be done by way of force, only deference by other states to the hegemon, so he introduces the concept of an “international regime,” or “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” According to Keohane, as these regimes become routine in international politics, the hegemon may no longer be needed. In the author’s words: “...the common interests of the leading capitalist states, bolstered by the effects of existing international regimes (mostly created during a period of American hegemony), are strong enough to make sustained cooperation possible, though not inevitable.”
2. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order,” *Review of International Studies* 25 (1999): 179-196. [EL]
 - Deudney and Ikenberry discuss the liberal international order as a distinctly Western system, in which “like-minded” states cooperate within economic and security institutions for their mutual benefit. Importantly, the authors describe a world dominated by liberal institutionalism and characterized by collective security institutions, American hegemony, semi-sovereign great powers (Germany and Japan), economic openness, and a particular Western civic identity.
3. G. John Ikenberry, “The Settlement of 1945,” in *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press): 163-214. **Available online through the AU Library**
 - Ikenberry describes the situation present between the United States and Western Europe (and the world) following the end of the Second World War. He shows that American power played a key role in establishing the cross-cutting political, economic, and security institutions that not only tied the US and Europe together, but embedded democratic practices of negotiation and compromise into the Western liberal order.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING:

1. John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992,” *World Politics* 52, no. 1 (1999): 1-37. [EL]
2. Michael Mastanduno, “Partner Politics: Russia, China, and the Challenge of Extending US Hegemony after the Cold War,” *Security Studies* 28, no. 3 (2019): 479-504. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017, 1-3; 40-41, 47.

PHASE II: GRAND STRATEGY AND THE INSTRUMENTS OF POWER

DAY 6 – GRAND STRATEGY

Date: 1 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Understand how realism, liberalism, constructivism, and institutionalism inform the various grand strategy options for the United States.
2. Comprehend the retrenchment-engagement debate in US foreign policy.
3. Infer future options for US grand strategy as they relate to a rising China or recalcitrant Russia.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-510 (L) THE ENDURING NATURE OF US GRAND STRATEGY

OVERVIEW: Dr. Kelly Grieco’s lecture provides an overview of the grand strategy debate in the United States. It takes the *National Security Strategy* (2017) as a starting point for identifying US grand strategic practice and analyzes the rhetoric versus the reality of US grand strategy in the 21st century.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS1-511 (S) GRAND STRATEGY: AN ONGOING DEBATE

OVERVIEW: Phase II transitions from discussing the theories of the war, peace, and the national interest, into assessing what foreign policy options are available to the United States in pursuing its interests. It does this first by introducing the concept of grand strategy, or “the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance the state’s national interest.” The following readings debate the US’ role in the world, and the following readings offer different assessments of the strategic environment and existing threats to US national security and, in turn, come to different conclusions about the benefits and drawbacks of the US remaining actively engaged across the world.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/7): 5-43. [EL]
 - Posen and Ross define grand strategy as “relatively discrete and coherent arguments about the US role in the world.” They outline four grand strategy options for the US in the post-Cold War environment: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy.
Read only through page 43.

2. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior US Grand Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 4 (July/August 2016): 70-83. [EL]
3. Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, “Should America Retrench? The Battle Over Offshore Balancing,” *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 6 (November/December 2016): 164-169. [EL]
4. Mira Rapp-Hooper and Rebecca Friedman Lissner, “The Open World: What America can Achieve After Trump,” *Foreign Affairs* 98, no. 3 (May/June 2019): 18-25. [EL]
 - These three articles first extend the conversation to the present day and focus on the retrenchment-engagement debate in US foreign policy. Mearsheimer and Walt put together an argument for offshore balancing, a selective engagement strategy. Brands and Feaver argue that the consequences of retrenchment would be dire. Rapp-Hooper and Lissner offer what some might see as a middle way forward.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING:

1. James Clay Moltz, “Space and Strategy: A Conceptual versus Policy Analysis,” and Damon Coletta, “The Perilous Gulf Between National Space Strategy and International Security,” *Astropolitics* 8, no. 2-3 (2010): 113-136; 140-142. [EL]
2. Patrick Porter, “Why America’s Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the US Foreign Policy Establishment,” *International Security* 42, no. 4 (2018): 9-46. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017

Summary NDS 2018, 2

DAY 7 – DIPLOMATIC STATECRAFT

Date: 3 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Comprehend the role of diplomacy and diplomats in international politics.
2. Comprehend the relation of international law to diplomacy
3. Infer the varying role of diplomacy within distinct grand strategies.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-512 (L) DIPLOMATIC STATECRAFT AND SPACE POWER

OVERVIEW: Dr. Andrea Harrington’s lecture will address the politics of space diplomacy. Since the launch of Sputnik, diplomacy has been an important element of maintaining relative stability in the relations of States beyond Earth. From the formation of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to the establishment and operation of the International Space Station and beyond, what could have been a Cold War flash point instead offered a thread of stability in US-USSR and then US-Russia relations. This lecture will address successful (and not so successful) endeavors at diplomacy for the space domain.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS1-513 (S) DIPLOMATIC STATECRAFT, IGOs, TRACK II DIPLOMACY

OVERVIEW: Pursuing the goals outlined by a state’s grand strategy is the “central task of diplomacy.” Diplomats pursue national objectives, implementing strategic guidelines through various diplomatic maneuvers. Much of the time, this maneuvering takes place within the halls of international organizations, which assist in facilitating the negotiation and implementation of agreements, resolving and managing disputes and conflicts, elaborating diplomatic norms, and shaping diplomatic discourse. At other times, states utilize Track II maneuvers for diplomatic engagement and negotiation. What are the best practices for the conduct of diplomacy? How might different conceptions of the national interest affect the use of diplomatic channels?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. Chas W. Freeman, Jr., *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997): 69-104.
 - Freeman outlines the role of diplomacy in grand strategy, and the primary functions that diplomats play in its implementation. He stresses the need for diplomatic intercourse in regulating international relations and sustaining the international order, as well as diplomats’ potential role in adapting to a shifting international system and order.
2. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 1 (Feb 1998): 3-32. [EL]

- Abbott and Snidal introduce the concept of international organizations, investigating their functions and properties. The authors suggest that IOs present a multinational platform for the achievement of foreign policy objectives. They additionally argue that IOs may assist states in establishing common diplomatic norms and practices that can lead to peace.
3. Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998): 1-14 (skim); 17-19; 20-38; 52-65; 71-84; 113-133; 150-171; and 244-254. **Available online through the AU Library**
 - Sigal recounts the 1993-1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, the events leading up to the signing of the General Agreed Framework that temporarily ended North Korea’s search for the bomb, and former US President Jimmy Carter’s key role in negotiating the agreement. In the end Sigal turns to why the US has been unable to cooperate with DPRK.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING:

1. Marcus Holmes, “The Force of Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Mirror Neurons and the Problem of Intentions,” *International Organization* 67, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 829-861. [EL]
2. Monica D. Toft, “The Dangerous Rise of Kinetic Diplomacy,” *War on the Rocks*, May 14, 2018. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017, 33-34, 48-50
Summary NDS 2018, 2

DAY 8 – INFORMATION AND SOFT POWER

Date: 4 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Comprehend the role of information and soft power in international politics.
2. Infer the varying role of soft power within distinct grand strategies.
3. Comprehend China’s use of strategic communication regarding the global pandemic.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-514 (S) SOFT POWER, STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION, COVID-19

OVERVIEW: Proof of power lies not in resources, but in the ability to change states’ behavior. Soft power describes a state’s ability to attract and co-opt rather than repel and coerce. Culture, political values, and foreign policy are its currency, while it works through interdependent relations and international institutions. Soft power may be wielded through public diplomacy and strategic communication and battling narratives have long been a part of American foreign relations and national security, going back to Wilson’s ideal of “making the world safe for democracy.” Recently, a battle over strategic narratives ensued between the US and China surrounding the pandemic response of each to COVID-19. With more traditional instruments, the ‘hard power’ of old, less and less effective, how can states shape the environment to their benefit? Is the US power to attract diminishing?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy*, 80 (Autumn 1990): 153-171. [EL]
 - Nye summarizes the diffusion of power across the globe and details the new forms of power due to rising interdependence among states. He introduces the concept of soft power—the capability of a state to get others to “want what it wants.”
2. Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O’Loughlin, “Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power,” *Media, War, & Conflict* 7, no. 1 (2014): 70-84. [EL]
 - Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin outline one way that soft power is implemented toward attaining political ends, through the development and dissemination of strategic narratives. The authors identify three levels of strategic narrative—international, national, and issue area—and provide examples of how to recognize and develop narratives to shape international discourse.
3. Kurt M. Campbell and Rosh Doshi, “The Coronavirus could Reshape Global Order,” *Foreign Affairs*, March 18, 2020. [EL] Accessed at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order>.

- Campbell and Doshi raise the possibility that the US may be losing the strategic narrative battle with China over global leadership with regards to its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The authors chart what this might mean for the future international order and US soft power.
4. Michael Green and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Pandemic won’t make China the World’s Leader,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 15, 2020. [EL] Accessed at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-15/pandemic-wont-make-china-worlds-leader>.
 - Green and Medeiros suggest that the concern over China’s pandemic “leadership” is overblown, but they warn about US complacency during the crisis.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING:

1. Chas W. Freeman, Jr., *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997): 41-45. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017, 34

Summary NDS 2018, 4-6

DAY 9 – MILITARY ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS

Date: 7 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Comprehend the role of military alliances and coalitions in international politics.
2. Comprehend how different schools of thought explain alliance formation and behavior.
3. Infer the varying role of military alliances and coalitions within distinct grand strategies.
4. Comprehend the use of NATO with regards to East Asian partnerships and balancing China.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-515 (L) A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY ALLIANCES

OVERVIEW: Dr. Gregory Miller’s lecture will provide a comprehensive overview of alliances in international politics. The lecture will draw attention to the variance in scope of alliance partnerships, focusing on their different types (formal vs. informal; ententes/neutrality pacts/non-aggression pacts/defense pacts/offensive alliances; alliances vs. security communities), the different purposes of alliances (capability aggregation; managing/binding/tethering; signaling/communicating interests; deterrence), and the trade-offs and dilemmas involved with alliance partnerships (security vs. autonomy; entrapment vs. abandonment fears).

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS1-516 (S) ALLIANCE FORMATION, NATO, THE POLITICS OF COALITIONS

OVERVIEW: The military instrument of power amounts to much more than national armies, navies, and space forces. Alliances are a valuable tool in international politics, and can impact the decision of states to intervene in wars, increasing the credibility of deterrent threats made on behalf of allies. Alliances have also been found to be useful in providing information to state leaders trying to anticipate the behavior of other states. This seminar concentrates on the relevance, value, challenges, and politics of military alliances and coalitions. Why and when do states form alliances, and when are coalitions more suited to the task of achieving national objectives? What is the role of the distribution of capabilities in inciting alliance formation, and what is the role of diplomats in negotiating the terms of coalition building?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): 3-43. [EL]

- Walt explores the question of why and when states form alliances, and whether or not (and when) smaller states are more likely to balance against, or bandwagon with larger states. He suggests that states are most likely to balance against *threats* rather than simple material power. He also enters into a discussion about the impact of ideology on alliance formation, and the instruments of foreign aid and penetrating diplomats in recruiting alliance partners and dictating partners' behavior.
2. Joe Burton, "NATO's 'Global Partners' in Asia: Shifting Strategic Narratives," *Asian Security* 14, no. 1 (2018): 8-23. [EL]
 - Burton traces NATO's development in the post-Cold War period, and the strategic narratives the organization employed over time. He identifies the benefits (and potential costs) of NATO's partnerships outside Europe.
 3. Marina E. Henke, "The Politics of Diplomacy: How the United States Builds Multilateral Military Coalitions," *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (2017): 410-424. [EL] **skim pp. 413-417**
 - Henke points out that members of "coalitions of the willing" do not always begin willingly. She emphasizes the value of diplomats in identifying the wants and needs of potential coalition partners and negotiating their terms.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING:

1. Zoltan Barany and Robert Rauchhaus, "Explaining NATO Resilience: Is International Relations Theory Useful?" *Contemporary Security Policy* 32, no. 2 (2011): 286-307. [EL]
2. James D. Morrow, "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 3, no. 1 (2000): 63-83. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017, 37-42

Summary NDS 2018, 8-10

DAY 10 – ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

Date: 8 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Comprehend the role and tools of economic statecraft in international politics.
2. Comprehend the impact of global economic interdependence on such tools.
3. Infer the varying role of economic statecraft within distinct grand strategies.
4. Comprehend the competing options of economic statecraft in dealing with a recalcitrant Russia or a rising China.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-517 (L) ANTITERRORIST FINANCING AND THE FIGHT AGAINST ISIS

OVERVIEW: Dr. Melia Pfannenstiel’s lecture will assess the US ‘global war on terror’ through the lens of economic statecraft. The US interagency has implemented unilateral economic and financial sanctions to deny groups the necessary resources to commit acts of terror. The US has also worked multilaterally with intergovernmental organizations and allies to combat terrorism abroad using economic statecraft. The lecture will detail the economic campaign against ISIS financing that occurred primarily between 2014 and 2016.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS1-518 (S) ECONOMIC STATECRAFT, SANCTIONS, FOREIGN AID

OVERVIEW: The health of a national economy impacts the potential of a state and its ability to pursue and achieve national interests. It affects all other aspects of state power, including diplomatic influence, the persuasive power of information and culture, as well as military capabilities and alliance dynamics. Economic statecraft is an instrument by which states can achieve strategic objectives short of war. In some cases, states might even use economic statecraft to prepare the future battlefield to their advantage. In others, a state might seek to shape the strategic environment using economic aid. What are the options available to statesmen for the use of economic power? When is economic statecraft most likely to succeed in achieving strategic objectives?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. Chas W. Freeman, Jr., *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997): 45-52.
 - Freeman details the strategic and tactical uses of economic measures in pursuing the national interest. He highlights the costs and benefits of economic interdependence (brought on by increasing globalization).
2. Edward Fishman, “Even Smarter Sanctions: How to Fight in the Era of Economic Warfare,” *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2017): 102-110. [EL]

- Fishman provides some examples of how the US has implemented tactical uses of economic measures to impact its adversaries' decision-making process. He pays particular attention to the cases of Iran prior to 2015 and Russia following the invasion of Crimea in 2014. He provides some indication of when targeted sanctions are likely to make an impact versus when they will not. He contends that the US should create a permanent sanctions contingency-planning process within government.
3. Melvyn P. Leffler, "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," *Diplomatic History* 12, no. 3 (1988): 277-306. [EL]
 - Leffler outlines one of the more impactful strategic uses of economic measures, The Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery Act). While initially a strategy for the economic recovery of Europe, the framers quickly became aware that the plan would need to include military and diplomatic elements to shape the postwar balance of power and integrate a revitalized Germany into Western Europe.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING:

1. James P. O'Leary, "Economic Warfare and Strategic Economics," *Comparative Strategy* 5, no. 2 (1985): 179-206. [EL]
2. Inwook Kim and Jung-Chul Lee, "Sanctions for Nuclear Inhibition: Comparing Sanction Conditions between Iran and North Korea," *Asian Perspective* 43 (2019): 95-122. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017, 37-42, 48-50

Summary NDS 2018, 2

PHASE III: CHALLENGES AND THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

DAY 11 – RUSSIA

Date: 10 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Understand Russia's national security perspective.
2. Understand the history of the post-Soviet space.
3. Infer options for US foreign policy in approaching Russia.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-519 (L) RUSSIA AND US FOREIGN POLICY

OVERVIEW: Dr. Andrew Aiken's lecture addresses contemporary US-Russian relations. It will discuss the debate over Russia's orientation (status quo vs. revisionist), give a primer on Russian national interests and foreign policy; its use of political, diplomatic, and economic instruments of power. The lecture will identify potential flashpoints in the US-Russia relationship, and discuss how the US might pursue its interests in Eastern Europe.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS1-520 (S) RUSSIA RESURGENT

OVERVIEW: The end of the Cold War marked a beginning of Russian political transformation and strategic retrenchment. Since the election of Vladimir Putin, however, optimism surrounding that transformation and retrenchment has faded among Western allies, as NATO expansion and intervention in Kosovo disrupted relations between Russia and the Alliance. Russia's military involvement in Georgia in 2008, and its 2014 invasion of Ukraine brought existing tensions to a head. How should we understand Russian aggression? What are its causes? Have our responses been sufficient for deterring further Russian aggression? How can the US best pursue its interests with Russia?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. Vladimir Putin, "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy," February 10, 2007. Accessed at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>. [EL]
 - An address by the Russian President that is now viewed as "prophetic" of the future of Russian relations with the West. In the speech, Putin heavily criticizes the US' role in the world, and the interventions of NATO over the previous two decades, as well as the alliance's expansion.
2. Alexander Cooley, "Ordering Eurasia: The Rise and Decline of Liberal Internationalism in the Post-Communist Space," *Security Studies* 28, no. 3 (2019): 588-613. [EL]

- a. Cooley recounts a history of the post-communist space since 1990, charting the growth of the liberal world order in and around former Soviet states, as well as its decline. He focuses on three aspects of the Western liberal order following the disintegration of the USSR: (1) transatlantic and regional organizations, (2) Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs) backed by Western powers, and (3) Western-backed liberal democracy. He suggests that the decline of these trends was so rapid following the Color Revolutions (2002) and the expansion of NATO (2004) because of shallow institutionalization.
3. Elias Gotz, “Putin, the State, and War: The Causes of Russia’s Near Abroad Assertion Revisited,” *International Studies Review* 19, no. 2 (2017): 228-253. [EL]
 - Gotz introduces the challenge of Russia in the 21st century, outlining the competing structural, domestic, and ideational influences on Russian aggression in its foreign policy.
4. Emma Ashford, “Not-So-Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia,” *Foreign Affairs* 114, no. 1 (January/February 2016): 114-125. [EL]
 - Ashford addresses the Obama Administration’s response to Russia’s invasion of Crimea—targeted sanctions. She argues that the sanctions have not been effective, and the US should change course moving forward.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING:

1. Katri Pynnöniemi, “Russia’s National Security Strategy: Analysis of Conceptual Evolution,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 31, no. 2 (2018): 240-256. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017, 2; 8; 14; 25-28; 35; 38; 45; 47-48; 51
Summary NDS 2018, 2; 4; 9

DAY 12 – CHINA

Date: 11 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Understand China's national security perspective.
2. Understand the history of Chinese grand strategy.
3. Infer options for US foreign policy in approaching China.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-521 (L) CHINA AND US FOREIGN POLICY

OVERVIEW: Dr. Michael Kraig's lecture addresses contemporary US-Chinese relations. It will discuss the debate over China's orientation (status quo vs. revisionist), give a primer on Chinese national interests and foreign policy; its use of political, diplomatic, and economic instruments of power. The lecture will identify potential flashpoints in the US-China relationship and discuss how the US might pursue its interests in East Asia.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS1-522 (S) CHINA ASCENDANT

OVERVIEW: China's increasing political and economic heft along with rapid development in its technological sector, have prompted serious debate over whether or not the state is strong or weak. Regardless of the outcome of these debates, China's growth, and the accompanying changes in its national security interests are a concern to the US. What does the growth of China mean for the future of international politics, or the liberal world order? Is China a status quo or a revisionist power? How can the US best pursue its interests in East Asia?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. Xi Jinping, "Speech Delivered to the 19th Communist Party Congress [Selections]," October 18, 2017. Accessed at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf. [EL]
 - If there was any question over whether China was attempting to hide its growth from the world, it dissipated with this address by President Xi. In it, Xi refers to China as a "great" or "strong power" no less than 25 times, and touted China's building of artificial islands in the South China Sea as a success. Importantly, Xi also envisions a future in which China plays a greater role in international politics.
2. Avery Goldstein, "The Evolution of China's Security Challenges and Grand Strategy" (2017). Accessed at gjaqyj.cnjournals.com. [EL]
 - Goldstein surveys Chinese conceptions of national security from its unification under Chairman Mao Zedong, to its current form under

President Xi. As the author recounts, China's security interests have been tied closely to its external environment.

3. Michael Beckley, "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," *International Security* 36, no. 3 (2012): 41-78. [EL]
 - Beckley challenges the notion that the rise of China is as dangerous as most pundits suggest. He assesses China's rise in power and capabilities relative to the position of the US and finds it wanting. He concludes that misrepresenting the rise of China is dangerous and could lead to conflict; US engagement in East Asia should seek to regain its strategic vision.
4. Charles L. Glaser, "A US-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice Between Military Competition and Accommodation," *International Security* 39, no. 4 (2015): 49-90. [EL]
 - Glaser builds a US strategy that will, in theory, manage the rise of China. Glaser founds his strategy on defensive realist assumptions, particularly that great powers are "security maximizers" (as opposed to "power maximizers"). He then outlines a plan for US-China "grand bargain," involving concessions from each party to mitigate the risks of war. Key components of his bargain would be China ending its activity in the South China Sea and settling its territorial disputes with neighbors while accepting US forward presence in East Asia, in exchange for an end to the US commitment to Taiwan.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING:

1. Van Jackson, "Red Teaming the Rebalance: The Theory and Risks of US Asia Strategy," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 3 (2016): 365-388. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017, 2; 8; 21; 25; 27-28; 35; 38; 45-48; 50-53

Summary NDS 2018, 2; 4

DAY 13 – NORTH KOREA

Date: 14 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Understand North Korea's national security perspective.
2. Understand the strategic predicament of the North Korean regime.
3. Infer options for US foreign policy in approaching North Korea.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-523 (L) NORTH KOREA AND US FOREIGN POLICY

OVERVIEW: Dr. Todd Robinson's lecture will address contemporary US-North Korean relations. It will discuss the debate over North Korea's orientation (status quo vs. revisionist), give a primer on North Korean foreign policy and its use of political, diplomatic, and economic instruments of power. The lecture will identify potential flashpoints in the US-North Korean relationship, and discuss how the US might pursue its interests with North Korea.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS1-524 (S) NORTH KOREA GONE ROGUE?

OVERVIEW: Despite the Donald J. Trump Administration's efforts at summit diplomacy with North Korea, the Kim Jong-Un regime continues to test both short-range and long-range missiles on the peninsula and beyond. The *National Security Strategy* (2017) identifies the nuclear threat and emphasizes the role of US alliances with South Korea and Japan in countering it. The *NSS* goes on to note its goal of "denuclearization of the peninsula." The following readings suggest that this objective may be farfetched, and even unneeded. What are realistic options for the US moving forward? How can the US best pursue its security interests in Northeast Asia?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. Thae Yong-ho, "An Insider's Look at the North Korean Regime [Selections]," *Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Serial No. 115-78*, November 1, 2017 (Washington, D.C.: USG Publishing Office). [EL]
 - Thae Yong-ho is the Former Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the United Kingdom. Thae defected to South Korea in 2016, and is one of the highest-ranking members of North Korea to do so. His 2017 testimony to the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs offers an inside-look at the North Korean regime, its interests, and the challenges faced by its leader, Kim Jong-un.
2. Victor Cha, "The North Korea Question," *Asian Survey* 56, no. 2 (2016): 243-269. [EL]
 - Cha summarizes the domestic and international dilemmas facing the North Korean regime. From a military coup to economic collapse to

abandonment by its Chinese ally, Kim Jong Un's strategic environment is plagued by uncertainty.

3. N. D. Anderson, "Explaining North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions: Power and Position on the Korean Peninsula," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 6 (2017): 621-641. [EL]
 - Anderson suggests that North Korea's interminable pursuit of a preponderant nuclear arsenal is best explained by structural realism. That is, the power of the US and its position on the peninsula is an ever-present threat to the North Korean regime, and as long as the status quo is maintained, North Korea will seek a nuclear capability.
4. Victor Cha and Katrin Fraser Katz, "The Right Way to Coerce North Korea: Ending the Threat without Going to War," *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 3 (2018): 87-100. [EL]
 - Cha and Katz present a way forward with the US denuclearization policy toward North Korea. The authors propose that strengthening the alliance with Japan and South Korea, along with increased diplomatic and economic pressure will better the US negotiating position over the long term.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING:

1. Inhan Kim, "No More Sunshine: The Limits of Engagement with North Korea," *The Washington Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (2017): 165-181. [EL]
2. Darcie Draudt and John K. Warden, "The Strategic Rationale for Maritime Tension Reduction in the Yellow Sea," *The Washington Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (2017): 183-197. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017, 3; 7; 8; 25-26; 45-28

Summary NDS 2018, 2; 3

DAY 14 – IRAN

Date: 15 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Understand Iran's national security perspective.
2. Understand the history of Iranian relations with the West, in particular, the United States.
3. Infer options for US foreign policy in approaching Iran.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-525 (L) IRAN AND US FOREIGN POLICY

OVERVIEW: Dr. Chris Hemmer's lecture will address contemporary US-Iranian relations. It will discuss the debate over Iran's orientation (status quo vs. revisionist), give a primer on Iranian foreign policy and its use of political, diplomatic, and economic instruments of power. The lecture will identify potential flashpoints in the US-Iran relationship, and discuss how the US might pursue its interests in the Middle East.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS1-526 (S) A RISING IRAN?

OVERVIEW: Iran's industrial strength and the size of its population give it a significant latent power advantage in the Middle East. Between 1979 and 2003, Iran had a regional balancer in the form of Iraq, but the 2003 invasion and subsequent events created a power vacuum in the region that Iran has sought to fill through the use of military clients and proxy warfare. The détente between the US and Iran that had seemingly formed under the Obama administration has deteriorated following the Trump administration's abrogation of the JCPOA, renewed sanctions, and the US strike on Iranian General Qasam Soleimani. What are realistic options for the US moving forward? How can the US best pursue its interests in the Middle East with regards to Iran?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. Ayatollah Khamenei, "Televised address delivered on the occasion of Nowruz and Eid ul Mab'ath [Selections]," March 22, 2020. [EL] Accessed at <https://english.khamenei.ir/news/7451/US-officials-are-charlatans-and-terrorists>.
 - Khamenei addresses the Iranian public during the global pandemic, and responds to US offers of PPE assistance with a firm "No."
2. Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 2008), ix- xxiii; 17-29; 47-101; 115-118; 123; 133; 150-166; 193-215.
 - Kinzer introduces the historical background behind Iran-US relations. The historical account provides context to the statement of Ayatollah Khamenei. It also begins an important conversation around approaching Iran, viewing it as either a "revolutionary state" or a rational actor.
3. Afshon Ostovar, "The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran's Way of War," *Security Studies* 28, no. 1 (2019): 159-188. [EL]

- Ostovar surveys Iran’s history of using proxy fighters to fulfill strategic ends. He notes that since the 1979 Revolution, Iran has employed militant clients to augment its material capabilities—relatively limited compared with its neighbors—in a variety of strategic environments.
4. Hassan Ahmadian and Payam Mohseni, “Iran’s Syria Strategy: The Evolution of Deterrence,” *International Affairs* 95, no. 2 (2019): 341-364. [EL]
 - Ahmadian and Mohseni elaborate on the strategic relationship between Iran and Syria, explaining the origin and continuance of their overlapping strategic interests. The authors suggest that Iran’s support for Syria is tied to its interest in preserving Iranian stability.

FURTHER SUGGESTED READING:

1. Kayhan Barzegar and Abdolrasool Divsallar, “Political Rationality in Iranian Foreign Policy,” *The Washington Quarterly* 40, no. 1 (2017): 39-53. [EL]

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017, 48-50

Summary NDS 2018, 2

DAY 15 – NON-STATE THREATS

Date: 17 December

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

1. Comprehend the debate over terrorism as a major threat to the US and international security.
2. Comprehend how various traditions frame global health in international politics.
3. Infer options for US foreign policy in approaching terrorism and pandemics.

LESSON OVERVIEW:

IS1-527 (M) NATIONAL SECURITY AS HUMAN SECURITY

OVERVIEW: Explore the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security video gallery here <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/video-gallery/>. Human security places the individual, his/her needs, and wellbeing at the center of analysis. At the individual level, personal, political, food, and environmental security are paramount. This paradigm turns the focus of concern to safeguarding human lives from critical, pervasive threats, from political violence to environmental degradation. As you watch the videos, consider how an increased emphasis on the value of human security over that of national security might impact the grand strategy of states. What should be the role of the military in these issues?

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS1-528 (S) VEOs AND GLOBAL PANDEMICS

OVERVIEW: The non-state threats and challenges facing the United States in the contemporary international environment are not entirely distinct from the others, yet where they do differ is in the incredible ambiguity around defining what each of them actually threaten. Is it human security, soft power and reputation, economic interest and long-term economic health, human capital and latent power, national security and national borders? This course has been about the various ways that US national interests are conceived and impactful of foreign politics and grand strategy. How we define the threats from international terrorism and pandemics will again affect our responses to the challenges they pose.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

READINGS:

1. John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to 9/11,” *International Security* 37, no. 1 (September 2012): 81-110. [EL]
 - Mueller and Stewart argue that the American public has internalized the fear resulting from the attacks on September 11, 2001, and as a result, have become delusional about the number of plotters, their capabilities, and their unity in carrying out further 9/11-like attacks. Their argument

- implicitly challenges the notion that international terrorism is a principal national security.
2. Michael J. Boyle, “The War on Terror in American Grand Strategy,” *International Affairs* 84, no. 2 (2008): 191-209. [EL]
 - Boyle attempts to “relocate the war on terror in American grand strategy.” He reframes the fight, aiming to delegitimize the tactic, rather than make war on an ideology. He emphasizes the US-led creation of a global anti-terror regime, in which a rule against “indiscriminate harm against non-combatants” should be enforced.
 3. Nathan Paxton and Jeremy Youde, “Engagement or Dismissiveness? Intersecting International Theory and Global Health,” *Global Public Health* 14, no. 4 (2019): 503-514. [EL]
 - Paxton and Youde outline features of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) and apply four different theories of international relations—realism, institutionalism, constructivism, and feminism—to better understand the dynamics of global health policy.
 4. Susan Peterson, “Epidemic Disease and National Security,” *Security Studies* 12, no. 2 (Winter 2002/3): 43-81. [EL]
 - Peterson assesses the potential for international diseases and viral pandemics to be legitimate threats to national security, narrowly defined. She contends that framing these types of events is counterproductive and leads to the “garrisoning of states behind national boundaries,” rather than necessary “international and transnational humanitarian assistance.”

RELATED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

NSS 2017, i; 3-4; 7-12; 42; 45

Summary NDS 2018, 3

JOE 2035, 22-23