AFEHRI File 19-10

Research Materials/Source Documents
ENLISTED FIRSTS

FILE TITLE: 1st B-52 Tail Gunner to Score a MIG Kill - SSgt Samuel O. Turner

Reviewed by:

AFEHRI Representative

EPC Representative

Scanner Operator

APPROVED BY:

GARY R. AKIN, CMSgt, USAF
Director
Air Force Enlisted Heritage Research Institute
CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE SILVER STAR

TO

SAMUEL O. TURNER

Staff Sergeant Samuel O. Turner distinguished himself by gallantry in connection with military operations against an opposing armed force as a B-52 Fire Control Operator near Hanoi, North Vietnam, on 18 December 1972. On this mission, Sergeant Turner's aircraft was attacked by numerous enemy fighters. During these attacks he skillfully operated his gunnery radar equipment to train his guns on the attackers and destroyed one of them. By his courage in the face of hazardous combat conditions and outstanding professional skill, he successfully defended his aircraft and its crew and enabled it to complete its mission and return safely to base. By his gallantry and devotion to duty, Sergeant Turner has reflected great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.
The award was presented by the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, Gen. John C. Meyer.

Sergeant Turner is an 11-7 year veteran of the Air Force.

The son of Mr. and Mrs. William E. Turner of Atlanta, he attended Russell High School in East Point, Ga., and David Lipscomb College in Nashville, Tenn. He has been in Vietnam for two years.
307th SW

Claim for Enemy Aircraft Destroyed

307th SW Board
307th SW CC
17th AD CC
HQ 7AF/DO
IN TURN

1. I submit the following claim for one MiG aircraft destroyed on 18/1251:40Z Dec72, 2108:30N, 104-56:20E while flying as a gunner of B-52D #6676, call sign Brown 3.

2. I have submitted no prior claims.

3. Attachment 1 contains my statement supporting this claim, and supporting evidence (witness statement).

SIGNED

SAMUEL O. TURNER, SSgt, USAF

2 Atch
Statement of Claim

1st Ind

FROM: 307th SW Wing Board

TO: 307th SW CC
17th AD CC
HQ 7AF/DO
IN TURN

Recommend approval of the above claim based on the attached statements of Brown 2 and Brown 3.

SIGNED

BILL V. BROWN, Colonel, USAF
Board Chairman
2nd Ind to (307th SW Ltr, 27 Dec 1972)

FROM: 307th SW CC

TO: 17th AD CC

APPROVED

SIGNED

DONALD M. DAVIS, Colonel, USAF
Commander

3rd Ind

FROM: 17th AD CC

TO: Hq 7AF/DO

APPROVED

SIGNED

GLENN R. SULLIVAN, Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

4th Ind

DAF, Hq 7AF/DO

TO: 307SW/CC

The Hq 7AF Enemy Aircraft Claims Evaluation Board convened on 2 January 1973 and confirmed the claim pertaining to SSgt Samuel O. Turner, Gunner, B-52 #6676, call sign Brown III.

FOR THE COMMANDER

C.M. TALBOT, Major General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

4 Atch
1. Stmt of Claim
2. Stmt - SMSgt Camp
3. (Added) Minutes of Board
4. (Added) 7AF S.O. G-1, 8 Jan 73

Cy to: CSAF/XOSS/INO/XOOG (3)
CINCSAC (1)
CINCPACAF (1)

2
Claim for Enemy Aircraft Destroyed

307th SW Wing Board
307th SW CC
17th AD CC
Hq 7 AF/DC

20 DEC

1. I submit the following claim for one MiG aircraft destroyed on 12/18/47 Dec 72, 2108:180, 104-5/170E while flying as gunner of B-52 #676, Brown III.

2. I have submitted no prior claims.

3. Attachment I contains my statement supporting this claim and supporting evidence (Witness Statement).

Jamel O. Turner
CAPT, USAF

2 Atch
Statement of Claim

1st Ind

FROM: 307th SW Wing Board

TO: 307th SW CC
17th AD CC
Hq 7 AF/DC

IN TURN

I recommend approval of the above claim based on the attached statements of Brown II and Brown III.

SIGNED

ILL V. BROWN, Colonel, USAF
Board Chairman
STATEMENT

MSGt Louis E. LeBlanc, the gunner flying on Brown 2 on 18 December 1972, related the following information to MSgt William R. Camp, Wing FCS debriefer on 18 December 1972.

I (MSGt LeBlanc) observed a bogie on my radar at the 6:30 position at 6 NM (this was 43K behind Brown 3), he closed to about 3NM behind me. I attempted to lock-on to the bogie, but the nose ALR-16 jammed my radar as I attempted to lock-on with my track radar. Then I went to my optics so I could monitor the bogie and Brown 3. I saw Brown 3 dropping flares, and I saw what looked like a flash from the guns of Brown 3. Then I saw a bright fire ball, much brighter than the flares behind Brown 3. Then I looked back at my radar scope and the bogie had disappeared.

The above statement is the oral report given me by MSGt LeBlanc to the best of my recall, and is given in place of his statement. MSGt LeBlanc is presently missing in action.

WILLIAM R. CAMP, E2MSGt, USAF
Wing Fire Control Superintendent
3 January 1973

Reply to
attn of  DO

Subject  Minutes of the Seventh Air Force Enemy Aircraft Claims Evaluation Board

To  Organizations concerned

1. The Seventh Air Force Enemy Aircraft Claims Evaluation Board was convened at 1430 hours, 2 January, 1973. The board considered claims for destruction of enemy aircraft as follows:

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<td>Maj John J. Lydon, AC</td>
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<td>1Lt Robert S. Carley, WSO</td>
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<td>MSgt Bobby D. Johnson, Gunner</td>
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<td>Insufficient Evidence.</td>
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<td>Copper 03</td>
<td>SSGt Loy G. Newlun, Gunner</td>
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<td>Insufficient Evidence. (2 claims)</td>
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<td>AIC Albert E. Moore, Gunner</td>
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SPECIAL ORDER G-2252 WAS THE LAST ORDER PUBLISHED IN THE G-SERIES FOR 1972

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

SPECIAL ORDER G-1

8 January 1973

1. SSGT SAMUEL O. TURNER, [Redacted], 307SW, Gunner of B-52, is credited with destroying one MiG-21 in aerial combat on 18 December 1972. AUTHORITY: Minutes of the Seventh Air Force Enemy Aircraft Claims board, 2 January 1973.


FOR THE COMMANDER

SIGNED

DAVID W. MORLEY, Captain, USAF
Director of Administration

DISTRIBUTION
"G"
B-52 GUNNER DOWNS MIG

HQ SAC (SAC PS) --- A B-52 gunner on a mission near Hanoi, North Vietnam, in December 1972, shot down an enemy aircraft to become the first B-52 gunner to do so in the history of the Air Force.

For this achievement, SSgt. Samuel O. Turner, 30, of Atlanta, Ga., was awarded the Silver Star, the nation's third highest award for heroism.

Sergeant Turner was the fire control operator on a B-52 in the first wave of aircraft to strike the target.

Describing the action, Sergeant Turner said, "We were a few ships back from the lead aircraft. As we approached our target area, numerous surface-to-air missiles began coming up and exploding around us. We did not divert or turn back. We had our target and planned to hit it regardless.

"As we drew nearer to the target the intensity of the SAMs picked up. They were lighting up the sky. They seemed everywhere.

"We released our bombs over the target, and had just proceeded outbound from the target when we learned that there were MIG aircraft airborne near a particular reference point.

"Our navigator told us the reference point was in our area and before long we learned the enemy fighter had us on its radar."
"As he closed on us I also picked him up on my radar when he was a few miles from our aircraft.

"A few seconds later, the fighter 'locked on' to us, meaning the fighter pilot was in a position to make a firing pass.

"As the MIG closed in, I also 'locked on' to him. He came in low in a rapid climb. While tracking the first MIG, I picked up a second enemy aircraft at eight o'clock at a range of about seven and a half miles. He appeared stabilized - not attacking us, obviously allowing the other fighter room to maneuver and conduct his run first.

"As the attacking MIG came into firing range, I fired a burst. There was a gigantic explosion to the rear of the aircraft. I looked out the window but was unable to see directly where the MIG would have been. I looked back at my radar scope. Except for the one airplane out at eight o'clock, there was nothing. And within about 15 seconds, even he broke away and we lost contact with him.

"As we left the threat area, my aircraft commander told the other aircraft, 'I think we got one.' and they knew what he meant.

"When we landed, I talked to the people in the number two ship. They said they saw the whole thing."

The citation accompanying the award of the Silver Star to Sergeant Turner said, in part, "By his courage in the face of hazardous combat conditions and outstanding professional skill, he successfully defended his aircraft and its crew and enabled it to complete its mission and return safely to base."
SO, made the third MIG-21 kill of the day.

Coy records the action:

Red Crown informed us that the other MIG-CAP was engaged with MIG's and for us to remain with the strike flight. Red Crown called new bandits airborne from Phuc Yen and vectored us 096° towards them. Red Crown estimated their altitude at 12,000. We continued the vectors until we merged. Having no visual contact, we made a 180° left turn and continued towards bandits.

On a heading of 040° contrails were observed by myself at 1 o'clock. Red Crown informed me that they were probably my bandits. My wingman called bandits visual at 2 o'clock. I turned and visually acquired a MIG-21 in a right descending turn. I spiraled down with the MIG-21, calling for Major Brown to lock on. I then fired three AIM-7's during an elapsed time of 23 seconds.

The first two missiles I did not observe. The third fell away to the left. The MIG was continuing down in a right 20° bank turn. I then selected heat and fired three AIM-9's. The third missile was visually acquired by myself at 200–300 feet aft of the MIG-21 and was observed to fly up the tailpipe of the MIG-21. The entire aft section of the MIG-21 was a fireball and was disintegrating. This occurred at 1425:40 hours. The timing is precise. Col. Robert E. Wayne, my wingman in aircraft 2, observed the missile impacting the MIG-21 and verified that the entire aft section of the MIG-21 was one large fireball. Capt. Glenn A. Proft in aircraft 3 observed the missile impacting and the entire aft section of the MIG coming apart. Immediately after missile impact he observed the MIG pilot eject and also observed chute deployment. Our flight then egressed as a flight of four.

Operation Linebacker came to an end on 22 October 1972, and many of the fighter squadrons which had been temporarily deployed to Southeast Asia returned to their home bases or sent elsewhere the Far East. Linebacker’s demise was premature, however, for it soon became apparent that the North Vietnamese had no intention of stopping wholesale infiltration into South Vietnam so long as American aircraft remained south of the 20th parallel.

President Nixon, on 18 December, gave the order to attack the enemy in his home territory once again, this time with a concentrated force unprecedented in the Vietnam conflict. The new operation—actually a resumption of the previous campaign—was coded Linebacker II.

Primary targets for Linebacker II consisted of rail complexes, storage facilities and supply areas, power plants, radio broadcasting stations, air bases, and SAM sites in the area around Hanoi and Haiphong. Beginning with 18 December, except for a standoff on Christmas Day when no missions were flown, targets were attacked day and night. Enemy air defenses posed a formidable obstacle to the attacking forces. But during this phase, SAM's posed the major threat. All of the B-52 bombers lost during this phase of the war were downed by surface-to-air missiles.

Score Two for B-52 Gunners

With the resumption of Linebacker operations, USAF fighter aircrews and—for the first time in the air war—gunners aboard B-52 bombers, accounted for five MIG-21 kills.*

The first victory credited to a gunner came on the night of 18 December. S/Sgt. Samuel O. Turner, normally stationed at March AFB, California, but on temporary duty with the 307th Strategic Wing based at U-Tapao airfield, Thailand, was the tail gunner aboard a B-52D, part of the heavy bomber force hitting targets in the Hanoi area. Turner describes the engagement:

We were a few ships back from the lead aircraft. As we approached our target area, numerous surface-to-air missiles began coming up and exploding around us. We did not divert or turn back. We had our target and planned to hit it, regardless.

As we drew nearer to the target the intensity of the SAM's picked up. They were lighting up the sky. They seemed to be everywhere. We released our bombs over the target and had just proceeded outbound from the target when we learned that

*During the Korean War, there were 27 victories recorded by B-29 gunners.
there were MIG aircraft airborne near a particular reference point.

Our navigator told us the reference point was in our area and before long we learned the enemy fighter had us on its radar. As he closed on us I also picked him up on my radar when he was a few miles from our aircraft.

A few seconds later, the fighter locked on to us. As the MIG closed in, I also locked on him. He came in low in a rapid climb. While tracking the first MIG, I picked up a second enemy aircraft at 8 o’clock at a range of about 7½ miles. He appeared stabilized—not attacking us, obviously allowing the other fighter room to maneuver and conduct his run first.

As the attacking MIG came into firing range, I fired a burst. There was a gigantic explosion to the rear of the aircraft. I looked out the window but was unable to see directly where the MIG would have been. I looked back at my radar scope. Except for the one airplane out at 8 o’clock, there was nothing. And within 15 seconds, even he broke away and we lost contact with him.

Turner’s MIG kill was witnessed by another gunner, M/Sgt. Lewis E. LeBlanc, who confirmed the kill. LeBlanc saw a fireball at the MIG-21’s approximate range and azimuth.

The mission of protecting the heavy bomber fleet was generally assigned to F-4 MIGCAP flights which accompanied every bomber wave over North Vietnam. One MIGCAP aircrew demonstrated unusual aggressiveness and persistence and scored a victory without even hitting the MIG. This rare feat was achieved by Capt. Gary L. Sholders and his WSO, 1st Lt. Eldon D. Binkley, who were the lead aircraft on 21/22 December. Sholders explains their accomplishment:

Our flight dropped off the tanker at 1948Z and proceeded north toward the assigned orbit point. Upon contact with Red Crown, the flight was
advised of enemy aircraft activity west of Hanoi. Red Crown began vectoring at 2003Z.

We elected not to pursue the bandit immediately because his altitude was below an overcast which covered virtually all of the Hanoi area. Our flight established a left orbit at approximately 60 miles from Hanoi. We remained in this orbit until approximately 2018Z, when Red Crown advised that the bandit had climbed to 16,000 feet.

We made a hard left turn to 100°, established immediate radar contact with a single enemy aircraft crossing right to left, range 18 miles. Clearance to fire was obtained from Red Crown, and we rolled into a 5-mile trail position on the bandit. The bandit then engaged his after-burner and began a steep climb. We obtained a lock-on using boresight mode, and closed to approximately 3 miles when the radar broke lock at approximately 2022Z.

Red Crown advised our flight shortly thereafter that the bandit was south at 10 miles. We then turned to reengage. The flight remained within 8 miles of the bandit in a maneuvering engagement, using intermittent radar returns and vectors from Red Crown, until approximately 2033Z.

We were unable to obtain a radar lock-on during this period of time. Red Crown advised the flight at 2033Z that the bandit was south at 7 miles, heading home. We then turned southeast, attempting to reacquire the bandit heading toward Hanoi; no contact was made on this heading. We then made a right turn to the northwest and immediately acquired radar contact with an enemy aircraft at 25 miles on the nose, apparently heading for Yen Bai airfield.

We pursued the bandit, closing to approximately 20 miles as the bandit appeared to be orbiting Yen Bai. The bandit then turned northeast. Using radar we were able to close to approximately 7 miles. We pursued the bandit until approximately 2046Z, when the engagement was terminated for fuel considerations. At the termination of the engagement, the bandit was on the nose at 7 miles. Our position at that time was approximately 010°, 60 miles from Hanoi. Shortly after termination of the engagement, one of the controlling agencies called a bandit north of Hanoi.

Intelligence sources confirmed (on 24 December) that an enemy aircraft went down in the early morning hours of 22 December 1972. Ours was the only flight in the area that engaged an enemy aircraft for any length of time on 21/22 December; in addition, the only flight that pursued an enemy aircraft after he had apparently attempted a landing at Yen Bai airfield. On the strength of the aforementioned evidence, we claim one enemy aircraft destroyed due to continued pursuit which resulted in fuel starvation for the enemy aircraft.

Lt. Col. James E. Brunson and Maj. Ralph S. Pickett, destroyed a MIG—21 on 22 December. Their flight was escorting strike aircraft in Route Package 6. According to Brunson (the flight leader), two MIG’s were encountered:

After pre-strike refueling, the flight—the ingress MIGCAP in this Linebacker II mission—proceeded north toward Phu Tho en route to their assigned CAP area near Kep airfield . . . Two bandits started climbing out to the northwest of Hanoi. Red Crown was controlling the flight as they crossed into North Vietnam. Red Crown reported the MIG’s as heading 290° and climbing through 26,000 feet. Red Crown gave our flight a vector of 020° and called the MIG’s 30° right, 46 miles, at 29,000 feet, with friendlies between our flight and the MIG’s.

The MIG’s turned south toward us and the friendlies. Red Crown vectored us for a head-on intercept. Red Crown called the MIG’s at 020° and 16 miles from us when the flight leader got a radar lock-on in that position and asked for clearance to fire. Red Crown cleared him to fire if a visual identification was made, as friendly aircraft were still in the area.

Our flight jettisoned the centerline fuel tanks and accelerated. The MIG was about 10,000 feet higher than the flight, and as aircraft 1 started his pull-up to center the radar steering dot, he saw a silver MIG—21 above him.

The flight leader put the MIG in his gunsight piper and fired four AIM—7 missiles in rapid succession with full radar lock-on, maintaining a steep climb toward the MIG. Both the aircraft commander and weapon systems officer observed
one of the AIM-7 missiles detonate in the tail section of the MIG-21, causing the tail section and large pieces ... to separate. The MIG went into an uncontrollable spin. No bail-out ... was observed.

The flight was still in good formation and turned to engage the second MIG in the flight, which was observed by aircraft 3. This MIG escaped and the flight returned to base due to fuel.

Airman First Class Albert E. Moore, a B-52 gunner, won credit for the next MIG. A tail gunner during a bombing raid on the Thai Nguyen railroad yards on 24 December, he acquired a fast-moving bogey on his radar scope. He notified his crew to dispense chaff and flares, got target lock-on at 4,000 yards, and as the bandit closed to 2,000 yards, opened fire. He continued firing until the blip blossomed on his scope, then disappeared. His feat was witnessed by T/Sgt. Clarence W. Chute, also a gunner, who saw the MIG-21 "on fire and falling away."

U.S. strikes resumed once again on the 26th. Two days later, a MIG-21 fell prey to Maj. Harry L. McKee and his WSO, Capt. John E. Dubler, who were on MIGCAP duty. They met a MIG-21 west of Hanoi and promptly downed it. "Red Crown called the position of a bandit heading west," said Maj. McKee:

Captain Dubler made radar contact with the bandit at 90 nautical miles range at approximately 2150 hours. Red Crown called our position as being 270° and 92 nautical miles from Bullseye at 2156.30. ... we were in trail with the MIG and had radar contact 30° left at 11 nautical miles.

We were cleared to close by Red Crown and a full system lock-on was made at 10 nautical miles. My wingman [Capt. Kimzey W. Rhine] called 'locked on' shortly thereafter.

Both aircraft fired on my verbal command with the radar dot centered. I fired two AIM-7 missiles at 2157:20; Rhine fired one AIM-7 at the same time. Order of firing was aircraft 1, one AIM-7; then aircraft 2, one AIM-7; then aircraft 3, second AIM-7. We all observed a large fireball approximately 4 nautical miles distant at 12 o'clock at 2157:30. Missile firing was at maximum ASE
circle expansion. ... It appeared that all three AIM-7’s guided. Further, it appeared that the first missile impacted the MIG, followed immediately by impact of the missile fired by Rhine.

At missile firing our airspeed was Mach 1.05, altitude 30,500 feet, and heading 010°. Moments later I observed a fireball on the ground in the vicinity of the shoot-down. We continued to operate as a flight of two, in a MIGCAP capacity, until 2235 hours, whereupon we egressed ... 

Major McKee may have intended to have his wingmen, Captains Rhine and James W. Ogilvie in aircraft 2, share in the aerial victory. Seventh Air Force’s claims evaluation board—though initially viewing this MIG kill as a joint effort—decided to credit only McKee and Dubler.

Linebacker II achieved the desired political results, and on 29 December 1972 President Nixon ended massive raids above the 20th parallel. Fighting continued south of the bomb line, and American pilots were permitted to cross the parallel in pursuit of North Vietnamese aircraft attacking B-52’s and other U.S. aircraft. Such an incident took place at 0230 hours on 8 January 1973 and resulted in the destruction of a MIG-21 by Capt. Paul D. Howman and his WSO, 1st Lt. Lawrence W. Kullman, of the 432d TRW. This victory was the only USAF MIG kill in 1973 and the last of the war. “We were flying a MIGCAP in Route Package 3, 80 miles southwest of Hanoi,” relates Howman:

... when we received a MIG warning from Red Crown at 1930Z [0230 hours, 8 January local time]. The bandit call put the MIG 240° and 14 nautical miles from Bullseye, which was approximately 65 nautical miles north-northeast of our position.

After the second bandit call at 1932Z, Red Crown vectored us 330° and called the MIG at 020° and 60 nautical miles from our position.

We continued the intercept until we were 020° and 26 nautical miles from the MIG. At this time, Red Crown gave us clearance to fire as well as a vector of 026°. During this entire time we had radar contacts on the bandit. We descended and obtained a visual contact with the MIG’s afterburner at 10 nautical miles, and a full system radar lock-on at 6 nautical miles.

Crew boards B-52.

They fired two missiles. The first detonated approximately 50 to 100 feet from the MIG, but the second hit its target. The MIG burst into flames and broke into three distinct pieces.

A few days later, a Presidential order halted all bombing of North Vietnam, and on 29 January 1973, the Vietnam cease-fire went into effect.
HISTORY

OF

307th STRATEGIC WING

OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1972

(Unclassified Title)

Volume I

Assigned to

Air Division, Provisional, 17, Eighth Air Force
Strategic Air Command

Stationed at

U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield, Thailand

PAUL J. GILLETTE
Sgt, USAF
Historian

BILL V. BROWN
Colonel, USAF
Commander

DATE: 12 July 1973

Volume 1 of 4 Volumes
Copy of 4 copies
Most of this threat was blunted by F-4 Mig CAP sorties which escorted the bomber waves. During the Linebacker operation, the 307th's force of tail gunners proved that Mig kills were not reserved for the fighter jocks.165

(U) Staff Sergeant Samuel G. Turner, March AFB crew T-07, was the tail gunner on Brown 3 on 16 December, the first night of Linebacker II operations. While operating in the Kanoi area, Sergeant Turner picked up two targets on his fire control system radar. He also received two aircraft intercept signals on the APQ-25 scanner. The E/W officer dispensed chaff and flares, but the pursuing aircraft continued to close in for the kill. When one Mig closed to 2,000 yards, Sergeant Turner fired numerous bursts totalling 69 rounds. Almost simultaneously, both the target blip and the airborne intercept signals disappeared from the radar scopes. The other target backed off and contact was lost. Sergeant Turner's Mig kill was witnessed by the gunner in another aircraft, who confirmed disappearance of the return from his scope and the appearance of a visual fireball at the bogey's approximate range and azimuth.

Twelfth Air Force confirmed the kill.166

(U) A second Mig kill was confirmed by 7th Air Force for Airman First Class Albert E. Moore, the tail gunner for Wright-Patterson AFB crew E-17. Airman Moore was aboard Ruby 3 during the 24 December raid on the Thai Kyen Railroad yards. After acquiring a fast-moving bogey on his radar scope, he notified his crew to dispense chaff and flares, got target contact at 1,000 yards, and, as the bandit closed to 2,000 yards, opened fire. He continued firing until the blip blossomed on his scope and disappeared. The 19-year-old, 13-mission veteran's feat was witnessed.

1. Interview, Sgt I.J. Gillette, historian, with S/Sgt W.R. Camp, fire control superintendent, 13 Mar 72.
by another gunner and an F-4 pilot. 167

(U) Asked in an interview with the Air Division Information Office if he'd do it again, Airman Moore replied, "On the way home, I wasn't sure whether I should be happy or sad. You know, there was a guy in that rig. I'm sure he would have wanted to fly home, too. But it was a case of him or my crew. I'm glad it turned out the way it did. Yes, I'd go again. Do I want another rig? No, but given the same set of circumstances, yes, I'd go for another one. 168

(U) Two other rig claims, one on the 18th and another on the 23rd of December, were submitted, but disapproved because of lack of confirmation. Still, they were probable kills. 169

Linebacker II Morale

(U) Linebacker II operations were an inspiration to all personnel within the Strategic Wing. Morale soared with the challenge of executing a bombing campaign of unparalleled magnitude and the realization that positive action was being initiated which might quickly end the war. While losses were keenly felt and deeply regretted at U-Tapao, they, too, served to further unite and dedicate all associated with subsequent mission accomplishment. 170

170. Interview, Sgt P.J. Gillette, historian, with Col D.H. Davis, wing commander, 30 Jan 73.
3 January 1973

Minutes of the Seventh Air Force Enemy Aircraft Claims Evaluation Board.

Organizations Concerned

1. The Seventh Air Force Enemy Aircraft Claims Evaluation Board was convened at 1400 hours, 2 January 1973. The board considered claims for destruction of enemy aircraft as follows:

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<tr>
<td>24 Dec 72</td>
<td>Ruby III</td>
<td>AIC Albert E. Moore, Gunner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BOARD ACTION: Validated.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2. Each board member was provided a written intelligence summary of each claim, and each claim was briefed by Capt Nekoba, Hq 7AF/DI-65. The board members discussed each claim, the board voted and the results were as indicated above.

3. Board members present were:
   
   Major General C.M. Talbott, Chairman
   Colonel Kenneth B. Glover, DU-23
   Major Robert J. Straubinger, DU-261
   Major Peter M. Dunn, DI-64
   Capt Francis K. Nekoba, DI-65
   TSgt James A. Morrison, Recorder

4. Others present:
   
   Colonel Ralph Stevenson, SACADVON
   Major Gerald Paes, SACADVON

______________________________
JAMES A. MORRISON, TSgt, USAF
/Recorder

Minutes approved/disapproved.

______________________________
C.M. TALBOTT, Major General, USAF
/Chairman
307th SW Wing Board
307th SW CC
17th AD CC
Hq 7AF/DO
IN TURN

1. I submit the following claim for one MIG aircraft destroyed on 18/1251:40Z Dec 72, 2108:30N, 104-56:20E while flying as gunner of B-52 #66676, Brown III.

2. I have submitted no prior claims.

3. Attachment 1 contains my statement supporting this claim and supporting evidence (Witness Statement).

Samuel O. Turner
SAMUEL O. TURNER, SSgt, USAF

1st Ind

FROM: 307th SW Wing Board

TO: 307th SW CC
17th AD CC
Hq 7AF/DO
IN TURN

Recommend approval of the above claim based on the attached statements of Brown II and Brown III.

Bill V. Brown
BILL V. BROWN, Colonel, USAF
Board Chairman

Peace . . . . is our Profession
2nd Ind to (307th SW Ltr, 29 Dec 1972)

FROM: 307th SW CC

TO: 17th AD CC

Approved/Disapproved

DONALD M. DAVIS, Colonel, USAF
Commander

3rd Ind

FROM: 17th AD CC

TO: Hq 7AF/DO

Approved/Disapproved

GLENN R. SULLIVAN, Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

4th Ind

DAF, Hq 7AF/DO

TO: 307th SW/CC

The Hq 7AF Enemy Aircraft Claims Evaluation Board convened on 2 January 1973 and confirmed the claim pertaining to SSgt Samuel O. Turner, Gunner, B-52 #66676, call sign Brown III.

FOR THE COMMANDER

C M Talbott, Major General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

4 Atch
1. Stmt of Claim
2. Stmt - SMSgt Camp
3. (Added) Minutes of Board
4. (Added) 7AF S.O. G-1, 8 Jan 73

Cy to: CSAF/X0OSS/INO/X00G (3)
       CINCSAC (1)
       CINCPACAF (1)
STATEMENT

In a ARC LIGHT mission against targets in the Hanoi area I observed no targets on my Fire Control System at 12000 yards. Evasive action as initiated by our crew. The EW officer and I also had two AI signals on the APR-25. Chaff and flares were dispensed. The targets pursued our aircraft and closed in range. One MIG closed to 4000 yards and I locked on to the target at the 6 o'clock position. The target closed to 2000 yards, I fired a 6 to 8 second burst (694 rounds). The target disappeared from the FCS scope and simultaneously the AI signal disappeared from the APR-25 receiver. A fire ball was observed at the 30 o'clock position. The other target backed off to 10000 plus yards and disappeared from the FCS indicator. There was no further electronic contact.

[Signature]

SAMUEL O. TURNER, SSgt, USAF
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 307TH STRATEGIC WING (SAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96330

30 December 1972

307th SW

Claim for Enemy Aircraft Destroyed

307th SW Wing
307th SW CO
17th AD
8th TAF/DO

1. I submit the following claim for one MIG aircraft destroyed on 16/12/72 at 2108Z, 195-47E while flying as gunner of B-52 #4483, Ruby III.

2. I have submitted no prior claims.

3. Attachment 1 contains my statement supporting this claim and supporting evidence (Witness Statement).

ALBERT E. MOORE
ALBERT E. MOORE, AIR, USAF

2 Atch
Statement of Claim

1st Ind

FROM: 307th SW Wing Board

TO: 307th SW CO
17th AD
8th TAF/DO
IN TURN

Recommend approval of the above claim based on the attached statements of Ruby II and Ruby III.

BILL V. BROWN, Colonel, USAF
Board Chairman

Peace . . . is our Profession
Ind Ind to (307th SW Ltr, 30 Dec 1972)

R/0/ 307th SW CC

D: 17th AD CC

Approved/Disapproved

Donald M. Davis, Colonel, USAF
Commander

Ind Ind

ROM: 17th AD CC

D: HQ 7AF/DO

Approved/Disapproved

Len B. Sullivan, Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

th Ind 17 January 1973

AF, 7AF/DO

D: 307SW/CC

The HQ 7AF Enemy Aircraft Claims Evaluation Board convened on 1 January 1973 and confirmed the 24 December 1972 MIG claim submitted by Col. Albert E. Moore, Gunner, B-52 #5083, call sign "Ivy III."

OR THE COMMANDER

C. W. Talbot

C. W. Talbot, Maj. Gen., USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

4 Atch
1. Stmt of Claim
2. Stmt - T Sgt Chute
3. (Added) Minutes of Board
4. (Added) 7AF S.O. G-1, 8 Jan 73

Cy to: CSAF/XOSS/INO/XOOG (3)
CINCSAC (1)
CINCPACAF (1)
STATEMENT

On 24 December 1972, while on a bombing mission on the railroad marshaling yards at Thai Nguyen in number 3 aircraft of Ruby cell, I observed a target on my radar scope 8jo 3 o'clock, low at 3 miles. I immediately notified the crew and the target started closing rapidly. It stabilized at 4,000 yards 6:30 0'clock low. At this time I locked on to the bandit. He started closing very rapidly. I called the pilot for evasive action and the EWO for chaff and flares. When the target got to 2,000 yards, I notified the crew that I was firing. I fired at the bandit until it ballooned to 3 times in 3 seconds then suddenly disappeared from my radar scope at approximately 1,000 yards, 6:30 low. I expended 300 rounds in 3 bursts. I did not observe him in the scope monitoring for other targets.

Albert E. Moore
ALBERT E. MOORE, AIC, USAF
STATEMENT

On the night of 24 December 1972, I was the gunner in the number 2 aircraft in Ruby cell. I observed a bandit at 12,000 yards low. We closed from the 8:30 o'clock position into 6,000 yards at 6:30 low. At this time I called my crew to begin maneuvers. Due to a partially collapsed scope and the proximity of number 3 I did not fire. I went visual and saw the bandit on fire and falling away. Several pieces of the aircraft exploded and the fire-ball disappeared in the undercast at my 6:30 position.

CLARENCE W. CHUTE, TSgt, USAF
29 December 1972

Claim for Enemy Aircraft Destroyed

307th SW Wing Board
307th SW CC
17th AD CC
Hq 7AF/DO
IN TURN

1. I submit the following claim for one MIG aircraft destroyed on 18/12532 Dec 72, 21-30N, 106-18:30E while flying as gunner of B-52 #5063, Green I.

2. I have submitted no prior claims.

3. Attachment 1 contains my statement supporting this claim and supporting evidence (Witness Statement).

BOBBY D. JOHNSON, MSgt, USAF
FR 429-44-8669

Statement of Claim

FROM: 307th SW Wing Board
TO: 307th SW CC
17th AD CC
Hq 7AF/DO
IN TURN

Recommend approval of the above claim based on the attached statement.

BILLY BROWN, Colonel, USAF
Board Chairman

Peace . . . . is our Profession
2nd Ind to (307th SW Ltr, 29 Dec 1972)

FROM: 307th SW CC

TO: 17th AD CC

Approved/Disapproved

RONALD M. DAVIS, Colonel, USAF
Commander

3rd Ind

FROM: 17th AD CC

TO: Hq 7AF/DO

Approved/Disapproved

GLENN R. SULLIVAN, Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

4th Ind

DAF, 7AF/DO

TO: 307SH/CC

The Hq 7AF Enemy Aircraft Claims Evaluation Board convened on 2 January 1973 and disapproved the 18 December 1972 MIG Claim submitted by MSgt Bobby D. Johnson, Gunner, B-52 # 5063, call sign Green I. All source intelligence information does not support claim.

FOR THE COMMANDER

C.M. TALBOTT, Major General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

3 Atch
1. Stmt of Claim
2. Stmt - Capt Webber
3. (Added) Minutes of Board

Cy to: CSAF/XOSS/INO/XOOG (3)
CINCSAC (1)
CIN:PACAF (1)
STATEMENT

In an ARC LIGHT mission 18 December 1972 against Kep Airfield, North Vietnam, I observed a target on my Fire Control System at 4 O'clock, 5,500 yards. The bogie closed very rapidly. Evasive action was initiated with chaff and flares being dispensed. I lock-on and fired until the bandit disappeared from the limits of my scope. I believe this was the target that launched the missiles observed by the co-pilot. After we stopped evasive action and were straight and level I saw another target at 7 O'clock position at 3,000 yards. I locked-on and fired at the rapidly closing bogie and told pilot to initiate evasive action. I fired until the target intensity ballooned, stopped and abruptly fell away at a rapid rate at approximately 1,500 yards. There were two other targets making passes at our cell and I fired at both. I stayed in the scope monitoring for targets and was not able to visually see the aircraft destroyed.

Bobby D. Johnson, MSGT, USAF
STATEMENT

On 18 December 1972 while on a bombing mission at Kep Airfield, North Vietnam our cell, Green, was attacked by approximately 4 MIGs. The MIG I observed was at 3 O'clock at our altitude. When he fired his missiles the flash illuminated his aircraft, which was light gray in color. I observed 3 missiles fired at us from this MIG, then he broke down under us to the right. On this mission we were Green one.

MICHAEL J. WEBBER, Captain, USAF
TO: 307th SW  

29 December 1972  

CC: Claim for Enemy Aircraft Destroyed  

TO: 307th SW Wing Board  
307th SW CC  
17th AD CC  
Hq 7AF/DC  
IN TURN  

1. I submit the following claim for two MiG aircraft destroyed on 23 December 1972, at 1217Z and 1221Z. Location was 21-30N, 106-43E and 21-30N - 106-40E while flying as a gunner of a B-52, aircraft number 5074, call sign Copper III.  

2. I have submitted no prior claims.  

3. Attachment 1 contains my statement. Supporting this claim is based on the following attached statements.  

[Signature]  
Lt. Col. NEWMAN, JR., SSgt, USAF  
2 Atch  
Statement of Claim  

TO: 307th SW CC  
17th AD CC  
Hq 7AF/DO  
IN TURN  

20 DEC 1972  

Recommend approval of the above claim based on the attached statements.  

[Signature]  
BILL V. BROWN, Colonel, USAF  
Board Chairman  

Peace . . . . is our Profession
2nd Ind to (307th SW Ltr, 29 Dec 1972)

FROM: 307th SW CC

TO: 17th AD CC

Approved/Disapproved

DONALD M. DAVIS, Colonel, USAF
Commander

3rd Ind

FROM: 17th AD CC

TO: Hq 7AF/DO

Approved/Disapproved

GLENN R. SULLIVAN, Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

4th Ind

DAF, Hq 7AF/DO

TO: 3C7S-.CC

The Hq 7AF Enemy Aircraft Claims Evaluation Board convened on 2 January 1973 and disapproved the 18 December 1972 MIG claim submitted by SSgt Roy G. Newlin, Jr., Gunner, B-52 #5074, call sign Copper III. All source intelligence information does not support claims.

FOR THE COMMANDER

C.M. TALBOTT, Major General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

3 Atch
1. Stmt of Claim
2. Stmt - Capt Hanchett
3. (Added) Minutes of Board

Cy to: CSAF/XOSS/INO/XOOG (3)
CINCSAC (1)
CINCPACAF (1)
STATEMENT

2.5 minutes prior to target, I observed a MIG at 6,000 yards, closing rapidly. I lock-on and fired at 4,000 yards. The MIG backed off but came in rapidly the second time. I called for evasive action, flares and chaff. The MIG fired missiles and missed by approximately 20 yards at 7 o'clock high. Our flare dispenser was not working. I opened fire at 2,000 yards and saw the MIG explode approximately at the 6:30 position. I observed the 2nd and 3rd MIGs at 2 minutes after the target. At 6,000 yards they exchanged ranges, first one would close and then the other. I fired short bursts at 4,000 yards. One MIG closed to firing range (1,900) yards, and I saw the blip on my scope disappear after firing two bursts. The other MIG at 4,000 yards broke away low at the 6:30 position and never reappeared on my radar scope. The 4th MIG engagement was about 5 minutes after the target. Roy Crown was called, the blip on my scope closed to 4,000 yards and I fired one short burst. The 4th MIG never came any closer, before breaking off at the 3:30 position.

Loyd G. Nevels, Jr., S/Sgt, USAF
STATEMENT

On 3rd December while inbound to our target north of Hanoi as Copper 1, we were intercepted by more than one unfriendly aircraft. These were detected by my EWG and the crew of Copper 2. One of the bandits called our 6 O'clock position, range 5,000 yards, for 3-4 minutes until we released our weapons on target. During the post-target-turn, the bandit moved into 3,500 yards, as heard from the gunner, and launched weapons against us. I now believe them to be unguided rockets. The gunner then commenced firing for about the 3rd time and later stated he observed a fireball. All contact was lost on the bandits by the EWG and gunner. I have discounted the possibility I might have turned into my own flares since on postflight the system was found 100% full and operative. We were intercepted a second time by an unfriendly aircraft after we climbed back to altitude. I believe he left after about 1 minute due to HCG escort in the area by then. Sgt Newlun claimed later he observed a second bandit to "balloon" on his scope after he had fired, and believed it to be his second kill.

Theodore L. Hanchett
THEODORE L. HANCHETT, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander 96 BW
B-52 gunner describes

(Editor's note: The following article contains the reminiscences of TSgt. Samuel Turner about the day he shot down a MiG six years ago. The effort gained him the Silver Star, the third highest award in the Air Force. Sergeant Turner was TDY at Castle recently, training for the H-Model B-52.)

We were the spare, number one, aircraft; ready to go in case one of the regular scheduled aircraft developed any mechanical problems. We felt sure we were going to be able to get in this day's action.

The engines roared as we taxied to the end of the runway and parked waiting and watching for a chance to go. Pretty soon came all the planes, 27 B-52s, all making the turn right in front of us and starting their take offs. We started to think this wasn't our day. Things looked real good. Then as the last plane turned to take off it started to vent a little bit of fuel off his right wing tip. As he straightened up the fuel started pouring out even more — big gushes of fuel.

I think I was the first one to notice because of our position. I told the pilot and he studied the problem for a while and then he informed the control tower. The aircraft aborted.

Immediately we assumed their position and call sign within a matter of minutes we were off. So there we were rushing to catch up with the rest of the planes.

The bombing area was reached, North Vietnam, and we made our release.

Going into an area like that you leave the training behind — this is the real thing. All the training is over, you get a lump in your throat and your adrenalin is flowing — you're on oxygen — you're tense, constantly checking your instruments and your parachute straps are down as tight as they can go. And you finally say I'm ready to go — I'm ready to punch out if I have to.

We were leaving the area — our job was done — we felt like we were safe. We got through the hardest part. But the ground control people informed us MiGs were on their way after us. We were out bound and it just so happened that we were the last ship to leave the area.

Until you've actually got your equipment — you're not going to find you.

Our Electronic Warfare officer was Capt. Eugene Duck for in the 328th Bomb Squad first one to get any indication.

TOP GUN — TSgt. Samuel Turner from Ellsworth AFB, S.D., recently completed transition training here for the H model B-52, the first B-52 gunner to down a MiG during the Vietnam conflict. There have been only two gunners to officially record a kill since B-52s came into production. (U.S. Air Force Photo by TSgt. Joe Connell)

REMINISCING — Capt. Eugene Duck and TSgt. Samuel Turner talk about their missions over Vietnam. Sergeant Turner flew over 150 missions while Capt. Duck exceeded 250 flights in Vietnam. During those missions they flew in the D-model B-52. Today they both fly the H-model where the gunner's seat is next to the EWO, not in the tail section.

(U.S. Air Force Photo by TSgt. Joe Connell)

NOTICE TO ADVERTISERS

Everything advertised in this publication must be made available for purchase, use or patronage without regard to race, creed, color, national origin, or sex of the purchaser, user, or patron. A confirmed violation or rejection of this policy of equal opportunity by an advertiser will result in the refusal to print advertising for that source.
describes MIG kill

Until you’ve actually got an indication on your equipment — you’re not sure they are going to find you.

Our Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) who was Capt. Eugene Duck, now an instructor in the 328th Bomb Squadron here was the first one to get any indication that the MIG was nearing. He asked me if I saw anything. I was looking like crazy and couldn’t see anything at that time. It was night time and I didn’t take my eyes off my radar scope.

My radar screen was cluttered with chaff which is what is dumped out of the aircraft to make it difficult for the enemy radar. I managed to pick up a target which was closing in fast. I locked on to the target and when it got in range I began to fire. It seemed about three seconds later there was a flash. I didn’t hear anything. I was thinking missile hit. I had been watching them constantly up until this time missing us and heading towards us and exploding.

I neglected to look outside to let the pilots know what was happening in the way of missiles. I realized my attention was on the scope, so I diverted my attention away from the scope and stopped firing to look outside. It was black except for the flash that went down. Looking back into the scope the approaching target had disappeared. Checking with the EW he indicated it was down.

For a few minutes nobody said anything and we continued to go home. Then the EW said, “Hey gunner — that’s probably the first time the guns of a B-52 have been fired in anger.” Our pilot commented to the other ships as we caught up with them, “I think we got one” and that was it. Another B-52 pilot and an F-4 fighter pilot that was in the area confirmed the kill. It was the first time a gunner of a B-52 downed an enemy.

After getting back we went through our regular check list after landing and inspected the aircraft. It was in good condition, not a scratch.

I’ll never forget those unforgettable days over North Vietnam during Dec. 1972.

Samuel Turner from Ellsworth AFB, S.D., who transition training here for the H model B-52 was two gunners to officially record a kill since B-52s.

(U.S. Air Force Photo by TSgt. Joe Connell)
GUNNERS,

Here's the latest edition of the Bulldog Bulletin. We heard from just about everyone this issue. A lot of good information came in this time too. MSgt Butch Foster sent the info on the ASG-15 (A), MSgt Gel Nicely added the A/R system check handout, and the Nellis guys provided a list of techniques for use against fighters. SMSgt Chuck Killgore listed all of this year's promotees in his input. We've included a list of honorary GUNNERS too. Help us update it, by sending in any corrections, additions, etc. This is what we like to see. Now GUNNERS can find out what's going on, what's coming down the pike, who's promoted etc. We're talking to each other now, not one to one over AUTOVON, but to all of the GUNNERS. If you read this issue cover to cover, you'll be hard pressed NOT to learn something new from this issue. There's a lot of material of all types.

A new change for the forthcoming issues:

8 AF units will send their inputs NLT 15 January/July to:

8 AF/DOTTP
Barksdale AFB, LA 71110-5000
Attn. CMSgt Marv Myers

15 AF units will send their inputs NLT 15 January/July to:

15 AF/DOTTP
March AFB, CA 92518-5000
Attn. CMSgt John Lowery

All of the special activity units should continue to send their inputs directly to me. I need the inputs NLT the 1st of February and 1st of August in order to get them organized and to the printers by the 20th of the month. It takes the printer 10 days to do his thing, and I mail them around the 1st of March/September.

Until next time, C'est La Vie

Pete De Felice
The Bulldog Bulletin is published two times per year, by the GUNNERS of the 4235th Strategic Squadron, Carswell AFB, TX, for the sole purpose of the betterment of the GUNNERY career field. It will be published on the first day of March and September. Inputs are needed from each unit, with no limit to the number of pages, authors, or subjects. Aside from the "standard" input we need articles of a crosstalk nature too. ALL inputs are needed by the first day of February and August. Thanks to the HQ/SAC Office of the Historian for the help with the information on Sam Turner. Send all inputs to:

4235th STS/DOTT
Attn: Tsgt De Felice
Carswell AFB, TX 76127-5000
AV 739-5211

MIA's this issue, Fairchild, Pentagon, Tinker, HQ/SAC.
1. The Trust Fund that was set up for the son of Sgt Dave Felix, by the Red River Raiders GUNNERS Association, Grand Forks, ND. Still welcomes donations. (A 362-6605)

2. It looks like the first class of the Enlisted Aviation Qualification Course (EAQC) will start in October at Sheppard AFB, TX. It will replace the EAUS at Castle.

3. If you haven't heard by now, you will real soon. GUNNERS are now officially Positive Control (PC) crewmembers. All that PC pay should make up for all the time we've been doing it anyway.

4. The GUNNERS Conference will be hosted by Eighth Air Force this year. It will probably be held at Carswell AFB TX, in the November/December time frame.

5. The GTU boys are heading up to Fairchild AFB, WA in August to teach the 92nd BMG GUNNERS to carry little screwdrivers and say stuff like "receiver gain, ATA, control handle (singular), and 'What do you mean it wasn't a 100% fireout?'"

6. The Minot AFB GUNNERS were the only unit to send a list of honorary GUNNERS with their BDB input. The list in this BDB is compiled with lists from the GTU, 4235th STS, and 7 BMG, at Carswell and Minot. Compare it with your units corporate memory and send it to the BDB for the Spring 86 issue.

7. The BDB is also compiling data bases of Pre B-52 GUNNERS (WWII, Korea, etc), retired GUNNERS. Keep the lists coming.

8. SMSgt Chuck Killgore has new office and phone number (A 487-4167/5462), so a good million or so people have to change their (choose any or all of the following):
   a. Desk phone directory
   b. Little scrap of paper in their wallet
   c. List of phone numbers carved in the phone booths on alert
   d. Cross-training paperwork
   e. All of the above
The **GUNNER** profession lost one of its true heroes last Spring. On April 12, 1985 MSgt (Ret.) Samuel Turner finally succumbed to the disease that wracked the last years of his life.

Sam, the first B-52 **GUNNER** credited with a MiG kill, died in his native state of Georgia. His military decorations included the Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, and a number of Air Medals. His assignments included tours at McCoy AFB, Florida; Craig AFB, Alabama; U-Tapao Thailand; Andersen AFB, Guam and his last at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota.

There are some in this profession not fully aware of Sam's historic act on the night of December 18, 1972. The information presented on the next several pages, provided by the SAC office of the Historian, should enlighten the uninformed. This issue of the Bulldog Bulletin is dedicated to Sam Turner.