The new national security strategy to support the Nixon Doctrine has been designated "realistic deterrence." The President has said the transition to the new concept "is underway but far from completed. . . . We have set a new direction. We are on course." In this issue of the Review, Colonel Kenneth L. Moll examines the concept, points out the lack of finalization of the strategy and the force structure to implement it, and postulates that the Air Force can provide the crucial ingredient: the flexibility of aerospace power.
LATE IN 1970, after nearly two years of foreign policy and strategic studies by the Nixon Administration, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced a “new strategy of realistic deterrence.” The Secretary’s 191-page “Defense Report” of 15 March 1971 provided many additional guidelines and explanatory details and emphasized that the strategy truly “is new.” However, study of the Defense Report and the accompanying fiscal year 1972 budget shows no clear pattern for future force structure in the late 1970s. It is the theme of this article that the final and definitive “realistic deterrence” strategy has not yet evolved, and the final force-structure concepts have not been determined. The Air Force seems to be in a unique position to offer the strategy’s one missing ingredient.

Mr. Laird’s 1971 Defense Report is a particularly interesting document, especially when read in conjunction with President Richard M. Nixon’s Foreign Policy Report of 25 February 1971 and the 1970 versions of both reports. Together, these documents provide an insight into the Nixon Doctrine, the criteria
for strategic sufficiency, and other guidelines of realistic deterrence.

It is not necessary here to trace the development of the Nixon Doctrine from the initial Presidential “backgrounder” during a fueling stop of Air Force One at Guam on 25 July 1969 to its most recent articulation in the President’s 1971 Foreign Policy Report. Nor is it necessary to review the many abandoned terms—such as “low profile,” “1½-war strategy,” or “zero-war strategy”—which have been used at various times, officially or unofficially, to describe the Administration’s tentatively evolving strategic concepts. It suffices merely to describe the present, for 1971 contains the latest diplomatic and strategic milestones in the Administration’s progress toward a “new era.”

Mr. Laird reports that “in effect, we have completed our transition to baseline planning, and we are now building for the future,” but he adds that “we have not solved all the hard problems before us.” Mr. Nixon says “the transition from the past is underway but far from completed. . . . our experience in 1970 confirmed the basic soundness of our approach. We have set a new direction. We are on course.”

The course charted by Mr. Nixon emphasizes partnership (the Nixon Doctrine) with “our friends” who “are revitalized and increasingly self-reliant.” This partnership, together with strength and negotiation, will form a new foreign policy and “an enduring structure of peace.”

Acknowledging the President’s foreign policy direction, the 1971 Defense Report defined the supporting “new National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence.” The new strategy “is designed not to manage crises but to prevent wars” and is to operate “across the full spectrum of possible conflict and . . . capabilities.” It is, the Report asserts, “positive and active” as compared to past policy which was “responsive and reactive.”

In a recent interview, Mr. Laird said that realistic deterrence had to be developed to “deter not only nuclear war but all levels of armed conflict. But at the same time we had to develop this new strategy in a way that faces up to the realities of the 1970s.” Being “perfectly frank,” he observed that “successful implementation of the strategy of realistic deterrence is the most difficult and challenging national-security effort we have ever undertaken in this country.”

What makes it so hard are the new realities in today’s world. As listed in the Defense Report, these realities are a growing Soviet military capability and international influence, emerging Chinese nuclear threat, reordered national priorities and higher personnel costs for the U.S., changing world economic environment, and greater awareness of burden-sharing by NATO and Asian friends.

Perhaps because the 1971 Defense Report was, as one newspaper described it, “top-heavy with broad philosophy and rather thin on explicit details,” general reaction to it was somewhat unenthusiastic and confused. Most press accounts repeated without much comment Mr. Laird’s claim of a new strategy and did not attempt to interpret or endorse its reputed innovations. A Washington Post editorial considered that “novelty—newness and change—was a central, even somewhat obsessive, theme,” adding that the Report’s “novelty is overstated, as are claims for the internal cohesiveness of the new policy in all its many parts.” Other reporters saw contradictions in the logic and the words. The Washington Star quoted a defense official as saying, “The whole point [of the new strategy] is to put downward pressure on war and upward pressure on negotiations,” but the paper also noted that Mr. Laird’s Report “leans very heavily on a concept called ‘the total force.’” A later Star column hit the Report’s criticism of the old “responsive and reactive” policy while discussing “only a few pages later . . . how the United States might ‘respond’ to world problems.”
Admittedly, it is difficult to put one's finger on exactly what is new. The Defense Report points out strongly that the new strategy is not "a mere continuation of past policies in new packaging." Yet it contains many hoary truisms, such as the necessity for "lowering the probability of all forms of war through deterrence of aggressors" and for correlating "military strategy, national security strategy, and foreign policy." Despite a 22-page chapter on force planning concepts and 52 pages on the plans themselves, it is much easier to find piecemeal shading differences than it is to find significantly new concepts.

In some respects the two former strategies, massive retaliation and flexible response, receive clearer definition than the new one. For example, the Defense Report states that massive retaliation's "strategy and forces were deterrence-oriented with emphasis on nuclear umbrella" and that its research and development emphasis was "on development of new systems." For flexible response, the "significant change in strategy was the shift in emphasis to greater orientation for U.S. toward bearing the principal Free World burden in non-nuclear conflict." Flexible response R&D "emphasized refinements rather than conceptual new systems." The Defense Report does not supplement these succinct descriptions

"Nixon Strategy for Peace: Strength-Partnership-Negotiations" (extracted from the 1971 Defense Report). According to the author, this diagram of "realistic deterrence" includes an implicit concept that (1) other Free World nations will concentrate on deterrence in the lower two-thirds of the spectrum, while (2) the United States will concern itself mainly with the upper two-thirds (these two factors have been added to the original diagram, with arrows). The strategy's "missing ingredient," he says, is a force-structure concept which "must be founded upon U.S. aerospace flexibility."
with a similar description of realistic deterrence, although it does present diagrams to illustrate all three strategies. These diagrams are helpful in a general way but offer few detailed conceptual insights.

Realistic Deterrence: An Interpretation

The most subtle—but perhaps most important—conceptual change is the use of “realistic deterrence” to avoid fighting wars in the lower part of the conflict spectrum. Massive retaliation and flexible response deterrence focused on the upper part of the conflict spectrum, where it worked very well. What is new in realistic deterrence is the idea that America may be freed from lesser wars by strengthening other Free World nations. In his Foreign Policy Report, Mr. Nixon said, “It is our policy that future guerrilla and subversive threats should be dealt with primarily by the indigenous forces of our allies. Consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, we can and will provide economic and military assistance. . . .” This idea was expressed another way by the President in two interviews shortly after release of the Defense Report. Mr. Nixon told C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times that, after Vietnam, “I seriously doubt if we will ever have another war. This is probably the very last one.” A few days later he told Howard K. Smith of American Broadcasting Company there would continue to be brushfire wars but “the main thing for us is not to get involved in them.” Strangely enough, the press and public paid little attention either to the President’s statements or to this basic concept within the Defense Report.

Possibly the concept was not fully understood because the Defense Report did not explicitly correct earlier statements which seemed to emphasize improved U.S. conventional forces. However, instead of emphasizing U.S. conventional capabilities, the Defense Report indicates that strategic forces will remain about level while other manpower is to be reduced during FY 1972. U.S. active duty personnel will continue to decline (from 2.7 to 2.5 million during FY 72—down from 3.5 million in FY 69). There will also be a slight reduction in civilian and reserve component strength. The Defense Report contains considerable discussion of the desired “reduction of draft calls to zero by July 1, 1973,” and of the continually rising personnel costs, while the Nixon Doctrine calls for fewer U.S. troops overseas. These factors dictate “smaller U.S. active forces, with great emphasis to be given to their readiness and effectiveness.” This reduction is an important part of the new strategy and a major change from the flexible response force structure, especially in ground forces.

The Report implies that the main improvements for deterrence of lesser wars will come from other Free World nations—aided and supported by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional forces, and military and economic assistance. These other nations will provide deterrence mostly within the lower two-thirds of the spectrum, while the U.S. must provide deterrence in the upper two-thirds. The Report’s most significant new strategic emphasis is on this “Total Force approach” to deterrence, which is described as applying “all appropriate resources for deterrence” across the spectrum.

The Defense Report states that “for those levels in the deterrence spectrum below general nuclear war, the [Free World] forces . . . must have an adequate warfighting capability, both in limited nuclear and conventional options.” The total force approach seems to place some increased emphasis on U.S. theater nuclear forces. For general nuclear war, realistic deterrence depends upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella just as the previous two strategies did, but at the same time there is discussion and some added dependence on negotiations (SALT) and on defensive measures (ABM). The importance of “maintaining and using our
technological superiority” is recognized, and the FY 72 R&D budget is indeed increased some 16 percent. The new strategy avoids emphasis on either new systems or refinements but instead proposes “options to adjust” future force capabilities.

Despite these indications that the new strategy is different from the two previous ones, it is not always clear what the differences mean in terms of future U.S. forces and capabilities. For example, in the listing of “six major reasons” for the R&D increase, five reasons are related to advanced technology and new capabilities while the last is “to develop simpler and less expensive weapons.” The Report talks elsewhere of assigning “multi-mission roles” to some forces and of specially tailoring other forces. It notes that the Army’s readiness today “is lower than we would like” and that “our tactical air forces also need to be improved”; extensive descriptions of these improvements are provided. But the Navy is the only service to receive an increase (seven percent) in the FY 72 budget, perhaps because of the acknowledgment, buried in a brief discussion of European deployments, that “in this context naval forces are particularly important.” On the other hand it is maintained that “our goal is to minimize the need” for naval deployments.

These illustrations are not presented here in any critical sense; no such document could be written without providing some ambiguities and apparent contradictions when statements are selected from within its lengthy context. The point is that the concepts and guidelines for realistic deterrence are not specific enough to permit resolution of the ambiguities.

There are a number of factors—some described in the Defense Report and some not—which might enable realistic deterrence to work, even without further evolution and clarification. Factors favorable to the new strategy include

- Increased readiness, burden sharing, and the total force approach, to provide greater

![USS Horne (DLG-30) guided missile frigate](image-url)
deterrent utility of Free World forces.

—Negotiations that may lessen the probability of war and reduce defense costs.

—Nixon Doctrine redefinition of U.S. national interests and roles overseas. This means greater psychological and material self-reliance of the Free World, with less direct American involvement and, implicitly, lowered U.S. military commitments.

—Greater public and governmental willingness to accept security risks (or at least to accept a lowered priority for security needs). This willingness is based partially on perceptions of a decreased external threat and on the optimistic hope that potential Soviet/Chinese threat developments will not materialize. Unless the calculated risks fail and the potential threats do materialize in some inescapable manner, the above factors probably would create a more "enduring structure of peace" than existed in the past when world stability depended almost solely on U.S. military power. Realistic deterrence might well work within such a structure.

Nevertheless, the "favorable" elements alone do not appear to be sufficient to insure the credibility and success of the new strategy. Burden sharing, improved readiness, and the total force approach are goals that have been sought by the U.S. ever since the formation of NATO in 1949, though these goals were not always specifically named and given the same emphasis as today. There is an obvious limit to the additional capabilities which might now be expected, and it is not at all clear that these concepts alone will be enough to compensate for the reductions in active U.S. forces. Similarly, negotiations will not necessarily lead to any breakthroughs for American and Free World security.

Finally, reduced American emphasis on overseas involvement might make the new and less "reactive" military strategy more tolerable to the American public (and therefore more workable in the seventies than its predecessor); yet it would not seem to make America more effective in worldwide deterrence. U.S. force reductions, together with evidence cited in the Defense Report that the threat is not decreasing, may actually offer a prospect of decreased and endangered deterrence in at least some parts of the spectrum. Obscurities and weak points remain in the deterrence equation, and it is not always clear how Free World forces will deal with them.

The situation today perhaps is analogous to that of 1949—two years after the policy of containment had been adopted—when containment's accompanying military force structure was still unclear. The Unification and Strategy hearings proved how little definition or agreement there was. By 1953–54, containment's massive retaliation strategy and force-structure concept had been fully articulated, and it was understood and acquiesced in by all. Similarly, so much had been written and discussed about flexible response that it was well understood when adopted in 1961. In 1953 and again in 1961, although there were many arguments about details, the basic thrust and implications of each new strategy's force structure were not in question. That is not the case with realistic deterrence; something is missing.

On the surface at least, the guidelines seemingly fail to provide a clear indication of the U.S. force-structure and employment concepts that are to make realistic deterrence work. Though some of the guidelines are original and distinctive, the combination of vital new elements or capabilities does not seem sufficient to establish a truly new dimension to the concept of deterrence. There is not yet a new strategy as innovative and conceptually lucid as the Nixon Doctrine itself. Something must be added to make the evolving strategy more than simply "a movement toward a middle position between" massive retaliation and flexible response (as one writer saw it in late 1970). To support the distinctive new foreign policy, the new strategy should be completely distinctive in its own right.
It is not the purpose of this article to be critical of anyone for failing to develop a wholly new military strategy in two years. (Developing the 1947 containment policy’s strategy took six years.) Rather, the purpose is simply to examine the state of evolution of realistic deterrence and to make the point that its new strategic guidelines are not yet matched by specific force-structure concepts.

Service Concepts Needed

Another purpose is to appraise what might be done by the military services to assist in the further conceptual evolution of realistic deterrence.

The Army does not appear to be able to offer much that is new. Pared by the new strategy from almost 20 divisions to 13½ (plus 8 “Modernized Reserve”) divisions, the Army also has had its budget reduced from $25 billion in FY 68 to $21.5 billion in FY 72. (In the same time period the Air Force was reduced from $25 to $23 billion, and the Navy was increased from almost $21 to almost $23.5 billion.) The Washington Post quoted an “administration insider” as summing it up: “The Army is taking it in the neck.” Writing knowledgeably on the future, in the July 1971 Foreign Affairs, an Army colonel observes that the Army and other services must provide “a flexible military force relevant to political realities” and that “careful force planning and programming at the highest echelons are necessary to lay the groundwork for rewarding peacetime service.” But he suggests no new strategic policies whereby the Army could facilitate fulfilling these needs. The new strategy would seem to preclude any new and conclusive Army contributions except, of course, in the areas of military assistance and more responsive reserve forces.

Many maintain that the key to new capabilities for realistic deterrence is something called the “Blue Water Strategy.” Navy Mag-
azine editorialized about this in its January 1971 issue, noting that the Nixon Doctrine "seems aptly fitted to a 'blue water' or maritime military strategy, emphasizing seaborne air and amphibious power just over the horizon, keeping American forces largely out of foreign countries but able to move in with limited means quickly. . . ." In its February issue, Navy returned to the subject. The President, it proclaimed, "seems to be moving—albeit ever so slowly—toward a 'Blue Water Strategy.'" In March Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, former Chief of Naval Operations, wrote that the "only way" the Nixon Doctrine "can be fulfilled is through a strong maritime strategy." He advocated a "hard-hitting modern naval force" for controlling the seas, showing the flag, and supporting other nations. "The ability to engage decisively and disengage quickly," he said, "is the inherent strength of a maritime strategy." A few days later the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative F. Edward Hébert, said 1971 would see a "renaissance" of the Navy, "top dog" in the defense budget for the first time since World War II. He supported not only more aircraft carriers and rebuilding of the surface fleet but also a larger fleet of nuclear fleet ballistic missile (FBM) submarines—"perhaps the best protection we have now, the best deterrent we have now as far as the Navy is concerned." Emphasizing the latter point, a Prize Essay in the April U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings urged a "blue water oceanic option" that would move the "strategic deterrent to sea while there is still time."

A "blue water" strategy, including FBM strategic forces as well as carriers and other surface ships for conventional operations, may indeed be the missing link that is needed in realistic deterrence, even though at first glance this strategy seems to run counter to the policy of increasing deterrence across the spectrum while reducing U.S. manpower and costs. The only justified observation here is that there has been no clear articulation (at least publicly) of how the blue water strategy would work, what general force structure would be required to support it, and whether the resultant capabilities would in fact provide any essentially new and decisive element for realistic deterrence. Thus it is difficult to visualize how a blue water strategy could, at reasonable cost within the new realities, offer any sizable innovations. But there is no intent here to argue against
either the Army or Navy coming up with a new force-structure concept in support of realistic deterrence; they should be encouraged to do precisely that. And the Air Force should address what the Air Force might do to help implement Mr. Nixon’s “new direction” and Mr. Laird’s “new strategy.” The nation should have the opportunity of selecting from a large marketplace of ideas.

The services must seek, “in a way that faces up to the realities of the 1970s,” to contribute more to the total force approach. As an indispensable feature of this effort, the military establishment must offer a new breadth of Presidential options—something Mr. Nixon clearly indicates that he wants.

Curiously, the matter of Presidential military options has received more emphasis in the Foreign Policy Reports than in the latest Defense Report. In 1970 Mr. Nixon posed a question which received considerable attention and conjecture at the time:

Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?

In his 1971 Foreign Policy Report, in discussing strategic “flexibility—the responses available to us,” the President answered his question:

We must insure that we have the forces and procedures that provide us with alternatives appropriate to the nature and level of the provocation. This means having the plans and command and control capabilities necessary to enable us to select and carry out the appropriate response without necessarily having to resort to mass destruction.

Perceptive reporter William Beecher of the New York Times put the question and answer
together in a recent column, concluding that they reflect "the President's determination to increase his choices in nuclear war should deterrence fail." But it is more than that. Elsewhere in his Foreign Policy Report, Mr. Nixon indicated a parallel desire for "a full range of options" for general purpose forces. What he wants, it emerges, is precisely what Mr. Laird wants: deterrence across the spectrum. The President merely places a different emphasis on the problem. For realistic deterrence across the spectrum, there must be credible options anywhere within that spectrum.

The need for Presidential options and the concept of realistic deterrence are indivisibly related—each calls for greatly improved flexibility in deterrence. And improved flexibility appears to be the one missing ingredient in realistic deterrence. Without flexibility, large and separate U.S. forces would be needed for each separate increment of the upper deterrence spectrum. Such a force structure is hardly realistic within the President's stated defense limit of 2.5 million military personnel and 7 percent of the gross national product.

With reduced resources, the U.S. must emphasize (as Mr. Laird has said) advanced technology, nuclear-capable forces, highly skilled but limited manpower, and (as Mr. Nixon has urged) flexible Presidential options. Also, to provide deterrence in the upper two-thirds of the spectrum, U.S. forces must emphasize multimission capabilities to operate efficiently and broadly within this range. To support such operations, the U.S. command and control structure must be able to guarantee the essential worldwide information and responsiveness so that the President could select and confidently order any one of the variety of options at his command.

An Aerospace "Total Force"

New Strategy

This U.S. force-structure requirement matches exactly the Air Force's near-term potential. Of all the services, the USAF is the one which can best provide versatility for worldwide total force deterrence, using multimission aerospace forces supported by advanced, survivable command and control, including aerospace surveillance systems. Air Force strategic forces could be used to help deter less-than-all-out strategic nuclear or tactical nuclear attacks, or even conventional conflicts in such places as Vietnam or NATO. Nuclear-capable tactical air forces similarly could be used to help deter strategic war as well as tactical nuclear and conventional conflicts. (The Defense Report makes these latter two points, but without emphasis and without attention to command and control—the key to both flexibility and credible options.)

Army and Navy forces, on the other hand, are not so flexible. For example, armor and amphibious battalions, helicopters, aircraft carriers and other naval surface forces, ABM systems, and FBMs—all offer something special for realistic deterrence; each will be required for its special applications. But none offers efficient and realistic deterrence except in one rather narrow part of the spectrum. None—except aircraft carriers—has the flexibility to deter substantially in other parts of the spectrum.

In my opinion it will be up to the Air Force to provide most of the force and option flexibility needed in the seventies. No listing will be suggested here of the specific systems and developments required; this calls for detailed, classified studies. It can be said that the necessary aerospace force and command and control systems either exist today or are possible within the state of the art. With the right principles and appropriate emphasis, the required capabilities can be put together well within the fiscal and manpower limits. It can also be said that the Army and Navy would retain important roles in the new strategy, each making its own contributions.

Primarily, however, for deterrence in the critical upper two-thirds of the spectrum, I
believe the new force-structure concept must be founded upon U.S. aerospace flexibility. Emphasis on aerospace flexibility must be the central U.S. element in the total force ap-

proach. This one innovative ingredient will complete the evolution of a distinctive new strategy of realistic deterrence needed for the seventies.

Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research

Notes

1. The Defense Report contains the FY 72 budget and force summary; the remainder of the Five-Year Defense Program (FY 73-76) is classified. This writer's observations are based solely on the Defense Report and its unclassified guidelines, without reference to or knowledge of the FY 73-76 program.
9. The assertion that the two earlier strategies were distinctive and reasonably clear is based on the Defense Report's incisive analysis of them as well as on the writer's own research.
IMPENDING CRISIS
IN AIR FORCE
LEADERSHIP

Colonel Doyle E. Larson
First Sergeant Delaney eased into the parking spot and stopped. The colonel will be disappointed, he thought, if the guys don't go along with his plan. He got out of the car, closed the door quietly, and started across the parking lot. The crunch of the gravel echoed loudly between the dormitories, and he considered for a moment that some of the guys would be irritated by the noise.

Delaney opened the door and peered down the hall. Trash was piled knee-high at the center of the hall, and here and there a lone beer can lay on its side.

"The janitor will have his work cut out for him," he said, half aloud.

The smell of incense, perfume, alcohol, and pot invaded his nostrils as he knocked softly at the first door. Pie pondered about the source of each of the smells and then realized that the door had come open and he was staring into the face of T/Sgt Bill Johnson, the dormitory chief.

"Good morning, Bill. Don't know whether you remembered or not, but this is the Fourth of July. The day the colonel wanted to have a parade,—ah—to sort of celebrate the country's two hundredth birthday."

"Oh, gee, that's right, Sarge." Bill rubbed his eyes and then said, "I'll try to get the guys rounded up right away. Can't promise you anything, but I'll do my best."

"I'll certainly appreciate that, Bill," the first sergeant replied.

"Tell you what," Bill said, "we'll meet you in the day room in fifteen minutes—make it eight o'clock on the nose."

By eight o'clock the first few airmen began coming into the day room, in various stages of undress and costume. Most stared sullenly at the walls, each other, or the sergeant, but a few gave voice to loud complaint as soon as they stepped into the room, bitching profanely about being awakened on their day off and about the suspected ancestry of "lifers."

Sergeant Delaney began to explain the situation, somewhat hesitantly, but then heard the approach of Sgt Johnson and decided to withhold his comments until all the airmen were present.

"That's all I can round up, Sarge. Benson and Brill must be downtown with their girls. Talley says he's sick, and Rudder won't open his door. He had a little party in there last night with some of the WAFs, and they're probably still 'tripped out.'" Johnson finished his explanation and sat down.

"OK, Bill, thanks," said the first sergeant. "Guys, I'm awfully sorry to wake you up so early this morning on your day off, but the colonel is pretty keen on us doing something special to celebrate the nation's two-hundredth birthday. He just feels strongly that we ought to have a parade in order to sort of make something special out of the event. What do you guys think about the idea?"

"I think it's just plain stupid," an airman in the front muttered. "Two hundred years. Big deal." A chorus of voices gave him a measure of support.

The first sergeant held up his hands and said, "The colonel will sure be disappointed if we don't have this parade. Look, this thing won't take long—you can wear your 1505's—and after it's over I'll use squadron funds to buy beer and grass and we can have a little party. What do you say? I mean, after all, this will only be the second Saturday this year that we've made you do anything at all."

At the side, a couple of airmen mumbled something that Delaney thought might be interpreted as favorable. Sgt Johnson said he thought it sounded OK. After another wave of conversation, the first sergeant spoke again.

"OK, then. Let's do it. We'll meet on the parade ground at nine and the whole thing will be over in less than thirty minutes. I am sure pleased that you are all helping me out on this."
Is such a scene possible in the Air Force in 1976—just five short years away? The drastic increase in violent dissent, lack of respect for law and order, absence of patriotism, and rampant disorder in our society are readily apparent. But will things come to such a state in so few years that the scene just depicted could actually occur? Quite possibly so.

Some young adults are rejecting many aspects of our culture, formulating radical new society patterns, and rapidly overturning existing moral standards. Quite often it appears that they seek to destroy traditions and institutions without having so much as a vague idea of what will be established as a replacement. With these young people displaying attitudes and morals so widely different from the established standards of older generations, there is small hope that the Air Force can remain immune to these cultural changes taking place throughout the nation. From this population resource, of course, must come the future lieutenants, crew chiefs, clerks, technicians, leaders, and managers of the seventies. There is evidence that the changes are already under way in the Air Force. Use of marijuana has increased to a point where osi investigative units are totally saturated. The Army and the Marines have experienced a doubling of desertion rates in the past four years, and the Air Force increase may portend worse things to come. Some blacks demand Afro haircuts and soul music, and some young airmen argue with their sergeants about whether or not to shine their shoes or scrub the floor. Indeed, the Air Force may very well be right on the fringe of some radical changes. After completing a worldwide survey of the current student unrest, Joseph A. Califano, Jr., former aide to President Johnson, commented on the parallel unrest in the military:

In the Army, dissent is a major issue on a scale unprecedented in the history of this nation. Radical newspapers are being published, anti-war coffee houses are being opened, and military discipline is no longer accepted at face value. The college graduate in the Army wants to be shown that the exercise of military authority over him is both right and necessary, the same standard he uses for all other authority.¹

In order to comprehend and cope with the problems created by these cultural changes, usaf managers need to understand how our society got where it is today, determine its current impact on the Air Force, and try to determine how it will affect the management of resources in the next decade. Unfortunately, usaf senior managers, the very people who should be attempting to solve this problem, appear to be thoroughly confused themselves. A similar observation about the civilians of that generation was made by Richard Poirer in the Atlantic Monthly:

More terrifying than the disorder in the streets is the disorder in our heads; the rebellion of youth, far from being a cause of disorder, is rather a reaction, a rebellion against the disorder we call order, against our failure to make sense out of the way we live now and have lived since 1945.²

A salient fact is that today's young people in their late teens or early twenties were untouched by two very strong factors that influenced the older generation, which includes the senior managers in the Air Force today. These two very influential factors were the depression of 1929–32 and World War II. Members of the older generation have these two influences firmly entrenched in their characters, whether they are aware of it or not. These influences have instilled in people over forty a keener respect for hunger and poverty than today's youth can ever fully understand, for so few of them have known want of any kind. Through the impact of World War II, our senior people have shared the emotion of an urgent threat to national security, the resulting unification of the nation in an almost unanimous resolve, and the happiness that was experienced at the absolute defeat of a
mortal enemy. Moreover, that enemy was one that could be identified easily with the forces of evil. That clear-cut situation contrasts sharply with the complex nature of the world today: a cold war environment that has no definite lineup of forces and an ending that cannot be visualized by even the most skillful of political scientists.

In 1945 World War II servicemen came home to civilian life with their war brides in tow and settled down to what they hoped would be a peaceful life. The GI Bill and associated veteran benefits gave them a running start toward a prosperity and affluence unheralded in the history of mankind. Children of the Great Depression, they worked diligently and successfully to acquire more and more possessions, build bigger and more expensive houses, and buy finer cars, investing wisely—in short, creating a blanket of security against any future economic calamity like that which they had experienced in the early thirties.

With new and daring psychologists as their guides, the war veterans spawned the “baby boom” and vowed to provide their children with all the things that they themselves had never been able to enjoy. In a multitude of ways the ex-servicemen broke the “shackles of tradition” and raised their children in an environment of prosperity and permissiveness.

The generation that had survived both the depression and the war entered the decade of the fifties with growing confidence and rising expectations. College completed, they entered the business world, rose in rank and position, increased their incomes, acquired more possessions, and began to display all the distinguishing marks of middle-class success. From material and economic viewpoints, their lives were well ordered and their goals were easily visible.

Had that generation taken the time to examine the moral and social aspects of their society, they might not have felt so comfortable. Perhaps it was impossible for them to determine their situation and observe the direction they were heading. Quite possibly the rapidly changing world around them and the onrush of technology distorted their perspective and permitted hindsight evaluation only. At any rate, it now seems clear that the veterans of World War II were undergoing a transition—a cultural transition in which mankind itself was in the process of growing up, and doing it much too rapidly.

Throughout the fifties strong factors were at work as this cultural transition took place. A shift in living habits and attitudes resulted in a steady increase in urbanization. A once stable living pattern, geographically, became a fluid situation with the proliferation of automobiles. At the same time the influence of the church began to decline significantly. What had previously been clear-cut moral standards now were scrutinized more carefully; some were found irrelevant and were replaced by a code called situational ethics—“It all depends on the situation.”

As the influence of the church waned, parents very carefully kept up the façade of respectability. Children were faithfully taken to church each Sunday while fathers, just as faithfully, played eighteen holes of golf. Attitudes and morals soon began to crumble, and before long the phoniness of the situation began to be apparent to the younger generation.

The space age dawned on a generation of parents and national leaders totally unprepared to cope with the rapid pace of technology, already advancing at a speed that, when coupled with growing urbanization, was bringing about subtle but very real deterioration of the society. “The society of the 1950’s based on bland conformity, privatism, and middle class values of sociality, was not ready for the sudden impact of the technological age.”

But ready or not, the age came. It arrived as most of today’s young generation was still in the early formative stages of life. The gen-
eration of the sixties grew up under the strong influences of science and technology, in a society 75 to 80 percent urbanized, constantly being reshaped and unified by the new electronic media. Television drew youth into new levels of human involvement and provided them with a depth of knowledge and a quantity of information far greater than that experienced by their parents at a comparable age. In effect, this generation became the first to grow up under the dominant influence of strongly humanistic values.

There were several strong psychological forces at work molding this young generation into the specter we see today. The first of these forces has been termed “instantism” and can be attributed to technology. Because of significant developments in packaging and preserving, it became possible to have instant foods of unlimited varieties: instant breakfast, quick-fix lunch, ten-minute TV dinners—add water and it became almost the real thing. At the same time development of the transistor permitted radios and television sets that start working immediately. As a result, today’s youth expect things on an instant basis—master the piano overnight—learn a language in just hours—build muscles in a flash—get out of Vietnam tomorrow. They are, in short, the Now Generation. The consequence of “instantism” has been a lack of patience and perseverance on the part of the young people and a corresponding intolerance of failure or slow progress.

Another psychological factor has been society’s overemphasis on scientific and material aspects of life. The young have been deluged with possessions and gadgets and overwhelmed with scientific data. Parents, teachers, and scientists have poured forth limitless streams of information, displayed all things and all creatures in the most complete, naked, and factual manner possible, and answered each and every question with totally accurate scientific pronouncements—no intuitive, mysterious aspects permitted.

Youth has rebelled. It has refused to fall down and worship “mother science” and the “almighty dollar.” It yearns instead for things meaningful, beautiful, and mysterious. It wants warmth and feeling instead of toys, trinkets, and a TV sitter. It has rejected the coldly rational, scientific, practical approach to life in favor of intuitive, humanistic attitudes.

Television has unquestionably been another major factor in the lives of the younger generation. Worldwide instant telecast has permitted them to watch Neil Armstrong take man’s first step on the moon, switch to a baseball game in New York, and then view the Vietnamese combat in their own living room, watching an infantryman bleed, in living color, as the action actually occurs. Moreover, television has brought more than a simple change in method of communication; it has also caused a change in thinking processes. The ability to select from a wide variety of programs, to reject a subject when it has become boring or difficult, moving instead to a new and exciting picture has caused the younger generation to think superficially and often indifferently about a multitude of problems without ever really coming to grips with any of them. The Now Generation is prone to view matters only as they appear here and now and is reluctant to take the time and effort to study a problem in depth, from beginning to end, and labor hard for a solution. Instead, they dash into the middle of a problem, attempt to analyze it quickly, and then turn away from it without really understanding the matters that caused the problem in the first place or to speculate on future possibilities. How much easier it has been for them to select a different channel until one is found that is easier to watch and less painful to the conscience.

Many senior USAF managers survey this young generation and despair of ever being able to turn over to it the reins of management. Frequently, the older generation reacts
to this new breed of young people angrily and irrationally, and a situation already bad becomes worse. How bad are they, really? Is there, in fact, a wide gap separating senior from junior, oldster from youngster? Can bridges be restored? Allen J. Moore, in his book *The Young Adult Generation*, has this to say about the differences between the generations and the gap that separates them:

In times of rapid change, normal differences between generations are aggravated and greatly magnified. This is due largely to a breakdown in communications structures between generations and the inability of society to maintain continuity between age groups. In other words, in spite of numerous avenues for dialogue—instant and portable TV, a proliferation of transistor radios, mountains of papers, magazines, and books, and two and a half cars per family—the generations have stopped communicating with each other. Mr. Moore contends, however, that the gap between generations is not as wide as many people believe. A recent study, he says, found that two-thirds of the students polled believed that their attitudes were very similar to the attitudes of their own parents. Further, he points out, moral standards have not been changed abruptly but have been steadily becoming more liberal for the past half century.

The younger generation thus may really not be as far out of step as suspected at first analysis. This thesis is supported by sociologists Richard Flacks and Kenneth Keniston. Both found high correlation between the beliefs of young adult protesters and their parents, as well as between those held by nonprotesters and their parents. There is, in fact, little evidence that young adults participating in the various movements of dissent have been converted from or have rebelled against those values and beliefs held by their parents.

Therefore, the gap may not be as wide or as frightening as previously feared. But it cannot be dismissed lightly. The Air Force must draw its manpower from this new generation, and never before has a generation been so dominant in creating massive changes in a culture. Dr. Clark Kerr, former Chancellor of the University of California, stated in an interview:

The students in any country are usually going in the same direction as the country itself, only the students are a little quicker and go a little bit farther. So if you want to understand students, you better try to understand the country. And also, if you want to understand the country, you better look at the students, because they are a very sensitive weathervane that will tell you the way things are pointing.

The USAF will not solve its leadership problems merely by conducting a study of student life, of course. But the new generation must be studied and its shortcomings understood. The youth of today urgently need a balancing influence, which the older generation is capable of providing. The young adult entering the Air Force in the seventies is different from his elders—different but far from perfect. Although 95 percent of the younger generation are decent, sincere, and intelligent, they need wise and capable leaders who can help them mature into the better and brighter leaders who will be needed in the eighties.

USAF managers must be made aware of and trained to cope with the traits of the young airman and officer entering the Air Force today. To overcome the effect of “instantism,” the young airman must be taught patience and perseverance. Only through experience on the job can the young man understand the need for these essential traits. Recognizing youth’s strongly humanistic attitude and sensitive nature, the properly trained manager will establish and maintain a personal, open, and direct line of communication through which he can express genuine concern for and interest in each man he supervises. In this way he will teach by experience the practical and ra-
tional approaches to problem solving. By understanding thoroughly the impact of television on a youth's thinking process, a fully prepared supervisor can assist him in thinking a problem through as he faces it, patiently explaining each step from start to finish and helping the airman arrive at a valid and realistic solution. Because he is aware that the young man will often construct lofty and impractical ideals, the manager must be trained to help him build a foundation of good sense and practicality for those beliefs. And, finally, because the young man of today frequently lacks a framework of moral and ethical standards that could serve as a guide for his life, the Air Force manager must be prepared to suggest sound goals and guidelines he can follow and set an unpretentious example he can emulate.

The question naturally arises, then, as to whether or not the Air Force is presently prepared to cope with this cultural change taking place around us. The answer must be in the negative. The vast majority of Air Force managers are woefully prepared and untrained, and the growing examples of mission failure or degradation because of this are either unrecognized for what they are or just covered up by embarrassed supervisors.

The Air Force is well equipped to accommodate the young men who enter the service in a commissioned status. The Air University system of professional military education almost guarantees the young officer an opportunity to take at least one if not all three of the courses conducted, either in residence or by correspondence. These schools are designed and operated with a high degree of flexibility and relevance, which enables them to keep pace with the changing society and make appropriate changes in leadership training techniques.

A comparable system for leadership training does not exist for the young man who pursues an Air Force career as a noncommissioned officer, however. Although Air Force Regulation 50–39 provides for NCO academies, few noncommissioned officers are afforded the opportunity to attend, and then only after they have already served as managers for fifteen years or more. AF 50–39 also provides for NCO leadership schools for airmen serving in grades E-4 and E-5, but unfortunately only five major commands are operating just a handful of such schools. Many leadership schools were closed when a manpower shortage developed because of the needs in Vietnam, and very few of them have reopened. Another directive, AF 50–37, establishes management training for junior officers, civilians, and noncommissioned officers. Again, however, the chances for the young NCO manager to attend during the early part of his career are negligible.

This deficiency in NCO leadership training is affecting the USAF at a crucial point in the organization: at the middle management level, where young and inexperienced noncommissioned officers are attempting to train, discipline, and motivate large numbers of young airmen of the Nower Generation. This is the initial point of contact with the younger generation. This is the "front line" that must contend with changing morals taking place in our society. This is the vital element that should be serving as the bridge to span the generation gap which separates the colonel from the basic airman. But unfortunately, these young noncommissioned officers are forced to do their job without the benefit of any formal leadership or management training. And, frequently, this lack of NCO training is the direct cause of mission failure or degradation: the required workload could not be accomplished because the work force lacked the proper motivation or leadership. The work that these NCO managers are responsible for almost always amounts to the very heart of the unit's mission. This is the middle manage-
ment level that must deal directly with the people. As Carl Heyel has put it:

No matter what new techniques for decision making and operational control are developed, every organization must still depend upon people for its final output. And these people must be selected, trained, assigned, directed and controlled. That is why management on the firing line continues to be the key link in every management chain of action.8

"Management on the firing line"—the flight line, the electronic maintenance shop, the data-processing room—these are the "gut" areas of the Air Force mission, and these are the areas where middle management is breaking down and adversely affecting the mission accomplishment. This breakdown has been taking place with increasing frequency, sometimes covered up and corrected by a supervisor but more often not.

The situation will worsen as USAF is given fewer men and less money. General Ryan has stated that more work must be done, and done better by fewer people. That goal will not be realized unless immediate corrective action is taken to provide adequate leadership training for junior noncommissioned officers, the E-4 and E-5 managers who must make first contact with the young airman.

AFR 50-39 does not presently outline a course of training that will do the job. That course must be revised to provide greater emphasis on human relations, understanding human nature, and personalized leadership techniques based on a knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the youth of today. At the present time only about 25 percent of the curriculum is spent on this subject area. Leadership schools must be opened up throughout the Air Force, on each base, to provide all key NCO managers in the grades of E-4 and E-5 the skills they desperately need to train and manage the young airman.

A fresh and searching look needs to be taken at the content of these leadership courses. The requirement for each subject must be examined in light of the question, What kind of a junior manager do we need in today’s Air Force? In the interests of economy and mission effectiveness, such subjects as close-order drill may have to be de-emphasized in favor of greater emphasis on effective communication. The time currently allotted for "ATC familiarization" might be better spent on a subject such as "conducting an OJT Program." In short, the entire course needs to be restructured to meet today’s needs. USAF can ill afford to continue using 1940 management techniques for the Air Force of the seventies.

In the face of a rapidly changing culture and confronted with increasing reductions in men and equipment, the Air Force is being challenged today to do more and more with less and less. If USAF management is to meet this objective, each member of the force must be capable of assuming more and more of the load. Each NCO and officer must be better motivated and better trained. The key to the entire operation may very well be how well Air Force management adjusts to the changing society in America. If adjustments are not made, if corrections are not ordered, USAF will not measure up to the stated objectives.

Air War College

Notes
7. Mary Harrington Hall, "Interview with Clark Kerr," Psychology Today, October 1967, p. 27.

This article has been adapted from a paper written by the author as a student at the Air War College, 1970-71.
THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD

Colonel Francis H. Weiland

The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) marked its twenty-ninth anniversary on 30 March 1971. It is the oldest international military body in the free world today, having operated continuously since its inception in 1942. IADB's functions are principally concerned with military planning and strategic studies. The Board also provides an invaluable opportunity for exchange of professional information and maintenance of an intimate dialogue among defense institutions of the Americas, as well as among some of the most important military personalities in the western hemisphere.

As an indication of the high regard in which the Board is held by the Latin American member governments, four former Delegates are currently presidents of their countries: General Emilio Garrastazu Medici, President of Brazil; General Fidel Sanchez Hernandez, President of El Salvador; Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, President of Guatemala; General Juan Velasco Alvarado, President of Peru.
In light of recent events in Latin America and the greatly increased urgency for an effective and viable United States foreign policy for this area, it is especially timely to examine this multinational body in some detail, for evaluation of its function as the principal military organ for coordinating defense matters in the hemisphere. The purpose of this article is to review briefly IADB’s historical development, organization, functions, and importance as an institution within the framework of the Inter-American System.

historical development

Concern for western hemisphere security in the late thirties and early forties of this century predated the formal entry of any American nations into the conflict raging in Europe. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 made security a priority consideration and triggered preparations for collective defense among the American nations. At the urging of the Chilean Foreign Minister, Juan B. Rossetti, in a cablegram to the Pan American Union on 9 December 1941, the problem was formally addressed at the Third Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, January 1942. The Ministers created the Inter-American Defense Board by unanimous resolution and immediately called a meeting of military officers in Washington, D.C., to study and recommend measures for the common defense.1

Born of the pressures and urgencies of the common threat from the Axis powers, which loomed large as the United States became heavily committed in World War II, the organization emerged as a dynamic force in resolving the immediate problems of coordinating the defense of the hemisphere. From its headquarters in Washington, the IADB framed the basis for coordination and cooperation among the individual national forces which proved so effective during the years of conflict.

Among the Board’s significant wartime accomplishments were projects dealing with security against sabotage, protection of sources of strategic materials, establishment of naval

*Diagram of the Inter-American System*
and air bases, exchange of air intelligence, antisubmarine defense, and standardization of organization, training, and materiel. The Board also succeeded in its efforts to introduce language training in military schools of each country, to insure effective communication among the armed forces of the American nations. Most important, the concept of hemispheric military cooperation and reciprocal assistance was firmly established.

In 1945 the Conference on Problems of War and Peace, meeting in Mexico City, reaffirmed the status of the IADB as the military organ of the Inter-American System. In reviewing the Board’s operation up to that time, the conference concluded that the IADB had proved its value as an agency for joint study of military problems, exchange of information, and formulation of recommendations regarding the army, naval, and air forces of the American republics.

Two later conferences of the American states developed agreements that are now perhaps the most important bases of inter-American relations. These were the Rio conference of 1947, which produced the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (better known as the Rio Pact) and the Bogota conference of 1948, which produced the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS). These two documents and the agreements which they record have become cornerstones of the Inter-American System. Discussions of defense and security matters at other conferences in the years that followed were also appropriately noted in the progressive development of the Board. Collectively they have added, either by direction or implication, new dimensions to the mission and functions of the IADB. These aspects are treated more fully in the remainder of this discussion.

organization

The general concept of the Inter-American System and the organization of its elements are depicted in the accompanying chart. Operations of the military organ, the IADB, are fully independent of the political organ, the OAS. Although Article 64 of the Charter of the OAS provides for establishment of an Advisory Defense Committee to advise the Organ of Consultation on problems of military cooperation that might arise in connection with the application of existing treaties on collective security, the committee has never been activated.

The only actual link between the Board and the OAS is through the General Secretariat of the OAS for budget purposes. Of course, if the Advisory Defense Committee were to be convoked, the Board would furnish both advisory and secretariat support to the committee. The authority of the Board emanates directly from the member states in precisely the same manner as that which exists for the OAS. OAS decisions flow to the American states through the OAS ambassadors. On the other hand, IADB resolutions are passed to the member governments by the military Chiefs of Delegation.

By majority vote of the original IADB Council of Delegates, the location of the Board was established in Washington, D.C., and the regulations and basic organizational structure were developed. The IADB initially comprised three elements: a Council of Delegates, for directing the organization, and an International Staff and a Secretariat, which were subordinate to the Council. The current structure is identical except for the addition of another subordinate element, the Inter-American Defense College.

The location of the organization is important because this determines the nationality of key positions in the structure. Board regulations specify that the host country fill the positions of Chairman of the Board, Director of the International Staff, Director of the Inter-American Defense College, and Secretary of the Board. Since the United States is the host country, these key positions are filled by rotation among the U.S. military services.
The Chairman is nominated by the service Chief of Staff to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointed by the President of the United States. The positions of Director of the International Staff, Director of the College, and Secretary of the Board are also filled through nomination by the chief of the service responsible, according to a predetermined schedule of rotation.

The present Chairman of the Board, Lieutenant General Eugene B. LeBailly of the United States Air Force, succeeded Lieutenant General James D. Alger of the United States Army. According to the established sequence, the next Chairman should be nominated by the United States Navy. The positions of Vice Chairman, Vice Director of the International Staff, and Vice Secretary of the Board are filled from nominations of Latin American states on a rotational basis, the sequence having been determined by a drawing of lots in the Council. Brigadier Jorge José Sartorio of the Air Force of Argentina, the current Vice Chairman, is also Chief of the Argentine Delegation. Prior to joining the Board, he was Commander of the VII Air Brigade, AAF.

Although this prescription for assignment of top posts to the host country would seem to suggest United States dominance, Board regulations strictly limit the authority of these positions and reserve all final policy determinations to the Council of Delegates for corporate decision. The Board may be relocated in any member country simply by a vote of the Council of Delegates. In that event, the posi-
tions of the Chairman, the Directors of the Staff and the College, and the Secretary would automatically revert to the new host country.

The Council of Delegates is the ultimate governing authority of the IADB. The Council, which is currently comprised of delegations from eighteen countries, deliberates topics on its agenda and produces decisions on internal matters in the form of directives, which are transmitted to the Staff, the Secretariat, and the Inter-American Defense College, as appropriate, for implementation. Matters concerned with planning the common defense or advisory aspects related directly to the primary mission of the Board are referred, after processing by the Council of Delegates, to the member governments in the form of resolutions.

All the delegations are manned entirely by military personnel, and most are headed by senior general or flag-rank officers, who normally serve for a period of at least two years. Size of the delegations is not limited by regulations, but as a practical matter participation in Council sessions is restricted to not more than four delegates from any nation. The larger countries generally maintain a strength of four participating delegates, while some of the smaller countries are represented by a single officer. Each delegation has but one vote, however. The Chairman does not have the privilege of a vote.

Regular sessions of the Council are held on alternate Thursdays. Additional special sessions and assemblies may be called by the Chairman or by the Council as deemed appropriate.

At the present time the International Staff is made up of 17 officers from seven countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and the United States. The work program assigned by the Council generally presupposes a Staff strength of 20 officers. All member countries are authorized to assign officers to the Staff, and representatives of additional countries are expected to participate in the near future. The Staff operates under the direction of Brigadier General Charles R. Bushong, United States Army.

An impressive volume of work is handled by the Staff, not only in relation to its modest size but also in that its work is the product of parliamentary action and multinational cooperation. All Staff divisions and committees are chaired by Latin American officers. Final staff work and recommendations are arrived at by the working elements of the Staff, in much the same manner as are decisions of the Council of Delegates. For this reason the Staff is headed by a Director and Vice Director rather than the more conventional chief and vice chief of staff.

The Staff performs all tasks specifically prescribed by the Council and accomplishes all technical work required in connection with the primary mission of the IADB. This latter process is continuous and includes preparation of special studies and supporting Staff work for coordination with military elements of the member states.

These tasks are extremely complex and demand highest attention to detail and professional skill on the part of the Staff. In the majority of instances, officers detailed to the International Staff are among the most competent and promising in the armed forces of the hemisphere. Four former Staff members have been elevated to general/flag rank in the past year, during or immediately after conclusion of their tours. Other officers are now representing their countries as ambassadors after completing their tours of duty with the Board.

The Secretariat provides administrative and logistical support for the entire organization. These functions are carried out through four Deputy Secretaries—for Administration, Conference and Documents, Finance, and Liaison and Protocol. The post of Vice Secretary is rotational by country and is currently filled by an army officer from El Salvador.

Because of the obvious need for ready ac-
cess to U.S. government protocol and support agencies and for an intimate familiarity with the Washington scene, most of the administrative personnel of the Secretariat are either U.S. nationals or Latin Americans who have long had assignments in this country. Among the many diversified tasks accomplished by the Secretariat is that of interpreting and translating the heavy volume of business of the Board, which is carried on in four languages. While Spanish is prescribed for everyday Staff work, all formal documentation is also prepared in French, Portuguese, and English. The Secretariat provides interpreter service for the Council sessions, which are conducted much like a miniature United Nations, with simultaneous interpretation in the four languages used by the member countries.

The academic organ of the Inter-American Defense Board, the Inter-American Defense College (IADC), was opened in 1962 at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. It was established for the conduct of advanced studies at the strategic level, with broad involvement in areas and disciplines particularly related to this hemisphere. The overall goal and course of instruction are very similar to those of our war colleges. The course of instruction is designed to advance the professional qualifications of military and civilian government officials, to prepare them for participation in activities associated with international cooperation within the hemisphere and interaction with nations or international organizations outside the hemisphere. Significantly, less than twenty percent of the curriculum is devoted to military subjects.

The position of Director of the College is rotated among the United States military services, in the same manner as the position of Chairman of the IADB. Rear Admiral Gene LaRocque, United States Navy, is the present

*The Council of Delegates in session*
Director of the IADB, having succeeded Major General John B. Henry, USAF.

The College, like its parent organization, is in all respects a truly inter-American institution. The positions of Assistant Director and Chief of Studies are permanently designated by Board regulations to be filled by officers from countries other than the host country. Since 1964 civilian government officials have been admitted to the College both as students and as members of the faculty. This broadening of the student body and faculty has tended to expand the scope of interest in the College and has added a new dimension to the student viewpoint being developed during the course of study. The faculty of the College is preponderantly Latin American, and Spanish is the official language for course instruction. Senior officers and civilian officials from all member nations meeting enrollment requirements are eligible for acceptance as students. Provision is made for sixty students, each member state being assigned a normal quota of three student spaces. This quota may be augmented to accommodate the desires of member governments if nominations for any class are less than capacity. Class X, which graduated in June 1971, was comprised of military and civilian students from thirteen countries. The course lasts nine months.

The College curriculum devotes much more time to the politico-economic and social fields than it does to those of a purely military nature. Typically, the student body is addressed by Latin American ambassadors to the OAS, Cabinet officers of the United States government, and lecturers who are outstanding authorities in the humanities as well as the social sciences. Thus, the course equips students to cope with the problems of the individual countries, familiarizes them with the characteristics of international organizations, and provides a broad understanding of the dynamics of the modern world.

Since its establishment, the College has graduated 337 students. Most often, alumni return to their countries to assume more advanced positions in military service or as high-level civil government officials. Their “success stories” include promotions of some forty-four alumni to general/flag rank, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, a Minister of Labor, three Ministers of Defense, and numerous others who have been appointed to high-level dual positions having civil as well as military responsibilities, such as Director of Civil Aviation. Recent developments attest that this is a continuing trend.

Top officials of the Board and the College continually receive highly complimentary correspondence and enthusiastic personal comments about the College from government leaders of the American states. These comments laud the quality of instruction and nearly ideal atmosphere for study. Attendance at the College is considered a prestigious recognition and a positive factor in advancing the professional career of the officers selected as students.

functions of the organization

As previously noted, the Inter-American Defense Board was initially established to study and advise member governments on matters concerning the defense of the western hemisphere. The planning function was later identified as part of the Board’s mission. At first glance the IADB, when paired with the OAS, seems to bear a functional similarity to NATO, and for this reason it is interesting to compare these institutions. Both are designed to provide military defense and security for their respective geographical areas.

The juridical basis in each instance is defined by formal treaties, which record the determination of the signatory parties to join in collective defense and establish means for collaboration in security matters. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 may be considered the western hemisphere counterpart of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. There are, however, some ob-
vious differences: NATO is primarily a military defense organization, while the OAS/IADB “team” embraces political, economic, and cultural fields as well. The NATO military complex is an immense and powerful force in-being. The OAS/IADB has no ready forces at its disposal; rather, it constitutes an integrated base of expert capability to resolve problems and cope with aggression. The IADB has no established “chain of command” in the classic military sense. Coordination and liaison are maintained, however, with other elements of the inter-American military system: the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA), the conferences of the chiefs of the individual armed forces, and the bilateral or multilateral exercises conducted by military forces in the hemisphere.

Strategic plans and recommendations are developed by IADB for subsequent expansion and implementation by individual member governments, rather than by multinational action as is the case with NATO. OAS/IADB operates on a budget about one-sixth that provided for the combined NATO operation, although the mission of both is to deter aggression and provide for collective defense in event of attack.

Each of these organizations is playing an extremely important role in world affairs, and they continue to function effectively in their respective areas of concern. The OAS/IADB, however, accomplishes its missions relative to security aspects at much less cost and somewhat less formality.

Perhaps the distinction between these two great defense complexes is historically a function of the nearness of the threat of outside intervention. The closeness of the Soviet Union and its historical preoccupation with imposing a barrier between the Eastern bloc and the West, coupled with its direct interventions in the internal affairs of some of the Eastern bloc countries, have constituted a more imminent threat than any facing the Americas.

The Central American Defense Council was established 14 December 1963 in Guatemala City and is comprised of the Defense Chiefs of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Panama, although not a member, regularly sends observers to activities conducted by CONDECA. Its organization is patterned generally after the IADB and does function as a regional military organ; but it is not subordinate to the Board. IADB observer participation and reports received from CONDECA exercises provide an important element of realism to overall defense planning.

The conferences of the chiefs of the armed forces have accumulated an admirable list of accomplishments, related, of course, to the interests of their respective services. Here again, through observer participation and receipt of conference reports and special studies, the Board derives significant tangible benefits. Observers at the annual Air Force chiefs’ conferences and the reports generated by these conferences have provided timely technical ingredients for Air Force aspects of Board plans.

In those countries that have assigned airborne antisubmarine functions to their Air Forces, appropriate units are included in this essentially naval training operation.

Several combined exercises have been conducted in the hemisphere. These have often been arranged with U.S. support but under multinational auspices.

Military planning by the IADB is focused on the strategic level. Since it is the highest military organ in the Inter-American System, the Board formulates those basic elements for military planning that are not already established in existing documents of the System. For example, the Board produces “Basic Elements of Continental Policy,” “General Strategic Evaluation,” and “Continental Strategic Concept” and keeps these documents current. Board plans are designed for maximum flexibility, to provide a basic format for coordination and to permit effective operational plan-
ning by national authorities.

The first General Military Plan was developed in 1949 and 1950, was accepted by the Board in 1951, and is maintained continuously by the Staff. Subsequent revisions have been made to accommodate, as appropriate, the changing political conditions in the world. The plan is classified, of course, but it can be said that specialized aspects, such as strategic areas and logistics, are covered in a number of detailed annexes.

Of the possible war hypotheses now addressed in the plans, it is recognized that the most probable threat is that manifested in many areas in the form of rural guerrilla movements and, more recently, in urban terrorism. These movements are alleged to be supported to some degree by nations of the Communist bloc. Even though it is considered that Castro-sponsored insurgency presents an immediate, tangible threat to social progress and political stability in the Americas, Soviet and Chinese Communist inroads present a longer-term threat. Soviet policy, unlike that of Cuba, encompasses more subtle and indirect means of reaching its subversive goals. It
is recognized also that, while the Communist countries publicly attempt friendly relations with American governments through intensified diplomatic intercourse and trade and cultural exchanges, they simultaneously support local Communist parties. IADB studies and planning continue to encompass all aspects of military concern. The threats of armed attack and subversion are afforded appropriate consideration in all aspects of staff work.

In general, the work of the Board is addressed to the member governments in the form of recommendations or resolutions. The final formal acceptance of this work, however, is entirely at the discretion of the individual governments.

Consistently, officers assigned to the Board have firmly supported the principle of hemispheric solidarity, and the Board has remained staunchly anti-Communist. At the same time, many members are quick to emphasize their belief that Communism cannot be neutralized by military force alone but must be preempted through vigorous effort in the economic and social fields as well. Many of the studies produced by the IADB Staff have highlighted the necessity of continuously relating defense planning to nonmilitary fields of national development. Board members recognize the need for increased effort on the part of their own military leadership toward achievement of this purpose.

**Importance of IADB in Inter-American System**

While evaluation of any international organization is often difficult to express in concrete terms, the IADB has earned many credits during its long history. Not the least of these is the fact that only one relatively minor armed conflict has occurred in Latin America since the Board was established. The very existence of the Board has been a major contribution to the preservation of peace and security in the western hemisphere. The cooperation and interchange fostered by the Board do much to eliminate friction among neighboring armed forces.

The absence of official military representation on the OAS Council and the lack of regularized official coordination between the OAS and the IADB are considered by some to be weaknesses which tend to make the system less effective than it could be. When Dr. Galo Plaza, Secretary General of the OAS, addressed the Council of Delegates of the IADB in June 1968, he acknowledged the importance of coordination and liaison between the two organizations and pledged to seek ways to that end. The most recent example of this relationship is the fact that the Board was invited to send a representative to attend the sessions of the OAS General Council and the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The Board was represented at these sessions by the Chairman, Lieutenant General Eugene B. LeBailly.

The Board has proved to be a valuable agency for planning and for collaboration among military officials of its twenty member countries. This close affiliation embraces all branches of the armed forces, and the continuous exchange of imaginative professional military views constitutes an extremely important nucleus for mounting a rapid collective effort in defense of the hemisphere if need be.

Now, nearly thirty years after its establishment, the IADB continues to produce military plans, advice, and recommendations for the member states. This function is extremely important in maintaining a continuous strategic evaluation and a capability to respond to any threat by marshaling resources quickly for collective defense. At a time when some political pundits seem inclined to optimism regarding the cold war—in spite of the Soviet suppression of initiative among its satellites and the continuing Communist aggravation in Berlin, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East—many Latin Americans hold an opposing view. To them, the external threat is more ominous and insidious now than ever before. The need for close military collaboration, alert
area surveillance, and an aggressive internal security program is well recognized.

The Inter-American Defense Board provides the active organization for accomplishing strategic-level studies and plans for just such a situation. It has even greater potential and stands ready to do more.

Inter-American Defense Board

Notes

1. Resolution XXXIX, Third Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro, January 1942.

2. As used in this article, the term "Inter-American System" embraces all official permanent organizations and intergovernmental conferences to meet political, economic, social, and military requirements of the American states comprising the system, which are also members of the OAS.

3. The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Rio de Janeiro, August 15-September 2, 1947. The Rio Pact established the boundaries of the security zone of concern to the signatory states and is referenced in Article 4 of the Treaty. This zone is defined in the treaty in specific coordinates of latitude and longitude, generally as enclosing the territory of North and South America and adjacent waters, from pole to pole. Significantly, although Canada is not a member of either the OAS or the IADB and is not a participant in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, its territory is included in the security zone defined in the Treaty.

4. Originally founded with 21 countries, the IADB excluded Cuba in 1961. Of the 20 remaining members, only Costa Rica and Haiti do not presently have a delegate assigned, but this situation is temporary.

Correction

The Soviet SS-9 missile shown on page 19 of our September-October 1971 issue was incorrectly identified as an SS-11. Both the SS-9 and the smaller SS-11 missiles have been tested with multiple re-entry vehicles.
THEN IT'S TOMMY THIS, AN' TOMMY THAT, AN' "TOMMY, 'OW'S YER SOUL?"

BUT IT'S "THIN RED LINE OF 'EROES" WHEN THE DRUMS BEGIN TO ROLL—

*   *

FOR IT'S TOMMY THIS, AN' TOMMY THAT, AN' "CHUCK HIM OUT, THE BRUTE!"

BUT IT'S "SAVIOUR OF 'IS COUNTRY" WHEN THE GUNS BEGIN TO SHOOT . . .

—Kipling

THE "AGE OF AQUARIUS"—THIS TIME OF PROTEST AND DISSENT—AUGURS BADLY FOR AMERICAN MILITARY MEN. TO A SMALL BUT VOCAL YOUNG MINORITY, DISENCHANTED WITH THE STATE OF OUR NATION, ANTIMILITARIsm IS A BASIC TENET OF FAITH. AND GIVEN THIS CONDITION OF DISAFFECTION, THE ABILITY OF THE MILITARY TO SURVIVE AS A VIVABLE, PROUD, AND DISCIPLINED ORGANIZATION IS IN JEOPARDY.

IT WILL BE THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE TO EXPLORE THE IMPLICATIONS WHICH YOUTHFUL ANTIMIL—
We have never, since the Battle of Bull Run, been caught up in a social revolution at a time of simultaneous economic affluence and economic stress, while debating foreign policy and, at the same time, fighting an unpopular war. The total impact of this novel environment has been a tremendous and generally unfavorable effect on attitudes toward the military services, particularly the attitudes of young people.4

For many, the ills of America go deep into the gut of this country. In his thought-provoking book The Crisis of Confidence, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., reasons that though millions were out of work in the worst days of the Great Depression, one could safely walk the city streets. In the 1930s America’s dissidents endured by remaining inside the fabric of society. Despite the economic situation, people still respected traditional stability. Nobody killed our leaders; no state went communist; no gangs murdered business men; looting was virtually unknown.5

The fact remains that in the 1930s most people did not challenge the American system itself! Yet apparently this is happening today. As Herbert Marcuse, philosopher of the New Left, asserts: the system itself—with its “aggression, domination, exploitation, ugliness, hypocrisy or dehumanization, routine performance”—is under cross-examination.6

So it is that some of the young—who have seen three of their champions murdered in America (the two Kennedys and Dr. King)—literally seek to revolutionize our nation. Meanwhile, says Mr. Schlesinger, middle-class Americans are so frightened and polarized that a recent gun registration ordinance in Chicago turned up 357,598 guns—probably more equipment than that possessed by many active armies.7

Amplifying my earlier reference to American dissident youth blaming much of this trouble on the military, the New Republic, in a lead editorial, “A Restoration of Confidence,” said:
Those who protest and march and those who don't cannot comprehend how the hungry can be fed, cities made livable, rivers and air purified, the uneducated properly schooled—so long as the President and Congress commit most of our national budget to the military.8

Yet most military men fail to understand why they should be scapegoats for every possible shortcoming in America today. In this position, they join the overwhelming majority of Americans over thirty who disagree strenuously with “mod” youth. For older Americans, these young people are engaging in an untenable refusal to “play by the rules”:

*They* had to work to achieve the social position they presently occupy, but other groups...
in American society are demanding these positions as a matter of right. *Their* children had to pass entrance exams to get into college; other men’s children (they think) do not. *Their* fathers had to work long hours to support their families: other men’s fathers seemingly did not. *They* fought bravely to defend America in World War II and in the Korean War, and now it is alleged that those who fight and die in wars are immoral or foolish. *They* lived according to the American ethic of sobriety and respectability, and now they see on TV the spectacle of the drug smoking hippie at a rock festival.

So today’s middle-class American is told the old ways no longer apply; others can take by handout what he sweated to achieve. Yet what of the rules of hard work, belief in God, and patriotism which “made America great”? Many military men will be quick to agree that America, faced with a chronic distaste for the old ways, is in a crisis. Today, we have alien creeds and a loss of traditional religious belief; hippie dirt in place of discipline; class war; ungovernable cities; mannish women; nudity flaunted; a chaotic society. The changing standards and lack of social stability are reflected in our X-rated and R-rated movies, which present areas of experience and behavior that would have been deemed unworthy of our neighborhood movie screens as recently as a decade ago.

With the present milieu, then, it is easy to see why Mr. Harwood’s investigation for the *Washington Post* found military men confused by present-day American mores. As one West Point major put it, “Does society care for us? Does it respect us and believe in what we are doing? How are we to function in a hostile society?”

*America in decline?*

We must go one step deeper with this problem. A physician cannot hope to halt a deep infection by treating only the skin surface. In the same way, any commentary on contemporary American antimilitarism must move to the ultimate question: Could it be, simply stated, that the youth reject traditional ideas of patriotism because this nation is in a sickening decline?

It is said that the oldest known piece of writing is a stone tablet dated many centuries before Christ. Upon this tablet are written words which translate as follows: “Alas, times are not what they used to be; children no longer honor their parents.” In the days of Plato, also, men complained that children were not respectful of their elders. Obviously, bemoaning the decadence of the younger generation is nothing new.

Nonetheless, there is a genuine feeling among many of America’s concerned thinkers that something is disastrously wrong. As support for this thesis, consider one leading intellectual magazine, *Horizon,* reputed to have its finger on the pulse of current thought. Recent articles have compared the Fall of Rome to present-day America; commented on “The Flight from Reason”; and compared the United States to the fragile, haunted Weimar Republic.

The intellectual historians see a general aversion being voiced by the young against the old mores and a rejection of traditional values. More important, as Professor Edmund Stillman wrote in *Horizon,* in his intriguing article, “Before the Fall,” there appears to be a failure of national nerve by both old and young.

Stillman posits—and many would agree—that amazing parallels exist between the Fall of Rome and our own time and people. Comparisons are easily made: In both Rome and present-day America, “the kids have it too easy,” and the severe frontier ways no longer gain honor; in both worlds, “old religions” receive lip service—but a young Christian willing to die for his faith is today, arguably, as hard to come by as a Roman youth in A.D. 250 willing to die for, say, belief in the god Jupiter. In both times and places, parents in-
dulge their children by overpermissiveness. In both, morals are lax; a breakdown in law and order appears imminent; words like “chastity,” “altruism,” “patriotism,” “esprit de corps,” or “nationalism” are considered outdated and funny. As with Rome, America’s best men seem drained off to fight. In both, tradesmen do shoddy work; manual labor is thought demeaning; dehumanizing practices gain wider acceptance; discipline is in short supply; and the economy—geared to war and deficit spending—decays.

Are these parallels between Rome and America accurate? At least since the time of Gibbon, historians have been fascinated with unraveling the riddle of why Rome fell. Through this discovery, they hope to avoid failure in their own society.

Is there validity in the comparison of the two nations? Unfortunately, history does not yield its lessons easily. But what happened in Rome following its permissiveness must give us pause for our own times. In Rome, the last of the old stoic virtues remained in but one class: the military. There, also, military emperors eventually took control, and the nation remained more or less a military dictatorship for centuries.

some tentative suggestions

Admittedly, these matters are disturbing. In light of what has been written, we come full circle to the point of origin: Given today’s social and intellectual attitude of “Do your own thing,” is there any place for a disciplined military force? To put it more simply, How does the military survive, faced with the hippie generation?

For the military to remain a proud organization, it must demonstrate that no conflict exists between today’s creative participation and the more traditional concepts of duty, honor, country. In searching for ways by which the military might best achieve success in this purpose, I have arrived at five suggested areas for exploration:

- We must enrich the sphere open to ambitious younger officers and airmen. The Air Force must reweigh the role of the military and consider whether that task might become more far-reaching. It might include domestic civic action programs accelerating social, racial, and economic growth; exchange programs with colleges and local governments; and dialogue to bridge the gap between military and civilian citizens.

- We must recognize that today’s bright young man wants to do his best, and we must offer the greatest of participative management possible, consistent with discipline and mission. Autocratic management leaves little place, of course, for job satisfaction or creativity. Some would go farther and question whether certain traditional practices are necessary for carrying out the mission. In today’s “soft core” force, for example, Air Force enlisted personnel are distinctive from those of the other services in that they rarely engage in battle. Though the mission may be to fly and fight, must the Nco in civil engineering, the JAG paralegal technician, or the personnel manager also be fighters? Perhaps not.

- We must challenge our bright junior men and reward their excellence. Today’s youth possess great capacity to yield fresh perceptions to the Air Force. As General James Ferguson said, speaking to a Space and Missile Systems Organization group of junior officers, the men want and need recognition for genuine achievements—what General Ferguson calls “psychic income.” Such recognition is not to be had through making a bright young man a library officer or engaging in what General John C. Meyer calls “Mickey Mouse and Bunny Rabbit programs.” Perhaps this also means disabusing ourselves of what many think is a fascination for trivia—superficial aspects of tradition which today lack relevance for many. Perhaps, after all, the length of one’s hair, the presence of a
“tail” showing on an airman’s fatigue uniform, or the “leveling” of books by order of height at a service academy could be re-examined for their “relevance” (to use the modern vernacular). Eliminating outdated concepts and giving real jobs to these men means demonstrating that imagination and intelligence are needed and will be nurtured; means being sensitized to legitimate gripes about the structure of the forces; means never abridging individual freedom of choice and action unnecessarily.

* We must recognize that there is no need yet to panic. Military historians have pointed out that very vocal antimilitarism is a traditional part of America. During the past 25 years we have enjoyed an unusually long period of high acceptance by society. A review of history will point out matters of pertinent interest: some 98 draft dodgers were killed in riots in the first few months of the Civil War; the first shots in the Mexican War were fired while Congress was preparing to abolish West Point; and some 67 percent of the population opted against the Korean War in late 1950. Thus, the message to be learned from history is, simply, Don’t panic. The American people seldom really “like” the military, and for the Air Force to expect love from the civilian sector is asking too much.

* Finally, we must possess a means for
military men to register legitimate—even controversial—feelings without fear of censure. Otherwise, experiment and criticism will pass to "outsiders" rather than Air Force professionals who fully understand our mission and "the art of the possible." For example, many Air Force officers today reason that the stage directors of the Vietnam conflict are civilians who have superintended that overall expedition, yet the military is blamed for the fact that the war is not "won." Many officers privately insist that the American government never asked the military to "win" that conflict. Now, when does free expression of this view become impermissible license? Perhaps the issue needs much thoughtful probing.  

For Lincoln, too, there existed a brutal, bloody, unpopular conflict. In the Civil War, as now, there was little clear understanding of the national aim. Then, as now, riots caused injury or death. Then, as now, newspapers editorialized against the President, calling him a tyrant, despot, or wicked traitor. Then, as now, foreign critics second-guessed the American leader. Then, as now, "doves" in New England asked for a moratorium. Then, as now, the youth called the war sinful and unjustifiable. Yet Lincoln remained true to the words he had spoken in 1860, while still an unknown attorney, at Cooper Union in New York. His words may offer safe harbor for the doubts which assail us today:

Neither let us be slandered from our duty by false accusations against us, nor frightened from it by menaces of destruction. . . . Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith let us to the end dare to do our duty as we understand it.

JAG School,  
Institute for Professional Development

The crisis facing the American military today is the same as that which faced the nation over a century ago. History may or may not repeat itself—but remarkable similarities exist between the problems of our present Commander in Chief, trapped in the frustration of a foreign adventure and a radical domestic society, and another Republican President.

Notes

7. Schlesinger, op. cit.
In My Opinion

THE COMMANDER
AND THE MINORITY MENTAL PROCESS
I worry a great deal about a very tangible and personal qualification necessary for effective interaction with minority personnel, that of racial sophistication. This sophistication is not what you might imagine: it doesn't come from a mere belief that all men are created equal; it doesn't come from attending a school that was integrated back in the forties; and it also doesn't necessarily come from the exercise of command.

Today I will assume that commanders are all racially sophisticated and that you will grant me total academic freedom so that I may, in effect, take the gloves off a delicate subject. You may perhaps evaluate your own internal racial sophistication by the degree to which you are or are not surprised by what I say. As you know, in the Equal Opportunity business we are mainly concerned with the black minority problem, because it outranks all others in severity.

By an unfortunate but necessary circumstance, a large majority of Americans have been victim of an immense put-on by black Americans. This put-on has involved purposely conveyed mistruths and evasions repeated and repeated for centuries by a minority filled with hostility and frustration. The scope and depth of black hostility toward whites has—to this day—remained beyond the comprehension of the layman.

I was in Montgomery, Alabama, during the historic bus boycott of the mid-fifties, attending Squadron Officer School. In the evenings and on weekends I would spend my time engaged in what limited social activities there were. Well, social activities were less frivolous than usual because the big topic every night at churches, in restaurants, bars, and at other gathering places was the status of the boycott. The object of much hilarity and anger were the stories related by live-in and live-out domestic help. They would relate, to everyone's cynical amusement, how they told their employers in no uncertain terms that they didn't want any part of that mess!—that there were a lot of outsiders about, just causing trouble!

This information was imparted to the employers with dramatic and practical sincerity—a sincerity necessary to survive. By and large, ol' dependable Bessie Mae and Beulah were believed. In this and many other circumstances, the black either said nothing or conveyed the opposite of his true attitude to his employer.

To a lesser extent, a similar evasion has occurred in the military among black officers and NCO's. Under the circumstances of integration of the armed forces, there has been a reluctance on the part of the black officer and NCO to advertise his blackness. After all, were not the services proclaimed fully integrated? What retort is there to the statement that you can progress just as far and as fast as your abilities dictate? Many things have conspired to introduce subliminal pressures to be quiet about race and to concentrate on the business of seeking out the hated enemy.

All these things and others left the nation unprepared for a historic phenomenon that has occurred within the framework of American society: the Africanization of the American black. What exactly do I mean by the Africanization of the American black? Visually, its manifestations are quite apparent: the Afro, the dashiki, the black power symbol, etc. Naturally, the mental process is less apparent, but most noticeable in the military is the proliferation of black ethnic groups or associations.

If this Africanization had not occurred coincident with the hippie cult and long hair, it would probably be more dramatic or obvious because essentially it reflects an irreversible conceptual rejection of the American dream.

Let's think about the when and why it happened. The time of change can be readily identified. If you were to obtain one of the film strips of national newspapers and carefully run the film backwards, you would note that the beginning of the rejection of American dress, American grooming, and so forth
IN MY OPINION

began at approximately the time the Fair Housing Bill was defeated in Washington. If you continued to run the film backwards, you would see the continuing demonstration process that had its genesis in Montgomery. But the defeat of the Fair Housing Bill in 1966 was most significant because its message to black Americans was that you may have integration but not equality. As you remember, prior to this bill the demand for equal rights was being answered by bill after bill, all of which represented quantum civil rights advances. However, the Fair Housing Bill was really to have furthered true equality because it would have facilitated the destruction of the ghetto. The obvious reversal of voting patterns by previously staunch supporters of Negro rights tended to validate in the minds of the then Negro a deeply rooted folk attitude that the American white cannot be trusted. Figuratively speaking, it rendered the then moderate Negro impotent. In the mind of the black, the Fair Housing Bill represented acceptance as a social equal; it represented recognition that the right to own property anywhere in one’s land was equal in importance to the right to dispose of property.

Today the militant young black’s view is that integration alone is unacceptable; equality is the goal. Many people have been confused by first the black appeal for integration and then the apparent attempts by blacks to resegregate themselves. This is not really a conflict but is a manifestation of the ideology of separatism. Under this concept, to be integrated means that a superior “accepts” an inferior and grants rights to him. Separatism on the other hand means that there are two lateral and equal positions—the white position and the black position. Neither grants the other anything because they are both equal; that is, equal but different. Thus we now have the black fixation on an ethnic identity. Until very recently the black was actually ashamed to be black. The African was really thought to be like those native characters in Tarzan movies. Negroid hair was thought to be ugly and very African.

Because a human being is a human being, the sudden rejection of attempts to look and think exactly like the white American has resulted in some overreaction in the black lateral position. The danger in American culture for years to come will be that the seriousness of what has occurred will not be understood. In the end we shall have a better America, but I fear our racial confrontations will become more serious before they ease. We see many overreactions to this change, most notably the Black Panther stance versus the police. The result is that the Panthers are now accepted as black folk heroes.

Our current military racial problems are not simply a reflection of the attitudes or circumstances occurring in American society. No, our problems are the result of nonrecognition or lack of appreciation of the fact that, though we all call ourselves American, separate identifiable cultures are involved.

It has been common many times to speak of the adjustments that some people have to make when they come into the military. One example is the guy from upstate Minnesota who has never had any contact with blacks before. Seldom mentioned or appreciated is his black counterpart. As Equal Opportunity Officer I am continually in contact with northern big-city ghetto blacks who until they came into the service had no contact with whites. The isolation and immensity of the New York, Chicago, Washington, Philadelphia ghettos—to mention a few—produce first-term airmen whose total world has previously been black. The ghetto is not a nice place to grow up in. The product of the ghetto is naturally a bit different from his service bunkmate who is, say, a middle-class white. The ghetto’s black is often sullen, aggressive, hostile, loud—a problem.

Essentially, the ghetto serviceman is a problem because he’s in a strange environment, competing with others from—often—highly
advantaged backgrounds; but of course he's "being treated just like everyone else." Sure as shootin' he's being supervised by some hard taskmaster who lets the chips fall where they may and is absolutely convinced that he's the world's fairest individual. What the supervisor doesn't realize is that this black youngster is not under the slightest illusion that he's equal to everyone else. Now suddenly, in a white world, he hears articulate conversation in the barracks, and it upsets him: he realizes how shallow his world has been, he realizes how poor his diction is, he even feels stilted in making small talk. And when he's put up on the starting line by the fairest supervisor in the world and told to compete, his mental process says "Uh huh, that guy knows I'm going to fail." When his deportment begins to deteriorate after he's been given an equal chance to succeed, it is perhaps concluded that he's just a troublemaker after all.

Often this airman, unable to communicate with you as his commander, is so sensitive about his communicative inadequacies that he refuses to be drawn out. Perhaps you have noted a lack of personality in many black airmen. This apparent lack of personality is actually an unfortunate inability to communicate effectively so as to project personality. Actually, he's quite awed by you and the power you wield. This awe is unfortunate because in many instances it prevents him from approaching you informally. The fifty black guys down at the ball diamond demanding redress represent people who in most cases have all their lives listened at the breakfast and dinner table to parents talk about what the supervisor did or said to them or what they had to do as a result of some supervisor's order. Their picture of society is that of someone being supervised, someone at the bottom rung, someone powerless. This type of individual feels so powerless and inadequate (and this inadequacy is reinforced by his new association with airmen from white middle-class backgrounds) that when he finally gets up nerve enough to say something meaningful—something he feels is constructive—he has to have forty-nine other guys with him for support, and it comes off as a confrontation.

Although this guy is black, in many instances his presence forces on the supervisor an attitude readjustment that benefits young white personnel also. One notable feature of the so-called militant black movement is the lack of reaction from white airmen. To be sure, there are those who say that the blacks are getting special privileges, but perhaps you will have those with you always. Actually, the young white often is in agreement with the objective of black grievances, but he is not of a cultural orientation that would predispose him to the brinksmanship approach of communicating problems.

Many times there is an attempt to say that something was a "nonracial" thing, just people problems. Here again the point is missed: any time only black personnel are involved in something it may appear nonracial, but the question must be asked, Why are only the blacks interested? For instance, Why would the use of disposable plastic glasses in a mess hall annoy only black airmen? What I'm inferring is that because of the communicative helplessness of many blacks—because so many feel that you are incapable of understanding their feelings—they'll quite often confuse you by injecting seemingly unimportant nonracial complaints.

I can remember a number of years ago how the Commandant of Marines explained the racial assaults and disorders that were occurring at Camp Lejeune. He said that a number of mistakes had been made: not enough soul music on the juke boxes, for one; another was a statement in a medical guide that in suspected heat exhaustion the marine should be checked for paleness. He then said it was now realized that the statement was considered offensive to blacks because they don't pale. I remember shaking my head at the time, knowing it would be unfortunate if he contin-
ued to believe that that sort of thing was causing black marines to assault whites. Though he may well have been told that, again you have these misleading illustrations by those who feel that it is impossible or embarrassing to attempt to communicate reality. What was really being said was that black marines were completely ignored as identifiable contributors to the corps. The soul music bit and the medical book were only the "for examples."

In terms of racial sophistication, the Thirteenth Air Force approach has been to de-emphasize the motherhood aspect of equal opportunity. In other words, we have perhaps gotten a bit off the track in approaching equal opportunity in terms of the Ten Commandments or the Bill of Rights. All too often we have associated it with many cultural ideals that are not really encompassed in our day-to-day lives but are merely accepted in a conceptual sense. For instance, in terms of our cultural orientation it is bad to be prejudiced. However, I think if we were to examine the black attitude toward prejudice we would find that the black does not expect an individual to be unprejudiced. He well appreciates the fact that to grow up unprejudiced in today's society would be an exceptional accomplishment. Rather, the black appreciates those individuals who recognize and "accept" their prejudices and are therefore in full control of their expressed attitudes.

One unfortunate thing that usually occurs when a racially unsophisticated supervisor initially confers with a black subordinate is that there is an attempt to say something like "I'm from the North" or "I grew up unprejudiced" or "I believe in treating everyone fairly." Although it might be considered just the thing to say, this type of statement is considered offensive to a black. In particular, I would caution anyone from the North against using that geographical locale as a sort of plus factor. Black folklore does not favorably differentiate between the northerner and the southerner. Quite often the northerner is at a disadvantage in dealing with the American black because the black has often observed that the northerner is more susceptible to reversals of attitudes under pressure than the southerner is. The southerner, having once made his racial attitude known, pro or con, is generally thought to maintain a reliable and consistent position; conversely, the northerner is often felt to be racially unreliable.

In fact, I think more candor would go a long way towards winning the confidence of black military personnel. Actually, a black subordinate would be pleasantly surprised to hear a white supervisor say that he is to some degree prejudiced; that he is prejudiced because he grew up that way; that he has not been able to cope fully with the attitudes he learned many years ago; that he is not completely sure of himself in terms of not saying things that are considered offensive by blacks; that far from blacks' being hurt personally or professionally while under his supervision, he feels that he and the organization will benefit from their presence. Then when a slip of the lip occurs, the black will not discredit the earlier professed lack of prejudice and feel he's really in an enemy camp.

In addressing the subject of supervision and equal opportunity problems, one thing was clearly evident to me as base Equal Opportunity Officer at Takhli. Though there were a number of organizations that had large numbers of black personnel, only a few seemed to have racial problems. I used to have a sort of standing joke with my base Assistant Equal Opportunity NCO. When he would call to say that there was an airman in his office with a problem, I'd jokingly remark, "Don't tell me he's from________squadron!" Many of the squadrons were never heard from with requests for adjudication of racially oriented problems, while others seemed to be a hotbed of dissident activity. In most instances there was one personality to whom everything pointed as the culprit, and usually that personality was a senior NCO. In all my experi-
ence as base Equal Opportunity Officer at Takhli, I never had a complaint against an officer from an equal opportunity standpoint. However, I do not intend to let the officer off the hook so lightly. Though in many instances the senior NCO was fingered as the problem, when the OIC or commander would depart, the problems of the particular organization ceased, even though the same senior NCO was still present. Naturally, the NCO is in a position where he has much more “body contact” with airmen than do the officers. I have concluded that many times the NCO was not really to blame but was more readily so identified because he carried out the policies of the OIC or commander.

Perhaps my biggest shock as Equal Opportunity Officer—and this after eighteen years’ service at the time—was to find that there are individuals in the ranks who purposely and continually harass others for no reason except that they are of a different race or different religion, and that this harassment was so designed and calculated. I was not prepared for this, but through thorough equal opportunity investigations, I was able to document it time and time again.

When I’d encounter such situations and brief the commander on racial problems expressed to me by one or more of his airmen, his first reaction would normally be to hit the ceiling. He would most definitely and emphatically state that his door was always open and question why the airman found it necessary to bring this thing out in the open without first advising him. Essentially, the fact that the airman did take the problem outside the organization served as constructive criticism, for although the door was open, someone or something had tended to block the progress of personal complaints through it.

I recently made a tour of all Thirteenth Air Force bases in Thailand, and at one base I addressed a meeting of all organization and tenant squadron commanders. I was rather surprised the next day, while awaiting my air-

craft at the airport, when a squadron commander came down specifically to speak to me. This squadron commander, a captain, said he had enjoyed my presentation and would like my comments on a situation that he was currently faced with. It seems that the black airmen in the organization had requested an audience with him, but he was deferring their request on the advice of his first sergeant, who felt that the white airmen in the organization would consider it preferential treatment. He stated that his first sergeant had twenty years’ service and he did not feel he should buck this experience. The scenario sounded all too familiar. I advised him that probably the reason his first sergeant opposed the meeting was that the captain would be hearing a lot about his first sergeant at the meeting. I thought that the comments of his black personnel would be very constructive to him as a commander.

If I could say that I have come to one major conclusion as a result of my exposure to the equal opportunity business, it would be that we have airmen in the military who, if employed by industry, would be called the hard-core unemployed. I call them the hard-core unemployed basic airmen. “Hardcore unemployed” is a term that industry has applied to personnel who normally would not be hired but who were hired because of government contractual requirements. Since industry, unlike the military, is profit-oriented, once industry had these guys on board it had to decide how to make a profit out of them. Industry decided to institute programs for retraining and reorienting them.

The programs developed were quite extensive, and industry began to learn some rather interesting things about these people. Not surprisingly, it was found in many instances that they could not get to work on time. Though this tardiness was initially considered mere ir-
responsibility, closer examination disclosed that they had never really learned the social value of timeliness. They had never held positions that required punctuality; in fact, they had held very few positions. It took a considerable amount of time to orient these people toward the reason why being on time was important, but in most cases they were eventually successful. They also found that an apparent lack of job aggressiveness on the part of disadvantaged employees was not a physical laziness but was actually an aversion to undertaking new responsibilities for fear of failure or fear of criticism. Tardiness and lack of aggressiveness were, therefore, determined to be constant factors or habit patterns.

If you look at the military performance profile of many airmen whom we process through 39–12 actions today, you often see a familiar pattern of circumstances and actions eventually culminating in identification of the individual as a "troublemaker," whereas actually he was, through lack of background, unable to meet particular standards. A typical example is being late to work. This individual cannot believe that he is so important to the vast military machine that he need be given an Article 15 because he is late for work a few times. But of course that is exactly what happens. He does not consider the fact that his overall performance has been marginal anyway. Because he does not understand and has not previously developed the social values of the broader community, he interprets the punishment for minor infringements of rules as directed at him because of his color, and an almost predictable deterioration of his deportment results.

Although I have touched on only a small portion of the hard-core unemployed problem that we have in the military but do not recognize, I think we will have to address specifically these individuals and their problems as we move toward the all-volunteer force. As an example, I might statistically emphasize my comments by pointing out that at one of the large bases in the SEA theater fifty-five percent of the airmen basic are black. I feel that eventually this problem will have to be remedied by longer periods of basic training for this type of personnel, black or white. Why? Because, unfortunately, we are turning these unprepared individuals loose in our military society before we have sufficiently reoriented their social values and remedied their cultural inadequacies.

One of the things constantly being used in the equal opportunity area today is the rap session or round-table discussion. I think essentially this is fine as long as we do not use such forums as a device cloaked under the word "communication." We are beginning to use the word "communication" today the way we quite often use the word "professional"—that is, impropetly. It is beginning to be implied that as long as we just communicate we are solving problems. In many of the equal opportunity round-table discussions or rap sessions that I have attended, communication was going on, but only the transmitting or sending part of communication; the receiving part, the listening and understanding portion of communication, was lacking. Quite often these sessions amount to a period of mutual admonition, name calling, and exposure of problems, but no problem solving. I feel it is important, when this type of session is held, that someone insure that problems once identified are followed up and, hopefully, solved. Otherwise this form of communication begins to take on the air of "doing your thing."

In conclusion, I'd like to say that the equal opportunity field is very young and still thrashing about for effective methodology. The equal opportunity officer has an emotionally draining job in that he is in daily contact with emotionally disturbed people. The first emotionally disturbed person he meets is the guy who brings in the problem. The next emotionally disturbed person encountered is the one just informed that he has been accused of being racially prejudiced. After nine
to twelve months of equal opportunity adjudication, many officers and NCO's develop a case of what I call “equal occupitis.” At long-term bases they ask to be relieved; at the conclusion of short tours they happily disappear from view. The main reason for this has been that although equal opportunity is a full-time job, it has previously been delegated as just another “additional duty.” However, we now see a number of Air Force actions that are fast leading to the designation of the equal opportunity field as an Air Force specialty.

The world through black eyes is much different from the one you commanders imagine. Because the average black has always been so removed from the exercise of power, he actually views your position as a sort of super omnipotent one. When he opens the base newspaper, he makes a point of looking for black faces; if none are there, he draws some conclusion about the paper’s staff and you. He watches you as you make your rounds of the base—he watches to see if and how you approach black personnel, and he draws a conclusion. He looks at the ratio of black to white prisoners in your confinement facility and draws a conclusion about you. He listens to your speech pattern and is unconcerned as to whether it is southern or northern, but he listens for the word “boy” or “colored people” or “I was a poor boy myself and look how I’ve succeeded”—he listens for these gaffes and draws conclusions. Although you may not feel that these statements are distasteful or that the conclusions I’ve mentioned constitute a fair evaluation, the evaluation is made nevertheless.

So, finally, Airman First Class George Washington reports to your base and asks the first black face he sees, “What kind of base is this?”—not “How’s squadron so-and-so?” or “How many black officers are around?” or “How’s the female situation?”—but “What kind of base is this?” And if the reply is, “Man, this is the worst base I’ve ever seen,” it’s mutually understood that the question was related not to the availability or scarcity of facilities but to the image of the one person who is thought to be all things to all people: the commander.

_Hq Pacific Air Forces_
A PRODUCTION function describes how certain inputs can be combined to produce a given output. Because of the widespread belief that a quantifiable measure of military output does not exist, there has been little effort to estimate the parameters of such a function for military personnel. I suggest, however, that an acceptable proxy for this output could be the Operational Readiness Inspection scores generated by various units of our operational commands. These scores give a measure of the effectiveness we might expect from our units and personnel if they were ever put to the test in an actual wartime situation. Actually, this is the rationale behind the Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI).
Let us take the Strategic Air Command as an example. A SAC crew's primary mission, in case of war, is to put its bombs and missiles on the target. The ORI bombing scores give a relatively objective measure of how SAC crews would perform this function. I am not arguing that these scores provide the full measure of an individual's output; certainly there are other factors that one would wish to consider. However, a crew's superior performance in this particular area does enhance SAC's primary mission: to deter aggression. These scores, therefore, do provide a first-order measure of output.

This article describes the preliminary results of a feasibility study in the SAC ORI-Personnel subarea. The question which it attempts to answer is, "Are SAC ORI bombing scores randomly generated, or can we determine some basic input factors that significantly influence their values?" In other words, is there a significant relationship between a crew member's background and how well he performs on a given ORI? Specifically, what type of returns do we obtain from such factors as experience in the aircraft, length of service, age, and educational level? Additionally, are qualitative ratings such as Officer Effectiveness Reports and crew designations (Ready, Senior, or Select) good indicators of how well the individual will perform on the ORI?

The data base

The sample period covered by this study ran from July to December 1967. During this period 30 SAC B-52 Strategic Wings participated in the Olive Pit Express simulated wartime mission as part of either an ORI or a Bar None exercise. The two exercises are identical except that the ORI is monitored by an Inspector General team whereas the Bar None exercise is not. All scores recorded during these flight missions were transmitted to Headquarters SAC and later provided for the study by the SAC Inspector General and Director of Training. The individual SAC wings then provided lists of all crew members who participated in the Olive Pit Express exercise, so that personnel background data on these individuals could be extracted from the master file by the office of the Director of Personnel Planning, DCS/Personnel, Headquarters USAF. These data were mated with the crew ORI scores to provide the sample observations.

The decision whether or not to include a particular crew in the sample was predicated on two requirements. The first requirement was that the crew had flown the low-altitude phase of the mission and recorded bomb scores during that phase. The second requirement was that all large crew scores had resulted from crew error and not from materiel failure or unknown causes. Both these requirements were imposed to provide a more consistent measure of crew output. The data matching process, subject to these requirements, provided 387 observations, or "crews over the target," for the sample analyzed in this study.

A list of the variables included in the sample is shown in Table 1. The qualitative variables take the value 1 or 0 and are used to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>List of Sample Variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output Variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Level Bomb Circular Error (CE) or Miss Distance in Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qualitative Input Variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52 aircraft model (D, E, F, G, H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew designation (Ready, Senior, Select)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitute crew member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar None exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of commission (ROTC, OTS, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quantitative Input Variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total flying time in hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52 flying time in hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total commissioned service time in years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age in years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level (code for years of school)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Effectiveness Report index</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
classify the data by groups. Such classifications can often increase the sensitivity of the analysis, as will be shown later.

One qualification must be put on the results: Absolute bomb scores are considered security information and cannot be given in an unclassified article. For this reason whenever the results are presented graphically, one score is designated by the letter X, and other scores are shown as incremental differences from this base score. When the results are presented algebraically, the constant term in the equation is denoted by the Greek alpha, \( \alpha \). These procedures disguise the absolute scores obtained by the crews while still permitting one to observe the relationships between the scores and input variables—the subject of this study.

**Crew Personnel Characteristics**

The high correlations between certain personnel background variables, such as total flying time, commissioned service, and age for each crew member, made it impossible to determine the independent influence of these variables with any degree of confidence. As an example, the correlation matrix for the aircraft commander variables is presented in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flying Hours</th>
<th>B-52 Hours</th>
<th>Commissioned Service</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Educational Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flying hours...</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>-.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52 hours</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned service</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>- .20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In situations such as this, the most effective variable for explaining the desired relationship must be chosen to stand for the common factor, which in this case could be labeled “experience.” For this study that variable is total flying time.

Another rather interesting finding of the study was that ORI scores were more sensitive, in a statistical sense, to the personal background of the aircraft commander (AC) than to that of the copilot (CP), radar navigator (RN), navigator (NAV), or electronics warfare officer (EWO). This may be surprising to some who suppose that scores would be most sensitive to the personal background of the radar navigator, the crew member who actually does the bombing. Apparently the aircraft commander sets the pace for the whole crew, whose effectiveness may be highly dependent on his leadership ability. One reason for this finding could be that the aircraft commander's background is usually representative of the background of the entire crew. The correlations presented in Table 3 give credence to such an argument. The experience levels of the individual crew members are positively correlated. Except for the correlations between the aircraft commander and navigator and between the navigator and electronics warfare officer, all correlation coefficients are statistically significant beyond the 99 percent confidence level. In general, the more experienced aircraft commanders have the more experienced...
crews. For these reasons, the aircraft commander’s background data were used to represent the entire crew.

sensitivity results

On the Olive Pit Express exercise, four low-altitude simulated bomb drops were recorded. Ideally the average score should be used as an output variable, but tests using each individual score and the average indicated that the first score recorded was the main discriminator among crews. The variance around the mean score for the first target was approximately five times that of the others. Therefore, the variance of the first score dominated in the variance of the average, so that each gave essentially the same results. In addition, it was noted that the same bombing method was used on the first target, whereas the method varied considerably on the other targets as crews evaluated their equipment status after the first simulated bomb drop and changed to alternate bombing modes. Therefore, for reasons of both sensitivity and consistency, the first score rather than the average score was chosen as the measure of output in this study.

As previously mentioned, a number of qualitative variables were used to classify the scores in various categories. If there is a significant difference between the mean scores for each category, the analysis can often be improved by holding these mean effects constant in the regression equation. The remainder of this section describes the results of these sensitivity tests.

Aircraft model. The various B–52 models have slightly different bombing equipment, and if these differences significantly affect the scores, these effects should be taken into account when evaluating personnel effectiveness. An analysis of variance test indicated that the scores recorded by one model were significantly higher than those of other models. Therefore, this effect was held constant in the regression equation estimated in the following section. For security reasons it is disguised in the constant of that equation.

Aircraft commander’s source of commission. An analysis of variance test indicated there were no statistically significant differences between scores classified by the aircraft commander’s source of commission.

Substitute crew member. Seventeen percent of the crews in the sample had a substitute for one of the five officers on the crew. Contrary to the belief that substitutes adversely affect crew coordination, there was no significant difference between the scores of crews with and without substitute members. Perhaps the explanation lies in SAC’s highly standardized crew procedures.

ORI versus Bar None. There was no significant difference between the scores recorded by crews flying the ORI exercise monitored by the Inspector General team and those flying the unmonitored Bar None exercise.

Crew designations. There were significant differences between mean scores recorded by crews with different designations—Ready, Senior, or Select. This indicates there was a qualitative difference between the crews included in the sample. These qualitative differences were incorporated in the general model described in the following section, and their significance is explained there.

combat crew production function

Regression analysis was used to estimate the parameters of the combat crew production function. Ideally, this technique takes into account the interaction between input factors, and it attributes to each its marginal contribution to output. Sometimes, when the correlations between a set of input variables are extremely high, as between total flying time, commissioned service time, and age, it is impossible to separate the individual influence of each input. The technique is normally successful, however, in handling lower correlations, and confidence can be placed in the estimated
parameters as long as the T tests are significantly high.

As an example, total flying time was negatively correlated with educational level (Table 2), since a number of the longer-time crew members entered service through the aviation cadet program, for which a college degree was not required. More recent entries had college degrees whether they entered through a service academy, ROTC, or OTS program. As might also be expected, total flying time was correlated with the qualitative crew variables because, in general, the Select crew members had more flying time than Senior and Ready crew members. In both cases, however, it was possible to break out the separate contributions of these inputs.

The most prominent factors in explaining crew bomb scores were the qualitative ratings of the crew (Ready, Senior, Select) and the aircraft commander’s experience and educational level. The estimated production function, using total flying time for the experience factor, is presented in Table 4. The T statistics for each of the estimated coefficients are presented in the right column and are based on the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero. All tests are significant beyond the 95 percent confidence level.

The R² statistic indicates that only 20 percent of the variation in bomb circular errors (ce) was explained by this function, but this is not unusual for a relationship estimated by cross-sectional data drawn from an operational environment. The fact that 80 percent of the ce variation is still unexplained does not render the function useless. The T statistics indicate that bomb ce’s are responsive to changes in the included explanatory variables, so that the estimated model can be used to examine policy alternatives.

The production function defines a three-dimensional surface with output (bomb ce) a function of the two inputs, flying time and educational level. The level of this surface is shifted vertically depending on whether Ready, Senior, or Select crews are being considered. This concept is rather difficult to visualize unless some of the factors are held constant at their means and the influence of the others is expressed in a two-dimensional graph, as in the following subsections.

Crew designations. When a crew first attains combat status, it is given the crew designation Ready. After the crew has performed

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Crew Production Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb circular error = α1 + T statistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1766.9 (Senior crew) 3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2663.9 (Select crew) 4.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-215.6 (1000s of flying hours)² 3.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 32.0 (1000s of flying hours)³ 5.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1499.7 (1 + educational-level code) 2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² = .20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of freedom = 381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Educational Level Code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>high school graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>1 year of college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>2 years of college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>3 years of college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4 yrs of college, no degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>college graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>graduate work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>master’s degree</td>
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</table>

well, the wing commander, taking into consideration such distinct empirical data as daily bombing scores and navigation proficiency, will promote the crew to Senior rank. The Select crews are then picked from the Senior crews who have performed in an outstanding manner.

The qualitative differences between the three crew categories can be depicted by holding the effects of the flying-time and educational-level variables constant at their means and adding these effects to the constant α1. The bomb ce’s then become a function of only the differences between crews:
bomb \( c_e = a_3 - 215.6 (1000s \text{ of flying hours})^2 + 32.01 (1000s \text{ of flying hours})^3 \)

This equation defines a cubic relationship and is plotted in Figure 2. The bomb \( c_e \)'s decrease until reaching 4500 flying hours and then begin to rise at an increasing rate. In addition, at approximately 2200 flying hours a point of inflection is reached, where the curve begins to bend upward, from increasing to decreasing returns to experience.

It is interesting to note that the shape of this particular function conforms closely to that of the traditional production function visualized in economic theory. If the vertical axis in Figure 2 is translated so that higher values are desirable, the production function takes the form shown in Figure 3. It shows increasing returns from additional flying hours in area \( A \), decreasing returns in area \( B \), and negative returns in area \( C \). This particular production function is complicated, however, by the fact that it takes time to gain experience and move out the horizontal axis.

**Figure 1. Bomb circular errors as a function of crew designation**

Figure 1 shows that there is a significant difference between the mean scores by crew category, particularly between the Ready crews and the other two classifications. The wing commander's qualitative ranking system can be verified on the basis of ori and Bar None scores—not surprising since his selection process incorporates past performance indicators. Conversely, the crew designation provides an insight into the expected performance of a crew on the simulated wartime mission.

**Experience factor.** The independent effect of experience can be obtained by holding the qualitative crew differences and educational levels constant at their means and observing the production equation as a function of only the flying-time variable:

A regression equation, using commissioned service time, gives essentially the same form as that for flying hours. This is to be expected, since the two variables are highly correlated. A compatible commissioned service scale has therefore been included in Figure 2 below the horizontal axis. It shows that the minimum
bomb ce occurs at 4500 flying hours or 11 years of commissioned service. The average aircraft commander has somewhat less flying time but more commissioned service than this. The increase in bomb ce’s depicted by the right portion of the curve is interesting because it indicates that there may be a time beyond which it is undesirable to keep a pilot on a combat crew. It should be emphasized, however, that the solid experience curve is based on a weighted average of Ready, Senior, and Select crews. It does not necessarily imply that an older Select crew member will receive higher error scores than a younger Ready crew member. Both the qualitative and quantitative aspects must be taken into consideration. The Select curve falls below the weighted average, and the Ready curve above it. Portions of these curves are shown by the dashed lines in Figure 2. These curves do imply that within each category the younger crews are more effective.

One could argue that the rise in ce’s results from a qualitative change in the mix of the force through time as the more effective crew members advance to command and staff positions. However, this is a continuing phenomenon, and it would be inappropriate to deny advancement to the most proficient individuals just to keep the average quality of the crews up—unless, of course, aircrews are to be recruited on a career basis, as some people advocate. Barring this, we must still cope with the rising ce.

One might also question whether the flying-time mix of B-52s and other aircraft types might not affect the slope of the experience curve. The high correlation between B-52 flying time and total time made it impossible to determine these separate effects with any degree of confidence. An analysis of the data, however, showed that approximately 40 percent of each aircraft commander’s total time had been in the B-52. The graph in Figure 2 reflects this mix.

**Educational level.** The final factor influencing output in the production function is educational level. Holding the other factors constant at their means gives the following production equation:

\[ \text{bomb ce} = a_4 + 15,000(1 + Z) \]

where \( Z \) is the educational level code. This reciprocal relationship is rather interesting because when plotted it takes the form shown in Figure 4. Positive returns result from higher education, but the incremental returns are not as great at higher levels of education as they are at lower levels. This would appear reasonable for aircraft crew members. The educational range for SAC aircraft commanders ran from high school graduate to master’s degree.
The actual plot of \( \text{CE} \)'s against educational level is given in Figure 5. (When comparing Figures 2 and 5, one should note the difference in the vertical \( \text{CE} \) scale.)

**Officer Effectiveness Report**

Beyond isolating Select crews, the Officer Effectiveness Report index gave little indication of how a crew member would perform on the \( \text{OER} \) and Bar None exercises. Of course, the Select crews scored lower bomb \( \text{CE} \)'s, but the incremental differences between scores and \( \text{OER} \)'s by crew type were not highly correlated. This is illustrated in Figure 6, using the Ready crew as a base, where \( \Delta \) stands for the difference in \( \text{OER} \)'s and \( \text{CE} \)'s between two crew ranks.

It would appear that Select aircraft commanders' \( \text{OER} \)'s are out of proportion to their performance on the simulated wartime mission, but a statement such as this must be qualified by other considerations. First, the \( \text{OER} \) index reflects a number of other factors in addition to performance on simulated wartime exercises. Leadership potential, in particular, is highly weighted. Second, Select crews normally have the additional function of instructing and evaluating other crew personnel in the organization. All these factors are weighted in the \( \text{OER} \) index. Considering this, it is not surprising that the \( \text{OER} \) index fails to provide a particularly good forecast for performance on the simulated wartime exercises.

**This Article** outlines the results of a study designed to determine the feasibility of estimating the parameters of a military production function. The output measure is the bomb scores generated by SAC B-52 crews on a simulated wartime mission. These scores are influenced by both qualitative and quantitative factors.

Qualitative factors are necessary because there are distinct differences between individuals that cannot be measured by the normal quantitative variables. The wing commander's crew rating (Ready, Senior, or Select) provides the best input to describe this effect. This rating provides a valid estimator of a crew's performance on the simulated wartime mission.

Holding these qualitative differences constant, one finds that two of the aircraft com-
mander’s background factors, which can be quantified, also affect the crew’s output. The first of these is an experience factor which can be represented by either total flying time or total commissioned service. Using either of these variables, when one estimates the traditional production function, he finds first an area of increasing returns to experience, then decreasing returns, and, finally, negative returns.

The second influential factor in the aircraft commander’s background is his educational level. The estimated relationship shows that we experience positive returns with higher levels of education throughout the sample range. The incremental returns, however, are greater at lower levels of education than at higher levels.

The results of this study do raise some interesting questions about the possible structuring of our rated force, and they should be investigated with further analysis. For instance, on the curve in Figure 2, the optimal experience level appears to be at approximately 4500 flying hours or 11 years’ commissioned service. Beyond this point, effectiveness begins to decrease. At about 6700 flying hours or 16 years’ commissioned service, effectiveness has decreased to a point equal to that of a new aircraft commander. Would this be the ideal time to remove a pilot from combat crew duty? Not necessarily. It might be somewhat before or even after this time. Ultimately, it will probably depend on how much importance is placed on an increase in bomb CEs, which in turn depends on such factors as weapon lethality, bombing pattern, target vulnerability, and the quality of target intelligence.

Costs also are important as well as rather complicated. Cost determination will depend on how the individual is utilized after he is removed from crew duty. If he is placed in a nonrated position that contributes very little to the flying portion of the Air Force mission, then his high training cost must be amortized over a shorter span of time. In addition, another pilot must be found and trained to replace him, necessitating a trade-off between an increase in force cost and an increase in bomb CEs.

More than likely, however, the rated individual performing in a nonrated capacity still contributes, at least in part, to the flying mission of the Air Force, making it rather difficult to figure the amortization of his training cost. For example, how much of his flying is productive in the sense that it supports the unit mission and how much is unproductive, or straight proficiency flying? If this individual is placed in a nonflying position that requires a rated background, his training cost can still be amortized over the original period. The problem then becomes a question of how many of these command and staff positions are available. Surely there will not be enough to cover the increased demand if officers are arbitrarily removed from combat crews after a given number of flying hours or years of commissioned service.

One proposal that has intuitive appeal is to rotate a number of these officers who are not programmed for command and staff positions through flying jobs that are decreasingly rigorous. For example, if it is agreed that combat crew duty in B-52s is a rather strenuous activity, there may be a point at which it would be desirable to rotate rated personnel into less rigorous but still primarily flying jobs. According to this proposal, a hypothetical career pattern might take a pilot through fighters or bombers, and then transports. Before such a career pattern could be recommended, however, additional studies—such as this—are needed to determine the sensitivity of effectiveness to flying time or length of service for each type of flying activity.

The curve of Figure 3, showing the decrease in bomb CEs with increasing education, must also be evaluated with caution. For example, it appears that a decrease in bomb CEs of approximately 1000 feet could be expected.
SAC's "RBS Express"

Resting on a siding at a remote site, the radar bomb-scoring (RBS) train provides combat crews realistic training. . . . An airman watches the bomber’s approach on the electronic bomb-scoring equipment aboard the train. . . . A sergeant plots the accuracy of the drop on the simulated target, the RBS Express.
as the force moves from one of high school graduates to one of college graduates. But there is both a social cost and a military cost involved in procuring a more highly educated rated force. The decision-maker must decide whether the increase in effectiveness is worth the higher costs. It must also be emphasized that the results presented in this article pertain only to primary aircrew members and not to personnel occupying higher command and staff positions—positions in which the returns to education may be considerably higher. If a substantial number of these positions are to be filled by members of the rated force, education takes on added emphasis.

The questions outlined above indicate how valuable well-defined personnel production functions could be as an aid in structuring the military forces. The main purpose of this study has been to determine the feasibility of estimating the parameters of such a function. It does appear that reliable statistical results can be obtained in areas in which a quantifiable measure of military output does exist. Additional and more detailed research is needed now.

United States Air Force Academy

This research was originally described in Air Force Academy Technical Report 69–1 dated September 1969.
TWO days after the North Koreans seized the intelligence ship U.S.S. Pueblo, President Lyndon Johnson’s press secretary, George Christian, began briefing a hastily assembled group of White House correspondents. It was 1125 hours 25 January 1968.

Christian had news of one facet of the American response to the seizure. He started by announcing that “the President has directed Secretary of Defense McNamara to recall to active duty certain air squadrons and support units of the Air Force and the Navy.”

After explaining that the Reservists and Guardsmen were being called under Congressional authority provided in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1967 and that the recallees could be activated for a period of up to 24 months, Christian opened the press conference to questions. He responded to several queries and then suggested: “You will have to have your people get details at the Pentagon.”

As soon as the reporters left George Christian’s press conference, most began deluging the Pentagon with requests for the promised “details.”

Representatives of the wire services, the networks, and the larger newspapers and news magazines relayed their inquiries through their Pentagon correspondents. (Some 35 newsmen maintain office space in the Pentagon and cover military affairs on a full-time basis.) Others called the Press Desk of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (oasd/pa), and still others called direct to the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Information (SAFOI).
When the Press Desk officer receives an inquiry, he completes a brief “query form” to note the name and organization of the inquirer, the time the inquiry was received, and the specific question. This form is passed to the service involved. As soon as the answers are developed and approved for release by appropriate officials, the information is passed back to the Press Desk for release to the inquirer.

Quite often, when an inquiry relates to some nonvolatile issue or information already in the public domain—as, for instance, “What types of jet fighters do we have in Vietnam?”—the formality of a query form is dispensed with and the matter is handled by telephone.

But the mobilization of 372 fighter and transport aircraft and 14,187 Air National Guardsmen and Air Force Reservists was not a routine matter (there had been no major reserve force call-up since the Cuban crisis of 1962), and all information had to be carefully scrutinized for accuracy and security prior to release.

Within three minutes after the Christian press conference, SAFOF had its first press query. The Press Desk called to request a breakdown of the number and types of aircraft and numbers of personnel assigned to each unit that had been called. Fred Hoffman, the Associated Press veteran Pentagon correspondent, asked if the Air Reserve Transport Units being mobilized were the same as those originally scheduled for deactivation. SAFOF field offices in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York had picked up wire reports of the mobilization and wanted to know what was releasable. Additionally, a score of callers from all over the nation asked the question, “Is our unit being activated?” These were easily and quickly answered because a releasable list of mobilized units had been distributed to all action officers in SAFOF’s Public Information Division.

Shortly before noon, the senior information officers of the National Guard Bureau and the Air Force Reserve, laden with fact sheets, strength figures, and assorted information, had moved into the Press Desk area to provide instant expertise and expedite query responses.

By 1300 hours, less than two hours after Christian’s announcement, the first barrage of inquiries had been handled. In addition, the SAFOF field offices and the major commands had been provided with press guidance and releasable information.

Activity had been fast and furious, and of course all assigned personnel could not be spared to concentrate on this issue. The usual flow of inquiries about such topics as weapons research, procurement, and Vietnam operations continued unabated, and specialists in those areas had to ensure that this more routine business was attended to.

There were, inevitably, some minor foul-ups and communications breakdowns in those first hectic hours. The Military Airlift Command (MAC) called to report that the list published by OASD (PA) contained an error in the designation of one of the mobilized units. SAFOF checked the list, confirmed MAC’s observation, and arranged for the immediate release of a corrected list.

Yet another minor difficulty arose when OASD (PA), about midafternoon, reversed its position on releasing the individual personnel strength figures of the mobilized units. An Air Force colonel assigned to OASD (PA) had noted that several of the Navy recalled units were only 50 percent manned while most of the Air Force units were well above 90 percent manned. He felt that publication of the manning figures would reflect adversely on the Navy and wanted to hold up on this point until he could confer with Navy public affairs officials.

There minor snags notwithstanding, the first test—that of marshaling a tremendous amount of data on very short notice, clearing it for release, and expediting it to waiting newsmen—had been passed.
On the following day, 26 January, the “in depth” newsmen came in with their requests. John Mulliken, Time Magazine’s Pentagon reporter, requested strength figures on all Air Force units in the Pacific area. Life wanted to send Sam Angeloff (an Air Force Reservist) to do a feature on the recalled 184th Tactical Fighter Group in Wichita, Kansas. The American Broadcasting Company wanted a complete rundown on the history of reserve activations. These obviously involved a great deal of leg work and research, but they were the sorts of projects routinely handled by SAFOI.

Since the range of legitimate questions reporters might ask is almost limitless, obviously it would be impossible for OASD (PA) or SAFOI to garner all the answers before the questions were posed. Who could have predicted that George Wilson of the Washington Post would ask the number of pilots affected who were airline pilots or that Hugh Lucas of Aviation Daily would ask the amount of the monthly payroll of the mobilized units? As press interest in the call-up announcement subsided, SAFOI personnel found time to evaluate press treatment of the event. SAFOI judged that most of the reportage seemed to be factual and that the reporters had drawn realistic inferences. The Associated Press observed: “The call-up is generally viewed as an administration effort to put some military bite behind the diplomatic bark directed at the North Koreans who captured the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo.” United Press thought that the call-up added “psychological pressure to these [diplomatic] efforts” and was viewed as a diplomatic signal in itself, directed as much to Moscow as Pyongyang, that the United States means what it says in demanding the return of the Pueblo.

Both wire services included in their early releases that the mobilized Reservists and Guardsmen were to report to their respective units by midnight Friday 26 January. Widespread publication of the reporting times contributed to a very high percentage of men “present for duty” at the appointed hour.

After the initial excitement and enthusiasm waned, however, complaints were not long in cropping up.

Some of the mobilized Guardsmen and Reservists charged that they had been rushed to active duty but now found themselves with little to do. News reports, letters to the editor, and letters to congressmen publicized the complaints.

Norman Sklarewitz of the Wall Street Journal fired the first major volley on 15 March with a front-page story headlined “Where Are They Now? Activated Reserves Just Waiting Around.” This report contained examples of most of the various types of gripes the men were making.

He had requested and received Air Force cooperation in preparing his story. Telephone interviews were arranged with recallees, specific questions he asked were processed, and answers in writing were provided. To a question on morale, the Tactical Air Command (which had gained most of the mobilized units as they came on active duty) responded in part: “TAC believes the morale of the Air Guard units assigned as part of this command is commendable.”

Sklarewitz’s story, however, did not reflect TAC’s optimism. In his lead he asked the question, “What ever happened to the 14,787 air reservists mobilized in January?” And in 800 or so searing words he answered his own questions. Most of the men, he said, were doing nothing except complaining. One airman reported that he spent his day emptying trash cans. Another remembered doing “not one productive task of any substance.” As for morale, most were “disgusted,” and others were “bugged by all this uncertainty.”

The reporter saved his most critical statements concerning the recallees for his last par-
agraph. "Some military officials also say it is a good thing the reserves haven't been sent to Vietnam or Korea. They say the men just aren't prepared to fight."

Sklarewitz painted a dismal picture and in the process revealed that he, too, was displeased with the Pentagon. He charged that "the Pentagon does not have much to say about the activated reserves. Officials sidestepped queries for days. . . . As for how long the men will be in, an officer repeated only that the authorization is for up to 24 months."

Sklarewitz obviously felt he was being given the runaround. He was not accustomed to covering Pentagon news and was not as prepared for built-in delays involving staff work as a "Pentagon regular" would have been.

After completing his telephone interviews, he posed several additional questions to oasd (PA) on 14 March. safoi tracked the somewhat lengthy answers down and returned the information to the Press Desk for relay to Sklarewitz on 15 March.8 The story—without the answers—had appeared in that morning's Wall Street Journal.

In this instance the reporter, very likely under the pressure of a deadline, did not wait for the safoi responses for even one day before filing his story. The incident points up how one kind of "news management" charge can originate. Nonetheless, the story appeared in
an influential newspaper and was highly critical.

Others in the same vein began to appear. The Newark News asked SAFOI to comment on an AP report that mobilized Reservists, particularly college-trained men, were complaining bitterly about being "treated like dirt." SAFOI proposed that some of the rationale developed for the Sklarewitz queries be used to respond, but OASD(PA), remembering the short shift given this material by Sklarewitz, rejected the proposal and went with a "no comment" response.

The fact was that some of the recalllees were beginning to complain about inactivity. There were likely not nearly so many as Sklarewitz reported nor so few as the "through channels" complaints indicated to Air Force officials.

An additional mobilization of some 3500 Air Force Reservists, which was announced on 11 April, did little to still the rising chorus of "inactivity" complaints. However, SAFOI was afforded something of a breather in that all the units involved in this smaller mobilization were to be given 30 days' notice prior to reporting in mid May.

Essentially the problem of "inactivity" arose because of a basic misunderstanding. The recalllees assumed that, because they had been activated immediately following the Pueblo seizure by the North Koreans, they would be sent almost immediately to Korea to bolster American forces there. Air Force planners, on the other hand, were proceeding on a different set of assumptions.

Early in March, in response to their questioning why they were called up, SAFOI issued the following statement, clearly outlining the Air Force's position:

Although the reserve units were mobilized because of the Pueblo incident, they were not necessarily called to active duty to serve only in Korea. . . . Now that they are on active duty, they comprise a portion of the total world-wide defense structure. With this in mind, the units, and the personnel assigned, will be handled in the same manner as the entire Air Force, which means taking normal tours in all theaters of the world under standard Air Force Policies.9

It soon became apparent that "standard Air Force policy" in this matter was to step up training of the mobilized units but to hold off on deploying them overseas. Pilots and personnel directly associated with the flying mission were extremely busy during the first 90 days of their active duty tours, but some support and administrative personnel had relatively little to do. Typically, this was because the mobilized units had deployed to Air Force bases that already had fully manned support facilities capable of providing most of the administrative support required.

Some of the pressure of "inactivity" charges was relieved in May and June as two recalled fighter squadrons were deployed to Korea and four were sent to Vietnam.

Even media reports of the deployments, however, contained hints of trouble to come. Announcing the arrival in Vietnam of the Colorado Air Guard squadron, the New York Times added: "Most of the service and administrative personnel would not be sent to Vietnam because there was already sufficient support there." 10

On 1 July, Sergeant Robert A. Levy of the recalled 113th Tactical Fighter Group (of Washington, D.C.) wrote an open letter to the President, the Congress, and the Department of Defense.11 In 2000 well-chosen words Levy reviewed his unit's experiences during the call-up and expressed his carefully thought-out opinions. Levy charged that the Air Force was an "unbelievably demeaning environment" and that all the men did was "participate in chess tournaments and take coffee breaks." He concluded, "Never have I seen human resources so tragically wasted." Prior to his call to active duty, Levy had earned the Ph.D. (at age 24), authored a book and a dozen articles, and organized his own
computer firm. He wrote well and persuasively. His letter received wide publicity, and on 12 July it was included in the Congressional Record by Congressman Durward G. Hall of Missouri.

Air Force reaction to this sort of publicity was prompt. On 13 July a Department of Defense national news release stated that 10,800 of the 15,750 recallees had already been deployed overseas and in the United States with their units. The announcement added that the Air Force had ordered 2200 of the recalled men to replacement assignments overseas and would shortly order the remaining 2700 men to assignments within the United States. In response to a press query, the Air Force said that “all reassignment orders should be issued by the end of July.” These assignment actions effectively stilled the complaints of inactivity—almost everyone was now going somewhere to fulfill a specific role.

But reassigning personnel out of their Reserve units raised another hue and cry—the principle of “unit integrity” was being violated. Basically, unit integrity amounted to a policy of keeping recalled units intact. National Guard recruiting drives had stressed the theme, “Train with your buddies, serve with your buddies.”

The reassignments were followed by a rash of complaints to congressmen from the affected individuals and by critical media reports. The New York Times front-paged its story of the Air Force action and observed: “The announcement followed bitter complaints made publicly and privately by many airmen who have received orders within the past two weeks. These airmen contend it is contrary to Air Force policy for them to be reassigned as individuals.”

Two days later, on 17 July, Senator Javits announced that he had wired Air Force Secretary Harold Brown asking for a “comprehensive senior policy review” of the reassignment policy.

From a public affairs point of view, the Air Force had jumped from an
“inactivity” frying pan into a “unit integrity” skillet.

The “skillet,” however, was to prove a great deal cooler than the frying pan. The unit integrity problem had been anticipated as reassignment plans were being formulated. On 13 May, Alfred B. Fitt, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, had sent a memorandum to the military departments, spelling out unit integrity policy. He cited a 1959 Defense directive which clearly stated that, although personnel would be ordered to active duty only with their units, “this does not prohibit the reassignment of the personnel of such units after being ordered to active duty.” He added that it was not intended that such units be used primarily as a source of filler personnel for other units, either regular or reserve.1

Dr. Theodore Marrs, Air Force Deputy for Reserve Affairs, in an hour-long interview with Harold Gal of the New York Times on 18 July, said that any Reservist called should assume that he would be utilized—possibly outside his home unit—and that there was Air Force, Department of Defense, and Congressional authority and precedent for reassigning men out of their units. He declared that reassignments were reviewed by high authorities and were based on real need, not whim. He

Mobility processing prior to Southeast Asia deployment . . . Seventh Air Force Commander, General William W. Momyer, welcoming one of the pilots of the first Guard unit (Colorado Air Guard) to Vietnam . . . Close air support strike typical of Guard and Reserve performance in Vietnam
admitted that the Air Force had perhaps overstressed the “Train with your buddies, serve with your buddies” theme and said he regretted it. With these “regrets,” Dr. Marrs ended the Air Force’s public comment on the unit integrity issue.

Air Force Secretary Harold Brown assured Senator Javits that each individual complaint would be carefully examined. Paul H. Nitze, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, informed Secretary Brown that his personnel utilization policy was approved with the proviso that “reserve personnel will be released upon demobilization of the units with which they were mobilized, regardless of their assignment at the time of the demobilization order.”

Later in August, a group of New York Reservists lost a bid in federal court to block their reassignment orders when the judge ruled that the President had the right to activate them and the Air Force had the right to reassign them.

Doubtless the number of the complaints and Congressional interest served to make the Air Force give more careful attention to its reassignment policies and perhaps did, in the end, serve to protect some Reservists from being malassigned. And as a direct consequence of the furor, the Air National Guard dropped or toned down its “Serve with your buddies” slogan.

With completion of the reassignment actions and the overseas deployment of additional reserve combat units, the public affairs problems of the call-up virtually disappeared. In fact, for the remainder of the active duty tour the mobilized units were to attract a great deal of very favorable attention by the media.

The key to the improved public affairs climate was that, given meaningful jobs and a sense of mission accomplishment, the recallers performed superbly. Complaints were few. In the final analysis, operational performance of the mobilized units—especially those in combat—merited favorable press coverage.

SAFO’s tasks relative to the mobilized units then became routine. Because many of the Guard and Reserve units were overseas, information officers in the overseas theaters assumed responsibility for issuing releases and responding to most inquiries relative to their combat performance.

On the morning of 3 October, the Legislative Liaison office notified the Congress of the dates of release from active duty of each of the units. Later the same day SAFO made the information available to the press through the DoD Press Desk. Most of the units were scheduled to return to reserve status by 30 June 1969, which meant an active duty tour of from 15 to 17 months for most—considerably less than the maximum 24 months.

SAFO’s Community Relations Division began to work on plans for “Welcome Home” and deactivation ceremonies. High-ranking civilian and military speakers were invited, and parades, bands, and aerial demonstrations were planned.

There were still occasional letters to congressmen (as often as not from Reservists who had been sent to Korea and were irate because they were not being sent to Vietnam) which had to be answered. But with all the policy decisions now ironed out, drafting responses was made easy.

Senior Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve officials accepted invitations to address various organizations across the country. They usually informed their audiences that the recalled units were serving well on active duty and presented such statistics as numbers of combat sorties flown, targets destroyed, tons of cargo airlifted, etc.

In the fall of 1968, Brigadier General Winant Sidle, USA, Chief of Information in Saigon, invited the Air National Guard to send over a special Information team to make in-depth reports on combat accomplishments of the Guard units. This program was carried out with considerable success.

As the active duty tours approached an
end, theater commanders sent congratulatory and appreciative messages to the governors of the various states to which the units were returning. These messages, which were widely reprinted in the various state newspapers, and the fanfare of deactivation ceremonies provided an auspicious ending to an operation that at times had been subjected to harsh judgments by both the press and the public.

Austin, Texas

Notes
2. The "cleared" version of Defense Secretary McNamara's testimony before a Senate subcommittee on 7 June 1968 was to become a primary source of releasable data on the Pueblo incident. The following excerpt is quoted to illustrate the degree to which security censoring can limit information: "The force structure of the 5th Air Force within South Korea at the time of the "Pueblo" seizure consisted of [deleted] F-4C's, of which [deleted] were physically located at Kunsan [deleted] and [deleted] at Osan [deleted]. Therefore, with the exception of [deleted], the [deleted] available aircraft within South Korea were [deleted]."
3. Interview with Mr. James Newton, action officer, SAFOI-P, 26 March 1970.
6. SAFOI-P Answer to Query form dated 29 January 1968. The United Press asked SAFOI what percentage of recalled personnel had reported for duty. The National Guard reported that over 88 percent of their men had reported within three hours after the official announcement. The Air Force Reserve had no "three-hour" figures but said that over 98 percent of assigned personnel had reported by the Friday midnight deadline. Both figures reflected favorably on reserve force readiness and organization, and the United Press release on this matter was regarded by SAFOI as a "plus."
8. SAFOI-P Answer to Query form dated 14 March 1968.
9. Ibid.
16. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel James Elliot, Public Affairs Officer, National Guard Bureau, 26 March 1970.

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J.D.W.
Books and Ideas

DETENTE OR STATUS QUO IN EUROPE

Colonel John L. Sutton
THE people of the Western world have long hoped for a détente, a relaxation of tensions, between Communist and non-Communist Europe. Some thought it had arrived in 1968; instead, Soviet forces arrived in Prague. Some think the cold war is history; others point to the twenty Soviet divisions that remain in East Germany. And everyone asks: Will the seventies mean confrontation or negotiation in Europe?

In a short and tightly written volume, two highly qualified experts examine the problem of European security for the seventies in terms of U.S. diplomatic options.† Authors Stanley and Whitt not only have formidable academic backgrounds but have also had extensive policy-making experience in the Department of Defense. In addition, both have served with the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Minister Stanley as second-ranking man in the mission. Moreover, their work was prepared in consultation with an advisory committee that included many former U.S. ambassadors and military commanders in Europe.

The German Question

*Detente Diplomacy* takes the reader through some preliminary history of European security before arriving at what are termed the main issues. The heart of the matter is determined to be the German question, with the Berlin problem a kind of core within it. The authors conclude rather rapidly that the long-stated U.S. objective of German unification is and has been an unrealistic one. No Western power could really have faced the prospect of a united Germany allied with Russia, with Communist power extending to the Rhine. Could the Russians accept the contrary prospect of a NATO at the border of Communist-dominated Poland? Further, since Germany is too large for an "Austrian neutrality" kind of solution, the authors say: "It is hard to reach any conclusion other than that there are no available solutions in the short term for the problem of Germany, other than minor variants on a status quo which neither side is willing or able to change by force." (p. 45)

With regard to the specific problem of Berlin, the authors find it even less susceptible to an agreed change from the status quo. They do, however, examine possible solutions to both problems, even including the radical idea of a buffer state to be known as Middle Germany. This state would be created with land from both East and West Germany and would lie between the two—a hapless echo of the division of Charlemagne's empire in the ninth century. (We are reminded, however, lest we think the plan fantastic, that unification by "triplication" was the method used in

1947 to create the Department of Defense and, incidentally, the United States Air Force.)

On the German question, *Detente Diplomacy* may not satisfy the more optimistic observers. But the authors are not persuaded by the widely held notion that détente is an irreversible process and cannot be successfully resisted by the Soviet Union. And they are less willing to press for movement for its own sake than are statesmen like Willy Brandt or scholars like Brzezinski. Stanley and Whitt believe that the risks of a true détente appear to be well above the post-Czechoslovakia tolerance level of the Soviet system. A détente becomes, then, almost by definition, a condition that is intolerable, or at least a challenge, to the Soviet system.

The delicate question is, How much contact with the West can the peoples of Eastern Europe absorb and still not endanger the Communist governments of that area and their alliances with the Soviet Union? The cases of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 are guideposts in determining the answer. Some observers suggest that the unsettling effect of a liberalization of the Communist world would concentrate Russia’s attention on its domestic affairs. Yet there are too many historical precedents of governments trying to settle problems at home by finding trouble elsewhere to make this a comfortable conclusion. Mr. Frederick Wyle, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs, writing in *The Round Table* for April 1970, is apprehensive. “Substantially free popular contact and relations between East and West Germany, for example, is almost bound to endanger the survival of the Communist government in East Germany, and the resultant turmoil in East Germany and Berlin may lead to just the sort of dangerous confrontation that the Soviets wish to avoid.”

Stanley and Whitt share this apprehension. Their examination of the German problem throws up a great many danger signs and warns that complacent projections of the future of Eastern Europe as an area of waning Soviet influence should be carefully re-examined. They go even further and recommend that the Western nations “have an interest in the stability and long term development of the ‘other political system’ and can pledge themselves not to change it by force or seek to undermine its internal security.” (p. 99) As our British friends might say, this seems a bit much. By its example alone, West Germany compromises the internal security of East Germany. Could we really ask the West Germans to guarantee Communism in East Germany by such a pledge?

**Mutual Force Reductions**

Unable to find room for substantial movement in the German question, the authors turn to mutual force reductions. No formula for agreement has been found to permit phased reductions of U.S. and Soviet forces in Europe, but Congressional pressures are building for some substantial withdrawal of the more than a quarter million American troops in Western Europe. Would a unilateral troop reduction by the U.S. bring about some corresponding move by the Soviets? The authors appear to doubt it. They believe the number of Soviet troops that would be removed from Eastern Europe is strictly limited. Not only do these forces represent the potential Soviet solution to another Hungarian or Czech crisis but since the deployments are excessive for internal security reasons alone Soviet planners evidently consider the possible hostility of satellite forces. An observation worth pondering is that Czechoslovakia was brought into the Soviet camp in 1948 with only covert Soviet help to the Czech Communist Party, whereas twenty years later more than a hundred thousand soldiers were needed to be sure of keeping it there. Despite the difficulties facing an agreement, the authors believe that the Soviets
might be able to cut back their forces by about fifteen percent (five Soviet and five satellite divisions). This should be the extent to which we should set our sights, at least initially.

And what of a substantial cut in U.S. forces brought about by Congressional pressures? The authors show concern here. Starting with the premise that there is rough equality between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces of about a million men on each side, they move gingerly into the question of burden-sharing among the NATO nations. They seem to say that the European nations are doing more to support NATO than many Americans believe. For example, they note that the United States incurs from one-third to one-half of NATO's annual defense costs whereas its gross national product is nearly two-thirds that of all NATO nations; that West Europeans have provided the lion's share of the $1 billion post-Czechoslovakia increase in NATO defense budgets; and that the United States now uses more of NATO's commonly financed infrastructure than it pays for. These are excellent arguments and doubtless reflect the close experience which the authors have had in dealing with their opposite numbers in the NATO headquarters in Paris and Brussels. One wonders, however, if they will be very effective against such less sophisticated arguments as (a) Why does the U.S. devote a higher percentage of its national budget to defense than the European nations do? and (b) To echo Senator Mansfield, why can't Europe, having been made "safe and comfortable" for twenty years, organize an effective defense against 200 million Russians who have 700 million Chinese at their backs?

Stanley and Whitt argue, moreover, that an American reduction of forces in Europe might very well lead to a corresponding reduction in West European force levels. The European nations, they suggest, would likely conclude from an American withdrawal either that an arrangement had been made privately between the U.S. and the Russians, leaving no valid cause for anxiety, or that America had devalued its interest in Europe, thus forcing European nations toward accommodation with the East. In either case there would be an incentive to relax West European defense efforts. In other words the authors argue in favor of the status quo by implying that a withdrawal of U.S. troops might trigger, not a Soviet force reduction, but a reduction of friendly forces. Still, can this type of argument deflect Congressional pressures for a significant reduction?

An East-West Conference

Soviet motives for an East-West security conference (proposed by the East European states in October 1969) are treated with skepticism. The two proposed agenda subjects, renunciation of force and expansion of trade, are not reassuring. As the authors point out, the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty within the Socialist commonwealth (the ex post facto justification for the invasion of Czechoslovakia) would pose a prickly item for the conference, and a security conference is hardly necessary for improving trade relations. It is thus more likely, suggest Stanley and Whitt, that such a conference would become a propaganda base for the Soviets and take on a circus character.

The authors have reason to be skeptical of conferences sponsored by the Communists: They can achieve a peaceful solution quietly when it represents no advantage for the Communist side; but a conference, even if it does not become a Communist diplomatic victory, can be a Communist propaganda triumph or at least a stalemate to be blamed on the other side. The past ten years of disarmament conferences—with one (the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference) lasting since 1962 and apparently destined to go on forever—have yielded very modest results. But the Communists have obviously relished these low-key
propaganda forums, using them to extract concessions from the Western powers simply by wearing down their patience over the years. Stanley and Whitt are undoubtedly correct when they say (p. 88) that Communist propaganda machines had a field day with "general and complete disarmament" for nearly a decade, although they imply that by finally adopting the phrase ourselves we effectively nullified it for further use by the Soviets. While this last conclusion may be true, to adopt a propaganda slogan as U.S. policy is a tricky affair, and sooner or later one must answer the question of who is to be deceived, the Soviets, the U.S. public, or just who?

How Safe Is the Status Quo?

The basic message of Detente Diplomacy is a sober caution to those who press impatiently for detente and who may recommend or pursue policies that outrun the realities of the moment. A final settlement in Europe, the authors emphasize, is an evolutionary process.

It would be difficult to fault the Stanley-Whitt analysis on the basis of the European scene alone. Yet, to what extent is it viable when abstracted from the larger world diplomatic and military playing field where the Soviets are increasingly active? There are indications that the Soviet government at home is politically and economically on the defensive, fearful of events in the East European states and unable or unwilling to quell dissent within its borders. On the other hand, this same Soviet government is undertaking aggressive strategic measures worldwide and enjoying a new confidence in its powers, possibly in about the same proportion that uncertainty has increased internally. With client states in Egypt and Cuba, with 1400 ICBM's, with a naval presence in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean, the Soviet Union is an expanding world military power. We may be overly optimistic to speak of maintaining the status quo in Europe without taking into consideration the leverage that can be exerted from this new Soviet posture. The Soviets have or soon will have bargaining weights which have not been included in the set of European balances described by the authors but which undoubtedly can exert a profound effect upon the European stalemate. What, for example, might be the asking price for removal of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba? Berlin, perhaps?

The authors' response to this criticism would probably be that they have isolated and examined the basic European problem and have not sought to clarify the U.S./Soviet balance worldwide. Yet the Stanley-Whitt analysis would be more persuasive if we were dealing with the Soviet Union in its traditional role as a continental Eurasian power. Alas, in the coming decade we must deal with the Soviet Union in the full realization of its newfound strength as a world military power.

Lexington, Kentucky

Notes


2. Highly placed U.S. civilian planners have stated that this rough balance of a million men on each side exists. For example, see the article by Frederick Wyile previously cited or a letter by the then Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain Enthoven in Survival, September 1968.
THE USES OF HISTORY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

HERMAN S. WOLK

HISTORY is not obsolete. Not yet, anyway. Despite the fact that "relevance" and all manner of theoretical nonsense are currently the fashion, there are still, fortunately, a few hardy souls around who continue to apply their intelligence to illuminating the past and making it comprehensible, thereby helping us to understand our own age. This has always seemed to me an exhilarating experience, not only because of the excitement of discovery but because we thereby come to realize (as we should have all along) that our own difficulties are not unique after all; they are not, thank heaven, so overpowering.

Michael Howard is a refreshing antidote to the Herman Kahns of our time—historical analogy instead of theory, insight instead of numbers, understanding in place of guesswork, and a facility with language. One has little difficulty seeing Kahn, with his imagination, as the Norman Mailer of the defense intellectuals. Despite the estimable contributions of social science over the last twenty years, the obsession of many social scientists with methodology, model building, and inexplicable games has produced an astonishing amount of drivel. Part of this massive overdose of gamesmanship proceeded from the kind of macabre incantation leveled by Max Singer of Kahn's Hudson Institute: "Experience," he said, "won't serve as a guide any more to practical affairs. The world has become too complicated." When up the creek, throw away the oar.

Apparently without realizing it, the Kahns and Singers greased the way for a movement to do away with history. Experience can no longer be used as a useful guide to human affairs; consequently, radical solutions are required. A number of years ago Walter Lippmann described these self-styled scientific pooh-bahs as "frightened, irritated, impatient, frustrated and in search of quick and easy solutions."

They are still with us, and the English military historian Michael Howard demonstrates anew, with his essays in Studies in War and Peace,† that the study of history is still a remarkable cure for the compulsion to look for panaceas. In an essay on Jomini, Howard observes that although abstract strategical thinking has its place, "it is also dangerous, for a theorist to think of a theatre of war in terms of a 'chessboard.'"

Howard fuses the traditional discipline of the military historian with the largely contemporary approach of looking at military history as only a part of a political-military-economic-social canvas. From Waterloo and Wellington to William I and the two World Wars and their aftermath, he takes a societal approach. Thus, the First World War still "lies like a dark scar across the history of Europe, an interruption in the development of western society rather than a part of it." (p. 99) But the First World War should not have been a surprise. It was what Europe had been preparing itself for: armies were not really conceived of as deterrents; they were built to fight wars. And the size of these armies was matched only by their grinding inflexibility. Primarily it was a matter of mobilization.

Now, a little over half a century since the end of World War I, there is a predictable tendency for historians to forget the character of that conflict when they write of the great

Air Power Crusaders

Brigadier General William ("Billy") Mitchell (1879–1936) commanded air forces of AEF in World War I, afterward crusaded for recognition of air as fulcrum of military decision. . . . Italy's General Giulio Douhet (1869–1930) expounded theory of strategic air offensive, influenced thinking of U.S. airmen between World War I and II—and again in the nuclear age. . . . Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Trenchard, (1873–1956), was Britain's first Chief of the Air Staff, 1918–29, and was again active in World War II.

campaigns of the Second World War and of high strategy in the nuclear age. But World War I left a powerful legacy. The American air leaders between the wars, in World War II, and in the post-1945 period were aware of it. The character of the First War had not been shaped primarily by air bombardment, although this very point could be used by the air advocates to show that trench warfare was too overwhelmingly costly and even self-defeating to be considered seriously again. The consensus as to the war's lessons could not have been appreciated by far-seeing airmen. The wartime Chief of Staff, General Peyton C. March, pointedly concluded:

The war had taught many lessons; the principles of warfare, however, remained unchanged. It was not won, as some had predicted it would be, by some new and terrible development of modern science; it was won, as has every other war in history, by men, munitions, and morale.³

Nevertheless, there were those who were appalled. Thoughtful airmen pondered what longer-range bombing planes might accomplish if given the chance. Statesmen, stunned by the slaughter in the trenches, began the search for alternatives. The airplane provided the means to circumvent the carnage of the front lines, to attack the enemy deep in his homeland, at the source of his power. The population, Howard writes,

. . . must be attacked directly. It must be softened and subverted by propaganda. It must be starved and enfeebled by blockade. It must be remorselessly bombed from the air. Its morale must be undermined to a point where its capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. (pp. 108–9)

Consequently, despite the late and limited
application of the air weapon, thoughtful observers of the Great War had seen enough to become convinced of the potential of the independent air offensive. American airmen—pre-eminently Brigadier General Billy Mitchell—with the British Independent Air Force as an example and fortified by their own ideas (though little experience), came out of the war persuaded that some day their vision of the air offensive as the fulcrum of military decision would be borne out. Unfortunately, however, their powers of persuasion failed to match their enthusiasm and determination. Mitchell, a prophetic and dynamic airman, led the crusade. But, as with most prophets, he couldn’t convince his contemporaries. The years between the World Wars were marked by the airmen’s battle to secure a separate air mission and an independent air force. The airplane had not demonstrated its effectiveness in combat, and, besides, it couldn’t span the oceans that had long protected the United States. The task, therefore, would not be an easy one, nor would success come rapidly. It would take almost thirty years and another world war before the air arm would be made an independent service on equal footing with the Army and Navy.

The struggle for autonomy in the 1920s and 1930s is a fascinating story in itself, marked by paradoxes and nuances in their own way just as interesting as the great bomber offensive of the Second World War. Nevertheless, the bomber campaign understandably captured the attention of historians and the public. Controversy about it still rages. Even with the benefit of hindsight (the realm in which the historian must work), attempts at objectivity have often been shoved aside by the persistence of dogma and the

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Bomber Offensives

In one daylight attack on the German industrial and transportation hub at Frankfurt am Main, 800 heavy bombers of the Army Air Forces, accompanied by hundreds of fighters, dumped 1800 tons of bombs on the target. . . . India-based Superfortresses of Twentieth Bomber Command flew a "perfect mission" from the standpoints of weather and observed results of their tons of bombs delivered on a large Japanese supply depot near Mingaladon airfield in the vicinity of Rangoon, Burma.
frequency with which purportedly critical analyses have turned out to be obviously self-serving. The fact that these controversies still go on stands as a tribute to their continued relevance and to the energy of air bombardment advocates and critics.

Howard points out that the doctrine of the Italian theoretician Giulio Douhet over-estimated both the destructiveness of high-explosive bombs and the capacity of aircraft to deliver them accurately and in adequate numbers to their targets in the technological conditions then obtaining; while it equally underestimated the capacity of civilian populations to survive prolonged ordeals which previously might have been considered unendurable. (pp. 191-92)

Yet, despite Douhet’s shortcomings (understandable in the circumstances of that period), his reputation as the foremost theoretical exponent of the strategic air offensive remains intact. The great paradox is that technology after World War II resurrected Douhet; his doctrine fit the nuclear age peculiarly well. An interesting footnote, not pointed out by Howard, is that recent scholarship posits that Douhet’s influence on the Air Corps Tactical School was even greater than that of Billy Mitchell. But that is another story and, like most Air Force history, one that has yet to be written fully and with critical perspective.

As far as the Second World War is concerned, it was, says Howard, “like the First—a conflict of attrition between highly organised and politically sophisticated societies, in which economic capacity, scientific and technological expertise, social cohesion and civilian morale proved to be factors of no less significance than the operations of armed forces in the field.”  (p. 192)

Strategic air power did not win World War II. It did not by itself win either the battle for Europe or the war in the Pacific. It was not an unqualified success. To argue that it was destroys any serious attempt to find the truth. Although the Allied high command may have viewed the air offensive as complementary to the invasion of the Continent, the air leaders had other ideas: a belief that the bombing could bring Germany to her knees. Yet in Europe it took several years, the introduction of new tactics and equipment, and a rebound from near failure until the bomber offensive—together with other crucial factors—brought Germany to a collapse. The “thunderclap” idea, which held that the war could be won with a single all-out blow, proved to be a false theory. Long-held assumptions about strategic bombing tactics proved unworkable in combat—indeed, almost disastrous—and until the bombers were accompanied to the target by long-range escort fighters, the issue was very much in doubt.

In the Pacific a different situation obtained. By early 1945 the Japanese position was in an advanced state of deterioration. With B-29s the U.S. overcame Japan’s will to continue in less time and with fewer bombs than was the case with Germany. Japan was vulnerable to fire-bombing, and its defenses were inadequate to blunt the onslaught. Invasion proved to be unnecessary; the war ended, and lives were saved. And so, ironically, what the airmen hoped for in Europe came true in the Pacific: the B-29 fire-bomb offensive crumbled Japan. Even to General H. H. Arnold, the end came unexpectedly soon.

In all of this, one must keep in mind the wartime circumstances attending decisions. It is, of course, easier to judge the situation now, with the knowledge accumulated during a quarter century. Wars are almost never fought according to plan, and the air offensive not only over Europe but also over Japan was conducted under serious operational limitations. Air strategy was governed by feasibility, by the existing conditions and forces available, not by a theoretical litany expounded in some obscure classroom. It could not have been otherwise. It was a dynamic situation fought on a day-by-day, hour-by-hour basis. Decisions, as Michael Howard observes, “had to be made
rapidly, if not hastily, on the basis of evidence known to be inadequate and historians will debate endlessly whether or not they were right.” (p. 142) Noble Frankland’s observation is apropos and contains more truth than many would care to admit:

Nor in war, which is not a game of chess, should intellectual reasoning be put at a premium even in the highest operational commanders; intuitive judgment, or, as Napoleon might have put it, luck, is a much more important quality.6

The bombing offensive and the results it achieved need not be exaggerated nor tiresomely defended. Did the bombing win the war? Could it have won by itself if even greater resources had been given over to it? To attempt seriously to grapple with these questions is a futile and self-defeating exercise. Better to honor the brave participants with an uncompromising search for the truth. Their uncommon courage and perseverance in the face of uncertainty and great odds deserve no less from us. Perfection in the conduct of war (and in historiography, it might be added), especially in a form of warfare never before tried, is almost always impossible. To say that better planning and a more flexible doctrine might have achieved results earlier should not be interpreted as an indictment or even criticism. It is offered as an explanation. One doesn’t look for certainty in an appraisal of the conduct of human affairs. Understanding would seem to be a more modest and attainable goal.

The immediate post-World War II period was marked by demobilization, confusion in the wake of the demonstrated power of the atomic bomb, and the enunciation of great—but alas, illusory—hopes for peace, already being dashed by the budding cold war. Few governmental and military leaders immediately recognized the overarching impact of the atomic weapon. Howard expresses his admiration, however, for two particularly prescient writers, Bernard Brodie and the late Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Both proved to be remarkably accurate in their assessments of the strategical shape of the next two decades.

In The Absolute Weapon (1946), Brodie wrote that no longer would the United States have the time to mobilize military power as we had done in the Second World War. In the event of war, we would have to fight with forces in-being. The atomic weapon had revolutionized the concept of warfare. Its tremendous destructive potential meant that we now had to deter war. “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars,” he observed. “From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.” 7 Brodie was one of the first publicly to outline the doctrine of deterrence. Others were thinking along the same lines—some even before the close of the war—including Generals H. H. Arnold and Carl Spaatz and the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, W. Stuart Symington.

Howard writes of the evolution of the doctrine of deterrence and then goes far beyond that concept with an insightful essay entitled “Strategy and Policy in Twentieth-Century Warfare.” In the nuclear age, the utility of military power has declined because of the tremendous cost—human and material—associated with its use. But it still plays an important part in world power relationships. Wars, Howard notes, are not simply acts of violence: “They are acts of persuasion or of dissuasion; and although the threat of destruction is normally a necessary part of the persuading process, such destruction is only exceptionally regarded as an end in itself.” (p. 193)

The point is that strategy and policy must be orchestrated. “In making war,” says Howard, “it is necessary constantly to be thinking how to make peace.” (p. 193) For example, with reference to Vietnam,

... a foreign power fights indigenous guerrillas under disadvantages so great that even the most overwhelming preponderance in military force and weapons may be insuffi-
cient to make up for them. In such wars... military operations are therefore only one tool of national policy, and not necessarily the most important. They have to be coordinated with others by a master hand. (p. 196, italics added)

Force must be used with precision and restraint. It must be based on carefully considered policy; if not, it will turn out to be counterproductive. In the nuclear age, the more powerful the force a nation commands, the more stringent are the restraints on its use.

What wisdom can be derived from Studies

in War and Peace? Perhaps foremost, that however hard we try to chart our way through the puzzle of human affairs, we somehow always fail to calculate the whole equation. Events remain unpredictable. The very best we can do will remain imperfect, imprecise.

History will never be an unbroken string of successes. History is not statistics nor an exercise in piling up facts. Neither is it certitude. History is understanding. It is irony. History is mistakes. It holds no simple lessons.

Silver Spring, Maryland

Notes

DIPLOMACY AND THE POSSIBLE

Dr. Joseph Churba

FOR the old and wise, history is analogous to the chastening experience of life, inducing a measure of humility conspicuously absent among the less scarred and those who would ignore its recordings. Unlike the so-called pragmatic politician of the day, the historian of the Middle East finds little solace in the mumbo-jumbo of “peace proposals” and “package deals” reflecting more maneuver than substance, though portrayed as enhancing the prospects for peaceful change. The historian’s unfortunate lot is to view the contemporary scene in the wider perspective of age-old divisions and enmities that crisscross the region and, with a kind of resilience, give conflict and tension an enduring reality from
which there appears to be no escape. Nevertheless, despite the intense, and as yet fruitless, search for alternatives to violence and diplomatic paralysis in the Arab-Israeli conflict, there remains hope of defusing what is certainly the most intractable political problem of the day.

The Art of the Possible purports to offer nothing less. Accordingly, the book offers itself to frustrated diplomats and nervous policy-makers who will read it if only out of sheer desperation. I commend Professor Reisman for his perceptive analysis of the present play of forces in the Middle East. His rejection of the commonly held reductive fallacy implying that the Arab-Israeli problem is the exclusive and central issue in Middle Eastern politics places him at least one cut above others who will not allow the facts to confuse their prejudice. Yet, as is so often the case where the diagnosis of an irrational problem is reasonably accurate, the prescribed medicine seems to have no curative ingredients for the ailment itself; instead the prescription would probably make the patient worse, with new complications.

A diplomatic settlement between the parties is somewhat perfunctorily ruled out by Reisman. He proposes an alternative that would not be a "quixotic quest for peace" but a search within the realm of the possible, for a "system of minimum order" that would serve as the groundwork for a future peace. Emphasizing the need for "unfettered investigation of new political techniques and legal institutions," he writes of the necessity for innovative thinking and "creative diplomacy" that alone can establish the conditions for eventual and lasting peace in the region. Thus, for each of the immediate focuses of conflict, the author proposes a plan: for the Sinai Peninsula, the establishment of a Sinai Development Trust; for the West Bank of the Jordan River, the creation of a Palestinian state; for the Golan Heights, the foundation of a Druze Trust territory; and for the City of Jerusalem, the drafting and adoption of an international statute.

Inasmuch as Professor Reisman's "creative diplomacy" represents another concoction for Israeli withdrawal that clearly does not require Arab governments to sign a peace treaty or to establish diplomatic and commercial relations or even to act in a peaceful way with a neighboring people, his proposals have value only for exploratory purposes. As propositions for action, they ignore the religious, political, and emotional heritage of the area. The proposed diplomatic stratagem is, indeed, typical of the mounting cynicism that marks some of the solutions offered for Middle Eastern affairs.

For example, since Egypt finds no incentives for a negotiated peace in her present burden of huge defense expenditures, aggravated by a sluggish economic growth rate, by losses of revenues from the Suez Canal and the Sinai oil fields, and by the fall in tourism, how likely is it that Reisman's suggestion that the Sinai be neutralized will induce her to agree to any formal diminution of her sovereignty in the Sinai Peninsula? An externally supervised Sinai Development Trust would hardly be perceived as an exercise of Egyptian autonomy. The SDT would have to be a global corporation that would float bond issues in commercial markets and operate independently of any state. While there would be no question of Egypt's residual sovereignty over the peninsula, routine police functions and border supervision would have to be carried out by the SDT police force of a multinational character. Perception of these facts by the Egyptians would, it is argued, be offset by an

abundant source of gainful employment" for the 300,000 Palestinian Arab refugees in Gaza and by the prospect of reducing Egypt's chronic unemployment. All of this is predicated upon converting a wilderness into an economic paradise by finding treasures hidden beneath the sand and rocks of the region.

No less difficult is the author's assumption that third-party palliative economic arrangements necessarily diminish the politico-strategic and emotional significance attached to the conquered territories. The less optimistic easily recall the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, and considerable restraint is necessary not to recite the psychological, political, and security liabilities of the "peace" that history has already recorded. The author seems to demolish his own case by failing to cite a single historical precedent.

More difficult yet is Reisman's belief in benevolent participation by the U.S.S.R. in the proposed scheme, even to the extent of coercing its reluctant protégé to cooperate. Now Middle Eastern specialists may debate the nature of Soviet intentions in the region, but if they agree on anything at all it is manifestly not the suppressed Russian urge to make the Sinai desert bloom. Surely a region spared from Soviet "benevolence" is a region saved. Curiously, the author does not call for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles and military forces—clearly the first step toward restoring Egyptian sovereignty and the creation of a "system of minimum order." He never really escapes from the first question: If the Soviets are sufficiently influential to foist a complex structure of security, why can't they simply encourage a genuine dialogue with the Israelis, leading to a peace agreement?

The proposals for disposition of the West Bank and the Golan Heights conform to an avant garde definition of security. Accordingly, we are told that despite Israel's new borders her defensive posture has not improved.

The Israeli proponent of territorial retention, like his American counterpart, the proponent of arm, is motivated by an imperative of territorial defense that contemporary weapons have long since obsolesced. Flying and missile time between Tel Aviv and Amman is the same no matter who controls the Sinai. Israeli control of Sinai does not change the missile distance between Cairo and Tel Aviv. No matter how much territory it controls, any state in the Mediterranean is open from the sea to quick attack by aircraft flying below the radar threshold. This is not to suggest that territory has no strategic importance. The strategic value of territory is a function of a broad, multifaceted context; in many circumstances, territory is not of major importance. (p. 57)

Presumably, the nightmares are not over for Israeli generals. The reversal of the prewar strategic relationship between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and the acquisition by Israel of security in depth are irrelevant. Reisman implies that occupation of Sinai has not really removed the threat of rapid juncture between Egyptian and Jordanian forces across the Negev triangle. Tel Aviv, 300 miles from Egyptian forces, is as secure as Cairo—now only 80 miles from Israeli forces. That air bases in the north of Israel have fallen out of Egyptian aircraft range counts for as much as the 15-minute loitering time the Israeli Air Force has gained with its new bases in Sinai. And if the new bases imply an easier striking range and a faster turnaround for attacking aircraft and larger payloads, "the imperative of territorial defense" does not really mean much. Indeed, one suspects that Reisman might have a hard time persuading Israelis in at least a score of villages that control of the Golan Heights has eliminated the threat of Syrian artillery. He would certainly rue the day he tried to convince Arabs that Israeli troops 40 miles from Damascus and 25 miles from Amman constitute no threat to their security.

As though the popular mood in Israel were "expand or perish," it is a matter of consider-
able ease for Reisman to lecture Israelis on the sins of “micro-colonialism.” Good Christians will take issue with the dubious assertion that Jeremy Bentham’s unheeded call in 1793 for emancipation of the colonies was the original sin leading to the world’s current crises. Israelis are therefore chided not to repeat the error.

"Unless Israel has the courage to recognize the demands of the Palestinians and show enough political maturity to deal with men who have terrorized them, a surging source of instability will continue." (pp. 55–56) Indeed, courage would have to be summoned in order to submit to the genocidal demands of Yasir Arafat’s Fatah, George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Naif Hawatmeh’s Popular Democratic Front. To be sure, such maturity is at a premium among nations which actually face the threat of political and physical extinction. The crisp legal language of the author assuages fear and reduces the problem to the barest simplicity:

... Israel need only announce that it will withdraw from the West Bank regions occupied in 1967 upon formation of a representative Palestinian government recognized as independent and sovereign by the United Nations and committed to active compliance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter. Israel would then permit the United Nations Committee on Self-Governing territories to dispatch an observer team to the West Bank, which would administer a series of referenda: The inhabitants would determine the form of government they wished and would choose their political leaders. Israel would thereafter withdraw under a United Nations timetable. The United Nations might station a peace-keeping force on the eastern or western boundaries of the new Palestinian state, but this would be a largely symbolic gesture. (p. 52)

The element of reciprocity is not crucial in Reisman’s concept of international relations. The burden is upon Israel to act as midwife to the projected Palestinian Arab state, but Arab governments and Palestinian Arabs need not recognize the existence of a Hebrew or Jewish national entity. Thus, with no more than a painless stroke of the pen, conflict and tension related to the balance of power in the Arab East would dissipate in the train of Israeli largesse inspired from renewed love and trust in the United Nations.

With attention more upon possible Israeli military expansion than upon the necessity to persuade the Syrian government to the wisdom of a political solution, Reisman’s proposal for converting the Golan Heights into a Druze Trust Territory, if considered seriously, is sure to confront the policy-makers with an example of how to neglect history and lose that which history has already effectively resolved. One of the more healthy signs in the situation is that the warrior-like Druze have not succumbed to the nationalist bug which the author roundly denounces as the scourge of Middle Eastern politics. Yet he anticipates an evil day and offers to cede Syrian land to the Druze so as to “minimize the national and trans-national tensions involved in eventual Druze claims for self-determination.” The generosity is misplaced. A heretical offshoot of the Shi’ite Ismailis whose foremost aim is to preserve their traditional customs and practices, the Druze of Syria, Lebanon, and Israel have managed quite well without the dubious benefits of Chapters XI and XII of the United Nations Charter.

Indeed, while the Druze in Israel enjoy religious autonomy and full citizenship—even serving in the army—their coreligionists in the Levant are active in the Arab nationalist movement and in Syrian and Lebanese political leadership. Why the author seeks to undo this relatively happy arrangement, as well as risk the delicate Christian-Muslim balance in Lebanon, is as mystifying as the presumed greater readiness of Syria to cede the Golan to the Druze in preference to the only slightly less despised Israelis.

The author, with his talent for “creative
diplomacy,” has yet another proposal. It is for an international statute for Jerusalem that would accord Israel only nominal sovereignty and would “incorporate effective and enforceable guarantees of autonomy and unimpeded access by adherents of other faiths to their respective holy places.” Despite Israel’s zealous protection of churches, mosques, and other holy places in Israel (e.g., Capernaum, Tabha, the shrines in Nazareth, the Mount of Beatitudes, the al Jazar mosque in Acre), the author does not find it difficult to imagine Israel’s barring certain Christians and Muslims from the City of David for political reasons or even reconstructing the ancient temple where the Dome of the Rock presently stands. In fact, the author does not credit Israel’s declared readiness to work out an arrangement for safeguarding the holy places under the jurisdiction of the respective religious authorities. Instead, his proposal would incorporate the International Court of Justice into the decision structure of Jerusalem, thus placing the capital city somewhere between nominal Israeli sovereignty and a corpus separatum whose mandate would be determined by the vagaries of international law.

To be sure, the proposal is at once symbolic of and consistent with the overall plan to encircle Israel with a number of varying quasi-sovereign entities or buffer zones, whose existence might ostensibly resolve the security dilemma. The inherent ambiguities of such arrangements, however, will not be lost upon the security-obsessed Israelis, who in the final analysis would sooner forget Reisman than either their right hand or Jerusalem.

Air University Institute for Professional Development

REFLECTIONS FROM HARRIMAN

Dr. Joseph W. Annunziata

Ambassador W. Averell Harriman has published a compilation of his observations concerning fifty years of U.S. relations with Russia and other countries.† Using as a basis a series of lectures he gave at Lehigh University, and adding explanations, amplifications, additional thoughts, and anecdotes, he has produced a fairly complete personal memoir of his long experience with Russian-American affairs and related activities. It is a valuable record which otherwise might not have been preserved, because of the active life Harriman continues to lead at age eighty.

For many people who identify Harriman

† W. Averell Harriman, America and Russia in a Changing World (Garden City: Doubleday, 1971, $5.95), 218 pages.
with his anti-Vietnam war views, it will be a revelation that he has consistently advocated a firm stance against Communists on issues of vital interest to the United States. He first became involved with Russia after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, as a 26-year-old Republican international banker with a manganese concession in the Soviet Caucasus. He soon realized that the revolution was not a passing thing but would have a long-lasting influence on world affairs.

After his first visit to Russia in 1926, he became convinced that the Bolshevik Revolution was in fact a reactionary one and not "the wave of the future"; that it denied the basic tenets of America—the rights and dignity of the individual and the belief that government should express the will of the people. Although Harriman switched political parties in 1928 to support Al Smith for President and subsequently became a devoted advocate of Democratic Rooseveltian policies, he has never altered his basic conviction that the Bolshevik Revolution, for all its manifest achievements, has been on balance a tragic step backward in human development. In 1945 he was actually criticized for saying that Stalin's objectives and ours were irreconcilable.

Harriman gives many previously unpublished details of his negotiations with the Soviets and his positions during the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. Presently, he is particularly concerned about the dangerous effects which the strategic arms race and the U.S. fighting in Vietnam are having on U.S.-Soviet relations. As to the future, he foresees continuing changes in U.S.-Soviet relations and hopes for a steady mutual understanding of the economic, social, political, and military areas where the two countries can coexist; but he certainly sees no convergence between the two countries as long as the Communist attitude remains basically antipathetic to American ideals.

Yet Harriman, during his long experience with the Russians, has seen them our allies at one time and our enemies at another and that their temperament and experiences make them volatile and easily suspicious. Therefore, the U.S. must be patient, flexible, persistent on matters of principle, and constantly on the lookout for the smallest steps whereby the two nuclear superpowers can cooperate rather than have tense relations. On the one hand he decries the old cold war warrior who sees no change, who still thinks in terms of the Stalin era, with the monolithic structure of international Communism looming as the immediate threat it used to be. On the other hand he decries those who believe that now the only difference between us and the Soviets is a matter of economic theory and that all we have to do is show love and affection for them and everything will be all right.

His driving realization seems to be that, since the Soviet Union and the U.S. have the capacity to destroy each other and the better part of the world, they have a serious responsibility to find a way to get along on this small planet in spite of their differences. He pictures the problem as confused by misunderstandings, rigid prejudices, and unrealistic hopes that exist in this country and by blind suspicions, misinformation, and inhuman ideology within the Soviet Union.

The Vietnam problem, Harriman believes, must therefore be put in a proper perspective, since it is but one of the significant international issues we face today. The only satisfactory solution he can envision is for South Vietnam's President Thieu to broaden his government. He should rally the non-Communist forces of South Vietnam and form an alliance representative of the majority of the people. "Big" Minh, who was once the most popular of South Vietnamese generals, is willing to do this; the Buddhists, the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, the labor unions, and other non-Communist groups could be brought in, with Thieu himself representing the Catholic faction. All these non-Communist groups are anxious to
end the war and remain in their country. They know that a military victory cannot be won, and they are ready to make a political settlement. But they need to organize themselves so as to be able to win the political contest that will come after the end of hostilities.

Thieu must bring these people in and field a team in Paris that wants to negotiate. The result may be a nonaligned, neutral government in South Vietnam; but that is the best we can expect and is in the long run compatible with our interests. Furthermore, Harriman believes this solution will entail a separate U.S. agreement with Hanoi. The North Vietnamese are nationalists and want to be independent of Peking, from whom they must now import three hundred thousand tons of rice a year. They are satisfied with the relations they have established with France and also want to have normal relations with us, so they can have access to our technology and miracle rice.

Throughout this book, one discerns that Harriman's chief concern, from the very beginning of his diplomatic career, has been economic and social progress and that he believes political and military means are to be used discretely, with human progress constantly in mind. Harriman could be labeled a pragmatic humanitarian. His decisions to be conciliatory or intransigent have usually been dictated by whether he believed one attitude or the other would best further these overriding goals. He believes that, in the past, good as well as bad decisions were made; but in any case speculation about them will not change them, and we must go forward from here, doing our best to improve the economic and social status not only of the U.S. but of other nations of the world whose condition inevitably has an effect on ours.

Finally, one is impressed by Harriman's genuine patriotism and optimism for the future of his country. He rejects the rock-throwers and the burners because they destroy and play into the hands of the most reactionary. On the other hand, he praises students and other antiwar dissenters who are taking constructive action against the tragedy of lost American lives, the division of the country, and the wartime diversion of resources that are urgently needed elsewhere. He concluded his Lehigh lectures with this eloquent advice to his student audience:

This country has symbolized man's highest hopes and principles. It has achieved the greatest production the world has ever seen. Use all this well. Learn from past mistakes and try to improve on the past. I am utterly impatient with some who talk about overthrowing this whole nation. Put it in the right path, make America live up to her highest principles, even improve the traditions if you will. But don't decry the past. Understand the past. Build on it for a better America. My guess is you will.

*Fairfax, Virginia*
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The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "Squadron Officer School, Junior Officers, and You" by Colonel Arthur R. Moore, Jr., USAF, as the outstanding article in the September-October 1971 issue of the Review.
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