Military Cross-Cultural Competence: core concepts and individual development

Brian R. Selmeski

Centre for Security, Armed Forces & Society
Royal Military College of Canada

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Brian R. Selmeski
Research Associate (Anthropology)
Royal Military College of Canada
selmeski@rmc.ca

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Introduction

Militaries—at least those of industrialised countries—are quite adept at generating a limited amount of procedural and declarative knowledge about other cultures when they deem it valuable in achieving operational success. This often takes the forms of pre-deployment briefings, awareness training, pocket references (i.e., “smart cards”), etc. These efforts have demonstrated generally positive results (along with some inevitable but unanticipated negative consequences) by facilitating mission accomplishment and reducing suffering, injury, and death of both combatants and civilians. Nevertheless, these efforts are generally narrow, superficial, short-term responses to pressing needs.

Armed Forces appear less able and/or inclined, however, to design, implement, and sustain medium- to long-term non-context specific efforts (i.e., not driven by any particular operation) to develop all service members’ ability to more effectively communicate with, relate to, and influence—by force of reason or arms—groups and individuals from other cultural backgrounds. Instead, the limited emphasis in this vein is too often conflated with regional, political, and/or language familiarity (with perhaps a modicum of culture rather than a deep understanding) for a few, select military professionals. Historically, this has been the preferred approach to prepare advisors, foreign area officers (FAOs), special operations forces (SOF), and defence/service attachés (e.g., Kaplan 2004; 2005; Simons 1997; 2003). Results have been mixed.

I am not the first, nor do I expect to be the last, to observe the need for increasing the quantity and quality of cultural knowledge in the profession of arms and its integration to specific military systems. Witness the ever-increasing number of publications to this effect by serving and retired military officers (e.g., Carroll 2004; Exum 2007; Fleischer 2005; Hajjar 2006; Kron 2007; Lively 2007; Renzi 2006; Scales 2004; 2006; Theriault and Wulf 2006; Trebilcock 2007; Varhola 2004; 2006; Wong, et al. 2003; Wunderle 2006; Zeytoonian, et al. 2006), civilian employees (e.g., Corn 2006; Jandora 2005; McFarland 2005; Morrison 2006), politicians (e.g., Erwin 2004; Skelton and Cooper 2005), journalists (e.g., Packer 2006; Sappenfield 2006; Stannard 2007), and academics—from those working within the security sector to those on the outside and some who move back and forth across this artificial border (e.g., Glenn 2005a; 2005b; Heuser 2007; McFate 2005a; 2005b; McFate and Jackson 2005; Morrison 2006; Salmoni 2004; 2006; Schwerzel 2005; Simons and Tucker 2004; Tucker and Lamb 2006; Varhola 2004; 2006; Watson Institute 2006).

In fairness, militaries, particularly in the US, have begun responding to these calls—often reaching out to the academic community in the process (e.g., Connable 2006; Fontenot 2005; Kipp, et al. 2006; Nuti 2006; USMC 2006). This process is likely to increase in pace and breadth as the US seeks

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1 Declarative knowledge entails “knowing ‘facts’” whereas procedural knowledge is “knowing how to accomplish a specific task”. Neither entails problem solving or abstract thinking.

2 For example, the US Joint Military Attaché School focuses primarily on ensuring graduates do not cause offence whereas the US Special Forces’ past success in cross-cultural scenarios (together with a high operational tempo) have limited their leadership’s enthusiasm for further enhancing members’ competence.

3 This is especially true for military intelligence systems. I will address this to a degree in the body of this paper, however, my focus here is primarily on professional military education systems and ultimately individual members’ acculturation to the profession of arms.

new approaches to the situation in Iraq. For example, the Iraq Study Group (e.g., Baker, et al. 2006) called for vastly increasing the number of US military personnel serving as advisors to Iraqi units, a process the Army had already begun months before (e.g., Martin 2006; Shanker and Wong 2006; Spiegel 2006). Similarly, the British, French, Dutch, and other armed forces have been increasingly re-studying their imperial pasts and multicultural presents in hopes of developing their own approaches to integrating culture and operations (e.g., Boré 2006; Chivers 2007; Collinson 2006; Gooren 2004; Smith 2006). Nonetheless, too many senior officers from some of these countries continue to quietly insist that managing cross-cultural relations is “in their blood” due to centuries of experience in colonial administration. Curiously, the Canadian Forces (CF) remain somewhat ambivalent about this exercise. While recent months have witnessed an increasing number of operational, applied, and strategic research projects on culture in the CF, these remain largely disparate and isolated efforts that lack buy-in from senior uniformed and civilian defence officials.

The multiple calls for change and valiant responses in different countries are reminiscent of the old Hindu-Muslim tale—popularized in this hemisphere by American John Godfrey Saxe’s famous poem (1878)—of a group of blind men describing an elephant. Each addressed only the part they could feel (the trunk, tail, tusks, etc.), ultimately failing to perceive the whole animal. So too, most of these appeals and responses for more attention to culture in the military have been motivated by the aspects that have either directly affected, captured the interest of, or corresponded to the official responsibilities of the authors. Consequently, institutional reactions have generally been guided by constrained directives rather than broad conceptual inquiries, and systematic methods.

This approach has yielded some positive results, and will likely continue to do so; but it is not the quickest, most efficient, or comprehensive way forward. The initial steps to addressing the military’s “cultural needs” should not be to determine what the armed forces should teach (course content) or gather (intelligence information) or create (new organizations) or measure (metrics)—the usual military tendencies. Instead, first we should clarify the concept (what is it that we seek to develop), then craft a framework (the wider set of ideas that inform the objective), and finally establish broad objectives at various professional development levels (a matrix of what military personnel should be, should know, and should do).

This approach is not so distinct from the pedagogical stance I advocate for teaching anthropology to undergraduate, graduate, and professional students. As two long-time teachers noted, “the task of introducing anthropology to thousands of educated non-specialists over the years has convinced us that the best way to do this is to emphasize no so much what anthropologists have discovered, but how anthropologists think about what they have learned—concepts over facts if you will” (Monaghan and Just 2000: 1). Alternatively, as an undergraduate professor of mine was fond of saying, we should “teach how to think, not what to think” so individuals can ask better questions

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5 Winslow et al.’s (2004) review of “diversity management and training in non-American forces”, suggests parallels between military’s internal management of diversity and cross-cultural competence. The US Armed Forces, however, continue to treat these as distinct realms—despite falling under the same Under Secretary of Defense.

6 Briefly, I contend that many Canadian defence professionals’ naïve acceptance of a set of national and institutional myths lead some to believe that (a) Canada is a truly multi-cultural country; (b) the Canadian Forces are drawn from and represent this population; and therefore (c) given short blocks of training on the context-specific culture, military personnel will succeed in culturally complex operations. In fact, (a) recent scholarship demonstrates significant disconnects, tensions, and misunderstandings between Canada’s many cultural groups (e.g., Aboriginals-Whites, Anglophones-Francophones, recent immigrants-native born); (b) all recruiting and personnel analyses to date have identified a significant gap between the diversity of Canada’s population and who serves in the military; and (c) even if the Forces were more representative, there is no empirical data to suggest that this would result in truly cross-culturally competent individuals teams.
and learn for themselves. In sum, short-term operationally focused responses to the military’s “cultural needs” emphasize facts over concepts primarily through training; long-term institutional approaches—such as developing cross-cultural competence—will require a distinct approach.

1. Culture, Competence, and Misguided Efforts to Combine Them

The logical place to begin this exploration is by determining what, precisely—or as best possible, we mean by “culture”. This is no small task; there are literally thousands of popular, professional, academic, and other understandings of this now hip concept. For the purpose of this paper, I will restrict my focus to the academic realm. Nonetheless, how one understands culture depends, in large part, on one’s disciplinary approach. It seems that unlike several years ago, when culture was something of a dirty word, today nearly all academics purport to be “scholars of culture”, including: anthropologists, psychologists, political scientists, sociologists, linguists, organizational behaviouralists, and others. Yet each has differing assumptions, data, theories, interests, and objectives. This yields at times vastly divergent definitions, or alternately, subtle but significant differences that are often overlooked at our own peril.

As if this were not enough, major differences often exist within disciplines as well. Take the old joke about anthropology, for instance:

Q: What do you get when you put two anthropologists in a room?
A: Three definitions of culture!

Tabling the inter- (and intra-) disciplinary sniping and turf-wars for the moment (though, as I note in the conclusion, these differences will have to be unpacked in the near future), I contend that the immediate objective should not be to generate a definitive and all-inclusive definition of culture. This is a fool’s errand certain to take a long time while producing a result of both questionable validity and utility. Instead, the focus should be on creating a common understanding of what culture is, how it works, and how one learns about it. To this end, it is useful to accept prima facie that we should instead focus on more and less useful understandings of culture. The utility of an approach, in turn, depends on one’s objectives, purposes, or needs (intellectual or practical); the culture in question; and the context in which it is developed or will be applied.

It is also critical to acknowledge (as most serious academics working on issues related to culture agree) that culture is not a social group, material object, activity, or officially articulated statement. Regrettably, most military studies of (and frameworks for addressing) culture fail to recognize such obvious distinctions. Some of the other commonly held basic tenants include that culture is:

- Learned, shared, patterned, and transmitted across generations;
- Multi-levelled, including:
  - Surface: material and verbal and non-verbal behaviour;
  - Middle: physical and symbolic structures; and
  - Deep: values, beliefs, expectations, emotions, and symbols that range from the commonly recognised to those that are taken for granted;
- Performative, expressed in many forms (enacted as behaviours, embodied as feelings, and

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7 The iceberg metaphor is often used to convey this aspect of culture. Implicit in this metaphor is the fact that surface elements (those you can easily observe—if you want and try to) are vastly outnumbered and outweighed by the deep elements (which are often quite difficult to observe…until, as the passengers and crew of the Titanic can attest to, they breech your hull).
embedded as meanings);

- Influential (but not necessary predictive) regarding what, how and why do things, as well as the way they think and feel;
- Relatively stable but not static; elements change over time and these modifications often affect other (seemingly unrelated) aspects;
- Adaptive to human needs (e.g., biological, environmental, social, political) but not always as expected when viewed from a different culture;
- Dependent on the whole or system rather than isolated parts (i.e., holistic).

In sum, as Tim Ingold notes, culture is not composed of “neatly bounded and mutually exclusive bodies of thought and custom, perfectly shared by all who subscribe to them”. Individuals may have multiple, even conflicting cultural influences that they abide by, negotiate between, or ignore as circumstances dictate. He continues noting that “whatever the sense in which it is employed, the concept of culture entails a very high level of abstraction…[it] is not something that we can ever expect to encounter ‘on the ground’”. In other words, culture is not ‘a thing.’ Thus, he concludes it is “more realistic to say that…people live culturally, rather than that they live in cultures” (1994: 330, emphasis in original).

Though somewhat vague and highly theoretical, this is a more rich and useful understanding of culture than the official DOD/NATO definition: “a feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man [sic]. Included are such items as roads, buildings, and canals; boundary lines; and, in a broad sense, all names and legends on a map” (Department of Defense 2006a). If we accept the academic working understanding of what culture is (and is not), rather than the DOD definition, then what is cross-cultural competence or 3C?8 Perhaps it is easier to start by explaining what it is not:

- It is not cultural awareness: “If we just have a good pre-briefing, everything will go fine”. This is too passive. 3C requires on-going and active learning on military professionals’ part (before, during, and after deployments); it is not a one-time 30-minute “solution”. More on this shortly.
- It is not additional language training: “If we just get more Arabic [or Kurdish, or Pashto, or Farsi, or fill-in-the-blank] speakers, everything will go fine”. This is too one-dimensional. 3C should be complemented with linguistic competence at all levels (as well as linguistic awareness in operational settings and linguistic expertise for certain select individuals), yet while knowledge of a foreign language is generally positive, alone it is insufficient to achieve the necessary result.
- It is not more knowledge of International Relations: “If we just have more FAOs, everything will go fine”. This is too focused on international/state systems. 3C emphasizes people’s lived reality, be they adversaries, allies, non-combatants, or others. This distinction is often not recognised by serving and former officers writing on the need for cultural education; perhaps they do not fully understand the culture concept (e.g., McFarland 2005). (See Rubinstein (1988; 2003; 2005; Rubinstein and LeCron Foster 1997) on the challenges of integrating cultural analysis to international security studies and practices.)
- It is not additional background on radical Islam: “Didn’t we say that about communism a couple of years back?” This is too operationally and contextually focused. Real 3C will permit military professionals to develop this understanding but also acquire other

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8 Too frequently, this is abbreviated as “cultural competence”, yet almost everyone is competent in their own culture as a result of enculturation. The focus for militaries is cross- or inter-cultural competence, that is, the ability to function effectively despite cultural differences.
perspectives that may seem superfluous, trivial, or even misguided now but may be essential
to the armed forces in the not-so-distant future.

Before defining what 3C is, let me start by briefly exploring the idea of “competence”. I have chosen
this term intentionally, as how the larger issue is framed will shape and influence everything that
follows—concepts, exchanges, practices, etc. Moreover, even a cursory review of the literature
reveals a plethora of alternate terms being bandied about, often with little consideration for the
implications. Each has been developed to differing degrees of sophistication and comes with some
theoretical baggage—or worse yet, with inadequate theoretical backstopping developed as a result of
intuitive rather than rigorous consideration.

Building on a similar exercise by Ng et al. (2005: 4), a longer—though still incomplete—list of
terms (and illustrative authors) would include:

- Cultural savvy (e.g., Wong, et al. 2003);
- Cultural astuteness (e.g., Stewart 2006);
- Cultural appreciation (e.g., Collinson 2006);
- Cultural literacy or fluency (e.g., McFarland 2005);
- Cultural adaptability (e.g., Sutton and Gundling 2005);
- Cultural or human terrain (e.g., Connable 2006; Kipp, et al. 2006);
- Cultural expertise (e.g., Department of Defense 2005; Kaczmar 1996);
- Cultural competency (e.g., Collier 1989; Johnson, et al. 2006; Wiseman, et al. 1989);
- Cultural awareness (e.g., Boré 2006; Hajjar 2006; Schwerzel 2005; Skelton and Cooper 2005;
Wunderle 2006);
- Cultural intelligence (e.g., Ang, et al. 2004; Earley and Ang 2003; Earley, et al. 2006; Konrad
2006; Ng, et al. 2005); and
- Cultural understanding (e.g., Bledsoe 2005; Connable 2006; Department of Defense 2005;
Department of the Army 2006).

These concepts are oftentimes similar, but they are not the same. The proliferation of terminology,
lack of shared understanding, and absence of a scientifically rigorous foundation generates
significant confusion and hinders such efforts’ overall effectiveness. Rather than exploring each
individually, I will characterize them as four broad groups:

- Awareness, appreciation, understanding, and expertise are perhaps the most frequently used
concepts, but suffer serious limitations which I have already addressed in this paper.
- Literacy and terrain are newer terms that non-academic authors, primarily with military
backgrounds, have used to label something they know is important and can be best defined
through analogy. Rubinstein has argued (personal communication) quite vigorously that such
approaches run “the risk of reifying culture in dangerous ways”, referencing his previously
cited work on “the dangers of such reification of culture in the context of peacekeeping” and
international relations as evidence.

9 Others that I have heard used in casual conversation/practice include cultural flexibility, sensitivity, and skills. As
culture becomes an ever more popular topic of discussion in military circles, this list will likely continue to expand,
producing even greater confusion and imprecision.

10 In military terms, the argument is that just as the map is not the (physical) terrain, the data presented as human terrain
is not culture. Effectively navigating the physical terrain requires a host of tools (especially an accurate map and
reliable compass) and abilities (particularly “reading” the map, compass, and land). So too for cultural terrain, yet such
tools and skills have not yet been developed, tested, or conveyed to troops.
• **Astuteness**, adaptability, and savvy, on the other hand, are used here by non-anthorologist academics to characterize a phenomenon that they can neither fully unpack nor make accessible to an audience of non-specialists. These approaches too lack a conceptual or theoretical framework to guide efforts to assess, develop, and validate them.

• Finally, cultural **competence** and intelligence are academic constructs stemming primarily from the organisational behaviour and psychological communities’ efforts in the field of international business. (Note that this is different from armed forces’ use of the term cultural intelligence to describe the results or process of collecting and analysing cultural information for military purposes (e.g., Renzi 2006; Simons and Tucker 2004) but not too distinct from the US Marine Corps’ use of the phrase.11) Given that these are the most scholarly, thoroughly articulated, and validated of the many terms in use, I will explore each here in greater detail.

When reviewing the cultural competence literature, one must first distinguish between “competencies” or skills and “competence” or status. The former tend to be expressed as a list of individual tasks (e.g., can do X to Y standard) whereas the latter is often used to describe achieving proficiency for a given professional development level (e.g., a competent company grade officer). Too often, scholars fail to make this distinction explicit. Moreover, academics and practitioners alike often assume or imply that competence (status) can be achieved by mastering the requisite competencies (skills). Finally, one is challenged by the sheer volume of writing on the topic. Psychologist Victor Catano surveyed the literature and found that as with culture, there are countless definitions of competency, all of which “tend to reflect either individual or specific organizational concerns”. Yet, he went on to note that:

> In fairness, there may be more agreement among these definitions than is apparent. Each definition tends to be a partial definition. They generally contain parts of three elements. First, most suggest that competencies are the knowledge, skills, abilities, and other traits or factors (KSAOs) that underlie effective or successful job performance; second, the KSAOs must be observable or measurable; and third, the KSAOs must distinguish among superior and other performers (2002: 4).

Using this logic, attributes are only considered to be competencies if they aid workers in improving (in a demonstrable way) their accomplishment of a job-related task. By extension, the acquisition of additional (or better) competencies (or their sub-components) can produce individuals who are more or less competent. Similarly, this approach assumes that the objective can be disaggregated, broken down into small pieces that when re-assembled will produce the desired effect. By this logic, to accomplish “X”, the worker must be able to do “A”, “B”, and “C” to a certain standard. (This reasoning should sound familiar to anyone who has ever served in uniform.) While useful, I see several significant shortcomings with this approach when it is applied to culture:

First, it focuses too heavily on measurable traits, factors, etc.—that is, surface-level behaviour—when culture, by its very nature, also entails middle-level structures and deep-level values, beliefs, and emotions. Is it methodologically or empirically acceptable to lump these various and expansive concepts mechanically under KSAOs’ “other” category? I, for one, do not think so. By extension,

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11 According to Connable (2006), the US Marine Corps Intelligence Activity—which developed the ubiquitous and now infamous “smart cards” and many more detailed studies of culture—distinguishes between cultural awareness (“what?”), understanding (“why?”), and intelligence (“so what?”). They emphasize that the levels of sophistication and granularity individuals gain increase as they progress in rank, knowledge, and experience. Other than the use of the term “intelligence”, which is prone to narrow interpretation as information regarding the adversary’s location, disposition, and intentions’ in the military context, I have no particular qualms with this construct.
the developmental focus of such approaches tend towards promoting appropriate/effective action rather than generating comprehension. Both are necessary. Second, such understandings of competency leave open the interpretation of “successful performance”, raising the likelihood that ethnocentric measures will be introduced and thereby skew the actual measurements. One useful technique to address this bias is the “360-degree assessment”, yet to the best of my knowledge, the approach has never been adapted for use in operational and/or strategic contexts.

Third, embedded in this purposeful understanding of competency are a series of biases and assumptions that stem from both the discipline most frequently associated with such studies (primarily industrial-organisational psychology) and the job context in which they operate (Western, bureaucratic, for-profit, information era, business/management). Neither of these lends themselves particularly well to dealing with cross-cultural competence, as many other cultures do not share these assumptions and culture is not reducible to discrete tasks. In short, the Fordist foundation of competency theory works poorly, perhaps not at all, to address issues of culture, which we have already stipulated “depends on the whole or the system rather than on isolated parts”.

The second body of literature, on cultural intelligence or CQ, was developed by industrial-organisational psychologist P. Christopher Earley (Dean, Business School, National University of Singapore) and organisational-behaviouralist Soon Ang (Director, Centre for Leadership and Cultural Intelligence, Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore). Broadly speaking, CQ is understood as “an individual’s capability to adapt effectively to new cultural contexts” (Earley and Ang 2003: 59). The authors have argued quite persuasively that CQ is both distinct from and complementary to other forms of intelligence, such as academic, practical, social, emotional, etc.

CQ is a multi-component construct consisting of four facets, each of which has low to moderate correlation, confirming their distinctiveness (Ang, et al. 2004). These sub-elements entail differing levels of abstraction, and include:

- Meta-cognition—strategies of awareness, planning, and checking of knowledge;
- Cognition—command of domains of cultural knowledge;
- Motivation—direct attention to learning and functioning in culturally diverse situations;
- Behaviour—verbal and non-verbal enactments.

Research to date also demonstrates that CQ is closely linked to personality (Ang, et al. 2006a), but also entails capability (Ng and Earley 2006). Thus, it is state-like, not trait-like and trainable; so employers can develop their workers’ CQ rather than having to recruit individuals who already possess it. What is more, each of these four facets can be measured across a spectrum of capability—from high to none, rather than yes or no—making CQ a multi-level construct. Finally, researchers have demonstrated that aspects of CQ have a positive relationship to successful cross-cultural adjustment (Templer, et al. 2006) and are predictive of Cultural Judgment and Decision Making; Adjustment and Well Being; and Job Performance whether measured by task, contextually, or adaptively (Ang, et al. 2006b).

Despite this impressive list of accomplishments, CQ is not without its problems and limitations.

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12 Also called multi-source or multi-rater feedback, 360s entail assessment by superiors, peers, subordinates, and one’s self to identify gaps between how you and others perceive yourself and your job performance.
13 The Singaporean Armed Forces Training Institute’s Centre for Leadership Development and Nanyang Business School’s Centre for Leadership and Cultural Intelligence have, however, begun integrating a cultural intelligence module to their military’s on-line 360-leadership assessment.
Two areas of interest for future research include measurement (Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 2006; Ng and Earley 2006; Thomas 2006) and understanding/developing the concept in teams (Earley, et al. 2006: Chapter 7 “Building High Performing Global Teams”; Janssens and Brett 2006). There is also a less frequently voiced but still pressing need to improve how cognitive cultural intelligence is understood and measured (see Annex A).

After reviewing both approaches, I have adopted the language of “competence” in deference to its pervasiveness across and throughout armed forces’ professional development systems as well as to minimize confusion between the academic and military uses of the term “intelligence”. Nevertheless, I attempt to address the embedded assumptions and my reservations about these concepts as detailed above. I also strive to integrate CQ’s strengths in assessment, development, and validation to my approach. By taking a complementary stance, I hope to build on the respective strengths of each approach to produce the most rigorous, effective, and comprehensive model possible.

2. Examples, Lessons, and Comparisons with Other Professions

In addition to addressing the conceptual foundations of competence, it is also useful to review how other professions—many of which have longer or at least more extensive experience in grappling with these concepts and trying to implement them—have understood and sought to achieve 3C. First, I will briefly sketch some of the ways in which two professions—health/social service and diplomacy/international development—have conceived of and approached this challenge. Then I will compare the military with international business (from whence the CQ literature draws heavily), to illuminate some of the challenges of comparing across professions.

Cross-cultural competence has received significant attention in the health and social service field. For example, the State of Minnesota’s Department of Human Services (DHS) has a policy statement that plainly asserts, “an organization cannot be clinically or programmatically competent unless it is culturally competent” by which they presumably mean cross-culturally competent. The policy further stipulates that although cultural competence can never be fully attained, it can be

Enhanced with:
- culturally competent personnel—providers, paraprofessionals, and administrators with appropriate skills, knowledge, and attitudes
- culturally competent services—interventions and treatments proven effective with individuals from the diverse communities likely to be served
- culturally competent organizations—policies, administrative procedures, and management practices designed to ensure access to culturally appropriate services and competent personnel (Minnesota Department of Human Services, et al. 2004).

This essay primarily addresses the first factor, personnel, and like the health profession, the armed forces must work to develop the competence of all segments of the work force. The notion that individual cross-cultural competence does not necessarily generate organisational or institutional competence, is an important observation, to be addressed in a future publication (Selmeski in progress-a). Minnesota’s DHS also compiled some of the more commonly used examples

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14 I distinguish here between “international development” (e.g., USAID, CIDA, etc.) and “humanitarian aid” (e.g., MSF, Care, etc.). The dividing line is not always clear though, and the efforts of both humanitarian and hybrid organizations deserve greater attention in future studies. Likewise, in time, comparative studies of the legal, spiritual (e.g., rabbis, imams, ministers, missionaries, etc.), hospitality (e.g., hotel staff, flight attendants, etc.), and other professions could generate additional insights for the military.
definitions of the term from the health professions, including:

- “A set of congruent behaviors, attitudes, and policies that come together in a system, agency, or amongst professionals and enables that system, agency, or those professionals to work effectively in cross-cultural situations” (Cross, et al. 1989).
- “The integration and transformation of knowledge about individuals and groups of people into specific standards, policies, practices, and attitudes used in appropriate cultural settings to increase the quality of services, thereby producing better outcomes” (Pope-Davis and Coleman 1997).
- “The ability of individuals and systems to respond respectfully and effectively to people of all cultures, classes, races, ethnic backgrounds, and religions in a manner that recognizes, affirms, and values the worth of individuals, families, and communities and protects and preserves the dignity of each” (Child Welfare League of America 2001).
- “An ability to provide services that are perceived as legitimate for problems experienced by culturally diverse persons” that “denotes the ability to transform knowledge and cultural awareness into health and psychosocial interventions that support and sustain healthy client system functioning within the appropriate cultural context” (McPhatter 1997).

In my experience, many military professionals are sceptical of the utility of models, concepts, and ideas drawn from such a distinct—and “fuzzy”—profession. I, on the other hand, see these as offering ample lessons and useful insights in efforts to conceptualise, and eventually increase, cross-cultural competence in the security sector. Before articulating the key commonalities of these statements, however, it seems prudent to review the experiences of another profession for which there is also a sizeable literature.

Similarly, the US diplomatic corps has made various efforts to introduce 3C under a variety of names and guises. For example, anthropologists, particularly linguists, were hired at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) shortly after it opened in 1947 (Kennard 1949). This process took a significant step forward in 1951, when anthropologist Edward T. Hall was hired as director of the Point IV Training Program (Hall 1957; Sorrells 1998). Rather than just teaching novice (and, by his account, a fair number of veteran) diplomats and aid workers about particular cultures, Hall aimed to develop their recognition of the importance of the culture concept as well as their ability to effectively communicate across cultures (Hall 1992; Rogers, et al. 2002).

Hall’s objective was to complement “training in the language, history, government, and customs of another nation” with “specific knowledge of ourselves as participants in a culture” in order to “stop alienating the people with whom we are trying to work” and on whom the US was already spending billions of dollars in overseas development assistance (1959: 10, 168, 9). He sought to bring the US “out of the stone age of human relations in the overseas field” that was fuelling growing anti-Americanism as Lederer and Burdick noted in their popular and influential book, *The Ugly American* (1958). While the language may be melodramatic by contemporary standards, the situation sounds uncannily familiar to the US’ current state of affairs.

To achieve these objectives, Hall and his colleagues developed a theoretical approach to culture. The core of their model was presented at the meeting of the American Anthropological Association in December 1952, full copies of the revised work were then circulated among colleagues, and the final results were published jointly by FSI and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) the
following year (Hall and Trager 1953). Elements of this approach were later made available for a broader audience in what was perhaps Hall's most famous book, *The Silent Language* (1959).

Though largely grounded in the linguistic and biological theories of the day (Rogers, et al. 2002: 5-7) and therefore somewhat antiquated by today’s criteria, Hall’s efforts and models provide an important example for current efforts to achieve 3C in the military (particularly Appendix II, “A Map of Culture”, which reproduced the core of the framework from his 1953 work). In particular, I would identify two pressing lines of further research:

On the one hand, what other synthetic approaches have anthropologists developed over the years to teach and operationalise the culture concept to international practitioners—by either modifying Hall’s “map” or developing their own? On the other, how does one implement such an approach? Would this entail creating lists of all the different aspects for each of the 100 categories identified in Hall’s 10 dimension x 10 characteristic matrix to provide individuals with a “roadmap” rather than just a “concept map”? Would the 100 categories and/or (potentially thousands of) aspects then have to be ranked to help focus individuals’ efforts to understand culture? If so, would these be prioritized in general or for particular cultures? How?

Hall was eventually pressured to leave FSI, which today has no anthropologists on staff. With the exception of an elective on “Communicating Across Cultures”, training/education effort now focus primarily on acquiring knowledge of specific foreign cultures—the very approach that Hall rejected 56 years ago. Nevertheless, the Department of State has thoroughly integrated the importance of culture knowledge (and foreign language proficiency) to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) professional competencies. This produced the Foreign Service Precepts, a competence-based development framework that guides diplomats’ evaluations, assignments, and promotions (Foreign Service Institute 2006).

Despite this impressive degree of institutionalisation, FSI’s language-centric approach to culture and their limited efforts to develop 3C likely diminishes their efficacy in practice. This reinforces Beeman’s observation that in:

> The United States’ conduct of foreign policy, almost no attention is paid to cultural differences between nations. It is assumed that wealth and military might are universal levelers, and that little else matters. Occasionally it is recognized that religious feeling, ideology, pride, greed, or altruism may be factors in the course of human events, but such matters are often dismissed as unpredictable factors (2003: 679).

The Peace Corps, by comparison, has taken a more holistic approach to cross-cultural and self-awareness training/practice. Yet, Bennhold-Samaan (2004: 369) notes that while the organization has a long history of such efforts, a dedicated cross-cultural specialist job was not created until 1996.

The role of this individual was to “provide a framework and institutionalize cross-cultural training”

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15 It is important to note that Hall, his principle collaborator George Trager, and their colleagues at FSI functioned as applied scholars and ran their program like an academic department. Therefore they were given—or as he describes, took—time not only to develop the conceptual/theoretical framework for their work, but also to debate the issues in depth with each other, close colleagues, and the larger anthropological community over a period of years. The lesson for the military, of course, is that scholarly approaches to cross-cultural issues are often effective but generally not quick, neat, or easily developed in a 9-5 office (or worse, intellectual sweatshop) environment.

16 The Human Relations Area Files (HRAF), is often cited as an example. HRAF, however, is a programmatic, descriptive tool that systematically summarizes available and cross-references ethnographic data according to a pre-determined outline, rather than a synthetic, explanatory approach like Hall's map. Consequently, it provides “answers” rather than “questions” and is of little use if the content is out of date or there are gaps in the coverage—both of which occur with regularity.
by enhancing “the personal and professional cross-cultural effectiveness of volunteers and staff to better achieve the Peace Corps’ goals and to promote practical as well as theory-based cross-cultural training approaches”. To do so, she built academic and professional networks, developed training materials (e.g., Storti and Bennhold-Samaan 1997; 1999), and assisted other staff members’ efforts to integrate cross-cultural perspectives to different aspects of training.

Given the diversity of cultures in which Peace Corps personnel work (136 countries since the program was founded 1961), these efforts have had to balance between context-specific training and general approaches. This presents a useful model for military planners struggling to address current and future operational challenges. Both are large institutions with global reach. Yet, members of the Peace Corps tend to self-select based on their comfort with or interest in cross-cultural circumstances whereas military personnel often opt for uniformed service for just the opposite reasons (or are quickly acculturated as to the “right way to do things”).

Still, the Peace Corps have faced significant hurdles in achieving their goal. Bennhold-Samaan admits that too often “cross-cultural training is fragmented and diluted to merely one isolated component” despite the fact that it is “integral to the successful implementation of development projects, and pivotal to achieving all three goals of the Peace Corps” (2004: 372). Similarly, some posts (or volunteers) have focused primarily on ‘dos and taboos’, emphasized content over concepts, or dismissed the training as either common sense or unnecessary. A few have even resisted such training outright. Finally, Bennhold-Samaan laments the difficulty of recruiting and retaining competent trainers.

These challenges should give military planners pause regarding the complexity of the challenge they are faced with when seeking to integrate 3C to the professional development system. At the same time, relatively few soldiers are ever immersed in a foreign culture to the same degree as Peace Corps volunteers—with SOF and other advisors the clear exception. The armed forces have another advantage as well: Whereas the Peace Corps can conduct only pre-service, in-service, and close of service training over the course of 48 months, professional military education and training span the entire course of a military professional’s career, from 3 to 33 years.

As useful as these comparisons with the diplomatic and health professions are in broadening our thinking, we must also acknowledge what functions in one sector may not be perfectly transferable to another. Given the CQ literature’s heavy reliance on data developed from the international business (IB) context, and the utility of this approach to assess/develop 3C, it would be useful to spell out some of the similarities and differences between IB and the military:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Often operate in unfamiliar cultural contexts</td>
<td>Military often faces more/greater cultural differences¹⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augment their workforce with local hires</td>
<td>Military takes the bulk of their workforce with them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can improve efficiency and efficacy through training and education</td>
<td>IB prepares executives, military (like health) must involve all members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer quick and easy answers (e.g., checklists)</td>
<td>Consequences: military (life/death) &gt; IB (profit/loss)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members are frequently unaware of their own cultural biases/projection</td>
<td>Military operations entail greater power differential with the local population¹⁷</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁷ McNamara (2006) graphed these two aspects—high vs. low cultural and power differences—to great effect in her concluding comments to a recent conference. She also urged participants to acknowledge and accept that colonialism is an important lens through which much of the world continues to view the efforts of the West.
Professionals must work collectively, across cultural differences, to accomplish the objective. Military professionals understand and accept the principle of unlimited liability.¹⁸

| Table 1. Comparison of C3 in the International Business and Military Professions |

As this table makes plain, while there are many commonalities between these—and other—professions, the distinctions are also significant. This should serve as a cautionary reminder to those who seek to mechanically transfer approaches from one field to another. While such simplistic replication may be impossible, there are nevertheless many lessons to be learned by studying similar efforts in other sectors. With these preliminary musings over culture and competence, examples from the health and diplomatic professions, and the aforementioned comments on what cross-cultural competence is not, let us now (finally) turn to what 3C is.

### 3. Cross-Cultural Competence (3C)

One could deduce from the data presented in the previous sections that cross-cultural competence generally entails:

- An understanding of other people’s ways of thinking and acting (not just their governance systems or linguistic traditions), which requires:
  - on-going and active learning (including self-critique),
  - the recognition and acceptance of diversity as inevitable;

- The conversion of this knowledge into action through:
  - the cultivation of positive behaviours in particular circumstances,
  - the ability to adapt and integrate awareness to action;

- A balance between specialization and generalization, such as:
  - solid understanding of the culture concept as opposed to expertise in a particular culture,
  - linguistic abilities versus a recognition of the importance of language and/or ability to effectively use a translator;

- A desire to increase legitimacy, quality, and efficiency of service and the profession;

- Policies that recognize the importance of 3C and link it to the professional ethos.

- Implicitly there is also a requirement for the profession to impart this competence to members through education and training.

These provide an inkling of what military cross-cultural competence might be understood as, yet they clearly require some modification to be relevant to the profession-of-arms. I propose that for the profession of arms, 3C is:

**The ability to quickly and accurately comprehend, then appropriately and effectively engage individuals from distinct cultural backgrounds to achieve the desired effect.**

(1) **Despite not having an in-depth knowledge of the other culture, and**

(2) **Even though fundamental aspects of the other culture may contradict one’s own taken-for-granted assumptions/deeply-held beliefs.**

While this understanding of cultural competence is perhaps too long and awkward in some people’s opinions, it reflects the fact that like ethics and professionalism, 3C is a complex idea that tends to

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¹⁸ That is, being “subject to being lawfully ordered into harm’s way under conditions that could lead to the loss of their lives” (Canada 2003: 26).
be clearest in our minds when it is absent or violated (i.e., cross-cultural incompetence). We know unethical behaviour when we see it (like pornography—as Justice Stewart famously wrote in his 1964 ruling), but have a difficult time developing an operational understanding of it proactively as ethics defy simple rules-based approach. Likewise, we know that soldiers torturing and killing a non-combatant (then ignoring and covering up the deed) as occurred in Somalia is unprofessional (and unethical); yet, not torturing and not killing non-combatants does not necessarily make soldiers professional (or ethical). Consequently, developing an adequate framework and model of military professionalism in Canada ultimately required a lengthy study (several years) and publication (82 pages) (i.e., Canada 2003).

Recognising examples of cross-cultural incompetence are useful, for example by applying methods such as the critical incident technique (Flanigan 1954). In fact, there is now an ample literature demonstrating how the US military's general lack of cross-cultural competence has contributed to quagmire in Iraq. (Especially note British Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster's scathing assessment reprinted in Military Review (2005), GEN William S. Wallace's forceful response (2006), and Observation #9 in then-LTG David H. Petraeus subsequent article (2006).) Valuable though such analyses may be, alone proscriptions are insufficient to generate positive understanding and behaviour. Thus, these must be complemented with a conceptual and applied understanding of what 3C is—no matter how messy or ungainly it may be.

It is also worth stating exactly why cross-cultural competence is necessary for military professionals. Contrary to popular belief, 3C contributes not only to operational (to include the tactical level) success, but also to institutional strength and professional well-being (for a fuller explanation of the difference, see Canada 2003; or Matthews 2002 for a US perspective; particularly the project directors' introductory chapter: Snider and Watkins 2002). I will address these in turn:

**Operationally:** Cross-cultural competence is essential for military professionals to successfully deal with members of the following groups:

- **Comrades (one’s own unit):** Militaries just are not what they used to be (i.e., mass armies). Diversity is the rule now, rather than the exception; and no matter what some Marines may say, you cannot completely re-make people in your institutional image (see recent news events that catalogue the experiences of Muslim Marines, neo-Nazi Marines, Marines accused of murder, rape, and other crimes). Likewise, military units and communities often have significantly internal differences, so new members must achieve social competence or face the consequences (e.g., Pulliam 1997). Start at home: If a military professional cannot conduct a basic cultural assessment when s/he arrives at a new unit, how is s/he going to do it in an Afghan (or Iraqi or Rwandan or fill-in-the-blank) village?

- **“Sister Services”:** What are the cultural roots of the tensions/conflicts/misunderstandings that so often plague joint operations? An old joke captures these cultural differences best:
  
  If you tell the Navy to secure a building, they will turn out the lights and lock the door.
  
  If you tell the Army to secure a building, they will occupy it and forbid entry to those without a pass.
  
  If you tell the Marines to secure a building, they will assault with heavy fire, capture the building, fortify it, and call for an air strike against the opposing forces.
  
  If you tell the Air Force to secure a building, they will negotiate a three-year lease with an option to buy.

  Note that the US is not alone in this: I have personally observed similar phenomena in Canada, Bolivia, Ecuador, and The Netherlands, so I presume it also exists elsewhere—
though not necessarily in the exact same form—particularly in multi-national deployments.

- **Allies:** How can a military professional undertake successful coalition operations when they cannot effectively deal with the Bangladeshi (or Pakistani or Ghanaian or fill-in-the-blank non-Western) troops (who provide an increasingly large percent of PSO troops) under his/her command (or on the same base, who have “our backs” or whatever their job is)?

- **Adversaries,** who may take the form of: Conventional forces (seemingly in short supply these days); Unconventional forces (e.g., guerrillas or special operations forces); or Irregular forces (e.g., paramilitaries or “terrorists”).

- **Non-combatants,** including: Civilians of all ideological persuasions often in challenging circumstances (ranging from sympathizers and formerly empowered groups to refugees/displaced peoples and national minorities); international organisations or IOs (United Nations, regional organisations, Red Cross, etc.); non-governmental organisations or NGOs (Doctors Without Borders, Care, etc.); and/or non-military government actors (especially diplomats and developmentalists—3D or integrated security solutions).

**Institutionally/Professionally:** Important as these objectives are, alone they are neither sufficient reason nor guide to develop 3C. One must also consider the institutional imperative in order to more effectively connect (and recruit) on the home front with:

- Politicians who provide direction, allocate funding, and oversee the military in a democracy;
- Civilians who the armed forces serve (i.e., society) and recruit (to make them, temporarily, into soldiers); and
- Diverse communities who often times have specific objectives and/or interests.

Failure to attend to any or all of these relationships and ensure the profession is not dramatically out of sync with the expectations of each can endanger not only institutional well-being (e.g., funding, recruiting, etc.) but also professional health (e.g., public trust and respect, degree of autonomy and self-regulation, etc.).

Inherent in all these examples is a fundamental tension between the military’s traditional emphasis on internal integration and a growing call for greater external adaptability. The former often produces a rigid mechanical/structural orientation (and a preference for homogeneity/uniformity) whereas the latter is increasingly seen as necessary to ensure sufficient flexibility and innovation in an uncertain operational environment (as well as recognising, valuing, and preparing military professionals to work in culturally diverse settings/units). This tension is neatly captured in the figure below:

![Figure 1. Canadian Forces (CF) Effectiveness Framework (Canada 2005: 19)](image-url)
Achieving both operational and institutional success can only be accomplished by balancing these competing requirements; a trade-off that most military professionals are inadequately prepared to make (and often to recognize).[^19] 3C is central to ensuring that military professionals are both aware and take steps appropriate to the circumstances in order to balance internal integration and external adaptability (operational, institutional, and professional) while also achieving mission success (operational) and taking care of people (institutional/professional).

4. The Canadian Forces’ Professional Development Framework (PDF)

The Canadian Forces addressed the need to balance this tension through the creation of a “Professional Development Framework” (PDF). After briefly explaining the PDF and its origin, I will apply it to provide one possible approach to developing cross-cultural competence over the course of a military career.

The PDF (Walker 2006) is essentially a template and guide for producing effective leaders with a professional ideology reflective of the CF’s military ethos and the leader capabilities necessary at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels through a very hierarchical process: PD (a point I will return to). This particular PDF was developed through a substantial research effort using military references, generic leadership literature, as well as interviews with uniformed leaders.

The CF PDF has two primary components, which form its axes:

First, the institution recognizes five broad capacities: expertise, cognitive, social, change, and professional. Walker (2006: 20) defines these as:

- **Expertise**: “Specialist (Military Occupation Classification) and Technical (clusters, e.g., combat arms, sea trades, aircrew) proficiencies, an understanding and development of the Military and Organizational environments, and the practice and eventual stewardship of the profession of arms, with the capacities to represent and transform the system through applications at the Strategic and Institutional levels”.
- **Cognitive**: “A problem-solving, critical, Analytic, “left-brain” competence to think and rationalize with mental discipline in order to draw strong conclusions and make good decisions; plus an innovative, strategic, conceptually Creative, “right brain” capacity to find novel means, “outside the box” ends, and previously undiscovered solutions to issues and problems”.
- **Social**: “A sincere and meaningful behavioural Flexibility to be all things to all people, with sincerity, combined with Communications skills that clarify understanding, resolve conflicts and bridge differences. These capacities are blended with Interpersonal proficiency of clarity and persuasiveness, Team relationships that create coordination, cohesion, trust and commitment, and Partnering capabilities for strategic relations building”.
- **Change**: “Self-development, with risk and achievement, to ensure self-efficacy, Group-directed capacities to ensure unit improvement and group transformation, all with an understanding of the qualities of a CF-wide Learning Organization, applications of a learning organization philosophy, and the capacity of strategic knowledge management”.
- **Professional**: “An acute awareness of the unique, theory-based, discretionary body of

[^19]: Curiously, Schein contends that the raison d’être of organisational culture is to “cope with [a given group’s] problems of external adaptation and internal integration” (1985: 9). Despite this prescient observation, I disagree with his general approach to culture, as I find it overly static, harmonious, and narrow—naturalising and obscuring rather than mediating and resolving such tensions (see Annex A for a fuller treatment of this issue).
knowledge at the core of the profession with an Internalized Ethos whose values and beliefs guide the application of that knowledge. The discretionary nature of military knowledge requires keen judgement in its use and involves Moral Reasoning in thinking and acting, shaped by the military ethos. Professional Ideology underpins a leader exemplar with Credibility/Impact who displays character, openness, assertiveness and extroversion that ensures the necessary effect by and from the leader”.

Visually, these capacities fit together in a jigsaw puzzle-like fashion to reinforce their interconnectedness and inter-dependence. Moreover, professional ideology—which I, for one, would have preferred to label “professional culture”20—is depicted as the central, lynchpin piece:

![Figure 2. CF Leader Framework: 5 Leader Elements – 16 Leader Attributes (Walker 2006: 29)](image)

Second, the CF distinguishes between four levels of professional development:

4. Senior—Colonel/General and Sergeants Major;
3. Advanced—Major/Lieutenant Colonel and Platoon/Gunnery Sergeant → First Sergeant;
2. Intermediate—Lieutenant/Captain and “strategic corporal” → squad leader; and
1. Initial (or Novice)—cadet/new officer and enlisted equivalent.

Other militaries categorize these levels differently, often distinguishing pre-commissioned officers and soldiers in basic training (introducing a 0 level to the equation) from those who have joined units. Similarly, few other armed forces treat officers and non-commissioned members using a single framework—though the CF certainly recognizes that the specific needs and processes vary between the two groups as well as across occupational specialties, services, etc. Nevertheless, most militaries recognize 4 key stages of professional development based loosely on the apprentice, journeyman, master, and guild leader model. Thus, much of the Canadian model is transferable despite its national peculiarities.

Together, these capacities and levels form a matrix of what general attributes an individual should

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20 *Duty with Honour: the profession of arms in Canada* (2003) does not mention professional ideology, but does distinguish between the military ethos (the ideal) and culture (the actual). Subsequent publications (e.g., Bentley 2005, Canada 2005, Walker 2006, etc.) modify these understandings and introduce new terminologies, however in my assessment none of them adequately conceptualise culture nor afford it sufficient importance.
have at different stages of his or her career as depicted below:

![Figure 3. CF Professional Development Framework (PDF)—overview (Walker 2006: 31)](image)

A more fully developed version of the PDF, complete with generic competencies, is included at Annex B. Note that in Figure 3, as with the jigsaw-like Figure 2, professional ideology is accorded particular status. The subtly coloured “waves” of influence that wash over the entire profession emanate from the seniors’ grasp of “professional ideology”—that is, their stewardship—not their “expertise”. In fact, tactical capability is the furthest away from the “epicentre” possible. This reflects another axis of differentiation not included in the graphic above, one that captures the focus, type of knowledge, how it is acquired, and what the critical points of reference are.

If one divides the twenty-cell matrix diagonally by drawing a line from senior expertise through junior professional ideology (this is depicted graphically in Annex C), the contents are divided into two roughly equal halves (triangles) with the following predominant characteristics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Task/job completion</th>
<th>Professionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Procedural/declarative</td>
<td>Conceptual/abstract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>Learned (often by rote)</td>
<td>Discovered/acculturated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance</td>
<td>Explicit/formal</td>
<td>Implicit/informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Internal (the institution)</td>
<td>External (society, government, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premise</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Post-modernity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Nature of the CF PDF

This has a number of implications for the development of cross-cultural competence: First, individuals at different stages of PD will comprehend varying degrees of cultural nuance/subtlety/abstraction. Secondly, “culture” has far more of the characteristics from the top right (abstract, ambiguous, informal concepts) than the bottom left (the world is knowable,

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21 This is not to suggest that either half or triangle is exclusive of the other's influence; rather, I seek to identify the relative emphasis of each. Hence, the closer to the top right corner, the more prevalent, and strong these characteristics are. Coloured shading would undoubtedly be a better way to depict this, but this currently escapes my graphic skill to depict and command of prose to describe.

22 See Walker (2006: 21) for a similar but broader analysis.
definable, and based on rules, thus problems are solvable given sufficient data and time). Finally, the techniques of teaching/instilling/developing cross-cultural competence must correspond to this, a point to which I will return.

As the astute reader has no doubt already ascertained, culture—qua culture—is not explicitly articulated in the CF PDF. This stands in stark contrast with other approaches, such as that proposed by Leonard Wong of the US Army War College, who identifies “cross-cultural savvy” as a “meta-competency”:

The Army’s future leaders clearly need to be well-versed in interacting with cultures outside the U.S. borders. Cross-cultural savvy, however, refers to more than just the ability to work with non-US militaries. The meta-competency cross-cultural savvy includes the ability to understand cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical, and political boundaries. A strategic leader with cross-cultural skills is comfortable interacting with and leading joint, international, interagency, or inter-organizational entities. Future strategic leaders must be able to work with a diverse group of people and organizations ranging from 24-year-old congressional staffers, to Northern Alliance warlords, to representatives from nongovernmental organizations (Wong, et al. 2003).

While the CF PDF fails to mention, explore, or define 3C, it is still a useful reference as it articulates the concept’s key building blocks: Rather than starting by defining competencies (or “skill sets”), the CF PDF presents macro groupings of capacities, aspects of which can be combined to provide more specific competencies. These terms are not just jargon, catchwords, or semantic hairs to be split; instead, think of CF PDF’s five capacities as a “palette of primary colours” from which one can mix a nearly infinite range of “shades of paint” or competencies. Possessing the necessary competencies or attributes under each of the five capacities at any given PD level would (if properly conceived, delivered, and assessed) result in competence or status.

Cross-cultural competence fits this metaphor quite nicely: There are specific sub-sets of each of the five capacities that need to be combined to produce somebody who is cross-culturally competent. For example, 3C is partially addressed under the Cognitive and Social Capacities (see Annex B): Cognitive Capacity, for example, emphasizes development from Following Theorems & Practical Rules → Applying Theories & Concepts → Developing Mental Models → Creating Knowledge. Likewise, Social Capacity includes “Strategic Relations Building” at the Senior level.

These are a good start, yet woefully insufficient. Neither explicitly recognizes culture as a domain in its own right; thus, unless mandated by seniors, it could easily be ignored in PD programmes generated from this framework. Moreover, the cross-cultural tasks envisioned under “Strategic Relations Building” are carried out at far more junior levels every day. If we do not teach military professionals these skills until they are Colonels or senior NCOs, we are doing a disservice to our junior personnel (who we routinely ask to carry such tasks out), thereby endangering both mission success and the well-being of the profession.

What is more, as Wong, et al. suggested, culture is too often seen as pertaining to the “other” (adversaries and non-combatants) and allies, ignoring cultural aspects of ones own troops, NGO/IO

23 Alan Okros has argued that as a result of this division, the “home faculty” of professional military education (PME)—that is the set of academic disciplinary assumptions that guide the educational process—should shift at the more senior levels from Engineering (the world is definable, problems are solvable) where it is now, to Philosophy (the world is only describable, problems often have no solution, certainly not simple ones), with Anthropology and other disciplines dealing explicitly with culture falling only slightly closer to the centre.
personnel, members of other government departments, and those on the home front. Without a clear vision of what cross-cultural competence is, looks like, and entails at different professional development levels, the chances of achieving it across the profession are slim at best.

5. PDF Meet 3C, 3C Meet the PDF

As a first step toward synthesizing these two concepts, let me propose broad objectives or roles for cross-cultural competent individuals at four levels (note that I have reversed the order, to build from the bottom-up):  

1. Initial or Novice (cadet/new officer and enlisted equivalent)—Cultural Self-Identity;  
2. Intermediate (Lt/Capt and “strategic corporal” → squad leader)—Intra-Cultural Facilitator;  
3. Advanced (Maj/LCol and PltSgt/GSgy → 1SG/SGM)—Pluri-Cultural Leader; and  
4. Senior (Col/Gen and SGMs)—Cross-Cultural Ambassador.

In greater detail but still at a conceptual (rather than technical) level, these professional objectives could be understood as follows:

1. Initial or Novice (cadet/new officer and enlisted equivalent)—Cultural Self-Identity:  
   We have to recognize that we are submitting generally young adults to an intensive acculturation process. Whether the individual can see it or not, the military is grinding the cultural lens through which they perceive the world so they will see it as a soldier not a civilian. Nevertheless, the individual is still a person with his/her own worldview (shaped by national, family, religious, and other influences). So, the first, entry level role that needs to be understood (and that we need to assist people in making sense of), is simply cultural self-identity as a citizen-soldier—who am I, how do I see the world, what are the values etc that are important to me, etc. Second, 3C should also provide information on the culture concept and develop individuals’ ability to apply prescriptive training (i.e., use the “smart card”, make sense of the “pre-deployment briefing”, access the “University of Barnes and Noble”, etc.).

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24 When discussing culture, we frequently tend to focus on those who are more different than similar to us. Ironically, when one looks at the quantity and frequency of contacts most soldiers have with these groups, they are primarily with other “blue” or friendly forces (comrades, “sister services”, and allies), followed by “green” elements (non-hostile members of the local population), “orange” elements (government, NGO, and IO personnel), and finally “red” or adversarial forces. This, DODD 3000.05, and pressure/preliminary drafts/critique of a new counter-insurgency doctrine (Cohen et. al 2006, Department of the Army 2006, Shultz and Dew 2006) has led the US Army to re-define the primary focus of operations (i.e., the “centre of gravity”) from “red” to “green” elements—and the focus of cultural learning. Similarly, it suggests to me that “blue” forces should be a primary focus of cultural learning as they represent the majority of cross-cultural contacts and therefore potential misunderstandings. Acknowledging the internal heterogeneity of armed forces may also reduce troops’ tendency to see the world in stark and counter-productive dichotomies of “us versus them”.

25 This section was developed in close collaboration with Dr. Alan C. Okros, Executive Director of the Royal Military College of Canada’s Centre for Security, Armed Forces & Society.

26 This model squares quite nicely (though not perfectly) with both Gurstein’s (1999: 215-216) initial assessment of the training requirements for “peacekeeping armies of the future”—suggesting that contemporary operations are more similar than distinct from peace support operations—and Graen and Hui’s call for the development of “transcultural skills” within the professional military education and training systems (1999: 244-247). PD levels also map quite closely onto those developed by Gardenswartz and Rowe (1998), subsequently proposed for use in military cultural education by McFarland (2005).

27 US soldiers’ colloquial term for “knowledge” acquired from books purchased through the popular bookseller Barnes and Noble. The process often entails the less than rigorous process of visiting the store (on-line or in person),
2. Intermediate (Lt/Capt and “strategic corporal” → squad leader)—Intra-Cultural Facilitator:
The “Intra-” recognizes some/many of the multiple sub-groups, sub-cultures, nuances, etc. and identities/roles that inform individuals at any given time. Consequently, the emphasis here is on working with diversity within an overarching cultural domain so that as leaders they can work effectively with generally similar but slightly different “others”. This may be framed as accommodating differences amongst subordinates or across units where there is much in common but significant differences in specific areas.

3. Advanced (Maj/LCol and PltSgt/GSgry → 1SG/SGM)—Pluri-Cultural Leader:
These individuals must be able to work effectively in environments in which there is more dissimilarity than similarity across the groups. Therefore, a coalition of US, Canadian, and British soldiers may only require the intra-cultural competence as they share large amounts of common culture. Leading a coalition with African and Asian troops, diplomats and developmentalists, NGOs and IOs, and others will likely require pluri-cultural competence.

4. Senior (Col/Gen and SGMs)—Cross-Cultural Ambassador:
Following models of the stages of moral development embedded in Professional Ideology (Bentley 2005), this individual should be able to fully recognize their own cultural world view and to be able to find external reference points to allow them to critique or work outside of this frame in order to assist different groups to understand each other and collaborate (whether in parallel, co-operatively, or another fashion).

At a more detailed level, the following suggests how the five broad capabilities elucidated in the CF PDF could generate specific cross-cultural competencies at different PD levels. This model assumes that acquisition of these would constitute individual cross-cultural competence (note, this information is depicted graphically as a matrix in Annex D):

1. Initial or Novice (cadet/new officer and enlisted equivalent)—Cultural Self-Identity:
   - **Expertise**: Knowledge of the culture concept and ability to apply prescriptive training.
   - **Cognitive**: Reasoning to understand how culture shapes the person.
   - **Social**: Awareness of inter-personal and inter-group differences.
   - **Change**: Self-insight and receptivity to cultural awareness training.
   - **Professional Ideology**: Recognition of implicit ethos and identification of cultural references to guide conduct.

2. Intermediate (Lt/Capt and “strategic corporal” → squad leader)—Intra-Cultural Facilitator:
   - **Expertise**: Knowledge of key domains of culture (kinship, religion, exchange, etc.).
   - **Cognitive**: Reasoning to draw inferences from behaviours and symbols to underlying systems and meanings.
   - **Social**: Work with individual and group differences.
   - **Change**: Self-understanding and ability to adapt behaviour to context.
   - **Professional Ideology**: Conduct cultural self-regulation (avoid offending, signal own values).

searching for a general topic (e.g., Iraq + culture), purchasing the first (or several) source(s) found, and reading it (them). This process is similar to how McFate describes google.com being used to make policy in the absence of solid ethnographic data (2005: 46).
3. Advanced (Maj/L.Col and PltSgt/GSgy → 1SG/SGM)—Pluri-Cultural Leader:
   - **Expertise**: Knowledge of broader cultural context in which military operates.
   - **Cognitive**: Post-modern reasoning and cultural sense making.
   - **Social**: Develop common objectives while recognising diversity.
   - **Change**: Shape group understanding and align team behaviours to context.
   - **Professional Ideology**: Conduct ethical reasoning in culturally conflicted settings.

4. Senior (Col/Gen and SGMs)—Cross-Cultural Ambassador:
   - **Expertise**: Understanding culturally complex contexts.
   - **Cognitive**: Perceive world views relevant to complex setting.
   - **Social**: Represent own and others’ cultural perspective to multiple audiences.
   - **Change**: Align symbols to create common shared or imagined community.
   - **Professional Ideology**: Develop own framework for moral and ethical reasoning in culturally-conflicted settings.

Achieving this will require a significant and co-ordinated effort at the individual, but more importantly, the institutional level.

6. Enhancing 3C through Military Professional Development Systems

The CF recognizes four professional development pillars or mechanisms:

1. **Experience**: life and professional.
2. **Training**: allows a well-practiced response to predicted scenarios.
3. **Education**:\(^{28}\) facilitates a well-reasoned response to unpredictable scenarios.
4. **Self-development**: self-paced and self-directed activities.

While all four could be applied to the process of developing military professionals’ cross-cultural competence, the complex nature of culture will require increased emphasis on education rather than the military’s traditional reliance on experience, training, and self-development. What is more, in their current manifestations, these pillars focus almost exclusively on cultivating declarative and procedural knowledge. Thus, they will have to be significantly re-tooled if they are to aid military professionals achieve cross-cultural competence through acculturation to the profession, development of empathy, self-discovery, etc. (i.e., elements from the top right half of the CF Professional Development Framework as described above and in Annex B).

For example, currently, every task or learning objective in the US Army has its concomitant conditions and standards. Culture is imbricated not only in the tasks, which by definition will be vague and abstract, but also the conditions and standards. Yet the nature of culture and the operational environment (McFarland and Fontenot 2000), presumes that conditions and standards will be ambiguous and constantly changing. Yet how does one elaborate appropriate standards? (Especially when the goal is to assess cultural knowledge acquisition or task proficiency—neither of which fully captures the essence of 3C to begin with?)

The task is difficult but not impossible, as Simons’ study of the US Special Forces (1998) concludes that ambiguity can in fact produce excellence in group and individual performance. Transferring these lessons to conventional forces will, nonetheless, be a significant challenge. Likewise, implementing them in an institution that favours conformity over innovation will require some

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\(^{28}\) This includes both PME and secondary/post-secondary civilian education.
significant changes. Not everything will entail such up-hill battles, though. Some of the easier applications and modifications of the PD pillars to develop 3C might include:

**Experience:**
- Encouraging more military personnel to live off base, travel, participate in diverse communities, serve on exchanges, etc.
- Recruiting greater numbers of minorities, bi-, multi-, and trans-cultural individuals (e.g., Ben-Ari and Elron 2001; Gurstein 1999; Soeters and van der Meulen 1999) as they are already accustomed to navigating and negotiating between cultures—a useful skill and perspective for the profession even if these are not cultures of interest today—though greater diversity of personnel without careful study and planning ensures neither enhanced cross-cultural effectiveness nor necessarily increased performance (e.g., Mannix and Neal 2005).
- Attracting more members with certain experiences (e.g., former exchange students), educational background (e.g., anthropology majors), higher CQ levels (if one accepts that these attributes are trainable) or personality features (e.g., openness to new ideas and experiences, flexibility, etc.—if one was convinced the keys to success are trait-like).
- Providing military personnel stationed overseas greater opportunities (and encouragement) to learn the local language, culture, and geography (as the British and other countries militaries’ commonly do) rather than assuming a defensive posture, insular orientation, and remaining “inside the wire” (Hawkins 2001).

**Training:**
- Individual: familiarization courses, language training, etc.
- Collective: small to medium sized unit training integrating cultural components such as operations in mock villages, role-playing, etc.\(^{29}\)

**Education:**
- Heavier emphasis on liberal arts, especially anthropology, but also more religion (esp. theology), sociology (esp. qualitative), psychology (esp. social and cross-cultural), geography (esp. human and cultural), philosophy (esp. ethics), etc., as well as shifting from language training to a language arts approach.\(^{30}\)
- Exposure to the culture concept—through a mandatory pre-commissioning or post-enrolment specially tailored anthropology course, for example—could be used to “jump-start” the process (though a single class in “world politics and culture” will, more often than not, emphasize “politics” and provide little insight to “culture”).
- Returning to the quote from Monaghan and Just in my introduction, the integration of culture to PME should emphasize less “facts”—ethnographic data (in hopes of finding “the answer”)—and more concepts (e.g., culture, holism, relativism, emic vs. etic, kinship/inheritance/descent/residence systems, social stratification, segmentation, ritual, symbols, taboos, etc.) that will promote understanding of “issues” (not “problems”).

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\(^{29}\) Collective training, in particular, is a field that will require significant additional study in the near future (e.g., Selmeski in progress-a) although it falls beyond the immediate scope of this paper.

\(^{30}\) In fairness, many military language-training centres—such as the US Defense Language Institute’s Foreign Language Center (www.dli.fci.edu/index.asp)—have increasingly integrated cultural understanding and stressed the ability to communicate in multiple (i.e., military and non-military) contexts. Ironically, more than half a decade ago, Kennard (1949) described how anthropologists at FSI employed a similar approach.
Similarly, anthropological methods (e.g., fieldwork, ethnography, participant observation, social network analysis, comparative linguistics, etc.) should be taught to help individuals gather data on their own. Finally, a passing familiarity with anthropological and other social scientific theories (e.g., functionalism, structuralism, cultural materialism, cultural ecology, etc.)—tailored to the appropriate PD level and occupational specialty, of course—would facilitate deeper understanding of these sorts of data/information.

This is going to require a serious re-think of what constitutes useful education. What is taught, to whom, when, and by whom? Likewise, who is hired, where, and when? DOD says it is committed to teaching culture, yet I can count the number of professional anthropologists employed as full-time professors (not adjuncts, part-time instructors, or sessional lecturers) within the US military’s PME system on one hand (political scientists and historians, by contrast, are employed in droves). Others are teaching culture too, and while most of them are no doubt competent professionals in their own field, I wager that most lack the degree of conceptual (not factual) expertise that PhD-trained anthropologists bring to the discussion.

Rushed or poorly conceived efforts to introduce culture to PME curricula (by military and civilian administrators who perceive the problem but do not necessarily have as clear vision of the “solution” nor how to implement it), can produce more heat than light (Fujimura 2006). What is more, to quote a Marine colleague who speaks from experience in the field and the schoolhouse, when dealing with culture, “a little knowledge can be as dangerous as complete ignorance—if not more so”.

The culturally-focused research and development centres and policy analysis units that are proliferating within the defence community—and that should be providing instructors with additional concepts, models, and theories—suffer a similar dearth of professional anthropologists. This is not always for lack of desire or effort on their part, yet the shortfall requires them to draw largely on other disciplines with “only have a hunch as to what the study of culture entails” (Fujimura 2006) and “regional experts” who are similarly ill equipped for the task (Henk 2006). Hence, much of this important work is conducted either by cultural studies novices within the system, contractors (often of dubious academic preparation), or (in the best, but least common case) external...
Regardless of their nature, the bulk of these organizations have far more of an operation focus than an institutional one.\textsuperscript{34} This is not terribly surprising, given that the inability of Phase IV operations to predict, prevent, and respond to the Iraqi insurgency was a primary catalyst for their establishment. (It also helps explain why the US is becoming a leader in this field, quickly surpassing countries that have traditionally boasted greater cultural awareness, such as the UK and Canada.) Moreover, their preliminary efforts to communicate cross-cultural know-how are disjointed (Henk personal communication) and in my assessment range from adequate but superficial (e.g., Nuti 2006; USMC 2005) to downright poor (e.g., Department of Defense 2006b). Henk (2006), confirms my general assessment, describing some of the resulting training material from one US Army center as “conceptually and factually flawed, reflecting a somewhat painful amateurism”.

Cultural education will require less emphasis on recruiting, commissioning, and forming engineers and more emphasis on advanced degrees in “soft” sciences and humanities (see Exum 2007 for a general discussion; and Fujimura 2003; 2006 for a more ethnographic treatment of this dilemma at the US Naval Academy). Is the US Air Force (or Navy, Army, or Marine Corps) ready to commission (and enlist) more Anthropology, Religion, Gender Studies, and other “non-traditional” majors?\textsuperscript{35} Are they ready to permit more ROTC and USAFA cadets to take a year abroad to live and study submerged in non-European contexts?\textsuperscript{36} Or to attend the Bolivian and Paraguayan Military Academies?

Military leaders eager to apply the standard “PME school house” style—standardized syllabi, rigid learning plans, seemingly never-ending PowerPoint presentations, constant assessment and quantitative ranking, a teacher-centric focus, etc.—to achieve 3C should recall Hall’s pedagogical approach at FSI. By his own account, diplomats were impatient and generally disinterested in learning about what he understood as the quintessence of cross-cultural communication: “what culture is” (1959: 35-36). As a result, he adopted “methods of training [that] were highly participatory and experiential. Hall de-

\textsuperscript{34} An initial, though likely incomplete, inventory of these organizations in the US and their respective foci (\textit{O}=Operational, \textit{I}=Institutional) includes: The US Marine Corps’ Intelligence Activity (MCIA) and Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) at Quantico—\textit{O}; the US Air Force’s Center for Language and Cultural Studies at Maxwell AFB—\textit{I}; the US Navy’s Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (CLREC) in Pensacola—\textit{O}; the US Army’s JFK Special Warfare School at Ft. Bragg—\textit{O}, TRADOC Culture Center and University of Military Intelligence at Ft. Huachuca—\textit{O}, University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS), Foreign Military Studies Office’s (FMSO) Cultural Operations Research–Human Terrain (COR-HT), and Center for Army Leadership (CAL) at Ft. Leavenworth—\textit{O/I}; the Office of the Secretary’s Defense Language Office (DLO)—\textit{I}; and likely others, with more almost certainly to follow.

\textsuperscript{35} In the case of the US Army, the answer is finally—after too many years—“yes”. Tice (2006) reports that the Army is increasing “funded graduate school opportunities for high-potential junior officers...to broaden the intellectual capital of the officer corps in such areas as cultural awareness, diplomacy, governance and security and operational skills”. He goes on to note that “approved academic disciplines for the expanded graduate school program” in cultural awareness includes anthropology, geography, and other social sciences. While this comes more than a decade too late for the author—who was once told by his career manager that the Army needed neither anthropologists nor PhDs, despite having been offered a full fellowship to Syracuse University—it is an encouraging step for the future of the institution.

\textsuperscript{36} I fought this administrative battle as well, eventually taking Fall Semester of my senior year to conduct independent research abroad. This was only possible thanks to the indefatigable support of my professor of Military Science, then Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas MacIver who insisted that the benefits to the Army outweighed the disadvantages of my temporary absence from the Corps of Cadet. Without this experience, I might never have decided to become an anthropologist (Selmeski 1992).
intercultural communication” (Rogers, et al. 2002: 10).

- Not all of this education must be done “in-house” or with defence personnel, though. There are thousands of highly qualified scholars—American and international—in these disciplines who would likely jump at the opportunity to teach Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Air Personnel so long as their professional and ethical concerns are addressed up front and respected (see Kaplan 2006 for an example from the intelligence community; and Selmeski in progress-b for a brief introduction to these concerns in the discipline of anthropology).

- Regardless of how 3C is imparted through PME, these techniques will have to undergo validation studies (which themselves will have to be developed and vetted to ensure they are not ethnocentric). Likewise, individual students’ learning will have to be assessed (no easy task) to gauge their actual competence before being required to apply it operationally, bringing up the pesky topic of metrics yet again.

**Self-development:**

- Reading lists, videos, etc.
- In both the US military and CF systems, self-development tends to be the “catch-all” approach to provide professionals’ with capacities the system is too busy, inflexible, or otherwise incapable of accomplishing. I hope that it will not be used in the same manner for 3C, though initial evidence is not encouraging. Perhaps this is not surprising given the military’s high operational tempo, short duration of courses, ample other subject material to be covered, and general bureaucratic resistance to change. Nor is the military alone in this predicament, as recent reports on the FBI and other institutions of the security sector demonstrate (e.g., Horwitz 2006).

- Yet even a cursory review of “cultural awareness reading lists” from the various services raises other, perhaps more troubling, concerns: (1) many of the sources recommended in such documents are only marginally related to culture (focusing instead on politics, economics, military history, etc.); (2) they contain precious few anthropological references; and (3) none that I reviewed contain any general readings on the culture concept—with the exception of noted political scientist and ethnocentrist Samuel Huntington’s troublingly sub-titled *Culture Matters: how values shape human progress* (2000).

This is only a very brief treatment of these issues, elaborating specific “learning objectives” as well as the associated “paths” and “pedagogies” (to use the trendy jargon of military “education technicians”) will require long, hard thought and discussion between scholars from a variety of disciplines along with military professionals.\(^{37}\) Alternately, the armed forces could improvise this or rely on the same set of narrow disciplinary perspectives it found useful since the Cold War. I suggest that neither of these options is likely to produce the desired results.

**Some Concluding Thoughts**

The good news is that some of what I am calling for is already starting to occur in various militaries.

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\(^{37}\) Also see Wong (2005: particularly slide 10) for a US Army perspective on how “cross-cultural savvy” could be developed. Note, however, that Wong’s approach places far more emphasis on “regional”, “linguistic”, “political”, “economic”, and other factors than culture as understood in this paper. This leads me to believe that while he astutely identified the need/deficit in PME (e.g., Wong et al. 2003), he has not yet conceived of an adequate means to develop this capacity among military professionals.
None that I know of, however, has a coherent plan that integrates cross-cultural competence using all PD pillars at all development levels for non-context/operational purposes. Instead, it tends to be a knee-jerk reaction to the deployment-of-the-day and focused on content delivery rather than fostering general competence across the profession. I suggest that adopting a competency-based approach will both improve the efficacy of content delivery (when the time comes) and better prepare military professionals to confront unscripted/unexpected situations.

Full implementation will require significant funding. Yet, in the US DOD FY 06-07 budget proposal, language and cultural training amounts to less than the cost of one F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. So, promoting 3C is, at one level, a question of funding priorities. Even more importantly, however, this requires recognition of one’s institutional need (the US military has done so; the Canadian Forces have not, yet) and an awareness of the issues at play/conceptual frameworks that could be used to resolve them (hence the importance of building bridges between the military and academia).

My musings in this paper should not be mistaken for definitive answers, but rather an attempt to identify the major realms of inquiry, pose some preliminary questions, and provide some admittedly superficial initial responses from an anthropological perspective. Clearly, a great deal more research and conceptualising must occur, and several areas stand out as requiring particular attention. From most abstract to most concrete, these are:

- How do different academic disciplines (this paper has taken a particularly anthropological approach) understand culture, and which aspects may be of relevance to the military operationally and institutionally?
- What has been done within the US and Canadian militaries to date? How effective has it been? How have other militaries and professions not examined in this paper addressed similar challenges? What could we learn from them? What is unique to the armed forces?
- How should this professional development framework be expanded and employed to guide the development of individual members’ 3C?
- How should this plan be operationalised—what specific content should be taught to whom (common versus specific by rank, trade, etc.), how, where, and when?
- How should this effort be assessed to ensure it is achieving the desired goals (and that these are in fact the most appropriate objectives)?
- How should cultural effectiveness be conceived, developed, and evaluated for small and medium sized teams?
- How can military organizations promote and sustain 3C across the institution and the profession of arms?

These are large and complicated questions; nevertheless, I hope these introductory thoughts—tentative and disjointed though they may be—promote greater awareness, discussion, and action that will ultimately lead to more militaries achieving broad-based 3C.

38 Should these be performance based? This presents the dilemma of how to benchmark, or as Jeff Bearor of USMC’s CAOCL asked rhetorically: “Should we only prepare half of the next Marine rotation to Iraq to gauge how effective our efforts are?” Clearly not, as learning from failures is less desirable than from successes, though many successes pass undetected, as they consist of problems adverted, minimised, or recovered from quickly. Nor can this process be easily reduced to a metric, something that Steve Rotkoff of UFMCS described as “creating the illusion of precision [regarding cultural knowledge/understanding], not actual precision.”
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Annex A. Conceptualising Cognitive Cultural Intelligence (CQ)

When visiting Singapore in Fall 2006, Dr. Soon Ang, Director of Nanyang University Business School's Centre for Leadership and Cultural Intelligence, asked me a deceptively simple question: How might anthropology help her team better conceptualise and operationalise the measurement of cognitive cultural intelligence to improve both professional development and scholarly analysis? My response has three parts and culminates with a preliminary approach:

First, when one begins to unpack this question, it is revealed as a challenge for an entire career, one that pits the benefits of parsimony against those of holism. Thus, it addresses some of anthropology’s great theoretical debates as well as the discipline’s historical inability to provide relevant and useful concepts to professions such as international business and the military. Moreover, I am not an expert in quantitative methods nor the precise (proprietary) instruments used to assess CQ. I can, therefore, only offer initial observations and from there some modest recommendations.

Second, I suggest modifying CQ’s reliance on Edgar Schein’s approach to culture (1985). Schein is a psychologist who focuses primarily on organisational culture and in his most famous work offers what at first appears to be a reasonable definition of the concept as:

A pattern of basic assumptions— invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration—that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (9). Schein confesses, however, to being “rooted more in theories of group dynamics and group growth than in anthropological theories” (8). The result is a narrow conceptual foundation, objectives, and focus that fails to address crucial elements such as symbols, structures, and behaviour. He also recognises, but cannot reconcile, that individuals have (and are influenced by) multiple cultures—not just organizational culture.

Furthermore, Schein falsely assumed that humans—especially leaders, as his book was a study of culture and leadership—can make and control culture. In fact, they only make the social structure and influence (probably less than they would like to admit) part of the culture. As anthropologist James Peacock (1986: 6) notes, “culture is beyond the control of any single person; it takes on a power of its own”. Finally, Schein reifies culture as something bounded and relatively stable rather than holistic and in a constant state of flux.

Despite these significant limitations, Schein’s work is quite useful insofar as he has popularized the study of organizational culture and distinguishing between three levels: artefacts and creations, values, and basic assumptions. I propose to modify this tri-partite approach somewhat by adding behaviour, introducing a new meso-level that integrates some of the anthropological insights Schein omits, and collapsing values and assumptions into a broader category as follows:

39 Anthropological emphasis on behaviour has varied with the discipline’s preoccupation. For example, Ingold (1994: 394) notes, “as [anthropological] emphasis shifted from manifest patterns of behaviour to underlying structures of symbolic meaning, culture came to be defined in opposition to behaviour, much as language was opposed to speech.” I, along with many other anthropologists, reject this position. Similarly, the Marie Intelligence Activity’s focuses on behaviour rather than belief, as they feel the former can be assessed and influenced but not the latter (Connable 2006). I find this attitude disconcerting too, as de-emphasising belief only renders it increasingly invisible to Marines, not less important in shaping the actions of those they must interact with regularly. My point is simply that to be truly cross-culturally competent, one must be conscious of and understand behaviours as well as beliefs.

40 This is also to Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner’s approach as described in much of their corporate consulting and scholarly literature.
• Surface—material and behaviours (verbal and non-verbal);
• Middle—structures and systems (physical, symbolic, etc.); and
• Deep—values, beliefs and emotions (aware → taken for granted).

The third part of my response to Ang was to re-think the domains her team used to generate their survey questions. These were drawn from the Human Relations Area Files’ (HRAF) Outline of Cultural Materials or OCM (Murdock, et al. 2006), which establishes a coding system regarding many aspects of select cultures. In 2004, anthropologist Carol Ember and several other HRAF members modified the OCM. They group the 97 “Subject Codes” and hundreds of sub-codes (ranging from land use to taboos to military tactics) that formed the backbone of the traditional system under 18 new “General Topic” headings: Basic Information; History, Prehistory, and Culture Change; Language and Communication; Economy, Food, and Resource Exploitation; Technology and Material Culture; Marriage, Family, Kinship, and Social Organization; Social Relationships; Life Cycle; Sexuality and Reproduction; Political Organization and Behaviour; Justice, Law, and Social Problems; International and Interethnic Relations; Religion; Health, Illness, Medicine, and Death; Education and Knowledge; Arts; Recreation; Information Sources and Research.

Nevertheless, 18 domains were still too many to operationalise in an assessment instrument, so Ang subjected them to standard quantitative assessments to determine which could be demonstrated as causal and independent variables of CQ. Her result was six factors: Legal and Economic Systems; Religious Beliefs; Marriage Systems; Arts and Crafts; Rules of Language; Rules for Expressing Non-verbal Behaviour. Though scientifically sound from a quantitative approach, this process removed much of the richness and nuance of culture as anthropologists understand the concept from the variables.41

Moreover, assessing CQ requires that data be elicited with numerous instrument questions, each constructed with ample cultural insight. Finally, as data elicitation requires self-reporting, it is difficult to assess with certitude the validity of informants’ responses. In reverse order, my recommendations to address these concerns are:

• Complement survey self-reporting with qualitative interviewing and observation to triangulate the results—anthropologists can assist;
• Employ individuals knowledgeable in the local culture to help develop instrument questions and expand the length of the survey—anthropologists and local individuals can both assist;
• Re-visit HRAF’s OCM to generate a new list of domains (less than 18, but more than 6), regardless of how they fare during quantitative evaluation, to produce a fuller and more accurate set of questioning frames—this anthropologist began to assist with this process.42

41 Overall, I find these factors to be too focused on systems; hence, they do not effectively capture behaviours or meanings. I also recommend removing language, as learning culture via language requires too great a command of syntax, grammar, vocabulary, etc. to be an effective baseline measurement and can produce “bi-ignorance” rather than bi-lingualism. (In this sense, I agree with Michael Agar (1993, 2006) and the US Air University’s “big C, little l” approach to “Culture and language” development.) Finally, I suggest changing “Marriage” to the broader concepts of “Family & Kinship”.

42 This also means that “dimensions of culture” approaches popularized by consulting firms such as ITIM/Hofstede (1980, 2001)—Power Distance; Uncertainty Avoidance; Individualism; Long-Term Orientation; and Masculinity—and THT/Trompenaars (1994, 1998)—Universalism vs. Particularism; Individualism vs. Communitarianism; Specific vs. Diffuse Cultures; Affective vs. Neutral Cultures; Achievement vs. Ascription; Sequential vs. Synchronic Cultures; Internal vs. External Control—provide only partial answers, 3C requires more granularity and breadth of understanding. These are powerful analytical categories, to be sure, but not domains. (For a fuller review and critique of dimensions and national culture approaches, see Smith (2002) and McSweeny (2002).)
The following matrix is a first attempt to conjoin domains with the aforementioned tri-level approach. The 11 domains I selected may not be applicable to all cultures, but on first review they seemed potentially important (i.e., they possess face validity). Nor do I presume that the content (or questions used to determine/assess it) are universal, hence for now they remain shaded in grey:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CORE DOMAINS OF CULTURE</th>
<th>(examples of select sub-domains)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family &amp; Kinship</td>
<td>(e.g., marriage, children, family, origins, decent, inheritance, locality, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religion &amp; Spirituality</td>
<td>(e.g., origins, agency, dieties, birth/death/ health/afterlife, law, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex &amp; Gender</td>
<td>(e.g., categories, roles, identities, responsibilities, reproduction, labour, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Politics &amp; Social Relations</td>
<td>(e.g., community, ethnic, regional, national, origins, status/leadership, law, rituals, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economics &amp; Resources</td>
<td>(e.g., production, re-distribution, accumulation, exchange, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time &amp; Space</td>
<td>(e.g., orientation, purpose(s), measurement, relations, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Language &amp; Communication</td>
<td>(e.g., verbal &amp; non-verbal, direct vs. indirect, high vs. low context, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technology &amp; Material Culture</td>
<td>(e.g., production, adoption, health, functions, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>History &amp; Myth</td>
<td>(e.g., creation, origins, ends, events, individuals, agency, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aesthetics, Recreation &amp; Sustenance</td>
<td>(e.g., art, music, sport, clothing, adornement, rest, leisure, food, drink, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learning &amp; Knowledge</td>
<td>(e.g., experiential, community, professional, formal, etc.)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVELS OF CULTURE (potential forms)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surface – material &amp; behaviours (verbal &amp; non-verbal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle – systems &amp; structures (physical, social, symbolic, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deep – beliefs [aware --&gt; TFG] (values, emotions, assumptions, etc.)</td>
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</table>

Table 3. Core Domains and Levels of Culture

Such a tool could be used for data gathering, analysis, or storage/transmission purposes. It is not without flaw though, as it lacks the ability of Hall’s map to correlate different domains of culture. Nor does it offer a way to sort the cultural data that is pertinent to the military professional’s immediate question from the rest—no matter how interesting it might be. Thus, this should be treated as a draft instrument rather than a honed and tested one.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPERTISE</th>
<th>TACTICAL TO STRATEGIC</th>
<th>COGNITIVE CAPACITIES</th>
<th>ANALYTIC TO CREATIVE/ABSTRACT</th>
<th>SOCIAL CAPACITIES</th>
<th>INTERPERSONAL TO INTER-</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL</th>
<th>CHANGE CAPACITIES</th>
<th>OPENNESS TO PARADIGM</th>
<th>SHIFTING</th>
<th>PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY</th>
<th>INTERNALIZING TO STEWARDSHIP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SENIOR</td>
<td>Security Expertise</td>
<td>Knowledge Creation</td>
<td>Strategic-Relations Building</td>
<td>Multi-Institutional Partnering</td>
<td>Stewardship of the Profession</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Scope and content moves from knowledge to expertise with accompanying expansion to a strategic understanding of the domain of security. Shift from knowledge to expertise requires ability to apply the philosophy and principles that govern the generation and employment of military capacities (knowledge + philosophy = expertise) and strategic, institutional co-existence among peer ministries, foreign defense agencies. Expertise at this stage clearly is dependent upon the complementary development in Professional Ideology, a full understanding of the Profession of Arms.</td>
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<td>Belongs to the concept of Leading the Institution, relies on secondary and tertiary influence processes for the senior leader to communicate institutional priorities and strategic intent across organizational systems. Builds on teams such that immediate subordinates can contribute novel ideas and can critique taken-for-granted assumptions. Externally focused capacities pertain to building and maintaining strategic relations with others engaged in the broad security arena and related national/government initiatives.</td>
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<td>Multi-Institutional Partnering</td>
<td>Focus is external, on changing others’ understanding of the military as a strategic political capacity, and internally on implementing internal change initiatives. In this latter regard, there is an emphasis on the initial stages of anticipating change, effectuating contributions to the change, and monitoring and adjusting initiatives over the change period. Senior leader initiatives exist to transform and improve a team or multiple units, or to attempt learning-organization applications at organizational and institutional levels.</td>
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<td>Stewardship of the Profession</td>
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<td>Defence Knowledge</td>
<td>Mental Models</td>
<td>Group Cohesiveness</td>
<td>Group Transformation</td>
<td>Stewardship of the Profession</td>
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<td>From information to knowledge, incorporating a broad understanding of CF and defense as a key component of security and government functions. Shift from information to knowledge requires additional perspective of understanding the rationale and purpose of intended actions; the generalized outcomes, which are to be achieved (information + purpose = knowledge).</td>
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<td>Inductive and deductive reasoning skills to create, adapt and generalize knowledge both from one’s own previous learning and experiences as well as from other domains such as professional literatures. Conducts abstract reasoning and draws on appropriate professional orientation to be able to understand desired outcomes. Aware of assumptions embedded in the ‘military’ way of framing issues, testing working hypotheses, operating within the academic discipline of ‘military thinking’.</td>
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<td>At this level of larger or multiple units/teams/groups, is involved in aspects of Leading the Institution, applies broad influence processes to ensure internal cohesion, fostering commitment and supporting subordinate leaders while also engaging in effective boundary spanning activities especially in joint or multi-national operations.</td>
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<td>Able to adapt and align groups or sub-systems to the broadest requirements of the institution while ensuring the tactical proficiency and effective integration of individuals and small teams/sections within the larger formation.</td>
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<td>Cultural Alignment</td>
<td>Guides framing of problems, interactions with others, to apply leader influence to shape or align the extant culture to be consistent with the ethos. Contains some of the most complex challenges in achieving competing Institutional Effectiveness objectives—mission success versus member well-being, internal synchrony and stability versus external adaptability and experimentation.</td>
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<td>Military Information</td>
<td>Theories &amp; Concepts</td>
<td>Individual Persuasion</td>
<td>Self-Efficacy</td>
<td>Self-Regulation</td>
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<td>How MOC contributes to larger formation capabilities. Understanding not only what to do but the context in which this occurs (data + context = information). Examples: Effects-Based Operations, context of incremental information on democratic systems, international law, civil control of the military.</td>
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<td>Able to reason, moving from the concrete to the abstract, from procedures and rules to principles.</td>
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<td>Social skills for Leading People, particularly the abilities to effectively influence others ‘one-on-one’ or small group, using some range of influence behaviours appropriate to the characteristics of the situation, the followers and the individual leader.</td>
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<td>Capacities at this stage are focused on the individual’s abilities to monitor self-efficacy, engage in self-reflection, make early commitments to self-development, and adapt one’s behaviours to the social environment/context in which one is functioning.</td>
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<td>Conducts basic self-regulation, avoiding obvious ethical violations and not displaying behaviours which erode the reputation, image or credibility of the profession; essentially a journeyman stage of professionalization. Aligns by the principles of the Defence Ethics Program. Is capable of serving as an example at this level.</td>
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<td>Technical &amp; Tactical Procedures</td>
<td>Theorems &amp; Practical Rules</td>
<td>Theorems &amp; Practical Rules</td>
<td>External Awareness</td>
<td>Normative Compliance</td>
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<td>Learning standard Military Occupational Classification (MOC) and sea/land/air group procedures. For initial leader roles, acquiring an overview of such standards and procedures, small group tactics.</td>
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<td>Reasoning at this level is intended to identify the appropriate task procedures using simple theorems, practical rules or established scientific principles/laws. Interacting, interconnected with Expertise, the two elements represent a ‘cookbook’ approach to problem solving and task accomplishment with limited capacity for innovation.</td>
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<td>Aware of group norms, minimum leader style flexibility. Moderate communication capabilities applied through baseline interpersonal skills reflecting an awareness of basic influence factors, group diversity issues and non-prejudicial self-behaviour.</td>
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<td>Minimal expectation in change capacities would be a generalized orientation and awareness of changes occurring external to the CF, and the CF transformative efforts, as means of signalling the importance of practicing openness to externally-driven change.</td>
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<td>Understands the concepts and practices of the profession of arms at an introductory level. At a minimum practices military group norms, adheres to discipline demands. As an an initial professional (apprentice), looks externally (to supervisors or codes of conduct) for guidance as to the appropriate behaviours in specific circumstances. Internalizes values minimally.</td>
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Annex C. Characteristics of the CF Professional Development Framework
## Annex D. Preliminary Application of the CF PDF to Cross-Cultural Competence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>EXPERTISE</th>
<th>COGNITIVE</th>
<th>SOCIAL</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
<th>PROFESSIONAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SENIOR</strong>&lt;br&gt;(Cross-Cultural Ambassador)</td>
<td>Understanding culturally complex contexts.</td>
<td>Ability to create unique world views which are relevant to complex setting.</td>
<td>Ability to represent own and others’ cultural perspective to multiple audiences.</td>
<td>Capability to align cultural symbols, messages, beliefs, etc. to create common shared or imagined community.</td>
<td>Ability to develop own framework for moral and ethical reasoning in culturally conflicted settings.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ADVANCED</strong>&lt;br&gt;(Pluri-cultural leader)</td>
<td>Knowledge of broader cultural context in which the military operates.</td>
<td>Post-modern reasoning and cultural sense making.</td>
<td>Ability to develop common objectives while recognizing diversity.</td>
<td>Ability to shape group understanding and align team behaviours to context.</td>
<td>Ability to conduct ethical reasoning in culturally-conflicted settings.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INTERMEDIATE</strong>&lt;br&gt;(Intra-Cultural Facilitator)</td>
<td>Knowledge of key facets of culture (role of language, religion, national identity, etc.).</td>
<td>Reasoning to draw inferences from behaviours and symbols to underlying cultural aspects.</td>
<td>Ability to work effectively with individual and group differences.</td>
<td>Self-understanding and ability to adapt behaviour to achieve the desired outcome in a particular cultural context.</td>
<td>Conduct cultural self-regulation (avoid offending, signal own values).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INITIAL</strong>&lt;br&gt;(Cultural Self-Identity)</td>
<td>Information on the culture concept and ability to apply prescriptive training.</td>
<td>Reasoning to understand how culture shapes the person.</td>
<td>Awareness of interpersonal and inter-group differences.</td>
<td>Self-insight and receptivity to cultural awareness training.</td>
<td>Recognition of implicit ethos and identification of cultural references to guide conduct.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About the Author

Brian R. Selmeski is an Anthropological Research Associate at the Royal Military College of Canada’s Centre for Security, Armed Forces & Society in Kingston, Ontario. He was born in New York, lived in South America, served as an Army officer in Central America, and aspired to join the Special Forces until his back decided otherwise. In 1996, he was offered a doctoral fellowship in socio-cultural anthropology from Syracuse University. His Army career manager advised him that such an advanced degree in this arcane discipline was frivolous and would not be approved, so he resigned his commission and set out to become a military anthropologist. After completing his coursework at Syracuse’s Maxwell School, cross-training in archaeology at Binghamton University, and learning to speak Quechua at Cornell University, he carried out three years of fieldwork and archival research (1999-2002) funded by the Social Science Research Council and Fulbright Commission. His dissertation examines how the Ecuadorian Army’s beliefs about multicultural nationalism facilitate and shape conscription for young indigenous men, develop programmes for their communities, and national political events such as the 21 January 2000 indigenous-military uprising that toppled then-President Jamil Mahuad. Along the way, he helped establish, then was twice elected to chair the Latin American Studies Association’s Ecuador Section (2000-2002) before creating the Military Anthropology Network (2003-present), a group he still administers. Since 2004, he has directed an applied research project to assist the Bolivian Ministries of the Presidency, Defence, and Government draft multicultural policies, design professional reforms, and implement diversity projects in the Army, Navy, and National Police. In July 2006, he accepted an invitation to serve as an external academic member of the US Air University’s Cross-Cultural Competence Project. As a result, he is now conducting conceptual and empirical research on how armed forces can best enhance all members’ cross-cultural competence through their professional military education systems.