




AIR UNIVERSITY **review**

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1970



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REVIEW



AIR UNIVERSITY **review**

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

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the cover

No Pandora's box this, for though there are always problems where people are concerned, the present Air Force personnel situation—both military and civilian—is a far cry from that "prolific source of troubles." In fact, with the forward-looking policies that Lieutenant General A. J. Russell and his DCS/Personnel staff present in this issue of the *Review*, personnel prospects seem more favorable than might be expected in a time of diminishing resources and forces.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

LIEUTENANT GENERAL A. J. RUSSELL



THE goal of personnel management can be easily described, for it is identical with the goals of the entire Air Force management team; that is, to obtain the maximum mission effectiveness from the resources available. There is an extra dimension in personnel management, however, for it must attempt to insure that human resources are utilized in a way that is optimum both to the mission *and* to the individual. What appears to be the logical course of action is not necessarily the best when dealing with human beings. We must consider the needs, hopes, and aspirations of our people. In the final analysis, the reaction of thousands of individuals to current personnel management decisions is a significant determinant of Air Force human resource effectiveness not only today but also in future years.

Like other Air Force managers, personnel managers do not operate in a vacuum. Personnel policies are, in varying degrees, the result of and responsive to external factors such as executive decisions, fiscal guidance and budgets, legislative directives, Congressional interests, public interests, and international tensions.

For the past few years major personnel programs have centered around the requirements generated by the war in Southeast Asia. Relatively short-term policies were established and programs devised to meet mission needs, retain experienced personnel, distribute assignments equitably, and resolve the many large and small personnel problems that arise in a wartime situation. Although management emphasis will continue in this area, the more difficult and demanding policies and programs necessitated by the wartime situation have been established and are generally understood by Air Force people. Barring further international crisis, the predominant external factor influencing personnel management currently and for the foreseeable future is funding.

The belief of many that a larger share of the nation's gross national product should be allocated to solving domestic problems, coupled with the desire of the administration to

hold federal spending to an absolute minimum in an effort to curb inflation, is resulting in drastically lowered funding for defense purposes. This lowered funding will inevitably result in fewer people on active duty in the Air Force, for the cost of people is our greatest single expense. One-third of the Air Force budget, over \$8 billion, has been spent in each of the past few years in recruiting, training, and maintaining our military and civilian personnel. Obviously, substantial savings are possible when personnel strengths are reduced.

Although the Air Force did not experience a large influx of military personnel during the buildup for the Vietnam war, our strength total did climb by 48,000, from 857,000 in fiscal year 1964 to a peak of 905,000 in FY 1968. Beginning with 1969, however, there has been a series of personnel reductions as the Air Force has met the requirements of a steadily decreasing personnel budget and year-end strength ceilings.

By the end of FY 1969 the strength was down 43,000, to 862,000. By the end of FY 1970 it will have dropped approximately 53,000 more. In the proposed budget for FY 1971, which at the time of this writing is being considered by Congress, Air Force strength will be reduced to a force total of 783,000. The force is now well below the strength level at the start of the Vietnam war, and the end of reductions is not yet in sight. Undoubtedly, there will be more.

When reducing the force, personnel managers have available several alternative actions. Seldom does one action satisfy the requirement. Reductions must be made with full

General Russell was Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Hq USAF, when he wrote this article. On 1 August 1970 he became Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and was replaced as DCS/P by Lieutenant General Robert J. Dixon.

consideration of impacts on a balanced force, the future force, possible additional near-future force reductions (which have been realized in each of the last three fiscal years), the morale of the force, and the individuals affected.

To date, reductions have had a relatively minor impact on the career force. Cuts and dollar savings in the airman force have been achieved through reduced procurement, early releases, and rollbacks in release dates. Several alternative actions were employed to reach the reduced officer strength levels. Procurement cutbacks and early releases accounted for the bulk of losses. Other actions related primarily to a discontinuation of programs instituted during the Vietnam buildup to retain experienced personnel. The selective retention of regular officers twelve months past their desired date of separation or retirement was discontinued in 1969. Also in 1969 the program to retain Reserve officers who failed a second time for promotion to major was discontinued, and the "up or out" feature for promotion to major was reinstated. In 1970 the Air Force released "continued captains," those with 14 to 17 years' service who had twice failed selection for promotion and had accepted the opportunity to continue on active duty in an indefinite status. Additionally, most Reserve officers who completed twenty or more years of service during FY 70 were separated and retired.

The Air Force was reluctant to release any of its career Reserve officers, both because of their substantial contribution to the mission and because of personal inconvenience or hardship they might suffer. Since cutbacks made reductions necessary, however, the release actions were determined to be most equitable when all officers in the force were considered. Reservists in the career force were given six months' notice prior to retirement or separation from active duty. The six months' notice is a policy requirement, not a legal one, since statutory authority provides for Secretarial release of a Reservist at almost any time.

In FY 1971 the 26,000 strength reduction will be achieved through normal attrition and reduced procurement of officers and airmen.

Should additional reductions become necessary, as occurred with Project 703 in FY 1970, it may be necessary to exercise other reduction actions, since there are limits to how drastically procurement can be cut in any one year. The Air Force Academy strength is fixed by law and not subject to management strength reductions. Also the AFROTC is a long lead-time procurement source, not susceptible to a sudden reduction. There also are limitations to reduction possibilities in Officer Training School, since a large portion of the OTS output is committed to stabilized programs, primarily flying training. Finally, one of the most critical considerations is that drastic reductions in procurement today may create serious imbalance in the force in future years.

Next to meeting mission requirements, the effects of reductions on individuals and career progression programs receive primary consideration in personnel policy decisions and actions. Certainly the Air Force has a moral obligation to treat its personnel as fairly as circumstances permit. Additionally, equitable treatment and viable career progression programs have a decided impact on the morale of the force and on career intentions of young people in the force.

The impact on career progression as a result of reductions is felt most keenly in promotion opportunity. In this regard, the critical factors are the length of time in which reductions are to be made and the grades held by individuals being lost to the force. Officer grade authorizations are based on fixed ratios of each grade to total commissioned officer strength. Airman authorizations are based on law and are additionally regulated by Department of Defense policy. When reductions are gradual over a period of years, management actions and the normal force attrition rate make it possible to maintain a viable yearly promotion program. Large-scale reductions in a short period of time, however, have substantial impact on promotion programs and may require exceptional management actions, such as legislative relief. This is an area which requires exacting management with an eye to maintaining reasonable promotion opportunities over the next several years.

Compounding the problem of lowered manpower funds is the move toward an all-volunteer force. Estimates of the cost of such a force vary from as low as \$2 billion to as high as \$3.5 billion a year, depending on the size of the force and timing. The all-volunteer force as a national goal is supported by the Air Force. The Air Force, however, maintains the position that programs designed to attract new personnel into the services must not be instituted at the expense of the career force. A major inconsistency of purpose would result if the effort to adopt a small, voluntary force were to be accompanied by involuntary release, loss of promotion opportunity, and deterioration of the service life of volunteers currently serving.

It is evident that, even in this era of austere budgets and reduced force levels, the Air Force will continue to have adequate

numbers of well-trained personnel to accomplish the mission, along with career progression and related programs that support and benefit its people. The responsibility of personnel managers at Headquarters USAF is to recommend plans, policies, and programs to Air Force leaders, Department of Defense, and the Congress that will accomplish these aims.

The responsibility of leaders and managers in the field is to appreciate and understand the inevitable turbulence in the personnel system when reductions occur, to communicate to all personnel the Air Force's determination to care for its people, and to insure that priorities are properly assigned and resources effectively managed so that no unreasonable demands of time and effort are placed upon the individuals in our smaller force. We must all effectively manage and protect our human resources to insure that we will meet Air Force needs today and in future years.

Hq United States Air Force

OUR GOAL

Promote the Best with the Best System

MAJOR THOMAS A. KUSTELSKI


Nobody has a right to be promoted; but he does have a right to equal consideration with his fellow airmen.

He has a right to be told honestly if he is not capable of promotion. He has a right to understand the system he lives by.

HON. L. MENDEL RIVERS¹

WHEN Chairman Rivers made this statement in August 1967, few of us realized the far-reaching effect his words would have on our system of selecting airmen for promotion. The shape of things to come was clearly outlined, however, by General J. P. McConnell, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force, when he challenged the 1968 Airman Promotion Conference by saying:

All of you are familiar with our past and present airman promotion problems, many of which have been beyond the control of the Air Force. Most of these problems are behind us, and the outlook for airman promotions,



although not yet ideal, is quite promising. The task now is to improve promotion management to satisfy both the needs of our people and those of the Air Force.²

Our basic Air Force promotion objective has been and always will be "to promote to enable the Air Force to fill its requirements for specific grades and skills in each Air Force Specialty (AFS) within the limits established by grade ceilings."³ General McConnell's remarks further set the theme that any new promotion system must do more than meet the basic Air Force objective; it must, he said, be "people oriented."

Lieutenant General Horace Wade, then USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, in the keynote address to the same conference, reiterated this point when he said:

I don't think I need to remind you that our airman promotion system has come under the closest scrutiny, both externally and internally, and has been the subject of unprecedented interest and publicity over the past year. This spotlight has been trained on airman promotions because of considerable dissatisfaction of our airmen with the selection system, especially one that does not select him for promotion.⁴

General Wade zeroed in on the lack of "visibility" in our promotion system:

The second problem or trouble with our promotion system has been our failure . . . or inability to communicate the reason behind our airman promotion management controls. Had we given more attention to the problem of communications, we might have overcome the stagnation problem.

Promotion stagnation was the disease but, had communications been applied in the right doses, the patient might have recovered much faster. He didn't die, but he was critically ill.⁵

With the implementation of the Weighted Airman Promotion System (WAPS) this year, an entirely new "people oriented" selection concept has come into being. It is clear that any new system, to be acceptable, must satisfy both the basic Air Force promotion objective and the needs of the airman force. The Weighted Airman Promotion System was conceived and designed to do just that.

What criteria must a system meet to be "people oriented"? First, each competing individual should be in a position to do something constructive about his own promotion chances—generally to excel in performance. If he is not selected for promotion, he should know why not and know where he stands in relation to his fellow airmen. Next, it should have "visibility" in order to do away with the many shortcomings we know existed in past systems. Without exception, these systems failed to provide an airman who was not promoted with any understanding of the reason for his nonselection or the things he could do to improve his chances in the next cycle.

Another factor, of equal importance with those mentioned, is the centralization of selections. Our human-relations experts tell us that people do not want or expect favoritism in personnel actions pertaining to them; they simply want the fairest possible break, and this "goes double for promotions." However, many airmen feel that they cannot receive fair and equitable treatment at the hands of locally constituted boards. They believe that under a decentralized system too much is dependent on factors beyond their control; for example, shredouts of promotion management list quotas rather than compete Air Force-wide within each career field.

We do know that centralization of E-8 and E-9 selections has been outstandingly successful and has eliminated much of the dissatisfaction among eligibles for those grades. It was for these reasons—to satisfy our people and to design a system that would be as fair and equitable as possible—that the WAPS was conceived and that all promotion selections to grades E-4 through E-9 were centralized at Hq USAF.

AT THIS POINT I am sure that several questions come to mind. What were the problems beyond Air Force control that General McConnell was talking about?—Why did we wait so long to go to a Weighted Airman Promotion System?—Why a mechanized system?—In the final analysis, does the WAPS meet the criterion of being "people oriented"? A re-

view of some of the selection systems used in the past and an explanation of how we arrived where we are today should provide at least some of the answers to these questions.

Before World War II the unit commander, with the advice of his first sergeant, promoted individual airmen to all grades. Qualitative standards were not applied to any very high degree in determining promotion selections. An individual was considered promotable if he had no marks against him in the first sergeant's "Black Book." Promotions were made only to fill positions vacated through attrition. Units were fairly stable during this period, with very few enlisted personnel being transferred, so promotion opportunity was extremely limited. It was not uncommon for a man to retire from the service without ever having advanced beyond the grade of corporal.

The promotion outlook changed rapidly with the World War II buildup because the accelerated personnel turnover created frequent vacancies in every grade. Promotion opportunity, for a time, became almost unlimited. Here again, however, there were no established qualitative criteria to govern selection in the promotion process—grade vacancy and the unit commander's decision were still the deciding factors.

It was not surprising that a system of promotions to fill grade vacancies proved unacceptable in a greatly expanded service. As vacancies were generated by rotation of personnel to and from overseas units, promotions were made in the units to fill these vacancies. Inevitably the grades of personnel were rapidly exceeding the authorizations of the units to which they were assigned. Recognizing this dilemma, the Army Air Forces published AAF Regulation 35-54 in October 1944, which established certain criteria for promotions and retention of grades. Vacancies created by departing personnel would not be filled but would be held to absorb grades of requisitioned replacements. Grades would be retained only if minimum standards for the military occupational specialty and the level of demonstrated proficiency within the specialty were met. Quality was brought into the promotion process by requiring each Army Air

Forces base unit to establish a board to give detailed consideration to all promotions and make recommendations to the commanding officer. Although no standards or criteria were set for the board's use, this action was a step toward qualitative promotion selections.

The absence of guiding standards and promotion criteria allowed a countless variety of systems to be used for promoting personnel during the World War II era. The resulting problems were inevitable and were being recognized when the Air Force came into being in 1947. When World War II ended, the AAF was top-heavy with noncommissioned officers, many with only three or four years' service. Reduced enlisted strengths and a rank-heavy structure of career-minded NCO's created our first serious hump condition, virtually blocking promotions for lower-grade airmen. This hump not only reduced promotion opportunity to a minimum but also caused great imbalances in many career fields as Air Force requirements for highly skilled personnel changed rapidly. For the first time Air Force planners had to start thinking seriously about using promotions as a tool for balancing the force among specialties.

During 1950 the Air Force made another attempt to regulate the promotion of enlisted personnel. On 24 March of that year the pertinent Army regulations were rescinded, and the Air Force established its own policy governing the promotion of airmen. The new procedures, however, still retained many of the characteristics of the old Army system. Grade authorizations were governed by the Department of the Air Force, and decentralized control was maintained by permitting group commanders to make promotions to all grades. Authority to promote to E-2 and E-3 could be delegated to squadron commanders. The really significant feature of the new policy was that it established eligibility criteria, consisting of minimum time-in-grade requirements for promotion.

The practice of promoting against unit vacancies continued until 1953, when the Air Force adopted the system of allocating promotions to the major air commands. A new regulation, AFR 39-29, "Promotion of Airmen,"

dated 2 January 1953, contained guidance stating that promotions to grades above E-2 would be controlled by the periodic allocation of promotion quotas from the Director of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF.

The regulation further explained that promotions would be strictly limited to the quotas allocated for each of these grades. This new system furthered decentralization of control by authorizing delegation of authority to promote to lower echelons. The regulation also made one other significant change in the minimum time-in-grade requirements for promotion: it increased the time in grade required for promotion to a more realistic figure in connection with the control of promotion allocations.

Yet another revision occurred during 1954: on 31 March authority to promote to grades E-5, E-6, and E-7 was restricted to major command or higher level. Commanders of major air commands retained, however, the authority to delegate promotions to grades E-2, E-3, and E-4 down to and including squadrons.

Grade ceiling control began in 1958 as a direct result of the rising costs in pay and allowances required to support large numbers of noncommissioned officers. Initially, the control restricted Air Force manning in the top four enlisted grades to 55 percent of the enlisted force. In 1960, grade controls were extended to include the newly created E-8 and E-9 grades, and the ceiling was increased to 58.5 percent. In 1964, the Department of Defense further extended grade controls to include ceilings on each of the top six enlisted grades. Under this program the Air Force is required to compute and state its manpower requirements by grade to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on an annual basis. OSD then evaluates stated Air Force manpower requirements in terms of projected program changes, grade authorizations, grade structure, anticipated attrition, promotion opportunity, costs, and the long-range effects of the requirement if it is approved. When OSD completes this evaluation, it issues authorized enlisted grade ceilings for the next fiscal year. These grade ceilings, once issued by OSD, are considered absolute and binding on the Air

Force. The Air Force must scale its promotion quotas to comply with the OSD grade ceilings and is responsible for seeing that the total number of enlisted personnel serving in each of the top six grades does not exceed the authorized ceiling. Actual grade vacancies are determined by computing the number of losses projected to occur during the year. The difference between the year's beginning and ending strengths, plus the projected losses, provides the Air Force with the actual number of available promotion vacancies. The Air Force then promotes to fill these vacancies but must not promote more than the OSD ceiling will allow. The ceiling for each grade is reflected in the approved fiscal year end strength.

The importance of the control that OSD exercises over the top six enlisted grades cannot be overemphasized. This system actually enables OSD to direct the Air Force promotion operating program by grade and also to determine the number of enlisted promotions which the Air Force can make during any fiscal year.

One need only examine the differences that have occurred between the OSD grade ceilings and the stated Air Force manpower requirements to determine the effect this arrangement has had on the Air Force enlisted grade structure. During the past few years the Air Force has continually stated a requirement for a larger percentage of its total enlisted strength in the top six grades. Since 1966 the top six requirement has been approximately 73 percent of total enlisted strength. In 1966 the Air Force was authorized 58.2 percent, but rather than create a promotion hump by a surge of new grade authorizations, the Air Force elected to phase up to requirements systematically, with increased authorizations in the top six grades spread proportionately over five years. OSD has concurred in the Air Force plan. Fiscal year 1970 is the first time the Air Force has requested and been authorized a grade structure in accordance with its requirements.

The lower grade ceilings authorized by OSD have represented the maximum allowable manning which the Air Force could have serving in each grade. This has meant accom-




WEIGHTED AIRMAN PROMOTION SCORE NOTICE			
DATE PREPARED		NAME	SMITH
SSAN	425933397	CAFSC	73270
CURRENT GRADE			
FACTORS		SCORE	REMARKS
SKT SCORE		65.00	
PFE SCORE		60.00	
TIS SCORE		28.00	
TIG SCORE		25.00	
APR SCORE		124.95	
DECORATION SCORE		6.00	
TOTAL SCORE		308.95	
SCORE REQUIRED FOR SELECTION		320.00	
CYCLE DESIGNATION	70A	UNIT	RJ1123

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MAY 68

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Weighted Airman Promotion System

Adopted in 1968 and being implemented in 1970, WAPS has been designed to ensure selection of the best qualified in each specialty, Air Force-wide, for promotion to grades E-4 through E-7. Visibility of the specific weighted criteria used in the system stimulates understanding and confidence. . . . The WAPS Test Control Branch maintains indexed test data for research purposes. . . . Personnel receive a Weighted Airman Promotion Score Notice. . . . In the Computer Branch a scanner scores test records. . . . Magnetic tapes feed computers.



plishing the Air Force mission with an enlisted grade structure below that which was believed to be necessary. The promotion system must operate within this limitation, and the promotion quota for each grade must be restricted to the vacancies that are projected to occur in the authorized grade structure during the year. Further, the existence of these OSD ceilings has required the Air Force to establish additional management controls designed to balance and create a more equitable grade manning structure in all Air Force specialties.

The Air Force, from its very beginnings, has been overmanned in the noncommissioned officer grades. The Korean War added to this problem by creating further distortion in the grade-service profile, forcing the creation of new management controls in order to correct grade imbalances. Just so many grade authorizations are issued by OSD, and it is incumbent upon the Air Force to see that its total manning for each grade does not exceed these authorizations. Faced with this problem, the Air Force has had to channel airman promotions into those specialties that are manned below their authorized level, in an effort to improve grade capabilities and bring the grade manning by skill into balance. To do this the Air Force has resorted to a stringent promotion management system. The key element in this system is the Promotion Management List (PML), which specifies the maximum percentage of eligibles in each specialty that may be promoted without overmanning the next higher grade.

The controls and limitations imposed on the airman promotion system by the PML are derived from a number of computations, which in turn are based on the promotion operating program levels and authorized manpower allocations. Initially, the management controls were very restrictive, particularly for those specialties that were overmanned. These specialties were allowed only a token quota of 2 percent. Other specialties were authorized increments of 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 percent. These management controls remained relatively unchanged until 1959, and still many specialties continued to exceed manpower au-

thorizations. A revised regulation, AFR 39-29, "Promotion of Airmen," dated 4 March 1959, implemented more stringent controls and established the promotion criteria for two new enlisted grades, senior master sergeant (E-8) and chief master sergeant (E-9). The authority to promote to these grades was restricted to wing commanders or higher.

Only minor changes in promotion management occurred during the early sixties. Time in grade was reduced and promotion opportunity increased because of some relief in the OSD grade ceilings. However, problems were still encountered with promotion management. During October 1965 the Air Force adopted additional controls in an attempt to better balance the grade structure among the various specialties. Specifically, an exact allowable percentage of promotions within a specialty was established. It could not exceed grade manning and was intended to bring all skill areas up to a common operating level.

In 1965 the promotion program for E-8 and E-9 came under intensive scrutiny. The small number of promotions being made to these grades was causing inequities in selection consideration, primarily because a decentralized system was being used. In 1966 a decision was made and implemented to centralize E-8 and E-9 selections at Hq USAF. The results confirmed the advisability of centralization for other grades in order to enable eligible airmen to compete on equal terms for all available vacancies.

Prior to 1967 promotions were made by cycle—one, two, or three cycles per year, depending on grade. This system frequently caused the Air Force to fall below its grade ceiling authorization between cycles. The 1967 World-Wide Airman Promotion Workshop developed methods for monthly incremental promotions that allow selected airmen to be promoted earlier. They also permit the Air Force to take advantage of grade vacancies on a monthly basis rather than by cycle, thus having an immediate effect of creating more promotions.

Even after these extensive changes, the problems of promotion by specialty were still evident. The old axiom of "being in the right

place at the right time" was a major factor in promotion opportunity. Airmen complained of competing for promotion with airmen in other specialties. The Airman Promotion Conference in 1968 evaluated the possibility of central selection of airmen both by board process and by a point promotion system. Because of the volume of eligibles, the finding was that it would be impossible to centralize promotions at Hq USAF when a board and selection folder were involved. Airmen also continue to complain about the board process because they could not be told why they were not selected or what they could do to be selected.

TO MANAGE better by specialty, to promote the best qualified in each specialty, and to give the system visibility, the Weighted Airman Promotion System was adopted in July 1968. It was scheduled to become operational with cycle 71-A, the first promotions under it to begin on 1 June 1970.

The WAPS is a revised automated airman promotion system designed to select airmen for promotion to grades E-4 through E-7 using specific weighted criteria. It provides each nonselected airman with a promotion status report, provides increased visibility, and answers the questions "Why was I not promoted?" and "What can I do to improve my chance for promotion?" It enhances each airman's confidence in the promotion system because it is understandable; it provides a more equitable method of selecting airmen for promotion; and it facilitates and expedites the promotion administrative process.

The weighted system was approved by the Secretary of the Air Force on 3 July 1968 and by a special Congressional subcommittee on enlisted promotion policy on 9 July 1968. Congressional interest in the promotion practices of the armed forces developed as a result of the thousands of letters from enlisted men to congressmen during the fifties and sixties complaining about promotion programs in general and promotion boards in particular. As a result of these

complaints and the concern of individual congressmen, the Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services established a special Subcommittee on Enlisted Promotion Policy Review. The findings and recommendations of the subcommittee indicated that a major revision of the Air Force airman promotion system was essential. This is reflected and confirmed in these extracts from the special subcommittee report:

The subcommittee recommended that the Air Force revise its system to have weighted criteria uniform for all enlisted promotion boards with maximum weight set for each of the various promotion factors and with provision for periodic testing in a man's skill and greater emphasis on test results in promotion consideration.

The subcommittee received assurance that the decision on the new system is firm and that there is no possibility of the Air Force reversing this most important advance.

With the WAPS the Air Force now has a unique airman promotion selection process that provides fair and equitable consideration for all eligibles to a degree impossible under any previous system. By featuring a high degree of "visibility" and describing in detail the factors upon which promotions are based and the weight given each factor, the new system will restore the confidence of all airmen in the Air Force promotion program. By correcting the inequities in the old system and removing the doubts and misconception that surrounded it, WAPS will significantly improve morale. This should ultimately remove the primary basis for the thousands of letters of complaint which congressmen have received from Air Force enlisted personnel.⁶

The WAPS was developed after extensive study and research into the Airman Career Management Program. The policies and procedures are sound and do meet the desired goal of selecting the best qualified airmen Air Force-wide for promotion. However, as in any new system that relies on voluminous machine-processed data, WAPS in its present configuration is not the ultimate. Continued study is needed to insure that the program remains current, serves the needs of the Air Force

and the individual, and continues to meet established objectives. Some prime problems for review are frequency of testing promotion eligibles, frequency of promotion cycles, the elimination of grade E-4 from the WAPS, the inclusion of promotion to grades E-8 and E-9, analysis of the factors and weights given to each factor, and re-evaluation of the eligibility criteria for each grade.

Any such system as the WAPS could not have been implemented until the Air Force had the capability to collect the voluminous personnel data required in the selection process. The Personnel Data System (PDS-A1) did provide this capability with some minor exceptions, e.g., airman performance report and decorations data. The nonavail-

ability of some data in-system, plus the requirement to re-evaluate PDS-A1 data, has caused the WAPS to become a self-standing system. The more sophisticated systems with larger data bases that will come into being during the seventies, such as the Personnel Management Information System (PMIS), will eliminate the need for an independent system to capture and store promotion data. The interface of WAPS with PMIS will give us a faster, more responsive, and extremely accurate method of acquiring and processing promotion data.

We have come a long way since the days of the first sergeant's "Black Book." We now have a system that is *promoting the best*.

Hq United States Air Force

Notes

1. L. Mendel Rivers, *Enlisted Promotion Policy Review*, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Enlisted Promotion Policy Review, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968, p. 6325.

2. General J. P. McConnell, remarks delivered to 1968 Airman Promotion Conference, Bolling AFB, D.C., 2 April 1968.

3. Air Force Regulation 39-29, "Promotion of Airmen," Washington, D.C., 25 November 1969, para 1.

4. Lieutenant General Horace M. Wade, keynote address to 1968 Airman Promotion Conference, Washington, D.C., 1 April 1968.


5. *Ibid.*

6. For a comprehensive view of the WAPS, see AFR 39-29, 25 November 1969, and AFM 30-3, 21 June 1968, Volume II, Chapter 7.

TOPLINE

*The USAF Personnel Plan
for the Officer Force*

COLONEL GEORGE H. ROPP, JR.



THREE years ago top personnel managers concluded that a practical systems approach to total personnel force management not only was needed but was at last possible through new computer capability. They knew that reacting to events and making decisions only on the basis of near-term requirements often tended to perpetuate undesirable personnel force characteristics and create unforeseen future problems. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was becoming increasingly interested in service personnel matters. A consistent, rational Air Force plan for longer-range personnel force management was necessary to provide stronger and more complete justification for personnel requirements and policies. As a case in point, in the matter of pilot training rates it was urgent that Air Force total requirements be set forth in clear and logical terms. Further, the changing aspirations of American young men, clearly pointed up in a variety of studies including "New View,"¹ signaled the need to recognize and respond to demands for responsible jobs and assure equitable and desirable career opportunities, visible to all.

personnel management objectives

In October 1967 the Director of Personnel Planning, to get started, formed an Ad Hoc Planning Group of the best-qualified personnel staff officers available. He charged this group with developing, on an urgent basis, the means to chart a personnel course and measure progress. The group, with a bow toward the management by objectives approach, first identified six broad qualitative characteristics defining the kind of total personnel force desired. Moving to the more specific, they then presented management goals to support each force characteristic and finally developed specific objectives for each of the personnel subforces (officer, airman, Reserve forces, and civilian). For the active duty officer force, for instance, there were 84 objectives grouped under traditional personnel function rubrics such as "procurement," "education and training," and "utilization." Each of the characteristics, goals, and objec-

tives was supported by rationale to promote understanding and acceptance.

Approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCS/P), the objectives were a milestone in personnel planning. They not only made top management aims visible but provided a basis for each subordinate manager to establish his own goals and facilitated communication by providing a common language. Together, the objectives constituted the Air Force position on vital personnel issues. In December 1968 the desired characteristics and qualitative goals of the personnel force were embodied in the personnel annex to the USAF Planning Concepts document (formerly known as The Plan).

USAF Personnel Plan

With the qualitative objectives as a foundation, work was directed toward defining the future personnel force in quantitative terms and identifying the actions necessary to achieve a desired structure for each of the four personnel subforces. The objectives became Volume I of the USAF Personnel Plan, the succeeding volumes to contain objective force structures for officer, airman, civilian, and Reserve forces as well as plans for personnel programming and personnel operations. The first of these volumes to be completed was Volume II, on the officer structure, which was given the short title *TOPLINE* (for Total Officer Personnel Objective Structure for the Line Officer Force). It represented a broad Air Staff effort that combined the findings of competent studies and analyses with the latest computer technology to produce a plan for configuring the total active line officer force. Because this plan is intended to help in making decisions that have long-range impacts, it is important that each officer understand its tenets.

THE framework of the *TOPLINE* volume is a simple one. First, it analyzes the current line officer force distribution in terms of grade and years of service in rated and nonrated categories. (Management of chap-

lain, judge advocate, and medical and dental officers is treated separately.) Second, it identifies deficiencies and their causes and presents a desired officer distribution structure for 1980. Third, it displays annual interim objective forces; and it details needed policy changes to move today's force through time toward a more desirable force configuration.

current inventory

The fy 71 officer force inventory reflects an undesirable profile of humps and valleys

from birth and is a prime cause of problems in promotion, fluctuating annual accession and training rates, aging aircrews, obscure career opportunities, and excessive cockpit tenure. For instance, an analysis of the fy 71 active duty officer force shows:

—A large group of nonrated officers with less than five years of service. They are in positions of greater than normal responsibility to fill the voids in higher-level nonrated line positions.

—A shortage of rated officers with from 6 to 14 years of service.




Figure 1. Line officer force structure (inventory), fiscal year 1971, lieutenant colonel and below. The bulge on the left side in the 15- to 19-year groups represents rated officers filling jobs authorized in lower grades; on the right side, senior jobs being filled by junior officers.

caused by disproportionate numbers of officers in certain year groups and in elements of the force (pilots, navigators, and nonrated line officers). (Figure 1) This condition, to one extent or another, has plagued the Air Force

—Many senior rated line officers being used in rated positions normally requiring more-junior officers. (This situation is not viewed favorably by seniors or their juniors.)

—Pilot and navigator inventories decreasing

owing to retirements, the lure of the airlines, and Vietnam losses).

—The number available for cockpit duties is the lowest since 1949, although the total pilot strength is compatible with OSD-determined operational needs. This situation is the result not only of a reduced inventory but also of the numbers that are in the pipeline (PCS travel, TDY, and training) and a minimum number selected for career broadening in schools and in nonrated line positions.

—The force has been permitted to free-flow in the past. This means that all qualified officers have been permitted to enter career status (or have been granted that status upon entry) in accordance with their individual desires. No planned stable retention objectives have been in force.

—The irregular shape of the line officer force profile over the years has contributed to inequitable promotion and job opportunities between year groups and elements.

—Field-grade manning in nonrated line career fields is 70 percent of authorizations. Without the rated officers assigned, manning would be less than 50 percent.

This analysis omitted mention of the positive aspects of today's personnel force. It is a tribute to leaders of the past that the Air Force has fully met its commitments, and we can be confident that it will continue to do its job. However, personnel planners firmly believed that new computer technology, combined with modern personnel analysis, could produce an integrated plan that would mitigate if not eliminate in the future the kind of undesirable conditions in today's force.

causes of unwanted officer force characteristics

Humps and depressions in the officer force structure resulted from a combination of (1) changing total force requirements in past years, (2) the numerical strength and training ceilings imposed on the officer force each fiscal year, and (3) the practice of varying procurement to adjust to changes in the ceiling. A contributing factor was the policy of allowing an uncontrolled number of officers to move into career status. Once humps and de-

pressions are established, they tend to be self-perpetuating even in the absence of total strength changes. For instance, as officers in a hump complete their careers, it is necessary to replace them with newly procured officers in equivalent numbers if total strength is to be maintained.

The current nonrated officer shortages in the middle years can be largely attributed to the relatively high number of rated officers who were trained each year up to 1958 and their propensity to remain in the Air Force.

projected free-flow force of FY 80

Planners may ask the pertinent question: If current practices continue, what will the future be like? By aging the force with the computer model, using available experience factors for dynamics such as losses and promotions, a reasonable answer can be obtained—as, for instance, the projected officer personnel force for FY 80 (Figure 2). It includes

—a minimal resource of experienced rated officers, since the median age and experience level of the rated force has declined significantly;

—a significant hump of nonrated officers beginning to develop in the field grades; and

—a developing hump of rated officers in the early years.

THE INCREASE in young rated officers in this projected force is the result of high training rates in the early seventies. Increased training was needed to compensate for loss of the older pilot hump through retirement and normal losses of other pilots in every year group.

The hump of field-grade nonrated officers reflects the entry into the career force (without a planned retention program) of nonrated officers who were commissioned in the high procurement years of FY 65 through FY 69.

TOPLINE objective force

Having analyzed the current force and its projection into the future under current poli-

cies, the officer force planning team had two basic tasks remaining: (1) developing an attainable objective force within realistic parameters of annual accessions, training rates, retention, and promotion; and (2) determining the actions and policies needed to shape the inventory so as to meet the objective.

it contains pilots, navigators, and nonrated specialists, who in many respects are not interchangeable. Recognizing these factors and deciding that a complex personnel system can best be structured and evaluated by using numbers, TOPLINE architects established basic objectives and controls, which included:




Figure 2. Inventory profile, free-flow projections, Lt col and below, FY 80. Here the FY 80 force (as projected by computer model using current loss rates and force-regenerating policies) is compared with the objective. The aging pilot and navigator hump of FY 71 has disappeared, and a new one is forming in the early service years. On the nonrated side a bulge of officers in the middle years results from high procurement in FY 65-69 and uncontrolled flow into the career force.

In establishing criteria for selecting an objective force, planners had to bear in mind the special nature of the officer force. For instance, its closed system requires continuous input of new people at the bottom, an upward flow through the years of service and grades, and finally controlled and purposeful attrition. A dominant characteristic of the force is that

(1) Strength objectives for pilots, navigators, and nonrated officers (in both the Regular and active duty Reserve categories).

(2) A range of acceptable annual procurement with a floor for each element (pilot, navigator, and nonrated) of the force.

(3) Specific numbers of officers in each element who will be selected for Regular com-

missions and for career Reserve status before they complete their initial service commitments.

(4) Acceptable ranges of numbers of officers to receive career status in each element each year. (A selection-in process will identify those to be given career status.)

Using a static personnel planning computer model (SP²) and the parameters established in the objectives, the DCS/P team, after more than 800 computer runs, chose the optimum objective structure that is TOPLINE. In Figure 3 and in the actions to be taken to achieve the objective structure, each officer




Figure 3. TOPLINE objective force, Regular and Reserve, by job category and status. This force would most satisfactorily meet Air Force requirements as to cost, attainability, viability, and effectiveness standards. An inventory approximating this objective force must be a long-range goal, since there is no satisfactory way of instantly filling current voids with personnel possessing appropriate experience levels or of reducing humps without unacceptable effects on individual careers.

(5) Establishment of equitable promotion opportunity for each element within the career force.

(6) Retirement of most Reserve officers at the 20-year point. These quantified standards simplify the process of evaluating deviations (such as externally or internally generated strength changes) and cost versus benefit.

can begin to see how TOPLINE affects him.

new personnel policies

To get on a direct course toward TOPLINE (Figure 4 shows how the force would look in ten years), the Air Force adopted concepts that departed from past ways of steering the

officer force. Some of the ideas were not new, having been debated in various forms through the years. TOPLINE, however, made it possible to evaluate these ideas, as well as new policies, by simulation testing in a total force context. Although a few of the ideas required new legislation, they were not entirely interdepend-

Specific time period contracts for some noncareer officers
Restructured flight pay.

The youth/experience standard. A significant feature of TOPLINE is the youth/experience standard for the officer force in the grades of lieutenant colonel and below. The




Figure 4. TOPLINE FY 80 profile, Lt col and below. Following the TOPLINE structure, the computer model projected the FY 80 inventory. Here that projection is compared to the objective force configuration. Voids in rated officer requirements are partly filled with contracted officers, to preclude another uncontrolled hump going through the system. Only the bottom half of the TOPLINE structure is filled, indicating it will take ten years to achieve the planned force.

ent. and progress toward TOPLINE began in early 1970. New policies for the officer force included:

- A youth/experience standard for computing pilot and navigator requirements
- Nonrated officer career progression equity
- Definition of the rated officer supplement and its use

manpower structure, reflecting requirements developed by traditional manpower engineering validation techniques, was found to be inadequate for evaluating the *personnel force* structure. While the manpower structure states needs in terms of grade, an officer's grade is an inaccurate indicator of his age, experience, or (in the case of the rated officer)

ated proficiency. For example, in June 1969 there were captains in every year group from 3 to 19 years, majors from 8 to 22 years, and lieutenant colonels from 13 to 28 years. Further, in today's force only 42 percent of pilots in the grades of lieutenant colonel and below have less than 13 years of service, whereas over 80 percent of all nonrated officers are in the 12-years-and-under category. The simple comparison of inventory against manpower grade requirements, therefore, does not provide sufficient information for the personnel planner or manager.

TOPLINE provided an additional standard by stating a percentage of the total force inventory, in the grades of lieutenant colonel and below, that should have 12 years or less total active federal commissioned service (TAFCS). (TAFCS was selected as a criterion because it is a reliable indicator of age and experience.) The TOPLINE standard requires that accession and training rates be aimed toward keeping not only total officer requirements filled but also toward maintaining 70 percent of the requirements for lieutenant colonel and below filled with officers of 12 years or less TAFCS. Computer modeling showed that determining training rates this way would give the Air Force (1) adequate, attainable, and sustaining annual officer production, (2) a continuing youthful posture in its force, (3) adequate numbers of senior officers to meet supervisory requirements (from normal progression out of the 1- to 12-year group), and (4) the means for a purposeful and visible career development program for the entire officer force.

Nonrated officer career progression. When we went into Vietnam, we had approximately 61,500 rated officers in the grades of lieutenant colonel and below (as of 30 June 1965); on 30 June 1969, the inventory was about 52,800. The steady decline in rated strength emphasizes the importance of preserving nonrated managerial capability today and signifies the increasing role of the nonrated officer in future senior management. The TOPLINE structure is deliberately and purposefully designed to provide an adequate flow of nonrated officers through the year groups and grades, as well

as greater job challenges for nonrated officers (because they will comprise a higher percentage of senior management capability in the future). The relatively high rated inventory of past years resulted inevitably in rated officers occupying a higher percentage of nonrated line positions.

This situation will undergo a steady change toward equality, since TOPLINE assures the career nonrated officer of progression and promotion opportunities to colonel equal to those of the rated officer. Floor and ceiling bench marks for nonrated accessions and quotas for nonrated (as well as rated) officer selection for Regular commissions and career Reserve status were designed to insure this equality of opportunity. These controls will preclude *unplanned* numbers of rated officers from crossing into nonrated fields to block nonrated progression opportunities and will dampen the formation of a nonrated hump, with its stultifying effects on promotions. TOPLINE provides methodology to determine equitable promotion quotas for pilots, navigators, and nonrated officers to major and lieutenant colonel if such decisions are required to prevent imbalances in year groups, grades, or elements (pilot, navigator, or nonrated officer) of the force.

Even with equitable advancement, however, there will not be enough nonrated colonels for the nonrated colonel jobs, since three out of four colonel jobs are in nonrated utilization fields (a higher ratio than found in lieutenant colonel jobs). The equitable advancement of officers in each element, therefore, will mean that a portion of the colonel positions in nonrated line areas will always be filled by rated officers.

In sum, the controlled placement of younger rated officers in nonrated jobs, plus the purposeful input to the career force of nonrated officers at the four-year point, will serve to open a long channel of progression for the career nonrated officer. In effect, the nonrated officer's chances of winning career status will be greater than previously afforded but somewhat fewer than those of his rated colleague, whose training costs are high. Once in the career force, however, his advancement

opportunities through colonel will be equal to those of the rated officer.

Rated supplement and its use. TOPLINE plans for some pilots and navigators to be in nonrated jobs during both peace and war. Some will be capable senior executives whose rated skills will be surplus to operationally determined rated requirements. Others will be in the rated supplement, centrally managed to a planned size and to the youth/experience standard. ("Supplement" is defined as the additional pilots and navigators needed to maintain or expand the wartime capabilities of the Air Force and to provide for career development of the rated force during peace and war.) Each officer in the supplement will be in one of these categories:

<i>Category</i>	<i>Contingency Response</i>
Surge	To meet immediate demands for increased crew members at the beginning of a conflict.
Drawdown	To provide additional replacement crews through the next 18 months of conflict.
Controlled rotation	To provide replacements to meet combat tour rotation policies (as rated officers return from combat, some will be assigned to nonrated positions in this category, releasing others for combat on a one-for-one basis).

Young rated officers will be selected (according to merit and desire) from cockpit duty for a several-year tour in the supplement upon entry into the career force. This planned placement of the rated officer into the supplement (1) provides the most usable, responsible replacement crews; (2) minimizes the impact on nonrated functions when the supplement is withdrawn (because these younger officers can be more readily replaced by increased input of new nonrated officers); and (3) makes possible a broad leadership and executive development program for deserving young officers.

Contracts. As we have seen, the officer

personnel force has tended to rebuild itself in its own image. When one hump moves out at the top, another is created at the bottom to maintain total strength. New humps could be kept from moving through the system by inducing officers to remain on active duty temporarily past their initial commitments, while reducing procurement oscillation. TOPLINE therefore recognized current authority for contracting officers' services for specified time periods.² To provide incentive for officers to accept contracts, TOPLINE recommends the seeking of necessary legislation for bonus payments. By using contracts, the Air Force can maintain total strength without creating long-lived humps. Further, contracts provide a satisfactory way of reducing or increasing the force in response to short-range demands without adversely affecting the career force. The use of contracts envisioned in TOPLINE provides for

- adequate monetary incentives (bonus)
- contract maximum of three years
- contracts shorter than three years being renewed as required to as high as three years
- contractees' being offered career status if required. (Acceptance would preclude payment, or cause repayment, of bonus.)

Flight pay. One of the main thrusts of TOPLINE is to insure optimum retention rates by remedying those situations that have been cause for good officers to forego careers in the Air Force. The most important accomplishment in this regard will be the assurance to all officers of challenging careers with visible advancement opportunities, including the planned development of specific numbers of rated officers in specialties outside the cockpit after the initial term of service. Another important area affecting retention is pay. The combined effect of attractive airline pay and absence of flight pay increases in the Air Force over the years has been an important factor in the decision of many highly qualified young rated officers to leave the service. To offset this disadvantage to the Air Force, TOPLINE supports a restructured flight pay table (developed by OSD) that would increase flight pay earnings over a full career while providing emphasis on aircrew duty.

Benefits of TOPLINE

Using the systems approach to total force planning, TOPLINE gives the Air Force both an objective officer force structure and patterns for utilization of officers. It provides justification of the requirements for officer procurement and retention. From the OSD viewpoint, it means that personnel force policies need not be reviewed piecemeal but that the total personnel base can and must be considered along with the impact of each policy on it. TOPLINE also contains the promise of stabilized undergraduate pilot and navigator training costs in the future. Finally, for the career officer himself, TOPLINE makes possible visible, obtainable, and attractive career progression opportunities. The rated career officer can expect planned opportunities for school attendance and career broadening in nonrated jobs and a career that does not require an indefinite cockpit tenure. The nonrated career officer, on the other hand, can have higher confidence that his opportunities for higher grades (through colonel) are equitable and protected.

THE USAF Personnel Plan, of which TOPLINE is but one part, is a milestone in the advancement of top-level personnel management. This article describes its inception as well as the details of the volume on the active officer force. While the plan is an official document for the *current* (and continuing) guidance of personnel managers, it will require many years to fulfill. Further, some of its recommended changes may ultimately be modified or deleted, since implementation depends on factors beyond Air Force control.

The USAF Personnel Plan is designed to be dynamic. It is as good as current knowledge can make it. As events occur, as new experience factors are obtained, as technology and the nation's defense requirements change, incremental changes to the plan will be made. It will be at all times, however, the road map to tell top managers where the personnel force is, where they want it to be, and the best way to get it there. It is being used as the basis of dialogue with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on those portions requiring OSD approval or legislation.


Hq United States Air Force

Notes

1. Department of the Air Force, *A Study in Officer Motivation (New View)*, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., November 1966, Vols. I and II (distribution to wings and groups). Also see Dr. Clifford

E. Smith, "The Implications of 'New View' for Motivating Officer Behavior," *Air University Review*, XX, 3 (March-April 1969), 57-62.

2. 10 U.S.C.A. Sec. 679.



MANAGING THE CIVILIAN WORK FORCE IN THE SEVENTIES

CHARLES A. ROBERTS

WHAT IS PAST
IS PROLOGUE

HERE stands here in Washington a neo-classic federal building adorned with a granite statue on the base of which these words are carved: "What is past is prologue." As we pause on the threshold of a new decade and peer into the haze of the future, trying to foresee our problems, trying to develop solutions, trying to plan for a better way to get things done, let's not ignore the counsel of those wise words. They can provide us with an insight into tomorrow which no amount of "crystal-balling" will ever be able to equal, no matter how clairvoyant the gazer may be.

setting the stage

In the context of managing the civilian work force, just what is this past that anticipates the future? What does it consist of? How was it formed? Who created it over the past two decades and more? Was it successful? Has it established a pattern for the future? Should that pattern be replaced? Revised? Sustained? The thrust of this article, then, will be to review our past . . . to examine our present . . . to consider the bad as well as the good—and hopefully to end up with reasonable predictions and recommendations.

The concept of personnel management, of work force management or even of management in general, was not nearly as voguish in the late forties as it is today. We had just come out of a long and trying war, we were a contracting organization, we were attuned to the requirements of a totally military activity, and our civilian work force served in a totally military environment. The concept of a military-civilian management team had not been fully developed. The emphasis on a civilian leadership philosophy, as evidenced in recent years, was just emerging in the Department of Defense (DOD). Our requirement as an organization was not for a highly sophisticated work force such as we have today but rather for what was often referred to as an "army of clerks," denoting an absence of professionals.

Since the nature of the work force determines the nature of its management, our requirements at that time were fairly simple and easily met. Basically, the work force,

because of its composition, required administration rather than management. The requirements to administer—that is, to locate applicants; investigate, examine, and hire them; set their salaries; control their benefits; train them; see that they were paid; and if necessary admonish them for their shortcomings—gave rise to the creation of a unique clan of employees now known as "personnel management specialists." (As we shall see later, even the title used to designate these employees involves opposing philosophies, i.e., management vs. specialist.) These people—some hiring experts, some position classifiers, some wage administrators, some employee relations specialists, some clerks—comprised the total Air Force team for administration of the civilian work force.

As the need for personnel specialists began to increase, functional management "dropped the ball" by abandoning many of its responsibilities to the personnel administrators. It should be noted that this occurred in spite of Air Force policy guidance which delegated ample authority to managers to handle their own work force management affairs. Thus, the personnel specialists in effect slowly became managers of the work force rather than administrators, as was originally intended. There are few managers in today's Air Force organizations (our average age is about 47) who cannot recall the "Tell it to Personnel" attitude which existed in the fifties and to some extent still persists. Originally, the civilian personnel specialist teams filled a critical void. They provided an efficient and complete response to the personnel administration requirements of the work force. However, with what appeared to be the encouragement of management, coupled with the authority inherent in many of the administrative processes, the personnel specialist began expanding his role to the extent of becoming *the* personnel manager. In some instances personnel began to "call the shots" on such vital decisions as hiring, assigning, training, promoting, retaining, and firing personnel. With respect to at least one-third of its total work force, management to a substantial degree did not exercise its managerial voice.

As the personnel function took form, its representatives began to venture farther and farther into the management environment. Armed only with the tools of personnel administration, the specialist did his best under the circumstances and began applying *his* programs to *management* situations. The most hackneyed phrases in the personnel lingo today are "selling our programs to management" and "gaining the support of management." For the past two decades the personnel specialist has found himself "selling" every idea that came down the pike—from "equality" to "merit." He has become such an effective salesman and has acquired so much support that it is a bit shocking to read comments from the outside world (some call it the "real" world) on this same point. George Berkwitz, Senior Editor of *Dun's Review*, puts it this way: "Snowed by jargon, unfamiliar with much of what the specialists propose, the confused executive either just goes along with the recommendations or shunts them aside."¹ Bernard J. Rahilly, Vice-President and Director of Management Development of W. R. Grace & Co., says it a little less subtly: "Giving specialists latitude is like letting kids loose in a candy store."²

This expanded role of the personnel specialist continues to persist, but even so, there is an indication of at least some light at the end of the tunnel. In a recent study of manpower planning, covering the entire logistics field in DOD, some 47 recommendations were made, mostly concerned with civilian work force management. While the specific recommendations, taken on a one-for-one basis, may or may not represent the optimum solution to a particular problem, collectively they make it clear that functional management wants to become involved more and more in its personnel and manpower operations. Additionally, it is entirely possible that some of the change which is occurring stems from the personnel specialist himself. Even though he has oversold management on his own program and now finds himself *telling* management what to do,³ it is apparent that he is beginning to recognize the more important aspects of his role—those of adviser-consultant—and

is eager to join management in resolving its problems on its own terms. Bernard Cushman, Executive Vice-President of Norton Company, has summed up the specialist's role in a way that is tailor-made for our situation: "Specialists are most helpful as individuals who question and challenge line decisions, push management into thinking strategically and into being creative and innovative. . . ."⁴

So much for the past. So much for the thinking (and sometimes absence thereof) which brought us to the threshold of the seventies. The question is not so much where *are* we as where *are we going?* To continue with the philosophy which gave rise to the present role of the personnel organization would be not only out of tune with our times but potentially disastrous. Change is upon us and is one of tomorrow's major imperatives. The required change is evident and can be simply stated. Whether it can be as simply effected is another matter. In short, personnel must disengage itself from the role of "program salesman" and "work force manager to all." Management, *functional* management, beginning at the *very top*, must take on total responsibility for managing *all* its people.

today's scene — people

How does the prospect of having today's youth as tomorrow's managers appeal to you? Have you considered that fifty percent of the people in this nation are under twenty-five? Have you really thought about the product that will come out of today's environment and be the work force of tomorrow?

There are two sides to the coin. Can you imagine a future manager who smokes pot? has an arrest record? has served time? has participated in strikes against the government as an employee? This may sound a bit far-fetched, but the chances are that some of each of these categories are *already* on our roles, and the probability of that number's increasing is excellent. An environment which each day produces situations where high-level state and federal officials find themselves or members of their families on the other side of the law, where junior-high students take

and push dope, where unwed motherhood is no longer unusual—is an environment which will, no matter how tightly we close our eyes, produce a different breed.

On the other side of the coin—and perhaps even more significant than these somber situations—is the ever increasing involvement of young people in today's social problems. Better air to breathe—cleaner water to drink—more honesty in business practices—greater respect for human dignity—abolition of racial and religious biases—greater social justice—less involvement in the political affairs of other nations—all these are matters of the greatest concern to the people who will make up tomorrow's work force. Just recently, still in the sixties, in a meeting of young Air Force employees, it was suggested that management permit employees to volunteer a couple of hours each day—or even each week—out of the normal work schedule to help out in neighborhood social programs. In short, these young people want Air Force to pay their salaries while they help invalids get out to vote, work on antipollution projects, counsel young drug addicts, teach the disadvantaged. From this breed will come our work force and many of our leaders of the seventies. Are you as a manager ready to be confronted with such drives and motivations on the part of your work force? The *least* we can do in preparation is to acknowledge the existence of these conditions. We might do well to do more—like plan. All these conditions, and many others, naturally have an effect on the individual employee and will manifest themselves as much on duty as off. Whether our reaction to them is positive or negative is of little importance for the purposes of this article, but they must be *understood* or our ability to communicate with our work force will be in jeopardy.

today's scene — polarization

From all reliable accounts, there is a polarization process taking place in our work force management philosophy. We are beginning to concentrate primarily on the upper and the lower levels. Examples of both sides

of the coin can be found in this phenomenon. Virgil B. Day, Vice-President, Personnel and Industrial Relations for General Electric, describes a "bi-modal" work force as follows:

Our research suggests that our major challenge will be in learning how to manage and motivate a bi-modal work force—a work force, that is, which poses key and highly divergent problems to managers at its two extremes. At one extreme will be the "top 15 per cent" represented by key professional and managerial workers. Before 1975, we shall have passed a significant milestone in labor force history; for the first time, these professional and technical workers will outnumber skilled craftsmen.

At the other extreme of this bi-modal work force will be the "bottom 15 per cent" of our urban and rural disadvantaged. The first group consists of the highly educated, affluent, highly mobile, and highly motivated; the other, of the poorly educated, poverty stricken, ghetto-bound, poorly motivated. I am not, of course, saying that the needs of the remaining 70 per cent of the work force are unimportant, only that the new challenges to our innovative thinking will need a sharper focus at these two extremes.⁵

today's scene — to centralize or not to centralize

I honestly believe that by establishing appropriate policies at the Secretarial level and placing the necessary accountability at the proper levels, the Department of Defense can be managed more effectively.⁶

The Services have moved from a loose association with one another following World War II to a highly centralized Defense system in recent years. It is entirely possible that this process has gone too far . . . Over centralization can affect both initiative and responsibility at lower levels, sometimes greatly increasing costs as a result.⁷

These remarks were not made by ordinary men. The former by Defense Secretary Laird and the latter by Air Force Secretary Seamans hopefully point to a new era of decentralization. If these comments can somehow clear the "bureaucracy hurdle" and become official management guidelines for the seventies, our prospects for the future will be greatly en-

hanced. The chance of its occurring, however, is no better than fifty-fifty. The Parkinsonian effect which General McConnell, before retiring, described as requiring "more and more detailed information at higher and higher levels, and—more and more people at those levels" is just as active in precluding decentralization as the Secretaries are in recommending it. General McConnell's sum-up may explain the increasing OSD involvement in purely service affairs. Example: OSD (I&L) has actually acted upon a case in which the training being given an Air Force employee at the entry level was not found to be precisely equivalent to that which the Army offers. Admittedly, this seems to be an insignificant example when taken in isolation, but not when one considers the constant push from above to standardize *systems*, to standardize *procedures*, to standardize *programs*, to standardize *data*, and presumably at some Utopian point in the future even to standardize *people*.

Dr. James W. Walker of Indiana University Graduate School of Business recently put it this way: "To see to it that people are effectively utilized the manager must be willing to try new manpower planning in a fashion suited to the particular needs of his company. He cannot expect simply to imitate the methods of others or, worse yet, to import whole systems and programs and expect them to work in his own organization." As we have found out again and again, the problems are at the lower levels and they are never the same. The power to solve them should be at that level also. If ever there were a need for a face-to-face situation, this is it:

problem development → ← *power to resolve*

today's scene — information versus data

How much does today's manager know about his people? "Very little" is probably the most precise answer. We are organized in such a way that Personnel probably has more information than it really needs, and functional managers who have to get the job done know far too little about their workers. Some see it this way: Personnel people need *data* for their operation, and managers need *infor-*

mation. The first category is what goes into a computer for statistical purposes. The second is alive, changing, meaningful—the stuff on which decisions are based. Data is an employee's birthday; information is when he plans to retire. Data is the kind of college degree he has; information is what he plans to do with it. Data is his current salary; information is whether he will move for a promotion. At a time when managers are starving for information, there is too much emphasis being given to data. Monumental systems are being established to collect and manipulate data in many ways—all of which will undoubtedly impress managers but will not solve their problems. On the other hand, precious little is being done to explore the means of obtaining the more meaningful attitudinal type of information that managers have to have.

Let's not be overly impressed with data-processing promises. In his recent book *Up the Organization*, Robert Townsend, the Avis miracle man, snaps: "First get it through your head that computers are big, expensive, fast, dumb adding machine-typewriters. Then realize that most of the computer technicians that you're likely to meet or hire are complicators, not simplifiers."¹⁰ James P. Timoney, American Standard's Manpower Planning Manager, had this experience with personnel data systems: "A complete dossier on each of tens of thousands of employees were put on tape, and the data bank became so monstrous that the only time they could run the computer for other business was on holidays."¹¹

the curtain goes up

What have we seen in our examination process? Have we answered any questions? Can we?

Let's sum up. Tomorrow's work force is going to be different, to say the least. Different by virtue of the environment in which it grew up, different by virtue of a new set of values spreading across the land. It will be more involved, more articulate, better educated, and as capable as any group we have seen before.

Tomorrow's work force will contain a

normal number of "yes" men, but an unusually high number of "no" men. It will be more imaginative and more creative than any previous group, but because of its search for truth and excellence much of its output will be discarded by the group itself. It will not be impressed by big numbers and massive programs, and it will ask *why* at every turn. It will be impressed by direct, forthright actions—by a management that shows concern, by an organization that cares for the human side of its work force. To utilize this group effectively, the manager is going to have to have similar qualifications. So tomorrow's manager, as far as relations with the work force are concerned, must above all be capable, dedicated, honest to himself, well read, and highly compassionate. There's nothing impossible to achieve in all of this; it's just a matter of a frame of mind—and a lot of work.

As we have already seen, the mantle of today's personnel managers must be passed to the functional managers. Personnel people will be consultants in the seventies. They will keep abreast of developments and improvements in their field. They will pass these on to functional managers for their use or rejection. The work force manager of the seventies will be the functional manager. Consult with personnel representatives? By all means, but do your own work force managing.

- Start with an information-gathering process in your own organization. (Make it

simple and *relevant* to your own situation.)

- Massage the results of assessment yourself. (You'll get to know your people better this way.)

- Identify weaknesses in your work force. (Plan to overcome them.)

- Identify high-potential people. (Plan to use them more effectively.)

- Consider the goals and ambitions which your people, individually, have established for themselves. (Try to understand these goals and take part in their being realized.)

- Forget the old hard-nosed approach. (Your successes are going to be in relation to your ability to work with your people, not push them.)

- Challenge the rules. (That's how they get changed.)

- Stay humble. (If you're not now, get that way.)

- Admit errors. (It's not only refreshing, it'll bring applause from your people.)

- Bite the bullet when the occasion arises. (Putting your job on the line in support of your people or your convictions can really be exhilarating.)

- Don't look behind you for a personnel shoulder to lean on. (You're on your own!)

Hq United States Air Force

Notes

1. George Berkwitt, "Is Management Too Specialized?" *Dun's Review*, February 1970, p. 23.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

3. For more information on the subject see J. R. Schuster, "A Diagnostic Model for Industrial Relations," *Personnel Administration*, July-August 1969, pp. 28-33.

4. Berkwitt, p. 23.

5. Virgil B. Day, "Managing Human Resources in the Seventies," *Personnel Administration*, January-February 1970, p. 24.

6. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird in his remarks to Summer Interns on 28 July 1969.

7. Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans, Jr., in presentation on the FY 1970 Air Force budget to the Senate Appropriations Committee.

8. Air Force Chief of Staff General J. P. McConnell in presentation on the FY 1970 Air Force budget to the Senate Appropriations Committee.

9. James W. Walker, "Forecasting Manpower Needs," *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1969, p. 164.

10. Robert Townsend, *Up the Organization* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 36.

11. Berkwitt, p. 22.



Air Force Review



MANAGING THE TRANSITION OF AIR FORCE MANAGERS

A Challenge to Management Education

JOHN A. LANG, JR.

THE history of changeovers in national administrations in the U.S. federal government has been fraught with instances of waste of management skills and time-consuming trial-and-error experience. However, during the administration changes of 1961 and 1969 we find evolving a pattern of management education to better prepare top management for this all-important transition.

Accounts of the 1961 transition are well presented in a Brookings Institution report, *The Presidential Election and Transition 1960-1961*, edited by Paul T. David, and in another Brookings study, *Changing Administrations, the 1961 and 1964 Transitions in Six Departments*, authored by David T. Stanley. Mr. Stanley concludes very perceptively that the success of the 1961 transition "fostered a constructive attitude toward the transfer of power. The citizen can hope that all parties

to future changes of administration will make the further changes and devote the extra effort needed to assure that power will change hands with a minimum of risk and confusion."

National interest in the effective management of administration changes was further evidenced in the passage by Congress of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963, which sets forth policy guidance for "the orderly transfer of the executive power in connection with the expiration of the term of office of a President and the inauguration of a new President."

The transition period of 1968-69, then, afforded an opportunity to use the improved techniques resulting from management education. My evaluation of the outcome in only one part of an executive department, the Department of the Air Force, is based on my

experience as the senior Air Force civilian official representing the Secretary of the Air Force in the exercise.

Though the Air Force is not a cabinet department, it did have during the year of transition the largest share of the federal budget, \$26.2 billion, and, next to the Army, the largest number of personnel of any department, 1.2 million (335,000 civilian, 865,000 military). Accordingly, a report and evaluation of the transition in the top civilian management of this vast executive organization in FY 1969 should be of particular interest to management educators.

Certain basic problems were encountered throughout the period of the 1969 transition, and a complete solution to some of them is not yet at hand. Several major problems were posed:

1. How to effect an orderly transfer of management information, skills, and know-how.
2. Development of guidance in required qualities of leadership needed for continuing desirable programs and in initiating new ones to fulfill the department's roles and missions.
3. How to develop a greater understanding of interagency, White House, and Congressional relationships.
4. What should be done about high-level officials who are in competitive Civil Service jobs but whose attitudes and abilities do not meet the expectations of a new administration.

First, let us look for a moment at the background and authority for the 1968-69 transition. On 9 September 1968 Charles S. Murphy of the White House staff wrote the head of each executive department that "the President wishes that necessary steps begin now in order to meet the objective that each outgoing official of your agency plan to do for his successor those things which will assist in a smooth and orderly transition." He cited the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 as the authority for "the orderly transfer of the executive power."

Mr. Murphy's memorandum continued: "Such a transition requires careful advance planning," and "each agency will have the major responsibility of briefing its own in-

coming management." His memorandum further directed the head of each agency to prepare "Transition Materials" on the following subjects:

- Agency mission and statutory authorities
- Basic organization and functions
- Budgetary and financial information
- Key personnel
- Significant interagency relationships
- Significant intergovernmental relationships
- Legislative processes and problems
- Policy and program issues, priorities.

In addition, Mr. Murphy indicated that each new appointee needed information on the following:

- Arrangements for taking office
- Personal policies and administration
- Internal communications
- Program operations and administration.

Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, at his staff meeting on 23 September 1968, discussed his views on transition with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and expressed his hope that transition planning could take full advantage of the experiences in 1953 and 1961 and anticipate as many of the needs of the incoming administration as possible. He requested each Military Department Secretary to designate a senior civilian official to consult with his Special Assistant, George M. Elsey, on coordinating transition planning among all major Defense components. Mr. Clifford further instructed each Departmental Secretary: "Your representative will also be responsible for supervising the preparation of the essential briefing materials to enable a new administration to obtain rapidly a grasp of organization, functions, personnel relationships, programs, and problem areas." In addition he stated: "Our planning must insure that the Department continues to operate with the absolute minimum of disruption and that the new senior personnel entering the Department have been given every opportunity to become acquainted with their responsibilities and obligations."

Air Force transition planning

In response to Secretary Clifford's request,



Melvin R. Laird is sworn in as Secretary of Defense by Chief Justice Earl Warren, 22 January 1969.

on 25 September 1968 Dr. Harold Brown, Secretary of the Air Force, designated me, as the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, to be "the senior Air Force civilian official" for the Department of the Air Force in the 1968-69 transition. I promptly assembled a staff to assist me, and we launched into this effort with enthusiasm. I named Lieutenant Colonel Maurice L. Mullen of my staff as executive assistant for the project and obtained the services and assistance of knowledgeable civilian and military officials throughout the Secretariat and Air Staff.

During the remainder of September and the months of October and November, we assembled, classified, evaluated, and put together in three volumes the basic materials called for in the White House memorandum and Secretary Clifford's instructions. From time to time we attended transition confer-

ences under Mr. Elsey's guidance at the Department of Defense level, comparing progress in each of the military departments. We kept Secretary Brown and the Chief of Staff, General J. P. McConnell, fully posted on our exercise and obtained their advice and suggestions. We had complete cooperation from all echelons of the Secretariat and the Air Staff in preparing, evaluating, and presenting our materials.

By 21 December we completed our basic project, composed of three transition volumes on the following subjects:

Volume I—*Key Positions*, together with job descriptions, biographies, and pictures of incumbent senior officials.

Volume II—*Personal Information*, such as appointments, pay, promotion, assignments, separations, retirements, conflict of interest, honors, ceremonies, and protocol matters.

Volume III—*Departmental Organization and Subject Issues*, including functional statements, authorities, roles and missions, priorities, budgetary processes, procurement and contracting, operations and logistical support, interagency and Congressional relations, and a wide variety of individual issues and answers called "The Shopping List."

Next, we asked each of the incumbent Presidential appointees in the Secretariat and the principal Air Staff officials to examine the transition volumes and offer suggestions for improvement and refinement. Each one complied with great care and full cooperation.

By Inauguration Day, 20 January 1969, we had our transition materials in final shape and were ready to welcome aboard the new leadership team. The new Air Force Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, Grant L. Hansen, was the first to arrive and begin his transition indoctrination. On 15 February, the new Secretary, Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., took his oath. By the following June we had our full set of new senior managers on board.

Since the new managers came to the Secretariat over a period of four or five months, we had sufficient time to present the transition materials to each one and brief him on the contents, receive questions and furnish answers, and set up orientation visits to project offices and air installations. The real management lesson learned by all of us who participated in the 1968–69 transition exercise is that advanced management planning and programming do pay substantial dividends and insure that the Department continues to operate with an absolute minimum of disruption during a period of transition.

In evaluating the usefulness of the Air Force transition experience, Mr. Hansen stated in a letter dated 17 March 1969: "As I take over the SAFRD office, I wish to express my appreciation for the most excellent job which you, your people and contributors have done in providing for my indoctrination. The transition material has been of outstanding quality and coverage. It has hit hard at both general coverage and identification of major and urgent matters."

Much was learned by all who were a part

of this transition exercise that will help in improving management techniques, methodology, and materials next time. Some of our indoctrinees felt that a better job could be done to adapt the vast store of transition materials to the individual needs of the incoming man, in light of his background and experience and his future duties and responsibilities. Others suggested that we cut down on the volume of descriptive detail; spell out abbreviations, acronyms, and number designations; develop a better compilation of reference data on Air Force and other military aircraft, missiles, and systems; and present more pros and cons on subject issues and more light on "gritty" issues.

By and large, the new Air Force executives handled their new tasks and responsibilities with professional skill. Within a few weeks after their arrival, they were in the midst of serious decision processes and were answering probing questions from Congress and the public media for which they were better prepared than if they had not had the benefit of the transition exercise.

analysis of major problems

To return to the four major problem areas in the 1968–69 transition, I feel that a very creditable job was done in meeting the first three: the orderly transfer of management information, skills, and know-how; guidance in the required qualities of leadership; and development of greater understanding of interagency, White House, and Congressional relationships. However, as to the fourth problem area, that of blending senior careerists with new administration managers, I feel that we have not yet found the best formula for this mix.

This problem is certainly not a new one. In fact, David Stanley, in *Changing Administrations*, published in 1965, says:

More difficult and controversial is the question of what to do about high-level officials who are in competitive civil service jobs but whose attitudes or abilities do not meet the expectations of a new administration. The whole matter of tenure and flexibility of



Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird administers the oath of office to Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., as Secretary of the Air Force on 15 February 1969. Mrs. Seamans observes the Pentagon ceremony as her husband is sworn in.

assignment in higher federal civil service raises difficult dilemmas of equity and efficiency . . . To make a long story short, the present situation is not satisfactory, and there must be some revision of civil service laws and regulations so that department heads have more freedom to replace or reassign higher civil servants without depriving them of career tenure, reducing their status and pay, or destroying their prestige.

Mr. Stanley's comment on the 1961 transition applies to the 1969 transition as well. In fact, the problem is still very much with us at the top federal executive management level.

I know that the U.S. Civil Service Commission is genuinely concerned with this dilemma. In a recent briefing presented to the Federal Executive Group in Washington, Seymour S. Berlin, Director of the Commission's

Bureau of Executive Manpower, stated that there have been complaints from several new Presidential appointees that senior careerists are not sufficiently responsive to the policy guidance of the present administration and are frustrating their new managers. He reports that the question is often being asked: "How can we insure that bureaucracy reflects public policy expressed through the political process?" His observations reveal that the new political managers tend to believe that careerists are "locked in" and are often identified in the minds of the new management with the past administration's programs.

Mr. Berlin indicated that the Commission now has a study in depth under way in this problem area and that their findings thus far indicate the need for an overhaul of the Fed-

eral Executive Assignment System, involving changes in law and regulations, which will provide:

- A simplified and integrated executive personnel system.
- A new compensation system that will allow more flexibility in the supergrade pay structure.
- A new system for entry into and retention in the career executive group. This could involve a contract period extending for stated periods, e.g., five years, with renewal contracts on an annual basis.
- A new system that gives executive managers more flexibility to appoint, reassign, and remove supergrade careerists.
- A system for more effective overall and agency planning.
- A single source to provide executive branch overview and leadership.
- Effective career management programs.

Mr. Berlin's probing search for desirable and workable remedies is indeed timely and promising. How far he and the Civil Service Commission, under the able leadership of Chairman Robert E. Hampton, will be able to design and implement a resolution of this dilemma is a question that is hot on the Washington griddle. All of us can well foresee stiff headwinds and roadblocks that any substantial effort will encounter in moving toward better management and utilization of senior careerists throughout the federal organization.


This challenge, I feel, is our greatest and most significant piece of unfinished business from the 1968-69 transition period. Its resolution will require our best professional talent and know-how both in and out of government, from academia, industry, and the private sector. Those who are deeply concerned with this issue must have the courage and foresight to press on with the task before it is too late.

Hq United States Air Force



EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

COLONEL VINCENT J. KLAUS, U.S. ARMY



A NEW Air Force Regulation 178-4 has recently been published that establishes policy for output measurement/management indicator systems.¹ The regulation, which implements a Department of Defense directive, merits the attention of managers of all services. Its implementation should promote the spread of urgently needed output information for the Air Staff and the Department of Defense.

Developing the Defense budget requires the tailoring of worldwide military commitments to the parameters of available resources. The Congress is faced with an even greater responsibility. That body must weigh each military request against those developed by the other federal departments to insure that the nation receives maximum benefit for its tax dollars. The most popular form of analysis today is to divide the budget into component parts in order to permit a closer examination of the resources required.

Such subdivisions, however, rarely provide better visibility into the program objectives. One of the results of the new regulation will be to assist budget review at all levels, up to and including the Congress, by providing better information on the output side of the equation. If all the implications of a trade-off decision are to be appreciated, detailed explanations of costs must be matched by comparable explanations of objectives or output.

The Department of Defense, in general, enjoys an excellent flow of input information. By all indications it is the output side of the input/output equation that urgently requires improvement. To support this statement a news release dated June 26, 1969, might be offered as evidence. It originated with the

Congressional Subcommittee on Economy in Government, of which Senator William Proxmire is Chairman, and contains the following reference to output information:

. . . with Federal spending accounting for nearly 20 percent of total national production, we must focus on major outputs and objectives. We must begin asking what our expenditures will accomplish and whether or not the accomplishment is worth the cost.

For most of the appropriation decisions which the Congress makes, there is little or no indication of who gains and who loses and even less knowledge of whether or not the expenditure program is producing more than it is costing. A budgetary process which operates with so little information and in such a haphazard fashion is not a rational system.

Other evidence of the need for improved output information can be found in modern accounting literature. In a recent article Dr. Lennis M. Knighton² first establishes his purpose:

. . . One of the most fundamental and important concepts of accounting is the "matching" concept, for it is precisely from this concept that the whole system and practice of accrual accounting derives its justification and importance. In commercial accounting this concept is generally interpreted to require a matching of revenues with the expenses incurred to produce the revenues.

Dr. Knighton then clearly describes the problem in government accounting:

. . . Determining the benefits to be matched with current expenses is undoubtedly the most difficult problem in governmental accounting; for the ideal measures of benefits are not the services or products produced but the results of those services or products.

In the same article he provides an excellent example of the type of output information he is recommending:

. . . For example, effectiveness in highway construction would be difficult to assess with anything other than engineering measures and statistics; and the effectiveness of highway programs must necessarily include statistics reflecting changes in the number of accidents, dollar losses of property, personal injuries, deaths, average speed of vehicle movement, number of vehicle miles traveled, etc. Likewise it is impossible to evaluate the effectiveness of health programs in the absence of medical statistics and measures, or of welfare programs in the absence of sociological, psychological, and economic data. Certainly not all of this information can or ought to be accumulated through the accounting information system, but it all must be related to the information that is available (or should be) through the accounting process. Some information may be gathered in a systematic way through other processes; some may be available only through special surveys or statistical testing; and some may be available only as the product of an expert opinion or professional judgment, as is often the case in health matters, for instance. But until and unless such standards are developed and such information is available, it will be impossible either to articulate objectives, to exercise meaningful control over operations, to measure the results of operations, or to evaluate the effectiveness of performance.

This type of information, its collection and utilization, is the subject matter of Air Force Regulation 178-4. The task of collecting this information is a formidable one and will require all the assistance the new regulation can offer. An example is the difficulty encountered in measuring the output of Defense organizations. They perform a multitude of tasks, and each type of performance has its peculiar output. The difficulty in measuring the output of a unit is indicated by some of the complicating factors:

—An organization's output can be measured by actual performance and by the maintenance of a capability to perform.

—An organization may have only a few major outputs but several "hidden outputs."

—Current output measures are nonstandard vary greatly in quality and usefulness from user to user, and have no established basis for comparisons.

An examination of the impact of the new Air Force Regulation on these factors confirms the opinion that a good deal of progress toward improvement may result from that regulation.

The distinction between actual performance and maintenance of a capability to perform was established by DOD Directive 7000.4, "Output Measurement Systems," 13 April 1968, and is also contained in the new AF Regulation. Accordingly the first complicating factor is more widely accepted than the others. Perhaps a useful example may be found in the major outputs of a supply depot and of a Minuteman squadron. Most of the outputs of the former are tangible, quantifiable, and easily adaptable to managerial manipulations such as quality control, trend analysis, cost analysis, and many more sophisticated analytical methods. The major output of a Minuteman squadron is the maintenance of a capability to perform, within parameters of time and effectiveness. One instance of measuring the capability to perform would seem to be the Joint Staff's FORSTAT ratings of C-1, C-2, C-3, or C-4. Superficially, these ratings would appear to reflect a unit's capability to perform, but a more detailed analysis by air staffs will be required before they can be accepted.

The new regulation provides a workable set of criteria for evaluation of existing measures and development of new measures. Paragraph 5 states that output measures

. . . must therefore possess the following characteristics:

a. A plausible relationship must exist between activity as measured by the indicator and the resources consumed;

b. The output measure must not be synonymous with resources consumed;

c. The output measure must be meaningful to managers and stated in simple, direct terms;

d. The output measure must be programmable and available from bonafide data sources;

e. Output measures selected must permit aggregation of data to program element level

with reliability and meaningfulness.

The second complicating factor, "hidden outputs," does not mean literally hidden, but rather obscured, overshadowed by the more obvious outputs of a unit. These obscured outputs may consume a sizable portion of an organization's resources but are omitted or, at best, rarely included as output information flowing from the organization. Their existence explains many of the inconsistencies that appear when cost is matched with output over a period of time. Increases in the visible efficiency of an organization may in fact be due to increased productivity, reduction of waste, etc., but may also be due to a reallocation of resources. When a unit is pressed by higher managerial staffs to decrease its costs of production in relation to its output, it may accomplish this by diverting hidden or unreported outputs to the major output under analysis. As an example, a military unit can improve the ratio of cost to output of "short tons shipped" by reallocating resources from hidden outputs as well as by increased efficiency. Upon careful analysis it may be found that maintenance, or material surveillance, or some other hidden output was cut back or held in abeyance until the pressure was off.

Such diversion of resources may well be justified by the emergency and therefore may represent sound managerial action to insure accomplishment of an important task. The flaw exists in the fact that senior staffs, well removed from the organization, are not aware of the diversion and tend to credit the increase in output (without an increase in input) to improved efficiency or, most likely, to elimination of "fat" in the organization's budget.

When measures developed in response to the new regulation are matched with accrued costs, these diversions should become obvious. The measures defined in paragraph 6a of the regulation, "Organizational Products," should indicate that the increase in one product was accomplished at the expense of another. However, complete visibility does require accrued costs for the matching process. Will they be available? An article by Carl W. Tiller of the Bureau of the Budget promises

that accrual accounting will be a reality in this fiscal year.

[To] the [same] extent to which this matching of accrued costs with organizational products occurs, identification and observation of hidden outputs will also be possible. Whether or not such detailed matching will occur and at what levels of command it will be used is, at this point, highly speculative. Forecasting is a hazardous pastime but certain observations can be made with a comfortable degree of assurance. Given, that accrued costs become available and that organizational products are identified, the matching process appears inevitable. Managers will, by the nature of their responsibilities, seek ratios such as cost per unit of output. This increased visibility of a unit's performance will just as naturally lead to analysis of production and of changes in product/resource ratios thus leading to identification and observation of a much more complete list of outputs.³

This should permit identification and observation of hidden outputs in the near future.

Thus the accrued costs combined with the output measures developed as a result of the new regulation will make possible the matching concept described by Dr. Knighton.

As to the third complicating factor, that a unit's output often changes with its assignment, Department of Defense organizations may be assigned tasks never envisioned by the staff that designed them. In adapting themselves to unusual missions, the units curtail or lose other capabilities. Dependent upon the time spent in an unusual configuration, it may take days or weeks of retraining before the unit regains all the capabilities it was designed to possess. This should not be construed as criticism of extraordinary assignments. Indeed, the flexibility of a military unit is one of its most valuable attributes. However, when such assignments are made, senior staffs must receive usable information concerning the effects of the assignment on the unit's ability to perform all of its designated tasks. How can a staff, separated geographically from the unit, determine what capabilities the unit has or to what extent degradation will occur? It appears that three things are required: an easily referenceable

listing of what the unit is expected to be able to do; a means of assessing and expressing the unit's present capability in relation to the listing; and a means of transmitting this information.

At the time of this writing, the Air Staff has under development a Unit Capability Measurement System that promises to meet all these requirements and more. The development of output measures in response to the

new regulation will provide needed groundwork for the Unit Capability Measurement System or whatever follow-on system is selected by the Air Staff.

As to the last factor listed (that the measures in use vary from user to user), in a good deal of the output information being collected within the department today enough variation exists to confuse the issue whenever output measurement is discussed. A portion of the OSD staff that has been faced with this problem for some time informally developed the classification system shown in accompanying tabulation. The system serves to orient and explain objectives and to form a base for discussion. It was perhaps the best tool at hand to use in explaining what was available and what was wanted.

With the publication of Air Force Regulation 178-4, a new spectrum of definitions becomes available, as shown in the following excerpt:

Classifications of Output Measures. The types of output described and recorded by various organizations fall at different points along a spectrum. The output of an organization may be described by:

a. Organizational Products which describe what is produced by an organization for external use or effect. For example, number of engines repaired, amount of ordnance delivered.

b. Benefits to Another Organization, i.e., products of one organization expressed in terms of benefits received by other organizations. For example, adequacy and quality of repaired engines as received by operating units, tactical assistance resulting from ordnance delivered.

c. Benefits to Society or Contributions to the National Objective which are at the top of the scale and translate organizational output into social or national goals. For example, program element output measure, unit capability, economic indicators.

NOTE: Different users describe outputs at different levels on this spectrum according to their requirements. In general, outputs at the lower end of the spectrum are more readily expressed in precise or quantified terms; those at the higher end may be difficult or wholly impracticable to describe in precise terms.

OSD Classifications of Output Measures

A good deal can be said about the quality and usefulness of an output measure by using the five classifications defined below.

Class	Type of output represented
A	<i>External benefits.</i> Products of one organization expressed in terms of benefits received by other organizations. Examples: adequacy and quality of repaired engines as received by operating units; tactical assistance resulting from effects of ordnance delivered.
B	<i>Organizational products.</i> Description of what is produced by an organization for external use or effect. Examples: number of engines repaired, amount of ordnance delivered.
C	<i>Evaluated work measures.</i> Description of levels of activity in terms reflecting efficiency and effectiveness through application of engineered, historical, or postulated standards. Example: earned man-hours.
D	<i>Levels of activity (unevaluated).</i> Number of man-hours used or units of work performed. Examples: number of overtime hours worked, number of square feet covered, number of personnel trained (without precise definitions of "work," "cover," or "train").
E	<i>Reclassifications of cost information.</i> Sometimes permits output information to be inferred. Examples: number of personnel assigned, number of activities managed, number of dollars obligated.

Although there are similarities, the set of classifications in use by the Air Force is the only approved and documented one. Accordingly, it provides stabilization and standardization to the classification problem. The importance of standardized categories will be most appreciated by people working to develop output measures.

The Air Force is the first service to

respond formally to Department of Defense Directive 7000.4, and this response promises to make a major contribution to the general state of the art. The regulation should initiate actions that will not only improve Air Force managerial systems but also contribute, by knowledge and example, to all other services, indeed to the federal government as a whole.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

Notes

1. Air Force Regulation 178-4, "Air Force Output Measurement/Management Indicator Systems," 11 September 1969.
2. Lennis M. Knighton, "Performance Evaluation and the

Matching Concept in Governmental Accounting," *The Federal Accountant*, September 1969, pp. 95-103.


3. Carl W. Tiller, "Why Accrual Accounting?" *Defense Management Journal*, Summer 1969, pp. 29-31.

Acknowledgment

For this article's lead-in photograph the *Review* is indebted to Colonel Clifford Eugene Raisor.

A LOOK AT RACIAL POLARITY IN THE ARMED FORCES

MAJOR GEORGE M. BOYD



AT PRESENT, many problems confront the military establishment and the nation. In my view, the most pressing national problems are the defense of the nation, the feeding of the poor, and the upgrading of minority citizens. Note the order of priority, national defense being first. While it is obvious that we have defended the nation in the past and shall always continue to do so, we have not always applied a commensurate effort to feeding the poor and upgrading minority groups. These latter two problems are compounded by the great number of people involved: statistics indicate that there are more poor people in the United States today than ever before.

Where does the military stand on these subjects? First, the Department of Defense has the most equitable policy of any agency within the government. Remaining vestiges of discrimination are rapidly being eliminated. But the Defense Department has primary responsibilities that prevent its taking a more active role in general social improvement. As a consumer of national resources itself, it is hard pressed to contribute substantially to poverty programs, civil rights moves, or other internal civic actions. There is one notable exception: law and order. The Department of Defense is called upon to assist municipal and state governments in the maintenance and restoration of law and order. This is a proper role for the military and includes helping in rescue operations, disasters, and other emergencies.

Its good record and past achievements aside, the military is directly involved with existing problems facing the nation. In fact, some aspects of those problems exist within the services. In a recent statement, L. Howard Bennett, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Rights, said:

There are problems within the military that we must tackle... but there is a new dimension to the recent troubles. They represent a spill-over from the problems of the civilian community. . . .¹


As a direct result of the national urban crisis, the military is faced with the problems

of racial conflict or, to be more specific, the polarity of races. The most serious aspect is that of black versus white. The blacks have been promised equality for many years; now they demand more positive action toward fulfillment of these promises. Their cry is not without justification. Growing unrest has been evident in the military among the younger troops, not all of them black. This is important to note, since it indicates that many people are aware of social injustices to both black and white.

basic minority problem

Some idea of the magnitude of the problem facing the minority group may be gained from the accompanying comparison of incomes of the minority and majority groups based on education levels (Figure 1). It is apparent that the minority group in the United States is far behind. Knowing the problem should be an incentive to find an equitable solution. This is not to suggest that we in the service should compromise our responsibility to our mission. However, just as we need intelligence to carry out a combat operation, we need to know the problems of the minority group if we are to cope with them in terms of compatible military environmental conditions.

Figure 1. Statistics on median family incomes in 1966, by years of school completed and color. (From Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1968)



There is one thing "going for us" in the military. It may not seem important, but persons of equal grade receive equal pay. This is not necessarily true in civilian life. With an "edge" like that, our problems are not nearly as acute as those in the civilian community. Because of this edge, the military has traditionally been an attractive vocation for minority group members. The income, combined with the fair play and integration within the armed forces, has long made the military uniform a status symbol for members of the minority.

new attitudes

In recent years, however, there has been a decided change in attitudes of the minority groups toward the military services. For example, one black officer is reported to be resigning his commission because of alleged discriminatory policies and practices. This is a serious matter. The cost of his West Point training is one obvious consideration; but the fact that racial polarity has caused an officer of the minority group to take such a drastic step cannot be ignored. The following is an extract from a newspaper interview:

... the Air Force has been unfair to me personally and to Negroes in general ... it will be up to the Air Force whether it accepts or rejects my resignation ... I don't expect any complications, I think they will be glad to get rid of me ... the Air Force is not sensitive to the problems of Negro officers and men ... I have decided to give up 14 years of service which I began as a cadet at West Point ... I felt that I could overcome the bigotry of rating officers by my hard work ... my record indicates that I haven't gotten credit for what I should have gotten credit for.²

Obviously, now is the time for the Department of Defense to look at its personnel policies in light of the problems in our contemporary society. The Secretary of Defense, The Honorable Melvin R. Laird, stated it quite simply when he issued a plea to military men to "reject divisive and fragmenting forces and influences in our society which seek to diminish the integrity, unity and

strength of our armed forces. We must not permit any irrelevancies of race and color, nor any other factor, to divide and weaken us."³

The Secretary's remarks are timely. He was speaking of the racial polarity in the armed forces. He called upon every commander "to provide the leadership that will continue to translate the policy of equal opportunity into living and meaningful reality for every man and woman serving in our nation in the uniforms of the armed forces."

The Navy has taken a big step in its appointment of flag officers. Navy Secretary John H. Chafee wants admiral selectees to be honest enough to tell the whole truth, the bad as well as the good. In a letter to the flag board, he called for leaders "possessed of especially wide-ranging, innovative, perhaps even radical-thinking minds." It appears that Secretary Chafee wants officers who will recognize the problems of people as well as those of hardware. It takes courage to promote innovations that cope with problems of racial polarity and national defense in the same environment.

In a lecture to the Naval War College on 4 March 1969, Howard T. Robinson, a Foreign Service officer, asked the question, "Are our institutions flexible enough?"

Can our military establishment meet the challenge of how to attract young men into the services? Can we inspire our servicemen, black and white, to behave better at home and particularly overseas? Or will it be necessary to dismantle the existing institutions and replace them with something else? At this point we can bring into sharp focus the question, "Are our institutions flexible enough? ... Until recently we thought of poverty, student unrest, and violent demonstrations as a product of undeveloped societies. We now witness that our young people, students, the Blacks, and the poor are stridently confronting our society and our institutions ... Foreign nations, both our friends and our adversaries, will continue for some time to think "Why haven't you made your constitution live as you said you would?" ... I do not think any of these nations doubt our military or economic powers. Our adversaries see our disturbances as a desirable weakness, one to be exploited."⁴

responsibility of the military

As military commanders and staff officers, ours is an all-encompassing task. The challenge before us was stated by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on 31 July 1969:

Last October we asked all of our major commands to submit ideas for things the Air Force could do to help solve the problems that confront our society . . . The outcome was a comprehensive report to the Secretary of Defense and the subsequent establishment of a DOD Domestic Action Council in April 1969 . . . Whereas the Council can develop major programs for DOD-wide implementation, we in the Air Force must exercise initiative to help solve domestic problems at the community level where we live and work . . . We must continue to seek ways to improve environments in which Air Force people live and work; we must strive to assure equal opportunity within the Air Force; and we must seek to influence the changes affecting our nation so that they may be constructive . . . With encouragement and leadership, our people will respond. Their initiatives and enthusiasm are essential to success of the Domestic Action Program. I ask that you provide that leadership and your personal support.⁵

This challenge requires a total commitment in thoughts, words, and actions. It is obvious that if our men have confidence in our judgment and sense of fair play, our military job, regardless of what it is, will be easier. If for no other reason than that, a little understanding goes a long way.

Achieving this understanding is within a commander's role. After all, part of the leadership responsibility of the officer corps is to know and understand *all* American people. It is to the advantage of all officers to learn as much as possible about the minority people under their jurisdiction. Commanders, whether black or white, must consider the viewpoint of all the ethnic groups represented among their men. In essence, they must communicate.

Moreover, each officer must realize that he reacts to his personal feelings, prejudices, and political environment. I am not suggesting that our commanders and other officers are unfair or that they make decisions detri-

mental to the military system. I am suggesting that they are human beings subjected to the same mass-media projections as other American citizens. To be fair and honest with each man is more difficult when all of a man's background and rearing are dictating courses favoring emotional bias. This dilemma makes it necessary that there be a system to minimize this agonizing personal reaction and to promote fair decisions.

What can be done?

What can the individual officer or non-commissioned officer do while accomplishing his mission as a military man? Is there a program of constructive contribution that will help solve these problems? Past experience indicates that much can be done. I would like to propose several actions that have been quite successful in promoting understanding. It is noted that aggressive programs will engender some additional effort and possibly some criticism. The very existence of this kind of uninformed adverse reaction indicates the need for such a program. Accomplishments in this area require courage, careful planning, and a dedicated attitude.

To begin with, a commander himself must be attuned to constructive change. As General Jack J. Catton, Commander, Military Airlift Command, has said:

In future years you're going to be associated with a society totally integrated which actually does measure people by ability, regardless of race, color and creed. That's new, even though the Constitution was written many years ago. If you're not attuned to changes like that, you're not going to properly and effectively lead the young people who are the product of contemporary America.⁶

Commanders and most other officers and supervisors have ready access to many people and officers capable of assisting them.

The first step a commander or supervisor might take is to find out just what the rights of military personnel are. The legal officer is more than willing to keep people informed of these rights. A commander must divorce his political convictions from his military man-

agement. The job he has is an incredible responsibility to citizens of 50 united states and does not permit mental reservations about any of these citizens. An officer who knows the law will find that many decisions have already been made for him. To a busy commander this is a welcome respite.

A commander must advise his people of their rights. I have found that if our people know they can go to Congress for help and if we as their commanders tell them of this right, there will be less tendency for them to do so. We must be sincere, for lip service is easily detected.

Another key man in combating the racial polarity problem is the information officer. Through his contacts with civic leaders, news media, community organizations, etc., he has an opportunity to know the prevailing attitudes of the community. He serves as a valuable link in the chain of communications between the military and the public.

There are many other agencies capable of providing assistance. For example, each military installation has an equal opportunity employment officer for both military and civilian personnel. The military personnel officer and the civilian personnel officer are experts in their fields and can also help. The manpower and management engineering officer is helpful. He can prevent manipulation of authorizations intended to circumvent the equal opportunities guaranteed to minority group members or to serve other special interests. The inspector general can advise on specific questions and clarify the do's and don'ts of the DOD equal opportunity program.

base-community relations

The Base-Community Council is the best two-way street available for establishing goodwill. I suggest that at least one member of the staff representing the commander on the council be from a minority group. He should be someone who is a good contact in the minority community. If I were a base commander, I would want to know what is going on there. It is possible that there might be confrontations with local citizens in which military

forces would be brought into play. A good contact in the neighborhood can be of immeasurable value. If adverse attitudes are known, it is easier to make contributions to the positive aspects of community life. One good gesture might make the difference between a peaceful confrontation and a riot. We must keep in mind that what affects one side of town affects the entire town.

Assistant Secretary of Defense Roger T. Kelley has said:

I think we have to admit that some of the same racial tensions that explode in the civilian sector also explode in the military when people aren't busy doing a common job . . . I don't think we know the scope and the seriousness of this problem in the services today . . . We've been fire-fighting . . . Firefighters go down and hear what people want them to hear . . . Yes, we have a problem, but we'll solve it. . . . [Kelley believes he has to get people of all races and backgrounds together to "eyeball" it and find out what the real problems are. He wants to assemble teams of people, white, black, Spanish-American, and Indian] . . . people who have insight into the racial problem to discuss it.⁷

the chamber of commerce

The chamber of commerce is one of the military's best friends. After all, a local military installation represents a sizable income to most cities and almost the total income to several. Commanders should work with the neighboring communities and seek their cooperation; it may be needed. Some federal laws are in conflict with state or local customs affecting race relations. When this is the case, commanders must insist that federal law be upheld. Failure to do so condones the divisiveness that Secretary Laird mentioned. To stand up and be counted is an occupational hazard. Most commanders have been in combat, yet some of them back down when asked to fight racial injustice at home.

If racial polarity in the services is to be truly eliminated, we, as commanders and officers, must make a critical self-appraisal of our actions in several important areas: military discipline, effectiveness reporting, etc.

military discipline

What kind of military program prevails on base? Are members of minority groups allowed to do pretty much as they please, while strict discipline is required of members of the majority? If so, divisiveness is once again encouraged. It should be obvious that each service member's obligation is the same. He must present a proper military appearance and meet his obligations until he is separated from the service. Are members of minority groups rewarded for doing outstanding or superior work? In several instances, minorities have been told that they have to work twice as hard as their white equivalents because they are black or of other minority racial origin. If we let this type of situation continue, we are again encouraging divisiveness between the races.

effectiveness reporting

What are the promotion opportunities for black servicemen? The fact that more young black officers are entering the service is good, but what does the future hold for these men? While 9.4 percent of the total military personnel are black, there is not a proportionate number of black officers and NCO's on active duty spread throughout all grades. The blame for this situation cannot be placed entirely on the poorer quality of education received by black servicemen. The case of the West Point graduate referred to earlier demonstrates this. No matter what the reasons for this disproportionate spread may be, the method of achieving it is clear: comparatively low effectiveness reports.

How are minority group members rated on APR's and OER's? Do we give them truly objective ratings, while giving our friends and other favored persons inflated superior ratings? If so, we are defeating many of the objectives set for us as leaders. Failure to recognize outstanding accomplishments and capability is poor leadership. Although each officer in a command position would emphatically deny that he was a party to such actions, what cannot be denied is the scarcity of minority group members in the field-grade and general-

officer ranks of the military. Unless raters and commanders insure that objectivity is applied to everyone in the rating system, more drastic corrective measures may be necessary. If the military is to be a place where equal opportunity is a fact of life, a quota system to insure a proper and equitable mix by rank according to military population ratio may have to be established. As objectionable as quotas are, they do insure opportunity.

Certainly, education is one of the keys to solving the entire problem of racial polarity. Again, as commanders and officers, we must appraise our own behavior in this area. Do we take full advantage of our education program? Do we read extensively? Have we read of black contributions to American history? Can we look at our black officers and men and relate them to the glorious American heritage which history accords them? What about Mexican Americans? Do we know about Indians who fought on the side of America? If we haven't done at least some reading in these areas, we are not living up to our responsibilities as commanders. Each commander should direct his officers to read about minority Americans so that they will be able to lead the men who are descendents of those who have contributed to the defense of our nation. (I have proposed a Historical Reference Agency for the Department of Defense to help lead the way to interracial understanding. I have been informed that the implementation of the agency is not feasible; however, the Department is putting more emphasis on the accomplishments of minority members of the military establishment as they continue to make their contributions to our heritage.)

Minority troops should be encouraged to get all the education they can while in the service. This will have the far-reaching effect of presenting more capable individuals to society upon completion of their military obligation.

In an article published in the February 1969 issue of *Air Force and Space Digest*, I indicated that part of the polarity problem involves the "heritage gap."⁸ Basically I believe that much of the misunderstanding in the military services stems from lack of knowl-

edge. Whites do not know enough about blacks; therefore, it is difficult to dispel stereotype images and cultivate true respect. Furthermore, blacks do not know enough about themselves, since most of their orientation is toward white America. In this climate it is difficult to exercise command and provide effective leadership. It is one of the most serious challenges facing our nation.

Each commander should find out what minority personnel, especially officers, of his command have to say on the subject. Minority group members should be asked for proposed solutions to the various problems. Naturally, solutions should be solicited from other personnel as well, to insure that the final solution is the best possible remedy to the problem.

If a commander has senior black officers in his command, he should seek their counsel. They have lived through much in the past three decades, and, if asked, they can assist in many ways. For example, I know of a Defense Department project concerning housing to which a senior black officer offered policy assistance, based on his many years of service. His letter was unanswered, his offer disregarded. The project proved unsatisfactory, though it could have succeeded. Another instance demonstrates how many good points can be made for the armed forces by asking minority group members for assistance. Here is a letter written from a small Midwestern town:

I just wanted to express the thanks for our Chamber of Commerce again for your most interesting talk to our Ladies night dinner. How well you handled the gal at the dinner who felt that her son, who joined the reserves to avoid actual duty if possible, should be receiving more pay. I suspect that she secretly felt that a white Private should receive more than a Negro [officer].

Because this community has no Negro residents, I was doubly delighted when I received your picture. There is much ignorance and bigotry to be overcome in all communities, and this one is no exception. Certainly your presence here with your lovely wife helped dispel a small part of this blight upon our land.

It is the efforts of men like you who will make our country really great, and we who hide

in our security appreciate your courage more than you know.

principles of war

The war on poverty, divisiveness, racial polarity, and national instability requires our attention just as much as our military obligations. Even though the military mind has been attacked in recent years, I am convinced that it has a lot to offer our confused society. This will probably be a thankless effort, but many people will applaud our attempts to improve our nation. As military men, we have the capability to make a unique and effective contribution to this war: the application of the traditional principles of war to this new war on poverty, divisiveness, and racial polarity. Textbooks say that a principle of war is a fundamental truth governing the prosecution of war. We can gain more insight into the solutions I have recommended by approaching them with the principles of war in mind.

Objective. The principle of the objective states that "all efforts must be directed toward a clearly defined decisive and attainable goal." Obviously the objective in the current war is to make a contribution to the improvement of our national welfare without jeopardizing or compromising our military mission. Within our capability to exist in the various communities and ethnic groups influenced by the probability of military activities, there must be definite parameters established within which we may contribute effectively. In essence, our objectivity must be considered in terms of what we are capable of doing.

Offensive. The principle of the offensive states that "offensive action is necessary to achieve decisive results and maintain freedom of action." Our war on contemporary social problems requires that we take the initiative. This can be construed as enlightened self-interest. If we improve the social climate of our military area of influence, we improve the environmental conditions necessary to our military operations. We are in a position to select the place, the time, and the means for our contribution to the improvement of contemporary society.

Simplicity. Simplicity is "a quality or state of being clear and uncomplicated." If we organize our staffs and determine what lines of communication—including the language and the symbols—will best serve our purposes, we will have achieved the simplicity characteristic of an efficient operation. To attain this simplicity, it may be necessary to solicit the assistance of those staff members who are experts in their fields, as previously discussed.

Unity of Command. The principle of unity of command states that "the decisive application of full combat power requires unity of effort under one responsible commander." Contributions to our contemporary society will reflect the administrative policies, procedures, and techniques of the individual commander. It will be possible to measure his image by how effectively he leads in the fight against social unrest, disruption, and other problems confronting both military and civilian citizens.

Mass. The principle of mass requires "the achievement of superiority of combat power at the critical place and time for decisive purpose." The critical time and place occur with every instance of divisiveness revealed to us as military men. This principle requires much more of us than halfhearted actions taken on the pretense that because we are doing something we are doing enough. All available facilities, service support, skill, resolution, discipline, courage, administration, and leadership must be devoted to what apparently will be a long-contested engagement.

Economy of Force. The principle of economy of force requires "the allocation of available combat power in such a manner that all tasks together achieve results effectively." Now this means that we must concentrate our efforts in sufficient strength and in such a manner that all of our actions are cohesive. It implies that we must carefully consider the apportionment of military forces and other resources available for this purpose so that accomplishment of our primary military mission will not be impaired.

Maneuver. The principle of maneuver states that "one's military resources must be po-

sitioned to favor the accomplishment of the mission." The advantageous position of the military in American society has already been noted. To further upgrade the quality of the military community, the community mix must be examined and clear-cut objectives sincerely communicated, to place the "enemy" (the fighters for status quo) at a relative disadvantage. Thus we can achieve results that would otherwise be more costly in men and material.

Surprise. Surprise connotes "striking the enemy when, where, and in a manner for which he is unprepared." Obviously we must be prepared to implement bold and innovative plans which are within our capability and which will best serve our purposes in our respective spheres of influence. Surprise in this struggle may include some of the principles of psychological warfare and may very well be daring. It appears that the timing of our campaign to eliminate divisiveness should be appropriate to the local situation.

Security. Security is "essential to the preservation of combat power, and through security we retain freedom of action." Again, this suggests that we must maintain our vigil to prevent compromise of our first order of business, which is the defense of the nation. Within the framework of this principle, our efforts to upgrade contemporary society must not interfere with freedom of military action.

Mere knowledge and understanding of the principles of war or principles of management or any other principles will not provide the solution to every problem. In the final analysis, sound judgment and common sense are of vital importance to the successful accomplishment of our objectives.

IT SHOULD BE obvious that the unfortunate business of racial polarity is part and parcel of our society. There are solutions to the problem. Our obligation as members of the Department of Defense and as citizens of the United States demands that we do all in our power to combat anything that would weaken our national welfare. In the words of Secretary Laird:

We must maintain harmonious, cooperative working relationships among military personnel so as to maintain high morale, military effectiveness, and combat readiness. . . . Much remains to be done, and it is to this task of removing every vestige of discrimination that I give my personal commitment.⁹

The challenge, as I see it, is to meet the problem head on. We must not be hesitant

about healing the wounds of divisiveness between the races. If our nation suffers internal strife, everybody suffers. We of the military must unite; we must work together—all of us: black, white, yellow, red, tan, or brown. We must communicate, talk about our mutual problems, and find solutions. We must—before it's too late.

McConnell AFB, Kansas

Notes

1. "Military Weighs Racial Friction," *Wichita Eagle*, Wichita, Kansas, 18 August 1969.
2. "Negro Officer Submits Air Force Resignation," *Wichita Eagle*, Wichita, Kansas, 8 October 1968.
3. Melvin R. Laird, "Plea to Military Men," *Air Force Times*, 21 May 1969.
4. Howard T. Robinson, "Are Our Institutions Flexible Enough?" *Naval War College Review*, XXI, 9 (May 1969), 62-67.
5. Letter to Major Air Commands from Chief of Staff,

USAF, "Support of Department of Defense Domestic Action Program," 31 July 1969.

6. Jack J. Catton, General, USAF, "A Personal Concept of Command," *Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders*, AFRP 190-2, Number 3-1969, p. 22.

7. "Racial Strife Probed," *Air Force Times*, 27 August 1969.

8. George M. Boyd, Major, USAF, "Filling the Military's Heritage Gap," *Air Force and Space Digest*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (February 1969), pp. 49-51.

9. Laird, "Plea . . ."

Acknowledgment

For this article's lead-in photograph the *Review* is indebted to Technical Sergeant Francois B. Rolling.

Military Affairs Abroad

SEATO'S CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERSUBVERSION

MAJOR JOEL J. SNYDER

THE fifteenth anniversary of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in September 1969 was a crucial one. Critics of the alliance have continued to assail its usefulness. Manila newspapers have predicted that SEATO's break-up was imminent, or at least that its prospects were questionable.¹ Even in Thailand, the host country for SEATO headquarters, some have expressed doubt about its value. A few United States observers have also raised their own objections to SEATO. The United Kingdom and the United States policies of withdrawal from Southeast Asia have fed the pessimism about SEATO. The SEATO Secretary General, Lieutenant General Jesus M. Vargas, remarked to an American Chamber of Commerce meeting in Bangkok that the greatest immediate concern to free Asians was the tendency in the Western world to turn homeward. He noted that "one-time strong and determined allies... were gradually pulling out of the Asian scene."²

Despite SEATO's well-known weaknesses and asserted diminishing potential as a defensive alliance, nearly all of the eight member nations—Australia, Thailand, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, France, United Kingdom, United States—continue to solidly endorse the organization. At the May 1969 Council of Ministers meeting in Bangkok and again in the fifteenth anniversary ceremonies, member nations' representatives spoke strongly in terms of SEATO's continuing role in collective security and economic and cultural endeavors.

The question that remains about SEATO is simply why it continues to survive despite its limitations. The Manila Pact, the basis for the organization, does not provide for specific actions by member nations to meet the common danger, nor does it explicitly recognize that an attack on one is an attack against them all, as does the North Atlantic Treaty. There is general recognition that an armed



attack would endanger peace and security and that each member in that event will "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." Besides a relatively weak treaty basis for SEATO's mutual defense structure, differences in national policies among SEATO participants are another limitation. Over the years the mutual interests and attitudes of some of the members have become increasingly divergent. The military participation of France and Pakistan has been marked by a reduction of commitments, though both still pay their annual civil and military dues. After 1963 member nations found it necessary to modify the principle of unanimity. A more flexible arrangement now provides that a majority vote of five may adopt a proposal of the Council, provided there is no negative vote. Those who abstain are not bound by the decision.³ Consequently, while France and Pakistan do not fully participate, neither have they cast negating votes against the decisions of the other members. After the Laotian crisis, the Rusk-Thanat communiqué of March 1962 allowed bilateral and national defensive measures of the U.S. and Thailand without the prior agreement of all other parties to SEATO. This individual application of the treaty obligations has been generally accepted by other members.⁴

The sum total of the general language of the pact and charter, and of subsequent working-level and international interpretations, has been to reduce the treaty constraints or commitments to a matter of national self-interest, enlightened though it may be. A lack of supranational commitments was reflected in the internal structure established by the treaty. In the beginning there was no decision-making authority within the organization to deal with SEATO matters, and there was a minimum of formal coordinating machinery. The position of the Secretary General and the Military Planning Office were not established until 1957.⁵ The Council is structured to provide for consultation, and it meets monthly. Representatives are the member nations' ambassadors to Thailand and an official from the Thai Foreign Office. In SEATO each represents his own country, obviously, and not exclusively

a multilateral agency. A routine decision authority has evolved in the Permanent Working Group (PWG), which meets weekly to consider SEATO business. While PWG members negotiate and coordinate their national interests in relation to SEATO, any matter of significance is referred through the Council of Ministers to the national capitals for resolution.

The military aspect of SEATO continues to exist because it serves the national security interests of its members. It is a multilateral defensive organization in consonance with other bilateral and trilateral security agreements. Through SEATO the Asian and southwest Pacific partners have an assurance of the Western members' interest in their strategic defense. From another viewpoint, the Western nations have the assurance that their strategic resolves are reasonably acceptable to the Asian and southwest Pacific partners. In short, it is a mutually beneficial treaty relationship that reflects the international realities which exist between Asian and Western-oriented nations. The key to understanding SEATO is, therefore, to understand the relationships between its members—the great powers, Southeast Asian nations, and the southwest Pacific members.

The SEATO strategies of collective defense and mutual security were stimulated by the loss of China to Communist forces and the Korean and Vietnamese wars. In 1954, faced with continued adverse developments in Asia and especially Indochina, Thailand requested United Nations observers along its Mekong River borders with Laos. This proposal was vetoed by the Soviet Union.⁶ Secretary of State Dulles proposed a "united action" to oppose the enemy on the ground.⁷ The British were reluctant to support joint military actions in face of the impending Geneva conference, so joint military actions were set aside for Indochina. Dulles's plans for a security pact for Southeast Asia were stimulated by Thailand's initiative in early 1954 during the Indochina crisis. The outcome of the Geneva Convention and apparent unwillingness of the Communists to abide by its terms probably increased United States concern over further Communist expansion into Southeast Asia.⁸

SEATO's defensive purpose has been to

deter further expansion of Communist powers. A corollary purpose has been to support greater Asian participation in regional and multilateral undertakings. Against these defensive objectives, critics have noted that SEATO failed to respond with resolute defensive measures against the threat to Laos in 1961 and to South Vietnam since 1964-65. These episodes are sometimes offered as evidence that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization has failed its purposes.

Such criticism rests upon a restricted view of SEATO's objectives. Concerted military action by standing forces under a unified command would be appropriate to NATO but not to SEATO. None of the requisite structure exists within SEATO to make such a response possible, nor was it intended in the design of SEATO. The United States itself was not in favor of a unified military command and standing force at the Manila conference.⁹ The defense commitment of the charter, to act in accordance with Constitutional processes, was a language formula consistent with all the other defensive treaties between the United States and Asian nations, including Australia and New Zealand. But there were no provisions requiring a member nation to take specific actions in the common defense of the members. SEATO's purpose, like other U.S./Asian defense treaties, has been to help justify the Asian presence of Western strategic defense capabilities while not limiting unduly Asian and Western powers' military responses to aggression. Thailand's Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, bluntly recognized this situation when he stated that "... no treaty can bind any sovereign nation." He considered that treaty partners would carry out their treaty obligations only if their national interests coincided. The provision for "constitutional processes" he labeled an escape clause.¹⁰

Despite the lack of compelling formal commitments, within the broader frame of their mutual self-interest SEATO members have taken common measures to provide for their defense. The troop deployment to Thailand in 1962 was characterized as a response to Communist offensives toward the Mekong River valleys in Laos. Members also have con-

tributed to South Vietnam's defense. Though the national forces have acted outside formal SEATO control, each participant has generally recognized that its contributions were in support of obligations to the SEATO treaty. The United States has claimed that SEATO provided the legal treaty basis for the massive aid given to South Vietnam. Secretary of State Dean Rusk cited SEATO as the source of U.S. legal authority, in Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee hearings in January-February 1966.¹¹ The SEATO response to South Vietnam was in compliance with the pact, since South Vietnam, as a treaty protocol nation, had requested assistance in meeting Communist aggression. One critic concluded that the United States was committed in Vietnam by the SEATO treaty because it chose to be, whereas Britain, France, and Pakistan did not so choose.¹² It is possible that France and Pakistan received no invitation to participate from the government of South Vietnam, the necessary prerequisite to a legal SEATO commitment. There were special reasons for the United Kingdom to take a neutralist position as co-chairman of the Geneva Accords. Nevertheless, the U.K. encouraged the commitment of the other members of SEATO.

An important instance of SEATO's broad purpose applies to Thailand-United States relations. The mutual defense aspects of American presence in Thailand have been consistently related to the SEATO treaty. The Rusk-Thanat communiqué of March 1962 placed the SEATO commitment alongside bilateral economic and military assistance agreements with Thailand as an important basis of United States actions to aid Thailand's defense.¹³ In May 1969, at the SEATO Council of Ministers conference, Secretary of State William P. Rogers stated that the Rusk-Thanat communiqué was a valid restatement of SEATO responsibilities. President Nixon's press release from Bangkok during his summer 1969 Asian trip reiterated the American pledge to support Thailand. In discussions with SEATO Secretary-General Vargas, President Nixon was understood to have offered reassurances regarding future United States support for the organization and presumably its member nations.¹⁴

FIFTEEN years of existence is evidence of SEATO's success. Internal subversion and insurgency have been opposed—effectively in the Philippine Republic and with increasing impact in Thailand. The credibility of SEATO's deterrent influence is recognized even by its critics, and no doubt by Communist China itself.¹⁵

While it would be claiming too much to assert that SEATO is the best alliance that could be developed for Southeast Asia, it does possess two salient advantages. First, it provides a convenient vehicle for representing the regional defense interests of Asian members. Second, its consultative, nonauthoritative structure is acceptable to the domestic political interests of Asian nationalists. These features might be all that is either desirable or possible in the Asian multilateral defense arena.

A comparison of the regional groups that have paralleled SEATO in the 1960s reflects common limits in their compulsion to organize. Nearly all have occasional ministerial council meetings, embryonic working groups, and generalized objectives. None offers more than a forum for developing cooperation along lines of mutual national interests, and some have not lasted beyond their initial meetings.

The most recent organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), replaced the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and ASA's stillborn predecessor, MALPHINDO (short for Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia). ASEAN machinery includes annual meetings, a standing committee in the Foreign Ministry of the host country, and plans for other specialist groups that may be formed.

Another reasonably successful group is the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), formed in Seoul, Korea, in 1966. The original purpose of the Korean sponsors was an anti-Communist defense alliance. However, the ASPAC that emerged is only a political forum for social and economic objectives. There is a standing committee, but it lacks any permanent secretariat.¹⁶ Various specialized centers are also being established, including an Economic Cooperation Center in Bangkok and a Social-Cultural Center in Seoul. In a recent press

interview the Thai Foreign Minister characterized ASPAC as "unlike SEATO . . . but a looser confederation of Asian nations seeking and learning the value of cooperation."¹⁷

The several new organizations and conferences among the Asian countries demonstrate a growing cohesion and desire for regional programs. The struggle to shape the identity and form of the various groups closely imitates the early experience of SEATO as it established its permanent secretariat and military advisory mechanisms. It is pertinent to recall that SEATO also evolved from a small unit supported by Thailand's Foreign Ministry. So far most of the new groups have begun to develop an associated structure much like the civilian side of SEATO, which suggests that the consultative approach is acceptable and suitable to Asian regional affairs.

The new groups have been reluctant to include military or defense matters. The proposed defensive purpose of ASPAC was softened because of resistance from Japan particularly, although Australia and New Zealand also originally opposed the ASPAC defense objectives out of deference to SEATO.¹⁸ No other recent Asian-founded association has even pretended to further multilateral defensive purposes beyond the language of general aims and principles. It is unlikely that the infant regional associations will develop effective military defensive institutions in the near future. This avoidance of military aspects leaves the current field to SEATO for regional mutual defense, limited though it is. It implies also that from an Asian and Western point of view SEATO provides a satisfactory arrangement on the issue of regional defense alliances.

In my opinion, a loose conference-type association of military allies without a formal structure might be started around the SEATO foundation. This overlapping group could expand SEATO's consultative feature beyond the treaty members to other countries with mutual interests. Political and military coordination in defense planning and intelligence could involve other countries in a loose, semi-invisible association.

The regular SEATO Council meetings in recent years have provided an opportunity for

a separate consultation among the principal nations contributing forces to South Vietnam. These meetings were established by the 1966 Manila conference among the seven troop-contributing countries. Until 1970 they were hosted by whichever SEATO member was hosting the Council session, and they followed that session but with South Korea and South Vietnam in addition to the five SEATO allies participating in South Vietnam. A recent meeting of troop-contributing countries followed the SEATO Council Ministers' annual conference in Bangkok in May 1969. According to Bangkok press reports, the problems of ending the war in Vietnam and maintaining peace in Southeast Asia were topics on the agenda.¹⁹ Future development of this kind of political-military association will undoubtedly be gradual and unforced by its participants.

Although SEATO membership is more limited than might be desired, it does include strategically essential countries. The ANZUS partners (Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) are gaining importance as the remaining Western powers after the United Kingdom withdraws its Far Eastern forces by 1971. France has not participated in military activities for several years or attended SEATO Council meetings since 1967.

No Western power could operate effectively in Asia without the support of Asian countries, to provide logistical bases and supporting manpower. Thailand and the Philippine Republic are essential from this aspect. Thus the five key countries that would be crucial to a successful military defense of Southeast Asia—namely, Thailand, Philippine Republic, Australia, New Zealand, and United States—are already aligned in SEATO and are cooperating in South Vietnam. This strategic relationship is well understood in Asia. During the Fourteenth Council Meeting in Bangkok, 20–21 May 1969, the Ministers spoke directly to the issue. The Australian representative noted SEATO's special role in the international cooperation of the region and stated, ". . . we in Australia place considerable reliance upon SEATO and on what it represents to our own security."²⁰ Carlos P. Romulo, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, commented on

SEATO's inherent defects and restraints, but he also concluded that

the many instances of actual collaboration . . . could not have been possible were it not for the singular commitment made by the United States, symbolized by SEATO to defend the region from any aggression. . . . SEATO has, therefore, provided the minimum framework within which the relatively defenseless nations of Southeast Asia could get on with their plans for development, and ultimately to become responsible for their own security.²¹

Speaking even more plainly, SEATO Secretary General Vargas told the Council meeting that "no security alliance can hope to succeed without the active participation of an established world power." Asians, he said, should develop their defenses in collaboration with the powers of the free world. To put the strategic issue in simple terms, he said: "I have yet to see an American President who is prepared to take the view that American presence, power and influence are not necessary in containing communist aggression in Southeast Asia."²²

The strong testimonials of the members indicate that SEATO will continue to influence the regional development of Asian countries. As a pattern of multilateral undertakings and as the "minimum necessary vehicle for great-power defense commitments, SEATO has served an essential purpose that will remain relevant in the foreseeable future.

A CENTRAL issue in the current debate over SEATO is its potential adaptability to future conditions. The present situation in Southeast Asia has changed significantly since 1954. A post-Vietnam environment will offer new possibilities for progress and change. There are new challenges for regional groups to consider and new alignments between participating countries. Moreover, in the wake of British withdrawal policies, the United States has begun the phasing back of its major military forces in the region. Under these new conditions SEATO will have to adjust to survive, especially if it is to offer essential mutual defense advantages to its members.



Foremost in affecting SEATO's future is the changing nature of the threat. Several years ago a major danger was from conventional attack by Communist China, as in the Korean War. With the Vietnam War, subversion and insurgency have become a more real danger than overt invasion to the Asian countries.

The Communist threat has also employed a softer thrust of aggression using government-to-government relations. Communist organizations engaged in overt and covert revolutionary activity are active in Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, where normal political relations and trade go along with subversion. Since 1965, when Lin Piao called for widespread "people's wars," Communist China's policy has more openly supported subversion and insurgency in Southeast Asian countries. Secretary General Vargas remarked that "after the Vietnam War, insurgency will be the greatest danger facing all free countries in Southeast Asia," and he said that he would ask the SEATO Council to invite other non-Communist Asian countries to participate

with SEATO members in joint efforts to meet the problems of Communist-supported insurgency.²³

As Council Ministers considered the new challenges facing SEATO in 1969, they called for greater emphasis on countersubversion, along with political consultations and economic cooperation, to meet the new Communist tactics. Some, like the Australian Minister, expressed deep concern about Communist subversion and insurgency. Other delegates called for efforts to adapt the organization to the new nature of the threat. Secretary of State Rogers suggested that SEATO's assets should be turned toward countering subversion.

The words, perhaps more ardent than in previous Council meetings, were not a unique departure from SEATO objectives in the past. At SEATO's inception, the treaty articles had paid some attention to the threat of subversion, although these references were vague and limited like the measures for dealing with overt aggression. Nevertheless, SEATO Council



The American presence in Southeast Asia is closely related to the mutual defense aspects of the SEA Treaty Organization (SEATO) and is reinforced in Thailand by the bilateral economic and military assistance agreements expressed in the Rusk-Thanat communiqué of March 1962. . . . Thai nationals (opposite) man the guard towers at Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base. . . . Thai troops, with their Special Forces advisers, approach a village suspected of being under Viet Cong domination. . . . Villagers trek to a cooperative dispensary for medical attention by USAF medics.

representatives had been directed, as one of their first tasks, to arrange an expert study group on combating subversion. The Council at its first meeting in Bangkok in February 1955 stated that "subversion and infiltration constitute a serious threat to the peace and security of the area." Both the British and Philippine governments reported to the Council on measures they had taken against subversion within the treaty area.²⁴

At Karachi, Pakistan, in March 1956, the Second Council Meeting noted again that Communist tactics were placing increasing reliance on infiltration methods, and SEATO members were asked to place priority on regional cooperation and joint action in countering subversive activity.²⁵ The first seminar on countering Communist subversion took place in November 1957 in the Philippines. A second followed in February 1960 at Lahore, West Pakistan. Other efforts were also taken in the early sixties to make SEATO more effective in dealing with the subversive threat. An expert study group in 1961 recommended that a per-

manent office be established in SEATO to identify and assess specific problems of insurgency in the treaty area. Among other measures, SEATO staff organizational terms of reference were to be reviewed for adequate attention to the importance of countersubversion work. The military advisers also directed the Military Planning Office of SEATO to study what military plan assistance could be provided to support countersubversion objectives.

A Special Assistant to the Secretary General was set up in 1962, along with an expert staff and a Committee of Security Experts, composed of delegates from intelligence and police agencies, to assess and exchange information on the nature and extent of the threat of Communist subversion.²⁶ This group, now called the Intelligence Assessment Committee, holds semiannual meetings to assess the Communist subversive and insurgency threat in the treaty area.²⁷

SEATO's Information Advisory Group conducts regular ad hoc meetings on regional information programs, including the nature and

exposure of Communist propaganda. The group is chaired by the Public Information Office Director, who maintains liaison with the Special Assistant on exposure matters. The SEATO Public Information Office produces both written publications and radio programs aimed at offsetting Communist subversion. The Research Office collects materials and focuses on Communism in the treaty area.²⁸ In addition, SEATO has produced or is making several training films, including one on Malaysia made in 1963, one concerning Thailand entitled "Border Lands," and three others intended eventually for a regional audience.

The Council meeting of 1966 was a benchmark of progress in SEATO's countersubversion programs. Strongly endorsing the Secretary General's efforts to assess and identify Communist insurgency threats, the meeting was followed by new attention and assistance for countersubversion by member nations. The present SEATO administrative budget for countersubversion and related economic, informational, and cultural programs has become about six times larger than the funds spent for military planning.²⁹ The main accomplishment of the expansion of SEATO into countersubversion has been to provide advice and arrange assistance among member governments for the countries with a subversion problem.³⁰

A third countersubversion seminar, this one on internal security in rural areas, was conducted in Quezon City, Philippine Republic, in June 1968. The meeting was significant because of the attendance of experts from South Vietnam, South Korea, and the International Institute for Rural Reconstruction, along with SEATO members (except France and Pakistan). It reflected a growing regional interest among neighboring countries faced with similar insurgency problems.

The Second Expert Study Group, which convened in early 1969, not only studied the subversive threat in the Philippines and Thailand but also reviewed once again SEATO's effectiveness in countersubversion, in light of the need for an overall regional effort and SEATO's role in developing a broader countersubversion objective.

The SEATO-sponsored Community Devel-

opment Program suggests a possible avenue for such a regional activity. A seminar on community development in 1965 recommended that a director for this specialized area be added to the Secretary General's staff. In 1967 the director was appointed. A goal of international exchange of community development experts was realized when the Philippines and Thailand participated in the first such program in 1969. Besides the exchange visits and tours, overall study and training effort was carried on at the SEATO-Thailand Regional Center in northeast Thailand. Aimed at assisting community development committees mainly from Thailand, the center also provided a decentralized focus for the visiting experts to discuss new approaches and innovations in community and rural development.

Although the center cannot be characterized as an Asia-wide organization for community development training, it has already functioned satisfactorily as an outpost for integrating community development at the regional level and as an institution to provide technical services, such as research and evaluation, field training, and exchange among its participants.³¹ It has the potential for a broader role in this key countersubversion activity. Such a SEATO expansion will depend, of course, on Thailand's willingness as well, but to date the Community Development Center has had a profound impact on Thailand's training plans and on the betterment of the local villagers in its vicinity. The visiting experts strongly urged that SEATO's community development exchange program be developed and expanded in the future. With SEATO assistance, an international seminar on village development and security was held in Bangkok in March 1970, under the auspices of the government of Thailand. Participants from ten countries, including four non-SEATO members (Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and South Vietnam), met for six days to discuss various aspects of countersubversion.

Although SEATO's countersubversion study and information activities have grown, a less impressive record has been achieved in providing material assistance to countersubversion projects. Only a modest start has been

achieved. Since 1965 the United States, Australia, and other donors have provided project assistance through SEATO to the Asian members for countersubversion purposes or to directly related rural development activities. The Hill Tribe Research Center in Chiang Mai, north Thailand, has become a key element in developing essential knowledge about the hill tribes that are being subjected to Communist infiltration. Australia has supported the establishment of three technical training schools for the Royal Thai Armed Forces, the latest one a Motor Mechanics School that began in March 1969. Other assistance has included radio and broadcasting transmitters for northeast Thailand, civic action projects in the Philippines, donation of vehicles and audiovisual equipment to Thailand's Communist Suppression Operations Directorate, and the Secretary General's provision of \$18,650 to aid in Thailand's hill tribe evacuation and resettlement programs. While these activities are neither large nor relatively expensive, they establish SEATO as a channel for material help to the countries having insurgency problems. Along with the study programs under way, this aspect of SEATO's countersubversion role could get bigger and more significant.

WILL SEATO ever be sufficient to deter effectively the subversive threat to Southeast Asia? SEATO's critics have suggested that its role to date in combating insurgency has been limited and less successful than it has been in deterring overt war.³² The issue of SEATO's future effectiveness requires an understanding of what could be done in the countersubversion area, compared to SEATO's potential.

An essential premise about countersubversion is that the responsibility to deal with it belongs to the affected nation. The security threat is small, even though aimed at the weakest and most vulnerable parts of the target society. Multilateral military deployments are not an appropriate remedy. Rather, a flexible mix of economic, social, and security programs is required, and these must suit the

conditions peculiar to each circumstance of subversion. These situations need thorough analysis and study, including consultation between donor and recipient countries, to develop the best countersubversion program, one carefully designed to support the indigenous capabilities. Large-scale aid—as in South Vietnam—is now being recognized as less appropriate to the early stages of insurgency, when SEATO might be called upon for informational help, expert study, or limited, specialized kinds of material assistance. Other domestic or international restrictions will probably prevent future large increases of direct assistance beyond those measures that are now in existence or that can be introduced multilaterally through the SEATO Council.

Because the threat of insurgency is against the internal structure of a country, neither bilateral nor multilateral assistance can provide a quick or inexpensive remedy. Countersubversion programs require nationally and regionally based social and economic development programs as well as village-level security forces. Against this complicated need, the kinds of response that major powers could make in the future will be more restricted than at present. Military aid and advisory assistance are expected to be reduced along with large-scale economic grants. The result will probably be a threat demanding more resources for solution than could be generated in the troubled nation or than major allies would be willing to provide. On the other hand, there is increasing support for regional and international associations as avenues for providing technical assistance or limited aid to specific programs. SEATO could develop its ability to channel multilateral help to a member nation in need, and SEATO's experience in Thailand proves that it is possible. SEATO may also develop informal mutual interests with other regional groups such as ASPAC or ASEAN, thus enhancing its flexibility to provide a broadly based response. Such a possibility was implied in May 1969 by the Thai Foreign Minister, when he called for "political consultations" among the various associations' members.³³

A modification to the organizational struc-

ture of SEATO may be required to better realize its potential for countersubversion activities. Whether a new working-level staff will evolve from existing Secretary General or Military Planning offices cannot be predicted. Nevertheless a moderate strengthening of SEATO in this vital area is generally recognized as desirable. The Council Ministers indicated their nations' support for such a development. The resulting structure will undoubtedly remain consultative and designed to allow maximum

national initiatives. In the Asian environment of embryo regional groups faced with a diffuse and concealed threat of insurgency, SEATO could well develop another forerunner feature in multilateral activities. Its achievement of the countersubversion measures that are possible and successful could indicate the new shape of Asian regional security measures in the decade ahead.

Hq Pacific Air Command

Notes

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3. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, *Manila Pact and Pacific Charter*, SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok, Thailand, 1968.
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13. *Department of State Bulletin*, XLVI, 1187 (26 March 1962), 498-99.
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21. Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, "What They Said: Extracts from Opening Statements," *SEATO Record*, VIII, 3 (June 1969), 12-13.
22. Lieutenant General Jesus M. Vargas, Secretary-General, SEATO, "Two Top Men Spell Out SEATO's Vital Role on the Chessboard of Asia," *SEATO Record*, VIII, 3 (June 1969), 24.
23. *Bangkok Post*, 23 April 1969.
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25. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-25.
26. Fifield, p. 135.
27. Jesus M. Vargas, *SEATO Report: 1966-1967*, SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok, p. 15.
28. Fifield, p. 136.
29. Interview with Paul Eckel, Special Assistant to the Secretary General, SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok, 21 February 1969.
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31. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
32. Miller, pp. 60-61.
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In My Opinion

AIRLIFT—A TIME FOR CHANGE

COLONEL LESTER R. FERRISS

TODAY there is a Military Airlift Command, but it is *the airlift command* in name only, not in fact. There are other airlift units outside the command, and within MAC itself its efforts and energies are diluted by its responsibility for supervising functions that are no more directly related to airlift than to other USAF principal missions. These nonairlift organizations are the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS), Air Weather Service (AWS), Aerospace Audio-Visual Service (AAVS), and Aerospace Cartographic and Geodetic Service (ACGS).

While these units are receiving somewhat limited supervision, planning assistance, and support from a MAC staff that is primarily—and rightly so—oriented toward resolving airlift problems, it is paradoxical that elsewhere in the Air Force there are major and significant airlift units: in the Tactical Air Command, in the U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and in the Pacific Air Forces. Some have opined that these airlift units in nonairlift commands receive about the same emphasis and management as the nonairlift services do in the Airlift Command.

If the organizational anomalies described had no measurable effect on our military efficiency and strength, any discussion would be academic; but it is my thesis that the fragmentation of airlift roles and missions results in duplication, overlapping, unnecessary redundancy, and blurring of responsibilities. My present purpose, therefore, is to voice an appeal for change in the management of our nation's airlift capability: change toward a single functionally oriented force. This appeal has been made many times in the past decade—in the Congress,¹ in the Pentagon,² in various studies. But each time it has been rejected or set aside to await further study and evaluation.

The duplication and blurring of responsibility begin at the highest USAF management level, the Air Staff, where responsibilities for airlift functions are split, divided, and at times fragmented among a number of staff agencies, most notably the Airlift Division, Directorate of Operations, DCS/Plans and Operations, and the Directorate of Transportation, DCS/Systems and Logistics. Here in the inner workings of the Air Staff is reflected the continuing struggle between airlift as an operational capability

(represented by the Airlift Division, Directorate of Operations) and airlift as a transportation resource (represented by the Directorate of Transportation). Since it is both³ and is so used, dependent upon the requirement, consideration should be given to combining these Air Staff functions. Precedent was established with the organization of the Special Assistant for Strategic Mobility in the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At the major command level there is duplication, with airlift planners and experts in MAC, TAC, USAFE, PACAF, AFLC, and others. Only in MAC is airlift the principal mission. In the other commands the voice of airlift is often weak and seldom heard or heeded. Nevertheless, all the staffs expend varying amounts of manpower and resources on formulating policy, plans, and procedures for airlift tactics and techniques; combat control team doctrine; air transportation systems; design and operation of passenger and air freight (cargo) terminals; aeromedical evacuation systems; compilation of airlift data through sophisticated machines and computers; and a myriad of other functions related to airlift and its uses and application.

In field operations the duplications—or, even worse, the omissions because of blurred responsibilities—are more dramatic. One terminal may be operated by MAC according to MAC policies and guidelines, another by AFLC according to AFLC policies and guidelines, or by PACAF, or by USAFE. And seldom are any two operated in the same way, or are manpower and work standards the same, or is documentation exactly the same (although much has been done to standardize documentation).

Maintenance and support of expensive and sophisticated materials handling equipment (part of the 463L system) differ, depending on the using command's emphasis. (In this regard, implementation of the 463L system has been slowed and hindered by multiple command responsibility for its development and design.)

The efficient use of personnel resources also is hampered. It is conceivable—and it has happened—that in an overseas area a decrease in airlift workload results in a temporary overage of personnel at one station while another,

with an increased workload, has a shortage; but because the air terminals and related functions are operated by different commands (MAC vis-à-vis USAFE or PACAF) there is no way to realign the resources in a timely manner. The same problem sometimes develops in the use of equipment, in the use of facilities, and even in the use of aeromedical evacuation crews.

WHAT is the answer? The simple—and to counter critics, overly simplified—solution is to make the Military Airlift Command the one true airlift organization. Just as we have a Strategic Air Command, an Air Training Command, an Air Force Logistics Command—all with relatively straightforward and homogeneous responsibilities—let us have a command that is responsible for all airlift, and only for airlift. Only three actions will be necessary:

- First, strip away from MAC the technical services of ARRS, AWS, AAVS, and ACGS. These services (like the Communications Service and the Chart and Information Center, both once part of MAC) do not need to be assigned to MAC; they would increase in stature by becoming autonomous.⁴

- Reassign to MAC the so-called tactical airlift resources and responsibilities of TAC. The former distinction between “tactical” and “strategic” airlift has been erased; the artificial command structure delineation should also be erased. Both MAC and TAC have combat airlift missions. Both work on a daily basis with Army units in furthering combat missions.⁵ The duplication of effort should be eliminated.

- Assign to MAC the resources and responsibility for operating the overseas airlift systems in the Pacific, Europe, and other theaters. These systems, including aeromedical evacuation, should be managed by MAC but in accordance with requirements established by the theater commanders. Airlift should be the servant of the theater commander; his requirements should dictate the system to be established, but airlift experts should supervise its operation.

With these three actions I believe we would achieve a single integrated airlift organization not only capable of fulfilling the current military airlift needs of the nation but also capable of planning a single organization for fulfilling future needs, one that will reduce if not eliminate the wasteful practices and inefficiencies resulting from the present duplication of effort and fragmentation of responsibilities.

Counterarguments will be posed, many of which have been heard before. I shall mention only four of them, with my rebuttals.

1. MAC would be "too big," the airlift organization would be bigger than most of the users to be served.

I need only point to AFLC; it serves all commands, and its size is not cited as objectionable.

2. Different ideas from different commands create a "healthy" situation and contribute to progress.

Responsible and productive debate is always desirable, but not the kind that results in duplication and waste. Two Strategic Air Commands have not been needed to stimulate ideas for our strategic striking capability.

3. The Airlift Service Industrial Fund (ASIF) under which MAC operates is cumbersome; it complicates and even inhibits the use of airlift.

Granted that the ASIF is anathema to many military personnel. Yet it is noteworthy that not all airlift operations have to be under ASIF. Further, a quote from the original Mr. Airlift, Lieutenant General William Tunner,

puts the industrial fund concept in proper perspective:

The . . . Airlift Service Industrial Fund is unique to a war-ready military force. But it is an *administrative funding device only* and should not be permitted to becloud the true nature of MATS' reason for being . . . (Emphasis added)⁴

Any industrial fund concept should accommodate to the needed airlift organization; the airlift organization should not be structured to accommodate to industrial funding.

4. Theater commanders should have their own airlift, under their control, to use as required.

As indicated earlier, there is no argument with the "as required" part of this. The airlift force can and should be established to meet the needs of the theater commander, but it should be operated by airlift specialists. Theater and USAF component commanders do not "own" their strategic bombing capability, their air rescue capability, communications service, their weather service, or many other theater resources that are part of a specialized command.

OTHER arguments will be advanced, some specious, some valid. But on balance I am convinced that consolidation of the nation's military airlift forces is desirable. Parochial views and vested interests should be set aside, and steps should be taken to establish a Military Airlift Command in the truest sense of the name. It is in the nation's interest.

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Notes

1. See, in particular, "Report of Special Subcommittee on National Military Airlift of the Committee on Armed Services," House of Representatives, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1963.

2. A review of many organization options was conducted in 1963 (completed in January 1964) by a DOD special study group, chaired by Solis Horwitz, its inconclusive report entitled "Study of Organization and Management of Military Airlift."

3. An interesting treatment of this aspect is contained in a recent article by a former commander of MAC, General Howell M. Estes, Jr., "Modern Combat Airlift," *Air University Review*, XX, 6 (September-October 1969), 18.

4. If the Air Force "separate operating agencies" would thus become too numerous, a case could be made for consolidating all into a "services command" to support the Air Force in such functions as are now performed by diverse agencies. I doubt that such a consolidation is necessary, however.

5. Those who are not aware of the scope and magnitude of MAC's involvement in what was once known as "tactical airlift" will be interested in Major General Courtney L. Faught's "Combat Airlift Training in MAC," *Air University Review*, XX, 6 (September-October 1969), 35-43.

6. Lieutenant General William H. Tunner, "Strategic Airlift," *Air University Quarterly Review*, XII, 3 and 4 (Winter and Spring 1960-61), 112.

EDUCATING THE NCO FOR TODAY'S AND TOMORROW'S AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SIGMUND ALEXANDER

SINCE the end of World War II the United States has led the world in a technological revolution unprecedented in the history of mankind. It took 43 years, from the initial flight of the Wright brothers in 1903 until 1946, to make daily scheduled passenger flights across the oceans of the world a reality. The year 1957 witnessed the first feeble Thor firings at Cape Canaveral; eleven years later a Saturn V rocket launched three astronauts to the moon, and they returned safely. The Air Force, too, has reflected great technological advances. It has gone from the C-54 to the C-5, from the P-12 to the F-111, from the B-17 to the Minuteman.

America leads the world in this technological revolution because it is capable of transforming new discoveries and techniques into new products and hardware in minimum time. Specific examples include computers, molecular electronics, synthetics, jet propulsion, and automation. One of the principal reasons the United States has become world leader is that it has large numbers of engineers and administrators capable of exploiting any technological breakthrough. The basis of this capability lies in the educational opportunities afforded by the GI Bill of Rights. Since the GI bill, higher education has become available to almost anyone who is capable and has the desire for it. Our highly complex society requires educated people and offers little opportunity to the uneducated.

The Air Force recognizes the importance of technical training and education to its NCO's, and its technical schools are among the finest in the world. Unfortunately, the opportunities for professional and formal education afforded the NCO are not on a par with those for technical education.

NCO education, like that for officers, may be considered as falling into three categories:

Technical — which is designed to train the individual for a specific skill activity, such as radar technician, clerk typist, jet engine mechanic.

Professional — which is designed to improve the individual's ability as a manager of men or materiel and prepare him for positions of greater responsibility. Professional schooling includes the base management school, NCO prep or leadership schools, and the NCO academies.

Formal — which is the education one receives at civilian institutions—high school, college, and university.

Of the three, the one on which the Air Force places the greatest emphasis is the technical. The reason is simple enough: the Air Force needs mechanics to maintain aircraft, clerk typists to handle paperwork, etc. During wartime, the programs of the technical schools are shortened, accelerated, and expanded. For example, with respect to jet engine mechanics, a new base may be opened to train them; the number of hours required to train them may be reduced, while the training itself is accelerated.

Since the need for technical training is basic to the mission of the Air Force, it is the one area which is least vulnerable to reduction. There is little debate about the need for technical training. It may be changed, it may be modified, but it cannot be eliminated.

Professional training, on the other hand, is extremely vulnerable to the changing needs of the Air Force. The results of professional training are not readily visible; by having an NCO attend an NCO academy, the Air Force does not obtain a new dental technician, clerk typist, or mechanic. How does one measure the increased potential of an NCO? The reply to this question is highly subjective and prejudiced either for or against by the evaluator's

background and experience. Under the best of conditions, only a minority of NCO's are ever afforded the opportunity for any professional education. The lack of professional training has not kept many NCO's from achieving highly responsible managerial and leadership positions. Having achieved success, many of them ask, Why have any professional schools at all?

In reality, the Air Force can exist without professional education for NCO's though not without technical schooling. However, the assimilation of professional knowledge is haphazard at best and leaves gaps in the NCO's background. The Air Force has become too big and too complex to rely on hit-or-miss exposure during on-the-job training as its principal means of professional education. Henry Ford, though he created the Ford Motor Company, came close to destroying it because he did not realize that he could not run the giant company of 1939 as he had run the Ford Motor Company when it was started in his garage. Can we in the Air Force rely on catch-as-catch-can for professional education? The P-12s are gone and we have the F-111, yet assimilation remains our chief means of professional development of the NCO corps. Professional education for NCO's must be regarded not as a stepchild but as a requirement equally as important as technical training.

The lack of NCO leadership schools is utterly deplorable. The Air Force continues to leave education of the majority of its new sergeants to osmosis, as it did in the past.

Leadership schools have been established in recent times by major air commands to correct this deficiency by providing the new NCO with basic leadership, management, and communicative skills to enable him to do what was expected of him. These leadership schools exist because the commands which they serve recognize their value and are willing to allocate the manpower and other resources to make them a reality. Their existence is in constant jeopardy, since there is no actual Air Force authorization for them. When money and resources become tight, as at present because of Vietnam, leadership schools are the first to feel the economy axe. Once closed

down, they, unlike the phoenix, seldom rise to life again from the ashes. The provision for leadership schools should be firmly established by USAF directive, which should require all commands to create and support them. This is important psychologically, as their status would no longer be in doubt.

At the present time, the most important professional education provided the NCO's is at the various command NCO academies. Their status is not entirely secure either, as evidenced by the ease with which some were closed down in the name of economy. Their existence should also be firmly established by USAF directive. Thought should be given to whether it would be advisable to establish a single Air Force NCO academy or continue with the present command academy concept. A single Air Force NCO academy could provide a uniform approach toward NCO education. Its position in NCO professional education would be similar to that of the Air Command and Staff College for officers.

The curriculum presently taught at the academies must be expanded to include courses directed toward giving students an understanding of the impact of the computer, mechanization, and automation on the Air Force and the causes and background of the sociological revolution going on in America. Understanding IBM, black power, and SDS is as important to the NCO's education as understanding SEA.

It is becoming obvious that NCO professional education should not end with the NCO academy and that further schooling is needed for the Air Force master, senior, and chief NCO's. The whole subject of senior NCO education should be examined with respect to what the senior supervisory NCO needs to know to do a better job. This is not a simple matter and will require a good deal of questioning, fact seeking, analysis, and staff work. The type of school, its location, the length of the course—all are important, and attendance at a senior NCO academy will have to become a prestigious accomplishment if it is to succeed.

Formal education for many NCO's ends with high school, a GED high school equivalency test, or a few off-duty college courses. It

would be desirable for every NCO to want to continue his formal education to a baccalaureate degree. This, however, would be contrary to human nature. Not everyone wants or is capable of achieving a baccalaureate degree. Nevertheless, the opportunity should be offered to all NCO's who aspire to it.

The Air Force's education program does allow the NCO such an opportunity. However, I believe greater emphasis should be placed on encouraging NCO's to avail themselves of educational opportunities, from the NCO's immediate supervisor to the base and wing commanders. Increased education benefits not only the NCO but the Air Force as a whole.


Technical and managerial competence are both important. Witness the fact that British

aircraft engineers are among the most competent and highly creative in the world, yet Boeing and Douglas aircraft dominate the world's commercial air. Obviously other factors played a part—possibly British management and salesmanship were not as outstanding as British engineering.

The Air Force has existed without professional NCO training and organized education programs in the past. The Air Force of the future cannot, in my opinion, continue to be the qualitative, superior organization it is today without such training.

Are we perhaps being penny-wise and dollar-foolish?

Defense Communications Planning Group



"CHE" GUEVARA'S IDEAS ON REVOLUTION

LIEUTENANT COLONEL OAKAH L. JONES, JR.

MANY historians, social scientists, journalists, and governmental officials have turned their attention to the study of Cuba during the past ten years. They have produced a staggering list of publications since Fidel Castro Ruz seized power in the "Pearl of the Antilles" on 1 January 1959. Of the hundred or so books that have appeared, only a few will be definitely meaningful in the long-range analysis of revolutionary Cuba and its leaders. Most of these recent works have been of a polemical nature and were either highly biased, inadequately researched, or largely influenced by the immediacy of events in Cuba. Balanced views and documentary studies have been all too rare.

The present book by Jay Mallin† is one of the best to appear in recent years. It is neither an emotional study nor an attempt to vindicate or denigrate its principal subject,

Ernesto "Che" Guevara de la Serna, or Cuba. The author's purpose is to present the essence of Guevara's thinking on the topics of revolution and guerrilla warfare. He achieves his goal admirably by presenting a selection of Guevara's major speeches and writings without attempting to publish everything he said or wrote. In addition, Chapter 10 presents photostatic copies of the pages in Guevara's Bolivian diary, with the author's translations paralleling them. Finally, there is an excellent heretofore unpublished account by Ciro Roberto Bustos of his experiences with Guevara's rebel band in the Bolivian Oriente during 1967. Bustos, an Argentine insurrectionary from the unsuccessful uprising in Salta and now a Bolivian prisoner, provides insights into the nature of the guerrilla activity in Bolivia, observations on Guevara's leadership (or lack of it), and an account of the daily activities

†Jay Mallin, ed., *"Che" Guevara on Revolution: A Documentary Overview*, with Foreword by Mose L. Harvey (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1969, \$7.95), 255 pp.

of these guerrilla bands before their suppression.

Mallin has made an exhaustive study of the "Number 3" and sometimes "Number 2" man of the Cuban revolution. Formerly a journalist with various periodicals, the author is now a research scientist at the University of Miami's Center for Advanced International Studies. His three trips to Bolivia (the last shortly before Guevara's death), excellent command of the Spanish language, and familiarity with a wide range of source materials enhance the overall value of this book. His scholarly approach and exhaustive study of Guevara's own words contribute to the final balance of the product.

The work is exactly what the title suggests. It consists of three basic parts. First, the author provides a thoughtful, objective introduction placing Guevara in perspective. He reviews the major known phases of his subject's life, but emphasizes the unique aspects of his thoughts, particularly the insistence that guerrilla warfare, when applied "correctly," could be pursued to ultimate victory. This concept was in opposition to that advanced by Lenin, China's Mao Tse-tung, and Vietnam's Vo Nguyen Giap. Mallin makes comparisons of revolutionary thought among these figures and further provides a general analysis of the major concepts advanced by Guevara. He concludes with a perceptive analysis of the man and the myth, comparing realities with fictional observations about Guevara. Here he notes the revolutionary's inadequate command of history and economics as well as his inability to think creatively or profoundly. Mallin notes that the reality of "Che" Guevara is one thing and the growing fiction about him quite another. Finally, he points out the irony in the fact that Guevara's image seems to appeal to people who profess hatred of war, violence, industrialization, collectivism, and bureaucracy, all of which he advocated.

The second and third parts of the book—Guevara's own speeches and writings and the concluding account of Bustos—comprise nearly eighty percent of it. Here the reader finds Guevara's speech to the United Nations on 11 December 1964, his Prologue to General

Giap's *People's War, People's Army*, his farewell letter to Castro and to his Cuban involvement, and other principal letters and published works. These documents reveal Guevara's views on guerrilla campaigns, the need for diversification and immediate industrialization in Cuba, the social responsibilities of rebel armies, socialism itself, his anti-imperialistic preoccupation, and his attitude toward the deteriorating insurrection in Bolivia. For the professional military man these chapters also depict the inadequacy of air power when employed in a conventional manner to root out guerrilla bands. Most important, however, military personnel can gain insights into the philosophy, nature, and tactics of the guerrilla concept in warfare, including the belief that popular forces can succeed against regular armies. Since Latin Americans have long employed guerrilla warfare against both invading and domestic armies, this study is a particularly meaningful one if examined carefully.

There are only a few minor weaknesses noted in the book. Maps of Cuba and Bolivia would have been very helpful to the reader, allowing him to follow the course of the revolutionary movements described in the text. There are a few typographical errors. The notes for the Introduction should have been placed at the bottom of each page instead of collecting them awkwardly at the end of the work. But these are not major detracting features, for the reasoning is generally sound and the documents well selected to illustrate Guevara's ideas.

"Che" Guevara's historical inaccuracies and contradictory thoughts are obvious throughout. His stated objection to foreign intervention and interference in the internal affairs of other countries, expressed in his speech to the United Nations, is in conflict with his promotion of Cuban interference in the affairs of other Latin American countries. In fact, his final involvement in Bolivia is one illustration of this contradiction.

Perhaps the greatest irony may be observed in Guevara's not practicing what he preached whereas his enemies did. Bolivia was a poor choice as a location in which to

launch a revolution. Guevara proved he knew nothing of Bolivian history by trying to promote an insurrection in a country that had already experienced a major upheaval in 1952 and subsequently had undertaken a program of land reform, economic diversification, and social integration. Furthermore, he repeatedly demonstrated that he knew nothing of the terrain where his forces operated, failed to show positive qualities of leadership, caused internal dissension within his bands, and failed to gain the support of the local populace. He and his followers were *extranjeros*, foreigners, dis-

trusted by the Bolivians. These fatal mistakes on his part were at variance with his earlier teachings. He even tried to regularize guerrilla warfare, which he had stated earlier depends upon its flexibility. Bolivian armed forces demonstrated that they had learned the lessons of guerrilla warfare either through formal training, advisory assistance, or practical application of guerrilla tactics in pursuit of the ever dwindling opposition movement. Thus, Guevara's original ideas may have been used by his enemies to defeat him.

United States Air Force Academy

LEND-LEASE AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS A. JULIAN

THE German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 undoubtedly created something akin to a collective sigh of relief among top officials of the United States War Department. Here was at least temporary respite from the fear that the British, who had so gallantly survived the nadir of their military fortunes in 1940, would succumb to German invasion in 1941, leaving the United States to face the awesome military power of the Nazis alone. Here, in short, was time—time to help strengthen the United Kingdom's defenses through all-out lend-lease aid, time to bring the American armed forces at least closer to the state of readiness that would be necessary to fight the global war envisioned in both the American-British staff conversations of early 1941 and the basic American War Plan, RAINBOW 5.

Since March 1941 the Administration's increasingly open commitment to support the British in their struggle against the European fascist powers (and whatever hopes it still had for avoiding direct American military involvement) had been embodied in lend-lease. Created initially to prevent British financial exhaustion brought on by massive orders for American arms, lend-lease was also the obvious means whereby similar purchases by the U.S.S.R. could be financed once its inadequate foreign exchange reserves ran out—an almost immediate situation. However, President Roosevelt, with his customary instinct for what was possible in domestic politics, moved only slowly toward extending lend-lease to the Soviet Union because of the strident opposition of isolationists, supported widely by American religious groups hostile to aiding

the "godless" Soviet government in any fashion.

The President's maneuvering both to probe and shape American opinion to favor or at least accept this move, and the interim patchwork of financial expedients he used (the secret purchase of Soviet gold being one), have been described brilliantly by Raymond H. Dawson.¹ Now, Robert Huhn Jones, Associate Professor of History at Case Western Reserve University, has written a narrative account of lend-lease to the U.S.S.R., † beginning with its foreshadowing in FDR's initial decision to aid Stalin in June 1941 and running through the end of the flow of materiel to the Soviet Union in late September 1945. For the bulk of his narrative, Jones draws together much information already familiar from published sources² as well as a small amount of new material, chiefly from the Franklin D. Roosevelt and Truman Libraries.

Insofar as Jones introduces a theme, he does so in his first chapter, in which he discusses the origins of lend-lease, citing President Roosevelt's comparison of materiel aid as analogous to a garden hose loaned to a neighbor to put out a fire; both altruistic and selfish motives come to mind, but no thought is given to remuneration. Jones sees FDR's acceptance of the "garden hose" idea and rejection of "the dollar sign" relative to lend-lease as fundamental to an understanding of how Roosevelt was to have lend-lease administered throughout the war.

Jones describes the initial uncertainties in Washington following the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the roles played by Joseph Davies and Harry Hopkins in extending the lend-lease program to the U.S.S.R. At the subsequent Moscow conference of October 1941 the Anglo-American representatives (including Lord Beaverbrook and two future U.S. ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Admiral William Standley and W. Averell Harriman) signed an agreement

with the Soviet authorities specifying the materiel to be transferred, thus translating FDR's and Churchill's desires into a formal program.

As Jones relates, the signature of this first Soviet Supply Protocol was but the beginning of an immense effort to fulfill its terms and those of successive Protocols. For there were often conflicting demands of other Allies as well as of our own Army and Navy, attacks by Nazi submarines and aircraft on vessels carrying supplies to transshipment points or Soviet ports, and immense distances and other geographic adversities.

An organization to administer aid to the Soviet Union had to be created. Soviet requirements had to be adjusted to American production schedules. Ultimately, the Persian Gulf Command, under Major General Donald H. Connolly, had to be established to provide the technical skill and services necessary to move a major portion of the military supplies through Iran. American management techniques helped cut unloading time at Persian Gulf ports during 1943 from 50 days to 18. Anglo-American successes in the Battle of the Atlantic, the opening of an aircraft ferry route from Alaska across Siberia (the ALSIB route), and improvements in cargo handling throughout the lend-lease system facilitated delivery to the U.S.S.R. between 22 June 1941 and 20 September 1945 of shipments worth approximately \$10,200,000,000, including some 14,000 aircraft.

Jones describes these developments in his first nine chapters and introduces a number of interesting points: the Protocols did not confer responsibility for delivery upon the United States; although the Soviets constantly pressed for more shipments over the sea lanes to Murmansk and Archangel, they provided no effective air cover for the convoys; and as late as January 1943, twenty-five percent of Americans polled did not know what lend-lease was!

Additionally, in the most original and interesting part of the book, Professor Jones

†Robert Huhn Jones, *The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969, \$6.95), 326 pp.

assesses the impact of lend-lease aid upon the Soviet war effort and indicates changing Soviet and American attitudes toward lend-lease from its inception almost to the present. In these final chapters, he draws upon the monumental six-volume Soviet history of the war, still little known except to specialists since not readily available in English translation.³ Jones concludes, predictably, that lend-lease shipments helped stem the German tide and boost the morale of Soviet fighting men. Like General John R. Deane, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission to the U.S.S.R., 1943-45, he stresses the contribution to Soviet military mobility of the tremendous number of trucks, jeeps, motorcycles, and other lend-lease vehicles and points to the important role that shipments of food, specialized metals, and petroleum products played in meeting Soviet deficiencies.

Jones's discussion of Soviet attitudes toward lend-lease is a traditional one, emphasizing the fluctuating Soviet attitude and amount of publicity given to American aid and the almost complete denial of its importance in the postwar era, including its treatment in the official Soviet history.

Except for these chapters, Jones makes little attempt at analysis, stating his intent was to provide an outline of a complex subject that could not be treated definitively. He uses a terse, journalistic prose that makes his book eminently readable. Regrettably, however, a close reading reveals some deficiencies that limit its usefulness for the student and even the general reader. Notably, the book contains occasional distortions^o which reveal Jones's lack of mastery of the sources he does use (as well as his ignoring of others) and a curious naïveté.

In writing about a group of complexly related topics, one runs the risk of exaggerating the importance of one individual aspect, distorting its true significance. Jones compounds this problem in at least one instance by careless use of one of his sources, without noting the conflicting and more accurate ac-

count of the event in another source listed in his bibliography. Specifically, Jones explains the proposal (code-named VELVET) to place an Anglo-American air force in the Caucasus in late 1942 in the following terms:

Stalin emphasized [during early October in offering to curtail some war materiel orders] that everything except aircraft already made up a part of the Second Protocol. Army planners resisted sending more airplanes than scheduled, and this time Roosevelt backed them up; instead they offered Stalin an American base [sic] in the Caucasus (which Stalin turned down) and two hundred, perhaps three hundred transport planes before the end of 1943. (p. 154)

What Jones ignores, thus seriously distorting the actual situation, are the facts that: (1) the President himself first suggested the Caucasus project to General George C. Marshall in late August 1942; (2) Roosevelt thereafter aggressively pushed the project as a means of providing direct military support of Soviet resistance in the Caucasus; and (3) the War Department from the Chief of Staff on down (including General Arnold and the AAF) opposed the project but yielded to the President's desires in the matter. The full context shows that VELVET was not a sop offered to Stalin in lieu of an increase in American aircraft allotments under lend-lease, although the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making a virtue out of necessity, apparently used its existence to help justify their refusal to allot more aircraft to the Soviet Union. In short, Jones makes lend-lease the primary factor in the situation when it was not.⁴

In another minor but surprising distortion, Jones cites as an example of Soviet downplaying of American aid the fact that "no Russian paper published information about Allied supply routes or convoy arrivals," as if publication of such data were to be expected—especially illogical in a pathologically suspicious regime such as the Soviet government.

Perhaps the most salient deficiency in the book is its insufficient emphasis on the U.S. military's relationship to the Soviet aid program. The War Department involvement in aid to the Soviet Union went back to the

^oThe reader whose curiosity is piqued by the picture of the usually dour Molotov "smiling under his mustache" as he leaves the White House on 1 June 1942 (p. 114) will search in vain for such a description in Sherwood's book, cited as the source.

immediate aftermath of the German attack on the U.S.S.R. and started with a marked difference in the points of view of the Army and the President. Whereas the President was willing to take aircraft from AAF units if necessary to assist the Red Army, General Marshall in mid-July 1941 was

unalterably opposed to the release of any U.S. pursuit planes and light and medium bombers until we have first established units of these types in the Philippines for the security of the Fleet anchorage and the defense of the islands.⁵

He also pointed out that insufficient aircraft for maneuvers weakened training programs unacceptably.

Marshall's attitude was conditioned not only by his own sense of the Army's weakness relative to its potential foes but also by the gloomy predictions of his Military Intelligence Division, suggesting that military hardware sent to the U.S.S.R. would fall into the hands of the *Wehrmacht* after the supposedly incipient collapse of the Soviet fighting forces. However, the President was insistent upon having a meaningful program of materiel aid implemented as quickly as possible, and his view prevailed. As Harold Stein has pointed out in analyzing wartime civil-military relations, FDR's military advisers never disputed his basic decision to aid the U.S.S.R. nor did they question his right to do so, whatever reservations some may have had.⁶

The Army and Navy played secondary roles in the Soviet aid program. Harry Hopkins directed lend-lease to the U.S.S.R. through the Soviet Protocol Committee, though the program operated through career Army men like Major General James H. Burns, Major General Sidney Spalding, and Brigadier General Philip Faymonville. However, various agencies of the War Department, especially the Army Air Forces (AAF), were involved with the program on an almost day-to-day basis because they were charged with overseeing the delivery of military equipment and supplies to designated shipment points. This involvement was a constant reminder of the Soviet aid program's role as a factor in Anglo-American military planning, and it also helped

shape the War Department's plans and attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Specifically, the urge to use lend-lease as a bargaining lever, to get something in terms of military advantage in return for military equipment sent to the Soviet Union, was always present in some Army circles, particularly the AAF. In 1943-44, this led to a little-known proposal of heavy bombers for bases that interestingly (in view of his consistent rejection of the idea of using aid for leverage) had the tacit support of the President.⁷

Similarly, AAF interest in the ALSIB route for the delivery of aircraft, a subject which Jones treats in some detail, was conditioned not only by AAF responsibilities for aircraft deliveries under the Soviet Protocols but also by General Arnold's interest in using Soviet Far Eastern bases at which to base American heavy bombers. These points, important to an understanding of the course of the Soviet aid program, are essentially ignored by Jones.

For historians and other specialists, the biggest flaw in the book is that it is not based upon such exhaustive research as is claimed in the Foreword (in all fairness, not written by Jones). A number of published sources are ignored, some of which are cited in the notes for this review. More significantly, important documentary collections were not consulted—and no student of the subject is likely to take Jones's assertion seriously that "it is doubtful that records in closed categories would substantially alter the general outline or conclusions of this book." It is not simply a matter of availability, since many pertinent War Department, especially AAF, records have been declassified or are declassifiable. Notably, one pioneering study, a doctoral dissertation based on such records and not consulted, was written almost six years before Jones's book was published.⁸ Access to other records (including those of the Soviet Protocol Committee) is available with a security clearance, and material from them usable after screening. The latter process is sometimes inconvenient and usually slow, but it can no longer be ignored by anyone wishing to claim "exhaustive" research.

In spite of these caveats, the book is

useful for the general reader. *The Roads to Russia* provides a brief, readable introduction to the origins and course of our program of wartime materiel aid to the Soviet Union. However, to gain insight into the complexities of the situation, such as the interaction of the lend-lease program with American military planning, the Presidential groping for a policy that would cement the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union as a peacetime dam against future aggression, and the State Department's more traditionally oriented attempt to reach the same goal through definition of a common

interest, one should supplement Jones's book by reading a recent article by George Herring, "Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War," in the *Journal of American History*.⁹

Hopefully, Herring or some other careful worker in the myriad collections of official papers will produce a more searching and critical study in the near future. Until then, *The Roads to Russia* will help fill an important gap in the writings about Soviet-American relations during the Second World War.

United States Air Force Academy

Notes

1. Raymond H. Dawson, *The Decision To Aid Russia, 1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959).

2. Mined heavily are Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley's official Army history, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955); Robert E. Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948); Admiral William H. Standley's account of his stewardship in the U.S.S.R., *Admiral Ambassador to Russia* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955); William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason's *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953); Stephen Roskill's *The War at Sea, 1939-1945* (3 volumes in 4; London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954-1961); and Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell's official Army history, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953), as well as Dawson and appropriate volumes of the Department of State's *Foreign Relations* series.

3. *History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* (6 volumes; Moscow: Military History Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the U.S.S.R., 1961-65).

4. Matloff and Snell, pp. 329-36, cover the project fully, but Jones relied upon (and misused) Leighton and Coakley, pp. 584-86. Also see Roosevelt's message to Churchill, October 5, 1942, Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 576.

5. Memorandum, Marshall for General H. H. Arnold, 16 July 1941 (File 145.95, folder WP-111-C-4, Russia, Bk 1, in USAF Historical Archives, Maxwell AFB, Alabama).

6. Harold Stein in "Editorial Comments" on Marvin D. Bernstein and Francis L. Loewenheim's "Aid to Russia: The First Year," Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 151.

7. For a full discussion of AAF interest in securing Soviet collaboration in the war, see Thomas A. Julian "Operation FRANTIC and the Search for American-Soviet Military Collaboration, 1941-44" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Syracuse University, 1968).

8. Richard C. Lukas, "Air Force Aspects of American Aid to the Soviet Union: The Crucial Years 1941-1942" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Florida State University, 1963).

9. *Journal of American History*, LVI (June 1969), 93-114.

WAR BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST GIANTS: TO BE OR NOT TO BE?

DR. KENNETH R. WHITING

THE world of the 1950s seemed to be a bipolar one: the United States and its allies facing a seemingly monolithic Communist bloc stretching from the eastern borders of West Germany to the shores of the Pacific. Then, in the 1960s the Communist bloc began to disintegrate, a disintegration that separated the two giants of the "monolith," Russia and China. Now it seems that the 1970s may be the decade in which the two enormous Communist countries try to resolve their growing differences by the force of arms. Although such a conflict is not yet inevitable, qualified observers, who a decade ago would have scoffed at such a war, are now gravely concerned about its possibility. But then, who in the 1950s would have predicted that by the late 1960s Peking would be calling the Russian leaders "the new tsars," while the Kremlinites in turn were pointing to Mao as "mad" and a "new Hitler"?

Harrison E. Salisbury, long-time American correspondent in the Soviet Union and now Assistant Managing Editor of the *New York Times*, has written a book that all but predicts such a war as inevitable.† Salisbury, first assigned to head the United Press bureau in Moscow in 1944, has spent many years in Russia and has traveled extensively about the country. His travels in Siberia and Outer Mongolia are especially pertinent to this latest book, since it is that area which would be the locale of a Sino-Soviet war.

Salisbury sees a number of underlying causes for the present hostility between Moscow and Peking. First, the Russians, overrun by Asiatic hordes throughout their history (Scythians, Huns, and Mongols), have a traditional fear of invasion from the East. The

Chinese are the latest in the long line of such enemies. Second, from the sixteenth century, the Russians have been pushing into Siberia and along the Pacific, determined to be the dominant power in that area. Third, although both the Soviet and the Chinese regimes are Communist, they have long distrusted each other. Salisbury traces this dislike to the mid-1920s and Stalin's assumption that Mao was a Trotskyite. Fourth, China, because of her enormous population and lack of arable land, needs to expand just to eat. Where more logically to expand than into the former Chinese territories seized by the Russians in the nineteenth century? Last, China is now building up an arsenal of nuclear weapons and working assiduously on a delivery capability. Thus, as Salisbury has the Kremlin hawks put it: "Better hit them *now* while we have the edge." (p. 64) It is assumed throughout the book that if a war comes it will be a pre-emptive one initiated by the Russians and will involve the use of nuclear weapons.

There can be little doubt that the Kremlin leaders are able to play upon a traditional Russian fear of invasion from the East, a fear that dates back to the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century. For example, the poet Yevtushenko, aroused by the fighting on Damansky Island in the Ussuri River, described the Chinese as "the new Mongol warriors with bombs in their quivers," and he seems to have hit a sensitive spot in the Russian racial subconsciousness. As is true in much of his book, however, Salisbury seems inclined to overdo a thesis. For example, on page 34 he says that the Russians make no distinction between the peoples of the East, be they Mongol, Uzbek, or Chinese, and on page 32 he states that "No

†Harrison E. Salisbury, *War Between Russia and China* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969, \$4.95), 224 pp.

Russian mother would think of permitting her daughter to marry a Mongol, Chinese, or any non-Aryan Asian." This reviewer was in Uzbekistan in October 1969 and was amazed at the large number of mixed marriages between Uzbeks and Russians, especially in the cities of Tashkent and Samarkand.

In his historical account of relations between the Kremlin and the Chinese Communists since 1921, Salisbury again seems to push his thesis to the point of *reductio ad absurdum*. Without citing any real evidence, he has Stalin hating Mao as a Trotskyite from the mid-1920s. To quote from Salisbury:

If Moscow were to open its most secret archives they would demonstrate that Stalin hated, despised, and distrusted Mao from the mid-1920's when Mao, rightly or wrongly, was identified in Stalin's mind with the Trotskyite opposition. (p. 81)

This being the case, Stalin gave his support to Chiang Kai-shek. To those of us who cannot divine the contents of Moscow's "most secret archives," it has long been assumed that Stalin's support of Chiang was based on his conviction that a China under Chiang was a far greater counterweight to the Japanese, at that time Russia's main opponent in the Far East. After all, Mao headed a relatively weak military force in the 1930s.

Again, the Salisbury account of how the Soviets remained in Manchuria "to thwart an immediate Communist takeover" (pp. 78-79) is hardly the conventional interpretation. Chiang did request the Soviets to stay until February 1946, but it was the Soviets who balked at leaving during February and March. In the meantime, they prevented the United States from landing Nationalist troops at Dairen and Port Arthur, saw to it that the Chinese Communists got a goodly share of the captured Japanese weapons, and when they finally did leave, Lin Piao had deployed some 300,000 troops in depth throughout the countryside in Manchuria.

One is also inclined to boggle at the theory that Stalin set up the invasion of South Korea *after* Mao's visit and specifically *because* of the visit. (p. 92) This is part of his case

that Stalin was interested in seizing the rest of Korea in order to put Mao in a "nutcracker" between Outer Mongolia, controlled by the Kremlin satrap, Choibalsan, and a unified Korea under Kim Il Sung, while at the same time Moscow's man, Kao Kang, was in charge of Manchuria.

Salisbury then tops off the whole drama by citing a rumor that there was an assassination plot directed at Mao in 1949 or 1950 and a "rumor about a rumor" that Stalin and the Russians were behind it. Most historians probably drool with envy that the rules of the craft keep them from writing such interesting yarns.

The development of the split between the Russians and the Chinese, however, is valid enough when based on known facts that can be buttressed by the citation of sources. Why, therefore, gild the lily by piling rumor upon rumor and by trying to divine the contents of the Kremlin's secret archives? The dubiety of much of Salisbury's evidence only weakens his case. On the other hand, he leaves out some factors that have tended to exacerbate Sino-Soviet tensions, such as the conflict of strategies in the Third World, Mao's fear that Soviet "goulash" Communism ("revisionism" in Communist jargon) might infect the purity of the Chinese revolutionary effort, and the struggle for the leadership of the world Communist movement.

Chapter IX, entitled "The Land and the Need," attempts to show that China is desperately in need of more land in order to feed the burgeoning population. No one will argue with the assertion that China has an acute shortage of arable land or that feeding 800 million people, give or take a hundred million, presents a serious problem. But it may be a questionable assumption that the Peking leadership sees Outer Mongolia or the Soviet Far Eastern provinces as a solution to that problem. China's population is increasing at the rate of 15 to 20 million a year, and it is extremely doubtful that all the Soviet territory the Chinese claim was stolen from them under the unequal treaties would go far toward solving their problem. Salisbury seems prone to exaggeration when he says: "Confronted

with the dilemma of starve or fight, the Chinese really have no alternative. They will—and must—fight.” (p. 148) It is doubtful if the Chinese see their plight as that desperate or that they see the Mongolian desert or the Far Eastern provinces as a solution.

Having described the racial, geopolitical, and other reasons for the hostile state of affairs now existing between Peking and Moscow, Salisbury then comes up with a probable scenario for a future Soviet attack on China. He describes in some detail Zhukov's campaign along the Khalkin-gol in Outer Mongolia in the autumn of 1939 when he defeated the Japanese. He also goes into some detail in his account of how the Soviets crushed the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria in August 1945. He thinks that the advocates of a pre-emptive war against China are basing their plans on a similar strategy—only this time with a much more mobile force plus nuclear weapons. He cites the appointment of Colonel-General Tolubko, former first deputy commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, to head the Soviet Far Eastern forces as definite evidence that if war comes nuclear weapons will be used.

Assuming the conflict does take place, what will be the outcome? Salisbury feels that the Kremlin hawks are promising the Politburo a short and decisive war, one in which the Chinese nuclear capability will be quickly and surgically removed, the outlying areas such as Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and the northwest in general overrun, and as a result the Maoist clique will be ousted from office. The Chinese, on the other hand, are determined to convert the war into a drawn-out “people's war” that will last for years, or even decades. In neither case does Salisbury see anything but tragedy for all, including the United States. A successful blitzkrieg, as promised by the Kremlin hawks, would mean a powerful Soviet Union astride the Eurasian continent, not to mention the nuclear fallout that would inundate Japan and the United States. A long “people's war” would draw into it many other nations as the years went by and could be the beginning of a Third World War.

In the face of the disastrous consequences

that could ensue if a Sino-Soviet war were to occur, Salisbury thinks the United States should bestir itself in seeking some way to forestall the calamity. His first suggestion is that the United States find some way of bettering relations with Peking. He sees the Taiwan problem as the main block to such a rapprochement—all Washington has to do is reverse its stand on the question. His other panacea is a “world food pool,” either set up unilaterally by the United States or established in cooperation with Canada, Australia, and the U.S.S.R., a pool from which China can draw *as a right*.

Here Salisbury seems to be thinking in oversimplified terms, as is demonstrated in the following quotation concerning Asia: “Underlying all the conflicts, feuds, wars, rebellion, and antagonisms can be found an economic infrastructure: the problem of population and food.” It just isn't true. The Indian-Pakistani feud is basically religious and territorial (Kashmir); the main problem of Burma is ethnic diversity, as is that of Malaysia; China certainly did not conquer Tibet for its food-growing potential, which is nil; and Indonesia certainly did not acquire West Irian for food. These are just a few of the “feuds and antagonisms.” Furthermore, it is hard for this reviewer to visualize the Soviet Union contributing grain to a “world food pool” which the Chinese Communists could draw upon while Russian agriculture, employing 40 percent of the labor force, is just about breaking even in feeding the nation. The inadequacies of these suggested policies for averting a Sino-Soviet war merely point up how little Washington can do to influence relations between the two Communist giants.

WHAT can one say about such a book? It is a fascinating piece of literature, partly factual and partly imaginative. Inasmuch as it is obviously not a piece of scholarly research, it would seem irrelevant to enumerate all the historical gaffes and geographical howlers. On the other hand, there is a good chance of a Sino-Soviet war if the two regimes continue their present courses, and such a conflict might

well have dire consequences of a global nature. More cautious prophets list all the reasons why the Soviet leaders should not initiate such a conflict, and they are right. But the same cautious prophets assured us throughout the winter, spring, and early summer of 1968 that the Soviet leaders would not use military force to solve the Czech problem. In short, Mr. Salisbury may be right in his gloomy forecast. One does, however, wish he

had tidied up his evidence, had relied more on facts and less on rumors, and had not overdone some of his arguments. But I suppose that would have taken a lot of the color out of his book. However inadequately, he has dealt with a very important problem and has dared to venture where the more cautious seem unduly hesitant.

Aerospace Studies Institute

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AWARD

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "On Military Force Planning" by U. A. Coty, E. J. Daniels, and R. A. Shane as the outstanding article in the July-August 1970 issue of the *Air University Review*.



Major General George E. Brown, Auditor General of the United States Air Force, presents the bimonthly Air University Review Outstanding Award plaque to Captain Charles M. Plummer.

AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AWARDS PROGRAM

Captain Charles M. Plummer, USAF, a Career Development and Training Officer, Professional Services, Hq USAF Auditor General, Norton AFB, California, has been selected by the Air University Review Awards Committee to receive the annual award for writing the outstanding article to appear in the *Review* during fiscal year 1970. His article, "The Time Barrier: Psychological Frontier of Student Activism," was previously designated the outstanding article in the January-February 1970 issue.

The awards program provides payment to eligible authors, a \$50 award for the outstanding article in each issue, and a \$200 savings bond for the yearly outstanding article. Bimonthly and yearly award winners also receive a plaque.

The bimonthly winners for the past year were Major William T. Wilson, USAF, "A New Vitality in Soviet 'Defense' Posture," July-August 1969; Major William R. Sims, USAF, and Captain Angelo J. Cerchione, USAF, "In Search of an Aviation Environment Master Plan," September-October 1969; Colonel Robert B. Kalisch, USAF, "Productivity of Basic Research," November-December 1969; Captain Plummer, January-February 1970; Captain Henry Viccellio, Jr., USAF, "Concepts, Objectives, and Doctrine," March-April 1970; and Major General Gordon T. Gould, Jr., USAF, "Computers and Communications in the Information Age," May-June 1970.

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