FILE TITLE: Project 100,000 (Recruiting Standards)

Reviewed by:

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Director
Air Force Enlisted Heritage Research Institute
BACKGROUND PAPER
ON
"PROJECT 100,000"

Can you imagine the Department of Defense (DOD) or the United States Air Force (USAF) participating in a program that would label them as social welfare institutions? (6:2) Defense Secretary McNamara put it best when he announced the rationale for DOD’s involvement in PROJECT 100,000 by stating “Poverty in America, effects our national security, by its appalling waste of talent.” (4:5) This paper will describe a DOD and USAF social program called "PROJECT 100,000," and increase your knowledge into the USAF’s past history. This paper will first discuss the motivating factors and ulterior goals that led to the start of PROJECT 100,000. From there you will be see the lay out of PROJECT 100,000's sequential development. Next you will discover the characteristics of the PROJECT 100,000 people and their job assignments in the USAF will than be discussed. What were the motivating factors and ulterior goals of PROJECT 100,000?

There were many motivating factors and ulterior goals that contributed to the start of PROJECT 100,000. The Johnson administration spawned this project, and the Nixon administration’s interest continued to strengthen it. (4:5F) President Johnson clearly showed the project to have high level emphasis on 6 March 1967 when he described PROJECT 100,000 in his message to Congress on Selective Service, and stated:

SMSgt Noret/HQ AFMC/SPO/787-3352/sn/22 Feb 95
"In the past, many thousands of men were rejected—and put into deferred categories—who could have performed satisfactorily, sharing the burdens as well as the benefits of service. Most of these were disadvantaged youths with limited educational backgrounds or in some cases, curable physical defects....This will be a continuing program. The Nation can never again afford to deny to men who can effectively serve their country the obligation—and the right—to share in a basic responsibility of citizenship." (9:21)

Evolving from continued government and public concern that over one-third of the people trying to enter the military were declared unfit by mental or physical standards. (8:570) The government wanted to broaden the opportunities for enlistment and equalize the military service obligation for all. They needed this during the South East Asia conflict as a means to increase the availability of new recruits. It reduced the number of draftee's required to fill service requirements at the same time. In addition, people thought using the military training schools as an excellent way to take societies un-productive citizens and turn them into productive citizens. (9:21) PROJECT 100,000 would also require the much needed revamping of all training classes, in order to handle the individuals identified as New Standards Accessions (NSA). (2:1) PROJECT 100,000's sequential development was very quick in coming to life.

The description of PROJECT 100,000's sequential development would be as follows.

Defense Secretary McNamara announced PROJECT 100,000 in August 1966. In October 1966, the armed forces lowered the entrance examination requirements for people entering the service; and the program officially began accepting NSA's. (12:11) By 1970, the mandatory restrictions of PROJECT 100,000 had seriously handicapped the USAF Recruiting Service. Consequently, in January 1971 Air Training Command began to question the advisability of continuing the program.
The Air Force enlistment quotas for NSA’s officially terminated on 1 December 1971. (1:186) With no enlistment quotas being forced, the program continued to lose support, and was officially terminated in 1973. (9:22) How did the characteristics of the PROJECT 100,000 people and their job assignments in the USAF compare to the norm?

Standing out were the characteristics of PROJECT 100,000 people and their job assignments in the USAF. The NSA people came from primarily very poor families, and most were from areas that had a very high rejection rate for military service. Almost 40% of the NSA people were black, and 47% came from states in the South. (8:570) The average percentile score for PROJECT 100,000 people was 14, while the score for the normal control group was 54. Educational opportunities contributed greatly to the low scores' people received on their entrance examinations. Learning that 49% of the NSA people had failed at least one grade in school, and 17% had failed two grades shows the validity of that theory. (10:871) The NSA people fared very well transitioning into their military jobs. (11:880) Most were given non-combat type skills after completion of military basic training. The purpose of this was in line with preparing an individual to be a productive member of society upon completion of their military commitment. That required the NSA’s receiving a job that they would receive training for in the military, but allow easy transition to a lateral civilian job upon discharge. Because the NSA’s successfully integrated back into society, the people did declare the program a success. (14:1) Let’s highlight the important aspects of PROJECT 100,000.

The Johnson administration spawned PROJECT 100,000, and the Nixon administration’s interest continued to strengthen it. The project evolved from continued government and public concern over one-third of society failing to meet the enlistment requirements. It also provided a means to increase the availability of new recruits during the South East Asia conflict. Defense
Secretary McNamara announced PROJECT 100,000 in August 1966. The Air Force terminated enlistment quotas on 1 December 1971. With no enlistment quotas being forced, the program officially terminated in 1973. The NSA people came from primarily very poor families. Almost 40% of the NSA people were black, and 47% came from states in the South. NSA people fared very well in their military jobs. People declared PROJECT 100,000 a success because of the NSA’s successful integration back into society. Someday the Department of Defense (DOD) or the United States Air Force (USAF) may again participate in a program such as PROJECT 100,000. Knowing what we know today will help us correctly influence those future decisions.
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OUTLINE
ON
THE
US AIR FORCE
HELPS INITIATE
"PROJECT 100,000"

- INTRODUCTION
  - PURPOSE STATEMENT
  - OVERVIEW

- THE PURPOSE OF PROJECT 100,000

- SEQUENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROJECT 100,000

- THE GOAL OF PROJECT 100,000

- CHARACTERISTICS OF PROJECT 100,000 PEOPLE

- JOB ASSIGNMENTS OF PROJECT 100,000 PEOPLE

-CLOSURE
BACKGROUND PAPER
ON
PROJECT ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND

How many of you are familiar with this project? The supervisor you are working with
may have been one of those selected to become a part of this program and is enjoying
service as a senior leader in today's Air Force. I will explain the purpose, goal, impact,
additional training cost, and the lessons learned from this ambitious program designed in
the fifties and instituted in the late sixties.

Project 100,000 was initiated for three basic reasons:

1. To broaden the opportunities for enlistment and equalize the obligations
for military service.

2. To use the training avenue of the services to assist these men to become
productive citizens when they return to civilian life.

3. To foresee military planning.

The opportunities to enlist in the services obviously needed broadening due to the large
number of personnel rejected each year. This number appeared to be increasing and
without some changes the Air Force would continue to receive the best qualified volunteers
and the Army would receive the lower category personnel. Initiation of this program
required each service to participate and share in the training responsibility. This training
provided "New Mental Standards" personnel as they were called, to serve a dual purpose.
They would be qualified to perform in an acceptable manner for the service and the
training they received would be an asset to them when they returned to civilian life. An
added advantage to the program is that the personnel trained under this project would
increase the flexibility of the manpower reserves within the United States in the event of a
national emergency.

SMSgt Zakari/MXS/MAP/3447/jhz/7 Dec 94
The goal of Project 100,000 was to enlist, train, and utilize marginal men. High school dropouts, men from impoverished backgrounds, and men that were considered to be functionally illiterate were inducted. According to a Pentagon study, the average age was 20.4 years: 57 per cent had not completed high school: 38 per cent were unemployed and 18 per cent were earning less than $60 a week in unskilled positions. As mentioned before and just as important, the program's aim was to return these people to civilian life with a marketable skill after their tour of duty. Department of Defense requirements for the first year were set at 40,000 personnel and thereafter 100,000 per year. The Air Force began participation in January 1967, but this was not an entirely new situation for that service as similar action by the Defense Department in 1963 forced both the Air Force and Navy to accept proportionate numbers of recruits in the lower mental categories to relieve some of the burden placed on other services. Each service used established aptitude tests to make selections and the Air Force determined suitability through the Airman Qualifying Examination. The mental category status of each person was defined in terms of his score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. There were five categories numbered one through five with category one being regarded as the highest percentile (93-99%) range. The majority of Project 100,000 men were classified as Category IV on the basis of their score. Before program initiation they were being rejected because they failed to meet the minimal mental standards or, in some instances, physical standards.

Up until 1976 research on the impact of Project 100,000 to the services revealed differences of opinion as to its success or failure. As Arthur J. Healy stated "policies set forth by the Secretary of Defense to govern this project specified that minimum standards of performance would not be reduced, but every effort would be made to bring these men up to satisfactory performance levels". A study was performed by the Personnel Research Division to evaluate the progress and performance of marginal ability personnel who
enlisted in the Air Force during the period 1 April 1967 through 31 March 1968. The subjects included all Category I and Category IV male airmen accessions and a ten per cent random sample of all Category II and III personnel who enlisted during the above specified period. It must be noted that all medical accessions were excluded from the analyses. Categories I, II, and III served as the control group and Category IV accessions comprised the experimental group. The study concluded that the majority of the lower mental ability personnel were performing at a significantly lower level of proficiency than their contemporaries at the higher levels. The criteria measured success in basic training completion, disciplinary action, unsuitability discharge, academic elimination from technical training, change of job specialty, attainment of skill level and attainment of grade E-3 or higher were utilized. Out of 12,700 men in the control group, 12,280 or 97.6% of them completed basic training. Out of 14,215 men in the experimental group, 13,221 or 93.0% completed basic training. As the previous statements allude, the Project 100,000 Group not only had a lower percentage completing basic training, but had more disciplinary actions, more unsuitability discharges, a higher attrition rate for tech training, more shifts in Air Force specialties, and a lower percentage attaining the skill level and the grade of E-3 or higher. These figures seem to arouse one's curiosity. Is a difference of four per cent in completion rate of basic training that significant when compared to the additional manpower that was allowed? What would the results have been if that study had compared the Cat IV's against a combination of all Cat I and only 10% of Cat II and III enlistees? And what would the results have been if the 100,000 subjects were compared with enlistees that met previous minimum mental requirements in Cat III? I'm sure those question's will never be satisfactorily answered.

This large scale project did not come about without additional training and expense and some lessons learned. Project 100,000 required the establishment of one of the largest programs in history to reduce illiteracy amongst the recruit. It was discovered that a decrease in the student to instructor ratio was required to allow the instructor to spend
more time with the slow learner. Once the individual's weaknesses were identified special training was available. Individual remedial study programs in reading and mathematics were established. Better audio-visual training aids improved the classroom presentations and the step by step learn by doing method was utilized. Enlistees reporting to Lackland AFB, Texas found to have reading anomalies were assigned to the proficiency unit. The time spent with this unit depended upon the individual's progress, usually lasting from one to nine weeks. When the enlistees reading grade level progressed to the sixth grade level, as determined by the Armed Forces Institute Tests, he was reassigned to the standard basic military training program. While the proficiency program was not a fixed duration, the maximum length of time an individual could remain was 65 day's after which he returned to basic training. This remedial training was sufficient to get the recruit through basic and into 89 out of the 238 Air Force specialities and upon completion of tech school he was sent into the field where he started on-the-job training (OJT) for his specialty. As you know, OJT included a requirement to complete a career development course (CDC). This was where the recruits poor reading ability took effect as the reading level is set at the eighth grade for the CDC. The Project 100,000 recruit who had reading problems when he entered the Air Force will very likely continue to be far behind his contemporaries. With effort, the majority passed with assistance from their supervisor's. The next hurdle if they entered a second enlistment, would be taking the weighted airman's promotion system test. Studies have shown that most individuals regressed to the same reading level they had attained prior to entry into the remedial program and were less likely to get promoted beyond E-4 or be accepted into most of the highly technical career fields. The peculiar thing is that there was little difference found in job performance as compared with men with a higher literacy grade level.

In conclusion it would be difficult if not impossible to locate where these men are now but I will leave you with a few thoughts. Since the majority of the literacy problems were found in the Cat IV enlistees, the best solution would have been to reject any applicant
who failed to attain a passing score on the qualification test. Obviously this was not an acceptable solution to the problem, not to mention it becoming more expensive to accept and train marginal manpower. So, what did we do? After realizing the cost was favoring quantity over quality, the Department of Defense (DOD) terminated quotas on 1 DEC 1972, essentially terminating Project 100,000. In addition the DOD Appropriations Act of 1972 prohibited the establishment of mandating quotas based on mental standards. Now that the all volunteer force is a fact of life and has been for the past twenty or so years, the services have all established programs that attract and retain the highest caliber people, and as a result are maintaining a motivated and willing cadre of military professionals!

SMSGt John H. Zakar Jr.
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DoD's Welfare Plans Risky

By Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker (USAF Ret.)

Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford recently proposed that the Department of Defense take on additional domestic welfare programs. Specifically, he said the Pentagon would experiment in low-cost housing, automation in hospitals, teaching methods and training aids. He also proposed that weapons contractors who contributed most to welfare and anti-poverty programs be favored.

Many members of Congress feel one reason Defense appropriations have risen sharply during the past eight years (the proposed 1969 defense bill is the largest in our history) is because DoD takes on the tasks of other departments of government, since it can get the money.

Clifford's suggestion that DoD become active as a new welfare agency supports this. One will search in vain in the National Defense Act of 1947 and its amendments for any directive or authorization that it assume welfare tasks.

There is a legitimate welfare area which should consume the interest of the Pentagon. That concern the status of the 3 million men and women in uniform who are underpaid compared to those with similar skills in civilian life. They receive inadequate compensation for long periods of family separation, frequent changes of station and the hazards of their wartime duties.

Thousands of military men could qualify for poverty program grants since their income is less than the standards set for federal relief. It will be small comfort for the junior officers and enlisted men who have lived in trailers, garages and hovels for years, and who are forced to drive 30 to 40 miles to work because of inadequate housing, now to learn that hard-to-get funds for military quarters are to be used in an experiment on low-cost housing. Such a project is appropriate for—and in fact is now in progress at—the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

As a result of the failure of the Pentagon to represent the interests and guard the welfare of our men in uniform, re-enlistment rates are very low and resignations and early retirement of young officers are the highest in years.

The proposal that contracts for weapons be let on any other basis than the best weapon (determined by the military) at the fairest price (determined by competitive bidding) could open a Pandora's box. It could return weapons procurement to earlier times when favorite states, favored cities and those who contributed most to party coffers got the contracts.

The best weapon at the cheapest price should be the firm criteria in defense procurement.

30 Oct 1969
How Far Involvement?

Traditionally the mission of the Department of Defense has been to plan for, prepare for and conduct war when and if it comes about. However, today’s arena is such that the Department and the Services themselves are becoming at least tangentially involved in issues that are primarily domestic in nature.

There has been considerable controversy both within the military and on Capitol Hill as to the precise degree to which DOD should be concerned in such issues and at what point it should restrict its “social baby-sitting.”

The services are already strongly committed to such programs as Project Transition (preparing outgoing servicemen for employment survival in the civilian environment) and Project 100,000 (assisting incoming servicemen to meet minimum military standards).

Now Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford has publicly pledged the Defense Department’s aid in overcoming some of the social ills of the county including the hard core unemployment problem. He has also ordered DOD officials to prepare an outline for future action which will be recommended to the new administration. The outline will include such other areas as housing, health and education.

“There is a real potential for defense industry to bring enterprise to the ghetto,” he said. “I want to see this sort of effort expanded.” Clifford further indicated that he would effect changes in the ASPR (Armed Services Procurement Regulations) to encourage major contractors to give greater attention to the possibility of locating new facilities in or near labor surplus areas and give more consideration to placing subcontracts in these areas.

As might have been expected, the Clifford announcement jarred a cry of anguish from the Hill where legislators are ever sensitive to Congressional prerogatives.

Most critical was ranking minority member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the House, Rep. Glennard P. Lipcensp, who said “I strongly oppose the concept that it is the function and responsibility of DOD to establish unity in this country and to take over running all areas of our country. This would set a dangerous precedent for other agencies.”

The Congressman also voiced his concern that this would be opening the door for legislators of systems analysts to move from “cost-effectiveness” to “social effectiveness” studies in defense planning. “Certainly,” he said, taking a swipe at the Pentagon’s civilian management, “the record of DOD in recent years has not been such as to give assurance that it has solved all its own problems and is now ready to assume new additional burdens.”

Other grumblings have also been heard from the industrial giant itself. Clifford’s suggestions that perhaps big business also has obligations in these areas were less than enthusiastically received and elicited comments that the Secretary should limit his activities to matters of national security and stay out of the welfare business.

Even the old bugaboo of the “military/industrial” combine lurked on the periphery of the issue. (Clifford and most knowledgeable defense leaders concur that though former President Eisenhower’s warning had a certain validity, the system of checks and balances has precluded such a complex.)

With all the pros and cons involved, with Congress jealously guarding its domain, and with the Pentagon attempting more and more to assist in alleviating some of the nation’s most pressing domestic problems, the controversy is not likely to cool in the near term future.

Still for whatever the rights and wrongs or tradition dictates, certain truths loom obvious. The profile of war and the place of the military in the world society have changed. Just as the civilian populace no longer enjoys any amnesty from the ravages of battle, the military community can no longer remain aloof and detached from encumbrances of civil life.

The Department of Defense is spending some 50% of the tax dollar. Already it is spearheading education development and the optimum development of U.S. educational resources. Can it not also through innovative endeavor make a considerable contribution to housing, health, and welfare?

If the military and civil structures are no longer separable, is not the very thought of taking forces traditionally designed for destructive purposes and redirecting them toward constructive ends, a vitally stimulating objective for the future?

Certainly, the dilemmas facing the nation today require the maximum utilization of total resources. It is also apparent that those programs in which the Department of Defense is currently involved are designed to benefit the individual and therefore the nation. Perhaps the legislators and Defense officials should work in greater concert to take full advantage of the vast DOD resources. Or as Secretary Clifford phrased it, “This element of the government, which spends half of the nation’s tax money, owes no less to the country.”

Craig Powell

DECEMBER 1968
Lieutenant General Sam Maddux, Jr.
Commander, Air Training Command
Randolph Air Force Base, Texas 78148

Dear Sam,

During the past week we submitted our proposals to ATC (ATXPP-P) for greater DOD involvement in domestic social programs. Our proposals reflect realistic appraisals of the current social needs and cite application of our greatest resource, a training capability. As you pointed out at your recent Commanders' Conference, we exercised normal caution against over-involvement in these domestic problems, avoiding a usurping of responsibilities of other state or federal agencies. In spite of our cautious approach to the OSD request, any aggressive action to rush implementation of the proposals would detract from our efforts to provide the best possible technical training and support for Air Force personnel.

We are presently engaged in many new efforts to improve our technical training as is evident by the initiation of the Experimental Studies Branch at this Center. If our resources are siphoned off to assist numerous social programs, our training quality will undoubtedly suffer. As you know, we are already participating in Project 100,000, Program for Summer Examination Employment Program and United Fund, to name just a few. To administer Project 100,000, we have been authorized additional instructor personnel in critical areas. In addition to the requirement for more manpower spaces to administer other social programs, of even more concern is the inordinate amount of time required of top commanders and key personnel. These social programs are always given a high priority. They require personal involvement from the top of each echelon of command, resulting in less time for the individuals to devote to primary mission problems and new ideas for increasing our effectiveness.

The attached article written by Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker (USAF Retired) illustrates rather pointedly some of the "social problems" within the Air Force. It surely behooves us to make plans to alleviate our
own in-house problems before taking on additional national responsibilities for which no funds or manpower is appropriated. For example, I am concerned about the low quality and high cost of civilian housing available to our young married airmen of Chanute. I am equally concerned about the unhealthy conditions resulting from inadequate or non-existent sewage systems prevalent in the small communities within commuting distance of Chanute. I have written to the Governor about the hazards presented to the safety of Chanute personnel by the condition of U.S. Highway 45, a prime access route into Chanute.

Greater OSD involvement is recommended in alerting the responsible federal agencies to the need for construction programs to remedy these social problems within the DOD. Such programs provide employment and raise the earning level of the area residents. The end result would be improved living conditions for all persons within the total area.

As to the national social problems, I believe there are many areas in which each Air Force installation can assist the local community. However, each commander must approach with caution all new proposals until he is certain that he is not jeopardizing his prime mission. His prime concern must be for the welfare of the military and civilian force upon which the mission depends. Therefore, it is recommended that ATC reports on how we have trained Project 100,000 airmen, how we have provided transition training for airmen returning to civilian employment, and ATC participation in similar programs, be made available through OSD to other federal agencies having responsibilities for the health, education and welfare of underprivileged groups.

Sincerely

M. C. DEMLER, Major General, USAF
Commander

Atch
Article - Eaker's View
Suggest you pass these recommendations on to Capt. Hubbard before they commit us to a longer program.

I'm sure General Demler would like to see these comments and the article by Mr. Greenberg—

if he will have time—

Another question:

Cal Hinsley

General Demler

Original sent to OI on 18 July

Mary
Tentative Visit by Member of West Virginia State Legislature and Educators on 20 August 1969

1. I believe that the 2-1/2 days suggested in the telephone memo concerning the visit of the West Virginia State Legislature and educators is excessive as regards the length of time. I feel that we could lay on a good program for approximately 1-1/2 days. To exceed this would needless tie up too much of our school people's time and take them away from other requirements.

2. I suggest that the agenda include comprehensive briefings on: Tech School organization; course development procedures; training innovations; and Project 100,000. This would then be followed by a lecture-tour of various departments in the Tech School to include our new Display Center. The program would end with a question and answer session in our conference room.

3. I recommend that OI suggest to Capt Hubbard, ATC (ATCOI-I) that this type and length of visit be suggested to the visitors.

4. As an aside I have included an article by Mr. I. M. Greenberg on Project 100,000. This article appeared in Phi Delta Kappan. I don't know whether the General has seen the article or not. I found it rather interesting since some parts of it were almost direct quotes from talks and reports from our School (Mr. Greenberg has visited Chanute). Some of the things that Mr. Greenberg addresses relate to comments in Gen Demler's 9 July 69 memo which is attached. It would appear to me that the most direct thing that the public school system could do as regards Project 100,000 is to put more emphasis on fundamental education; i.e., teaching the "3-R's". I cannot help but feel that if this were done we would have less people in our society who would be classified as New Mental Standard Airmen, since if they could read they would probably do better on their entrance aptitude test.
5. I don't recall if we have told the General that we have been advised that all New Mental Standard Airmen will be sent to Tech Schools in Phase IV of the Project -- no more OJT to the three level for these people. This should take some of the load off the back of the field commander.

H. SHERWOOD, Jr., Colonel, USAF
Commander, 3345th Technical School

2 Atch
1. Article
2. Gen Demler's Memo
Project 100,000:
The Training
of Former Rejectees

By I. M. GREENBERG

For the May, 1967, KAPPAN (The Military and Education), Clayton Braddock wrote "Project 100,000." Then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had just announced that the armed forces would accept annually some 100,000 men who by earlier standards would have been rejected. Project 100,000 has now been tested. Here is a summary of what the military has learned about "rejectees."

During the 1960's there was growing concern in government, in the educational community, and among public leaders over the fact that one-third of our nation's youth were being declared unfit for military service under standards established by the armed forces. We are all aware of numerous programs which were initiated in the past decade to upgrade the educational and skill level of disadvantaged youth and assist them in finding jobs and a future in our society. Project One Hundred Thousand is a Department of Defense effort to make a contribution toward helping solves this most pressing problem by accepting for military service large numbers of young men who would have been previously rejected for military service.

In this article I shall describe our experience with Project One Hundred Thousand and then discuss the factors which contributed to the success of the program.

The program was announced in August, 1966, by Secretary Robert McNamara in a speech which stressed the relationship between poverty, poor education, and social unrest. In October, 1966, the armed forces lowered the entrance requirements for military service. We began accepting thousands of young men who were previously being rejected because they failed the standard entrance tests or the educational requirements for service. Provision was also made for accepting some men with easily correctable physical defects.

The goal was to accept 40,000 such men the first year and 100,000 each year thereafter. Project One Hundred Thousand derived its name from this annual goal. We have been meeting our input goal. By the end of March, 1969, 30 months after the program began, we had enrolled 190,000 men. More than half were volunteers; the remainder were draftees. Some 93 percent were accepted by lowering the test standards and educational requirements. The other seven percent were volunteers for medically remedial surgery or physical conditioning.

The Department of Defense is not a social welfare institution; its primary responsibility is to provide the combat capability needed for national security. We do feel, however, that the DOD, along with all other major institutions, should be concerned with the broader aspects of national security. Our well-being as a nation suffers when we lose the potential contribution of a sizable proportion of our young men because of low academic achievement, undeveloped talent, and despair. Project One Hundred Thousand recognizes the opportunity of the armed forces to contribute their unique capabilities toward improving the competence of a portion of our nation's youth.

Most of the statistics quoted in this article come from a computerized name-by-name tracking system which was set up to manage the program. The file also contains comparable information on "control groups" of men who entered service with higher scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. Results from this tracking system are compiled and published periodically.

Characteristics and Performance

Project One Hundred Thousand men come primarily from poor families and disproportionately from geographic areas and localities which have high rejection rates for military service. Nearly 40 percent are Negro, compared with a nine percent Negro input for the control group; 47 percent of the Project One Hundred Thousand men come from the South, while only 28 percent of the control group entered from that region.

The educational profile highlights the gap between their school attendance and their achievement level.

The educational deprivation of these men is also reflected in their scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. The average percentile score for Project One Hundred Thousand men is 14, compared with 54 for the control group.

Project men are not "mentally retarded" as the term is generally used in education and psychology.

MR. GREENBERG is director, Project One Hundred Thousand, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

KAPPAN
Although entry standards were lowered, about 10.5 percent are still being rejected for failure to pass the written tests. This means that about 200,000 young men who reach military age each year still cannot pass the "mental standards" for military service.

When we started the program we were confident that the vast majority of men would be able to qualify as satisfactory servicemen by exposure to our instructional and motivational techniques. The results exceeded our expectations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>100,000 Control Group</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent High School Graduates</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number School Grades Completed (Ave.)</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading Ability—Median Grade</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Reading Below Fourth Grade Level</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Who Failed or Repeated School Grades</td>
<td>47.0 (known)</td>
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- In basic training 95 percent graduated, compared with 98 percent of all other men.
- In formal skill training courses only 10 percent failed to graduate, compared with a four percent attrition rate for the control group attending the same grade of courses. Those who fail usually succeed in another type of course or are given on-the-job training.
- Some 60 percent of the Project One Hundred Thousand men are being given noncombat-skills assignments. Most of the assignments have direct or related counterparts in the civilian economy. After combat training, the most common assignments for Project One Hundred Thousand men are in the fields of food service, supply, wire communications, motor transportation, equipment repair, construction, and military police. The men have been assigned to more than 200 different occupational specialties.
- Their promotion record has been excellent. The enlisted grade structure has nine levels, starting with grade E-1. After 20 months of service, 52 percent were in grade E-4 or above, compared with 59 percent for the control group. Many are entering leadership positions.
- The annual court-martial rate for these men has been less than three percent. This figure is heartening because we did expect more severe discipline—
  - Men with severe reading limitations are given full-time remedial education for three to eight weeks during basic training. More than 80 percent complete the course and show gains averaging 14 grades.
  - The attrition from service—for all causes—has been modest. For example, a cohort with 20 months' service had a 12 percent separation rate compared with a six percent rate for all other men. This includes men separated for unsuitability, misconduct, medical conditions, family hardship, and also battle casualties.

Our records show that project men do not perform as well as a cross-section of men with higher educational levels. The differences in performance are, however, not very large. Most of the project men have become highly satisfactory servicemen. Although they all scored low on the service entrance test, they are not a homogeneous group. Given the opportunity, many of the former rejects do a better job than men who had higher test scores.

What are the factors which have led to the high rate of success these men have had in military service?

### The Military Environment

The young man who enters military service is separated from his previous environment. He enters a form of residential training. A conscious effort is made to build self-confidence, pride, and good work habits. The environment is highly structured and disciplined. The system acts rapidly to reinforce satisfactory performance and correct deviant behavior. Group competition is used to foster teamwork and motivate men to succeed and help their buddies succeed. The early months of military life are hard for all recruits, but they know there are penalties for not trying or quitting.

Military life opens a new chance, often viewed as the last chance by many who have tasted only failure and poverty. The typical drill sergeant announces on the first day: "I don't care whether your daddy is rich or poor, whether you went to college or just grade school—you're all the same to me. Right now you are a miserable looking bunch, but eight weeks from now this platoon is going to be the best damn platoon in the battalion." As the weeks go by the recruit gains confidence as he masters the simple skills in basic training and is ready to learn more complex skills.

Training instructors and unit commanders report that Project One Hundred Thousand men, on the whole, have greater difficulty in coping with personal problems—debts, family crises, girl friends—but the machinery exists to counsel and help them. The environment is demanding but at the same time supportive. The individual does not feel alone or adrift.

The recruit knows there is a place for him after he finishes training. The job may be quite basic, but it is a man's job because of the organizational setting. Being a cook in a tank battalion or on an aircraft carrier provides more status than working in a hometown restaurant. In the service the man is a member of a military unit, such as an aircraft wing, a ship, or a regiment, which has its own heritage and traditions. His uniform announces his full-fledged membership in one of the military services, and this membership bestows upon him the grandeur acquired in past wars and battles—events recorded in the history books he has seen in school. The same organizational loyalties that lead men to sacrifice in combat also provide some of the motivation that helps them to learn to read better, study harder, and strive for promotions.

Men coming from deprived backgrounds and black ghettos find that the military doesn't hold them back because of their race or previous social status. What counts most now is their performance. Their inadequate education does keep most of them out of the more complex jobs initially, but they do have a chance to become supervisors and improve their education if they work hard enough.

June, 1969
Instructor Attitudes

The majority of the instructional staff used to train enlisted men is military. We do employ some civilian teachers in technical schools and educational development courses. The military instructors are carefully selected and are given instructor training before they assume their duties in training centers or technical schools. They are competent in the limited subject matter they are required to teach and are given well-developed lesson plans to follow. Although they are not professional educators, they have qualities which help them perform well in their teaching tasks.

The instructors are optimists; they assume that the young man's personality can be modified and his ability level improved regardless of the deficiencies in prior background. The personnel planners in the Pentagon set the standards for entry into military service and operate the computerized assignment systems which deliver men into different training courses. These operations are not governed by the training centers and schools. When the recruit or student arrives for training, the instructor assumes he is educable.

Of course some men do fail in training. In most cases the instructor feels that the student's failure occurred because somehow he, as an instructor, was unable to motivate the student to try harder. The instructor rarely attributes the student's failure to cultural deprivation or genetic limitations. This attitude is certainly unsophisticated, but is perhaps the best approach for helping Project One Hundred Thousand men reach their full potential.

Military instructors work very hard. Those involved in basic training work about 70 hours a week during the training cycle. In schools, the instructors spend evenings tutoring men who are having difficulty in keeping up with the class. Project One Hundred Thousand has put a considerable strain on the military instructor. We feel that he has been the single most important reason for the success of the program.

Assistant During Training

Project One Hundred Thousand men are trained along with all other men in our regular training centers and schools. There are provisions for helping them, if necessary, at all stages of their training. They are not stigmatized as slow learners on the basis of their entrance test scores. They—and all other men—are given extra help only if they need it.

A variety of methods is used to provide assistance to those who cannot keep pace during training:

- **Tutoring and Counseling**—This technique has proven to be very effective with Project One Hundred Thousand men. Schools usually schedule two-hour study periods three evenings per week. While most students study on their own, those who are having difficulty in the course are tutored by an instructor or another student.
- **Recycling**—Men repeat portions of their training by being set back to a training company or class which is in an earlier stage of training. Some men are recycled because they missed several weeks of training due to illness or emergency leave.
- **Special Training Companies**—Each basic training center has a unit which is organized to provide concentrated attention for men requiring physical conditioning, slow learners, or those who have serious motivational or adjustment problems. About half of the trainee population in these companies are Project One Hundred Thousand men. The stay in these special training companies averages two weeks, with a range of from one to 30 days. Men are returned to a regular training unit as quickly as possible.

- **Remedial Education**—Project One Hundred Thousand men and others who have severe reading limitations are sent to a remedial reading course before or during the basic training cycle. The Army course, called Army Preparatory Training, is six weeks in length, although some men leave after three weeks. The men get six hours of academic instruction each day, four in reading, one in arithmetic, and one in citizenship studies. Introductory military training is also provided at the end of each week day and on Saturday morning. The students are encouraged to read in the evening. The Air Force and Navy courses are somewhat similar.

Results have been excellent. About 80 percent of the men who enter the remedial education courses make progress. The gains in reading ability average 1½ grades. The typical student enters with a 4.0 grade reading ability and is reading close to 6.0 when he graduates. The improvement is substantial, although it is recognized that some of the measured gains are achieved by refreshing dormant reading skills. The remedial education
courses are improving the men's chances for success in military training and providing the foundation for future educational growth. The technical schools continue to improve the reading ability of these men during tutoring sessions. Programmed instruction materials in arithmetic are in use in various technical courses to provide the mathematical skills associated with the occupation.

Opportunities for continued educational upgrading are available after the men complete training and are assigned to units. The military General Educational Development (GED) programs award eighth-grade and high school equivalency certificates. Although the GED program is usually conducted during off-duty times, commanders try to make duty time available for those who do not have a high school education.

Heterogeneous Grouping

Educators have shown interest in our experience in training Project One Hundred Thousand men along with all others in our regular training centers and schools. This is why we adopted this policy:

First, we wanted to avoid stigmatizing the men as a sub-par group. Our goal is to improve their confidence and self-esteem. Segregation on the basis of entry scores would defeat this objective. Men who come into service with a history of failure in civilian life take enormous pride in graduating from a regular class. Their grades may be below the class average, but they now feel they can compete and survive.

Second, although we use achievement and aptitude tests in qualifying men for service and as assignment tools, we recognize that these instruments have limitations. While the men accepted in Project One Hundred Thousand are a relatively homogeneous group in terms of entrance test scores, their actual performance varies widely. As we anticipated, the aptitude test scores underestimate the potential ability of many Project One Hundred Thousand men.

Third, we feel that Project One Hundred Thousand men learn more by associating with a cross-section of American youth. Learning, in the fullest sense, doesn't stop when the training day is ended; it continues informally in the barracks, the dining room, and the enlisted men's club where the men drink beer. The mixing of ability levels also enables us to use the "buddy system" during training. Bright students are given responsibility for helping those who are making slow progress.

I do not mean to criticize ability grouping as an educational technique. We have been able to operate under a policy of mixed grouping in Project One Hundred Thousand because our total setting made it feasible. We are fortunate in having a wide spectrum of skill training courses that Project One Hundred Thousand men can master. We assign very few of them to complex courses such as computer programming, electronic maintenance, or meteorology. In the main, they are trained in the simpler skills at the beginning. However, in any course they take, the student body contains a cross-section of ability levels. Each occupation needs men who will be able to fill supervisory ranks and later take more advanced training in the occupational field. Therefore, even in the simplest courses attended by the Project One Hundred Thousand man, he will be grouped with others of greater educational achievement. To help sustain the system of homogeneous grouping, we have procedures for helping the man who cannot keep pace; or, if necessary, we assign him to another type of training.

Improved Training Methods

When we started Project One Hundred Thousand we were confident that the curriculum and training methods used in recruit training centers were satisfactory. The only changes we made were to expand the capacity of the special training companies and, later on, add the capability of providing remedial reading instruction. Fortunately, the big improvement in basic training occurred prior to Project One Hundred Thousand.

The armed forces had taken steps to raise the selection standards, training, and prestige of the drill segments.

The military services have for many years been leaders in the field of technical education. Their vocational-type courses are job-oriented, stress practical exercises, and utilize modern training devices. We did feel that we should make changes in some of these courses to enhance the success rate of Project One Hundred Thousand students. The military services have made revisions in more than 50 courses and the process is continuing. The changes fall into these main categories:

- Eliminating subject matter and theory found to be unrelated to the job.
- Simplifying the reading levels of the materials. We used simpler words, shorter sentences, and added pictures, diagrams, and cartoons to increase comprehension.
- "Hands-on" training was increased to allow more learning by doing, and lecture time was reduced.
- More audio-visual aids were added and many of the training aids were improved. For example, in an eight-week automotive maintenance course we added 21 kinescopes, 50 new slides and charts, and five new simulators to better demonstrate the vehicle components.
- Instructors were added to some courses to permit training in smaller groups.
- Tests used in the courses were revised to make them relevant to the job the man would be required to perform. In some cases pencil and paper tests were replaced with performance type tests.

N ever change we made proved to be effective. For example, some programmed tests proved to be too boring; others were too difficult for men with low reading ability and poor study habits. Some material which was rewritten in cartoon format flopped because the same unintelligible language was transferred from paragraph form to cartoons. We also found that there are limits to the simplification process. Some courses do require the learning of theory, the reading of complicated technical manuals, and the use of high school level mathematics. We did not choose to dilute the quality of training in the
process of simplifying a course. On the whole, we are pleased with the results of our course modification effort. Most of the changes we made proved to be of benefit to all those attending the course. Project One Hundred Thousand served as a catalyst, triggering the reexamination of the way we were preparing men for jobs. The military services are developing new procedures for redesigning a technical course in a systematic way.  

Many Project One Hundred Thousand men, especially in the Navy and Air Force, have taken their skill training on the job instead of attending a resident course. On-the-job training is not left to chance. The training objectives, study guides, and tests for each skill are prepared centrally by training agencies in the services. The man’s supervisor in the supply depot, maintenance shop, or hospital also serves as a teacher.

Costs of the Program

The cost of Project One Hundred Thousand is estimated to be $19 million a year, or about $200 per man. These costs are low because they are “added” rather than total. The strength of the armed forces was not increased for Project One Hundred Thousand. We are accepting these men in lieu of other men with higher educational or physical qualifications. Most Project One Hundred Thousand men complete their training on schedule and become satisfactory service men. There are only minor costs for this group. The added costs are primarily for:

- Remedial education for those who need it.
- Higher attrition rates in training and longer training time for some.
- Hospitalization, physical conditioning, and convalescence for men with correctable physical defects.
- Data processing, research, and administration.

The Future

The program is expected to continue operating at the current rate during this year. The numerical objective is subject to change if the armed forces are reduced in size.

We are seeking ways to improve the program by investing in research. The ongoing research effort includes work on: 1) culture-fair or nonverbal tests of mental ability; 2) new methods for teaching men with low verbal abilities; 3) determining the minimum literacy requirements of certain military jobs.

Some of the first Project One Hundred Thousand men who entered service have now returned to civilian life. We plan to conduct follow-up studies on how well they adjusted to civilian life, compared with like men who were not in the military. Most of these men need some assistance in gaining a foothold in the civilian economy. The armed forces have established Project Transserve to help smooth the way for these men who are returning to civilian life. Men can volunteer to spend the last few months of their military service working toward a high school degree or acquiring a civilian type occupation.

Limitations

Project One Hundred Thousand is reaching only a portion of the young men who suffer from educational and skill deficiencies. About 200,000 men each year are still being disqualified for military service because they cannot pass the tests of mental ability. The young men who are being rejected have even more severe educational problems than the enrollees for Project One Hundred Thousand.

It is not practical to expand Project One Hundred Thousand. The men who are accepted on the basis of lowered entrance standards are being used to fill jobs in the military services. The overall size of the armed forces was not increased to accommodate this program. Last year one out of every nine men accepted for the enlisted ranks was a Project One Hundred Thousand man. The job composition of the military services and the need for men who can progress to the higher ranks limit the number of poorly educated men who can be accepted each year. Military service is providing re habilitation to only a portion of the men who need a new chance to succeed. The number who are assisted by military service may even drop in the future. If the armed forces are reduced to their pre-Vietnam level, we can expect a proportionate curtailment of annual input of Project One Hundred Thousand men. The main task of remedial education and job training still rests with our civilian institutions.

The military approach to training provides no blueprint that can be followed by civilian institutions. A major part of the success of Project One Hundred Thousand is due to the total environment of military life. This setting cannot and should not be introduced into our civilian school systems and rehabilitative agencies. I do believe that the military experience in training Project One Hundred Thousand men may provide others with some helpful ideas and encouragement.

2-Address by Robert S. McCamara, Secretary of Defense, before Veterans of Foreign Wars, New York City, August 23, 1966.
4-Project One Hundred Thousand—Characteristics and Performance of New Standards Men,” issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Manpower 

Unique Teacher Training At Univ. of Connecticut

Three new programs are providing unique training experiences for teachers in city schools at the University of Connecticut, Storrs. One of these programs, “Educating Teachers for the City,” recently received the AACTE’s Distinguished Achievement Award for Excellence in Teacher Education.

Features of the award-winning program include: full-time, qualified lecturers representative of the ghetto’s informal power structure, who introduce and translate to students the sociological and psychological realities of the ghetto, cooperative investments of time and money by local school districts, the State Department of Education, and the university, contact with the inner-city way of thinking, achieved by on-site residence during the entire program; replacement of the traditional lecture-text-examples approach to methods instruction in the campus classroom by on-site methods instruction dealing with real people, problems, materials, and situations.

A second program, the New London-Groton Urban Education Project, is designed so that student teachers live in a house near the deprived area of the city. They live and teach in the urban environment for one semester.

In a third project undergraduate teacher education students are given instruction on the theory and practice of teaching reading to disadvantaged children while riding on a bus to the Hartford ghetto. Once arrived in Hartford, they put bus-learned theory into practice by working in tutorial situations with children in need of remedial instruction.

PHI DELTA KAPPAN

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UNCLASSIFIED

Air Training Command's
Support of Forces in Southeast Asia
1961-1973

BY
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After the initial buildup in SEA, OSD developed some new enlistment goals for the Armed Forces which not only placed greater demands on the Air Force's recruiting efforts, but on its military and technical training efforts as well. One of the more problematical innovations, as concerned ATC, was known as "Project 100,000"-- a program begun in October 1966 to accept men into the Armed Forces who were not qualified for military service under previous mental and physical standards. Project 100,000 evolved from growing government and public concern with the fact that more than one-third of the men reaching military age each year were declared unfit for service under the mental and physical standards established by OSD. Of the 600,000 rejected each year, half could not meet the mental standards as measured by written tests and educational requirements. Among those being rejected were men who, the OSD reasoned, would be accepted by the military services during times of war or national emergency declared by Congress. That the program had high-level emphasis was made clear on 6 March 1967 when President Johnson described Project 100,000 in his message to Congress on Selective Service, and stated:

In the past, many thousands of men were rejected-- and put into deferred categories--who could have performed satisfactorily, sharing the burdens as well as the benefits of service. Most of these were disadvantaged youths with limited educational backgrounds or in some cases, curable physical defects... This will be a continuing program. The Nation can never again afford to deny to men who can effectively serve their Country the obligation--and the right--to share in a basic responsibility of citizenship.

OSD gave three principal reasons for initiating Project 100,000. One was to broaden the opportunities for enlistment and equalize the obligations for military service. Another was to use the training establishment of the Armed Forces to help these men become productive citizens when they returned to civilian life. A third purpose was to provide an opportunity to learn to improve selection, training, assignment and utilization techniques for men who scored low on entrance tests. OSD officials reasoned that a priority mission of the military services was to maintain the capability to train quickly and effectively all of the new men.
developed a modified BMT program for these special trainees and extra time was allotted for those who were unable to complete the modified training successfully. An expanded recycling and remedial training program and a reading proficiency program were established at Lackland to reduce the BMT elimination rate of Project 100,000 personnel. By 1970, approximately 36 percent of all Project 100,000 recruits had received remedial literacy training. This special training was required for all low aptitude personnel whose entering reading scores were below the sixth-grade level. Additional instructors were required, and considerable extra instructor time had to be provided on an individual basis. Initially, an additional 202 instructor spaces were authorized to meet the special and remedial instruction and counseling needs of Project 100,000 airmen in BMT and technical training, but most of these were deleted in 1971 after HQ ATC staff members determined that these special needs could in most cases be met by the normal instructor staff without degrading training.27

At the project's peak, ATC officials reported that 89 percent of the new mental standards airmen who entered formal technical training courses graduated. Through extra training effort, this high success rate was achieved without compromising any of the command's standards of performance. Moreover, these new mental standards airmen were not shuttled into a few, low-grade skill areas. They received training in 71 different technical courses.28

By 1970, it was determined that the mandatory restrictions of Project 100,000 had severely handicapped the USAF Recruiting Service, and in January 1971, ATC officials began to seriously question the advisability of continuing it and a companion project--the Medical Remedial Enlistment Program. Critical evaluations were forwarded to HQ USAF. Neither of the programs was cost-effective in terms of effort expended for yields gained, and Air Force recruiters and those from the other services were already bearing the brunt of nation-wide disenchanted with the SEA conflict and rising antipathy toward military service. Retention in the service was also being affected. Moreover, government policy was heading toward an end to the Selective Service draft, which meant building an all-volunteer force, and programs such as Project 100,000 were not compatible with the quality force of the future. As noted previously, OSD responded by dropping the mandatory quotas and, while the services still had to accept low aptitude enlistees, Project 100,000 died quietly in the wake of the all-volunteer force.29
required to meet force structure requirements. The type of men accepted under Project 100,000 were those who might be needed in future periods of high manpower requirements.24

Under quotas established for the project, the combined services were to accept 40,000 new standards personnel during the first year of the project and 100,000 each year thereafter. The Air Force's share of this quota was approximately 35 percent for the first year, and between 12 to 16 percent for subsequent years. Quotas for the enlistment of new mental standards personnel were officially terminated on 1 December 1971, but selective recruitment under Project 100,000 continued until the draft ended in 1973. ATC recruiters dutifully met or exceeded Air Force quotas annually, and by the time the project ended the command had enlisted well over 80,000 personnel under the new mental standards. The merit of Project 100,000, as stated by one ATC spokesman, was "that it has taken men who in all probability would have been a drain on the national economy and has made them productive. For many of these men, satisfactory performance in the military is their first success after a long line of failures." But, the program was costly—at a time when the military services were undergoing the most severe budgetary constraints—and it was disruptive to the normal recruiting and training process.25

Under policies established for the program, OSD directed that minimum standards of performance would not be reduced and that the military services would be prepared to spend extra time and effort "in helping these young men achieve satisfactory performance levels." An OSD policy statement further clarified this:26

Although most men are expected to complete their training on schedule, we are prepared to spend up to three months additional time in the training cycle with those who need extra help. We are also committed to imaginative innovation in the restructuring of technical courses to facilitate learning by Project 100,000 men and other students.

An elaborate reporting system was established to monitor the program and, during the early months of implementation, officials from HQ ATC and the training centers devoted a considerable amount of time in restructuring some BMT and technical courses to accommodate learning requirements for the increased numbers of new mental standards personnel. Lackland officials
11. (cont'd) 1 Jan 65, 31 Mar 68, p 5, material used is (U).

12. Memo (U), Gen Momyer to Gen McConnell, subj: Basic Military and Technical Training, 18 Feb 66, Doc I-14 cited in Hist, ATC, Jan-Jun 66, Vol VIII.


14. Hist (S), ATC, FY 69, p 58, material used is (U); ATC Activity Input to Project Corona Harvest on Technical Training Support of SEA, Apr 68-Dec 69, pp 91, 92.

15. Hist (S), ATC, Jul-Dec 65, pp 115-122, material used is (U); Hist (S), ATC, Jan-Jun 66, pp 133-138, material used is (U); Hist (S), ATC, FY 69, pp 169-172, material used is (U); Benson, A Brief History of Lackland Air Force Base, p 32 (U).

16. Hist Brief, as in note 1 above; memo (U), Lackland Historian to ATC/CSH, subj: Basic Military Training Flight Sizes, 8 May 75; Hist (S), ATC, Jan-Jun 66, p 133-141, material used is (U).

17. Hist (S), ATC, Jan-Jun 66, pp 141-154, material used is (U).

18. Hist (S), ATC, Jul-Dec 65, pp 134-141, 143, material used is (U).

19. Ibid.


22. Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, FY 71, pp 153-155, material used is (U); Benson, A Brief History of Lackland Air Force Base, 1941-1976, p 32.

23. Rpt (U), subj: Description of Project One Hundred Thousand, Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, April 1968, on file in ATC Hist and Research Div; Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, FY 69,
23. (cont'd) pp 136-148, material used is (U); Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, FY 70, pp 380-381, material used is (U).

24. Rpt, as in note above.


26. Guidance Paper (U), subj: Project One Hundred Thousand, Office, Sec of Def, (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), 31 Mar 67; rpt (U), subj: Description of Project One Hundred Thousand, Sec of Def, (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Apr 68.

27. Speech (U), Maj Gen Madsen, 21 Aug 69; Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, Jan-Jun 67, pp 291-317; Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, Jul-Dec 67, pp 276-289; Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, Jan-Jun 68, pp 162-166; Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, FY 70, pp 380-381. All material used is (U).

28. Speech, as in note above.

29. Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, FY 69, pp 136-148; Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, FY 71, pp 126-138; Hist (S-XGDS-3), ATC, FY 72, pp 139-142. All material used is (U).

30. ATC CO-19 (U), 29 Apr 59; Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, Jan-Jun 59, p 103, material used is (U).

31. Hists (S-XGDS), ATC, 1961-1969, material used is (U).

32. Ibid., material used is (U).

33. Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, Jul-Dec 66, pp 232-233, material used is (U).

34. Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, Jan-Jun 68, p 199; Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, FY 70, pp 181, 194; Hist (S-XGDS-3), FY 72, p 184. All material used is (U).

35. Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, Jul-Dec 66, pp 132-133, 214-215, material used is (U).

36. Ibid.; pp 214-215; Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, Jan-Jun 67, pp 171-174. All material used is (U).

37. Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, Jan-Jun 67, pp 174-177, pp 178-180; Hist (S-XGDS), ATC, Jul-Dec 67, p 181. All material used is (U).
1. Attached is the paper by Roger W. Little that we discussed Wednesday at the Commander's Coffee. It appears that he has established himself among the "community of scholars" as an authority in the field of Sociology of the Military Establishment. He is Executive Director of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, whatever that is. Also attached is a paper published in the same journal by a PhD from Berkeley who answers Little with some of the possible negative effects of the "military rehabilitation" program.

2. We can make certain conclusions pertaining to the purposes of this program, those of fulfilling manpower needs and providing basic education. Indications are that the project has successfully fulfilled increased manpower needs - we have not

(continued on reverse)

FROM
THOMAS M. WILMOTTE, 2d Lt,
Aasst Chief, Tng Eval Div

DD FORM 1 OCT 60
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DD FORM 94, 1 Feb 56, and DD Form 95, 1 Feb 56, which will be used until exhausted.
lowered our training standards, and our attrition rates (although increased somewhat) have not been excessive. I can't speak for the Army or Navy, but Project 100,000 airmen are performing satisfactorily in the field.

3. The very difficult thing to measure, however, is the sociological and psychological effect the armed services have had on our "lower-class, culturally disadvantaged" Project men. This question may be of greater importance yet as we realize that a turmoiled society can be as great a threat to national security as any foreign aggression. Whether the military can provide its Project men with the "basic education" which Little talks about is still speculation at this point. Sure, we provide remedial reading training, individual and group counseling, and other prescribed "medication" to cure their social ills, but we won't know what effect these measures have had until these men have returned to civilian life. Project 100,000 will follow its participants back into civilian life, to see if they have utilized their "basic education" and advanced training to become a productive and responsible member of society. When the results of these follow-up studies are analyzed, we will realize the sociological worth of the program.

1 Atch
Paper on Basic Education, etc.
WASHINGTON — Defense last week released a profile of the man who goes into Project 100,000, the man who until new standards were set, was not acceptable to the service because of mental or medical deficiencies.

More than 50 percent of the men are from the South, 38 percent are Negroes and 26 percent of the new men go into combat specialties.

The other 89 plus percent learn skills ranging from service and supply jobs to electronic equipment repairing.

More than 50 percent were rated "excellent" in conduct and efficiency. Only two percent got court-martial convictions and nine percent received non-judicial punishment.

The average Project 100,000 man was promoted twice in the first 12 to 15 months of service (to E-3) and 30 percent were promoted three times during this period (to E-4).

Nearly 96 percent of the new standards men successfully completed basic training, compared to 98 percent for all other men. In the entry-level skill training the washout rate was 13 percent for the Project 100,000 men, compared to training courses.

As anticipated, the new standards men performed better in combat training courses and the simpler technical courses than in the complex to less than five percent for other men attending similar more complicated technical training areas.

One example given was the attrition rate of three percent in the combat skills area compared to a washout rate of more than 20 percent in electronic equipment repairing.

The report said the new standards men "tend to perform best in training which stresses practical work and does not require significant reading and mathematical abilities."

Defense plans to refine its assignment procedures and improve its courses so that there will be fewer failures in the technical-type training.

Men who are dropped from training are not discharged from the service.

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What makes a Pontiac a Pontiac?

(And what makes ordinary cars ordinary?)

Only Pontiacs have Wide-Track. Drive a Pontiac and you'll wonder who took all the bumps and curves out of the road.

Even our lowest priced Pontiac has a unique 175-hp Overhead Cam Six. Unless you count cylinders, you'll swear it's a V-8.
If I understand the essence of Roger Little's paper correctly, it is that there is an important lesson to be learned, particularly by educators, from the "second chance" function that the military, through its Project 100,000, has been able to provide for members of disadvantaged minority groups. With this conclusion I could not possibly agree more completely. The practices of military socialization and the acceptance of these practices by persons like Roger Little indicate, in fact, that the lesson must be learned and learned quickly, for the hour is quite late.

In assessing the efficacy of Project 100,000's rehabilitative functions, we should not lose sight of the fact that this "experiment in basic education" was not conducted for purely altruistic reasons—or even as an attempt to dissipate the imminent specter of civil disorder—but primarily, as Little implies, in order to reduce the pressure of a military manpower shortage. The most important question to be asked then is not whether Project 100,000 was successful; the question, rather, is what is to be taken as an acceptable indicator of success on the part of educators and mental health practitioners.

A vast amount of knowledge and skill regarding education and vocational training has indeed been acquired within military institutions. This parallels its vast amount of technical knowledge and skill mastery in almost every phase of organized human endeavor, since the military has been active in numerous fields. Not only is it the largest vocational training institution in the United States, as Little points out; it is also the largest converter of both hardware (manufacturers) and software (research) and the largest employer of health personnel. Besides operating the third largest supermarket chain in the United States, it is considering the number of its employees and the size of its landholdings, the third largest socialist state. Each of its functions, including the educational and vocational training function, has been a natural outgrowth of an organization intended to fulfill one basic purpose: the defense of American interests by means of violence and the threat of violence.

Through the vast financial resources
available to the military (more than 60% of the national budget), through its highly centralized and authoritative decision structure, and through its ability to remove people from the legal, judicial, and social institutions which affect other citizens, the military has been able to produce some truly remarkable results in particular areas of human endeavor. Each of these results, however, bears in some way the markings of the official and actual purposes of the larger organization.

One cannot deny the important rehabilitative effects of some of the practices that have been demonstrated in the armed services’ Project 100,000. Certainly, the ability of the armed services as an institution to take on these disadvantaged people without regard to their prior history and to ignore their previous records of delinquency and failing academic grades works to the advantage of the recruit. The assumption on the part of the institution that each recruited person is capable of making the grade in the program is very important in building the recruit’s confidence. Also, the heterogeneous groupings of individuals—mixing people from different backgrounds, different ability levels, and different races—can itself be very useful and has been shown to be of value in Project 100,000. There is something unusual, however, in the assumption by any rehabilitative agency that it can apply a particular technique to everyone in the same way and still be effective. There are certainly cases where this approach is not feasible and belief in its universal efficacy might be construed as another form of therapeutic desperation. Still, one should not deny the positive effects of this confident attitude of the therapeutic agent to be a master psychoanalyst or master sergeant.

There is no doubt also, as Little points out, that people from disadvantaged backgrounds who were previously unable to make the criteria for admission into the armed services are getting better food, more equitable justice, better medical care in the military than they were able to get anywhere else in society. Certainly, these services are of value in the rehabilitation of almost anyone and it is a sad reflection upon our society that some of its people must be underfed, ill-housed, uneducated, or without medical care unless they are in the military.

The sense of meaningful participation in a larger purpose, or of having a role to fulfill in a larger organization, the expectation by others that one can fulfill that role adequately—all are techniques which bear further study and application in the rehabilitation of young men. The concept of residential treatment—of taking people out of their ordinary disadvantaged communities, of obliging them to become part of a total institution—can also be demonstrated to have certain positive as well as perhaps certain negative effects, and I would certainly concur with the positive effects that Little has mentioned. But the negative effects of participation in military service are not touched upon in Little’s article.

Little speaks positively of the basic training of a set of skills which all members of the institution can and must know. He considers this a form of assimilation into the system, which helps to deemphasize prior social characteristics and create a pattern of personal growth. Most of the soldiers I have known look upon basic training as a destractive experience, in which their superior officers’ concern for the spit-and-polish is regarded as an attempt to maximize their
ability to accept authoritarian discipline even in matters of trivia. It is a time of dehumanizing masking of personal identity through enforced acceptance of a uniform, a crewworn, and a regimen of ungodly hours, harsh physical rituals, and irrelevant and purposeless tasks.

I believe that Little forgets that the function of basic training is not to rehabilitate youth but rather to render them effective parts of an organization which is incapable of tolerating discussion and dissent within its ranks, particularly because its main function of inflicting extreme malevolence on a national scale is one which requires an equally extreme form of discipline.

Little speaks positively of the fact that once admitted to the armed services, there is no question that the recruit will be incorporated into the organization's existing functioning roles. Similarly, he points out that having become part of the organization, the soldier "recognizes that he has real work to perform and that he has a real capacity to assist or retard the function of his immediate group." Is it out of place for us to ask, "to assist his group to what end?" Is it out of place for us to ask that a "rehabilitated" human being be able to ask the same question for himself? But the essence of military service is that the end is not to be brought into question; only the adequacy of ability in its pursuit is to be considered.

Little summarily dismisses the loss of sexual expression among the recruits: presumably, their previous mode of sexual expression was probably a false and misleading way of asserting their masculinity. However, he seems to feel differently about the recruit's sense of positive identification with his rifle. Here, the "power of his weapon" combines with the modern military concept of teamwork to help "make him rapidly aware of his individuality." This point is reiterated in Little's discussion of the uniform, its intrinsic quality, and the fascination that develops around being conspicuously dressed. I would not wish to contest my own value-laden images of masculinity, with those of Little, but I feel that many people in the mental health field would esteem different characteristics of the human male. Unlike the hantam rooster, the human male is sometimes esteemed by a function other than the ability to strut and claw.

What Little considers to be positive features of the climate of the military are features that are indeed shared by other total institutions, such as the state mental hospital and the prison. There, too, the working class culture and vulgarity of language predominate. There, too, the regularity of food and other services provides a dramatic difference from the ghettos the occupants come from.

It is certainly a telling fact about our society that Little is able to argue that the "disadvantaged" and incompetent youth can gain fairer justice in the military than anywhere else in society. It is equally telling that the military should be providing the largest, and possibly the best, example in the country of a vocational rehabilitation program for underprivileged youth when there has in fact been an educational system in this country for many years. Needless to say, resources for educational experimentation and staffing have not been what they are in the military, and it goes without saying that the scope of military-related experimentation and staffing (occupying more than one half of American scientific personnel) is largely to blame for
the squeeze in other areas. Yet with all its advantages, the function of the military organization is not lost in the provision of services it gives to its members. It provides an adequate and effective socialization into a society of paid killers.

Little's argument that 100,000 members of disadvantaged backgrounds could be effectively rehabilitated into the mainstream of society is convincing when we consider that during the same period of time another (perhaps some of the same) 25,000 Americans, disproportionately representative of similar backgrounds, were killed while performing their rehabilitated roles in Vietnam, i.e., while killing 100,000 Vietnamese.

The sense of performing a role in an organization with a larger purpose is nowhere better illustrated than in the military services and at times of warfare. It functions as well, unfortunately, on both sides of the battleground and operates independently of the value of the cause for which that military organization was brought into existence in the first place. Gershbsz is said to have been a most reasonable-sounding man. I could picture his defense of the Hitler Youth Corps and can find nothing in Roger Little's arguments for military education that would be damnable to such a defense.

Little does speak briefly about the functions of modern military organizations, about the needs of such organizations to abandon earlier concepts of victory, to move toward notions of international law and social change. What he gives too little attention to is the reasons why the United States does not move toward accommodation to such a world. Hearings by the House Armed Services Subcommittee in 1959 disclosed that over 1,100 retired officers with the rank of major or higher, including 261 of general or flag rank, were in the employ of the top 100 defense contractors. A study in 1964 showed 74 Senators and Representatives with continuing status in the armed forces. In 1957, one study showed 200 active (not reserve) generals or admirals on assignment to "nonmilitary departments of the government or to international or interservice agencies." An added 1,200 colonels or naval officers of comparable rank and 6,000 lower-grade officers were similarly assigned. Indeed, Little's point that the modern military cannot be isolated from civilian society is well taken. The evidence would seem to show that we no longer have a set of distinctly civilian institutions in American society, and the burgeoning military bureaucracy can in no way be counted upon to correct this important deficiency. The notion that people are no longer being trained, exclusively, to bayonet other people—there has been a transition from the role of the soldier as butcher to the role of the soldier as a silent, unquestioning technician—does not reduce the validity of this point. If all military supported contracts were to end suddenly, then we would have unemployed engineers and IBM punchcard operators, all in need of basic rehabilitation.

Little speaks with pride of those relatively high proportions of successful entrants in complex and advanced programs. But what does success in an Intelligence unit produce? To beam over the miracle that "intellectually disadvantaged" youths succeed in these programs "under the same requirements as those established for men with higher entry attributes" is to forget that the successes in such programs may prove far more disastrous to American society than the failures.
At a time when we are field testing our arsenal of techniques for military control and pacification through fire power, chemicals, torture, and education of many foreign and domestic peoples, is it not more fitting to ask whether the military establishment is obsolete and contradictory to priorities for human needs? Rather than seek justifications for its new uses—either as a model or as an agency for nonmilitary functions—perhaps it is time to terminate a mode of military dependency which is fostered by the periodic induction of major portions of society. Whatever the intellectual advantage or handicap, there would certainly be a moral advantage in utilizing agencies for rehabilitation which function under a basic premise that it is wrong to kill. The long-term advantages of such an education may be felt by all of us when the 100,000 riflemen return to find the conditions in the ghettos and rural slums lower to change than they were in the army.

There is absolutely no doubt that an organization equipped with the resources of the American military, and with its power, can involuntarily extricate young men from their social environments and bring them into a homogenizing low-level training program, which in fact builds up the self-confidence and the skill of many people who have not had opportunities to develop these in the home communities. There is no doubt that it can transform these people into components of an effective and mindless machine imbued with dedication to the task of organizing itself for the infliction of extreme malevolence. In our efforts to rehabilitate the American youth who have suffered because of deprivations in their home communities, we can afford to be humble and must be willing to take lessons from whatever source available. But as any therapist knows, if he has hope to be permanently effective, he must be able to learn from his clients as well.

The military is the example par excellence of the assumption that its values and its practices are correct and all that remains to be done is to bring people into the organization and make them operate more effectively within it. This has been the failing philosophy of the war on poverty—this assumption that the background culture of the people it is trying to help need not be respected, that it has nothing to offer either for the people themselves or for the society which is trying to assimilate them. I believe that the military could learn much from a program which would send all of its high-ranking officers involuntarily for a period of service to some black militant organization in the ghettos. It is not, however, a lesson that I feel they should be forced to undertake but rather one which those who are more informed might select voluntarily. The same choices for rehabilitation should be available to disadvantaged youth in our urban ghettos. The availability of choice and the assumption that institutions must respect the life and dignity of the individual are basic to education in a free society.

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HISTORY OF THE

Air Training Command (U)

FISCAL YEAR 1970

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HISTORY OF THE AIR TRAINING COMMAND (U) for FISCAL YEAR 1970

Twenty-seven Volumes
Text and Documents

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

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and community and public relations. Two recommendations came out of a review of the security police staff course (3OAR8111).

Special training, in separate classes, was recommended for staff level officers entering the field without previous security police experience. It was also recommended that career security police officers be identified and scheduled to attend the staff course between their eighth and twelfth years of service.

PROJECT 100,000

(U) As experience increased in training lower mental standard airmen enlisted under Project 100,000, * Hq ATC was able to re-appraise its instructor requirements in support of the project. An additional 202 instructor spaces had been authorized to meet the special and remedial instruction and counseling needs of Project 100,000 airmen. Hq ATC staff members determined that these needs could in most cases be met by the normal instructor staff without degrading training, and 89 instructor spaces were deleted in the fourth quarter of FY 1970. An additional 52 instructor spaces were deleted from the original authorization of 202 as a

88. Ibid.

*During FY 1970, 18 percent of the USAF's NPS enlisted accessions were programmed for Category IV (AFQT 10-30) personnel; 20 percent of the NPS accessions were programmed for personnel with certain medically remedial physical defects. These two groups, together with a research control group, made up the Air Force portion of the DOD's Project 100,000.
result of program reductions that were made to implement Project 703. After these two cuts had been made, 61 instructor spaces remained to meet the special needs of Project 100,000 students. 89

(U) Production statistics were another indication of the progress that was made in Project 100,000 technical training. During FY 1970, 2,919 New Mental Standard (NMS) airmen* graduated from 57 technical training courses. This was a decrease from FY 1969 production, but a reflection of the decrease in the total technical training program during FY 1970. From the project's inception in FY 1967 to the end of FY 1970, 15,756 NMS airmen entered technical training courses; 13,446 graduated, 1,721 were eliminated, and 589 were still in training. The total attrition rate for NMS airmen in FY 1970 was 10.5 percent, the lowest in the project's history. 90

PROJECT HEAVY BARE

(U) Hq TAC, in a 24 February 1970 message, requested ATC's participation in Project Heavy Bare, a program designed to

89. DD Form 1603, Hq ATC (ATTSE-E), 1 Jun 70; Hist (U), ATC/ TTS, Jan-Jun 70.
90. ATC Mgt Sum (FOUO), Tech Tng, 31 Aug 70 (Doc 1-9); Hist (U), ATC/TTS, Jan-Jun 70; ltr (U), ATC to USAF, subj: Progress Report, Project 100,000, June 1970, n.d., w/2 atchs (U) (Doc VI-78).
*NMS airmen were Project 100,000 enlistees in Category IV with an AFQT of 10-20. However, in the AFQT 16-20 range, the NMS designation applied only to airmen who passed no more than two of the four AQE aptitude tests.
Major General Marvin C. Demler  
Commander  
Technical Training Center  
Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois 61866

Dear General Demler:

We would like to thank you for your interest in our study and for giving us an opportunity to discuss it with you. Your insights and suggestions have been very helpful. In particular, your view of the Air Force technical training program as a change agent within the society at large is certainly appropriate to the Air Force response to Secretary Clifford's recent policy statement regarding contributions by the DoD to the solution of domestic problems.

We are returning your file copy of ATC Pamphlet 52-1, Patterns of Technical Training. It is an excellent overview of a very complex system and has been one of the most useful documents we have received. Thank you for making it available to us.

I hope that we shall be visiting Chanute again in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

(Mrs.) Margaret B. Carpenter  
System Sciences Department

MBC:baj  
Enclosure (1)
Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford found the response "very gratifying" to his request for suggestions concerning increased Defense Department effort in alleviating domestic problems.

Secretary Clifford announced the program Sept. 20 in a speech before the National Security Industrial Association, in Washington, D.C.

At that time he said the Defense Department had not only a moral obligation but an opportunity to contribute far more to the social needs of our country than it has in the past.

He called on the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Director of Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense to address themselves to this challenge and to report by Nov. 20.

"The response has been very gratifying," Secretary Clifford reported Dec. 10.

"In one service alone, the Air Force, 2,500 suggestions were submitted from base and commands all over the country," he said.

He acknowledged that the process of consolidating and evaluating this large body of creative ideas was time consuming. "However, I expect to be able to present my successor with a set of constructive proposals which will be helpful to him in ensuring that this Department plays a positive part in improving our society, without in any manner encroaching on the responsibilities of private or other public agencies, and without impairing its primary mission of defending our Nation."

The Secretary of Defense grouped a large proportion of the suggestions into four broad categories:

1—Making available for civilian use the spin-off of knowledge resulting from activities undertaken as a direct part of our primary function; for example, applying to civilian uses experience learned from military education and training.

2—Utilizing facilities which are required for defense purposes but are not used on a full-time basis; for example, using portions of installations for summer youth programs, on-the-job training, or upgrading the under-skilled worker.

3—Channeling some funds for procurement, maintenance and repair of equipment in a manner that will have beneficial social effects; for example, directing that the overhaul of certain types of equipment returned from Vietnam be directed to firms that hire and train hard-core unemployed.

4—Providing uniquely useful Defense facilities, equipment and personnel to other agencies on a reimbursable basis; for example, the Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations could be made available to civilian medical agencies for large-scale diagnostic health examinations, particularly of children at an early enough age to permit adequate treatment in their most formative years.

"Of course," Secretary Clifford continued, "we have not been merely studying ideas since Sept. 20."

"A contract was recently awarded to a joint venture of the General Electric Co., and Gibbs Associates to produce final drawings for the 200-family housing units at George AFB, Calif., that I mentioned in my speech..."

"My office has entered into an agreement with the Department of Labor for 6,000 hard-core youths to be given on-the-job training for Civil Service positions at Defense facilities in 41 cities throughout the country..."

"I have today (Dec. 10) approved a proposal for building one model school in each of the overseas areas where we maintain dependent schools. In consultation with officials of the Office of Education, the Educational Facilities Laboratory and the American Institute of Architects, my staff has drawn up a plan for a competition that we expect will result in new buildings that will permit the latest educational methods in settings most conducive to learning..."

"I have today (Dec. 10) authorized issuance of a request for proposals for a hospital design to incorporate new cost-saving technologies and to identify research and development projects that have a high potential for improving future hospital care..."

Secretary Clifford added this note: "As an aside, lest someone question why the Department of Defense is concerned with hospital design, I might note that we operate 250 hospitals and 450 dispensaries that provide health and medical care for over 10 million eligible people. The annual cost is now in excess of $1.8 billion a year and rising at the rate of 10 per cent a year."

[Diagram of Secretary Clifford]