



***INTERNATIONAL SECURITY II:
THE CONDUCT OF NATIONAL
SECURITY***

SYLLABUS

AY 21

**JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
PHASE I INTERMEDIATE LEVEL COURSE**

**UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
*21st Century Leaders for 21st Century Challenges***

**AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
MAXWELL AFB, AL**

FOREWORD

This syllabus for the International Security II course for the Air Command and Staff College, January-March 2020, provides both an overview of the course narrative, objectives and questions, as well as a detailed description of each lesson to assist students in their reading and preparation for lecture and seminar. Included herein is information about course methods of evaluation, schedule, and the fulfilment joint professional military education core goals.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY II

COURSE OVERVIEW

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course explores the conduct of national security through the lens of military strategy: the scheme for employing military means toward the achievement of political ends.¹ The course highlights the challenges of integrating military means to political ends and innovating strategy to account for changing circumstances. Specifically, it examines factors that complicate the formulation, execution, assessment, and innovation / adaptation of military strategy. It applies these concepts to strategies employed across the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), asking students to refine skills for advising senior leaders on meeting future security threats.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the challenges of formulating and executing military strategy to meet political objectives.
 2. Comprehend the challenges of assessing and innovating / adapting military strategy.
 3. Apply an understanding of military strategy – and the challenges of its formulation, execution, assessment, and innovation / adaptation – across the GCCs.
- ** Phase I of IS2 preview key course concepts; Phases II and III call for enhanced *comprehension* of those concepts; Phase IV *applies* those concepts to contemporary theater strategic challenges.

COURSE QUESTIONS

1. Which factors shape the formulation and execution of military strategy toward the achievement of political ends, and how?
2. Which factors shape the assessment and innovation / adaptation of military strategy, and how?
3. Which factors shape strategic effectiveness across the GCCs, and how might the US better formulate, execute, assess, and innovate / adapt US military strategy across the GCCs?

COURSE ORGANIZATION AND NARRATIVE

International Security II seeks to prepare analytically-minded leaders for operating within a complex international security environment, in service of complex national security objectives. The course focuses on military strategy. More specifically, it centers on the challenges of employing the military instrument of power in pursuit of policy aims. It further explores the complicated relationship between grand strategy and military strategy, and the implications of strategic guidance for the operational and tactical levels of war.

Each phase of International Security II examines challenges inherent to national security decision-making. Phase I introduces a foundational understanding of military strategy: the scheme for employing military means in pursuit of political ends. It goes on to disrupt this conventional (Clausewitzian) conception of strategy, suggesting that political and military leaders' attempts at "rational" means-ends matching are inherently challenging. It suggests that military strategy is not formulated, executed, assessed, or innovated / adapted in a vacuum. Rather, it is conditioned by various factors that complicate the employment of the military instrument in pursuit of national security interests. These complicating factors can undercut the attainment of political-military integration as well as strategic innovation.²

¹ Phrasing elements borrowed from Betts' "Is Strategy an Illusion?" pp. 5-6.

² The references to *integration* and *innovation* come from Posen's *Sources of Military Doctrine*, pp. 24-33.

Phase II addresses political-military integration. It employs three models of national security decision-making – rational actor, organizational behavior, and governmental politics – to examine factors that complicate the formulation and execution of strategy. Respectively, these three sets of arguments suggest that incomplete information, standardized institutional processes, and political “pulling and hauling” can significantly influence leaders’ decisions. These factors complicate means-ends matching; consequently, they have the potential to undercut strategic effectiveness.

Building on the themes of Phase II, Phase III focuses on strategic innovation, or efforts to ensure continued political-military integration in light of changing circumstances. It sheds light on the challenges of assessing and innovating / adapting strategy. To that end, it reveals that assessment and innovation / adaptation processes are subject to cognitive predilections, ethical dilemmas, civil-military relations, and strategic cultural tendencies. Thus, Phase III draws students to a more comprehensive grasp of the factors that affect decision-makers’ efforts to develop and update military strategy.

Phase IV takes guidance from the posture statements of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), addressing military strategic objectives, capabilities, and limitations across the GCCs. It examines GCC-specific and GCC-relevant strategic objectives, asking students to consider force capabilities and limitations for acting in pursuit of those ends. Phase IV also incorporates content from earlier portions of the course. It asks that students apply concepts from Phases II and III to GCC strategies, evaluating those strategies’ susceptibilities to incomplete information, routinized organizational processes, governmental-bureaucratic politics, cognition, ethics, civil-military relations, and strategic culture. The concept-to-case approach invites students to evaluate each strategy on the grounds of integration and innovation. It is designed to encourage an appreciation of the utility of strategy, as well as the challenges of maximizing that utility.

The course adheres to a specific methodological approach. Each day’s readings are ordered according to the following model: 1) theory – introduction of the key concept, 2) extension – refinement of the key concept, and 3) application – connection of the concept to a case study. The course methodology is unique, combining the study of foundational theories of war with application and analysis of historical and contemporary case studies. Students thus derive lessons, concepts, and ideas as the basis for decision making in strategy, planning, and operations. Though specific in its methodology, the course’s content is broadly interdisciplinary. It weaves themes from various fields – theory, policy, history, economics, psychology, sociology, security studies, and military practice – with joint concepts from the Profession of Arms. The course’s design, or the juxtaposition of its methodological specificity and disciplinary breadth, is meant elicit an enhanced understanding of military strategy.

The complexity of the international security environment – and the consequent complexity of national security objectives – calls for joint officers who are cognizant of the function and utility of strategy. International Security II aims to provide officers with enhanced critical-analytical tools for understanding the grand strategic context within which operations take place and the military strategic objectives that they serve.

EXTERNAL GUIDANCE

JPME-1 JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES [OPMEP 2015]

International Security II: The Conduct of National Security addresses Intermediate-Level College Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01E, signed 29 May 2015. The course supports the following Joint Learning Areas and Objectives, listed below:

Learning Area 1 – National Military Capabilities Strategy

- a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces to conduct the full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests.
 - IS2: 500, 501, 502, 503, 505, 506, 507, 509, 510, 511, 513, 515, 517, 518, 519, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 600, and 602 examine military strategy via contemporary and historical cases. The cases address the capabilities and limitations of ground, naval, and air forces.
- b. Comprehend the purpose, roles, authorities, responsibilities, functions, and relationships of the President, the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Joint Force Commanders (JFCs), Service component commanders, and combat support agencies.
 - IS2: 500, 501, 502, 509 examine the development and adaptation of military strategy, highlighting the purpose, roles, authorities, responsibilities, functions, and relationships of senior leaders involved in national security decision-making processes.
 - IS2: 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 525, 600, and 602 explore the purpose, roles, authorities, responsibilities, functions, and relationships of the Combatant Commanders.
- c. Comprehend how the US military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.
 - IS2: 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, and 525 address force organization (under the Geographic Combatant Commands) for planning, executing, sustaining, and training for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.
- d. Comprehend strategic guidance contained in documents such as the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Military Strategy, Global Force Management Implementation Guide (GFMIG), and Guidance for Employment of the Forces.
 - IS2: 500, 501, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 600, and 602 address the links between the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy; they also examine their influence on the posture statements of the Geographic Combatant Commanders.

Learning Area 2 – Joint Doctrine and Concepts

- a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.
 - IS2: 500, 600, and 602 examines concepts from JDN I-18 and JDN 2-19; JP 1, Chs. I-III; and JP 5, Ch. II.
- c. Apply solutions to operational problems in a volatile, uncertain, complex or ambiguous environment using critical thinking, operational art, and current joint doctrine.
 - IS2: 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, and 602 address cases of strategic responses – including the operational effectiveness of those responses – to contemporary regional challenges.

Learning Area 3 – Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War

- a. Comprehend the security environment within which Joint Forces are created, employed, and sustained in support of JFCs and component commanders.
 - IS2: 500, 501, 502, 503, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 600, and 602 address links between the security environment and the employment of Joint Forces toward military strategic objectives. Lessons 518-525, in particular, highlight the employment of Joint Forces in support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders' theater strategies.
- c. Comprehend the interrelationships between among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
 - IS2: 500, 501, 502, 503, 506, 507, 511, 515, 519, examine military strategic influences on tactics and operations; they also examine the effects of tactical and operational capabilities and limitations for the development (and redevelopment) of strategy. Lessons 520, 521, 522, 523, 525, 600, and 602 in particular, draw attention to the links between national military strategy, theater strategy, and tactics and operations.
- e. Comprehend the relationships between all elements of national power and the importance of comprehensive approaches, the whole of government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of security interests.
 - IS2: 500, 501, 506, 507, 508, 509, 512, 513, 519, 521, 522, 523, 525, 600, and 602 address interagency, allied, and partnered efforts in support of security interests.
- g. Comprehend the relationships between national security objectives, military objectives, conflict termination, and post conflict transition to enabling civil authorities.
 - IS2: 507, 509, 513, 600, and 602 explore the relationship between military objectives and national security. 507, 509, and 513, in particular, examine the complications of adapting strategy to account for conflict termination and post-conflict transition to enabling civil authorities.

Learning Area 4 – Joint Planning and Joint Execution Processes

- a. Comprehend relationship among national objectives and means available through the framework provided by the national level systems.
 - IS2: 500-525, as well as 600 and 602, explore the links between national objectives and the military (strategic) means for addressing those objectives.
- e. Comprehend the integration of IO and cyberspace operations with other lines of operations at the operational level of war.
 - IS2: 515 examines the integration of cyberspace operations with other lines of operations at (the strategic and) the operational level of war.
- f. Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, region, culture / diversity, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint force operations across the range of military operations.
 - IS2: 500, 501, 502, 503, 506, 507, 508, 509, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 521, 522, 523, 525, 600 and 602 address links between the security environment – with reference to the influence of factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, region, culture/diversity, and religion – and joint force operations across the range of military operations.
- g. Comprehend the role and perspective of the Combatant Commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies and plans.
 - IS2: 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 600 and 602 include or allude to the posture statements of the Geographic Combatant Commanders, which present commander (and staff) perspectives on theater policies, strategies, and plans.
- h. Comprehend the requirements across the joint force, Services, interorganizational partners, and the host nation in the planning and execution of joint operations across the range of

military operations.

- IS2: 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, and 602 address strategic responses to regional threats. The assigned readings, and particularly the posture statements of the Geographic Combatant Commanders, call attention to the requirements of the joint force, Services, interorganizational partners, and host nation for planning and executing operations.

Learning Area 6 – Joint Operational Leadership and the Profession of Arms

- a. Comprehend the role of the Profession of Arms in the contemporary environment.
 - IS2: 500-525, as well as 600 and 602, examine the role of the Profession of Arms in a complex and dynamic contemporary security environment.
- b. Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to anticipate and recognize change, lead transitions, and anticipate/adapt to surprise and uncertainty.
 - IS2: 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508 and 509 examine the effects of environmental change and uncertainty for military strategy; lessons 510-517 highlight the effects of change and uncertainty on strategic innovation. Lessons 518, 519, 521-523, and 525 share tangential links with this learning area.
- c. Comprehend the ethical dimension of operational leadership and the challenges that it may present when considering the values of the Profession of Arms.
 - IS2: 514, 515 directly explore the ethical dimensions of strategic and operational leadership; indirectly, lessons 502-503 draw links between the rational versus moral dimensions of leadership, and lesson 521 examines issues of discrimination and proportionality in the use of force.
- e. Communicate with clarity and precision.
 - IS2: While all seminar lessons involve communication skills, lessons 520, 521, 522, 523, 600 and 602 specifically require that students provide verbal and/or written reports on options for military strategic responses to regional challenges.
- f. Analyze the importance of adaptation and innovation on military planning and operations.
 - IS2: 500, 502, 503, 505, 507, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 600, and 602 engage, either directly or tangentially, themes of strategic innovation and adaptation.

JPME SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS

NOTE: IS2 IN BOLD

The CJCS memo, *Academic Year 2020-2021 Joint PME Special Areas of Emphasis* (SAE), identifies emphasis areas addressed in IS2 as appropriate.³

1. Globally Integrated Operations in the Information Environment

IS2: 513, 517, 522, and 523 explore the challenges of negotiating “competitors’ battle of narratives” and seeking to “gain an information advantage” over competitors.

- a. IS2: 522 and 523 address the “Importance of understanding the human, physical and informational aspects of the security environment.”
- b. IS2: 517 examines the formulation of “options that integrate information and physical capabilities and activities.”
- c. IS2: 513 focuses on “How the Joint Force executes operations in the information environment and modifies those operations as audiences respond.”

³ This section’s quoted content excerpted from the 2019-2020 SAE documents.

2. Strategic Deterrence in the 21st Century

IS2: 503, 504, 505, 513, 522, 523, 524, and 525 address variations on deterrence strategy.

- a. IS2: 503, 504, and 505 incorporate deterrence-relevant theory and concepts, touching on themes of rational actor decision-making, game theory / bargaining, perception, and the role of nuclear and conventional deterrence in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.
- b. IS2: 522 (and to lesser extent, 523) engages themes of “Harmonizing deterrence and assurance requirements.” IS2: 522 and 523 draw attention to the challenges of “Integrating deterrence, assurance, and strategic stability considerations into regional/global conflict planning,” as addressed in the EUCOM and INDOPACOM posture statements.
- c. IS2: 524 and 525 focus on nuclear threats and US ballistic missile defense, shedding light on the “nuclear proliferation challenge and non-Western nuclear powers.”
- d. IS2: 513 centers on contemporary deterrence challenges, and particularly cyber deterrence capabilities and limitations; lesson 522 also draws attention to the matter of “Extended nuclear deterrence and the assurance of allies.”
- e. IS2: 524 and 525 examine deterrence-supportive capabilities, including force composition and missions (specifically, ballistic missile defense).
- f. IS2: 522 centers on “Joint/Service and allied/partner contributions to deterrence planning, operations, and capability development,” and specifically examines US-NATO extended deterrence considerations.

3. Modern Electromagnetic Spectrum Battlefield

4. Space as a Warfighting Domain

- a. IS2: 517 includes case material focused on the “Joint Force/Coalition reliance on space.”
- b. IS2: 517 accounts for an “Awareness of potential adversary space capabilities and their reliance on space systems.”

5. The Return to Great Power Competition

IS2: 517, 522, and 523 directly engage themes of the return to great power competition.

- a. IS2: 517, 522 and 523 address “competition between the United States and great-power threats;” they further explore the trend’s implications for future warfare.
- b. IS2: 517 and 523 specifically address the “current and future role of technology in the changing character of war.”
- c. IS2: 517 addresses the “Consideration of new operational constructs, operating concepts, and capabilities as a way of maintaining friendly competitive advantage in the face of increasingly capable threats.”
- d. IS2: 517 examines “innovative solutions and institutional processes that generate lethal capabilities at greater affordability at the ‘speed of relevance.’”

6. Write Clear, Concise, Military Advice Recommendations

The IS2 midterm (position paper) and final (briefing-and-paper) call for development and written articulation of clear and concise military advice recommendations.

ACSC JPME PROGRAM OUTCOMES

NOTE: IS2 IN BOLD

The AY 20 International Security II course objectives map directly to two of the five ACSC Program Outcomes:

1. Articulate the complexity and uncertainty of operational leadership in the profession of arms.

2. Articulate the capabilities and limitations of military force, particularly airpower, in the effective integration of the instruments of national power.

- a. All IS2 course objectives meet this program outcome, as they require that students grapple with the complexities of crafting, executing, assessing, and updating military strategy (and applying an understanding of those challenges to the contemporary strategic challenges – and theater plans for meeting those challenges – addressed in the geographic COCOM posture statements).

3. Analyze the effects of the global security environment on the achievement of operational objectives.

- a. Phase IV of the course asks students to think critically about the environmental challenges within and across GCC areas of responsibility; the course's final assignment asks students to evaluate the viability of particular theater-strategic efforts in light of those challenges.
4. Apply military theory, operational art, joint concepts, and doctrine to develop effective warfighting plans for multi-domain operations.
5. Apply normative ethical principles in professional military decisionmaking.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1. **READINGS.** Students are expected to complete assigned readings in advance of that day's lecture and seminar. Students are encouraged to study the syllabus's seminar overviews, as well as theory-extension-application questions, before moving on to the assigned readings. The syllabus also references current joint doctrine relevant to that day's topic. Students are only required to read limited joint doctrine excerpts, but are urged to consider the connections between joint doctrine and military strategy.
2. **LECTURES.** Students will attend faculty lectures relating to assigned seminar readings. These presentations complement the readings and foster seminar discussion, enhancing knowledge of course concepts. Lectures provide theoretical background and historical context for the readings, applying theory to historical and contemporary case studies.
3. **SEMINAR PARTICIPATION.** Participation in seminar discussions is vital to the success of the course. Students must prepare for each seminar by completing all of the assigned readings. Each seminar member is expected to contribute to the discussion.
4. **MIDTERM ASSIGNMENT.** There is one written, graded midterm assignment in fulfillment of the requirements of the International Security II course.
5. **INTEGRATED STRATEGY ASSIGNMENT.** There is one integrated strategy assignment in fulfillment of the requirements of the International Security II course, consisting of an in-class, graded team-brief and a written, graded team-paper.
6. **METHODS OF EVALUATION.** One midterm paper: 2 page (single-spaced) take-home paper worth 40% of the course grade. One integrated briefing-plus- paper final assignment: in-class team briefing assignment worth 20% of the grade and one 6-7 page (double-spaced) team take-home paper worth 40% of the grade.

COURSE ADMINISTRATION

There are two types of readings in this course: 1) readings from books issued from the ACSC Book Issue Room; and 2) selected chapters and articles posted electronically. The syllabus denotes all readings posted electronically as “EL” (“electronic”). Students can also electronically access the syllabus, course calendar, supplemental materials, and lecture slides.

ACSC provides students with copies of the following course books, which must be returned at the conclusion of the course:

REQUIRED:

- Antulio J. Echevarria, *Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*. Cornell University Press, 1984.
- H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam*. New York: Harper Collins, 1997.
- Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard University Press, 1980.
- Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Longman, 1999.
- Yuen Khong, *Analogies at War*. Princeton University Press, 1992.
- Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*. New York: Basic Books, 1977.
- Robert Haddick, *Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014.

RECOMMENDED:

- Robert J. Art, and Kelly M. Greenhill, *The Use of Force: Military Power in International Politics*, 8th Edition. Lanham, Maryland: Roman and Littlefield, 2015.
- Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008 [1966]).
- David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006 [1964].
- Eric Gartzke and John R. Lindsay, eds. *Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy (2nd revised edition)*. New York: Penguin Books, 1991.
- Carl Builder, *The Masks of War*. RAND, 1989.

Please refer any questions to Ann Mezzell (Course Director, ann.mezzell@hqau.af.edu, Office 245B) or Wg Cdr Rich Milburn (Deputy Course Director, richard.milburn.3.gb@hqau.af.edu, Office 245A).

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY II: THE CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

COURSE SCHEDULE

PHASE I – MILITARY STRATEGY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Phase I of IS2 frames the substance and structure of the course. Day 1 defines military strategy, in accordance with Clausewitzian thought, as the *scheme for matching military means to political ends*. It suggests that strategic effectiveness rests on two key foundations: 1) how strategy is made – the extent to which it *integrates* military means to the state’s political ends, and 2) how strategy is updated – the extent to which it is *innovative* with respect to changing circumstances.⁴ Day 2 goes on to explore the range of factors that complicate the processes of making and updating strategy; it highlights the considerable challenges of attaining strategic effectiveness. The Day 1 and Day 2 readings, respectively, establish the structural frame (integration and innovation) and substantive themes (influences on integration and innovation) of the second and third phases of the course.

DAY 1 – MILITARY STRATEGY: INTEGRATION AND INNOVATION

DATE: 4 February 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the foundations of political-military integration (PMI), strategic innovation, and strategic effectiveness.
2. Apply concepts of PMI and strategic innovation to the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war (Vietnam case study).
3. Analyze the sources of the US’s strategic defeat in Vietnam, focusing particularly on sources of disruption to PMI and strategic innovation.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-500 (L): Military Strategy - Integration and Innovation [Martin]

Overview: This lecture introduces foundational concepts of military strategy, previewing themes of the course and setting the stage for seminar discussion. The lecture centers on comparative analyses of cases of strategic effectiveness and cases of strategic ineffectiveness.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-501 (S): Military Strategy in Theory and in Practice

Overview: According to Clausewitz, “Tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of war.”⁵ His conception of war as “an instrument of policy” suggests that we can conceive of military strategy as a

⁴ See Posen’s *Sources of Military Doctrine*, pp. 24-33.

plan for using military means toward political ends. Posen expands on this theme, suggesting that we can regard military strategy as a sub-component of a state's grand strategy – its plan for creating its own security. Achieving national security in the face of abundant threats and finite resources, he says, calls for committed attention to PMI. To this point, McMaster examines the early days of the Vietnam War, in which tactical victories often failed to translate to strategic successes. He traces the US's shortcomings in Vietnam to political and military leaders' neglect – and perhaps, evasion – of their mandated strategy responsibilities.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

ASSIGNMENTS

- ***INSTRUCTIONS FOR IS2-600 (E) MIDTERM PAPER DISTRIBUTED.***
- ***INSTRUCTIONS FOR IS2-602 (E) FINAL BRIEFING AND PAPER DISTRIBUTED.***

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction*, Ch. 1, pp.1-12.

Background: Echevarria provides an introductory overview of key definitional and conceptual guideposts for the study of military strategy.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VIII: Ch. 6.B., “War is an Instrument of Policy,” pp. 605-610. *Review* this selection (originally covered on Day 3 of WT).

Theory [Key Concept]: The Clausewitz reading establishes the foundational concept of the course: “War is an instrument of policy.” It frames military strategy, the subject of IS2, as the plan for and process of integrating military means to political ends. The selected pages revisit themes previously addressed in the WT course.

3. Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, Ch. 1 (“The Importance of Military Doctrine”), pp. 13-33.

Extension [Concept Refinement]: Posen expands on Clausewitz's dictum, depicting military strategy as a subcomponent of a state's grand strategy. Military strategy may undercut national security, he says, if it is poorly *integrated* to the state's grand strategic aims or poorly *innovative* with respect to changing circumstances.

Note 1: Posen's emphasis on political-military *integration* and strategic *innovation* provides the structural frame for the second and third phases of IS2. Also, please be aware that Posen uses the term **military doctrine** synonymously with **military strategy**.

Note 2: The Posen reading reinforces the link between IS1's focus on *grand strategy* and IS2's emphasis on *military strategy*. For brief doctrinal coverage of the links between grand strategy and military strategy, see JDN 1-18, Ch. 1, pp. I-4 to I-7. Note that strategic guidance themes will feature prominently in the upcoming JW course, providing context for various planning scenarios.

⁵ Clausewitz (Howard and Paret edition/translation), *On War*, p. 128.

4. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, Epilogue and Chs. 3-6, pp. 323-334 and 42-136. Skim pp. 42-61.

Application [Case Study]: He addresses leaders' explicit evasion (or tacit neglect) of their strategy-making roles and responsibilities during the lead-up to the Vietnam War. In doing so, he highlights discrepancies between what strategy *should be* at its best and what it *can be* at its worst. How might this text inform our understanding of recent-year national security decision-making?

Note 1: McMaster's discussion of graduated pressure recalls Schelling's thoughts on the manipulation of risk. You may wish to revisit Schelling's *Arms and Influence* (WT), Pape's *Bombing to Win*, pp. 66- 69 (AP1), or Echevarria's *Military Strategy*, pp. 56-63.

Note 2: You may note that US tendencies toward division (rather than integration) between civilian and military strategic roles and responsibilities reflect Jominian thought (WT). You may also observe that McMaster's text confronts themes previously covered in LD – particularly, themes relevant to the ethical dimensions of leadership.

RECOMMENDED READINGS (OPTIONAL)

1. Joint Doctrine Note 2-19, Ch. II, pp. II-1 to II-15. [EL] (Updated)
2. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, Ch. II, pp. II-1 to II-11. [EL] (Previous)

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Doctrine Notes 2-19 & 1-18: Strategy.
2. Joint Publication 1, Chapter I (“Instruments of National Power and the Range of Military Operations”), pp. I-11 to I-16; Chapter II (“Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces”), pp. II-1 to II-25; and Chapter III (“Section A: Department of Defense” and “Section B: Joint Chiefs of Staff”), pp. III-1 to III-6.
3. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter II (“Section A: National and Department of Defense Guidance”), pp. II-1 to II-11.
4. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum.

DAY 2 – THE CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATION AND INNOVATION

DATE: 5 February 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the factors that complicate PMI, innovation, and strategic effectiveness.
2. Apply an understanding of those complicating factors to US national security decision-making (Syria case study).
3. Analyze the effects of those complicating factors on US military operations in Syria.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-502 (M): *Obama at War* (PBS Frontline), 2015

Overview: This documentary focuses on the case of national security decision-makers' 2013 efforts to develop a coherent strategic response to the evolving Syrian civil war. It focuses on the challenges of crafting military strategy in the midst of uncertain threats and in support of uncertain political objectives. For additional context, please see the information that appears below the second seminar reading for IS2-503.

Note: This film contains graphic depictions of violence, including violence against children.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour movie

IS2-503 (S): *Strategy Skeptics: Arguments and Responses*

Overview: Given the range of factors that complicate military strategy, is rational means-ends matching attainable? Betts' "Is Strategy an Illusion?" grapples with the realities of war and their effects on strategic decision-making. Like Clausewitz, Betts acknowledges that the "boundless complexities and uncertainties" of war can remove it from its underlying rationale. He concludes that it is difficult – but not impossible – to reasonably fit military means to political ends. The second Betts article, "Pick Your Poison," illustrates themes from the first. It explores constraints on leaders' options for developing military responses to the evolving Syrian civil war. It also provides background context for the documentary scheduled for the IS2-502 lesson. [The film, in turn, sheds light on decision-makers' protracted moves, and distressing missteps, toward acting on the crisis. Its coverage of strategic decision-making on Syria highlights the particular challenges of crafting use-of-force options when threats – and thus, political ends – are unclear.]

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2000):5-50. [EL]

Theory and Extension [Concept and Refinement]: Betts' "Illusion" is a classic text of the strategic studies field. Betts examines the arguments of strategy skeptics – rejoinders to Clausewitzian depictions of "rational" means-ends matching – recognizing and responding to each in turn.

Note 1: The substantive content of course Phases II-III is largely oriented around the themes of Betts' "Illusion" piece.

Note 2: Some "Illusion" themes are referenced, in brief, in Echevarria's *Military Strategy*, Ch. 8, pp. 109-115. In addition, coercion-deterrence – which Betts references, but which is not central to his overarching thesis – is addressed in Echevarria's *Military Strategy*, Ch. 4, pp. 47-63.

2. Richard K. Betts, "Pick Your Poison: American Has Many Options in Syria, None are Good," *Foreign Affairs* (September 5, 2016).[EL]

Application [Case Study]: This piece previews themes to be further detailed in the *Obama at War* documentary. It applies concepts from "Is Strategy an Illusion?" to the case of US national security decision-making on Syria. While McMaster (Day 1) explores leaders' *evasion* of strategy-making responsibilities, Betts examines their *engagement* with them. What does the article suggest about the president's agency in strategy development? With respect to the US's Syria strategy, how do the dynamics of the Trump administration align with or diverge from those of the Obama administration?

Note 1: Betts' "Pick Your Poison" article and the *Obama at War* documentary preview themes relevant to AP2's Day 11 coverage of gray zone conflict (and attention to Operation Inherent Resolve). They also introduce themes relevant to JW's forthcoming coverage of the Joint Planning Process (JPP) – specifically, how the JPP seeks to account for complex problems in the context of a dynamic and multidimensional operational environment.

Note 2: The initial Betts article, as well as the Syria article and documentary, raise questions about cases in which the military *may not* be the best instrument for the pursuit of political ends. Recall, from WT, Troeder's discussion of the whole-of-government approach to strategy development.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18: Strategy.
2. Joint Publication 1, Chapter I, pp. I-10 to I-11; and Chapter II ("Unified Command") pp. II-7 to II-11 and ("Interagency Coordination") pp. II-13 to II-20.
3. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter II ("Section A: National and Department of Defense Guidance"), pp. II-1 to II-11.
4. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum.

PHASE II – THE CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL-MILITARY INTEGRATION

Phase II of IS2 examines the challenges of PMI, focusing particularly on factors that influence the *formulation* and *execution* of strategy. Each day's readings: 1) introduce a model of national security decision-making, 2) offer refinements on or rebuttals to that model's key assumptions, and 3) apply those concepts to a common case study. The models can be found in Allison and Zelikow's *Essence of Decision*, a noted text on national security decision-making. Each model – rational actor, organizational process, and governmental politics – suggests that particular factors are apt to shape or constrain decision-makers' options for matching means to ends. Note: The models are briefly summarized and contrasted with each other on p. 391 of the book.

DAY 3 – RATIONALIST ACCOUNTS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

DATE: 8 February 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the assumptions of the rational actor model.
2. Apply the principles and assumptions of the rational actor model to explain the formulation and execution of strategy associated with the 2009 Afghanistan surge.
3. Analyze the links between rational actor decision-making, PMI, and the formulation and execution of military strategy.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-504 (L): Military Strategy: The Continuation of Bargaining by Other Means [Grieco]

Overview: This lecture introduces the key principles and assumptions of the rational actor model, expanding on themes from the Fearon (seminar) reading. It then applies the model to a selection of historical and contemporary cases of military strategic decision-making.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-505 (S): Model I - Rational Actor Model (RAM)

Overview: What can we infer from the RAM? What characterizes rational actor decision-making? The RAM treats the state as a "black box," or a rational, unitary actor. It implies that we need not understand the inner workings of the state to account for its actions. Responses to threats can be understood as functions of preference-ordering: the state identifies strategy alternatives, assesses their respective costs and benefits, and selects the utility-maximizing option. This process, say Allison and Zelikow, can be likened to gaming scenarios – players seek "wins" via the adoption of particular strategies. Fearon builds on this notion, suggesting that decision-making can be complicated by the effects of incomplete information. This helps explain why rational states choose to go to war in spite of its great risks and costs. 2009 Af. Surge Comparison Case – Model I: Bapat employs the logic of the Fearon piece, treating the surge decision – and some of its ostensibly illogical elements – as the product of leaders' rational responses to political context. Note that Bapat's focus on *domestic* political concerns (2012 election) strays afield of traditional RAM accounts of preference-ordering behavior.

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chs. 1 and 2 selections (pp. 13-26, 40-54, and 109-120).

Theory [Key Concept] and Illustration: Model I assumes that strategy processes and products are determined by a rational, unitary state actor. Yet, rationality may be *bounded* – limits on actor information may shape preference-ordering calculations and behaviors (and PMI).

Note: The Ch. 2 reading selections illustrate rational actor accounts of the formulation and execution of the US's blockade strategy during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

2. James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995): 379-414. Focus points: pp. 379-414. [EL]

Extension [Concept Refinement]: Fearon's piece – which asks why wars recur despite their great costs to states – is one of the most widely cited conflict studies of the past 25 years. Why do rational states subject themselves to the "gamble of war" rather than seek negotiated settlements? Can Fearon's argument about *why* states go to war also be applied to the matter of *how* states go to war (Grieco lecture)? What does Fearon's piece suggest about incomplete information and the limits of rational means-ends integration?

Note: Fearon's key arguments are presented and recapped, respectively, in the article's introduction and conclusion sections; you are welcome to skip / skim the middle section's game theory content.

3. Navin A. Bapat, "A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (July 2010): 217-222 and 228-234.[EL]

Application [Common Case Study – 2009 Af. Surge]: Like Fearon, Bapat examines how one actor's decisions can influence other actors' choices and actions. How does Bapat's discussion of the Afghan "surge" case illustrate themes of rational actor decision-making? How does Bapat judge US calculations regarding short-term gains vs. long-term costs? What lessons can be drawn from this case study?

Note 1: Bapat's article applies rational actor explanations to the 2009 assessment and adaptation of the US's Afghanistan strategy (the transition to the Max Leverage, or counterinsurgency strategy). The "surge" case recalls themes from WT (Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare*); it also previews AP2's Day 7 surge-relevant content. See Echevarria's *Military Strategy*, pp. 46 and 74-76, for clear-hold-build and hearts and minds content.

Note 2: Like the Fearon piece, Bapat's article employs game theory. You may opt to skip over or skim this content; Bapat's key points can be found in the first and last two sections of the article.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency.
2. Joint Doctrine Notes 2-19 and 1-18: Strategy.
3. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II ("Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces").
4. Joint Publication 3.0, Chapter I ("Interorganizational Coordination in Unified Action"), pp. I-11 to I-12. Note: Indirect link to Day 3 content; direct link applies to content for Days 4-5.

DAY 4 – ORGANIZATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

DATE: 9 February 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the assumptions of the organizational behavior model.
2. Apply the principles and assumptions of the organizational behavior model to explain the formulation and execution of strategy associated with the 2009 Afghanistan surge.
3. Analyze the links between organizational effects on decision-making, PMI, and the formulation and execution of military strategy.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-506 (L): Military Strategy and Organizational Decisions: The Realist Illusion of the State as a Black Box [Milburn]

Overview: This lecture previews key concepts of the organizational behavior model. In addition, it roots organizational accounts of military strategy in Clausewitzian theory. It employs assumptions of the organizational model to explain the emergence of independent air forces in the UK and the US, and to explore various air forces' institutional predilections for strategic bombing.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-507 (S): Model II – Organizational Behavior Model

Overview: What can we infer from the organizational behavior model? What functions do organizations serve, and how do their routine processes and outputs influence the formulation and execution of strategy? Allison and Zelikow note that an organization's standard operating procedures, or the standardized products it generates, may constrain political and military leaders' strategy choice or strategy execution options. Likewise, Posen contends that the selected means are often a product of military organizational tendencies, particularly the penchant for offensive strategies. 2009 Af. Surge Comparison Case – Model II: Greentree examines the inconclusive results of Operation Enduring Freedom, tracing problems with the execution of the surge strategy to traditional civilian and military organizational inclinations.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chs. 3 and 4 selections (pp. 143-147, 153-158, 163-185, and 217-236).

Theory [Key Concept]: Model II suggests that strategic decision-making isn't always "centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing." Organizations – including military organizations – stick to routine processes and create specific outputs. Those outputs (means) may be inadequately suited to the ends, undercutting the attainment of PMI.

Note: The Ch. 4 readings illustrate organizational accounts of the formulation and execution of the US's blockade strategy during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

2. Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, Ch. 2, pp.41-59.

Extension [Concept Refinement]: Posen suggests military organizations prefer offensive strategies because they reduce uncertainty. This preference for the offense – as well as the differences between the roles of soldiers and statesmen – he says, can undercut political- military *integration* and strategic *innovation*. What do you make of Posen’s claims, and particularly his claim about civilian intervention in military affairs (and its effects on the achievement of PMI and innovation)? In your experience or estimation, is this claim valid?

Note: Posen’s comparison of the roles of soldiers and statesmen recalls themes from WT. See Shy’s (*Makers of Modern Strategy*) coverage of Jominian understandings of the military profession and strategy. The Posen piece also recalls elements of LD Day 10, particularly Schein’s *Organizational Culture*.

3. Todd Greentree, “Bureaucracy Does its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 36, No. 3 (2013): 325-356. [EL]

Application [Common Case Study – 2009 Af. Surge]: Greentree focuses on the civilian organizational and military organizational constraints on the adaptation of the US’s Afghanistan strategy. What do you make of Greentree’s claim that US warfighting capabilities were undercut by organizational tendencies? How does this account of the “surge” compare with Bapat’s? What lessons can be drawn from this case study?

Note 1: Greentree’s article applies organizational explanations to the 2009 adaptation of the US’s Afghanistan strategy (the transition to the Max Leverage, or counterinsurgency strategy). The “surge” case recalls themes from WT (Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare*); it also previews AP2’s Day 7 surge-relevant content. See Echevarria’s *Military Strategy*, pp. 46 and 74- 76, for clear-hold-build and hearts and minds content.

Note 2: Though it tangentially addresses bureaucratic-interagency effects (IS2, Day 5) the Greentree article chiefly centers on organizational accounts of strategy adaptation.

RECOMMENDED READING (OPTIONAL)

1. Jack S. Snyder, “The Cult of the Offensive in 1914,” in Art and Greenhill, eds., *8th Edition The Use of Force*, pp. 141-154.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency.
2. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18: Strategy.
3. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II (“Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces”).
4. Joint Publication 3.08, Chapter I (“Introduction”), pp. I-1 to I-17.

DAY 5 – GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS: BUREAUCRATIC-INTERAGENCY ACCOUNTS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

DATE: 11 February 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the assumptions of the governmental politics (bureaucratic) model.
2. Apply the principles and assumptions of the governmental politics model to explain the formulation and execution of strategy associated with the 2009 Afghanistan surge.
3. Analyze the links between bureaucratic decision-making, PMI, and the formulation and execution of military strategy.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-508 (L): The Interagency, Military Planning, and Operational Considerations [Campbell]

Overview: This lecture introduces key concepts of bureaucratic politics. It examines the practical challenges of the interagency process and their influence on military strategy.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-509 (S): Model III – Governmental Politics Model (Bureaucratic-Interagency Model)

Overview: What can we infer from the governmental politics (bureaucratic-interagency) model? How does political-bureaucratic gamesmanship influence strategy formulation and execution? Allison and Zelikow contend that regularized bargaining among government players – characteristic of the interagency process – may shape decision-making in ways that generate “deviations from ideal rationality.” Krasner agrees that decisions are likely to reflect competing agencies’ efforts to promote their own objectives, but questions the implications of the governmental politics model. The model, he says, “obscures the power of the President... relieves high officials of responsibility... and offers leaders an excuse for their failures.” Afghan Surge Comparison Case – Model 3: Marsh addresses the bureaucratic maneuvering and competition associated with the surge decision and its “lopsided compromise” effects.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chs. 5 and 6 selections (pp. 255-258, 294-311, and 329-347).

Theory [Key Concept] and Illustration: Model III suggests that strategy is shaped by the “pulling and hauling” behaviors inherent to the government’s national security architecture. Agency heads strive to win influence with senior leaders, hoping to advance their respective agencies’ strategy options. PMI may be heavily impacted by these interactive processes.

Note: The Ch. 6 readings illustrate bureaucratic accounts of the formulation and execution of the US’s blockade strategy during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

2. Stephen Krasner, “Are Bureaucracies Important? Or Allison Wonderland,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 7 (Summer 1972): 159-179. [EL]

Extension [Concept Refinement]: Krasner rebuts key assumptions of organizational (Model II) and governmental-bureaucratic (Model III) accounts of national security decision-making. What are Krasner’s criticisms of Model III? How might these criticisms inform our understanding of contemporary military strategic decision-making?

3. Kevin Marsh, “Obama’s Surge: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Decision to Order a Troop Surge in the Afghanistan War” *Foreign Policy Analysis* Vol. 10, No. 3 (July 2014): 265-288. [EL]

Application [Common Case Study – 2009 Af. Surge]: Marsh proposes that debates regarding the surge were largely influenced by the agency roles and interests of its “advocates and opponents.” What are the lessons of Marsh’s study? How does his account of the surge compare with those Bapat and Greentree? Which take on the surge strategy (Model I, II, or III) do you find to be most convincing, and why?

Note 1: Marsh’s article applies bureaucratic explanations to the 2009 assessment and adaptation of the US’s Afghanistan strategy (the transition to the Max Leverage, or counterinsurgency strategy). The “surge” case recalls themes from WT (Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare*); it also previews AP2’s Day 7 surge-relevant content. See Echevarria’s *Military Strategy*, pp. 46 and 74-76, for clear-hold-build and hearts and minds content.

Note 2: Recall, from WT, that the Jominian tradition prizes avoidance of the bureaucratic “mess” that often colors US strategic decision-making; it treats the (ideal) strategy process as one in which political leaders arrive at a decision, then hand over further war planning / making responsibilities to the generals. Consider the difference from Clausewitz’s “War is the continuation of politics...”

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency.
2. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18: Strategy.
3. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II (“Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces”).
4. Joint Publication 3.08, Chapter II (“Interorganizational Cooperation”), pp. II-1 to II-35.
5. Joint Publication 5.0, Chapter II (“Section A: National and Department of Defense Guidance”), pp. II-1 to II-11.

PHASE III: THE CHALLENGES OF INNOVATING FOR STRATEGIC EFFECT

Phase III of IS2 explores the complexities of evaluating and updating strategy – the challenges of ensuring continued PMI in light of changing circumstances. While Days 6-9 principally focus on themes of assessment and innovation, they also shed light on the challenges of wartime assessment and adaptation.⁶ Days 6 and 7, respectively, examine the influences of *individual leaders'* cognitive-psychological and ethical predilections on evaluating and updating strategy. Day 8, in turn, weighs the influences of *organizational-bureaucratic* behaviors (specifically, civil-military relations) on evaluating and updating strategy. Day 9, finally, considers the influences of *national* strategic-cultural predilections on evaluating and updating strategy.

DAY 6 – COGNITIVE ACCOUNTS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

DATE: 16 February 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the influence of cognitive-psychological bias on military strategy.
2. Apply cognitive-psychological explanations to historical cases of and contemporary debates on military strategy.
3. Analyze the links between cognition-psychology and the assessment of military strategy.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-510 (L): Decision-making for Strategists [Forsyth]

Overview: This lecture examines the challenges of strategic assessment, tracing shortfalls in strategic effectiveness to decision-makers' cognitive-psychological predilections and biases. The lecture contextualizes arguments stemming from cognitive-psychological theories of decision-making.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

ASSIGNMENT

- **MIDTERM PAPER SUBMITTED TO INSTRUCTOR BY START OF SEMINAR.**

IS2-511 (S): Cognitive Influences on the Assessment of Military Strategy

Overview: Sun Tzu prioritizes the role of assessments, or “estimates,” in strategic decision-making. War-planning, he notes, calls for consideration of factors ranging from the quality of political leadership to the capability of military personnel to an environment's climate and terrain.⁷ Clausewitz, similarly, calls for the careful evaluation

⁶ Theo Farrell defines **innovation** as “a major change that is institutionalised in new doctrine, a new organisational structure and/or a new technology.” See: Theo Farrell, “Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006-2009,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 33, No. 4 (2010): 567-594. Williamson Murray treats innovation as a predominantly peacetime behavior and adaptation as a predominantly wartime behavior. **Adaptation** is change based on combat-gleaned knowledge; **innovation** is change institutionalized across an entire organization over time. See: Williamson Murray, *Military Adaptation in War*, Cambridge University Press (2011).

of the adversary's (and one's own) political aims, strategic situation, and available capabilities. Yet, he concedes that assessment is "plainly a colossal task."⁸ Contemporary joint doctrine also recognizes the necessity – and accompanying challenges – of assessing and updating strategy.⁹ The Day 6 readings focus on cognitive-psychological influences on strategic assessment, suggesting that they may interfere with rationally optimal assessment processes. Jervis contends decision-makers are apt to misperceive other states' intentions and behaviors. Building on one of Jervis' claims, Khong weighs the hazards of reasoning by analogy. He attributes the decision to intervene in Vietnam, and the adoption of the graduated pressure strategy, to leaders' sometimes-faulty reliance on the "lessons of history." Rapport, likewise, considers the hazards inherent in abstract reasoning. He traces the challenges of revising strategy for post-invasion Iraq to leaders' assessment shortcomings – namely, their focus on immediate invasion and combat plans rather than distant-future post-conflict concerns.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics* Vol. 20, No. 3 (April 1968): 454-479. Selections excerpted from Karen A. Mingst and Jack L. Snyder's *Essential Readings in World Politics* (WW Norton and Co., 2004), pp. 189-199. [EL]

Theory [Key Concept]: Jervis challenges rational means-ends understandings of war and strategy. Decision-makers are prone to develop inaccurate *images* of other states, he notes; they are also prone to incorrectly assess their *intentions*. Misperception is common; it stems from a host of sources. What are the implications for the assessment of military strategy?

2. Yuen Khong, *Analogies at War*, Chs. 1 and 4, pp. 3-18 (*skim*) and 71-96.

Extension and Application [Concept Refinement and Case Study]: Jervis identifies *reasoning by analogy* as a common source of misperception. Khong expands on this hypothesis, attributing much of the decision-making on Vietnam – particularly about how to intervene – to leaders' reliance on the lessons of Korea. What implications can we draw from Kong's argument? How might his claims apply to contemporary cases of assessment? How might reasoning by analogy, or reasoning derived from the "lessons of history," complicate efforts to innovate or adapt?

⁷ Sun Tzu (Griffith translation), *The Art of War*, pp. 63-71.

⁸ Clausewitz (Howard and Paret edition/translation), *On War*, pp. 585-586.

⁹ Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, p. ix: "**Continuous assessment** should be a formalized, recurring process during the life of the strategy that assesses and evaluates the strategy's ends, ways, means, and risks against the evolving realities and possibilities in the strategic environment. National interests and policy often change over time... new strategies or modification(s) to extant strategies may be appropriate" and Joint Doctrine Note 2-19, p. VI-1: "Given the fundamental uncertainty in the strategic environment and the likelihood that requirements for the joint force will exceed available resources, **strategic assessment** is a vital component of strategy implementation. Further, because levels of risk are dynamic over time, such assessments must examine trends in risk across time and must be periodically updated to reflect a changing strategic environment." For additional information on the assessment of strategy, please see JDN 1-18, Ch. IV. For information on theater-strategic and operational assessment, please see JP 3-0.

Note: Both the Khong text and the following Rapport article center on cognitive barriers to the assessment of strategy. Yet, they also highlight the possibility that cognitive biases may complicate attempts at military strategic innovation. In 2007, Robert R. Tomes predicted that the 2003 invasion of Iraq (covered in the Rapport reading) would be one of the last conflicts to prominently feature the conventional warfighting innovations rooted in the later years of the Vietnam War. Acknowledging the adage that “we live life forward but understand it backward, through history,” he questioned whether the transformation lessons of the 1980s and 1990s were appropriately suited to the war on terrorism. Did the affinity for “smaller, lighter, more lethal, networked forces,” he asked, reflect shortfalls in learning the “hard lessons” of counterinsurgency warfare from the 1960s-1970s?¹ Note the tacit links to the upcoming Rapport article.

3. Aaron Rapport, “The Long and Short of It: Cognitive Constraints on Leaders’ Assessments of ‘Post-War’ Iraq,” *International Security* Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012): 133-171. [EL]

Extension and Application [Concept Refinement and Case Study]: Jervis also claims that *abstract reasoning* is a common source of misperception. Rapport contends that decision-makers are less capable of accurately assessing (the effects of) distant-future actions than immediate-future actions. How does this inform our understanding of leaders’ shortfalls in planning for post-invasion Iraq? How could assessment processes be amended to discourage such outcomes? How might the pitfalls of abstract reasoning complicate efforts to innovate or adapt strategy?

Note: The Rapport piece previews themes addressed in AP2’s Day 7 coverage of OIF.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, Ch. IV.
2. Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter II (“Assessment”), pp. II-8 to II-11.
3. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter I (“Principles of Planning,” “Planning,” “Strategic, Theater, and Functional Planning,” “Strategy, Plans, Operations, and Assessments Cycle”), pp. I-2 to I-9; and Chapter III (“Strategy and Campaign Development”), pp. III-1 to III-16.

¹ Robert R. Tomes, *US Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Innovation and the New American Way of War, 1973-2003*. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 1-3.

DAY 7 – CIVIL-MILITARY ACCOUNTS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

DATE: 18 February 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the influence of civil-military relations (CMR) on military strategy.
2. Apply CMR explanations to historical cases of and contemporary debates on military strategy.
3. Analyze the links between CMR, the assessment of military strategy, and related innovations / adaptations of military strategy.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-512 (L): CMR and the Challenges of Updating Strategy [Dains]

Overview: This lecture examines the challenges of assessing and updating strategy; it suggests that the CMR “gap” (and sometimes, strained CMR) may account for some of the difficulties of revising or recreating strategy. The lecture contextualizes arguments stemming from various CMR schools of leader decision-making.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-513 (S): CMR Influences on the Assessment and Innovation of Strategy

Overview: How do American civil-military relations¹⁰ shape processes of assessing and updating military strategy? Huntington provides a foundational theory for gauging civil-military relations and their effects on military strategic behavior. Rapp, in turn, notes that civil-military tensions often characterize the processes of formulating, executing, assessing, and adapting military strategy. Conventional notions of “proper” civil-military relations, he contends, fail to account for the realities of the national security decision-making. Feaver, in turn, employs CMR theory to examine the assessment and innovation / adaptation of the Bush administration’s Iraq War strategy. He asks, “What is the proper division of labor for strategic supreme command decisions during war?” The processes of assessing and updating the Iraq War strategy, he argues, suggests that neither civilian leaders nor military professionals played a dominant role in the decision to forego the stand-up/stand-down strategy for counterinsurgency options. Civil-military relations, he implies, may hold more nuanced effects on military strategic decision-making than traditionally acknowledged.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and The State*, Ch. 4, pp. 80-97.

Theory [Key Concept]: Huntington outlines two models of CMR: 1) *subjective civilian control* - military professionalism is diminished via civilian political influence over the military, and 2) *objective civilian control* - military professionalism is enhanced via dissociation of the military from civilian political influence.

¹“Broadly defined, ‘civil-military relations’ refers to the relationship between the armed forces of the state and the larger society they serve - how they communicate, how they interact, and how the interface between them is ordered and regulated. Similarly, ‘civilian control’ means simply the degree to which the military’s civilian masters can enforce their authority on the military services.” Excerpted from: Richard D. Hooker, Jr., “Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil Military Relations,” *Parameters* (Winter 2011-2012), p. 1.

2. William E. Rapp, “Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making,” *Parameters* Vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn 2015), pp. 13-26. [EL]

Extension [Concept Refinement]: Building on themes explored in Huntington’s classic text on CMR, Rapp explores the relationship between civil-military relations and national security decision-making. Note Rapp’s attention to CMR’s influences on the assessment and adaptation of military strategy.

Note: You may notice that IS2’s Day 8 reading draw on themes addressed earlier in the course. See, for example, the Day 4 readings on civil vs. military organizational predilections and the Day 5 readings on interagency pulling and hauling.

3. Peter D. Feaver, “The Right to Be Right: Civil Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision,” *International Security* Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011): 87-125.[EL]

Application [Case Study]: Feaver examines the links between civil-military relations and the assessment and innovation / adaptation of the Bush administration’s Iraq War strategy. In what ways did civil-military relations shape the decision to forego the stand-up/stand-down strategy for counterinsurgency options? In your estimation, does the transition to the “surge” (counterinsurgency) represent an innovation or adaptation in strategy? Why?

Note: The surge case recalls themes from WT (Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare*); also see Echevarria’s *Military Strategy*, pp. 46 and 74-76, for clear-hold-build and hearts and minds content.

RECOMMENDED READINGS (OPTIONAL)

1. Risa Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment*, Ch. 1, pp. 1-14. [EL]

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, Ch. IV.
2. Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter II (“Assessment”), pp. II-8 to II-11.
3. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter I (“Principles of Planning,” “Planning,” “Strategic, Theater, and Functional Planning,” “Strategy, Plans, Operations, and Assessments Cycle”), pp. I-2 to I-9; and Chapter III (“Strategy and Campaign Development”), pp. III-1 to III-16.

DAY 8 – ETHICAL ACCOUNTS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

DATE: 19 February 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the influence of the just war tradition on military strategy.
2. Apply just war principles to historical and contemporary debates on military strategy.
3. Analyze the links between just war considerations, the assessment of military strategy, and related innovations / adaptations of military strategy.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-514 (L): Just War Theory and Its Implications for Strategy [Connelly]

Overview: This lecture examines the roots and foundational principles and considerations of just war theory. The lecture encompasses questions about the presumed tensions between the pragmatism of strategy and the ethics of the just war tradition.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-515 (S): Ethical Influences on the Assessment and Innovation of Military Strategy

Overview: How does the just war tradition influence strategic decision-making? Do ethical considerations stand at odds with the rational foundations of strategy? Walzer contends that the two exist in tension with each other, but can also shape the other for the better. Walzer's classic text on the ethics of wartime decision-making and conduct, *Just and Unjust Wars*, examines the tenets of *jus ad bellum* (just cause for war) and *jus in bello* (just conduct in war). The subsequent readings, by extension, explore the implications of the just war tradition for US cyber strategy. Fidler observes that cyber technologies appeal to national security decision-makers, as they allow for the use of "force 'short-of-war' and coercion 'short-of-force.'" Borghard, finally, examines updates to US cyber strategy. Focusing on the DoD's 2018 Cyber Strategy ("Defend Forward"), she asks whether attempts to overcome adversaries' gray zone exploits via cyber coercion may risk inadvertent escalation.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

ASSIGNMENT

- **MIDTERM PAPER SUBMITTED TO INSTRUCTOR BY START OF SEMINAR.**

REQUIRED READINGS

1. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, Chs 2-3 and 8-9, pp. 21-50 and 127-159.

Theory [Key Concept]: Walzer's text is regarded as the classic study of ethics and war. Walzer illustrates his deliberations on ethics and war with historical cases. Yet, *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* considerations are also pertinent to assessing and updating strategy for future conflict and competition. How might just war concerns influence the assessment and innovation / adaptation of military strategy?

Note: The selections from the Walzer text focus predominantly on *jus in bello* concerns (just conduct in war – *how* wars are fought); *jus ad bellum* matters (just cause for war – *why* wars are fought) will be addressed in the IS2-512 lecture.

2. David P. Fidler, “Just & Unjust War, Uses of Force & Coercion: An Ethical Inquiry with Cyber Illustrations,” *Daedalus* Vol. 145, No. 4 (Fall 2016): 37-49. [EL]

Extension [Concept Refinement]: Fidler raises questions about the ramifications of the just war tradition for cyber-strategic options (and vice versa).

Note: Fidler’s article addresses various military strategies and strategic concepts. You may wish to use Echevarria’s *Military Strategy* as a reference companion for the piece. Also see the curriculum’s previous cyber content, such as that from Gartzke and Lindsay’s *Cross Domain Deterrence* (WT).

3. Erica Borghard, “Operationalizing Defend Forward: How the Concept Works to Change Adversary Behavior,” *Lawfare* (2002).

Application [Case Study]: Borghard examines the implications of 2018’s “Defend Forward” cyber strategy. At issue: Does the enhanced emphasis on cyber coercion (compellence) risk inadvertent escalation? If so, does the updated strategy fall shy of meeting the *spirit - if not the letter* - of the *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* traditions? Note the implication: Competitors like Russia remain ostensibly unencumbered by consideration of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* “constraints” on their cyber operations. To what extent do (or should) they shape ethical-vs.-practical US cyber operations?

RECOMMENDED READING (OPTIONAL)

1. Erica D. Borghard and Shawn T. Lonergan, “The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace,” *Security Studies* Vol. 26, No. 3: 452-481. [EL]

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

2. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, Ch. IV.
3. Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter II (“Assessment”), pp. II-8 to II-11.
4. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter I (“Principles of Planning,” “Planning,” “Strategic, Theater, and Functional Planning,” “Strategy, Plans, Operations, and Assessments Cycle”), pp. I-2 to I-9; and Chapter III (“Strategy and Campaign Development”), pp. III-1 to III-16.

DAY 9 – STRATEGIC CULTURAL ACCOUNTS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

DATE: 22 February 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend the influence of strategic culture on military strategy.
2. Apply strategic culture explanations to historical cases of and contemporary debates on military strategy.
3. Analyze the links between strategic culture and the innovation / adaptation of military strategy.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-516 (L): Strategic Culture: Ideational-Cultural Influences on Strategy

[Holzimmer]

Overview: This lecture addresses foundational definitions and concepts of strategic culture. It focuses on theoretical debates about the influence of strategic culture on military strategic practices. Specifically, it examines Weigley’s “American way of war” thesis: that the US is predisposed toward focusing on the achievement of battlefield victory rather than attainment of the political object which, in turn, shares links to the US’s biases toward strategies of annihilation and attrition. It further examines Echevarria’s rejoinders to Weigley’s emphasis on the role of strategic culture. The lecture sets the stage for the seminar readings, which examine the relationship between strategic culture and military (and military-strategic) innovation.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-517 (S): Strategic Culture vs. Strategic Innovation?

Overview: How does American strategic culture – US political and military leaders’ shared ideas and expectations about the use of force – shape the innovation of military strategy? Adamsky reviews foundational theories strategic culture, focusing on US strategic cultural inclinations and their links to US military and military strategic innovation. He examines strategic cultural influences on the informational-technological revolution in military affairs (IT-RMA), exemplified as the “Desert Storm Model.” Dougherty, in turn, whether the US’s strategic cultural predilections – specifically, its adherence to the “Desert Storm Model” – pose impediments to innovating for future geo-strategic challenges. As such, Dougherty calls for the adoption of a new American way of war; one that better accounts for the intentions, capabilities, and limitations of strategic competitors. Both Adamsky and Dougherty draw attention to American strategic cultural tendencies toward “mirrored” thinking: the expectation that other states’ military strategic decisions and behaviors will be reflective of US assumptions and calculations (rather their own assumptions and calculations). As such, we turn to Gaswami’s examination of China’s strategic culture and its influence on China’s military-strategic space ambitions.

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. THEORY: Adamsky, *American Strategic Culture and US the Revolution in Military Affairs*, Ch. 3, pp. 5-12 and 33-52. [EL]

Theory and [Key Concept], Extension, and Application: Adamsky examines key elements of American strategic culture, examining their links to military strategic innovation. Focusing on the case of the information-technology revolution in military affairs (IT-RMA), Adamsky examines links between US strategic cultural influences on – and potential inhibitions to the full realization of – the Desert Storm Model. What do you make of Adamsky’s position on the links between strategic culture and innovation? How might it be applied to present-day and future attempts at innovating for strategic effect?

Note 1: Adamsky references the historical predominance of attrition and annihilation strategies in US military thought and experience. See Echevarria’s *Military Strategy*, Chs. 2 and 3, pp. 14-25 and 31- 37, for additional content on attrition and annihilation.

Note 2: You may notice that strategic cultural concepts addressed in the Adamsky and (follow-on) Dougherty pieces build on some of the CMR themes covered on Day 7 of IS2.

2. Christopher M. Dougherty, “Why America Needs a New Way of War,” Center for a New American Security (June 2019): 1-38. [EL]

Extension and Application [Case Study]: Dougherty applies strategic cultural concepts to the question of the US’s preparedness for “large scale war with a great power.” Dougherty contends that the US penchant for techno-centric warfare – its adherence to the “Desert Storm model” – is inadequately suited to the challenges of great power competition, and potentially, the challenges of great power war. Innovating strategic options to account for these challenges – to meet the mandates of the 2018 NDS – Dougherty suggests, will require that the US adopt a new way of war.

Note 1: Dougherty’s article addresses various military strategies; it particularly engages themes of coercion-deterrence (the challenges of deterring adversaries versed in gray zone / hybrid warfare). You may wish to use Echevarria’s *Military Strategy* as a reference companion for the piece.

Note 2: The Adamsky and Dougherty texts highlight themes that color much of the AP2 course, particularly US strategic cultural inclinations toward a “way of battle,” precision strike operations, techno-centrism, etc.

3. “Explaining China’s Space Ambitions and Goals Through the Lens of Strategic Culture,” *The Space Review* (May 18, 2020). [EL]

Application [Case Study]: Building on Dougherty’s discussion of China’s emerging strategic intentions and military capabilities, Gaswami examines the influence of China’s strategic culture on its approach to the space domain.

RECOMMENDED READING (OPTIONAL)

1. Antulio J. Echevarria, III, “Toward an American Way of War,” Strategic Studies Institute (March 2004).
2. Brian McAllister Linn, “The US Armed Forces’ View of War,” *Daedalus* Vol. 140, No. 3 (Summer 2011): 33-44. [EL]

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, Ch. IV.
2. Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter I (“Joint Planning”), pp. I-1 to I-22; and Chapter II (“Strategic

Guidance and Coordination”), pp. II-1 toII-32.

3. Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning.

PHASE IV: STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO REGIONAL CHALLENGES

Building on the questions raised in the Day 9 readings – specifically, questions about whether the US is adequately prepared for and / or innovating for great power competition (or conflict) – Phase IV of IS2 examines the effectiveness of GCC-specific and GCC-relevant military strategies. In keeping with the purpose of the course, Phase IV provides case studies for the evaluation of particular types of military strategy. It asks students to consider the ways that complicating factors (introduced in Phases II and III of the course) can shape the pursuit of US national security interests. Students are encouraged to focus on options for assessing and innovating / adapting those strategies (Phase III) to better meet national security objectives.

DAY 10 – SOUTHCOM AND AFRICOM: CAPACITY-BUILDING

DATE: 23 February 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend capacity building – specifically, security force assistance – as a military strategy and the complicating factors that influence PMI and strategic innovation.
2. Apply an understanding of the above-listed strategy and complicating factors to today's *Debating Strategic Responses* question.
3. Analyze factors that complicate the formulation, execution, assessment, and innovation / adaptation of military strategy with respect to “real but limited” national security objectives.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-518 (L): Common Ventures: Capacity Building in the SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM Areas of Responsibility [Hutto]

Overview: This lecture introduces capacity building and its role in the pursuit of US national security interests. It reviews competing definitions of capacity building, then focuses on capacity building in the context of security cooperation. It goes on to explore factors that influence the effectiveness of capacity building strategies.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-519 (S): SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM: Capacity Building (Security Force Assistance)

Overview: The 2018 *National Defense Strategy* (NDS) summary prioritizes the challenges of posturing for great power competition. On initial review, these concerns seem to engage theater-strategic calculations particular to INDOPACOM and EUCOM. Yet, the challenges of great power competition are transnational in character; they call for engagement from each of the GCCs. The SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM posture statements acknowledge as much; they call for the advancement of US national security interests via partner capacity building efforts. The Day 10 readings examine security force assistance (SFA) as a form of capacity building. Biddle, Macdonald, and Baker evaluate SFA options for tackling “real but limited” national security objectives. They question the efficacy of SFA, given that the interests of SFA recipients often differ from those of SFA providers. Larsdotter applies similarly-themed arguments to the case of US security assistance to states in the African Great Lakes region, calling for changes to the US’s (and others’) strategies. Ellis, finally, proposes that SFA *can*

be a strategically effective option for securing US interests in the SOUTHCOM AOR. This will require, though, that leaders recognize its capabilities and limitations and invest in it appropriately.

Debating Strategic Responses: Are capacity-building strategies effective for the achievement of US policy objectives in the SOUTHCOM/AFRICOM AOR?

How might factors addressed in the previous phases of the course shape their effectiveness?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. NDS Excerpts → SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM Posture Statements.[EL]

Strategic Context: *Skim* for concepts addressed in the IS2-519 overview. You may wish to focus on content relevant to supporting partner states.

Note: Sun Tzu gives primacy to the *indirect approach* (WT); he posits, “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”¹⁰ How might capacity building (via SFA) constitute a variation on the indirect approach?

2. Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* (Apr. 2017): 1-18. [EL]

Theory [Key Concept] and Extension [Concept Refinement]: This piece examines the degree to which SFA enhances partner state military effectiveness. The authors theorize that provider-vs.-recipient interests in SFA may account for strategic shortfalls. They extend this concept to two SFA models: the Salvador model and the FM 3-24 model.

3. DePolo, “The Strategic Relevance of Modern FID and SFA Initiatives,” *Special Operations Journal* 4, 1 (2018): 15-38.

Application [Case Study]: DePolo evaluates the strategic logic of capacity-building efforts. While Biddle et al. contend that the costs of SFA often outweigh its benefits, DePolo suggests that SFA and foreign internal defense (FID) operations, particularly those carried out in the SOUTHCOM AOR, often prove strategically advantageous to the US. What do you make of DePolo’s position? How does it stack up against the position advanced by Biddle et al.?

4. Jacobsen, “Maritime security and capacity building in the Gulf of Guinea,” *African Security Review* 26, 3 (2017): 237-256.

Application [Case Study]: Jacobsen focuses on capacity building efforts off the coast of West Africa, asking whether and how they have had an effect on countering piracy.

¹⁰ Sun Tzu (Griffith translation), *The Art of War*, p. 77.

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication 3-20: Security Cooperation, Appendix B (“Security Force Assistance”).
2. Joint Doctrine Notes 2-19 & 1-18: Strategy.
3. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II (“Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces”), pp. II-1 to II-25; and Chapter III (“Section D: Combatant Commanders”), specifically III-7 to III-9.
4. Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter I (“Fundamentals of Joint Operations”), pp. I-1 to I-14.
5. Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning.
6. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum.

DAY 11 - CENTCOM: DECAPITATION

DATE: 25 February 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend decapitation (related: targeted killing) as a military strategy and the complicating factors that influence PMI and strategic innovation.
2. Apply an understanding of the above-listed strategy and complicating factors to today's *Debating Strategic Responses* question.
3. Analyze factors that complicate the formulation, execution, assessment, and innovation / adaptation of military strategy with respect to counterterrorism objectives.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-520 (S): CENTCOM: VEOs, Decapitation, and Drone Warfare

Overview: Counterterrorism encompasses a range of strategic and tactical options; perhaps most prominent among them is decapitation. Although the strategy is not explicitly addressed in the 2019 CENTCOM posture statement, the Trump administration seems to favor the strategy, as evidenced by reports of its increased reliance on overseas drone strikes.¹⁰ It seems plausible that decapitation and/or targeted killing will remain relevant to CENTCOM theater strategy. Carvin examines the effectiveness of decapitation within the context of a broader counterterrorism strategy; she suggests that the difficulties of gauging its efficacy raises concerns for policymakers and strategists. Byman, and then Kurth Cronin, debate the merits of counterterrorism via drone strike. Byman argues that drones provide economical and low-risk means of decapitation and denial; Kurth Cronin, however, warns against letting “either gadgets or fear determine strategy.” Jordan, finally, provides a case study of the drone campaign in Pakistan, examining its effects on Al Qaeda Central.

Note: The lecture hour goes to preparation for the final briefing and paper.

Debating Strategic Responses: Is decapitation (or the related strategy of targeted killing) an effective strategy for the achievement of US policy objectives in the CENTCOM AOR? Do drones enhance decapitation's / targeted killing's effectiveness for the achievement of US policy objectives in the CENTCOM AOR?

How might factors addressed in the previous phases of the course shape its effectiveness?

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour research, 2.0-hour seminar

GROUP 1 GCC ASSIGNMENT DUE DATES

GCC	Brief	Paper
CENTCOM	25 Feb 21	3 Mar 21, 1630h

REQUIRED READINGS

1. NDS Excerpts → CENTCOM Posture Statement.[EL]

Strategic Context: *Skim* for concepts addressed in IS2-521 overview. You may wish to focus on content relevant to countering violent extremist organizations (VEOs).

2. Stephanie Carvin, “The Trouble With Targeted Killing,” *Security Studies* Vol. 21, No.3: 529-555. [EL]

Theory [Key Concept]: Carvin explores the challenges of evaluating decapitation strategy; she weighs arguments in its favor against those critical of its strategic value.

Note 1: Carvin addresses the tendency toward treating *targeted killing* and *decapitation*, by definition, as the same strategy-type; many strategy experts distinguish between the two (see Echevarria’s *Military Strategy*, Ch. 6). You may also wish to revisit Pape’s coverage of decapitation strategy (AP1), particularly pp. 79-86, 80-86, and 219-223 of *Bombing to Win*.

Note 2: Please be aware that Carvin, as well as Byman, Kurth Cronin, and Jordan, recall IS1 content on violent non-state actors. See IS1 Day 15: VEOs and Non-State Actors.

3. Daniel Byman (2013), “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s WeaponofChoice,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 92, No. 4: pp. 32-43. [EL]

Extension [Concept Refinement]: How well, and to what extent, do drones contribute to decapitation and ultimately, the pursuit of counterterrorism aims? How has the ongoing “drones debate” shaped the evolution of counterterrorism strategy?

Note: The Byman and Kurth Cronin items (see below) are featured as paired debate articles; the “Extension” questions that appear above also apply to the Kurth Cronin article.

4. Audrey Kurth Cronin (2013), “Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 92, No. 4: pp. 44-54.[EL]
5. Javier Jordan, 2014. “The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign Against Al Qaeda Central: A Case Study,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 37, No. 1: pp. 4-29. [EL]

Application [Case Study]: Jordan addresses the effects of drone strikes in Pakistan on Al Qaeda Central. What are the implications of the case study with respect to decapitation (or targeted killing)? How might the lessons of this case apply elsewhere?

RECOMMENDED READINGS (OPTIONAL)

1. Jenna Jordan, Margaret E. Kosal, and Lawrence Rubin, 2017. “The Strategic Illogic of Counterterrorism Policy,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 4: pp. 181-192. [EL]

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication 3-26: Counterterrorism.
2. Joint Doctrine Notes 2-19 & 1-18: Strategy.
3. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II (“Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces”), pp. II-1 to II-25; and Chapter III (“Section D: Combatant Commanders”), specifically III-7 to III-9.
4. Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter I (“Fundamentals of Joint Operations”), pp. I-1 to I-14.
5. Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning.
6. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum.

DAY 12 – EUCOM: EXTENDED DETERRENCE

DATE: 26 February 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend extended deterrence as a military strategy and the complicating factors that influence PMI and strategic innovation.
2. Apply an understanding of the above-listed strategy and complicating factors to today's *Debating Strategic Responses* question.
3. Analyze factors that complicate the formulation, execution, assessment, and innovation / adaptation of military strategy with respect to counter-hybrid objectives.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-521 (S): EUCOM: Extended Deterrence (Enhanced Forward Presence)

Overview: Deterring threats and aggression against allies poses more specific challenges – namely, credibility challenges – than deterring threats and aggression against the homeland. The Day 11 readings explore concepts of extended deterrence. Schelling's introduction to deterrence theory highlights the importance of credibility in deterrence-as-bargaining; it also addresses the implications of surprise attack. Gerson extends these theoretical concepts to the strategy of extended deterrence, focusing specifically on the logic and utility of conventional force options for extended deterrence. Zapfe, then Lanoszka and Hunzeker, examine NATO Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics, addressing the challenges of extended deterrence against a resurgent Russia.

Note: The lecture hour goes to preparation for the final briefing and paper.

Debating Strategic Responses: Is extended deterrence (in the form of enhanced forward presence) an effective strategy for the achievement of US policy objectives in the EUCOM AOR?

How might factors addressed in the previous phases of the course shape its effectiveness?

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour research, 2.0-hour seminar

GROUP 2 GCC ASSIGNMENT DUE DATES

GCC	Brief	Paper
EUCOM	26 Feb 21	3 Feb 21, 1630h

REQUIRED READINGS

1. NDS Excerpts → EUCOM Posture Statement.[EL]

Strategic Context: *Skim* for concepts addressed in IS2-522 overview. You may wish to focus on content relevant to the shift from “engagement and assurance to deterrence and defense.”

2. Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Chs. 1-2 and 9: pp. 3-6, 21-28,35-46, and 207-208.

Theory [Key Concept]: Schelling addresses “binding” – commitment and credibility – in bargaining scenarios. Note the relative importance of credibility in homeland deterrence versus extended deterrence (see Gerson 2009).

Note: This reading (and the subsequent articles) reference themes from WT. You may wish to revisit Schelling’s *Arms and Influence* while reading the Day 13 content.

3. Michael Gerson, 2009. “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” *Parameters* Vol. 39: pp. 32-48. [EL]

Extension [Concept Refinement]: Gerson examines conventional options and capabilities for deterring threats and aggression “against friends and allies.” What are the challenges of (extended) conventional deterrence with respect to credibility? What are the challenges of conventional deterrence with respect to *fait accompli* calculations?

4. Martin Zapfe, 2017. “Deterrence from the Ground Up: Understanding NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence,” *Survival* Vol. 59, No. 3: pp. 147-160.[EL]

Application [Case Study]: Zapfe examines the capabilities and limitations of non-nuclear deterrence, focusing on the case of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics. What risks and shortfalls might enhanced forward presence present? How might they be overcome?

Note: Zapfe, as well as Lanoszka and Hunzeker, recall IS1’s themes on grand strategy and great power competition / conflict. See IS1 Day 11: Russia’s Resurgence as a Great Power.

5. Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, 2016. “Confronting the Anti-Access / Area Denial and Precision Strike Challenge in the Baltic Region,” *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 161, No. 5: pp. 12-18. [EL]

Application [Case Study]: This study further complicates extended deterrence (enhanced forward presence) considerations, focusing on the challenges of Russian anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) efforts and precision strike capabilities. How do these factors undermine NATO’s strategy? Can enhanced forward presence be modified to better account for NATO’s deterrent aims?

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum, pp.10-11.
2. Joint Doctrine Notes 2-19 & 1-18: Strategy.
3. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II (“Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces”), pp. II-1 to II-25; and Chapter III (“Section D: Combatant Commanders”), specifically III-7 to III-9.
4. Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter I (“Fundamentals of Joint Operations”), pp. I-1 to I-14.
5. Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning.
6. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum.

DAY 13 – INDOPACOM: OFFSHORE CONTROL

DATE: 1 March 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend offshore control as a military strategy (and proposed alternatives to offshore control) and the complicating factors that influence PMI and strategic innovation.
2. Apply an understanding of the above-listed strategy and complicating factors to today's *Debating Strategic Responses* question.
3. Analyze factors that complicate the formulation, execution, assessment, and innovation / adaptation of military strategy with respect to counter-A2/AD objectives.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-522 (S): INDOPACOM: Responses to A2/AD

Overview: Hammes calls for refinements to US strategic thinking about China's role in the Asia-Pacific region. He contends that existing operational concepts cannot be expected to substitute for military strategy; strategy, he notes, must account for critical assumptions, ends-ways-means coherence, priorities and sequencing, and a theory of victory. He proposes "offshore control" as a strategic alternative to operational concepts such as AirSea Battle. Haddick, similarly, calls for enhanced strategic options for addressing China's salami-slicing and military modernization efforts. He notes that sustained forward presence is necessary for securing US interests in the Asia-Pacific region, but it requires augmentation. The US, he claims, must overcome organizational tendencies toward matching force to "China's strengths rather than its weaknesses." He calls for a strategy that makes more effective use of US assets, and those of its allies, against China's vulnerabilities.

Note: The lecture hour goes to preparation for the final briefing and paper.

Debating Strategic Responses: Is offshore control an effective strategy for the achievement of US policy objectives in the INDOPACOM AOR?

How might factors addressed in the previous phases of the course shape its effectiveness?

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour research, 2.0-hour seminar

GROUP 3 GCC ASSIGNMENT DUE DATES

GCC	Brief	Paper
INDOPACOM	1 Mar 21	3 Mar 21, 1630h

REQUIRED READINGS

1. NDS Excerpts → INDOPACOM Posture Statement. [EL]

Strategic Context: *Skim* for concepts addressed in IS2-523 overview. You may wish to focus on content relevant to offshore control (Hammes) or strategies for augmenting US forward presence (Haddick).

2. Bartholomees, “The Issue of Attrition,” *Parameters* 40, 1 (2010): 5-19. Focus: “Exhaustion,” pp. 9-14.

Theory [Key Concept]: Bartholomees outlines the strategy of exhaustion, distinguishing it from the related strategy of attrition. He describes blockade-based variations on the strategy, specifying how they employ the military instrument for economic leverage (toward political ends).

3. T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” *Strategic Forum* No. 278 (June 2012): 1-16. [EL]

Extension and Application [Concept Refinement and Case Study]: Hammes questions decision-makers’ focus on Air-Sea Battle – an operational concept – absent broader consideration of military-strategic options. He advances “offshore control” as a strategy for addressing the challenges posed by China’s growing military influence in the Asia-Pacific.

Note 1: Hammes’ proposed offshore control strategy incorporates distant-blockade elements. For additional content on blockade-as-exhaustion, see Echevarria’s *Military Strategy*, pp. 38-40.

Note 2: Hammes, as well as Haddick, recall IS1 content on grand strategy and great power competition. See IS1 Day 12: China’s Ascendance as a Great Power.

4. Robert Haddick, *Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific*, Chs. 4-7, pp. 77-159. *Skim* Ch. 10, pp. 203-218.

Extension and Application [Concept Refinement and Case Study]: Haddick calls for a “competitive” strategy to counter China’s A2/AD and augment US forward presence. This strategy, he says, calls for Pacific partnerships, long-range airpower dominance, and enhanced naval power. Do Haddick’s proposals constitute a cohesive military strategy? If so, how would you categorize them (as a type of military strategy)? How does Haddick’s proposed strategy align with or differ from offshore control?

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Doctrine Notes 2-19 & 1-18: Strategy.
2. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II (“Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces”), pp. II-1 to II-25; and Chapter III (“Section D: Combatant Commanders”), specifically III-7 to III-9.
3. Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter I (“Fundamentals of Joint Operations”), pp. I-1 to I-14.
4. Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning.
5. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum.

DAY 14 – RESEARCH AND WRITING DAY

DATE: 2 March 2021

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-523 (R): Integrated GCC Strategy Assignment Development

Overview: This seminar period is dedicated to preparation for the Integrated GCC Strategy Assignment. Please use this research and writing day to meet with your seminar instructor and assignment team members.

CONTACT HOURS: 3.0-hour research

DAY 15 – NORTHCOM: MISSILE DEFENSE (CONDITIONAL DETERRENCE)

DATE: 3 March 2021

LESSON OBJECTIVES

1. Comprehend classical versus conditional deterrence (related: counterforce) as military strategies and the complicating factors that influence PMI and strategic innovation.
2. Apply an understanding of the above-listed strategies and complicating factors to today's *Debating Strategic Responses* question.
3. Analyze factors that complicate the formulation, execution, assessment, and adaptation of military strategy with respect to homeland defense objectives.

LESSON OVERVIEW

IS2-524 (L): NORTHCOM and The Bomb: Defending Against Nuclear Threats [TBD]

Overview: This lecture addresses the role of NORTHCOM, strategic options for achieving evolving missile defense objectives, and the complexities of matching military means to homeland defense ends.

CONTACT HOURS: 1.0-hour lecture

IS2-525 (S): NORTHCOM: Missile Defense (Conditional Deterrence)

Overview: The Day 15 content centers on deterrence concepts central to national missile defense (and related counterforce concepts) and their implications for homeland defense ends. The readings revisit deterrence debates, extending theoretical concepts to practical considerations: evolving security threats and the limitations of missile defense capabilities. Gibilterra contrasts classical deterrence with conditional deterrence; conditional deterrence, he notes, implies that national missile defense could be effective under certain conditions. Crouch et al. extend these concepts to practical considerations: evolving US missile defense capabilities, and evolving threats from Iran and North Korea. Buontempo, finally, examines the case of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, addressing its implications for enhanced homeland ballistic missile defense (BMD) effectiveness.

Debating Strategic Responses: Is a BMD-centric strategy (and specifically, conditional deterrence) an effective strategy for the achievement of US policy objectives in the NORTHCOM AOR?

How might factors addressed in the previous phases of the course shape its effectiveness?

CONTACT HOURS: 2.0-hour seminar

REQUIRED READINGS

1. NORTHCOM Posture Statement. [EL]
Strategic Context: *Skim* for concepts addressed in IS2-525 overview. You may wish to focus on content relevant to ballistic missile defense.
2. John Gibilterra, 2015. "Conditional Deterrence and Missile Defense," *Comparative Strategy* Vol. 34, No. 1: pp. 64-73. [EL]

Theory [Key Concept]: Classical deterrence suggests that missile defense is destabilizing, while conditional deterrence suggests that a “limited” missile shield can increase stability. What are the implications of this debate for national security decision-makers?

3. J.D. Crouch, Robert Joseph, Keith B. Payne, and Jayson Roehl, 2009. “Missile Defense and National Security: The Need to Sustain a Balanced Approach,” *Comparative Strategy* Vol. 28, No. 1: pp. 1-9. [EL]

Extension [Concept Refinement]: This article examines missile defense advances since 2001, asserting that the US should seek a “balanced capability” to defend against current and future threats and missiles of various ranges. How does this concept of national missile defense fit within broader theoretical debates on classical versus conditional deterrence? How can it be extended to recent-year developments in North Korea and Iran?

4. Joseph T. Buontempo, 2015. “A Trajectory for Homeland Ballistic Missile Defense,” *Defense and Security Analysis* Vol. 31, No. 2: pp. 99-109. [EL]

Application [Case Study]: Buontempo extends concepts inherent to missile defense debates to the case of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. How might the results of this case study inform options for enhanced homeland BMD effectiveness?

RECOMMENDED READINGS (OPTIONAL)

1. Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, 2001. “National Missile Defense and the Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy,” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1: pp. 40-92. [EL]

RELATED JOINT DOCTRINE

1. Joint Publication 3-01: Countering Air and Missile Threats.
2. Joint Doctrine Notes 2-19 & 1-18: Strategy.
3. Joint Publication 1, Chapter II (“Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces”), pp. II-1 to II-25; and Chapter III (“Section D: Combatant Commanders”), specifically III-7 to III-9.
4. Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter I (“Fundamentals of Joint Operations”), pp. I-1 to I-14.
5. Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning.
6. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum.