Gender Roles in the Arctic Region

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## Table of Contents

Preface \hspace{2em} iv  
Overview of Arctic People (Indigenous & Non-Indigenous) \hspace{2em} 1  
1. Indigenous Groups Living in the Arctic \hspace{2em} 16  

[NOTE: 7 out 8 Arctic countries have indigenous people living in the Arctic. Exception is Iceland]

A. Aleut [Russia/US-Alaska] \hspace{2em} 16  
Gender Roles \hspace{2em} 21  
B. Athabascan [US-Alaska] \hspace{2em} 36  
Gender Roles \hspace{2em} 41  
C. Chukchi [Russia] \hspace{2em} 54  
Gender Roles \hspace{2em} 60  
D. Dolgan [Russia] \hspace{2em} 69  
Gender Roles \hspace{2em} 72  
E. Enets [Russia] \hspace{2em} 80  
Gender Roles \hspace{2em} 83  
F. Eskimo (Yupik) [Russia/US-Alaska] \hspace{2em} 83  
Gender Roles \hspace{2em} 88  
G. Evens [Russia] \hspace{2em} 97  
Gender Roles \hspace{2em} 102  
H. Evenk [Russia] \hspace{2em} 111  
Gender Roles \hspace{2em} 114  
I. Gwichin [Canada/US-Alaska] \hspace{2em} 124  
Gender Roles \hspace{2em} 127  
J. Inuit (Inuvialuit/Kalaallit/Inupiat) [Canada/Denmark/US] \hspace{2em} 138  
Gender Roles \hspace{2em} 142
K. Khanty [Russia] 152
  Gender Roles 158
L. Nenets [Russia] 166
  Gender Roles 170
M. Nganasan [Russia] 183
  Gender Roles 188
N. Sami [Finland/Norway/Russia/Sweden] 199
  Gender Roles 204
O. Yukagir [Russia] 216
  Gender Roles 219

2. Non-Indigenous People Living in the Arctic 222
A. Canada 222
  Gender Roles 233
B. Denmark (Greenland) 248
  Gender Roles 255
C. Finland 266
  Gender Roles 271
D. Iceland 281
  Gender Roles 286
E. Norway 295
  Gender Roles 302
F. Russia 312
  Gender Roles 325
G. Sweden 342
  Gender Roles 348
H. United States (Alaska) 365
  Gender Roles 375
Preface

This report creates a catalog of resources for use on the topic “Gender Roles in the Arctic Region.” This catalog of resources is in response to a request by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Air University (AU) Academic Centers, USAF Culture and Language Center (AFCLC) at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama and is in support of the AFCLC mission.

The mission of the AFCLC is to serve as the USAF focal point for creating and executing programs that sustain career-long development of Linguistically, Regionally, and Culturally competent Total Force Airmen to meet the Service’s global mission. In addition to providing subject matter expertise and support for Air Force Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) governance, the AFCLC accomplishes this mission by designing, developing and delivering: 1) LREC familiarization education to AU officer, enlisted, and accessions programs; and 2) pre-deployment training and training products.

As a Research Analyst for Metro Professional Services, the researcher has identified open source material on Gender Roles in the Arctic Region by using multiple sources during his research. This catalog includes academic journal articles, books and other legitimate peer-reviewed, academic resources. Sources are categorized by topic and broken down into relevant sub-topics based on the request of the AFCLC representative or on the discernment of the researcher. Catalog entries include Title, Author, Source, Date and Content Abstract, Summary or Overview that gives the end user a sense of what the author has to say about the selected topic and sub-topic. The text used in this compilation is taken verbatim from the source, and none of this information is intended to be viewed as a product of AFCLC or Metro Professional Services. Inclusion in this compilation does not constitute endorsement of the source by AFCLC.
Overview of Arctic People (Indigenous & Non-Indigenous):


Overview:

The Arctic is a region like no other in the world and it’s warming twice as fast, bringing with it rapid change impacting life on land and at sea.

About 4 million people live in the Arctic, spread out over eight countries, including the United States. Diverse landscapes—from the sea ice to coastal wetlands, upland tundra, mountains, wide rivers, and the sea itself—support abundant wildlife and many cultures. Of all the wildlife in the Arctic, the polar bear is the most fitting icon for this region. It’s amazing adaptation to life in the harsh Arctic environment makes it an impressive species.

Within America’s Arctic, the remarkably productive waters of the Bering Sea attract marine mammals, such as gray whales, which travel great distances to forage and raise their young. Almost half of the fish caught in the United States comes from here making fisheries vital to local livelihoods. Across the Bering Sea in Russia, the Kamchatka Peninsula’s River systems produce up to one-quarter of all wild Pacific salmon. The salmon provide nourishment to other wildlife, including the Kamchatka brown bear.

The Arctic, including the Bering, Beaufort and Chukchi seas, now faces an uncertain future due to climate change, mining, shipping, oil and gas development, and overfishing.

Current & Relevant Information:

Living in the Arctic

In the Arctic, nature operates at extremes. The climate is intense, landscape often treacherous and weather can be brutal. No matter the season, everyday life for the 4 million people living in the region is inextricably linked to the environment.

As a rapidly warming climate brings on new conservation challenges, these problems impact both people and the nature. Shrinking sea ice forces polar bears to spend more time on land, and people and bears can come into conflict. New ambitions to drill for oil and gas bring never-before-seen risk to regions that are home to some of the most pristine habitats (or landscapes) and unique wildlife on the planet.

Arctic indigenous peoples are acutely aware of these growing tensions. They’ve lived off the land and hunted animals for food, clothing, and other essential uses for generations. Such a way of life is threatened almost daily by climate extremes.
The Arctic Council reports that roughly 400,000 indigenous people live throughout the Arctic. They speak over 40 languages, some of which have few remaining speakers. Still, estimating numbers of Indigenous people in the Arctic is difficult. Not everybody collects the numbers, and different countries define “indigenous” differently.

“Arctic Indigenous Peoples,” Arctic Centre University of Lapland [2]
https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion/Arctic-Indigenous-Peoples

Overview:

Indigenous peoples have inhabited the Arctic for thousands of years. The proportion indigenous people is estimated to be about 10 percent of total population living in arctic areas. There are over 40 different ethnic groups living in the Arctic. Map with fact boxes on Indigenous peoples who are permanent participants at the Arctic Council.

Current & Relevant Information:

Arctic indigenous peoples include for example Saami in circumpolar areas of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Northwest Russia, Nenets, Khanty, Evenk and Chukchi in Russia, Aleut, Yupik and Inuit (Inupiat) in Alaska, Inuit (Inuvialuit) in Canada and Inuit (Kalaallit) in Greenland. All of the above-mentioned countries except Iceland have indigenous peoples living within their Arctic territory. Official statistics do not necessarily recognize indigenous populations separately, although differences occur. The number of indigenous people is not accurate because of the definition of indigenousness. Demography of indigenous peoples of the Arctic based on linguistic groups.

There is a great variation of cultural, historical and economic backgrounds among the groups. However, a common feature for most of the indigenous communities in the Arctic is that they have already undergone substantial changes due to the globalization of the western way of life, state policies, modern transport and the introduction of mixed economy.

In general, indigenous people have a specific connection to land that they have inhabited. Other features, for example distinct language, culture and traditional livelihoods such as reindeer herding, fishing and hunting are characteristics of indigenous people in the Arctic. Industrialization, social change and environmental problems such as climate change, however, present threats to the continuity of these livelihoods and culture.

Recently, political organization of indigenous peoples has led to international recognition and clarification of human and political rights concerning indigenous populations. Rights to land and natural resources are an important part of the culture and survival of indigenous peoples in the Arctic.
Settlement in the Arctic regions

Arctic areas are inhabited approximately by four million people according to the AHDR definition (Arctic Human Development Report) of the Arctic. The settlement area is divided between eight Arctic countries; Canada, United States, Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Denmark. The circumpolar region is extremely sparsely populated. Using more broad definition, according to the University of the Arctic Atlas, there are approximately 13.1 million people living in the area of the circumpolar North, see the map Indigenous population in the Arctic.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the number of Arctic people started to grow rapidly because of improved health care for indigenous populations and the discovery of vast natural resources located in North which led to a large influx of immigrants. Recently population growth in the Arctic has slowed down in general and in some cases (e.g., Russian North) the total population has been even declining. It is estimated that two thirds of the total population live in relatively large settlements. The settlement of the indigenous peoples living in circumpolar countries is characterized by small, widely scattered communities.


Overview:

Have You Ever Wondered...

- How long have people lived in the Arctic?
- How many cultures live in Arctic zones today?
- How is climate change affecting the Arctic?

Current & Relevant Information:

Where exactly is the Arctic? It isn’t marked by a border or line of latitude. Instead, it is the region of the world surrounding the Arctic Ocean. In general, this zone includes land that is too far north to support most agriculture.

Today, around four million people live in the Arctic. About 10 percent of them belong to Indigenous cultures that have long lived in the region. In fact, the Arctic is home to more than 40 ethnic groups. They live across Alaska (U.S.A.), Canada, Greenland, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Russia.

The Indigenous cultures of the Arctic are widespread and diverse. They include the Inuit people, a culture made up of several unique groups across Canada, Greenland, and Alaska. Others include the Saami, Aleut, Yupik, Chukchi, and several other Indigenous groups.
Each of these cultures has its own unique customs and traditions. However, they also have a lot in common with one another. For instance, all Indigenous groups living in the Arctic have a close relationship with the land they live on.

If you’re used to a warmer climate, the Arctic region may seem inhospitable. But to the Indigenous people who have lived there for generations, it’s plentiful. If you live in the region, you know it’s full of resources. You just need to know where and when to look for them.

Most Arctic peoples engage in hunting and fishing. These activities are a main source of food. After all, it’s difficult to grow crops in the region! Many Indigenous cultures in the area also herd animals such as reindeer.

Today, Arctic Indigenous people have another thing in common: the effects of climate change. The warming climate has led to melting permafrost. It has also caused changes in the migration patterns of many animals. This affects people’s way of life and access to food sources.

Many Indigenous cultures of the Arctic have spoken out about the effects of climate change. Their advocacy resulted in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Completed in 2005, it was the first report of its kind. It outlined the impacts of climate change on the Arctic and made the case for protections.

Today, the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic continue to live in harmony with the land. Many continue to push for environmental protections. And, of course, they carry on the customs and traditions that have been passed down for thousands of years.

What traditions run in your family? Is the area you live in affected by climate change? Today, take some time to learn more about a culture different from your own. You may just find something you have in common!


Overview:

THE ARCTIC COUNCIL AND ARCTIC PEOPLES

To cater for the differing needs of Arctic inhabitants, the human dimension of the Arctic Council’s work covers a wide array of areas, from mental and physical health and well-being, to sustainable development, local engagement, education, youth and gender equality. Arctic Peoples are represented in the Council by the Permanent Participants, and their work is supported by the Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat.

Current & Relevant Information:

The Arctic is home to almost four million people today – Indigenous Peoples, more recent arrivals, hunters and herders living on the land and city dwellers. Roughly 10
percent of the inhabitants are Indigenous and many of their peoples distinct to the Arctic. They continue their traditional activities in the context of an ever-changing world. Yet, as the Arctic environment changes, so do livelihoods, cultures, traditions, languages and identities of Indigenous Peoples and other communities.

Changes in the Arctic affect inhabitants in various ways. Arctic communities are already facing challenges that result from the impacts of climate change, demonstrating the need for action to strengthen resilience and facilitate adaptation. At the same time, the Arctic offers potential for sustainable economic development that both brings benefits to local communities and offers ground for innovation transcending the region.

https://www.arcgis.com/apps/Cascade/index.html?appid=2228ac6bf45a4cebafc1c3002f0f0c4

Overview:
Indigenous Peoples have lived in their Arctic homelands for millennia. The land and waters of the Arctic anchor indigenous societies. They provide resources upon which their cultures continue to survive.

Map above showing the Indigenous population distribution in the Arctic (blue circles) by region and the Arctic boundary (red) according to the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP). Sources: AMAP, Natural Earth.

Current & Relevant Information:

The Arctic Council

The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental cooperative forum focused on environmental and sustainable development issues. Its founding document is the Ottawa Declaration, a political agreement. The Council is unique in that it provides a place for the Arctic states, Arctic Indigenous Peoples and other inhabitants to discuss Arctic issues. The Arctic Council is not a treaty-based organization and
operates by consensus. It makes recommendations to governments but has no power to enforce action.

**Permanent Participants**

Permanent Participants are organizations representing Arctic Indigenous peoples in the Council. They are supported by the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat.

**Aleut International Association (AIA)**

There are about 19,000 Aleuts in the United States and Russian Federation living on a chain of islands that stretch between the North Pacific and Bering Sea from southwest Alaska to Russia. They speak mostly English and Russian. Eastern Aleut is the dialect of the Aleut language with the most speakers, with several other endangered or extinct dialects. The Aleut International Association was formed in 1998 to address the environmental and cultural concerns of the Aleut People who have been living in the Bering Sea region for millennia.

**Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC)**

AAC was formed in 2000 and represents approximately 45,000 people who traditionally live inland in a vast stretch of taiga and tundra. Their region has been continuously occupied for the last 10,000 years. AAC was established through a treaty signed by indigenous representatives from Alaska, and the Yukon and Northwest Territories in Canada.

**Gwich’in Council International (GCI)**

Approximately 9,000 Gwich’in live in small communities scattered across the Northwest Territories, Yukon and Alaska. GCI was established as a non-profit organization in 1999 by the Gwich’in Tribal Council to ensure all parts of the Gwich’in Nation in the Northwest Territories, Yukon and Alaska are represented at the Arctic Council.

**Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC)**

The Inuit Circumpolar Council represents 160,000 Inuit living in four countries. Founded in 1977, ICC was one of the three original Permanent Participants at the Arctic Council (along with the Saami Council and the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North).

**Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON)**

Indigenous Peoples live in approximately 60% of the territory of the Russian Federation, from Murmansk in the west to Kamchatka in the east. There are 40 different groups of Indigenous People in the Russian north with a total population of 244,000. The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North was founded in 1990 at the First Congress of Indigenous Peoples of the North of USSR and is an
umbrella organization for 35 regional and ethnic organizations of Indigenous Peoples.

Saami Council International

The Saami Council was established in 1956, making it the oldest Indigenous Peoples Organization in the Arctic. The Saami Council was one of the three original Permanent Participants and represents approximately 100,000 in northern Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Kola Peninsula in Russia.

Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS)

IPS was established in 1994 under the auspices of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), the forerunner of the Arctic Council. The role of the secretariat is to facilitate contributions from the Permanent Participants to the cooperation of the eight Arctic states and to assist the Permanent Participants in their work, and provide them with necessary information and materials. IPS is now based in the offices of the Arctic Council in Tromsø, Norway.
The Arctic Council is unique in that it provides a place for the Arctic states, Arctic Indigenous Peoples and other inhabitants to discuss Arctic issues.

This above map shows the approximate regions of the 6 Permanent Participants which include: Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), Saami Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), Aleut International Association (AIA), Gwich’in Council International (GCI), and Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC). Sources: Philippe Rekacewicz - GRID-Arendal.

Indigenous societies have imbued the land with meaning; every feature is named and linked to the history and spiritual lives of the people. Their cultures have adapted and evolved along with their understanding and appreciation of their world.
The above map shows the many Arctic Indigenous culture groups and Indigenous languages. sources: CAFF, AMAP.


Overview:

The Arctic, or circumpolar, peoples are the indigenous inhabitants of the northernmost regions of the world. For the most part, they live beyond the climatic limits of agriculture, drawing a subsistence from hunting, trapping, and fishing or from pastoralism. Thus, climatic gradients, rather than simple latitude, determine the
effective boundaries of the circumpolar region, and these gradients have their counterparts in the major environmental transitions. Of these transitions, the most important is the tree line, which marks the northern margin of the coniferous forest, or taiga. Between this limit and the coasts of the Arctic Ocean, the land consists of open tundra, though, in regions of high altitude, pockets of tundra lie enclosed within the forest zone.

Arctic environments are commonly imagined to be barren and inhospitable, habitable only by virtue of the extreme physical endurance and technical virtuosity of the peoples who dwell in them. Though their possession of these qualities is not in doubt, this view of the far north rests on a misconception. The image of the remote wilderness, to be conquered through a struggle for survival, belongs to the language of the alien explorer, not to that of the native. For indigenous people, the circumpolar environment is neither hostile nor forbidding but familiar and generous, offering the gift of livelihood to those who would treat it with consideration and respect.

Though there are indeed seasons of scarcity, these alternate with periods of extraordinary abundance. The continuous daylight of the warm Arctic summer, coupled with ample surface water from melting snow, allows for a phenomenal rate of growth of surface vegetation, and this in turn attracts a multitude of animals, many of them of migratory species. Warm ocean currents around some of the Arctic coasts are likewise conducive to an abundance of marine fauna. It is not, then, scarcity that characterizes the Arctic environment but rather its seasonality. The resources available for human subsistence—which are primarily faunal rather than vegetable—tend to occur in great concentrations at particular times of year, rather than being widely dispersed and continuously available. These fluctuations naturally affect the settlement patterns and movements of human populations, as do the marked seasonal variations in the length of day and night and in the opportunities afforded by the landscape for transport and travel.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

**Adaptations to local environments**

The three major environmental zones of forest, tundra, and coast, and the transitions between them, establish the range of conditions to which the ways of life of the circumpolar peoples are adapted. These conditions are strikingly uniform across both northern North America and Eurasia, and this uniformity is matched by remarkable similarities in cultural adaptation throughout the circumpolar region. Broadly speaking, it is possible to class these adaptations into four kinds. The first is entirely confined within the forest and is based on the exploitation of its fairly diverse resources of land animals, birds, and fish. Local groups tend to be small and widely scattered, each exploiting a range of territory around a fixed, central location. The second kind of adaptation spans the transition between forest and tundra. It is characterized by a heavy, year-round dependence on herds of reindeer or caribou,
whose annual migrations from the forest to the tundra in spring and from the tundra back to the forest in autumn are matched by the lengthy nomadic movements of the associated human groups—whether these be of hunters (as in North America), who aim to intercept the herds on their migrations, or of pastoralists (as in Eurasia), who are in continuous association with them. The third kind of adaptation, most common among Inuit (Eskimo) groups, involves a seasonal movement in the reverse direction, between the hunting of sea mammals on the coast in winter and spring and the hunting of caribou and fishing on the inland tundra in summer and autumn. Fourth, typical of cultures of the northern Pacific coast is an exclusively maritime adaptation. People live year-round in relatively large, coastal settlements, hunting the rich resources of marine mammals from boats in summer and from the ice in winter.

Identification of Eastern and Western Arctic cultures

In northern North America the forest and forest-tundra modes of subsistence are practiced only by Indian peoples, while coastal and coastal-tundra adaptations are the exclusive preserve of the Inuit and of the Aleut of the northern Pacific islands. Indian cultures are thus essentially tied to the forest, whereas Inuit and Aleut cultures are entirely independent of the forest and tied rather to the coast. Conventionally, this contrast has been taken to mark the distinction between peoples of the subarctic and those of the Arctic. Thus, in this article, of the indigenous peoples of northern North America, only the Inuit and Aleut are considered to be Arctic, whereas the Indian groups are dealt with separately in the article American subarctic people. A division of this kind, however, cannot be applied to the indigenous peoples of northern Eurasia. Apart from the Siberian Yupik (Eskimo), and perhaps some coastal Chukchi and Koryak inhabiting the northeastern tip of Siberia, there are no exclusively Arctic peoples in Eurasia. As among the Indians of the American subarctic, forest and forest-tundra adaptations predominate. For this reason, it has been necessary to treat the Eurasian Arctic and subarctic together as a single culture area. It should be noted, moreover, that the southern limits of this area are defined more by considerations of environmental adaptation than by culture per se. A number of Eurasian peoples are distributed over regions that span the transition between the taiga forest and the grassland steppe to the south. In such instances, only the forest-dwelling groups of these peoples will be considered here.

Apart from the absence of a cultural division corresponding to the environmental division between Arctic and subarctic, the north of the Old World is distinguished from that of the New in two major respects. The first lies in the domestication of the reindeer, the second in the history of settlement and European contact. The domestic reindeer is ubiquitous throughout Arctic and subarctic Eurasia (except the Pacific coast), whereas the North American caribou—which is virtually identical to the Eurasian wild reindeer—has never been domesticated. As a domestic animal, the reindeer is unusual both in that it has not been removed from its natural area of
distribution and in its lack of deviation from the wild form. Originally employed within the hunting cultures of the forest, the eventual consequence of its adoption was the emergence among the peoples of the forest-tundra transition, from Lapland to the Bering Strait, of a unique form of pastoralism. It also led to the disappearance of the wild reindeer from most of this territory, since the wild animals lost out in the competition for pasture. In the absence of the domestic deer, an equivalent form of pastoralism never developed spontaneously on the American continent. Attempts were made, at the end of the 19th century, to introduce reindeer herding into Alaska, using imported deer and herdsmen, but they were notoriously unsuccessful.

As regards the history of settlement and contact, the most obvious difference is that the Russian exploration of Siberia was virtually complete at a time when the European exploration of northern North America had hardly begun. Although both movements of exploration were dominated by the fur trade and although it had very similar consequences for native communities on both continents, the former belongs to the earlier history of the trade, the latter to its later phases. In the European subarctic the contrast is even more striking, for there is a history of contact between its native people, the Sami (Lapps), and Finnish and Scandinavian settlers that dates back almost 2,000 years and that is part of indigenous cultural tradition. In the case of the Finns and the Sami, even the respective languages are closely related. This situation of continuous contact is a far cry from the encounter, in the North American Arctic, between Euro-Americans and Inuit, which brought together representatives of cultural worlds that, until that time, had had separate histories and had remained completely unaware of each other’s existence.

**Relations with the encompassing nation-states**

The eventual outcome of the history of contact on both continents, however, has been that indigenous groups have come into the knowledge not only of the world of their colonizers but also of one another. For the first time, for example, Sami people came to know of the existence of Inuit, and vice versa, and to realize that as the indigenous populations of their respective lands they share common problems, interests, and aspirations. This mutual awareness has been given political expression on an international level in the notion of the “Fourth World,” uniting all such indigenous minorities encompassed within the boundaries of modern nation-states. Though the notion is intended to be of global application, its force has been felt above all in relation to the peoples of the north, in northwestern Europe and North America, all of whom presently find themselves citizens of Western liberal democracies and both beneficiaries and victims of the institutions of welfare capitalism that have been developed in these countries since World War II.

This points to one of the major criteria of the modern world for dividing the indigenous peoples of the circumpolar region—namely, the artificially imposed geopolitical division between East and West. The Sami, as citizens of the Nordic countries, have been much more closely identified with their counterparts in North
America than with the indigenous minorities of Siberia, for the recent history of the latter group was for decades shaped by its incorporation within the overall political and administrative framework of the U.S.S.R. Yet in both East and West the lands traditionally occupied by native groups have turned out to contain reserves of raw materials and energy vital to the industrial growth and prosperity of the encompassing states as well as to be of crucial significance for their strategic defense. This has brought money and jobs to the north, as well as the trappings of large-scale and advanced technology. But the jobs are largely filled, and the technology operated, not by native people but by a skilled immigrant workforce. Native people have become socially and economically marginalized in their own homelands.

It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the ways of life and livelihood of the indigenous peoples of the circumpolar north are bound to become things of the past, as natives abandon their “traditional” occupations of hunting, trapping, fishing, and herding and take to “modern” ways. Though it is true that northern native people have been quick to adopt certain elements of modern technology and consumer hardware, from snowmobiles to radios and televisions, this is because their use, alongside more traditional items, makes good practical sense in the context of everyday life. And, although the purchase of these and other items necessarily involves them to an increasing extent in the workings of a money economy, this involvement represents an attempt to sustain, rather than to abandon, a valued form of livelihood. People are not forced to make an all-or-nothing choice between the paths of tradition and modernity. Far from attesting to a state of transitional disorientation, as though suspended between two worlds and two times, such creative blends of the old and the new show that, for the peoples of the north, life is an ongoing concern. It is only because of the Western tendency to equate indigenous cultures with an exclusive adherence to tradition that they seem always to be on the point of disappearing.


Overview:

There are now approximately 4 million people living permanently in the Arctic, with the vast majority of them having come to the area as populations expanded elsewhere, access and communications were improved, and natural resources were exploited.

Discoveries of oil, minerals, and diamonds in the North, and a growing interest in Arctic tourism and ecotourism, are bringing many non-indigenous people to the Arctic to both visit and live.

Indigenous populations now range from about 80% in Greenland, 50% in Canada, 20% in Alaska, 15% in Arctic Norway and as little as 3-4% in Arctic Russia.
In contrast, Antarctica has no indigenous populations. The permanent human population of the Arctic - about 4,000,000. The Antarctic - 0.

“Migration in the Arctic,” Timothy Heleniak, Arctic Yearbook, 2014 [8]  

Abstract:

People have been migrating to, from, and within the Arctic regions for centuries. Because of the small overall population size and small size of settlements, migration has a significant impact on overall population change and changing human capital in the Arctic. Much of the migration in the Arctic is driven by changing resource availability. This is true of the migration of Arctic indigenous peoples as well as the movements of outsiders. The various booms and busts of resources drive much of the migration in the Arctic, though climate change is having an increasing impact in some settlements. This chapter examines both internal and international migration movements in the Arctic. Internal flows are those within Arctic countries and regions and include movements up the urban hierarchy from smaller to larger settlements which is the predominate trend. International migration are flows to and from the Arctic from other countries. Flows of people from outside the Arctic to work in resource extraction projects have increased in recent years. Movement of Arctic natives to outside the Arctic has also become common resulting in a large Arctic diaspora population. Following discussion of broad migration flows is a disaggregation of those flows by age, gender, and level of education, key factors affecting human capital in Arctic regions and settlements. The focus of the paper is on how migration flows impact human capital in the Arctic both positively and negatively. Policies of Arctic countries and regions towards migration is examined as the state plays a larger role in impacting the spatial distribution of the population than elsewhere.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

Since the time when the first humans crossed the Bering land bridge following the retreat of the last ice age, migration has played a large role in shaping the size, distribution, and composition of the Arctic population. The overall population of the Arctic is quite small and the sizes of even the largest settlements are not very large compared to those elsewhere in the world. Thus, the movement of people into or out of the settlements or regions in the Arctic has an enormous impact on the size and composition of the populations. This chapter provides an overview of recent trends and patterns of migration in the Arctic. It begins by examining some of the main factors influencing migration in the Arctic, followed by a comparative look at
migration across the region, followed by a region-by-region analysis of migration across each Arctic region.

Conclusion

Based on current migration patterns in the Arctic several trends about migration in the future can be identified. This is already the case in many Arctic regions. First, even though there is increased attention to the Arctic and increased resource development, much of the resource development requires rather small and concentrated workforces, thus with a number of local examples, there is not likely to be a huge influx of people to the Arctic in the foreseeable future. According to projections in the forthcoming AHDR, the population of the Arctic is projected to increase only slightly from 4.0 million in 2010 to 4.2 million in 2030 (Heleniak, 2014). The period of rapid growth of the Arctic population from migration seems to be subsiding. Between 2000 and 2010, the population of the Arctic actually declined slightly, by 56,000 people or 1.4 percent. Second, in spite of the overall decline in migration into the Arctic, with more countries becoming interested in the Arctic, people from a wider variety of countries will come to the region, many as labor migrants. Third, as documented above in the section on migration in each Arctic region, there is a clear trend towards increased migration into the larger urban areas in the Arctic that is expected to continue.

1. Indigenous Groups Living in the Arctic:

[NOTE: 7 out 8 Arctic countries have indigenous people living in the Arctic. Exception is Iceland]

A. Aleut [Russia/US-Alaska]:


Overview:

The Aleut people are now living in the Commander Islands in Russia, the Pribilof Islands, the Western part of the Alaska Peninsula as well as in the Aleutian Islands in the United States. Aleuts were forced to leave the Aleutian Islands and move to the Pribilof Islands after the discovery of the Pribilof Islands by Russians in 1780 (JOCHELSON 1868:43), to the Commander Islands from Atka and Attu in 1826 and to the Kuril Islands since 1828, including 30 people from Attu in 1872, then to the Commander Islands in 1888 to hunt sea otters for the Russian-American Company (JOCHELSON 1968:42-43). Excluding such dislocations, the Aleut original homeland is the Aleutian Islands and the Alaska Peninsula.

The Aleutian Islands are located north of 52 degrees north latitude stretching West to East in 30 degrees wide in longitude, dividing the Bering Sea from the north Pacific. Though geographically and in cultural areas the Aleutian Islands are
classified as Arctic, there exists no tundra (that is, free from permafrost) and no ocean ice except in the Cold Bay area on the Alaska Peninsula. The Islands may be thought to have an exceptional non-Arctic warmer environment in the Arctic cultural area because the cold water and winds of the relatively shallow Bering Sea meet the warm water and air of the Japan Current as it crosses the north Pacific above the extremely deep Aleutian Trench, both air turbulence and fog are formed in all seasons, and it is often called the 'birthplace of fog and wind.' The tide moving through narrow straits between some of the steep and sharp-edged islands becomes mountainous riptides (LANTIS 1984:161) especially on the Pacific side.

Native people living in the Aleutian Islands have been wholly dependent on local coastal and marine resources such as sea mammals, fish, sea birds, invertebrates and driftwood, and there are no trees growing in the islands. By using local resources through many generations, the Aleutian Islanders have elaborated special adaptation strategies, producing the Aleut culture from a general Eskimo base.

Current & Relevant Information:

Conclusions

To conclude the points discussed in previous sections I will sum up the interrelation of the six features proposed in the first section.

One important environmental feature in the Aleutian Islands is the isolation and localization of dwelling places but the Aleut people exploited their adjacent islands as fishing camps and hunting grounds beyond the limit of their homeland. Of course, this expansion of their activities was made possible by kayaks of the highest quality and their navigation techniques and knowledge. Building kayaks were made possible by driftwood and bentwood technology, and by large sea mammal hunting to supply enough skins.

Another feature of the island environment is their coastal zone complex enough but resourceful for a great of variety of "minor" activities, which made it possible to supply emergency food for people in the famines caused by their harsh climate which is the third feature of an island environment.


Overview:

DH (04:46): Please share a bit about yourself in terms of your heritage, where’s home for you and focus of your life’s work.

LM: (Aleut) What I said in my language, which is the Aleut language, Aleut people lived in the Bering Sea area for about 10,000 years. We still live there. In Aleut, my traditional name is Kuuyux, I come from the people of the sea lion. Sea lions are to
us are like the bison are to the plains Indians or the whales are to the Eskimos of the far north. My traditional name Kuuyux means extension like an arm extending out from the body and was given to me when I was four years old. It is given to one person in each lifetime, so my Kuuyux which was the older man, looked for me, found me and designated me the next Kuuyux when I was four.

My generation was the last generation to have a fully intact traditional upbringing. I spent equal amounts of time with every segment of the community. So, I spent equal amounts of time with the women, who took me out berry picking. I had to be there when they were preparing the foods, the wild foods that we ate. And with the men with hunting, fishing, and with the elders who would take me out camping, and would be there storytelling. To get to know my grandfather and for him to get to know me I had to spend 24 hours a day with him, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, for two years. I went to work with him. I went to bed with him. I went early in the morning out to the Bering Sea, where we’d take the Bering Sea water over our bodies, and praying towards the east as the sun rises. Then that very evening we might go to the Russian Orthodox church – he saw no real distinction between that, to terms of core spirituality that he was involved with. My Aachaa, I had a traditional relationship with an Aachaa, is a mentor type role of an older person with a younger person. My Aachaa picked me out when I was 5 years old and he taught me much of what I know about being Aleut about hunting about relationship to people, and about being a man, and relationship and understanding of nature. Yet literally from age 5 to age 13 he may have said no more than 200 words to me because words are considered in a traditional way not only to be superfluous but to diminish one’s own understanding of things that are based on one’s own inherent intelligence, of what we call the real human being.


Overview:

Our surroundings and society are both constantly evolving. Some changes are due to natural processes. People are responsible for other changes, because of what we do—for example, increasing the size of the population, expanding technology, and increasing mobility and connectivity. And some changes—like climate change—are due to a combination of natural processes and actions of people. In the Arctic, including the Aleutian Islands, marine and coastal ecosystems have seen the largest number of regime shifts with direct and indirect consequences for subsistence activities, commercial fisheries, and coastal communities (Council 2016). This paper describes current subsistence activities and changes local residents have observed over time in three Aleutian Island communities—Akutan, Nikolski, and Atka. As described more later, we did initial household surveys in 2016 and a second round in 2017, as well as more detailed interviews with some residents.
Current & Relevant Information:

The Aleutians are an isolated group of islands extending 1,200 miles from southwest Alaska toward Russia (Figure 1).

![Map of the Aleutians](image)

Figure 1. A map of the study area with communities identified.

Indigenous residents of these islands are predominately Unangan (Aleut), but they are diverse. Historically they spoke nine distinct dialects (Bergsland 2001), but today there are two main dialects. Residents of Atka and Attu speak the Western dialect and residents of Nikolski and Akutan, among others, speak the Eastern dialect (Collins et al. 1945). Unalaska/Dutch Harbor is the largest community, with a population of about 4,600, and it is one of the top seafood producers in the United States (NOAA 2015). The smaller places have populations ranging from 22 in Nikolski to 626 permanent residents in Sand Point. (Sand Point, King Cove, and Akutan have fish processing plants, and counting plant workers inflates typical estimates of their populations.) For thousands of years residents of the Aleutians have lived off the bounty of the ocean for subsistence harvests, and also for commercial harvests since the arrival of outsiders. This area of Alaska was one of
the first to come in contact with outsiders—Russian fur traders in the 1700s—and thus the Aleut people have a long history with commercial harvesting (Reedy-Maschner 2010). But during World War II, many residents were forced to evacuate the islands, and the federal government sent them to internment camps in southeast Alaska. The entire original community of Atka was burned (U.S. Department of Health 1980). While the residents were gone, their villages were looted, the equipment they used for commercial and subsistence fishing was destroyed, and they lost continuity. Federal aid for re-building after the war was limited, and Aleutian residents were left at an extreme disadvantage for participating in commercial activities, compared with residents of other villages in southwest Alaska. That disadvantage has had lingering effects (Reedy-Maschner 2010).


**Overview:**

Aleut, a name given to the Unangan by the Russian fur traders, but who prefer to be called Unangan, are people who have had to and still currently rely on the sea for their livelihood. Unanga means the original people and Unanganin is the plural form. Unangan is another traditional name for them. Unanangan means Seasider. Unangax is the plural form for Unangan.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

Traditionally, Aleut Unangan men were the ones who hunted the seals, whales, sea lions, sea otters, sometimes walrus, and in some areas, they were the ones who hunted the caribou and bears. The Aleut Unangan women were in charge of gathering fish, birds, wild plant foods, and mollusks. The wild plant foods included berries and the weaving of fine grass basketry. Baidarkas are a one-man and two-man skin boat, these Baidarkas, along with kayaks, or large, open, skin boats were what the Aleut Unangan men used for hunting. Ivory, stone, and bone were all used in multiple ways. This included being incorporated into designs on containers, oil lamps, needles, awls, and other objects.

The first encounter that the Aleut Unangan people had with the Russian people colonizers was in 1741. This encounter happened when Vitus Bering led the expedition to the Aleutian Islands. Following the encounter, the Russians quickly established control, which can be attributed to a large party of Russian and Siberian hunters who caused severe injuries and death of the people in the Aleutian Islands in 1745 while they overwintered (spent the winter). Subsequent of the overwintering of the hunters, Russian courts found some hunters of the group guilty of cruelty.

Decades later the Russian trading companies treated the Aleut Unangan people as they treated their own rural people, as serfs (labor bound under the feudal system). Their labor was not tied to agriculture; it was tied to fur production. The Aleuts’
Unangans’ traditional ways of life had been heavily disrupted from the Russians by the 1830s. In the later 19th century, more disruption occurred to the Aleuts’ Unangans’ ways of life due to the discovery of gold in Alaska. The discovery of gold in Alaska drew many prospectors to the region. Due to being under foreign control, the Aleut Unangan population had dramatically declined from a population of approximately 25,000 to 2,000 by the end of the 19th century.

By the late 20th century, the Aleut Unangan people were bringing back many traditional cultures. These traditional cultures were subsistence hunting and gathering practices, crafts, and their language. Today, most Aleuts Unangan peoples live a subsistence lifestyle. This includes fishing, hunting, and gathering berries. During the summer months, a large number of Aleut Unangan families spend their time harvesting traditional foods and preserving them for the winter.

Gender Roles:


Abstract:

The term ‘fisher,’ used to include women when describing fishing occupations, is gaining popularity; but this trend of pushing women into a broader category with men, even where a strong sexual division of labor remains, obscures actual practices and relationships. In an Alaskan Native coastal society where subsistence and commercial fishing practices are combined, Aleut women inhabit the roles of fishermen, fishermen’s wives, mothers, daughters, or girlfriends with pride, and are variably involved in fishing, processing, politics, business and family life. As men dominate the fishing arena, women fulfill crucial roles on land as they partially dictate sharing patterns which determine subsistence harvests, and as they choose mates which affirm male status roles. Their choices speak volumes, shaping dynamics on the water and in the communities. This is ever more apparent if we follow the fish from catch to pantry to table. The identity of being Aleut is tied to fishing, which is most visibly practiced by men, but it is the behaviors and attentions of women that give the whole system its meaning.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

Research on women in fishing economies (e.g., Chapman 1987; Ellis 1977; King 1992-1993; Nadel-Klein and Davis 1988; Nadel-Klein 2003; Sinclair and Felt 1992; Skaptadóttir 1996) or in industrialized commercial fishing (e.g., Allison et al. 1989; Binkley and Thiessen 1988; Fields 1997; Fricke 1973; Thiessen et al. 1992) emphasize women’s participation as challenging the stereotypical image of this
male-dominated arena of rugged individualists. This literature promotes gender equality or equal participation at sea, and yet we cannot assume that equality is the goal for all women. In fact, a focus on gender equality may obscure an examination of the equal representation of men’s and women’s roles in fishing. Further, most works on commercial fishing in Northwestern North America and Alaska neglect indigenous women, even though they share in Alaska’s largest industry.

**Conclusion**

Although there is a division of labor such that typically men fish, hunt, hold political office and own boats and permits, and women collect bidarkis and clams, prepare and preserve fish and game, share wild foods and manage offices, men and women cross over and blur these lines in constant motion. Women are not homogeneous in any specific arena of life: some women stay home and process foods and raise children; others hold a job and process foods and manage the household; others are intensely involved in village and global politics; others own boats and/or permits and fish regularly. Men often pick bidarkis; kipper, smoke and jar salmon; share fish and game; go berry picking; and testify at resource management meetings, for example, and thus are engaging in a broad range of activities.

Most women do not want to be equal to men in fishing because the social rewards are not the same for them. Ortner and Whitehead (1981) argue that gender is a prestige structure where women’s roles, activities, and products of their labor are generally accorded less prestige than their male counterparts. Black (1998) adds that species hunted by men carried symbolic significance whereas species hunted and gathered by women and children are seen as utilitarian. This model is partially true for these villages where men gain or lose status in providing fish and game, and women gain or lose status in food preparation, in the quality of the final products, and in sharing. The status of women is not, however, as vulnerable to the volatility of fishing success because of the diversity of roles and responsibilities among them. Women nonetheless maintain a close watch on the fishermen in their lives, since their identities are linked to the status of ‘their’ fishermen.

Being a capable fisherman is the essence of being an Aleut man. Adult men spend the majority of their time working on their boats both in the harbor and at sea, and must continuously demonstrate their abilities as fishermen. Status is maintained through continuous hard work and success. Women support their activities by providing supplies to the boat, taking care of in-home responsibilities, and fiercely fighting for their rights to continue fishing. Women also hold land-based jobs to provide money for fishing as well as for their families, especially in lean years. Occasionally they will fish with their husbands, but they often wait for him to send them fish to process and/or distribute. Men and women employ a wide range of hunting, fishing and processing techniques that they have learned throughout their lives, and although most of these chores are gender-marked, a rigid sexual division of labor is neither possible nor desirable.
Much of the feminist anthropological literature has emphasized a ‘male bias’ paradigm suggesting that women are often ‘forced’ to express themselves through the dominant male ideologies, and that women are ‘muted’ because of this (reviewed in Moore 1988:3). This is certainly a recognized, empirically documented trend for many parts of the world; however, this does not begin to capture the situation for Aleut women. Here, the identity of being Aleut is inextricably intertwined with the fishing economy, the most visible aspects of which are largely practiced by male Aleuts, but through which the behaviors and attentions of women give the whole system its meaning. Fishing is recognized and affirmed by women as having status, and prestige categories are centered around this. We cannot assume that a ‘male’ prestige system is exclusively male, since women choose mates based upon certain criteria, and their choices speak volumes, signaling to men which behaviors and attitudes are desired. Within the villages, women are crucial to maintaining the status of their fishing spouses, kin, and themselves through their attitudes, political pursuits, and especially in supplying salmon and other products to their subsistence networks.

https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1160&context=soc_facpub

Abstract:

Human-environment interactions can affect the gender balance of resource-dependent societies in a variety of ways. Historical and contemporary data on Alaska Native populations illustrate such effects. Some 18th and early 19th century observers noted an excess of females, which they attributed to high mortality among hunters. Population counts in the later 19th century and well into the 20th found instead an excess of men in many communities. Female infanticide was credited as the explanation: since family survival depended upon hunting success, males were more valued. Although infanticide explanations for the excess of males have been widely believed, available demographic data point to something else: higher adult female mortality. Finally, in the postwar years, the importance of mortality differentials seems to have faded — and also changed direction. Female outmigration from villages accounts for much of the gender imbalance among Native populations today. Natural-resource development, particularly North Slope oil, indirectly drives this migration. In Alaska’s transcultural communities, the present gender imbalances raise issues of individual and cultural survival.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

Linkages are often seen between environment and basic demographic variables — birth rate, death rate, and migration flow. In this article we direct attention to some
ways in which environmental variables can also have gender-specific effects on
deaths and migration. Such effects alter a society's male-female balance, influencing
both the life chances of individuals and the viability of their communities.

Our analysis here concentrates on Alaska, but the patterns we describe appear to
be more general. Gender imbalances due to migration or mortality have been
reported in many societies, from Ireland (Messenger, 1969; Scheper-Hughes, 1979)
to China (Tuljapurkar, Li & Feldman, 1995). Recent surveys found differences
between the migration expectations of young men and women in rural Scotland
(Seyfrit & Hamilton, 1992a), Alaska (Hamilton & Seyfrit, 1993a) and Newfoundland
(Hamilton & Seyfrit, 1994a). Gender-balance patterns resembling Alaska’s appear
also in Greenland, both in contemporary population data (Hamilton, Rasmussen,
Flanders & Seyfrit, 1996) and in historical reports (see notes in Taylor, 1966:217-
218). Jentoft (1993) describes female outmigration from contemporary Norwegian
fishing communities. Informally, we have heard accounts of similar phenomena in
other places including Iceland, Siberia and the South Pacific. The details of how
gender balance varies with changing environmental and social conditions differ from
place to place, however, and deserve individual study.

Alaska’s indigenous people are Eskimo, Indian, or Aleut. The term Eskimo is
sometimes rejected as pejorative, in the belief that it originates from a proto-
Algonquian expression meaning “eaters of raw flesh.” Many prefer the self-
designation of Inuit (“people”) instead. Inuit, however, properly refers to one
cultural/linguistic group spanning northern Alaska, the Canadian Arctic and Labrador
coasts, and Greenland. Some speakers of Yupik (“real people”), a second major
linguistic group found in west and southwest Alaska (with affinities to Siberia), would
rather be called Eskimo than Inuit. Furthermore, recent scholarship suggests that the
word Eskimo actually has fewer pejorative roots, not in Algonquian but in a
Montagnais, expression meaning “snowshoe netter” (Damas, 1984:6). Today the
Alaska Federation of Natives, among others, views Eskimo as a neutral term
covering both Inuit and Yupik peoples.

Writers in Alaska employ capital-N “Native” as a designation encompassing
Eskimos, Indians, and Aleuts. This allows use of small-n “native” as a term for
anyone born in Alaska. In other U.S. states, the term Native American may be
preferred over Indian since the latter arose from Columbus’ geographical confusion.
In Alaska, however, the term Indian (covering Athabaska, Tlingit, Haida, etc. but not
Eskimo or Aleut) remains useful. Native Americans from other states, some of whom
move to Alaska, may be identified by Alaska Natives as “outside Indians.”

More than two thirds of Alaska’s 86,000 Natives presently live in the small and often
remote communities of the Alaskan bush. Elements of traditional culture, including
language, persist there alongside newer Native institutions and the heavy presence
of dominant U.S. culture. As recently as the 1960s, many villagers of northwest
Alaska endured bitter Arctic winters in frozen sod huts, much as their ancestors had.
Today most dwell in warmer prefabricated houses and schools, although a few still hunt the bowhead whale. Children in some village schools of southwest Alaska begin their schooling speaking Yupik, and switch to English only after third grade. In small villages throughout the state, subsistence hunting and fishing may contribute up to half of the food supply (Jorgensen, 1990).

Despite the appeal of traditional culture, the otherwise limited job, life and recreational choices inspire many young people to leave Native villages. But a large fraction of leavers later return, after finding that city life suits them less well. Native students who drop out from the University of Alaska at Fairbanks, or from Mount Edgecumbe High School (a predominantly Native boarding school in southeast Alaska), often cite homesickness as their reason. Bush villages thus continue to play a central role in the survival of Alaska Native culture, and provide a home for Natives who wish to stay close to their culture — facts recognized by Native and non-Native leaders alike.

Although they help keep traditional culture alive, bush villages are nonetheless experiencing a period of rapid social change. Resource-based industry — forestry, fishing, mining, and especially oil — has been the principal force behind this change, bringing into the bush waves of money, people and infrastructure. With these have come other changes in economy, housing, government, education, transportation and the advent of satellite T.V. Recent books survey the cultural impacts of such change (Chance, 1990; Condon, 1987; Duffy, 1988; Fienup-Riordan, 1990; Jorgensen, 1990; Kizzia, 1991; Oswalt, 1990).

Since 1991 we have been conducting research on how resource development affects adolescents in bush Alaska. Surveys and discussions with high school students soon directed our attention towards migration as a key variable, and in particular, towards the ways in which gender differences in outmigration were changing the demographic profile of bush villages (Seyfrit & Hamilton, 1992b; Hamilton & Seyfrit, 1993a, 1993b, 1994b).

Previous writings present more detailed cross-sectional analysis of the contemporary Alaskan population (Hamilton & Seyfrit, 19933b, 1994b), and also that of Greenland (Hamilton et al., 1996). This article takes an historical view instead, to look at demographic changes over a period during which an essentially neolithic culture became what Jorgensen (1990) called “oil age Eskimos.” Gender imbalances have been common in Alaska Native villages over the past two centuries. The direction of imbalances has changed, however, in response to changing interactions between society and the physical environment.

**Discussion**

Data presented in this article put the gender imbalances of modern Arctic villages into broader historical perspective. Unfortunately, our historical data do not include
complete age-sex-ethnicity breakdowns for every community, comparable to data we have from the 1990 Census. Other limitations of the historical analysis result from changes in communities (some have vanished, appeared, or moved over the periods discussed) and shifting ways in which record-keepers treat ethnic identity. Early U.S. censuses counted all Natives as “Indians,” for instance. During a period from about 1880 through 1910, “mixed-blood Indians” were counted as a separate ethnic group. Microfilms of some old census records were simply unreadable, and before the advent of the U.S. Census, population estimates in remote areas may involve considerable error. Our conclusions therefore rest to some extent on reading between the lines of available hard data, and could be much further refined.

Gender imbalances in either direction is nothing new in Alaskan villages. Historical explanations focused on death rates: either high hunting-accident rates creating an excess of women, or infanticide allegedly creating an excess of men. Data from 1920-1950 show no evidence of infanticide, however, and instead suggest higher mortality among adult females.

After 1950, coinciding with improvements in public health, especially tuberculosis, the statewide gender imbalance among Natives disappeared. World War II and the Cold War cycled thousands of U.S. servicemen through remote parts of Alaska; some married Native women. At the same time, many Native men were drafted and traveled to places far from home. In the postwar era, a generation of Native youth went away to boarding school for their secondary education. These events and the subsequent economic development widened experiences and opened new doors of mobility to Native populations. Population data show a pattern of large-scale migration from villages to regional centers, and from centers to the cities. For a variety of reasons, long-term migration involved more women than men abandoning village life for larger communities.

During the postwar era, migration replaced mortality as the primary cause of local gender imbalances. Since migration reflects individual decisions, it can respond rapidly to changes in opportunities or economic conditions — such as the oil boom in Barrow. Migration flows should therefore be reversible. The gendered flow from rural villages, however, seems to have had a similar form if not magnitude throughout much of the last 40 or 50 years.

Historical records thus suggest that society-environment interactions have influenced the gender balance of Alaska Native communities in a series of ways:

1. Hunting exposed males to a greater likelihood of accidental death.

2. Starvation and epidemics (especially post-contact) sharply reduced populations. Tuberculosis, and perhaps other diseases, disproportionately affected women because of their indoors and caregiving roles.
3. Natural-resource exploitation drew sudden inflows of non-Natives, mainly men. Some of these non-Natives married Native women.

4. Today, Native migration flows reflect socioeconomic opportunities including those created by natural-resource industries and the accompanying public sector expansion.

These details apply to Alaska, but it seems likely that many other societies also experience changes in gender balance — as they do in size, growth rates, or age structure — due to complex interactions with their physical environment. Gender balance in turn may affect other social phenomenon, including a range of modern health and social problems not usually perceived as having environmental roots.

“Aleut: People,” Britannica, 2 September 2022 [15]
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Aleut

Overview:

Aleut, self-names UnangaŞ and Sugpiaq, a native of the Aleutian Islands and the western portion of the Alaska Peninsula of northwestern North America. The name Aleut derives from the Russian; the people refer to themselves as the UnangaŞ and the Sugpiaq. (The Sugpiaq pronounce the Russian-introduced name Aleut “Alutiiq.”) These two groups speak mutually intelligible dialects and are closely related to the Eskimo in language and culture.

The earliest people in this region, the Paleo-Aleuts, arrived in the Aleutian Islands from the Alaskan mainland about 2000 BCE. Ancient Aleut villages were situated on the seashore near fresh water, with a good landing for boats and in a position safe from surprise attack. Village placement in such locations persisted over the long term, as did many other cultural characteristics.

Traditional Aleut villages were usually composed of related families that lived in extended family households in well-insulated, semisubterranean homes. Kinship was reckoned through the mother’s line. A chief, generally a seasoned and talented hunter, might govern several villages or an entire island. His rule, however, was based on his wisdom, experience, and ability to build consensus rather than on raw power.

Current & Relevant Information:

Traditionally, Aleut men hunted seals, sea otters, whales, sea lions, sometimes walrus, and, in some areas, caribou and bears. One-man and two-man skin boats known as baidarkas, or kayaks, and large, open, skin boats (Eskimo umiaks) were used. Aleut women gathered fish, birds, mollusks, and wild plant foods such as berries and wove fine grass basketry. Stone, bone, and ivory were fashioned into containers, needles and awls, oil lamps, and other objects.
Overview:
The origin of the name "Aleut" is uncertain. It is possibly derived from the Olutorski tribe, on the Olutorsk River, in northeast Kamchatka, and was applied by early Russian fur hunters to residents of the Aleutian Islands. But it may instead be derived from the Chukchee word for "island," aliat. Finally, it is possible that "Aleut" comes from the name the westernmost Aleuts, on Attu Island, used to refer to themselves, "Aliut," which was then extended eastward by the Russians. Today, Aleuts infrequently refer to themselves with the Aleut word "Unangin" (or "Angagin"), meaning approximately "we, the people."

At the time of initial Russian contact in 1741, Aleuts occupied all the Aleutian Islands west to Attu Island, the western tip of the Alaska Peninsula, and the Shumagin Islands south of the Alaska Peninsula. In the late 1700s and early 1800s, Aleuts were settled on the Pribilof Islands in the Bering Sea. Today, some thirteen Aleut villages remain, mostly in the Pribilofs and eastern Aleutians.

Current & Relevant Information:
Although traditionally there was general division of labor by both age and sex, a feature of the Aleut food economy was that most members of a community could make an important contribution to their families' food supplies. Thus, though younger, able-bodied Aleut men traditionally did all the hunting at sea, few other subsistence pursuits were restricted to only one group. This basic pattern continues to the present: men are still the only ones who go out in their skiffs to hunt, while all members of the Community fish, collect marine invertebrates, gather eggs, and so on.

Overview:
No matter where Native American tribes lived in America, there was a lot of work to be done to survive. They had to hunt, farm, prepare food for the winter, build homes, make their own clothing, and protect themselves from their enemies. In the typical Native American society, the work was divided up between the men and the women. They each took on different roles in society in their daily lives.

Although each tribe and region were different, the division of labor between men and women was generally similar across most of the Native American tribes. The women were responsible for work around the house, like cooking and raising the children. The men were responsible for work away from the home, like hunting and raiding.
Current & Relevant Information:

**Typical Women's Work**

The women were generally in charge of the home and sometimes the fields. They worked extremely hard.

- **Cooking** - The women cooked and prepared the meals. This could involve skinning and cleaning the animals, gathering fruit and nuts, building a fire, and smoking meat to be stored for the winter.

- **Crafts** - Women had a variety of crafting skills they used around the home including making baskets, weaving cloth, preparing animal hides, and making clothing.

- **Harvesting** - In many tribes the women were responsible for harvesting the crops. The men might help in this task, but it generally fell upon the women.

- **Other Jobs** - Women had a variety of other jobs including raising the children and gathering firewood. When a tribe moved, it was generally the woman’s job to pack up the home for moving and then set it back up at the new location.

**Typical Men's Work**

The men were in charge of the tribe's activities away from the home.

- **Hunting** - The primary job of the men was hunting and fishing. Animals were not only used for food, but their skins were used for clothing and, in some cases, to make their homes.

- **Fighting** - Men also were responsible for making war and protecting the village.

- **Crafts** - Typical men's crafts had to do with their jobs such as weapons for hunting and boats for fishing and traveling.

- **Other Jobs** - In most Native American tribes, men were the political and religious leaders. They often did the heavy work such as building permanent homes and planting crops.

**Interesting Facts about the Roles of Women and Men**

- In some cases, men worked on detailed crafts such as ceremonial jewelry.

- The women were in charge in the homes. They often owned the home and everything in it.

- Women were well respected in the tribes for their hard work and providing food from farming.

- Men and women had different roles, but generally had equal rights. In some tribes, the chief was a man, but he was elected by the women.
• Today, around 25% of the Native American tribes that are recognized by the federal government are led by women.


Summary:

The purpose of this report was to provide an overview of the epidemiology of violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women as well as an accounting of the criminal justice responses to this violence. Key findings include:

• National rates of homicide victimization against American Indian and Alaska Native women are second to those of their African American counterparts, but higher than those for white women. However, these national averages hide the extremely high rates of murder against American Indian and Alaska Native women present in some counties comprised primarily of tribal lands. Some counties have rates of murder against American Indian and Alaska Native women that are over ten times the national average. Like other women, American Indian and Alaska Native women are more likely to be killed by their intimate partners compared to other offenders.

• Using information to estimate nonfatal victimizations from official police report data, such as the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) or the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation is extremely problematic since we know less than half of violent victimizations against women are ever reported to police. Random sample surveys of women are the most appropriate method for estimating incidence rates. Unfortunately, a majority of studies that have examined violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women have relied on convenience samples of women (e.g., those available for study such as women seeking medical care at a clinic), which cannot be generalized to the population of all women, even women in a particular tribe. The extreme diversity in social, cultural, and economic conditions across tribes as well as the differences that may exist between American Indian and Alaska Native women who reside in urban areas (roughly 60%) off tribal lands, makes estimating rates of violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women problematic. Making comparisons of incident rates is also difficult because of the extremely diverse nature of the survey questions used to uncover victimizations.

• An analysis of the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) reveals that rates of rape and other sexual assaults are higher for American Indian and Alaska Native women compared to both African American and white women. Rape and sexual assaults against all women regardless of race were more likely to be committed by known offenders. These results are consistent with findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey (NVAWS) that found American Indian and Alaska
Native women were significantly more likely to experience a rape in their lifetimes compared to other women.

• With few exceptions, surveys of American Indian and Alaska Native women conducted in local areas including those residing on tribal lands as well as those residing in urban areas also generally find high rates of rape and sexual assault victimization. However, because of the extreme variation in the wording of the questions used, it is not always possible to know whether these victimizations were completed rapes or other sexual assaults. There has been one very rigorous survey that employed a random sampling design to uncover rape victimizations, both completed and attempted, within six tribal nations, which generally found high rates of rape with the exception of one tribe.

• According to NCVS data, rape and sexual assault victimizations against American Indian and Alaska Native women are just as likely to be reported to police compared to victimizations against other women, however, a friend, family member, or another official are most likely to do the reporting, not the victim herself. In only 6% of the victimizations that were reported were victims aware that the offender had been arrested. This is similar to the percent of other women who report that an arrest was made in their case.

• National annual incidence rates and lifetime prevalence rates for physical assaults are also higher for American Indian and Alaska Native women compared to other women. Like other women, American Indian and Alaska Native women are more likely to be assaulted by known offenders compared to strangers. Roughly equal proportions of these victimizations against American Indian and Alaska Native women are reported to police compared to other women. In addition, reports to police by American Indian and Alaska Native women are just as likely to result in arrest compared to reports made by other women. These national patterns do not, however, reflect variation in reporting and arrest rates that may occur across tribal nations.

• The unique position of American Indian and Alaska Native tribes as both sovereign and dependent creates problematic jurisdictional barriers that sometimes prohibit an effective criminal justice response to American Indian and Alaska Native victims of violence. Several federal laws have limited tribal government’s power to prosecute offenders including the Major Crimes Act (1885), which mandated that virtually all violent crimes committed on tribal lands were to be prosecuted by the federal government. Although tribes have the power to concurrently prosecute cases of violence, the Indian Civil Rights Act (1968) mandates that tribal courts are not permitted to punish offenders with more than $5,000 in fines, one year in jail or both. Importantly, tribal sovereignty in punishing offenders does not apply to non-American Indian and Alaska Natives (Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 1978).
• Complicating jurisdictional issues even more is Public Law 280 (1953), which gave state governments jurisdiction over offenses committed against American Indian and Alaska Natives on tribal land in six “mandatory” states including Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin, and some states that also assumed part or total jurisdiction over some tribes within state boundaries including Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. Since Public Law 280 (PL-280), however, several states have retroceded authority to specific tribes making jurisdictional issues even more complicated.

• Complicated jurisdictional issues still produce unique barriers to American Indian and Alaska Native women seeking help from a criminal justice authority on tribal lands. When an act of violence occurs on tribal lands, there are several possible law enforcement officials who may respond including tribal officers, Federal Bureau of Investigation officers, Bureau of Indian Affairs officers, and in PL-280 states, state police officers. Deciding who has jurisdictional authority is dependent on several factors including the crime that was committed, whether the offender or the victim was an American Indian and Alaska Native, and whether the crime was committed exclusively on tribal land. The jurisdictional confusion that may ensue when an act of violence occurs sometimes produces an inadequate and delayed response to female victims. Importantly, some tribes have worked out cross-deputization agreements with state police authorities, which serve to alleviate the jurisdictional confusion over authority.

• Additional problems in law enforcement are exacerbated on many tribal lands by insufficient funding, inadequate training, and victims’ lack of trust for outside authority.

• Although tribal governments do not have jurisdiction to prosecute non-American Indian and Alaska Native offenders in criminal courts, they do have authority to enact civil orders against them, including Personal Protection Orders (PPOs). PPOs provide injunctive relief for petitioners who seek to use legal remedies to end threatening behavior, cease contact with another individual, or to alter custody arrangements. The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 established “Full Faith and Credit” for PPOs, which mandates jurisdictions to honor PPOs enacted in other jurisdictions. Importantly, this means that States and tribal governments must enforce the protection orders of other State and tribal jurisdictions. In reality, however, the variety of orders and accompanying legal punishments and the understanding of the intent of the order vary by each State and tribal government, creating significant barriers to the enforcement of “Full Faith and Credit.”

• In addition to legal barriers that may impede American Indian and Alaska Native women from obtaining justice, there are also other barriers including the social isolation of many tribal lands that precludes some American Indian and Alaska Native women from obtaining adequate medical care including the availability of
rape kits being performed by trained medical staff to aid prosecution. Cultural barriers also prevent some American Indian and Alaska Native women from seeking assistance from those outside the community, while issues of privacy may also prevent others from seeking help inside close-knit tribal communities where “everyone knows everyone else’s business.”

- Some American Indian and Alaska Native communities are developing culturally sensitive interventions for violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women both within and outside of the criminal justice system. These family or community forums emphasize restorative and reparative approaches to justice. One example of this is the Navajo Peacemaking system. Other culturally sensitive victim support services are being created across the country, in both urban settings as well as on rural tribal lands.

- A great deal of progress has been made to combat violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women as a result of the VAWA 1994 and its reauthorizations in 2000 and 2005. Initiated in 1995, one of the most significant initiatives administered specifically for American Indian and Alaska Native communities has been the Services-Training-Officers-Prosecutors (STOP) Violence Against Indian Women (VAIW) program. The primary purpose of the STOP VAIW Discretionary Grants Program was to reduce violent crimes against American Indian and Alaska Native women. In 2006, over $6.7 million was awarded to 35 American Indian and Alaska Native communities under this initiative. Additionally, American Indian and Alaska Native tribal governments and tribal associations could obtain funding under other grant programs including the Legal Assistance for Victims Program, the Rural Domestic Violence, Dating Violence, Sexual Assault, and Stalking Assistance Program, The Supervised Visitation and Safe Exchange Program, and the Grants to Encourage Arrest Policies and Enforcement of Protection Orders Program. Over $21 million dollars were awarded to tribal communities under these initiatives in 2006 and 2007. Title IX of VAWA 2005 significantly increased existing set-asides to tribal nations and created a new consolidated initiative called the Tribal Government Program, which gives tribal governments a longer list of options on how funds can be utilized to combat violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women.

In the past few decades, we have learned a tremendous amount about the vulnerabilities that American Indian and Alaska Native women have to violent victimization as well as the unique obstacles they face when seeking help from law enforcement authorities and other officials for these victimizations. We have several recommendations that we believe will provide more fruitful investments to combat this violence in the future:

- Valid and reliable data on violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women are essential in formulating policies likely to prevent this violence and to respond effectively. Importantly, without solid baseline rates of violence against
American Indian and Alaska Native women at both national and local levels, there is no way to assess the overall effectiveness of interventions. Using official data from police reports is not desirable for these endeavors because police reporting by female victims can be influenced by a number of factors. Moreover, since less than half of all violent victimizations against American Indian and Alaska Native women are ever reported to police, using survey methodology is the only reliable way to estimate and track trends in violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women. However, because many local tribes will not have the resources to conduct surveys, official data from police will likely remain the principal means to monitor levels of violence. As such, it is important that efforts be made to improve the official databases that exist at the local tribal level.

- We recommend using the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation since its data template allows the collection of detailed information about the incidents including the victim/offender relationship along with other socio-demographic characteristics of the victim and offender. The jurisdictional issues described in this report should not prevent tribes from creating databases from initial victim reports.

- We now have consistent and reliable evidence from several random sample surveys conducted at the local tribal level, as well as from two national random sample surveys that violence disproportionately affects American Indian and Alaska Native women. It is important, however, that victimization of American Indian and Alaska Native women continue to be monitored by already existing surveys. Since the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) remains the only large-scale survey conducted annually, every attempt should be made to restore the sample size of the NCVS in order to monitor violence against small subsets of the population, including American Indian and Alaska Native women. The current sample of the NCVS is insufficient to monitor patterns and trends of different forms of victimization (rape, assault) against American Indian and Alaska Native women, even when multiple years are aggregated. Future survey research efforts should be focused on understanding the causes of violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women, not just measuring the magnitude of this violence. To do this, collection efforts must be theoretically guided.

- Different research designs using different wording in questions to uncover victimization events at the local level will continue to produce disparate findings in the future. We contend that new resources directed at counting “how many” American Indian and Alaska Native women are victims are misguided. Even the most conservative estimates indicate that violence is an extremely serious problem in many American Indian and Alaska Native communities. The limited resources that are available would be better invested in developing interventions and prevention programs, scientifically evaluating their efficacy for protecting American Indian and
Alaska Native women, and making sure all female victims of violence have safe havens in the meantime.

- Research intended to evaluate the efficacy of programs and policies created to protect American Indian and Alaska Native women must employ scientifically rigorous standards, when possible, to determine if programs had their intended “impacts.” Unfortunately, much of the evaluation research to date has predominately evaluated the “process” by which programs were implemented. While these are important, they do not tell us anything about whether programs had the intended consequences of protecting women. We are not alone in this call. The National Research Council Committee on the Assessment of Family Violence Interventions similarly identifies improving the standards of evidence used in the evaluation of family violence programs as critical. We have learned far too many times that ineffective policies can sometimes do more harm than good.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

While recent research has illuminated the reality of violence present in some American Indian and Alaskan Native communities, only relatively recently has scholarly and Congressional attention been given to the vulnerability that American Indian and Alaska Native women face to violent victimization. The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 was extremely important legislation for protecting female victims of violence in general, and even more important for American Indian Alaska Native women. VAWA 1994, along with its subsequent revision in 2000 and 2005, have explicitly set aside funds to combat and respond to violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women. For example, VAWA 1994 set aside 4% of its allotment for Services and Training for Officers and Prosecutors (STOP) Grants for American Indian and Alaska Native federally recognized tribes. In the reauthorization of VAWA in 2000, this allotment was increased to 5%. In addition, many of the sections in the 2000 reauthorization of VAWA allotted 5% to American Indian and Alaska Native tribes. For example, 5% of the funds established for Safe Havens for Children Pilot Programs, which grants money to provide supervised visitation and safe visitation exchange of children by and between parents in situations involving domestic violence, were set aside for American Indian and Alaska Native tribes.

Because of the high rates of victimization against American Indian and Alaska Native women have been uncovered at both the local tribal levels and at the national level, section 904 of the 2005 VAWA reauthorization Act explicitly called for a baseline study to: (1) examine violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women; and (2) examine the effectiveness of local, tribal, state and federal responses to such violence. In addition, section 904 required the establishment of a task force to assist with developing and implementing the study consisting of
representatives from a) national tribal domestic violence and sexual assault nonprofit organizations, b) tribal governments, and c) national tribal organizations.

The goal of this report is to provide a synthesis of the empirical literature at both the local and national levels that has provided magnitude estimates of violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women along with a review of the methodologies on which the estimates are based. The report includes the crimes of homicide, rape and sexual assault, physical assault, and stalking. In addition to this review, we conduct original data analyses of homicide data from the Indian Health Service and the Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) as well as rape and assault data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) to provide an epidemiological assessment of violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women and how the contextual characteristics of these victimization differ from women of other groups including white, African American, and Asian American women.

Finally, we provide a detailed review of what is known about criminal justice responses to violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women including the barriers to the legal interventions of such violence. Included here is a synthesis of other interventions that have been used at local levels to respond to and prevent violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women including such innovations as Navajo Peacemaking. We conclude with our recommendations for future research.

**Conclusion**

The Violence Against Women Act and its reauthorizations have made some important advances in what we know about violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women and how we respond to this violence. Moreover, it has undoubtedly helped to bring awareness to the issue and helped to change antiquated ideals that tolerate violence against women in the population in general, and in the American Indian and Alaska Native population in particular. We have already highlighted the problems associated with measuring violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women and the problems associated with interventions designed to respond to and ameliorate the consequences of this violence.

B. Athabascan [US-Alaska]:


**Overview:**

The Athabascans traditionally lived in Interior Alaska, between the Brooks Mountain Range and the Kenai Peninsula. There are eleven distinct linguistic groups among the people who made their homes along the five major rivers: Yukon, Tanana,
Susitna, Kuskokwim, and Copper. A nomadic people, Athabascans traveled in small groups to fish, hunt, and trap. Today there are approximately 16,000 Athabascans living in Alaska, and call themselves “Dena,” or “the people.” In the Anchorage area, the Dena’ina Athabaskan people made their homes throughout has now become the largest urban setting in the state.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

The resources of the land are important to the Athabaskan people, who are taught respect for all living things. Each year, summer fish camps were base for the people, who would move to a different location in the winter. Depending on the season and the resources available, the Athabaskan people have multiple house types appropriate to the region and the weather.

The Athabaskan people had ample access to stone, antlers, wood, and bone, and used them to be make houses, boats, snowshoes, clothing, and household goods. Birch trees were a staple.

“**Athabaskan,**” Mary Goddard, Travel Alaska [20]
https://www.travelalaska.com/Things-To-Do/Alaska-Native-Culture/Cultures/Athabaskan

**Overview:**

Athabaskan territory ranges from the **Brooks Range** in northern **Interior** Alaska to Cook Inlet in **Southcentral** Alaska, and from Norton Sound in the west to the Canadian border in the east and beyond. There are 11 distinct languages among the varying groups of Athabascans. The Athabascans were migratory, following the fish and game, and created communities near some of Alaska’s larger rivers, including the Yukon, Tanana, Susitna, Kuskokwim, and Copper Rivers. Many of our familiar locations named in Interior and Southcentral — like **Denali** (the Great One) — are traditional Athabaskan names.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

The Athabascans built winter villages and summer fish camps and lived and traveled in small groups of between 20 and 40 people. In their matrilineal system, Elders made the important decisions for the group, and the core unit was often a woman and her brother with both of their families. The mother’s brother still frequently takes charge of educating her children in Athabaskan history and traditions.

Because resources were seasonal, Athabaskan men engaged heavily in trade with other communities. They used canoes made of birch bark and moose hide, as well as sleds and dogs to transport goods. Clothing was also resource-based; moose and caribou hides were used for tunics, moccasins, and other articles.

Today, the Tanana Chiefs Conference in Interior Alaska is the nonprofit Alaska Native association that provides many services for its tribal members. The Morris Thompson Cultural and Visitors Center in Fairbanks partners with the Tanana Chiefs
Conference to provide classes and Athabascan cultural programs, many of which are taught by rural Alaska Native residents, as a way of sharing traditions and skills with Alaska visitors and residents alike. You can find authentic Alaska Native artwork, Athabascan beadwork, ivory, baleen, and other handmade gifts from around Alaska in their Alaska Native Gift Shop.

Then and today, the Athabascan people hold potlatches. These are held for a variety of reasons from celebration to mourning. Food is made and shared with the community, and one popular dish is moose head stew. In Athabascan culture, wealth was shown by giving it away and it was during potlatch that this was demonstrated.

Athabascan people are well known for their elaborate beadwork and moose hide leather which is used in art and regalia like tunics, vests, dresses, and gloves. In Nenana, the Alfred Starr Nenana Cultural Center focuses on the culture and lifestyle of the Athabascans along with local history of Nenana. Exhibits cover Alaska Native beadwork, Yukon 800 riverboat racing, dog mushing, and the Nenana Ice Classic. A gift shop is stocked with local Alaska Native crafts. The Ahtna Cultural Center, located next to the Wrangell-St. Elias National Park Visitor Center in Copper Center, has exhibits, a traditional fishwheel, and information on the Ahtna Athabascan people who live in this region.
HOUSE TYPES & SETTLEMENTS

Athabascans traditionally lived in small groups of 20 to 40 people that moved systematically through the resource territories. Annual summer fish camps for the entire family and winter villages served as base camps. Depending on the season and regional resources, several traditional house types were used.

TOOLS & TECHNOLOGY

Traditional tools and technology reflect the resources of the regions. Traditional tools were made of stone, antlers, wood, and bone. Such tools were used to build houses, boats, snowshoes, clothing, and cooking utensils. Birch trees were used wherever they were found.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Athabascans have a matrilineal system in which children belong to the mother’s clan, rather than to the father’s clan, with the exception of the Holikachuk (ho-li-ka-chuk) and the Deg Hit’an. Clan Elders made decisions concerning marriage, leadership, and trading customs. Often the core of the traditional group was a woman and her brother, and their two families. In such a combination, the brother and his sister’s husband often became hunting partners for life. Sometimes these hunting partnerships started when a couple married.

Traditional Athabascan husbands were expected to live with the wife’s family during the first year, when the new husband would work for the family and go hunting with his brothers-in-law. A central feature of traditional Athabascan life was (and still is for some) a system whereby the mother’s brother takes social responsibility for training and socializing his sister’s children so that the children grow up knowing their clan history and customs.

CLOTHING & REGALIA

Traditional clothing reflects the resources. For the most part, clothing was made of caribou and moose hide tunics and dresses in the summer and fall. In the winter, fur from caribou, beaver, muskrat, and ground squirrel were added to make their clothing.

Moose and caribou hide moccasins and boots were important parts of the wardrobe. Styles of moccasins vary depending on conditions. Both men and women are adept at sewing, although women traditionally did most of the skin sewing.

Traditional regalia vary from region to region. However, in all Athabascan cultures, the ultimate sign of status and wealth was dentalium shells, which were traded up the Northwest coast of Alaska and were typically only worn by wealthy individuals like a traditional leader and his family. Before European contact, the main form of decoration on Athabascan clothing were porcupine quills, which were flattened and dyed to create complex geometric patterns, and red ochre, which was used to paint...
parts of their clothing. After European contact, glass seed beads largely replaced porcupine quills and beautiful floral patterns were adopted from missionaries in Eastern Canada.

TRANSPORTATION

Canoes were made of birch or willow and the covering of birch bark was attached with spruce roots and sealed with spruce pitch; larger boats were also made of birch or willow for the frames and covered with moose or bear hide. All Athabascans used sleds; however, they were generally not pulled by dogs until after European contact. Of vital importance during the winter were snowshoes, which were created for a variety of weather and snow conditions; dogs were primarily used as pack animals and were also valuable for hunting and protection from big game.

TRADE

Trade was the principal activity of Athabascan men, who formed trading partnerships with men in other communities and cultures such as the Tlingit, Yup’ik, Sugpiaq, and Iñupiaq as part of an international system of diplomacy and exchange. Traditionally, partners from other tribes were also, at times, enemies, and traveling through enemy territory was dangerous.


Overview:

Athabascan Indians live in interior Alaska and have the largest land base of any other Alaska Native group. The Athabascan are efficient hunters and fishers and the moose, caribou, salmon and the birch tree are the most important resources. These provide food, clothes and shelter. In summer, they spend a great deal of time at their fish camps along major river systems – including the Yukon, Tanana, Innoko, Chandelar, Koyokuk and Tolovana rivers. In winter, they hunt caribou, moose and smaller animals.

The Athabascan people traditionally lived in Interior Alaska, an expansive region that begins south of the Brooks Mountain Range and continues down to the Kenai Peninsula. There are eleven linguistic groups of Athabascans in Alaska. Athabascan people have traditionally lived along five major river ways: the Yukon, the Tanana, the Susitna, the Kuskokwim, and the Copper River drainages. Athabascans were highly nomadic, traveling in small groups to fish, hunt and trap. Today, the Athabascan people live throughout Alaska and the Lower 48, returning to their home territories to harvest traditional resources. The Athabascan people call themselves ‘Dena,’ or ‘the people.’ In traditional and contemporary practices Athabascans are taught respect for all living things. The most important part of Athabascan subsistence living is sharing. All hunters are part of a kin-based network in which they are expected to follow traditional customs for sharing in the community.
Current & Relevant Information:

The Athabascans have matrilineal system in which children belong to the mother's clan, rather than to the father's clan, with the exception of the Holikachuk and the Deg Hit'an. Clan elders made decisions concerning marriage, leadership, and trading customs. Often the core of the traditional group was a woman and her brother, and their two families. In such a combination the brother and his sister's husband often became hunting partners for life. Sometimes these hunting partnerships started when a couple married. Traditional Athabascan husbands were expected to live with the wife's family during the first year when the new husband would work for the family and go hunting with his brothers-in-law. A central feature of traditional Athabascan life was (and still is for some) a system whereby the mother's brother takes social responsibility for training and socializing his sister's children so that the children grow up knowing their clan history and customs.


Overview:

There are eleven groups of Athabascans in Alaska. The Athabascan people originally came from Asia approx. 35,000 years ago across the Bering Strait. The Athabascans themselves do not believe the migration story, rather they believe they have always been here. Recent evidence suggests that the migration across the Bering Strait went in both directions. The Athabascan people traditionally lived in Interior Alaska, a region that begins south of the Brooks Mountain Range and goes all the way down to the Kenai Peninsula. They traditionally lived along five major rivers: the Yukon, Tanana, Susitna, Kuskokwim, and the Copper River and migrated every season, moving with small groups to fish, hunt and trap.

Current & Relevant Information:

Typical Athabascan families consist of a mother, father, their children, and grandparents. The Alaskan Athabascans believe that a girl is ready to marry soon after she hits puberty. Her suitor is preferably someone who demonstrates excellent hunting skills, because men are responsible for hunting. The man works for his in-laws for a year or two before possessing his own home.

Gender Roles:

“From One Young Woman to Two Old Women: How Cultural Continuity Is Illustrated Through Athabascan Values,” Caroline Williams, Journal of Research on Women and Gender, March 2012 [23]  
https://digital.library.txstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10877/12851/55-Article%20Text-194-1-10-20160408.pdf?sequence=1

Overview:
In Alaska and Canada prior to the nineteenth century, Athabascan girls went through an intensive education system. With the onset of first menses girls went into seclusion for up to a year, living in a specially constructed shelter on their own, yet under the watchful eye of their mother. As Cruikshank (1979) explains they went to a “school.” The “curriculum” consisted of very intense courses, explaining to the girls how they become women. The purpose of this “school” was wide-ranging. The girls had to learn how to contribute to the community; the duties expected of a wife and mother; how to become mentally and physically fit; how to protect the community, herself and her future children; and how to become the ideal Athabascan woman (Libby 1952: 3). For the duration of seclusion, as the mother would visit and care for the girl, she would instruct her on Athabascan values and important protocols concerning womanhood. One of the ways mothers would teach their daughters was through the use of stories.

In contemporary Athabascan societies cultural values have endured. Nonetheless, circumstances surrounding instruction and methods used to teach cultural values have changed with each generation. Multi-generational oral stories have been published, such as Velma Wallis’ two books, Two Old Women (2004) and Bird Girl Follows the Sun (1997), therefore adapting the transmission of values. The first legend published, Two Old Women, was told to Wallis by her mother. The story is based on two women, Ch’idzigyaak and Sa’ and their journey of survival in harsh Alaskan winter conditions. The two women had become complacent about their roles in society and were abandoned by the group. Choosing survival over death, the two women flourished while the rest of the band faced devastating hardship. On reuniting with the community, the women once again became valued members. These stories hold important cultural lessons. As a result, girls can now read for themselves the lessons which their mothers would have once told them during seclusion.

In the information which follows, cultural continuity in today’s Northern Athabascan societies is illustrated. By comparing and contrasting Northern Athabascan people’s puberty observances and seclusion with Velma Wallis’ book Two Old Women, evidence of this continuity can be seen in the continuance of Northern Athabascan values such as self-sufficiency, hard work, and responsibility to village. By first examining the early ethnographic scholarship and marking the changes over time, the transition of cultural continuity into contemporary society will be shown. In the last two sections, illustrations of how such values have endured into the present day, and discussions of the significance of the changes in puberty observance and teaching of traditional values have been shown. This information proves that continuity endures through the values that were taught to young women at the time of puberty seclusion and observances.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

**Summary and Conclusion**
By comparing and contrasting Northern Athabascan women’s puberty observances and seclusion with Velma Wallis’ book Two Old Women, evidence of cultural continuity can be seen in the continuance of Northern Athabascan values such as “Self-Sufficiency,” “Hard Work” and “Responsibility to Village.” By examining the early ethnographic scholarship and marking the changes over time, transition of cultural continuity in contemporary society has been shown. In the last two sections, illustrations have been made to show how such values have endured into present day. In demonstrating that the instruction and methods used to teach cultural values have changed with each generation, the importance lies in the persistence of values into contemporary societies. These values are what distinguish Athabascan women, especially in urban areas of Alaska and Canada, and in an ever-increasing world of globalization, these values also provide Athabascan peoples with a distinctive cultural identity.

Although this paper has shown endurance of values over time, through their publication, there is little control over whether today’s Athabascan girls read the material. As mentioned earlier, Cruickshank states that there is a physical loss of teacher and student roles in the very young and older women which has occurred due to the loss of puberty seclusion. As the examples of cultural continuity all come from women born 1960 or before, it has yet to be proved that the continuance of values will remain in those born in the 1970s and onwards. The generation born in the 1970s would have no recollection of their predecessor’s involvement in national movements for the recognition of American Indian Peoples (1969 Alcatraz occupation, 1973 siege of Wounded Knee). Further research is therefore needed to question whether there is a correlation between the loss of formally structured educational systems based on Athabascan values, such as the puberty observances and seclusion and displacement issues that teenagers face in contemporary Northern Athabascan bands, and whether today’s Athabascan girls read texts such as Wallis’ Two Old Women and gain values from them as set out in this paper.

https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1266&context=ghj

Abstract:

From 1769 to 1772, Samuel Hearne embarked on the first European overland expedition to the Arctic under orders from the Hudson’s Bay Company. In search of copper reserves and sites for future company forts, the Hudson’s Bay Company outfitted Hearne with a group of Chipewyan and Cree guides that would take him to the lands past the Arctic Circle where no other European had been. As the only European in his expedition party, Hearne had to quickly adapt to the Athabascan way of life and found his English and imperialist cultural ideas challenged by his native travel companions. Hearne also became especially entrenched in the
gendered aspects of Arctic indigenous life and saw first-hand sexual division of labor, marital wrestling contests, polygamy, and murder over the course of his three expeditions. Through his experience of gender in the Arctic, Hearne underwent a cultural change and by the end of his journey no longer viewed himself superior to the natives because of his European origins. Hearne returned to Europe with a more balanced view of indigenous culture and continues to be remembered and studied today for his unique cultural perspective.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

Unlike other explorers of the eighteenth century, Hearne became intimately involved in Arctic indigenous life, particularly in its gendered customs. Through witnessing Arctic gender roles, polygamy, marital wrestling matches, and murder, Hearne was transformed over the course of his expedition, eventually rejecting contemporary notions of cultural superiority.

Hearne’s first expedition lasted only one month, ending with him and the Englishmen returning to Prince of Wales Fort alone and emptyhanded. Tension between Hearne and his native companions peaked as he and the other Europeans struggled to brave the harsh weather. This behavior outraged Hearne and led him to describe his native guides as “capable of committing any crime, however diabolical.” During his first expedition, he felt a deep-seated resentment for the Native Americans, as they offered little assistance to him in a new and difficult environment. Hearne was still considered an outsider, making no connections with his native guides and receiving no help in return.

Hearne’s second expedition lasted ten months, taking place from February to November 1770. This time, Hearne left the lackey boys behind, insisting on being the only European in the party. Isolating himself among the Native Americans and disobeying the direct orders of his Company superiors may have been an attempt to better assimilate into the Athabascan way of life. On this expedition, Hearne joined a similarly composed group of Chipewyan and Cree men with a few women and children present. During this expedition, Hearne observed the native women working to maintain the camps for their husbands, while remaining strong in their refusal to help him. This enraged Hearne, prompting him to write, “I never saw a set of people that possessed so little humanity, or that could view the distresses of their fellow-creatures with so little feeling and unconcern.” From Indian men and women alike, Hearne received no assistance in his struggle to survive and traverse the Arctic environment. Retaining his European way of thinking, he expected the native men and women to work for him but never considered Athabascan social order or his place within it. He failed to understand that Chipewyan society was organized on the principle that everyone has a crucial role to play to ensure survival in the Arctic. Hearne’s position as an outsider expecting to be waited on offered nothing to his guides who in turn paid him no respect, making Hearne’s first two attempts to reach the Coppermine River futile.
The second expedition, however, was not a complete failure. While Hearne failed to reach the Coppermine River on this attempt, his outlook and awareness of Athabascan life changed drastically during the second expedition. On his way back to Prince of Wales Fort in August 1770, Hearne met Matonabbee, a prominent Chipewyan man who was supposed to guide Hearne in the latter half of his second expedition. After Hearne lamented his failure to reach the northern lands, Matonabbee explained where the Englishman went wrong. In Matonabbee's opinion, the previous two expeditions failed because the travel bands did not include enough women. Matonabbee explained the significant role women play in the Arctic:

“Women were made for labor; one of them can carry, or haul, as much as two men can do. They also pitch our tents, make and mend our clothing, keep us warm at night; and, in fact, there is no such thing as travelling any considerable distance or for any length of time, in this country, without their assistance.” Initially, Matonabbee’s words perplexed Hearne, who believed the women to be “odd” and prone to excessive greed “when the men are not present.” Having Athabascan women perform such crucial tasks for the expedition meant the native men did not exercise full control, but rather shared essential duties with the women. The presence of women on official expeditions likely made Hearne uncomfortable, as their control of key aspects of survival like the food provisions and construction of shelters gave the native women a degree of power over the men. During Hearne’s upbringing in eighteenth-century England, there existed a dichotomy between the way the upper and lower classes defined femininity. While many English women of the lower class performed similar back-breaking labor to their Arctic contemporaries, Hearne was used to a different ideal of femininity defined by confinement and relegation of women to household duties. Hearne struggled to set aside his own notions of class and gender and trust people who lived such a different life from him.


Abstract:

In the Upper Tanana Athabascan village of Northway, in Eastern Interior Alaska, humpback whitefish (Coregonus pidschian) are an important component of the local native culture and the primary species in the subsistence fishery. In 2002 a collaborative project with the Northway Village Council, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the University of Alaska Fairbanks began to examine the relationship between local knowledge and fisheries science. Through three years of semi-directed interviews and participant observation it became clear that, partially due to gender-specific fishing roles, women and men differed in their knowledge about how changes they perceive in their environment affect humpback whitefish. Women were
able to document patterns that men had not observed such as seasonal and annual variation in the prevalence of parasite-infected whitefish. Men and women observed increased sedimentation in area lakes and increased air and water temperatures over the past fifty years. The inclusion of both men’s and women’s diverse perspectives led to new questions about possible trends in parasites and the impacts of environmental change and weather patterns on fish behavior and health. We argue that because men and women often differ in their knowledge base regarding a resource, the combination of their observations results in a more holistic understanding of a social and ecological system than either can accomplish alone. This, in turn, can lead to a sounder basis for resource management and enhance the ability of a system to cope with expected and unexpected change.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

Women’s roles and knowledge related to their environment are receiving more attention than in the past, as are their contributions to ecological research (McDowell 1984; Satia and Wétohossou 1996; Siar 2003; Shanley 2006). However, the relevant literature still reflects a general bias toward men’s roles and knowledge in relation to farming, hunting, and other resource uses, while largely ignoring the crucial and complex role women play in these activities (Slocum 1975; Davis and Nadel-Klein 1992; Estioko-Griffen and Bion Griffen 1993; Madge 1994). The kinds of information that men can provide have traditionally been viewed as more valuable. This is also the case in terms of women’s fisheries-related understanding and experience. Women in many different cultures and communities hold knowledge that is different from men due to the division of labor and the often-gendered patterns by which informal and formal knowledge passes from person to person (Van de Ploeg 1993; Nygren 1999; Siar 2003). Knowledge within and between communities is not homogeneous or static and varies depending on gender and other factors such as age, religion, occupation, and social class (Guyer 1991; Davis and Nadel-Klein 1992; Madge 1994; Huntington 2002; Jewitt 2002; Crona and Bodin 2006) which intersect to shape, direct, and limit the experiences of individuals. Taking gender into account provides new and different perspectives, expanding not only our knowledge base, but possibly our practices of science itself (Davis and Nadel-Klein 1992; Schiebinger 1997; Jewitt 2002). Where the literature emphasizes men’s knowledge, it misses the information that is embedded in women’s activities, such as their particularly focused observations of fish anatomy gained by processing large numbers of fish for consumption.

Women’s perspectives may help researchers understand environmental changes because women make different observations than men and may voice new concerns or relate information or knowledge passed on to them by other women. The information for this chapter, which explores women’s environmental knowledge and concerns in a subsistence-based community in Alaska, results from a project linking
local knowledge and fisheries science about humpback whitefish (Coregonus pidschian) in the Alaska Native (Upper Tanana Athabascan) village of Northway, along the Canada-Alaska border. Research on environmental change in the Arctic and the role that local or indigenous people play in this process continues to grow and receive attention from scientists of various disciplines (see Riedlinger and Berkes 2001; Cochran and Geller 2002; Krupnik and Jolly 2002). In the Arctic, local people are already aware of changes that also have a significant impact on the rest of the world (ACIA 2005). For this reason, it is a particularly appropriate site for the study of climate and environmental change. Environmental changes such as increasing temperatures, thawing permafrost, and changes in wildlife populations or health are often noticed by local people, especially those who are engaged in daily subsistence activities including fishing and fish processing (Huntington 2002; Jolly et al. 2002). Therefore, arctic residents, both men and women, are important players in this process and possess crucial insights and observations about environmental change.

In Northway, Alaska, humpback whitefish are the main subsistence fish and are central to people's lives (McKennon 1981; Case 1986; Marcotte 1991), yet certain aspects of their life history are unknown in the scientific community (Tallman and Reist 1997; Brown et al. 2002). Through semi-directed interviews and five months of participant observation, it became apparent that men and women vary in the breadth and depth of their knowledge related to whitefish and their environment. A growing awareness of the need to listen to both men and women was a significant part of this project and led to new and more in-depth questions and research directions, and a realization that women have an important role to play in understanding environmental change and human adaptation to change. Although women and men have been included in harvest assessments and traditional ecological knowledge studies about fish (Anderson and Fleener 2001; Georgette 2002; Simeone and Kari 2002; Brown et al. 2003), there are few studies highlighting how the differing roles that men and women play in these subsistence activities shape their knowledge base. Nor has there been sufficient research on the importance of these differing experiences, how local people link these experiences together, and how they may contribute to environmental studies in the Arctic. This chapter moves toward filling that gap by highlighting how working with women and men and understanding these gendered differences in knowledge leads to new insights concerning a fishery and related changes in an ecosystem. In particular, this chapter focuses on how men and women see and experience environmental change in the Upper Tanana region of Alaska in terms of changing water levels and siltation, parasites in whitefish, and shifting weather patterns.

**Conclusion**

In Northway, environmental change is affecting people's lives and influencing their fishing methods, locations, preparation, and harvest. This chapter has focused on
how men and women experience change and how gender influences their knowledge base about whitefish and the ecosystem as a whole. Listening to both women and men is important because 1) they possess different information based on their roles related to subsistence activities such as fishing, 2) their concerns are based on what they see and hear in their respective roles, and 3) they have diverse historical knowledge bases passed down from other men and women. This historical knowledge is crucial when examining environmental change as scientists or researchers may have limited knowledge concerning their occurrence, relative intensity, and potential impacts to humans. It is not simply the varying perspectives people have that are important. Linking their observations is what creates a more complete understanding of a system over time. Crossing cultures and disciplines is a challenge, and recognizing the heterogeneity of communities and cultures is crucial in this process. Researchers must consider not only gender differences, but other factors such as age when examining local knowledge. For example, in Northway children usually clean the fish stomachs preparing them for frying and eating. Thus, children often have observations about current whitefish diet that adults may miss. This complexity should be embraced since it adds depth to the issue and in a sense gives it multiple dimensions.

The linkages and observations presented in this chapter have broadened the knowledge base about whitefish and the Northway area, generated new hypotheses such as the potential connection between water temperature and fish behavior, focused or redirected fisheries research, and helped in understanding the social complexities that exist and how environmental shifts affect lives. Understanding a social or ecological system and the implications of changes to those systems is not possible without an awareness of the social context in which such processes occur. This requires a comprehension of the roles and perceptions of both men and women.


Overview:

In the United States, violence against indigenous women has reached unprecedented levels on tribal lands and in Alaska Native villages. More than 4 in 5 American Indian and Alaska Native women have experienced violence, and more than 1 in 2 have experienced sexual violence. Alaska Native women continue to suffer the highest rate of forcible sexual assault and have reported rates of domestic violence up to 10 times higher than in the rest of the United States. Though available data is limited, the number of missing and murdered American Indian and Alaska Native women and the lack of a diligent and adequate federal response is extremely alarming to indigenous women, tribal governments, and communities. On some
reservations, indigenous women are murdered at more than ten times the national average.

Statistics define the scale of the problem, but do nothing to convey the experience of the epidemic. They tell part of the story, but fail to account for the devastating impacts this violence has on the survivors, Indian families, Native communities, and Indian nations themselves. Native children exposed to violence suffer rates of PTSD three times higher than the rest of the general population. Nevertheless, the statistics make absolutely clear that violence against Native women is a crisis that cannot wait to be addressed.

The Center's Safe Women, Strong Nations project partners with Native women’s organizations and Indian and Alaska Native nations to end violence against Native women and girls. Our project raises awareness to gain strong federal action to end violence against Native women; provides legal advice to national Native women’s organizations and Indian nations on ways to restore tribal criminal authority and to preserve tribal civil authority; and helps Indian nations increase their capacity to prevent violence and punish offenders on their lands.

Current & Relevant Information:

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND DENIAL OF EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW

It is outrageous that the vast majority of these women never see their abusers or rapists brought to justice. An unworkable, race-based criminal jurisdictional scheme created by the United States has limited the ability of Indian nations to protect Native women from violence and to provide them with meaningful remedies. For more than 35 years, United States law has stripped Indian nations of all criminal authority over non-Indians. As a result, until recent changes in the law, Indian nations were unable to prosecute non-Indians, who reportedly commit the vast majority (96%) of sexual violence against Native women. The Census Bureau reports that non-Indians now comprise 76% of the population on tribal lands and 68% of the population in Alaska Native villages. Many Native women have married non-Indians. However, it is unacceptable that a non-Indian who chooses to marry a Native woman, live on her reservation, and commit acts of domestic violence against her, cannot be criminally prosecuted by an Indian nation and more often than not will never be prosecuted by any government.

Federal and state officials having authority to protect Native women and girls are failing to do so at alarming rates. By their own account, between 2005 and 2009, U.S. attorneys declined to prosecute 67% of the Indian country matters referred to them involving sexual abuse and related matters. Even grimmer, due to the lack of law enforcement, many of these crimes in Native communities are not even investigated.
United States law creates a discriminatory system for administering justice in Native communities— a system that allows criminals to act with impunity in Indian country, threatens the lives and violates the human rights of Native women and girls daily, and perpetuates an escalating cycle of violence in Native communities. Women who are subjected to violence should not be treated differently and discriminated against just because they are Native and were assaulted on an Indian reservation or in an Alaska Native village!

VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

All this highlights the United States’ failure not only under its own law, including the trust responsibility to Indian nations, but also its obligations under international human rights law such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Perhaps the most basic human right recognized under international law is the right to be free of violence.

Through international advocacy, the Center and its partners not only educate, but also add world pressure on the United States regarding its obligations to end the epidemic of violence against Native women. Toward that end, the Center and its partners have raised awareness about violence against Native women in the United States within the United Nations through its Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2007), Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism (2008), Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (2011), Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2012), and repeatedly through the Human Rights Council and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.

The Center and its partners also have brought regional international attention to violence against Native women within the Organization of American States (OAS). In 2008, on behalf of numerous nonprofit organizations and tribal governments, the Center and Sacred Circle National Resource Center to End Violence Against Native Women submitted an amicus brief in support of Jessica Gonzales Lenahan, who filed the first human rights case involving domestic violence in any international body against the United States. The case, which involved the deliberate failure of local police to enforce a domestic violence protection order, did not arise in Indian country. However, it has major implications for Native women who rarely see their abusers brought to justice. In 2011, the Center and its partners, the NCAI Task Force on Violence Against Native Women and the National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center, participated in the first ever thematic hearing on violence against Native women in the United States before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The Commission has since expressed concern about violence against indigenous women in the United States, noting that such situations tend to be accompanied by impunity and urging the United States to address this violence through laws, policies, and programs. In 2018, the Center, the Alaska Native Women’s Resource Center, and the National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center participated in a second thematic hearing on violence against Native women in the
United States. The hearing paid particular attention to the urgent situation of Alaska Native women, who are vastly over-represented in the domestic violence population and terribly underserved by state law enforcement, and also to the crisis of missing and murdered indigenous women.

REFORMING FEDERAL LAW TO RESTORE SAFETY TO NATIVE WOMEN

The Center collaborates with Native women’s organizations and Indian nations to change and improve United States law that unjustly restricts Indian nations from adequately investigating, prosecuting, and punishing these crimes against all perpetrators. The Center supports efforts to strengthen Indian nations in restoring safety to Native women. Our project recognizes that protection of Native women must involve strengthening the ability of Indian nations to effectively police their lands and prosecute and punish criminal offenders.

A center piece of our work with partner organizations has concerned the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which expired in 2011. The Indian Law Resource Center, the National Congress for American Indians Task Force on Violence Against Women, Clan Star, Inc., and the National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center have been working both domestically and internationally to restore safety to native women and to protect their most basic human right, the right to be free of violence. We supported efforts to add provisions to VAWA that would restore tribal criminal authority to address violence against Native women by non-Natives in Indian country. In 2012, the Senate passed such a bill by a strong bipartisan vote, however, the House stripped out protections for the most vulnerable, including Native women. Then, time simply ran out for the 112th Congress, leaving the lives of Native women threatened daily and tribes as the only governments in the United States without authority to protect women from domestic and sexual violence in their communities.

The 113th Congress acted quickly, passing a bipartisan VAWA with tribal provisions intact. On March 7, 2013, President Obama signed the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA 2013) into law, an historic step forward that reflects not only the United States’ commitment to protect Native women from domestic violence, dating violence, and violations of protective orders, but also its restoration and reaffirmation of inherent tribal sovereignty to protect their citizens from violence. Tribal participation in the new jurisdictional provisions is voluntary. VAVA expired in 2018 and is pending reauthorization in the 116th Congress.

TRAINING NATIVE COMMUNITIES

Restoring tribal criminal authority will only end violence against Native women if Indian nations have the institutional capacity and readiness to exercise such jurisdiction. Many Indian nations are developing the infrastructure for tribal justice systems to provide safety to Native women and girls within their territories, including tribal police departments, codes, and courts. Many have domestic violence codes;
training for tribal law enforcement, tribal courts, prosecutors, and probation officers; and various programs for domestic violence offenders.

The Safe Women, Strong Nations project contributes to these efforts by providing Indian nations and Native women’s organizations with assistance to build the capacity of Indian nations to investigate, prosecute, and punish those who commit violence against Native women and restore safety to Native women. This includes assisting Native women’s organizations and Indian nations in better understanding criminal jurisdiction in Indian country and implementing provisions in the Tribal Law and Order Act and VAWA 2013. The Center also assists and prepares Native women’s organizations and Indian nations in using international advocacy to end violence against Native women.


Overview:

As anthropologists strive to develop new forms of analysis and presentation of ethnographic materials, the balancing of data, analysis, reflexivity and relevance poses an enormous challenge. In Northern Athabascan Survival, Women, Community and the Future, Phyllis Ann Fast has met these challenges in a path breaking and illuminating volume. The book is a thematic, powerful account of the lives of the contemporary Gwich'in of northeastern Alaska that flows from three years of fieldwork by Fast in the region. Fast, of mixed northern Athabascan (Koyukon) heritage raised in an urban Alaskan environment, set out to understand the political and social dimensions of Gwich'in politics in their villages but moved beyond this goal to a fuller engagement with the nature and process of existence in the communities.

Current & Relevant Information:

In the final two chapters, Fast looks to the future and recapitulates the central claims of her book highlighting the relevance of certain key findings for the future. Here the relevance of her findings to specific areas of action is presented. While she clearly intends this section for a Gwich’in readership, it is unlikely that any Gwich’in will be drawn to the discussion. Nevertheless, she asserts her belief that they will find Athabascan solutions to their problems. Unfortunately, Fast does not address how the external institutional structures might be reconstructed to better meet the needs of the Gwich’in. She starkly asserts that the Gwich’in villages are threatened by a myriad of forces for destruction but concludes that through the search for the identification of the problems, the Gwich’in will persevere. They will do so from a self-definition that as a people, “We suffer, we endure, but we continue on” (Fast: 255)
Overview:

Alaska Native peoples are culturally diverse. They embrace customs and traditions that are rooted in quintessential values of community and a deep respect for nature. Many Alaska Native peoples believe that all living beings have spirits and animals are revered. Historically, they have inhabited almost every part of the state and traditionally, they moved seasonally to hunting and fishing grounds to support their subsistence ways of life. Alaska Native peoples have protected their lands for thousands of years and, over time, have developed the valuable ability to detect anomalies in nature before anyone else can. Although Alaska Native people may resemble each other in the tools that they use and the English language that they speak, each Alaska Native group is a separate ethno-linguistic society and distinct in its use of the land’s resources, their social interactions with other groups, and how their culture changed after contact with Europeans. Like with any other culture, Alaska Native cultures are constantly changing. People continually reshape their lives, identities, and actions in their daily course of experiences. It is important to note that although their methods and practices may have changed from the past, they are still rooted in an idea of respect for nature, elders, and communal values.

Many Alaska Natives today live in major cities throughout Alaska. In addition to maintaining their subsistence ways of life, Many Alaska Native peoples today have jobs in different fields and work as federal and state employees, corporate leaders, teachers, and in law enforcement, to name a few.

Current & Relevant Information:

Athabascan

Athabascan peoples traditionally occupied a large part of Interior Alaska. They inhabited the region from the Brooks Range in the North to Cook Inlet in South-central Alaska and from Norton Sound in the west to the Canadian border. They were highly mobile peoples who frequently traveled in small groups to hunt and fish along the banks of the Yukon, Tanana, Kuskokwim, Sustina, Copper, and Kenai Rivers. They built winter base camps and summer dwellings for easy access to resources like fish. Different house types were used depending on the season and resources. People who took on leadership roles varied among the different groups of Athabascan peoples. Some groups, like the Ahtna and Dena’ina, had appointed chiefs. The Deg Hit’an had men and women elders who helped resolve disputes. For some Athabascans, the core family unit was composed of a woman, her brother, and their families. An important feature of traditional Athabascan life was that the mother’s brother was responsible for training and socializing his sister’s children. He would be tasked with teaching his nieces and nephews the clan’s history and
customs. Athabascans traded important food resources and tools for other goods that were seasonally unavailable. Athabascans are also well known for their elaborate beadwork. Contact with Euro-Americans did not occur until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century when trading companies and Russian Orthodox priests arrived in the Cook Inlet area. Many traditional customs and languages still exist today. Athabascans still schedule social and subsistence events according to the season. During the fall, they may hunt caribou and moose. In the spring they hunt geese and ducks, set beaver traps, and practice dog-sledging. In the summer, many Athabascans go fishing, berry-picking, and hunting.

C. Chukchi [Russia]:

“Reindeer Herders’ Culturescapes in the Koryak Autonomous Okrug,” Alexander D. King, Research Gate, January 2002 [29]

Overview:

Chukchi are one of a few ethnicities who are the butt of jokes in Russia. I was told many Chukchi jokes in Kamchatka, mostly by Chukchi and Koryaks themselves. Rarely were Koryaks identified in these jokes, but I was told one ‘Koryak joke’ during tea where my wife and I were the only whites present:

A Koryak is sitting out in the tundra guarding the herd. He hears a voice calling, ‘People! People!’ [liudi]. He runs toward the sound over the hill and sees a Russian man at the bottom in the snow. The Russian calls out ‘People! People! Help me!’ The Koryak says, ‘Oh? In the tundra we are people. There in Tilichiki we are just Koryaks’.

Everyone laughed, and a Koryak woman sitting next to me commented, ‘Yes, in the tundra we are always people’. The tundra is the locus of native culture in Kamchatka. Everyone in Kamchatka regardless of ethnicity or length of residence agrees on this value, but the other meanings associated with tundra spaces and native peoples vary from the differing perspectives of Russians, native elites, and native non-elites.

In Palana Russians and even some native elites (characterized by higher education and white-collar employment, usually in a larger town) associate spaces in the tundra with ‘wilderness’ and oppose them to ‘civilization’. This nature-culture divide allocates Koryaks to the wilds of the tundra, which is outside the European understanding of ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’. In civilized places, as the joke points out, they are not quite ‘people’, but something less, mere ‘Koryaks’. Native people who participate in a way of life connected to the tundra can make a ‘wilderness’ versus
‘civilization’ distinction if led in that direction by the conversation. They are familiar with European values, but they do not express these values when talking about themselves on their own terms, ‘on their own turf’. As one can infer from the joke, native people understand the tundra as their ‘own’ space and oppose the tundra to the town as a ‘Russian’ or ‘other’ space. This landscape of self and other can be used to mark boundaries or define groups; it references different, often contradictory, sets of values, different cultural patterns.

Before I present the local symbols associated with the landscape and the most relevant social relations, an etic orientation for the reader is warranted. Kamchatka is a peninsula in the far northeastern corner of the Russian Federation. It separates the Sea of Okhotsk from the Bering Sea and the Pacific Ocean. The Koryak Autonomous Okrug is an administrative territory occupying the northern two-thirds of Kamchatka and some of the adjoining mainland. The okrug is bordered on the north by the Chukchi Autonomous Okrug, by Magadan Province to the northwest and by Kamchatka Province to the south. The indigenous people of this area are enumerated into several cultural groups in the standard anthropological works: Itelmen, Koryak, Chukchi, and Even. Sometimes Koryaks are divided into Chauvchu (reindeer herders) and Nymylan (town-dwelling hunter-fishers), but this economic (or praxis) distinction can be extended to all the indigenous ethnic groups in the area. While people in Kamchatka sometimes distinguish ethnic groups from one another in this way, they most often distinguish mestnye (locals, natives) from priezzhie (incomers), especially when they are discussing cultural differences (whether practices, beliefs, social relations, etc.). The group priezzhie is not monolithic; priezzhie include Russians, Ukrainians, Buriats, and others, but mestnye pointed out to me that these distinctions meant nothing when describing how these elites related to and talked about native people. Although my discussion here focuses on reindeer herders and their relations to the landscape, both in White imagination and in native people’s own terms, my generalizations could be extended to hunter-fisher people, as well.

This paper contrasts two ways of speaking about the landscape and native culture in the Koryak Autonomous Okrug (KAO), which I identify as ‘European’ and as ‘native Kamchatkan’. Contrasting ways of speaking about the landscape mark someone as native (mestny, korennoi) or non-native (priezzhi) in Kamchatka. My term, ‘culturescape’ is an attempt to connect culture to the landscape in a way evocative of Appadurai’s (1996) ideas of ethnoscapes, neighborhoods, and locality, which are best understood as activities or processes, not entities. My usage of ‘culturescapes’ is also part of an attempt to return to a more old-fashioned anthropology, one that values such information as toponymy and narratives about trees and hills. As Basso (1996, 109 ff.) and Descola (1996) have argued, thinking of the landscape as existing ‘out there’ independent of humans reflects a European worldview. The landscape is best understood as simultaneously a background for a cultural worldview and constituted by that same worldview (Feld and Basso 1996, 14 ff.).
This follows native Kamchatkans’ ways of talking about place; it is a physical landscape, which is enacted and expressed in terms of social relations and activities. My usage of the term ‘culturescape’ is an inverse of Appadurai’s ‘ethnoscape’. Instead of a de-territorialized network of people, identities, and ideas, I emphasize the rootedness of daily life and people’s understandings in a particular place.

Current & Relevant Information:

As is typical across Siberia, the indigenous population is mostly rural, while immigrant Russophones dominate the more urban settlements of Palana, Ossora, and Tilichiki/Korf. What Russians see as civilization (Moscow, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski); natives see as European spaces (cities, towns). Russians in Kamchatka understand this point of view as one that puts native people not in civilization but in wilderness, and this makes native people ‘wild’, whether as noble savages or just as primitives. Koryak and Chukchi reindeer herders in the Koryak Autonomous Okrug talk about the landscape as different kinds of places. Naturally they make distinctions between domestic and not; they have small and large rituals marking places as domestic. These places weren’t previously unmarked, however, but different, associated with other persons (human or non-human). Other kinds of persons inhabit other kinds of spaces – herd deer, bear, fish, and various spiritual personae.


Abstract:

The article presents the results of scientific expedition studying the level of interethnic tolerance of representatives of Chukchi ethnos who live in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) (2012). In the process of empirical study, it was found that representatives of Chukchi ethnos have a prevailing average level of ethnic tolerance.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

The study of interrelation between the unique culture of peoples of the North and psychology is aimed at connecting history with routine way of life, ethnical specificity with its modern interpretation. The study of cultural and specific mechanisms of ethno psychological display of personality of native people will allow, with taking into consideration size and variations of the culture standard, to render effective and categorical psychological assistance that makes it possible to establish really harmonic relations with own personality and the world around.
Revival and maintenance of ethnic identity and ethnic self-consciousness of indigenous peoples is an important task of the modern society. In connection therewith, studies of ethnic identity and interethnic tolerance specificity of peoples, living in Northeastern Russia, are of special topicality.

The Sakha Republic (Yakutia) is a multinational region, where historically not only native ethnic groups, but also representatives of different peoples of Russia and CIS countries have lived.

On the territory of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) 32,860 representatives of low-numbered peoples of the North, including the Evenks–18,232, the Evens–11,657, the Yukaghirs–1,097, the Chukchis–602, the Dolgans–1,272 live. Population of the low-numbered peoples of the North is 3.2% within all population of the Sakha Republic.

The native low-numbered peoples of the North, settled dispersed on a huge area of Arctic space, were formed as an ethnos exactly on this territory. During centuries they have led a specific nomadic and semi-nomadic life, which turned into their way of life. These peoples possess original ancient cultures; their life is inseparably associated with native lands and traditions. Ensuring their legal protection, improvement of social and economic status is considered as matter of priority of a state policy of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia).

The Chukchi – the most ancient inhabitants of continental regions of the far north-east of Siberia, mediums of an inland culture of wild deer hunters and fishermen. Neolithic findings on the Ekytikyeem and Enmyveem Rivers and Lake Elgytg date back the second millennium B.C. By the first millennium C.E., having domestic deer and partially leading sedentary life on a sea shore, the Chukchi came into a contact with the Eskimo. A transfer to the sedentism was especially active in the XIV-XVI centuries after penetration of the Yukaghirs in the Kolyma and Anadyr valleys, who occupied places of wild deer open seasons. The Eskimo population of coasts of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans was partially forced out in other coastal regions by the continental hunters-Chukchi, and partially assimilated. In the XIV-XV centuries as a result of the penetration of the Yukaghirs in the Anadyr valley a territorial separation of the Chukchi from the Koryaks happened, connected with the last by origin.

In the epoch of global profound changes of societies, not only social and economic aspects of development, but also fates of many native peoples, who’s historically formed way of life being based on a traditional culture, undergoes a significant influence of an industrial civilization, are intertwined. A problem of adaptation of the native peoples to changes of natural environment, social and technical transformations undoubtedly is of a research interest. On the other hand, the native peoples have new ways to solve problems, connected with an opportunity to use innovative technologies in all spheres of life that will promote preservation and development of a native language, the origin culture, spiritual heritage of the people.
Processes of a cross-cultural assimilation and an interethnic cooperation long ago became relics of the modern society, in the period of global changes, these processes require special attention. Decreases of an interethnic tension, increase of a cross-cultural tolerance, development of integration processes is urgent today. A research of contents of ethnic stereotypes, peculiarities of the interethnic cooperation and socio-cultural adaptation of the low-numbered peoples is of the great interest.

**Conclusion**

Thus, as a whole on Chukchi selection, the level of ethnic tolerance is average. As for hetero stereotypes of representatives of Chukchi ethnos, among positive features prevail: endurance, hospitality, good nature, sense of duty, love of children, love to native places, modesty, diligence, ability to survive in severe conditions, and among the negative ones are aggression, talkativeness, suggestibility, arrogance, trustfulness, inertness, non-obligatoriness, absence of purposefulness, tendency to abuse of alcoholic drinks, frankness, indifference, deservedness, weakness for temptations, weak character, shyness, obstinacy, loss of national dignity, feeling of national lameness.

“Chukchi People,” Britannica, 11 March 2024 [31]
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chukchi

**Overview:**

Chukchi, also spelled Chukchee, also called Luorawetlan, people inhabiting the northeastern most part of Siberia, the Chukotskiy (Chukotka) autonomous okrug (district) in Russia. They numbered 14,000 in the late 20th century and are divided into two chief subgroups, reindeer Chukchi and maritime Chukchi. The reindeer Chukchi inhabit the interior of the easternmost portion of the okrug, the Chukotskiy (Chukchi) Peninsula, and its Siberian hinterland; the maritime Chukchi inhabit the Arctic and Bering coasts. Both speak a Luorawetlan language of the Paleosiberian language group and are linguistically and culturally related to the Koryak and Itelmen (Kamchadal).

**Current & Relevant Information:**

The reindeer Chukchi formerly lived mainly off of domesticated herds of reindeer. These herds supplied them with means of transport, milk and meat for food, and pelts for clothing and shelter. The maritime Chukchi lived by hunting Arctic Sea mammals, chiefly walrus, seals, and whales, and by fishing.

Their traditional dwellings varied according to their subsistence pattern. Maritime Chukchi lived in fixed villages; their houses were semisubterranean. Reindeer Chukchi were nomadic and lived in tents, changing residence according to seasonal change in pasture. Transportation depended on sledges pulled by reindeer or dogs harnessed in pairs. The maritime Chukchi traveled in boats with wooden frames and
skin covers. The basic socioeconomic unit of the maritime Chukchi was the boat team of several related families; it sometimes included neighbors. The village was a territorial association of related and unrelated families. Among the reindeer Chukchi, the encampment of families who herded together was the basic economic unit.

According to Chukchi religion, invisible spirits populate the universe. Sacrifices were an important aspect of the major festivals. Shamanist ceremonies were conducted for divination and healing.

After the Russian Revolution the Chukchi were settled on collective farms. Technical improvements and new economic activities have been introduced among them.


Overview:

The Chukchi People (also called the Chukchee or Luorawetlan) are a Siberian aboriginal group that lives in the Chukotka Autonomous District within the northeast region of the Russian Federation. They are closely related to other Siberian cultural groups in the northeast region, such as the Koryat and the Itelmen (also called the Kamchadal). The Chukchi are divided into two distinct groups: the reindeer herding Chukchi and the maritime Chukchi, each living a different lifestyle and relying on various sources of food, shelter, and transportation. Living in the extreme environment of the Arctic, the Chukchi have adapted to survive in many interesting ways. Today, there are approximately 16,000 Chukchi people.

Current & Relevant Information:

Characteristics of the Chukchis

The reindeer herding Chukchi, also the chavchyvat, are primarily nomadic and focus on the reliance on the unique Chukchi breed of reindeer, which they use for food, clothing, and transportation. The nomadic people usually live in a hut made from reindeer hide, known as a yaranga (or jaranga). Today, many nomadic Chukchi people still live in yarangas or sometimes in wooden houses or apartment buildings that were built during the reign of the Soviet Union. To move around the Chukchi peninsula, the people rely on sleds pulled by either reindeer or dogs. Families were the basic social unit, with each having its own herds and encampments.

History of the Chukchi Tribe

Humans are estimated to have first migrated into the Chukchi Peninsula (or Chukotka) approximately 2,500 years ago. The Chukchi culture, alongside neighboring peoples, such as the Koryak, originated from a currently unknown indigenous culture that first settled in the Siberian northeast.
The Chukchi most likely became their own cultural group approximately 800-1,000 years ago. Their first appearance in a historical written record was in 1641 (the Chukchi had no written language until the 1900s). During the 1640s, Russian cossacks (a type of explorer) attempted to conquer the land and take resources as a form of tax from the Chukchi on behalf of the Russian Tsar. The Chukchi defied the Russians, and they were successful. Therefore, the Chukchi could decide the amount of taxes they paid to the Russians.

Over the next few centuries, the Chukchi would continue interacting with Europeans, mainly traders. Christian missionaries, mainly those of the Russian Orthodox faith, attempted to convert the Chukchi, but the traditional beliefs held firm and persisted even today.

Gender Roles:


Abstract:

The authors of the paper write about the history of this special issue, explain why they have chosen the Russian North as their focus and render their understanding of changing gender relations through the definition of gender shift. Further, they describe multiple interrelated processes of gender shift, or gender shifts, unfolding in demographic, socio-economic, symbolic and cultural, administrative and political spheres. This description is illustrated with references to the diverse contributions to this issue, which represent a wide range of topics and approaches and provide rich empirical material originating from northern indigenous and multiethnic, nomadic, rural and urban communities. Discussions on and interpretations of gender shift are followed by anthropological case studies presented by the three authors on the basis of their research conducted in Zabaikal’skii Territory, Komi Republic, and Chukotka.

Current & Relevant Information:

In May 2008 the editors of this volume organized in Cesvaine, a small town in Latvia, a workshop entitled “Gender Shift in Northern Communities of Russia,” supported by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research and the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. Out of the papers presented during this workshop and the intensive discussions that followed each of the presentations grew this special issue. Setting the frame for the articles to come, we would like to explain why we decided to invite a number of specialists to reflect on gender relations in this part
of the world (the Russian North), how we define this notion of “gender shift,” and how each of us individually relates to this notion in our respective research.

Why Study Gender in the Russian North?

“Man the Hunter” was the title of a famous anthropological symposium in 1966—a time when it was politically correct to use the word “man” for all human beings or men only. The ambiguity of this wording resulted from a widespread indifference or ignorance toward women’s roles in hunting societies. Anthropologists working among the indigenous peoples of Siberia, however, have often been puzzled by the fact that the tundra and taiga—the treeless spaces and the boreal forests of northern Eurasia—are indeed a mostly male domain. Many hunters of Siberia nowadays live, for much of the year, without their wives, mothers, and daughters; many of them are in fact bachelors. The situation with reindeer herders is very similar.

This phenomenon is reflected in public discourse: Indigenous women and men often express their concern about an imbalanced gender relation. The increasing absence of women in the taiga and tundra is considered one of the principal reasons for the crisis in hunting and reindeer economies (e.g., Schindler 1997; Ssorin-Chaikov 2003). In addition, indigenous men, particularly in reindeer encampments, complain about the loneliness of the single life and the lack of women to share household duties.

Clearly, the picture was very different in earlier centuries. Perhaps hunting and reindeer herding were always pursued mostly by men, but nonetheless in those days women did live together in one tent with their husbands, fathers, and sons. The emigration of women from the tundra and taiga is a fairly recent phenomenon; it took place from the 1930s to 1980s and was a consequence of the Soviet modernization project. Articles presented in this issue (Rethmann, Vitebsky, Ziker, and our own insights further below in this introduction) evince various versions of the story of “where have all the women gone,” analyze how the manifold intended and unintended consequences of this separation play out today, and also provide evidence that this process has not happened evenly across the whole large territory of the Russian North (as emphasized particularly fervently by Liarskaya (this issue).

Conclusion

To conclude, present-day gender relations in northern communities deserve a more locally oriented analysis reconsidering the existing concepts of gender and kinship (Collier and Yanagisako 1990) and leading beyond the widely spread stereotypes about male and female roles. Such analysis also requires the ability to discriminate between the effects of post-Soviet socio-economic crisis and the more recent trends and developments. The concept of gender shift may help us to work out an efficient approach to studying changing family and gender relations in Northern communities of Russia.
The workshop on the gender shift held in May 2008 and the resulting collection of papers has not only expanded the geographical and methodological frameworks of research on changes in gender roles and contracts, kinship, and family relations. It has also enhanced our understanding of gender shift with its underlying multiple and diverse processes unfolding in different spheres of life in Northern Russia, ranging from family, gender and sexual relations in taiga and rural settings, to finding a nanny or a sexual partner in a megalopolis, and through to general socio-political activism of women and present-day status of men.

Our discussions and field experiences of gender shift have demonstrated that both male and female residents of Northern communities share the common post-socialist realities affecting family and gender relations along with other vitally important spheres of their life. Considering this, the concept of gender shift cannot be understood if taken out of the context of people’s everyday life practices impacted by recent socio-economic and political changes, and growing industrialization and globalization of the Russian North.

“Chukchi,” Countries and their Cultures [34]
https://www.everyculture.com/wc/Norway-to-Russia/Chukchi.html

Overview:

Several small and ancient Paleo-Siberian groups live in Russia’s extreme northeastern section of Siberia. The Chukchi are an ancient Arctic people who chiefly live on the Chukchi peninsula, or Chukotka. The Koriak also inhabit the southern end of the Chukchi peninsula and the northern reaches of the Kamchatka peninsula. The Nivkhs inhabit the island of Sakhalin and the Amur River Valley. Some scholars believe that the Nivkhs may be related to the Koriaks and Chukchi of far northeastern Siberia, and perhaps some native peoples of Alaska. This article profiles the Chukchi, the largest of the three groups.

The Chukchi who live in the interior of the Chukchi peninsula have traditionally been herdsmen and hunters of reindeer; those who live along the coasts of the Arctic Ocean, the Chukchi Sea, and the Bering Sea have customarily hunted sea mammals such as seals, whales, walruses, and sea lions. The Chukchi call themselves the Lygoravetlat (singular: Lygoravetlan), which means "genuine people."

In 1729, Russia launched a series of vigorous military campaigns against the Chukchi. By the 1760s, the Russian government decided that the cost of getting rid of the Chukchi was too high in terms of money and troops. They ended the war on the condition that the Chukchi stop attacking Russian settlers and start paying the yearly tax that native Siberians paid in furs. In the 1930s, the Chukchi were forced into state-supervised economic collectives (group settlements where their work and pay were controlled by the government). Chukotka became a region of mines and gulags (concentration camps). The arrest of millions of Soviet citizens during the
1930s created a need for isolated areas in which to build prison camps. Later in the Soviet era, the Chukchi were the frequent subjects of ethnic stereotype jokes told by Russians.

Current & Relevant Information:

FAMILY LIFE

Families consisting of parents and unmarried children living in a single dwelling are now typical. Sexual activity usually begins before marriage. There is little shame attached to unwed motherhood.

Women's status in traditional Chukchi society was clearly inferior to that of men. The status of Chukchi women has improved in the twentieth century as a result of Soviet policies of sexual equality, and women now serve as administrators, teachers, and doctors.

“Chukchi,” Encyclopedia.com, 15 May 2024 [35]

Overview:

The Chukchi are an Arctic people who chiefly inhabit the Chukchi peninsula, or Chukotka, in the extreme northeastern section of Siberia that faces North America across the Bering Strait. Archeological and linguistic evidence suggests that their original homeland probably lay further to the south along the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk, from which they migrated to their present area about six thousand years ago. The Chukchi who live in the interior of the Chukchi peninsula have traditionally been herdsman and hunters of reindeer; those who live along the coasts of the Arctic Ocean, the Chukchi Sea, and the Bering Sea have customarily hunted sea mammals such as seals, whales, walruses, and sea lions. The Chukchi call themselves the Lygoravetlat (singular: Lygoravetlan), which means “genuine people.” The word "Chukchi"—sometimes spelled "Chukchee”—is itself a plural form of the Russian word Chukcha (feminine: Chukchanka), which is their word for an individual Lygoravetlan. The reindeer Chukchi also call themselves Chavchu (“rich in reindeer”), whereas the coastal Chukchi call themselves the Ankalit (“sea people”). Interestingly, the reindeer breeders among the neighboring Koriak people have also been known to call themselves "Chavchu."

The Chukchi were one of the last Siberian peoples to fall under Russian rule. Russian Cossacks and adventurers in Siberia first learned of the Chukhi from the neighboring Yukagirs and Koriaks in the 1640s, but no serious attempt was made to conquer them at first. Russia was at that time occupied with subduing Siberia’s other indigenous peoples, and in any event the harsh tundra lands inhabited by the Chukchi were relatively poor in sable and other valuable fur-bearing animals sought by the Russians. But Chukchi raids on nearby Cossack settlers, combined with a
need to find new sources of furs after stocks in other parts of Siberia had been depleted, led Russia to launch a series of vigorous military campaigns against the Chukchi in 1729. The Chukchi put up a ferocious resistance and, when surrounded, they frequently committed mass suicide rather than surrender. By the 1760s, the Russian government decided that the cost of vanquishing the Chukchi was too high in terms of money and troops and ended the war on the condition that the Chukchi cease attacking Russian settlers and pay the yasak (the yearly tax that native Siberians paid in furs). Since Chukchi territory was quite isolated from the rest of the Russian empire and its cold, harsh climate was unattractive to outsiders, the Chukchi suffered much less than most other Siberian peoples from Russian colonization and exploitation and government interference into their way of life under the Czar-ist regime and the early Soviet period. Most Chukchi contact with the Russians came through trade, in which the Chukchi received knives, kettles, and other cooking utensils, vodka, tea, tobacco, and sugar in exchange for their fox furs and ivory. American whaling ships also participated in this kind of barter with the Chukchi in the late 1800s. This relatively independent existence came to an end in the 1930s, however, when herdsmen and sea-mammal hunters were forced into state-supervised economic collectives. Chukotka became a region of mines and gulags (concentration camps) as Stalin’s campaign to rapidly develop Soviet industry increased demands for the tin and gold that lay under Chukchi soil. Furthermore, the arrest of millions of Soviet citizens during that decade’s waves of mass political repression created a need for isolated areas in which to build prison camps. Later in the Soviet era, the Chukchi were culturally afflicted as the frequent subjects of ethnic stereotype jokes told by Russians.

Current & Relevant Information:

FAMILY LIFE

Traditionally, Chukchi lived in encampments of several nuclear families who were usually related to each other and who shared reindeer herds or sea-mammal-hunting equipment. Polygamy was widespread, especially among wealthy Chukchi, until it was banned by the Bolshevik government. The nuclear family with one or two children living in its own dwelling is now typical of the Chukchi. Sexual attitudes have customarily been fairly tolerant (although incest, rape, and intercourse with girls who have not reached puberty are prohibited). Sexual activity usually begins before marriage, although there is little stigma attached to unwed motherhood.

One practice formerly common among the Chukchi was the "group marriage" in which two or more male friends had the right to occasionally sleep with each other's wives. Sometimes this privilege was granted to esteemed visitors as well. The children of women whose husbands formed part of a group marriage were considered relatives and were forbidden to marry each other.
In a traditional Chukchi wedding, a reindeer was sacrificed and the couple anointed with its blood. Red ocher was substituted for reindeer blood among the maritime Chukchi. If the bride was to become part of the groom's household, she traveled to his family's home for the ceremony. On the other hand, if the groom had agreed to join his father-in-law's family, the ceremony took place at the latter's home. The marriage partner who was joining the spouse's family gave up all of his or her property to it. Weddings of this type have now been largely replaced by civil ceremonies.

GENDER ISSUES

Women's status in traditional Chukchi society was clearly inferior to that of men. Women could not eat until the men in the household had been served, and females received the less desirable cuts of meat. Wife-beating was also common. Nevertheless, they could own property (such as reindeer herds) and were permitted to divorce abusive husbands. The status of Chukchi women has improved markedly in the 20th century as a result of Soviet policies of sexual equality, and women now serve as administrators, teachers, and doctors.

The severe economic collapse in the Russian north strongly affected Chukchi women, who faced additional burdens in the face of chronic unemployment and economic difficulties.


Abstract:
Before the Aboriginal peoples of Chukotka were introduced to European culture, they lived a traditional way of life which defined their material and spiritual culture. During the integration into the Russian State, all spheres of their life went through various transformations. This article presents an overview of the history of Aboriginal peoples of Chukotka (Yupiget, Chukchi, Evens, Koryaks, Chuvans, Yukagirs and Kereks).

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction
Before the Aboriginal peoples of Chukotka were introduced to European culture, they lived a traditional way of life which defined their material and spiritual culture. Aboriginal peoples of Chukotka have different cultures and belong to different language groups. However, they share a lot of characteristics in their development. The main factors are: 1) they evolved in isolation from other cultures and for a long time were not ready to meet with more developed cultures, 2) as they were not protected, they went through the most radical influences by the State. Indeed, during
the integration into the Russian State, all spheres of their life went through various transformations. To better understand these changes, it is necessary to present a brief history of the Aboriginal peoples of Chukotka. This article is devoted to that.

**Children separated from their parents**

During the Communist period, Aboriginal children were placed in preschool establishments and boarding schools. Schools brought literacy, Russian culture, and enabled some Aboriginal peoples (and then their children) to reach a high and safe place in society. However, many Aboriginal people who went through the all-Russian school program, could not find their place in life—neither in their traditional culture, nor in the Russian one. The advantages of boarding schools were neutralized by the following circumstances:

- Excessive, forced separation of children from parents.
- Unjustified isolation of children from parents as well as from their natural, social and cultural environment.
- Overwhelming number of non-aboriginal personnel in children’s establishments.
- Minimal teaching of Aboriginal languages and prohibition of using it among students.
- Due to lack of knowledge from non-aboriginal reformers and personnel regarding Aboriginal diet and culture, a radical change of food was imposed on Aboriginal children which caused difficulties in their metabolism.
- Fosterage outside of family and school education of Aboriginal children caused the formation of “not normative” types of persons unable to acquire their culture through traditional mechanisms.

The schools located in villages and cities had common curricula and new teachers who did not adapt Aboriginal children and teenagers for the European lifestyle and socially-significant work. At the same time, the young left behind the traditional lifestyle and activities of their ancestors. They were ashamed of being Aboriginal and ran away from the tundra. Groups of rural and city Aboriginal people began to keep away from a decreasing group of people leading a traditional life. This situation created a lack of young staff among reindeer herders and in other traditional aspects of living.

At that time, an unusual gender disproportion was established: the young men chose to remain in the tundra and the girls preferred to live in villages and cities. As a result, few families were formed but a high rate of unmarried women had children. Groups of rural and city Aboriginal peoples began to keep away from a decreasing group of people leading a traditional life.
Overview:

Gender identity is a relatively new term in Western culture, but has had a lasting impact on cultures all around the world for hundreds of years.

Gender identity is defined as one's innermost concept of self as male, female, a blend of both or neither. It is how individuals perceive themselves and what they call themselves. One's gender identity can be the same or different from their sex assigned at birth, according to The Human Rights Campaign.

Project Director for Diversity & Inclusion and Gender & Sexual Diversity Initiatives at Iowa State nicci port said gender identity is how one sees oneself as a gendered or agendered person, in which it is defined by the individual. Someone's gender identity can be fluid, depending on an individual’s experience or culture.

However, port said there is often a misconception that occurs in relation to gender identity and gender expression.

“Gender identity is how a person sees themselves and gender expression is what a person does to communicate their gender to others — clothing, hairstyle, mannerisms, way of speaking — roles we take in interactions with others and so on,” port said.

Assistant Director for the Margaret Sloss Center for Women and Gender Equity Andra Castle also said gender expression is the outward appearance of a person whereas gender identity is in their brain, someone cannot see someone’s gender identity.

The concept of gender identity and gender expression are very apparent in different cultures in the world, according to PBS.

Current & Relevant Information:

Other cultures that held the concept of a third gender were the Chukchi in an indigenous Siberian tribe, the Inca tribes in Peru and Xanith in Islamic cultures.

The Chukchi are a nomadic, shamanic people who embrace a third gender. Generally, the shamans who are a part of this tribe are biologically male with some adoption of female roles and appearance who married men but also were not subject to the social limitations placed on women. Those who were Chukchi could accompany men on the hunt as well as take care of family.

“Impact of social guarantees on economics of the Russian,” Elena N. Bogdanova, Revista Espacios, 10 February 2018 [38]
Abstract:
Preferences for individuals living and working in the High North of Russia turned out to be a heavy burden for the northern economics and primarily for commercial enterprises. Entrepreneurs suffer from losses caused by obligatory extra social guarantees provided for women only. It increases remuneration of labor and cuts down the share of gross profit of the companies. The issue of extra-burden on the employers in the Arctic regions of Russia needs elaboration of support measures for entrepreneurs.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction
Economic development in Russia, especially in the Arctic regions, depends on many factors: state budgeting policy, investment climate for private companies and corporations, living conditions etc. Inequality of physical placement of production facilities and low density of population, severe climate conditions and undeveloped transport infrastructure make these territories unattractive for business because of high cost of production, considerable operating costs and necessity to provide social guarantees for their employees. Therefore, mostly big enterprises turned by the government into joint stock companies work there. But they strongly depend on state investment policy and do not have any financial independence.

Currently decrease of population in the Northern regions of Russia is an evident tendency which threatens economic stability of these territories. Thus, the President of the Russian Federation has declared population maintenance to be a priority for government’s socioeconomic policy. At the same time the Arctic regions are considered to be the area of strategic geopolitical interests for Russia.

Though negative demographic trends became evident in these regions: aging population, high rates of mortality and occupational diseases (Shahnaj Begum, 2016; Anastasia Emelyanova et al., 2012).

Negative demographic trends are rooted in exploration of these territories and areas settlement process. Unlike other Arctic countries industrial Russian North attracted people from all Russian regions. The problem of population maintenance became more actual in 1960s. That’s why extra social privileges for people living and working in the High North were approved. In 1990s the range of those “northern” benefits were extended due to necessity of political leaders to strengthen their positions. Thus, all these privileges were introduced during the Soviet Union period when most of the enterprises were state-owned, and financing all the expenses (including labor costs) were covered from the state budget. Since 1990s the process of privatization (transfer of state property into private ownership) started. It resulted in turning of the big enterprises into the joint-stock companies. The state is still 100%-shareholder of those ones which have a strategic importance for the Russian Federation.
Therefore, payment of extra social privileges in the Northern regions of Russia became heavy burden for local business. Current programs of subsidizing business in the Russian North intended to improve material and technical base ignore issues of social development of the companies. They do not cover any labor costs (including salaries with northern benefits, extra leave and travel costs of the employees within a vacation).

This article is aimed to discuss the impact of social guarantees on economics of the Arctic regions of Russia and offers some instruments for burden decreasing for business due to extra social privileges implementation.

Conclusions

To conclude, the issue of extra-burden on employers in the Arctic regions of Russia must be a subject of discussions for the state authorities and elaboration of support measures for entrepreneurs (i.e., cutting down or subsiding of insurance contributions to the off-budget social funds). Current regional and municipal programs for subsidizing local business in the northern territories of Russia should be revised, and cover a part of labor costs (extra social privileges – extra leave, travel costs of employees within vacation).

Simultaneously, federal programs for subsidizing social development of big strategically important companies in the Northern regions of Russia should be initiated. All these special measures are intended to provide population maintenance and economic stabilization in the Arctic regions of the Russian.

D. Dolgan [Russia]:

“Dolgan People,” Britannica, 15 February 2016 [39]
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Dolgan

Overview:

Dolgan, Turkic-speaking people constituting the basic population of the Taymyr autonomous okrug, which is far above the Arctic Circle in north-central Russia. They numbered about 6,000 in the late 20th century.

The Dolgan migrated to the area from the southwest, presumably in the 18th century. The nucleus of the Dolgan people was formed from a few Evenk (Evenki) clans that subsequently adopted a dialect of the Turkic-speaking Sakha (Yakut). Before the Russian Revolution of 1917 the Dolgan were organized into clans, headed by clan elders. In the late 20th century, they were principally reindeer herders, collectivized under the Soviets, though their way of life was only gradually becoming less nomadic. Vegetable gardening had become important, along with traditional game hunting.

“Dolgan in Russia,” Joshua Project [40]
https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/11593/RS
Overview:

Dolgan means "people living on the middle reach of the water". The Dolgans live in the territory of Taimyr, Dolgan-Nenetsky Autonomous District, Krasnoyarsky Kray and Anabar Ulus, Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and in the vast territory from the west side of the Lower Yenisei River to the east of the Anabar river. The Dolgan's population is about 7,261 according to a census in 2002, and they are spread out between different locations. The most common language used is Yakut. The first writings in the seventeenth century were about Anabar where Dolgans have their settlements. The writings say that some marksmen groups were trekking from Mongolia to a new land on the Anabar River for the Tsar's army.

In the beginning of the seventeenth century on the Lower Anabar, there were ancestors of Avashsky Nganasans called Tavgi who migrated to the west. Under Tungus (Evenks) pressure, the ancestors were forced out of Central Yakutia. According to a famous Soviet historian, Gurvich I.S., the Yakuts pushed into the lands in the middle of the seventeenth century. There was a migration to the middle of Yenisei and Khatanga Rivers on the Taimyr Peninsula at approximately the same time. When the Russians came to Taimyr and the adjacent coastlands in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, different ethnic groups lived side by side on the severe land. With all the different groups mixing together in one area, it created the formation of a totally unique ethnic community. The different languages and life styles eventually became the primary foundation of the future Dolgan ethnic group today. The Dolgan have three tribal groups known as: the Dolgans, the Dongots, and the Edyans.

Current & Relevant Information:

During the daily lives of the Dolgans, they hunt, fish, and breed deer. Ilia Spiridonov, a Dolgan from Anabar, was the first award-winning deer-breeder in 1957. There are a lot of other deer-breeders and hunters that have been awarded with different medals and orders of USSR and Russia. In the republic there are recognized poets such as Kylyatskov S., Shubin K., and Tunrin L. Also, Spiridonov U. is a professional artist, not just known in his republic but also in Russia and other countries as well. There is a popular children's musical group called "Heiro", as well as other amateur performances in the republic.

The Dolgan women are very skilled at making national clothes, decorating the deer equipment, and other household things for their nomadic way of life. Dolgans have compacted settlements in Yurunkhaya village by the Sea of Laptevs. The present day Dolgans do not identify themselves with the Yakuts or the Evenks. Seven hundred thirty-two Dolgans live in Anabar Ulus, giving them a higher percentage of people living there. In Anabar Ulus, they have their own high school, medical station, kindergarten, and a small cinema. However, the cinema is old so they are planning to build a new cultural center. Because of the different climatic conditions and a lack
of elementary facilities, it has been difficult for them to attract teachers there. Therefore, some of the students graduate school without taking some of the main subjects. Social problems include alcoholism, unemployment, and poverty. The Dolgans also have no writing of their own, therefore they use Russian writing. They cannot use the Yakut script because it is unfamiliar to them, making it unsuitable for use in their schools.

“Dolgan,” Minority Rights Group International, December 2020 [41]
https://minorityrights.org/minorities/dolgan/

Overview:

According to the 2010 national census, there are 7,885 Dolgan in the Russian Federation. Dolgan are a Turkic people of Tungusic origin. They speak a dialect of the Sakha language and are being assimilated by Sakha, but still retain a separate identity. They live in the Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug. There are some Christian additions to their shamanist-animist religion.

Current & Relevant Information:

In 2005 the populations of the Taimyr Autonomous Okrug (AOk), the Evenk AOk and Krasnoyarsk Krai, voted in favor of the unification of the three regions in a referendum. The unification took place in January 2007.

In October 2013, deputies of the State Assembly of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) met their colleagues from the Taimyr Dolgan-Nenets region. The meeting was devoted to the preservation of the traditions and culture of the peoples of the north, as well as to cooperation between Dolgan in the Sakha Republic and Krasnoyarsk Krai. Elena Glomareva, the people’s deputy of the Republic of Sakha, expressed her concerns about the lack of teaching materials in the Dolgan language. The group called for an increase in the availability of newspapers, books and other publications in the native language, as well as the teaching of Dolgan at schools.

In September 2014, negotiations between the Dolgan minority and representatives of the Surgutneftegaz company took place in the village of Dubinka. The locals expressed concern about the company’s plans to build two large structures for mining purposes, opposing their construction as a threat to the deer who migrate through the area. Moreover, the Dolgan representatives expressed their community’s fear of losing its traditional hunting and fishing grounds.

“Dolgans,” B.C. Alexander, Arctic Photo, 2020 [42]
https://www.arcticphoto.com/polar-info/polar-info22.htm

Overview:

The Dolgans live on the Taymyr Peninsula in the central Siberian Arctic. They number about 7,000 and nowadays, they are mainly to be found living in settlements along the Dudypta, Kheta and Khatanga Rivers as well as the shores of Khatanga
Bay. The Dolgans have the youngest Arctic culture, which only was recognized in the 19th Century. Scientists believe that the Dolgan evolved from a mixture of three other northern Siberian cultures, the Yakut, Evenk and Nenets. Their territory consists largely of open tundra and has a particularly harsh climate. The Khatanga area, for example, has an average January temperature of minus 33.8° Celsius with frequent winter storms. Just to the south of their territory in Taymyr lies the port of Dudinka and the industrial town of Norilsk whose pollutants are found right across the Arctic.

Current & Relevant Information:

Their traditional economy is based on a combination of reindeer breeding, hunting wild reindeer, as well as other game, trapping and fishing. The reindeer herders follow the common system of moving north in the spring and south in the autumn following traditional migration routes. These are changed each year, so that the group returns to the original route every fourth year, depending on the condition of the pastures. Slaughtering of domestic reindeer is normally done in November, when the reindeer are closest to the herders’ villages. Dolgan reindeer herders use baloks rather than tents. These are small huts, mounted on sled runners and insulated with reindeer skin. They have small stoves in them which burn coal that the herders bring form the villages. Most Dologans nowadays live in settlements. Often these villages are small with only a few hundred people with wooden houses heated by coal. The facilities are usually very basic with no mains water or sewage system.

Gender Roles:


Abstract:

In this article I discuss sexual relations of young people in the tundra village in Russian Far East. Sexual behavior and gender roles in this society are defined by traditions and young people are urged to follow these. Traditionally, premarital sex is not tolerated and from the first sight there is no physical space for illicit sexual relations in the village. However, young people find their own ways to pursue their interests. I show that they make use of what I call “empty physical and social space.” Young people are creative and manage to find space for sex. Young people also make use of contradictory social norms, intricate kinship and clan structures, or certain interpretations of “good behavior” to have and meet the partners they wish to have.
In this paper I will discuss multiple levels of sexuality among Eastern Dolgan youth in the Anabar District, northwestern Republic of Sakha, eastern Siberia. At the beginning of the paper, I will analyze Dolgan social and moral norms to show the social framework for young people’s lives. Furthermore, I will discuss the sexual behavior of the young people, how it is linked to the ideas of gender and prestige. In this article I shall give an overview of how young people’s sexuality exists in the social and physical space of a tundra village. I will argue that when pursuing their sexual adventures, ordinary (obychnye) young people do not rebel against their parents’ society’s norms but use “free space” as it exists both in social norms and the physical environment.

In 2000 and 2001, I spent eight months in the Anabar District (Anabarskii ulus), conducting fieldwork for my doctoral dissertation. Three villages are located in the district. Two of them, the district center, Saaskylaakh (2,500 inhabitants), and the northernmost village in the district, Uurung Khaia (1,200 inhabitants), were my bases when I was not in the tundra. Uurung Khaia is mainly populated by Sakha-speaking Dolgans, whereas Saaskylaakh is home to Evenki, Russian, and Sakha residents. Dolgan people in the district belong to the eastern group and speak a different dialect than the Dolgan people discussed by John Ziker in this issue. Eastern Dolgans have also adopted many traits of Sakha culture into their everyday culture. Intermarriage with Sakha over many centuries and 20 years of national politics of the Republic of Sakha have caused a shift in the identity of Anabar Dolgans. In many cases they feel affiliation with both Sakha and Dolgans and see no contradiction in identifying themselves with both groups the same time (Ventsel 2005). Historically, Eastern Dolgans were more trade-oriented than Western Dolgans. Therefore, among the Anabar Dolgans, the concept of private property is more developed, while kinship ties are looser (Ventsel 2005). Probably as a result of Sakha influence the kinship hierarchy and sexual division of labor are stricter and generally followed among Eastern than Western Dolgans.

Uurung Khaia is a village on the banks of the Anabar River, where a big part of the population directly and the rest of the inhabitants indirectly depend on the tundra’s resources. This means that many adults are constantly in the tundra for hunting, fishing, and working in reindeer brigades. Most of the eight months I spent in this district, I spent with the reindeer herders and hunters of Uurung Khaia. Uurung Khaia is seen in the district as a “provincial” village (in contrast to the “capital,” Saaskylaakh), and there was no hotel there, so I stayed at people’s homes when not in the tundra. Uurung Khaia is a village that has a new modern school, a daycare center, and, at the edge of the village, a huge base for fuel that is transported by boat to the village during the navigation period and shipped by trucks to other villages. The center of the village is a square with a two-story office building for the village administration and the former sovkhoz, which has turned into a municipal
agricultural enterprise. Around the square, there are concrete buildings that contain two apartments, one three-story apartment house, and some fur-processing shops. Most people, however, live in one- or two-apartment wooden houses that are located around and between the few streets. This is a small and not very visually interesting village that is dusty during the summer and covered with snow in a winter that lasts eight months a year and can be very cold—more than 60 degrees below zero. Outside the village, there is endless tundra, an open space without any trees, and only a few bushes.

**Conclusion**

This paper is about hidden sex among “ordinary” (obychnye) Dolgan youth. I have sought to show that being young in an Arctic village is not about rebelling against society but rather about adapting their lifestyle to the norms and codes of behavior of their parents” world. Young people conceal their premarital intimate relations, because sex before marriage does not match with the concept of “proper behavior.” I have demonstrated how the social and physical environment of young people strongly affects their sexual strategies. Dolgan youth are “creative” in finding empty physical and social spaces for their intimacy. In a place where the whole environment in and around the village seems to be unsuitable for hidden sex, they find possibilities to use space that their parents cannot control. Of particular relevance is how individuals in this village utilize Dolgan norms and uncontrolled social space to pursue their own interests. To understand hidden sex, one should have background knowledge about Dolgan kinship structures, social and moral norms, and gender roles. Dolgan youth use their relative freedom, complex kinship structures, and the community’s tolerance to certain aspects of social life (like not sleeping at home or not condemning single mothers) to follow their own interests. Dolgan youth behavior is not an outright rebellion against their parents’ world. The young people just try to establish and maintain their own parallel world, one that is not in conflict with the main values of the community.


**Abstract:**

This article questions the notion of gender shift in the Yamal region. It looks at the migration of indigenous women from the tundra/taiga to settlements and towns, as well as at the specific gender division of space that has resulted from this process in the Russian North. The author provides a detailed analysis of quantitative and qualitative sources dealing with these issues in different regions of the Russian
North and compares this material with the situation she observed and studied in Yamal in the 2000s. In this way, the author not only shows that Yamal seems to hold a special position in terms of how gender relations are organized today, but she also stresses that although the general picture of the gender shift may look similar, one should pay attention to differences that challenge generalization for the whole of the Russian North.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

Among the phenomena that provoked increased interest at the conference “Gender Shift in Northern Communities of Russia” was the migration of indigenous women from the tundra and taiga to settlements and towns, as well as the specific gender division of space that has resulted from this process. I will use “gender shift” to describe the migration of women from the tundra, and issues related to it. This article will focus on the situation in Yamal, which I will compare with other regions of the Russian North.

To understand the situation in Yamal I had to inscribe it into a broader context of the Russian North in general, examining materials related to various territories and peoples from the Kola Peninsula to Chukotka. It turned out that publications on this topic started appearing more than 20 years ago: some of them are directly related to my subject, while others mention it only in passing. To my knowledge, the authors of these studies do not use the term “gender shift,” employing only descriptive names for the phenomenon. These works may be divided into two large groups, “quantitative” and “qualitative.” The former primarily comprises demographic statistics, or else parts or paragraphs of works in demography, ethno-demography, and ethno-sociology, which compile and analyze statistical data. The latter include various anthropological and ethnological works that analyze not so much figures, but situations and contexts. Materials of both types may often be found within the frames of one work.

Since it is impossible, in one short article, to compare the situation in Yamal with every other region of the Russian North, in the first part of this paper I will provide data from several regions, and then discuss these parameters in relation to Yamal.

Taimyr (formerly Dolgan-Nenets Autonomous Region): With Evenks, inhabitants of the peninsula, almost all women and children live in settlements; family nomadism is virtually absent: “women are not the way they used to be, they don’t want to live in the tundra,” say the people (Anderson 1998:201).

Abstract:

This article is an inquiry into the extent to which, and how, roles of men and women in indigenous communities in north-central Siberia have changed along with the changing economic and political context from the 1917 Communist Revolution to the post-Soviet era. The starting point for this investigation is archived data from the 1926/27 Polar Census of Siberia. Fieldwork conducted in the region in the 1990s and 2000s provides comparative materials. During this 80-year period, the development of centralized settlements and regional urban areas brought increasing professionalization of traditional economic activities and greater involvement of the indigenous population in civil service work. As a result, the flexibility of gender roles in the indigenous pre-Soviet economy was sacrificed in favor of work in state companies and organizations that followed gender contracts imposed following the general Soviet model. In the post-Soviet period, following the collapse of the Soviet planned economy greater flexibility in gender roles has been observed, along with increasing importance of informal exchange networks and reliance upon hunting, fishing and trapping as key inputs to local economies.

Current & Relevant Information:

This article explores the extent to which, and how, roles of men and women in indigenous communities in north-central Siberia have changed along with the changing economic and political context from the 1917 Communist Revolution to the post-Soviet era. The starting point is a survey of household and community cards from the 1926/27 Polar Census. The ending point of the discussion is recent fieldwork conducted in the region.

The Polar Census was one of the most detailed enumerations of indigenous peoples in Siberia with over 400 potential data points for each household (Anderson 2005, 2006). The material has become an important historical source for aboriginal demographics, economics, settlement patterns, and lifeways during a critical historical period. Census records from the Taimyr Region summarized in this article contribute to understanding the pre-Soviet history of women’s and men’s work, inter-household cooperation, and trade. The Soviet period saw increasing integration of the indigenous population with the larger economy and society, gravitating indigenous populations to centralized settlements and regional urban areas. As permanent settlements were constructed in the region families were assigned apartments and many women and men found salaried employment in vertically integrated and state-owned organizations. As a result, changes in gender roles and kinship relations occurred. The Soviet and post-Soviet periods’ changes are briefly discussed in light of oral history interviews and ethnographic studies conducted with indigenous people in two communities in the Taimyr Region. The post-Soviet period
saw a breakdown of state-owned organizations, high levels of unemployment, alcoholism, and unnatural death.

Related to the question of changing gender roles is the importance of historical changes in economic and social organization that influence household economies and thus gender roles, kinship, and family structures. Such historical economic and institutional changes are the most likely to cause changes in the gender contract. To study the dynamics of changing gender roles, the causes of such changes should be investigated by exploring the relationship of observed changes to other observed variables. This strategy implies observations throughout time. For purposes of this article, investigation of available census materials can provide information to evaluate changes for approximately the past 90 years, although there may be some additional census sources that could push back further that time frame with limited comparability. In other words, it may be difficult to study the dynamics of changing gender roles, depending on what the sources are, how the data were collected, and whether the same categories of data were collected. Different types of sources may give incomparable information, for example, archival materials, oral histories, contemporary observations and ethnography, and previous ethnographic literature. For the analysis presented in this article I rely upon census materials (1926/27 and 1997 through 2007) that include some comparable data, along with ethnographic interviews and observations. Census materials from 1997, 2001 and 2003 were provided by village administration and sourced from the village registry book, and verified interviews of a small number of key informants (both Tukhard and Ust’-Avam) and in structured interviews of 79 household heads (Ust’-Avam). In 2007, the earlier census materials were updated with the help of two key informants in Ust’-Avam.

One area of contentious debate within anthropology is the definition of “tradition.” Some anthropologists claim that there are no traditional families or traditional economic activities of indigenous people of Siberia at all, and all that is left are “survivals” (Oleg Kuznetsov, personal communication). On the other hand, the use of the tradition concept in discussion of indigenous Siberians’ adjusting to post-soviet economic uncertainty (Vorob’ev 2001) and land use (Kuchinskii 2007) is well established in Russia, particularly in light of legislation about traditional land use, as in other areas of the world (Kuper 2003). Rather than view tradition as something lasting, stable, or fitting into a neatly carved mold that cannot change through time, and those traditions do not exist if they have broken that mold, I argue that traditions necessarily include a great deal of flexibility (cf. Habeck 2005:184; Ziker 2002; Bjerkli 1996). Traditions are behaviors, practices, and representations (i.e., culture) that are learned and copied from ancestors. This does not mean that traditions do not change—traditions are recreated through time and recontextualized. Australian aboriginal dreamtime, a symbol of Australian aboriginal societies, is interpreted in dreaming stories in light of current issues and future challenges. Similarly, in this article I look for continuities and variation in gender roles through time and how such
changes correlate with changes in the larger political economy. Such data are potentially of great use because while technology has changed, subsistence strategies, such as reindeer hunting, fishing, and a variety of other hunting and gathering activities have been and continue to be conducted in the Taimyr Region, some since the early Holocene period (Khlobystin, Fitzhugh, and Pitul’ko 2005:81).

Similarly important in approaching transformation of gender relations is the distinction between “facts” such as demographic information and “feelings,” and where people may be worrying about changes that they perceive, but which may not be turning up in “facts.” For example, in my study region I heard a number of elderly female informants say that young women today do not know how to tan hides, sew, or butcher meat properly. Were these women likewise criticized when they were young? While I do think in the past most young women would know how to butcher, their abilities, or style, may have been the subject of discussion of elder kinswomen. It is difficult to study such feelings in the past. In the present it may be impossible to develop comparable facts since most of the mothers of today’s elderly have passed on to their final road.

Finally, this article will attempt to address the question of what is partnership and how does this relate to gender in northern Siberia. Much may be learned from kinship and genealogical method. When using this method, it is important to differentiate between rules and behavior. Genealogy may help to document behavior (gender relations) in order to compare with rules (gender contract). For example, many families used to live together in traditional mobile dwellings with a partner family, to whom they may or may not be related as kinsmen. In addition, families travelled together in groups at certain times of the year and split apart at others. It is likely that living with a partner family was an arrangement that made certain tasks more effective. Processing hides, for example, entails much drudgery and sharing the work could have made it more pleasant or effective. It is likely that there was much visiting across the dwelling and between dwellings at these times. Today, analogous mechanisms are still in use. For example, a number of families share the responsibility of feeding their children (Ziker and Schnegg 2005). It is easy to emphasize change without a good knowledge of the past. Maybe there are more continuities than we suspect.

After a brief introduction to the study area, and Polar Census materials from the Taimyr Region, the article moves to a discussion of changes occurring during the period of Soviet development from the 1930s to the 1980s; this discussion will attempt to track changes in gender roles and partnerships. Finally, a discussion of current gender contracts and gender roles will provide the basis to examine continuities and divergences throughout time. This method could be framed in terms of an ethnoarchaeology of demographics that can help scholars and indigenous people themselves understand historical developments over time.
Abstract:

The role of men in hunter-gatherer societies has been subject to vigorous debate over the past 15 years. The proposal that men hunt wild game as a form of status signaling or “showing off” to provide reproductive benefits to the hunter challenges the traditional view that men hunt to provision their families. Two broad assumptions underlie the signaling view: (1) hunting is a poor means of obtaining food, and (2) hunted game is a public good shared widely with others and without expectation of future reciprocation. If hunters lack the ability to direct food shares and obtain subsequent benefits contingent on redistribution, then the ubiquitous observations of male hunting and universal pair-bonding cannot be explained from a perspective that emphasizes kin provisioning and a division of labor. Here we show that there is little empirical support for the view that men hunt for signaling benefits alone. The ethnographic record depicts a more complex relationship between food sharing patterns, subsistence strategies, mating, and the sexual division of labor. We present a framework incorporating trade-offs between mating and subsistence strategies in an economic bargaining context that contributes to understanding men’s and women’s roles in hunter-gatherer societies.

Overview:

The Dolgan inhabit the Taimyr Peninsula and the left bank of the lower Yenisei River, across from the town of Dudinka. This territory forms part of the Taimyr (Dolgan-Nenets) Autonomous District (okrug), the TAO, which is part of the Krasnoyarsk region of the Russian Federation (RF). The Dolgan do not enjoy national autonomy. In the majority of settlements, they reside and conduct their economy in common with the Nganasan, Evenki, Nenets, and other nationalities, as well as with migrants. At the present time most of the Dolgan are concentrated in the settlements along the courses of the Dudypta, Kheta, and Khatanga rivers and along the shores of Khatanga Bay. Some also live in the settlements of Levinskie Peski and Khantaiskoe Ozero in the western part of the TAO. A number of families reside in the district capital of Dudinka and in the large townlike settlement of Khatanga.

Men are engaged for the most part in trapping and hunting, fishing, and reindeer breeding. Women's labor related to these activities consists of providing men with clothing, preparing food, and participating in the processing of the catch. In the
settlements men are engaged in heavy labor on fur farms, in construction, in the
building of cold-storage units in the permafrost, and in bringing in fuel and water.
The Dolgan men, in contrast to the Nganasan, participate more actively in dwelling
construction and household tasks. Within the family, there is also division of labor
based on age.

“Dolgan - Marriage and Family,” Countries and their Cultures [48]

Overview:

Formerly parents arranged marriages for their children. The groom's family sent a
matchmaker to the family of the bride, where the bride-wealth was discussed, as
well as what the bride would bring to her future husband's family. The wedding was
held at the home of the bride's parents’ family. Then the newlyweds moved to the
residence of the family of the groom. Ideally, only after the birth of the first child, did
they, with the help of their kin, establish their own dwelling and household.

At present, young people enter into mutual agreement between themselves but
consult their elders about the permissibility of their union. The marriage is registered
according to (Russian) law, and a feast is given that is attended by very many and
lasts for two to three days. Weddings are attended by kinsmen living in other
settlements.

Current & Relevant Information:

Certain nomadic Dolgan groups formerly had their own lineage (Russian: rodovye)
names. As a rule, children were numerous. The head of the family, a man, was
universally respected, but the women, too, had a considerable degree of
independence. The practice of taking orphans or children from poor families with
many offspring into a related family was widespread in the past and remains so.
Today, the nuclear family predominates. In reindeer-breeding brigade each family
has its own portable dwelling. Single young persons live with the families. Trapping
is conducted occasionally by work crews whose members are linked by ties of
kinship. In such cases the members live in a relatively large single-room house
constructed in the hunting territory. Trap lines, however, were assigned to each
individual. In the settlement, each family belonging to a work crew has its own
quarters. Children of school age live in the settlements, either with relatives or in the
school dormitory.

E. Enets [Russia]:

“Who lives in the Russian Arctic?,” Anna Sorokina, Russia Beyond, 20

Overview:
About 20 percent of Russia is located beyond the Arctic Circle and this area is the home for 2.3 million people - more than half of all Arctic-dwellers in the world. Most of them are Russians, but there are also 40 indigenous peoples of the North. Each has its own language, culture and traditions. Only a quarter of them are nomadic, with the rest preferring urban life these days: the largest Arctic cities are Murmansk (280,000 inhabitants), Norilsk (about 180,000), Vorkuta (over 50,000) and Salekhard (over 50,000).

Current & Relevant Information:
One of the vanishing peoples of the world, with only 200 individuals left. Often, the Enets are called ‘Yenisei Samoyeds’. They live in the Taimyr Peninsula in small Arctic settlements near the Yenisei River and are engaged in hunting and fishing. There are several dozens of Enets native speakers among them. Their language is close to the languages of their neighbors - the Nenets and Nganasans.


Overview:
Enets, also called Enet’-enche, Yeniseiok, or Yenisey Samoyeds, an indigenous Arctic people who traditionally resided on the east bank of the lower Yenisey River of Russia. They numbered about 300 in the Russian census of 2002.

Current & Relevant Information:
The Enets live in the Arctic tundra, a region of permafrost, and are divided into two major groups, the so-called Tundra Enets and the Wood Enets, though smaller divisions also exist. In addition to living in different ecozones, the Tundra and Wood groups each speak a different dialect of the Enets language, which belongs to the Uralic language family.

The Enets are closely associated with the Nganasans, the Nenets, the Dolgans, and the Evenks and consider themselves the original inhabitants of the Taymyr Peninsula. Until the Soviet intrusion into this region, the Enets were nomadic hunters and fishers who used domesticated reindeer as draft animals. Soviet rule brought forced settlement for the Enets and initiated the wholesale destruction of their environment in the interest of industry.


Overview:
Enets (enet’-enche) is the self-designation of this ethnic group the original meaning of which is 'a human being, a man'. In most cases the adjective enej -- onaj (real, genuine) is added; i.e., enej enet or 'Enets, a real human being'. In a similar manner the Enets language is called onaj bazaan 'a real, genuine language'. The name
Enets was first used by a linguist and ethnologist, G. Prokofiev, in 1937. It is a version of the pronunciation of nenets.

An earlier and better-known name for the Enets was the Yenisey Samoyeds, derived from their habitat on the Yenisey. This name is still widely used outside the Soviet Union. The general name Samoyed was first used in a chronicle by Monk Nestor. It has been suggested that the word has its origins in the somatu or samatu, used by the Selkup to denote the Enets. Another theory has it as a non-Russian word of unknown origin. The Bai tribe on the Ob has been mentioned in another Russian chronicle (the 11th century).

Current & Relevant Information:

**Habitat.** The Enets inhabit the east bank of the River Yenisey in the western part of the Taimyr Peninsula. They belong to the Dudinka and Ust-Yenisey Districts of the Taimyr Autonomous Territory in the Krasnoyarsk region. It is a polar permafrost area, mostly tundra and tundra mountains. The maximum temperature in summer is +13 °C and the average temperature in winter is -30 °C. The Tundra Enets move in an area between the Yenisey and the Pyassina while the Wood Enets live to the north in the center of the Dudinka territory, in wooded tundra.

**Population.** The Enets are the smallest Samoyed ethnic group. Since the census of 1926, there has unfortunately been no further exact data on their numbers gathered. The situation has, however, improved in recent years.

In 1959 only 18 Enets were officially registered in the Taimyr Autonomous Territory. This was the result of ignorance; a part of the Enets were registered as Nenets, and another part as Nganasans. Following this debacle, the census was carried out by an ethnologist, V. Vasilyev, and the result this time was "over 300". The population of the Enets had probably stood at "about 300" for several decades.

As late as 1974 the density of population on the Taimyr was low (42,000 inhabitants per 862,100 square kilometers). In recent years, however, the population has doubled. The native people are more alarmed by the ruinous economic influence and pollution introduced by the newcomers, than by the numbers they have arrived in.

**Anthropologically.** The Enets belong to the Uralic race. Mongoloid and Arctic features are predominant, with only a minor European influence observable. They have broad faces, high cheekbones and slit eyes. Their hair and eyes are dark, and their skin is swarthy. The average height of the male Enets is less than 160 cm. They have no facial hair.

“The history of the Enets people,” tumbex.com, 2015 [52]
https://www.tumbex.com/uralic-solidarity-blog.tumblr/post/114148818530

Overview:
The ancestors of the Enets people were Samoyeds who came from Southern Siberia and the area around river Tom.

The Enets people were first mentioned in a text originated in 15th century Novgorod. In 17th century the Enets people lived a nomad life, the Tundra people around the downstream of the rivers Taz and Yenisey, and the Forest people in the Turuhan river valley. In the end of the century, they had to give way to Nenets and Selkup groups and move to the eastern side of the downstream of Yenisey. The ones that stayed on the west side of Yenisey and around the Taz area were assimilated to the Nenets groups that moved there. In the 1930s’ kolkhozes were formed and the Enets people moved to multicultural population centers and were mostly assimilated to the Nenets and Nganasan peoples.

Current & Relevant Information:

According to Hajdú, in the 60s’ hunting and fishing played an important role in the lives of the Forest Enets, while reindeer breeding was the most important source of income for the Tundra Enets. “The Enets way of life was in part like that of the Nenets and in part like that of the Nganasan,” he wrote. Enets tents were similar to the Nganasan ones and the cut of their clothing varied, sometimes being alike the Nganasan shape, sometimes of that of the Nenets.

Gender Roles:

NOTE: No specific information found on the Gender Roles of the Enets.

F. Eskimo (Yupik) [Russia/US-Alaska]:

“What’s the difference between “Inuit” and “Eskimo”? Feheley Fine Arts [53]

Overview:

“Eskimo” used to refer to Inuit and their culture, whether by your grandparents, parents, or maybe even a friend who grew up outside of Canada. It’s a term that has been out of date since 1980 when the name “Inuit” (meaning “people” in Inuktitut) was recognized by the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) to denote Inuit groups across the circumpolar region (Canada, Greenland, USA, and Russia). Today, “Eskimo” is considered a pejorative term. Here’s a brief history explaining why.

Current & Relevant Information:

The etymology of “Eskimo”

According to Inuk author and translator Mini Aodla Freeman, the term “Eskimo” came from another Indigenous language in Canada: Cree. In Cree, the word is “escheemau” which roughly means “eaters of raw meat.” Freeman explains the word developed after the Cree first encountered Inuit and found them eating raw meat—a way of life the Inuit proudly continue on until this day.
Another theory is that the word has an Innu-aimun origin, a language spoken by the Labrador and Northern Quebec-based Innu. This word is “awassimew/ayassimew” which means, roughly, “one who laces snowshoes.” Originally it may have been used by the Innu to describe the Mi’kmaq and later transferred to the Inuit. Over time, this word too developed into “eater of raw meat” as in Ojibwa (similar to Cree), the prefix “ashk” can mean raw or fresh. The French later translated the word to “esquimaux” which made its way into English use.

**Why “Eskimo” is pejorative**

Using “Eskimo” today is considered pejorative or derogatory simply because “eater of raw meat” is not how Inuit choose to refer to themselves, and they never did. The word is an exonym—a name given to a group by another group—and its continued use can perpetuate harmful stereotypes. As Mini Aodla Freeman has written: “To me the word ‘Eskimo’ does not mean anything. […] Inuit differentiated themselves from the animals of nature, not other races.”

The name “Inuit,” however, comes directly from the Inuktitut language and is the preferred term of the Inuit. In 1977, a group of Inuit delegates from across the circumpolar region met in Alaska for the first Inuit Circumpolar Conference. There, they discussed Inuit rights and self-determination. The ICC proceeded to adopt the term “Inuit” to designate all Inuit within the circumpolar region, thereby rejecting the use of “Eskimo.” This is stated in the ICC charter, signed in 1980. [5] To continue to refer to Inuit as “Eskimo” can be viewed as disrespectful toward Inuit self-determination.

**Where “Eskimo” is used today — in Eskimo art for sale and beyond**

Today you may see “Eskimo” used here and there for few reasons. One is when referring to the name as used within its historical context. For example, early prints like Kiakshuk’s *Eskimo Woman with Fox Trap* (1961) and Lucy Qinnuayuak’s *Young Eskimo Family* (1965) were titled before the term was acknowledged as derogatory. You may also find that many Eskimo art history books and Eskimo painting catalogues published before 1980 are, naturally, filled with the word. Some key texts have updated their terminology in revised editions, like George Swinton’s seminal 1972 book “Sculpture of the Eskimo,” re-titled “Sculpture of the Inuit” in the 1992 reprint.

In contemporary Eskimo artwork, some Inuit artists have used the word “Eskimo” in their art as an act of subversion. Nunatsiavut artist Mark Igloliorte, for example, created a video piece titled *Eskimo Roll* (2017). In it, Igloliorte films himself capsizing in a kayak, an Inuit invention, using the technique of his Inuit ancestors. Through this act, Igloliorte re-asserts the original function of the kayak before it was appropriated by non-Inuit for recreational sport, using the title term “Eskimo” as a tongue-and-cheek nod to the non-Inuit exonym. Through artistic license, Igloliorte brings the word and its derogatory power into question.
In Alaska, “Eskimo” is still considered by some as an accepted term to refer to the Yupik. According to the Alaska Native Language Centre (ANLC), Alaskans/Yupik accept “Eskimo” over “Inuit” as the latter is not a word in their language. To the Yupik, “Inuit” refers only to the Inupiat of northern Alaska, the Inuit of Canada, and the Kalaallit of Greenland.

“Comparative Yupik and Inuit,” Lawrence Kaplan, University of Alaska Fairbanks: Alaska Native Language Center, 1 July 2011 [54]
https://www.uaf.edu/anlc/research-and-resources/resources/archives/comparative_yupik_and_inuit.php

Overview:

Four distinct Yupik (or Western Eskimo) languages are spoken along the shores of the Gulf of Alaska, in southwestern Alaska, and on the easternmost tip of Siberia. The Inuit (or Eastern Eskimo) language continuum is spoken in northern Alaska, Canada, and Greenland. Another Eskimo language, the virtually extinct Sirenikski of Siberia, is usually grouped with the Yupik languages although it may actually constitute a third distinct branch.

Current & Relevant Information:

The sound system of the Yupik branch of Eskimo differs from that of the Inuit branch perhaps principally in the following ways:

1. Yupik has a fourth vowel, the shwa (like the e in the word roses), in addition to the three vowels a, i, and u found in all Eskimo (and Aleut; Inuit as a result has two kinds of i, that from original i and that originally from the shwa),

2. the Yupik languages have various forms of rhythmic alternation of stressed and unstressed syllables, while such prosodic systems are absent from Inuit,

3. Yupik lacks the consonant assimilation process so common to Inuit (especially as one travels east), and

4. voiceless fricatives are more prominent in Yupik than in Inuit.

As with these phonological differences, the differences in vocabulary between Inuit and any of the Yupik languages is greater than between any two Yupik languages. For example, while Inuit use sumiaq for 'boat', Yupik languages use some form of angyaq; while Yupik uses maklak for 'bearded seal', Inuit uses ugruk. Even words common to both sides will often have a distinctly Yupik version and a distinctly Inuit version. For example, the word for 'leg' is iru in all forms of Yupik and niu in Inuit, though both forms come from the same ancient Eskimo word.

“Yupik people,” Britannica, 20 October 2023 [55]
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Yupik

Overview:
Yupik, also called Yupiit or Western Eskimo, indigenous Arctic people traditionally residing in Siberia, Saint Lawrence Island and the Diomede Islands in the Bering Sea and Bering Strait, and Alaska. They are culturally related to the Chukchi and the Inuit, or Eastern Eskimo, of Canada and Greenland.

Current & Relevant Information:

The traditional economic activity of the Yupik was the hunting of sea mammals, especially seals, walrus, and, until the latter half of the 19th century, whales. Trade with the Russians developed at the end of the 19th century. The Yupik also traded with neighboring reindeer breeders and others. Some enterprising Yupik specialized in trade and used their economic advantage to become village chiefs, with such functions as opening and closing the hunting season, helping to mediate quarrels, and deciding the times for trade journeys. Hunting methods included harpooning from shore or boats, spearing animals in land drives, and, later, the use of guns. Hunting fur-bearing animals, fishing, and collecting plant food were auxiliary activities. Kayaks (one-person, closed skin boats), baidarkas (open, flat-bottomed boats), and whaleboats provided coastal transportation; dog teams and sleds were used on land.

The Yupik practiced shamanism and believed in benign and harmful spirits; the latter caused various misfortunes, especially illness. Certain animals and birds were (and still are) considered sacred and not to be harmed. Rituals, mainly connected with ensuring future success in hunting and with thanksgiving for past hunts, often included dramatic performances and dances. Women generally played an important part in religious rituals.

“The Siberian Yuits: A Russian People,” Language Connections [56]
https://www.languageconnections.com/the-siberian-yuits-a-russian-people/

Overview:

Recently, Language Connections, a translation and interpreting services agency, had the fortunate opportunity of receiving an inquiry about a language known as Central Alaskan Yup’ik. The client was in need of transcription and translation services to document an ongoing environmental project in Bristol Bay, Alaska. There, many of the local elders were not able to communicate in English.

Until that time, no one at our company had ever heard of the Yupik peoples or languages. A lot of what went into finding qualified Yup’ik language vendors capable of handling this assignment was learning a great deal about the language and culture ourselves. We soon found that we were not only fascinated by Central Alaskan Yup’ik but all Yupik languages.

Current & Relevant Information:
The first differentiation that we found within this language group is in the apostrophe placement in “Yup’ik,” but not “Yupik.” The apostrophe is added to the name of the Central Alaskan Yup’ik language, indicating a consonant stress elongating the pronunciation of the letter p. However, the name of other Yupik dialects are written without the apostrophe, as is the name of the people that actually speak Yup’ik.

Our research also led us to discover that Yup’ik is the ultimate divergence in a chain of languages that include Siberian Yupik, the Russia-based language and culture from which Central Alaskan Yup’ik initially stems.

The Yuit peoples (singular: “Yuk”), who are also sometimes referred to as the Siberian or Central Siberian Yupik, originate from the far eastern border of the Russian Federation on the Chukchi Peninsula. The Yuit encompass the Naukan, Chaplino and Sirenik Siberian-Eskimo groups, as well as others who were amalgamated within this predominant demographic.

Under the Yuit umbrella, these groups share the Central Siberian Yupik language which is distinguished from Central Alaskan Yup’ik primarily by its pronunciation of elongated consonants, but also by their dissimilar vocabulary. Yupik is the first part of the Eskimo-Aleut language family and can itself be broken down into several different dialects, including Central Siberian Yupik, which form a chain of languages ending in Central Alaskan Yup’ik.

Through any chain of languages it is possible to trace the evolution of linguistic patterns due to the slight differences that occur from dialect to dialect. For example, although Central Alaskan Yup’ik and Central Siberian Yup’ik are mutually unintelligible, standard Central Siberian Yupik and its neighbor dialects, Naukanski Yupik or Chaplanski Yupik are mutually intelligible. Further, Naukanski has more in common with Central Alaskan Yup’ik although they are still not close enough within the chain to be communicable with Central Alaskan Yupik.

Unlike English, Central Siberian Yupik has as many as 27 consonants and only 4 main vowels ‘a’, ‘i’, ‘u’ and ə (schwa), but each of these has a long form (‘aa’, ‘ii’, etc.). The language has an iambic stress pattern which means that the stress is put on the second syllable of each two-syllable metrical foot, e.g. every other syllable starting with the second.

The grammatical structure consists of root words which then have suffixes added on to create words with a sentence-like meaning, which in most other languages would require multiple “free” words (though, this is a technique that can also be found in some Eurasian languages, such as German). Within Yupik word structure, the meaning of a word always stems from the left of the word gaining specificity through the suffixes attached to the right. Moreover, the ordering of these suffixes may be various to signify different meanings.
Verbal structure in Siberian Yupik demands poly-agreement with all subjects and objects, which further affects the attachment of suffixes on the root of a word.

Historically, the Siberian Yupik people have lived an oral culture, passing stories and wisdom down through generations by word of mouth, but without a writing system. In the 1760s, writing was introduced by missionaries working with the Yupik peoples, although, at first most were taught only how to write in Russian.

Soon, however, Russian’s Cyrillic script was adapted to Yupik in order to accommodate translation of the Bible and other religious texts into Yupik. Yet, it was not until the beginning of the 19th century with the further arrival of Europeans seeking out resources and industry within the region that Yupik languages truly came to have written forms.

Since the 1860’s, when the US purchased Alaska, there has been a movement in motion to replace the Cyrillic script with the Latin alphabet, and although succeeding with Central Alaskan Yup’iks, it has been met with staunch opposition by the Yuit, who view themselves as being more aligned with Russian cultures.

Today, the Yuits continue to partake in many of their historical traditions, their culture of shamanism, amulets and animal folklore, living in traditional yaranga dwellings, and speaking their native Central Siberian Yupik and its many divergent dialects.

It’s amazing that they have survived through so much change when other Eskimo-Aleut languages of the far eastern border of the Russian Federation on the Chukchi Peninsula have not, among them the more closely related Central Siberian dialect of Sirenikskiy, for example. This culture, based largely in Russia and which mostly uses Russian’s Cyrillic writing system, is more often equated with its Eskimo heritage. In this global world, it is important to understand how smaller civilizations, such as the Yuit, have managed to survive and assimilate within the larger civilizations of which they have come to be a part.

Gender Roles:


Overview:

A demure ten-year-old, wearing typical girl’s attire, sits quietly playing with a doll as he dreams of killing his first game animal.

A family sleeps surrounded by the objects of their daily lives; unaware they will soon be crushed by intruding sea ice.
A nursing mother dies, and her family kills the infant and buries mother and child together rather than allow the child to starve to death.

On a Bering Sea Island, a woman born in a dome-shaped house of driftwood and walrus hide dreams of seeing a real lawn of green grass.

A man brings the fish he just caught to his wife on the shore, where she cleans, cuts, and marks them as her own.

During a time of major social transformation, seamstresses abandon drilled-eye needles and adopt grooved needles in their stead.

These are few of the moments whose significance this volume explores. By its nature, our focus on gender takes us within houses and families, putting “the people” back into our studies of broad social, political, and economic trends.

This volume has two basic aims. First, we want to begin to fill a gap concerning descriptions and analyses of women’s and men’s prehistoric, historical, and contemporary roles in northern Native communities. Second, we wish to present anthropologically comprehensive discussion and analysis of past and present gender roles and relationships.

Current & Relevant Information:

This volume begins in the ethnographic present, considering contemporary issues of gender identity and change. In his captivating portrayal of Canada’s Netsilik kipijuqtuq, Stewart informs readers about the social production, performance, and perception of self and gender. His research serves as a caveat throughout this book, a warning that there are certain pitfalls to relying on Western dichotomies, given that the kipijuqtuq does not quite fit typical anthropological notions of a third category such as the Native Californian two-spirit (Hollimon 1997).

Furthermore, in her case study of the Northwestern Plateau’s Colville Indians, Ackerman investigates an anthropological paradigm first posited by Eleanor Leacock (1978) that sexual inequality necessarily follows participation in an industrial economy. According to Ackerman, this Native Plateau community is steadfast in its ideology that women are valued for their productive contributions and remain the “backbone” of the economy.

Finally, Jolles takes us on a life history journey with an Alaskan Yupik woman, including the familial (and community) shift from use of semisubterranean structures to aboveground houses. She uses oral history and personal testimony to chart this Native woman’s extraordinary accomplishments and ordinary daily activities in order to help us understand the challenges facing an individual in the midst of dramatic economic, social, and material changes.

“Transformative Skin: The Ongoing Legacy of Inuit and Yupik Women’s Tattoos,” Mariah Carrillo, University of New Mexico UNM Digital Repository, 1 December
Abstract:

Feminine indigenous tattoo traditions of the American Arctic have often been overlooked in scholarly literature due to colonial preconceptions regarding native gender roles and the nature of adornment. Modern Euro-American conceptions of skin and self often rely on rigid, essentialized categories, such as race and gender, to mark identity onto the individual body. However, the Inuit and Yupik peoples of Alaska and Canada regarded personal essence as fluid and transformative, a belief made visible in the networks of sewn lines that declared a woman’s status and agency.

This text examines both written ethnological records and a diverse range of material artifacts, emphasizing visual analysis and critical theory, in order to uncover the trajectory of Arctic tattoo forms and meanings from past to present. By analyzing indigenous feminine tattoos from an art historical perspective, I will argue that this ancient technique was both vitally embedded in historic northern aesthetic and conceptual systems, and that it continues to provide a useful tool for the creation and transformation of contemporary American conceptions of identity.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

As new generations of indigenous artists, scholars, and leaders come of age in North America, systems of European colonization that have long sought to erase native cultures are being negotiated and circumvented in favor of diverse practices grounded in aboriginal agency and experience. One form currently undergoing a resurgence of interest among indigenous Arctic groups is the process of tattooing that was for centuries prevalent among indigenous polar women. After falling out of use in the mid-twentieth century due to cultural shifts and colonial attempts to assimilate Arctic peoples into settler society, aboriginal tattoo forms, techniques, and systems of meaning are being rediscovered and renewed by young native women in Canada and the U.S. who desire a tangible connection to their heritage.

The art of tattoo is a venerable practice that, prior to the mid-nineteenth century, was widespread among indigenous peoples of the far North. Archaeological evidence attests to the extreme age and widespread similarities of tattoo techniques and forms among various Arctic cultures. Tattoo was used for many purposes, including hunting, healing, magic, and beautification. Among Inuit and Yupik women, tattoos served a transformative purpose, creating from the biological reality of the female body the gendered identity of womanhood. The incursion of European colonists beginning in the sixteenth century reconfigured cultural matrices in such a way that, over the ensuing four centuries, indigenous tattoo traditions became less
prevalent and, by the mid---twentieth century, were almost extinct. In recent years, however, several young Native artists have re---awakened interest in these historic techniques and forms.

The following text examines the history and legacy of Yupik and Inuit women’s tattoos, while also uncovering the way these tattoos have intersected with both colonial and indigenous webs of meaning. There are a number of indigenous Arctic groups that have practiced tattooing, including the Aleut of the west Alaskan peninsula and the Aleutian Islands (who will, due to significant historic differences from the Yupik and Inuit, not be significantly discussed in this text); the Yupik of the Bering Strait and northwest Alaskan coast; and the Inuit, including the Inupiat of the Alaskan far north, as well as the various Inuit groups of Canada. Although a great deal of anthropological work has been done about native polar cultures, scholarship examining tattoos specifically is relatively rare, especially concerning contemporary practices, and often must be referenced across multiple groups. There are a number of overarching ideologies and structures underlying tattoo traditions across the American Arctic, although with regional and cultural variations. Thus, I will explore the separate colonial and anthropological material dealing with various Yupik and Inuit groups’ historical tattoo traditions, while also discussing the similarities and confluences of aesthetics and ideology that are manifested.

While this work will necessarily rely on previous anthropological and ethnomusical analyses to provide an understanding of past practices, the focus will be on both Arctic tattoos and indigenous cultures as vital and ongoing. Contemporary scholarship on native peoples of the U.S. and Canada often creates a false boundary between “traditional,” historic lifeways and practices carried out in an elegiac pre---colonial or pre---reservation past, and a “contemporary” native identity built on modernism, inevitably portrayed as a cultural product of Euro---American origins. Instead, I will examine the way cultural practices and ideas are embedded in the ever---changing connective tissue of daily experience, shifting with changing circumstances, but eternally tying the present to the past in a web of ongoing negotiation.

Analyzing tattoos of the far North from an art historical perspective will necessarily differ from past anthropological projects through an emphasis on visuality and cultural praxis. To make my argument, I will rely not only on historical written sources and contemporary anthropological scholarship but also on a varied range of visual artifacts. In order to gain a fuller understanding of Arctic women’s tattoos in relation to both the historic Inuit and Yupik cultures from which they originated, as well as the ever---changing nature of tattoo practices during periods of colonial contact, I will examine such diverse artistic forms as ancient Bering Sea ivory sculptures, early modern European prints, nineteenth and twentieth---century anthropological photography, and contemporary documentary film. These seemingly
distinct techniques and traditions all contribute to a richer understanding of the forms, history, and transformations of Inuit and Yupik women's tattoos.

I will also apply critical theory to texts and objects in order to examine the function of tattoos in Arctic conceptions of gender and aesthetics, and to consider the effects of colonization on northern cultures. However, although I consider a critical perspective essential to this project given the troubling colonial past underlying indigenous and settler relationships, my intention is to use theory as a tool to uncover bias masquerading as objective scholarship, and to cast old information in newer, more productive perspectives—not to force diverse cultural artifacts and ideologies into an overarching theoretical framework.

As citizens of Euro-American nations in the twenty-first century, it is essential to consider the past legacies of imperialism that continue to affect indigenous peoples throughout the world. Historical scholarship can further this process by avoiding the trap of locating aboriginal knowledge and practice in a contained and static past, pushing instead to trace the ongoing webs of meaning and experience that connect generations of native peoples throughout history to the present. As a long-lived and widespread cultural system, Arctic tattoos are tied to an expansive and rich indigenous heritage and are now lending their connective powers to native women currently finding their voices in the discourses and negotiations of contemporary America.


Overview:

St. Lawrence Island was a fistful of deep-sea earth squeezed dry in the hand of the Creator and placed in the Bering Sea, according to local belief. Jolles traces the spiritual world of the contemporary marine mammal hunters who inhabit the island, particularly in the village of Gambell, one of only two inhabited villages on the island. Yupik people are considered in relation to clan organization, names and souls, marital unions, birth and death, hunting and religious ceremonies, and the commitment to wild subsistence foods. Faith, Food and Family is an engaging read, from Jolles’ Easter arrival in 1987 through more than a decade of mutual respect in sharing life’s moments, good food and stories. Jolles’ commitment and concern for the people of St. Lawrence Island is unquestionable. The trials of everyday living—such as getting water (before indoor plumbing became the norm in 1997) and following ever-changing ‘roads’ through mud, ice and snowdrifts—are vividly described for the Yupiit, but also for Jolles herself, who sometimes fumbles but learns with patience and diligence.

Current & Relevant Information:
Strong gender roles limited Jolles access to men’s activities, so the focus is on the lives of women; however, the whale hunt, polar bear hunts, and the walrus hunt clearly carry great social and nutritional importance to the ramket (pl.), the individual hunters and the community as a whole. She writes, “…although whaling is superimposed on all things, sacred and secular, walrus and seals feed people every day” (p. 279), indicating the power behind whaling. Taking a polar bear or a whale accords great status to the hunter and the heights of the graveyard are reserved only for these hunters (p. 116, 221). It is also significant that boat captains were early converts to Christianity, seeking power and prestige (p. 85, 218).

The communities pay close attention to boys as “our food for tomorrow, you know, our hunters for tomorrow” (p. 163), so I would think that activities of the Eskimo Walrus Commission and the Eskimo Whaling Commission would be forefront in people’s minds.

“A fading culture adapts to the changing times in this Arctic town,” Jennifer Kingsley, National Geographic, 25 January 2019 [60]
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/women-of-chukotka-arctic-russian-culture

Overview:

With each new border and political shift, the indigenous women of Chukotka, Russia adjust to maintain their heritage and survive.

Current & Relevant Information:

We were eating more than I thought possible, including jellied whale casserole and fresh apricot buns, while Elizaveta Dobrieva’s family explained that their ancestors descended from the polar bear and the killer whale. Then Elizaveta disappeared into the back room of her apartment in Lavrentiya, Chukotka, and came back cradling a dark wooden carving. Its eyes slanted down to a long nose, and many thin vertical lines extended below the chin. Elizaveta told me that the lines represent tattoos and indicate that this figure is a woman.

“This is the keeper of our clan,” she said, “her name is Yiakunneun.” (иякуннеун) She held the figure like it was a baby, resting it in the crook of her arm, so it seemed to look up at her face. She showed me how she would talk to it, consulting it during difficult times in her life. Then she put her fingers to its mouth and showed how she feeds it with choice morsels from her own table on special occasions. Elizaveta’s ancestors have lived with Yiakunneun for four or five generations, back when life was very different. This cultural figure could be transported into a new life when so many other things had to be left behind.

Elizaveta had been recommended to me by someone at the local library, but when I went to her house, I didn’t know what we would talk about. My visit was part of a three-year journey around the north to learn about the Arctic from its people. Their
personal stories are a reminder that the Arctic is more than a setting for climate change, resource extraction, or debates over sovereignty. It is home to over four million people living through a period of unprecedented change.

In Chukotka, a region in the Russian far east, women still speak about the displacement they experienced during the 1950s when many indigenous people were pushed to larger settlements with state-built housing and encouraged to “modernize.” About 800 of the 1,200 Yupik people in this region were relocated in just a few years, and though the relocations happened without the use of force, they caused irreversible cultural change.

Elizaveta is Siberian Yupik and was born in 1942 in the village of Naukan, Chukotka, on the edge of the Bering Sea. She lived there until 1949. When she was seven years old her family moved about 50 miles away to Lavrentiya. Naukan remained her summer home until 1958 when the Soviet authorities closed the village. They explained that Naukan was not a good place to build modern houses and that it was not healthy to live in yurangas, traditional tents. In the summer of 1958, the usual supply ship with food and coal did not come, and within two months Naukan was closed and its people banned from returning.

At that time, Elizaveta remembers her great uncle saying “If they close Naukan, we will lose our language.” “Now,” she told me, “That is what has happened ... My grandchildren do not speak it.” Yet 60 years after that relocation Yiakunneun lives on, hidden in a special place in this apartment, just as she would have been hidden in the yuranga generations ago. I wonder where she will be generations from now, who will look after her, and what a Yupik home will look like by then.

Maya Pelyatagina (майя Васильевна пелятагина), a reindeer herder living in a small tundra camp, paused for a long time when I asked her to describe the tundra. Perhaps it seemed like a silly question, given that we were surrounded by it, but I was curious how she would describe the tundra to others. Finally, she said, “I would only say nice things about the tundra.”

It took us 14 hours to drive 120 miles to reach the yurangas where Maya lives with a Chukchi reindeer brigade. It was autumn, the ground had faded to golden brown, and the herders had brought the reindeer, all 2500 of them, into camp. When I asked the crew leader, Valtagin, for a recommendation on who to talk to – even in this community of a dozen people – he said I should talk to the women because they would have a different perspective on life out here. There were four there at the moment: Maya, Olya (оля), Valentina, and Elena. They often leaned into the doorway of the yurangas, and sometimes the animals came right up to the cooking fire.

It only took Maya a few minutes to tell me about her life. Her childhood was split between town and tundra. She studied cooking, had a daughter, married and came back to work with the herd. Officially, she was listed as a veterinary technician, but
she mostly looked after the yuranga, which is traditionally the role for women. When I tried to go deeper into her life story she said, “I have told you everything.” Out here, it’s about doing rather than talking. The stories I heard were less concerned with the past and future, they were told through the rhythm of daily life.

The herdsmen take shifts with the animals, so food must be prepared many times each day. For breakfast, we scraped reindeer meat from the rib bones, drank warm reindeer broth and hot tea full of sugar, and we tore into fresh fried bannock. Later Olya told me, “We are always busy, only the herdsmen have time to rest.” I wondered if she would rather be in the village, where she goes for vacation. “There is nothing to do in the village,” she said.

Before bed, several of us gathered in the yuranga as night fell and brought the cold with it. Maya set up the lamp that would keep the tent lit and warm all night, an orange flame that stretched back generations, though it is no longer fueled by oil from marine mammals. These days, the lamp is made from a tin can filled with diesel and a wick made of fabric. Someone pulled out a smartphone which had been charged by a small generator, and we crowded the tiny screen to watch a video of a cat being fed with a spoon. The yuranga exploded with laughter. Then we crawled into the tent made from reindeer skin, called the polog. There was one skin pillow that stretched the length of the communal bed for all of us to rest our heads on. The floor was layered with bunches of willow twigs, a bearded seal skin, a layer of carpet, and finally our blankets. The tundra underneath it all.

Life in Chukotka has changed drastically in the last century. Even before the end of the Soviet Union, many indigenous people in Chukotka were part of modernization efforts that included displacement and fundamental shifts in the daily economy. These changes had very personal consequences for each person who experienced them.

On the tundra, the sounds of reindeer, sandhill cranes, loons, and ravens have been joined by ATVs, generators, and mp3 players. Indigenous languages have given way to Russian. The stories have changed too, and much has been lost, but these women taught me that a story – whether spoken, sung, or lived – is a process that renews itself with each telling, but the telling cannot happen on its own. Stories are nothing without people to hear them.

“The Dwellers Between: Yup’ik Shamans and Cultural Change in Western Alaska,” Ahnie Litecky, University of Montana, 2011 [61]
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2001&context=etd

Abstract:
This paper examines the history of the Yup’ik Eskimos of western Alaska and explores how their shamans shaped the response to introduced epidemic disease. As in the experiences of so many other Native American groups, disease epidemics
played an important role in the history of relations between the Yup'ik Eskimos and white settlers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I argue here that while the Yup'ik Eskimos grappled with the devastating effects of introduced diseases, they did not repudiate their shamans and traditional faith, which sets the Yup'ik people apart from other Native Americans. Before contact with Europeans, the Yup'ik people relied on their shamans for physical and psychological healing. Despite challenges from missionaries, traders, and disease, the Yup'ik Eskimos retained faith in their shamans well into the twentieth century. The shamans' enduring power as healers rested on specific features of the Yup'ik belief system and the inability of western medicine to cure disease at crucial historical moments. During Russian rule in western Alaska, the shamans maintained their influence over the people by leading the Yup'ik Eskimos to incorporate new diseases, like smallpox, into their world view. Later, American missionaries and their western medicines brought enormous pressure onto the shamans to relinquish control. However, widespread disillusionment following the terrible double epidemic of 1900 encouraged the Yup'ik people to return to their shamans.

Current & Relevant Information:

Shamans had an important role in village life; they were respected and sometimes feared because of their close ties to the supernatural. As the most powerful religious person in a village, the shaman saw everyone defer to his judgment. Nelson, who visited many Yup'ik villages, wrote that the Eskimos “have great faith in the power and wisdom of the shamans, who are the highest authority, to whom all questions of religion and the mysteries of the invisible world are referred.” To be well-respected leaders, shamans had to be both knowledgeable and articulate, and, most importantly, speak on behalf of the community. Wealth or hunting ability were not necessarily prerequisites for leadership. Kromchenko observed that the Eskimos on Stuart Island, just off the coast near St. Michael, relied on their shaman during a bartering session and “showed some respect for him in our presence.” Often a shaman’s child inherited the position, although any youngster who distinguished himself or herself as special or different could be trained as a shaman's apprentice. Shamans were usually men, although women could also act as shamans. While generally a rigid separation defined gender roles in Yup'ik society, the shaman often occupied an ambiguous position. A male shaman would not hunt and often slept in the sod homes of the women. However, the shaman was also tasked with assisting the hunters. In some oral traditions the shaman would travel to the moon at night and influence land animals to come down to earth to be hunted. According to Yup'ik elder John Paul, “some shamans worked on the path of the fish the people were going to use. It is said they were clearing the path for the fish. And then the [angalkut] who are able to would go down into the ocean during the winter to make a request for plenty of seals or other sea mammals, so that springtime would bring an abundance when men went out sea-mammal hunting.”
Shamans made sure that villagers followed the complex system of social and economic taboos because personal or village-wide disaster could follow the breaking of these rules. Some taboos centered on subsistence practices. Zagoskin reported that the Eskimos would not use a hatchet or iron pickaxe to break the ice for fishing because the fish would not come near the ice hole. Other taboos were gender, age, or situation specific, such as prohibitions surrounding menstruation, limiting water intake for boys, or restricting hunting practices for a man who had recently lost a relative.

Some scholars have argued that Orthodox missionaries were highly successful among the Kuskokwim villages. According to Black, many Native Alaskans embraced Christianity “not through missionary preaching or through incitement by gifts and social advancement” but because Orthodox religion did not require natives to change their daily lives. However, the primary source record does not support Black’s argument, at least before the 20th century. There were similarities between Russian Orthodoxy and Yup’ik culture that would have facilitated conversion. The public confessions practiced by the Yup’ik were also practiced in the Orthodox religion. Both shared traditional divisions between the sexes; in church, men and women were required to sit on opposite sides. Similarly, housing and daily activities of the Eskimos were divided by gender. Some Eskimos were willing to adapt Russian Orthodoxy to their lifestyles because they recognized similarities to their own culture, which surely reduced the anxieties and problems of conversion.

G. Evens [Russia]:


Overview:

The Evens are an indigenous people of Northeastern Siberia. Most Evens are nomadic hunters and reindeer herders, but some Evens along the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk also engage in fishing and seal hunting. They are closely related in language, culture, and physical type to the Evenki. The Evens' name for themselves is Even (plural Evesel); the origin of this term is obscure. (Some Western scholars write Even as Ewen.) The Evens who dwell on northern Kamchatka and along the northernmost coastline of the Sea of Okhotsk also refer to themselves as the Oroch (plural Orochel) from oroch (reindeer). The adjective Mene, which means "settled," is sometimes used by the non-nomadic fishermen of the Sea of Okhotsk coast. (A different Tungusic-speaking people of the Amur River region—not to be confused with the Evens—also uses the self-appellation Oroch.) Some Evens also identify themselves by the names of their clans or tribes (Huldacha, Dutki, Kukuin, etc.). In older Russian and Western ethnographic literature, the Evens who occupied what is now northern Yakutia and Magadan Region (Russian oblast) were called Lamut: this
term is of Evenki origin and is derived from lamu (sea). The remaining Evens were not differentiated from the Evenki in ethnographic writing until the Soviet period (when the anthropological and linguistic study of the peoples of Siberia greatly developed) and, like the Evenki, were called Tungus (from Tongus, the Yakut word for Evenki).

Although there is much that is uncertain in the origins of the Evens, it is clear that the Evens were formed over many centuries from Tungusic-speaking tribes that mixed with other native peoples of Siberia (particularly the Yukagir and Yakut) as they migrated through the taiga and tundra of Eastern and Northeastern Siberia. Russian Cossacks and explorers began to move into Even territory in the first half of the 17th century. The Evens put up a fierce resistance and frequently attacked and burned Russian forts. Nevertheless, Russia succeeded in subduing them by 1700. Thereafter, the Evens were required to pay the yasak (tax in furs). The Russian government's use of Evens as agents to collect the yasak from neighboring Chukchi, Koriak, and Yukagirs facilitated the Evens' expansion onto land previously settled by these peoples.

Russian contact brought diseases such as smallpox, mumps, chicken pox, and influenza, to which the Evens had no immunity. This, coupled with the loss of lands to Russian settlers, a decline in the animal population (caused by overhunting in order to pay the yasak), the rise of alcoholism, and economic exploitation by Russian officials and merchants, led to a reduction of the Evens' numbers and a steep decline in their standard of living. After the October Revolution, the Communist government attempted to shield the Evens and other northern groups from the negative effects of Russian contact. This effort was influenced by Russian anthropologists who specialized in the study of the Siberian peoples and idealistic Bolsheviks who shared the anthropologists' concern. To aid them in developing economically and culturally within the framework of their own traditions, 10 Even National Districts (Russian raion) and one National Region (krai) were established in northern Yakutia and on the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk. Taxes on the Evens were reduced, and Even debts to traders were canceled. State-run trading posts that offered fair prices for Even furs were established, and education and Western medical care began to be provided in at least some Even areas. This relatively humanitarian approach to ruling the Evens was abruptly abandoned upon Stalin's rise to power by the end of the 1920s. During the 1930s, Even hunters, fishermen, and reindeer herders were forced into collectives as part of the collectivization of agriculture. At the same time, Stalin's campaign to speedily raise Soviet industry to Western levels brought an enormous number of Russian miners and loggers into Even territory, particularly after the discovery of gold deposits in 1931 and 1932. The proportion of Evens in the population of the Even national areas dropped from 80% to 40%. The eastward evacuation of Soviet industry away from the front during World War II, and the further growth of extractive industries after the war, continued the ecological damage begun in the 1930s. Moreover, increasing official pressure
against Even culture (particularly the Even language) from the Stalin years on placed the Evens’ survival as a people in jeopardy. Like the other Siberian peoples, the Evens were powerless to criticize policies harmful to their economy and culture until the Gorbachev era.

Current & Relevant Information:

According to the 2002 Russian census the Evens number 19,071, all of whom live in the Russian Federation. Although they do not form a compact mass and their settlements are located in areas in which members of other nationalities (mainly Russians and Yakuts) form a majority, they are scattered over a very wide territory—almost 3 million square kilometers (1,864,200 square miles). There are 8,700 Evens in the northernmost reaches of the Sakha (Yakut) Republic, particularly its Sarkyryrskii, Ust'-Yanski, Omiakonski, Nizhne-Kolymskii, Sredne-Kolymskii, Verkhne-Kolymskii, Tomponski, Momski, Allaikhovskii, and Verkhoianski districts (Russian raion); 1,900 in the Okhotskii and Verkhne-Bureinskii Districts of Khabarovsk Territory (Russian krai); 1,300 in the Chukchi Autonomous District (Russian okrug); 3,800 in the O'lskii, Severo-Evenskii, and Sredne-Kanskii Districts of Magadan Region (Russian oblast); and 1,500 in the Bystrinskii District and Koriak Autonomous District of Kamchatka Region.

The climate of the Even lands is generally harsh and cold. In northern areas of Even settlement such as the Indigirka River valley, winters last up to nine or ten months, and average annual temperatures do not exceed –13.5°C (7.7°F). Even territory is characterized by mountainous taiga forests of cedar, fir, pine, larch, birch, and spruce, and in the northernmost regions, barren or sparsely forested tundra. Reindeer, mountain sheep, squirrel, bear, elk, sable, fox, wolves, ducks, geese, and grouse are the most common animals. Grayling, cod, loach, and freshwater salmon are found in the rivers and streams of the Even lands, and saltwater salmon and seals inhabit the coastal waters of the Sea of Okhotsk.

“Even People,” Britannica, 9 November 2016 [63]
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Even

Overview:

Even, also spelled Evens, also called Lamut, northern Siberian people (12,000 according to the 1979 Soviet census) closely related to the Evenk (q.v.) in origin, language, and culture. They inhabit the territory to the north and northeast of the Evenki Autonomous Okrug, where they have influenced and have in turn been influenced by their neighbors. The Even who settled on Kamchatka learned and practiced Chukchi traits; those who mixed with the Yukaghirs created an Even-Yukaghir population that is bilingual. Other peoples related by similar ties include the Dolgan, who are a nomadic reindeer-breeding group, and the riverine Negidals, who are primarily fishermen and hunters.
Overview:

Archeological evidence shows that people have been living on southern Kamchatka as long as most indigenous people anywhere else, that is for some thousand years.

For an economy based on hunting and gathering, Kamchatka was rather densely inhabited.

Small communities dotted the coasts and river valleys; many of them were not more than a day's walk from one another.

Current & Relevant Information:

The Evens and Evenky (tunguses) are similar by culture. The Evens ancestors having come to Kamchatka changed their traditional occupation hunting for reindeer breeding. Russians arriving to Kamchatka called the Evens roaming from place to place along the Okhotsk seaside "lamuts", it means "living by the sea". Herdsmen they called "orochi", it means "reindeer men". Beside reindeer breeding and hunting the coastal Evens caught fish and hunted marine animals. For fishing they made different kinds of dams and traps. Blacksmith's work was very popular with the Evens.

Overview:

The Evens are mostly nomadic hunters, or reindeer herders; on the coast, some are seal hunters or fishers. They speak the Even language as opposed to Russian, and are visibly distinguishable from ethnic Russians. Soviet-era Russia enforced change upon the Evens. The Russians created a written language for the Evens and eliminated illiteracy. For Evens and other Siberian Natives, the Soviet years altered their existence. ‘Sovietization’ was implemented due to incompatibilities between tribal life and Soviet ideals. Such ideals included a rejection of shamanism – a condemnation that failed to find roots in the indigenous culture due to the lack of an alternative presented by the Russians. However, the decline of shamanism due to negative perceptions of such practices indicates the success of Sovietization in this respect. Education became mandatory in the hopes of encouraging adoption of a Soviet lifestyle to usurp traditional practices and values. For instance, the Soviets offered reindeer breeders a return to their previous semi-nomadic lifestyle if they sent their children to boarding school for 8 years at a collective center, where Russian was taught as the predominant language. A 1950s and 60s resettlement program forced far-out families to relocate to be closer to the collective center,
where they no longer had land and were thus required to participate in Soviet jobs. Therefore, throughout the Soviet era, indigenous people including but certainly not limited to the Even people, suffered a cultural dissolution at the hands of the Soviets.

Current & Relevant Information:

Indigenous people are disadvantaged in comparison to ethnic Russians. In 2007, Russia abstained from voting for the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Legally, indigenous people are not protected in Russia. The umbrella organization for protecting indigenous rights in the country (RAIPON) is state-controlled. Given their reluctance to legally enshrine indigenous rights in the UN, it is easy to imagine the Russian state’s treatment towards Natives which is presumably manifested in the actions and policies of RAIPON. Evidence of this is found in the formal classifications of indigenous peoples in the state – of 180 different peoples in the Russian territory, only 40 are officially recognized. Such disdain for indigenous people in the country permeates society. Socioeconomically, crises are experienced to a greater extent by the minorities of Northern Russia, Siberia and the Far East, who are indigenous, than other minorities in the country. Traditional indigenous trades, such as hunting or reindeer breeding, are either in crisis or have disappeared, likely due to modernization.

The Russian arrival at and consequent settlement in Siberia impacted indigenous peoples to a significant degree. Integration of the indigenous people, who had a different culture, spiritual beliefs and behaviors to Russians, posed a challenge. The solution proposed was ‘yasak’: a symbolic payment made by the indigenous people to Russia to evidence their Russian citizenship and obedience to the state. The main goods used to pay this fee were tusks found in mammoth remains or walruses, skins and furs, and other luxury goods. In other words, yasak was payment made to their invaders in order to continue living land they already inhabited. It is necessary to acknowledge another unsurprising, yet nonetheless offensive, injustice against the Natives of the Russian territory – their land and resource rights. Legislation referring to this issue was revoked in 2015. The consequence of this revocation is the erosion of local authorities’ legally protected ability to protect indigenous land from resource users and businesses looking to use the land for their own benefit. A number of violations occurred in 2015 and 2016 following this legislative change. Similarly, in 2017, the reduction in indigenous trade was further threatened when legislation was passed that increased the level of difficulty experienced by indigenous people in applying for fishing applications. In the Pacific region of the country, fishing is a large industry. The new laws require indigenous people to follow a long application process before they can fish – the timing, location, and amount of which they must accept. Evidently, Russia is keen to limit the rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples, whose land they settled on.

Unfortunately, this year’s oil spill in the Russian Arctic will further the disproportionate hardship experienced by Russian Natives. The spill, which began
on 29th May, has polluted a large lake near Norilsk – Russia’s most polluted city. Over 21,000 tons of oil have entered the Ambarnaya river and surrounding soil, following a storage tank collapse attributed to melting permafrost, a consequence of climate change. The disaster will especially impact indigenous people as the Taimyr Dolgano-Nenetsky District around Norilsk is home to many groups of Natives, who, as previously noted, engage in (and depend on) herding, fishing, and hunting as part of their lifestyle. Though, as previously noted, these practices have declined somewhat, they are still important to indigenous people, and will be dangerously affected by the ecosystem damage that will inevitably occur following the oil spill. The Russian state has little regard for this, having built Nornickel's smelting facilities on indigenous land, over 80 years ago. Thus, it is improbable that the government will attempt to mitigate or amend the inevitable problems of May’s environmental catastrophe on behalf of the indigenous people it will affect.

Gender Roles:

“Evens,” Encyclopedia.com, 15 May 2024 [66]

Overview:

The Evens are an indigenous people of Northeastern Siberia. Most Evens are nomadic hunters and reindeer herders, but some Evens along the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk also engage in fishing and seal hunting. They are closely related in language, culture, and physical type to the Evenki. The Evens' name for themselves is Even (plural Evesel); the origin of this term is obscure. (Some Western scholars write Even as Ewen.) The Evens who dwell on northern Kamchatka and along the northernmost coastline of the Sea of Okhotsk also refer to themselves as the Oroch (plural Orochel) from oroch (reindeer). The adjective Mene, which means "settled," is sometimes used by the non-nomadic fishermen of the Sea of Okhotsk coast. (A different Tungusic-speaking people of the Amur River region—not to be confused with the Evens—also uses the self-appellation Oroch.) Some Evens also identify themselves by the names of their clans or tribes (Huldacha, Dutki, Kukuin, etc.). In older Russian and Western ethnographic literature, the Evens who occupied what is now northern Yakutia and Magadan Region (Russian oblast) were called Lamut: this term is of Evenki origin and is derived from lamu (sea). The remaining Evens were not differentiated from the Evenki in ethnographic writing until the Soviet period (when the anthropological and linguistic study of the peoples of Siberia greatly developed) and, like the Evenki, were called Tungus (from Tongus, the Yakut word for Evenki).

Although there is much that is uncertain in the origins of the Evens, it is clear that the Evens were formed over many centuries from Tungusic-speaking tribes that mixed with other native peoples of Siberia (particularly the Yukagir and Yakut) as they
migrated through the taiga and tundra of Eastern and Northeastern Siberia. Russian Cossacks and explorers began to move into Even territory in the first half of the 17th century. The Evens put up a fierce resistance and frequently attacked and burned Russian forts. Nevertheless, Russia succeeded in subduing them by 1700. Thereafter, the Evens were required to pay the yasak (tax in furs). The Russian government's use of Evens as agents to collect the yasak from neighboring Chukchi, Koriak, and Yukagirs facilitated the Evens' expansion onto land previously settled by these peoples.

Russian contact brought diseases such as smallpox, mumps, chicken pox, and influenza, to which the Evens had no immunity. This, coupled with the loss of lands to Russian settlers, a decline in the animal population (caused by overhunting in order to pay the yasak), the rise of alcoholism, and economic exploitation by Russian officials and merchants, led to a reduction of the Evens' numbers and a steep decline in their standard of living. After the October Revolution, the Communist government attempted to shield the Evens and other northern groups from the negative effects of Russian contact. This effort was influenced by Russian anthropologists who specialized in the study of the Siberian peoples and idealistic Bolsheviks who shared the anthropologists' concern. To aid them in developing economically and culturally within the framework of their own traditions, 10 Even National Districts (Russian raion) and one National Region (krai) were established in northern Yakutia and on the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk. Taxes on the Evens were reduced, and Even debts to traders were canceled. State-run trading posts that offered fair prices for Even furs were established, and education and Western medical care began to be provided in at least some Even areas. This relatively humanitarian approach to ruling the Evens was abruptly abandoned upon Stalin's rise to power by the end of the 1920s. During the 1930s, Even hunters, fishermen, and reindeer herders were forced into collectives as part of the collectivization of agriculture. At the same time, Stalin's campaign to speedily raise Soviet industry to Western levels brought an enormous number of Russian miners and loggers into Even territory, particularly after the discovery of gold deposits in 1931 and 1932. The proportion of Evens in the population of the Even national areas dropped from 80% to 40%. The eastward evacuation of Soviet industry away from the front during World War II, and the further growth of extractive industries after the war, continued the ecological damage begun in the 1930s. Moreover, increasing official pressure against Even culture (particularly the Even language) from the Stalin years on placed the Evens' survival as a people in jeopardy. Like the other Siberian peoples, the Evens were powerless to criticize policies harmful to their economy and culture until the Gorbachev era.

Current & Relevant Information:

Family Life
Prior to the 20th century, the Evens were organized into ngunmin (clans) whose members were related to each other by blood. It was forbidden for two members of the same clan to marry each other. Clan members shared hunting and herding grounds and were obligated to help each other in times of need. Egdengen (elders) gathered taxes from the clan communities and delivered them to Russian officials, distributed gunpowder from the clan's stores, and judged disputes between members. The clan system was weakened considerably by the Soviet-era forced resettlement of members of different Even clans into the same herding and hunting collectives, and the nuclear family has replaced the clan as the basic Even social unit. Nevertheless, some traits of the clan system—particularly mutual aid and the taboo on marriage between clan members—continue to be observed.

The clans were divided into nuclear families consisting of a man, a woman, and their children, who lived with their parents until marriage. In traditional society, marriages were usually arranged by the parents, sometimes when the pair in question were still minors. The parents of the groom were required to pay a tori (bride-price) of reindeer, deerskins, leather tobacco pouches decorated with beadwork, clothing, tea sets, cooking utensils, leather-working tools, knives, axes, or other useful items to the wife's parents, who reciprocated with gifts of their own. After the gifts were exchanged, the bride was taken to the groom's parents' home, which she circled three times on reindeer-back before entering. She then circled the hearth three times and cooked meat there in her own cauldron to signify her entry into the groom's household. Newlyweds usually lived with the groom's parents until they were able to establish a new household. Wealthy Evens sometimes had two wives, but since polygamy was forbidden by the church, one of the wives had to pose as a servant or blood relative when non-Evens visited the household. Arranged marriages have disappeared during the 20th century. Now men and women marry for love, and polygamy has become a thing of the past.

**Gender Issues**

In traditional Even society a sharp division of labor enforced gender norms. Some scholars have even suggested that women in traditional Even society held a relatively privileged position, especially in economic sector as property holders. During Collectivization, and particularly the period during and after the Second World War, the integration of the Evens into the Soviet economy and society blurred this division of labor, particularly as women gained access to education and industry and Russian migration came to the Even territories. At the same time the imposition of collective property and the abolition of private property had a direct impact on many Even women.

“Women’s Solidarity in Siberia,” Megan Milligan, et al., Carlton.edu, 3 June 2009

Overview:
Off-campus study programs are renowned for bringing together people with no previous connections. This is most obvious when a group of five girls are sent into the wilds of Siberia for a week-long trip surrounded by twice as many guys twenty-four hours a day. In this instance, the program director (Diana Osipovna) is our only adult female companion—a fortunate circumstance considering that certain situations could otherwise be rendered extremely awkward.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

The wives of the Decembrist revolutionaries also left their mark on the Siberian landscape. Mostly noblewomen who chose to renounce their wealth and social position in European Russia to follow their exiled husbands, they brought with them the culture and education severely lacking in a land of wooden huts and labor camps. Their independence and strength refused to desert them even under the harshest conditions, and they succeeded in building up a relatively sophisticated city without the help of husbands or other strong male leaders.

During our travels through Siberia, we were inspired to find an area where women were, and are, respected and regarded as important patrons of culture and religion. They were required to break out of the traditional roles of mother and housewife; for example, the wives of the Decembrists had to endure severe deprivations while their husbands served prison sentences in the labor camps. Under these circumstances, the women had to grow closer to each other and hold each other up, just as we formed a closer bond in our group and with Diana Osipovna. Siberia is a land of delicate balances, and we were fortunate to be able to experience the gender balance in this area.

“Born of Reindeer: The Eveny People of Siberia and the Russian Far East,”
Selena Hoy, Discover Silversea, 21 February 2019 [68]
https://discover.silversea.com/destinations/russian-far-east/eveny-people-russian-far-east/

**Overview:**

In the beginning, there was only the sea. One day, a maiden came down from heaven to the water. She was riding on an eight-legged reindeer, and tufts of reindeer fur that scattered on the surface of the sea became a raft. The reindeer gave their body to become earth, mountains and forests. The lice from their fur became wild reindeer roaming the landscape. The reindeer’s heart became a hero, and their lungs became a boy and a girl. So says one Eveny legend, recounted by Semyon Egorovich Dyachkov and recorded by professor Vasily Afanasievich Robbeck in 1978.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

**An Indispensable Resource**
Reindeer are vital to the survival of the Eveny, or Even (singular), people—an indigenous ethnic minority living in northeastern Siberia and the Russian Far East. There is about 20,000 Eveny, and they are close cousins of the more well-known and numerous Evenki people. Both are part of the Tungus group of people and languages, according to the 2015 paper “Casting Timeshadows” by anthropologists Piers Vitebsky and Anatoly Alekseyev. Vitebsky studied and lived with the Eveny for more than 20 years, and Alekseyev is an Eveny reindeer herder turned anthropologist.

The region inhabited by the Eveny people, which straddles the Arctic Circle, is incredibly beautiful, but extremely remote. And with winter temperatures dropping down to 70 degrees Fahrenheit below zero (56 degrees below in Celsius), only Antarctica is colder. There are few roads—the Trans-Siberian railway runs hundreds of miles south.

The Eveny have long survived these conditions in close symbiosis with reindeer. “Reindeer were the basis of the Eveny economy,” says Dmitri Banin, a Silversea Expedition Expert who has chatted and traded with the Eveny before reindeer excursions. “Most of the Eveny reared reindeer and hunted. Some Eveny had reindeer pastures in the areas of the Kolyma, the Omolon and the Indigirka rivers.”

There are thought to be over a million wild reindeer, called “buyun,” living in Russia, which are not herded but sometimes hunted. Another million are semi-domesticated “oron,” coexisting with indigenous groups that shadow their migration across the land to survive. And then there are the domesticated reindeer, or “uchakh,” that have been trained to be ridden and harnessed to sleighs. These companion animals act as the bridge between humans and the wilder reindeer.

In his book, “Reindeer People,” Vitebsky writes, “Apart from mining, there is no way that humans can make a living on this landscape except in partnership with the reindeer; and they cannot live with the reindeer except by following their perpetual migration.” The nomadic Eveny depend on reindeer for food, like meat and milk. Their clothing relies on the reindeer’s hide and fur, perfectly adapted to the Arctic temperatures with a double layer of hair, the fine undercoat covered with a coarse layer of hollow hairs that insulate and trap warmth.

In a harsh landscape where there may not be another person for a hundred miles or more, where there are few settlements and supplies, finding fuel for vehicles is not a given even if roads exist. Consequently, the Eveny depend on reindeer for transportation. The slight build of the Eveny allows herders to ride on “uchakhs,” which weigh about one-third that of a horse, and they have designed harnesses and sleighs to carry gear across the frozen tundra and the sub-polar taiga.

**Adaptation and Modernization**
Some Eveny became semi-settled and work in fishing and hunting sea mammals, says Banin. With the arrival of the Russians, they hunted sables, foxes and squirrels that accounted for up to 90 percent of their income. “Collectivization in the 1930s was destructive for the Eveny traditional social structure, including the nomadic lifestyle,” says Banin. “Many nomadic Eveny settled down, joined collective farms called "kolkhozes" and occupied themselves in cattle-breeding and agriculture. Permanent settlements were formed.”

Today, many people live in wooden houses. But some Eveny still maintain large herds of reindeer of up to 2,000 animals. They spend part of the year in tents on the land, traveling with the reindeer as they move into the high mountain pastures during summer to graze and fatten. During the bitter winter, the herders retreat to winter huts in the shelter of the valleys while the reindeer survive on lichens. Back in the villages, even the people who don’t participate in herding still depend on the reindeer economy for trading meat and fur and selling antlers for Korean and Chinese medicine.

While some traditional aspects survive through language and mythology, others fade. “Ethnic tourism and interest in Eveny culture can slow down or partially reverse this process by conserving traditions that could be shown to visitors,” says Banin. Although there has been a loss of traditional culture—many young people have never even been to a reindeer camp—the language still lives. “The Eveny language is taught in preschool and primary school, together with Russian,” says Banin. “Only 19.9 percent consider Russian their native language. Eveny is used as an oral language for communication between reindeer herding brigades.”

Vitebsky notes in his book that one Eveny scholar has compiled 1,500 different words that refer to reindeer. For example, a “berne” is a reindeer that keeps getting lost and is vulnerable to wolves, and a “holimangan” is a salt-loving reindeer who will come to lick an offering of a handful of salt. This richness of language demonstrates how important reindeer are to the Eveny people, and how crucial they have been not only to a way of life but to life itself.


Abstract:
This piece of research sets out to discover why co-gendered shamans are flourishing in Myanmar but have all but disappeared on Sulawesi. A review of the literature, firstly, on shamanic liminality in general and, secondly, shamanic gender liminality in particular, reveals that there are three main ways of linking gender liminality with becoming a shaman. In the first the calling comes beforehand and becoming co-gendered follows afterwards. In the second being co-gendered comes first and the calling follows. In the third, there is no intrinsic link between gender
liminality and becoming a shaman. The first type seems no longer to exist. Fieldwork among the Bugis people on Sulawesi reveals that the second type is just surviving while fieldwork in Myanmar shows that the third type is flourishing but with co-gendered shamans now forming the majority. By interviewing NatKadaw, Burmese shamans, and studying the nature of society in Myanmar, it becomes apparent that there are many reasons to explain why co-gendered NatKadaw have become so numerous and so popular. Buddhism, however, is the over-arching factor. On Sulawesi, once again a combination of interviews and a study of the island’s history reveals the complexity behind the decline in numbers of the Bissu, the Bugis shamans. Again, religion is the over-arching factor – in this case Islam. The study concludes, however, that in spite of the differences between the NatKadaw and the Bissu, there is a tendency for both to become entertainers albeit that the NatKadaw are popular entertainers while the Bissu were until recently involved largely in high art. At the moment, however, the Bissu are rejecting the entertainment route and are developing in two different directions.

Current & Relevant Information:

The term 'shaman' derives from the language of the Tungus speaking Eveny and Evenki reindeer herders of northern Siberia. The term refers to "persons of both sexes who have mastered spirits, who at will can introduce those spirits into themselves and use their power over the spirits in their own interests, particularly helping other people…" However, the word has been applied to any "communal leader chosen and trained to work for the community by engaging with significant other-than-human persons." Those other-than-human persons may be animals, plants, ancestors or any of a range of deities. The societies in which they live are profoundly different from those of the so-called Western world so that inhabitants of the Western world find it difficult to appreciate the worldview of shamanic societies. The difficulty is not just in the label 'animist' that Westerners give to those societies. "The difficulty is rather that we have, for ourselves, through the material conditions of our lives and known as a karadji, margidbu or mulla-mullung, has often managed to go into a type of trance through sheer mental focus and without the use of drugs, music or dance. The Mongolian Darhad shaman, udgan or zairan, may enter a trance merely by gently playing on a trumpet – an instrument they call an amaan khuur and which is often known as a Jaw’s Harp in the West. Some Mongolian Darhad shamans, on the other hand, use a drum and may consume alcohol to aid their entry into a trance. Shamans consume either the hallucinogenic peyote cactus which contains mescaline or the mushroom known as Psilocybe cubensis which contains psilocybin.

Forager societies tend to value egalitarianism, cooperative autonomy, and sharing. Furthermore, foragers exhibit a strong gendered division of labor. However, few studies have employed a cross-cultural approach to understand how forager children learn social and gender norms. To address this gap, we perform a meta-ethnography, which allows for the systematic extraction, synthesis, and comparison of quantitative and qualitative publications. In all, 77 publications met our inclusion criteria. These suggest that sharing is actively taught in infancy. In early childhood, children transition to the playgroup, signifying their increased autonomy. Cooperative behaviors are learned through play. At the end of middle childhood, children self-segregate into same-sex groups and begin to perform gender-specific tasks. We find evidence that foragers actively teach children social norms, and that, with sedentarization, teaching, through direct instruction and task assignment, replaces imitation in learning gendered behaviors. We also find evidence that child-to-child transmission is an important way children learn cultural norms, and that noninterference might be a way autonomy is taught. These findings can add to the debate on teaching and learning within forager populations.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

Anthropologists and psychologists have long been interested in how cultural beliefs, chore assignment, and subsistence strategy influence the development of culturally sanctioned behavior and personality traits (e.g., Barry, Bacon, & Child, 1957; Barry, Child, & Bacon, 1959; Whiting & Whiting, 1975). Small-scale agricultural societies are well-represented in this research, but fewer studies have been conducted among the world’s hunter-gatherer (or forager) populations (see Nielsen & Haun, 2016, for discussion). Furthermore, although cross-cultural studies on how forager children learn subsistence skills have become more common within the anthropological discipline (e.g., Lew-Levy, Reckin, Lavi, Cristóbal-Azkarate, & Ellis-Davies, 2017; MacDonald, 2007), few studies have explored the ways social norms and values are transmitted among foragers. This is surprising for two reasons: first, forager cultures are tremendously diverse, occupying virtually every environment in the world. And yet, most exhibit common foundational schemas, including egalitarianism, an emphasis on cooperative autonomy and sharing, and a gendered division of labor (e.g., K. M. Endicott, 2011; Leacock & Lee, 1982; Lee, 1992; Marlowe, 2007; Woodburn, 1982). Thus, understanding how these foundational schemas develop...
and how their ontogeny might differ across foraging societies can contribute to our understanding of how cultural features are perpetuated across generations.

Second, within the field of social learning, the frequency and importance of teaching in small-scale societies has become a matter of debate (B. S. Hewlett & Roulette, 2016; Lancy, 2010). Although an increasing number of studies demonstrate that teaching occurs in small-scale societies (Boyette & Hewlett, 2017; Garfield, Garfield, & Hewlett, 2016; B. S. Hewlett & Roulette, 2016; Kline, Boyd, & Henrich, 2013), few studies have explored the role of teaching in the transmission of social and gender norms among foragers. Such research could contribute new data and propose novel theoretical implications for the debate surrounding the presence of teaching in small scale societies in general, and in foragers in particular.

Considering these gaps, the present article aims to answer two main questions: first, what are the prominent methods and settings in which forager children learn social and gender norms cross-culturally? And, second, does the transmission of social and gender norms occur through teaching? To answer these questions, we conduct a meta-ethnographic analysis on how foragers learn social and gender norms across childhood. Although we are not the first to use a systematic cross-cultural approach to investigate children’s learning (Barry et al., 1957, 1959; Garfield et al., 2016), the meta ethnographic method represents a novel approach to studying this topic. Indeed, meta-ethnographies are ideal for uncovering broad patterns from quantitative and qualitative data together, registering commonalities and differences otherwise overlooked (Britten et al., 2002; Campbell et al., 2003). Before we outline our methods and findings, we will briefly describe the foundational schemas of foragers, key features of hunter-gatherer childhood, and children’s learning processes.

**Conclusion**

Ultimately, then, some of our findings on the role of teaching and imitation in foragers support those found in other small-scale societies. First, we have found evidence for teaching within forager communities, especially with regard to kinship and sharing. We have also found that imitation is especially important for learning aggression or cooperation and gendered behaviors among mobile foragers. Finally, using the playgroup as a diverse, yet child-specific platform of learning, children’s social capabilities coalesce during middle childhood.

We have also identified three novel findings rarely discussed in the literature. First, nonintervention may be a form of teaching autonomy among hunter-gatherers. Second, though learning gender roles mostly occur through imitation, as foragers settle, teaching, in the form of direct instruction and chore assignment, becomes increasingly common. And, finally, child to child transmission is an overlooked but common pathway through which cultural knowledge is acquired. These three findings should be further explored to increase our understanding of forager child
development and culture change. Furthermore, some of our findings differ from those of Garfield et al.’s (2016) eHRAF review on social learning among foragers. These differences highlight the fact that the cross-cultural methodology used by researchers should be diverse, to capture a diversity of results. Meta-ethnographies represent a novel way to study social learning among foragers.

This review has highlighted the importance of investigating how hunter-gatherer children learn social and gender norms, and how cross-cultural studies can uncover interesting gaps that necessitate further investigation. We hope that this article, and other cross-cultural papers on forager children’s learning (e.g., Garfield et al., 2016; Lew-Levy et al., 2017), can be used to explore the various ways forager children’s learning is similar to, and differs from, learning in other small-scale societies, and the ways learning patterns change as foraging societies become increasingly enmeshed in the structure of the nation-state.

H. Evenk [Russia]:
“Evenk People,” Britannica, 12 September 2018 [71]
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Evenk-people

Overview:

Evenk, also called Evenki, Evenki also spelled Evenky or Ewenki, formerly Tungus, the most numerous and widely scattered of the many small ethnic groups of northern Siberia (Asian Russia).

Current & Relevant Information:

The Evenk numbered about 70,000 in the early 21st century. A few thousand live in Mongolia, and the remainder are almost equally divided between Russia and China. They are separable into two distinct cultures: hunters and reindeer breeders are scattered in the vast area of the taiga (boreal forest) from the Ob-Irtysh watershed eastward to the Sea of Okhotsk coast and Sakhalin, and from the Amur River basin in the south northward to the Arctic Ocean; horse and cattle pastoralists or sedentary farmers reside in Transbaikalia and northeastern China and Mongolia. Many of the Evenk are bilingual, and the Evenk language is not the native language of more than half of the ethnic Evenk.

The Evenk traditionally were organized in clans tracing their descent along paternal lines. The members of a clan had a communal fire and invoked common ancestor spirits in their prayers. Each clan was led by an assembly of elders, including the clan shaman (whose duties included healing the sick, traveling in the spirit world, and prophesying). Notably, the word shaman is itself an Evenk word.

After the Russian Revolution of 1917 the Russian Evenk were organized into collective farms, and in 1930 the Evenk national (now autonomous) okrug (district) was created. Most nomadic Evenk were settled, and their subsistence economy was
supplemented by such activities as fur farming, agriculture, and industrial and government occupations.


Overview:

Contemporary reindeer herding in Siberia varies greatly from region to region, due to influences of different environments, histories, and ethnic characteristics. The Evenki, formerly known as the Tungus, practice taiga-type reindeer herding—also known as Evenki- or Tungus-type herding—in south Siberia’s mountainous zones.

Current & Relevant Information:

While scholars have made fine distinctions between the Evenki type of reindeer herding and the Sayan type practiced by the Tozhu, Tofa, and Dukha, these two types are more similar than different. (Vasilevich and Levin) Both are characterized by the use of reindeer for transportation purposes—as pack and riding animals—and for their milk products. Neither group farms reindeer for meat; in fact, the Evenki slaughter deer for food only in exceptional cases. Instead, using the deer as transport intensifies hunting and, consequently, increases the yield of game.

Like the Sayan, Evenki reindeer herding relies on small herds, with an optimal herd size of 20 to 30 deer per family. By comparison, the large-scale tundra reindeer herders who raise the animals primarily for meat have as many as 1,000 deer or more in one herd. Tundra-type herding is more extensive, with less contact between the herders and livestock. On the other hand, Evenki and Sayan reindeer herding is based on a closer relationship between the reindeer and the herder. As a result, Evenki and Sayan reindeer are tamer than tundra reindeer. Most deer in Evenki herds are used to being saddled and either ridden or burdened with a pack, and the does are used to being milked. The deer come to depend on specialized technologies requiring intensive and intimate contact between humans and deer, such as smudge pots to protect against midges and other biting insects, provision of salt, and protection from predators; thus, they never stray far from human settlements.


Overview:

The Evenks were formerly known as tungus. This designation was spread by the Russians, who acquired it from the Yakuts and the Siberian Tatars (in the Yakut language tongus) in the 17th century. The Evenks have several self-designations of which the best known is even, evenk. This became the official designation for the people in 1931. Some groups call themselves orochen ‘an inhabitant of the River
Oro’, orochon ‘a rearer of reindeer’, ile ‘a human being’, etc. At one time or another tribal designations and place -- names have also been used as self-designations, for instance, manjagir, birachen, solon etc. Several of these have even been taken for separate ethnic entities. The Evens or Lamuts receive a separate mention, because though originally close to the Evenks, they are now considered to be a different people.

Current & Relevant Information:

The Evenks inhabit a huge territory of the Siberian taiga from the River Ob in the west to the Okhotsk Sea in the east, and from the Arctic Ocean in the north, to Manchuria and Sakhalin in the south. The total area of their habitat is about 2.5 million square kilometers. In all of the Soviet Union only the Russians inhabit a larger territory. According to the administrative structure, the Evenks inhabit, amongst others, the Tyumen and Tomsk regions, the Krasnoyarsk district, the Irkutsk, Chita, and Amur regions, Buryatia and Yakutia, the Khabarovsk district and the Sakhalin region. However, their autonomous national territory is confined solely to the Krasnoyarsk district, where 3,200 of the 30,000 Evenks live. Close to 12,000 Evenks live in Yakutia. A large Evenk community (the Solon, the Tungus, the Ainak, the Nakagyr and the Orochon) lives in the northeast of China, close to the Soviet border, while others inhabit areas of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria.

“Evenki,” B.C. Alexander, Arctic Photo, 2020 [74]
https://www.arcticphoto.com/polar-info/polar-info24.htm

Overview:

The Evenki are the most widely scattered of all the native peoples of Siberia. Today, about 30,000 Evenki inhabit a gigantic area of Siberian taiga that stretches from the River Ob in the west to the Okhotsk Sea in the east, and from the Arctic Ocean in the north, to Manchuria and the Island of Sakhalin in the South. The total area of their territory is over 2.5 million square kilometers.

Current & Relevant Information:

The original home of the Evenki, formerly known as the Tungus was the area around Lake Baikal in the south of Siberia, where all the ancient Tungusic groups originated. The anthropological features of the Evenki, are evident in the early Neolithic people around the shores of Lake Baikal. Pressure from other neighboring tribes led to the Tungus began to migrating eastwards to the Amur and the coast of the Okhotsk Sea, and also north, to the Lena River basin northwest, to the Yenisey River. They moved up to the tundra in the north, and the steppes in the south. As they extended through Eastern Siberia, they assimilated other tribes. The Evenki split into three different groups, ‘foot’, ‘reindeer’, & ‘horse’ with each developing a different dialect and way of life. Evenki horse and cattle breeders belonged to the ‘horse group’ and were involved in agriculture. Reindeer breeders who settled in the vast area from the
Yenisey River to the Sea of Okhotsk and who also hunted and fished belonged to the ‘Reindeer’ group. The main occupation of the ‘foot’ group was hunting and trapping.

The Evenki settled in areas which had a similar environment mostly, mountain taiga and, to a lesser extent, mountain tundra. Their economy was based on reindeer breeding and hunting which allowed them to be extremely mobile and achieve an exceptional rate of expansion. Their whole traditional culture supported this mobile way of living: they had light conical tents, excellent skis, and light clothing. This way of life and its associated tools and equipment, formed the basis of the Tungus Culture.

Gender Roles:

“Gender Distinctions in an Egalitarian Society: The Case of Evenki People of the Baikal Region,” Tatiana Safonova and István Sántha, Anthropology of East Europe Review, 2010 [75]

Abstract:

In this article we present the case of the Evenki people, Siberian hunter-gatherers that share some traits of egalitarianism with other hunter-gathering people of the world. Using the cybernetic approach, proposed by Gregory Bateson in social anthropology, we describe the circular logic of interaction between genders and study the strategies that Evenki use to solve contradictions between personal autonomy (manakan) and dependencies associated with intergender relationships. The scope of our interest covers such situations as flirting, conjugal unit establishment, promotion of business contacts with strangers (andaki relationships), everyday violence and aggression, as well as ecstatic states. The presented analysis of the episodes of interaction in everyday life shows that Evenki social organization is based on a situational approach to the distinction of genders. The research is based on several fieldworks conducted in the Baikal region (Russia), but the core materials relate to a two-month stay with one Evenki community in spring 2006.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

Human cognition is organized in such a way that one tends to ascribe some characteristics to an isolated object, although in practice these characteristics exist and show themselves only in interaction between the object and other objects. Stone is hard when it resists our attempts to crush it; its hardness is a quality of our
relationship and the relationships between it and other objects, or the relationships between its molecular parts. “Language continually asserts by the syntax of subject and predicate that “things” somehow “have” qualities and attributes. A more precise way of talking would insist on the fact that the “things” are produced, are seen as separate from other “things,” and are made “real” by their internal relations and by their behavior in relationship with other things and with the speaker” (Bateson 1988 [1979]:64).

The same problem is with the notion of roles, ethnicities, and stereotypes, which are usually the results of the same ascription of the quality of the relationship to only one particular side of it. The study and experience of gender distinctions are vulnerable to the same mistake of attribution—there are no men and women isolated from each other. The only possible way to be socially recognized as a woman, for example, is to be in social relationships with other men and women. And all the female characters that are shown in the course of such being are the constituent parts of these relationships. To continue this logic, we can assume that differences in gender distinctions observed in various societies are not the results of the production of different types of women and men, but the results of different patterns of organization of the relationships between them. And here we come to the focus of this article, which will be on the way gender is produced in the frames of egalitarian social organization of modern Siberian hunter-gatherers, in this case the Evenki people. In this chapter we will describe how the relationships between men and women are integrated into the system of egalitarian ethos and will show exactly how different they are from the way gender is produced in hierarchical societies, for example in our own “Western” cultures, such as Russia and Hungary. Returning to the citation from Bateson that we used in the first paragraph, we cannot pretend that the description we present here is neutral, but it is itself the result of an attribution mistake, because everything we have observed and noticed about the system of gender relationships in Evenki society are not qualities that this system has, but are parts of the relationship between this system and us.

The basic hunter-gatherer skills of Evenki ethos are not for establishing, but avoiding hierarchical relationships. (For example, these skills are important for changing the behavior.) There are no such crystal-clear things as egalitarian and hierarchical ethos, which exist distinctly from each other in practice. But the result of their systematic relationship can be described by the production of such a schematic model. The main claim for carefulness here is in the need to keep in mind the difference between life and model. The relational epistemology of the cybernetic approach, which we use in this chapter, requires us to always keep in mind the distinction between different logical types. The map that we draw here is not the territory that we experienced. The only conceivable way to reduce the possibility of the confusion of information from these different levels is to build one more abstract level on which to describe how the experience of the territory has changed us so that we came to produce this particular map, and how the production of the map will
influence our perception of the territory. And then the reader herself/himself has to undertake the same exercise concerning the chain of changes that happens in the course of their own interaction with this text. Ascription of the qualities, familiar or different from own experience, is the process of relationship in which these differences or commonalities exist. And scientific generalizations are inevitably products of such unconscious processes of attribution. This process was described most accurately by Bateson himself in the epilogue to the second edition of his book Naven, which he wrote in 1958 (Bateson 1958:280-303).

There are also some features in our description that will look very familiar to Western readers, and this will mean that either the system of organization of relationships among Evenki people shares the patterns with the system in which the reader lives herself/himself, or the reader’s system shares some patterns with the systems of the authors. We suppose that the assumptions are true and could provide us and readers with an incentive to continue the study and comparisons.

The following description is based on our fieldwork experiences among Evenki of the Baikal region. In the text we outline the episodes from the particular period—two months that we lived in one Evenki family in spring 2006—to present congruent materials and save the contextual connections as far as it is possible in the frames of one single article. The outcomes of gender relationships that we observed in the life of this family resonated with our other observations made during subsequent periods of fieldwork among Evenki people of the same region. Because the designation “Evenki people” is artificial (and like all scientific designations has its own rather complex history of development), we use it for identification of people we study with caution, supposing that people living in other regions that are also called Evenki can practically be involved in different systems of relationships and concerned with other forms of presentation of egalitarian and hierarchical elements of their cultures. This trap is unfortunately unavoidable, as every such system is alive, changing, developing, or disintegrating. At the same time the representation of the system can also be framed differently by different researchers. But these are old confusions that are necessarily part of scientific discourse and have importance for its generation and advancement.

“Evenki,” Encyclopedia.com, 15 May 2024 [76]
https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/modern-europe/russian-soviet-and-cis-history/evenki

Overview:

The Evenki are an indigenous people of central and eastern Siberia, Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia. Although there has been a great deal of controversy among scholars regarding their original homeland, the most reliable anthropological, linguistic, and archaeological evidence indicates that the Evenki were formed to the east of Lake Baikal in southeastern Siberia around 1000 bc. They then spread
throughout eastern and northern Siberia, mixing and intermarrying with other native Siberian peoples. In addition to the general name Evenki (which means simply "person" or "people"), they identify themselves by the names of their clans or tribes: Birat, Ile, Manegir, Mata, Orochen, and so on. Although the word Evenki is a singular term in the Evenki language itself, it is used as a plural in Russian, the Russian singular being Evenk for a male and Evenkiika for a female. In recent decades, the use of Evenki as both singular and plural has become common among most non-Russian writers, although one occasionally encounters the form Evenk/Evenks. In older Russian and Western ethno-graphic literature, the Evenki were formerly referred to by the term Tungus, which is derived from Tongus, the Yakut word for "Evenki."

The Evenki have long been known for their skill at hunting reindeer, bear, moose, sable, squirrel, and other animals, and they rely on hunting for most of their food. The Evenki are divided into two main groups based on the economic activities they perform in addition to hunting. Those of central and northeastern Siberia, herd reindeer, and those of southeastern Siberia, Mongolia, and China, raise horses and cattle. A smaller, eastern group along the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk—often called the "sitting Evenki" because they own no reindeer—has traditionally lived exclusively by hunting forest animals and seals and fishing.

The Evenki have been under Russian and Chinese rule since their conquest during the 17th century by the Romanov and Qing dynasties respectively. Much of the vast territory they originally occupied was gradually taken from them by the government and given to Russian settlers. Nevertheless, with the exception of tax collection (originally in the form of furs), sporadic campaigns by the Russian Orthodox Church to Christianize them, and occasional arrests and trials for theft and other crimes that directly affected the Russian settler community, significant official interference in the day-to-day life of the Evenki came only in the Soviet period. During the 1930s, Evenki hunters and herdsmen were forced into collectives as part of the collectivization of agriculture. Stalin's campaign to rapidly develop Soviet industry simultaneously led to an enormous influx of Russians and other outsiders into Evenki territory to exploit its timber and mineral resources. This resulted in serious environmental damage to ancestral Evenki lands.

Current & Relevant Information:

**FAMILY LIFE**

Traditional Evenki society was organized into clans that were reckoned on the basis of descent from a common male ancestor and contained from 10 to 100 nuclear families. Clans performed a variety of social functions. For example, they owned communal hunting and herding territory, shared shamans between settlements of clan families, and formed alliances by marriage between their members (it was forbidden to marry someone from the same clan). Clan councils headed by the
clan’s elder men and women decided on issues such as war with other Evenki clans, punishment of wrongdoers within the clan, and aid to poor clan members.

Within the traditional Evenki nuclear family, men and women performed distinct roles. Men hunted and butchered game and made weapons, tools, and other household items from metal and bone. Women cooked; gathered firewood; herbs, and berries; prepared skins and birch bark; raised children; and cleaned the dyu and its surroundings. Women had to observe a wide range of taboos specific to their sex, most of which had to do with menstruation. For example, a menstruating woman was forbidden to touch weapons or wash in running water, and she had to bury the cloth or fur that she used as a sanitary pad far away from the encampment lest misfortune befall the family's hunters. If she was a shaman, she could not practice her profession until her period had passed. To these taboos must be added those mentioned earlier in connection with pregnancy and childbirth. Moreover, an Evenki woman was expected to behave in a reserved and quiet manner around her elders, in-laws, and guests. On the other hand, women had certain rights that could not be violated. Wife-beating was extremely rare, and husbands and wives usually enjoyed harmonious relations characterized practice by a high degree of equality. A woman could leave her husband if he abused her or even summon her male relatives (and sometimes those of her husband) to give him a thrashing. She could also leave her husband if he proved to be a neglectful provider or lover. The taboos restricting women's behavior have passed from observance in the past 50 years or so. The division of labor between the sexes persists in traditional occupations, but men and women interact on equal terms in teaching, administration, and certain other modern professions.

GENDER ISSUES

A strong division of labor between genders characterized traditional Evenki society. The effective integration of the Even-kis into the Soviet economy and Soviet society during and after the Second World War and the similar process among the Chinese Evenkis beginning in the 1960s had a particularly strong effect on Evenki women. Particularly in Russia women’s increased access to education resulted in women forming a disproportionately large segment of the Evenki intelligentsia and Soviet elite. At the same time Evenki women in the Soviet Union, and later in the Russian Federation, were subject to Soviet gender stereotypes that limited their effectiveness in various ways. Nevertheless, since the collapse of the Soviet Union Evenki women, and particularly women members of the Even-ki intelligentsia, have been at the forefront of the movement to revitalize Evenki society along traditional lines.


Abstract:
Federal laws in the Russian Federation set out restrictive criteria for Indigenous peoples to be recognized politically, socially, and culturally as Indigenous Small Numbered Peoples of the north (KMNS). These criteria emphasize “traditionality,” a strategic tactic equating indigeneity with rural landscapes and thus discounting urban Indigenous individuals and communities as modern political and self-determining subjects. Stories from Indigenous women living in Yakutsk, the capital city of Sakha Republic (Yakutia) challenge these narratives by reconstituting the urban landscape from an Indigenous perspective. The challenges emanating from urban landscapes, and relationships integral to navigating these challenges, are examined in this thesis from a critical Indigenous feminist geographical framework, honoring and celebrating the numerous manifestations of urban indigeneity entangled throughout Yakutsk.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

Political, social, and cultural understandings of the Russian Far East in white-Euroheteropatriarchal-privileging structures and discourses of power are shaped by sensationalized media portrayals, historically reminiscent imaginings, and homogenized narratives of Russian culture and peoples. Upon closer inquiry, however, realities of Russian spatialities and relationalities are quickly revealed, the people substantiating them are multifaceted, and the complex relationalities forming the Russian Federation, the largest country in the world, are illuminated. The lack of awareness and attention paid to Indigenous peoples in these landscapes are exposed, and compassionate engagement by researchers poised to advocate for their inclusion in global discourse becomes invaluable to local communities. It is the responsibility of researchers from privileged positions to encourage nuanced and intentional understandings of how global forces such as capitalism, colonialism, and gender violence are impacting Indigenous communities beyond narrow imaginations of places like the Russian Far East.

This project developed and draws inspiration from intersecting personal, political, and academic motivations. The project’s goal is to interject into static and intransigent discourses about Indigenous women and their relationships to urban place. My sense of belonging to and understanding of the social, political, and cultural nuances of the urban Indigenous community on unceded Musqueam, Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh territories (Vancouver, BC) was a catalyst for expanding relations to and understandings of urban indigeneity on an international scale. Transitioning from Wet’suwet’en territories to unceded Coast Salish territories at 18 to pursue education in the city introduced me to the responsibilities inherent in this liminal space I would become so familiar with that challenged the rigid perceptions of the binary between urban and rural. I became familiar with how many of my own community members embodied the woven assemblages of urban indigeneity without ever compromising or renouncing their ways of life and
knowledge that stemmed from the land. Undertaking this work as a Cree-Metis woman (with personal experience transitioning between Indigenous communities I call 'home' and navigating diverse challenges as I adapted) framed the approach, expectations, and goals for the project. These intergenerational intellectual traditions and cultural knowledge have been passed down from my great-grandmother, to my grandfather, and from my mother to me, guiding my own identity formation and perspective on the world as a Cree-Metis woman with mobility and innovative relationality in my every breath.

Research about Indigenous peoples in Sakha Republic (Yakutia), and Russia expansively, does not for the most part and at present consider how cities and urban dynamics impact contemporary Indigenous identities. This is due to narrow perceptions in Russia about indigeneity embodying and depicting ‘traditionality’ isolated from the pace and lifestyles of modern, globalized societies. Settler-state positionings of Indigenous peoples as incompatible with cities, contemporary ambitions, and indefinite self-determination are increasingly critically evaluated and challenged by Indigenous peoples experiencing these realities. The goals of this research are to acknowledge and celebrate the multifaceted experiences, struggles, and ambitions of Every and Evenki women in Yakutsk, the capital city of Sakha Republic (Yakutia). My research questions were developed to honor the specific geopolitical nuances of how urban Indigenous women experience, cultivate, and perceive indigeneity in conversations with and beyond restrictive Russian legal and political definitions. By illuminating the realities of Indigenous women’s entanglements with urbanization, globalization, and colonialism in the Russian Far East, this research challenges the constrictions placed on the flourishing indigenous present and futures by legal criteria set forth by Russian laws.

Upon arriving to Yakutsk, Russia in May 2018, my research questions and conceptualizations rapidly shifted to reflect the needs, expectations, and realities of the community members I was working alongside. The lens through which I gazed and the approach to research I took shifted though ongoing development of relational responsibilities that allowed meaningful relationships to develop between myself, the city, the people, and the stories we shared. The foundations of this thesis are woven together by these relationships developed to explore the nuances and meanings of Eveny and Evenki women living, navigating, and interacting in the capital city of Sakha Republic (Yakutia).


Summary:

Gender equality in the Arctic is highly relevant to the agenda and role of the Arctic Council (the Council) and its Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), which have emphasized gender equality in previous projects and initiatives. The
importance of issues of gender and diversity has become increasingly evident, the latest example being Iceland's emphasis on gender issues during its Council Chairmanship.

GEA highlights the importance of recognizing and appreciating diversity in terms of discourses, gender, Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, governance, education, economies, social realities, sustainability, and balanced participation in leadership and decision making, in both the public and private sectors.

A major component of GEA III has been to develop this report on gender. It pulls together material, information, and expertise to provide an overview of gender-related issues in the Arctic and contributes to filling knowledge gaps on this subject. The GEA III report seeks to identify emerging issues, priorities, and concrete strategies that support gender balance and increased diversity.

The primary intended audience for this report is policymakers in the Arctic region. It is a resource for those interested in gender issues in the Arctic, including Arctic inhabitants and researchers. We hope that a broader audience, including the private sector, will appreciate the relevance of the report to their work.

The report does not claim to be comprehensive, but it is a step forward in strengthening the knowledge base and understanding required for developing policies that foster resilient and thriving communities.

Current & Relevant Information:

The definition of gender has changed in recent times, from referring to sex at birth (Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, 1882) to being "a concept that refers to the social differences between women and men that have been learned, are changeable over time and have wide variations both within and between cultures" (United Nations Terminology Database, 2020). In linguistics, gender is also "a classification by which nouns, and pronouns are grouped and inflected or changed in form, in relation to sex or their lack of it" (Webster, 1979, p. 762). Webster's 1979 definition goes on to explain how some languages use gender to categorize objects, while others distinguish between animate or inanimate objects. In all of this, the dictionary claims that the English language is "neutral".

Much of the present discourse on gender comes from a binary definition of gender, where men and women are sharply separated through sexuality and seen as disparate beings. Indigenous perspectives on gender, which often bring a holistic perspective on human beings, challenge the binary perspective on many levels. Although sex and gender of individuals are recognized and appreciated, many Indigenous Peoples avoid categorizing individual community members using sexuality. Men and women are, first and foremost, appreciated as neutral" human beings. Each member is born with an innate spirit that cannot be discouraged nor disrespected. Instead, the community members deeply appreciate the innate sense
of purpose. These measures are taken to discourage conflict with the physical as well as spiritual aspects of the self. Categorizations, depending on the cultural group, may be defined by roles and responsibilities of persons in their relationship with all the creation and the land. In other groups, it may be in reference to spiritual uniqueness, where in First Nations communities in Canada there is a notion of "two-spirited" people. In 2019, the Arctic Athabaskan Council – in a workshop related to gender – defined gender identity as referring to "how someone feels about themselves, in terms of being a "woman", “man”, or outside of the gender binary".

“Evenki and Even,” Jeffrey Hays, Facts and Details, May 2016 [79]  
http://factsanddetails.com/russia/Minorities/sub9_3f/entry-5132.html

Overview:

The Evenki, also known as the Tungus, are a group of 30,000 or so traditional reindeer herders and pastoralists who live scattered across Siberia and the Far East: in Evenki National Area, Yakutia, Taimyr, Buryatia, Sakhalin Island, the Sakha Republic, in northern Siberia around the Lena River, south of Lake Baikal and around the Amur River in Manchuria.

The Evenki were divided into many distinct groups. Some of the names used to describe them—Birar, Ile, Manegir, Mata and Orochen—were names these groups. They are divided into two main groups: 1) reindeer herders who live in tundra in the north; and 2) horse and cattle pastoralists who live in the mountains, larch forests and grassland in the south. [Source: Vanora Bennet, Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1997]

The Evenki speak a Tungus-Manchu language, which is related to Chinese, look like Mongolians and live in family units called brigades. During the Soviet period, some Evenki were settled in villages; others were allowed to practice their herding ways. The Evenki used to wear fish skin clothes.

Current & Relevant Information:

Evenki Marriage and Family

Marriages have traditionally been arranged, with the consent of the bride and groom. The custom of paying bride wealth was outlawed by the Soviets. In recent decades many Evenki have married non-Evenki.

Traditional elopement occurs. Under this custom a couple sets up a felt tent with a traditional conical tent beside it. In the middle of the night the girl sneaks out of her tent and rides off with her lover. The couple sleeps together in the traditional conical tent. The marriage is formalized when an elderly woman rearranges the bride’s eight pigtails into two. Most newlyweds set up their households with the groom’s clan.

Children have traditionally been both spoiled and toughened up. They were breast fed in some cases until they were six but were sometimes exposed to the freezing
cold naked to toughen them up. It was not uncommon for children to be treated with exposure to the cold to get rid of diseases. These days children of nomads spend a lot of time away from the herding clan attending boarding school. Their parents complain that makes them weak.


Overview:

The basic social unit was the small or nuclear family, often augmented by an older relation (e.g., a surviving father or mother of the husband). Marriages were arranged by parents, usually with the consent of the bride and groom. Less frequently, the groom abducted his bride. In the former case, the groom was responsible for providing bride-wealth, usually in reindeer, or working for his future father-in-law for a period of time. The dowry that the woman brought with her to the new household approached the bride-wealth in value. Exchange of sisters as brides between two or more families was a widely practiced alternative, obviating the need for provision of goods or labor by the grooms. After the wedding (attended by up to 150 people) the woman went to live with her husband's clan. Divorce could be initiated by either party, especially in the case of one spouse's failure to provide for the family's needs.

The Soviet state forbade the customs of bride-wealth and prearranged marriages without the consent of both spouses. Increasingly, Evenki marry non-Evenki: in Yakutia 72 percent of Evenki women were married to non-Evenki men, and 66 percent of Evenki men were married to non-Evenki women in 1979. The figure for inter-ethnic marriages is higher in urban than rural areas but still above 50 percent in some rural areas. Historically, many of the Evenki who attached themselves to Russian settlements had been expelled from clans.

Current & Relevant Information:

**Domestic Unit.** The family was usually headed by the father, sometimes by a brother or grandfather, and, in the case of death of these males, by the mother or her brother. Extended families of several generations were not uncommon, but the average family size at the turn of the century was 5.5 members, and more recently, 3.7 (1979, among Evenki families in Yakutia). Marriage rates among the Evenki have fallen over the last few decades, and single-parent families of unwed mothers and children have become increasingly common. Although the proportion of extended families has declined over time, such families are still much more common among the Evenki than among nonnative residents of Siberia.

**Inheritance.** Items owned collectively by the family or the clan were passed from generation to generation. These included the fire (i.e., coals from the family hearth), the flint stone and hook for hanging the cooking kettle, and most reindeer. Many of
the reindeer herds can be viewed as clan rather than family property; although individual families cared for the deer, the clan elders could stipulate their redistribution when the need arose to help poorer clan members.

Riding reindeer were personally owned, as were hunting and much domestic equipment. Most personal possessions, including one's riding deer, accompanied the deceased to the grave. Other reindeer would be distributed among the sons and any (male) wards after the death of the head of household. If a son wanted to set up his own household before the death of his father, the father might give him a large number of reindeer and the needed equipment. Property of the (male) head of household would not be divided at the time of his death if he left a widow. If she remarried within her husband's clan, her children became the wards of the new husband; if she remarried outside the clan, children and reindeer were distributed among the late husband's relatives. A woman leaving her late husband's clan could take only her own personal possessions (including tent cover and any reindeer she had brought with her to the marriage, and the offspring of those reindeer). At her death some of her possessions were buried with her, and small items were returned to her mother or distributed to her friends as keepsakes. Children conceived prior to marriage were kept by their mother's parents when she married.

I. Gwichin [Canada/US-Alaska]:


Overview:

The Gwich’in are the northernmost Indian Nation living in fifteen small villages scattered across a vast area extending from northeast Alaska in the U.S. to the northern Yukon and Northwest Territories in Canada.

The word “Gwich’in” means “people of the land,” and it refers to a people who have lived in the region since before the U.S. and Canada existed. Today, the Gwich’in homelands span both countries. Oral tradition indicates the Gwich’in have occupied this area since time immemorial, or, according to conventional belief, as long as 20,000 years.

Current & Relevant Information:

Nine thousand Gwich’in people make their home on or near the migratory route of the Porcupine Caribou Herd, and have depended on caribou for their subsistence way of life for thousands of years. Today, as in the days of their ancestors, the caribou is still vital for food, clothing, tools, and are a source of respect and spiritual guidance for the Gwich’in.

Alaska
The Gwich’in in Alaska live in nine communities, Arctic Village, Beaver, Birch Creek, Canyon Village, Chalkyitsik, Circle, Eagle Village, Fort Yukon and Venetie. Their communities are organized under tribal governments with elected chiefs and councils. The Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments is a consortium of the Gwich’in and two Koyukon tribal governments to address regional concerns as directed by the tribes.

**Yukon**

Vuntut Gwitchin is the name of people who live in the settlement of Old Crow, Yukon. The name in the Gwich’in language means “people of the lakes”. Old Crow is the northernmost Yukon community, located at the confluence of the Crow and Porcupine Rivers.

**Northwest Territories**

The Gwich’in communities Fort McPherson (Teetl’it Zheh), Tsiigehtchic, Aklavik and Inuvik in the Northwest Territories are located in the region of the Mackenzie Delta.

“About the Gwichin,” GTC Department of Cultural Heritage, 2016 [82]  
https://www.gwichin.ca/about-the-gwichin

**Overview:**

We are one of the most northerly Indigenous peoples on the North American continent, living at the northwestern limits of the boreal forest. Only the Inuit live further north. We are part of a larger family of Indigenous people known as Athapaskans, which include peoples such as the Slavey, Dogrib, Han and Tutchone but our language and way of life is distinct.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

At the time of contact with Euro-Canadians, we lived in nine different bands with lands stretching from the interior of Alaska through the Yukon and into the Mackenzie Valley. In the Northwest Territories, we now live primarily in the communities of Fort McPherson, Tsiigehtchic, Aklavik and Inuvik and we number about 3440 people. We still maintain close cultural and family ties with our Gwich’in relatives in the Yukon and Alaska, and together we total over 6000 people in 15 communities.

Traditionally, our lands extended from the mountain headwaters of the Peel and Arctic Red Rivers in the south, to the Mackenzie Delta in the north, from the Anderson River in the east, to the Richardson Mountains in the west. Many families still maintain summer and winter camps outside our communities. Hunting, fishing and trapping remain important both culturally and economically, with caribou, moose and whitefish being staples of our diet.
Overview:

Gwich’in, also called Kutchin, a group of Athabaskan-speaking North American Indian tribes inhabiting the basins of the Yukon and Peel rivers in eastern Alaska and Yukon—a land of coniferous forests interspersed with open, barren ground. The name Gwich’in, meaning “people,” is given collectively to an indefinite number of distinct American Subarctic peoples, there being no precise agreement among authorities on whom to include under this cover name, which is as much linguistic as cultural.

Current & Relevant Information:

The Gwich’in people’s most influential neighbors were the Eskimo, or Inuit, with whom they traded and fought and from whom they borrowed such cultural traits as tailored caribou-skin clothing (most conspicuously, the Eskimo hood and mittens), various hunting weapons, and the sled. They also shared many customs with tribes to the south and east—painting their faces and hair, wearing feathers as hair ornaments, and decorating their clothing with fringes and beads. Gwich’in houses were domed structures of poles and fir boughs, banked with snow in winter and ventilated by a smoke hole at the top. Little is known of Gwich’in religion or beliefs, but they were well known for their feasts, games (especially wrestling), singing, and dancing. Early 21st-century population estimates indicated more than 4,500 individuals of Gwich’in descent.


Overview:

In June of 1988, the elders and traditional leaders of the Gwich’in Athabascans congregated for the first customary gathering of their Nation in more than a century. July 26th will mark the first day of the 15th biennial Gwich’in Gathering, this year in Arctic Village.

Current & Relevant Information:

Today, approximately nine thousand Gwich’in people live in fifteen small villages scattered across the northernmost parts of Alaska and Canada, making their home on or near the migratory route of the Porcupine Caribou Herd. In accordance with tradition, when the first Gathering was held in 1988 a talking stick was used, and those in attendance unanimously decided to speak with one voice against oil and gas development in the birthing and nursing grounds of the Porcupine Caribou Herd.
The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge is deeply important to the Gwich’in way of life. Known in Gwich’in as “lizhik Gwats’an Gwandii Goodlit” – the Sacred Place Where Life Begins – the Coastal Plain of the Arctic Refuge acts as the calving grounds for the Porcupine Caribou Herd, a source of primary sustenance for the Gwich’in. The Gwich’in people are “people of the land,” and as residents of a region extending from northeast Alaska to the northern Yukon and Northwestern Territories of Canada for more than 20,000 years, it is safe to say that their knowledge of and connection to the Refuge is strong.

Gender Roles:

“Gwichin People,” Britannica, 12 December 2017 [85]
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Gwichin

Abstract:

Gwich’in, also called Kutchin, a group of Athabaskan-speaking North American Indian tribes inhabiting the basins of the Yukon and Peel rivers in eastern Alaska and Yukon—a land of coniferous forests interspersed with open, barren ground. The name Gwich’in, meaning “people,” is given collectively to an indefinite number of distinct American Subarctic peoples, there being no precise agreement among authorities on whom to include under this cover name, which is as much linguistic as cultural.

Current & Relevant Information:

In traditional Gwich’in social organization, men became chiefs by demonstrating leadership or prowess in hunting or war. Men’s major pursuits included battle, fishing, and hunting caribou, moose, and other game. Women’s pursuits included making nearly all household goods, gathering wild plant foods, and transporting their families and material possessions during frequent moves from one camp to another.

“Gwichin,” Encyclopedia.com, 15 May 2024 [86]

Overview:

The northernmost Indians in North America, the Gwich’in live in Alaska and Canada’s Northwest and Yukon Territories, straddling the Arctic Circle between roughly 65° and 69° North latitude, and 130° and 150° West longitude. This region consists largely of boreal forest, taiga, and alpine tundra biomes, and is dominated by permafrost and continental climate with long winters and short, surprisingly warm summers. Alexander Mackenzie, the first person of European descent to record his impressions of the Gwich’in, called them Quarrellers, because of their guttural, vociferous speech and oratorical proclivities. French-speaking fur traders called eastern bands of Gwich’in "Loucheux," a translation of the Chipewyan word for them.
(yeux louches, "eyes that squint"). The ethnonyms Koochin, Kootchin, Kutchin, Gwitchin, and Gwich'in are derived from gwich'in, which is used in conjunction with a place word to identify people or dwellers who live in a particular location, for example, Teet'it Gwich'in, "people of the head of the waters," Vantat (Vuntut) Gwich'in, "people among the lakes." The Gwich'in self-designation is dinjii zhyuh, or "person, Indian." After 1970, Gwich'in developed steadily as the preferred ethnonym. Despite social and cultural variations among regional bands, the Gwich'in are culturally and linguistically distinct from their neighbors, the K'ashot'ine, Shihta Got'ine, Tutchone, Han, Tanana, Koyukon, and Inuvialuit and Inupiat Eskimos.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

Distinctive but not exclusive, men's and women's roles were tempered by practical exigencies and small-group demography. Men were more likely than women to hunt, trap, twine fishnets, make war, and deal with the implements associated with these tasks. Women were more likely than men to tend to the children, prepare and cook food, haul sleds (dogs being scarce prior to the new trading-post exchange economy), prepare skins and make and repair clothing and blankets, gather vegetal food and fuel, and haul water. With predictable exceptions (e.g., nursing and warfare) flexibility has probably always been the rule, and despite early opinion about women being subjugated "beasts of burden," in reality Gwich'in women held authority within the household and were assertive in other domains.

Some marriages were decided by the prospective bride and groom, unless the bride's mother or other members of her family objected to the status or promise of the prospective husband. Other parents arranged the marriages of their daughters and sons. A young girl's mother might take the initiative in arranging her daughter's initial intimacy and consequent future marriage. Men might also secure wives by living with and serving the parents of an especially young girl until she reached marriageable age, or by successfully wrestling a married man for his wife.

The Gwich'in practiced monogamy (most common), polygyny (chiefs, shamans, and wealthy men often possessed four or five wives and one chief had eighteen), and polyandry (the woman in such a marriage being admired). Partners also sometimes exchanged wives. No matter which post-marital residence rule obtained, in practice matrilocality, patrilocality, and matri-patrilocality were found. A man might beat or divorce an adulterous wife, and a woman could divorce an abusive husband or leave to take up with another man. Evidence for the levirate is equivocal; but following a man's death, his brother, in theory, had to approve the widow's remarriage. In the late-twentieth century arranged marriages disappeared. More young people remain unmarried, and divorce, frowned upon by the church, is rare.

"Development and the Changing Gender Roles of Gwich'in Women," Karim-Aly S. Kassam and Wanda Wuttunee, University of Calgary, 1995 [87]
Overview:

Social change in the name of “development” has had profound implications on the lives of Aboriginal women and their communities. Indeed, Aboriginal people throughout the world are seeking strategies to better their lives and relationships with each other and society broadly. Sharing is culturally an integral component of many of these communities. This paper seeks to share the experiences of Gwich’in communities in socio-economic change.

The Gwich’in are the northernmost Amerindians. Traditionally they lived a nomadic way of life, hunting and gathering. At present the Gwich’in live along the McKenzie River in the Northwest Territories. In December 1992, the Gwich’in settled a Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement with the Government of Canada.

The aim of this paper is to examine the changing gender roles of Gwich’in women. The paper is based on interviews conducted by two researchers in the Gwich’in communities of Inuvik and Fort McPherson, Northwest Territories in 1994 and 1995 respectively. The changing gender roles of women will be considered from three perspectives: (1) the movement from the traditional to the wage economy, (2) the community management and leadership role of women, and (3) the impact of the Land Claim Agreement.

Current & Relevant Information:

Discussion

The tale of the Gwich’in Women is one of self-empowerment against a backdrop of dramatic social change. Arguably their traditional upbringing may have been the key feature in preparing them to cope with change. While being raised to be mothers, care givers, makers of clothing, preparers of food and so on; they were also taught skills such as hunting to prepare them for survival. The fluidity of gender roles was an important asset when facing what seem like insurmountable obstacles as a result of colonization, Christianization and the imposition of the market system. This is a case of women accepting modernity on their own terms. The traditional gender roles of women were supplemented rather than replaced by entry into the market system.

When examining gender roles and community development, it is clear that for the Gwich’in the word “community” includes not only humans but the plant and animal life in their traditional lands. Therefore examination of gender relations must also take into account the relations of humans to the surrounding wildlife. The majority of the discussion on gender issues in European literature is devoid of this nuance.

As the implications of the Land Claim Agreement unfold, Gwich’in women will continue to be key players in their community’s well-being. The Gwich’in approach to
community development appears to be inclusive of all community members and draws on traditional beliefs and blends modern tools to become a modern aboriginal community meeting change on their terms. Women play a critical role and are challenged to meet their potential and develop skills that will benefit the community. While Fort McPherson and Inuvik suffer the social ills of many communities, there are bright lights to be found in the people who have a clear vision of the community and are willing to work hard to make it a reality.


Overview:

This report provides guidance for implementing new requirements in the Government of Canada’s proposed Impact Assessment Act, specifically to consider “the intersection of sex and gender with other identity factors” when examining potential social, economic, and health impacts of major projects with a potential for environmental impact (Parliament of Canada, 2018). While there is shared responsibility between different government jurisdictions (federal, provincial, territorial, Indigenous Peoples), the focus here is on the federal government and proponents. The report draws on Indigenous women’s experiences surrounding resource development and considers how Indigenous Peoples’ knowledges can guide resource-related decisions. Indigenous women often carry different perspectives, backgrounds, and positions, which contribute to different priorities, concerns, and approaches to resource development (LaBelle, 2015).

This report focuses on how to strengthen impact assessment processes for Indigenous women. It identifies principles and practices to guide proponents and governments to do a better job with identifying the impacts of major resource and infrastructure developments on Indigenous women, including making impact assessment processes, and mitigation strategies, more attentive to the experiences of Indigenous women.

A companion literature synthesis to this report delves into the diverse social, economic, health and cultural impacts that may be experienced by Indigenous women in the context of resource development projects (Manning, Nash, Levac, Stienstra, & Stinson, 2018). It identifies some positive and many adverse impacts that major economic projects may have on Indigenous women and their communities. Key findings, summarized in this report, help to inform our proposals for developing better impact assessment practices that can help in mitigating adverse impacts on Indigenous women.

We begin this report by setting out the changing context of impact assessment in Canada (Section 3). Key findings on impacts for Indigenous women, concerns about
the existing impact assessment process, and the role of Indigenous knowledge in impact assessment are presented in Sections 4, 5, and 6. Section 7 summarizes three key notable case studies that illustrate the importance of different aspects of environmental assessments for Indigenous women. Sections 8 and 9 document our recommended actions for improving the impact assessment processes for Indigenous women going forward. We conclude the report by identifying some key gaps that remain.

Current & Relevant Information:

KEY LESSONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Based on an extensive review of academic and community literature, and seven key informant interviews with Indigenous women and allies across present-day Canada who have been actively involved in impact assessment processes, this report highlights a number of serious impacts of resource extraction on Indigenous women and their communities (these are detailed in our companion report; see Manning et al., 2018). We then describe key shortcomings with existing impact assessment processes. Because of the critical need to better understand, engage with, and center Indigenous knowledges in the process, we then suggest four key tensions that hinder such meaningful engagement. We go on to offer three examples of past projects where there is some hopeful evidence of considering Indigenous women’s experiences and voices. The last two sections of this report provide an overview of (Section 8), and details about (Section 9), guiding principles, key factors, and best practices that could better attend to Indigenous women’s experiences with resource development and extraction, and better enable their contributions during impact assessments. The summary that follows focuses primarily on key lessons for moving forward, but also highlights persistent gaps in our knowledge; gaps that should be targeted for research investment.

How to Ensure Impacts for Indigenous Women are Identified

A key lesson learned from this research is that impacts for Indigenous women are unlikely to be identified unless Indigenous women are involved in the impact assessment process. Ensuring that the scope of impact assessment is broad, inclusive of social impacts, and incorporates areas important to Indigenous women’s lives, such as family and community wellbeing, is essential. Gender based analysis (GBA+) is an important tool for identifying gendered impacts from resource development projects. It should be mandated in all impact assessment processes. Indigenous women’s organizations have proposed guidelines to guide culturally relevant GBA+. If adequately resourced, these organizations could be engaged by proponents and settler governments to do GBA+ research that inform the impact assessment process. In attempting to identify gendered impacts, proponents and settler governments must resist the tendency to homogenize and recognize the
diversity among Indigenous women. Different women might experience the costs and benefits of resource development in different ways.

**How to Improve Indigenous Women’s Engagement Across the Process**

Recognizing that Indigenous women’s voices are often missing from the impact assessment process and developing commitments to ensure their presence is an essential first step for both settler governments and proponents. Recognizing the potential diversities among Indigenous women and taking steps to ensure they can access the supports they might need to participate fully in impact assessment processes would likely have a positive effect in this area. Considering changes to impact assessment procedures and approaches to make them less adversarial and intimidating would also likely allow more Indigenous women to feel more comfortable in participating. Ensuring adequate funding to participate, sufficient time to respond to government and proponent reports and requests, and facilitating capacity building in the area of impact assessment for Indigenous women and their organizations would all contribute to positive outcomes.

There are also several opportunities for improving Indigenous women’s engagement in mitigation strategies, including by ensuring their participation in developing work-site training, policies, and procedures, and in informing proponents’ corporate social responsibility programs. Indigenous women should also be actively involved in developing and implementing community monitoring of project impacts. It is worth noting that Indigenous women’s engagement will come regardless of – if not in the form of meaningful collaboration, then in the form of resistance through protest and lawsuits. When mistakes are made and Indigenous women are forced to protect their knowledges, lands, families, and communities, proponents and governments can take notice and shift their practices accordingly.

**Final Thoughts**

This is an important moment in time. The federal government has signaled its commitment to improving the work of impact assessments, and also its commitment to undertaking gender-based analysis (GBA+). At the same time, there are concerns about the extent to which the federal government will be able to honor – through the proposed Impact Assessment Act – its responsibility to obtain free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) from Indigenous Peoples, as is its commitment through the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (King & Pasternak, 2018). In this context, there is a tremendous opportunity to develop new and meaningful ways forward in impact assessments, that do honor FPIC, and that are attentive and responsive to the experiences of diverse Indigenous women. We are pleased to offer our findings and recommendations to these efforts.

Overview:

Women are actively engaged in fisheries work around the world is without question. From crabmeat processors in Tabasco, Mexico to fish traders in Lake Victoria, Tanzania to participants in the shrimp aquaculture industry in coastal states of India, women are significantly involved in fisheries both directly and indirectly (Munk-Madsen 1998; Newell and Ommer 1999; Kumar 2004; Ahmed 2005; Neis et al. 2005). This degree of participation is reflected in the vast array of ongoing community-based, fisheries projects and the development of relevant programs and policies that are currently being conducted internationally.

In Europe, the AKTEA European Network: Women in Fisheries and Aquaculture was initiated in 2005 to recognize women’s contributions to fisheries; to increase the visibility of women’s roles in fisheries; to participate in decision-making on matters affecting women’s roles; to exchange ideas and experiences and to work towards the political and institutional acceptance of women’s organizations in fisheries. Primarily focusing on Western Europe, AKTEA also coordinates conferences that enable academics, politicians and fishers to share experiences. In its Green Paper on the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy published in 2001, the European Commission acknowledged the need for the Union to ensure that the role played by women in the fisheries sector be recognized and enhanced. Extensive research has been supported by the European Union including a major 2002 study on the role of women in fisheries in thirteen European countries. Following the acceptance of this report, Member States in the European Parliament adopted a resolution on “women’s networks: fishing, farming and diversification" committing to launching “the necessary actions to secure greater legal and social recognition of the work of women in the fisheries sector.” The International Collective in Support of Fish workers (ICFS) with offices located in Belgium and India draws its mandate from the International Conference of Fisheries and their Supporters (ICFWS) held in Rome in 1984. It is an international non-governmental organization that works toward the establishment of equitable and sustainable fisheries particularly in the small-scale, artisanal fisheries. It implemented the Women in Fisheries program that supports research and policy development and publishes reports, monographs and other publications on women in fisheries (including Yemaya the ICSF Newsletter on Gender). In 1977, the WorldFish Center (a research center associated with the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research) was formed to focus on living aquatic resources in the developing world. The Center hosts the biennial World Fisheries Forum which includes a Gender and Fisheries component attracting international participants. This symposium “recognized the breadth and depth of changes needed to create a gender-sensitive fisheries sector and make real improvements in the lives of those involved” (Williams et al. 2006:3). In North America, sustained, long-term programs and organizations focusing on women and fisheries have not been as well-established or have formed to address a particular issue and then disbanded. For example, following the collapse of the cod fisheries in
the late 1980s and the subsequent closure of those fisheries in Atlantic Canada, a variety of groups including Women’s FishNet formed throughout the region to give women a greater voice in decision-making and a forum to respond to the introduction of an unpopular compensation package through linking with other groups facing similar issues. Spearheaded by researchers at Memorial University of Newfoundland and Labrador in Canada, this group has now broadened its focus to address related community and health issues. Despite the success of these organizations and initiatives, to date no group exists or has been created that addresses the regional needs of women involved in fisheries across the circumpolar north. Some women in this region belong to groups such as AKTEA or Women’s FishNet while others may have specific issues addressed through women’s organizations such as Femina Borealis in northern Europe.

An extensive literature exists that documents the contributions of women and men in fisheries, and research on gender relations in fisheries has dramatically expanded since the late 1970s (Porter 1985; Bavington et al. 2004; Grzetic 2004; Neis et al. 2005). In the circumpolar north, this literature has been dominated by Norwegian, Canadian, Icelandic and American scholars, some of whom are represented in these pages. Earlier work focused on women’s involvement in, and contributions to, fishery-based households and communities (Munk-Madsen and Larsen 1989; Nadel-Klein and Davis 1988; Gerard 1995) as well as on the gendered division of labor. More recent literature adopts a gender-based analysis of the linkages between fisheries and globalization including how industrial restructuring relates to international markets and changing dynamics in local communities (Power 2005). According to MacDonald:

Fisheries have long provided interesting vantage points from which to explore processes of capital accumulation and relations of class and gender. The community basis of most fisheries highlights relationships that might otherwise be lost in a more geographically dispersed industry. Interactions between the gender division of labor in wage work, family production and domestic work are more visible in a context where household members are integrated in one way or another into the same industry...Linking the experiences of fisheries communities worldwide will contribute to an understanding of globalization in general, its gendered nature and its failure as a basis for sustainable development in human or ecological terms (2005:18).

The gender and fisheries literature has primarily focused on community or nation specific studies and this has resulted in a significant gap in research on areas including the Arctic. Why is adopting a regional approach to research on the roles and experiences of women in fisheries relevant or even necessary? A regional approach facilitates the comparing and contrasting of experiences across geopolitical boundaries. In the case of the circumpolar North, this is critical in regards to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in general, and Indigenous women
in particular. It is clear that in any country with a significant Indigenous population, national comparisons between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples are meaningless. Statistics regarding health, education, income level and unemployment, amongst other factors, vary significantly. While each Indigenous group represents a separate nation and identity, it can be argued that sharing common cultural values, similar attitudes toward natural resources (including fisheries) and the challenges of navigating between traditional and Western-based knowledge systems, would be far more valuable. This is evident in the chapters that follow.

Contributors to the book were solicited through academic institutions throughout the Circumpolar North; Indigenous organizations, various relevant list servers addressing fisheries and/or Arctic issues and professional contacts. Although Indigenous involvement was strongly encouraged, few Indigenous individuals submitted manuscripts. All contributors were affiliated with universities or research institutes at the time of submission and the book primarily reflects these interests.

The first section of the volume focuses on gendered participation in subsistence and commercial activities related to the fisheries, including case studies from Nunavut in Canada, Alaska in the United States, and Iceland. Both Reedy-Maschner, and Mulle and Anahita investigate the roles of Indigenous women in Alaska. In ‘Chercher les Poissons,’ Reedy-Maschner explores how the sexual division of labor influences fishing practices and relationships both at sea and in Aleut coastal communities. Mulle and Anahita’s chapter, entitled, ‘Without Fish, we Would no Longer Exist,’ addresses shifting patterns in the involvement of urban Native women Southeast Alaska in contemporary subsistence activities. Tyrrell and Shannon examine two different aspects of Inuit women’s economic participation in fisheries in Nunavut. In ‘It Used to be Women’s Work: Gender and Subsistence Fishing on the Hudson Bay Coast,’ Tyrrell considers gendered perceptions regarding the Arctic char fishery while in “Everyone Goes Fishing: Gender and Procurement in the Canadian Arctic,” Shannon focuses on differing participation of community members in fishing derbies as examples of vital procurement activities. In ‘Are Living Fish Better Than Dead Fillets? The invisibility and power of Icelandic women in aquaculture and the fishery economy,’ Karlsdottir presents women’s views on fisheries with an emphasis on gender and regional development. The last chapter of the first section, ‘Gender, Knowledge and Environmental Change Related to Humpback Whitefish in Interior Alaska,’ by Robinson, Morrow and Northway, investigates gendered knowledge in fisheries in the eastern interior of Alaska and how ongoing environmental change necessitates that the differing knowledge(s) of both women and men are critical for the sustainable management of natural resources.

The second section of the volume presents case studies in Norway, Sweden and Canada that explore differing governance practices. Gerrard’s chapter, “I Have Always Wanted to go Fishing”: Challenging Gender and Gender Perceptions in the
Quota-Oriented Small-Scale Fishery of Finnmark, Norway,’ applies a gender-based analysis to the impact of the quota system and other contemporary Norwegian fisheries policies on fishers in Finnmark, Norway. Two other chapters in this section focus on Sami fisheries in northern Norway. Helander-Renvall explores how Sea Sami women reclaimed power within the fisheries sector despite marginalization by Norwegian fisheries policies. In ‘Women in Sami Fisheries in Norway—Positions and Policies,’ Angell considers Sami women’s shifting involvement in fisheries due to the support and involvement of the Sami Parliament. Úden’s chapter entitled ‘Gender, Equality and Governance in Arctic Swedish Fisheries and Reindeer Herding’ is a comparative study regarding governance issues affecting Swedish women in both fisheries and reindeer herding. Kafarowski reviews Inuit women’s access to and participation in decision-making processes in fisheries in Nunavut, Canada. The concluding chapter of the book, ‘Gender, Human Security and Northern Fisheries,’ by Hoogenson, provides a preliminary exploration of the relevance of the human security concept to gender and fisheries.


Overview:

As other authors in this volume have demonstrated, the effects of resource development in the north are profound and complex. In this chapter, we review the literature that explores how these effects are gendered. Although gender has not always taken a central place in northern research, indigenous women across Canada’s north have often voiced their concerns over development through reports and submissions to Environmental Assessment (EA) processes. Women from remote communities in the Northwest Territories (NWT), for example, expressed their concerns in a response submitted to the 1995 Environmental Impact Statement for a proposed diamond mine (Brockman & Argue, 1995). The women were concerned that the mine would increase alcohol and drug abuse and negatively affect family and community life. The submission also asked that the company address the additional barriers that women would face accessing employment benefits, compared to men. These included not having access to childcare, being typecast into lower paying traditional jobs, and being unable to accept work that involves long distance commuting because of their childcare responsibilities. A few years later, the Tongamiut Inuit Annait (TIA), an organization representing Inuit women in northern Labrador, made several submissions to the Voisey’s Bay nickel mine/mill and smelter project Environmental Assessment Panel. In addition to asking that the proponent attend to the gendered impacts of development, the TIA made a number of recommendations concerning gender and governance. In 1998, the TIA organized a workshop which gathered Inuit women to examine the EA and land
claim processes and they suggested that EA and land claim policies and processes adopt gender sensitive methodologies, that funding should be provided to Aboriginal women’s groups, and that they ensure equal representation of Aboriginal women on all institutions pursuant to land claims (Archibald & Crnkovich 1999). Many of the concerns raised by women in these earlier assessments are still relevant. More recently, in 2011, the Mokami Status of Women Council filed a response to the EA statement for the Lower Churchill Hydro Development in Labrador which outlined how the proponent did not adopt a feminist methodology, that the company failed to set detailed targets for the training and hiring of women and that the Environmental Impact Statement did not provide adequate information about child care, housing, and response to alcohol and drug abuse (Hallett & Baikie, 2011).

Despite the important roles that Aboriginal women have played in the politics of resource development, however, gender has often been assigned peripheral status in academic research on northern resource development. This may be a product of the masculine nature of resource industries or of the divide between the community-centered perspectives of Aboriginal women and those of white feminist movements who have tended to prioritize individual emancipation. The limited literature that does exist suggests that the perspectives of Aboriginal women can offer crucial insight into how northern economies and cultures are changing as a result of resource industry growth. There are many indications that resource development is profoundly re-shaping gender relations in northern communities, altering the flow of wealth through families and kin networks, the status and power relations between women and men, and social and cultural practices and beliefs. In this chapter, we suggest that adopting a gendered lens that extends beyond the study of indigenous women is critical to understanding the flows of wealth to, and the social and cultural changes within northern communities.

Our overview encompasses literature on northern resource development and gender relations in the Arctic since the 1980s. Although we focus on Canada’s north, because the literature is limited, we also draw on sources that examine the gendered impacts of resource development in other regions. Although we adopt a constructivist understanding of gender, seeing gender as a range of attributes associated with the categories ‘women’ and ‘men’ that are culturally specific and that change over time, we are cognizant that much of the literature pertaining to gender focuses on Aboriginal women and their relations with men. The review therefore focuses more narrowly on Aboriginal women and resource development despite our intentions to adopt a broad perspective on gender relations. We divide the literature on gender and resource development into three perspectives: economic perspectives focused on patterns of wealth distribution; socio-cultural perspectives that describe the impacts of resource development for gender relations in the community and family and political perspectives examining how resource development influences the role of women in resource and community governance. Of these three areas, the socio-cultural impacts of resource development on
northern Aboriginal women are the best documented, however there are important linkages between economy, governance and social and cultural implications that have been overlooked.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

**Conclusions and areas for future research**

The research on gender and resource development is varied but displays some trends. Overall, there remain many knowledge gaps. Most studies have adopted a case study methodology and focus on Aboriginal women rather than on a more complex understanding of gender relations. Furthermore, much of the research does not draw connections between economic, social, cultural and governance spheres. We therefore make several recommendations.

To increase the generalizability of research across the north we see a strong impetus for comparative research and for the use of multiple methods, such as the inclusion of some statistical analysis. Second, we feel that the absence of a more critical understanding of gender constitutes a significant research gap. We feel that a more nuanced approach is necessary to understand the complexity of community change resulting from resource development. Finally, a systematic investigation of the gendered dimensions of social and cultural life in northern Canada has yet to be undertaken, let alone one that considers the ways in which gender intersects with resource extraction industries. Such an investigation would need to be sensitive not just to women, but to men and masculinity, and would account for the complex, intersecting importance of gender, Indigeneity, colonization, sexuality and class. It would also involve a critical examination of taken-for-granted understandings of the gendered dimensions of Indigenous community life, many of which are based on outdated (and thoroughly gendered) anthropological scholarship. We hope that this research can help to link resource development with gendered dimensions of social suffering in the north (which are not currently well explained or linked to economic change), such as high male suicide rates and high school dropout rates.

J. Inuit (Inuvialuit/Kalaallit/Inupiat) [Canada/Denmark-Greenland/US-Alaska]:


**Overview:**

The Inuit people of the world are a group of culturally similar Indigenous Peoples who live in the Arctic regions of Canada, Denmark, Russia and the United States.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

In Canada, the Inuit primarily live in Nunavut, the northern third of Quebec, the coastal region of Labrador, and in pockets in the Northwest Territories (primarily on the coast of the Arctic Ocean), and formerly in the Yukon. These areas are
collectively referred to as Inuit Nunangat. The Inuit People were recognized in the Constitution Act of 1982 as a distinctive group of Canadian Aboriginals who are neither First Nations nor Métis.

The constituency of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, a United Nations recognized organization, includes Canada’s Inuit and Inuvialuit (Inuit People who live in the western Canadian Arctic region), Greenland’s Kalaallit Inuit, Alaska’s Inupiat and Yup’ik People and the Siberian Yupik People.

As an aside to your interest in knowing more about the Inuit, be aware that the Yupik People of Alaska and Siberia do not consider themselves to be Inuit and prefer to be known as the Yup’ik, Yupiit or Eskimo, whereas in Canada and Greenland, the term “Eskimo” is considered derogatory.

“Eskimo,” New World Encyclopedia [92]
[92] https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Eskimo

Overview:

Eskimos or Esquimaux is a term referring to aboriginal people who, together with the related Aleuts, inhabit the circumpolar region, excluding Scandinavia and most of Russia, but including the easternmost portions of Siberia. They are culturally and biologically distinguishable from other Native Americans in the United States and Canada. There are two main groups of Eskimos: the Inuit of northern Alaska, Canada, and Greenland, and the Yupik, comprising speakers of four distinct Yupik languages and originating in western Alaska, in South Central Alaska along the Gulf of Alaska coast, and in the Russian Far East. The term "Eskimo" is not acceptable to those of Canada, who prefer Inuit or those of Greenland who refer to themselves as Kalaallit; however, these terms are not appropriate for the Yupik, whose language and ethnicity is distinct from the Inuit. The Aleut culture developed separately from the Inuit around 4,000 years ago.

Although spread over a vast geographical area, there are many commonalities among the different Inuit and Yupik groups. Of particular note are their shamanistic beliefs and practices, although these have all but died out in recent times. Contemporary Eskimo generally live in settled communities with modern technology and houses instead of the traditional igloos, and have come to accept employment and other changes to their lifestyle although they continue to be self-sufficient through their hunting and fishing. The harsh climate still determines much about their lives, and they must maintain a balance between those traditions that have supported them well for generations and changes brought through contact with other cultures.

Current & Relevant Information:

Terminology
The term Eskimo is broadly inclusive of the two major groups, the Inuit—including the Kalaallit (Greenlanders) of Greenland, Inuit and Inuinnaqtuq of Canada, and Inupiat of northern Alaska—and the Yupik peoples—the Naukan of Siberia, the Yupik of Siberia in Russia and St. Lawrence Island in Alaska, the Yup’ik of Alaska, and the Alutiiq (Sug’piak or Pacific Eskimo) of southcentral Alaska. The anthropologist Thomas Huxley in On the Methods and Results of Ethnology (1865) defined the "Esquimaux race" to be the indigenous peoples in the Arctic region of northern Canada and Alaska. He described them to "certainly present a new stock" (different from the other indigenous peoples of North America). He described them to have straight black hair, dull skin complexion, short and squat, with high cheek bones and long skulls.

However, in Canada and Greenland, Eskimo is widely considered pejorative and offensive, and has been replaced overall by Inuit. The preferred term in Canada's Central Arctic is Inuinnaqtuq, and in the eastern Canadian Arctic Inuit. The language is often called Inuktitut, though other local designations are also used. The Inuit of Greenland refer to themselves as Greenlanders or, in their own language, Kalaallit, and to their language as Greenlandic or Kalaallisut.

Because of the linguistic, ethnic, and cultural differences between Yupik and Inuit languages and peoples, there is still uncertainty as to what term encompassing all Yupik and Inuit people will be acceptable to all. There has been some movement to use Inuit as a term encompassing all peoples formerly described as Eskimo, Inuit and Yupik alike. Strictly speaking, however, Inuit does not refer to the Yupik peoples or languages of Alaska and Siberia. This is because the Yupik languages are linguistically distinct from the Inupiaq and other Inuit languages, and the peoples are ethnically and culturally distinct as well. The word Inuit does not occur in the Yupik languages of Alaska and Siberia.

“The Inuit Case Study,” Ana Nunez, Human Rights and Climate Change [93]
https://www.ciel.org/Publications/Inuit_CaseStudy_Sep07.pdf

Overview:

The Inuit, indigenous people inhabiting the Arctic region of Canada, Alaska, Greenland and Russia, share a unique heritage, culture, and homeland. Transported by dog teams, finding temporary shelter in igloos, and warming up with furry karpas, Inuit inhabit one of the most isolated and harsh lands on Earth. The warming of temperatures over the last 30 years has resulted in major changes to their ancestral land and consequently, their livelihoods. United into a major human rights movement with wide international support, the Inuit are currently fighting to defend their right to live and conserve a land that is literally melting under their feet.

Current & Relevant Information:

The Inuit
The more than 155,000 Inuit people located in the Northern Polar Region have successfully managed to balance their traditional practices and modern life. The economy of the region is based largely on natural resources, from oil and gas to fish, caribou, and whales. Tourism is also a growing source of income and the public sector, including the military, employs a wide part of the population in the area.

In addition to the cash economy, traditional subsistence through hunting and fishing represents a main source of income for the Inuit and contributes greatly to their overall well-being.

“Crossroads of Continents and Modern Boundaries: An Introduction to Inuit and Chukchi Experiences in the Bering Strait, Beaufort Sea, and Baffin Bay,” Henry P. Huntington, et al., MDPI, 24 June 2020 [94]

Abstract:

The homeland of Inuit extends from Asia and the Bering Sea to Greenland and the Atlantic Ocean. Inuit and their Chukchi neighbors have always been highly mobile, but the imposition of three international borders in the region constrained travel, trade, hunting, and resource stewardship among neighboring groups. Colonization, assimilation, and enforcement of national laws further separated those even from the same family. In recent decades, Inuit and Chukchi have re-established many ties across those boundaries, making it easier to travel and trade with one another and to create new institutions of environmental management. To introduce Indigenous perspectives into the discussion of transboundary maritime water connections in the Arctic, this paper presents personal descriptions of what those connections mean to people who live and work along and across each of the national frontiers within the region: Russia–U.S., U.S.–Canada, and Canada–Greenland. Some of these connections have been made in cooperation with national governments, some in the absence of government activity, and some despite opposition from national governments. In all cases, the shared culture of the region has provided a common foundation for a shared vision and commitment to cooperation and the resumption of Indigenous self-determination within their homelands.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

Inuit are predominantly a maritime people whose homeland reaches from the Asian coast of the Bering and Chukchi seas across the northern waters of North America to the Atlantic shores of eastern Greenland. Some of their Asian neighbors, the Chukchi, also hunt and fish in the sea, extending the boundaries of shared cultural
practices. From time immemorial, Inuit and Chukchi have traveled on water and ice throughout this region, to hunt, fish, socialize, and trade.

Their interactions have included neighboring peoples such as Koryak, Athabascan, Aleut, Dene, Cree, and Innu. Inuit themselves comprise several distinctive language groups, including Yup’ik, Cupik, Siberian Yupik, Inupiaq, Inuvialuit, Inuit, Inughuit, Kalaallit, Tunumiut, and others. These groups share a common language family as well as maritime hunting practices and a high degree of mobility on land and sea. The Chukchi include maritime hunters as well as inland reindeer herders, an unusual combination in the Arctic part of Russia.

Gender Roles:

“Melting Snow: The changing roles of Iqaluit women in family, work and society,” Mathilde Matthijsse, Durham University, 2010 [95]  https://core.ac.uk/reader/85308

Abstract:

My thesis is a detailed anthropological study of the experiences of women as a result of their changing gender roles in Inuit families, in the labor market and in Inuit society more broadly. Although McElroy reported as early as 1975 that ‘a higher percentage of the total population of women than of men are employed [in Frobisher Bay and Pangnirtung]’ (McElroy 1975:679) the effects of this have never been systematically researched. This thesis is the first to use theoretical constructs from Bourdieu’s toolkit, including the capitals (social, cultural, symbolic), the habitus and the cultural arbitrary as well as theories of empowerment, to analyze how women have constructed and negotiated meaning in their new roles as financial provider for their families. It draws on data collected during ten months of fieldwork in Iqaluit, Canada, using a mix of qualitative methods including in-depth interviews, group discussions and participant observation.

My findings show that different ideologies, values, ways of life and habitus shape and are shaped by life experiences of women in contemporary Iqaluit. These differences find their basis in women’s upbringing, ranging from traditional, to transitional, to contemporary; women’s experiences with education; and their interactions with incoming institutions with different cultural origins. Social negotiations characterize the process in which women create roles and identities for themselves, combining these different influences. Women’s access to financial and cultural capital in some cases impacts on and is a consequence of women’s empowerment, and their ability to challenge the cultural arbitrary. However, whilst empowerment is generally seen as a positive development, it can upset the balance between partners or other family members, who may struggle to appropriate economic, cultural and social change to the same extent. For that reason, it is important that the people of Nunavut, both men and women, work together to create for themselves a place in their family, community and society in which they can provide a meaningful contribution.
Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

My thesis is a detailed anthropological study of the experiences of women as a result of their changing gender roles in Inuit families, in the labor market and in Inuit society more broadly. It is based on data collected during ten months of fieldwork in Iqaluit, Canada, using a mix of qualitative methods including in-depth interviews, group discussions and participant observation. Iqaluit is a very suitable place to study these changes, as it is a modern place, it ‘continues to grow more cosmopolitan every year’ (Searles 2001:123) and, as it is used as a base for many institutions, it has many employments and educational opportunities on offer. ‘Iqaluit is a cultural and ethnic crossroads; it is an excellent place to study how ‘cultural difference’ is experienced daily’ (ibid). It is a place where the tension between modern and tradition is strongest; where tensions between home and work are negotiated; where people struggle to give meaning to the tension between Inuit-ness and Canadian-ness; between aboriginality and economic development and cultural and economic survival and where people make difficult decisions about whether survival in the modern world must necessarily mean loss of traditional aspects of life.

From Jenness’ visit in the 1920s, the Inuit were already adapting to money and wage labor (Jenness 1961 [1928]:vi), which created dependencies on outsiders for (hunting) implements and other products (Freeman, Bogoslovskaya et al. 1998:72). This steadily continued with men entering wage employment, mostly construction, between 1940 and 1970 and women taking up employment more regularly from the 1970s onwards (Bodenhorn 1990:61; Minor 2002:65; Sprott 2002:92). Access to wages has been argued to decrease interdependence of family members (Chance 1990:110; Condon and Stern 1993:395) and, reportedly, wages were not shared in the same way as subsistence resources were (Mitchell 1996:131; Briggs 2000:115). In the 1970s McElroy observed in Frobisher Bay (which was to change its name back to Iqaluit in 1987) and Pangnirtung, that male and female children were channeled ‘into somewhat separate directions’, with the emphasis for boys on learning hunting skills, and for the girls of wage employment, further education and upward mobility (McElroy 1975:682). In contemporary times this trend has been internalized to such an extent that young women at the age of 20 are seen as ‘turn[ing] their time and energies to the responsibilities of work and child-care’ in Holman (Condon 1995:59); in Alaska ‘women are more apt to pursue wage work for which formal education is important’ (Kleinfeld and Andrews 2006:113); and –again in Alaska, but this is also the opinion of some of the women I spoke with –office bound, desk jobs are not seen as suitable for Inupiat masculine roles (Wexler 2006:2943).

Inuit men have a strong desire to maintain (at least partly) a subsistence life-style (McElroy 1975:683; Myers and Forrest 2001:140; Chabot 2003:30; Boul 2006:28); however, the cost of purchase and maintenance of hunting equipment is prohibitive
As a result, gender and family roles have been reassessed, with families pooling resources from both wage and subsistence economies (see Bodenhorn 1993 in Alaska:192; and Hovelsrud-Broda 2000 in Greenland:193; Wenzel 2000 in Nunavut:70). In some cases, however, waged family members are obliged to share more than they can afford, thus putting them at a disadvantage, and in most cases reported this concerns younger female family members (Wenzel 2000:70).

In this thesis I will explore the effects of these changes using a number of theoretical constructs from Bourdieu’s analytical ‘toolkit’. I will draw on the concept of the different capitals, including cultural capital, or certain kinds of knowledge seen as being legitimate by the dominant in a society; social capital which enables access to resources through a durable network of relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition which also create obligations; and symbolic capital which ‘is nothing other than economic or cultural capital when it is known and recognized’ (Bourdieu 1989: 21, see also Bourdieu 1986:49; Webb, Schirato et al. 2002:97; Bourdieu 2002 [1972]:36; Jenkins 2003:107). The second concept I will use is the habitus, which is a largely unconscious set of rules, values and dispositions which is constituted by and therefore adjusted to particular conditions. The habitus is acquired through socialization and personal development and is considered natural and self-evident to the individuals sharing it and it enables the individual to act appropriately in certain circumstances (Bourdieu 2002 [1972]:78). Finally, the reproduction of the cultural arbitrary, emphasizes the arbitrariness of any political, social, economic or power system in any society, whilst most people in any given society take these systems as natural and logical. Because certain kinds of cultural capital are valued by the dominant, and the dominant socialize their children in such a way that they will possess the necessary cultural capital and the necessary habitus to succeed in reaching dominant positions in society, the arbitrary reality which determines that certain people should dominate others is reproduced. At the same time, people who are dominated, do not have the means to accumulate the cultural capital necessary to be successful in powerful positions. They are not raised in the habitus that would enable them to move naturally into a position of power and they therefore not only fail to change the cultural arbitrary, in fact they perceive the world order as natural and inevitable just as the dominating, and see themselves as unfit for powerful positions in society. They thus consider as natural the cultural arbitrary, without questioning its legitimacy (Bourdieu, Wacquant et al. 1994:8; Bourdieu 2002 [1972]:89). These concepts have great explanatory power in analyzing people’s actions and reasons for actions.

However, since gender and change are central in this thesis, and since Bourdieu’s concepts fall short of enabling full analysis of social change and gender (McCall 1992; Joppke 2000; Moi 2000; Throop and Murphy 2002; Jenkins 2003), I will also use empowerment theory to analyze how women have constructed and negotiated meaning in their new role as financial provider for their families. Empowerment
theory is pertinent and relevant in the context of Nunavut, as its creation is an attempt of the Inuit of the eastern Arctic to determine their own lives and future, it also enables analysis of unequal power relations and resistance against dominant ideologies.

The women I spoke with are both influenced by different ideologies, values and ways of life, and in turn they themselves also influence them. Women’s outlook on life has been shaped in part by their experiences in childhood and the way and context of their upbringing. The women I spoke with have also had varied experiences with schooling and the education system as well as with other institutions, whether traditional or contemporary; this has had a differential impact on their lives and on how they create a role for themselves in their families or in society. Some women have been able to create a strong role and identity for themselves, some in so doing have challenged traditional expectations, which in turn has enabled others to do likewise. Others have used knowledge gained to challenge the cultural arbitrary in more systematic ways, in an attempt to create a more culturally sensitive Nunavut society. At the same time, this process of individual enrichment can cause tension in the home, when a woman is not supported by other members of her family to do so. It is therefore important for Inuit women to create a balance between the different influences, ideologies and ways of life. It is also clear that Inuit women will need the help and support of Inuit men, so that men and women together can establish this balanced society.

The experiences of Inuit women in contemporary Nunavut society will be presented by introducing the researcher, the project and the methods in the next chapter. After this, I will set out the theoretical framework in more detail in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 takes a critical and detailed look at the historical context and the anthropological history of the Arctic, which provide the context within which to study contemporary lives and processes in the Arctic. This is followed by four ethnographical chapters. Here I will present my data on growing up, socialization and parenting in Inuit families, exploring the question of how ideas about socialization and parenting have changed and how this has influenced the lives of different women and the decisions they make (Chapter 5). I will discuss family dynamics, ideologies and social change in contemporary Inuit society and in so doing I investigate to what extent relationships influence the positions Inuit women can occupy and the decisions Inuit women can make as well as the expectations household members, kin and society have from Inuit women in general and working Inuit women in particular (Chapter 6). The next chapter (Chapter 7) deals with ideologies and meanings attached to working and learning for the different genders, examining how the changes in Inuit society are experienced by the different genders. Finally, in the last chapter I look into empowering processes, and contemporary conflict regarding education and authority (Chapter 8) in order to establish to what extent Inuit women have been able to empower themselves, how this has changed their self-image and what role Inuit women today play in creating a new, meaningful Inuit society.

Overview:

The Inuit had strong gender roles but those rules were not set in stone. The women are generally domestic and did work such as cooking, cleaning, sewing and looking after children. While the men were usually the hunters, fishers and gatherers. Although these were the principal jobs they were not set in stone. There were some women who were forced to hunt either out of personal choice or necessity. And while the men were away hunting, they were expected to know how to cook and sew.


Overview:

Claudia Nussbaumer continues her series, ‘Gender roles in indigenous communities,’ this week looking at Inuit communities of Greenland, Canada and Alaska.

The Inuit (meaning, ‘the people’) are a large group of culturally similar communities living in the Arctic regions of Greenland, Canada, and Alaska. The total population is around 150,000.

There are four aspects, which are markers for social hierarchy in traditional Inuit culture: The community as a whole, leadership, gender and marital relationships and the relationship between the Inuit and the people of Canada.

Current & Relevant Information:

As Inuit people hold their traditions in high regard, elders play a crucial role within the Inuit community. They are thought to be the best source of knowledge when it comes to practices and teachings. Women and men alike are recognized as elders. Elders are not literally regarded as leaders of the community, yet their philosophy is the foundation of Inuit society.

Those chosen to lead are elected on the basis of their ability to communicate the elders’ teachings to the entire community. They act merely as spokespersons rather than decision makers. Inuit society is very communal and governing is regulated by consensus. There is no obligation to obey the decisions made by leaders, though most of the time they are respected as they have the elders’ blessing and the best interests of the community in mind.
Modern conceptions of gender often experience tension with more traditional practices, long considered the norm within Inuit communities. Traditionally, men would be in charge of hunting and gathering, leaving women to bear the brunt of household decisions. Men and women were divided and tasked with gendered roles for the continuance of society. While men would engage in the hunt itself, women would look after the men when they returned, sewing their clothes from the animal skins, cooking meals and performing other tasks vital to survival. Women were, however, free to learn traditionally male skills.

With government-led forced resettlement, traditional Inuit society underwent a radical change. Inuit communities stopped living in camps and started living in more ‘modern’ communities where hunting became less important for survival. Modern wage-jobs became the norm and consequently, had a major effect on gender roles. Women entered the workforce and were empowered through doing so. This change grated with traditional practices of gender that Inuit society had long practiced.

Women have become, in many cases, the primary provider within their families. However, working a wage job whilst looking after children and doing domestic housework is a ‘double burden’ for many women. The opinion of many women is that their traditional social roles should be modified to reflect their changing society, and it should be recognized that these roles often limit the power of women within their communities. The ideas of equality pose potential conflicts with the communitarian ideas of Inuit society, especially as older generations are more likely to conform to the traditional values.

“Inuit,” J. Sydney Jones, Countries and their Cultures [98]
https://www.everyculture.com/multi/Ha-La/Inuit.html

Overview:

Once known as Eskimos, the Inuit inhabit the Arctic region, one of the most forbidding territories on earth. Occupying lands that stretch 12,000 miles from parts of Siberia, along the Alaskan coast, across Canada, and on to Greenland, the Inuit are one of the most widely dispersed people in the world, but number only about 60,000 in population. Between 25,000 and 35,000 reside in Alaska, with other smaller groups in Canada, Greenland, and Siberia. The name Eskimo was given to these people by neighboring Abnaki Indians and means "eaters of raw flesh." The name they call themselves is Inuit, or "the people." Culturally and linguistically distinct from Native Americans of the lower 48 states, as well as from the Athabaskan people of Alaska, the Inuit are closely related to the Mongoloid peoples of eastern Asia. It is estimated that the Inuit arrived some 4,000 years ago on the North American continent, thus coming much later than other indigenous peoples. The major language family for Arctic peoples is Eskaleut. While Aleut is considered a separate language, Eskimo branches into Inuit and Yup'ik. Yup'ik includes several languages, while Inuit is a separate tongue with several local dialects, including
Inupiaq (Alaska), Inuktitut (Eastern Canada), and Kalaallisut (Greenland). Throughout their long history and vast migrations, the Inuit have not been greatly influenced by other Indian cultures. Their use and array of tools, their spoken language, and their physical type have changed little over large periods of time and space.

Alaskan Inuit inhabit the west, southwest, and the far north and northwest of Alaska, comprising the Alutiiq, Yup’ik (or Yupiat), and Inupiat tribes. As the first two tribes are dealt with separately, this essay will focus on that group regionally known as Inupiat, and formerly known as Bering Strait or Kotzebue Sound Eskimos, and even sometimes West Alaskan and North Alaskan Eskimos. Residing in some three dozen villages and towns—including Kotzebue, Point Hope, Wainwright, Barrow, and Prudhoe Bay—between the Bering Strait and the McKenzie Delta to the east, and occupying some 40,000 square miles above the Arctic Circle, this group has been divided differently by various anthropologists. Some classify the Inuit into two main groups, the inland people or Nunamiut, and the coastal people, the Tagiugmiut. Ernest S. Burch, Jr., however, in his book The Inupiaq Eskimo Nations of Northwestern Alaska, divides the heartland, or original southerly Inupiat, who settled around Kotzebue Sound and the Chukchi Sea, into 12 distinct tribes or nations. This early “homeland” of the Inupiat, around Kotzebue Sound, was extended as the tribes eventually moved farther north. Over 40 percent of Alaskan Inuit now reside in urban areas, with Anchorage having the highest population, and Nome on the south of the Seward Peninsula also having a large group of Inupiat as well as Yup’ik. Within Inupiat territory, the main population centers are Barrow and Kotzebue.

Current & Relevant Information:

Family and Community Dynamics

Local groups were formed by nuclear and small extended families led by an umialik, or family head, usually an older man. The umialik might lead hunting expeditions, and he and his wife would be responsible for the distribution of food. Beyond that, however, there was little control exerted on proper behavior in traditional Inuit society. Villages throughout northern Alaska have replaced hunting bands, thus preserving to some extent the fluid network of their traditional society.

The Role of Women

There is still a recognized division of labor by gender, but it is a fluid one. In traditional societies, the men hunted, while the women tanned skins and made clothing and generally took care of domestic activities, and this occurred under the aegis of the extended family. In the modern era much of this has changed, but in general, outside employment is still the obligation of the male as well as any ancillary hunting activities necessary to help make ends meet. Women are, for the most part, confined to household tasks.
Courtship and Marriage

In the past, marriages were often arranged by parents; however, today dating openly occurs between teens. Group activities take precedence over individual dating. In traditional times, the most successful hunter could take more than one wife, though this was uncommon. Also, in the past, temporary marriages served to bond non-kin allegiances formed for hunting and or warfare. Married couples traditionally set up their home with the man's parents for a time. Plumpness in a wife was a virtue, a sign of health and wealth. While divorce was, and is practiced in both traditional and modern Inuit societies, its incidence is not as high as in mainstream American society.

“Inuit gender parity and why it was not accepted in the Nunavut legislature,” Laakkuluk Jessen Williamson, Etudes Inuit Studies, 1 August 2007 [99]

Abstract:

In this article, the historical circumstances that led up to the 1997 non-binding plebiscite on gender parity in what was soon-to-be Nunavut are considered. Firstly, traditional gender egalitarianism and fluidity in Inuit culture are described and exemplified by the values instilled in language, naming system, gendered roles and sexuality. Then, the political circumstances around the establishment of Nunavut and the way gender is played out on a political level are taken into account. The barriers against women in the electoral system are analyzed and the arguments made for and against creating gender parity are evaluated. The vote on gender parity and the reasons why gender parity was finally rejected are reflected on. In the second part, the manners in which various organizations outside of government interact in order to address gender issues are scrutinized. Political and artistic bodies that represent women within Nunavut are contrasted against an organization that contains Inuit men's voices, but does not represent them. Paradoxically, Inuit men still garner far more representation in the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut while at the social level they suffer more than women who are themselves more economically stable. The article ends with a discussion on the future of gender issues in Nunavut including the views held amongst Inuit youth on the topic.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

In 1997, the Nunavut Implementation Committee suggested that a two-member constituency system should be instituted in Nunavut’s future electoral process, allowing for one woman and one man to be elected from each constituency (Nunavut Implementation Commission 1995). The issue was put to a non-binding plebiscite and was voted down by 57% (Dahl 1997). In 1999, Nunavut was established as a one-member constituency system, with 19 constituencies and no
gender guidelines (ibid.). Only two women were elected in 2004 (Elections Nunavut 2004).

The possibility of gender parity within the Nunavut Legislature has been an interesting debate in the establishment of a modern indigenous authority. Whereas Inuit once led a nomadic life based on egalitarian principles and close-knit family, modern Inuit have undergone a tremendous amount of change in the past 50 years to become an emerging political power. Nunavut’s government intends to work toward combining Western political infrastructure with traditional knowledge. It reflects how “Inuit have had to adapt their beliefs and behaviors relating to governance, while at the same time attempting to adjust them to suit their needs” (Gombay 2000: 136). This paper argues that gender parity would have been a concise representation of the intersection of Inuit egalitarianism with a Western electoral system.


Overview:

At a time when western societies seem to have lost their markers, once found in sexual life, in gender relationships, in the sexual division of tasks, in standard definitions of the individual and the person, of family and kin, at a time, too, when they are bending under the weight of an exponential build-up of texts, theories and scientific discoveries, as ephemeral as they are brilliant, in the life sciences as well as in history, it is good to take time out to go and examine an indigenous society which, only fifty years ago, was still living from hunting, trapping, fishing and gathering. The people in this instance are the Inuit (as they name themselves, literally meaning: ‘the real humans’).

This society, which apparently retains no history and draws its knowledge from oral traditions handed down by the elders, as well as from experience of the natural world gained during childhood and adolescence under the attentive direction of the adults of the group, has derived and put into practice a theory of the individual and the person, of sex and of gender, of kinship and family, which is still capable of astonishing and instructing us.

One hundred years ago, Michel Mauss, the founding father of French anthropology, devoted a two-year course at the École Pratique des Hautes Études (5th section, Sciences of Religion) to the social structures of the Inuit. From their example, though without ever having studied them in the field, he had come to the conclusion that the life of all societies oscillates between two poles, an individualist pole and a ‘communist’ pole (in the sense that this term was still being given at the beginning of the 20th century); he postulated that this dualism, articulated around the dualism of
the seasons, marked the totality of the social, economic and religious life of a people. What he did not perceive was that behind this dualism was hidden another, the dualism of the sexes, which served as the conceptual framework for all the rest. The state of knowledge was insufficient at that time to allow this latter aspect to emerge. What Mauss had not been able to detect either, was that this dualism which he had uncovered was in fact integrated into a threefold system, involving a third element which straddled the boundary between the two others and fulfilled a mediatory function between them. It is this third element which I propose to designate by the expression ‘the third gender’.

Nevertheless, certain of Mauss’s anthropologist contemporaries such as Frazer (1907) or Marett (1914) had realized that ‘religious transvestism’ and ‘change of sex’ had a mediatory function on the religious plane. Sternberg (1925) would give further support to this explanation some years later, but two major theories were soon to obscure it. On the one hand, Marxism, based on its evolutionist presuppositions, saw in this adoption of cross-gender dress a residue of the primitive matriarchal social order (a theory now regarded as obsolete). On the other, Freudianism, which also carried evolutionist presuppositions, had difficulty in conceptualizing sexuality as anything other than a dualism, and in particular of thinking of social sex (or gender) functions apart from through the conceptual framework of sexuality. And this despite efforts made by Freudian dissidents like Jung who reconfigured the question by projecting that the duality was found within each individual (animus/anima).

But let’s return to the Inuit, and to a brief initial review of certain myths, beliefs, rituals and practices which mutually establish fields of meaning, as through an interplay of mirror images. In this I will be relying on my own research undertaken since the middle of the 1950s in the central Canadian Arctic (Nunavik and Nunavut), on my discussions with Alaskan Inuit, and on other data drawn from the ethnological literature.

Current & Relevant Information:

**The third gender of the Inuit**

We have with this second myth a type of echo of the previous myth, but within a female mode. Each after their own fashion, the two main characters straddle the gender boundary and engage in a mediatory role which is inaccessible to ordinary people: Itijuaq as mediator between Naarjuk, the spirit of the surrounding air, the force of the universe and of life, and the unwell bodies of humans; the ‘strange man’ as mediator between the hunters and their principal prey, the Arctic whale. Both characters express different but complementary aspects of Inuit shamanism.

Furthermore, in real life it was not rare for a male shaman to take a female shaman for a wife; and the Inuit had understood that a boy with female gender-identity was the ideal companion for a girl with male gender-identity. In such cases they strove to
pair them up by betrothing them to each other from the birth of the baby girl, retaining an age difference of two to three years.

Dressing these children in opposite-sex clothing lasted normally until puberty. It was then time for the boy to shed his plaits and his female garments and kill his first large prey. For the girl, as soon as her menstrual flow appeared, she had to take on female clothes again, have her face and part of her body tattooed and prepare herself for domestic life as a wife and mother. This transition created genuine crises of identity, which opened the way for the emergence of a shamanic vocation. At all events, the personalities of the two adolescents remained marked for life by their previous social gender reversal. They would remain in fact still symbolically cross-gendered, even if not openly, through the kinship terms that they continued to be called by and which were those that in the past had been used for their deceased namesakes of the opposite sex.

K. Khanty [Russia]:

“Khanty and Mansi: People,” Britannica, 5 June 2020 [101]
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Khanty

Overview:

Khanty and Mansi, Khanty formerly called Ostyak, Mansi formerly called Vogul, western Siberian peoples, living mainly in the Ob River basin of central Russia. They each speak an Ob-Ugric language of the Finno-Ugric branch of the Uralic languages. Together they numbered some 30,000 in the late 20th century. They are descended from people from the south Ural steppe who moved into this region about the middle of the 1st millennium AD.

Their present-day territory lies to the east of the Urals along the Ob River and its tributaries, from the Urals and a narrow belt of foothills to a vast central lowland that slopes gently to the Gulf of Ob. Some of the territory, both highlands and lowlands, is covered by vast swamps grown over with moss, peat, sedge, and small marsh pine. The climate is severe: winter lasts for six months, producing snow accumulations of 6.5 feet (2 m); there is flooding in summer as the rivers—the Ob, the Irtysh, and their tributaries—form a vast expanse of water.

Current & Relevant Information:

The Khanty and the Mansi have many similar features, including habitat, economy, organization, and a number of traditions. Their principal sources of subsistence are hunting (traditionally with bows and arrows and spears, later with guns), trapping, and fishing (with nets, weirs, seines, and traps); reindeer herding (mostly by the Khanty) was usually a subsidiary occupation and was probably a result of contact with the neighboring Nenets in the 15th century. The Ob-Ugrians traditionally either were nomadic or had settled dwellings according to their subsistence pattern. At summer hunting sites they generally lived in tents; their permanent winter homes
were wooden huts. Boats, skis, and some horse- or reindeer-drawn sleds provided transportation.

The Khanty and the Mansi were formerly divided into tribes consisting of local territorial groupings. Each individual, regardless of tribe, belonged to one of two phratries and was expected to marry outside his phratry. A phratry consisted of several clans, each with a name or names of an ancestor or ancestor hero, a sign or brand to identify clan property, internal organization, an ancestor cult, and a sacred site.

Of all the peoples of northern Siberia, only the Khanty and Mansi had stringed instruments: a type of five-stringed zither and a one- or two-stringed, bowed instrument (its bow made like a small archer’s bow strung with horsehair). The strings of both types were made from elk sinews.

Under Soviet administration the Khanty and the Mansi were settled on collective farms. In addition to the development of the aboriginal economy, such new activities as animal husbandry, fur farming, and agriculture were introduced.

“Khanty,” Marjorie Balzer, Encyclopedia.com, 17 May 2024 [102]
https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/historians-miscellaneous-biographies/khanty

Overview:

The Khanty were called Ostyak” by Russians until the 1930s, when their name was changed officially to reflect their self-designation. They are closely related, culturally and politically, to their nearest neighbors, the Mansi, historically called "Voguls," with whom they share the Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous District (okrug) in western Siberia. The district was called a "national" area until the 1970s. An area of intense energy development, the Khanty homeland, once larger than its current boundaries, has been inundated by temporary workers, most of them Slavs. Other native minorities in the district include the Nenets and Selkup (Samoyed groups) and the Komi (historically, Zyrian). Khanty also live outside their district, mostly in nearby regions of western Siberia. They are one of twenty-six "Peoples of the North," designated as a special legal category.

The Khanty-Mansiisk District of the Tiumen Oblast is bordered by the Yamalo-Nenets District and the Komi Autonomous Republic to the northwest and the Sverdlovsk, Omsk, Tomsk, and Krasnoyarsk regions to the southwest and east. It stretches from 58° to 62° N and 60° to 85° E. Khanty live as far north as the Arctic Circle and the Gulf of Ob, and as far south as the Irtysh-Tavda confluence, although they are concentrated in the Samarovsk, Surgut, Lariak, Beriozovo, Vasiugan, and Kondinsk areas of the greater Ob River Basin. Their territory, inside and outside the Khanty-Mansiisk District, includes tundra and taiga, with foothills of the Ural Mountains and lowlands of the Ob River. Forests of cedar, pine, and larch abound
along its multiple rivers. When the thick snow cover melts each summer, extensive flooding occurs, turning the lowlands into swamps of moss, peat, and marsh pine. The extreme continental climate is characterized by temperatures as low as $-50^\circ$ C and as high as $+20^\circ$ C.

The 1989 Soviet census recorded a population of 147,386,000 for the Russian Republic, 187,083 for the Peoples of the North, and 22,500 for the Khanty. The Khanty-Mansiisk District had a population of 1,282,396 in 1989. Thus, the Khanty are a tiny minority within their district and within western Siberia. Their numbers have increased only slightly from the 20,934 recorded in 1979 and the 17,800 recorded in 1926. Although industrialization and urbanization have escalated around them in the last twenty years, most Khanty have remained in collectives away from large towns. Their infant mortality rates are high, and their life expectancy rates, especially for males, are low. The average northern native 1980s life expectancy was 45 for men and 55 for women. Interethnic marriage is common with other Siberian minorities, and, to a lesser extent, with Russians.

Current & Relevant Information:

The first documents to refer to the Khanty indicate they had relations with Novgorodian traders in the eleventh century. Linguistic, archaeological, and folkloric evidence indicate that nomadic ancestors of the Ob Ugrians, possibly fleeing Christianization, had come north by the ninth century from steppes farther south. Crossing the Urals, they mixed and fought with indigenous populations and may have developed their dual phratry (or moiety) social system at that time. Conflicts with ancestors of the Mansi, Komi, and Nenets resulted in captives, who were made wives, slaves, or sacrificial victims. The Khanty paid tribute to the Tatar Khanate of Sibir from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries.

In 1582 some Khanty decided to side with the famous Cossack Ermak against the Tatar Khan Kuchum. To the Cossack's joy, a delegation of Khanty elders bearing furs and wearing jewels and silk arrived in the Cossack camp. Ermak assumed that these elders were princes with greater authority than they actually had, but the alliance lasted long enough to defeat Kuchum. Both before and after, trade relations proceeded with mutual benefit and, sometimes, misunderstandings. Khanty paid what Muscovites and Novgorodians considered a fur tax, iasak, in return for gifts and trinkets that the Slavic traders saw as insignificant. Colonization followed Kuchum's defeat, although a few Khanty uprisings persisted into the seventeenth century. Some rebellions against Moscovite rule involved coalitions of Tatars, Samoyeds, and Ob Ugrians. In 1604 the Khanty attacked Berezovo, a Cossack outpost built where a Khanty sacred grove had stood. They were led by disillusioned members of the elite Alachev family, earlier favored by Moscow and even christened before the czar. Christian proselytizing took place soon after conquest; Khanty children taken hostage were among the first to be converted. Tax incentives were offered for Khanty to become Orthodox, and sacred ancestor images were burned.
Russian settlers at first focused on the southern parts of Khanty territory, displacing some Khanty northward. By the nineteenth century Russians had moved to riverside villages throughout the region and a few had intermarried with the Khanty. Concern for Siberian natives was reflected in the liberal reforms of 1822 initiated by Count Speranskii and in periodic campaigns to curtail the sale of alcohol to natives by unscrupulous traders. Some Khanty joined a native revolt led by the Nenets Vauli Piettomin in the 1840s. By the twentieth century officials were alarmed at reports of disease, poverty, and population decline, especially among Khanty living in more southern areas.

In the north the Soviet era began as a rumor. Stories reached the Khanty of a Russian war, the czar's death, and "Lenin's new road." Most Khanty were not directly involved in the wave of destruction that swept Siberia during the civil war, as Red (Bolshevik) forces fought the Whites of Kolchak. The Khanty were worried, however, about village burnings on the Irtysh and supply shortages. A few Khanty revolutionaries, such as Ernov and Druzhinin, exposed traditional Komi enemies as Whites and eventually helped organize Soviet collectives. Native councils were formed with the guidance of the Moscow-based Committee of the North in 1924. The Ostyak-Vogul District, established in 1931, became the Khanty-Mansiysk District in the 1940s.

Collectivization involved a process of settlement, sometimes forced, of Khanty nomadic reindeer breeders, hunters, and fishers. Culture bases, kul'tbazy, established at Kazym and Lariak, were model collective centers, with schools, medical points, and stores. But the Khanty identified kul' with a word for "evil spirit." A 1933 revolt in Kazym resulted in Khanty taking Russian officials hostage, fleeing to the tundra, and eventually being arrested. Collectivization was not consolidated until the 1950s, when many people were again moved into larger villages.

“Khanty,” B.C. Alexander, Arctic Photo, 2020 [103]
https://www.arcticphoto.com/polar-info/polar-info25.htm

Overview:

The Khanty are one of the indigenous peoples of northwest Siberia. They were previously called ‘Ostyak’ (People of the Ob) by the Russians. Today there are about 22,500 Khanty most of whom live along the River Ob in the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Region and the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region. There are three separate groups of Khanty, ‘northern,’ ‘southern’ and ‘eastern’ and each has a different dialect and economic way of life. The Khanty culture dates back to the middle of the first millennium BC, and their ancestors are thought to have been Ugric horse breeders who moved northward into the taiga. By about 500 AD the main regional groups of Khanty were formed in their current areas. They adopted a hunting and fishing lifestyle, while the northern group also herded reindeer. They
were led by feudal chiefs before coming under the authority of the Russian state in the 16th Century.

Current & Relevant Information:

The traditional subsistence activities of the Khanty are river fishing, hunting and reindeer breeding. The main animals they hunt and trap in the taiga are elk, bear, hare, fox, sable, squirrel and weasel. They also hunt migratory waterfowl during the spring and autumn. Most Khanty live in rural areas in log cabins and also use tepee style tents made of reindeer skin or canvas. Reindeer herding remains very important with each clan having their own grazing and hunting grounds. In former times large reindeer herds reached 1000 animals or more in some areas, but most Khanty families kept much smaller herds of 20-30 animals. Some of the northern Khanty group still lead a semi-nomadic life, migrating with their reindeer herds in the spring and autumn. In the south the herders keep their reindeer close to the villages and the distances between their winter and summer pastures relatively short.

“Khanty,” Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer, Countries and their Cultures [104]
https://www.everyculture.com/Russia-Eurasia-China/Khanty.html

Overview:

The Khanty were called Ostyak" by Russians until the 1930s, when their name was changed officially to reflect their self-designation. They are closely related, culturally and politically, to their nearest neighbors, the Mansi, historically called "Voguls," with whom they share the Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous District (okrug) in western Siberia. The district was called a "national" area until the 1970s. An area of intense energy development, the Khanty homeland, once larger than its current boundaries, has been inundated by temporary workers, most of them Slavs. Other native minorities in the district include the Nenets and Selkup (Samoyed groups) and the Komi (historically, Zyrian). Khanty also live outside their district, mostly in nearby regions of western Siberia. They are one of twenty-six" Peoples of the North," designated as a special legal category.

The Khanty-Mansiisk District of the Tiumen Oblast is bordered by the Yamalo-Nenets District and the Komi Autonomous Republic to the north west and the Sverdlovsk, Omsk, Tomsk, and Krasnoyarsk regions to the southwest and east. It stretches from 58° to 62° N and60° to 85° E. Khanty live as far north as the Arctic Circle and the Gulf of Ob, and as far south as the Irtyshev-Tavda confluence, although they are concentrated in the Samarovsk, Surgut, Lariak, Beriozovo, Vasiugan, and Kondinsk areas of the greater Ob River Basin. Their territory, inside and outside the Khanty-Mansiisk District, includes tundra and taiga, with foothills of the Ural Mountains and lowlands of the Ob River. Forests of cedar, pine, and larch abound along its multiple rivers. When the thick snow cover melts each summer, extensive flooding occurs, turning the lowlands into swamps of moss, peat, and marsh pine.
The extreme continental climate is characterized by temperatures as low as —50° C and as high as +20° C.

The 1989 Soviet census recorded a population of 147,386,000 for the Russian Republic, 187,083 for the Peoples of the North, and 22,500 for the Khanty. The Khanty-Mansiisk District had a population of 1,282,396 in 1989. Thus, the Khanty are a tiny minority within their district and within western Siberia. Their numbers have increased only slightly from the 20,934 recorded in 1979 and the 17,800 recorded in 1926. Although industrialization and urbanization have escalated around them in the last twenty years, most Khanty have remained in collectives away from large towns. Their infant mortality rates are high, and their life expectancy rates, especially for males, are low. The average northern native 1980s life expectancy was 45 for men and 55 for women. Interethnic marriage is common with other Siberian minorities, and, to a lesser extent, with Russians.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

By the twentieth century the Khanty lived in various camps and villages, as well as on the outskirts of a few towns. Seminomadic Khanty lived in a transhumant pattern with summer and winter camps, moving with their reindeer to the same family territories each season. Their winter homes were small semisubterranean yurts, with only a few (three to ten) grouped together. In 1914 at the peak fall-winter season, population density along the Kazym River, for example, was only 3.2 per square mile. In the summer families were even more dispersed, with members living in skin tents (Russian: chum) that were sturdy yet easily portable. In the northeastern parts of Khanty territory, Khanty outnumbered Russian settlers until the 1930s, but near the towns of Obdorsk (Soviet Salekhard), Berezovo, Surgut, and Tobolsk, Russians predominated. Separate Khanty villages of shacks and cabins grew near Russian villages along the main rivers, where Khanty sometimes lived in relatively settled, Russified style. On the Irtysh, a few villages mixed Khanty and Russian styles, with log cabins lining dirt streets that fanned out from a riverbank.

With collectivization came the decline of nomadic reindeer breeding, so that by the 1950s reindeer breeders' families often lived in Russian-style villages while the men herded the animals on long shifts. A few women lived with their husbands as part of work brigades, but each family had a permanent log home or barrack apartment in a village. Collectives centered on fishing, hunting, and fur farming grew much larger than traditional settlements, averaging 1,000 or more people. Ethnic enclaves of Russians and Khanty were typical of such collectives in the 1970s. The capital of the district, Khanty-Mansiisk, has a diverse ethnic population in enclaves; it had fewer than 100,000 inhabitants in the 1980s. Towns with increasing numbers of Khanty residents include Surgut, Beriozovo, and Salekhard.
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Current & Relevant Information:

Gender divisions were strict in the traditional Khanty household, with men obtaining furs for women to soften, men fishing as women processed previous catches, men killing animals in ritual sacrifices, and women gathering berries and tubers. Since women were believed "impure," they needed to observe many taboos, including not stepping over weapons and not preparing food during menstruation. At other times they prepared food, tended children and domestic animals, set up tents, and organized the family for travel. Men were often away on long hunting, fishing, and trading trips during which women had to be self-reliant.

Soviet economic life thrust a few women into hunting and fishing; others became fish canners, milkmaids, fur-farm attendants, nurses, accountants, librarians, and schoolteachers. Many still work at home or spend long hours standing in line at local stores. Men remain hunters, fishers, and reindeer breeders. They also work in lumbering and in the unstable energy industry, where high salaries sweeten barracks living and dangerous conditions. Some Khanty have careers in government; others are academics or writers.

“Khanty,” Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer, Countries and their Cultures [106]
https://www.everyculture.com/Russia-Eurasia-China/Khanty.html

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Current & Relevant Information:

**Marriage.** Principles of patriarchy and patrilocality guided traditional marriages. Flexible households also allowed matrilocality, bride-service, and even bride-capture. Wealthy non-Orthodox Khanty could in principle have multiple wives (sisters were preferred), but in practice polygamy was rare. Despite widespread poverty, gifts to a bride’s family of reindeer, furs, meat, crafts, and, by the twentieth century, rubles, were common, as were dowries. Traditional Khanty wives considered both the gifts and dowry insurance against mistreatment in their husband's families, for if they ran home, payments had to be returned. This attitude was not shared by Soviet Khanty, who claimed that the payments and arranged marriages made women slaves. As late as the 1930s weddings featured bloody sheets displayed and torn to pieces by the bride’s mother, after which the new bride sat behind a curtain in her husband's family home while others caroused nearby. She emerged to work but was forbidden to show her face to her male in-laws.

**Inheritance.** Patrilineages traditionally regulated territory usufruct and male inheritance of animals. They controlled dowry size and allowed female inheritance of animals only when there was no logical male heir. Sale of land was rare, but when it occurred an entire lineage shared the proceeds. Collectivization made lineage territories obsolete.

**Socialization.** Participating in male hunting and fishing trips, young boys were trained in survival skills. They tended reindeer and, at puberty, were initiated into kin-group lore, rituals, and responsibilities. Girls were brought up reserved, obedient, and constantly working. They left home as brides as young as 12 years old. Soviet boarding schools changed these traditions, without fully instilling values of "young pioneer" Socialist training.

Overview:

The book provides a significant piece of research from the new era of ethnography that started with the fall of communism. During the Soviet period, it was nearly impossible for outside scholars to personally collect ethnographic data from Northern Russia (p. 42). Also, previous scholarship focused on issues of religious experience abstracted from the social context. The authors’ contextual approach is based on David Anderson’s concept of “belonging” which considers the variety of factors involved in a group’s self-definition (Anderson 2002). Siikala and Ulyashev explore a wide range of identity factors such as language, oral tradition, clothing, and landscape/physical environment.

The authors organize the volume into four sections. The first section describes the context, formulates the primary questions being addressed, and presents the ethnographic approach. The second section focuses on understanding the rituals of the Khanty. This section makes up half of the book. Then, with the third section attention shifts to the Komi who rather than ritual have worked to develop their folklore. Finally, the fourth section provides a case study of the Udmurts and concluding discussions.

There are a number of common themes that run throughout the four chapters. I want to highlight four of these: language, secrecy, adaptation, and gender.

Current & Relevant Information:

The authors found gender to be a key factor in both tradition and adaptation. The Khanty have “gender-based parallel cults” (p. 142) with women and men using distinct locations and practices in their respective rituals. Gender roles can shift over time with corresponding adaptation of the traditions. For example, in the regions they researched, women have taken an ever more active role in folk festivals (p. 304). In the case of Komi songs, the same shift has occurred which has led to the dominance of songs with themes that are of greater interest to women (p. 284).

Overview:

It seems safe to assume that I am not the only archaeologist who experiences something akin to a pang of longing when I have occasion to pick up an older ethnography. Many of the ethnographers of the early and middle twentieth century devoted almost as much attention to the material culture and environment of the people they studied as the people themselves. For all their shortcomings, these early ethnographies presented a richness of detail that is too often missing in contemporary works of cultural anthropology: settlement maps, illustrations of house patterns, accounts of subsistence techniques, and descriptions of everyday material objects. I was thus perhaps predisposed to have a favorable opinion of Jordan’s book and its close attention to Khanty material culture. But this is not a work of vulgar materialism, nor is it a return to the simple descriptive style of many past ethnographies. His primary concern is describing how the Khanty material culture, including landscapes, is ‘enculturated’ (i.e., given symbolic meaning) through physical transformation or incorporation into the symbolism of social practices.

Current & Relevant Information:

Having dispensed with the historical context, Jordan turns to the heart of the ethnography. In addition to material from a 10-month field study of communities on one tributary of the River Ob’, he makes good use of other scholarly works and ethnohistoric data. He reviews many of the fundamental aspects of Khanty society, including gender roles, kinship, settlement patterns, and subsistence practices. The bulk of his ethnographic material, however, focuses on the significance of animals and landscapes in Khanty cosmology and ritual. These discussions nicely illustrate the role that human agents play in the regeneration of nature through ritual practices. More specifically, he demonstrates that the creation and use of material artifacts within the landscape plays an integral part in the continual renegotiation of the relationship between people and animals.


Overview:

Along with the Mansi, the 29,000 Khanty in Western Siberia are the "titular nation" of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District, an area about the size of France and Russia's most important oil producing region. Around 4,000 Khanty are living in the Surgut region the first explored and most intensively used oil-province in Western
Siberia. The area, bounded by the Ob River and its tributaries, is marked by the transition from taiga to tundra. The flat landscape is predominantly swampland (60% of the total area) combined with numerous lakes and rivers (20% of the total area) to form a fragile hydrologic balance, this mosaic landscape has traditionally been used by the indigenous people for hunting, fishing, reindeer husbandry and gathering. The reindeer herders have 2 to 4 seasonal settlements.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

**Community Resilience**

There are some striking differences in the history of the Surgut region's Tromjogan River Khanty in comparison with other regions of the Russian North and Siberia. First: the soviet policy of sedentarization of the semi-nomads failed. Reindeer herders preserved their seasonal settlements and did not move to central villages established during the Soviet period.

Second: the process of gender split or gender shift associated with the removal of women from the tundra and taiga and the reversal of gender dominance observed in indigenous communities all over the Russian North did not take place among the Khanty even if changes in the gender roles and arrangements are observable. (cf Ssorin-Chaikov 2002; Tiusk 2001; Vitebsky and Wolfe 2001; Burykin 2002; Ljarskaja 2010).

Third: the number of domestic reindeer is still growing in one of the most intensively industrially used areas in the Russian North. In a lot of other regions of Russia, the numbers of domesticated reindeer went down continuously from the 960s on and halved to 1, 2 million in 2000 (cf. Klokov 2007; Dudeck 2009).

These developments are as more remarkable on the background of severe ecological problems including the destruction of reindeer pastures and pollution of air and water.

The economic and social situation of the indigenous population in the Surgut area is marginal, but a considerable proportion of the indigenous population at the Tromjogan River persist on a forest lifestyle and refuses to leave the traditional settlement.


https://lauda.ulapland.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/64608/Bogdanova_Elena%3B%20Filant_Konstantin%3B%20Filant_Praskovia%3B%20Andronov_Sergei%3B%20Lobanov_Andrei%20%20Juridica%20Lapponica%2048.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

**Abstract:**
The changing role of women in the traditional Indigenous communities of the Russian Arctic in the 21st century is a rarely studied phenomenon. However, this is an important period of significant strengthening of their civil, political and social rights compared to the 18th to 19th centuries, when gender inequalities and strict subordination of women limited their choices. Now, their voices can be heard: they can participate in political life and lobby for their rights to regional and federal authorities. However, some social insecurities still remain for women reindeer herders.

During the last decade, gender asymmetries concerning lifestyle, educational level and marital behavior have intensified and resulted in increasing emigration of women from the tundra as they have chosen to abandon their traditional lifestyles and move to urban areas. This chapter analyses the changing position of women in traditional reindeer herding societies and whether these transformations have improved women’s social security, reduced gender inequality and increased social justice.

To increase the social security of women reindeer herders, the authors recommend encouraging these women to apply for official self-employment (samozanjatyj) status (special tax regime with a tax on professional income), supporting cooperative forms of reindeer herding husbandry that employ women reindeer herders, encouraging the semi-nomadic lifestyles of Indigenous women, developing facilities in settlements for processing reindeer herding products that are managed by reindeer herders’ families, organizing production cooperatives for reindeer herders to develop facilities for deep processing of reindeer products and increasing the profitability of reindeer herding.

Current & Relevant Information:

**Introduction**

Sustainable development for the Indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East is one of the priority tasks of the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone in the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period Until 2035 (No. 645, 2020). However, ‘the maintaining and dissemination of the cultural heritage, the development of traditional culture, the preservation and development of the languages of Indigenous Peoples’ (Strategija razvitija [Strategy for the Development], No. 645, 2020) is impossible without the participation of women. They are key persons in maintaining the traditional life support system and national culture. At the same time, the impact of socio-economic and cultural transformations in society in the 20th to early 21st centuries, accompanied by the penetration of both technological innovations and the European value system that is not specific to the traditional culture of the Indigenous peoples of the Russian High North, have contributed to changing these traditional lifestyles. Liarskaia (2010, p. 3) noted a gender shift in Yamal at the beginning of the 21st
century. However, over the past 10 years, the situation in Yamal has changed dramatically. Now, the asymmetries (regarding lifestyle choices, education and marital behavior), which were not so evident before, have intensified and led to an increase in the emigration of women from the tundra as they choose to abandon their traditional lifestyles and move to urban areas.

Analysis of the ethnographic literature on the culture of the Nenets (from the end of the 19th century to the present) shows that gender issues are insufficiently represented. However, prior research can be found on the gender issues of the Indigenous peoples of the Yamal by Russian researchers (e.g., Andronov et al., 2020; Bogdanova et al., 2018, 2019, 2021; Liarskaya, 2010; Nabok & Serpivo, 2017; A. Popova, 2004; Serpivo, 2016). The problem of the influence of inter-ethnic marriages of the Nenets on ethnic and demographic processes has also been presented (e.g., Andronov et al., 2020; Kvashnin, 2002; Kvashnin & Volzhanina, 2003; Volzanina, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2009, 2010). Finally, Khariuchi (2001, 2010) discussed the role of Nenets women in science.

Additionally, some fragmented gender analyses of the Indigenous peoples of the Russian Arctic have been undertaken by foreign researchers (e.g., Vladimirova, 2018; Vladimirova & Otto Habeck, 2018). However, the language barrier, as well as foreign scientists’ difficulties observing ethical guidelines for conducting scientific research in the territory of the Russian Federation (due to the differences in national academic conventions concerning Russia), have complicated the gathering of sufficient field data, thus reducing the quality of these analyses. The value of these works lies in providing an independent, outside perspective regarding the experiences of the Indigenous peoples in the Arctic.

This chapter presents data on how the position of women in traditional reindeer herding societies has changed and whether these transformations have improved women’s social security, reduced gender inequality and increased social justice. Therefore, this chapter aims to 1) contribute to gender analysis and reflect on some gender inequalities in the Indigenous reindeer herding communities in the Arctic zone of Western Siberia, 2) give some historical background on the gender inequalities in the 19th century in Yamal to show the transition of women’s position in Indigenous society and strengthening of women’s rights and 3) present unique data on some of the gaps in Indigenous women’s civil and social rights that have encouraged these women to change their lifestyles and migrate from rural to urban areas.

Conclusions

Indigenous women reindeer herders’ rights have been significantly strengthened in the 21st century. They can participate in political life and lobby for the rights of Indigenous peoples at the regional and federal levels. Further, the civil rights of Indigenous women reindeer herders are protected by federal and regional laws.
However, there are still some gaps in the social rights of women reindeer herders, specifically challenges regarding their labor rights. Their status as unemployed jeopardizes their social security and does not guarantee a retirement pension in the future. However, there are some solutions that can be enacted through short- and long-term measures. The following are recommended to improve the labor rights of Indigenous women reindeer herders:

- Encourage women to apply for an official self-employed (samozanjatyj) status;
- Support cooperative forms of reindeer herding husbandry (i.e., peasantry farms) and employ women as reindeer herders;
- Encourage a semi-nomadic lifestyle for Indigenous women and create facilities in settlements for processing reindeer herding products that are managed by reindeer herders’ families, as this will provide new opportunities for women to be employed through their family business;
- Organize production cooperatives for reindeer herders to develop facilities for deep processing of reindeer products and to increase the profitability of reindeer herding.

L. Nenets [Russia]:

“Tribe: Nenets,” BBC, 24 September 2014 [111]
http://www.bbc.co.uk/tribe/tribes/nenets/index.shtml

Overview:

The Nenets people of the Siberian arctic are the guardians of a style of reindeer herding that is the last of its kind. Through a yearly migration of over a thousand kilometers, these people move gigantic herds of reindeer from summer pastures in the north to winter pastures just south of the Arctic Circle. No-one knows for certain whether it is the reindeer that lead the people or vice versa. What is certain is that fewer places on earth are home to a more challenging environment, an environment where temperatures plummet to -50C and were crossing the world’s fifth largest river as it deep-freezes is just part of the routine. Such a difficult environment unites the people physically through a regimented work ethic, but far more importantly, the Yamal-Nenets are unified by a robust and vibrant culture. It is a culture that has had to survive a turbulent history, from early Russian colonization, to Stalin’s terror regime, to the modern-day dangers of a rapacious oil and gas development program.

Current & Relevant Information:

The Yamal Peninsula is one of the least famous, but most important, regions of the Russian Federation. With a territory around 1.5 times the size of France, the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District (YNAO) is located in the West Siberian north, just northeast of the geographic border between Europe and Asia above the Arctic
Circle. Today more than 10,000 nomads herd 300,000 domestic reindeer on the pastures of the Arctic tundra. Under those pastures are huge gas deposits holding almost a quarter of the world’s known reserves.

The Nenets herder economy is driven by the reindeer meat that they sell. The salary they get from herding state-farm reindeer is minimal when compared to the income they get from selling private reindeer, and from sawing off their antlers to be exported to China as a male potency drug. Aside from its market value, reindeer meat is a source of food, shelter, clothing, transport, spiritual fulfilment and means of socializing. For example, it is still common that a bride price in the form of reindeer is paid, and a dowry is brought into the young family when a tundra couple marries. The reindeer is also revered as a symbol. It’s believed the people and the deer entered a kind of social contract, where reindeer offered themselves to humans for their subsistence and transport, and humans agree to accompany them on their seasonal migrations and protect them from predators. Such is the importance of reindeer to the whole district (and not just to the Nenets) that the reindeer symbol made it to the center of the YNAO coat of arms.

“An Introduction to the Nenet People,” Zita Whalley, Culture Trip, 3 August 2018
[112]  https://theculturetrip.com/europe/russia/articles/an-introduction-to-the-nenet-people/

Overview:
Russia’s most iconic reindeer folk, the Nenets, continue to practice their unique herding style in modern times. This practice has survived a tumultuous history, and the Nenets remain the keepers of Siberia’s Arctic despite new challenges threatening their traditions and way of life.

Current & Relevant Information:
The Nenet culture and way of life has survived the Soviet collectivization of reindeer herding and Stalin’s efforts of ethnic cleansing, only to face new issues of a modern kind. The effects of climate change and the pursuit of natural resources continually threaten their ability to use their native land as earlier generations have done. Despite this, the Nenets are a robust people, who are determined to preserve traditional customs and practices.

Homeland
As the wardens of Siberia’s north (above the Arctic Circle), Nenets have inhabited the rarely visited Yamal Peninsula for centuries. In their native tongue, ‘Yamal Peninsula’ translates into Land’s End. It is wild and remote, and the climate is harsh. It is also about one and a half times bigger than France. Despite consisting almost entirely of near-to-barren Arctic tundra, the frozen land harbors some of the biggest underground oil deposits on Earth. For the most intrepid traveler, it is also one of the best spots in Russia to view the northern lights.
Culture

The reindeer herd is central to the Nenet traditional way of life. Unlike other reindeer-herding people, the Nenet move massive herds between winter and summer pastures, traversing thousands of kilometers a year across frozen rivers in temperatures as low as -50°C (-58°F). This integral practice illustrates the nomadic traditions of the Nenets, who travel with their herds. Reindeer are a source of food, income, shelter, transportation and clothing for the people. So revered are the reindeer that the animal is often included in marriage dowries, and the Nenets believe that the creatures give themselves to humans for nourishment and transport in exchange for protection from predators along their migratory route. As a result of this belief, there is a kind of spiritual relationship between the Nenets and their precious beasts.

History

The Nenets can trace their heritage back about a thousand years on the peninsula. Throughout this time, they have practiced their traditional methods of reindeer herding. In 1961, the Soviet Union collectivized the practice and established a handful of state-run farms. Herders were under fixed contracts and worked for a salary. Despite this, they were still able to maintain a nomadic existence and keep their family units intact. Today, about 80 percent of the industry has returned to the private sector, while the remaining 20 percent is controlled by the regional government.

“Nenets People,” Britannica, 19 March 2021 [113]
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nenets-people

Overview:

Nenets, Russian (singular) Nenets, plural Nentsy, formerly Samoyed or Yurak, ethnolinguistic group inhabiting northwestern Russia, from the White Sea on the west to the base of the Taymyr Peninsula on the east and from the Sayan Mountains on the south to the Arctic Ocean on the north. At present the Nenets are the largest group speaking Samoyedic, a branch of the Uralic language family. Their name comes from the word nenets meaning “man.”

Current & Relevant Information:

Descended from people formerly inhabiting southwest Siberia, the Nenets are reindeer pastoralists, fishermen, and hunters (especially of wild reindeer) of the tundra, but they also include small groups of forest dwellers. Ethnographers generally refer to them as the Forest Nenets and the Tundra Nenets. The former group is much smaller (roughly five percent of the total Nenets population) and its language, considered seriously endangered because few if any children learn it, is spoken by only about 1,500 people. The language of the Tundra Nenets, the larger of the two groups, is spoken by more than 25,000 people, but children in some
regions are not learning it. The Forest Nenets live near the Pur River and on tributaries of the Middle Ob. The Tundra Nenets inhabit three principal regions: an area west of the Ural Mountains, the Ob and Yamal peninsulas, and regions on the Taymyr Peninsula and the Yenisey River. Smaller groups of peoples related to the Nenets include the Enets (Entsy, or Yenisey), the Nganasans (Tavgi), and the Selkup. In some areas Turkic languages and Russian have replaced Samoyedic dialects. Under Soviet administration, communal, collective production was introduced among the Nenets, with reindeer keeping remaining the main activity.

Reindeer breeding provides the Nenets with meat, lard, and blood for food; skins for making clothes, footwear, and winter tents; leather for making lassos, harnesses, and summer footwear; tendons for making thread; and horn for making various implements. A herd of 70 to 100 reindeer furnishes everything needed by a household.

Descent is traced through the paternal line; clans of people claiming common ancestry have their own territories, as well as common burial and sacrificial grounds and clan symbols and signs. Individuals marry outside their own clan. Women are in a subordinate position. There are several classes of shamans, with different abilities.


Overview:

In arctic northern Russia, industrialized resource extraction and climate change are presenting a double threat to the Nenets, an indigenous people native to Siberia. The Nenets depend heavily on their reindeer herds, using them for food, clothing, tools, transportation, and more as they migrate more than a thousand kilometers across the tundra every year. Photographer Steve Morgan recently traveled to the Yamal Peninsula to document the Nenets and their threatened way of life. Here is a selection of his photos, with captions by Joanna Eede of Survival International.

Current & Relevant Information:

Nenets herders move seasonally with their reindeer, traveling along ancient migration routes. During the winter, when temperatures can plummet to -50C, most Nenets graze their reindeer on moss and lichen pastures in the southern forests, or taiga. In the summer months, when the midnight sun turns night into day, they leave the larch and willow trees behind to migrate north. By the time they have crossed the frozen waters of the Ob River and reached the treeless tundra on the shores of the Kara Sea, they might have traveled up to 1,000 km.

The Yamal Peninsula: a stretch of peatland that extends from northern Siberia into the Kara Sea, far above the Arctic Circle. To the east lie the shallow waters of the Gulf of Ob; to the west, the Baydaratskaya Bay, which is ice-covered for most of the year. Yamal in the language of the indigenous Nenets means “the end of the world.”
It is a remote, wind-blasted place of permafrost, serpentine rivers and dwarf shrubs, and has been home to the reindeer-herding Nenets people for over a thousand years. Today, the Nenets’ nomadic way of life is under threat from the effects of climate change, making the tundra increasingly unpredictable, and from the discovery that the peninsula contains the largest gas reserves on the planet.

The Nenets’ migration routes are now affected by the infrastructure associated with resource extraction. Roads are difficult for the reindeer to cross and they say pollution threatens the quality of the pastures.

Under Stalin, Nenets communities were split into groups known as brigades, and forced to live on collective farms and villages called kolkhozy. Each brigade was obliged to pay reindeer meat as taxes. Children were separated from their families and sent to government-run boarding schools, where they were forbidden to speak their own language.

With the collapse of communism, young adults began to leave their villages for cities, a trend which continues today. In urban environments they find it almost impossible to adapt to life away from the cyclical rhythms of the tundra, and suffer from high levels of alcoholism, unemployment and mental health problems.

The Arctic is changing fast. As temperatures rise and the tundra’s permafrost thaws, it releases carbon dioxide and methane, greenhouse gases, into the atmosphere. With the ice melting earlier in the spring and not freezing until much later in the autumn, the herders are being forced to change centuries-old migration patterns, as the reindeer find it difficult to walk over a snowless tundra. The rising temperatures also affect the tundra’s vegetation, the only source of food for the reindeer.

Gender Roles:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348463781_Ethnic_identity_erosion_in_the_indigenous_Nenets_population_under_globalization_influence_gender_differences_between_adolescent_girls_and_boys

Abstract:

Research background: Ethnic identity development, while universal, is also recognized as an especially important prerequisite for economic and social life among indigenous populations. Global transformations such as technology, industrialization, global warming and political and economic forces are impacting positive ethnic identity development in indigenous populations around the world.
Purpose of the article: The purpose of this study is to examine gender differences in ethnic identity erosion in the adolescent indigenous Nenets population of the Russian Siberian Arctic Region.

Methods: The study sample included 78 children in boarding schools from the northern area of Western Siberia. To define ethnic identity, the "Types of Ethnic Identity" questionnaire was used.

Findings & Value added: The study results show that across 8th-9th grade as well as 10-11 grade Nenets adolescent boys perceive their ethnic identity positively. However, the same indicators show girls do not view their ethnic identity as positively. There are also several other interesting gender differences that emerge between the students in each grade. This may be the result of specific gender differences in perceptions about the economic and social realities of tundra life, the position of women in traditional societies as well as the impact of global transformations on indigenous populations overall.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

Globalization is a world-wide phenomenon which has, among other impacts, economic consequences that affect even the most remote regions on earth including the Arctic. Adolescents are especially susceptible to the effects of global economic trends as they develop their social identity.

The importance of identity development in adolescence cannot be underestimated. During adolescence children become more independent, and begin to look at the future in terms of relationships, vocation and family. The individual wants to belong to a society and fit in. According to social and human development theories, adolescence is the critical period in which humans attain their sense of personal as well as social being as they move into adulthood. Ethnic identity development, while universal, is also recognized as an especially important prerequisite for social life and economic behavior among indigenous populations. It is intricately entwined with traditional methods of survival such as nomadic reindeer herding, access to food and water, medicine and housing. Global transformations such as technology, industrialization, global warming and political and economic forces are impacting positive ethnic identity development in indigenous populations around the world. In this context, the Russian Siberian Arctic Region inhabited by groups referred to as "indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North" (ISNPN) becomes of particular interest for both research and practical purposes when looking at ethnic identity development.

Several countries such as Norway, Denmark, Finland, Canada, and Sweden have developed national strategies for Arctic studies largely for the purpose of protecting and preserving the social, political and economic rights of indigenous populations.
which are increasingly under stress. The goal is to balance traditional ways of life with the 3 demands of modern methods of education, health care and resource management economic behavior as well as maintain self-governance.

The importance of issues related to the development of ISNPN goes far beyond local humanitarian problems pertaining to the social life of indigenous ethnic groups, which represent a very small percentage (0.03%) of the total population of the Russian Federation. They directly impact economic and political structures that define social life among indigenous populations. Studies performed in the late 1990s indicate a demographic decline among indigenous peoples due to high mortality rates of children and adults of working age, reduced birth rates, and low average life expectancy. Hence, some researchers predicted depopulation or the complete disappearance of these indigenous groups.

While entire groups have not disappeared, they do face considerable stress from the globalization processes that are changing their way of life through inter-ethnic marriages, cultural and language assimilation. As such, the issue of ethnic identity development and its role in successful activation for the population in negotiating the modern world versus barrier or obstacle to regional development becomes of critical concern. In the Russian Federation, the ethnic identity of ISNPN individuals takes into consideration multiple factors. Privileges (so called "additional guarantees") granted by the State to the ISNPN often become a decisive factor in choosing one's ethnic affiliation for individuals of mixed origin. In this context one of the key issues of state relations with ethnic indigenous communities is the relationship between existing territorial and political structures and the ethnic identities of the indigenous population. It appears that this relationship and the categorization of the ethnic identity of an indigenous population it produces is instrumental in vesting the residents of a territorial/administrative entity with a sort of political and economic legitimacy. This is crucial in structuring and conceptualizing the environment and its resources for management purposes. However, heretofore little attention has been paid to the potential of these policies in creating different opportunity structures between men and women. There is concern that policies and programs designed to promote and preserve indigenous populations are largely beneficial to men. Women are increasingly choosing to inter-marry and leave behind life on the tundra.

The main problem and the aim of the study is the contradiction between the acquisition of the ethnic identity of indigenous minorities in the context of gender (for men and women) and the processes of globalization, dictating universal characteristics of the individual, standards of behavior, implemented largely through the sphere of economic behavior. The aim of this study is to identify the features of ethnic identity in indigenous minorities adolescents of different gender.

Overview:

What happens when indigenous peoples are exposed to globalization and assimilation? Is it possible for them to maintain their cultural heritage and continue with their traditional way of life? Zoia Vylka Ravna went to the Nenets on the Russian tundra in search of answers.

There are almost 45 000 people who can call themselves Nenets. Like the other 45 or so indigenous peoples in Russia, the Nenets still live off what nature provides, reindeer husbandry, and fishing.

They live in eastern Russia, Siberia, and northwestern Russia. For her studies, Ravna went to the northwestern area, to the Yamal Peninsula, which extends 700 km into the Barents Sea.

Current & Relevant Information:

Unique Culture

“The Nenets are nomads who have had a unique way of life. The reindeer is central to the Nenets’ culture. Without it, they would disappear as an indigenous people. They are born into a culture where traditional knowledge must be passed down from person to person if the community is to survive”, says Ravna.

But the Russian education system requires the children of nomads to leave their camps and live at boarding schools for nine months a year. This means that young people have little time to acquire traditional knowledge, language, and spiritual values.

Among the Nenets, women are the custodians of traditional knowledge, and it is women who pass it on to small children. When the women leave the camps and move to villages and towns – voluntarily or because they have no other option – they set an example for young girls, who may also leave the traditional life on the tundra.

The reindeer herder is left behind: a man who struggles to find a mate. There is an increasing tendency that young women choose not to return to the nomadic life on the tundra after finishing their schooling.

Conversely, young men more often return to the tundra and try to carry on with life as before without taking into consideration that there is a need to change their way of thinking. In addition, we see that men’s life expectancy is short, partly because of heavy alcohol consumption, which adds to the problem.

One of the aims of the Soviet state was to create an egalitarian society without gender restrictions, and this shook up the traditional gender roles of the nomads. The other major change came with the Soviet system of agricultural collectives:
reindeer were collectivized, though reindeer had never been collective property historically.

“Tribal Heroines,” Survival International [117]
https://www.survivalinternational.org/galleries/women

Overview:

On International Women’s Day, Survival International profiles the stories of inspiring tribal women around the world who are fighting for their fundamental human rights.

Current & Relevant Information:

A Nenets woman outside her chum (tipi) in Siberia’s Yamal Peninsula. Her homeland is a remote, wind-blasted place of permafrost, serpentine rivers and dwarf shrubs; the reindeer-herding Nenets people have migrated across it for over a thousand years.

During the winter, the women endure temperatures that plummet to -50C. This is when most Nenets graze their reindeer on moss and lichen pastures in the southern forests, or taigá. In the summer months, when the midnight sun turns night into day, the women pack up camp and migrate north with their families.

Today, their ways of life are severely affected by oil drilling and climate change. Their migration routes are now affected by the infrastructure associated with resource extraction; roads are difficult for the reindeer to cross and they report that pollution threatens the quality of the pastures.

The reindeer is our home, our food, our warmth and our transportation, said a Nenets woman.

“Nenets,” Juha Janhunen, Encyclopedia.com, 15 May 2024 [118]

Overview:

The Nenets are the largest of the groups generally referred to as the "Samoyeds." The Samoyeds also comprise three other linguistically related ethnic entities: the Enets, the Nganasan, and the Selkup. Two more Samoyed peoples, the Mator and the Kamas, survived until modern times (the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) but are now extinct. The Samoyed peoples may be divided into three groups according to their ecological environments: the Tundra Samoyeds, the Taiga or Forest Samoyeds, and the Mountain Samoyeds. Culturally, the most archaic group of the Tundra Samoyeds is the Nganasan, whereas the Selkup are the most typical Forest Samoyed group. In this division, the Nenets and the Enets show a dual cultural affiliation in that they are comprised of both tundra- and taiga-dwelling groups; these groups are referred to as the "Tundra Nenets," the "Forest Nenets," the "Tundra
Enets," and the "Forest Enets." The Mountain Samoyeds used to comprise the Mator and the Kamas. Although linguistically extinct, the latter still survive to some extent in the modern Khakas and Tuwan ethnic groups. An especially remarkable remnant of the Mountain Samoyeds is formed by the culturally unique northeastern groups of the Tuvans, the Tofalar.

The modern international name of the Nenets derives, through Russian, from the Nenets noun nyenecyaq (singular, nyenecyq), "human beings," used as an ethnonym by western groups of the Tundra Nenets. An etymological cognate of this item in the form nyeesyaaq (singular, nyeesyang) is used ethnonymically by the Forest Nenets, and further etymological cognates underlie the modern appellations of the Enets and the Nganasan. Eastern groups of the Tundra Nenets traditionally call themselves Khásawaq (singular, Khá'sawa), "men." In the past the Nenets were normally referred to as the "Yurak" or the "Yurak-Samoyeds," or even simply as "Samoyeds." The other Samoyed peoples have also been known by a variety of alternative ethnonyms, all of them covered by the general appellation "Samoyed." In modern ethnic taxonomy the term "Samoyed" is used to refer to the whole group of the six distinct Samoyed peoples, with no specific reference to any one of them.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

**Kin Groups and Descent.** Below the level of the two rudimentary and somewhat hypothetical phratries, the basic unit of traditional Nenets society was the patrilineal exogamic clan. Each clan had its own territory with pasturlands as well as hunting and fishing grounds, a cemetery, and places of worship. Some 100 clans survive, each possessing a more or less well-preserved tradition concerning its origin. Most important in the present society, each clan still has a name of its own, today used as the official surname of the clan members. Thus, the Nenets are one of the very few among the small minorities of the Far North having a set of their own non-Russian (and even non-Russianized) surnames. Given names, on the other hand, are rarely of Nenets origin today, although an unofficial Nenets given name may occasionally exist beside an official Russian one.

**Kinship Terminology.** The Nenets system of basic kinship terms distinguishes between three senior (grandparent, parent, elder sibling) and two junior (younger sibling, child) age categories. The terminology is slightly more differentiated for males than for females, but several important categories (sibling, younger sibling, child, parent-in-law of husband, younger sibling-in-law of husband) are expressed by sexually undifferentiated terms.

**Marriage and Family.** Until recently marriage was a matter decided by clan leaders; there were occasional cases of polygyny and levirate. In the family, the position of women was once inferior to that of men, and taboo restrictions limited women's activities, especially in connection with menstruation, pregnancy, and childbirth. On the other hand, the strict division of labor in the severe arctic conditions—the men
being concerned only with subsistence activities and the women taking care of
dwelling, clothing, and children—tended to favor equality rather than inequality of the
sexes. Children, too, used to be encouraged to be independent and are still being
introduced today, at a very early age, to the sexually differentiated responsibilities of
the adults.

“Nentsy,” Countries and their Cultures [119]
https://www.everyculture.com/wc/Norway-to-Russia/Nentsy.html

Overview:

For thousands of years, people have lived in the harsh arctic environment in what is
today northern Russia. In ancient times, people relied exclusively on what nature
provided and on what their ingenuity allowed them to use and create. The Nentsy
(also known as the Yurak) are one of five Samoyedic peoples, which also include
the Entsy (Yenisei), Nganasany (Tavgi), Sel'kup, and Kamas (who became extinct
as a group in the years following World War I [1914–1918]). Although many aspects
of their lives have changed, the Nentsy still rely on their traditional way of life
(hunting, reindeer herding, and fishing) as well as on industrial employment.

In the 1930s, the Soviet government began policies of collectivization, education for
all, and assimilation. Collectivization meant turning over rights to land and reindeer
herds to the Soviet government, which reorganized them into collectives (kolkhozy)
or state farms (sovkhozy). The Nentsy were expected to conform to the dominant
Russian society, which meant changing the way they thought of themselves through
education, new jobs, and close contact with members of other (mainly Russian)
ethnic groups.

Current & Relevant Information:

Marriages were traditionally arranged by the heads of clans; marriages today are
generally personal matters between adults. There are strict divisions between the
activities of men and women in traditional Nenets society. Although women were
generally considered less important, the strict division of labor between men and
women in the arctic made relations more equal than not.

Today there are still approximately one hundred Nenets clans, and the clan’s name
is used as the surname of each of its members. Although most Nentsy have Russian
first names, they are one of the few native groups to have non-Russian surnames.
Kinship and family units continue to be the main organizing features of society in
both urban and rural settings. These family ties often serve the important function of
keeping the Nentsy in the towns and in the country connected. Rules regarding
appropriate behavior follow traditional guidelines handed down from elders to young.

Women are responsible for the home, food preparation, shopping, and child care.
Some men follow traditional occupations, and others choose professions such as
medicine or education. They might also take jobs as laborers or serve in the military.
In towns and villages, women may also have non-traditional jobs as teachers, doctors, or store clerks, but they are still primarily responsible for domestic chores and child care. Extended families often include some individuals engaged in traditional occupations and some engaged in non-traditional work.


Abstract:

This paper discusses different strategies used by indigenous women seeking social security in Nenets Autonomous Region, Russia. Social security is understood as state provision as well as cultural institutions and efforts of individuals to overcome insecurity. One case describes the history of a woman who after the loss of her husband resorted to a traditional solution: she moved in to join the household of the deceased husband’s brothers in the tundra. In the second case, a woman leaves her baby in an orphanage for a few months. This latter strategy shows how women are able to preserve a high birth-rate while sustaining a tundra-based life. Even though these choices are seen within the dichotomy of tradition and modernity, which is central to existing ethnographies, this paper attempts to take the analysis further. I apply anthropological insights about care as a process that reveals social bonds, group belonging and identity in different settings, from the more intimate ties within kin groups to large-scale social systems such as state institutions. My goal is to contribute to the study of the interconnectedness among bonds, relations and affective landscapes on different levels – from mother–children bonds, to the nuclear family to community and state institutions.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

This paper is about some of the strategic choices that indigenous women in Nenets Autonomous Region (NAO), Russia, make in their life as mothers and wives. Such choices have profound influence on many different aspects of their lives, as I will show below. Nevertheless, this paper will hardly deal with a full standing analysis of all consequences of such choice or aim at explaining in any details how the women reason around it. For one reason, they would hardly recognize such decisions as social security, hence I use the notion for the purposes of analysis here and not as an emic local idea. The two cases described represent women’s participation in two institutions that have been often conceived of as substantially different and even contrary to each other. One belongs to traditional culture and regulates the fate of widows and the care for their children, and the second – to state public institutions of child care (orphanage). The first had been condemned by Soviet modernization policy as primitive and incompatible with contemporary values equality, collectivism, health and morality, and deemed ‘eradicated' by the mid-twentieth century. The
latter is seen nowadays as state imposed and undesired governmentality, and is presented as a contradiction to the popular expectations of what traditional indigenous culture and life should look like.

The purpose of this paper is to problematize existing ideas and expectations of how indigenous people relate to traditional kinship-based institutions and state institutions. The category ‘traditional’ has been applied increasingly in post-Soviet Russia to a catalog of practices found among the ‘Numerically-Small People of the North, Siberia, and the Far East’ (Donahoe, Habeck, Halemba, & Santa, Citation2008). Although the categories are defined by the state, there has also been a strong imprint from the international movement for indigenous rights. As a result of the penetration of notions and procedures for defining indigeneity, the global search for and reference to authenticity and tradition has been imported and reified both by indigenous communities and the majority of Russians. Proliferating anthropological research in the North and Siberia has contributed to the reification of indigenous tradition, often defined in binary opposition to Soviet state indigenous policy.

Nenets, one of the few groups who after the demise of the Soviet Union, successfully revived private reindeer herding and have actively preserved other elements of their culture, like language and tundra nomadism, have become emblematic (Golovnev & Osherenko, Citation1999). The reference to tradition, however, has older roots and began in the Soviet period, those days with condemnation of customary ways which were seen in opposition to modernization and ‘civilization’. Indigenous people were expected, according to Soviet ideology, to make a leap from the lowest stages of social development, to socialism and communism. Soviet definition, references and politics of indigenous tradition have been extremely complex, and unstable. In addition, at present, imaginaries of indigenous tradition also incorporate practices and ideas that occurred and developed in Soviet days. Despite this complex landscape of tradition, the two narratives that I present here have been located within it.

The complex Soviet and post-Soviet landscape of tradition shapes the contours and provides context for the understanding of the women’s choices that are at the center of this paper. These two instances occurred at moments quite distant in time, and at slightly different stages in the lives of the two women. In the first case, I describe Agafia, who after the death of her husband in the 1970s decided to follow a usual Nenets practice: she let her husband’s younger brothers take responsibility for her and the family’s five young children. She moved to live in the tundra where the brothers were employed as reindeer herders and where her five children grew up at the collective state enterprise Friendship of People.

In contrast to Agafia, at the time of this field study, Elena was a young and happily married woman with three children who lead a fully nomadic life in the tundra. She belongs to a special Nenets minority group, who managed to avoid the collectivization in the 1930s and lived relatively independently as small-scale private
reindeer herders during Soviet time. In this sense, one may say that Elena represents a non-interrupted ancestry and tradition of nomadic reindeer herding Nenets culture. My interest, in this case, was attracted by Elena’s decision to leave her youngest child (at the age of few months at the time of the field study) in an orphanage in the main city of NAO, Narian-Mar, for the first months of his life. This innovative strategy that some young nomadic women practice today, as I learned, permits them to reduce the weight of female chores while at the same time increase the comfort of their babies.

This paper will analyze the life choices sketched above in the light of the contemporary debate about Nenets culture and tradition. My goal is to show that the institutions of care that are located in family and kinship relations and thought of as traditional, such as levirate or state-provided social security, should not be seen in simple opposition. Processes of cultural and social transformation influenced by the Soviet and post-Soviet state, including its institutions of care, unfold in complex and unpredictable ways. Thus, the offered parallel discussion of two diachronic instances of strategic choices related to care reveals that no simple evolution can be traced from pre-Revolutionary to state-organized practices and ideologies of care, kinship and citizenship. Instead, the state-initiated struggle against some kinship institutions, such as bridewealth and levirate, and the many innovations introduced by the state, including kindergartens, boarding schools, orphanages, and other provisions have created a complex landscape of opportunities and limitations, generally perceived as ‘old’ and ‘new’. Indigenous people orient themselves within this landscape through their strategic choices. They improvise, experiment, and creatively combine in order to procure security and provide or receive care. They negotiate with state bureaucracies, in the wider society and within their own communities and families.

I take inspiration for my analysis and borrow concepts and ideas from the latest anthropological discussions of social security and care in the study of postsocialist societies. Social security, in such research, is understood both as formal institutional provisions at state level, as well as other cultural institutions and even efforts of individuals, groups, and organizations to overcome insecurities. As Thelen et al. define it, social security constitutes ‘a variety of arrangements, through which people acquire food, shelter, education, and care’ (Thelen, Cartwright, & Sikor, Citation2008, p. 3). Social security in this understanding emerges through diverse practices, relationships, ideologies, policies, and institutions.

Within this broader understanding of social security, I particularly emphasize the aspect of care, in the way it has been recently theorized by Thelen. Even though she focuses on practices, understandings and analysis of care mostly in state institutionalized settings, the insights provided are of much broader significance. In her latest publications, Thelen and her colleagues offer a perspective that aims at incorporating broader studies of social belonging, for example, through kinship. ‘Since kinship, like other forms of social belonging, has to be actively chosen, made,
or maintained, care practices are needed to contribute to the making and maintaining of kinship’ (Erdmute & Heike, Citation2015, p. 2). Care, thus, can be thought of as ‘a social practice that connects not only kinsmen and friends, neighbors and communities, but also other collectivities such as states and nations’ (Erdmute & Heike, Citation2015, p. 2). In this new understanding, research on care need not be concentrated only on the organization of social work and workers, as previously, but also pay attention on the act of care as human and emotional, as part of our human ‘capacity to make, shape, and be made by social bonds’ (Erdmute & Heike, Citation2015, p. 2). This approach reflects a duality of human perception and experience of care, both as a duty or a burden, but also as a pleasure, affection, satisfaction, trust, dependency. Care in this framework can be affected by individual and group identities, culture, and finally life courses and stages.

The field of care when drawn in this way can bring together the study of social order on different scales, for example, those of state institutions and kinship relations. Thus, kinship and state policies can be seen as entangled fields to a bigger extent that can mutually influence each other. In a recent review of anthropological analyses of care, Erdmute and Heike highlight the meaning of care as constituting or complementing kinship: ‘care is a particular type of social action performed among people who understand themselves as belonging to each other by kinship and who are performing belonging through care’ (Citation2015, p. 7). The authors underline that care and kinship can be simultaneously transnational and universal phenomena, and local, strongly influenced by culture and can take different expressions. ‘The modes of belonging produced, transferred, or confirmed through care refer both to the sphere of kinship as well as to other kinds of social belonging … to other types of collectivities, such as communities, nations, or states’ (Erdmute & Heike, Citation2015, p. 8).

The empirical data for this paper has been collected during a one-month field study in NAO in April 2013 by the three authors. Interviews and participant observation took place in the village of Karataika and tundra reindeer herding camps belonging to the Cooperative Friendship of Peoples (Druzhba Narodov). Even though not a native speaker of Russian, I am fluent in the language so it has been the main source of communication. The narratives of the two women that are main figures for the paper have central importance. Nevertheless, I also make use of the discussions and evidence provided by other members of the community in the analysis. Even though people collaborating in this project have not required anonymity or confidentiality, I have taken decisions based on my professional judgement and in observance of the leading ethical requirements in the field of Social and Cultural Anthropology. Thus the anonymity of some people has been preserved through invented names and slight changes in details to an extent that does not affect the quality of the analysis.

Discussion
The two life choices, discussed above, are separated in time and certainly illustrate historically evolving ideas in Nenets women of familial links, care and security, as well as state institutions. Nevertheless, I doubt that the analysis should be limited to history, social change, and cultural adaptation alone. Neither should the respective choices be solely attributed to the different historical paths of the groups of settled collectivized Nenets, whom Agafia represents, and the private reindeer owners, among whom Elena grew up and lives today. As explained earlier, both groups are related by kinship ties and pre-Soviet culture, as well as the profound influences that Soviet and post-Soviet transformations imposed on them in different ways. Even though today Yamb-To can be presented by some ethnic or regional politicians as the ‘most traditional’ Nenets nomads who can serve as a contrast and a corrective to remaining Nenets both living in the village and working in reindeer herding, this image mostly serves political purposes. The presented empirical illustrations can undermine such a simple dichotomy.

Both the cases of Elena and Agafia can be inscribed in a complex process of dynamic and evolving Nenets culture and social life, but these changes can hardly be demarcated into notions such as tradition and modernity. All the more so because both these concepts have been questioned and are nowadays seen in processual sequences. To illustrate this, I would insist that for Agafia her choice to insure care for her children following an old customary recipe did not have the same meaning and consequences that it would have had for some of her female ancestors. Her decision, I think, could not have changed her identity as a Nenets woman in the 1970s, when the practice of levirate was not as widely supported as earlier in the century. And finally, I cannot even assert that her choice is an instance of levirate custom application per se. At the same time, it in all likelihood reaffirmed her solidarity relations and emotional bonds with her extended family through the exchange of care. In a broader sense, after the failure of her marriage because of the alcohol addiction of her husband – a problem that many Nenets continue to share, the successful upbringing of her sons with the help of her extended family can even be interpreted as a reaffirmation of Nenets family and kinship as a locus of care. In the context of NAO, where alcoholism is a common affliction experienced by most Nenets who underwent collectivization, whether tundra employees or village residents, such an example is an important model. This perhaps could have also influenced our Nenets field assistant’s choice of Agafia as our informant.

Among other factors that influence such life choices, personal circumstances, social and family environments, individual history should be given a prominent place. This is well illustrated by the case of Elena. Her education and enculturation both in nomadic tundra life and village boarding school have created preconditions for a wider array of choices accessible and thinkable to her (Liarskaya, Citation2013). Elena seems to aspire both to spatial and social mobility that seems somewhat unusual for other Yamb-To female members of her age and older at the moment when this research was done. Her cultural experience provides her with knowledge
and security in the contemporary world that NAO represents for her. In this context, she feels trust in the state and some of its institutions, enough to leave her newborn child in its care. At the same time, she puts a claim to the state that she expects it to take care of her as a citizen, i.e. she claims her citizenship rights in a more direct way, consciously or not. In the same vein, she introduces her children as citizens with full rights, also by establishing the state as part of their identity since their birth. In this way, like many other contemporary Nenets, she also puts a claim that her culture and her people are legitimate members of the state and multicultural society, of which certain implications are expected. At the same time, she does not show persuasion that the state is in opposition to her own cultural traditions and a threat to them. Her use of state social security institutions is indeed helping her adhere to cultural practices such as nomadism by offering innovative solutions and opportunities.

Elena’s insecurity about the social propriety of this decision, which is perhaps still new in the context of Yamb-To, found expression in her unwillingness to talk about it. In the wider society, such practices are also questioned. Yamb-To are private reindeer owners, but they do not register their property or economy, and consequently make no financial contribution to the state through paying taxes. But by using state social security institutions they take advantage of these common resources. Thus, even in this context, where state budgets receive only minor support from the generally low taxes, such an arrangement can be seen as not entirely acceptable by other members of society. In contrast to Soviet authorities, who readily and even forcefully modernized indigenous people, imposing strict controls, the contemporary state is less willing to support the globally influenced ethnic revival projects developed by indigenous politicians and activists. Even a group like Yamb-To, who tends to be entirely self-sustainable, is thus seen competing for valuable natural and financial state resources. On this basis, young Yamb-To women’s strategies can be seen as morally controversial and even condemned.

During this research, I was not able to make contacts and interviews in the orphanage where Nenets babies are being left. My general impression, though, during conversations with clerks and the indigenous representative in the regional administration, is that the authorities are positive and looking for ways to improve the situation and further integrate Yamb-To. An indication of this is the attempt from above to organize the official registration of the group as a kin community (obshchina), a form provided in the Russian indigenous legislation that can give title to grazing land. Further, the community has been allotted a piece of land, although it is far away from their preferred pastures and thus not in use at the moment. These developments make me believe that orphanage administrators are willing to accept Nenets babies for shorter periods of time. Older people describe experiences with Soviet doctors and cultural workers who took babies from tundra-living mothers and put them in urban orphanages in order to ‘rescue’ the child from harsh tundra life.
Although these involve the more radical state interference imposed in Soviet times, it is likely that it has left traces on ideas about contemporary practices.

Elena’s choice indicates a new and different relation of Yamb-To Nenets to the Russian state and its social institutions. Further consequences may emerge from this change, both in Nenets society and in the way the state imposes controls on them. The notion of state control evokes Soviet power and indigenous policies, and the dominant academic and political narratives about them, which emphasize negative aspects. The impacts of the state are not necessarily the product of centralized power. State social institutions can shape the ideas and practices of kinship and family relations, while at the same time these kin relations, affections, and empathy can shape the functioning of state institutions and the organization of centralized care. Recent anthropological discussions of evolving mechanisms of social security in postsocialist states offer multiple examples (Thelen, Citation2015; Thelen & Alber, Citation2017). In this respect, the mutually evolving patterns of indigenous family, kinship, and community care and that offered by the Russian state deserve further research.

This article attempts to promote such analysis with two examples of women securing care for their young children through mobilizing combinations of social and state offered resources. In both cases, the choices have been interpreted as relatively acceptable from community moral point of view, although perhaps slightly controversial. The interplay between dynamic state policy and resistant but flexible cultural social forms appears to create an environment where renegotiation of socially acceptable norms and practices is an ongoing process.

M. Nganasan [Russia]:

“Nganasan People,” Britannica, 28 Mar 2016 [121]
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nganasan

Overview:

Nganasan, also called Tavgi or Tavgi Samoyed, an indigenous Arctic people who traditionally resided in the lower half of the Taymyr Peninsula of Russia. They numbered about 800 in the early 21st century.

Current & Relevant Information:

The Dolgan also inhabit this region, and neighboring groups include the Sakha and the Enets. The Nganasan speak a Uralic language related to Nenets and Enets. The language has two main dialects, eastern and western. Well into the 20th century the Nganasan way of life was nomadic, based on fishing and the hunting of reindeer. In the 1930s Russian influence began to be felt with the introduction of alcohol, the encouragement of settled existence, and the emphasis on literacy (in Russian). This era also saw the commercialization and collectivization of reindeer husbandry. By
the 21st century Nganasan culture had been heavily affected by these and other changes, and few children were being taught the Nganasan language.

“Nganasan in Russia,” Keith Carey, Joshua Project [122]
https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/15299/RS

Overview:
The Tavgi Samoyed Nganasan people lived independent lives until the 17th century when the Russian government agents and merchants arrived on the Peninsula of Taimyr, their homeland. During the tsarist era they were forced to offer tribute to the Russians. In the 1930s their traditional lifestyle was forcefully restructured by the Russian communist government. In the 1960s, their nomadic lifestyle was eliminated, and they were forced to settle. Their traditions and ethnic identity have been diminishing ever since.

Current & Relevant Information:

Where Are they Located?
This people group lives on the Taimyr Peninsula on the coast of the Kara Sea, just south of the Arctic Ocean. This is Russia's north.

What Are Their Lives Like?
Life is difficult and humiliating for the Nganasan people. Most have to take menial jobs while others are unemployed. Some have joined the Russian military to have some way to earn a living. They are also looked down upon or ignored by the Russian majority.

What Are Their Beliefs?
A small percentage of the Taavgi Samoyed Nganasan people are Russian Orthodox; the rest either follow their traditional shamanistic religion or they are secular.


Overview:
Their autonym is ‘nganassa(n)’, frequently ‘ngano nganassan’, however this is not universal. The Avam group prefers the autonym ‘njaa’ (brother) and the eastern Vadejev group prefers asa. Nganasans have not developed a common ethnic identity. Their older but now outdated ethnonym “Tavgi Samoyeds” or “Tavgis” has spread to other languages via Russian.

Current & Relevant Information:

Territory
Nganasans live in the southern and central parts of the Taimyr peninsula near the Arctic Ocean, administratively belonging to the Taimyr Autonomous District of Krasnoyarsk Krai. This is a predominantly treeless tundra area, while in the south there is also forest tundra. Nganasans are the northernmost indigenous people of Eurasia.

Before being forced to become sedentary, Nganasans migrated from The Pyassino, Dudypta, Boganida and Heta rivers in the south to the Taimyr peninsula and Byrranga Hills in the north. In 1960-1990 a gradual forced sedentism of Nganasans to three settlements: Volochanka, Ust-Avam and Novaya – took place.

Today, Nganasans form a minority in these villages: the largest ethnic group is Dolgans, while in Volochanka there are slightly more Nganasans than Dolgans. These days most Nganasans have moved out to larger cities of the region such as Dudinka and Norilsk. Sedentary Nganasans live quite far from each other and thus have very limited interactions.

**Population**

According to the 2010 census, 862 persons considered themselves Nganasans. In 2002 this figure was 834 and in 1989 there were 1262 Nganasans of whom 83.2% spoke the mother tongue. According to later studies only 44% of Nganasans spoke the language in reality and only 17.6% of Nganasans used it on a daily basis.

**Language**

Nganasan language, along with Nenets and Enets languages, form the Northern group of Samoyed languages. Towards the west, the Avam dialect is spoken, while Vadeyev or Khatanga dialect is spoken in the East. Differences between dialects are not significant. During the 2010 census, 125 persons claimed to know the Nganasan language.

The main language of communication both at home and at work is Russian. The language shift among the younger generation has been faster than among other Northern indigenous peoples due to the sudden transition to sedentism in multi-ethnic villages, as well as due to mixed marriages and residential schools.

Russian language and environment is regarded highly among Nganasans. On the other hand, this environment is rejecting Nganasans. It has been reported that Russians who interact with Nganasans have been subjected to bullying.

**History**

Nganasans probably assimilated a Paleo-Asiatic hunting tribe, as well as western Yukagirs, northern Tungus and western Samoyeds. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Nganasans were taxed by Russians. To facilitate collection of yassak, Nganasans were offered 15 buckets of vodka a year. Exploitation of their work and natural resources took off.
For a long time Nganasans lived in moderate isolation from Russians, however the Soviet rule brought changes. Since the 1930s and 1940s – somewhat later than with neighbouring peoples – authorities started persecuting Nganasans as well, by repressing both shamans and “kulaks”, despite the absence of significant economic inequalities among the Nganasans.

In the 1930s, during the collectivisation, reindeer herding brigades were established that initially consisted only of Nganasans. Towards the late 1950s and in 1960s, Nganasan and Dolgan brigades were merged and soon led to Nganasans’ forced sedentism which was seen as a prerequisite for “raising the cultural level” of nomads. This also led to the disappearance of nomadic reindeer herding. By the early 1990s over 90% of Nganasans had become sedentary.

Adapting to new circumstances have caused major problems for Nganasans. Most of them have been forced to perform unskilled labour and there are high levels of unemployment. Alcoholism is pervasive.

Livelihoods

Reindeer hunting has been an important livelihood for Nganasans and continues to be so, given that Taimyr has the world’s largest population of wild reindeer. Nganasans used to practice driven hunt at river crossings during reindeer migratory periods in autumn and spring.

Summer hunting of waterfowl, winter hunting of fur animals (with traps) and fishing has also played an important role in traditional Nganasan economy. They lived in temporary tent dwellings and kept sled reindeer who would drive the narta.

In the 19th century, Nganasans adopted large-scale domesticated reindeer herding with a permanent nomadic lifestyle (to the south in winter, to the north in in summer). Most Nganasan migratory areas were in treeless tundra, however in winter they also reached forest tundra. In the middle of the 20th century, baloks or mobile houses driven on skis by reindeer, were adopted, thus rapidly replacing tent dwellings.

In the 1970s reindeer herding and nomadic lifestyles disappeared among Nganasans due to regional economic policies. Domesticated reindeer herding areas have been replaced with wild reindeer areas. In our times, reindeer and fur animal hunting as well as fishing is practiced in collective farm units. Women work in village sowing workshops, producing reindeer hide clothes and souvenirs.

Beliefs

The shamanist-animist religion of Nganasans is based on the idea of reciprocity and balance between human and the supernatural worlds. The idea of balance is manifested in the sharing of hunting game between community members as well as in the moderate usage of resources in general, given that gods and tundra spirits
punish greedy and selfish people. At times, sacrifices are made in the tundra in order to ensure good relations with supernatural powers and to secure good hunting game, health, happiness and well-being.

Shamans have mediated the relations between humans and gods for many centuries. Nganasans believe in the existence of supernatural spirits. In their cosmology, Mother Earth, Mother Sun and Mother Fire are of great importance. Their best-known shamanistic rite is the the rite of the clean dwelling which took place in Mid-Winter after the end of the polar night and lasted 3-9 days during which the shaman was casting spells. The Kosterkin shaman dynasty is well known – their members were conducting shaman sessions exceptionally even during the Soviet era. These days shamanism has almost disappeared from the Taimyr peninsula.


Overview:

The Nganasan are settled on the Taimyr Peninsula, which is part of the Taimyr (Dolgan-Nenets) Autonomous District (okrug), which, in turn, is part of the Krasnoyarsk Krai of the Russian Federation. The Nganasan thus lack national autonomy, living as migrants with the Dolgans and other distinct ethnic groups. Several isolated families live in the district capital of Dudinka, others in other regions of the Russian Federation.

Current & Relevant Information:

The Taimyr Peninsula is entirely above the Arctic Circle, in the permafrost zone. The Nganasan, as pastoralists, hunters of wild reindeer, and reindeer herders, mastered the territory in the center of the peninsula between 69° and 76° latitude and today move north in the spring and south in the fall, following the reindeer migration. The basic routes run along the North Siberian plain, which is enclosed between the Byrranga Plateau in the north and the Putorana Mountain in the south. The northern limits of the migration east of Taimyr reached 77° N, skirting Lake Taimyr. Practically all of this nomadic territory was in the tundra, covered with many small lakes and the sinuous channels of rivers bordered by clumps of low-growing willows, alders, and dwarf birches. In winter the Nganasan drew near to the forested tundra, situated along the divide between the basin of the Piasin River and the small northern tributaries of the Kheta and Khatanga rivers.

The climate is very severe. In the "spring" (i.e., the beginning of July) the rivers open up; icing over in the autumn takes place about the middle of September in the southern part of this land. On the northern lakes the ice usually melts toward the end of August, but sometimes endures throughout the entire short summer. The average
mid-January temperature in Dudinka is 28° C; in July it is 12.9° C. Strong winds are frequent. Polar night lasts 65 days; polar day, 83 days.

Today the Nganasan are almost entirely concentrated in three small villages. The Western group of the Nganasan live in Ust'-Avam and Volochanka. The Eastern group (Vad) live in the village of Novaia Demografiia.

Gender Roles:

“Nganasan,” Galina N. Grachova, Encyclopedia.com, 15 May 2024 [125]

Overview:
The Nganasan are settled on the Taimyr Peninsula, which is part of the Taimyr (Dolgan-Nenets) Autonomous District (okrug), which, in turn, is part of the Krasnoyarsk Krai of the Russian Federation. The Nganasan thus lack national autonomy, living as migrants with the Dolgans and other distinct ethnic groups. Several isolated families live in the district capital of Dudinka, others in other regions of the Russian Federation.

Current & Relevant Information:

Division of Labor. Traditionally, as today, hunting and reindeer breeding were male activities. All housework is the woman's responsibility, including the labor-intensive sewing of the hunter's fur clothing. The work of the women, who often live with preschool children at the hunting site, is extremely demanding. In the villages today, however, husbands stoke the stove, prepare the fuel for it, and sometimes even cook if the wife is busy.


Abstract:
The article deals with the analysis of fairy tales as the basic form of the children’s literature of indigenous small-numbered peoples of the Krasnoyarsk Krai. The fairy tale is considered as a specific prosaic type of folklore, which focuses on preservation and translation of the unique values of some or another culture as well as on the generation ties maintenance. Through the method of content analysis done for the Evenk, Nganasan, Nenets and Ket tales, the authors characterize the world view peculiar to the culture of each of these peoples and define their family models. To the family model a particular attention is given, since namely the family represents a primary space for the personal formation, development of their ethnic
identity and system of values. Moreover, the fairy tale is considered as an especial form, which gives an opportunity to protect the uniqueness of indigenous small-numbered peoples living in the Krasnoyarsk Krai in the context of globalization, and harmoniously balance the values of traditional culture and modern achievement of the civilization.

Current & Relevant Information:
To assess the Nganasans family model, we have chosen the tale “The Lake of Death”. This story focuses on lives of two families headed by Boro-hala, a father of the first family, and Khansi-tala, a son from the other family. The tale begins with Boro, his daughter and Khansi going for hunting, where Boro sees seven polled deer which transform into a woman and then into a burbot; thus, Boro understands his death coming. Having decided to be seized, Boro comes to the Lake of Death, his daughter and Khansi follow him. The Lake takes Boro and says that it would also take children of Khansi and Boro’s daughter. In several years, one of their children, a shaman, kills domestic deer while hunting, a female and a male, after which his parents die. In the end the shaman finds a new family and gets all the goods.

Grounding on the material received through the content analysis (Table 2), we can identify a set of specific features for the Nganasan family:
- Those characters represented as heads of the family stand apart since they have the names. The first-degree relatives, i.e., the wife and children, also bear their father’s name, e.g., “Boro’s daughter”, “Khunsi’s mother and father, and Boro’s wife”. In the case of marriage, apart from becoming a wife, the daughter is also marked by her belonging to the father: “Khunsi, his wife, a daughter of Boro”. Still, this feature is peculiar only for daughters (and only for those who are under specific age); Khunsi’s sons are not characterized by such a kinship.
- The family description does not include the word “family” per se: the quantitative characteristics is far more important, e.g., “Five people began to live together”;
- There is a clear distinction between the generations, since people of the secondary generation are characterized as old people: “Two old woman and an old man stayed”; “The old, Khunsi’s mother and father and Boro’s wife”; “I am old” (Boro says about himself);
- Reference to gender is also crucial for the tale: there is a scheme like “husband – man – father” or “wife – woman – mother”, “daughter – girl” or “boys – sons”. This scheme can be explained by the fact that the gender identification implies a special behavior pattern and type of activity given by the sexual character.
- Hierarchy in the list of family members: “Khunsi, his wife, a daughter of Boro, their son-shaman and other two sons”, where the son-shaman is mentioned above his two brothers
Ancestors have been mentioned once: Boro says “my ancestors”. In fact, the possessive pronoun “my” is rarely used even in relation to the parents and children: Boro’s daughter only one time has called his “my father”. Moreover, this reference appears even after Boro’s death. The father also has said “my daughter” only once, but in this case, he has used this expression within the context of his daughter’s marriage.

Considering the total number of references, we shall note that such characteristics as “mother”, “woman”, “son” and “daughter” are most frequently mentioned. Still, it is worth saying that the family head is more often than not called by his name, e.g., Boro, or Boro-tala, have been used for 21 times in this tale; Khunsi, or Khunsi-tala – for 13 times. Thus, there is such family model, which has the head with his reference without any description as a husband or father; a woman characterized by her role as the mother; and there are children, i.e., sons and daughters.
Abstract:

Today’s Siberian Arctic, including Taymyr, is a reindustrialized area where the traditional economy of indigenous minorities finds itself clashing with global transformations, while nonmarket economic relationships typical of indigenous
communities are being badly damaged by the capitalist market relationships of post-Soviet Russia. Based on insights collected via field research between 2010 and 2015 and a critical analysis of statistical data on modern Taymyr’s economy (from January to July 2015), this paper attempts to assess the economic situation of Taymyr and its indigenous peoples, such as Dolgans, Nenets, Nganasans, Evenks, and Enets. Occupational employment and income statistics clearly demonstrate that the indigenous population is moving from a traditional economy to the modern post-industrial world. Traditional economic activities are 3 to 4 times less profitable than other types of business. State subsidies are no longer helping to mitigate the impact of the impoverishment process of the indigenous population. The establishment of traditional nature management areas, which could be used exclusively by the indigenous population, is being slowed down by the poorly developed legal framework required for creating such areas.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction. Russia’s Arctic and Northern territories are home to unique indigenous ethnic minorities from Siberia and the North. These days the global community believes that the unique economic, environmental, and cultural practices of Siberian and Northern indigenous peoples are a common heritage of mankind and require special protection. The economic situation of Siberian and Northern indigenous peoples is characterized by a number of specific features, such as tough climate conditions, unique forms of social communication, environmental thinking, and coexistence between man and animals, man and flora, man and the natural environment. Processes associated with globalization, urbanization and mass culture domination are undermining indigenous peoples’ traditional uniqueness and cultural environment. Secondary industrialization of the Russian Arctic is a subject requiring a detailed study into the current economic situation of the indigenous peoples living in the North and a well-planned strategy for the area’s socioeconomic development, taking into account the above features.

Brief Literature Review. Another prominent researcher of the economy of Taymyr’s indigenous peoples, J. Ziker, focused on the Nganasans and their land use and hunting practices (2002). He also analyzed social communications in the Dolgan, the Nenets, and the Nganasan communities in the context of food redistribution (2004) and conducted a detailed study of gender role shifts within Taymyr indigenous communities between 1917 and the 1990s (2010).


Overview:

This book draws together contributors from more than ten countries, writing on the diverse – yet often surprisingly similar – experiences of indigenous peoples on five
continents. It begins with a general introductory section on indigenous poverty and disadvantage around the world. This first section considers both quantifiable indicators of poverty – factors such as infant mortality, illiteracy rates, housing conditions, incomes and so forth – and less quantifiable aspects of poverty having to do with political voice, human rights and social exclusion. Part One thus lays the groundwork for the rest of the book by exploring particular patterns of disadvantage affecting indigenous peoples. Through specific studies from Mexico and Taiwan, as well as a comparative study from across the Americas, Part One demonstrates the very different international contexts in which indigenous peoples live, and the often-surprising similarities in their situations when compared with those of non-indigenous peoples.

From there, the book moves on in Part Two to address the position of indigenous peoples in contemporary nation-states, with a focus on indigenous rights, citizenship and indigenous demands for self-determination. These chapters explore the relationships between indigenous peoples and nation-states in various countries around the world, within the broader context of globalized economies and international recognition of indigenous rights. Indra Overland reflects on the historical position of indigenous peoples in Russia, as well as the limitations of international aid in terms of reaching impoverished indigenous peoples who live in comparatively wealthy nations. Don McCaskill and Jeff Rutherford then discuss the situations of indigenous peoples in various countries of South-East Asia, within the context of national policies and global economies.

Part Two continues with Louise Humpage’s insightful analysis of New Zealand anti-poverty policy for indigenous people, and the Maori’s response. In this chapter, as well as the following chapter on two Colombian indigenous groups and their experiences of ‘popular participation’, it becomes clear that indigenous peoples have their own agendas, and that these agendas are often poorly understood and recognized even by those governments that claim to seek their participation and inclusion. The section’s final chapter, by Stephen Cornell, explores indigenous demands for self-determination, offering a comparative study of four countries (Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States). Throughout Part Two, it becomes clear that understanding the relationships between indigenous peoples and nation-states is key to understanding indigenous poverty, and to uncovering the potential for change.

Part Three focuses specifically on indigenous peoples’ own perspectives on development and poverty reduction, a theme that runs through the book as a whole. Here, a Latin American study by Pablo Alarcón-Cháires explores indigenous peoples’ perspectives on the natural environment and development, offering various examples and suggestions as to how indigenous environmental knowledge and practice can contribute to poverty reduction for indigenous groups. This chapter is followed by an Australian case study describing an indigenous community members’
own anti-poverty strategies in one Australian town. Part Three concludes with a reflection on the history, context and achievements of Sami anti-poverty strategies in the Nordic countries.

This book is structured to include a variety of voices and perspectives without sacrificing continuity and flow. The narrative thus begins by drawing attention to the pattern of indigenous poverty (Part One), then discusses its national and international contexts (Part Two) before moving on to the question of development – or doing something about poverty (Part Three). Each of these three sections opens with a short introductory chapter, which presents a conceptual background to the topic and the chapters that follow. The book’s concluding chapter then draws together key themes from these three sections and reflects on their practical implications for poverty reduction among indigenous peoples. The aim is to create a convincing tapestry in which diverse stories and experiences are presented, key patterns explored, and conclusions drawn.

The strengths of this book lie in its international perspective, its focus on real-world cases, and its willingness to tackle, thoroughly and sensitively, one of the current 'big issues' in development and international policy. The book also has limitations. Because it has followed the contours of indigenous discourse internationally, it has sparse representation from some geographic areas, most notably the continent of Africa, where the terminology of ‘indigenous peoples’ is used less frequently. Even in other parts of the world, the book can offer only a small sampling of the great diversity of experiences of indigenous peoples. It does not attempt to profile all the indigenous groups of each region – impossible in anything short of a multi-volume encyclopedia – and as a result, inevitably, valuable experiences and perspectives will be overlooked.

Drawing on contributions from a broad range of disciplines within and beyond the social sciences, this book is truly multi-disciplinary. As such, it has a further limitation in terms of not being able to deliver a common research methodology or common theory-set for the study of indigenous poverty. As the reader will see, the multi-disciplinarity of the contributions to the book also means that the presentation and language differ from chapter to chapter. These limitations aside, there is still a lot to be gained from a multi-disciplinary project of this kind, both in terms of contributing to a multi-dimensional understanding of poverty in general and in helping to provide a nuanced explanation of the complexities of indigenous poverty in particular. The decision to write about indigenous peoples and poverty has entailed choosing to ask difficult questions, and to invite a range of voices into the conversation. The authors of this book share a wide knowledge and a diversity of perspectives. Their insights, taken together, can illuminate a way forward to better understand – and act upon – the issue of poverty among indigenous peoples.

Current & Relevant Information:
The results of this study indicate that, even in areas of high and very high socio-economic marginalization, poverty conditions and the worst health and living standards become more evident in indigenous groups than in non-indigenous groups. In general terms, both men and women are found to be in worse socio-economic conditions than their non-indigenous counterparts.

In this sense, a number of social inequalities are revealed by this study:

1. The socio-economic inequality (class-related inequality) suffered by indigenous and non-indigenous men and women in areas of high socio-economic marginalization in Chiapas compared to other socioeconomic regions.

2. The inequality between indigenous men and women compared to their non-indigenous counterparts (ethnic inequality).

3. The condition of indigenous and non-indigenous women compared to indigenous and non-indigenous men (gender-based inequality).

4. The inequality between indigenous women and non-indigenous women due to poverty and the fact of being indigenous and a woman (class, ethnic and gender inequality).

There are two particularly striking aspects. On the one hand, there is the fact that indigenous women have significantly lower educational levels (which might be explained by the fact that indigenous women’s education is mainly focused on household care, as well as by the poor educational condition of Chiapas, particularly in areas of high socio-economic marginalization). On the other hand, there is the fact that the indigenous/nonindigenous polarity in the locations under study grows in relation to the marginalization level of the municipalities they belong to, but the difference is much less marked between urban and rural municipalities, in a context where little more than ten communities in Chiapas (out of over 22,000 located in this state) have more than ten thousand inhabitants.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwig9rHN6J7xAhXDKs0KHWB1AXw4KBAWMAl6BAgJEAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmyelms.umd.edu%2Fcoursesh%2F1217261%2Ffiles%2F45786385%2Fdownload%3Fverifier%3DbPj4HCUxqcFSFmWsgoi7MOpXtpaFHqq8sOTcVSl&usg=AOvVaw2m6Z4wzTMLKH3_M-kg36xk

Abstract:

The role of men in hunter-gatherer societies has been subject to vigorous debate over the past 15 years. The proposal that men hunt wild game as a form of status signaling or “showing off” to provide reproductive benefits to the hunter challenges the traditional view that men hunt to provision their families. Two broad assumptions
underlie the signaling view: (1) hunting is a poor means of obtaining food, and (2) hunted game is a public good shared widely with others and without expectation of future reciprocation. If hunters lack the ability to direct food shares and obtain subsequent benefits contingent on redistribution, then the ubiquitous observations of male hunting and universal pair-bonding cannot be explained from a perspective that emphasizes kin provisioning and a division of labor. Here we show that there is little empirical support for the view that men hunt for signaling benefits alone. The ethnographic record depicts a more complex relationship between food sharing patterns, subsistence strategies, mating, and the sexual division of labor. We present a framework incorporating trade-offs between mating and subsistence strategies in an economic bargaining context that contributes to understanding men's and women's roles in hunter-gatherer societies.

Current & Relevant Information:

The amount of meat received was also significantly associated with the amount given to each family among the Pilaga (Gurven 2004), Yanomamo (Hames 2000), Dolgan, and Nganasan (Ziker and Schnegg 2005). Among the Ache, meat sharing is highly contingent at reservation settlements (Gurven, Hill, and Kaplan 2002), and nonmeat foods are shared contingently in both the forest and reservation when other confounding factors are controlled. Contingency trumps kinship on Ache reservations, with shares going preferentially to kin who give them large amounts of food rather than those who share little (Gurven, Hill, and Kaplan 2001). Only Ache Forest meat sharing shows no relationship between amounts given and received among nuclear family pairs (Gurven, Hill, and Kaplan 2002); however, on forest treks, meat may still be shared in a contingent fashion (Hill 2002). Informants state that a man must hunt and attempt to kill something in order for others to give him a share in the band’s daily production. Teenage boys are warned that if they do not hunt, they will not be fed. Men failing to hunt or help in cooperative hunts are generally not invited to participate on future treks.

Hadza meat sharing has been described as noncontingent because individuals approach undefendable kills and take portions for themselves. However, Hawkes, O’Connell, and Blurton Jones’s (2001, table 3) recent data reveal that a hunter’s family receives a larger portion of his kill (29.9 kg/kill) on average than do other families (13.5 kg/kill) for the largest animals. Other biases in meat distribution (to close kin, nearest neighbors, sharing partners, etc.) have not been examined among the Hadza, but Marlowe (1999) shows that men with biological children rather than stepchildren produce more food, suggesting that Hadza men acquire food partially to feed their families. Hawkes et al. (2001) report no relationship between the total amount of meat a hunter provides to all others and the amounts received in return from all others, but this does not test contingency. The right of a man or his family to take a portion of the kill may depend on his attempts to acquire food (and sharing the results) or provide some useful good or service, as we suggest among the Ache.
If so, obtaining a share of meat among the Hadza may be contingent on cooperative behavior that benefits hunters who share; indeed, part of demand sharing (Peterson 1993) may reflect debt obligations based on expected repayment. Whatever the explanation for demand sharing among the Hadza, our reanalysis does show significant contingency for meat transfers among pairs of Hadza hunters (Gurven 2004).

Women’s sharing patterns, a rarely examined feature of hunter-gatherer life, also contradict the signaling hypothesis. It is argued that women target items for which they can control resource package size and rarely acquire more than their families can eat (Bird 1999, 68). This is not true of the Ache, Hiwi, and probably the Hadza as well. Women often intentionally collect larger amounts of food than their family can consume, then widely share outside their nuclear family. Plant foods come in small increments, and women could stop working upon obtaining enough for their families. Ache women extract palm fiber starch one handful at a time, producing between 3,000 and 6,000 calories in each extraction session. Anecdotal reports suggest similar rates for Hadza root and berry collection and that Hadza women share with unrelated individuals (Blurton Jones, Hawkes, and O’Connell 1997). Ache and Hiwi women must therefore acquire large packages of collected foods intentionally because they gain from food transfer. Theory suggests that those gains cannot be increased by number of mates; gains from sharing should be in some form that affects women’s or offspring’s well-being. Ache and Hiwi women give away about 55% of all collected food (Gurven 2006; Kaplan and Hill 1985). Ache women at reservation settlements share an even higher fraction of their collected resources (76%). As package size increases, Hiwi and Ache women keep a smaller percentage for their nuclear family.

It has long been known that men share a greater percentage of their production than women; however, this may be because they often bring in large food packages. Analyses among the Hiwi (Gurven et al. 2000b), Ache on reservation settlements (Gurven et al. 2001), and Ache on forest treks (Gurven, Hill, and Kaplan 2002) show no sex differences in amounts shared outside the family for resources obtained by men and women after controlling for resource size. If women’s sharing patterns are identical to those of men, and the production of large packages and subsequent sharing by women is paid back in a form useful for parental investment, it seems parsimonious to assume the same for men’s sharing.

Many ethnographies report complaints concerning failures to meet sharing obligations or expectations, particularly in the context of pairwise exchange (see Gurven 2004). Men who hunt only as a form of mating effort should not be concerned with receiving conditional shares from previous recipients, nor should they complain or become upset when shares are not returned. If signaling provides fitness benefits, and signalers compete for an audience, men should prefer not to have their shares repaid, but no evidence supports this conjecture.
Why Don't Women Hunt?

The signaling model suggests that women avoid hunting because it provides low unpredictable payoffs. We have shown that hunting yields comparable or higher caloric returns and more favorable nutrient content than collecting in several societies. The Agta of the Philippines are often cited as evidence that women can hunt as proficiently as men, despite encumbrances of childcare. In fact, many forager women, including Ache and Hiwi, participate in hunting activities. However, women rarely make kills of medium-sized or large game; instead, they engage in activities that help men hunt successfully. In contrast, Agta women hunt with bows and arrows and kill the same prey as do men. The Agta data are important because they indicate conditions under which women may actively hunt. However, fewer than 100 Agta women claimed to have ever hunted from a population of about 9,000 on Luzon Island (P. B. Griffin and T. Headland, personal communication). Most women who reported having hunted were no longer hunting during the ethnographic observation period, and most late-twentieth-century Agta had never heard of women hunters (P. B. Griffin and T. Headland, personal communication). Hunting production data exist for a sample of only six women hunters (Goodman et al. 1985), and available data suggest several patterns relevant to women’s hunting: (1) carbohydrate resources provided low returns and were rarely encountered; (2) meat was traded for carbohydrates at a favorable rate; (3) fertility and ratios of dependent children to adults were low, with high availability of alloparents; (4) women who hunted were often sterile or post reproductive; (5) all women’s kills resulted from hunting with dogs; and (6) women’s hunting always took place less than 5 km from camp, allowing rapid return to dependent off-spring (Estioko-Griffin 1985, 1986; Goodman et al. 1985). The first three points may explain why African Pygmy women participate in communal net and bow hunting activities. Dogs immobilize Agta prey, perhaps explaining why they regularly dispatch prey without men whereas Hiwi and Ache women rarely do. No study of Agta women hunters has examined whether active hunting is related to women’s reproductive status at the time of hunting, but anecdotes suggest that women hunted infrequently or not at all when pregnant or lactating (Estioko-Griffin 1986, 42).

Brown (1970) proposed that women do not hunt because it is incompatible with childcare demands rather than because of strength demands or physical constraints such as endurance or spatial abilities (see also Hurtado et al. 1992). Keeping offspring alive is a top priority for forager women, and it precludes hunting in most environments. Nursing women adjust gathering rates according to the age of the youngest child with them at the food patch, and as infant age increases, collection rates increase substantially (Hurtado et al. 1992).

Mothers obligatorily care for infants because on-demand lactation occurs frequently throughout the day. Women would often lose prey were they to interrupt hunting pursuits to meet immediate childcare demands. Infants cry and fuss for many
reasons, and failure to react to distress calls lowers infant viability. The situation is quite different for sessile-collected resources and some small vertebrates, where pursuit can be interrupted at any time without loss.

Hunting is also dangerous for infants because of long distances traveled under arduous conditions and dangers inherent in rapid burst pursuits. Males experience higher accident rates than females among Ache foragers (Hill and Hurtado 1996) and higher death rates from animal attacks and snakebite among Tsimane (Gurven, Kaplan, and Zelada Supa 2007). Because maternal loss is more detrimental than paternal loss (Sear and Mace 2007), women may be more averse to risk of injury than men.

Finally, successful hunting requires at least 15–20 years of experience to obtain maximum return rates. Boys who miss sensitive-period skill development rarely become proficient hunters (Gurven, Kaplan, and Gutierrez 2006; Kaplan et al. 2000; Walker et al. 2002). The steepest gains in men’s hunting returns occur during the years when women experience high fertility and are constrained from hunting. This may explain why post reproductive women, free from childcare constraints, do not hunt in most societies.

N. Sami [Finland/Norway/Russia/Sweden]:


Overview:

In the far north of Europe, ancient sounds, unique craftwork traditions, and a particular language live side by side with modern technology. The Sami culture is the oldest culture in large areas of Northern Norway and is currently experiencing a strong renaissance.

Current & Relevant Information:

The Sami people live in four countries: Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. The total population in these four countries is estimated at approx. 80,000, of whom around half live in Norway. Slightly under half of these people talk Sami. In Norway, the Sami people in Norway live in almost all parts of Northern Norway, and in the southern parts of the country in Trøndelag and Femundsmarka in Hedmark.


Overview:

Sami, any member of a people speaking the Sami language and inhabiting Lapland and adjacent areas of northern Norway, Sweden, and Finland, as well as the Kola Peninsula of Russia. The three Sami languages, which are mutually unintelligible,
are sometimes considered dialects of one language. They belong to the Finno-Ugric branch of the Uralic family. Almost all Sami are now bilingual, and many no longer even speak their native language. In the late 20th century there were from 30,000 to 40,000 Sami in Norway and about 20,000 in Sweden, 6,000 in Finland, and 2,000 in Russia.

Current & Relevant Information:
The Sami are the descendants of nomadic peoples who had inhabited northern Scandinavia for thousands of years. When the Finns entered Finland, beginning about AD 100, Sami settlements were probably dispersed over the whole of that country; today they are confined to its northern extremity. In Sweden and Norway, they have similarly been pushed north. The origin of the Sami is obscure; some scholars include them among the Paleo-Siberian peoples; others maintain that they were alpine and came from central Europe.

Reindeer herding was the basis of the Sami economy until very recently. Although the Sami hunted reindeer from the earliest times and kept them in small numbers as pack and decoy animals, full-scale nomadism with large herds began only a few centuries ago. The reindeer-herding Sami lived in tents or turf huts and migrated with their herds in units of five or six families, supplementing their diet along the way by hunting and fishing.

Nomadism, however, has virtually disappeared; the remaining herders now accompany their reindeer alone while their families reside in permanent modern housing. While the reindeer of a unit are herded communally, each animal is individually owned. Many Norwegian Sami are coastal fishermen, and those in other areas depend for their livelihoods on farming, forestry, freshwater fishing, and mining or on government, industrial, and commercial employment in cities and towns. Sami increasingly participate in the Scandinavian professional, cultural, and academic world.

The Skolt Sami of Finland (and perhaps also the Russian Sami) belong to the Russian Orthodox faith; most others are Lutheran. The shaman was important in non-Christian Sami society, and some shamanistic healing rites are still performed. There is, at least in most of the northern Sami communities, a strong evangelical congregationalism (Laestadianism), in which local congregations are virtually autonomous.

The Scandinavian countries periodically tried to assimilate the Sami, and the use of the Sami languages in schools and public life was long forbidden. In the second half of the 20th century, however, attention was drawn to the problems of the Sami minority, which became more assertive in efforts to maintain its traditional society and culture through the use of Sami in schools and the protection of reindeer pastures. In each country there are Sami political and cultural societies, and there are a few Sami newspapers and radio programs.
Overview:

With a culture that remains strong, some 20,000 Sami live in Sweden. Sami country – known as Sápmi – stretches across the northern part of Scandinavia and Russia’s Kola Peninsula. The original settlement was even larger, but the Sami were gradually forced to give up land, first to farmers starting in the 1650s and later to industries such as forestry and mining.

There is no census for the Sami, but the population is estimated at around 80,000 people, spread over four countries with approximately 20,000 in Sweden, 50,000 in Norway, 8,000 in Finland and 2,000 in Russia.

The Sami are one of the world's indigenous people and one of Sweden's official national minorities. The minority status means – in short – that they have special rights and that their culture, traditions and languages are protected by law.

But it wasn’t until 1977 that the Sami were recognized by the Swedish parliament as an indigenous people.

Current & Relevant Information:

Reindeer husbandry traditions

Originally hunters and gatherers, the Sami turned to herding of domesticated reindeer in the 17th century. Reindeer naturally move across huge tracks of land to graze, and the Sami historically lived lives following the herds.

The modern norm is instead to have a permanent home and a cabin in the mountains for the herding season. And those who remain in the business have long since replaced the skis with snowmobiles, AWD vehicles and helicopters. Only some ten per cent of Swedish Sami earn a living from the reindeer industry, and many supplements their income through tourism, fishing, crafts and other trades.

Many have been forced to look for income elsewhere as a result of ongoing challenges to the reindeer trade, including disputes with the government over grazing rights, restrictions as to who may legally be involved in reindeer husbandry, and loss of land.

There’s a historical dispute between reindeer herders’ grazing rights and landowners’ logging rights. In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Sami, giving them common law rights to a specific area of land.

'Sami village'

A sameby – ‘Sami village’ – is not a traditional village but a complex economic and administrative union within a specific geographical area. Its members have the right
to engage in reindeer husbandry in this area, including building whatever facilities they need. In certain areas they also have fishing and hunting rights. It is regulated by a Swedish law called the Reindeer Husbandry Act (link in Swedish). There are 51 Sami villages, the largest one being Sirges in Jokkmokk.

Towards the end of the 19th century, many Sami permanently kept both farms and reindeer (mixed husbandry). The government, however, would make some contentious decisions, the repercussions of which extended well into the 20th century.

The Reindeer Pasture Law of 1928 limited reindeer ownership and membership in any Sami village to herders and their families. The new restrictions forced mixed husbandry farmers to choose between reindeer herding or other forms of agriculture.

For generations, people have been turning to other professions, and the Sami are trying to ease government regulations so people can belong to a Sami village without having to own reindeer.

**Truth and reconciliation**

The Sami have long been in contact with the nation states that were established on the land they called home. Through these encounters, the Sami have been forced to change their way of life. It’s a history filled with abuses, violations and racism.

In November 2021, the Swedish government announced that it was setting up a truth commission that will review the history of Sweden’s policies toward the Sami and the effect these policies have had on the Sami people. The assignment runs until 1 December 2025.

Back in 2019, the Sami Parliament had submitted its formal request to the government for a truth and reconciliation commission to be established. The year after, the Sami were awarded 1.2 million crowns (EUR 144,000) from the Swedish state to lay the groundwork for the truth commission.

**Official church apology**

In 2021, the Church of Sweden made an official apology to the Sami people for historical abuses. The apology was delivered by Archbishop Antje Jackelén at the General Synod’s special service of worship on 24 November in Uppsala Cathedral.

Another official apology is scheduled for the Ságastallamat 2 conference in Luleå on 21–23 October 2022.

Furthermore, the Church of Sweden’s central board is allocating 40 million crowns in strategic development funds for reconciliation processes during 2022-2031.

Overall commitments will be established based on responses from all dioceses, after which an action plan for the ten-year period will be drawn up in close dialogue with the Sami Council of the Church of Sweden.
The Sami Parliament

The organized Sami political work for autonomy began in the 1950s with the establishment of Sami associations that eventually lead to the establishment of Sametinget (Sami Parliament) in 1993. Sametinget is both a parliament and a government agency.

As a government agency with around 50 civil servants, the Sami Parliament has the daily responsibility of taking care of tasks concerning Sami culture, languages and Sami industries such as reindeer herding. It serves directly under the Swedish Ministry of Cultural Affairs.

The parliament is made up of 31 members, elected for four years. They convene three times a year. Those on the Sami electoral register – open to those who speak Sami and define themselves as part of Sami society – are eligible to vote.

According to statistics from Sametinget (link in Swedish), the numbers registering to vote have increased every election year since the first election in 1993. The last election, on 16 May 2021, had a voting list of 9,220.

Greater autonomy

Historically, one political goal has united all the political parties in Sametinget: greater autonomy.

Sweden’s constitution was amended in 2011 to affirm the obligation of public power in Sweden to promote the opportunities of the Sami people to preserve and develop a cultural and social life of their own.

The Sami parliaments in Finland, Norway and Sweden have drawn up a joint Nordic convention to strengthen their position as an indigenous people and influence decisions on Sami-related matters. The convention has not yet been approved by the Nordic governments.

“Sami Facts,” Cultural Survival, 9 June 2010 [133]
https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/sami-facts

Overview:

• The Sámi define themselves as an Indigenous People, as stated in the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169: “Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state boundaries.” The ILO is a specialized agency of the United Nations.

Current & Relevant Information:
• As far back as recorded history we know that Sámi people have lived in the Nordic countries and on Kola Peninsula in Russia, where Sámi still live today. It is estimated that about 40,000 Sámi live in Norway, 20,000 in Sweden, 7,500 in Finland, and 2,000 in Russia. For the most part, language and self-identification are the ethnic criteria used in all countries with Sámi inhabitants.

• The Sámi have depended on hunting, fishing, farming, and reindeer herding, and have been semi-nomadic. Today only 2 percent of Sámi work in the reindeer industry.

• The Sámi language is part of the Finno-Ugric branch of the Uralic language. There are several dialects of Sámi, and people who speak them may not understand each other.

• The Sámi parliament, Samediggi, was established by law in 1987 and opened by the King of Norway in 1989. The assembly has 39 members chosen by direct elections based on census numbers. The Sámi parliament is the authoritative advisory agency in issues regarding the Sámi people, but has no legal or executive power. The parliament is located in a beautiful building in Karasjok shaped like a gamme, or the old earthen huts where the Sámi used to live.

• The Sámi are organized in several large organizations in Norway and through common Nordic organizations. The Sámi Council assembles the largest organizations in the Nordic countries and works to advance Sámi interests.

• The Sámi are represented at the UN by the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues; in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, which includes Norway, Sweden, and Finland as well as the surrounding areas of Russia; and in the Arctic Council.

• The Sámi in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia have their own flag, which was approved in 1986. Today the Sámi people celebrate Sámi People’s Day on February 6.

Gender Roles:

“Women in Saami Society,” Sarah Andrews, Sami Culture [134]
https://www.laits.utexas.edu/sami/dieda/hist/women.htm

Overview:

The Saami are recognized as being an oppressed minority group, and much has been written, mostly by the Saami themselves, about their situation. However, the plight of Saami women is an important issue that has only recently started to gain a noticeable amount of coverage in Samiland. This began with the Saami feminist movement in the 1970s, which opened for discussion the issue of Saami women’s positions in a constantly changing society. Because of the changes the Saami have encountered as a result of modernization and their assimilation into Norwegian
culture, Saami women have been forced to reevaluate and redefine their roles in modern society.

Saami women’s issues fall into certain categories that are of particular importance, and I have grouped them accordingly as: women’s roles in society; Christianity and modernization; internalized racism; Saami men’s views of women; men and women’s topics in writing; the Saami feminist movement, including current and future issues; women in reindeer husbandry; and marriage. Even though I tried to separate issues within this paper for the sake of clarity, they are overlapping and therefore several points are mentioned more than once.

Current & Relevant Information:

Women’s roles in society

While it is clear that women are generally allowed a certain amount of prestige in a community by virtue of being the primary caretakers of children, Saami women are especially important because they are also responsible for passing on their unique indigenous culture to their children (Brenna, 8). The mother is also in charge of ensuring her family’s survival, and her responsibilities indicate that Saami culture contains a matriarchal element (Bosi, 79). Saami author Rauni Magga Lukkari thinks that Saami women brought up according to tradition have a lot of power. Lukkari says that women’s power is expressed through traditional Saami outlets, such as making clothes. The clothes that Saami women make are necessary for survival in the harsh winter climate, which, according to Lukkari, puts women in a position of power. She does say that this is not as true as it once was, when “sewing clothes took up the better part of women’s daily work” (Helander and Kailo, 108-109).

Modernization

It is believed that the arrival of modernization in Sapmi brought with it a loss of power among women. Modernization in this case is a broad term that encompasses several different ideas: Norwegianization, Christian influences, and a loss of traditional Saami culture. Without both Norwegian and Christian influences and the Saamis’ eventual forced assimilation into a different way of living, their customs and ideas likely would not have changed as dramatically as they did. Women were affected as a result of the change from traditional to a more mainstream society. Though they are still important, women are no longer absolutely imperative to the survival of the family. Integration into contemporary society has absolved Saami women of the responsibilities they once had, such as the need to make clothing or prepare reindeer skins. Clothing can be bought, and most Saami were forced to quit their life of reindeer herding for economic, social, and environmental reasons.

Saami men’s views of women

Women interviewed in No Beginning, No End have some interesting recounts of how they, and others, have been treated by Saami men. Paltto says that she has been in
situations where men won’t talk to her because she is married, and writer Inga Juuso says men have looked down upon her for being divorced, because divorce is only now becoming more common among the Saami (Helander and Kailo, 142).

Saami male authors can also provide insight into how women are viewed in society. While most Saami male authors choose to write about topics such as reindeer herding and maintaining the Saami cultural identity, Saami writer Eino Guttorm has taken a decidedly different path in his writings. He explores the male-female dynamic of relationships and writes openly about women in ways that other Saami authors have not. Guttorm commented on this difference between his and others’ works in No Beginning, No End. About Nils-Aslak Valkeapaa, who writes mainly about nature, Guttorm says that he is “oppressive. There is too much whining, sun, moon, squeaking, birds’ singing and sunshine…Like mother’s milk at its sweetest. It is good for sure. But it is not necessarily to everybody’s taste” (Helander and Kailo, 65).

In “The Bloodied Path,” Guttorm tells the story of a man who kills the mother of the woman he is living with, then lies and says the mother died a natural death. The women in his story are far from the motherly or caring type, and are instead portrayed as manipulative and brazen. Though his representation of women in his writings and in No Beginning, No End could be indicative of his feelings toward women, it is also possible that Guttorm’s brash commentary on women is nothing more his unique stylistic technique.

Guttorm says that he does not bash women, but he does classify them as either good or bad. He has been criticized for belittling women in his writings. He says:

A woman is prone to saying what’s on her mind, a woman nags more easily. A non-stop nuisance, itching everywhere, whining, like a non-stop plague of mosquitoes…Texts by women are marshmallow sweet. They have too many adjectives, complaints, self-pitying, and wailing…Flirting with the readers, crawling in front of them. That doesn’t charm the readers. The style smacks of sweetness (66).


Overview:

Claudia Nussbaumer continues her series, ‘Gender roles in indigenous communities,’ by looking at Saami gender roles, its change with the arrival of Christianity and the 1970s Saami feminist movement.

Current & Relevant Information:

The Saami are a Finno-Ugric people inhabiting Sápmi, a large area to the north of modern-day Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. Historically, they have been
known in English as ‘Lapps’ or ‘Laplanders.’ However, these terms can be perceived as derogatory. They have never been a single community in a single region of Lapland. Today’s estimated population is between 80,000-100,000.

In traditional Saami culture, women hold a certain amount of prestige due to being the primary caretaker of children. They are responsible for passing culture down through the generations and also ensure the family’s survival. Another important aspect is the making of clothes, especially vital for survival in such a harsh climate. These responsibilities and the esteem in which they are held within society indicate a matriarchal element to Saami culture.

However, Saami women themselves have spoken up about the influence Christianity has had on gender roles. Kristi Paltto argues that Christianity has made women subservient as it teaches that women should be men’s servants. Saami author, Magga Lukkari partially agrees with this statement. Lukkari claims that while Saami women are in a worse position than before, they are not as oppressed as women in the Western world. She further explains: “The position of a woman has been so important in a society based on an extended family that several generations will pass before Saami women are in the same position as Western women here.”

In connection with this is the Saami shamanistic religion, which recognizes a variety of gods. The most important god for women is Mattarahkko, the primeval mother. This god also has three daughters who help women through different stages of their life. The presence of female deities in traditional Saami religion is more evidence for the regard women are held in Saami society.

The Saami feminist movement came into existence for a number of reasons: the effects of modernization; gender disparity within society at large; and specifically, female reindeer herders demanding equal labor rights. Moreover, there was a constructed perception of what it meant to be a Saami woman. Even though it was the image of a strong, decisive mother, it limited and pressured women into a niche gender role.

The Saami feminist movement happened in the late 1960s and early 1970s when women globally began to address stereotypes, economic injustices, and the concept of gender roles. The oppression faced by Saami women is twofold as they experience oppression based on both gender and ethnicity, inside and outside their communities.

What is important to mention is that feminism didn’t reach all Saami women. Many Saami women felt that conversations around gender roles and feminism portrayed them as victims, and so, refrained in engaging in liberation efforts. Furthermore, there was no interaction between mainstream feminist organizations and indigenous groups on the issue- preventing a population-wide uprising from taking root.
Despite this, the 1988 Nordic Council’s Women’s Conference marked a significant step forward for Saami women. Many Saami decided to band together and form their own women’s organization, Sarahkka. This organization focused not only on women’s issues but also indigenous problems, such as land and water rights.


Abstract:
Historically, different nations-states at different times have tried to claim authority over the Sámi in the circumpolar north. After the nation state borders were drawn in the 1700s and 1800s, separating Russia, Norway, Sweden and Finland, Norway introduced a harsh and 1800s separating Russia, Norway, Sweden and Finland, Norway introduced a harsh assimilation policy that lasted over a century. Cultural Darwinist views and national assimilationist legislation and social strategies chipped away at Sámi society and its identity as an indigenous people. Over time Sámi women found their accustomed social, economic, and political autonomy eroded. Post-World War II, the emerging welfare state of Norway began a policy of “rationalization” in an attempt to equalize and raise living standards for their citizens. The result was an increase of social and national pressures that called for the Sámi people to conform to the majority society. Social efforts at rebuilding the nation were constructed according to Norwegian political, economic, educational, and cultural norms and the Sámi were feeling increasingly unrepresented. It was at this point, between the end of the war and the later part of 1960s, a kind of Sámi renaissance arose. Through the organization of knowledge, the Sámi opened up new areas of social and political understanding. For women, the formation of cooperation initiated by Elsa Laula-Renberg in 1904 created the atmosphere for Sámi women to begin evaluating their positions and roles in a modernized and advancing society, along with giving women the political and structural tools to address their concerns regarding increasing social and economic inequalities. The 1978 Reindeer Herding Act was dubbed a gender-neutral policy; however, because of ambiguities and omissions in the construction of the act, it only continued to perpetuate Sámi women’s invisibility as participants in an occupation that was traditionally central to their ethnic identity. In response Sámi women in the 1970s and 1980s began holding seminars and created organizations to address these issues socially and politically.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

In the ancient tale of “The Origin of Wild Reindeer,” two sisters, Áhceš-eadni and Náveš-eadni who each owned a female reindeer, but maintained separate dwellings, made their living from milk provided by the reindeer in their care. The reindeer
moved freely, returning in the evening and again in the morning to be milked. While grazing one day in the forest, Áhceš-eadni’s reindeer complained that her mistress had treated her unkindly calling her names and scratching her udder with her nails while milking. The reindeer stated right then that she would not go home again and sped off to the warmth of the woods. It was on that day that the tame reindeer was turned wild, according to the myth. Náveš-eadni’s reindeer, though, had never experienced such poor treatment; her human caretaker was kind and used a soft touch when she milked her. Because of the kindness Náveš-eadni’s reindeer had experienced, she felt pity for the woman and chose to stay, perhaps recognizing the human need to live in harmony with animal nature. The decision to stay created what the Sámi know today as the semi-domesticated reindeer (Odd Mathis Haetta, “The Ancient Religion and Folk-Beliefs of the Sámi”). The tale establishes two things that are essential to this research project. First, it shows the reciprocal relationship between humans’ and reindeer. Second, the tale describes the role that women had in founding the human relationship with reindeer.

Conclusion

Although for Sámi women and other indigenous people all over the world there is no “going back to what was,” as Vigdis Stordahhl writes, “among the Saamis we are now hearing women’s voices” (Stordahl, The Difficult 189). New methodology blended with the tried and true have been extended to include feminist approaches as ways to discover buried nuances in the historical literature and the inclusion of oral traditions as part of the historical accounts. Bjørg Evjen in “Research on and by ‘the Other’, Focusing on the Researcher’s Encounter with the Lule Sámi in a Historically Changing Context,” comments that over “the last few decades, the discipline of history had also been expanded to encompass social and cultural conditions - more widely understood - that required the use of oral sources. This contributed to the researcher and the researched being on more equal terms” (Evjen 186).

The Reindeer Husbandry Act of 2007 has now replaced the 1978 Act. The 2007 act concerns itself with internal changes rather than the “template of agriculture” on which the 1978 Reindeer Herding Act was based (Norwegian Reindeer Husbandry 20). According to the Norwegian Reindeer Husbandry Administration under the regulations of the 1978 Act the state had primary control in all areas of reindeer herding. Under the 2007 Act herders have been authorized a greater say within the industry and its management. The main changes in the 2007 Act when compared to the 1978 Act recognizes and gives a central position back to the siida system. The reindeer pasture district which is an administration one level higher than the siida herding alliances is in control of deciding land use regulations for each district. The 2007 regulations allow for the resolution of conflicts and finding rational and long-term solutions by reindeer owners themselves. The Act also permits herders to decide how many reindeer they may own but reserves the right to step-in in certain
situations and initiate maximum limits of reindeer numbers when necessary. The most important part of the new Act is in the recognition of civil rights of indigenous peoples and minorities. The 2007 Act allows more involvement of parties in the industry over sections that previously had been the domain of the state (Norwegian Reindeer Husbandry 20). Though in modernity Sámi women in the circumpolar north continue to work together to bring their important concerns and issues to the political and social stage as new expressions of what it means to be a Sámi woman and a female reindeer herder, they are currently being redefined. Patriarchal Western based economic systems are being reconsidered and re-evaluated through various legislative policies, and as Eikjok warns, "Sámi women’s perspectives and ways of understanding are scarcely reflected in the public discourse, which is still dominated by men" (Gender 57). The question left for the contemporary world then is not whether or not Sámi women will continue to find ways socially and politically to make themselves visible in all aspects of reindeer management, but how Sámi women will redefine and reshape the patriarchal structure, in order to restore women’s place where they are considered by Sámi traditions to be a central part of Sámi life moving forward into the future.


Abstract:
Researchers of adaptive capacity and sustainable livelihoods have frequently used social, cultural, human, economic and institutional capitals to better understand how rural and resource-dependent communities address environmental, social and economic stresses. Yet few studies have considered how men and women contribute differently to these capitals to support community resilience overall. Our research sought to understand the differential contributions of Sami men and women to the adaptive capacity of reindeer husbandry and reindeer herding communities in northern Sweden. Our focus revealed a gendered division of labor in reindeer herding as an economic enterprise as well as gendered contributions to a broader conceptualization of reindeer husbandry as a family and community-based practice, and as a livelihood and cultural tradition. Based on our results, we recommend that community resilience be enhanced by generating more opportunities for men to achieve higher levels of human and economic capital (particularly outside of herding activities) and encouraging women to contribute more directly to institutional capital by participating in the formation and implementation of legislation, policies and plans.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction
“…And what’s counted as a reindeer herder? It’s most of the things that the men do.

And today, I think, reindeer herding is many things. So also, it is to learn children and take care of the language – that kind of stuff could be a part of reindeer herding” (Woman, age 18–34).

Addressing the question, “What’s counted as a reindeer herder?”, posed by a Sami reindeer herder in our study, is important for interpreting the contributions men and women make to reindeer herding communities, particularly during times of social, economic and environmental stress. In the past century, climate change, large-scale resource extraction, industrialization, colonization and social and political change have all affected Indigenous peoples living in northern settings. Among the Indigenous people of Sweden—the Sami—is a small proportion that continues to pursue their traditional livelihood by means of reindeer husbandry. While research from Scandinavia suggests that Sami men and women make important, yet differentiated, contributions to their community (Kuokkanen 2009; Andersson and Keskitalo 2012), few researchers have connected these observations to examining the gendered dimensions of the adaptive capacity of Sami communities. Our research reveals those narrow assumptions about what activities constitute reindeer herding and who undertakes them typically focus solely on men as herders. These assumptions erase from view multiple contributions of both women and men who seek to sustain the business as well as the community and cultural practices associated with reindeer husbandry. As a consequence, we may not fully understand the assets or capitals used to build adaptive capacity of reindeer herding communities or what members of those communities are best positioned to contribute to community resilience.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the contributions of Sami men and women to the adaptive capacity of reindeer husbandry and the resilience of reindeer herding communities in northern Sweden. Specifically, we address the following questions: (1) How might reindeer husbandry be conceptualized to account for the multiple contributions of women and men to the capacity of Sami communities to adapt to environmental, social and economic change? (2) What can a focus on the assets or capitals of reindeer herders reveal about how women and men contribute to their adaptive capacity and livelihoods at individual and household levels and the resilience of Swedish reindeer herding communities?

Conclusions and Recommendations

While reindeer herding appears to be a male-dominated industry on the surface, both women and men are active in reindeer husbandry, and their respective roles are invaluable to its success. The research reveals key differences, however, that can be addressed at a policy level to enhance adaptive capacity and livelihoods in support of community resilience. The results indicate that policies that would
encourage men to consider appropriate, higher education options would increase their human capital directly, develop the value chain that the reindeer husbandry represents and thereby improve the economic capital derived from a very exclusive business. Such education opportunities must be developed in consultation with men who might benefit from the programs. Increased education and employment options might offer better opportunities for households and communities to build capacity for resilience, although they may also run the risk of diverting more people out of husbandry altogether, thereby weakening the sustainability of the business of herding and the culture of husbandry and reducing community resilience.

Further, encouraging women to engage in planning processes associated with RHPs would increase institutional capital among reindeer herding communities. The increased level of formal education among women in the sample suggests that women may be well positioned to become more influential in institutions that affect reindeer husbandry, including RHPs, local government and Sami Parliament. This would serve to shift power dynamics in reindeer herding communities, make women’s roles more visible and improve access by reindeer herding communities to a greater pool of intellectual potential to address their relative weakness within the power relations that shape the regulatory environment in which they operate.

Until now, the narrow conceptualization of reindeer husbandry solely as a rural economic enterprise has omitted many of the potential contributions that women and men might make to sustaining their livelihoods and the resilience of their communities. By pursuing a methodology that segregated contributions by gender, this study revealed a more nuanced understanding of the contributions and risks to adaptive capacity, demonstrating how gendered norms and expectations impact the life choices of both men and women, and pointing to the need for gender-sensitive policies and programs in education, and in processes associated with creating and implementing RHPs. Understanding the present-day gendered contributions of adaptive capacity for sustaining livelihoods and building community resilience provides insights that can help Sami people and researchers to understand and build more sustainable and resilient communities in the future. As gender intersects with a wide range of other mobilizing factors and processes imbued with power relations, this study represents only a first step towards gaining this understanding and taking action.


Overview:
The Sami are the indigenous people of Sapmi (Samiland), a territory that today spans central Norway and Sweden through northern Finland to the Kola Peninsula of Russia, with an estimated population of between 75,000 and 100,000 people.
Historically, Sami society was organized locally by the extended family system called the siida. Each siida had its own tribunal to look after such matters as hunting and fishing disputes and disputes over territory between two siidas. The siida system was the early model for Sami self-determination, a freedom that was, however, ignored and gradually erased by the colonizing states. From the 1800s onward, harsh assimilatory policies toward the Sami were implemented in the Nordic countries, mainly in the name of education and social welfare. According to the Nordic governments, the need for education and social welfare could be fulfilled only through learning the majority language of the governing country. In Norway, for instance, teachers were paid a bonus if they succeeded in teaching Norwegian to Sami students. In 1902 a law was passed mandating that land could be owned only by a citizen who both knew and used Norwegian.

This article gives an overview of the ways in which gender issues arise in state regulation of reindeer herding, one of the main traditional livelihoods of the Sami, and, consequently, in state regulation of the Sami. It shows how government practices have failed to take into account women’s roles in reindeer herding and have enacted policies that selectively disadvantage and disenfranchise women, leading them to leave reindeer herding as an occupation.

Current & Relevant Information:

**Sami women**

Like women in many other indigenous or traditional societies in the world, women in Sami society historically were regarded as equal to men, a dynamic characterized by a symmetrical complementarity of domains, roles, and tasks (Backman 1982). As a result, Sami women were independent and possessed power and control over certain domains. Often these spheres were domestic and private, but in some cases, they were also economic. Traditionally, reindeer-herding women in particular were often in charge of their family economies (Solem [1933] 1970; Sami Instituhtta 1979; Backman 1982).

Moreover, it was customary practice for women and men to own separate properties. Skolt Sami women, for example, traditionally owned everything that they prepared and made, including clothing for their husbands. Women and men also managed their own loans (Paulaharju 1921). According to Sami customary law, women and men inherited on an equal basis; it was also common for a Sami widow to move back to her own family and community, taking her property with her (Balto 1997). Further, Erik Solem ([1933] 1970) proposes that Sa´mi naming customs and terminology indicate a relatively strong matrilineal and matrilocal tradition. This does not mean, however, that patrilineal practices did or do not exist in Sa´mi society, nor can Solem’s findings be considered proof of the equal status of Sa´mi women in contemporary society.

**Conclusion**
Policies and laws imposed by the nation-states regulating and controlling reindeer herding and the way of life associated with it are an excellent resource for investigating the interconnectedness of colonial and patriarchal discrimination and domination. Government policies have made women invisible in the livelihood in which they have always played a central role. In many cases, they have erased women traditionally held right of ownership over their own reindeer and, in official records, have placed reindeer-owning Sami women under their husbands.

Restructuring indigenous societies from subsistence production into market economies dependent on trading goods has brought about far-reaching political and cultural transformations in indigenous societies in general. Global capitalist discourses have inherited legacies of colonial law that sought to exterminate indigenous peoples by outlawing their practices and livelihoods that do not conform to the logic and values of Western societies. Today the same results—making the conditions for indigenous cultures and livelihoods impossible—are achieved through the naturalized discourses of profit and development. Reindeer herding has gradually been made next to impossible by various gestures of colonial encroachment starting from the establishment of the nation-state borders in the eighteenth century to more recent processes such as hydroelectric development, logging, mining, and tourism. The process of incorporating indigenous societies into the capitalist economy has also been highly gendered and has had many gender-specific consequences. In the case of Sami women, it has resulted in the loss of both their status and visibility in their livelihood and in policies regulating it. This has led to changes in reindeer-herding activities, which in turn has radically reshaped communal work practices and introduced a new, gendered division of labor.


Overview:

The Sámi live in four different nations-states: Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Kola Peninsula of Russia. The geographical area that is considered to be the core area of settlement of the Sámi is called Sápmi in Sámi language. The Sámi are traditionally pastoralists, herding and keeping reindeer. The reindeer are normally not kept in a corral (more than temporary at some occasions) or in a barn; instead, they roam free in the forest or in the mountains. The Sámi reindeer herders move with the reindeer depending on season. In the winter session the reindeer are kept in the forest where they are sheltered from snow storms by trees; in the summer time the reindeer have the natural instinct to move to the coast or up in the mountains, away from the heat, mosquitoes and other parasites in the forest.
The Sámi are an Indigenous population which means that they lived in Sápmi long before the national states, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Russia, had extended their kingdoms to that area of the world. When the kingdoms of these national states moved in to the Sámi territory, they brought many changes to the Sámi way of living. The Sámi used to have their own religion, their own traditions, and the whole family used to travel with their reindeer according to the seasons. With the colonization of the Sámi and of Sámi lands, fewer and fewer people could continue with reindeer herding. Now in modern times, the reindeer herders are a minority in the Sámi collective, however, reindeer herding is still considered typical Sámi. Reindeer herding has become a symbol of Sámi identity.

Current & Relevant Information:

Changes in reindeer herding

Traditionally reindeer herding was organized in siida – families that worked together tending the reindeer. The siida consisted of siblings with their families – different constellations of brothers or/and sisters. Still today the siidais the socioeconomic unit for the reindeer herding. The Sámi traditional society (before colonization) was not an equal society – a person could own their own reindeer and there were families that were richer than other families. You also had young men working for richer reindeer owners. Men and women worked together and had different tasks in the reindeer herding (Pehrson 1964). Women in the traditional Sámi society had the right to own property and was normally in charge of the family economy. It was common for a widow to move back to her family and bring her property (Kuokkanen 2009). Thus, the women in the traditional reindeer society were not without decision power in the society. Men and women had different roles and power in different domains, complementing each other.

The Swedish legislation of reindeer herding, implemented in 1886, changed the situation for the women in reindeer herding. The law stated that a Sámi woman marrying a non-Sámi would lose her right to reindeer herding and their children would not have the reindeer herding right either. A non-Sámi woman marrying a Sámi man would gain the reindeer herding rights and their children too. The legislation was changed in 1971 so that men and women came to have the same right to reindeer herding (Olofsson 1995). However, today we still see the effects of the old legislation of reindeer herding (Beach 1982) and also other factors such as the implementation of mandatory schooling of the reindeer herders’ children (Eikjok 2004).

Today, the men normally have the status as head of the household (husbonde) in the reindeer-herding unit of the extended family (siida). The husband (or brother, father) normally is the caretaker of the women’s reindeer, the reason being that he gains (and so also the family) more influence in the sameby (the economical and geographical unit of reindeer herding), since the member has the number of votes
according to how many reindeer he or she has (Beach 1982). Women still own reindeer and work with reindeer herding. The implications of the status as non-reindeer herders in the same by are many. Most women are not registered as members in the sameby and can’t vote in the sameby. The men receive the state subsidiaries for reindeer herding. It also becomes problematic for a woman to continue reindeer herding at divorce or if the husband dies. She risks losing the reindeer and the right for pasture for the reindeer (Kuokkanen 2009).

O. Yukagir [Russia]:

“Yukaghir people,” Britannica, 6 November 2019 [140]
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Yukaghir

Overview:

Yukaghir, also spelled Yukagir or Jukagir, self-name Odul, remnant of an ancient human population of the tundra and taiga zones of Arctic Siberia east of the Lena River in Russia, an area with one of the most severe climates in the inhabited world. Brought close to extinction by privation, encroachment, and diseases introduced by other groups, they numbered some 1,100 in the late 20th century. Although they still generally inhabit the upper valley of the Kolyma River, the once-nomadic people are for the most part engaged in hunting, fishing, and reindeer herding. The domestication of reindeer probably started in the mid-17th century, just before Russian conquest.

Current & Relevant Information:

The Yukaghir can be classified into two divisions—the Northern, or Tundra, and the Southern, or Kolyma, Yukaghir. Their dialects are not mutually intelligible, and (until the late 20th century) multilingualism in several combinations of Russian, Chukchi, Even, and Sakha (Yakut) was common. Few of the younger Yukaghir speak their mother tongue, and because of assimilation they are generally monolingual or bilingual in Sakha or Russian.

The Yukaghir economy once depended heavily on seasonal migrations of elk and wild reindeer; these were killed in large numbers from canoes at water crossings or tracked by ancient methods. Fishing, next in importance, was based on biannual runs in major rivers. Molting waterfowl also were taken in quantity. The meat supply was supplemented by the gathering of berries, nuts, and other products of trees and shrubs. The groups’ activities involved cooperative methods and seasonal movements. Permanent homes were occupied only in winter; skin or bark shelters were used in warmer weather. Metal was rare, and most implements were of bone or antler.

The Northern Yukaghir were patrilocal (centered on the male’s family) while the Southern Yukaghir were matrilocal. Inheritance in both groups was patrilineal. Small family groups were generally organized into clans. Each clan was guided in matters
of food provision and clan defense by an able adult male. Although the Yukaghir were Christianized in the 18th century, they retained many traditional beliefs, including the practice of shamanism.

“Yukagir in Russia,” Keith Carey, Joshua Project [141]
https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/16068/RS

Overview:
Like most of the other peoples of Siberia, the Yukagirs were hunters who traded furs. They had bi-yearly hunting expeditions which they timed for when reindeer migrated across local rivers. They used bones and rocks for their arrow heads. In the 1400s they began to have access to metal which improved their hunting tools. Because of their belief in the spirit world, they would not kill more game than they needed.

The Russians invaded their land in the 1700s and demanded furs as tribute. Since the Yukagir people were depended on the land, they suffered from frequent famines. The Russians made the situation far worse by using up the local resources. For example, their dogs ate up fish that Yukagir people needed. The local ecology could not support these changes.

Current & Relevant Information:
Where Are they Located?
They are the remnants of a population who for many years have inhabited the tundra and taiga zones of Arctic Siberia. Over the centuries they have braved severe weather and survived. Most of them still live in the northeastern part of Russia's Siberia.

What Are Their Lives Like?
The Yukagir family groups are usually organized into clans, and an able adult male leads each clan. At one time they were matriarchal, with the line of descent coming from the mother's family line. It is unclear if this is still the case. At one time there were either 12 or 13 Yukagir tribes. Now there are only three.

Today there is some effort to keep their language alive; Yukagirs maintain their greetings and certain vocabulary for festivals. As of 1990, their children were taught their traditional language in school. For the most part, they use the Russian language, especially with outsiders.

What Are Their Beliefs?
In the 18th century many Yukagir people became Orthodox Christians; however, they still held onto traditional shamanistic beliefs. Some are probably secular. A small number are now Russian Orthodox, and a much smaller number are Evangelical.
What Are Their Needs?

The Yukagir people need to find ways to earn a prosperous living in the 21st century. Their homeland will not allow many of them to live by hunting, etc. In such situations, many people wind up working as day laborers, and not earning enough money.


Overview:

The Yukaghir from the Upper Kolyma Valley call themselves Odul, those from the Alazeya call themselves Vadul, and those from the Indigirka call themselves Dutke, Dutkil and Buguch. The name Yukaghir is considered to be a generic name of Tungus origin meaning the 'icy or frozen people'. However, there are also some other interpretations and Y. Kreinovich, for instance, claims that the origin of the word is unclear.

Current & Relevant Information:

Habitat. As recently as the beginning of the 17th century, the Yukaghirs were over a large territory in North-Eastern Siberia -- from the lower reaches of the River Lena in the west to the middle and upper reaches of the River Anadyr in the east, and from the Arctic Ocean in the north to the Verkhoyansk Mountains in the south. It has been suggested that the early Yukaghir (the Yukaghir-Chuvan tribes) inhabited areas further to the west and to the south. In the 12th or the 13th century the Tungus people (the Evens and the Evenks) invaded Northern Siberia, coming from the mountain taigas behind Lake Baikal. It may be assumed that the Tungus and the Yukaghir met near the River Vilyui and the lower Aldan. Probably part of the Yukaghir moved still further to the north: to the upper Yana, Indigirka, Kolyma and Anadyr rivers, and into the forests and the tundra. A part of them intermingled with the Tungus.

Today, a small number of the Yukaghir live in the Nizhnekolymsk district in Yakutia (the Forest Yukaghir or the Odul) and in the Srednekansk district in the Magadan region (the Tundra Yukaghir or the Vadul).

Population. According to 1970 census data the Yukaghir numbered 600 and according to 1979 census data their number was 835. Of these 37.5 % were native language speakers.


Overview:
The Yukagir are one of the smallest minorities in the former USSR. Territorially, the Yukagir are subdivided into two groups: the Taiga group lives in the Upper Kolyma District of the Yakut Republic and in the Saimanchanskoi District of Magadan Province along the tributaries of the Kolyma River. The Tundra Yukagir reside in the Lower Kolyma District of the Yakut Republic between the Kolyma and the Indigirka rivers. Both groups live among numerically predominant neighbors: Yakuts, Chukchee, Even, and Russians.

Current & Relevant Information:

Location. The region in which the Yukagir are settled is one of mountains, low ridges, and plateaus divided by valleys and covered by swamps and lakes. The mountains are covered by hardy northern trees: pine, larch, birch, and alder (good shelter for black bears, musk deer, squirrels, and mountain sheep). Aside from some dwarf birches and arctic willows, however, the northern plains and flatlands of Yukagir country support only sedge grasses, mosses, lichens, and berry-bearing bushes. Both territorial groups inhabit arctic or subarctic zones, the main feature of which is the permafrost. A cold winter with blizzards and winds gusting up to gale strength lasts about eight months. In January the mean temperature ranges from -40° F to —70°, and —90° has been recorded. Polar night (with mid-night sun) reigns in the Kolyma lowlands and the northern part of the Chukhotsk Peninsula. During the late spring and early summer, on the other hand, many plants bloom, enormous flocks of ducks and geese appear, the salmon run, and the lowlands become one great marsh. Summers are short and cool.

Demography. During the nineteenth century the population dropped drastically, from 2,350 in 1859 to 1,500 in 1897, eventually falling to below 500. Since then, according to Soviet statistics, it has changed as follows: 1926-1927: 443; 1959: 442; 1970: 613; 1979: 835; 1989: 1,112. This growth is mostly due to the high incidence of ethnically mixed marriages, the offspring of which commonly categorize themselves as Yukagir.

Gender Roles:

““Urbanites without a City”: Three Generations of Siberian Yukaghir Women,”

Abstract:

Female roles as promoted among the Siberian Yukaghirs today, favoring ideals of beauty, autonomy and above all a modern urban lifestyle, are not as clear-cut as they may seem at first glance. Superficially, it appears that there has been a complete reversal of what went before: the Soviet ideal of the strong working-class
woman has been thrown out and replaced with Western models of femininity. Dip a little deeper below the surface, however, and we see that things are not so different after all. Many aspects of today's ideal of womanhood are firmly rooted in the traditions of the Soviet period. What is different, however, is the inability of today's Yukaghir women to leave for the urban centers of Siberia. They are stuck in the remote village, although their mindset is truly urban.

https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/155237

Abstract:
This article analyzes materials about shamanism, contained in legends, stories and folk tales of Yukaghir-hunters of the upper Kolyma, institute of which officially got lost in the first half of the twentieth century. It also analyzes functional importance of the shaman as mediator between men and world of supernatural creatures, shaman-healer and shaman-defender from enemies. Attention is also paid to the personal qualities of the shaman.

The main sources of the study are comprised of the notes taken by the Pioneer researcher in this area (end of XIX – beginning of XX centuries), İ.A. İokhelson, and the compilation tapes produced by İ.A. Nikolayev and the writer of this study on old Yukaghir in the late twentieth century.

Current & Relevant Information:
It can be explained by the polarization of the male and female origins of Odul. V. Jochelson drew attention to it as following: "Typical for the primitive systems of Yukaghir is an antithesis between men and women as two separate groups. This can be seen in games in which men and women make two hostile parties; in the language, some of the sounds of which women pronounce is different from men's way; and for a woman, maternal relations are more important, and for men - relatives on his father's line; and such socialization of activities between the sexes, which has created for each of them distinct and independent sphere of activity" (1898: 259).


Abstract:
This is an insightful, highly original ethnographic interpretation of the hunting life of the Yukaghirs, a little-known group of indigenous people in the Upper Kolyma region of northeastern Siberia. Basing his study on firsthand experience with Yukaghir
hunters, Rane Willerslev focuses on the practical implications of living in a "hall-of-mirrors" world—one inhabited by humans, animals, and spirits, all of whom are understood to be endless mimetic doubles of one another. In this world human beings inhabit a betwixt-and-between state in which their souls are both substance and nonsubstance, both body and soul, both their own individual selves and reincarnated others. Hunters are thus both human and the animals they imitate, which forces them to steer a complicated course between the ability to transcend difference and the necessity of maintaining identity.

“Yukaghir Questionnaire,” Missouri.edu [147]
https://dice.missouri.edu/assets/docs/asia-other/Yukaghir.pdf

Overview:
The Yukaghir is an endangered tribe in Northern Siberia. The mainly fishing clan that travels in unison with meat food supply, whether it is in the water or on land, along with gathering berries and shrubbery has always battled with its neighbors. Many believe that the Yukaghir population has been steadily decreasing. I think the Yukaghir culture has been drastically decreasing. While the Yukaghir people are steadily decreasing by marrying and having families outside of the clan, their culture is disappearing rapidly. It’s unfortunate that children don’t understand when their grandparent speaks their ancestral language. I want to blame the Russians for ruining the Yukaghir culture but if it weren’t for the Russians, the Yukaghir might have been extinct decades ago. Russian colonization began in the mid to late 17th century and documented the brutal and numerous attacks on the Yukaghir. Due to the positive relations the Yukaghir hold with the Russian Federation, they have been treated better than many other native tribes in recent years. However, they are struggling to keep their culture alive with modernization and loss of land to hunt and gather on.

Current & Relevant Information:
There was a traditional division of production in which men did all the hunting and fishing and women did everything in the household and gathering. However, there was a sense of “genderlessness” in the Yukaghir community where the roles could be easily switched. Unless a woman was menstruating or pregnant, making many things including hunting taboo, she could go hunting with a group of men or by herself.

“Yukaghir in Ukraine,” Keith Carey, Joshua Project [148]
https://joshuapproject.net/people_groups/15070/UP

Overview:
The Yukaghirs are made up of 13 nomadic subgroups, including the Chuvans. They are the remnants of a population who for centuries have inhabited the tundra and taiga zones of Arctic Siberia.
In their original Siberian home, the Yukaghirs were nomadic hunter-gatherers. They would follow elk and reindeer migrations. The men would hunt for animals and fish while the women gathered edible plants during the warmer parts of the year. They used reindeer for transportation and sold skins of animals for cash.

With the decline of their traditional economic activities, the dismal environmental situation of their lands, and the decrease in the population of the Yukaghir people, they and their language are close to becoming extinct. Some have migrated to other parts of Russia or Ukraine.

Current & Relevant Information:

Where Are they Located?
The traditional home of the Yukaghirs is eastern Siberia in the Kolyma region. A small number of Yukaghirs had migrated to Ukraine.

What Are Their Lives Like?
We don't know how the Yukaghirs support themselves in Ukraine since there are so few of them. Many Yukaghirs have been assimilated into other cultures including those of the Yakuts, the Russians, and the Ukrainians. Imagine going from a nomadic lifestyle in the tundra to a modern urban setting like that of Ukraine. It must be a huge adjustment for the Chuvan Yukaghirs in Ukraine.

What Are Their Beliefs?
Many Yukaghirs have converted to the Russian Orthodox Church, yet they continue to practice their shamanistic beliefs in spirits. We do not know the current religious practices of the Yukaghirs in Ukraine, but they still lack a culturally-relevant fellowship of their own.

2. Non-Indigenous People Living in the Arctic:

A. Canada:


Overview:
The Arctic and Northern Policy Framework is a profound change of direction for the Government of Canada. For too long, Canada’s Arctic and northern residents, especially Indigenous people, have not had access to the same services, opportunities, and standards of living as those enjoyed by other Canadians. There are longstanding inequalities in transportation, energy, communications, employment, community infrastructure, health and education. While almost all past governments have put forward northern strategies, none closed these gaps for the
people of the North, or created a lasting legacy of sustainable economic development.

In her 2016 Interim Report on the Shared Arctic Leadership Model, Minister's Special Representative Mary Simon said, "the simple fact is that Arctic strategies throughout my lifetime have rarely matched or addressed the magnitude of the basic gaps between what exists in the Arctic and what other Canadians take for granted."

Co-developing the new framework became a bold opportunity to shape and direct change in the region by collaborating with governments, northerners and Indigenous governments and organizations. Consultation was not enough to meet the challenges and harness emerging opportunities in the Arctic and North. In a significant shift, the federal government, Indigenous peoples, Inuit, First Nations and Métis, 6 territorial and provincial governments (Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Newfoundland and Labrador, Quebec, and Manitoba) contributed to this framework together.

Current & Relevant Information:

A shared vision

Today, there is a shared vision of the future where northern and Arctic people are thriving, strong and safe. The Arctic and Northern Policy Framework gives us a roadmap to achieve this vision. There are clear priorities and actions set out by the federal government and its partners to:

- nurture healthy families and communities
- invest in the energy, transportation and communications infrastructure that northern and Arctic governments, economies and communities need
- create jobs, foster innovation and grow Arctic and northern economies
- support science, knowledge and research that is meaningful for communities and for decision-making
- face the effects of climate change and support healthy ecosystems in the Arctic and North
- ensure that Canada and our northern and Arctic residents are safe, secure and well-defended
- restore Canada’s place as an international Arctic leader
- advance reconciliation and improve relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples

For the federal government, the framework's goals will guide investments and activities, through 2030. Implementing the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework will require collaborative approaches. Our government recognizes that ‘made in Ottawa’
policies have not been successful. The new approach puts the future into the hands of the people who live there to realize the promise of the Arctic and the North. Through the co-development of the framework, and by working in partnership to realize its vision and implement its goals and objectives, this initiative will advance reconciliation and renew Canada's relationship with Inuit, First Nations, Métis and support the non-Indigenous residents of Canada's Arctic and North.

A crucial element of this innovative, cooperative form of policy making is the inclusion of chapters from our Indigenous, territorial and provincial partners. Through these chapters, our partners speak directly to Canadians and to the world, expressing their own visions, aspirations and priorities. These critical components of the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework map out areas of present and future collaboration between partners and the Government of Canada, and will provide guidance on the implementation of the framework.

In reflecting their priorities and aspirations, these chapters recognize and advance the vision and interests of Inuit, First Nations and Métis peoples. Partners have chosen their own approaches to crafting these chapters. For example, Yukon First Nations and the Government of Yukon have collaborated closely during the development of the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, and will be producing separate chapters that speak to their mutual as well as distinct interests. First Nations and Métis worked with the Government of the Northwest Territories to draft the Northwest Territories chapter of the framework.

Inuit Nunangat is the Inuit homeland in Canada. Inuit are the majority population in this distinct geographic, cultural, and political region. In order to respect and support Inuit self-determination, an Inuit Nunangat chapter was developed as an Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee deliverable. This chapter will guide how Arctic and Northern Policy Framework goals and objectives are implemented in Inuit Nunangat. This will ensure that the framework respects Inuit rights and that an Inuit Nunangat approach is utilized in the development and implementation of federal policies and programs that are intended to benefit Inuit, creating efficiencies that in turn benefit all Canadians.

Territorial governments have authored chapters setting out their priorities for new investments and approaches in areas such as economic development, infrastructure and post-secondary education. Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut are also contributing a pan-territorial chapter that articulates their common challenges and opportunities. Drawing on the 2017 Pan-Territorial Vision for Sustainable Development, the territorial governments offer their vision for how the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework can support strong and healthy communities, based on a foundation of responsible resource development, economic diversification, infrastructure and innovation.
The next phase of framework co-development will focus on implementation, investment strategies and governance, moving towards more integrated federal-territorial-provincial and Indigenous approaches to challenges and opportunities in Canada's Arctic and North. Partner chapters will be integral to this next step towards improving the quality of life for our Arctic and Northern residents, especially for Indigenous peoples.

Our future

The Arctic and Northern Policy Framework is ambitious and has just over 10 years to translate its goals and objectives into reality. In that time, the Government of Canada and its partners will close the gaps that exist between this region, particularly in relation to its Indigenous peoples, and the rest of the country.

Canada sees a future in which the people of the Arctic and North are full participants in Canadian society, with access to the same services, opportunities and standards of living as those enjoyed by other Canadians. This ambition will require greater effort, focus, trust and collaboration amongst partners.

Other circumpolar nations are making significant investments to make their Arctic regions part of the global community. Supporting Canadian initiatives to keep pace with international efforts will bring increased opportunities, health and well-being to Indigenous peoples and northerners.

Indigenous and Northern leaders have offered their best innovative, adaptive policy solutions that call for trust, inclusiveness and transparency. We can do no less than to respond with integrity, collaboration and openness. Building on these new partnerships, the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework provides a long-term foundation for transformative change, benefiting our Arctic, its Indigenous peoples, northern residents and all Canadians.

Conclusion: Next steps

The development of this framework has strengthened collaborative relationships between framework partners and among federal government departments. This development of new ways of working together is, in itself, a significant achievement.

In the second phase of the framework, governance mechanisms will be co-developed through discussions among framework partners, the governments and Indigenous peoples' organizations that worked together on the first part of the framework. These mechanisms will describe how partners will regularly collaborate to share information and assess progress on framework implementation, building on significant developments in governance over the last 50 years. Governance mechanisms will:

- support the jurisdictional and institutional landscape created by devolution, modern treaties and land claim and self-government agreements
• adhere to the principles of partnership articulated in *A New Shared Arctic Leadership Model*, the final report of Mary Simon, the Minister's Special Representative on Arctic Leadership

• meet partners' expectations for meaningful, ongoing involvement in policy decisions related to their interests

• provide a forum for all partners to be regularly convened for collaborative discussions on implementation of the framework

• commit to reconciliation in the context of renewed federal-provincial-territorial-Indigenous relationships

• ensure that existing fora, such as the Inuit Crown Partnership Committee, the Yukon Forum, and the Intergovernmental Council of the Northwest Territories, are leveraged to assist in implementation

• reflect the authorities and powers of territorial, provincial and Indigenous governments

Financial investment in the framework will be an integral element of its success. Partners will work together to develop an implementation and investment plan. The plan will outline how new investments together with other economic and regulatory levers will be used to contribute to implementation of the framework.

The implementation and investment plan will:

• define new investments

• provide information on how partners' funding initiatives are aligned with and supportive of the goals and objectives described in the ANPF policy statement, including in partner chapters

• provide strategic alignment and flexibility of investments to accommodate the unique nature of 'doing business' in the Arctic and north

• define indicators, data collection and reporting commitments related to specific funding and initiatives

**Annex: Principles for the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework**

The principles below were developed to provide continuing guidance on implementation of the framework.

• Decisions about the Arctic and the North will be made in partnership with and with the participation of northerners, to reflect the rights, needs and perspectives of northerners

• The rights and jurisdictions of Canada's federal, territorial, provincial Indigenous and municipal governments will be respected
• Development should be sustainable and holistic, integrating social, cultural, economic and environmental considerations

• Ongoing reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, using the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a starting point, is foundational to success

• As climate change is a lived reality in the region, initiatives will take into account its various impacts, including its impact on Indigenous northerners, who continue to rely on the land and wildlife for their culture, traditional economy, and food security

• Policy and programming will reflect a commitment to diversity and equality, and to the employment of analytical tools such as Gender-Based Analysis Plus to assess potential impacts on diverse groups of people

• The framework will respect a distinctions-based approach to ensure that the unique rights, interests and circumstances of Inuit, Arctic and northern First Nations and Métis are acknowledged, affirmed and implemented

• The Government of Canada recognizes Inuit, First Nations, and Métis as the Indigenous peoples of Canada, consisting of distinct, rights-bearing communities with their own histories, including with the Crown
  o The work of forming renewed relationships based on the recognition of rights, respect, co-operation and partnership must reflect the unique interests, priorities and circumstances of each people

• Every sector of society, from the private sector to universities and colleges, the not-for-profit sector, community-based organizations and individual Canadians, has an important part to play in building a strong Canadian Arctic and North.


Overview:

Quick Facts

Arctic and North Territory
Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Yukon, and Northern parts of numerous provinces, including Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Québec

Arctic and Northern Population
Approximately 150,000

Permanent Participants with Canadian constituents
Arctic Athabaskan Council, Inuit Circumpolar Council, and Gwich’in Council International

Current & Relevant Information:
Canada and the Arctic region

Nearly 40 percent of Canada’s land mass is considered Arctic and Northern, consisting of the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Yukon, and the northern parts of several provinces. Canada’s Arctic is home to approximately 150,000 inhabitants, of which more than half are Indigenous. Although Canada’s Arctic region is vast, less than one percent of Canada’s population lives there.

Indigenous Peoples


Canada in the Arctic Council

Canada held the first Chair of the Arctic Council from 1996 to 1998, and again from 2013-2015. Canada’s primary priorities related to the Arctic include addressing socio-economic and cultural development, environmental protection and climate change, and strengthening relations with Indigenous peoples. Specifically, during its first Arctic Council Chairmanship, Canada’s priorities included:

- Youth development in the Arctic, including social, environmental and economic issues affecting children
- Developing closer partnerships with Indigenous peoples and Arctic States to address common challenges and opportunities
- Cooperation between Indigenous Peoples and Arctic States

Throughout its most recent Arctic Council Chairmanship, Canada’s priorities included:

- Development for the people of the North
- Mental wellness in Arctic communities
- Integrating Indigenous knowledge of Arctic peoples into the work of the Council
- Environmental protection, including the reduction of black carbon and methane

Key Accomplishments Include:
Canada aided in the establishment of the Arctic Economic Council, an independent forum for business-to-business cooperation

Canada heavily aided in the development of an action plan to prevent oil pollution in the Arctic

An Arctic Council Framework for enhanced black carbon and methane emissions reductions

Assisted in the establishment of the open-access archive project to enhance the public’s accessibility to the Arctic Council’s work

The Arctic Council was established in Canada in 1996 with the signing of the Ottawa Declaration.


Overview:

The Arctic Ocean is a body of water centered approximately on the north pole. It is the smallest of Earth’s five oceans. Its boundaries are defined by the International Hydrographic Organization, although some other authorities draw them differently. Depending on which definition is used, waters of Canada’s Arctic Archipelago are included as part of the ocean, as are major Canadian bodies of water such as Baffin Bay, Hudson Bay and the Beaufort Sea.
Current & Relevant Information:

History

Human exploration of Canada’s Arctic Ocean began about 5,000 years ago with the Sivullirmiut. These people, sometimes called Tunnit or Pre-Dorset, likely travelled from Siberia in search of new lands to inhabit. Four thousand years later the Thule, ancestors of today’s Inuit, were the main explorers of Canada’s Arctic.

Countless Arctic expeditions took place from the 15th century onwards, as Europeans sought to map the Arctic Ocean. One of the main goals was to find a way to navigate through Canadian Arctic waters from Europe to Asia, connecting the two continents by a relatively short route. This hypothetical route, called the Northwest Passage, was finally navigated successfully in 1906 by Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen. It continues to be an important shipping lane today.

Industry and Economy

Subsistence fishing has been a key part of Arctic cultures for millennia. The Inuit and their predecessors relied on ocean mammals, fish and invertebrates for food. This is still the case today for many Arctic coastal communities, although large-scale commercial harvesting is now practiced as well. Some major commercial species include northern and striped shrimp, Greenland halibut, and Arctic char. Other
resources may soon be exploited to. For example, the Government of Canada has invested heavily in the exploration and mapping of the region’s oil and gas reserves. A moratorium on their extraction is in place, but it is reviewed every five years.

At the same time, due to slowly receding ice cover, the Arctic Ocean’s natural resources are gradually becoming more and more accessible. This will lead to increases in shipping, tourism, and economic development in Canada’s Arctic regions. These local activities affect the Arctic Ocean. For example, icebreakers modify their immediate environment as they navigate through sea ice. Increased shipping also means more shipwrecks and oil spills, especially because sea ice can cause serious damage to ships.

Politics

Eight countries surround the Arctic Ocean: Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland. Almost all Arctic land areas are definitively divided between these countries. However, sovereignty and economic rights over sea areas is a much more contested subject. In 2008, an agreement was signed between Denmark, Norway, Canada, Russia and the United States to attempt to divide up the ocean fairly. It followed the terms set out in the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. Established in 1982, the Convention provides international guidelines regarding how oceans are used and by whom.

Essentially, a country bordering an ocean – including the Arctic Ocean – is allowed exclusive economic rights over a zone extending 200 nautical miles (about 370 km) beyond its coasts. This means it has permission to explore and exploit non-living resources within that area. In addition, a country can be granted exclusive economic access beyond those 200 nautical miles if it can prove that these additional waters lie above its extended continental shelf. Because of this, all countries involved have scientists studying continental shelves in the hopes they can claim more of the resource-rich Arctic Ocean. For its part, Canada submitted a report to this effect to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2019.

“Canada has created an Arctic conservation zone almost as big as Germany,” Johnny Wood, World Economy Forum, 8 August 2019 [152]

Overview:

Canada’s Inuit people, whose lands occupy the remote northeastern region of Nunavut, live in an Arctic wilderness of raw natural beauty that is now under threat from climate change.

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has just turned the area into one of the world’s largest conservation areas, to counter the effects of rising temperatures on Arctic marine life and the indigenous people that call it home.
The initiative aims to build a conservation economy, which pairs environmental concerns with economic opportunities for local communities. New jobs will be created, accompanied by stewardship programs aimed at boosting monitoring and conservation of both the land and cultural sites.

In designating the new zone, Trudeau claims to have exceeded his government’s target of protecting 10% of Canada’s marine and coastal areas by 2020, reaching 14% a year ahead of schedule.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

**The last ice area**

The Tuvaliuituq Marine Protected Area (denoted in red above) covers an area nearly the size of Germany, according to the World Wildlife Fund.

It joins the nearby Tallurutup Imanga National Marine Conservation Area, formerly known as Lancaster Sound, to create a massive safe habitat for Arctic wildlife.

The zones lie within an area of Canada’s high Arctic and Greenland, which is expected to become the last surviving area of summer sea ice in the Arctic.

A large part of the Arctic’s ice is melting - and fast. Northern Canada is warming twice as fast as the rest of the planet, causing sea ice to disappear at an alarming rate, according to a recent study by climate researchers.

Permafrost, which has remained frozen for millennia, is melting 70 years ahead of forecasts.

Canadian researchers predict that most Canadian Arctic marine regions will be free of summer ice by 2050, which could be devastating for the Arctic ecosystem.

**Ice breaker**

What happens in the Arctic has serious repercussions for the rest of the planet, disrupting ocean currents and causing sea levels to rise. But the immediate impact of climate change is being felt closer to home.

Inuit people use the sea ice as a bridge to travel and hunt. While sea birds and marine creatures, such as whales, polar bears and seals, depend on it for survival.

The scale of the summer thaw is allowing more ships to enter the region, putting animal habitats under increasing threat.

And while the conservation zone should restrict the region’s exposure to industrial fishing, mining and drilling for oil and gas, such activities could still pose a threat to the wider marine environment.
Gender Roles:


Abstract:

Background

Indigenous people are over represented among homeless populations worldwide and the prevalence of Indigenous homelessness appears to be increasing in Canadian cities. Violence against Indigenous women in Canada has been widely publicized but has not informed the planning of housing interventions. Despite historical policies leading to disenfranchisement of Indigenous rights in gender-specific ways, little is known about contemporary differences in need between homeless Indigenous men and women. This study investigated mental health, substance use and service use among Indigenous people who met criteria for homelessness and mental illness, and hypothesized that, compared to men, women would have significantly higher rates of trauma, suicidality, substance dependence, and experiences of violence.

Methods

This study was conducted using baseline (pre-randomization) data from a multi-site trial. Inclusion in the current analyses was restricted to participants who self-reported Indigenous ethnicity, and combined eligible participants from Vancouver, BC and Winnipeg, MB. Logistic regression analyses were used to model the independent associations between gender and outcome variables.

Results

In multivariable regression models among Indigenous participants (n = 439), female gender was predictive of meeting criteria for PTSD, multiple mental disorders, current high suicidality and current substance dependence. Female gender was also significantly associated with reported physical (AOR: 1.52, 95% CI = 1.10–2.23) and sexual (AOR: 6.31, 95% CI = 2.78–14.31) violence.

Conclusions

Our analyses of Indigenous men and women who are homeless illustrate the distinct legacy of colonization on the experiences of Indigenous women. Our findings are consistent with the widely documented violence against Indigenous women in Canada. Housing policies and services are urgently needed that take Indigenous historical contexts, trauma and gender into account.

Current & Relevant Information:

Background
Indigenous peoples are overrepresented among homeless populations worldwide and urban Indigenous homelessness is on the rise. In Canada, Indigenous people are five times more prevalent among the homeless compared with the general population. Indigenous people account for 2.5% of Canada’s population but comprise 38% of the homeless in Vancouver, BC. Recent estimates indicate that over 30% of the Canadian shelter population is Indigenous, a crisis that is rooted in historical determinants and systemic discrimination. Longstanding structural inequities associated with colonization (e.g., the Indian Act, residential schools, marginalization and systemic racism, and dispossession of lands) are commonly noted as contributors to Indigenous homelessness. However, the effects of colonial policies, including disconnection from community, culture, and lands are experienced differently by Indigenous men and women, and these gendered perspectives have received little attention from researchers.

Historically, Indigenous women played central and powerful roles in their communities as matriarchs and the custodians of cultural and tribal traditions. Indigenous women have been subjected to coercive racialized policies intended to subjugate their traditional matriarchal roles and authority. In 1850, The Canadian government introduced a definition of “Indigenous”, whereby women forfeited their Indigenous status when they married a non-Indigenous man, while Indigenous men retained their status regardless of spousal ethnicity. Furthermore, Indigenous women were legally denied the right to any marital property upon divorce or separation with men retaining the right to the family home. The right to property defined under the Indian Act, has had far reaching implications in the lives, mobility and safety of Indigenous women. A patriarchal social structure was imposed by European settlers, and over time the belief that women were inferior to men began to influence Indigenous communities as increasing numbers of Indigenous women were disenfranchised and compelled to raise their families without customary connections to tradition, culture or community. A gendered hierarchy was also integral to the operation of Indian residential schools and continues to influence the marginalization of Indigenous women. Indigenous gendered health disparities must be framed by discussions of the distinct historical experiences of Indigenous men and women and the contemporary impact these factors have on Indigenous marginalization, street involvement, trauma and homelessness.

Menzies (2009) qualitatively examined the experiences of homeless Indigenous men and found that family disconnection, intergenerational trauma and violence were subjectively the key influences on their life trajectories. Despite the shared historical traumas of Indigenous men and women, Indigenous women in Canada bear a disproportionate burden of disease, poverty, homelessness, violence and incarceration. Violence toward Indigenous women in Canada has been identified as a national human rights crisis. There have been more than 160 cases of missing or murdered Indigenous women and girls in the province of British Columbia and 79 cases in Manitoba, most of which are unsolved. Indigenous Canadians’ rates of
violent victimization are more than double those of the non-Indigenous population and rates of sexual assault are nearly 3 times higher than for non-Indigenous Canadians. Violence shapes the context within which Indigenous women access (or avoid) housing and health services, and contributes to their “invisibility”. Indigenous scholars have called for research examining how colonialism, racism and sexism determine health and healthcare access among Indigenous women. Little is known about homelessness among Indigenous women and their experiences of violence, trauma, and coercion, which may shape their interactions with service providers.

Beyond ethnicity, additional barriers are experienced by women who are mothers struggling to maintain housing for their families. Thurston, Turner and Bird (2016) discuss the role of domestic and interpersonal violence (IPV) as a key contributor to homelessness among Indigenous women, and the racialized barriers Indigenous women face when seeking support for IPV, including the absence of culturally appropriate supports for women and their children. In addition, being female and Indigenous carries an increased risk of trauma (e.g., PTSD), often as a consequence of violent assault. Recent research has discussed the crucial importance of expanding culturally relevant and safe services for Indigenous peoples as a whole. However, few studies have investigated the relevance of cultural and gender-based differences within marginalized Indigenous groups.

Indigenous women are overrepresented among homeless women, and are more likely than men to provide care for children or other family members while experiencing core housing need. No known research to date has quantified the impact that homelessness among Indigenous women has on the ability of their children and future generations to thrive. In 2016, 60% of children and youth in care in BC were Indigenous and this percentage has been increasing over time with Indigenous children 15 times more likely to be in care than non-Indigenous children. Intergenerational trauma is a direct result of colonial child welfare policies from the 1960’s at the height of the residential school era, when provinces removed Indigenous children and placed them in foster care, most often with non-Indigenous families. Indigenous women are five times more likely than non-Indigenous women to be single parents. Research on marginalized women engaged in sex work in Vancouver found that over one-third had their children forcibly removed and that Indigenous women had a 66% greater odds of child apprehension compared to non-Indigenous women. Some authors contend that continued apprehension of Indigenous children into government care is contemporary cultural genocide, evidenced by the fact that the number of children in care today exceeds the number at the height of residential schools. Little is known about the impact of historical and current child apprehensions on homeless Indigenous women’s levels of trauma and trust for government programs and services.

Several studies indicate that pathways to homelessness differ based on gender. For example, homeless women are more likely to be victims of violence compared to
men and more likely to report family disruption or dysfunction while men are more likely to report loss of a job, mental illness, and substance use problems as precursors to homelessness. Clark and Rich (2003) highlighted that homeless populations are diverse in ethnicity, gender and pathways to homeless and recommended matching housing interventions to the characteristics of the service users. However, few studies have focused on the distinct needs of Indigenous women who are homeless, contributing to their ‘invisibility’ in the public policy realm.

Our study aimed to address this gap by investigating the relevance of gender in a large sample of Indigenous people who experienced homelessness and mental illness in two Canadian cities (Vancouver, British Columbia; Winnipeg, Manitoba). Our study focus was within Indigenous peoples, and not a comparison between people of differing ethnicities. We hypothesized, based on the forgoing historical and contemporary rationale, that compared to Indigenous men, Indigenous women would have significantly higher prevalence of current trauma, suicidality, substance dependence, and recent experiences involving violence and threats.

Conclusion

Housing policies and interventions for Indigenous Canadians must incorporate evidence of distinct needs associated with gender. Indigenous people experience homelessness in the context of historical and contemporary colonization. Violence and ongoing trauma have particularly forceful effects on the wellness of Indigenous women, their families, and communities. Yuan et al. (2015) described a research agenda for violence against American Indian and Alaska native women, calling for participatory research to develop culturally appropriate, strengths-based interventions. Similarly, Canadian researchers Browne et al. (2016) have described an approach to developing Equity Oriented Services, emphasizing culturally-safe care, trauma- and violence-informed care, and contextually-tailored care, all operating in partnership with Indigenous people. Further research and Indigenous leadership are required to investigate how culturally safe; trauma informed care can be incorporated into existing housing policy and programming. The current study found that the repercussions of colonization were evident in distinct ways among Indigenous men and women who were living with significant psychological distress and homeless in Canada. Practices that are informed by these differences are essential to redressing the displacement of Indigenous women into homelessness, violence, and other forms of societal victimization.

“Gender and Arctic climate change science in Canada,” David Natcher, et al., Humanities & Social Sciences Communications, 25 February 2020 [154]
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-020-0407-6

Abstract:

There is growing recognition that gender diversity within research organizations can result in innovative research outcomes. It has also been recognized that gender
homogeneity can undermine the quality and breadth of the research and may allow some to cast doubt on the legitimacy of scientific findings. In this paper, we present the results of a gender-based analysis of Canada’s ArcticNet Networks Centers of Excellence. Representing Canada’s single largest commitment to climate change science, ArcticNet has involved 761 researchers who have published >2400 peer-reviewed publications on the impacts of climate change in the Canadian Arctic. Our results indicate that, despite outnumbering their male peers at the graduate levels, the representation of women within ArcticNet exhibits a marked decline to only 21% (N = 51) of all ArcticNet investigators (N = 246). In addition to being numerically under-represented, female investigators in ArcticNet have fewer research collaborators and are generally less integrated into the network as compared to their male colleagues. Male investigators tend to form homophilious ties—publishing predominately with other males, whereas female investigators have heterophilious collaborations, with fewer peer-reviewed journal articles. Given the complexities of climate change research, particularly in the Arctic where the impacts of climate change are projected to be most extreme, the equitable inclusion of female scientists and other under-represented groups is crucial if sustainable solutions are to be found.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

**Introduction**

It is safe to say that in 2020 there are more young women pursuing careers in Arctic research than ever before (Moon, 2018). In the past 50 years alone, women have gone from being barred from Arctic field sites, to leading international research expeditions, directing national and international research organizations, and serving as mentors to the next generation of Arctic researchers. According to Seag (2019), the history of women in Arctic research is a story of exclusion to inclusion that has been "led by inspiring women who broke one ice ceiling after another". Yet if the gains women have made in Arctic sciences are to continue, they will require the necessary institutional support to advance their research careers (Carey et al., 2016; Moon, 2018). Unfortunately, there are indications that this support—and the opportunities it can offer to women in Arctic sciences—are far from being fully realized.

During the Polar 2018 Open Science Conference in Davos, Switzerland, over 300 attendees participated in a session entitled From Entering the Field to Taking the Helm: Perspectives of Women in Polar Research. During this session, panelists, and participants shared experiences of professional exclusion, harassment, and in some cases, workplace violence. These conditions were attributed in part to a research culture firmly rooted in masculine norms of behavior (Seag, 2019) where the exclusionary legacies of the early twentieth century remain deeply entrenched in the conduct of Arctic science today (Starkweather et al., 2018). While acknowledging that progress has been made—in the field, the laboratories, and administration—
the full entry of women into Arctic sciences has yet to be achieved (Hoogensen, 2017). Rather, women continue to encounter formidable obstacles to their career development and are challenged to gain the same professional opportunities (Moon, 2018) and recognitions (Gazni and Didegah, 2011) as their male peers.

In this paper, we present the results of a gender-based analysis of the ArcticNet Networks Centers of Excellence (NCE) (hereafter ArcticNet). Established in 2004, ArcticNet represents Canada’s single largest commitment to Arctic climate change science to date. The principal objective of ArcticNet is to study the impacts of climate change in the Canadian Arctic by consolidating national and international research expertise. To this end, ArcticNet has engaged over 1000 researchers, including investigators, graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, and other specialists from 34 Canadian universities and 20 federal and provincial laboratories and agencies (http://www.arcticnet.ulaval.ca). To determine the extent to which women have gained entry into this national research network, we assessed how the gender of ArcticNet researchers influences professional collaborations and research output. Our results lend quantitative support to the testimonials of female researchers who have felt excluded and marginalized in the conduct of Arctic climate change science in Canada.

Conclusion

Given the complexities of climate change, particularly in the Arctic where its impacts are projected to be most extreme (Trainor et al., 2007), the inclusion of female scientists and other under-represented groups is crucial if sustainable solutions are to be found. By harnessing diverse and collective abilities of the entire scientific community, ArcticNet and other research organizations will be better placed to address the societal challenges associated with climate change in the future (Beck et al., 2014). Therefore, promoting diversity within research organizations is not only a matter of equity but also leads to higher quality science (Nielsen et al., 2017).

The objective to produce the highest quality of science possible is clearly reflected in Canada’s NCE Program and its Statement on Equity, Diversity and Inclusion, which commits to supporting all qualified individuals, inclusive of members of under-represented groups, in order to mobilize Canada’s best research. By extension, the NCE Secretariat expects all NCE-funded research organizations (e.g., ArcticNet) to be equally committed to those principles. Yet expectations alone are insufficient in creating representational equity. The results from this analysis indicate that the challenges women once faced in gaining entry into Arctic sciences are not yet resolved, and persistent inequalities continue to hamper the career opportunities of female scientists. What is therefore required is to move beyond statements on equity, diversity, and inclusion to actual policies that ensure principals of inclusion are not only respected but actually implemented. In other words, policies that move from being unconsciously exclusive to consciously inclusive of gender equality (Kuo, 2017). By increasing the representation of women in Arctic sciences, particularly in
climate change research where conclusions remain contentious (Gay-Antaki and Liverman, 2018), will lend to greater scientific credibility and improved public acceptability of research findings.

“Pan-Arctic Report: Gender Equality in the Arctic Phase 3,” Arctic Council, April 2021 [155]

Summary:

Gender equality in the Arctic is highly relevant to the agenda and role of the Arctic Council (the Council) and its Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), which have emphasized gender equality in previous projects and initiatives. The importance of issues of gender and diversity has become increasingly evident, the latest example being Iceland's emphasis on gender issues during its Council Chairmanship.

GEA highlights the importance of recognizing and appreciating diversity in terms of discourses, gender, Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, governance, education, economies, social realities, sustainability, and balanced participation in leadership and decision making, in both the public and private sectors.

A major component of GEA III has been to develop this report on gender. It pulls together material, information, and expertise to provide an overview of gender-related issues in the Arctic and contributes to filling knowledge gaps on this subject. The GEA III report seeks to identify emerging issues, priorities, and concrete strategies that support gender balance and increased diversity.

The primary intended audience for this report is policymakers in the Arctic region. It is a resource for those interested in gender issues in the Arctic, including Arctic inhabitants and researchers. We hope that a broader audience, including the private sector, will appreciate the relevance of the report to their work.

The report does not claim to be comprehensive, but it is a step forward in strengthening the knowledge base and understanding required for developing policies that foster resilient and thriving communities.

Current & Relevant Information:

Arctic Canada
The degree of urbanization in Arctic Canada varies, but the sparsity of the population has implications for mobility and access to jobs, education, and welfare services. 53% of the population are Indigenous (Statistics Canada, 2020) and colonization has had important implications for gender and patterns of movement in Canada. There is a gender imbalance in Arctic Canada and population analysis of Inuit Nunangat reveals that there is a higher sex ratio imbalance amongst the non-Indigenous population, potentially due to in-migration of non-Indigenous men for work purposes (Lévesque & Duhaime, 2016).

**Immigration**

Immigration from outside Canada to Arctic Canada is often associated with work migrants. In Nunavut, the level of immigration from outside Canada is significantly lower than for NWT and Yukon. For NWT and Yukon, the number of immigrants in comparison to population size was similar for the period 2011 to 2016 (Statistics Canada, 2020). However, there are gendered differences between the two territories. NWT saw almost double the number of male immigrants compared to female immigrants. Yukon, on the other hand had 37% more female immigrants than male immigrants. In NWT and Yukon, the dominant group to immigrate are Filipinos. For NWT, 39% of female immigrants and 40% of male immigrants between 2011 to 2016 were from the Philippines. For the same period in Yukon, 60% of female immigrants and 52% of male immigrants were from the Philippines (Statistics Canada, 2020).

“Canadian History: Pre-Confederation,” opentextbc.ca [156] https://opentextbc.ca/preconfederation/chapter/10-7-gender-roles/

**Overview:**

Patriarchal authority was the norm in the colonies, less so among some Aboriginal communities, but even their missionaries were making changes. Property ownership in Upper Canada and the Atlantic colonies favored men and, given the link between property ownership and the franchise, it favored them politically as well.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

**Women and Girls**

The role of women in the first half of the 19th century was diverse, ranging from life in a religious order to working in a logging camp.

Even though many industries at the time were very male oriented, women helped in woodlot management and harvesting on their family farms. Even in the logging camps, women might find work as cooks, laundresses, and boarding-house keepers. Villages like Bytown (Ottawa), however rowdy and dangerous they were at their worst, contained a substantial female population. Similarly, mining towns were heavily male enclaves but not entirely bereft of women. It was rare to find females
working in underground coal mines in British North America, even though in England women labored in pits until prohibited by law in 1842, and in Belgium for decades after that. Women did, however, find work in haulage and at the pithead; Aboriginal women in particular played a role in Vancouver Island’s coal industry loading the ore from the mine head in cedar baskets and then down the long hill to the waterfront and onto ships.

In the days before factories, fine work associated with textiles and shoe manufacture was often performed by women. Since most artisanal operations were independent — that is, run by families or small employers — the living and working spaces were often closely connected if not overlapping. The manufacture of wool — carding, spinning, and weaving — was cottage industry work in which both men and women participated, but in which women predominated. Likewise, the manufacture of dairy products (milk, butter, cheese) was an important component of female farm work, as was canning preserves. Women made these products not simply for themselves but for sale. Fall fairs presented opportunities for women to show off their products under the scrutiny of their peers; a coveted blue ribbon would mean orders from local grocers and thus were an important source of cash. Because farm produce was often sold under a system of credit, any cash a woman brought in might be a household’s chief source of hard currency. The household was, therefore, much more than a place of domesticity: it was a site of production.

There is an interesting parallel to be drawn between the impact the fur trade had on pre-contact Aboriginal skillsets and the industrialization of “women’s work” in the 19th century. During the fur trade, copper pots made handwoven cedar baskets obsolete; in the era of industrialization, textile mills dealt a fatal blow to homespun clothes-making. (Indeed, the term homespun changed in meaning from denoting artisanal skill to a derisory adjective meaning unsophisticated and unlovely.) In both cases, manufactured goods were substituted for time-consuming crafts and the one gradually squeezed out the other.

But women’s work remained significant to the social economy of early British North America, particularly in farming, logging, and fishing. New farmland in many cases had to be carved out of the forests, so while the men did the hard work of clearing the land, the women tended to the early planting, weeding, and some animal rearing. If logging was lucrative, men might carry on with that seasonally or over a longer term to accumulate money for the farm. The frontier farm women thus perpetuated the near-independence experienced by habitant women married to fur traders in New France: their men were off elsewhere earning money so the farm was the woman’s domain. Even after the farms matured into more stable economic propositions, women’s work was critical to their success.

Many other women during this time operated boarding houses and laundries. In communities centered on resource-extraction, generally dominated by men, there was high demand for good accommodations, a daily meal or two, and clean clothes.
Women who provided these services brought in cash to contribute to the household economy. In single-industry and/or company towns from Cape Breton to Vancouver Island where workers were paid with scrip or credits to be spent at the company store, a woman’s income might be critical. Where possible, women opened and operated saloons (perhaps capitalized by their wage-earning husbands) and small stores. Sometimes these were temporary measures, part of a plan calculated to provide an income when the husband could no longer manage heavy work. Amanda (Gough) Norris’s experience illustrates a similar cross-generational experience: she was one of the first English immigrants to Vancouver Island in the 1850s and she worked alongside her husband in his print shop until their sons were old enough to take her place.

In other cases, women raised chickens, pigs, and even cows on very small urban properties. Taking in boarders, even in cramped little homes and tenements, was another possibility, one for which women were usually responsible. These were all financial survival strategies that reduced costs and provided hard-to-come-by cash.

As support grew in the early 19th century for formal education, the need arose for teachers. Although the Catholic tradition in French Canada provided generations of educator development, there was nothing in the way of formal training for English-speakers in British North America. Women took on many of the early teaching responsibilities in Upper Canada, most seizing on it as an opportunity to improve their incomes. Teaching typically took place in the teacher’s home, although small academies also appeared, especially after 1820. For these “lady teachers,” expertise came with experience, although many — perhaps most — never intended to teach for more than a few years until they were married. Widows and lifelong spinsters, to take a different life-course view, came to teaching as a survival strategy and a means to attain financial security.

By the 1840s education was becoming more regulated, so the setting of the independent teacher-proprietor working out of her home declined. Female teachers were generally restricted to teaching girls and boys below the age of puberty. Older boys were the responsibility of male teachers. To be clear, however, most boys and girls did not proceed very far in formal education: the advantages of literacy and numeracy were not appreciated by many agricultural and/or industrial families. The emergent middle classes, however, placed a high value on literacy. Their growing wealth made the business of opening a small school a worthwhile venture.

As ideals of womanhood changed mid-century, middle-class parents wanted their daughters to be educated and provide some “refinement” and a domestic sensibility. Middle-class families demonstrated their success by sending their daughters to school, and girls who turned into literate, organized, respectable young women were more likely to marry good middle-class lads, thereby ensuring the family’s security for another generation. As more girls received this kind of education, demands grew for more specialized skills that moved beyond literacy and behavior. Musical and
artistic education was added to the mix, making daughters even more attractive as prospective brides. An education that extended into the girl's mid- to late teens might prepare her for a career as a teacher-proprietor.

The Catholic French-Canadian experience offered different opportunities to women. Despite its strict hierarchical structure and gender roles, the Catholic Church nevertheless contained room in which a woman could maneuver. Whether it was in health care or education, a number of full-time and lifelong career paths were available to women of all social classes. Almost entirely, these positions involved taking religious orders, vows of celibacy, and possibly poverty as well. Certainly, women who “took the veil” gave up much, but they also gained security within the largest corporate organization in the colonies and the possibility of making independent and consequential decisions on a daily basis.

Women also found work on the legal margins of society. The sex trade was alive and well, usually concentrated in brothels somewhere near the docks. Dancehall girls — women who were paid for a dance — blurred the edges between the suggestion and the provision of sex as a business proposition. In gold rush towns of the Cariboo, the acrobatic “hurdy gurdy girls” charged a dollar a dance, which mainly involved being thrown into the air, sometimes upside down. Clearly the prospect of spending time with and being in physical if not sexual contact with a woman had a great appeal to the multitude of men working in resource towns. Dancehall owners exploited this to the point that dance girls were often and very wrongly equated with prostitutes. In Victoria these roles were often filled by Aboriginal women, so they faced the double opprobrium of the moral and, inevitably, racial prejudices held by crusading journalists, politicians, and clerics alike.

More generally, the experiences of Aboriginal women were different from those of non-Aboriginal women. On the West Coast they traditionally worked in food preparation: fishing and hunting was usually done by the men, but the women were responsible for dressing and preparing the food. The skills developed propelled Aboriginal women into the multitude of salmon canneries that appeared on the West Coast in the late 19th century.

These women also worked in horticulture and were quick to seize on earning opportunities in the fields of settler-farmers. Aboriginal women on the coast had a long-established claim to their earnings, which were not necessarily shared with the men in their lives. As well, child-rearing and care responsibilities were often the lot of “the infirm,” to use one historian’s phrase. This was particularly the case when traditional work became industrialized, such as when Aboriginal women (and mothers) worked in the canneries. While child-minding might not always be available to non-Aboriginals at least it was sometimes enjoyed by First Nations women.

Indeed, the responsibility of reproduction fell to women in both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies. In households containing extended families, mothers might
receive assistance raising their children; women in nuclear family households fared less well. Daughters were trained into motherhood by taking on responsibilities for younger siblings, which, given the fertility rates of the period, they were likely to have. From the filles du roi to Confederation, there were significant social and economic pressures on women to marry and have children. In rural areas, children contributed significantly to the business of farming; primogeniture left a widow vulnerable to the prospect of expulsion from her home, so having children with whom she could live in old age was a practical strategy.

Men and Boys

In a study of manliness in 19th century Nova Scotia, Janet Guildford identifies three ideals of masculinity. These rose sequentially though they overlapped significantly, existed concurrently, were in conflict with one another, and sometimes even blended together.

The first is the “masculine achiever,” a character who subscribes to the view that by hard work and ambition he would be rewarded with wealth and success. This ideal keeps his feelings to himself for the most part, is driven, and believes very much in the value of individual autonomy. The second is the “Christian gentleman,” a variant that appears around the mid-century and is more likely to display sympathy and even empathy, less likely to measure his manliness by his wealth, and more concerned with proprieties (as he understands them). No less hard working, he is the embodiment of “evangelical Christianity,” a movement that took root after the 1830s across the English-speaking world. Finally, there is the “masculine primitive,” the muscular and physically powerful male who represents the success of the “race.” It is not a coincidence that the masculine primitive appears around the same time as Darwinian theories about the survival of the fittest.

These were types favored and promoted and dissected in middle-class literature, in the pulpit, in newspapers, and in theatre. And they had their uses for the emerging colonies. Missionary zeal augmented and tempered mercantile muscle while physical prowess made for a strong militia in a strong empire. While each might critique the weaknesses of the other, they were distinctively 19th century creations. In the dominant heterosexual narrative of the day, each one had to be able to turn his abilities into the sort of earnings that would win him a bride and a family — the twin pillars of Victorian society.

Men often walked away from this domestic ideal. After all, ideals of personal autonomy were not necessarily compatible with the binding role of patriarch. This was part of the appeal of heading off to goldfields and forest frontiers. When the American writer Mark Twain had his character, Huck Finn say that he’s going to “light out for the territories,” he was speaking of this chance to escape the grasp of “civilization” and routine. If one considers a boy being born in the 1820s when the farming and logging frontiers were expanding rapidly, then reaching adulthood in the
1840s and 1850s, by which time towns and cities were growing and opportunities for independent action shrinking, it is easy to imagine him wishing for a life he knew second-hand from his elders. As the number and size of farms available to homestead or to buy in the Canadas and the Maritimes shrank, the western frontier on the Plains became more attractive.

And economic and demographic factors often forced their hand. Opportunities to marry are closely tied to the ratio of men to women: where there is an imbalance (and there was a radically stark imbalance in British Columbia among the newcomer population after 1858, running as high as 200 men to every non-Aboriginal woman), lifelong bachelorhood was likely for some. Very local economic conditions also affected men’s options in these years. In Lower Canada in the 1820s, as the availability of new farmland for young families diminished and as prosperity on existing seigneuries slipped, the nuptiality rate dropped as well. If there was a pioneering option nearby, regardless of how poor the soil might be, marriage numbers rebounded. And, perhaps most significantly, if there existed a reliable source of part-time — perhaps seasonal — labor for men, possibly in logging or fishing, then marriage once again became a possibility.

In something like a mirror image of women’s experiences, men were also expected to follow certain gender roles in work and other socioeconomic activities. The commercial seal hunt in Newfoundland and Labrador provides one example. In the 1700s this was an activity that involved both men and women. Seals were hunted near to shore and whole families participated. Then, in the late 18th century, the work became organized on a larger scale. Vessels set out in the spring to hunt seals in more commercially viable numbers, in part because of rising demand for seal oil. At this point, women were excluded from the process and it became “men’s work.” By the middle of the 1800s, according to historian Willeen Keough,

the dominant cultural understanding of the seal fishery [was] an exclusively masculine space — where men and boys tested themselves in a harsh, frozen landscape; where cruel sealing masters drove their crews to exhaustion while greedy merchants urged on their fleets with the toast “Bloody decks and a bumper crop”; where countless ships were crushed in the ice and thousands of men lost their lives.

There was a huge appeal, nonetheless, in the machismo, heroic, mythic features of this business, and males young and old competed for a chance to join the fleet.[8] Most importantly, there was money to be made and sealing was as good a way to do so as any along Newfoundland’s northeast coast. Being gendered into the role of seal hunter meant, conversely, being gendered out of other possibilities. The individualistic striver, risking life and limb for a good catch so as to cover the family’s costs, was never objectively the best of all possible options.
Boys had to make choices from an early age. Apprenticeships, as we have seen, and laboring jobs as well often began by age seven or eight. Boys pursuing a trade were usually “apprenticed out” to another household where they were trained and, for all intents and purposes, raised.

As the overwhelming majority of British North Americans either lived on the land or in fishing villages, the typical boyhood involved hard labor that followed the hours of daylight rather than a clock on the wall. Until the 1870s, working people in towns had only one day of rest a week: Sunday. This left little time to recharge small bodies which they badly needed, given the beatings regularly administered by overseers in some of the colonies’ truly Dickensian-like workplaces. The physical demands of boyhood were high in this period, possibly higher than they had been at any time before in human history outside of plantation slavery. Formal schooling, moreover, offered little in the way of relief.


Overview:

Canada is located in the northern portion of the continent of North America, extending, in general, from the 49th parallel northward to the islands of the Arctic Ocean. Its eastern and western boundaries are the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans respectively. Its land area totals 3,851,809 square miles (9,976,185 square kilometers). The easternmost portion of the country is a riverine and maritime environment, consisting of the provinces of Newfoundland, Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick. The central portion of the country, in its southern areas, is primarily boreal forest (the provinces of Ontario and Quebec). This forest region extends across the entire country from the eastern slopes of the Rocky Mountains through to the Atlantic coast, and is dominated by coniferous trees. A section of the country westward from the Great Lakes basin along the southern extent of this forest region is a prairie made up mostly of flat grasslands (in the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta). The westernmost portion of the country is dominated by the Rocky Mountains, with a narrow riverine environment, made up of northern rain forests, west of the mountains (in the province of British Columbia). Between the southern Carolinian forest of the central regions of the country lies a region in Ontario and Quebec characterized by numerous lakes and expanses of exposed rock known as the Canadian Shield, an area left exposed after the most recent glacial retreat. Across the northernmost portion of the country from east to west lies a region dominated by tundra and finally at its most northern reach, an arctic co-zone (in northern Ontario and Quebec and in the territories of Nunavut, Northwest Territories, and the Yukon).

Current & Relevant Information:

Gender Roles and Statuses
Division of Labor by Gender. There is no specific gender-based prohibitions on participation in labor, but cultural and political values enforce a system of differential access and participation in the labor force. Health-care provision exemplifies this implicit division. Medical doctors, the highest paid and highest status health-care providers, are over-whelming male. In contrast, so-called ancillary health-care providers such as nurses are over-whelming women. Several factors contribute to this division. A distinction between healing and caring, where healing is seen as the province of science and caring the province of nurturing, has the effect of steering men into the "scientific" area of health and women, culturally more closely associated with nurturing, into the "caring" area. While this tendency continues to change, the implicit rules of division of labor persist as expressions of cultural values.

Statutory prohibitions exist against gender-based discrimination in labor, but their interpretation and enforcement has been complex and highly controversial because they come in conflict with often deeply held values of gender difference and gender roles. For example, the work-related recommendations of a federal commission on the status of women, which was convened in the 1960s, have not yet been implemented.

The Relative Status of Women and Men. In terms of explicit rules, women and men have equal standing and equal status in Canadian society. Both men and women may participate in political life, serve in government, own and dispose of property, and soon. That few women do successfully participate in official political life remains a contentious issue for many Canadians, because male-dominated networks of access to political authority and political participation continue, implicitly, to exclude women. Perhaps more important than political participation, however, are certain economic realities which indicate that the status of women relative to men remains uneven. Women are more likely to live below the poverty line, are more likely to head single-parent households, are more likely to work in the service sector, the lowest paying and most volatile sector of the labor market, and are more likely to be the subject of violence by their conjugal partner. It is important to note that the status of gender relations in any society has at least two components—the official version, that is the explicitly stated values and ideals of the society as a political entity, and the practical version, the actual nature and quality of life, risk, and participation of women relative to men.


Overview:

Canadian couples still divide most household chores along traditional lines—even though women and men, overall, share more home duties more than ever, a new Statistics Canada study of opposite-sex couples shows.
Current & Relevant Information:

It's an age-old division of labor unlikely to shift much until parents routinely expect their daughters to mow the lawn and their sons to do laundry, Western Sociology professor Michael Haan says.

"The seeds of gender roles are planted way before people are married," said Haan, Canada Research Chair in Migration and Ethnic Studies and Academic Director of the Statistics Canada Research Data Centre at Western.

While who does what in the home is often a matter of negotiation in a relationship, it's also a function of how the pair themselves were raised to understand household chores and gender.

B. Denmark (Greenland):


Overview:
**Greenland Ice Sheet**, the single ice sheet or glacier covering about 80 percent of the island of Greenland and the largest ice mass in the Northern Hemisphere, globally second in size to only the ice mass that covers Antarctica. It extends 1,380 miles (2,220 km) north-south, has a maximum width of 680 miles (1,094 km) near its northern margin, and has an average thickness of about 5,000 feet (1,500 metres). The Greenland Ice Sheet extends from approximately 60° N to 80° N and thus is not in the polar zone, unlike the Antarctic Ice Sheet. The Greenland Ice Sheet is protected by cold waters of mostly Arctic origin against the temperate Atlantic waters from the southeast. In volume it contains 12 percent of the world’s glacier ice, and, if it completely melted, sea level would rise 24 feet (7.4 meters).

The Inuit are believed to have crossed to northwest Greenland from North America, using the islands of the Canadian Arctic as stepping-stones, in a series of migrations that stretched from at least 2500 BCE to the early 2nd millennium CE. Although the Swedish explorer Baron Nordenskiöld ventured onto the ice sheet in 1870 and 1883, the first known crossing was made by the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen and his party in 1888, traveling from Angmagssalik (Tasiilaq) to Godthåb (Nuuk). Subsequent explorations include those by Robert Peary and Knud Rasmussen.

Current & Relevant Information:

Geological records show the presence of the ice sheet since the Eocene Epoch, about 56 million to 33.9 million years ago. Deep-sea sediment cores from northeast Greenland, the Fram Strait, and the south of Greenland suggest that the Greenland Ice Sheet has continuously existed since 18 million years ago. More-numerous glaciation records are seen after about 14 million years ago, during the Middle Miocene. A warm interval occurred about 2.4 million years ago, as evidenced by a unit, 328 feet (100 metres) thick, of sand, silt, and clay in northern Greenland. The period from 424,000 to 374,000 years ago is considered to be the best analog to the current global climate, and during this phase Greenland is thought to have been almost ice-free. This geological evidence is often cited by researchers who argue that the Greenland Ice Sheet will soon disappear as global temperatures rise. Most of the ice is believed to have formed during an ice age from 188,000 to 130,000 years ago. The ice sheet expanded during the final Pleistocene glacial advance until about 24,000 years ago, when it covered an area 40 percent larger than its current extent.

The Greenland Ice Sheet occupies a saucerlike basin that has a bedrock surface near sea level under most of Greenland. The ice mass, covering an area of 708,100 square miles (1,833,900 square km), is contained by coastal mountains on the east and west. It is thicker in the centre than along its margins and rises to two domes. The northern dome, located in east-central Greenland and reaching more than 10,000 feet (3,000 metres) above sea level, is the area of maximum thickness of the ice sheet and has the lowest mean annual temperature on the ice sheet (−24 °F
It is separated from the southern dome (8,200 feet [2,500 metres] in elevation) by a depression with a maximum elevation of 7,900 feet (2,400 metres) that runs from the Disko Bay area in the west to the Angmagssalik area in the southeast. The movement of the ice sheet is principally outward from the crest of the ice divide. The margin of the ice sheet reaches the sea in the area of Melville Bay southeast of Thule in the form of large outlet glaciers that calve off into the ocean, producing numerous icebergs.

In the 1970s the Greenland Ice Sheet Program was organized by scientists from the United States, Denmark, and Switzerland. Deep ice cores from the Greenland Ice Sheet were obtained for comparison with deep cores from the Antarctic ice mass to gain a better understanding of the factors controlling present and past ice mass dynamics, atmospheric processes, and the response of ice sheets to climatic change and to determine whether past changes in climate were global or regional in character. Studies of ice cores have also revealed a detailed stratigraphic record of glaciation and vegetation in Greenland. The period from the last glaciation to the present is preserved through fossil records, and it thus provides a record of the flora and fauna of Greenland.

Loss of mass of the Greenland Ice Sheet since the 1990s is well documented, with the ice loss accelerating in the 21st century. The ice loss has been driven by a drop in the surface mass balance (SMB) of the ice sheet itself, caused by solar radiation, air temperature, and amount of precipitation, as well as sharp losses due to iceberg calving. With continued melting, fjords are widening, and this in turn is allowing heat from the air to seep to glacier bases. The consequence of all these changes is an increase in the movement rate of glaciers, which results in further iceberg releases. The Greenland Ice Sheet is thus believed to have contributed 0.4 inch (10.6 mm) to the global sea level rise since the 1990s.

“Greenland,” Rasmus Ole Rasmussen, Britannica, 1 June 2024 [160]
https://www.britannica.com/place/Greenland

Overview:

Greenland, the world’s largest island, lying in the North Atlantic Ocean. Greenland is noted for its vast tundra and immense glaciers.

Although Greenland remains part of the Kingdom of Denmark, the island’s home-rule government is responsible for most domestic affairs. The Greenlandic people are primarily Inuit who, depending upon the region they are from, call themselves Kalaallit (West Greenlanders), Inugguit (from Thule district), or Itt (East Greenlanders). They call their homeland Kalaallit Nunaat (“Country of the Greenlanders”). The capital of Greenland is Nuuk (Godthåb).

Current & Relevant Information:

Land
More than three times the size of the U.S. state of Texas, Greenland extends about 1,660 miles (2,670 km) from north to south and more than 650 miles (1,050 km) from east to west at its widest point. Two-thirds of the island lies within the Arctic Circle, and the island’s northern extremity extends to within less than 500 miles (800 km) of the North Pole. Greenland is separated from Canada’s Ellesmere Island to the north by only 16 miles (26 km). The nearest European country is Iceland, lying about 200 miles (320 km) across the Denmark Strait to the southeast. Greenland’s deeply indented coastline is 24,430 miles (39,330 km) long, a distance roughly equivalent to Earth’s circumference at the Equator.

People of Greenland

Nearly nine-tenths of Greenlanders are principally of Inuit, or Eskimo, extraction. They are very strongly admixed with early European immigrant strains. More than one-tenth of the people are Danish, most of them born in Denmark.

The official languages of the island are Greenlandic (also known as Kalaallisut, an Inuit language belonging to the Eskimo–Aleut language family) and Danish (a Scandinavian, or North Germanic, language); English is also spoken.

Evangelical Lutheranism is the official religion. It is followed by nearly two-thirds of the population; about one-third of Greenlanders follow other forms of Christianity. Traditional beliefs, including shamanism, are still practiced by a small minority.

The population of Greenland is widely dispersed. The large majority of people live in one of the island’s 18 municipalities. The remainder live in villages.

Because of emigration levels, Greenland’s population growth rate was about zero at the start of the 21st century. Life expectancy is comparable to the world average, with males typically living into their mid-60s and females generally living into their early 70s.


Overview:

Quick Facts

Population

- Greenland: 55,992 (January 2019)
- The Faroe Islands: 52,124 (January 2020)
- Denmark: 5,822,763 (January 2020)

Arctic Indigenous Peoples

Inuit
Current & Relevant Information:

The Kingdom of Denmark in the Arctic region

The Kingdom consists of three parts – Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands – and, by virtue of Greenland is centrally located as a coastal state in the Arctic. This involves specific rights and obligations in the region. Today, both Greenland and the Faroe Islands have extensive self-government.

The Faroe Islands and Greenland have had home rule since 1948 and 1979, respectively. Home rule arrangements have been continuously modernized, most recently by the Takeover Act on Power of Matters and Fields of Responsibility and the Act on Faroes Foreign Policy Powers of 2005 in the Faroe Islands, and the Greenland Self-Government Act of 2009.

The three parts of the Realm share a number of values and interests and all have a responsibility in and for the Arctic region.

In an equal partnership between the three parts of the Danish Realm, the Kingdom of Denmark speaks with one voice in the Arctic Council.

About Greenland

Greenland is the world’s largest non-continental island and is geographically located on the North American continent. However, in terms of geopolitics, it is a part of Europe. Greenland’s icecap covers 81 percent of its area, leaving 15 percent of the coastline inhabitable. There are 17 towns and 58 villages located throughout the country. The population density is the lowest in the world. Counting the ice-free areas only, the population is a mere 0.3 persons per square kilometer.

Greenlanders are descendants from the Inuit Thule Culture. The Thule people were strong hunters, so traditionally hunting had been the most important source for survival of the Greenlandic people. Today, approximately 10 percent of the workforce is involved in the hunting industry. Fishing is Greenland’s primary industry, with major exports including shrimps, Greenland halibut and cod. Greenland is home to many mineral resources, including gold, rubies, diamonds, coppers, Rare Earth Elements and oil. The Tourism sector is also increasing, with tourist numbers rising. Greenland places an emphasis on developing sustainable tourism.

Denmark

Denmark is the southernmost of the Scandinavian countries, and consists of a peninsula, Jutland and an archipelago of 443 named islands, with the largest being Zealand, Funen and the North Jutlandic Island. Over 5.8 million people lives in Denmark. Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands are equal entities within the Kingdom of Denmark. The Self-Government Arrangements transfer political competence and responsibility from the Danish political authorities to the Greenlandic and Faroese authorities. The Danish Government constitutionally
conducts Foreign and Security policy of the Kingdom of Denmark in close cooperation with the Governments of Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The Danish Armed Forces undertake important tasks in the Arctic including the enforcement of sovereignty.


Overview:

Denmark has for the first time put mineral-rich Greenland top of its national security agenda, ahead of terrorism and cybercrime.

The Defence Intelligence Service (FE) linked its change in priorities to US interest in Greenland, expressed in President Donald Trump’s desire to buy the vast Arctic territory.

Greenland is part of Denmark, but has significant autonomy, including freedom to sign major business deals.

China has mining deals with Greenland.

The FE’s head Lars Findsen said Greenland was now a top security issue for Denmark because a "power game is unfolding" between the US and other global powers in the Arctic.

In August the Danish government dismissed as "absurd" President Trump's suggestion of a US-Denmark land deal over Greenland.

Mr. Trump then cancelled a state visit to Denmark and called Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen "nasty".

The US interest in Greenland goes back decades. The US has a key Cold War-era air base at Thule, used for surveillance of space using a massive radar. It is the US military’s northernmost base, there to provide early warning of a missile attack on North America.

Current & Relevant Information:

**Why the new focus on Greenland?**

Greenland's strategic importance has grown amid increased Arctic shipping and international competition for rare minerals. Arctic waters are becoming more navigable because of melting ice, linked to global warming.

The vast island is strategically located between North America and Europe, easing deliveries to many markets.

In a statement to the BBC, the FE’s Lars Findsen said: "We have decided to start this year's Intelligence Risk Assessment with a chapter on the Arctic, as the interests
of the great powers in the Arctic have direct impact on and growing significance for
the Kingdom of Denmark.

"Despite the Arctic nations' shared ambition to keep the region free of security policy
disagreements, the military focus on the Arctic is growing. A power game is
unfolding between great powers Russia, the United States and China that deepens
tensions in the region."

Russia has stepped up its economic and military activities in the Arctic. There are
competing territorial claims at the UN from Denmark, Russia, the US and Canada in
the North Pole region, where energy and mineral resources are becoming more
accessible.

Kasper Wester, a defense journalist with Danish news website OLFI, says
Denmark's military routinely patrols Greenland's airspace and waters.

However, in August Denmark sent a large support ship to Greenlandic waters for the
first time. The Absalon, and sister ship Esbern Snare, are the biggest Danish naval
vessels.

**What are Danish-Greenland relations like now?**

Greenland's population is about 56,000 and for decades the territory has been
economically dependent on Denmark.

The Self-Rule Act of 2009 granted Greenland far-reaching autonomy, though
Denmark retains control over foreign affairs, defense, security and immigration.

Fisheries account for more than 90% of Greenland's exports, most of which go to
Denmark, and prawn is the main species caught.

Denmark is helping Greenland to build three big international airports, one of them in
the capital Nuuk. A Chinese bid for the airport project was rejected.

The government in Copenhagen gives Greenland an annual block grant of 3.9bn
Danish kroner (£445m; $574m).

Speaking to the BBC, journalist Kasper Wester said "for Greenland's people there is
huge potential income in exporting minerals, and the whole independence
discussion relates to that".

Some Greenlandic politicians were pushing for independence, he said, but most of
them "know they would be much worse off without the Danish subsidy".

But he said there was still discussion about whether Danes were too colonial in their
approach to Greenland.

"Danish politicians are very cautious about what's going on. Not many will say it's a
good idea to do too much business with the Chinese," he added.
Gender Roles:

“Pan-Arctic Report: Gender Equality in the Arctic Phase 3,” Arctic Council, April 2021 [163]


Summary:

Gender equality in the Arctic is highly relevant to the agenda and role of the Arctic Council (the Council) and its Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), which have emphasized gender equality in previous projects and initiatives. The importance of issues of gender and diversity has become increasingly evident, the latest example being Iceland's emphasis on gender issues during its Council Chairmanship.

GEA highlights the importance of recognizing and appreciating diversity in terms of discourses, gender, Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, governance, education, economies, social realities, sustainability, and balanced participation in leadership and decision making, in both the public and private sectors.

A major component of GEA III has been to develop this report on gender. It pulls together material, information, and expertise to provide an overview of gender-related issues in the Arctic and contributes to filling knowledge gaps on this subject. The GEA III report seeks to identify emerging issues, priorities, and concrete strategies that support gender balance and increased diversity.

The primary intended audience for this report is policymakers in the Arctic region. It is a resource for those interested in gender issues in the Arctic, including Arctic inhabitants and researchers. We hope that a broader audience, including the private sector, will appreciate the relevance of the report to their work.

The report does not claim to be comprehensive, but it is a step forward in strengthening the knowledge base and understanding required for developing policies that foster resilient and thriving communities.

Current & Relevant Information:

Greenland

The Greenland ice sheet covers almost 80% of the country with people living in coastal areas mostly on the Western side of Greenland. Within settlements and towns there are local road networks; however, there is no road infrastructure
connecting populations to each other except for a limited road network in the south of Greenland. This means that the mode of transport between settlements and towns is by air, by boat in the summer, and dog sled in the winter.

Due to its size, travel in Greenland can be time consuming and costly. This significantly impacts the mobility potential of its residents as frequent mobility is challenging and daily commuting virtually impossible. As many as 85% of Greenlanders live in urban areas, the highest figure of Indigenous People in the Arctic (Laruelle, 2019). Part of the explanation might be that migration to urban areas can be a necessary alternative practice compared to regular mobility, which is a realistic option in some other areas of the Arctic.

The population in Greenland of 56,000 has been stagnant over the past 20 years. Inuit represent an estimated 90% of the inhabitants (Laruelle, 2019), the highest concentration of Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic. As with other Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic, neither migration nor gender can be fully understood without paying attention to colonialism. Through a paternalistic colonial strategy to maintain Greenlandic culture and hunting traditions, and thus promote the Danish trade monopoly, the Greenlandic male hunter was encouraged and celebrated by the Danes. Furthermore, colonial patriarchy and Christian understandings of appropriate gender practices were promoted as part of colonialization. These were in contrast to traditional gender practices in Greenland, which were grounded in a different gender ideology characterized by a degree of genderlessness (Arnfred & Pedersen, 2015).

In the life-worlds of Inuit, one was not so much defined by gender, but rather through equalness and worthiness as a being (Arnfred & Pedersen, 2015). Consequently, gender was less rigid and binary, and fluid forms of gender were accepted (Williamson, 2006). Subsequently, a Westernized gender ideology has emerged, and one of the key issues dominating discourses on gender equality in modern Greenland is that of gender-based violence.


Overview:

Greenland has a new gender equality minister after this spring’s early election, and the gender equality issues have been transferred to a new ministry. Yet gender equality did not dominate the pre-election debate, despite substantial needs in the area.

Current & Relevant Information:

Gender roles need to be challenged to achieve change
Paternal leave was one concrete gender equality issue that was addressed during the election campaign. At present, women in Greenland are entitled to 17 weeks of parental leave whereas men get 3 weeks. Couples cannot share the weeks, as in other Nordic countries.

‘All political parties agree that this needs to change. They say that a new law is under way, which is badly needed,’ says Olsvig Brandt.

The widespread gender-related violence in Greenland is another challenge for the politicians. During the election campaign, there was talk about establishing a crisis center for men, but according to Olsvig Brandt, that was mostly a strategic move to gain votes.

‘That’s how they talk before an election, but I don’t think men’s violence gets nearly the attention it should in politics. There should be much bigger investments in preventive work. The violence against women is a national catastrophe that’s not being taken seriously enough.’

According to Inge Olsvig Brandt, there needs to be more discussion about gender roles, and not least the role of men, in Greenland. Today, Greenland is characterized by a gender-segregated labor market where men make more money than women, at the same time as women take more responsibility for the care of children and other family members. Statistics show that a majority of students in higher education are women. They also show that suicide, violence, crime and homelessness are more common among men. When former gender equality minister Martha Lund Olsen was in office, an initiative to form men’s groups was taken and had positive effects.

‘A male representative from the gender equality council has visited smaller communities along the entire coast and started men’s groups where these types of issues are discussed,’ says Olsvig Brandt.

She continues to say that Greenland’s sheer size and infrastructure pose important challenges for the gender equality work. The country is twice the size of Sweden, Norway and Finland combined, but only about 56 000 people live there, almost exclusively along the coast.

‘What we do in Nuuk is one thing, but what does it look like in the more rural areas? We see it as very important to change the way people think when it comes to gender roles and gender equality.’


Overview:
In the society that I live in, men and women are treated equally. Since I live in the United States, I assumed every country in the world has the same equality of men and women. I come to find out that in most other countries it is not like that, men over power women. In Greenland, women are treated differently than men. “Women have had relatively little success in advancing their participation on decision-making bodies. The struggle to recruit women candidates and have them elected to political office continues. The attitude of male politicians toward women’s participation and tradition-bound voting habits are the reasons often cited for this protracted struggle (Thomsen)”. Along with childbirth and childcare, women were also responsible for sewing skins to make clothes, preserving, processing, and cooking food, caring for the sick and elderly, and helping to build and take care of the family’s shelter. Warm, light, and serviceable clothing was perhaps the greatest achievement of the Inuit. For protection against the bitter Arctic winter, even the best modern clothing has not surpassed it.

Current & Relevant Information:

While men out supporting themselves by hunting fish, sea mammals and land animals for food, heat, light, clothing, tools and shelter. “They hunted mainly seal and caribou, but also whales, walrus, polar bear, musk ox, fox and wolf. The animals were used for food and their skin was used for clothing, blankets, tents and boats. Little was wasted, there was no pollution and, apart from natural trends, animals and people lived in harmony with a land that most people from the south would find hostile in the extreme (Rose).” Men have the opportunities ranging from administration, work environment, quality assurance, medical clinic/hospital, engineering, operations, fire department, and communications.

While I was doing this research about the societal roles of men and women in Greenland, I came across an article that surprised me. Since learning about their roles, I found it stunning that “Greenland is the country with the highest suicide rates. The rate here is 24 times that seen in the United States. Even Japan—a nation with a well-documented suicide—has an annual rate of only about 51 people per 100,000 inhabitants. Greenland's is 100 per 100,000 (George)”. These numbers are shocking and important in this blog post because most of them are teenagers or young adults. No one can conclude on why people commit suicide but we do know that “Shootings and hangings account for 91 percent of male suicides and 70 percent of female suicides (George)”. As I continue to learn about this country, it is heart breaking to hear that my country has the highest suicide rate and “Some suspect that Greenlandic teens choose suicide for the same reason young people do almost everything else—because they see their friends doing it (George)”.

After doing all of the research, I have come to find out that these roles for men and women are still the same. Women stay at home and take care of the children while men make the money and hunt for food. I would like to understand more about the government in Greenland and understand more indebt about the laws they have. As
well, I would like to admit that it was a bit difficult to find websites about the societal roles because some websites were either not reliable (i.e., Wikipedia) while others had little information to work with. I would like to mention that I would like to go to Greenland and study the men and women there to get a better feel of how they live and see if women like staying at home and taking care of the children every day. Finally, I would like to go to Greenland, help bring down the suicide rate and help women fight from them to be able to work.

“Appendix A: Report by the Government of Greenland on the implementation of CEDAW,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Department of Gender Equality, May 2008 [166]
https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&p=dcdf5f7c789591b77mldidHM9MTY3MTIzNTIwMCZpZ3VpZD0wYzFhYzkOC1iY2E0LTEyZmQxMzE0MzI4ZWQwMzYwNzMmMzI5zaWQ9NTIwN&ptn=3&hsh=3&fclid=0c1ac9d8-eca4-61c4-1a10-dbb8ed036073&psq=Appendix+A%3a+Report+by+the+Government+of+Greenland+on+the+implementation+of+CEDAW&u=a1aHR0cDovL2Nkbi5sbXMuZm8vbWVkaWEvMz
9OC9jZWRhd19mcmFncmVpZGlub2luZG9jaW4uc292ZXJpZnJhbWw=

Overview:

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was ratified by Denmark and entered into force on 21 May 1983. The Convention was ratified without reservation extending to Greenland.

Thus, the human rights articulated in the Convention have been applicable to the people of Greenland for three decades. This is the second report to document the efforts of the Government of Greenland to ensure gender equality in all areas of society administered by Greenland.

Current & Relevant Information:

Significant developments since the last report

Gender equality is a fundamental value in the democracy of Greenland. Thus, the Government of Greenland strives to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in all society.

Since the 7th periodic report to CEDAW 2004-2008 efforts have been made to strengthen awareness on gender equality in Greenland through initiatives and legislation:

- Increased efforts to promote awareness on gender equality through e.g., increased cooperation, seminars, events, websites and a national gender equality day on 20 May
- Prepared national strategy and action plan against domestic violence 2013-2016, including various initiatives to combat violence against women
• Prepared amendments to Parliament of Greenland Act no. 7 of 11 April 2003 on Equality of Women and Men including additional provisions to:
  o promote equal representation of women and men on boards in companies owned or partly owned by the Government of Greenland
  o prevent sexual and gender-based harassment
• Guidelines for corporate governance in companies, including promotion of diversity and equality between women and men
• Improved statistics on e.g., violence against women, income differences and women on boards.
• Establishment of Greenland Council for Human Rights

“Greenland,” Kevin Hillstrom, Countries and their Cultures [167]
https://www.everyculture.com/Ge-It/Greenland.html

Overview:
Greenland was probably originally settled by descendants of the present Inuit culture, who identify the island as Kalaalit Nunaat—meaning “land of the people”—in their native language. It received the name Greenland from Norse explorer Eiríkur Rauðe Þorvaldsson (known today as Erik the Red). He sailed from Iceland to the island in 982 C.E. and spent the next three years farming a plot of land along the southern coastline. He returned to Iceland in 986, intent on encouraging others to settle the rugged island. With this in mind, he referred to the island as Greenland, reasoning that a pleasant name would be more likely to attract settlers. Several colonies subsequently were established in Greenland, but these failed to survive. In 1605 King Christian IV of Denmark claimed Greenland for his kingdom. It remained a colony of Denmark until 1953, when it received county status. This change also gave Greenlanders full Danish citizenship. In 1979, Greenland became a self-governing part of the Danish realm after passage of a popular referendum. But it is still subject to the Danish constitution, and Denmark continues to manage the island’s external affairs in areas such as defense. Greenland is currently composed of three administrative divisions: West Greenland (Kitaa in Greenlandic), East Greenland (Tunu), and North Greenland (Avannaq, also known as the Thule District).

Today, about 80 percent of Greenland’s population is of Inuit or mixed Inuit/Danish heritage. Most of the remainder are of Danish descent, although a small number trace their heritage back to other regions of Europe. Modern Greenland has undoubtedly been shaped by European values and perspectives, but the island nonetheless features unique Inuit and European cultures that are distinct from one another. These differences in social customs and attitudes do bring tensions, but Greenlanders are united by the commonly held challenges of cold climate and isolation, as well as a genuine affection for the land on which they live.
Current & Relevant Information:

**Gender Roles and Statuses**

**Division of Labor by Gender.** Gender roles in Inuit communities are interchangeable in many respects. Men and women share in many chores associated with their subsistence-oriented lifestyles, although responsibilities related to hunting and fishing still tend to be divided by gender (for instance, men typically do the actual hunting, while women attend to drying the meat, harvesting of the skins, etc.)

**The Relative Status of Women and Men.** Inuit society has traditionally placed greater value on boys than girls, and these attitudes persist today.

“Attitudes towards gender equality in Denmark, Sweden and Norway,” Jørgen Goul Andersen and Ditte Shamshiri-Petersen, Department of Political Science Aalborg University, 28 October 2016 [168] https://dpsa.dk/papers/Shamshiri-Petersen%20Goul%20Andersen.Gender%20equality%20attitudes.DPSA%20paper.pdf

**Overview:**

This paper explores the attitudes of Scandinavian women and men towards gender equality and various political instruments to promote gender equality. It is based on a comparative survey conducted in Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 2015. It is the first Danish survey of the whole population to explore such attitudes at length, and it is actually the first comparative Scandinavian data set on the issue. Oddly enough, gender issues have not played a very significant role in most ongoing surveys like the election surveys, probably because such attitudes did not appear to have much independent impact on voting (Evans, 1993).

One might expect that such attitudes were rather uniformly favorable of equal rights. The Nordic countries are typically perceived of as pioneers regarding gender equality. Equal rights and opportunities for men and women has been a sort of hallmark of Scandinavia (Langvasbråten, 2008;33; Borchorst, 2009:30) – and an integrated part of these countries’ national self-images (Freidenvall, Dahlerup & Skjeie, 2006; Heidenreich, 2012:153). In her seminal work Welfare State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism (1987) Helga Hernes introduced the term ‘woman-friendly welfare states’ and pointed to the Nordic democracies’ progressive alliance between women and the state: A favorable combination of state feminism from above and feminization from below (Hernes, 1987:153).

At the same time, Hernes underlined that equality between men and women had far from been achieved. To stipulate from her model, however, it would be a question of time. With solid backing from the people, it seemed plausible that remaining barriers would gradually erode. Thirty years later, the situation has indeed improved, but it is also obvious that there is still quite some distance to go. As revealed by e.g., the Nordic Power Studies (SOU 1990:44; Christiansen & Togeby, 2001; Togeby et al.,
and the Swedish Women Power Study (SOU 1998:6), the distribution of power positions between men and women has remained highly skewed, in particular in business life. Women have obtained more equal pay, but the gender gap remains, even if we take account of gender differences in job functions, and job functions remain different, partly reflecting that women’s career opportunities remain more constrained. There are remedies for that – such as introducing gender quotas for different positions in the public and private sector, introducing parental leave schemes that force fathers to take their part of family obligations (and suffer the same career breaks as women) etc.

Needless to say, not all political decision makers want to promote such instruments. But they have also met resistance, both among men and women. In the United States it has emerged that what previously looked as a straight line towards more equal gender roles has been broken (Cotter, Hermsen & Vanneman, 2011). It could appear that in the US, the feminism from below has to some extent run out of steam.

But what about the Scandinavian countries? How is public opinion towards gender equality? Do women still pressure for higher gender equality, and are they followed by men? Does the young generation of women take more or less radical positions than the older generations? It has previously been predicted on the basis of Danish youth surveys conducted in 1979 and 1988 (revealing little change in levels) that attitudinal changes might not be irreversible (Togeby, 1995a), but how does it look 30 years later? Below we shed some light on these issues. More specifically, we examine various aspects of gender equality attitudes across the Scandinavian countries.

Unfortunately, as pointed out long ago, empirical measures as regards gender issues have tended to be highly skewed towards gender role attitudes (Stacey & Thorne, 1985). This situation has not changed very significantly (Kane & Whipkey, 2009); even measures of “feminist” attitudes have often relied much on gender role questions (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). The gender gap in voting is well analyzed (e.g., Chaney et al., 1998; Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014; Emmenegger & Manov, 2014; for the latest Danish accounts, see Goul Andersen, 2015, 2016). Quite some effort has been put to analyzing gender differences in general political attitudes (e.g., Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Norrander & Wilcox, 2008; Oskarson & Wågnerud, 1995; Oskarson & Rohdén, 2002; for Danish studies, see Togeby, 1994a, b, c; Goul Andersen, 1984, 2016). But attitudes towards the politics of gender inequality and towards policy instruments to counter this inequality has not very often been measured empirically. Most time series, in particular from the US, are on attitudes towards gender roles or, at best, very general measures. But even though it was a slogan of the feminist revolution in the 1960s and 1970s that “the private is political”, most gender role attitudes are rather “private” attitudes. When it comes to goals and instruments of gender equality policy, even conceptualization and measures are not very well developed.
In this paper, we suggest to distinguish between the following aspects:

- Attitudes towards gender roles
- Attitudes towards gender equality as an ideal
- Perception of the current state in terms of distance from the ideal, and
- Attitudes towards particular policy instruments to promote gender equality.

Undoubtedly, these dimensions are highly correlated, but from a conceptual point of view, they are different, and one might very well expect to find somewhat different determinants of these attitudes (c.f. Togeby, 1995a).

In this paper, we shall examine differences in attitude patterns across the dimensions above. One could expect that most people in Scandinavia – both men and women – have abandoned traditional gender role perceptions. Still, this can be differentiated. One question is whether people believe that men and women should have the same roles in relation to the labor market and family responsibilities (household, upbringing of children etc.). Another question is whether women and men are considered equally qualified for top positions in political life and in business life. Undoubtedly, there may be a certain “social desirability bias” when people – in particular men – answer such questions, but one could none the less expect that traditional gender role perceptions tend to be more resilient when it comes to professional positions than with respect to labor market participation and family responsibilities where double earning families has been the norm for nearly half a century.

Next, we examine the differences between men and women across these dimensions. To what extent do Scandinavian men support gender equality policies? One might expect that gen-der differences tend to increase as we move from gender roles to perceptions of the current situation and in particular to attitudes towards policy instruments to remedy gender inequalities. But we actually know less about the gender distribution of attitudes in this field than across most other policy fields where attitudes towards e.g., welfare, taxes, warfare (just to mention a few is-sues where gender differences are almost universal across countries).

Finally, but not least, we shall compare the Scandinavian countries. Over the last couple of decades, quite significant differences have developed in public policy as well as in political discourse. In Norway, the dominant discourse has articulated women’s particularity and distinctiveness. Thus, being different to men, women are entitled to make particular political claims (Heidenreich, 2012:165) and historically the state has played an active role in promoting gender equality. In Denmark and Sweden ‘the difference argument’ has never gained ground. On the contrary, the dominant feminist ideology has seen women as similar to men, and gender neutrality rather than distinctiveness has been the goal. In Sweden, feminism has been more in the offensive ideologically than in the two other countries (in particular Denmark). A few years ago, all male Swedish political leaders declared themselves as...
feminists. In Denmark this word has sometimes been almost a shaming label, but perhaps most importantly, during the 90s and 00s the issue has been almost out of the political debate, except when it comes to suspecting immigrants for maintaining traditional gender roles and oppression of women. Thus, in Denmark most notable is the absence of a prominent gender equality discourse. If anything, the discourse contains the notion that gender equality is a nonissue (Dahlerup, 2009). As regards public policies, there are quite significant differences in the Scandinavian parental leave schemes, and there are differences in the willingness to apply the instrument of gender quotas or other “affirmative action” to promote gender equality.

Finally, in the last section we make generational comparisons. The straight-line argument from the 1970s predicting irreversible change, deeper cleavages, and higher impact of attitudes has for long been questioned or falsified. One could expect, however, that in Scandinavia changes in gender roles are reversible whereas dissatisfaction with the current state of gender equality, and attitudes towards policy instruments is more dependent on attention, that is, on mobilization and discourse. This suggestion is far from new (Togeby, 1995a). But it would imply that one would expect gender role attitudes to be fairly similar across countries. As the countries are so culturally similar, one would also expect abstract ideals to be similar across countries. On the other hand, one would expect feminist attitudes like dissatisfaction with current conditions and favorable attitudes towards policy instruments to be stronger in countries where the mobilization has continued (both from “below” and “above”), that is, Norway and in particular Sweden. However, one might also expect more counter-reaction among men in countries where feminism has been on the offensive, in particular as regards attitudes towards specific policy instruments.

Current & Relevant Information:

**Gender role attitudes**

The survey did not include any questions about traditional gender roles such as the appropriateness of women having paid work, ability of working mothers to take sufficient care of their children etc. But it did include two questions about gender roles in the family and one about women’s capacity for political leadership (see Table 1). Not surprisingly, nearly all respondents answered that there is no difference in men and women’s capacity for political leadership, and the figures were nearly the same among men and women in all three countries, even though it remains that 8-11 per cent of the male respondents believed that men were a little or much better, as against 5 per cent among women.

When it comes to the division of labor in the family, we do in fact encounter small country differences. We did not ask about details of household work, but asked whether “men should take as much part in childcare as women”. In Denmark only 62 per cent (of all respondents) agree. Even though it should be added that only 9 per
cent disagree – the remaining 29 per cent answer “neither agree nor disagree” – it remains that Danes are somewhat less convinced than are the Swedes and Norwegians. In Sweden 67 per cent agree, and in Norway the figure is 72 per cent. This is in fact rather surprising. It is also surprising that we find small, but significant gender differences on this item. In all three countries, the proportion agreeing that men should take as much part in childcare as women is 10-12 percentage points higher among women.

Finally, we included a question about the desirability of men taking paternal leave (without mentioning anything about legislation). Among the Swedish respondents, 62 per cent agreed, almost the same figure as in Norway. However, in Denmark the figure was below 50 per cent, both among men and women. Again, it should be kept in mind that only 17 per cent of the Danish respondents disagree, but this figure is also clearly higher than in Sweden and nearly twice as high as in Norway.

Also, at this point we find small differences between men and women: 3 percentage points in Denmark, 7 percentage points in Sweden and 9 percentage points in Norway. These differences are small, but they imply that country differences among women are somewhat larger: 49 per cent of the Danish women agree, as against 64 and 67 per cent, respectively, among Swedish and Norwegian women.

The picture of course depends on the indicators selected, and we have omitted those that appear most trivial since they reflect options (e.g., of married women not working) that are not available any more. But it remains that even when it comes to gender role questions that support what would appear as nearly hegemonic values in the Nordic societies, we do find what one could feel tempted to call more “traditionalist” (or more “liberalist”?) attitudes among Danish respondents than among Swedes and Norwegians. It is obvious, also for Danes those men and women are equally capable of assuming political leadership positions, but it is not equally obvious that fathers and mothers should share the responsibility for children, and for the Danes, it is far from undisputable that in principle, men should take paternal leave.

This is a surprising first indication that Danes are more stuck in the maintenance of traditional gender roles – even though many among the respondents would probably
not perceive it this way. It is also remarkable – although perhaps slightly less surprising – that in all three countries, women are stronger adherents of “modern” gender roles than men.

C. Finland:


Overview:

Quick Facts

Arctic Territory

Northern Ostrobothnia, Kainuu and Lapland

Arctic Population

180,000 (Lapland), 5,500,000 (Finland)

Arctic Indigenous Peoples

Saami

Current & Relevant Information:

Finland and the Arctic Region

While Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013 defines the entire country as Arctic, nearly one-third of the country’s land mass lies above the Arctic Circle in the province of Lapland. Despite its vast size, Lapland is sparsely populated with just under 180,000 inhabitants, while Finland’s total population exceeds 5,500,000.

Finland has contributed expertise and modern technology to industries such as Arctic construction, Arctic environmental technology and the development of Arctic infrastructure, transportation and navigation in ice-covered waters. It also houses various Arctic research and educational programs and institutions. Several biological research stations are located in Lapland, where Arctic ecology is studied. The Arctic Centre, an institute affiliated to the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi, carries out interdisciplinary research on the effects of global changes and on the natural balance of Arctic nature and Arctic societies. The University of Oulu has a research focus on Arctic medical sciences. Arctic-related issues are also included in teaching and research programs of many other higher education institutions in Finland.

Indigenous Peoples

The Saami are an Indigenous people who live in Sápmi, an area that stretches across the northern parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. The Saami population is estimated between 50,000 and 80,000, with approximately 10,500
located in Finland. The preservation of the Saami’s languages and culture is governed by an autonomous Saami parliament in Inari, Finland.

“Finland,” The Arctic Institute Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, 1 August 2022 [170] https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/finland/

Overview:

The area defined as Northern Finland covers three provinces that together form 44% of Finland: Northern Ostrobothnia (Pohjois-Pohjanmaa), Kainuu, and Lapland (Lappi). When talking about the Finnish Arctic, the area most commonly referred to is Lapland as the Arctic Circle crosses the province at approximately the same latitude as its capital, Rovaniemi. This puts one third of Finland’s territory above the Arctic Circle. The total area of the three provinces of Northern Finland is 160,851 km², of which Lapland covers 98,983 km². Despite being the largest province in terms of territory, Lapland remains sparsely populated with only 180 thousand people. These people are spread across Lapland’s 21 municipalities which, in turn, form six sub-regions. The Sámi Homeland in Lapland is legally defined and includes the municipalities of Enontekiö, Inari and Utsjoki and the northern part of Sodankylä.

Lapland has a typical subarctic climate with cold, snowy winters and reasonably mild summers. The average temperatures range from -13.5 °C to 14.5 °C whereas during the winter months temperatures can dip below -30 °C. The record low -51.5°C was measured in Kittilä in 1999. Lapland’s nature and scenery is dominated by fells, forests and waterways. There are several fells in Lapland, with the most well-known being Halti, Saana, and Korvatunturi. About 30% of the land in Lapland is either national parks or other nature conservation areas. Around 90% of the Sámi homeland area is government controlled and 80% falls within nature conservation areas. These areas are important for traditional reindeer husbandry and tourism.

Finnish Lapland has been upheld as an example of how ecosystem services can help prevent ecological problems caused by human action, as well as a way to resolve land-use questions in an economically and environmentally sustainable way. Finland has attempted to position itself as a leader in sustainable development in the Arctic region. Moreover, Finland is often rated among the world’s top countries in terms of environmental protection standards. In spite of these impressive achievements, Finland’s ecological footprint is still quite high when compared to its Nordic neighbors.

With over 70% of the country covered, Finland is Europe’s most forested country. Of these forests, about 17,000 km² of it are strictly protected. Finland’s forest resources are increasing as the natural growth of forests more than compensates for the amounts of timber logged. Finland’s contributions to global greenhouse gas emissions are small in global terms, but very high when measured per capita. Renewable energy sources account for about a quarter of all the energy used in Finland. A large part of this renewable energy is produced from residuals generated
in the pulp and paper industry, including bio-sludge and wood chips. Almost half of the wood used in Finland is burnt to produce energy.

The Regional Council of Lapland has developed a climate change strategy for 2030. The strategy lists goals for Lapland in order to better mitigate climate change in the region. Lapland’s carbon dioxide emissions in 2009 were about 2.8 million tons, which is more than the Finnish average in proportion to population density. The province of Lapland sees climate change as bringing both economic opportunities for development, but also as a threat to traditional livelihoods.

The Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE) is represented in the Arctic Council’s Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) studying contaminants in lake sediments and the movements of harmful airborne substances. SYKE also takes part in the Arctic Contaminants Action Plan (ACAP). The Centre for Economic Development, Transport and Environment (ELY Centre) in Lapland also takes part in AMAP and other international environmental management initiatives.

Current & Relevant Information:

Helsinki, Finland’s capital and largest city, has a population of 648,650. The entire Helsinki region counts approximately 1.5 million inhabitants. Most of the largest cities in Finland, including Helsinki, are located in the south. These include Espoo (281,886) and Tampere (234,441). The biggest cities in Northern Finland are Oulu (202,753), Rovaniemi (62,667), Kajaani (37,039), and Tornio (21,912). As of 2014, 181,815 people lived in Lapland.

The majority of Arctic residents in Finland speak Finnish, with 1,560 speaking Sami, 438 speaking Swedish, and 3,467 speaking some other language as their mother tongue. Much of the current population of Finland’s Arctic predates the country’s modern independence to its time as part of the Swedish Empire (~1249-1809). Many Finns and Swedes moved to Lapland to build villages around isolated dwellings in the wilderness, both claiming land and cultivating parcels. These settlers sought to capitalize on the wilderness and its hunting and agricultural potential. Eventually, new industries like forestry and mining drew southerners to the Arctic for economic gain.

There are approximately 10 thousand Sámi living in Finland. Only about 35 percent live in or near their original Sámi homelands, and those that do live in Lapland compose only 5 percent of the population. This represents a challenge to the Sámi community and culture. Other major challenges facing the Sámi in Finland are maintaining the Sámi language, the limited health and social services available in their remote communities, as well as problems of social exclusion.

The Sámi in Finland are represented by the Sámi Parliament established in 1995 as an independent legal entity subject to public law with its own governing body. There are 21 elected representatives and 4 deputies in the Sámi Parliament who are
elected every 4 years. The Sámi Parliament can make initiatives, proposals and statements representing the official view of the Sámi in Finland on issues concerning them in both national and international contexts.

The Finnish Constitution was amended to include stronger rights for the Sámi in 1995. The amendments recognized the status of the Sámi as an Indigenous people and gave the Sámi additional rights to maintain and develop their languages and culture. The new legislation guaranteed that Sámi language and culture in their Homeland would be managed by the Sámi and not the Finnish government. The Finnish authorities thus have to consult with the Sámi Parliament in all matters affecting the status of Sámi as an Indigenous people.

In Finland, the definition of a Sámi is laid down in the Act on the Sámi Parliament and is mainly based on the Sámi language. According to this official definition, a Sámi is a person who considers him- or herself a Sámi, has learnt Sámi as his or her first language, or has at least one parent or grandparent whose first language is Sámi. There have been some issues with the definition lately as the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland still has the right to define the Sámi status. The Sámi Parliament considers this a violation of their rights to define their own identity and community membership. Finland has still not ratified the International Labour Organization’s Convention 169—a binding UN document dealing specifically with Indigenous rights.

The Sámi culture has maintained its traditional elements but faces challenges today as people become integrated with global industries, growing tourism, and technological development. To adapt to the changing economic opportunities of Finland’s North while keeping indigenous traditions alive, the two major occupations in the Sámi Homeland are tourism and reindeer husbandry. The Sámi Parliament advocates and works together with the municipalities to revive and maintain the Sámi language and education. All the middle schools and high schools within the Sámi Homelands are legally obligated to offer education also in the Sámi languages; North Sámi, Skolt Sámi and Inari Sámi.

The Sámi of Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden are represented in the Arctic Council by the Saami Council, a non-governmental organization founded in 1956. The Saami Council actively deals with policy-related tasks advocating the Saami rights and interests in the four countries as well as to an international audience.


Overview:

Finland has said that the next iteration of its Arctic policy will take a long-term perspective on the region by pushing for economic development that does not
capitalize on the effects of global warming, strengthening the Arctic Council and other institutions and linking its strategy for the region to its national goal of becoming carbon-free by 2035.

“In line with the government program, all activity in the Arctic region must be tied in with the carrying capacity of the environment, the need to protect the climate, the importance of sustainable development principles, and respect for the rights of indigenous peoples,” a government statement issued last week said.

Finland’s current policy was drawn up in 2013 and updated three years later. The process of drawing up a new version, which is expected to take about a year, officially began last month during events in Helsinki and Rovaniemi titled Globally Influential Finland in the Arctic Region.

Current & Relevant Information:
A glimpse of the direction the strategy is likely to take was seen earlier this year, when Prime Minister Sanna Marin laid out her views on the effects of global warming in the region during a session of the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, where she talked up the Arctic Council and described any prosperity gains from oil drilling as short sighted.

“The Arctic issue is so much more than a geopolitical issue or an issue of geopolitical contest or competition or tension. It’s about climate, it’s about our future, and that’s why we need to tackle climate change if want to save the Arctic and also tackle the risks [related to] the geopolitical issues,” she said.

Those involved in the process expect the outcome will be a “narrow” but “far-reaching” policy that pushes cooperation among the Arctic countries, a stronger role for the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council and greater EU involvement in the region.

Finland’s revision is taking place as the four other Nordic countries — Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Iceland — are preparing new Arctic strategies of their own, and all five, say diplomats, have spoken with each other “where relevant and appropriate” — particularly in areas like security policy — in an effort to iron out major differences amongst the policies.

“Finland’s Arctic and Antarctic cooperation,” Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland [172]  https://um.fi/arctic-cooperation

Overview:
Finland is an active Polar actor. We are one of eight permanent members of the Arctic Council and one of 29 consultative parties making decisions concerning Antarctica.
The Arctic is still one of the purest and most pristine regions in the world. However, today it is also facing rapid and partly controversial changes. Climate change and its impacts and repercussions, both regionally and globally, logistics opportunities that open up as the ice is melting, pandemics and the natural resources of the Arctic have made the region increasingly interesting, but also more vulnerable on the international arena.

As also stated in Prime Minister Sanna Marin’s Government Program, the key premises of Finland’s Arctic cooperation are the carrying capacity of the natural environment, climate protection, and respect for the sustainable development principles and rights of indigenous populations. According to the Government Program, Finland will also be an active player in strengthening the Arctic policy of the EU.

The Strategy for the Arctic Region, adopted in 2013 and updated in 2016, specifies the objectives and means of Finland’s Arctic policy. Now the Arctic policy strategy is being revised on the basis of the current Government Program.

Current & Relevant Information:

Finland’s foreign and EU policy on the Arctic

Finland’s foreign and EU policy on the Arctic builds on cooperation in the EU, the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and in the context of the Northern Dimension Partnerships. Nordic cooperation strengthens Finland’s Arctic role.

Environmental cooperation and respect for the interests of indigenous populations are important elements of Finland’s Arctic foreign and EU policy.

Gender Roles:

“Pan-Arctic Report: Gender Equality in the Arctic Phase 3,” Arctic Council, April 2021 [173]

Summary:

Gender equality in the Arctic is highly relevant to the agenda and role of the Arctic Council (the Council) and its Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), which have emphasized gender equality in previous projects and initiatives. The importance of issues of gender and diversity has become increasingly evident, the
latest example being Iceland’s emphasis on gender issues during its Council Chairmanship.

GEA highlights the importance of recognizing and appreciating diversity in terms of discourses, gender, Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, governance, education, economies, social realities, sustainability, and balanced participation in leadership and decision making, in both the public and private sectors.

A major component of GEA III has been to develop this report on gender. It pulls together material, information, and expertise to provide an overview of gender-related issues in the Arctic and contributes to filling knowledge gaps on this subject. The GEA III report seeks to identify emerging issues, priorities, and concrete strategies that support gender balance and increased diversity.

The primary intended audience for this report is policymakers in the Arctic region. It is a resource for those interested in gender issues in the Arctic, including Arctic inhabitants and researchers. We hope that a broader audience, including the private sector, will appreciate the relevance of the report to their work.

The report does not claim to be comprehensive, but it is a step forward in strengthening the knowledge base and understanding required for developing policies that foster resilient and thriving communities.

Current & Relevant Information:

Finland

The population of Arctic Finland grew by 2% from 2000—2019 compared to 7% in Finland as a whole, peaking in 2015 with a population of 666,400. However, since 2015 there has been a decline in the region bringing the population down to 662,300 (Statistics Finland, 2020d).

Arctic Finland is also home to 10,000 Sámi people, of which an estimated 60% live outside Sámi Homelands (Sámediggi, 2020). Sámi rights are defined according to geography and apply to the three municipalities of Enontekiö, Inari, and Utsjoki as well as the Sámi reindeer-herding district of Lapin Paliskunta, which is in the municipality of Sodankylä (Löfving et al., 2020).

When examining population trends within North Ostrobothnia, Lapland, and Kainuu, it is evident that population changes are not uniform throughout the provinces. In Lapland and Kainuu the population declined by 16% and 8%, respectively, during the period 2000-2019. In contrast, North Ostrobothnia, which accounts for almost two thirds of the population in Arctic Finland, experienced a population growth of almost 11% over the same time period (Statistics Finland, 2020a). The cities in Arctic Finland have grown substantially, and despite a population decline in Lapland overall, the city of Rovaniemi in Lapland grew by 9% from 2006—2019 (Statistics Finland, 2020c).
Unlike many areas in the Arctic, the Finnish Arctic appears relatively gender balanced. From 2000—2019 the sex ratio remained constant for most of the period, at around 101 men for every 100 women. In comparison the sex ratio in 2019 for Finland generally was 97.5 men for every 100 women (Statistics Finland, 2020d). Interestingly, when examining the sex ratio of the two large cities of Oulu and Rovaniemi a diverging picture emerges. Whilst the sex ratio in Oulu has become more equal at almost 100 men for every 100 women, there are still more women than men in Rovaniemi (91:100) (Statistics Finland, 2020c). These figures suggest that despite Arctic Finland generally, and Lapland specifically, having an overall balanced sex ratio, women in Lapland are more likely than men to settle in the urban area of Rovaniemi.

“Finland: pioneer in gender equality,” International Gender Equality [174]

Overview:
Finland was the first country to grant full political rights to women in 1906. For more than 100 years women have had active roles in working life and decision making.

Our rise to the top ranks in various ratings is based on equality.

The entire talent of our small nation — not only 50% of it — was fully utilized and we were the first country in the world to do this.

Finland is a world leader in creating an equal society for women. We are still pursuing this work and hope to lead by example.

Current & Relevant Information:

TODAY WE ARE PROUD TO REPORT:

• 47% of Members of Parliament in Finland are women.
• 12 out of 19 Ministers in the Government are women.
• 49% of all employed people are women.
• Roughly one third of all entrepreneurs in Finland are women. This is a significant figure compared with other EU countries.
• In the Finnish Foreign Service about 45% of ambassadors are women and over 50% of the 560 diplomats are women.

WE HAVE RECEIVED THESE ACCOLADES:

• 3rd most gender-equal country in the world (The Global Gender Gap, 2017).
• Best early childhood education in the world (Global Competitiveness Report, 2016-2017).
2nd best country in the world to be a girl (Save the Children, Girl’s Opportunity Index, 2016).

Mother’s wellbeing rated 2nd best in the world (Save the Children, 2016).

Most effective country at utilizing human talent (World Economic Forum).

“Gender-equality pioneering, or how three Nordic states celebrated 100 years of women’s suffrage,” Eirinn Larsen, Ulla Manns, and Ann-Catrin Östman, Scandinavian Journal of History, 25 January 2022 [175]

Abstract:
The Nordic countries do not just identify strongly with gender equality: they also increasingly mobilize their pasts, as well as more contemporary notions held at the international level wherein the Nordics are seen as exceptionally gender equal, to highlight and brand themselves in the present as global pioneers of women’s rights. In this article, using nation-branding as an overarching perspective, we examine how this eagerness among the Nordics to be perceived as front-runners of gender rights affected the memory politics at play during the national commemoration of 100 years of women’s suffrage in Finland (2006–2007), Norway (2013) and Sweden (2018–2022). In addition, we ask what national narratives the respective jubilee celebrations helped to facilitate – and whether those narratives correspond with the images that function as the primary brands of Finland, Norway and Sweden today.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

From the 1990s onwards, there has been a surge in national jubilee celebrations within the Nordic region. Among these events, we find celebrations of the centenary of women’s suffrage. The Nordic wave of commemorating the achievement of women’s enfranchisement began in Finland in 2006 as part of a national celebration of Finland’s parliamentary reforms of 1906, and continued in Norway in 2013, before Sweden in 2018 embarked on a little more than three-year-long celebration of the political reforms that had led to the introduction of universal and equal suffrage in the country. As memory studies scholars emphasize, national commemoration events are products of certain ways of remembering the past, and such events are often governed and dominated by contemporary political and economic concerns and visions for the future. The purpose of this article, then, is to critically compare how the memories of women’s achievement of the right to vote in the Nordic region have been produced, narrated and used in their respective national contexts with an emphasis on the centenary celebrations of women’s suffrage in Finland, Norway and Sweden.
The relationship between history and memory is never straightforward and takes different forms in different countries. The argument set forth in this article is that, intentionally or not, the various celebrations of the centenary of women’s voting rights in Finland, Norway and Sweden were influenced by parallel gender-related nation-branding activities in which all of the Nordic countries are currently involved. The Nordic countries do not only identify strongly with gender equality: they also increasingly mobilize their pasts, as well as more contemporary notions held at the international level wherein the Nordics as seen as exceptionally gender equal, to highlight and brand themselves in the present as global pioneers of women’s rights. Sweden is the most aggressive gender-equality brander of the Nordic states, since 2014 with the ambition to pursue a feminist foreign policy. In relation to women’s right to vote, however, Sweden was something of a laggard compared to both Finland and Norway. Although a process of parliamentary reforms to regulate political representation in Sweden began in 1918, Swedish women were not enfranchised until 1921. This position as a Nordic latecomer of women’s suffrage challenge the consistent notion of Sweden as progressive pointed at by scholars such as Jenny Andersson and Mary Hilson among others. The key question examined here, then, is how this eagerness to be perceived as front-runners of gender rights was to affect the memory politics at play in the national commemoration of women’s suffrage of Sweden in comparison with the centenary celebrations of Finland and Norway. Also, we ask, what national narratives did the respective jubilee celebrations help to facilitate – and did these narratives correspond with the images that function as the primary brands of the three countries? If not, how can the gap between memory politics and gender-related nation-branding be understood and explained? To answer these questions, we draw upon various types of sources produced during the centenary celebrations of the three countries examined. Special attention is paid to the involvement of parliaments, ministries, and actors such as feminist organizations and scholars. Different actors are usually involved when historical milestones of national significance are produced, regardless of whether such productions are devoted to esteemed artists and authors or to social and political reforms, such as the achievement of women’s suffrage at the turn of the last century. Within the Nordic context, civil society, historians and other university scholars, museums, media and archives are key actors within national memory production. In addition, there is the state, of course.

The article begins with an introduction to nation-branding and more gender-related forms of nation-branding and reputation management. In the subsequent sections, the national cases are analyzed and compared in chronological order – that is, the Finnish celebration of parliamentary reforms (2006–2008), the Norwegian suffrage jubilee (2013) and the jubilee to celebrate the birth of modern democracy in Sweden (2018–2022) are each examined in turn. In the concluding section, we return to the question of how the past is commemorated, produced and used in the era of nation-branding.
Overview:

Finland has a good track record in gender equality. The Global Gender Gap Report 2018 ranks Finland as 4th in the world. Finland is a country where women usually work full-time and enjoy equal access to education and healthcare. It is also where women are most likely to be able to participate fully in the country’s political and economic life. As provided for in the Constitution the Finnish society is committed to gender equality.

Finland was the first country in the world to extend the right to vote and stand for elections to all women and men in 1906. Finland was also the first country to elect women to Parliament: 19 were elected to the 200-seat Parliament in 1907. The success of Finland as a country is to a great extent linked with improvements in the status of women and gender equality. Already in 1917, a number of Finnish women were given four weeks of maternity leave. Nowadays the parental leave is almost one year and is also used increasingly by fathers.

Current & Relevant Information:

Women and men are equally represented in the Finnish labor market. This is due to affordable, good-quality child care, measures to reconcile work and family life, and a policy to distribute family leaves more evenly between parents. Discrimination based upon gender, gender identity and expression of gender is prohibited by law.

All Finnish children study in mixed classrooms for at least 9 years and receive free meals at school. The level of education of women is higher than that of men: 58% of university graduates in 2017 were women.

Areas for improvement include the gender pay gap and the lack of women in top corporate positions.

Health and well-being of families is supported by child health clinics and other services. Finland is famous also for its maternity package sent to every expectant mother or family.


Abstract:

Stimulated by the recent debate on gender roles and men’s fertility behavior (Puur et al. 2008; Westoff and Higgins 2009; Goldscheider, Oláh and Puur 2010), we present evidence from Finland as a country well into the second phase of the so-called
gender revolution. We examine how gender role attitudes relate to childbearing intentions at the onset of family life, intentions to have many (3 or more) children, and high personal fertility ideals among low-parity men and women. Gender equality attitudes are measured for both the public and the domestic sphere and the influence of work and family orientation is controlled for. Finding signs of a U-shaped association among men, we conclude that both traditional and egalitarian attitudes raise men’s expected fertility compared to men with intermediate gender attitudes and independently of family values. Among Finnish women the impact of gender attitudes is smaller and more ambiguous.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

Gender and gender equity represent an important challenge for fertility research. Gender shapes reproductive strategies, be it through mate choice and parental investment (Trivers 1972), power relations within the household (Folbre 1983), or more general notions of gender ideology (Philipov 2008). Differing views exist as to whether increased gender equity will make people wish for more or fewer children. Historically, traditional family arrangements have correlated with higher numbers of children. During the first demographic transition to smaller families women became much more equal with men. However, at the same time the provision of child care from kin diminished and parents were increasingly removed from the family sphere, intensifying the stress of women’s double burden of combining wage and domestic work (Goldscheider 2000). The second demographic transition witnessed even smaller family sizes while recent years have seen a recuperation of fertility in the most developed societies, which also score high in gender equity (Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009).

Several studies predict that fertility will increase as gender equity within families advances. For instance, influential articles by Peter McDonald (2000a and 2000b) proposed that the imbalance between high gender equity in institutions such as education and market employment and lower level of equity in family life have contributed to low fertility in advanced countries. Once the ‘gender revolution’ is completed fertility should rise (see also Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996; Puur et al. 2008; Goldscheider, Oláh, and Puur 2010). This may indeed be one explanation for the recent reversal in fertility decline (Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009). However, the actual impact of family gender equity and egalitarian values on fertility is unclear, although it is crucial for understanding demographic prospects and “the male role in Europe” in the 21st century (Puur et al. 2008).

Of special interest in European demographic research has been the relationship between the fertility intentions of men, women, and couples, and actual childbearing (Oláh 2003; Puur et al. 2008; Philipov 2009; Westoff and Higgins 2009). In particular the role children play in men’s lives and the impact of gender equity on fatherhood
has been discussed in numerous recent studies (Thomson, McDonald, and Bumpass 1990; Thomson 1997; Thomson and Hoem 1998; Rosina and Testa 2009). Egalitarian women can reasonably be expected to opt for either ‘no families’ or ‘new families’ (Goldsheider and Waite 1991). If their double burden is alleviated – due to work and family reconciliation policies or due to men acquiring a larger share of household tasks – a positive influence of gender equality on women’s childbearing prospects can be presumed. But why should gender egalitarian attitudes increase men’s fertility aspirations, since equality means more, not less domestic work for them? Both indirect and direct explanations have been suggested. If egalitarian men are more willing to share domestic and childcare tasks, this may increase their partners’ desire to have children. Egalitarian men may also attach more importance and meaning to family life and fatherhood than traditional men do. Hence, ‘doing family’ or strong family orientation of egalitarian men could compensate for the costs of domestic and caring responsibilities and increase men’s fertility intentions (e.g., Goldsheider 2000; Puur et al. 2008:1887). However, not all egalitarian men are highly family-oriented, while men with traditional gender attitudes may also prioritize family life.

This article is stimulated by the recent debate on the relationship between traditional and egalitarian gender roles and fertility, focusing particularly on men’s attitudes to gender equality and having children (Puur et al. 2008; Westhoff and Higgins 2009; Goldsheider, Oláh, and Puur 2010). We present evidence from Finland as a country with a relatively high level of gender equity in both public and private life and thus well into the second phase of the gender revolution. The relationship between egalitarian attitudes and fertility intentions of women and men with no children or only one child is investigated. We examine how egalitarian attitudes relate to childbearing intentions at the onset of family life, intentions to have many (3 or more) children, and high personal fertility ideals among men and women with no or only one child. Men’s responses are compared with data on women, as information about both sexes is needed in order to understand the link between gender relations and fertility.

**Discussion**

The ongoing discussion on men, gender equity, and fertility involves many different views and approaches. Theories of the incomplete gender revolution suggest that gender equity should today boost fertility, particularly in societies where the equality is reaching into families (Goldsheider and Waite 1991; McDonald 2000a and 2000b; Puur et al. 2008). Other scholars claim that for different reasons, such as the double burden of egalitarian men or the pro-family values of traditional men, men favoring gender equity will probably have fewer children than other men do (Westoff and Higgins 2009). Finally, previous studies have found that both traditional and egalitarian gender attitudes can contribute to higher fertility. A clear role division between the spouses, whether egalitarian or polarized, may improve their ‘team
work’ and facilitate everyday coping, while “transitional couples struggle most with the balance between work and family” (Torr and Short 2004:123).

How do attitudes toward gender equity shape the fertility intentions of men and women in Finland, a country well into the second phase of the so-called gender revolution? We have analyzed fertility ideals and intentions among adult Finnish men and women with no or only one child. Inspired by the recent debate on men’s fertility intentions and gender equality, we wanted to use broader measurements of gender equality and to pay special attention to the independent contributions of work and family orientation alongside gender equity.

Our results showed that men’s gender attitudes were in some cases related to the intention to have the first child, although these associations did not reach statistical significance. Support for gender equality was associated with higher fertility intentions among childless men. By contrast, women with intermediate gender equity attitudes were more likely than other women to opt for parenthood.

The impact of gender ideology significantly influenced men’s overall fertility ideals and plans, so that traditional men were more likely and men with intermediate attitudes least likely to wish for and plan many children.

Thus, the evidence from Finland presented here gives some slight support for Puur et al. (2008), in the sense that egalitarian men appear most eager to become fathers. Particularly, when compared to intermediate men, egalitarian men had higher parenthood intentions as well as overall fertility expectations. However, traditional attitudes also clearly boost men’s fertility ideals in the direction found by Westoff and Higgins (2009). Although Finland can be said to be a country relatively far into the second gender revolution, with developed family-friendly social policies promoting paternal involvement in child care, traditional men still favor having children more than other men do.

The stronger effect found for egalitarian values by Puur et al. (2008) than in our study (and others) may, however, be due to different measurements. As the authors acknowledge in their response to Westoff and Higgins (Goldscheider, Oláh, and Puur 2010), some of their questions used for measuring gender egalitarianism probably measured what we have here called family orientation. This would be especially true for the statements “Family life often suffers because men concentrate too much on their work” and “For a man the job should be more important than the family”. We controlled for family and work orientation and found that egalitarian attitudes still raised intentions to become a parent. Family orientation, in turn, correlated consistently and significantly with men’s and women’s intentions to have a first child, and with men’s higher fertility intentions. The independent effect of both gender attitudes and of family orientation on men’s fertility intentions remained when controlling for other ideational and structural variables.
As in many previous studies, the impact of gender attitudes depended on what fertility component was examined. Gender attitudes had more impact on higher fertility intentions (among men) than on the proximate and more concrete decision to have the next child. As such, studies of mean expected or ideal numbers of children may detect stronger relations between equality and fertility than those analyzing parity-specific childbearing behavior. We also suggest that gender egalitarianism may influence the number of children, especially through the timing of parenthood. While egalitarian men are almost as likely as traditional men to opt for parenthood and large families, they may start having children at a later stage than other men do.

Our study has several limitations. An obvious shortcoming is our data only refers to men and women at parity 0 and 1. However, this sample reflects the family structure of the majority of the age group in question. Another limitation is that we did not study actual fertility outcomes. General family size preferences are known to be relatively weak predictors of subsequent behavior, especially when respondents are asked about preferences concerning several parities beyond their current one. Nevertheless, in order to understand how gender attitudes relate to fertility intentions, the inclusion of more abstract ideals and plans is warranted. In our next study we hope to be able to link these survey data with childbearing outcomes of respondents through birth register data.

To conclude, our findings indicate a tentative U-shaped association between gender attitudes and fertility among Finnish men. Traditional but also egalitarian attitudes raise men’s fertility intentions, especially related to above-average numbers of children. Among Finnish women the impact of gender attitudes is smaller and more ambiguous. Unlike most other previous research, we found that Finnish women with traditional gender attitudes did not wish for more children than did other women. Instead, mothers with egalitarian values showed signs of having higher childbearing ideals and intentions. This can be interpreted as support for the claim that equally sharing couples more often have a second child (Torr and Short 2004). In regression analyses gender attitudes did not affect women’s childbearing intentions. Women’s educational level, income, family, and work orientation were more important for their fertility intentions than were their gender role attitudes. Gender equity may thus affect men’s and women’s fertility aspirations in contradictory ways. We should also remember that egalitarian Finnish fathers of one child were not exceptionally eager to have two or more children. Factors not included in this analysis, such as personality traits and partnership satisfaction, which may interact with gender equality, may also be at play here and would merit inclusion in future studies.

“Gender Equality Policies in Finland,” Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2006
https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/70236/Es200608eng.pdf?sequence=1

Overview:
Women have traditionally worked alongside men in Finland. Agriculture dominated by small farms required a full contribution from both women and men. The changing occupational structure gave women an opportunity to work in the industry and the service sector, while at the same time they also had to work for their living.

Modern debate on equality between women and men began in Finland in the 1960s. Traditional gender roles were questioned as they were seen to be based on the division of labor in an agricultural society. In an urbanized society both women and men work outside the home. It was also emphasized that women and men should have equal roles in looking after the family, have a right to gainful employment and be able to have an influence in society on an equal basis. It was also stressed that it is the responsibility of the Government to provide social protection and services. The demands for reform appealed to both women and men and established the basis for the gender equality policies of the following decades. The Committee on the Status of Women published a reform program in 1970, and the Council for Equality was founded in 1972 to promote the implementation of the reforms.

International debate, particularly in Scandinavia, and international agreements and movements have also had a major impact in Finland.

Current & Relevant Information:

Men and gender equality

Gender equality should also be considered in relation to men. A unit which deals with men and gender equality has operated in the Council for Gender Equality since 1988. Finland’s Government Program for 2003–2007 states for the first time: “Gender equality will also be evaluated from the male point of view.”

The theme ‘men and gender equality’ emphasizes the support for fatherhood and parenthood, including encouraging men to take family leave. In Finland, policy preparation concerning men and gender equality has been made part of general equality policy. The central new aim is to increase men’s involvement in gender equality policy debate and the promotion of gender equality.

D. Iceland:

“Iceland,” The Arctic Institute Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, 1 March 2023 [179]  https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/iceland/?cn-reloaded=1

Overview:

The majority of Iceland’s land mass sits just south of the Arctic Circle, with only the small island of Grimsey located partially inside the Arctic Circle. The country’s physical landscape is a mix of barren fields, rich agricultural lands, and stark peaks. The high amounts of precipitation and generally warmer weather than other areas at its latitude is due to its place in the Atlantic Ocean’s Gulf Stream. Average annual
precipitation ranges from 400 to 4000 mm, with averages of 3000 mm on the south coast of the island.

Iceland, an island country in between the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, sits atop the northern Mid-Atlantic Ridge. Its position on the Ridge results in extensive volcanic and geothermal activity. Most of the country is a recently created mountainous lava desert, with the highest elevation at 2,110 meters (6,923 feet) above sea level. Just over 10 percent of the island is covered by glaciers, though these are now rapidly retreating due to climate change. Most of Iceland remains undeveloped, with the vast majority of its population residing in a ring along the coast. Twenty percent of the main island is used for grazing, while one percent is cultivated. The majority of Iceland’s population resides in four cities: Reykjavík, Kópavogur, Akureyri, and Hafnarfjörður. Residents of these four cities account for 60 percent of the country’s entire population.

Despite only having a population of slightly more than 337,000, in 2017 more than two million people visited the island. While bringing a significant boom to the Icelandic economy after the 2008 Icelandic financial crisis, this tourism has brought environmental concerns with it. The government of Iceland, the tourism industry, and a growing body of academic researchers have dedicated much time, thought, and energy in ensuring that nature conservation efforts are not jeopardized by such a large increase in annual visitors. Building tourist infrastructure in an already saturated housing market, developing wilderness areas as tourist resorts, damaging moss-covered geographies, and the breaking of recent volcanic features are just a few examples of how tourism is changing the Icelandic landscapes and having an impact on its environment.

Increased energy production from hydroelectric and geothermal sources has also put pressure on Iceland’s natural landscape, demanding more dams to be built across streams, rivers, and estuaries and wilderness areas to be reclaimed for geothermal plants. Geothermal plants emit hydrogen-sulphide, which is both corrosive and toxic. Hydrogen sulphur does not necessarily lead to any specific diseases; but it does cause complications for those already suffering from serious illness. It must be acknowledged that Iceland’s dedication to renewable energy sources has made it a global leader in clean energy and one of the lowest energy sector greenhouse gas emitters. However, Iceland has seen an increase since 1990 in its greenhouse gas emissions from its industrial and transport sectors.

Iceland also has significant issues of soil erosion and desertification due to its high content of volcanic ash. Today nearly one third of the country is desert, though when the Vikings first settled the island, it was lush with trees, shrubs, and grass. The introduction of sheep, deforestation, and human settlement by Iceland first settlers, in addition to frequent volcanic eruptions, glacial river floods, and katabatic winds, has led to the landscape of ice and fire that Iceland is known for today. The Icelandic government has taken action against soil erosion and desertification since 1895, and
has established the Soil Conservation Service of Iceland to combat desertification and promote sustainable land use.

The health of the ocean is of great importance to Iceland as an island nation. Therefore, Iceland imbues great importance into maintaining a healthy ocean environment and to ensure sustainable utilization of the ocean as one of the core sectors of Iceland’s economy. Iceland’s policies for ocean management and conservation are based on the UN Law of the Sea, which the country ratified in 1985; the concept of sustainable development, and the view that responsibility for the conservation and utilization of marine ecosystems is best placed in the hands of those states directly affected by the decisions taken and with the greatest interests at stake. Perhaps the largest environmental marine issue for Iceland is the sustainable harvesting of fish and other living marine resources. The alleged overfishing of mackerel in large part led to Iceland withdrawing its European Union application and further disputes between the continental Europe and Iceland overfishing. Despite being a fishing country with a focus on sustainable use of the ocean, Iceland is generally not regarded as an Arctic Ocean littoral State as its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is not adjacent to the high seas portion of the Central Arctic Ocean.

Current & Relevant Information:

Iceland became an independent republic from the Danish monarchy in 1944 after nearly six centuries of colonial rule. The original settlement of Iceland began in the late 9th century, perhaps around 874, by Norse settlers who migrated from Scandinavia because of civil strife and a shortage in arable lands. Though there is archeological evidence to support that Gaelic monks from a Hiberno-Scottish mission were there in the 8th century, the Norse Vikings were the first to bring sustained, growing communities to the island. By 930, the majority of arable land in Iceland was already claimed and the world’s first parliament (the “Thing”) was formed. From DNA sampling today, the native population of Iceland can be traced to those of Ireland, Britain, and Scandinavia. Because of their relative isolation throughout history and small founding population, Icelanders are highly genetically homogeneous and have been the subject of much genomics research.

Icelandic culture and language are strongly derived from Norse tradition. The Icelandic language, unique to the island and a direct descendent of Old Norse, is the basis for a rich culture of writing, particularly Sagas, poems, and ancient literature. Njáls saga, a saga about an epic blood feud, and Grænlendinga saga and Eiríks saga, describing the discovery and settlement of Greenland and Newfoundland, are among the most popular and still told today. By some accounts, Iceland has more writers, books published, and more books read per capita than anywhere else in the world. Traditional crafts such as silversmithing, weaving, and wood carving are, among folk song and dance, widely practiced.
As of 2022, more than 376,000 people live in Iceland, and 93 percent of the population is Icelandic. Nearly 90 percent of the entire population lives in urban areas, with 60 percent living in the capital region of Reykjavík. Iceland inhibits a strong traditional liberal and progressive Nordic outlook similar to Norway and Sweden, and consistently ranks high for measurements for quality of life in surveys like the United Nations Human Development Index. Icelandic society has a high degree of gender and marriage equality, with a strong legal system to support child protection and women’s rights. Because of their historic isolation, Icelanders value independence and self-sufficiency, not only seen in their society but in their economy and national policies.

Today Icelanders are by and large Lutheran with other Catholic and Christian minorities existing. While many people identify as Christian, over forty percent of the population considers themselves to be non-religious or convinced atheists. Even though many Icelanders identify as Christian, there are still some who believe in Icelandic folklore, such as Huldufólk, hidden people who live in rocks.

“Is Iceland in the Arctic Circle?” Christina Degener, Iceland Unlimited, January 2017 [180]  https://icelandunlimited.is/is-iceland-in-the-arctic-circle/

Overview:

Iceland is located between Greenland and Norway and is an island in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. For many people, the name sounds already so “cold” that they assume this island must be close to the North Pole. Have you ever wondered how far North it is actually located? Is Iceland in the Arctic Circle?

Current & Relevant Information:

What is the Arctic Circle?

The Arctic Circle is the imaginary circle around the earth, parallel to the equator, at latitude 66° 33’ N. The Arctic Circle marks the latitude on the Earth’s surface above which the sun does not set on the summer solstice and does not rise on the winter solstice. Travelers wishing to cross over the Arctic Circle should take note that the Arctic Circle crosses only the countries Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, the U.S., Canada, and Greenland. Is Iceland in the Arctic Circle as well? You will learn more about it in a second.

Is Iceland in the Arctic Circle?

The mainland of Iceland is just a few degrees south of the Arctic Circle. The Arctic Circle does, however, pass through Grimsey Island, which lies only 40 kilometers (25 miles) off the North coast of Iceland.

Some Facts about Grimsey Island

[180]
Grímsey is the northernmost inhabited Icelandic territory. Approximately 100 people live on this small island. Grímsey has an area of 5.3 km² (2.0 sq mi) and a maximum elevation of 105 meters (344 ft).

Most of the inhabitants live from commercial fishing. There are rich fishing grounds around the island.


Overview:

Quick Facts

Arctic Territory:
All of Iceland

Arctic Population:
365,000

Current & Relevant Information:

Iceland and the Arctic Region

Iceland is an Arctic State where the Arctic Circle passes through its northernmost community, Grímsey Island, 40 kilometers off the north coast of Iceland. Iceland has approximately 365,000 inhabitants.

Iceland’s key industries have been largely based on the sustainable utilization of natural marine and energy resources. The country has the highest share of renewable energy in any national total energy budget, with about 85 percent of the total primary energy supply derived from domestically produced renewable energy sources and geothermal water is used to heat around 90 percent of Icelandic homes. In recent years, tourism has become a key pillar of the Icelandic economy and growing emphasis has been placed on innovation and the creative sector.

Indigenous Peoples

Iceland is the only Arctic State that does not have an Indigenous population. From the start of settlements in the ninth century AD to today, Iceland inhabitants have mostly come from Northern Europe.


Overview:

Arctic issues have in recent years become ever more prominent internationally as well as domestically. The discussion on the changing Arctic and its relationship with climatic change, discussions on the utilization and protection of natural resources,
continental shelf and sovereignty demands, societal changes and the opening of new seaways is and will be of interest today and in the future.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

It is clear that few states have a greater interest in the sustainable development of the area than Iceland, since all of the country and a large part of its territorial waters lie within the boundaries of the Arctic region. This is unique among the member states of the Arctic Council. Arctic issues touch nearly every aspect of Icelandic society and are a key foreign policy priority in Iceland.

Iceland’s policy in Arctic issues is anchored in a parliamentary resolution adopted unanimously by Althingi in the spring of 2011 which outlines 12 priority areas. They cover e.g., Iceland’s position in the region, the importance of the Arctic Council and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, climate change, sustainable use of natural resources and security and commercial interests. Emphasis is furthermore placed on neighbor-state collaboration with the Faroe Islands and Greenland as well as the rights of indigenous peoples.

The Arctic Council, since its establishment in 1996, has become the most important multinational forum for Arctic issues. In addition to the eight founding members, six organizations of indigenous peoples have permanent seats on the Council and 39 parties have observer status: 13 states, 13 intergovernmental organizations and 13 non-governmental organizations. Decisions are made unanimously in the Council.

**Gender Roles:**

“Pan-Arctic Report: Gender Equality in the Arctic Phase 3,” Arctic Council, April 2021 [183]


**Summary:**

Gender equality in the Arctic is highly relevant to the agenda and role of the Arctic Council (the Council) and its Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), which have emphasized gender equality in previous projects and initiatives. The importance of issues of gender and diversity has become increasingly evident, the latest example being Iceland’s emphasis on gender issues during its Council Chairmanship.
GEA highlights the importance of recognizing and appreciating diversity in terms of discourses, gender, Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, governance, education, economies, social realities, sustainability, and balanced participation in leadership and decision making, in both the public and private sectors.

A major component of GEA III has been to develop this report on gender. It pulls together material, information, and expertise to provide an overview of gender-related issues in the Arctic and contributes to filling knowledge gaps on this subject. The GEA III report seeks to identify emerging issues, priorities, and concrete strategies that support gender balance and increased diversity.

The primary intended audience for this report is policymakers in the Arctic region. It is a resource for those interested in gender issues in the Arctic, including Arctic inhabitants and researchers. We hope that a broader audience, including the private sector, will appreciate the relevance of the report to their work.

The report does not claim to be comprehensive, but it is a step forward in strengthening the knowledge base and understanding required for developing policies that foster resilient and thriving communities.

Current & Relevant Information:

Iceland

Iceland has seen rapid population growth for several decades, and from 2000—2019 the population increased by 30% (Statistics Iceland, 2020b). More than two-thirds reside in or around the capital of Reykjavík, making it one of the most urbanized states in Europe (Hlynsdóttir, 2020). Iceland is sparsely populated like much of the Arctic but connected through a road network circling the island.

For some time, the sex ratio in Iceland has been relatively balanced, and from 2000—2004 the sex ratio was 100 men for every 100 women. However, in 2005 the proportion of men to women started increasing because of a rise in immigration. The immigrants were disproportionately male, coming to work in growing economic sectors like construction, which mostly consists of a male workforce. Prior to the bank crisis in 2008, the sex ratio had reached 104 men for every 100 women. However, over the course of the crisis the sex ratio fell with the emigration of men and almost levelled with the female population. In 2015 the sex ratio started to become skewed due to a disproportionate number of male immigrants (Statistics Iceland, 2020c). By 2020 the sex ratio for the total population had risen to 105.5 men for every 100 women.

“Icelandic Women: Myths, Role Models & History,” Ragnheidur Harpa, Iceland Travel, 4 March 2020 [184] https://www.icelandtravel.is/blog/icelandic-women/
It’s long been a myth abroad perpetuated by internet memes that all Icelandic women are beauty queens looking for foreign husbands to take care of them, but that is simply a myth. Your average Icelandic woman is typically educated and committed to fighting for gender equality, and there are more than enough Icelandic men (and women) for each woman.

The fight for women’s rights in Iceland has most certainly been a journey, with many U-turns and backlashes but also victories and beautiful moments full of hope and optimism. However, when it comes to tourism, the famous tale of the island in the north where everyone is a promiscuous super model has proven difficult to overcome.

In truth, Iceland has had four Miss World winners and having premarital sex is not frowned upon. However, when certain airlines advertise “dirty weekends” to Iceland promising connections with a gorgeous Icelander has not been met with smiles. Thankfully, today we have begun to see change. We had hoped to be recognized for our feminist values and our fighting spirit, and thankfully, the global news media caught on. After all, there is a lot to talk about on that matter.

Iceland is a country of choice and opportunities. You are pretty much free to do what you want. And, we are proud of our rights to do so. We breastfeed in public if we want, we wear what we want, we study what we want, we shave or we don’t shave, we build muscles if we want, we sleep with who we want, and we run for office if we want. The only thing that really bothers us is being told that we can’t do something. That’s when you’ll really see the Viking blood boil.

Current & Relevant Information:

Gender Equality Facts About Iceland

• Since the year 2018, it has actually been illegal to pay women less than men for the same job (which is, of course, how it should be).

• Iceland had the first democratically elected female president in the world, Vigdís Finnbogadóttir.

• As well as the first only gay Prime Minister, Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir.

• In 1923, the first Icelandic woman took her place in Althing, the Icelandic parliament. This was Ingibjörg H. Bjarnason.

• Iceland was the second country to set up a SlutWalk event only months after it originated in Canada.

• In Iceland it is neither unusual nor is it frowned upon for people to have children with more than one partner.

• Women don’t take up their husband’s last name when they get married. Instead, they keep their last name throughout their lives. However, their last names usually
come from their father’s first name. Although there has been a huge change in this during the last two decades. More and more women are giving their children their first name as their children’s last.

• The rate of female participation in the labor force runs at more than 80%, compared with just over 90% for men. This is the highest in the world!

• The vast majority of Icelanders don’t celebrate Valentine’s Day. Instead, we have Women’s Day and Men’s Day, which is actually called Farmer’s Day (it’s an old tradition).

• When the financial crash happened in 2008 it was, in big part, women who led the rescue.

• The maternity and paternity leave in Iceland goes up to 12 months in 2021. The split is 5-5-2, meaning that 5 months go to parent A, 5 months to parent B and they decide together what to do with the remaining 2 months. Until 2020, it had been 9 months split 3-3-3 however in 2020 it went up to 10 months with an equal split.


Overview:

Since 2009 and according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report, Iceland is the global leader in gender equality. During the WIP Study Trip (3-4 April), 50 international female Parliamentarians will discuss about the policies that were needed to achieve this position and about whether the Icelandic model can be exported.

Women’s suffrage was introduced in Iceland as early as 1915 and it was the first country in the world to elect a female Head of State, Vigdis Finnbogatottir (1980). During the last decade, the country has passed, among others, laws to ensure gender balance on boards, to ban strip clubs nationwide and to secure paid paternity leave for 3 months.

Current & Relevant Information:

Iceland is the world’s global leader in gender equality (WEF, 2009-2013).

For the past five years, Iceland has topped the rankings of the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report. The score is based on good results in terms of political empowerment and educational attainment and on improvements in women’s economic participation.

Iceland approved equal inheritance rights for men and women in 1850.
In 1850 women gained the same inheritance rights as men; until then daughters only had the right to one third of the inheritance.

The female suffrage was introduced in Iceland in 1915.

Women gained the right to hold local office in 1908. The same year, four women were elected to the city council in Reykjavik. Following this success in the local elections, women over the age of 40 gained the same rights in national elections in 1915, and in 1920 all women did.

The first woman elected to the Icelandic Parliament was Ingibjörg H. Bjarnason (1922).

The first female representative, Bríet Bjarnhéðinsdóttir, was elected as an alternative member but never actually took a seat in the Althingi. The first woman to be elected and actually sit as a member of the Althingi was Ingibjörg H. Bjarnason, who headed a Women’s List in national elections held on 8 July 1922.

The first female mayor in an Icelandic municipality was elected in 1957.

In 1958 women were only 1% of all council members in Iceland. In 1957 the first woman became mayor in Kópavogur and in 1959 in Reykjavik.

The first female Cabinet Minister in Iceland was elected in 1970.

In 1970 the first female cabinet minister was appointed. The same year, inspired by women’s rights and feminist movements all over the world, the “Red Stockings”, movement was founded and was a key radical force in raising awareness on various gender equality issues.

Icelandic women went on strike nationwide on the 24 October 1975.

On 24 October 1975, more than 25,000 women in Iceland took a day off to emphasize the importance of women’s contribution to the economy, both in paid and unpaid work. As a result, the society as a whole came to a halt. Also, that same year, a law on three months maternal leave was approved, a new law on abortion, reproductive and maternal health was passed and the Women´s History Archives was founded.

42% of the candidates for the last elections in Iceland (2013) were women.

633 women ran for office at the election to the Icelandic Parliament. - Today, 39,7% of the Parliamentarians in Iceland are women.

Iceland is ranked number 12 in the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s World Classification. 25 out of 63 seats of the Parliament of Iceland are occupied by women. Iceland’s electoral system is based on proportional representation.

Iceland has a high rate of women’s participation in the labor market (77.6%)
Participation in the labor market by both men and women has always been at a high level in Iceland and the participation of women in the labor market in Iceland is one of the highest among the OECD countries. Women started entering the labor market at an increased rate in the 1970s. This development has been met with childcare for pre-school children, a legal right for parents to return to their jobs after childbirth and a generous parental leave system.

90% of children aged 1-5 years are in day-care in Iceland.

The number of children attending kindergarten has increased immensely in the last 30 years. For children under the age of two: 9% in 1981 and 44% in 2009. In 2009, 95% of children aged 3 to 5 attended pre-schools (kindergartens).

Since 2003, Icelandic fathers have an independent (not transferable to the mother) right to 3-months of paid parental leave.

In the year 2000 the law regulating parental leave changed dramatically. Now Icelanders have a parental leave scheme that is unique. The total leave period is nine months long. Each parent has three months leave which is non-transferable and in addition the parents can divide three months as they like. During their leave parents who have been working full time receive 80% of their former salary up to a certain ceiling. Fathers have grasped this opportunity with enthusiasm and around 90% use their paternal leave.

A full ban on strip clubs was approved in Iceland in 2010.

In 2009 the purchasing of sexual services was made illegal with changes to the 206th article of the penal code (No. 19/1940). It is illegal to advertise and to benefit from prostitution, e.g., through pimping and other means. In 2010 a full ban on strip clubs was enacted with a change in the act on restaurants, accommodations and entertainment (No. 85/2007), banning the profiting from nudity.

Iceland approved a 3-year plan on implementing gender budgeting in 2011.

Implementation of Gender Budgeting started in 2009. The objective is to make the impact on the genders visible, so it is possible to respond and re-evaluate policies, expenditures, and sources of revenue in accordance with objectives for equality.

Iceland passed a new law that obligates companies to have a minimum of 40% of women or men in their boards in 2010. The law took effect on 1 September 2013.

In 2010 an amendment to the laws on public limited companies (No. 2/1995) and private limited companies (No. 138/1994) obligated companies that have over 50 employees to have both women and men on their company boards and if the board-members are more than three, the percentage of women or men cannot be under 40%. These amendments also included changes that will make monitoring easier. These changes took effect in 2013.
“Gender Equality: In Iceland’s International Development Co-operation,” Ministry for Foreign Affairs & Icelandic International Development Agency, 2013 [186]

Overview:

Discrimination based on gender is nevertheless common, and women, especially in developing countries, are subject to extensive inequality and discrimination. Their position is weaker than men, both socially and economically, and they are less likely than men to hold positions of power in society. In general, women in poorer countries of the world are in a less favorable position than women in more affluent countries. In fact, women and girls constitute a large majority of the world’s poor.

Promoting gender equality is a priority in Icelandic development cooperation and a specific objective of the Parliamentary Resolution on the Strategy for Iceland’s International Development Co-operation 2013-2016, hereafter referred to as the Development Strategy. This is based on the conviction that gender equality is a human right, as equality is in fact one of the core principles of the concept of human rights. Evidence shows that in societies where the struggle for gender equality has been most successful, the social and economic rights of the general public are greater.

The vision of gender equality in Icelandic development cooperation is also based on the assumption that gender equality is a prerequisite for progress and development. Gender equality is therefore not only an important development objective in itself, but also supports economic development. In other words, gender equality constitutes prudent economic policy. Research has shown that gender equality and women’s empowerment promote increased productivity in society; strengthens its institutions and improves prospects for future generations. Economic growth and higher incomes have been shown to reduce inequality between women and men. This is even more pronounced when the economy and the institutions of society, both formal and informal, are prosperous and strong/stable. This influences decisions taken both on a community basis as well as within households, and strengthens women’s position and reduces gender-based discrimination, e.g., with regard to education of girls and boys and the participation of women in politics and the formal labor market. Such changes can also increase opportunities for men to participate in household work and the care of children.

Current & Relevant Information:

Participation of men and boys

Gender equality implies that the status of women and men in society is equal and that women and men are entitled to the same opportunities and rights. It is important
that men and boys, just as women and girls, are aware of and challenge traditional
gender stereotypical assumptions and roles. Furthermore, there is a widespread
need to raise awareness among the general public of the fact that women’s
participation in all walks of life boosts prosperity and does not come at the expense
of men.

Icelandic Foreign Service and Gender Equality

Gender equality is one of the government’s key emphases and the actions to
increase women’s rights and for gender equality is an important aspect of Iceland’s
international work on human rights. In recent years, increased emphasis has been
placed on human rights in Iceland’s foreign policy.

Special attention has been given to women’s empowerment and their participation in
peace negotiations and post-war reconstruction, and actions to adapt and mitigate
climate change.

Foreign service employees seek ways of promoting human rights as a matter of
principle. In particular, the foreign service promotes gender equality through its work
within the UN and its funds and programs, as well as through the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the Council of Europe and the
World Bank, and in the field of development co-operation.

Gender equality is a basic human right

For the most part, women are less independent, have more limited means and less
power to take decisions that affect their lives and their society. It is important to give
consideration to different cultures but not to allow traditions to serve as an excuse
for oppression of women and to exclude them from power.

“Equality won’t happen by itself: how Iceland got tough on gender pay gap,” Jon
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/20/iceland-equal-pay-law-gender-gap-
women-jobs-equality

Overview:

Despite its image as a paradise of fairness, women earn less than men. Now Iceland
has become the first country in the world to enforce equal pay.

Current & Relevant Information:

On the face of it, Iceland is a good place to be a woman. For nearly a decade, it has
been rated the world’s most gender-equal country. It was the first to directly elect a
female president, nearly half its MPs and company directors are women, and first-
class daycare and parental leave help ensure almost four in five women have jobs.

So, it came as a shock for Fríða Rós Valdimarsdóttir to learn, when she was
managing a key team of 10 home carers at Reykjavik council a few years ago, that
male colleagues in other departments, with far fewer responsibilities than her, were being paid a great deal more.

“It has been illegal for decades, for jobs that are worth the same, to pay people differently because of gender, but still it happens – it’s simply been allowed,” says Valdimarsdóttir, who is now the chair of the Icelandic Women’s Rights Association, in her bright offices in the country’s capital.

Despite an equal pay act that dates back to 1961, Icelandic women still earn, on average, between 14% and 20% less than men. So Valdimarsdóttir and her association were one of many campaign groups to back a plan that finally resulted, last month, in the island becoming the first country in the world to legally enforce equal pay.

Within four years from January 2018, any public or private body in Iceland employing more than 25 people that has not been independently certified as paying equal wages for work of equal value will face daily fines. “The legislation will take some time to bed in, of course,” Valdimarsdóttir says. “There will be challenges. But it’s possible, and we can do it. Mainly, I’m just so proud we actually made it happen.”


Abstract:
A dramatic shift took place on October 24th, 1975, irreversibly changing the perspectives of women in Icelandic society. Prior to this date a discernibly low level of respect was evident for women in domestic and waged positions. Infuriation caused by this disregard for female efforts in the community, led to the united decision of Icelandic women to take action in the form of a strike. Known by locals as, ‘Kvennafri’, the 1975 ‘Women’s Day Off’ was an undeniable success, with ninety percent of the country’s female population refusing to partake in any form of work for the entirety of the day. This symbolic act of social defiance altered the understanding of women’s role in society and was an important turning point that paved the way for many positive changes regarding gender equality in Iceland.

Current & Relevant Information:
Planning Kvennafri required an immense aggregation of determination and cooperation; however, the outcome was definitively worth all efforts. The event, with widespread support and participation, was exceedingly successful. A feminist organization known as Redstocking first presented the idea of a strike in 1970, although it was not until 1975 that the suggestion was genuinely deliberated. According to the official Women’s History Archives in Iceland, a committee was formed in the spring of 1975 by representatives of the nation’s five largest female associations in addition to a spokesperson for the United Nations. This committee
was tasked with the organization of a congress for women in Reykjavik - the country’s capital - to be held later that year. When the congress met on the 20th and 21st of June, with over two hundred women of varying age, social status and political opinion in attendance, they discussed matters of concern primarily surrounding gender inequality. Here, a strike was proposed to be held on October 24th, the United Nations Day. However, many women displayed apprehension towards such an event - as strikes were illegal at the time - and feared it would cost them their jobs and cause uproar among men. Therefore, the event’s title was swiftly altered to the less severe label of a ‘day off’, gaining public approval and permitting mass participation. An article published in the Scandinavian Review by Mia Einarsdottir and Gerdur Steinthorsdottir (1997) claimed that polls conducted in various, Icelandic workplaces revealed “80-100 percent of the employed women were in favor of the action”. BBC reporter Kirstie Brewer (2015) supports this statement in her article titled, The Day Iceland’s Women Went on Strike, by claiming 90 percent of Icelandic women abstained from work of any form on that day. Additionally, Morgunbladid (1975), an Icelandic newspaper released a similar report on October 25th placing 25,000 women – over one tenth of the country’s total population – in Lækjartorgur, Reykjavik where speeches and celebrations were scheduled to commence throughout the day. Both sources corroborate in describing the day as a monumental occasion and overall success. All efforts paid off; women were finally recognized.

**E. Norway:**

“Norway,” The Arctic Institute Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, 1 August 2022 [189]  [https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/norway/](https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/norway/)

**Overview:**

In Norway, the Arctic is considered everything north of the Arctic Circle, despite the arguably minimal variation between the areas north and south of 66°34N. In terms of its foreign policy engagement, Norway distinguishes between the extreme Arctic (referring to the North Pole and the uninhabited areas in the so-called High Arctic) and the more hospitable and populated parts of Northern Norway and Svalbard, deemed the “High North” or “nordområdene” in Norwegian.

The landmass of the two northern counties (Nordland and Troms og Finnmark) accounts for a third of the landmass of mainland Norway (totaling approximately 100,000 km² out of approximately 300,000 km²). Svalbard and Jan Mayen archipelagos add another 85,000 km². The climate in North Norway— with the exception of Svalbard—does not vary significantly from the southern part of the country, as in the case of some Arctic countries.

The average temperature in Tromsø, the largest city in the north, oscillates between -4 °C (25 °F) in January and 12 °C (54 °F) in July. The North Norwegian coast is ice free and, due to the Gulf Stream, experiences fewer extreme temperatures than
cities further south in for example Canada or the United States. Longyearbyen in Svalbard, on the other hand, experiences more arctic-like conditions, with -13 °C (9 °F) in March and only 8 °C (46 °F) in July. Climate change has especially affected the ecological conditions on Svalbard, as the summer sea ice has gradually receded. This has an adverse impact on plant and animal life, not only on Svalbard, but also in mainland Norway. Changes related to the tree-line, movements of fish stocks and agricultural yield, challenge the ability of local communities to adapt and sustain their livelihoods in the north to a greater extent than elsewhere in Norway.

Current & Relevant Information:

Tromsø is the largest city in the Norwegian Arctic with 76 thousand inhabitants (2019), followed by Bodø with 52 thousand inhabitants (2019). In total, roughly 480 thousand people live in the three Arctic counties of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark. Another 2,667 people live on Svalbard. Bodø is the regional capital of Nordland; Tromsø the regional capital of Troms; and Vadsø the regional capital of Finnmark. Albeit sparsely populated in a European context, the population numbers are relatively high when contrasted to the North American Arctic. Although difficult to specify exactly, the Sámi population in Norway is between 40–50 thousand, with most residing in the three northern counties. Karasjok, Finnmark, is the seat of the Sámi Parliament of Norway.

The traditional lands of the Sámi people in Norway, Sápmi, stretch from Hedmark county in the middle of Norway, to the Russian border in the north. Even though the Sámi are a minority in most parts of Sápmi, traditional reindeer herding is still present across the land. Sámi reindeer herding takes place in a total of 140 municipalities. Reindeer herding—and other traditional Sámi livelihoods such as fishing, hunting and gathering—are some of the most important ways in which the Sámi cultural heritage is preserved in Norway. The Sámi languages and traditions are thus part of daily life in Sámi communities, in contrast to other parts of the society where Norwegian culture dominates. At the same time, the Sámi people are a part of modern Norway and are keeping old traditions alive as well as developing the culture. The traditional livelihoods; however, are dependent on land, which at times there are conflicts over in the North of Norway.

Since its opening in 1989, the interests of the Sámi population have been ensured by the Sámi Parliament. The opening of the Parliament was seen as the end of an assimilation policy enforced by the Norwegian government since the 1850s. Norway was subsequently one of the first countries to ratify the ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which ensures the Indigenous peoples’ right to consultation before decisions regarding them are being made. In 2005, the Sámi Parliament and the Norwegian government signed an agreement which formalizes the procedures for consultation on all relevant policy issues. The increased focus on business opportunities by actors outside of the Arctic could lead to more pressure on an already endangered culture. It is worth noting the
Sámi Parliament’s many funding schemes to support small scale businesses and tourism.

“What is the Point of Norway’s new Arctic Policy?” Andreas Osthagen, The Arctic Institute Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, 2 December 2020 [190]
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/point-norway-new-arctic-policy/

Overview:

Norway’s new High North policy is a complex mix of initiatives and statements. The main rationale is still ensuring a developed northern region so that Norway can stand strong vis-à-vis the great powers in the north. In addition, the policy plays a role in domestic politics ahead of next year’s election.

Last Friday, in a week that began with Northern Norway taking its first premier division gold in football, the Norwegian government presented a new white paper on the High North to the Norwegian Parliament. Various ministers descended on the northern cities of Alta, Bodø, and Tromso to present work that has been underway for several years: this is the first white paper since 2011.

Any Norwegian government must balance many different interests. The priorities of the ministries in Oslo are not necessarily the same as the wishes of Hammerfest municipality or Nordland county. Vladimir Putin is also paying attention. Many footballs need to be juggled.

If football were an indicator of the situation in the northernmost third of Norway, perhaps such a policy document would be superfluous. But Northern Norway has a number of challenges that require special attention. Not only that; what Norway is doing in the north is also of great importance for both its foreign and security policies and concerns.

Current & Relevant Information:

Concluding Remarks

In sum, Norway’s current Arctic policy white paper boils down to a desire by the current government—especially prime minister Erna Solberg and foreign minister Ine Eriksen Søreide—to show action in the north. Symbolic and real. Sprinkled with domestic political positioning.

The 2020-white paper marks a turn from foreign and security issues in the north towards regional development in Northern Norway. Albeit a welcome shift for those living in the north—which constitute almost 10% of Norway’s population—it does little to address the increasingly tense security situation in the north.

As Norway is uniquely positioned between the East and the West in the Arctic, finding ways to address this situation and related concerns should still be a priority. In any case, the High North will continue to be the part of Norway where local politics
meets the world, and regional measures may have foreign policy consequences. That is why Norway has a separate policy for the Arctic.


Abstract:
For Norway, the Arctic is an integral part of the country in terms of both economic development and security considerations. Since 2005, consecutive governments in Oslo have made use of this fact, in combination with international attention given to the north, to foster a High North policy framed around regional economic development, climate issues and international cooperation (especially vis-à-vis Russia). However, over the last few years, challenges have emerged. Focusing on the foreign and security policy aspects of Norway’s Arctic approach, this article defines Norway’s Northern engagement and how this engagement has evolved since 2005. Then, the challenges currently facing Norway in the domain of foreign and security policy are discussed in terms of the new Arctic policy document released in late-2020. These challenges are broadly surmised as relating to Russia’s military posture and the use of the Arctic as an arena for a China–US tug of war.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction
In 2005, the then Norwegian foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre urged the people to ‘Look north.’ Speaking in Tromsø, the self-proclaimed Arctic capital of Norway, he launched what was to become Norway’s new foreign policy flagship: the High North policy (nordområdepolitikken). With one-third of the landmass and 80% of its maritime domain located north of the Arctic Circle, it is no wonder that Norwegian politicians have been quick to seize the opportunity to promote a hybrid mixture of foreign and regional policy tools as the world has turned its attention northwards. Other Arctic countries – like Denmark, Sweden and the USA – have been much slower to embrace the Arctic as a foreign policy priority, if at all.

In part, Norway’s orientation towards the Arctic occurred as the result of a domestic initiative because economic opportunities were increasingly becoming apparent in the North. In part, international conditions were ripe as climate awareness, resource potential and Russian re-emergence started to appear on the agenda. Lastly, the new majority government in office beginning in the autumn of 2005 acted as policy entrepreneurs, building on the discrete Northern policy steps taken by the previous government.

When the Norwegian High North policy saw the light of day 15 years ago, it was an optimistic promise of increased attention to the North, new economic opportunities and the strengthening of dialogue and cooperation with Russia. In the beginning, it
looked hopeful: after the rather significant maritime boundary agreement with Russia regarding the Barents Sea was enacted in 2010, Russia’s then President Medvedev declared a ‘new era’ of relations between Norway and Russia. A border regime was created in 2012 so that the inhabitants of north-eastern Norway could travel visa free across the border to northwest Russia. The Arctic Council, created in 1996 to ensure cooperation on a range of issues in the Arctic, rose in stature and Norway managed to get the secretariat to Tromsø in 2011.

However, in 2014, the mood soured. First and foremost, the Russian annexation of Crimea contributed to changing the political climate in the North. Falling oil prices also led to the disappearance of many of the economic interests associated with the High North and to projects being placed on hold. Those who had expected (or hoped for) a Klondike in the North were disappointed, and the enthusiasm for the entire High North policy began to cool. It went from being an ‘priority’ to a ‘responsibility’.

In late-2020 the government in Oslo, which has held office for almost eight years, released the third Arctic policy of Norway (the first came in 2005 and the second in 2011). In terms of foreign policy, this signaled a third phase of the Norwegian High North policy: a phase that has been characterized by great power rivalry and harsh rhetoric outside Norway’s borders. Of the various parts of the Arctic, challenges are the greatest in the European part – Norway’s northern areas. Here, the military presence and provocative exercise activities have been increasing the most. Aftenposten – Norway’s largest printed newspaper – describes this development as a ‘power struggle on Norway’s doorstep’. Although researchers have largely rejected the idea of a budding resource war in the North, the view of and discourse about the Arctic has changed. More countries are now looking North and seem eager to use the Arctic as an arena for foreign policy influence and symbolic politics.

In the last decade, the Norwegian government has made use of the phrase ‘High North, low tension’ to highlight that the Arctic, despite fantastical claims by some scholars and media outlets, is a region characterized by amicable affairs. However, the question remains as to whether this is still an accurate portrayal of the current state of affairs and – crucially – Norway’s Arctic approach. This article examines and reviews Norway’s Arctic endeavors, not only limited to the official policy documents but also taking into consideration wider security concerns and interests.

The focus is on foreign policy dimensions, with an explicit emphasis on security policies. The article examines what defines Norway’s Northern engagement and how that engagement has evolved since 2005. Furthermore, how priorities have shifted in terms of security policy in the North is examined. The discussion then turns to the challenges that Norway is currently facing in the domains of foreign and security policy in 2021 and that it may face in the future. These challenges are broadly categorized as relating to Russia’s military posture – as is typical in Norwegian foreign and security policy outlooks – and the use of the Arctic as an arena for a
China–US tug of war, which has emerged as an entirely new dimension of Arctic politics.

Concluding remarks

Norway has been one of the most Arctic–focused of all the circumpolar countries in the past two decades. This is partly due to Norway’s geographic position – located at the relatively temperate nexus between the North Atlantic, the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean – and partly a result of its political handywork starting in 2003-5 to elevate the importance of the High North on both foreign and domestic policy agendas. Norway’s Arctic policy endeavor has undergone several phases since its creation over 15 years ago. Excitement and euphoria dominated the first phase, while security issues and economic disillusionment dominated the second. Now we are in the third phase, which has been dominated by geostrategic concerns and symbolic chest thumping by global actors.

Although the Norwegian High North (or Arctic if you will) policy is a unique hybrid mixture of regional and foreign policy tools, this article emphasizes the broader security dimensions of Norway’s Northern policy approach over the last decades. As Arctic ‘middle powers’ that are often free of broad international entanglements, countries like Norway, Canada and Denmark are likely to make use of their advantageous geographic positions to influence the near abroad. They are also concerned with upholding regional and global governance mechanisms (hereunder international law) that ensure stability and cooperation in the North and are eager to avoid the Arctic getting dragged into global rivalries or conflicts originating elsewhere.

In any case, it appears that Norway will continue to pursue an active role in the North, regardless of changes in government or further deterioration of Arctic regional relations. That prediction comes from the simple fact that almost 10% of Norway’s population and much more of its economic and resource potential lie north of the Arctic Circle: the region is not a periphery the same way that Alaska or Greenland are vis-à-vis Washington DC or Copenhagen. The Arctic is integral to Norwegian economic and security concerns, which Norway’s Arctic policy in recent decades has both contributed to and been a consequence of. Norway’s entry into the UN Security Council (from 2021 until 2023) and its increased engagement with global ocean politics are also linked to its Arctic policy priorities.

The idiom ‘High North, low tension’ still very much describe how Norway would prefer Arctic relations to be – especially vis-à-vis its Russian neighbor. Whether this description will continue to apply is up for debate. Military activity in the form of exercises and – at times– provocative maneuvers in the Barents Sea is nothing new to that part of the world. What has changed is how that activity is being interpreted and how certain political leaders make symbolic statements about Arctic geopolitics. The worry, however, is that such hype might spur further increases in military activity.
and thus fuel the very race that leaders are fearful of. Due to its role as both a NATO member and Russia’s neighbor, Norway in particular has a special responsibility to convey a cooler message while also continuing to encourage cooperative measures in the North, especially in the domain of security politics.


Overview:

Russia’s heavy investment in new ballistic missile submarines and long-range precision strike weaponry signal the Kremlin’s will to challenge NATO’s ability to reinforce the High North in a crisis, Norway’s top diplomat said Friday.

“The security landscape is getting more difficult,” Ine Ericksen Soreide said at The Atlantic Council on Friday.

Russia has built up a military presence in the Arctic over the last 10 years and deployed advanced strategic weapons, including submarines and missiles. The Kremlin also has built new air bases, giving its air force a longer reach into the Atlantic.

Current & Relevant Information:

Norway “is the only NATO member bordering Russia,” so it is monitoring the military build-up and increased civilian economic development on the other side of the border closely, according to Frank Bakke-Jensen, Norway’s minister of defense. Adding another dimension to military changes in the Arctic, he identified the Barents Sea as “optimal to test new weapons systems” for Russia’s armed forces.

Norway is “NATO’s eyes and ears to the North,” Soreide, who previously served as defense minister, added. She also noted that Norway is different from other Arctic nations with its ice-free waters, caused by the flow of the Gulf Stream from North America across the Atlantic, making it strategically important geographically.

Russia shares both land and water borders with Norway. Historically, “we meet Russia with firmness and predictability,” Soreide said. But ever since 2014, when Moscow seized the Crimea region from Ukraine, Oslo has been more wary of the Kremlin’s intentions across Europe. It also cut off direct exchanges between the two militaries at the time.

“If we don’t stand up to that [overt aggression as in Crimea and eastern Ukraine], who will?” she questioned, referring both to economic sanctions levied on Russian businesses and individuals and a renewed commitment to security spending in the alliance.
Gender Roles:

“Pan-Arctic Report: Gender Equality in the Arctic Phase 3,” Arctic Council, April 2021 [193]

Summary:

Gender equality in the Arctic is highly relevant to the agenda and role of the Arctic Council (the Council) and its Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), which have emphasized gender equality in previous projects and initiatives. The importance of issues of gender and diversity has become increasingly evident, the latest example being Iceland's emphasis on gender issues during its Council Chairmanship.

GEA highlights the importance of recognizing and appreciating diversity in terms of discourses, gender, Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, governance, education, economies, social realities, sustainability, and balanced participation in leadership and decision making, in both the public and private sectors.

A major component of GEA III has been to develop this report on gender. It pulls together material, information, and expertise to provide an overview of gender-related issues in the Arctic and contributes to filling knowledge gaps on this subject. The GEA III report seeks to identify emerging issues, priorities, and concrete strategies that support gender balance and increased diversity.

The primary intended audience for this report is policymakers in the Arctic region. It is a resource for those interested in gender issues in the Arctic, including Arctic inhabitants and researchers. We hope that a broader audience, including the private sector, will appreciate the relevance of the report to their work.

The report does not claim to be comprehensive, but it is a step forward in strengthening the knowledge base and understanding required for developing policies that foster resilient and thriving communities.

Current & Relevant Information:

Arctic Norway

Arctic Norway accounts for around half of Norway's landmass and consists of the two counties Nordland, and Troms og Finnmark. Additionally, Arctic Norway includes the islands of Svalbard. The total population of Arctic Norway has increased by
around 5% during the period 2005—2019, compared to 16% for the whole of Norway (Statistics Norway, 2020b). This difference in growth is partially explained through out-migration of young people, a factor that is visible in the age structure of the region (Statistics Norway, 2020b). Norway does not register residents according to ethnicity, however; there are estimated to be around 50,000 Sámi living in Norway, the largest Sámi population of Sápmi (Löfving et al., 2020).

Twenty years ago, for all age groups there was a gender balanced population with 101 men for every 100 women. This has subsequently increased to 104:100. However, for the population aged birth to 64 years only, there is a constant skewed ratio of 107:100 over the period 2000—2019, whereas the sex ratio for those 65+ has increased from 73:100 to 91:100, likely due to men’s life expectancy increasing during those years (Statistics Norway, 2020b).

“Women’s Rights in Norway,” Sylvia Eimieho, The Borgen Project, 1 April 2022

Overview:

According to the 2020 Global Gender Gap Index Rating Report, Norway took second place in the gender parity chart. The country is one of the most gender-equal countries in the world in terms of “economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival and political empowerment.”

The Global Gender Gap Index 2021 ranks Norway third in terms of gender parity with a score of 84.9% in 2021. Norway ranks behind Iceland and Finland and has made improvements in political empowerment, specifically the percentage of women in parliament — 44.4% in 2021 from 40.8% in 2020. Despite this progress, there is an obvious gender gap decline in economic participation with Norway scoring 0.6% lower than in 2020. Norway witnessed a decline in women’s participation in the labor force in 2021 and gender gaps in wage and income still exist.

In terms of the gender wage gap, women in Norway earn “an average of 87.9% of men’s wages in 2021.” In addition, only 34.5% of women hold senior positions in Norway in 2021, down from 35.6% in 2020. Furthermore, the fact that 41.2% of men engage in part-time employment in comparison to 58.4% of women in 2021 contributes to inequities. Narrowing the disparity in all sectors of the economy is necessary to attain gender equality.

Current & Relevant Information:

Women’s Rights in Norway and Equality

Norway has made strides in achieving equality in all spheres of societal influence. In 1884, the Norwegian Association for Women’s Rights emerged to canvass and lobby for gender equality policies. These feminists advocated for women’s
suffrage, the right to work and the right to equal education. In 1913, women in Norway gained the right to vote, 15 years after men began voting.

The legislative arm of the government has contributed immensely toward reforms for women’s rights in Norway. The Norwegian Parliament, also known as the Storting, amended the 1978 Gender Equality Act in 2002. The amended legislation requires both public and private sectors of society to “promote gender equality” as opposed to public entities only. The Norwegian government in furtherance of its equal rights effort in strengthening gender balance, passed a resolution in 2002 stipulating at least 40% representation of both men and women on the executive boards “of all public joint stock companies and State-owned companies.”

**Strides in Achieving Gender Equality**

Norway received recognition in 2016 as the first country globally to establish a gender equality ombud dedicated to a “society where power and influence [are] equally distributed and ensuring that all people regardless of who they are get treated equally.” In 2018, the country adopted the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act to improve the rights of workers, minorities and women in Norway.

The major focus of the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act centered on incorporating gender equality in all aspects of foreign policy, improving anti-discriminatory practices and advancing gender inclusion policies in work settings. In Norway, advertised jobs must not be gender-specific.

Norway also has a liberal parental paid leave system. In 2020, maternal leave entailed full pay for 49 weeks or 80% of one’s income for 59 weeks. Fathers in Norway can take up to 10 weeks of paid leave. Furthermore, “together, parents can receive an additional 46 weeks at full pay or 56 weeks at 80% of their income.”

**Looking Ahead**

Norway lacks a strong representation of women in politics but progress is visible in the election of two women as former prime ministers — Gro Harlem Brundtland in 1981 and Erna Solberg in 2013. Norway prides itself as an equal and enlightened society but there is the need for continued improvement on affirmative action and equal pay for equal work. There is still much to achieve in the clamor toward gender parity in countries all around the world. It is important going into the future that countries enact comprehensive reforms to erase harmful practices and all forms of discrimination against women in the quest for gender equality.


**Overview:**
Norway is considered to be one of the most gender equal countries in the world. However, that doesn't mean equal and challenges remain. Here's how Norway approaches gender equality.

Gender equality has an important part to play if a country or society is striving for true equilibrium. True gender equality would include level access to jobs, opportunities or other resources for all recognized genders.

But in order to achieve this equilibrium of the sexes, a drive to remove prejudice towards women—and other gender identities—is still needed. While Norway is one of the better performers in this area, narrowing the disparity even further is still required.

The objective of further progress isn't just needed in Norway. There is also a need for all other countries around the world to strive towards a common goal and a level playing field.

Let's take a look at the Norwegian model, recent history and the advancement that has occurred in recent years.

Current & Relevant Information:

**Gender legislation in Norway**

Introduced in 2002, the Norwegian Gender Equality Act aimed to promote equality and reduce discrimination in Norway. The wide-ranging act covered many discriminations that modern-day societies face.

They include the discrimination on the basis of gender, pregnancy, paid leave in connection with childbirth or adoption, care responsibilities, ethnicity, religion, belief, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age or other significant characteristics of a person.

Its aim is to reach all sections of society, but one main area of focus is in the workplace. It requires positive steps that employers take positive steps to promote gender equality and that measures are in place should instances of discrimination arise.

Additionally, job advertisements in Norway also have strict guidelines that employers must follow in order avoid discrimination. Advertised positions must not specify a desired gender for a job role. However, consenting action in favor of one of the sexes is allowed.

“The 'paradox' of working in the world's most equal countries,” Maddy Savage, BBC Work Life, 4 September 2019 [196]

Overview:
Even Europe’s most egalitarian countries struggle to put women on an even footing at work. In the Nordics, why do women still lag behind men in pay, management and company ownership?

When Bolette Wrestroem moved back to Denmark after spending most of her twenties overseas, she was excited to experience the “gender equality” for which the Nordic region is globally famous. At first, she wasn’t disappointed.

“I definitely think Denmark is more open-minded than all the other places I have lived,” says the 28-year-old, now a community manager for a Copenhagen start-up. “There is more focus on what you are capable of, instead of your gender.”

But amid immersion in a culture that seemed to actively champion women’s rights, she couldn’t escape the fact that there was still “primarily white males sitting at the top” of many of the best-known companies. Denmark’s global image, versus the reality, “didn’t always match up”.

It is a paradox that many women working in the Nordics will recognize.

The region has a glowing reputation as the best place in the world when it comes to gender equality, thanks to welfare states that support working families and promote parental leave, and legal, political and cultural support for the goal of gender equality.

But many experts argue that progress has flatlined, suggesting these countries are further from achieving equality than global observers might imagine.

“We do have the idea of being gender equal...but we have a long way to go before we are gender equal,” argues Anneli Häyren, a researcher at the Centre for Gender Research at Uppsala University in Sweden. “I think it will take quite a lot of time - another 50 years at least - until we get there - and that is only if we keep working at it.”

Current & Relevant Information:

Glass ceilings

Strong progress has been made in the public sector; in Sweden more women than men currently hold management positions in this sphere. In politics, 46% of Swedish members of parliament are women, while the proportion in other Nordic countries is around 40%.

However, there are still surprisingly few women in senior private sector roles. Just 28% of managers in Denmark are female, rising to 32% in Finland and Norway, and 36% in Sweden, according to a report by independent think tank The Cato Institute in 2018. Iceland is the highest-scoring Nordic country, with 40%. But that is still three points behind the US, where 43% of managers are women, despite the US ranking just 51 in the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap index.
Strong concerns about this disparity were raised last year in The Nordic Gender Effect at Work, a report from the Nordic Council of Ministers, an advisory body. The writers found “a troubling pattern” in businesses - “the higher up the hierarchy you look, the more men you will see”.

“It feels more equal than in the US, because people are more focused and consistent in talking about the topic...But I am not sure they are always held accountable in terms of upholding those ideals,” agrees Dani Nguyen, 31, an executive recruiter based in the Swedish capital who previously worked in Silicon Valley.

When it comes to pay, the difference between gross average hourly earnings of male and female employees in Denmark, Iceland and Norway is only slightly below the EU average of 16%. In Finland the figure creeps to 16.7%. Sweden comes out best with 12.3%, but still lags behind Luxembourg, Italy and Romania, which all manage a pay gap of 5% or less.

Meanwhile, women in the Nordics trail their male counterparts in attracting investment for new businesses. Only 1% of investments registered in the Nordic Tech List database last year went to companies headed solely by female founders, according to figures analyzed by Swedish business news site DI Digital.

“It is definitely a problem,” says Rikke Eckhoff Høvding, CEO of industry body The Norwegian Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (NVCA). “It is easier to get VC funding if you are male. We have had this discussion a lot in the last few years and everyone is asking ‘what we can do next?’.”

“Women's rights and gender equality,” Government.no, 29 January 2024 [197]
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/the-un/innsikt/womens_rights/id439433/

Overview:

The aim of Norway's work for gender equality is to increase the opportunities available to women and girls, promote their right to self-determination and further their empowerment. This is crucial if all girls and boys, women and men are to have equal rights and equal opportunities.

Current & Relevant Information:

The global situation for gender equality is characterized by contradictions and paradoxes. On the one hand, opposition to the rights of women and queer people is growing in some countries and regions. On the other hand, there is a growing trend towards gender equality, as the targeted efforts of authorities and women's own battle for their rights are providing better opportunities for women to participate in society at all levels on an equal footing with men. At the core of the contradictions are ideologies that view gender equality as a threat to the institution of the family, as
well as pressure to preserve traditional gender roles, and the fight for the right to decide over one's own body and sexuality.

Girls' and women's living conditions are more likely than men's to be characterized by poverty, lack of property rights and limited access to health services, food and schooling. Women and girls are more vulnerable to violence and child marriage, and they are exposed to female genital mutilation and unwanted pregnancies. The COVID-19 pandemic reinforced inequalities between women and men. Across the world, domestic violence increased, affecting women in particular. Climate change and conflicts may contribute to exacerbating gender equality, as women and men in many contexts have unequal access to resources and opportunities to influence the political agenda.


Is based on the action plan from the UN Women's Conference in Beijing in 1995, the Population Conference in Cairo in 1994, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals, especially Goal 5 on gender equality. Gender equality must be taken into account in all aspects of foreign and development policy.

The action plan is based on the premise that gender equality is a human right and that promoting the rights of women and queer people will contribute to social change. It has an inclusive approach that takes into account that women are not a uniform group but can be discriminated against on various grounds such as disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression.

The action plan has the following main objectives:

1. Everyone has the right and opportunity to decide over their own body
2. Everyone has the right and opportunity to live their lives free from violence and harmful practices
3. Everyone has equal economic rights and opportunities to participate in working life
4. Everyone has equal political rights and opportunities to participate in public life
5. Everyone has the right and opportunity to participate in efforts to promote climate, energy and food security

We have a specific target figure for gender equality in our development aid: Half of all bilateral aid must have gender equality as a main or sub-goal. The aim is better aid results - for everyone.
Sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR)

Access to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) is under pressure in many countries. The Government is working actively to safeguard the results and progress already achieved and to protect established norms and rights from setbacks.

The Government's international gender equality work prioritizes women's and queer people's right to decide over their own bodies. The Government is working to establish new alliances and increase support for comprehensive sexuality education, family planning, contraception and safe abortion. Supporting international efforts to combat gender-based violence is also an important priority.

Sexual and reproductive health and rights are crucial to women's freedom, power and opportunities. When women cannot decide over their own bodies, it affects their schooling, work lives and ability to participation in society. This is why sexuality education, access to contraception, the right to safe abortion and freedom from violence and harmful practices are fundamental in the fight for gender equality.

The right to decide over one's own body and sexuality is a controversial issue in many countries. Pressure on women's and queers' rights in general, and sexual and reproductive health and rights in particular, is increasing. Certain countries that were formerly allies and like-minded in the fight for SRHR are now working to undermine global norms in the field. Norway is actively working to defend rights that were achieved decades ago. Setbacks will have major ramifications for the lives and health of girls and women.

International efforts to promote access to sexual and reproductive health and rights are also part of the Government's Action Plan for Gender and Sexuality Diversity (2023-2026). The action plan includes measures for Norway's international engagement. Dialogue and cooperation with queer people and their organizations are central to Norway's efforts at country level and globally.

Harmful practices affect girls

Harmful practices, such as child marriage and female genital mutilation are among the most serious forms of discrimination against girls. 33,000 girls are married off every day. Every year four million girls are subjected to female genital mutilation.

Norway is working to combat harmful practices through two main tracks. One is to strengthen aid through relevant global programs under the auspices of the UN, as well as to integrate the measures to combat harmful practices into the aid activities on education, health, gender equality and human rights. The second track is to strengthen Norway's role as a driving force in combating harmful practices in international arenas where norms and guidelines are established.

Women, peace and security
Women, peace and security is a key part of Norway’s efforts for peace and security. Norway follows up its obligations under UN resolution 1325 through broad inter-ministerial cooperation involving six ministries. The Government’s Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security (2023-2030) is Norway’s fifth plan. It stipulates targeted efforts in several areas where Norway has a particular opportunity to promote women's peace and security work internationally. Such areas include peace and reconciliation work, work on protection, humanitarian efforts, human rights, as well as gender perspectives and women's participation in the security sector. The plan also reflects that the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda is becoming increasingly important also in our own preparedness and security work. Read more here.


Overview:

I got angry with my husband one recent morning when he wasn’t home when I returned from taking our school-aged daughters to the bus. Our preschooler likes to come with me on these bus drops, but my husband is the one who does our little girl’s hair and gets her off to preschool afterwards. His unexpected absence actually didn’t inconvenience me much: I needed to go swimming before work as part of rehabilitating a hamstring injury, and I had planned on dropping our daughter off for him on my way to the pool. But it nonetheless triggered my anger because if I’m going to absent from a responsibility, I typically ask for help. When my husband didn’t ask for my help, I felt like he was treating his contributions as optional, as if I was the default childcare provider.

Leave aside how we got past that because my point is not about conflict resolution, but rather that couples with children are negotiating their relationships on different terrain today than they were in the past. In an era when childcare was considered the mother’s responsibility, a husband could run an errand before work without asking—and without leaving a mother feeling presumed upon. The current issue of European Sociological Review has a study about children and parents’ union stability that speaks to big issues like living out gender role ideals, plus the similarities between marriage and cohabitation. Let’s talk about children and gender roles first.

Current & Relevant Information:

Children present a challenge to egalitarianism. It is easier to fairly divide paid work by assigning equal hours to each partner than it is to figure out just what constitutes a fair division of childcare. Living out a fair bargain is also complicated because we don’t have scripts to guide us in how it is to be done right. The authors of this new study, Rannveig Kaldager Hart, Torkild Hovde Lyngstad and Elina Vinberg, contend
that their evidence indicates that even in Norway—a country that scores very favorably on international indicators of gender equality like the United Nation’s Gender Inequality Index—patterns over time are indicative of an incomplete gender revolution.

Their study checked for differences over time (four decades) in how having a child together affected Norwegian couples’ chances of staying together. Couples with children have always been more stable than childless couples for a number of reasons, including both partners having more to lose by splitting up if there are children, a greater likelihood of childbearing in stronger relationships, and “stark (and likely internalized) norms against dissolving a two-parent family.” Nonetheless, the authors argued that the stability premium associated with shared children could wane with the progress of the gender revolution because children can increase the mismatch between ideals and lived experience, therefore destabilizing relationships. In other words, in a country like Norway, children present a greater challenge to egalitarian norms than in countries where gender roles are less equal even without children.

But what happens when the gender revolution progresses still further, and men move into the domestic sphere to the same extent that women have moved into paid work? Frances Goldscheider and her colleagues have theorized about two halves to the gender revolution in these terms, with the first half being an increase in women’s paid work that creates stress on families, but the second half being an increase in men’s involvement at home that relieves stress on families (particularly those with children). Hart et al. argue that if the second half of the gender revolution were stabilizing Norwegian families, we should see the stability premium associated with having a child increase over time. Instead, the stability gap that favors couples with children over childless couples was largely unchanged across four decades.

I’m unimpressed with their interpretation. First, even though I’m clearly sympathetic to the idea that children can heighten tensions around gender role expectations, I don’t think anyone is arguing that Norway should be past all that by now. Those who believe that the genders are essentially different don’t expect us to ever get past it, and those who believe that gender differences arise from socialization don’t expect us to jettison past (socialized) expectations overnight. Second, Hart and her colleagues give us a number of reasons to think that the stability premium associated with having a child should shrink over time, including mothers being more able to financially support children alone now than in the past. In other words, even if men’s participation at home were strengthening families with children, we might not see the stability gap between parents and childless couples grow because other social forces might offset that change.

Yet Hart et al., conclude that their results “do not underpin…optimism” about men’s participation strengthening families with children. Fair enough: The unchanging stability premium associated with children does not support the idea that men’s
participation is strengthening families with children—but neither does it provide any evidence against that claim.

My critique of their claim about a growing similarity between cohabitation and marriage has much the same flavor: It is possible, but not supported, given their evidence. First, they document what they call “a persistent super risk for cohabitants.” I like this term, “super-risk.” They introduce it to differentiate between the stability advantage children have if their biological parents are married rather than cohabiting, and change over time in the effect of children on the stability of cohabiting unions. That means that the super risk associated with having cohabiting parents can obtain in all time periods, even while shared children begins to strengthen cohabiting unions. From 1970-85, cohabiting couples with children were no more stable than those without children, and in the later time periods having a young child significantly increased the stability of cohabiting unions.

But I have trouble interpreting the emergence of a stability premium associated with children within cohabitation as supporting statements in their conclusions like “Childbearing in cohabitation seems to have lost much of its strength as a signal of social and demographic difference.” The “persistent super risk for cohabitants” is evidence against this: over all time periods, cohabiters were three times as likely to split as those who married without first cohabiting.

Moreover, Hart et al., do not provide any evidence that the advantage to marriage for children has declined over time. Their discussion also indicates that they think children stabilize cohabitations now when they did not do so in the 1970s because cohabitating childbearing is no longer a rare phenomenon characteristic of a select group of people. In fairness to the authors, the conclusion I am quibbling with could be properly interpreted as cohabiters simply becoming less select over time, but I am concerned it might be interpreted as marriage and cohabitation becoming indistinguishable over time, even though the research provides no evidence of that.

F. Russia:


Overview:

Russia is amassing unprecedented military might in the Arctic and testing its newest weapons in a region freshly ice-free due to the climate emergency, in a bid to secure its northern coast and open up a key shipping route from Asia to Europe.

Weapons experts and Western officials have expressed particular concern about one Russian 'super-weapon,' the Poseidon 2M39 torpedo. Development of the torpedo is moving fast with Russian President Vladimir Putin requesting an update
on a "key stage" of the tests in February from his defense minister Sergei Shoigu, with further tests planned this year, according to multiple reports in state media.

Current & Relevant Information:

Unmanned stealth torpedo is powered by a nuclear reactor and intended by Russian designers to sneak past coastal defenses -- like those of the US -- on the sea floor. The device is intended to deliver a warhead of multiple megatons, according to Russian officials, causing radioactive waves that would render swathes of the target coastline uninhabitable for decades.

In November, Christopher A Ford, then assistant secretary of state for International Security and Non-Proliferation, said the Poseidon is designed to "inundate U.S. coastal cities with radioactive tsunamis."

Experts agree that the weapon is "very real" and already coming to fruition. The head of Norwegian intelligence, Vice Admiral Nils Andreas Stensønes, told CNN that his agency has assessed the Poseidon as "part of the new type of nuclear deterrent weapons. And it is in a testing phase. But it's a strategic system and it's aimed at targets ... and has an influence far beyond the region in which they test it currently." Stensønes declined to give details on the torpedo's testing progress so far.

Satellite images provided to CNN by space technology company Maxar detail a stark and continuous build-up of Russian military bases and hardware on the country’s Arctic coastline, together with underground storage facilities likely for the Poseidon and other new high-tech weapons. The Russian hardware in the High North area includes bombers and MiG31BM jets, and new radar systems close to the coast of Alaska.

The Russian build-up has been matched by NATO and US troop and equipment movements. American B-1 Lancer bombers stationed in Norway's Ørland air base have recently completed missions in the eastern Barents Sea, for example. The US military’s stealth Seawolf submarine was acknowledged by US officials in August as being in the area.

A senior State Department official told CNN: "There's clearly a military challenge from the Russians in the Arctic," including their refitting of old Cold War bases and build-up of new facilities on the Kola Peninsula near the city of Murmansk. "That has implications for the United States and its allies, not least because it creates the capacity to project power up to the North Atlantic," the official said.

Russia insists motives are peaceful and economic

Russia’s foreign ministry declined to comment, yet Moscow has long maintained its goals in the Arctic are economic and peaceful.
A March 2020 document by Kremlin policymakers presented Russia’s key goals in an area behind 20% of its exports and 10% of its GDP. The strategy focuses on ensuring Russia's territorial integrity and regional peace. It also expresses the need to guarantee high living standards and economic growth in the region, as well as developing a resource base and the NSR as "a globally competitive national transport corridor."

Putin regularly extols the importance of Russia's technological superiority in the Arctic. In November, during the unveiling of a new icebreaker in St. Petersburg, the Russian President said: "It is well-known that we have a unique icebreaker fleet that holds a leading position in the development and study of Arctic territories. We must reaffirm this superiority constantly, every day."

Putin said of a submarine exercise last week in which three submarines surfaced at the same time in the polar ice: "The Arctic expedition ... has no analogues in the Soviet and the modern history of Russia."

Among these new weapons is the Poseidon 2M39. The plans for this torpedo were initially revealed in an apparently purposeful brandishing of a document discussing its capabilities by a Russian general in 2015.

It was subsequently partially dismissed by analysts as a 'paper tiger' weapon, meant to terrify with its apocalyptic destructive powers that appear to slip around current treaty requirements, but not to be successfully deployed.

Yet a series of developments in the Arctic -- including, according to Russian media reports, the testing of up to three Russian submarines designed to carry the stealth weapon, which has been suggested to be 20 meters long -- have now led analysts to consider the project real and active.

Russia’s state news agency, RIA Novosti, cited a "source" on Monday saying that tests for the Belgorod submarine, especially developed to be armed with the Poseidon torpedo, would be completed in September.

Manash Pratim Boruah, a submarine expert at Jane’s Fighting Ships, said: "The reality of the weapon is clear. You can absolutely see development around the torpedo, which is happening. There is a very good probability that the Poseidon will be tested, and then there is a danger of it polluting a lot. Even without a warhead, but definitely with just a nuclear reactor inside."

Boruah said some of the specifications for the torpedo leaked by the Russians were optimistic and doubted it could reach a speed of 100 knots (around 115 miles per hour) with a 100MW nuclear reactor. He added that at such a speed, it would probably be detected quite easily as it would create a large acoustic signature.

"Even if you tone it down from the speculation, it is still quite dangerous," he said.
Boruah added that the construction of storage bays for the Poseidon, probably around Olenya Guba on the Kola Peninsula, were meant to be complete next year. He also expressed concerns about the Tsirkon hyper-sonic missile that Russia says it has tested twice already, which at speeds of 6 to 7 Mach would "definitely cause a lot of damage without a particularly having big warhead itself."

Katarzyna Zysk, professor of international relations at the state-run Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, said the Poseidon was "getting quite real," given the level of infrastructure development and testing of submarines to carry the torpedo.

"It is absolutely a project that will be used to scare, as a negotiation card in the future, perhaps in arms control talks," Zysk said. "But in order to do so, it has to be credible. This seems to be real."

Stensønes also raised the concern that testing such nuclear weapons could have serious environmental consequences. "We are ecologically worried. This is not only a theoretical thing: in fact, we have seen serious accidents in the last few years," he said, referring to the testing of the Burevestnik missile which was reported to have caused a fatal nuclear accident in 2019. "The potential of a nuclear contamination is absolutely there."

“Dark Arctic: NATO allies wake up to Russian supremacy in the region,” Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen and Gwladys Fouche, Reuters, 16 November 2022 [200]
https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ARCTIC-SECURITY/zgvobmblrpd/

Overview:

The world’s largest satellite ground station, on the Svalbard archipelago off Norway, is used by Western space agencies to gather vital signals from polar-orbiting satellites. This January, one of two fiber-optic cables on the Arctic seabed connecting Svalbard to the mainland was severed. Norway was forced to rely on a back-up link.

In April 2021, another cable – one used by a Norwegian ocean research laboratory to monitor activity on the Arctic seafloor – was ripped away.

“This could have happened by accident,” Norway’s defense chief Eirik Kristoffersen told Reuters in response to the ruptures, which received little media coverage outside Norway. “But the Russians are capable of cutting cables.”

He was speaking generally and did not offer any evidence to suggest deliberate damage, but months later, in September, saboteurs caused major leaks to suddenly erupt in gas pipelines from Russia to Europe on the floor of the Baltic Sea. Russia’s defense ministry did not respond to a request for comment.

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ends a post-Cold War era of low tension and cooperation, such events highlight how hard it is for states to monitor their own waters – particularly in the Arctic, an ocean one and a half times the size of the
United States, where satellites are crucial to allow real-time detection and monitoring of activity.

Over recent years, NATO allies and Russia have scaled up military exercises in the region; Chinese and Russian warships conducted a joint exercise in the Bering Sea in September. Norway raised its military alert level in October.

But the West trails Russia in military presence.

Since 2005, Russia has reopened tens of Arctic Soviet-era military bases, modernized its navy, and developed new hypersonic missiles designed to evade U.S. sensors and defenses.

Current & Relevant Information:

Four Arctic experts say it would take the West at least 10 years to catch up with Russia’s military in the region, if it chose to do so.

“The Arctic is currently a dark area on the map,” said Ketil Olsen, formerly Norway’s military representative in NATO and the European Union, who heads Andøeya Space, a Norwegian state-controlled company that tests new military and surveillance technologies and launches research rockets.

“It’s so vast and with few civilian surveillance resources.”

The chief of the U.S. Northern Command, General Glen VanHerck, told a Senate hearing in March the United States needed better Arctic “domain awareness” to detect and address Russian and Chinese capabilities to launch advanced missiles and destroy communications infrastructure. In a Pentagon strategy document released in October, the United States committed to improving early warning and surveillance systems in the Arctic, but the pace of the planned modernisation is unclear.

At the same time, fast-rising temperatures are creating problems for some U.S. military infrastructure built on permafrost foundations, which are melting. Coastal erosion could also impact U.S. radar sites, the Pentagon says.

There are few risks in the near term, U.S. officials and military analysts say: The West is far stronger than Russia in conventional forces and Russia’s limited success in Ukraine exposed weaknesses many in the West had not expected.

Russia’s military efforts are currently mostly focused on Ukraine, leaving “very limited strength of personnel on the army side” in the Arctic Kola Peninsula, which is home to its Northern Fleet navy and nuclear submarines, according to Kristoffersen.

U.S. missile defenses are designed to defend against a limited attack from a rogue state, and the United States has expressed confidence in its ability to deter a nuclear attack by Russia or China. But insufficient visibility in the Arctic could limit U.S. response time in a crisis, a situation VanHerck and other officials want to avoid.
“What you can't see and what you can't determine, you can't defend from,” VanHerck told the Senate.

Police investigating the Norwegian cable ruptures interviewed the crew of Russian fishing trawlers that had been nearby, but dropped the investigations without charge for lack of evidence of what happened; the government said it brought forward a planned upgrade of the back-up line.

If a sabotage attack were to happen in Norway, it would likely be difficult to hold anyone accountable for it, Hedvig Moe, deputy head of Norway’s PST police security service, told Reuters. “We call it a deniable attack in our world,” she said.

“NATO is increasing its presence in the Arctic with more modern capabilities,” NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg told Reuters. “This is of course a response to what Russia is doing. They have significantly increased their presence … and therefore we also need greater presence.”


Summary:

Russia’s Arctic ambitions have attracted increasing attention in the West over the past decade as climate change opens up new opportunities in the region for navigation and exploration of its riches. For its part, Moscow casts a wary eye on what it sees as a challenge from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its position and ambitions there. The Kremlin’s rhetoric about Western encroachment has become more strident, in sync with its enhanced military posture and ambitious economic and infrastructure projects.

The Drivers of Russia’s Arctic Policy

Russian interest in the Arctic has deep historic roots that extend all the way to the sixteenth century and the conquest of Siberia driven by the never-ending quest for more resources and secure trading routes. Modern-day Russian posture in the Arctic is integral to its overall confrontation with the West, in which Europe is the principal theater. The saber-rattling in the Arctic and threatening rhetoric are driven by several factors: preparations for the unlikely, but potentially catastrophic contingency of war in Europe, the need to secure its second-strike nuclear capabilities (the bulk of which is based around the Kola Peninsula), and the quest for resources to pay for the proverbial guns and butter as the competition with the West shows no sign of abating. Great-power ambitions and the interests of powerful bureaucratic elites and business interests also play a role.

Ambitions vs. Reality
It remains to be seen whether Russia will be successful in realizing these ambitions. Its nuclear and conventional naval forces in northwest Russia are increasingly vulnerable to NATO’s long-range precision weapons. It is unclear whether the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia’s northern coastline into a major shipping route between Europe and Asia and the associated commercial projects are feasible and sustainable in the face of high costs and logistical complexity of operating in difficult climatic conditions with limited infrastructure, increased commercial competition from other countries, uncertain demand for hydrocarbons as the world shifts to green technologies, and the possibility of additional Western sanctions. The Kremlin’s posture in the Arctic is likely to continue as it enjoys backing from President Vladimir Putin and top military, government, and business actors. Its ability to achieve these broad ambitions for the region, however, is questionable at best.

**Implications for the United States and NATO**

Russia’s conception of its security requirements and NATO’s mutual-defense and deterrence commitments on the other hand have resulted in a tense standoff along the alliance’s northern flank as their forces operate in close proximity. Tempting as it may be to view the Arctic through the prism of great-power competition—which undoubtedly would fit with Russia’s quest for recognition as a great power—there is little to suggest that its military posture in the Arctic is a fundamentally new undertaking. Rather, it signals the return to a version of its Cold War–era posture centered around long-standing missions of protecting the sanctuaries of its ballistic missile submarine fleet and operations in the North Atlantic in the event of a war in Europe. Yet the Russian military is resuming these missions with fewer resources and facing a more formidable array of adversary capabilities than during the Cold War.

Russia has staked out ambitious territorial claims in the Arctic. Its rhetoric notwithstanding, it has thus far pursued them through legal means in compliance with the terms of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea, which it has signed and ratified.

Russia’s actions in the Arctic—its aggressive rhetoric and its far-reaching territorial claims—have done little to improve its diplomatic position there vis-à-vis other Arctic states and only antagonized them. Its only partner in its Arctic pursuits has been China, which claims that it is a “near-Arctic” state—a claim rejected by the United States and likely viewed with suspicion by other Arctic nations.

Considering the long-term nature of Russia’s confrontation with the West, the return to the relatively benign geopolitical environment in the Arctic that existed there in the 1990s is unlikely. Moreover, the current situation is not due to a misunderstanding, but rather to a clash of the two parties’ interests. That leaves two broad avenues for managing the standoff:
• Diplomacy: Although Russia may not prove receptive, the United States and NATO should seek areas of cooperation where there is a convergence of interests, as well as to devise rules of the road similar to those that existed during the Cold War to reduce tensions, avoid or manage crises, and mitigate the risks of conflict through an accident or miscalculation.

• Deterrence: The United States and NATO should continue to improve their defenses to discourage Russia from harassing their military and commercial aircraft and ships in and around the Arctic, and to ensure that the alliance maintains the capability to execute its wartime reinforcement plans for its northern and eastern flanks.

The alliance should continue to manage competition with Russia through a combination of resolve and restraint, improving and demonstrating its capabilities for defense and deterrence, but without overreacting to Russian muscle-flexing. Striking the right balance will be difficult and will require communicating to Russia clearly where the allies’ interests, objectives, and redlines are. The allies have been there before.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

During the first post–Cold War decade, Russia approached the Arctic as an area of low tensions, where cooperation with other powers in addressing common challenges was desirable and feasible.1 Gradually, however, as relations with the West deteriorated, and especially since its 2014 invasion of Ukraine, Russia has adopted a much more competitive, even confrontational, perspective on the Arctic. Instead of emphasizing the benefits of cooperative engagement, its leaders have articulated their view of the Arctic as a sphere of military and economic expansion, and an arena for their great-power ambitions.2 As a result of this changing attitude, Moscow has prioritized military superiority to counter what it claims is a growing U.S./NATO challenge to its interests there.

By any objective standard, U.S./NATO military deployments in the Arctic do not currently represent a threat to Russia’s Northern Fleet or to its other military assets there. The region possesses an abundance of natural resources, especially oil and gas, but these are available elsewhere in Russia. Exploring and extracting them in the Arctic requires huge capital investments and modern technology that would stretch its capacity. Global warming is opening up new commercial opportunities for shipping and fishing, but there is scant infrastructure in the region to capitalize on these opportunities, and rectifying this deficiency will be costly.

Russia’s evolving Arctic ambitions have engendered growing concerns among other Arctic nations, yet surprisingly little is known about the basis for these ambitions. This paper therefore addresses the following questions: What are the drivers of
Russia’s Arctic policy? How does it define its interests in the region and what tools does it employ to advance them? Who are the Russian stakeholders that would benefit from the exploitation of the region? What are the prospects for Russia realizing its ambitions? What are the implications of its actions and ambitions for U.S./NATO interests and policy?

Conclusion

In responding to Russia’s ambitions in the Arctic, it is important for the United States and NATO to base their plans on a realistic assessment of its posture there, its drivers, and its capabilities. Tempting as it may be to view the Arctic through the prism of great-power competition—which undoubtedly would fit with Russia’s quest for recognition as a great power—there is little to suggest that its military posture in the Arctic is a fundamentally new undertaking. Rather, it signals the return to a version of its Cold War-era posture centered around long-standing missions of protecting the sanctuaries of its ballistic missile submarine fleet and operations in the North Atlantic in the event of a war in Europe. The Russian military is resuming these missions with fewer resources and facing a more formidable array of adversary capabilities than during the Cold War.

Some hedging against a greater-than-anticipated Russian threat should be one element of the United States’ and NATO’s overall approach to the Arctic Region. But pursuing the goal of winning a great-power competition with Russia in this region is likely to be a distraction from other, more important U.S. pursuits. The alliance should act with prudence, realism, and restraint in protecting its core interests in the Arctic and carefully manage competition with Russia to avoid destabilizing consequences.

Even though their tense standoff is likely to continue, some cooperation between Russia and other Arctic nations, in practical areas that are largely depoliticized, is probably possible. These include climate change, search and rescue operations, and scientific research. Other opportunities for cooperation should be explored on issues of common concern, such as the safety of maritime shipping, environmental remediation, protection of fisheries, and incident management. In addition, it is essential for NATO allies to find potential diplomatic avenues for managing the standoff—that is, rules of the road to mitigate the risks of crises or incidents with the potential for escalation. No matter how unpromising they may seem, they should be explored. The allies have been here before.

“Russia’s Tough Talk on Arctic Sovereignty Must Be Taken Seriously,” Alexander Dalziel, Geopolitical Monitor, 4 March 2024 [202]
https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russias-tough-talk-on-arctic-sovereignty-must-be-taken-seriously/

Overview:
As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its third year, its implications for the geopolitics of the Arctic continue to unfold.

Although a military conflict is unlikely, Russia’s ambitious plans for the Arctic force the region’s other states to reconsider Russian thinking about how to manage potential points of tension. The Arctic Ocean’s continental shelves are one such issue.

Current & Relevant Information:

At a December public forum in St. Petersburg, Admiral Nikolay Yevmenov, head of the Russian navy, spoke of a “full-scale development beyond the 200-mile limit” of the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone in the Arctic Ocean. What I am translating as “development” here is the Russian word освоение, a word that bears multiple translations, extending from development to mastery to expansion, often with an economic angle. Elsewhere, it is translated as “take-over” or “expansion.” The context in which he spoke it was in relation to the Arctic as a “strategic resource base” of economic development.

In his remarks, Yevmenov closely ties that economic development to the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity in relation to that resource base, displaying how closely national security, defense and economics are intertwined in Russian economic thinking about the Arctic.

His words were fully in line with the body of strategic thinking that the Russian Federation under President Vladimir Putin has established since 2020. What we find in them does not sit comfortably with the concept of an “A5” of Arctic Ocean littoral states working together to settle jurisdictional questions diplomatically, a concept captured in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration signed by Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (for Greenland), Norway, Russia and the United States.

A careful unpacking of Russia’s evolving approach to international law and relations in the Arctic is in order.

First, we should take a step back to look at what is at stake. Demarcating the jurisdictional map of the far northern continental shelf has so far been largely a matter of science, in accordance with requirements the United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea. Briefly put, its Article 76 permits a country to extend past its 200-mile exclusive economic zone to the margins of the continental shelf should it be demonstrated its physical characteristics are continuous. That demarcation comes with rights to exploit resources in that expanded zone.

Canada, Denmark and Russia have all submitted the data underlying their respective claims to the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which rules on the integrity of the science. (The United States, not a signatory to the Law of the Sea, released its claim in fall 2023.) The commission ruled in 2023 that most of Russia’s submission was valid. Canada’s and Denmark’s claims are only
likely to be pronounced upon later this decade or early next. As of now, Canada, Denmark and Russia claim some of the same places in the central Arctic Ocean, concentrated along the Lomonosov Ridge.

Once the commission has ruled, a situation may emerge where all three have empirically justified claims to the same part of the shelf. If so, the final jurisdictional boundaries are agreed upon bilaterally. Canada-Denmark negotiations may not be easy, but however cool-minded they are, they will also be more or less amicable, and strictly at the negotiating table. A precedent for that is the settling of boundary disputes on Hans/Tartupaluk Island and in the Labrador Sea they concluded in 2022.

So, what about Russia? There is good reason to think that Russia will be less than an amicable negotiator and not leave it to the diplomats alone.

Here it is important to look at what the Russian leadership is saying on the matter. Useful resources are its main strategic documents, released over the last four years. The 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, the 2023 amendments to the 2020 Arctic Strategy, the 2022 Maritime Doctrine and the 2021 National Security Strategy reveal that Russia indeed thinks that it has a lot at stake. Canada, Denmark and the United States should take these seriously and prepare accordingly.

To start, these documents make clear that the Arctic Ocean and its continental shelves are an integral part of Russia’s geopolitics and prosperity. The Russian position is committed to exercising an extended jurisdiction on the Arctic Ocean’s continental shelf. Significantly, the National Security Strategy identifies the military’s defense of the continental shelf as a priority, a “goal of state security,” which dovetails with the document’s emphasis on resource exploitation rights as a function of national security and the general priority of the Arctic region in this regard.

The Maritime Doctrine lists the Arctic as the top priority of maritime strategy and is outspoken on Russian interests beyond its exclusive economic zone to the continental shelf and the delimitation of maritime boundaries under international law. The Foreign Policy Concept says that Russia will “step up” (Russian: активизация) the delineating of these borders in a region it identifies as the second most important after the countries of central Asia and eastern Europe, and what it calls the “near abroad.”

These statements fit into a process of geopolitical transformation Russia is trying to undertake to turn into a coastal Eurasian power, defined as much by its northern maritime edge as its terrestrial land mass. While the Arctic has long been touted as central to Russian identity, global warming is opening sea lanes that also conveniently enable Russia’s pivot to Asia, accelerated by the precarious relations with Europe.
This vision of Arctic coastal Russia is closely tied to its prosperity agenda. The region had already been an important part of economic planning. Now it is coming to be seen as the linchpin of future economic development. The Maritime Doctrine describes the Arctic Ocean as the only “vital” ocean to national interests, with its socio-economic development a “decisive condition” for future prosperity. Seabed resources on the continental shelf, it claims, are “predetermined” to be essential to alleviating depleted terrestrial deposits (itself a questionable claim).

Into this mix the strategies assess a sharply competitive, sometimes violent international context, including in the Arctic. The strategic documents describe the other Arctic countries as exhibiting varying degrees of hostility to Russia. The Foreign Policy Concept (Section 50.2, for instance), accuses the other Arctic countries of “militarizing” the region — conveniently ignoring Russia’s own steady modernization of its armed forces in its north.

Russia then goes on to state it will “counteract unfriendly states’ … militarization of the region.” The United States and its allies are pursuing an explicit “containment” strategy and trying to limit its access to the oceanic resources, according to the Maritime Doctrine; it goes on to say the Arctic is a place of “strategic competition.” According to the National Security Strategy, Russia’s Arctic development is being “obstructed” (a reference to sanctions on oil and gas projects). The disparaging epithet of “Anglo-Saxon” is hurled in Canada’s general direction in the Foreign Policy Concept as one of the United States’ henchmen.

The updated Russian Arctic Strategy introduces ambiguity into this overall depiction. It has retained an earlier description of the other Arctic states as “challenges” (Russian: вызовы) and did not elevate them to threats (Russian: угрозы). While it did de prioritize the relations with the other Arctic states from the 2020 document and replace them with bilateral, case-by-case relations with any states, the retention of the “challenge” language is almost certainly not an oversight and optimistically might be seen to represent something of an underlying offer to the Arctic community in the case of improved relations, against the hyperbolic accusations of militarization and Anglo-Saxonism in the other strategies. (A workable hypothesis here is that Russia’s long-term concerns in the Arctic include managing a potentially overreaching China, for which having Arctic partners would be decidedly beneficial for Moscow.)

So, will Russia leave the resolution of any disputes over the continental shelves purely to international law? In the Foreign Policy Concept, Russia reaffirms the “special responsibility of the Arctic states” regarding the Law of the Sea, with a specific reference to maritime delimitation” and sustainable development. It clearly has not abandoned international law.

But Putin and his regime see international law differently from the other (liberal and democratic) Arctic states. They import into their claims about international law the array of deeply cynical assumptions about how the world works, captured in the
Foreign Policy Concept’s acknowledgement of the “power factor” in current international relations; diplomacy, it contends, is of decreasing effectiveness.

Cynicism, though, does not exclude sincerity. For Russia, international law is an instrument. The starting point from any consideration of the question in Copenhagen, Nuuk, Ottawa and Washington must be Russia’s flagrant dismissal of international law by its invasion of Ukraine. Russia is not a country defined by its strict adherence to legality.

Expressing this, the subordination of international law to the national interest is a theme running through the strategic documents. The Foreign Policy Concept declares that delimiting the continental shelf will be done in accordance with international law but “unconditionally” in line with its “national interests” and “sovereign rights;” the amended 2023 Arctic strategy added new language foregrounding national interests.

In addition, doubts about the efficacy of international law pervade these documents. The Arctic Strategy and Maritime Doctrine both speak of a group of unspecified countries, presumably Arctic ones, seeking to revise international agreements along national legislative lines. These statements exhibit the leadership’s tendency to use international law instrumentality and see it as malleable to the interests of the “great powers.” They have culminated recently in talk (unlikely to be fulfilled) in Russia about leaving the Law of the Sea entirely.

In short, international law is generated by centers of global power and smaller countries expressing their interests, and balancing them in accordance with power. What the Kremlin is offering when it talks of international law is a framework for discussing national interests, but justice here is not an equally accessible good, instead something that will be decided by the powerful. This is something for Canada and Denmark, in particular, to be attentive to in Arctic matters.

As a consequence, preparedness should be made for a Russia acting superficially in line with international law but covertly seeking to advance its position. The likelihood that Russia will come to open blows over the Arctic is low, but the main threat is not open aggression.

It is to the asymmetric “grey zone” of deniable “hybrid” tools that we should be looking. The strategic documents fully acknowledge the use of force in international affairs, below and above the threshold of open warfare. Notably, in the Foreign Policy Concept it asserts that Russia is the target of a hybrid warfare campaign conducted by the United States and its allies, and the National Security Strategy and Maritime Doctrine provide additional enabling language for asymmetric responses. Reciprocity is a premise of Russian international conduct. These statements provide a clear justification for its use of so-called hybrid or grey zone coercion to achieve policy ends. If it perceives its negotiating position has deteriorated, Russia will be
ready to deploy a range of tools, likely to include deniable, coercive ones, below the threshold of open aggression to strengthen its bargaining position.

The strategic documents make clear that Russia is already trying to shape the negotiation space in the Arctic Ocean. If Russia’s relations with its Arctic neighbors remain on the same fraught footing that they are now — a near certainty with another six years of Putin about to start this spring — then it will agitate for maximalist outcomes in obtaining its “sovereign rights” in the Arctic Ocean.

Russian claims are unlikely to extend past what they have stated they want. That does not mean that the coercive “grey zone” will not be an active front in maneuvering for a Russia-optimal settlement or that Canadian and Danish or (by extension) U.S. interests are not at risk.

These three countries need to think about this and start to act now. Acquiring the capabilities that will keep Russia honest at the negotiating table, like icebreakers, submarines, subsea sensors and patrol aircraft, and the infrastructure to support them, takes years. Negotiations in a decades-long time frame will be advanced by establishing a situational awareness that needs to start being built today.

The timelines are long, and we can hope for a different Russia in the next decade or two. But hope, as is often quipped, is not a policy. Canadian, Danish, Greenlandic and U.S. leaders may well face in a decade’s time in the Arctic the same aggressive, uncooperative, and bad faith Russia that we face today in Ukraine. Ensuring we are prepared for hardball hybrid behavior from Russia in the Arctic is a matter for today, so we can be ready tomorrow.

Gender Roles:

“Pan-Arctic Report: Gender Equality in the Arctic Phase 3,” Arctic Council, April 2021 [203]

Summary:

Gender equality in the Arctic is highly relevant to the agenda and role of the Arctic Council (the Council) and its Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), which have emphasized gender equality in previous projects and initiatives. The importance of issues of gender and diversity has become increasingly evident, the latest example being Iceland's emphasis on gender issues during its Council Chairmanship.
GEA highlights the importance of recognizing and appreciating diversity in terms of discourses, gender, Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, governance, education, economies, social realities, sustainability, and balanced participation in leadership and decision making, in both the public and private sectors.

A major component of GEA III has been to develop this report on gender. It pulls together material, information, and expertise to provide an overview of gender-related issues in the Arctic and contributes to filling knowledge gaps on this subject. The GEA III report seeks to identify emerging issues, priorities, and concrete strategies that support gender balance and increased diversity.

The primary intended audience for this report is policymakers in the Arctic region. It is a resource for those interested in gender issues in the Arctic, including Arctic inhabitants and researchers. We hope that a broader audience, including the private sector, will appreciate the relevance of the report to their work.

The report does not claim to be comprehensive, but it is a step forward in strengthening the knowledge base and understanding required for developing policies that foster resilient and thriving communities.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

Arctic Russia Arctic Russia is a highly diverse region permitting only a limited overview of migration dynamics within the region. However, histories of migration shed some light on migration in Arctic Russia today. In the 1930s, Arctic Russia grew dramatically as the Soviet state used forced labor and sent millions of people to the region to secure rapid industrialization. Later a system of wage increments was developed alongside other benefits, to entice people to migrate to and work in the region. This resulted in a much larger population than would have been possible under free market conditions (Heleniak, 2020). In the wake of the Soviet Union breakdown and the Russian transition to a market economy, subsidies and enticements were reduced significantly. A so-called "flight from the North" followed, and the population declined by 20% (Heleniak, 2019). Intensive out-migration in the 1990s was mostly driven by the deteriorated well-being of northern populations. The fast expansion of cities in Arctic Russia also led to pressures on utilities, which resulted in highly contaminated water supplies (Khoreva et al., 2018), one factor impacting well-being in Arctic Russia. Most out-migrants were younger or working age individuals, while older cohorts of residents remained, leading to a rapidly ageing Arctic Russia (Vlasova & Petrov, 2010).

Even before the economic transition, the male sex ratio in Arctic Russia was significantly lower than in the rest of the Arctic, though higher than the rest of Russia (Riabova, 2001). In two decades, the sex ratio declined from 101 men for every 100 women, to 92:100 in 2010 (Heleniak, 2019). Although industries that attract and demand a male workforce in other Arctic regions are found in Arctic Russia as well, the male sex ratio in Russia differs significantly. Therefore, the Russian Arctic
diverges from the rest of the Arctic. A pivotal reason for this deviation is the difference in life-expectancy between men and women. The historical reasons for these differences between men and women are multifactorial (Heleniak, 2019). In contemporary times, however, an increased death rate among men due to murder, suicide, accidents and cardiovascular diseases, has negatively affected the male sex ratio in the Russian Arctic (Heleniak, 2014).

Despite out-migration accounting for a considerable share of population decline, data suggests, that only one quarter of the decline in the male sex ratio can be attributed to higher male out-migration (Heleniak, 2019). Three quarters are the result of significantly higher and widening gaps between female and male life expectancy. Whilst life expectancy varies somewhat in Arctic Russia, the average life expectancy for the region is lower for both men and women, than for Russia otherwise. In the Arctic zone of Russia in 2018, life expectancy for men was 67.1 years and for women 77.3 years, a difference of 10.2 years (Federal State Statistics Service, 2019).

Because of extensive out-migration, the region generally has been in decline, whilst some new cities mostly in Yamalo-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi have seen growth, most notably because of their significance in Russia’s oil production. Furthermore, the population moving to cities in the region, are relatively young people who are attracted to cities in Arctic Russia (Laruelle & Hohmann, 2020).


Overview:

The most fascinating product of studying abroad is the discovery of different mentalities in a culture. Specifically, in Russia, society has completely different views of women and their expectations. As a foreigner, the best way to understand these ideas is to step away from those of the United States and explore these nuances through firsthand experience.

Current & Relevant Information:

In my Russian conversation class, we discussed the idea of men being “the stronger sex” and how they relate to women. Interestingly, Russians do not refer to women as “the weaker sex”—nor do they think women are weak at all—but instead women are “the prettier sex.” As such, women do everything they can to live up to that idea. Whenever they are out in public, Russian women dress pristinely, always in high heels, regardless of the weather. Even now that it is starting to get colder and winter is settling in, women continue this custom with high heeled boots. It would be a
social scandal to wear sweatpants or running shoes unless one is on their way to the gym.

In response to the gracious exterior display, men generally act in a way that Americans would describe as “gentleman-like.” They give up their seats on the metro, hold out a hand to help you off a bus, and hold doors open for women, even if they are strangers. As one of my professors pointed out, it is ingrained in their minds that if a woman is in their presence, they, as men, should be on their best, most polite behavior. While these ideas of chivalry have been discouraged in the United States—due in part to extreme feminism—the gender roles of men in Russia have nothing to do with the idea of women needing their help. On the contrary, men help women because they are women, i.e., “the prettier sex.”

When my conversation professor first brought this point up, I was confused at the simplicity of their mentality. What one needs to realize, though, is that many of the gender roles in Russia come down to ideas of love and marriage. The biggest moment in the life of a Russian is the day that they get married (followed closely by having children), because it revolves around the love that two people share. Russian women dress nicely to find a husband, while Russian men act chivalrously in order to find a wife.

The most shocking part of Russian gender roles for Americans is the idea that love always outweighs work. That means that the majority of Russian women devote their efforts to finding a husband, and then caring for their children. That is not to say that women don’t receive educations or have careers here, because they most certainly do. In general, though, most set aside their career until their children are grade school age, meaning that they leave behind a job they might have had prior to having a child. Russians prefer to care for their children without the help of a nanny, and the idea of preschool is a foreign concept. They are completely devoted to their family and the love within it.

From the outside, it is impossible to see these gender roles as anything but cultural differences. However, when one takes the time to discover the depth of the Russian mentality, all sorts of new ideas are found. Interestingly, it even made me question some of my customs from the United States, like why we value having a job over finding love. I appreciate the time to explore the Russian culture as well as my own and look forward to the future insights that my study abroad experience has to offer.

These gender roles are by no means an absolute, but more a general idea in Russian culture.

“In Russia, gender equality still a long way off,” Francesca Ebel, ABC News, 8 March 2019 [205]
https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&p=c56d841579ce0f32JmltdHM9MTY3MTIzNTIwMCZpZD0wYzFhYzlkOC1lY2E0LTYxYzQtMWExMC1kYmI4ZWYwNzMmaW5zaWQ9NTE2OA&ptn=3&hsh=3&fclid=0c1ac9d8-eca4-61c4-1a10-
Overview:

Women in Russia may hold prominent positions in the government and business but traditional gender roles and a wide gender pay gap show that Russia is falling behind the West in gender quality.

Current & Relevant Information:

When a Russian army recruitment office ordered a photoshoot to celebrate International Women's Day, it didn't feature any of the 45,000 women currently serving in the country's armed forces.

Instead, the photos showed ballerinas in floaty white dresses posing with active servicemen incombats and machine guns. "The men's power lies in women's tenderness and love!" read a congratulatory note from the army office, based in Russia's fourth-largest city of Yekaterinburg.

While International Women's Day is marked Friday across many countries with calls for gender equality, in Russia it is still a holiday largely focused on celebrating traditional gender roles.

Women in Russia may hold prominent positions in the government — including the influential chief of the Central Bank and speaker of the upper chamber of parliament — but traditional gender roles still hold sway, and efforts to address problems like the gender pay gap, domestic violence and sexual harassment have hardly scratched the surface.

A younger generation of Russian women, however, is hopeful changes are afoot.

In a video address Friday, President Vladimir Putin gave his annual speech praising women.

"In this day and age, you have attained the heights of practically all professions ... and at the same time you remain beautiful, charismatic, charming, the center of gravity for the whole family, uniting it with your love, with your capacity to inspire and support, to give warmth and comfort," he said.

The #MeToo movement appeared to have taken hold in Russia last year when three Russian journalists accused prominent lawmaker Leonid Slutsky of sexual harassment. Some media companies called for a boycott of the Russian parliament, and the chamber's ethics committee held a hearing — developments that led some to believe that Russia was ready for a serious discussion on sexual abuse and harassment.
But the complaints were later dismissed as a conspiracy to smear Slutsky’s image, and the politician never admitted any wrongdoing.

Entrepreneur and lawyer Alyona Popova, one of the few voices to publicly side with the women, said she was shocked to see that not a single female Russian politician had come out to support the journalists.

"Lots of women in power know all too well what harassment is. They could have spoken out, but they didn't," Popova said.

Popova is preparing a draft bill to criminalize domestic violence, and is also lobbying for restraining orders to be introduced in Russia.

The Russian parliament in 2017 voted to decriminalize domestic violence that does not cause serious bodily harm — a move seen as a step back for a country where such violence is widespread. Some 12,000 women are killed as result of domestic violence in Russia every year, according to Human Rights Watch.

The gender pay gap is also an issue.

Olga Golodets, one of Russia's two female deputy prime ministers, said at a recent conference that women's average pay in Russia is equivalent to 70 percent compared to men's wages.

"With all the opportunities that women have, they do not achieve the same level of education, career growth and remuneration of their work, as men do," the minister said.

Some Russian women have decided to tackle the pay gap and harassment in their own way.

In the former imperial Russian capital St. Petersburg, two young women opened what they say is Russia's first exclusively female co-working space.

"I got tired of sexism and mansplaining at work, especially when I found out that my male colleague, who worked just as much as I do, had a salary up to 15,000 rubles ($230) higher than mine," says 27-year-old barista Svetlana Natarkhova, one of the co-founders of Simona, named after the French writer and feminist Simone de Beauvoir.

For a fee of just 150 rubles ($2.2) per day any female customer is welcome to stay and work at Simona, a bright, open space on the ground floor of a pre-revolutionary building.

Leda Garina, the other co-founder of Simona, said she is optimistic about the future of feminism even though "feminist" is often treated as a swear word in Russia.

She noted how a tiny group of feminists marching in the May 1, 2013 rally in St. Petersburg has expanded to several dozen at the same event five years later.
It’s high time for Russians to reclaim March 8, Garina says, and celebrate it as "the day of women's solidarity and fight for women's rights."

The day before Women's Day, about a half-dozen male activists of the pro-Kremlin group Syet entered Simona despite the protests of women there and presented vases of flowers as gifts. As they were leaving, one woman sprayed the person filing the encounter with gas.


Overview:

One’s family holds the highest importance to individuals in Russia. Relatives usually have very close relationships and are interdependent, helping each other in times of need. Extended family members are also very involved with people’s lives and the support of the household. If an uncle, aunt or any other relative is in need, it is considered to be the obligation of the immediate family to help. Grandparents play a big part in raising children, and may perhaps even live with the nuclear family. The elderly hold a very respected position in society and generally hold the most authority in the household.

Russia has quite crowded housing conditions comparative to Australia (in square metres per person). Traditionally, three generations lived together in one household. However, in present-day Russia, the nuclear family is becoming more common. Many young couples aspire to move out of their parents’ home after marriage. A shortage in housing and difficult economic conditions can make independent living a challenge, which means many grown children have to live with their parents. If an elderly couple lives independently and one of them becomes widowed, they usually move into the household of one of their children to be cared for into their old age.

In the common Russian household dynamic, both parents usually work; it is more commonly the woman’s job than the man’s to care for the children and do the housework. However, many modern Russian families have alternative dynamics. For example, parents may be divorced, or work in different cities away from their children. Often, grandparents will help raise children whilst both parents work, sometimes minding the grandchildren for entire holiday periods to give the parents time for themselves.

Some families of lower-socioeconomic backgrounds may combine their assets in order for all members to have economic security. Typically, if grandparents live with the nuclear family, their pensions contribute to the family budget.

Generally, most Russians adore children and aspire to have their own. It’s a primary goal to see one’s child be more successful than oneself and so Russians are often deeply proud of their kids. People can be expected to boast of their son or daughter’s success. However, there is a growing tendency for people to deliberately...
choose to stay unmarried and childless in order to focus on their careers. Family sizes may also be limited by economic conditions.

Current & Relevant Information:

Gender Roles

Women have equal rights to study and work in Russia. The communist regime sought to empower women and increase gender equality. However, since the collapse of communism, a significant amount of the progress towards gender equality has eroded. In the midst of high unemployment, women were the first to lose their jobs, and a traditionalist view of the division of labor and family life became popular again. Many women saw their participation in the workforce as a "double burden" when coupled with household labor as it continued to be considered the female’s duty to complete domestic tasks.

Today, many women work to increase the household income and all generally have the opportunity to pursue higher education. However, they still do not occupy as many leadership positions. Men continue to dominate the public sphere and, since quotas for female representation were discarded, the numbers of women in politics have declined.

Russian culture generally possesses very strong conceptions about femininity and masculinity. Women are expected to be well groomed, reserved and have a feminine look. Meanwhile, though men are also expected to present themselves tidily, it’s more acceptable for them to be unshaved, slightly unkempt and out of shape. If a Russian man is too well groomed, it may raise questions about his masculinity.


Overview:

On July 21–23, a distinguished group of Russian, European, and North American academics and practitioners gathered for a live, virtual discussion of the status of women in Russian society. The conversations focused on the present-day dynamics, challenges, and opportunities associated with six core themes: feminism, human rights and activism, women in politics and public administration, women in the workforce and labor market, family and motherhood, and the problem of gender-based violence and measures to combat it.

More than 70 people, about 60 percent based in Russia, attended the conference, and each of the six virtual roundtables brought together between 35 and 45 participants. Four kickoff speakers, one Western expert and three Russian academics and practitioners, began each discussion with introductory remarks.
before opening the floor to thoughts, observations, and questions. This structure allowed participants to present firsthand experiences, explore the gap between research and practice, compare Russian and Western academic perspectives, and establish new contacts between scholars of women’s issues and people involved in the subject matter on the ground. Adherence to the Chatham House Rule ensured a frank and uncensored conversation, and the Zoom chat and breakout rooms created an opportunity for less formal exchanges.

This report summarizes the discussions and lists the major takeaway points of the three conference days. It also outlines how the conversation on these important topics can continue in the form of events and publications at the Kennan Institute and beyond. Because of the Chatham House Rule, we omit the names of speakers and commentators.

Current & Relevant Information:

Conference Takeaways

The roundtable discussions focused on complex and diverse topics, but some core themes were repeated throughout the conference. Conference discussions highlighted the importance of involving both academics and practitioners in conversations about women’s issues, in Russia and elsewhere. It is not uncommon for practitioners in different fields to criticize scholars for being out of touch with what it is happening on the ground. In the case of Russia, independent politicians raise the issue of informal politics, whereby decisions are made outside designated institutions, as it tends to elude the scholarly eye. Here, bridging the gap between research and practice would mean that academics would examine unconventional aspects of the Russian political system and that politicians would borrow some academic prisms and terminology to better comprehend and describe the reality in which they function.

In addition to involving both scholars and practitioners, it is important to bring together different generations of feminists and activists. There were prominent feminists and feminist groups at different stages of Soviet and post-Soviet history, and today’s scholars and activists are not the first generation to study and promote the ideas of feminism in Russia, but the new generation of activists seems to lack some of the knowledge about earlier successes and challenges. This lacuna can be partly explained by the fact that many post-Soviet gender studies centers did not survive Russia’s conservative turn. Both the Soviet and early post-Soviet experiences need processing, and there is a clear need to reflect on Russia’s history and look back at the first feminist organizations and the people who laid the groundwork for today’s scholars and activists.

Intergenerational dialogue between Russian women’s movement veterans and new actors and thinkers can and should be supplemented with transnational dialogue.
between and among Russian, European, and American scholars and practitioners. Despite the differences between the two countries’ societies and political systems, Russia and the United States face some of the same challenges when it comes to the women’s agenda, and could learn from each other’s experiences.

In the Russian case, it is also vital to look beyond Moscow and St. Petersburg and engage the wide variety of regional experiences and perspectives on women’s issues from across the country. The Kennan Institute’s conference included participants from Ivanovo, Makhachkala, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Smolensk, Tomsk, and Tver, but wider geographic representation would enrich the conversation. Furthermore, as one participant noted, it might also be helpful to learn from the work of Holocaust studies and supplement the picture with the voices of direct participants and witnesses, such as clients of crisis centers or former inmates who became activists.

It is not possible to create a comprehensive picture of women’s problems absent the relevant national and historical context. In Russia’s case, it means tracing the history from before the Russian Revolution while also understanding Soviet and post-Soviet developments, the complex ethnic and religious setup of today’s Russian society, and the intricacies of the contemporary political system and regime. The evolution of Russian feminism over the past thirty years and the transformation of feminism into non-feminism and post-feminism are as interesting as the deeper historical roots of today’s agenda.

Many of the problems raised at the conference are systemic and go beyond women’s issues; solving them will require a cultural shift and political transformation. The Russian conservative backlash is shifting attention from the country’s economic decline and growing inequality to status anxieties and is undermining both traditional and intersectional feminist agendas. Some feminist and women’s rights organizations that used to be seen as a normal part of civil society are now ostracized by the general public. While the pursuit of women’s rights should not be reduced to a fight against specific government policies and legislative initiatives, Russia offers an interesting case for exploring the motivations and strategies of activism and social change in an authoritarian regime.

In light of the wide scope of the discussion and the interest participants expressed in one another’s work, there is a clear need for an ongoing conversation and a deeper exploration of specific topics in smaller online and offline meetings. One of the ideas voiced during the wrap-up session was to create a private online space so that this group of scholars, activists, and practitioners could maintain regular contact, exchange information, and explore the possibility of joint projects.

Another idea briefly discussed during the conference is a book project focusing on the history of the Soviet and Russian women’s movements. To incorporate the lessons learned in this conference, the project would need to offer a historical
overview, reflect on the work of the first Soviet feminists, who were marginalized even by other dissidents, recover what is left of the archives and libraries of feminist organizations and gender studies centers, and interview those living late Soviet and early post-Soviet thinkers and activists who laid the groundwork. It would also need to involve younger scholars and activists as co-authors to bridge the generation gap and ensure continuity of the Russian women’s movement.

Because of time constraints, the conference discussions had to omit a variety of problems existing within feminism and activism, but did touch on the complicated relationship between the two. It is no secret that despite a recent resurgence of interest in feminism, the word itself has negative connotations in Russia, and female activists often shy away from that label, even if their practical work reflects feminist ideas. Still, as many of the conference participants emphasized, the key to success lies in solidarity, including solidarity across gender divides and ideological lines. One can argue that it is time for female activists to embrace feminism, for men to become true allies in pursuit of women’s rights, and for feminists to join the fight for wider social change.

https://digitalcommons.conncoll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=slavichp

Abstract:

Despite significant shifts in Russia’s social and political spheres since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, traditional gender norms within the domestic sphere have remained generally constant to the present day. The home is a crucial site of gender identity construction due to its importance in Russian culture as a space that has long functioned as a refuge from public life and official discourse. Based on ethnographic interviews with twenty residents of Ufa about their daily practices in the domestic sphere, this study aims to illuminate the domestic social structures within the Russian home in order to achieve a greater understanding of broader social relations in Russia today. Viewed through the lenses of everydayness, narrative, gender, and the home, traditional gender norms reveal a stabilizing function for families, which there appears to be little motivation to change.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

Research Questions and Background Knowledge

Everydayness constitutes our daily practices and the narratives we generate about these practices. It is often masked in familiarity, but is not a transparent concept. Our understanding of everydayness arises out of a constructed idea of what is acceptable human behavior, and it is not inherent within us as human beings. Many ideologies and assumptions are concealed within our daily habits and become...
naturalized into our perception of the world. Although rarely questioned, gender comprises a significant part of how we experience and participate in everyday life. Gender identity greatly influences self-perception and the manner in which people interact with one another, shaping how we experience the home. The way we use domestic space reproduces and reinforces this identity on a daily basis. Since the home is a private space, the way we perform gender within it differs markedly from how we perform gender in the public sphere.

When I arrived in Russia for the first time in 2011, I was struck by how femininity was accentuated in the way women presented and conducted themselves on a daily basis in public. Men, I observed, assumed a hyper masculine role, acting as a protector and guide for women. Traditional gender roles, as I understood them in the cultural context of the United States, did not sufficiently describe the situation that I was witnessing. Gender norms in contemporary Russia arise out of a history of communism in the Soviet Union following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. These norms developed in opposition to pre-Revolutionary norms that were consonant with U.S. and European values of the time. Under the auspices of state feminism, women took on what is termed “the double burden,” as they were heavily mobilized into the workforce by the state while still retaining domestic responsibilities (Schrand 1999). Ideas of Western feminism did not find broad cultural resonance outside of intellectual circles in post-communist Russia and these concepts are widely rejected in the country today.

However, the gender question is more complex than it might seem from the way it is expressed and performed on the street, and it must be observed in a domestic context. The home has long been a key institution in Russia, clearly distinguished from the public domain as more relaxed and authentic, and I am interested in how gender is taught and expressed in this space. This topic is exceptionally important to address, as understanding gender in the home is vital to understanding social relations in Russia today. It is largely in the home that cultural practices and norms are passed down through generations, and it is precisely this sphere which is most hidden, out of reach, and unquestioned. Given the dramatic changes in other spheres of Russian life, why have traditional roles in the domestic space, if they are indeed still present, persisted? How are gender roles maintained in the everyday life of the Russian the home and passed down through generations? Are they transforming or enduring? These are the crucial questions I address in my thesis.

In this study, I discuss gender in the physical space and narratives of the Russian home through three generations: young college-age Russians born directly before or after the end of the Soviet Union, and their parents and grandparents who grew up during the Soviet era. Each of these generations, and especially the youngest, which has grown up within former Soviet lands after the fall of communism and the disintegration of the country, has been shaped by very different political and social surroundings. Certain domestic legacies, though, are still present. In modern
Russian cities, families live overwhelmingly in apartments and not single-family houses. Two Soviet trends that helped contribute to the modern housing situation are communal apartments, kommunalki, and apartment buildings constructed under Nikita Khrushchev, termed khrushchevki. These former housing institutions are not only reflected in current practices, but also in the way that Russians conceptualize their domestic culture through narratives.

Communal apartments, part of the same revolutionary project that purported liberation for women, were created to alleviate the housing crisis in the 1920s (Boym 124-125). New buildings were not widely constructed, but rather existing apartments or parts of houses were subdivided and transformed in order to accommodate multiple families. Many of these apartments were forcefully taken from aristocrats and other families labeled bourgeois at the time of the 1917 revolution. The minimum living space allocated was “about 10 square meters per person and 13 square meters per family” (Boym 124). Usually, each communal apartment provided one kitchen, one toilet, and one bathing room for all of its residents, which promised little hope of privacy and many opportunities for discomfort, conflict, and resentment.

Khrushchevki were apartment buildings conceived to alleviate the continuing housing crisis in 1957 under the rule of Khrushchev (Varga-Harris 561). Built of low-quality material, they appeared quite similar, if not identical, to one another. The interiors consisted of separate one-family apartments, rather than communal apartments. This arrangement supported the primacy of “the nuclear [as] the normative household and primary unit of society,” a large step away from other state efforts in favor of collectivism (Reid 147). Still, as Susan Reid discusses, a common and collective experience across family boundaries is created through this “standardization and uniformity in house form,” as it “tends to homogenize…domestic settings’ and, with them, domestic behaviors and values” (Reid 156). Although separate apartments created the opportunity for more privacy and choice in how one decorated and utilized living space, the spatial foundation still had a strong effect on the way that people lived, contributing to a “regimentation of life” (Reid 156). Both Khrushchev-era apartment buildings and communal apartments still exist in Russia today, and specifically in Ufa, where I conducted my research, though the existence of communal apartments has widely decreased. Interaction with and within these physical spaces has changed in material and nonmaterial ways to varying extents, reflecting new political and technological developments, while remaining engrained in and informed by the Soviet housing traditions.

Conclusions

Uncovering the attitudes and expectations that shape everyday life in the Russian home reveals that the complex gender structure of the domestic space does not directly mirror what is observed on the street. Women exercise more agency and hold greater responsibility than men do in the private sphere. Their responsibility for
the cleanliness of the kitchen and the home is significant not only in terms of the physical space, but also extends to sustaining social order in the family. Stability in the domestic space is very important among the Russians I interviewed, exemplified through their lack of clear ambition for change and the positively valued assertion that few changes have occurred in terms of family relations. In general, the younger generation is reproducing their parents’ cultural narrative of the space of the home, maintaining and perpetuating existing structures with limited alteration. Women truly maintain the status quo in the domestic sphere. Besides the physical labor of cleaning and other household chores, women also take responsibility for the coordination of these activities, making their position crucial in running the home, regardless of which family member actually carries out a task.

Men do not fulfill roles defined enough to maintain the family structure. Given the roles and habits I observed, it is possible to imagine a working family household without any men, but difficult to imagine a family household devoid of women. Following Mary Douglas’ assertion that dirt and untidiness relate to social disorder, the responsibility of the female family members to keep a tidy house is also the responsibility to create a vision of a socially orderly life (Douglas 1969). The family’s concern with accepting guests in a messy house is less about the physical space than about portraying a sense of order in the family unit. Maintaining this image is a task left exclusively to female family members.

Women in Russian cultural discourses have been held to higher moral standards than their male counterparts, often portrayed as honorable sufferers for a greater good. Nancy Ries refers to the “moral self-proving of women…where the heroine proves her spiritual purity by not choosing the object or path that would most benefit herself” (Ries 59). A morally elevated path, and the expression of suffering, gains an individual symbolic capital and “moral power” (Ries 89). While this figure exists in a pure sense only in theory and literary works, the idea permeates daily habits. For example, it is visible in women’s responsibility for the kitchen and domestic work, in the babushka’s service to her children and grandchildren, and in greater modesty in terms of alcohol consumption. Despite any negative repercussions these customs might have on the woman individually, they are valid because they contribute to ostensible familial and societal normalcy, benefitting the family unit at large.

Ries poses a question that I think is crucial to address here: “What constitutes real power in both families and nations?” (Ries 73). There is no single form of “real” power and no straightforward way to define it. Power manifests itself to various degrees in each sphere of our lives and of society, and men in positions of official authority are not the only ones influencing society. As ideologies are contained within everyday practices, domestic and national power are not completely distinct, but inform one another. It is pertinent to discuss what domestic power is, who holds it, and how this issue relates to the world outside of the home. Consistent with my argument that everydayness holds within it ideologies and structures of power that
transcend their physicality, the domestic sphere likewise affects what happens in the political and public realm. A related Russian joke that Ries refers to is told as follows:

A wife, talking to a friend about her marriage, says, ’I make all the trivial, unimportant decisions – where we will vacation, if we will move to a new apartment, if we will buy a car…My husband makes the really important decisions in the family, you know: can we build Communism in one country? Should the two Germanys reunite? (Ries 73)

This sense of divide between domestic and public work is reflected in the fact that a self-proclaimed housewife, and friend of Lara’s family, agrees with the statement that she has never worked a day in her life, despite her daily housework. It is clear that real work is considered to be done outside of the home, which ignores a huge amount of labor expended in the home each day. However, this conceptualization of work as existing solely outside of the domestic realm is consistent with the clear division between domestic and public space in the concept of byt.

A mother cannot realistically choose to opt out of her domestic responsibilities without great repercussions. Neither women nor men have much choice in how they define their place in the home, though the female role is much more clearly outlined, while the male role is delineated through its lack of definition. As Ries recounts, “The absence of men [in the family] has been a prevailing theme in Russia, among all classes, for several hundred years” (Ries 75). This absence resonates deeply in my research. Fathers were rarely mentioned in the narratives I heard, and they were less accessible to interview about the topic; at times they even physically excluded themselves from the conversation, as in Lara’s apartment. In another instance, a discussion of domestic practices turned quite political. Anna’s father referenced political themes in his answer to most of my questions, informing his discussion of the home with larger issues. None of the mothers I spoke with around the same age brought up such topics without prompting. My lack of breadth in male parent interviewees limits my ability to generalize about this issue; however, this example does point to a trend in men focusing on public and political issues instead of domestic ones. While the male interviewees I spoke with were more inclined to speak about philosophical and political topics, these concerns were not limited to the male sphere in the household. I have found that these topics are discussed in daily conversation regardless of gender, and views passed down to children most likely come from both channels. Anna and her mother participated in political discussions when I would spend time with the family, and there was not a clear gender divide in participation. However, Anna’s father’s unprompted transition to a topic contained within his comfort zone, rather than directly addressing the questions I posed, reveals that the domestic space is a passive experience for him, and not one over which he has full ownership.
Male family members are also limited in the way they define their domestic identity: the typical everydayness of a man at home has little to do with control over the actual space. Perhaps the father works during the day to help provide for his family, but in the physical home he does not contribute very concretely to necessary functions. Women have an authority over and understanding of domesticity that gives them an upper hand, in a certain sense, over men. Another aspect of male passivity in the home is related to “Russian men as victims of history in one form or another form, with women as the eternal attendants and caretakers of sacrificial males” (Ries 75). In this narrative, men achieve change in the greater world, but this change is only possible with the support of women. With less time devoted to daily concerns, male family members are indeed allowed more time to reflect extensively on philosophical issues, political developments, and in-depth plans for remont.

Remont is the one practice in the home very clearly male dominated, and men seem to take advantage of it. As it was in the Soviet Union, alteration of the apartment is a way of creating a distinct identity in a standardized space. In this context, the home is simultaneously a site of conformity and resistance. Amid familial consistency and stability, remont allows for controlled change that does not disrupt the everyday systems and structures.

Despite the lack of choice and the greater household burden within their roles, women do hold a great deal of power in shaping the home and its environment, and this power is not insignificant. In their interviews, the women discuss their domestic responsibilities with ownership and command, rather than portraying these tasks as an outside imposition. Much of Russians’ daily lives, among all generations, revolve around the home. Meals are eaten most of the time, if not always, at home. Significant holidays are more often celebrated in the apartment. According to my interviewees, the majority of their time not spent working or studying is spent at home. Even university students still living with their parents do schoolwork at home, rather than studying in the library or a café. This domestic power, therefore, is both quantitatively and qualitatively significant and holds weight, as residents inhabit this space for a great portion of their lives.

For female family members, especially wives and mothers, there is some comfort in having a defined and indispensable function to fulfill, regardless of employment status. The women I spoke with did not conceptualize their experience at home as oppressive and did not express strong discontent with it. It is possible that they would not feel comfortable sharing these feelings with me and would not articulate these issues using the same terminology. Instead, they were accepting of and resigned to their typical duties. In a study on the marginalization of men in the home, an unemployed single mother from Samara notes, “Men are kind of confused after all these reforms and crises. Things get to them more than they do to a woman. She’s more stable in the face of any crisis” (Ashwin & Lytkina 189). While many challenges arise in times of crisis in terms of managing a household, this role remains necessary, and women have been known to go to great lengths to fulfill it. In
the Soviet Union, women transitioned into the working sphere, but men did not transition into the domestic sphere in the same way, and are still struggling to find their place. In the case of Zoia’s family, the father’s lack of employment has led him to take on roles in the kitchen more often designated for the wife or babushka. Vera and Liuba, representations of the younger generation, express a desire for their husbands to do the same, seemingly regardless of his employment situation.

There are signs of forthcoming shifts in Russian domestic culture and labor division, both in practice and intent. However, the majority of the calls for and celebrations of change revolve around material comforts, reflecting more superficial transformations and a deeper attachment to older orders. In profound ways, views of gender roles have not shifted significantly from the current generation of grandparents to that of their grandchildren, and domestic culture has been remarkably consistent through political and societal transitions. There are two main arguments articulated in scholarly literature and contemporary discourse that explain the resilience of traditional gender norms in modern Russia. One of them points to the communist past as the main cause of the current situation, as state feminism did not improve women’s conditions significantly, but rather added greater responsibility to already demanding domestic duties. After experiencing this version of feminism, Russian women do not seem to find the egalitarian philosophy of gender equity attractive. The other argument, less articulated in scholarly works than in daily discourses, dissociates Russian women from Western feminism because it is perceived as markedly non-Russian. Within this line of thought, Russians have an alternative way of life that is equally valid.

Both of these views are articulated in a recent article, featured in a section of The New York Times sponsored by the Russian government, entitled “Why Do Most Russian Women Hate Feminism?” In this short piece, Diana Bruk provides a background and explanation for why Western feminist ideas have not taken root in Russia, but are rather met with aversion. “The iconic Soviet female...was productive rather than glamorous,” Bruk explains, “It’s no wonder then that with the fall of the Soviet Union... Russian women welcomed a return to traditional gender roles and felt the urge to overcompensate for years of subjugated femininity” (Bruk 2014). She goes on to argue that the current portrayal of family life in American sitcoms “is concerningly reminiscent of the issues that made Russian women weary of feminism” (Bruk 2014). Years of lost opportunity for feminine expression have led to an exaggerated return to femininity and traditional gendered divisions. The West, namely the United States in this case, has not offered desirable alternatives for Russian women.

I propose a different explanation for the endurance of traditional gender roles in the contemporary domestic sphere. This view was not directly expressed by any one of my interviewees, but can be inferred from my interview material as a whole. The apartment in Russia acts as a source of stability and strength amidst other
unexpected circumstances, and many everyday practices have indeed persisted regardless of larger societal changes. Shifts in gender norms would not only transform the way the kitchen runs, for instance, or who cleans the apartment, but would very deeply alter the structure and mythology that socially control the dwelling space. For stability to be maintained within the household, fathers and grandfathers would need to assume greater responsibility within the domestic space and begin to fulfill functions typically designated to women. As my informants’ comments and practices illustrate, a clear role has not been delineated for male family members, or mythologized in the same way that certain female figures, especially the babushka, have been. This shift would require not only a change in practices, but also in a deep-rooted conception of the home, and the introduction of instability into this heretofore reassuringly reliable space. The Russian young people I spoke with have grown up with their mothers and grandmothers at home as unwavering sources of support, providing a stable foundation for their families, whilst expressing minimal discontent in the amount of labor demanded of them. Enduring domestic structures serve a significant stabilizing function in the Russian home, one that my interviewees are unwilling to give up for an abstract idea of change.

G. Sweden:


Overview:

Quick Facts

Arctic Territory

Västerbotten County and Norrbotten County

Area

approx 153 400 km²

Arctic Population

approx. 520 000

Arctic Indigenous Peoples

Sámi

Current & Relevant Information:

The two northernmost counties, Västerbotten and Norrbotten, are defined as Sweden’s Arctic territory. This region represents about one-third of Sweden’s territory, but is populated with just over half of a million inhabitants – more sparsely populated than the southern parts of the country.
Sweden places a great emphasis on climate-related research in the Arctic. As a result of long measurement series, in some cases up to one hundred years, Sweden has contributed to greater global understanding of climate change. Northern Sweden is home to research stations in Abisko and Tarfala as well as the EISCAT12 scatter radar facility in Kiruna. Access to these modern logistics platforms is crucial for environmental research. The Abisko Scientific Research Station administers, coordinates and performs experiments and tests for researchers from all over the world. An extensive environmental monitoring program on temperature, precipitation, ice-thaw, flora and fauna in the local area has been in progress there for nearly 100 years. The Tarfala Research Station, located in the Kebnekaise mountains, conducts basic research, glacier monitoring, meteorological and hydrological analyses, snow chemistry and permafrost studies.

Efficient ice-breaking operations are required to promote maritime safety and improve accessibility in frozen waters. Sweden possesses leading expertise as regards shipping in Arctic conditions. Swedish icebreakers are able to support increasing commercial shipping in the Arctic as well as help with both the monitoring of the vulnerable marine environment and also Arctic research. In 2011 Sweden adopted a strategy on the Arctic region, where it promotes economically, socially and environmentally sustainable development.

“Sweden's strategy for the Arctic region,” Government Offices of Sweden, 2020 [210]

Overview:

Sweden will contribute, as one of the eight Arctic countries, to peaceful, stable and sustainable development in the Arctic. The Government wants to strengthen Sweden’s Arctic profile by making use of the full range of knowledge and resources available in Sweden.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

Sweden is an Arctic country. Sweden therefore has a particular interest in and responsibility for promoting peaceful, stable and sustainable development and contributing to constructive international cooperation in the Arctic. As one of the eight Arctic countries, Sweden is a member of the Arctic Council.

The Arctic is facing both new opportunities and severe challenges. This applies especially to the dramatic climate and environmental changes. Global warming has hit the Arctic particularly hard, reducing the extent of ice and permafrost cover and affecting biodiversity and the living conditions of the region’s population. The indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable. Climate change has also played a
part in increasing the economic importance of the Arctic. The smaller ice cover creates new conditions for the use of natural resources and sea transport, for instance. The region’s geostrategic importance has increased for both Arctic and non-Arctic states. Increased military presence and activity in the region have security policy consequences. COVID-19 has underlined the need for both resilience and preparedness in the local communities in the Arctic region to deal with pandemics.

Sweden has to take these changes in the Arctic into account. A Swedish core interest is to try to contribute to a peaceful, stable and sustainable development of the region through well-functioning international cooperation with Arctic and non-Arctic actors in the region. In both bilateral and multilateral settings, the Government will uphold an approach based on a broad concept of security. It is an overarching Swedish interest to uphold respect for international law and the rules-based world order, which form part of the foundations for international security and stability in the region. The Government will also contribute to achieving relevant global Sustainable Development Goals in the 2030 Agenda in the Arctic, too, and show leadership in the implementation of the international climate agreement (the Paris Agreement) to limit global warming, including in the Arctic.

The changes in the Arctic have also led to increased international interest in the region. Several countries in Europe and Asia have become observers to the Arctic Council. The European Union (EU) has strengthened its Arctic profile. The Government welcomes this development and takes a positive view of the possibility of mobilizing increased international support and engagement to address the global challenges, in the Arctic region, in particular the impacts of climate change.

At the same time, it is in Sweden’s interest to safeguard the special role and position of the Arctic states in promoting peaceful, stable and sustainable development in the Arctic region, mainly by strengthening cooperation in the Arctic Council.

The Government’s previous strategy for the Arctic region was adopted in 2011, the same year that Sweden assumed the rotating two-year Chairmanship of the Arctic Council for the first time. In the light of the rapid developments in the region, there is now reason for the Government to adopt a new integrated approach to Arctic policy.

This renewed strategy is intended to set out the Government’s objectives and main priorities in relation to the Arctic region and to specify the political direction of further work on the Arctic in six thematic areas:

1. international collaboration;
2. security and stability;
3. climate and the environment;
4. polar research and environmental monitoring;
5. sustainable economic development and business interests;
6. securing good living conditions.

One important starting point for the strategy is to make use of the full range of knowledge and resources available in Sweden regarding the Arctic region so as to contribute to sustainable development in the Arctic and also to enhance Sweden’s profile as an important actor in this respect. For a long time, Sweden’s engagement in the Arctic has involved not only the Government, the Riksdag and government agencies, but also regional and local authorities, indigenous peoples’ organizations, higher education institutions, businesses and other actors in Sweden’s Arctic region.

“Sweden,” The Arctic Institute Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, 1 August 2022 [211]  https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/sweden/

Overview:

Stockholm, Sweden’s largest city and the capital, has a population of 2 371 774 million. Most big cities, including Stockholm, Gothenburg, Uppsala and Malmö are situated in the south of the country. Although it is sparsely populated, approximately 15% of the total land area is situated north of the Arctic Circle. Kiruna, the northernmost and most populated town in Sweden’s Arctic, was home to 22,906 inhabitants in December 2019. Kiruna, built on top of an iron ore mine, is in the process of moving three kilometers east by 2033 to avoid collapsing into the mine pit. While general weather conditions in northern Sweden are harsh, with average winter temperatures hovering around -10 C°, its 17 C° summer average and long hours of sunlight allow for the industrial cultivation of grains, potatoes, and grass for hay.

Sweden has positioned itself as one of the most progressive countries on environmental issues in the world. With 99% of its solid waste recycled or used to produce biogas, Sweden was the first country to establish an environmental protection agency in 1967. Despite its reputation, Sweden has surprisingly light forestry laws, and often leaves decisions about logging to timber companies. The result of such lax regulation is the loss of large swaths of biologically-rich boreal forests in the North to clear cuts that remove up to 95% of the trees, leave deep tire tracks, and are often re-planted with lodgepole pine, a species imported from North America. The Word Wildlife Fund has reported that two thousand forest-dwelling species are threatened in Sweden. Mining in Sweden’s northern county of Lapland, in particular iron ore, has also led to environmental concerns over waste materials, heavy metal leaching, water contamination, and habitat destruction.

Sweden accounts for less than 0.2% of total global emissions, and has committed to building a society with no net greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2050. Northern Sweden is home to several climate research stations monitored by the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat, including an atmosphere radar facility and field stations capable of glacier monitoring and permafrost studies. Like the rest of the Circumpolar North, Sweden’s Arctic territory is facing some of the world’s most
intense temperature increases and increased precipitation. Such changes may lead to greater water flows, changes in soil conditions, and more extreme weather patterns. Sweden has made climate change research, mitigation, and adaptation top priorities in its national Arctic policy. Climate change leaves Sámi culture and industries particularly vulnerable, as they traditionally have strong links to the surrounding natural environment. Sweden’s Arctic strategy aims to strengthen the long-term capacity of these communities and of the surrounding environment to help them adapt to a changing climate.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

Of Sweden’s total population, only 5.4% live in the Arctic. With an average age of 41 in the north, Sweden is the second oldest arctic nation, and has seen a moderate decline of population since 2000 that is projected to continue. A testament to the internationalization of place and population in the 21st Century Arctic, each year just over 50,000 seasonal migrant workers from Asia and Eastern Europe are provided temporary work permits for berry picking.

Of all residents in the North, an estimated 17,000 to 20,000 are Sámi, an indigenous Finno-Ugric group that speaks the official minority language of Sámi. Sámi country, known as Sápmi, stretches across the northern parts of Scandinavia and Russia’s Kola Peninsula. The Sámi were originally nomads, living in tents during the summer and more sturdy peat huts during the colder seasons. Nowadays Sámi live in modern housing and only use tents as temporary accommodations during reindeer migrations if they do not already own cottages. Oral storytelling and Sámi music have a central role in traditional culture. Yoiking, a distinctive form of singing to recall events, people, and nature, is a core part of this tradition. Today Sámi are able to choose between attending government Sámi schools or regular municipal nine-year compulsory schools, where they can also receive instruction in Sámi. The aim of Sámi education in Sweden is to give the children the same instruction that Swedish children receive in the compulsory school while providing them with schooling that takes into account their own linguistic and cultural background.

Traditionally, their best-known means of livelihood is reindeer herding to provide meat, fur, and transportation. About 10% of Sámi today are connected to reindeer herding. For centuries the Sámi faced discrimination throughout the Nordic countries, often resulting in disputes over grazing rights and logging territories. Since the 1970s and 1980s, however, the Sámi in Sweden have steadily gained special protections and rights. This relative increase in their rights to their land and how it is used reached new height in January 2020 when the Supreme Court of Sweden voted against the government and gave Sámis exclusive rights to hunting and fishing across a swathe of Arctic Sweden.

Overview:

The government is turning an old research base above the Arctic Circle into a state-of-the-art satellite launching center.

Current & Relevant Information:

While the United States, China, Russia and several other countries already have spaceports, Sweden’s would be the first orbital launch site for satellites in Europe — capable of launching spacecraft into orbit around Earth or on interplanetary trajectories. Currently, the intergovernmental European Space Agency launches its traditional single-use Ariane rockets from French Guiana.

Several private European companies are designing spaceports in Europe to host a new generation of smaller rockets. Portugal is looking into building one on the Azores Islands, two remote sites have been allocated in Britain and Norway is upgrading its Andoya Space Center.

But none are as far along as Sweden, which is transforming an old Arctic space research center into a complex featuring several new pads for orbital launches and landings. The Esrange Space Center will be a testing ground for Europe’s first reusable vertical rocket in 2022, and it can conduct engine tests as well.
In 1972, the Swedish government took over the base from the European Space Agency, which no longer needed it. For decades, the Swedes hired out the site for smaller, slower research rockets, satellite ground-control services and the launching of stratospheric balloons. But with the commercial space race promising new revenue, the government-owned Swedish Space Corporation, which manages the site, is offering launch services to private ventures wishing to send satellites into space.

Gender Roles:

“Pan-Arctic Report: Gender Equality in the Arctic Phase 3,” Arctic Council, April 2021 [213]

Summary:
Gender equality in the Arctic is highly relevant to the agenda and role of the Arctic Council (the Council) and its Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), which have emphasized gender equality in previous projects and initiatives. The importance of issues of gender and diversity has become increasingly evident, the latest example being Iceland's emphasis on gender issues during its Council Chairmanship.

GEA highlights the importance of recognizing and appreciating diversity in terms of discourses, gender, Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, governance, education, economies, social realities, sustainability, and balanced participation in leadership and decision making, in both the public and private sectors.

A major component of GEA III has been to develop this report on gender. It pulls together material, information, and expertise to provide an overview of gender-related issues in the Arctic and contributes to filling knowledge gaps on this subject. The GEA III report seeks to identify emerging issues, priorities, and concrete strategies that support gender balance and increased diversity.

The primary intended audience for this report is policymakers in the Arctic region. It is a resource for those interested in gender issues in the Arctic, including Arctic inhabitants and researchers. We hope that a broader audience, including the private sector, will appreciate the relevance of the report to their work.

The report does not claim to be comprehensive, but it is a step forward in strengthening the knowledge base and understanding required for developing policies that foster resilient and thriving communities.

Current & Relevant Information:

Arctic Sweden The population of Arctic Sweden is evenly distributed between the counties of Västerbotten and Norrbotten, but the region is more sparsely populated than southern parts of the country (Statistics Sweden, 2020e). Västerbotten has grown by 6% since 2000, largely due to immigration. Conversely, Norrbotten experienced a population decline of 2.4% despite a substantial growth in the foreign-born population (Statistics Sweden, 2020c). In this sense, Arctic Sweden has experienced the same out-migration tendencies as much of the Arctic. Although immigrants have become a key source of population increase in the Nordic region over the past few decades (Heleniak, 2018), with the percentage of foreign born in Sweden reaching 24% in 2019, the equivalent figure for Arctic Sweden is only 11% (Statistics Sweden, 2020b). The overall sex ratio for Arctic Sweden is 104 men for every 100 women (Statistics Sweden, 2020e). However, when the sex ratio is examined within age groups, much like in Arctic Finland, the picture changes. The figure below indicates the sex ratio for the two age groups, 15—34 years, and those in the 65+ age group.
Overview:

Equal power and influence for women and men – that's what Sweden is aiming for.

Sweden has long been a pioneering promoter of gender equality. The overarching Swedish principle is that everyone, regardless of gender, has the right to work and support themselves, to balance career and family life, and to live without the fear of abuse or violence.

Every year, the World Economic Forum ranks around 150 countries based on the gap between women and men according to indicators within health, education, economy and politics. Since the report's inception in 2006, Sweden has never ranked lower than fifth.

Current & Relevant Information:

Equality in the workplace

Gender discrimination in the workplace has been illegal since 1980 in Sweden. The Discrimination Act – which came into force in 2009 – demands that employers not only actively promote equality between men and women, but also take measures against harassment.
Sweden is also striving for equal pay for equal work. The Discrimination Act states that employers and employees should work actively to even out the pay gap between the sexes. But a significant pay gap remains – one of the challenges on the Swedish gender equality agenda. In 2022, women’s average monthly salaries in Sweden were 90.1 per cent of men’s.

This gap can partly be explained by differences in profession, sector, position, work experience and age. But some of them seem to have more to do with gender.

When women have children, they tend to work part-time more often than men, which makes for a less positive career and wage development, as well as a lesser pension.

**Equal family policy – childcare and parental leave**

A family policy that supports working parents with the same rights and obligations for both women and men makes it easier for parents in Sweden to find a decent work–life balance.

Childcare is guaranteed to all parents and the aim is that nursery school should be affordable for all. It was in the 1970s that public childcare was reformed and expanded to facilitate for families with two working parents.

In 1974, Sweden was the first country in the world to replace gender-specific maternity leave with gender-neutral parental leave. The so-called parental insurance enabled parents to take six months off work per child, with each parent entitled to half of the days.

Back then, however, a father could sign his days over to the mother – which made for slower progress. Two decades later, in 1994, around 90 per cent of all the paid parental leave was being used by mothers.

In 1995, the first ‘daddy month’ was introduced, with 30 days of leave reserved for the father on a use-it-or-lose-it basis. If the father decided not to use that month off work, the parents would lose one month’s paid leave. In 2002, this was extended to 60 days, then in 2016 to 90 days of paid leave reserved for fathers.

Today, fathers in Sweden take around 30 per cent of the total number of days available to the parents.

The Swedish Discrimination Act states that employees and job applicants who are, have been or will be taking parental leave may not be treated unfairly.

**Positions of power**

In November 2021, Magdalena Andersson of the then-ruling Social Democrat party became Sweden’s first-ever female prime minister. Her spell came to an end in 2022 following the general election and a change of government.
After the 2022 election there were 188 men and 161 women in the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament. And of the 23 ministers currently serving under the prime minister, 11 are women.

According to Statistics Sweden's bi-annual report on gender equality from 2022 (publication in Swedish only), women held 67 per cent of executive positions in the public sector during 2020.

Sweden’s business sector, on the other hand, remains a male-dominated field. Of the companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, 10 per cent had women chairpersons in 2020, 13 per cent had female CEOs and 36 per cent of the board members were women.

Some Swedish politicians have suggested quotas for women as a quicker way of achieving gender-equal board rooms.


Abstract:

According to Social Role Theory, gender stereotypes are dynamic constructs influenced by actual and perceived changes in what roles women and men occupy (Wood and Eagly, 2011). Sweden is ranked as one of the most egalitarian countries in the world, with a strong national equality discourse and a relatively high number of men engaging in traditionally communal roles such as parenting and domestic tasks. This would imply a perceived change toward higher communion among men. Therefore, we investigated the dynamics of gender stereotype content in Sweden with a primary interest in the male stereotype and perceptions of gender equality. In Study 1, participants (N = 323) estimated descriptive stereotype content of women and men in Sweden in the past, present, or future. They also estimated gender distribution in occupations and domestic roles for each time-point. Results showed that the female stereotype increased in agentic traits from the past to the present, whereas the male stereotype showed no change in either agentic or communal traits. Furthermore, participants estimated no change in gender stereotypes for the future, and they overestimated how often women and men occupy gender non-traditional roles at present. In Study 2, we controlled for participants’ actual knowledge about role change by either describing women’s increased responsibilities on the job market, or men’s increased responsibility at home (or provided no description). Participants (N = 648) were randomized to the three different conditions. Overall, women were perceived to increase in agentic traits, and this change was mediated by perceptions of social role occupation. Men where not perceived to increase in communion but decreased in agency when change focused on women’s increased participation in the labor market. These results indicate that role change among women also influence perceptions of the male stereotype.
Altogether, the results indicate that social roles might have stronger influence on perceptions of agency than perceptions of communion, and that communion could be harder to incorporate in the male stereotype.

Current & Relevant Information:

Introduction

‘Signs of gender equality are evident everywhere, from men taking their toddlers to preschool in pushchairs every morning to women rising the ranks in traditionally male-dominated industries’ (The Local, 2018).

This quote describes Sweden as an egalitarian country where men are seen in caretaking roles whereas women are seen in typically agentic roles. In fact, Sweden’s national representation and national brand include gender equality as a fundamental part (Towns, 2002; Jeziorska and Towns, 2018). Sweden frequently positions itself and is positioned both nationally and internationally as world leading when it comes to gender equality (Towns, 2002). Following social role theory (Eagly and Steffen, 1984; Wood and Eagly, 2011), a result of such perceptions of gender equality in labor division should be that differences in gender stereotype content would decrease.

Agency and communion represent core dimensions of gender stereotype content, where agency is associated with masculine characteristics and communion with feminine characteristics (Abele and Wojciszke, 2014). Agency refers to traits such as independent, assertive and dominant, whereas communion refers to traits such as relationship-oriented, emphatic and caring. Social role theory posits that this division in gender stereotype content is based on observations (in media or in daily life) of women and men in different roles; a division of labor stemming from women’s and men’s differing physical capabilities for child rearing contra labor requiring physical strength (Koenig and Eagly, 2014). When women and men occupy and perform tasks in work and family life, personality traits are derived from behaviors, as described by correspondent inference theory (Gilbert and Malone, 1995). Thus, women are perceived as nurturing and kind because they occupy the majority of caretaking roles (both at home and in the labor market) whereas men are perceived as independent and assertive because they occupy the majority of managerial positions and jobs with higher status (Cejka and Eagly, 1999; Eagly and Wood, 2011). Inspections of job characteristics based on O*Net research by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics also found positive relationships between communal traits and roles primarily occupied by women, as well as between agentic traits and roles primarily occupied by men (Levanon and Grusky, 2016; Cortes and Pan, 2017). When groups of women or men enter non-traditional roles (i.e., roles requiring characteristics which are not stereotypically associated with that specific gender), social perceivers infer a corresponding shift in personality characteristics to accommodate the new role demands. Evidence of this is that gender stereotypes
have been shown to be influenced by perceptions about past, present, and future divisions of labor (Diekman et al., 2005).

So far, the literature on dynamic stereotypes has consistently shown that participants perceive the typical woman of today as more agentic, i.e., having more characteristics associated with masculinity, than the typical woman of previous times (Diekman and Eagly, 2000; Diekman et al., 2005; Wilde and Diekman, 2005; Diekman and Goodfriend, 2006; Garcia-Retamero et al., 2011; Bosak et al., 2017). The perceived change in agency has been quite linear in that masculine characteristics were both perceived to be lower in the past and higher in the future. The shift toward higher perceived agency has been explained by women's increased participation in the labor market in agentically demanding roles. Accordingly, perceived distribution of women and men in non-traditional roles has been identified as a mediator for perceived changes in gender stereotype content in several studies (Diekman and Eagly, 2000; Diekman et al., 2005; Bosak et al., 2017). Evidence for change in perception of men, in contrast, is not as conclusive. In studies from the United States (Diekman and Eagly, 2000; Diekman et al., 2005) and Germany (Wilde and Diekman, 2005), the perception of men showed no change, in Chile and Brazil (Diekman et al., 2005), masculinity was perceived to increase also in men, whereas in Ghana (Bosak et al., 2017) and Spain (Garcia-Retamero et al., 2011), men were perceived to increase in communality. When results indicated a shift in the perception of men, this was less often mediated by perceived distributions of women and men in non-traditional roles (Bosak et al., 2017).

Furthermore, self-reported data among women and men documented stronger shifts in agency related with social roles than communion (Moskowitz et al., 1994). Diekman and Schneider (2010) consider the interactions between broad gender roles and specific roles, and how they might explain change. For example, if women still do more of the household work that is associated with caregiving, or if they perform more communal tasks at work, they should not be perceived to decrease in communion. Similarly, if men do not work in professions which require communal skills, or enact family roles that are less associated with caregiving, men might not be perceived as acquiring communion only by taking more parental leave.

To our knowledge, past research on dynamic stereotypes has not discussed whether there might be differences in how malleable agentic and communal traits are. For example, perceived gender differences in nurturing are to a greater extent attributed to biological causes than gender differences in math ability (Cole et al., 2007), and motherhood is more strongly related with biology than fatherhood (McPherson et al., 2018). It is therefore possible that communion is seen as a part of a female “essence”, meaning that communal traits may be harder to gain for those not belonging to the category “woman.” However, a recent United States study on the sub-stereotypes of mothers and fathers did find that social perceivers estimated an increase of stereotypical maternal traits in fathers over time, due to fathers being
perceived as taking on more maternal tasks (Banchefsky and Park, 2016), meaning that communal traits are possible to include in the stereotype for at least fathers. In comparison to the United States, parental leave is longer in Sweden, and there are special benefits resulting from policies directed toward the non-birth parent. Since these policies have been marketed as an effort to increase parental leave among fathers, paternal roles may be more salient and have higher status in the Swedish society as compared to other countries. The question addressed in the current study is whether changes in parental care among men extend to the general stereotype of men in Sweden, leading to increased perceived communion among Swedish men. Such a shift would occur especially if people see men as more involved in parental care, and if they enact parental roles in the same way as women do (Diekman and Schneider, 2010).

Masculinity, in contrast to femininity have been described as transient, precarious and something that men continuously need to perform (Bosson et al., 2013). Masculinity is also associated with higher status than femininity (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005; Rudman et al., 2012), indicating that women might benefit from displaying agency, which are some of the trait characteristics of masculinity. Women’s self-ratings of agency (Twenge, 1997) and ratings of women in general (Diekman et al., 2005), have indeed gained in agency over time. However, although women with agentic traits are perceived to be equally competent as men, they may still face social penalties such as being less likeable or hirable compared to men with similar agentic traits and behaviors (Brescoll and Uhlmann, 2008; Rudman et al., 2012; Williams and Tiedens, 2016). Thus, descriptive stereotypes about women might include more agency today than in the past, but prescriptive stereotypes would still require women to avoid excessive agency (Rudman et al., 2012).

Social role theory also acknowledges that contextual factors, such as cultural values, impact inferences from observed role occupation to stereotype content. Cross-cultural research has shown that the male stereotype aligns with the core values of a culture: such that individuals from collectivist cultures rated men as more communal than women, whereas individuals from individualistic cultures rated men as more individualistic than women (Cuddy et al., 2015). Furthermore, research on cultural values has shown that Sweden is rated as individualistic rather than collectivistic (Hofstede, 2001), suggesting that the male stereotype in Sweden would be viewed as containing fewer communal qualities than the female stereotype. However, Sweden is also rated as one of the most feminine countries in the world, meaning that values such as relationships and quality of life are more important than money, objects and work. This indicates that communal roles among men, such as child-rearing, should be valued more highly and of higher status in Sweden as compared to many other countries. In sum, Sweden represents an interesting country in which to investigate if changes in social role occupation can influence the content of both the female and male gender stereotype, because of the strong identification as being
a gender egalitarian nation coupled with the presence of individualistic cultural values.

**Conclusion**

In support of social role theory, we directly showed that the perceived change in women’s agentic traits was specifically associated with a perceived change in the roles occupied by women. However, men were not perceived to change as a result of changing roles. Instead, when men were seen in non-traditional roles, their communal characteristics did not increase. Thus, seeing men taking their children to pre-school as described in the first quote is so far not enough to also perceive men as communal.

“How Gender Equal Is Sweden? An Analysis of the Shift in Focus under Neoliberalism,” Linda Lane and Birgitta Jordansson, Social Change, 2020 [216]
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0049085719901067

**Abstract:**

Sweden’s proven ability to enact family-friendly policies to support its gender equality ambitions has made it an exemplar of gender equality to emulate among developing countries. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that while Swedish gender equality has become an important part of Swedish identity, paradoxically, the foundations upon which this identity was built has gradually been eroded—Sweden has shifted from a welfare state with collective solutions and inclusiveness towards one of neoliberal governmental rationalities where individual autonomy and freedom of choice are seen as means of achieving gender equality. This new direction has implications for how gender equality policy is formulated. Using Bacchi’s ‘What is the problem approach?’ this article traces the Swedish gender equality discourse from the 1960s to the present while at every stage interrogating how equality was problematized and what solutions were offered.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

**Introduction**

Historically, Swedish feminist gender equality policy has embodied ideals that support the eradication of gender discrimination in all aspects of societal life including democratic, legal and economic equality. Having formally achieved the first two—democratic and legal equality, and far ahead of most countries in achieving the third—economic equality, Nordic countries have emerged as beacons for gender equality worthy of emulation (World Bank, 2019). Sweden’s membership in the European Union (EU) in 1995 also presented the perfect opportunity to capitalize on its expertise on gender equality. The culmination of Sweden’s proven ability to enact family-friendly policies to support its gender equality ambitions made it a valuable partner in the EU where gender equality as an ideology and political ambition was an emerging field. In this context, Sweden became an authoritative voice around issues
that would shortly gain central importance for the entire EU. Paradoxically, during the last decade, endeavors to build a gender equal society on universal grounds have been challenged through measures that lay the ground for social divisions related to class and ethnicity.


Overview:

Today we’re going to tell you everything you need to know about gender equality in Sweden, and outline why it’s one of the world’s best countries to live in for women. If you’re ready, let’s dive into the facts about gender roles in Sweden.

Gender equality is a goal that many countries have aspired to for many years because of its benefits. Studies have repeatedly shown that empowering girls and women promotes social development, establishes fair societies and expands economic growth.

Gender equality, also known as sexual equality, is the state of equal access to opportunities and resources regardless of gender. These policies uphold the rights of women to take on roles in leadership and decision-making.

Scandinavian countries have long been global champions of gender equality. They explicitly support the equal right for women at home, work, and public life. They have moved earlier and faster than other nations in promoting their objectives.

Sweden has been at the forefront of gender equality, along with other Nordic countries, for many years now. According to the Gender Equality Index 2020, Sweden ranks 1st in the EU. With 83.8 out of 100 points, its score is 15.9 higher than the EU’s.

Their commitment to closing the gender gap has been a cornerstone of Swedish society. Over the years, considerable efforts have been made to ensure that women enjoy the same rights, freedom and opportunities as men do in all spheres of life.

Sweden is now considered a paragon of gender equality, and many people are curious about what led to the development of the countries forward-thinking initiatives and policies.

Find out how gender equality in Sweden has been pivotal in the health and social development of the country, and the steps the administration takes to ensure that women are treated fairly and equally and have access to positions of power.

Current & Relevant Information:

When did Sweden get gender equality?
Gender equality took root in Sweden long ago when feminism gained a significant social and political role in Swedish society. It goes back to the 17th century when women in intellectual circles discussed it and focused on it.

Their ongoing debates and discussions led to the publication of influential books like Samtal emellan Argi Skugga och en obekant Fruntimbers Skugga by Margareta Momma in 1738 and poems like Fruntimrens Försvar (To the Defense of Women, 1761) that led the way.

Between the years 1718-1772, women were granted conditional suffrage. Later, in the 1800s, girls were allowed to be educated in schools that used to be restricted to males.

Around the same time, unmarried Swedish women were given the conditional right to vote in municipal elections (this made Sweden one of the first countries in the world to grant this right).

The country continued to progress in the 1900s when universal women’s suffrage was granted in 1921. Reforms such as the legislation of birth control and abortions in 1938, the passing of legislation for compulsory three-month maternity in 1955 and the elimination of joint taxes in 1971 continued to solidify Sweden’s position as a forerunner in gender equality.

Gender equality in the workplace was established after the Swedish government outlawed gender discrimination in 1980.

This law of was expanded when the Swedish Discrimination Act was passed in 2009 to protect the rights of the LGBTQ+ community, the disabled, religious minorities and ethnic and racial minorities.

The equality for women of color was highlighted after Sweden’s Feminist Initiative, the first feminist political party to win a mandate in the European parliament in 2014, began the conversation about feminism from an antiracist perspective.

**What are Sweden’s goals for gender quality?**

The overarching objective of Sweden’s gender equality policy is to provide the same power to both women and men when it comes to shaping society as well as their own life.

The six sub-goals that the Swedish government is working towards broadly include:

1. Equal division of power and influence

Both women and men should be granted the same rights and opportunities to play an active role in developing Sweden’s society.

2. Economic gender equality
The same conditions and opportunities for paid work should be applied for men and women to ensure their economic independence throughout life.

3. Equal education

Girls, women, boys and men should have the same opportunities and conditions when it comes to studying options, education and personal development.

4. Equal access to healthcare

Healthcare should be offered in equal terms for women and men, girls and boys.

5. Equal distribution of unpaid housework and providing care

Women and men must have equal roles in the household and be allocated the same share of responsibility.

6. Prevention of men’s violence against women

Violence against women must stop. Everyone, regardless of gender, must have the same right to physical integrity.

Swedish policymakers have adopted three practices to ensure they are aligned with these gender equality sub-goals.

1. Gender mainstreaming

This is an approach to policy-making that considers the interests and concerns of both men and women.

The Swedish government ensures that gender perspectives and awareness of gender equality are central to all activities and integrated into policy development, legislation and dialogue.

2. Gender-responsive budgeting

Creating a budget that keeps everyone’s welfare in mind leads to an equal distribution of resources and budgets that are used to realize all gender equality commitments.

Swedes take a budget-sensitive approach that involves assessing expenditures and their potential impact on women’s and men’s welfare.

3. Foreign policy

The Swedish also apply gender equality in their foreign policy. They feel that advocacy for women’s human rights is a moral obligation within the framework of their international presence.
Regular action is taken for forwarding their long-term goals of strengthening the rights of girls and women and the resources available to them, no matter where they live in the world.

**What did Sweden do for equality?**

The most significant gender equality reforms in Sweden took place in the 1970s. They boosted the prospects for women in the workplace and increased their ability to become financially independent.

This, in turn, has improved their overall wellbeing and bargaining power in their homes.

Collectively, these reforms have contributed to the establishment of a modern welfare state based on equality.

These are the six most important reforms that promote gender equality in Sweden:

1. Separate income taxation for couples

   Separate income taxes for both partners made employment more beneficial for both partners. It also created an incentive for women to work because their income would no longer be part of their partners.

2. Gender-neutral paid parental leave benefit

   Sweden was the first country in the world to introduce gender-neutral paid parental leave and has revised the reform many times after that. This dual family model for child-rearing is a fundamental policy in gender equality.

   Under this reform, Swedes get 6-month paternity leave and 12 months maternity leave — one of the world’s most generous parental leave periods.

3. Public child health care

   The development of affordable public child care facilities, including the expansion of daycare and preschool systems, was instrumental in women being active in the workplace.

   This policy took away the need to make child-minding arrangements with the help of nannies and family members. It also reduces the stress women face in balancing work, household tasks and raising their children.

4. Gender discrimination in the workplace

   In 1980, gender discrimination was made illegal. According to the law, employers need to treat both men and women equally in the workplace and take measures against any form of prejudice and harassment that occurs during employment.

5. Legalizing birth control and abortions
According to the abortion act of 1974, women have the choice of abortion until the eighteenth week of pregnancy.

After the eighteenth month, the woman will need to get permission from the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen) to have an abortion.

Unlike many countries, the legality of abortion is not a controversial political issue and has been mostly settled in Sweden. Measures have also been taken to prevent unwanted pregnancies by legalizing birth control.

This is done to ensure that children born are wanted and provided for by their caretakers.

6. Female representation in government

To ensure that women’s rights are taken seriously at the highest level of government and to advance their interests, Sweden has put together a government with an almost equal distribution of male and female government officials.

As of 2019, women made up 50% of the cabinet and 46% of the parliament. Consequently, feminism is now seen as an official government policy versus a social movement.

Can more be done for gender equality in Sweden?

To women living outside Sweden and some who live there, the country seems like one of the best places to be a woman. But how true is this statement?

While Sweden is in the top cluster of gender equality with other Scandinavian countries, like Iceland, Norway and Finland, there is still some way to go before it becomes a feminist utopia.

According to the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index, Sweden has slipped from the first position to fourth in gender equality charts. Based on a report from “Statistics Sweden, Women and Men in Sweden: Facts and figures,” there are several reasons for this.

First, there is an unequal representation for genders in education and the workplace. There are just eight out of 269 female managing directors in listed companies.

Despite all the reforms, there continues to be a gender pay gap like many other developed countries. Based on a 2018 study done by the European Union, women earn 12.2% lesser than men in Sweden.

While this pay gap is significantly lesser than the U.S.’s 18% and the EU’s average of 14.8%, it’s higher than Luxemburg and Italy.

Many experts attribute the cause of this wage gap to the customs and expectations around gender roles and norms. Even though Sweden has one of the highest
employment rates for women, many employed women work part-time and in low-paying jobs.

Their pay is further reduced when they decide to work less after having children. Like other women in the world, Swedish women are still expected to be the primary caretaker in the household.

This conflict between childcare and employment makes it harder for them to become financially independent and stay in full-time jobs.

Despite the generous 480 days of parental leave for both men and women, the Daddy Index published by the Swedish Confederation for Professional Employees (TCO) reveals that men use only one-fifth of their allowance.

The Swedish government has tried to rectify this by providing some tax relief for using services like laundry, cleaning and gardening. Still, significant reforms to change this disparity are happening slowly.

There’s more that needs to be done, faster to see improvements.

Gender equality is one of the benchmarks by which a society is judged. A fair society is seen as one where both men and women are equally present in all spheres of life. From this perspective, Sweden is one of the leaders, but there’s still room for improvement.

**How men benefit from gender equality in Sweden**

Both men and women benefit from the level playing field created by gender equality in Sweden. It’s not just an ongoing fight for women’s rights but a movement that ensures the health, safety and fulfillment of all members of society.

Getting rid of gender barriers also involves eliminating gender stereotypes, including harmful ones — and women are not the only ones impacted by them. Traditional masculinity that defines how a man should think and act can limit men.

For instance, men are supposed to show a sense of autonomy and maintain emotional control to conceal their vulnerability. This can lead to bottled-up emotions that result in mental health issues and unhealthy behaviors that involve violence and aggressiveness.

Breaking down gender roles in Sweden means doing away with the idea that real men don’t ask for help or need support from their loved ones and community. Any manifestation of “toxic masculinity” is considerably reduced because of the new societal norms created by gender equality.

Men have also been shown to be biologically hardwired to care for their children. Once they become fathers, there is a drop in testosterone and an increase in oxytocin, the “cuddle hormone,” which makes them want to be closer to their children.
The long paternity leave gives men the time and opportunity to play more active roles in their children’s lives.

Studies have shown that having a father positively present in a baby’s first year can have a beneficial impact on the child’s views of the social world. The gender equality laws in Sweden make that possible, benefiting both the father and the children.

What’s it like being a woman in Sweden?

With all these rules in place, one might wonder what living as a woman in Sweden is like. An outsider will pick up on a general feeling of mutual respect between men and women. The women are powerhouses of liberation and freedom and command respect no matter where they go.

Their position in society empowers them. They have a presence of strength and surety about themselves and what they do in society — whether that’s at home, the workplace, or walking down a street.

This is mainly due to the government mandating gender equality, but it’s also because of Sweden’s progressive culture. Men are supportive of women’s growth and their enhanced equality. They stand side by side with their women and remove any notion that they need or depend on.

Seeing men pushing baby strollers in Sweden and taking them to daycare centers is a common sight.

However, women who like the chivalry that comes from traditional gender roles might miss being wooed, admired and typical gentleman behavior such as opening doors or being helped with luggage. Being treated like a lady makes women feel cared for and does not imply that they are weak or incapable.

Yet, for most women in the country, it’s a small price to pay. With all the government has done over the years to create an equal society, Sweden remains one of the best countries to be a woman.

Other nations can be inspired by the examples they have set.


Overview:

With the 20th largest GDP per capita in the world, the affluent Scandinavian nation of Sweden is often seen as the quintessential nation for equality and liberalism. With its strong history of leading reforms promoting social welfare in Sweden, the country ranks first in Sustainable Development Goal progress out of the entirety of U.N. Member States. Of these reforms, many work to increase women’s rights in Sweden with a focus on ending the gender disparities visible in many other Western nations.
Current & Relevant Information:

**Reforms in Sweden Ending Gender Disparities**

Sweden has been championing gender equality for centuries. In one of the earliest known cases in Europe, the Swedish government granted women in Sweden suffrage in local elections in 1718. In 1842, girls could attend schools typically restricted to males only. Then, in 1919, women gained full voting rights in a movement led by suffragist Elin Wägner. Reforms would continue throughout the 20th century with the legalization of birth control and abortions in 1938, the passing of legislation for mandatory three months of paid maternity leave in 1955 and the abolition of joint taxation in 1971.

Most recently, the Swedish government outlawed gender discrimination in the workplace in 1980. Sweden further expanded on these laws through the passing of the Swedish Discrimination Act in 2009 and its expansion in 2017 that added protections for members of the LGBTQ+ community, people with disabilities, racial and ethnic minorities and religious minorities.

**Female Representation in Government**

Because of the centuries of reform, the advancement of women’s rights in Sweden is visible even at the highest levels of government. As of 2019, women make up 46% of the Swedish parliament and 50% of the cabinet, including the position of minister of gender equality that Åsa Lindhagen holds.

In comparison, women account for 23.7% of today’s United States House of Representatives out of a total of 537 seats. Women also make up only 20.8% of President Donald Trump’s 24-member cabinet.

Sweden’s almost even distribution between male and female government officials represents the sheer advancement of women’s rights in Sweden. In fact, Sweden now considers feminism part of the official government policy rather than just a social movement with gender equality being “central to the government’s priority,” according to a government statement.

**Continuing Gender Wage Gap**

However, despite these reforms, the gender wage gap, like in many other developed nations, still persists. In a 2018 study by the European Union on the gender pay gap in EU countries, data indicated that women earn 12.2% less income than men in Sweden for jobs of the same nature.

While this pay gap is significantly lower than the United States’ 18% or the European Union average of 14.8%, it is also significantly higher than the 5% wage gap in Italy and Luxembourg.
Many experts describe the presence of a wage gap in gender-equal countries as a paradox. It is unknown why this phenomenon occurs when the Swedish government takes many measures to assure women’s rights in Sweden, but experts assume that culture around gender norms and roles plays a part.

Sweden’s historic reforms and the committed government have led the nation to become one of the most gender-equal countries in the world. Mandating paid maternity leave, legalizing birth control and abortions and increasing women’s representation in parliament all contribute to this success. However, Sweden still struggles to close the wage gap between males and females even amid the ever-evolving policy promoting women’s rights in Sweden but is, nonetheless, still making strides in gender equality.

H. United States (Alaska):


Overview:

Quick Facts

Arctic Territory

All United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain.

Arctic Population

Approximately 50,000

Arctic Indigenous Peoples

Aleut, Alutiiq, Yup’ik, Iñupiaq (Northwest Alaskan Inuit), Athabaskan, Tlingit and Haida

Current & Relevant Information:

The United States Arctic Region

The United States became an Arctic nation upon the purchase of Alaska in 1867. Regions above the Arctic Circle include the North Slope Borough, the Northwest Arctic Borough and the Nome Census area. Alaska is the largest and the least densely populated state in the United States. The state has approximately 737,400 inhabitants, over half of whom reside in the two major cities Anchorage and Fairbanks.

Petroleum production and mining have been major industries in Alaska. Other prominent industries include fishing and tourism, which are of rising importance and
demand. Nearly two million people travel to Alaska each year to visit its vast glaciers, mountains and wildlife.

The United States has varied interests in the Arctic, including national and homeland security, environmental protection, sustainable development, promoting cooperation and collaboration with the other Arctic nations, involving Indigenous peoples in decisions that affect them and supporting and promoting scientific research across the region. The country’s goal is a secure and stable region free of conflict where its interests are safeguarded, its homeland is protected and Arctic States work cooperatively to address shared challenges. The United States Arctic policy was most recently updated in May of 2013 and supports the 2009 National Security Presidential Directive-66 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25.

**Indigenous People**

Indigenous Peoples in Alaska include the Aleut, Alutiiq, Yup’ik, Iñupiaq (Northwest Alaskan Inuit), Athabaskan, Tlingit and Haida. Of these peoples, the Yup’ik, Athabaskans and Iñupiaq live above the Arctic Circle and rely heavily on subsistence hunting and fishing. Approximately 18 percent of the Alaskan population are Indigenous.

“United States,” The Arctic Institute Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, 1 August 2022 [220]  [https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/united-states/](https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/countries/united-states/)

**Overview:**

The United States is an Arctic nation and privy to northern regional governance and policy decisions through its 49th state, Alaska. Purchased from the Russian Empire in 1867 for $7.2 million USD, the Territory of Alaska entered into statehood in 1959. As part of the continental, but not contiguous United States, Alaska is bordered by the Canadian Yukon Territory to the east and the Canadian province of British Columbia to the southeast. To the north lie the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas and the southern waters of the Arctic Ocean. To the west and south lie the Pacific Ocean, with Russia further west across the Bering Strait. Altogether, Alaska has more than 34,000 miles of coastline. Though it is the largest state in the union, it is the least densely populated, with over half of all residents living in two cities – Anchorage and Fairbanks.

Although research like the Arctic Human Development Report considers all of Alaska to be Arctic, Arctic Alaska commonly includes the North Slope Borough, the Northwest Arctic Borough, and the Nome Census area. Larger towns include Prudhoe Bay, Barrow, Kotzebue, Nome, and Galena. The average annual high and low for Barrow are -8.2 °C (17.2 °F) and -14 °C (6.4 °F), respectively. There are very few roads in the Alaskan Arctic, and many rural communities can only be accessed by aircraft or snowmobile in good weather. Northern Alaska largely consists of tundra covering mountain ranges, permafrost, and coastal plains that provide habitat
to bears, wolves, Dall sheep, muskoxen, reindeer, and many birds. The Gates of the Arctic National Park and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, both of which are fully and partially protected by federal law, help to preserve Alaska’s natural landscapes.

Alaska has been host to a number of high political and media profile environmental issues over the past five decades concerning tensions between natural resource extraction and environmental protection. The debate to permit drilling for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) has been an ongoing controversy since 1977. ANWR, a 19,300,000-acre refuge, is the largest protected wilderness in the US. ANWR’s Coastal Plain, also known as the “1002 Area” is rich in petroleum and natural gas deposits, though the amount of economically recoverable oil is debated. The key issue of oil exploration in the Refuge is the potential disturbance to wildlife, particularly the Porcupine Caribou that calve on the Coastal Plain and migrate through the Refuge from Alaska to Canada each year. In 2015, President Obama proposed to declare an additional 5 million acres of the Refuge as a wilderness area, which would put a total of 12.8 million acres of the refuge permanently off-limits to drilling or other development. In December 2017, a Republican-led Congress voted to lift the 40-year-old ban on energy development in ANWR. The decision came through a provision embedded within a larger tax bill mandating that the US Department of the Interior hold lease sales in the “1002 area.” The Department of the Interior has stated that it will move forward with ANWR lease sales in 2019, though legal battles are expected.

The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill has left a long, dark legacy on the narrative of oil exploration and environmental protection in the Arctic. On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker struck Prince William Sound’s Bligh Reef and spilled approximately 10.8 million gallons (37,000 metric tonnes) of crude oil over the next several days. The response was particularly difficult because Prince William Sound’s remote location is only accessible by helicopter, plane, or boat. The immediate effects of the spill include as many as 250,000 seabirds, at least 2,800 sea otters, 22 orcas, and an unknown number of fish deaths. Though most wildlife has recovered from the spill as of 2020, orca whales have yet to reach pre-spill levels, and an estimated 16,000 to 21,000 gallons of oil remain on beaches. Still today, there is significant concern over Arctic oil spills from activist groups, local communities, and environmentalists at large, as seen most recently by protests against Shell’s now terminated Arctic drilling campaign.

Pebble Mine, on public land in the Bristol Bay area of southwest Alaska, has been among the largest environmental concerns in Alaska in recent years. The proposed copper, gold, and molybdenum mine would be the largest open-pit mine in North America at two miles wide and over 2,000 feet deep. If developed, the mine poses serious risks of contaminating the watershed, salmon, and other fisheries with mine-generated pollutants such as heavy metals and acid mine drainage. In 2014, the EPA openly questioned the future of the salmon habitat should the mine open and
proposed restrictions that would effectively prohibit the project from moving forward. This was followed by the Obama Administration’s decision to initiate a 404(c) action under the Federal Clean Water Act, authorizing the EPA “to prohibit, restrict, or deny the discharge of dredged or fill material at defined sites in waters of the United States... whenever it determines, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, that use of such sites for disposal would have an unacceptable adverse impact on one or more of various resources, including fishers.” Although this action has stalled the mine and caused the development to lose several investors, the US Army Corps of Engineers has gone against the 404(c) decision and begun an Environmental Impact Assessment for the mine’s development. In November 2018, Alaska voters will decide the balance between resource development and salmon habitat protections. Ballot Measure 1, Salmon Habitat Protections and Permits Initiative would implement new requirements and processes for permit applications, reviews, and granting of permits for any project affecting bodies of water related to anadromous fish — virtually killing the economic viability of Pebble Mine.

Alaska’s Arctic, like the rest of the region, is facing warming at twice the rate of the rest of the globe. Higher temperatures create dangerous ice conditions; decrease the quantity and quality of annual snowfall; change weather patterns; and shift landscapes as permafrost thaws—all of which seriously undermine ecosystem and wildlife integrity.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

Over 736,000 people live in the [State of Alaska](https://www.alaska.gov). With one of the highest fertility rates in the Arctic, Alaska has one of the youngest and fastest growing populations of the region. Alaska’s median age is 34 years, with 39% of Alaska Natives under the age of 20. The population is projected to increase by 28% to 915,211 by 2035. This is not only from above-replacement fertility levels, but also from migration to the state. 61% of Alaska residents were born outside of Alaska, including 7% who were born abroad. Internally, over 20% of the population moved in 2009, making it one of the most mobile states in America. Much of this internal migration was from rural villages to urban areas below the Arctic Circle; the most populous of such cities are Anchorage and Fairbanks, where about 55% of the state’s population live. The past century has seen a general trend towards urbanization in America’s Arctic. In 1920, only 6% of the population was urban. Today, about two-thirds of the state resides in cities. This is also true for Alaska Natives, over 36,000 of whom live in Anchorage alone.

Alaska Natives make up 14.3% of the population of the State of Alaska. Tribes are generally divided into six major groupings: Unangan (Aleut), Sugpiaq (Alutiq), Yupik (Central Yup’ik and Siberian Yupik), Iñupiaq (Northwest Alaskan Inuit), Athabaskans (Interior Indians) and Tlingit and Haida (Southeast Coastal Indians). Of these, the Yup’ik, Athabaskans, and Inupiaq have traditional homelands above the Arctic Circle, with the Yup’ik and Inupiaq spreading across the Russian and Canadian
borders, respectively. These groups are hunter-gatherers, and continue to rely heavily on subsistence hunting and fishing of walrus, seal, whale, polar bears, caribou, and fish. The hunting of Bowhead whales benefits all members of an Inupiaq community, as the meat and blubber is allocated to all members according to a traditional formula. In communities with limited access to affordable fruits and vegetables, the consumption of whale and other vitamin rich raw meats provides important nutrition.

Throughout history, the US' governing of Alaska was characterized by little tolerance toward Indigenous belief systems, communities, and languages. Indigenous communities were disenfranchised and mistreated, and often used as geopolitical assets during World War II and the Cold War. While 1959 marked the statehood of Alaska, for Indigenous peoples of the American Arctic the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Act (ANCSA) in 1971 was economically, socially, and politically revolutionary. Signed into law on December 8, 1971 by President Richard Nixon, ANCSA was, and still is, the largest one-time land claims settlement in U.S. history. In 1966, the transfer of all lands in the public domain were frozen pending a settlement of Native land claims; then, in 1970, the Athapaskan Indians won an injunction against building a pipeline across their lands, catalyzing a chain reaction to settle all claims before Alaska’s oil could be developed. ANCSA extinguished all previously held Native claims in Alaska, and in return conveyed nearly a billion dollars and 44 million acres of land – the most tribal lands out of all US states – to 12 geographic regions of common heritage and interests. The sovereign status conferred on Native American reservations in the contiguous US does not exist in the Alaska context; instead, land provided by ANCSA is owned by Native-run corporations, with the intent being that all would benefit from resources on any given parcel of land. Twelve regional Native corporations, which encompass 229 tribal groups, own most tribal land and their subsurface mineral rights, and as such rank as the largest private businesses in Alaska.

Alaska Native history and rights have been significantly impacted by its implementation. Native Alaskan culture is thriving today in centers, schools, and community groups, though the century-long colonial rule of the Alaska Territory has resulted in serious inequality, intergenerational trauma, and socio-economic challenges still today. While there has been a general reduction in the proportion of speakers of most Native languages in Alaska due to discriminatory federal policies, there are concerted efforts at language preservation across the state.

Alaska faces a number of public health issues, including alcoholism and suicide that can also be linked to historical trauma and adverse childhood experiences Alaska has one of the highest per capita alcohol consumption rates in the nation, and a rate of alcohol dependence and abuse that is twice that of the national average. Between 1990 and 1993, 66.6% of all deaths in rural Alaska were alcohol-related. Alaska’s suicide rate of 23 for every 100,000 people in 2013 was the second highest in the
United States. For Alaska Native men between 15 and 24, the rate is 169 suicides per 100,000—14 times the US national rate. Cited reasons for such drastic numbers include historical trauma, mental illness, unemployment, cultural loss, and spiritual distress.

One of the biggest issues facing Alaskan communities today is climate change. Drastic changes in the Arctic climate have caused slumping, landslides, and severe erosion in coastal areas. With these ecological shifts, climate change is having a very real and immediate impact on communities that live in Alaska. Thinner sea ice with sudden thaws and later freezes make traditional practices of travel, hunting, harvesting, and communication between communities more dangerous and difficult. Decreased snow coverage makes hunting hazardous, forcing hunters to rely on cumbersome, colder tents instead of traditional igloos. The melting of permafrost, combined with more violent storms hitting the coastline that exacerbate erosion and flooding, puts homes, infrastructure, and livelihoods at risk. In extreme cases, such terrain devastation requires the relocation of entire communities. The marine species upon which the Inuit rely on for subsistence harvests and traditional knowledge transfer, including polar bears, walruses, ice-living seals, and many birds, are or will soon be in decline as a result of warmer temperatures and less sea ice. Some face extinction by the end of this century. Decreased access to traditional food sources force Inuit hunters to move to new, more dangerous locations that further exacerbate the travel issues resulting from climate change. These changes to traditional practices also affect the overall culture, as hunting provides spiritual and cultural affirmation, and is a key activity for passing skills, knowledge, and values from generation to generation.


Overview:

In March 2021, three Russian submarines simultaneously broke through the ice near the North Pole. Each boat could carry 16 ballistic missiles, and each missile could field multiple nuclear warheads. The submarines were soon joined by two MiG-31 aircraft and ground troops participating in Umka-2021, a Russian military exercise.

The exercise in March highlighted increased Russian military activity in the Arctic, but that was not the sole Russian signal. U.S. Alaska Command, under U.S. Northern Command, reported that they had intercepted more Russian military aircraft near the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone in 2020 than at any other time since the end of the Cold War. In April, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that Russia is trying “to exert control over new spaces. It is modernizing its bases in the Arctic and building new ones.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
responded by saying, “We hear whining about Russia expanding its military activities in the Arctic. But everyone knows that it’s our territory, our land.”

Russia is not the only authoritarian power with increased interest in Arctic affairs. In January 2018, Chinese officials published their first Arctic strategy document and attempted to buy and greatly expand Finland’s Kemijärvi air base for use by large Chinese aircraft, ostensibly for Arctic research. Their offer was rejected, supposedly because the northern airfield is next to Finland’s Rovajärvi artillery range. This fits a pattern. China has built Arctic research stations, conducted ongoing oceanographic surveys, and attempted infrastructure development across the region, projects that some believe have geostrategic or military purposes.

In order to better position the United States for geopolitical competition in the region, the Biden administration should write and publish a new national security strategy for the Arctic. The United States has a moribund 2013 Arctic strategy that was superseded by events and ignored by the Trump administration. In 2019, the Office of the Secretary of Defense released an Arctic strategy, and the Air Force, Navy and Army each released their own subordinate strategies. However, these individual strategies were not coordinated before being released, did not fully integrate efforts with civilian foreign policy agencies, and in some cases were produced only because of pressure from Sen. Dan Sullivan from Alaska.

It is time to rectify those omissions. A new Arctic security strategy should focus on deterring Russian and Chinese military attacks and preventing their attempts to weaken the established Arctic international order. To avoid mistakes from past Arctic national security, the Biden administration should build an Arctic strategy that responds to future security threats, can be resourced within constrained national budgets, and that integrates military and civilian actions across the government and private sector.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

**Goals for an Arctic Strategy**

Though the Biden administration has yet to release a National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy, guideposts exist to begin conceptualizing a new Arctic security strategy. Blinken expressed the U.S. desire to keep the Arctic peaceful when speaking at the May 2021 Arctic Council ministerial meeting. The administration’s March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance focuses on deterring and preventing adversaries from threatening the United States and its allies, inhibiting access to the global commons, or dominating key regions (i.e., the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere). Even though the document does not mention the region, its priority actions are applicable to the Arctic, such as leading a stable and open international system underwritten by alliances, partnerships, multilateralism, and international rules.
Any new U.S. Arctic security strategy should have three goals: deter military attacks against U.S. or allied territory originating from the Arctic, prevent China or Russia from weakening existing rules-based Arctic governance through coercion, and prevent regional hegemony by either China or Russia. To accomplish these goals, U.S. strategy should develop military capabilities for use in the North American and European Arctic subregions and then demonstrate the ability to use them in harsh Arctic conditions. The U.S. government should persuade regional allies and partners that the United States can be a trusted security partner in the region. Finally, the strategy should contain inducements to the private sector to build dual-use Arctic infrastructure that benefits the private sector while giving the military platforms from which to observe and operate in the Arctic.

“The Implications of U.S. Policy Stagnation toward the Arctic Region,” Heather A. Conley, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 3 May 2019 [222]
https://www.csis.org/analysis/implications-us-policy-stagnation-toward-arctic-region

Overview:

The United States’ strategic position near Russia and neighboring Canada allows the U.S. access to the Beaufort Sea, the Chukchi Sea, and the Bering Sea and requires the United States to manage a lengthy maritime border with Russia that extends through the Bering Strait and Chukchi Sea into the Arctic Ocean as far as permitted under international law. The U.S. government has articulated its fundamental interest in the Arctic for more than 40 years in a series of government strategies: beginning with President Nixon’s 1971 National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM-144), to Ronald Reagan’s 1983 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-90), to President George W. Bush’s National Security Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, signed in 2009, and the 2016 Report to Congress from the Department of Defense on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region. Each document established broad guidelines for U.S. policy in the region that aligned with the geostrategic realities at the time.

Today, there are three major drivers that are shaping the Arctic:

1. Geopolitical drivers of great power competition with the largest Arctic coastal state Russia and a self-proclaimed “near Arctic state,” China;

2. Environmental drivers, which are simultaneously transforming the Arctic maritime and terrestrial space at rates that confound scientists while fueling the development of flexible governance structures; and,

3. Economic drivers that are highly correlated with global commodity prices.

U.S. policy toward the Arctic is driven by these factors as well as Alaska’s important domestic economic role providing vital energy, mineral, and fishery resources. The Alaskan North Slope contains some of the country’s largest oils fields and natural
gas fields; the 2016 value of its mineral industry was $2.83 billion; and fisherman landed $5.4 billion of fish and shellfish in 2017. Alaska’s economic activity has been subdued for the past several years due to lower global energy prices. The state must respond to increased coastal erosion necessitating village relocation, permafrost thaw, and fresh water scarcity which is dramatically altering traditional livelihoods.

The challenge for an overarching U.S. Arctic policy is that it must address all of these cross-cutting issues simultaneously: protect the homeland, pursue environmental adaptation and resilience, and address global economic and security dynamics while engaging in anticipatory policymaking. U.S. government strategies and documents for the Arctic are largely descriptive in nature, and they have yet to alter resource allocations (with the exception of recent congressional funding for one heavy-icebreaker, which will be predominantly used in Antarctica) or establish new organizational structures that can more efficiently address these cross-cutting issues. They also do not offer a clear set of priorities.

**Current & Relevant Information:**

**The Stagnation of U.S. Arctic Policy under the Obama and Trump Administrations**

Despite the relentless pace of the three major drivers, U.S. policy toward the Arctic has remained largely stagnant over the past decade with a continued emphasis on science and international collaboration. In other words, the United States “makes do” by “making it work.” This has been particularly true for the U.S. Coast Guard, the lead U.S. agency with responsibilities for protecting the American Arctic and securing maritime waterways. Despite over a decade of studies and assessments, the U.S. Coast Guard continues to rely on outdated capabilities and thinly resourced budgets, which equates to a seasonal U.S. Coast Guard presence (July-October) in the American Arctic. Should an incident occur in the American Arctic, it is hoped that it happens during this season and preferably near a pre-positioned U.S. maritime asset. Years of underinvestment now leaves the United States ill-prepared as other nations prioritize the region as one of future geostrategic value.

One of the most significant moments in the Arctic’s geopolitical development occurred in 2013 when China was invited to become a permanent observer to the Arctic Council. This decision, combined with the emergence of Chinese President Xi Jinping as China’s leader and the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, gave China greater impetus to be more economically, diplomatically, and scientifically visible in the Arctic. This occurred at the same moment when the Obama administration was preparing in earnest for its chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2015-2017).

Since 2009, the Obama administration largely viewed the Arctic region as an alarming and persuasive example of the need to elevate climate change as a national security imperative. The U.S. administration created new administration
positions (e.g., a U.S. special representative to the Arctic Region and an executive director of the Arctic Executive Steering Committee) largely to manage its Arctic Council Chairmanship to give the Arctic issue greater public visibility and engage more closely with the state of Alaska. The Obama administration also increased the size of federally protected lands and waters in the American Arctic to minimize development that could adversely impact its environmental protection efforts. Much of this work built up to August 2015 when President Obama became the first president to visit the Alaskan Arctic in part to chair the Global Leadership in the Arctic Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement, and Resilience (GLACIER) conference, which brought together 20 foreign ministers, including those from Arctic nations and Arctic Council observer nations, to call for immediate international action to tackle climate change. China and Russia did not sign the GLACIER declaration.

President Obama’s three-day Arctic visit formed the basis of the U.S. priorities during its chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2015-2017): improving economic and living conditions in Arctic communities; Arctic Ocean safety, security, and stewardship; and addressing the impacts of climate change. But as a reminder of the growing geopolitical dynamics in the region, President Obama’s Alaskan visit occurred simultaneously with a large Sino-Russian naval exercise off the coast of Vladivostok, Russia in which Alaskans were greeted by 5 Chinese naval vessels off the Aleutian Islands.

The Trump administration concluded the U.S. Arctic Council chairmanship without significant change, but the administration began to disassemble the Obama administration’s Arctic-specific administrative structures, emphasized economic development, and dismissed climate impacts in the region. The U.S. budget dedicated to Arctic science and research has remained largely intact due to bipartisan congressional support, and U.S. secretaries of state continue to attend Arctic Council ministerial meetings. The Trump administration has re-opened onshore and offshore areas in the American Arctic for development such as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to oil and gas drilling with expedited environmental review although judicial review has slowed this process. New offshore leases in the Chukchi Sea have been made available, and the administration is working to promote oil exploration beneath ANWR’s coastal plain along the Beaufort Sea in what is thought to be the largest untapped onshore oil deposit in North America. In 2017, the governor of Alaska signed a Joint Development Agreement with China worth an estimated $43 billion to develop Alaskan liquified natural gas (LNG) for export to China.

Despite this greater desire for and receptivity to Arctic economic development, U.S. Arctic infrastructure remains very limited and will inhibit economic development. The closest U.S. deep-water port is Dutch Harbor in the southern Bering Sea, which is over 800 miles from the Bering Strait. The lack of icebreaking capabilities is one of the most glaring of U.S. capability gaps, but the U.S. Coast Guard recently selected
a firm to construct a polar security cutter which should be in service by 2024. As transits through the Bering Strait have more than doubled over the past decade, there is also an urgent need for greater communications assets and maritime domain awareness capabilities, particularly through the narrow Bering Strait.

One consistent success for U.S. policy in the Arctic is the question of governance. The United States has quietly and effectively engaged with the Russian government to introduce to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) a Vessel Traffic Management System for the Bering Strait, which took effect on December 1, 2018. It is the first internationally recognized ship routing measure approved by the IMO for polar waters. The United States also worked diligently at the IMO to secure a mandatory Polar Code, which came into force in January 2017. Finally, the United States, working closely with the other four coastal states, negotiated a preemptive fisheries moratorium for the high seas of the Central Arctic Ocean and brought together four other fishing nations (China, Korea, Japan, and Iceland) and the European Union to join that agreement (the CAOFA 5+5 Agreement).

Gender Roles:

“Pan-Arctic Report: Gender Equality in the Arctic Phase 3,” Arctic Council, April 2021 [223]

Summary:

Gender equality in the Arctic is highly relevant to the agenda and role of the Arctic Council (the Council) and its Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), which have emphasized gender equality in previous projects and initiatives. The importance of issues of gender and diversity has become increasingly evident, the latest example being Iceland's emphasis on gender issues during its Council Chairmanship.

GEA highlights the importance of recognizing and appreciating diversity in terms of discourses, gender, Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, governance, education, economies, social realities, sustainability, and balanced participation in leadership and decision making, in both the public and private sectors.

A major component of GEA III has been to develop this report on gender. It pulls together material, information, and expertise to provide an overview of gender-related issues in the Arctic and contributes to filling knowledge gaps on this subject.
The GEA III report seeks to identify emerging issues, priorities, and concrete strategies that support gender balance and increased diversity.

The primary intended audience for this report is policymakers in the Arctic region. It is a resource for those interested in gender issues in the Arctic, including Arctic inhabitants and researchers. We hope that a broader audience, including the private sector, will appreciate the relevance of the report to their work.

The report does not claim to be comprehensive, but it is a step forward in strengthening the knowledge base and understanding required for developing policies that foster resilient and thriving communities.

Current & Relevant Information:

Alaska

The Alaskan population more than tripled from 1960 to 2016, and migration in and out of the region has fluctuated over the period, partly linked to economic up and down swings. Notwithstanding fluctuations in net-migration, the 30-year period from 1986 to 2016 has seen a cumulative net-migration of minus 55,000 people. More recently, due to a sharp drop in birth rates, the natural increase no longer offsets levels of out-migration, leading to population decline between 2017 and 2019 for the first time in three decades (Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development, 2019).


Overview:

Women in Alaska earn about 76 percent of what men here earn, placing the state among the worst when it comes to the gender wage gap, according to data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Current & Relevant Information:

In 2015, women in Alaska had median weekly earnings of $787, compared to $1,034 for their "male counterparts," the bureau said in a report released this month. Those numbers are for full-time wage and salary workers.

The state tied with Louisiana for the sixth-worst for women’s earnings as a percentage of men’s (that list includes the District of Columbia).

Nationally, women earned about 81 percent of what men earned, or a median $726 per week for women compared to $895 per week for men.
One reason behind the wider rift in Alaska, experts say, is that many of the higher-paying jobs in the state are in the oil and gas industry, which is overwhelmingly male-dominated.

Less than 1 percent of women in Alaska worked in the construction and extraction industries in 2014, BLS data show, compared to 11.2 percent of men.

"Almost certainly the biggest factor — we have a higher percentage of oil and gas employment than other states do, and then that industry is the highest-paid in Alaska, and … the percentages are high for males," said Dan Robinson, chief of research and analysis at the Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development.

“Traditional roles for Arctic women changing faster than climate,” Gustaf Klarin, Anchorage Daily News, 13 May 2016 [225]  

Overview:

Women reject the Arctic to a higher degree than men. This applies to Canada, Alaska and the northern parts of Sweden, Norway and Finland, but the greatest shortage of women is in northern Russia and in Greenland. There are just 85 women for every 100 men in Greenland. Among Greenlanders living in Denmark however, the majority are women.

Current & Relevant Information:

"During the past 20 to 30 years, women have increasingly abandoned the role of the traditional housewife of the hunting and trapping husband," says Katrine Nathanielsen from the 8th of March Group. "Women are getting educations and making money while men are stagnating."

"This can lead to conflicts between men and women when the gender roles change, when the proud but poorly educated hunter loses status," says Inge Olesen Brandt, who serves on Greenland’s council for equality. "And this can lead both to suicides among men and domestic violence against women."

But social changes and altered gender roles are a greater threat to the old culture than changes to the climate according to Rasmus Ole Rasmussen at the Nordic Council's research institute Nordrigio. Young people, primarily younger women, are not especially interested in conforming to the traditional male-dominated culture, where the man hunts and the woman takes care of the home, the children and the spoils of the hunt. And when there is a shortage of women, it is difficult to maintain the hunting and trapping culture.
Overview:

A new look at historical data through the lens of gender illuminates the dynamic role women play in Alaska’s commercial fisheries.

Women play an integral, multifaceted—and until now, largely invisible—role in Alaska fisheries. The first comprehensive study of women’s participation, incorporating gender into 30 years of existing data, shows women participate in Alaska fisheries differently than men.

“Women are really important players in Alaska's commercial fisheries. They're key in contributing to family adaptability and in turn to community resilience,” said Marysia Szymkowiak, the scientist who conducted the Alaska Fisheries Science Center study. "Knowing how women participate directly in fishing and within fishing families and communities is critical to predicting and understanding responses to fishery changes—from individuals, to families, all the way up to communities."

Current & Relevant Information:

Gender-Blind Data


Historically, fisheries data on participants have not included gender. Such a gender-blind approach limits our understanding of access, mobility, and empowerment issues and can actually lead to gender biases.

“Not examining fisheries participation for women and men separately implies that there are no differences between them in our fisheries. That's a flawed assumption with potentially negative social and ecological implications if women and men participate differently—and this research shows that they do,” said Szymkowiak.

Beyond direct participation in the harvesting sector of commercial fishing, women perform many other jobs that are vital to fishing success. Women step in where needed to adapt to changing fishing and family situations. This includes shoreside employment, working on family boats, direct marketing, and engaging in the political process. This essential but “invisible” work is not captured in fisheries statistics.

“We cannot ignore the critical role that gender plays,” Szymkowiak said. “Understanding when, how, and where women fish, and what limits their participation, is essential if we are to maintain and promote community resilience in the face of huge ecological, market, and management changes in our fisheries.”
Overview:

Women in Alaska have made considerable advances in recent years but still face inequities that often prevent them from reaching their full potential. Since the 2004 Status of Women in the States report was published, the gender wage gap in Alaska has narrowed, a higher percentage of women have bachelor’s degrees, and women are more likely to work in managerial or professional occupations. Yet, as in all other states, women in Alaska are less likely than men to be in the labor force and more likely to live in poverty. Women also continue to be underrepresented in the state legislature.

Current & Relevant Information:

If current trends continue, women in Alaska will not see equal pay until the year 2092.

Women hold 28.3% of seats in the state legislature.

Key Findings

- Alaska’s best grade is in the area of employment and earnings, for which it receives a B. Its worst grade is in political participation, for which it gets a D.
- Alaska women who work full-time, year-round earn 77 cents on the dollar compared with similarly employed men.
- Approximately 25.2 percent of those working in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields in Alaska are women, compared with 28.8 percent nationwide.
- As of 2015, there are no women of color in statewide elective executive office in Alaska, and no women of color from the state in the U.S. Congress.
- Women in Alaska who are unionized earn $207 more per week, on average, than those who are not represented by a union.
- Approximately 33.2 percent of women in Alaska have a bachelor’s degree or higher, an increase of about 8 percentage points since 2000.
- In 2012–2013, 21.7 percent of Alaska’s four-year-olds were enrolled in state pre-K, preschool special education, or state and federal Head Start.
- Heart disease is the biggest killer of women in the United States. Alaska ranks 3 of 51 with a low mortality rate of 100.9 per 100,000.


Overview:
In 2022, Alaska women who were full-time wage and salary workers had median usual weekly earnings of $1,007, or 82.7 percent of the $1,217 median usual weekly earnings of their male counterparts, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Regional Commissioner Chris Rosenlund noted that the 2022 women’s-to-men’s earnings ratio of 82.7 percent compared to 79.1 percent in 2021. Nationwide, women earned $958 per week, or 83.0 percent of the $1,154 median for men. (See chart 1 and table 1.) The earnings comparisons in this release are on a broad level and do not control for many factors that can be important in explaining earnings differences, such as job skills and responsibilities, work experience, and specialization.

Current & Relevant Information:

In Alaska, the women’s-to-men’s earnings ratio has ranged from a low of 70.9 percent in 1998 and 1999 to a high of 82.9 percent in 2016. (Data for the states began in 1997.)

View Chart Data

Among the 50 states and the District of Columbia, median weekly earnings of women in full-time wage and salary positions in 2022 ranged from $751 in Mississippi to $1,626 in the District of Columbia. Women’s earnings in 12 states and the District of Columbia exceeded $1,050 per week. (See map 1.)

Median weekly earnings for men were lowest in Mississippi at $906 and highest in the District of Columbia at $1,876. Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia had weekly wages above $1,050 for full-time male workers.

Among the 50 states and the District of Columbia, Rhode Island had the highest women’s-to-men’s earnings ratio, 99.6 percent. Utah had the lowest earnings ratio, 73.1 percent. (See map 2.) The differences among the states reflect, in part, variation in the occupations and industries found in each state and differences in the demographic composition of each state’s labor force. In addition, sampling error for state estimates is considerably larger than it is for the national estimates. Consequently, earnings comparisons between states should be made with caution.
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