




AIR
UNIVERSITY
review

MAY-JUNE 1978





The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force

AIR UNIVERSITY **Review**

from the editor's aerie

Contemporary commentary about the current status and future prospects of the all-volunteer force frequently gives the impression that it is a departure from our traditional dependence on the draft. Yet except for relatively short periods of national emergency, the U.S. has historically filled the ranks of the armed services with volunteers. Dr. Curtis Tarr, who was Director of the Selective Service System from 1970 to 1972, examines the all-volunteer force in light of current conditions and ventures the prediction that we will rely on volunteer armed forces for a long time to come. Our cover reflects the American symbol of volunteerism, the Minuteman.

Several issues ago we published a two-part article by Wing Commander Peter Papworth, RAF, on the integrity of the Warsaw Pact. Continuing the dialogue in this issue, Major Robert Chandler examines the other side of the power equation with an assessment of the cohesion of NATO. In our next issue we will narrow the focus with articles that discuss the doctrinal employment of forces in the European area.

Editors, unlike old soldiers, are not inclined to fade away. As we go to press, word reaches us that our previous editor of many years, Colonel Eldon W. Downs, has written "30" to a full Air Force career. True to his calling even in retirement, he assumes editorship of the *Harper County Journal* in his hometown of Buffalo, Oklahoma. I am sure our readers join the staff of the *Review* in wishing Colonel Downs a happy and productive second career in another field of journalism.

Perhaps no organization in the Air Force has been more productive of articles and reviews for the *Review* than the History Department of the Air Force Academy. Accordingly, we follow the historians' activities with more than usual interest and wish them well in their forthcoming symposium, more fully detailed on page 30.



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


WHEN a nation sets aside the weapons and anguish of war, its leaders, those Arnold Toynbee called the "creative minority," seek ideals to pursue a more enlightened course. Thus, in 1972, Americans yearned, almost desperately, for new sources of hope. By almost any measure, the war in the jungles of Vietnam had been the most tragic in our history. "How," we asked, "can we avoid a similar aberration?" At the same time we wondered how we might improve on the practices of the recent past.

One of our most promising inspirations was to fill the armed forces entirely with volunteers, young men and women willingly accepting the burdens and often the drudgery of the nation's defense. This would mean abandoning selective service, that mechanism by which we had supplied manpower for the military services since 1940, except for an unsuccessful experiment just prior to the Korean War.

Proponents of all-volunteer force (AVF) marshaled convincing arguments for the idea. Although the draft had supplied the needs of the services recently, historically

THE FUTURE OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE



DR. CURTIS W. TARR

the nation always had relied on volunteers in times of peace. In a free society, why use compulsion if sufficient numbers of men would volunteer? Reliance on volunteers could curb ill-advised foreign commitments. Conscription of young men at low rates of pay really constituted a discriminatory tax on those called. Furthermore, with new technology requiring fewer men than in World War II, equity in choosing those to be drafted became more elusive, perhaps impossible to achieve. Finally, the Gates Commission promised that modest improvement in pay scales for entering enlisted men and officers would make volunteerism achievable.

A weary nation accepted the idea willingly, and the Army inducted its last conscript in December 1972. Since that time, the services have virtually met their goals for enlistment, although the most recent year has been a difficult one. The young people entering the forces now have better records than their drafted predecessors, both in the numbers with high school diplomas and in scores on the mental aptitude test. Also, the force seems to be representative of the various geographic regions of the nation. Recruits generally are members of middle-class families, as draftees were before them. Despite some complaints about motivation and retention, many commanders judge the present forces to be the best they have ever commanded.

Although the nation adopted the all-volunteer force with little difficulty, it is not likely to abandon the concept easily.

Yet in the face of this apparent success, many reliable observers now question how long the nation will be able to maintain volunteerism as the sole means of providing manpower for the armed forces. Senator John Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Howard Baker, the Senate

Republican leader, Senator Sam Nunn, member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and General Bernard Rogers, Army Chief of Staff—all have pointed to problems of cost of the all-volunteer force, the difficulty of recruiting sufficient numbers of qualified people, and racial imbalance. These problems should be considered with some care.

cost

When the nation made plans to rely entirely on volunteers, the Department of Defense gained congressional support for dramatic increases in military pay to a level of rough comparability with that offered to beginning workers in civilian positions. Partly as a result, defense manpower costs have risen to more than half of the total defense budget and may constitute three-fourths of it by 1981. In December 1976, Senator Stennis wondered how long the nation could allocate such a large share of its budget to people and thereby restrict what it invested in research and development and procurement of new weapon systems.

Another source of worry is the cost of mobilization, where significant increases in the numbers of people in the armed forces might make pay comparability even more burdensome. No reliable observer has ever suggested that volunteers would provide our manpower needs in a major war. But paying conscripts the same benefits as today's volunteers would require huge financial outlays. Finally the cost of recruitment, bonuses, and special payments to attract recruits enlarges our manpower expense, with an escalation in a time of difficult recruiting.

One view of volunteerism is that it has substituted economic for political conscription because many who have entered the services as volunteers had no other career alternatives. If one seeks to attract recruits by using monetary rewards, then one must expect the cost to be high. This is so particularly when the services require so many young people that

they tend to establish minimum starting pay scales that the private sector can exceed if ever it needs more people.

When someone argues that the all-volunteer force costs too much money, he implies that the draft would cost less. This is so only to a limited extent. If the nation reinstated the draft, it very likely would not reduce economic benefits to recruits; rather it would let inflation erode the purchasing power of those benefits. This would require time, perhaps years, to alter that portion of the defense budget allocated to manpower because pay and benefits to career noncommissioned officers and officers would necessarily keep pace with civilian salaries; these career personnel are and always have been a volunteer force. Meanwhile retirement costs would continue to grow.

Although recruitment costs, bonuses, and special payments could shrink with reinstatement of the draft, the cost of establishing and maintaining a selective service system would offset those savings in part. The all-volunteer force is costly. In the near term, conscription also would be expensive.

recruiting sufficient numbers

Thus far the environment for recruitment into the armed services hardly could have been better. Our forces have declined in size since 1972, the population of those from whom recruiters could draw has increased, the unemployment rate of teenagers has climbed to one in five, and military pay has improved substantially. What are the chances of sustaining the AVF if this combination of circumstances terminates? The military services now must recruit one person in three of those who are eligible to serve.

One concern is the size of the manpower pool in the future. The Bureau of the Census projects that the population of 18-year-old males will decline by about 15 percent between 1975 and 1985. The decline following 1985 will be even greater. But for the immediate future,

the economy rather than the size of the pool poses the greatest obstacle to volunteerism.

To analyze economic factors, staff members of the Defense Manpower Commission studied the opportunities for young men to find civilian employment in periods of slow, moderate, and rapid growth of the economy, and then they balanced these opportunities with the available pool from which the services will draw. The conclusion of this study is that during the next ten years the military services can attract the numbers of men they will require in periods of moderate or slow economic growth but that rapid growth will force substantial changes in policy.

We must provide the nation an adequate defense. For a long time to come, that defense will be undertaken by Americans who volunteer.

The management options available to meet recruiting shortages are several. One is to offer higher economic rewards, not only increasing the total cost but inflating beginning salaries for all young people.

Another option is to increase the number of civilians and contract personnel doing the work now undertaken by uniformed personnel. Much more of this can and should be done regardless of recruitment considerations. But there are limits. Many positions filled by enlisted men could be assigned to civilians, but some positions must be maintained as military spaces to provide opportunities for military personnel to spend time away from sea or isolated bases. Too much "civilianization" causes a higher percentage of the military slots to be undesirable, particularly for a family man, and thus retention and re-enlistment suffer. Also, there are positions that could be filled by civilians while units are in this country but would require military personnel

during deployment overseas; obviously, the military must occupy the post both here and abroad or readiness declines. Nevertheless, the services can use more civilians and contract personnel and should do so.

The military services could lower their standards of acceptance, assigning some jobs to people with lesser physical capability. The services, of course, must guard against admitting those with defects that would make them a permanent burden for the Veterans Administration. But some lowering of physical standards probably would increase the number of recruits without damage to force effectiveness. Another alternative is to lower mental standards. Some positions do not require mental Category I, II, or III people. Yet Project 100,000 taught us how much support is required to prepare Category IV people for assignment, even though the progress made by many of these youths was most gratifying when measured in human terms.

Finally, the services can and should attract more women. Quite aside from considering women for combat assignments—something that I do not believe the nation is yet ready to accept—there are many roles that now are not open to women or are so in too few numbers. All of these management options can help the services overcome recruiting shortages in the years immediately ahead. I personally believe they are sufficient to preclude serious difficulties, at least during the next ten years.

But the same cannot be said for the Reserve Forces. Presently the reserves, particularly the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve Forces, are about 10 percent below strength. This situation will deteriorate even further because requirements will grow during the next two years. This shortfall is particularly crucial, owing to the important role the reserves play under the total force concept, in our worldwide contingency planning.

When the Defense Manpower Commission staff studied reserve recruitment, they concluded that recruiting shortfalls probably

cannot be avoided in a period of rapid economic growth and that there will be difficulties even in slow and moderate growth. In the short run, many have suggested greater economic incentives, and these probably will be essential. Reserve leaders must continue to search for new ideas to make reserve service a more exciting opportunity for young men and women. In the long run, some military leaders have recommended a special draft for the Reserve Forces.

Personally, I do not believe that a draft for reserve service is possible. A reservist is a civilian with a part-time military obligation: it is assumed that he has a civilian salary on which to live. If men were inducted in one area for service in a reserve unit elsewhere, then considerable hardship could occur if the man were expected to find employment near the place where that unit resided. If men were conscripted only in those areas where reserve units had a shortfall, then serious inequities would result, and probably the practice would be challenged in the courts. If men were drafted in one state for service in a national guard unit of another state, then difficulties would arise if the unit were called by the governor for an emergency. My own assessment is that the Reserve Forces will be bound to the same recruiting arrangements as those available to the active forces, and this will continue to invite serious manning problems.

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One of the most perplexing reserve shortfalls is in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). An individual, either drafted or enlisted, is obligated to serve for six years. If he served as a draftee for two years on active duty, then he has a four-year obligation beyond that. If he enlists for three years, his obligation beyond that is

three years. It is from this pool of those veterans still obligated that the Army traditionally has planned to replace combat losses. Unfortunately, defense planners miscalculated the size of this Individual Ready Reserve because they did not estimate the effect of longer enlistments, higher re-enlistments, or the loss from the pool when a man went into a reserve unit. Numbers in the pool are diminishing rapidly. Although some military leaders have suggested that the pool should be expanded by lengthening the obligation of those who already have served, I believe the better alternative is to re-establish selective service for the registration and classification of all young men at age 18. Then the nation could rely more quickly on draftees for loss replacements, thus requiring a smaller IRR pool.

racial imbalance

Blacks constitute about 12 percent of the population of the 18 to 24-year-old youth, and the Army during the war in Vietnam had about the same percentage of blacks in its ranks.

. . . the services can and should attract more women.

Now, that share of blacks in the Army has doubled. Some question whether it is sound policy to continue that trend. For example, in war black casualties would be higher than the black share of the entire U.S. population. Would such a high percentage of blacks curb deployment options, say a commitment of troops to Africa? Some people have asked whether a high ratio of blacks in a unit might deter whites from wanting to be a part of the unit. I will say personally that those reservations do not trouble me.

Blacks join the Army in greater numbers than whites because their economic opportunities in civilian life are more limited. A policy

to limit blacks from entering the Army would in fact restrict them as the job market does, something that we should not accept as a national policy. Furthermore, if we had a draft at a time of high unemployment and offered the reasonable economic benefits to those entering the service, blacks still would volunteer even though the draft did not take them; they would be represented at a higher percent than their share of the population. The only way to reduce the proportion of blacks in the service under conscription is to offer low starting pay so that nearly every recruit is either drafted or draft-induced.

alternatives to the all-volunteer force

I believe that the all-volunteer force is working reasonably well. It is not without problems, but we must remember that any arrangement for providing manpower for the services invites problems. I can testify to some of those we faced at the end of the war in Vietnam.

If we abandoned the all-volunteer force, what would we install in its place? Many people have suggested a selective service system based on a lottery, with no exemptions or deferments. But this is not possible. The nation would not establish a draft without a classification for conscientious objection, and any new system would be forced to grapple with existing court decisions on what grounds are appropriate for those claiming that classification. Other young men would seek exemption from service because of hardship, and the nation would want to grant some of those petitions, even though they involve difficult judgments. Finally, there would be exemptions for those who did not meet mental and physical standards. Increasingly during the Vietnam War, we had difficulty with a few medical doctors who wrote letters supporting questionable exemptions. All of these problems, and the animosities that accompany them, would return with bitterness if we relied again on conscription.

Another option is universal training or service. Either possibility is equitable because everyone is involved. But to meet our military commitments today, we need forces in being, not forces in preparation. Universal service would bring great numbers of men into the service for short periods of time; when trained, the men would serve briefly before being discharged. Thus most of the career force would be required to train recruits. The forces in being would be plagued by turbulence.

Others talk about National Service involving all young people, perhaps at age 18, for two years. This proposal has more acceptance among older people than it does among youth. The first difficulty is that mandatory service may not be constitutional. Our only defense under the constitution for conscription was that Congress has the power "To raise and support Armies" and "To provide and maintain a Navy." To use those powers as authorization for national service, when most of the people involved would be employed outside of the armed services, would probably not stand the test of constitutionality. Thus, I believe national service would require a constitutional amendment, not easily enacted.

But if national service were constitutional, then organizational problems become mammoth. What agencies of the government are now or could in the near future be prepared to absorb hundreds of thousands of idealistic young people? How could we organize the work to be done so that these young people

could contribute to the nation in a manner that justified the hardship thrust upon them? Furthermore, if young people had options, how could we make certain that sufficient numbers of the best qualified would elect to serve in the armed forces? These are not questions easily answered. A dream in the abstract could disillusion young America in the reality of poor management.

Some have suggested that national service should be voluntary. That would eliminate the constitutional problem. But if greater ranges of opportunity are available to young people, it is difficult to see how this would help the armed services attract the numbers of qualified people they require.

ALTHOUGH the nation adopted the all-volunteer force with little difficulty, it is not likely to abandon the concept easily. My guess is that nothing short of a major emergency will convince the people of the nation to change what we now are doing. The only possibility in the immediate future is to invest every energy, every creative idea into the success of volunteerism. The danger of weighing alternatives is that it takes us away from the grim task of making our present systems perform successfully. Yet we cannot do otherwise. We must provide the nation an adequate defense. For a long time to come, that defense will be undertaken by Americans who volunteer.

Moline, Illinois

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Moline, Illinois



MAJOR ROBERT W. CHANDLER

A specter is haunting Europe: not the specter of Communism evoked in these famous words by Karl Marx in 1848, but the specter of Soviet hegemony. That specter arises from the steady expansion of the military power of the Soviet state. But it remains contingent upon the faltering of American purpose, as America, wounded by the internal travail and external setbacks of the last decade, becomes preoccupied with its internal problems and internal divisions.

James R. Schlesinger
February 1976¹

WITH this poignant reflection, the former Secretary of Defense asks whether the United States will muster the necessary political resolve and moral stamina to meet and overcome severe challenges to its vital interests in the coming decade. Dr. Schlesinger's observation also presupposes three long-standing postulates of American foreign policy: (1) a free, independent, non-Communist Western Europe is a vital interest of the United States, (2) Soviet military power threatens West European independence, and (3) American action is required to help counterbalance Moscow's armed might. This article reconsiders these fundamental assumptions: to re-examine the U.S. national interest in Europe, to reassess the need for European-based American forces, and to speculate what action the U.S. might contemplate to bolster West European resistance against Soviet domination.

Most commentators today, when describing NATO and evaluating its prospects, liberally sprinkle their observations with such words as "fragmentation," "disarray," "disintegration," "drift," and similar characterizations. Some analyze the obvious numerical military imbalance that favors the Soviet Union in northern and central Europe and offer an endless stream of new ideas for shifts in NATO strategy, tactical dispersion of its forces, logistical redeployment, standardization of armaments, and similar prescriptions. Others foresee a weakening of American political resolve that will result in eventual dissolution of NATO and an accommodation of West European foreign policies to Moscow's superior power—a "Finlandization" of Western Europe. Finally, a few worry about the issue, wring their hands, and spin out dire prophecies of a nuclear Armageddon that will devastate Europe, the United States, and the U.S.S.R.

Perhaps the greatest problem is that NATO has been overstudied, overtheorized, and oversensitized by too many observers for too long on both sides of the Atlantic. No one can

deny that over the years definite political realignments have occurred within the alliance to accommodate the divergent national interests and capabilities of its fifteen sovereign, independent member states. Nor can one ignore the fact that NATO is beset by a host of bewildering problems, both from the outside and from within. The emergence of "rough equivalence" in the strategic nuclear balance between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., for example, has had a tremendous impact on the Atlantic partnership, especially in light of the burgeoning Soviet-Warsaw Pact offensive military power in Eastern Europe. Internally, several corrosive factors are eating away at NATO's politico-military bonds as each member pursues its own national interests—sometimes in harmony, sometimes in conflict with its alliance partners.

Indeed, when taken together on a single perspective, these external and internal disintegrative influences do conjure a pernicious picture of a disjointed NATO in political disarray. But such a representation ignores the realities of why NATO was formed in the first place and what continues to hold it together.

Alliance Cohesion

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a *political* alliance with a military purpose. It has never been immutable; changes in its form and functions largely have flowed from a continuous metamorphosis of political relationships among its member allies.

At the outset of the Cold War, the war-weary peoples of Western Europe were deeply concerned about the Red Army poised along their borders. It seemed only natural at the time that the West Europeans and the North Americans should join in a tightly knit alliance to neutralize the military threat posed by the East. Since those early crisis years the loosening of NATO's inner links has evolved gradually as a natural by-product of the changing international environment—from

the "tight bipolar" days of the 1950s to the more diverse "bipolycentrism" of the '60s and '70s. Additionally, as the nation-states of NATO Europe recovered economically and regained political stability, their competence and self-confidence to prosecute their individual national objectives were enhanced—the common ties binding the allies slackened accordingly.

In recent years, the spirit of détente has made possible greater East-West trade and travel, political and arms control agreements, and a more relaxed international atmosphere that have contributed to benign perceptions of Soviet intentions. Yet, it is an irony of our day that while the West Europeans feel more secure than ever before, Moscow has increased its margin of physical military superiority over NATO to an unprecedented level. Apparently the Kremlin leadership has discovered something that we have known all along—democratic peoples have little stomach for costly defense expenditures in the absence of a clearly perceived, imminent threat. Indeed, despite some encouraging signs over the past year, NATO allies on both sides of the Atlantic still appear unwilling to support the spending necessary to offset the growing disparity in NATO-Warsaw Pact capacities, especially in the critical areas of northern and central Europe.

Another major influence affecting alliance cohesion is the increasing importance of NATO's nonnuclear forces. "While conventional forces must be linked to nuclear forces in order to represent an effective deterrent," U.S. Senator Sam Nunn explains, "now that the USSR has achieved strategic nuclear parity with the U.S., Warsaw Pact conventional superiority in Europe can be very dangerous."² This is what the NATO-Warsaw Pact arms control negotiations in Vienna are all about—trying to find a way to preserve political stability in central Europe by establishing a verifiable balance of military power at lower levels on both sides (the Western view). It is

toward these ends that the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks have been conducted for more than four years. Despite substantial proposals by the NATO allies, progress toward achieving an equitable agreement has been largely disappointing.³

The signing of the Final Act to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe by 33 European countries (all except Albania), Canada, and the United States in 1975 was a major politico-psychological event that contributed to Western images of nonhostile Soviet intent. As London's International Institute for Strategic Studies put it, "exactly what the event symbolized was uncertain." But many in the West have the opinion that the Final Act is a surrogate peace treaty that formally ends World War II. In effect, it sanctifies and gives Western *de jure* recognition to the Kremlin's nailing down of Eastern Europe.⁴

Internal erosive factors also have taken their toll on alliance cohesiveness. France, after a decade of absence, still remains outside the military organs of NATO. Greece, too, continues an outsider despite American urgings since the 1974 Cyprus crisis. Turkey similarly has maintained its pique with the United States and NATO in the wake of the Cyprus crisis and remains part in, part out of the military side of the alliance (the chances of Greek-Turkish conflict over the exploration and exploitation of possible oil reserves in disputed areas of the Aegean Sea remain, but mediation by other NATO countries so far has helped prevent military clashes). Portugal, after a two-year respite while it wrestled some tough domestic issues, is now on a road leading toward full reintegration with NATO. The question of Communist participation at the highest levels of the Italian government is an abiding source of great concern and consternation among the NATO allies. Spain, in spite of its obvious strategic importance, still lies on the periphery of the alliance. The British-Icelandic "cod war" that has been

going on and off for more than five years is in temporary recess with some hope the dispute may have been resolved (British trawlers repeatedly violated unilateral Icelandic fishing restrictions within two hundred miles of its coast; when the latter tried to enforce its declaration with gunboats, London responded by dispatching Royal Navy frigates, and shots, rammings, and a variety of ugly incidents soon followed). Finally, the U.S. Congress periodically has considered substantial troop reductions in Europe, and both Republican and Democratic Party platforms in 1976 called for a reappraisal of the American military footing in NATO, heightening European anxieties of Washington's long-term commitment.⁵

The irony of these variegated influences is that while they give the impression of disarray and fragmentation they are actually indications of political vitality and solidarity. Recent events have shown that the Atlantic partnership, without impairing its fundamental sense of direction and purpose, can tolerate a certain degree of diversity and conflicting national interests among its members. Some observers may bemoan NATO's seemingly tepid response to the many conflicts and crises involving alliance partners, but its lack of *direct* action in the affairs of its members reveals an important political strength. Whether by chance or design, its overt hands-off policy in dealing with events in Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Italy, Britain, Iceland, and, indeed, the United States during the Vietnam War demonstrates a high degree of political sophistication and flexibility.

In sum, NATO appears fragmented only in comparison to the strong bonds that welded a collage of weak European and powerful North American states together in the early 1950s. The looser NATO of the mid-1970s reflects today's political realities between the NATO allies and their place in the international milieu. A few persons might judge the Atlantic partnership an anachronism—a vestige of the Cold War—but the fact is that the very

common menace that brought them together in 1949 continues to provide much of its *raison d'être*.

U.S. National Interest

Since the earliest days of the Cold War, a vital national security interest of the United States has been to prevent Soviet hegemony over Western Europe. To this end, the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine in 1947 were designed in part to serve notice on Moscow of continued American concern and involvement in European affairs. When in 1949 the United States entered NATO in the wake of the Berlin blockade and the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia, the Kremlin was confronted by a tangible demonstration of American political determination to defend Western Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues to interweave and unite the national securities and destinies of Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Italy, Portugal, and Canada and the United States (Greece and Turkey were added in 1952; West Germany joined in 1955). Each nation promises in Article 5 "that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."

From the outset, American troops were an integral part of the allied defensive component. Numbering about 100,000 soldiers in 1950, U.S. forces were increased to more than 400,000 by 1952, when many believed that the Communist attack in Korea was a diversionary effort in prelude to an imminent Soviet thrust into Western Europe. American strength peaked in 1961 at about 463,000 during the Berlin crisis, followed by a gradual downward turn in the 1960s that lowered the number to today's figure of about 300,000 troops.

In recent years, both public and congressional concern have been expressed over the cost of maintaining these forces. Many have



F-16


F-4



The USAF in NATO


Since its inception a primary objective of NATO has been to deter Soviet aggression. United States Air Force aircraft which have flown in support of NATO or been a part of its order of battle include the General Dynamics F-16, McDonnell Douglas F-4, Phantom (participating in NATO Project Bullseye, 1968), Lockheed C-141 StarLifter, Fairchild A-10, Lockheed C-5 Galaxy, and the General Dynamics FB-111 strategic bomber.

C-141






FB-111



C-5



A-10

asked, for example, "why 200 million rich Americans should maintain around 300,000 American troops in Europe—thirty years after the end of World War II... to defend 250 or 300 million almost equally rich Europeans."⁶ Indeed, if one considers the issue from such a rhetorically loaded perspective, large-scale reductions may appear warranted. When contemplated from a more rational point of view, however, one finds that many of the arguments advocating substantial troop cuts are impressionistic and based on faulty notions of the purpose and role of the American armed forces.

In the first place, it should be evident that the forward basing of U.S. power today has nothing to do with World War II. American troops were dispatched to NATO Europe during the early 1950s to protect vital U.S. national security interests—to deter a European war that would have inevitably involved the United States—they continue to perform that crucial defensive function today. American forces are not and never have been based in Europe solely for the sake of European security. They remain in Europe because the threat from the East that brought them there has not diminished. On the contrary, a sound argument can be made that Soviet-Warsaw Pact military capabilities have increased dramatically in recent years, despite détente and the Kremlin's declared policy of peaceful coexistence.

Nor should there be any doubt that the securities and destinies of North America and Western Europe are inexorably linked. Americans have deep historical, cultural, economic, and political ties with Europe. A majority of Americans are of European descent; Americans and Europeans share similar cultural values, a common Christian-Judeo background, and similar political philosophies that embrace democracy and respect for freedom of the human spirit. Economically, American-European trade amounts to more than \$30 billion annually, and American capital investment in

Europe is more than \$30 billion. In addition, Western Europe, as a whole, has the greatest concentration of skilled manpower and economic productivity outside the U.S. and U.S.S.R.⁷

In short, "the NATO alliance is a manifestation of the interdependence of U.S. and Western European security," former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld reminds us. "We should not lose sight of the fact that NATO protects the United States as well as Western Europe."⁸ To be sure, a free, independent, non-Communist Western Europe is an American concern—a vital national interest in 1978 just as it was in 1949. Without a direct United States participation and forward deployment that is respected by the Kremlin and trusted by our allies, the medium-sized powers of NATO Europe would be unable, both politically and militarily, to stand up to the Soviet armed colossus positioned along their borders. "The United States today still represents the only potential counterweight to the military and political power of the Soviet Union," writes James R. Schlesinger. "There is no one else waiting in the wings. There will be no *deus ex machina*. That the United States alone has the power to serve as a counterweight to the Soviet Union continues to be an ineluctable fact—just as it has in the entire period since 1945."⁹ Forward-based conventional and nuclear forces still support the vital U.S. national interests—they also provide much of the backbone and politico-military cohesiveness that make NATO work.

Role of American Forces

A primary NATO objective has always been to deter aggression by the Soviet Union. Through most of the 1950s, when the United States enjoyed a preponderance of strategic nuclear power, alliance strategy was based on a tripwire concept. In event of an attack against Western Europe, the presence of American ground and air power was to serve as a

"trigger," unleashing a devastating massive retaliation by U.S. strategic nuclear forces against the Soviet homeland. This overwhelming reliance on the American strategic arsenal to deter war in Europe precluded the necessity for a strict conventional balance with Soviet armed might in Eastern Europe. But during the mid-1950s, when the U.S.S.R. began developing a substantial strategic force capable of striking the United States, NATO doctrine was modified to deal with the new superpower relationship.

Initially, the Americans countered the Soviet developments by deploying a potent arsenal of "theater nuclear weapons."¹⁰ Alliance doctrine at the time envisioned a simultaneous use of theater nuclear forces in Europe and a strategic nuclear massive retaliation against the U.S.S.R. By the early 1960s, the enormity of potential collateral destruction and civilian casualties in the NATO Europe countries began to penetrate the American consciousness (a notion probably shared by most Europeans for several years). Accordingly, the United States shifted its emphasis by advocating improved nonnuclear (conventional) capabilities to reduce the chances of nuclear conflict. Simultaneously, Washington promoted a doctrine of flexible response to cope with the realities of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic relationship.¹¹

First endorsed by the United States in 1962 but not formally adopted by NATO until 1967, flexible response places a premium on nonnuclear strength to deter and, if necessary, contain the Warsaw Pact. The strategy includes war-fighting capabilities to meet any level of conventional or nuclear attack as far forward to the East-West political frontier as possible. Flexible response provides a variety of credible options (including graduated nuclear escalation) that raise the potential risk confronted by the Soviet Union.

NATO's nuclear inventory consists of some 7000 warheads designed for delivery by tactical aircraft, artillery, and short-range ballistic missiles. Some weapons would be delivered by

European allies, but they are held in American custody until authorized for use by the U.S. President. Theater nuclear weapons play a crucial role in the flexible response strategy: (1) they deter nonnuclear aggression because of their potential, if NATO's conventional defense fails, to slow or halt a Communist advance; (2) they deter first use of nuclear weapons by the Warsaw Pact; (3) they influence the nonnuclear tactics that might be employed (e.g., they dissuade the massing of conventional arms that would be necessary for an effective attack against the West—massed ground forces make very lucrative nuclear targets); and (4) they provide an escalatory link with the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent.¹²

Although American bombers and intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles are the most important elements in the alliance military posture, extensive use of these weapons (and, therefore, their deterrent value) is probably least tenable in a conflict geographically constrained to Europe—in the eyes of American Allies and the Kremlin, too, massive retaliation against the Soviet Union is probably considered the least likely *planned* NATO reaction. But such a response might be deemed possible when one considers the overall military capacity of the Atlantic alliance as a single integrated escalatory chain, extending from conventional to theater nuclear to strategic nuclear warfare. It is from this potential escalatory chain of events that NATO draws its deterrence strength. No one can guarantee, for example, that even a small-scale Soviet-Warsaw Pact conventional foray would not escalate to a nuclear exchange between the superpowers, especially if NATO could not contain the Pact by nonnuclear means. As one eminent British officer, Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, observes, "the present NATO deterrent strategy is a nuclear one, but it has the flexibility afforded by a substantial level of conventional defence; and if this conventional strength should be eroded the strategy would become dangerous, heavily

reliant on nuclear weapons, a mere trip-wire."¹³ Thus, during an era of U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic nuclear parity, the conventional balance has taken on an added importance. Not only do NATO's nonnuclear capabilities signal a strong West European resolve to protect their political independence but they also provide a vital link with the theater and strategic nuclear forces of the United States—not as a "trip-wire" but as a part of the continuum of allied escalatory options extending across the spectrum of warfare. An erosion of NATO conventional strength vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, therefore, would be tantamount to lowering the nuclear threshold by making the use of theater weapons more likely and also increasing the possibilities of a strategic nuclear exchange. While Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger put NATO's military requirements into a realistic perspective when he noted that "if our high hopes for peace are to have solid foundations, and if we are to conduct our political and economic relationship in the world with an ample measure of confidence in our security posture, then NATO countries must continue to maintain a military capability in balance with that of the Warsaw Pact."¹⁴

The Military Balance

To be sure, the NATO-Warsaw Pact equilibrium is acutely sensitive to major changes by either side, especially in northern and central Europe. In these arenas one finds major armed force asymmetries that favor the East. (See Table I.)

An incisive study prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress in January 1976 forewarns that when Moscow's forces located in European Russia are taken into consideration,

the Soviet side could quickly achieve the classic ratio of 3:1 superiority in ground combat forces that many military men cite as a prerequisite for successful offensive operations. More importantly, the Kremlin could mass massive power at times, places, and under conditions of its choosing, while NATO defends a front that stretches 500 straightline miles from the Baltic to the Austrian border.¹⁵

Nonetheless, despite the East's obvious numerical superiority, many observers tend to agree that the NATO-Pact capabilities are roughly balanced. This is so because of NATO's qualitative edge in ground and air forces, the technological superiority of its destructive capacities, plus certain deficiencies

Table I. The military balance, northern and Central Europe

	NATO*	Warsaw Pact	(of which U.S.S.R.)
combat manpower (all types of formations)	630,000	945,000	640,000
main battle tanks	7,000	20,500	13,500
tactical aircraft	2,350	4,075	2,300
conventional artillery	2,700	10,000+	?
theater nuclear weapons	7,000	3,500	3,500
medium/intermediate range ballistic missiles	0	583	583**

*French forces not included

** (1976 Library of Congress estimate)

Source: *The Military Balance, 1977-1978* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), pp. 102-10

inherent to the Warsaw Pact armed forces. The upshot of the situation in northern and central Europe today is that "neither could attack the other with confidence of quick victory without escalation to nuclear war." And, writes Ray S. Cline in his recent geopolitical study for Georgetown University, "the tactical nuclear weapons on both sides are numerous enough so that only a truly crushing superiority in conventional arms would deny their effective use."¹⁶ Clearly, neither side has such a military preponderance nor is it likely such a disparity will develop so long as the West remains alert to the needs for both conventional and nuclear equivalence.

While the probability of Soviet military intervention in Western Europe may not be perceived as great as it once was, it should at least be recognized that the overall numerical advantage in armed might favoring the Warsaw Pact gives it a substantial potential for aggressive mischief. This superiority could also indicate a greater Soviet risk-taking propensity in the future. To be certain, unless an adequate military equilibrium is maintained, political intimidation of NATO Europe through threat of force could become a real part of the near-term European scene.

Or are Americans and their NATO allies foolish enough to believe that the Kremlin no longer covets influence in West European affairs? Although the warm waft of détente flowing from Moscow tells the West of peaceful intentions, certainly the long-standing Soviet goals regarding Western Europe remain unchanged: eviction of the American military presence, a breakup of NATO without a viable nuclear-armed European defense community taking its place, and ultimately a total domination over West European political, economic, and military affairs. To be reminded why American forces are in Europe today, one only has to review the recent Soviet actions in basing its variable-geometry Backfire nuclear bomber in north-western Russia. Similarly, Moscow has sup-

plemented its European-targeted ballistic missile force with new mobile launchers that are armed with multiple warheads.¹⁷ Are these defensive measures? Do they foster peace and stability? Are they consistent with détente? Or are they another incremental step in Moscow's attempt to overwhelm the West's political and psychological resistance to the "specter of Soviet hegemony haunting Europe"? In a study for the Stanford Research Institute, Richard Pipes of Harvard University summarized the Kremlin's grand strategy:

It seems probable that the long-term objective of Soviet foreign policy is to detach Western Europe from its dependence on the United States, especially where defense is concerned. . . . It is difficult to conceive of any event that would more dramatically enhance Soviet power. . . . Russian military power resting on a West European economic base would give the USSR indisputable world hegemony—the sort of thing that Hitler was dreaming of. . . . However, the separation of Western Europe from the United States must not be hurried. The Soviet leadership has taken a measure of U.S. politics and knows (whatever its propagandists may say) that it faces no danger from that side. . . . The U.S. forces in Western Europe present no offensive threat to the Soviet Union. Their ultimate removal is essential if the USSR is to control Western Europe, but their purely defensive character does not seriously inhibit Russia's freedom to maneuver. What the Soviet fears more is a German-French-English military alliance that might spring into existence should U.S. troops withdraw precipitately from Western Europe.¹⁸

The problem for NATO is to fashion a force composition that will ensure a balance of power and continued East-West stability. But, as Thomas W. Wolfe of the Rand Corporation observes, with the advent of U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic nuclear equivalence and the possibility of Moscow achieving a measure of superiority, "the theatre balance in Europe can be expected to grow increasingly precarious."¹⁹ Observers on both sides of the Atlantic contend that the existence of parity in effect "decouples" the American strategic arsenal from the defense of Europe—the time-worn

question of whether an American president would risk the destruction of New York for Paris. Recent changes in the U.S. nuclear targeting doctrine, however, have buttressed the credibility of this critical link in the deterrence process. Greater flexibility and an increased number of nuclear options by strategic forces have been made possible by the new policy. In effect, these revised targeting procedures at least partially "recouple" U.S. bombers and missiles to the defense of Western Europe and improve NATO's deterrence posture across the board.²⁰

Nonetheless, John Erickson of the Univer-

sity of Edinburgh is pessimistic about NATO's chances of maintaining adequate equality and stability. He notes that the Soviet "buildup in Europe is now an accomplished fact," and that it has given the Kremlin an instrument to secure limited political objectives by "simply having" a highly visible military force that is "now well past purely defensive requirements." Professor Erickson's final note sounds an ominous warning for the NATO peoples:

This all comes back to Solzhenitsyn's point that the Soviet leadership may place an undue and obsessive reliance on military force, on its form and function, but then Western Europe has

U.S. Army support for NATO includes the M60 tank, today's standard U.S. medium tank. Modern tanks have bigger guns, improved ammunition, more sophisticated fire control, and approximately twice the armor protection of World War II tanks.



increasingly chosen to ignore the military factor. Between them these two postures have contributed to what can only be counted a growing imbalance. In the final outcome, Europe may well become that "low risk option" that will suit the Soviet command perfectly.²¹

It seems evident that North Americans and West Europeans continue to embrace complementary national security interests that should coalesce in a strong NATO deterrence posture, lessening the possibility of Soviet intervention becoming a "low risk option." But this means that an adequate conventional-nuclear equilibrium must be maintained in northern, central, and southern Europe. It is open to question whether in the future the Allies will deploy sufficient armed forces to neutralize the political effectiveness of Warsaw Pact military capabilities. Ultimately, the answer will concern the political cohesiveness of NATO as much (and perhaps more so) as military hardware, for deterrence is the product of military capacity and political will. One must recognize, too, that Americans bear a special responsibility for NATO's deterrence because it is from the United States that the alliance draws nuclear strength and much of its political determination.

An Appraisal

"A goal of the highest priority for this administration is to ensure stability in the vital European region," Secretary of Defense Harold Brown explains. "The United States will do its share to ensure that NATO has the capabilities—conventional as well as nuclear—to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of Western Europe."²² Accordingly, in May 1977, the NATO allies responded favorably to President Carter's call for increasing their respective defense expenditures by approximately three percent annually in real terms. In addition, several short-term improvements to assuage NATO vulnerabilities have been undertaken, a long-term

NATO defense program aimed at ensuring greater coordination of national efforts has been instituted, and steps have been taken toward improving cooperation in development, production, and procurement of standardized NATO military equipment.²³

While these recent improvements in allied consultation are encouraging, they must still contend with differing European and American attitudes on the appropriate role and levels of NATO forces. For instance, while Americans advocate strong conventional war-fighting might to keep the nuclear threshold high, the West Europeans, as a whole, have been dragging their feet on matching the nonnuclear capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. For their part, the Europeans tend to regard a buildup of their own conventional strength as allowing greater numbers of Americans to go home, thereby weakening deterrence by reducing the visible or tangible U.S. political commitment to the defense of Europe—a debilitation of the conventional-theater nuclear-strategic nuclear escalatory chain. Indeed, the Europeans consider the theater nuclear weapons a critical link by which the American strategic arsenal is coupled to NATO. French journalist Pierre Hassner explains:

There is a wide consensus among Europeans on the notion that the risk of escalation is today the central element of deterrence in Europe as opposed to either conventional response or massive retaliation; that it has greater credibility than either; and that it is less sensitive to differences in strength. The basis of deterrence is less the credibility of a deliberate decision than the unpredictability of a process; the substitute for American strategic *superiority* . . . is *continuity* between the two American-led systems of deterrence.²⁴

In view of the critical importance given to American conventional and nuclear force postures by the NATO allies, it should not be surprising that they are acutely sensitive to discussions and actions in Washington that might indicate a substantial reduction of these forces. Thus, when Americans try to answer

the question "How much is enough?" in setting appropriate force levels in Europe, their calculations should include not only an assessment of deterrence and war-fighting capabilities vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R.-Warsaw Pact but also an evaluation of the most likely political impact on NATO's cohesiveness. Better yet, American-European consultations might best determine "how much is enough" by including the differing views from both sides of the Atlantic. Once this question is jointly answered, the next ones can be tackled: "Who pays, and how much?"

The answers to these important questions will be determined politically by the fifteen sovereign member states as each pursues its own national interests in its own way. One may be certain that although misunderstandings and differences of opinion may sometimes mar their relations, the NATO allies will remain partners in the crucial area of common defense so long as deterrence of Moscow remains a paramount concern to them all. Without the substantial counterweight provided by the United States against the material and manpower resources of the U.S.S.R., the West Europeans would have only two alternatives: arm themselves with nuclear weapons to deter Moscow and ensure a modicum of independence or accommodate

their foreign policies to the superior power of the Soviet Union, i.e., accede to "Finlandization." Americans should remember, too, as Ray S. Cline points out, Western Europe potentially could become "the most powerful regional center in the world if its resources were successfully mobilized for a common political purpose."²⁵ This latent capability alone seems reason enough for the United States to take whatever actions that might be necessary to deny Soviet hegemony over Western Europe—not to mention the American *moral* commitment to foster democracy and human rights abroad and the nation's long-standing promise to support NATO Europe militarily and politically against Soviet intimidation.

A specter is haunting Europe. But it is the specter of Finlandization resulting from political dissolution of NATO—a disintegration that can be made possible only by an American denial of sufficient armed forces to counterbalance Soviet power. It is in this context that Americans must realize that NATO's cohesion and Europe's future ultimately are in their hands—and that Europe's destiny is tied to their own.

Manassas, Virginia

Notes

1. James R. Schlesinger, "A Testing Time for America," *Fortune*, February 1976, p. 75.

2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Policy, Troops, and the NATO Alliance: Report of Senator Sam Nunn*, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 6. See also Leon Sloss, *NATO Reform: Prospects and Priorities*, Washington Papers No. 3-30 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 2.

3. *Strategic Survey 1975* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 110. See also Christoph Bertram, *Mutual Force Reductions in Europe. The Political Aspects*, Adelphi Paper No. 84 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972).

4. *Strategic Survey 1975*, p. 57.

5. U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Forces in Europe*, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973. See also Phil Williams, "Whatever Happened to the Mansfield Amendment?" *Survival*, July-August 1976, pp. 146-53.

6. William Watts and Lloyd A. Free, *State of the Nation* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1974), p. 240.

7. U.S. Congress, Senate, *U.S. Forces in Europe*, statements by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, pp. 58-115, and Ray S. Cline, *World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1975).

8. U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress*, Annual DOD Report FY 77, 1976, p. 8.

9. Schlesinger, "A Testing Time for America," pp. 76-77.

10. Although "tactical nuclear weapons" is standard lexicon for many journalists and commentators on NATO affairs, the term is used imprecisely to describe U.S. "theater nuclear weapons." As Britain's Brigadier Kenneth Hunt (Retired) observes, "there is...no satisfactory definition of a tactical nuclear weapon, since 'tactical' refers to the use and not the nature of the system—it would doubtless be considered strategic by whomever it fell on!" See Kenneth Hunt, *The Alliance and Europe: Part II: Defence with Fewer*

Men, Adelphi Paper No. 98 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 2.

11. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, "Report to Congress on the Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe" (April 4, 1974), as quoted by "Documentation," *Survival*, September-October 1975, pp. 235-41, and Wolfgang Heisenberg, *The Alliance and Europe: Part I: Crisis Stability in Europe and Theatre Nuclear Weapons*, Adelphi Paper No. 96 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 4.

12. Recently, the United States has begun to modernize some of its nuclear weapons stockpiled in Europe. The increased accuracy and lesser power of these new weapons may result in an overall reduction in number of forward deployed weapons without a cut in military capabilities. See "Fewer, Better Arms Is Goal Rumsfeld Assures NATO," *Chicago Tribune*, June 16, 1976, p. 14.

13. Hunt, *Defence with Fewer Men*, p. 2. See also General Andrew Goodpaster, U.S. Army (Retired), "NATO Strategy and Requirements 1975-1985," *Survival*, September-October 1975, p. 215.

14. James R. Schlesinger, "NATO's Constant Need—Improvement," *International Herald Tribune*, June 3, 1974, p. 6.

15. U.S. Congress, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *United States Soviet Military Balance: A Frame of Reference for Congress*, by John M. Collins and John Steven Chwai, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 9.

16. Cline, p. 83.

17. "U.S. Says Russians Are Arming More Missiles with MIRV's," *New York Times*, July 30, 1976, p. 6.

18. Richard Pipes, editor, "Détente: Moscow's View," *Soviet Strategy in Europe* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976), p. 23.

19. Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Europe," *Soviet Strategy in Europe*, Richard Pipes, editor, p. 156.

20. Andrew J. Pierre, "Can Europe's Security Be 'Decoupled' from America?" *Foreign Affairs*, July 1973, p. 774. See also Lynn Etheridge Davis, *Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine*, Adelphi Paper No. 121 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976).

21. John Erickson, "Soviet Military Posture and Policy in Europe," *Soviet Strategy in Europe*, Richard Pipes, editor, p. 207.

22. U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress*, Annual DOD Report FY 79, 1978, pp. 23, 6.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4. See also U.S., Department of the Air Force, "The Dynamic Future of NATO," *Commanders Digest*, October 6, 1977.

24. Pierre Hassner, *Europe in the Age of Negotiation*, Washington Papers No. 1-8 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 36.

25. Cline, p. 91.



Hear Me

Friend, hear me—
I served with Chappie
In peace and war
We were as one
Soaring and darting
Through blue skies and dark
We flew alone
Where others feared
And charted new courses
Across vast horizons
He's gone now...
...I fly alone.

Friend, hear me—
I served with Chappie
On a hundred airfields
In a thousand places
Soaring and diving
Through countless flights
We flew alone
Where others feared
And chased the enemy
Across the deep abyss
He's gone now...
...I fly alone.


Friend, hear me—
I served with Chappie
A gallant patriot
He filled my soul
As the dark sky
Warms to the sunrise
Still glowing spirit
Selfless leader
I did not seek him
But knew him always
Gone now...
...I fly alone.

Nation, do you hear—
I served with Chappie
Who dares soar
With me now
Is there another
So undaunted spirit
Whose love of service
Exceeds his strength
I am Courage
Gliding aimlessly
Chappie's gone now...
...Nation, have you another?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BARRY M. MEUSE
Moody AFB, Georgia

TECHNOLOGIC INNOVATION, SALT, AND STABLE DETERRENCE

GLENN W. GOODMAN, JR.



MUCH of the American arms control literature of the past year and a half is characterized by a sense of increasing frustration and uneasiness concerning the long-term viability of both the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and stable U.S.-Soviet deterrence. The long delay in achieving a SALT II agreement based on the Vladivostok guidelines of 1974, which have already been criticized by arms control advocates for being far too permissive, has partially contributed to this mood. The primary cause of concern, however, has been the rapid technological progress in strategic weapon systems on both sides, which threatens to overwhelm the existing SALT framework: ". . . the rate at which limitations are being imposed, even assuming a successful conclusion to SALT II, falls far short of the rate at which the forces are being improved. The race to control strategic arms is being lost."¹ There are widespread fears within the American arms control community that the SALT process is destined to become obsolete and the Soviet-American strategic relationship increasingly unstable in the years ahead unless the pace of technological innovation in strategic weaponry can somehow be brought under control.

Among the technological advances in strategic weapon systems, two in particular—improvements in ballistic missile accuracy and the development of long-range cruise missiles—are viewed as posing the most significant problems for both strategic arms control and stable deterrence in the future. There is concern among arms control advocates that these two areas of technological progress will bring about fundamental changes in strategic conditions and thus upset the familiar parameters of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. The following discussion, which will focus on the above two areas of technological innovation, will seek to demonstrate that (1) the "destabilizing" aspects of both ballistic missile accuracy improve-

ments and long-range cruise missiles for U.S.-Soviet deterrence have been exaggerated; (2) the SALT process will continue to be a viable enterprise in the future; and (3) the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship has a remarkable ability to withstand the impact of new technological developments and is more "stable" than arms control advocates have been willing to allow.

Accuracy Improvements and Silo Vulnerability

Dramatic improvements in ballistic missile accuracies are likely to occur in the foreseeable future which, combined with the existing technology of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), will make the achievement of effective counterforce capabilities by both the United States and the Soviet Union virtually certain in the 1980s. These capabilities will reside in each nation's silo-based, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces. Both sides are pursuing accuracy improvements in their MIRVed ICBM systems and are likely to attain substantial (theoretical) hard-target counterforce capabilities in the early to mid-1980s.² A situation is thus evolving as a result of accuracy improvements in which the ICBM silos of both the United States and the Soviet Union will become increasingly vulnerable to a first strike.³ This situation, it is argued, by increasing mutual first strike incentives, will have serious implications for strategic stability.⁴

Strategic arms control offers little hope of reversing or slowing the movement toward effective counterforce capabilities and vulnerable ICBMs. A SALT II agreement based on the Vladivostok Accord, with the latter's high ceiling on MIRVed launchers (1320), will be fully compatible with the achievement of substantial hard-target capabilities by both sides. A SALT agreement directly limiting accuracy improvements is infeasible. It is difficult to gauge the true accuracies of U.S.

missiles, much less verify the accuracies of those of the Soviet Union.

The prospects for SALT III center on strategic force reductions. However, the reductions, if negotiable, are very likely to be made in strategic delivery vehicles and MIRVed launchers (the categories established for SALT II), which would allow each side initially to withhold its MIRVed ICBMs from reductions. The reductions are also most likely to take place over an extended time frame on the order of perhaps 10 years and would thus come too late to alleviate the problem of ICBM vulnerability.

The negotiation of modifications to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty permitting ICBM defenses would be undesirable in light of the "political capital" each nation has invested in the treaty. Moreover, it would raise additional problems such as verification as well as uncertainties concerning each side's capability for city as well as ICBM defense.

A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban would prevent both sides from developing new ICBM warheads with improved yield-to-weight ratios. Nonetheless, the existing warheads on both sides, once linked with foreseeable ICBM accuracy improvements, will be sufficient for the attainment of effective hard-target capabilities.

A SALT limitation on the annual number of missile flight tests permitted each side is the most promising arms control approach to the problem of ICBM vulnerability. If low enough (perhaps a dozen per year), it could slow—but would not stop—missile accuracy improvements on both sides. However, it would have to be negotiated in a timely manner (by 1980 or so) if it is to have any effect in delaying the achievement of effective hard-target capabilities in the early to mid-1980s. Moreover, there will be a great deal of resistance to it on both sides, since it would reduce the confidence that each side has in the reliability and performance characteristics of its existing strategic weapon systems. It would also constrain qualitative

weapon systems improvements that groups in both countries will deem desirable. The Soviet Union is unlikely to agree to any type of qualitative restraint which it perceives would freeze it in a technologically inferior position.

In any event, ICBM vulnerability in reality will never be more than a theoretical condition, one which can only be projected by using extremely conservative calculations. The operational difficulties of carrying out an actual attack against the U.S. (or Soviet) silo-based missile force are formidable and would impose severe requirements of timing, coordination, and reliability on the attacker. Steinbruner and Garwin have convincingly demonstrated that a Soviet first strike against U.S. ICBMs would very likely leave the attacker with fewer ICBMs than the victim.⁵ The same would be true of a (hypothetical) U.S. first strike against Soviet ICBMs. Nevertheless, they argue, "to the extent [ICBM vulnerability] is believed in either the United States or the Soviet Union some destabilizing effect will occur as a self-fulfilling proposition."⁶ In fact, potential U.S. ICBM vulnerability has received so much discussion in the United States that its inevitable occurrence seems now to be taken for granted. Current discourse centers largely on how the United States should offset or eliminate the condition of vulnerability once it occurs.⁷

What are the potential risks and instabilities that would presumably be introduced by vulnerable ICBMs? It is generally agreed that Soviet leaders would not even consider initiating a "bolt out of the blue" nuclear attack unless they were confident of their ability to negate the U.S. retaliatory capability, that is, destroy virtually all U.S. land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers simultaneously. Moreover, the survivability and effectiveness of U.S. SLBMs and bombers are likely to be maintained through the 1980s. However, possible Soviet behavior during a crisis is feared. There might be an incentive for

the Soviet Union, it is argued, especially during a severe U.S.-Soviet confrontation involving major stakes, to launch a first strike to destroy U.S. ICBMs (as well as "nonalert" SLBMs and bombers). Soviet leaders, fearing that the United States was about to attack their vulnerable silos, might decide on a pre-emptive strike in the hope of improving Soviet war-fighting performance. Or Soviet leaders, by withholding some ICBMs as well as their SLBMs and bombers, might believe that U.S. decision-makers would be inhibited from retaliating against Soviet cities, since devastation of American cities would follow. Thus, crisis stability, it is argued, would decrease significantly as a result of vulnerable ICBMs on both sides.

However, the opposite can be argued equally persuasively. The existence of vulnerable ICBMs on both sides would be a factor that would strongly militate against the escalation of any crisis that occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union. The mutual fear of pre-emptive attack resulting from vulnerable ICBMs would induce extreme caution on both sides and create strong incentives for an expeditious and peaceful resolution of the conflict.⁸

The existence of vulnerable ICBMs, it is argued, could still have political implications. During a crisis, the Soviet Union might seek to extract political concessions through nuclear blackmail or threats, especially if it perceived its hard-target capability to be more substantial than that of the United States. Again, it can be argued, there would be a greater incentive with vulnerable ICBMs to avoid the escalation of a crisis. Nuclear blackmail by the Soviet Union in a crisis, such as a threat to destroy vulnerable U.S. ICBMs, would become an even more dangerous game under such conditions, potentially inviting a pre-emptive U.S. strike against vulnerable Soviet silos.⁹

In any event, the crisis "instabilities" posited by those concerned with ICBM vulnerability are based on extremely unlikely,

worst-case scenarios. Moreover, as previously mentioned, the vulnerability itself can only be projected by making excessively conservative assumptions. Yet it is on this basis that potential U.S. ICBM vulnerability has already become an entrenched state of mind among American strategic analysts and thus a fait accompli for the Soviet Union. The problem has been deemed serious enough to elicit some rather ambitious and, perhaps, drastic solutions from both the American defense policy and arms control communities involving major restructuring of U.S. deterrent forces. These range from proposals that the United States deploy land-mobile ICBMs to others calling for the unilateral reduction or elimination of existing U.S. ICBMs.¹⁰

The merits of these proposals have been debated at length in the strategic literature and will not be recapitulated here. The point to be made is that perspective seems to have been lost on this issue. Strategic analysts have become so bogged down in theoretical calculations and remote scenarios that they have lost touch with the real world in which political decisions are made. As Bernard Brodie has stated:

We have learned over the three decades that nuclear weapons have been with us that the balance of terror is *not* delicate. . . . The balance of terror does not even require that the people in control be reasonable, only that they be modestly above the threshold of sanity. The days when serious people spoke seriously of preemptive attacks with nuclear weapons are long since over.

For either superpower to attack the other because of an optimistic guess of the latter's vulnerabilities is obviously to take a risk of cataclysmic proportions. Neither can be seduced into such an error by some apparent shift in the relationship of forces—usually more apparent to technicians than to politicians.¹¹

It is clear that the dangers of ICBM vulnerability have been vastly exaggerated. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union and the United States seem inexorably headed for a condition of *perceived*—albeit illusory—mutual ICBM

vulnerability in the early to mid-1980s as a result of foreseeable missile accuracy improvements. The two countries are likely to experience that condition for some period of time before offsetting measures can be taken. However, it does not seem unreasonable to assert that both countries may very well learn to live with vulnerable missile silos, just as they have adapted to other anomalies of the nuclear era such as vulnerable populations, which initially aroused exaggerated fears. With the passage of time, ICBM "vulnerability" is likely to be seen as a false issue, though not visible as such to those caught up in the day-to-day strategic concerns of the 1970s.

To the extent that ICBM vulnerability (of some degree) is perceived as something less than desirable by the United States and the Soviet Union, it will provide incentives for both countries to negotiate direct reductions in MIRVed ICBMs or to seek mutual solutions such as the deployment of simplified silo defenses,¹² which could protect ICBMs but would be incapable of defending soft targets such as cities.

The United States, for its part, could begin now to play down the significance of ICBM vulnerability in its official statements and to reassess the implications of vulnerability more realistically in its force planning before pressures build for major and unnecessary changes in U.S. strategic forces. The Carter administration has already given indications that it may be moving in this direction.¹³

Long-Range Cruise Missiles

The development of new, long-range cruise missiles by the United States, which has been a significant factor delaying the conclusion of a SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union, has provoked a great deal of discussion in the year and a half in both the American press and strategic literature.¹⁴ It has become apparent

that the potential characteristics of these new systems—extremely high accuracy, nearly undetectable size, relatively inexpensive cost, and a multiplicity of ranges and launch platforms—offer significant military and economic advantages yet pose formidable problems for arms control. While the implications of these new systems clearly extend beyond strategic arms control and the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, the focus here will be on those areas.¹⁵ Moreover, since much has already been written about the problems that cruise missile limitations pose for SALT, the following discussion will be further restricted to the potential impact of these new systems in the *absence* of limitations.

The military advantages that the new, longer-range cruise missiles would provide the United States (and ultimately the Soviet Union) have been somewhat overdrawn. While tactical cruise missiles have enormous potential for cost effectively replacing U.S. tactical air forces,¹⁶ both land and carrier-based, the advantages of using cruise missiles in a strategic role would be less substantial. While they are likely to be considerably less costly, strategic cruise missiles would be operationally inferior to existing ballistic missiles. The subsonic speed and long flight times of cruise missiles would make them potentially vulnerable to Soviet air defenses.¹⁷ The absence of an extensive Soviet ABM system, on the other hand, ensures the penetration capabilities of U.S. ICBM/SLBMs. As Kosta Tsipis has stated:

Whereas the outcome of a strategic attack with ballistic missiles is comparatively certain and controlled, the outcome of a cruise-missile attack is uncertain, since it depends largely on the air defense capabilities of the attacked country. . . . In order to be sure that cruise missiles would penetrate to their targets one would have to launch many of them against each target to saturate the air defenses. That would require the deployment of many thousands of cruise missiles.¹⁸

Strategic cruise missiles will have the

capacity to be launched from submarines, surface ships, long-range bombers, and mobile surface-to-surface missile launchers. However, cruise missiles deployed in any of these modes, with the possible exception of those carried on bombers, would be inherently vulnerable. Consider the case of strategic cruise missiles deployed on ballistic missile or attack submarines. Because their range is very likely to be considerably shorter than that of SLBMs, the submarines carrying them would have to approach the territorial waters of the Soviet Union to attack their targets and would thus be vulnerable to Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW). (The deployment of strategic cruise missiles on attack submarines could force a rapid growth in Soviet ASW capabilities, which would ultimately reduce the security of the U.S. SLBM force.¹⁹) The other modes of launch would have similar drawbacks from the standpoint of prelaunch survivability, though these may not be deemed so serious as to rule out deployment.

The potential pinpoint accuracy of cruise missiles at long ranges could make possible the use of conventionally armed cruise missiles by the United States or its NATO allies against strategic targets in the Soviet Union, perhaps even hardened missile silos. This could provide the option of a nonnuclear response to a Soviet provocation, it is argued, raising the "nuclear threshold" and thus making nuclear war less likely. Others, however, argue that this would lower the overall inhibition to use force and thus increase the risk of superpower confrontation, since a nuclear response to a "strategic conventional" attack might be considered unlikely.

These kinds of arguments lose their cogency, however, when one recalls that even "strategic conventional" cruise missiles would be vulnerable to Soviet air defenses and once launched would be subject to an uncertain fate.²⁰ The United States would more likely employ MIRVed ICBMs for selective strikes rather than "undependable" cruise missiles.²¹

Moreover, the United States could never be sure that the Soviet Union (which some argue places greater emphasis on the homeland threshold and less on conventional/nuclear distinctions) would not respond to a "strategic conventional" strike with nuclear weapons.

The point to be drawn from this discussion—one which has not been recognized in most treatments of the subject—is that strategic cruise missiles, deployed in any mode except perhaps on long-range bombers, could not be counted on as secure and assured deterrent forces. They would probably never constitute more than supplemental strategic forces, such as current U.S. forward-based systems.²² Thus, strategic cruise missiles would be something less than the "ultimate weapons" that cruise missile proponents have portrayed them to be.

The same arguments would apply to Soviet long-range cruise missiles, if and when they are deployed.²³ The United States would have to deploy an extensive air defense system in that event, but it could counter such a threat adequately. Thus, it can generally be seen from the above discussion that the purported "destabilizing" aspects of long-range cruise missiles for U.S.-Soviet deterrence that have raised fears within the arms control community have been exaggerated. While a number of relevant issues were neglected in the discussion, it has briefly shown that long-range cruise missile deployments, at least in the foreseeable future, would not bring about any fundamental changes in the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. In fact, *they would probably enhance deterrence stability* by making it even more difficult to negate one side's retaliatory capability with a first strike.

How would SALT be affected by cruise missile deployments? One author has written that:

the new cruise missile's revolutionary characteristics . . . threaten to undermine the basic principles underlying successful U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements to date . . . the cruise missile . . . puts

the immediate future of SALT into jeopardy.²⁴

However, this seems to be overstated. If cruise missile deployments proceeded free of limitations due to the difficulties of verification, SALT would continue to be a useful framework since it could still address the *major* strategic force components of both sides, i.e., the ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers. These will remain the *assured* deterrent forces for both sides in the foreseeable future. Available means of verification would continue to make limitations on the testing or deployment of these forces possible. The failure of SALT to address strategic cruise missiles, which as discussed earlier would only be *supplementary* strategic forces much like U.S. forward-based systems, would not jeopardize its existence.

The introduction of long-range cruise missiles into Europe—the deployment there, for example, of conventionally armed cruise missiles by the United States or West Germany or of nuclear-armed cruise missiles by Britain, France, or the United States (or ultimately the Warsaw Pact countries)—would blur the distinctions between strategic/tactical and nuclear/conventional weaponry and cut across the jurisdictional patterns established between SALT and the negotiations on mutual force reductions (MFR) in Europe. As a result, future strategic arms control efforts might have to embrace a wider category of weapons and a larger number of participants. Specifically, an integration of the SALT and MFR processes in a multilateral framework might become necessary. But these problems seem to be more procedural than substantive. As Richard Burt has stated:

While there are, at present, strong political incentives for not tinkering with existing arms control institutions, it is apparent that SALT and MFR must adjust to the technological realities of a new era. If the adjustment takes place, arms control is likely to become more conceptually messy and politically difficult. But this will be preferable to having no arms control at all.²⁵

Technological Innovation

The underlying premise of this discussion has been that U.S.-Soviet deterrence stability has a remarkable capacity to sustain technological “system shocks.” Two decades ago the development of the ICBM raised widespread fears that fundamental changes in the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship would occur. In the late 1960s, the advent of ABM and MIRV technology had the same effect. As discussed here, exaggerated fears are again being raised concerning the strategic implications of ballistic missile accuracy improvements and long-range cruise missiles. “Killer” satellites and high-energy beams will likely be the “fate-determining objects” of the future.

The long lead times for the development and deployment of new technologies, however, coupled with the satellite and electronic surveillance capabilities that both the Soviet Union and the United States now possess, have rendered the notion of a technological breakthrough by either side invalid. Those lead times will inevitably permit countermeasures to be taken by the other side. If one side expands or improves its forces, sooner or later the other side will balance the effort. This should continue to be true in the future. As Colin Gray states:

There is no way, in the short or medium term, in which the mutual hostage relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States can be upset. Neither the defensive nor the offensive technologies that may currently be projected over the next decade and beyond, alone or in combination, carry any significant promise of being able to reduce expected casualties to a negligible level.²⁶

Nor will any new technologies such as long-range cruise missiles render SALT obsolete, as arms control advocates fear. SALT, in its present form or in some new incarnation, will continue to be a viable endeavor and to serve the objectives of arms control²⁷ for two reasons.

First, SALT has at least as much to do with the U.S.-Soviet political relationship as it does with their strategic relationship. As Gray has stated, "Success at SALT (always a nebulous quality), or the absence of undeniable failure, has been and remains very close to being a *sine qua non* for détente."²⁸ Détente, moreover, is doing somewhat more to reduce the probability of war than SALT alone could ever hope to do. Second, SALT will continue to provide both sides the opportunity to avoid mutual deployment of costly strategic systems such as the ABM. Bernard Brodie, suggesting that (formal) arms control agreements can probably do very little to reduce the probability of war or its potential destructiveness, argues that "in a pragmatic approach to arms control the object of saving money really deserves a

superior rating to that of saving the world."²⁹

IN CONCLUSION, the balance of terror is substantially less delicate than arms control advocates have been willing to allow. It is unlikely that any new technologies will upset the familiar parameters of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship in the foreseeable future. As Brodie has stated:

The terms "destabilizing" and "stabilizing" have become fashionable in referring to various technological developments. Their use commonly reflects a limited perception of how each development alters or fits into the entire technological and political universe in which we live . . . the fate of ourselves and of the world is not going to hang on what we do or fail to do about some object like the cruise missile.³⁰

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Notes

1. Paul Doty, Albert Carnesale, and Michael Nacht, "The Race to Control Nuclear Arms," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1976, p. 122.

2. See Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1978*, 17 January 1977, pp. 71, 122; Colin S. Gray, "SALT II and the Strategic Balance," *British Journal of International Studies*, October 1975, pp. 201-2. While warhead yield and target hardness are important, the most significant factor determining the hard-target kill (countersilo) potential of MIRVs is the accuracy with which they can be delivered on target. Accuracy is more important than yield roughly in the ratio of 4:1. For more technical discussions of accuracy and counterforce effectiveness, see the following: Michael Nacht, "The Vladivostok Accord and American Technological Options," *Survival*, May/June 1975, pp. 106-13; Kosta Tsipis, "The Accuracy of Strategic Missiles," *Scientific American*, July 1975, pp. 14-23; and Thomas A. Brown, "Missile Accuracy and Strategic Lethality," *Survival*, March/April 1976, pp. 52-59.

3. Some strategic analysts argue that the Soviet hard-target capability in the 1980s will be more substantial than that of the U.S. because of their ICBM throw-weight advantage and, hence, ability to deploy higher-yield warheads on their ICBMs (For a debate on this point, see Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, pp. 227-31, and Jan M. Lodal, "Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternative View," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1976, pp. 464-67.) However, the U.S. plans to begin deploying MK-12A warhead on its MIRVed Minuteman III ICBMs in FY 1978 (see Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1978*, p. 129—the Carter administration has not reversed the MK-12A deployment decision made by the Ford administration). This new warhead has twice the yield (340 kilotons) of its predecessor and, coupled with missile accuracy improvements, should produce a (theoretically) effective "silo killer."

4. "Stability" has become a controversial term, but strategic stability is generally understood to refer to a context wherein the "first strike bonus" is minimal, i.e., neither side can conceivably profit by striking first. In other words, each side would suffer approximately the same damage whether it struck first or in retaliation.

5. John D. Steinbruner and Thomas W. Garwin, "Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance Between Prudence and Paranoia," *International Security*, Summer 1976, pp. 165-68.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 168.

7. See, for example, Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1978*, pp. 70-72, 122, 129-30.

8. U.S. strategic forces would be on full alert during a crisis, increasing their survivability and giving the Soviet Union even more reason not to attempt a pre-emptive strike. Moreover, the Soviets could never be sure that in the heat of a crisis, especially with vulnerable ICBMs, the U.S. would not adopt a "launch-on-warning" policy for its ICBMs.

9. It is interesting to note that studies of the Cuban missile crisis, which seems to provide the U.S.-Soviet crisis "model" used implicitly by most strategic analysts, have argued convincingly that it was the specter of "just plain war" more than any other factor that caused Soviet leaders to back down. See Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Deterrence in the MIRV Era," *World Politics*, January 1972, pp. 221-42.

10. For the former proposal, see Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1978*, pp. 122, 129-30; Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente," pp. 229-30; and "Deterring Our Deterrent," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1976-77, pp. 208-9; for the latter, see John C. Baker, "The MX ICBM Debate," *Arms Control Today*, February 1977, pp. 4-5, and Jerome H. Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 331-32.

11. Taken from two articles: "On the Objectives of Arms Control," *International Security*, Summer 1976, pp. 32-33, and "How Much Is Enough? Guns Versus Butter Revisited," Lecture Series no. 56, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, August 1975, p. 7.

12. See Richard L. Garwin, "Effective Military Technology for the 1980s," *International Security*, Fall 1976, pp. 52-56.

13. The Carter administration cut FY 1978 funding in half for the new MX ICBM under development (which the Ford administration had planned to deploy in a land-mobile mode) and has extended it, in effect, as a bargaining chip to the Soviet Union. See *Wall Street Journal*, 23 February 1977, p. 28, and David Linebaugh, "SALT: An Agenda for Carter," *Arms Control Today*, March 1977, pp. 1-2. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown is reportedly reconsidering eventual deployment of the MX in "vulnerable" Minuteman silos. See *Newsweek*, 28 March 1977, p. 13.

14. See the following: Kosta Tsipis, "Cruise Missiles," *Scientific American*, February 1977, pp. 20-29; Alexander R. Vershbow, "The Cruise Missile: The End of Arms Control?" *Foreign Affairs*, October 1976, pp. 133-46; Richard Burt, "The Cruise Missile and Arms Control," *Survival*, January/February

1976, pp. 10-17; and Richard L. Garwin, pp. 56-66.

15. For a discussion of the implications of the new cruise missile technology for horizontal nuclear proliferation and conventional arms transfers, see Burt, "Proliferation and the Spread of New Conventional Weapons Technology," *International Security*, Winter 1977, pp. 119-39.

16. See Richard L. Garwin, pp. 60-62.

17. The low-altitude flight and low-radar cross sections of cruise missiles currently under development in the U.S. would enable them to penetrate present-generation Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) defenses. However, the Soviet Union could counter their deployment with improved SAMs and airborne radars with look-down capabilities.

18. Tsipis, p. 27.

19. *Ibid.*

20. As Richard L. Garwin states: "an effective defense of silos against cruise missiles might be obtained by a hardened machine gun mounted near the silo, or by relatively simple homing missiles," p. 64.

21. MIRVed or MARVed (maneuvering reentry vehicle-equipped) ICBMs or SLBMs, which may be equipped with terminal guidance and pinpoint accuracy by the late 1980s, could also one day provide the option of "strategic

conventional" strikes.

22. "Forward-based systems" are U.S. tactical aircraft based in Western Europe and Asia and on aircraft carriers that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons on targets in the Soviet Union.

23. According to official accounts, the U.S. is 5 to 10 years ahead of the Soviet Union in the technologies relevant to long-range cruise missile development; Tsipis, p. 29; Burt, "The Cruise Missile and Arms Control," p. 12.

24. Vershow, p. 133.

25. Burt, p. 17.

26. Colin Gray, *The Soviet-American Arms Race* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath & Co., 1976), p. 147.

27. The objectives of arms control are generally understood to be: (1) to reduce the probability of war; (2) to reduce the destructiveness of war, should it occur; and (3) to reduce the costs of preparing for war.

28. Gray, "SALT II and the Strategic Balance," p. 205.

29. Brodie, "On the Objectives of Arms Control," p. 19.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

The United States Air Force Academy will host its Eighth Military History Symposium on 18-20 October 1978. The symposium, entitled "Air Power and Warfare," will cover the full spectrum of twentieth-century aerial warfare. The program includes sessions on (1) the pre-World War II development of military aviation in the Western World, (2) the approaches taken by Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union to air operations during the war, (3) U.S. air leadership during World War II, (4) the postwar changes in U.S. air doctrine and organization, (5) the interaction between technology and aerial warfare, and (6) the use of air power in the limited wars of the past thirty years.

Those taking part in the proceedings include leading scholars from the U.S. and abroad as well as distinguished military aviators who have helped shape the course of history. The scholars include Forrest Pogue, I. B. Holley, Theodore Ropp, Alvin Coox, Charles Gibbs-Smith, Alfred Goldberg, and Robin Higham. Joining them are such noted military figures as Generals Ira Eaker, Curtis LeMay, O. P. Weyland, T. R. Milton, Bryce Poe, and Edward Lansdale.

For further information about the symposium, write Major John F. Shiner, Department of History, United States Air Force Academy, CO 80840.

OVER the past decade the United States has taken a myriad of actions, often seemingly unrelated and uncoordinated, in such diverse areas as economics, foreign policy, and national defense. Many of these actions were expediencies of the moment, apparently undertaken without consideration for future consequences. The cumulative, synergistic effect of these actions is to provide a ready opportunity for the Soviet Union to devise a unique strategy for world domination. This strategic option is unique in that, without the need for armed confrontation, it provides for the United States, of its own volition, to abdicate its role as a world power and assume one of only secondary consideration.

The decades since the Second World War have seen the United States attain a position as the strongest and most influential power in the world. "Number one," however, implies that there are other countries in the running. An increasing number of people now believe the U.S., at best, to be sharing the top spot with the Soviet Union. Others believe that the U.S. has declined to a "close second" position and will continue to decline in the future. This latter group attributes this decline to a weakening of that intangible ingredient known as "national resolve."¹


Few nations have relinquished their positions of power consciously, deliberately, and in the absence of external pressures. Rather, the passing of dominance from one nation to another has more often resulted from economic or military pressures.

Military pressure can take many forms, such as the following involving the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.:

Full-scale nuclear exchange. This could result in widespread, extensive physical damage on both sides, as well as severe disruption of both economic

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MAJOR KENNETH G. MILLER



systems. It could take several decades for the victors to rebuild their country to its pre-nuclear-exchange level.

Less-than-full-scale nuclear exchange or conventional conflict. This conflict could result in local defeat for either side. However, it is questionable whether such a conflict could be contained in either location or intensity. Neither side would likely be willing to risk the loss of prestige that would accompany a military defeat. (The author believes that if conventional conflict erupted between the two superpowers, escalation through tactical nuclear weapons to strategic nuclear exchange would result.)

Threat of overt action. A confrontation could build slowly, with the threat of military action if a certain threshold is crossed by the other side. In the face of strong, determined opposition, one side could concede to the demands of the other if no grave damage would occur to their self-interests. Capitulation, however, is foreign to the national character of both superpowers. The leadership of either country would likely be removed for allowing such humiliating events to occur (e.g., the Cuban missile crisis and Khrushchev's demise).

Nolo contendere (no contest). In the presence of a strong adversary, one side could choose not to take a stand on an issue and thereby avoid confrontation.² If done often enough and in situations of mounting importance, a country relinquishes its power by default.

The ultimate Soviet goal appears to remain world domination. Obviously, the most desirable course of action for the Soviet Union would be for the U.S. to, in effect, plead "nolo contendere," either because of internal or external pressures, or through a general lack of national resolve. Soviet commitments to offensive military forces and civil defense in recent years, however, indicate that they have not ruled out the possibility of conflict anywhere along the spectrum.³ But they intend

to pursue that goal judiciously and patiently in order to avoid paying a higher price than necessary.

Communist revolutionary theory views time as being on the side of communism; therefore, the fundamental strategies of guerrilla warfare lend themselves admirably to a protracted Soviet pursuit of world domination:

- Strike only when the odds are overwhelmingly in your favor.
- Avoid conflict when the possibility exists of grave damage.
- Strive always and in all places to shift the odds in your favor.
- Foment maximum confusion in your enemy's country, diluting unity and resolve.
- Camouflage your activities and intentions in order to deceive your enemy and capitalize on his lack of preparation.⁴

as others see us

Many nations of the world still vividly recall the tremendous industrial base and manpower resources that the United States brought to bear in World War II. Western Europe and Japan owe much of their current economic base to the generosity of the American people in the aftermath of that war. Few people in the world could mistake the tremendous depth of technology required to put men on the moon, and fewer still do not envy the personal freedoms and standard of living enjoyed by the average American citizen. Many countries have received economic, educational, medical, and technological assistance from the U.S., with few, if any, strings attached.

Yet, how do these same people perceive America's current willingness to maintain its role as a world power? If they were to catalogue their perceptions of the United States solely on information gained from the communications media, observations similar to the following might well result.

Political. Internally, our nation appears to be sharply divided over numerous issues. Foreign policy, foreign aid, domestic economic policy, organized labor, energy policy, and military spending are some of the more important ones. This fragmentation could easily be interpreted as preventing unified efforts toward a common goal.⁵

Economic. Many internal economic problems prevent our concentrated, effective use of the economic instrument of national power. These include inflation, unemployment, dependence on foreign sources for energy and raw materials, the decline of many "high technology" industries, rising labor cost, declining productivity, the debate over the role of multinational corporations, and the high percentage of our national budget focused on social programs.

Social. Sharp divisions exist within our country on the issues of racial integration, changing morals, welfare, medical care, poverty, the effect of inflation on fixed incomes, and the frequent conflict between concerns for the environment and economic growth. Polarization of these issues often precludes cooperation in other areas of common interest.

Technological. Technological strength is recognized as one of America's greatest assets. It is both broad and deep, equaling or surpassing any country in the world in almost all fields. When coupled with our large and highly sophisticated industrial base, it gives us an overwhelming advantage in any program we undertake.⁶ Unfortunately, this vast resource is not currently focused on any program of strategic importance.

Military. While both superpowers unquestionably possess the military capability to inflict mortal damage on the other, our relative position in the military arena is perceived by many as declining. Some Americans discount the warnings of their military leaders, suspecting a collusion between military and industrial leaders aimed at self-perpetuation

more than at defense. Military purchasing power has dropped at an alarming rate over the past ten years, especially in such future-oriented areas as the development and acquisition of new weapon systems and the research and development vital to long-term technological supremacy. Our strategic and conventional forces are aging rapidly and becoming more costly to operate and maintain. Yet modernization and replacement of weapon systems are proceeding at a slow pace, especially when compared to the unprecedented growth of Soviet offensive capability.⁷ Self-righteousness seems to overwhelm prudence occasionally, as when the U.S. unilaterally abandons offensive chemical warfare (and the Soviets counter with increased manufacture and deployment of chemical weapons);⁸ or as Congress and the American press thrust our foreign intelligence apparatus and operations into a public spotlight, which results in the loss of many sources of information.

Ideological. Our ideology is primarily oriented internally and contains no theoretical basis for its external expansion to other countries. While believing that our form of government is superior to any other, our efforts to convert other countries to representative democracy are spasmodic and limited primarily to the passive dissemination of information, rather than an aggressive propaganda effort and active political involvement. Some of our more valuable allies chafe at our periodic self-righteous arrogance and intolerance toward countries that are friendly to us, yet which do not have representative democracy forms of government,⁹ or who conduct foreign policies with which we do not agree. The ensuing cut off of military and economic aid (e.g., Turkey) is construed by many of our allies as internal "meddling" and makes U.S. foreign policy appear to be based only on a combination of short-term U.S. interests and political popularity contests,¹⁰ rather than on strategic common sense.

World opinion. Criticism of U.S. foreign

policy has become commonplace, especially among third world, nonaligned countries. In some instances, this may be due to merit or to a variety of emotional factors, such as rising sentiments of nationalism and their resentment of our prosperity and world influence. Many of these countries feel that they can criticize "the American giant" or engage in acts of violence against U.S. citizens, diplomats, and property with impunity and thereby gain a measure of self-respect by "standing up to imperialism." Yet they seem to perceive little such immunity from Soviet retribution, and therefore refrain from such actions toward the Russians.¹¹ Our policies are subject to much malevolence in public forums (e.g., the press and the United Nations) from nonaligned nations, Communist nations, and occasionally from our own allies. Considerable resentment toward us exists on the part of many undeveloped and underdeveloped peoples, despite the enormous sums of aid and technological infusion that have been poured into some of these nations. Consequently, there is a growing reluctance among the American public to support foreign aid programs.

National attitudes. An apparently prominent tendency among growing segments of our population is to turn away from the outside world and focus on the myriad of domestic problems that continue to plague our country—economic, environmental, and societal problems of staggering magnitude and variety.¹² This tendency is mirrored by the reluctance of many politicians to support foreign aid or national defense expenditures, and their concurrent desire to divert these monies to health, housing, welfare, education, and other areas directly concerned with increasing the immediate day to day standard of living of the American people, who already enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the world.¹³ Leisure time seems to be increasingly directed toward idle activities with no real physical or intellectual benefits. This traditional "Puri-

tan ethic" of self-discipline, industriousness, and frugality in the interest of a long-term goal seems to have been replaced by a quest for immediate self-gratification. American people seem increasingly self-centered and shortsighted, ignoring the far more serious problems of the rest of the world because of frustration and a concern for their own problems at home. Perhaps the most serious problems currently plaguing American attitudes today are a lack of direction and sense of purpose. As a nation, we have no clearly enunciated and tangible national goal on which our people can focus their energies and behind which they can unite their efforts, such as the space program of the 1960s.

The Blueprint

If the Soviet Union perceives our nation in a manner similar to that just described, then there clearly lies before it a strategy that could achieve world domination within a decade, without resorting to armed conflict.

Abdication by default is the result of a lack of resolve.¹⁴ It may result from preoccupation with immediate personal comforts rather than with the long-term national interest, a general lack of direction due to confusion and unrest in many areas of national and international activity, an introversion stemming from frustration in foreign affairs, a gradual weakening of strength and flexibility in national defense and international economics, complacency and wishful thinking rather than realism, or a combination of these factors. In our political system, it is indeed true that the actions of the government reflect the attitudes of the people.

A determined, patient, and skillful adversary can do much to foster the diminution of our national resolve, but their efforts must be marked with the utmost subtlety to avoid focusing attention on the true intent of their activities.¹⁵ As an example, Adolf Hitler spoke openly of peace, yet prepared quietly for war.

The rest of the world relied on a faulty perception of Nazi intentions and ignored Nazi capabilities. Europe muddled along hoping for peace and yet was drawn inexorably into war. History can be very valuable in showing what actions to avoid, yet too often we fail to learn from history.

The conditions that exist today in our country readily lend themselves to exploitation by the Soviet Union (using a combination of the concepts of protracted conflict and guerrilla warfare). I would expect a Russian handbook on the implementation of this strategy to have various component programs divided into two major efforts, one clandestine and the other overt.

covert efforts

The checklist for covert efforts might include the following.

- Support any individuals or groups (particularly politicians) whose activities contribute to a reduction in American defense spending, no matter how patriotic their motives. This support can take many forms (e.g., manpower, financial backing), but it must be such that the true source is never suspected. Support should also be given to all groups and persons who promote greatly expanded federal spending in nondefense areas, or who protest American military or political involvement in any foreign country or alliance.

- Strongly support extremist groups of all persuasions.¹⁶ The worldwide press has a tendency to give maximum exposure to anything bizarre or sensational; consequently, this communication tool is particularly potent. It can be manipulated to provide a constant bombardment of unpleasant stimuli that will tend to produce confusion and withdrawal in a person. Just as an animal who is constantly bombarded with unpleasant stimuli gradually becomes unwilling and unable to act purposefully, a nation in similar

circumstances will become more withdrawn, shortsighted, and unable to act decisively. Foreign extremist groups, even though their actions do not involve the U.S. directly, can nurture the growing spirit of American isolationism. Domestic extremist groups, on the other hand, can create confusion and serve to divert attention from strategic problems of less immediate but still vital long-range importance.

- Exacerbate economic problems at every possible opportunity. Products should be bought in large quantities on the world market or directly from the U.S. whenever these purchases will create a shortage in the United States or drive up prices to the American consumer. Seek to absorb or control the production of raw materials such as oil, chromium, bauxite, or uranium, which are vital to American economic health yet come from foreign sources. Support should be given to labor unions that are seeking increases in pay and benefits that exceed increases in inflation and productivity. Any action that can cause national or international economic uncertainty is a chance for exploitation.

- Give the widest possible coverage to all U.S. problems or failures in foreign affairs, real or contrived. An inability or unwillingness of the U.S. to support its international commitments must constantly be spotlighted for the rest of the world.¹⁷ Articles that describe successful activities should be suppressed, distorted, or played down as much as possible.¹⁸ The ridicule resulting from selective news coverage will serve to distort and diminish American influence abroad as well as to erode respect for America as a world power. Many foreign news media are either supported by the U.S.S.R., under Soviet influence, or selectively fed items that are false or distorted. As other nations lose respect for the U.S., the American people will first lose their own self-respect and then respect for their country. Self-esteem is as vital to nations as it is to individuals.

overt efforts

The Soviet Union can take certain measures designed to divert attention from its long-term goals yet at the same time foment a false sense of security in the United States.¹⁹ With control over most of the information that the rest of the world sees concerning internal Soviet policies, preparations, and intentions, these measures can be implemented with relative impunity. If expertly executed, they can virtually guarantee that the rest of the world will perceive that there is no Soviet threat and, therefore, there is no need to maintain economic or military defenses. The October 1973 attack on Israel is a classic illustration of how effective a carefully woven web of political and military misinformation can be.²⁰ The Soviet Union, as this example and others in Eastern Europe show, is eminently well qualified to exploit the weaknesses, complacency, and wishful thinking of any nation, the U.S. included.²¹ The Trojan horse of détente is yet another example of an effort with a tremendous potential for Soviet exploitation.²²

The list for overt efforts might include the following.

- Encourage trade at all levels. Every effort must be made to import high technology products, such as computers, air transport equipment, complete production lines, and materiel processing facilities.²³ The travel and personal contacts of foreigners who accompany these imports into the Soviet Union should be carefully controlled. This prevents an accurate picture of activities that may betray true intentions. This approach to trade enables the U.S.S.R. to make quantum jumps in many areas of technology without making the extensive investment in underlying research that would normally be necessary. This exchange should be accompanied with much fanfare, yet in reality it should be a one-way proposition, with nothing of practical value or utility going back to the U.S. or other Western

nations. Care must be taken by the Soviets not to export any technology if it aids potential adversaries or reveals the sophistication of Russian efforts in defense-related areas.

- Exercise care in all public forums not to appear belligerent or to indulge in flamboyant forms of provocative behavior that, in earlier periods, kept the U.S. alert. There must be no open profession or preaching of Soviet ideology and its ultimate goal of world domination, as this would only lend credence to the efforts of those Americans who advocate stronger measures for national defense.²⁴ If intervention in the internal affairs of other nations is necessary, proxies (such as the Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia) should be used to help camouflage Soviet involvement.²⁵

- Redouble efforts to surpass U.S. military capabilities during this period of importing technology and professing a complete "change of heart."²⁶ These efforts can go relatively unnoticed because of Soviet control of information relating to the size of military budgets and the nature of military programs. If America continues to lose momentum in military research and falls behind in efforts to modernize its air, sea, and land forces, the Soviet Union could, within a decade, have the military power to force the United States to back down in any political or military situation that would not directly threaten the survival of the United States.²⁷

- Support and publicize to the maximum extent possible any action throughout the world that focuses attention on U.S. intelligence activities. Efforts from any quarter in the U.S. to declassify sensitive information of any sort should get similar support. Publicity, especially on sensitive data, will do much to destroy intelligence gathering sources that can take years, even decades, to develop.²⁸ Without an accurate view of Soviet capabilities and intentions, it will be even more difficult for the U.S. to effectively direct its defense efforts.

THE SOVIET goal is world domination. A promising, low-risk alternative course of action is to induce in Americans a sense of complacency, an air of good will, a feeling of security, and a general reluctance to practice self-discipline and make the sacrifices necessary for continued national security and a viable foreign policy.²⁹ Simultaneously with this diminution of U.S. national resolve and a continued decline in our military capability, the Soviet Union would continue rapid expansion of their offensive military forces. This approach would allow the Soviets to make steady foreign policy gains and erode the U.S. position and influence around the globe. Eventually, Soviet military power would be such that the U.S. would have to yield to Russian designs in many areas of the world rather than risk a confrontation. *Nolo contendere* (acceding to an unpleasant outcome without resistance) would be more palatable than the loss of face from backing down in open confrontation.

At that point, the United States will have abdicated its role in the course of world affairs. The Soviet Union—as the only nation with the prestige, the military capability, and the *will* to fill the power vacuum—will have achieved its goal.

Democracies have historically preferred to

concentrate on domestic concerns when no clear-cut threat is present. The tendency is to relax as dangers seem to recede. We somehow perceive that the maintenance of strength is incompatible with, rather than the precondition for, the relaxation of tensions. Do we wishfully mistake prosperity for security, a fatal mistake that has been made by a parade of prior civilizations? Is our appraisal of détente too often colored by assumptions about Soviet motivations, intentions, and priorities that largely mirror our own desires and bear precious little resemblance to reality? Are we naively pursuing a belief that our security can be guaranteed by a piece of paper, hoping that it will serve as a substitute for determination, technology, and resources?

There exists in a substantial portion of the American public an indifference, apathy, and unwillingness to face harsh prospects. If the U.S. is going to become a second-class power on the world stage, this decision should be made consciously and deliberately, not as a result of wishful thinking and ignorance about the consequences of seemingly unrelated events and actions. Otherwise, the appraisal of national resolve attributed to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger will be frighteningly accurate: the American people *do* lack the will to maintain strategic parity and their present role in international affairs.³⁰

Washington, D.C.

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The long-range goal of arms reduction is a central policy of our government, and has been for a number of years. President Carter, by his words and deeds, has strongly emphasized this aspect of our security policy. His recent address at the United Nations is the latest example.

This search for ways to control the increase in numbers of weapons, their destructiveness, and their proliferation reflects policy continuity. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been staunch supporters of strategic arms limitations. This support stems from the judgment that if agreements are equitable and verifiable, US national security interests can be well served.

Mutual and verifiable reduction of strategic nuclear arms is a desirable, and, I believe, an achievable goal. However, we must be cognizant of Soviet actions and the risks they entail. Every policy, every strategy, every action entails some risk. Our task is to insure that that risk remains at a prudent level. We must be watchful that the earnestness of our wish does not blur our vision, or hinder our judgment.


GENERAL GEORGE S. BROWN
Address to the Business Council
Hot Springs, Virginia
14 October 1977

ENERGY RESOURCES: REVISITED 1977

DR. WILLIAM B. HAIDLER

As the 1973-74 energy crisis recedes from public memory, there is a tendency to believe that the energy crisis is behind us. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Dr. Ulf Lantzke, Executive Director
International Energy Agency, Paris¹



Seven years have brought about a dramatic change in the outlook of the United States regarding energy resources, distribution, and use, and in our policies relating to energy.² Our previous short-term concerns have become long-term realities. We are faced not only with insufficient electrical generating capacity in some areas but also with the lack of ability to raise capital to increase that generating capacity. Environmental issues are continually being debated, forcing additional delays in supporting construction. But of even more basic concern to our national strength as a world power is our ever increasing dependence on overseas energy resources for oil and natural gas. Whereas in 1971 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was just beginning uniform price agreements, OPEC has now proved its ability to enforce and maintain higher prices. The recent tiered structure with Saudi Arabia's leadership has arisen because of concerns within OPEC nations that user nations of the industrial West cannot withstand as high a price increase as desired by the producers. However, there has been no major break to date in OPEC's policy to price oil comparatively with alternate energy sources. In fact, many OPEC producers view competitive pricing as their obligation to avoid energy waste.

In late 1973 and early 1974, the U.S. was visibly inconvenienced by the oil embargo imposed by the OPEC nations in objection to our foreign policy. At that time, we imported less than 20 percent of our oil requirements; this embargo forced an inconvenience, not a disruption of our economy. Today we import 50 percent, and the percentage is rising. Also, we have not been able to reduce our increasing dependence of foreign energy sources in the past six years.

The United States could not have developed into a superpower if abundant, low-cost energy had not been available. By the same token, we cannot sustain our position of leadership without the availability of an

adequate supply of energy to meet the nation's needs. However, cheap energy is clearly a thing of the past. The OPEC nations' increase of oil from approximately \$3 per barrel before 1973 to \$12 today has placed oil in competition with other forms of energy. The OPEC nations also intend to maintain price parity with inflation throughout the world,³ reasonable to them considering that their imports from the Western nations, no small amount of which are arms, have risen in cost. Since cost of living indexes are included in many Western work agreements, contracts, and pension plans, the OPEC nations believe that their prices should be in step with the current market value of their products.⁴

the world

Today, energy is becoming scarce, although the U.S. does not seem to be as aware of this as the rest of the world. In terms of oil and the international market, crude oil reserves were 50 times the annual world consumption as recently as 1966; now they are but 30.⁵ Eighty-five percent of the world's oil and gas reserves lie primarily in the East, while use is primarily in the West.⁶ This is the world's oil distribution seen objectively, but from the U.S. point of view, the outlook is somewhat different.

For the West, the U.S. is still in an enviable energy position since we do have alternatives. We do have oil—not as much as in the past, but some. We have even less natural gas, and in 1975 we consumed twice as much as we discovered. Our greatest energy source is coal, which still remains largely untapped and is sufficient to meet our needs for several hundred years. Nuclear power has progressed and now provides power for 8 to 10 percent of the electricity generated in the U.S.; six years ago, it furnished but half of that. Other energy sources are minimal, providing only a few percent.

Energy is now recognized by all as a

perishable commodity. Yet while the price has become greater and resources are ever more limited, we still have those who act as if energy resources were limitless and argue for a return to the "good old days." At the same time, natural gas consumption is severely curtailed in many states, and gas companies are often not connecting new customers. Schools and industries have been forced to close for lack of fuel, primarily natural gas. Throughout the nation, industries, colleges, universities, and government offices have gone on energy conservation programs. Last winter, our domestic distribution by pipeline, truck, and barge was severely strained to deliver the supplies we do have.

There is no simple solution to these problems. Man will proceed rationally or irrationally, depending on how well informed and self-disciplined he is. My purpose is to present the situation as it is today in comparison to the way it was in 1971 with the additional realization that the solution we want as a nation may not be the solution that others will readily grant.

It will be the industrialized nations which will have to make the major adjustments if petroleum and natural gas reserves are to be extended by conservation, on the one hand, and the use of alternative energy sources on the other.

Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Administrator,
Energy Research and Development
Administration⁷

energy use

We still need energy since we use approximately 35 percent of the world's annual energy production with only 6 percent of the world's population. Thus, for the West, the U.S. faces a particular challenge. Because of the operation of various factors, not the least of which is the inability of U.S. corporations to generate the necessary capital under conditions of moderate economic growth and increasing environmental investment, energy growth in the U.S. can


be expected to average 2.8 to 3 percent per year over the next 25 years.⁸ The undeveloped areas of the world will probably have a more rapid increase in energy requirements as they become more industrialized and energy intensive in their methods of production. Thus, our competition with other nations for energy will become ever greater. Since our lead in energy use is so great and we do have domestic resources, we will probably retain our lead. However, this can be both a blessing and a curse—a blessing in that we will have a higher standard of living, but a curse in that other nations see our relatively small population using one-third of the world's energy output.

As with other products such as water and paper which have low prices relative to substitutable products, tremendous waste has been encouraged . . . signs of this affluence are all about us: oversized automobiles, over-heated buildings, black exhaust from factory chimneys and motor vehicles, buildings ornamented with electric lights, gas flares in oil fields, even electric toothbrushes in our homes. The non-productive and wasteful uses of energy have contributed to the rapid growth in energy demand—a demand well above our *needs*, . . .⁹

Projections have also been made which show that the demand of the consumer nations is less than a decade away from the maximum levels the producing nations are willing to supply.¹⁰ While we may want energy as a nation, the suppliers may be unwilling to supply it at any price. They may also reserve the right to say how we use it and what profits are just. Other factors opposing supplies to the U.S. are our lag in conservation measures and the fact that other nations live as well on considerably less energy. In Sweden, the energy use per capita is two-thirds that of the U.S., yet the standard of living is the same.¹¹ We stand next to the bottom in energy conservation compared to 14 other Western nations, as noted in a study by the International Monetary Fund. None of this helps our image. With our highly educated and technologically oriented population, we can adapt—a strong plus for the future

With the shrinking of the world's energy resources, man presses ever farther for new oil supplies. During the past decade particularly the earth's oceans—the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea, etc.—have yielded their oil for Western man's energy needs. A pipelaying barge (below left) works on a 25-mile undersea pipeline from the Louisiana coast; a self-contained platform operated by four oil companies is in the background. . . . Underwater pipeline (below right) is eased into position supported by pontoons, part of more than 200,000 miles of oil pipeline crisscrossing the country. . . . A drilling platform 27 miles off the Louisiana shore (bottom) is one of 2700 producing platforms in the Gulf of Mexico.





Ingenuity Yields Energy

Bulk refining equipment (left) at Joliet, Illinois, produces 18,000 barrels of high octane gasoline a day from liquefied petroleum gases. . . . The No. 1 James ultradeep natural-gas well in the Texas Panhandle (below left) is 4.6 miles deep and took 348 days to drill, at a cost of \$5.5 million. . . . The Athabasca tar sands in Canada, a potential source of 250 billion barrels of oil, are now being tapped during the warmer months. The bucket-wheel excavator (below) can dig more than 100,000 tons daily.



of the U.S., since we have just begun to institute and follow energy conservation measures.

U.S. energy resources

Our overall domestic energy supplies have not changed greatly since 1971. Coal remains our only domestic fuel that can meet our total cumulative energy requirements between now and the year 2000. Today coal can compete more economically with alternative forms of energy, particularly because of the increase in oil price.

U.S. oil reserves have decreased. The North Slope of Alaska is closer to reaching the markets of the U.S.; however, these reserves are not that great.¹² By today's estimates they would supply total U.S. oil demand for only 2 to 3 years. Production of the fields is planned for a 20-year life span or more. The distribution also poses some problems, but today we have only 31 billion barrels of oil as proven domestic reserves *including* Alaska as compared to 37 billion barrels in 1971 *excluding* Alaska. By comparison, the United Kingdom has 17 billion barrels of oil.¹³

Natural gas continues to be our most meager reserve. Today's proven domestic reserves are only 220 trillion cubic feet as compared to 265 trillion cubic feet in 1971. The increased prices allowed for natural gas have spurred increased drilling; however, the cost of drilling has gone up as much as tenfold as has the construction of pipelines, particularly when they must be underwater from offshore gas fields. Considering the other uses of natural gas and products that can be obtained from this basic resource, one suspects that the value of its use for heating will continue to be argued. The problem of the tiered domestic price structure between interstate and intrastate sales also remains to be solved in addition to price deregulation in order to increase exploration.

Our oil shale deposits continue to stand untapped because of the lack of a cost-

competitive extraction method or available water supplies needed for present processes.

Nuclear energy will continue to grow. The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) recently projected that electrical energy-generating capacity based on nuclear reactors may increase as much as tenfold by the year 2000. At the same time the warning was given concerning the energy intensity of reactor construction, such a rapid growth raises the question of whether the expanding system would produce more power than it absorbs and whether net power will be produced in adequate amounts and in a timely fashion.¹⁴

Hydro power has not changed more than a few percent since 1971 because of the lack of sites. Controlled fusion is as far off now as it was in 1971. The winds, the tides, and geothermal heat may still provide energy to specific localities. Large windmills have been researched further by NASA, but the energy storage method still remains to be solved. Solar energy for specific purposes has received considerable impetus by federal funding. This form of energy will probably fit in well with buildings in some locales. A new school in Michigan with 2000 sq. ft. of paneling is expected to generate 30 percent of the building's heating needs. If the paneling is installed, the projected payback period will be 18 to 20 years at present energy costs.¹⁵ Solar energy for the production of electrical power still does not appear practical because of the low efficiency of direct conversion systems and the high capital cost of indirect cycles.

Today, as before, coal is our ace in the hole. While electrical energy from fission-powered steam turbine generators is increasing rapidly, there will be a movement away from oil and natural gas to coal in future years for electrical generation as domestic oil and natural gas reserves become more scarce and the cost of imports becomes greater. Windmills, geothermal, and solar collectors will probably supply some small units in specific areas.

foreign energy resources

In the 1800s, our energy needs were based on wood. At the beginning of this century, we had switched to coal, and in the 1950s we were switching to natural gas; however, since 1968 we have been using more natural gas each year than we have discovered. Our oil production peaked in the early '70s. Consequently, the U.S. has been and will remain a net importer of energy, particularly in the liquid fossil fuels, sorely needed in transportation and military operations. Canada remains in a situation much like ours but with greater energy reserves per capita. Canadian proven oil and gas reserves are respectively one-fifth and one-fourth of ours. Canada has taken positive steps to decrease the use and exportation of her energy resources. Taxes are levied on new automobiles in accordance with horsepower, air conditioning, and other accessories. By the early '80s, Canada expects to halt all oil exports. Inasmuch as the upper tier of states receives approximately 20 percent of their oil from Canada, then the oil from Alaska may be needed to make up the lack of oil from Canada or further imports will be needed from the Middle East. Canada is also developing her resources in the northern reaches, Mackenzie Bay, and has begun excavating on the vast tar sands near Edmonton.¹⁶

Venezuela's proven oil reserves have increased somewhat from 14 billion barrels in 1971 to an estimated 15 billion today. With Venezuela in OPEC, she is subject to the price controls that those nations agree to. At the present production rate, Venezuela could exhaust her proven reserves in eight years. Mexico retains a reserve cautiously estimated at 7 billion barrels although it could become larger. Total Western Hemisphere reserves have remained comparatively constant at twice the U.S. domestic reserve.

In Western Europe, the energy situation has improved. While still very heavily dependent on the Middle East for oil, Europe's situation

has improved considerably because of the North Sea findings, from 4 billion barrels in 1971 to 25 billion today, close to the reserve of the U.S. These North Sea fields, both oil and gas, are still under development, but the Western European nations are not a potential major source of energy to the U.S.; in an emergency, they could even require a portion of our production. Unfortunately, the U.S. is not able to meet its own oil needs and those of Western Europe simultaneously.

In the Asia Pacific area the reserves have changed but little, 14 billion barrels in 1971, 19 billion now. Japan continues to be dependent on the Middle East; however, there may be a diversion of some Alaskan oil to Japan in turn for a diversion of oil from the Middle East to our East Coast ports. If this were done, it would require legislation since presently the export of Alaskan oil is prohibited. This arrangement would allow shorter shipping distances. Also, West Coast refineries are designed to handle a "sweet oil" in comparison to the higher sulfur content of the Alaskan and Middle East oils; thus, additional Middle East oil could be more easily processed by the East Coast than could Alaskan crude by the West Coast.

Libyan oil fields and reserves are already peaking. Libya, very much the voice of OPEC four or five years ago, appears more concerned to seek the highest price for her oil as soon as possible. Like Libya, Algeria has already drawn down her reserves considerably. Yet without a doubt, the Middle East remains the energy giant of the world. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait are the largest with 110, 63, and 67 billion barrels respectively in proven reserves; however, total Middle East reserves have decreased slightly to 326 billion barrels. Nevertheless, the Middle East still has more than one-half the world's total reserves of oil and one-fourth of the natural gas.

The Soviet Union has made major finds in the Siberian area—finds that may equal or even surpass those of the Middle East. Occidental Petroleum, a U.S. corporation, is

already helping the U.S.S.R. bring these fields into production by providing technology. However, the extent of these fields is still not fully known. If they are as large as sometimes thought, the Soviet Union could become the oil center of the world. While discoveries have decreased somewhat from recent official Soviet reports, reserves are now estimated at two and one-half times our oil reserves and four times our natural gas, respectively two and one and one-half times ours six years ago. The energy balance thus has swung more to the advantage of the U.S.S.R.

The U.S. still has a reasonable position and possibly could become self-sufficient if considerable effort were expended in scientific and technological development as well as disciplined use and distribution.¹⁸ But this energy self-sufficiency is under question by Senator Edward Kennedy and will be reviewed by hearings to be conducted by him and the Joint Economic Subcommittee. We have turned and probably will continue to turn more and more to overseas suppliers for oil and gas. These reserves are principally in the Middle East. Long-term supply from Canada no longer appears feasible; however, as a good neighbor she came to our aid last winter as did Mexico. Nor do the reserves of Venezuela and possibly Mexico offer as great support as we formerly anticipated. Our overseas allies, particularly in northern Europe, have improved their position, but they too are increasingly dependent on the Middle East; and our ability to supply our European allies is less than it was six years ago. Although the Soviet Union has become ever stronger in comparative energy reserves, the Middle East remains *the* giant, a giant which realizes the international power that energy resources bestow.

reserves

Reserves continue to be known deposits, which the world is recovering with today's

technology. They are working inventory; undoubtedly the final figure will be different and higher as technology improves and increased prices make more fields profitable. Besides technology and price, politics and international economics have influence, too. Saudi Arabia recently reported a drop of more than 40 billion barrels of oil reserves, considered to be for political reasons and the forthcoming takeover of Aramco by the Saudis. While Mexico may have a great deal of oil, Pemex conservatively maintains an estimate of 7 billion barrels, with another 10 possible, and theoretically, an additional 30 to 60 billion barrels.¹⁹ The true figures throughout the world will only become known through time, price, and ingenuity.

domestic policy

The uses of energy within the United States in 1960 were the following, by percentage: industrial, 35; commercial and other, 25; transportation, 20; and residential, 20.²⁰ A more recent description of energy use in the U.S. and in slightly different categories, by percentage, reads as follows: agriculture, 16; transportation, 25; industry, 26; and building and space heating, 33.²¹ For the future, the question is how can we best meet our needs and use our resources.

In his remarks to the international meeting, Dr. Seamans made it clear that no single option will meet the requirements of the future even though the U.S. has more options than most nations. Until 1985, Dr. Seamans sees a maximum use of domestic resources to offset increasing dependence on overseas oil with a very strong energy conservation program at all levels. He also urges using coal in place of oil or gas and an increasing dependence on nuclear energy.

Conservation is a means still largely untapped in the United States as one considers the continual production and demand for large automobiles versus smaller automobiles.

Transporting Middle East Oil

Oil tankers line up at the pier at Port of Dammam, Saudi Arabia (right), to be loaded with oil for shipment to the United States.... The CONOCO America, with deadweight tonnage of 271,857, transports crude oil from the Middle East to Europe. The 1105-foot supertanker has a capacity of more than two million barrels.



The gallons of automobile gasoline sold are setting new annual peaks again. We increasingly see a return to overlighting; gas lights are still burning day and night. Dr. Seamans noted that we waste 50 percent or more of the energy that we use. Thus, we could make a large dent in meeting our future needs by reducing our own domestic use.

Areas for conservation that appear most desirable are in transportation and space heating. The strength of the nation lies on its agricultural and industrial base, which together account for approximately 42 percent of the energy used in the U.S. This base must be protected. Our factories are often running with reduced heat. Last winter, gas quotas were established, and plants, schools, and offices were shut down. Measures of this sort have not yet been taken with the private dwelling. More encouragement has been given to increasing insulation, storm windows, and lower thermostat settings. There has not been a penalty other than a higher gas or electrical bill for private citizens who do not comply. Conservation here may be very fruitful. The American homeowner, if placed on the same footing as the American manufacturer with only so many BTUs or kilowatt-hours per month, will have a great deal more impetus for conservation. Laboratories, industries, and college complexes have reduced energy requirements from 10 to 20 to 30 percent or more with little or no impact on their overall operation. They have conserved because they were required to by the supplies allotted to them and the cost they could endure. If similar constraints were placed on domestic users, we might also see considerable energy saving in the home.

Energy policy was an issue in the last presidential campaign. To date, a reorganization of various federal agencies involved in energy research, development, and use has been accomplished, placing them under the directorship of the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration. The Atomic

Energy Commission, which had sponsored nuclear energy research and development under civilian control since 1947, has been abolished to become part of ERDA. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the Congress, with review of the nuclear energy budget, now sees this responsibility returning to separate congressional committees. Several years ago there was the possibility that a joint energy committee would be formed within Congress to provide legislative leadership to the nation's energy program. This has not occurred. Thus, while there have been some organizational changes to the executive and legislative structures directing, overseeing, or controlling the U.S. energy program, there has not been a dramatic change in our national direction of efforts to meet future energy needs. Changes of monumental proportion that will be needed within the U.S. for us to become less energy dependent will not occur overnight.

As time goes on, the continuing measures necessary for the U.S. to maintain a proper energy base as a foundation to world leadership may require changes to our habits and way of life. These may not all be readily accepted or pleasant. A strong leader both in the White House and in the Cabinet will be needed to formulate, manage, and put into effect such policies. Without them, our strength as a nation can become increasingly dependent on others whose supplies are not totally dependable.

Initially, some readjustment may be expected, emphasizing greater conservation and development of coal resources in accordance with President Carter's energy policies. (Immediately after his inauguration, he acted to decrease consumption both in the home and industry when faced with a bitter winter.) These changes would be at the expense of monies now devoted to nuclear energy. While nuclear energy will not be abandoned, reliance would be cut by reducing overall demand, by improving auto fuel economy, increasing home insulation, and

using industrial waste heat.²² John F. O'Leary, the new head of FEA, also expresses a cautious approach to nuclear energy.²³ By such measures and improved technology, our energy rate of growth could be reduced. Another fact emphasizing the importance of energy was Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's early visit to the Middle East.

outlook

Considering the longer term, 1985 and beyond, the situation may or may not be brighter. Fusion energy could still be the ultimate solution and most desirable because of the abundance of fuel reserves for that process.

Whether it will come to pass by the year 2000 becomes ever more questionable. Solar energy projections made in the U.S. and abroad do not predict a major contribution to any national economy by the sun. As time goes on, other methods and technologies may become apparent, but for the present the U.S. is faced with conservation and the use of more coal and nuclear energy. The recent severe winters may have at last focused our attention on our dwindling energy supplies. Above all we need the will as a nation to realize, accept, and live in accordance with the fact that our energy is limited and a very precious quantity.

My basic conclusion expressed in 1971 remains essentially unchanged, but there are

Energy exploration takes geologists and surveyors to remote areas, such as an Alaskan mountain peak near Katalla. After collecting rock samples, they await pickup by their helicopter "taxicab."



additional factors. While the free world needs oil, the oil-producing nations need to sell oil to support their own programs. The selling nations may strive for all the profit they can gain short of seriously harming their best customers. To support this contention is the moderation of oil price increases in late 1976 in accordance with the strained economic conditions in the free world. However, Reza Fallah and other OPEC spokesmen have added other dimensions that we must be aware of and appreciate. Comparative pricing of oil with periodic price adjustments is a policy OPEC plans to continue. How we use energy is also of concern to the suppliers. If we waste it, they may not be willing to sell or will price in such a manner that those practices undesirable to the seller cease for economic reasons. This practice combined with a strained domestic supply system and decreasing internal reserves requires a strong U.S. conservation program. A last concern of the seller is the limit of the energy reserves each has to sell. Since these

resources often form the basis of a national economy, as the reserves dwindle, prices and events may be less predictable.

THE U.S. energy position is still good, but we will have to work and accept change to maintain that strength. Without it our power at any bargaining table or military confrontation is weakened. Today there are no easy paths leading to the reserves or technology necessary to quickly improve our national energy resources or posture.

Dowagiac, Michigan

We are indebted to the following oil companies for photographs illustrating this article: Continental, Exxon, Mobil, Standard of California, Sun, and Texaco; and we gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Richard E. Drew, of the American Petroleum Institute, who made them available to us.

Notes

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This article is a sequel to "Energy Resources: An Element of National Power," *Air University Review*, January-February 1972, pp. 2-13, which Dr. Haidler wrote while he was serving as a colonel in the United States Air Force.

The Editor

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION

MAJOR BRIAN MULLADY, USA



The fact is that nowhere has the West been defeated for lack of strength. Our setbacks have been self-inflicted, either because leaders chose objectives that were beyond our psychological capabilities or because our legislatures refused to support what the executive branch believed was essential. This . . . is the deepest security problem we face.'

Henry A. Kissinger

THESE has not been a popular American war in more than thirty years. Of course, this lack of popularity did not prevent our military involvement in Korea, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, or Vietnam. As most political analysts would agree, the public generally exerts far less impact on foreign policy than on any single domestic issue. Traditionally, public opinion has been described as a force that is slow to effect policy, which follows rather than leads, and has little clear consensus. (See Figure 1.)

A growing school of thought suggests, however, that the Vietnam experience constitutes some kind of turning point in the reportedly weak linkage between public opinion and foreign policy, especially concerning the possibilities of future U.S. military intervention. When the public becomes sensitive to the costs of stalemate, support for intervention polarizes. Those who were previously indifferent to governmental policy take positions pro and con. And the linkage that was previously permissive becomes restrictive, inhibiting executive flexibility. The question is whether this restrictiveness has receded to its pre-Vietnam levels. After examining the intensity of this linkage, we shall draw conclusions based on current data concerning the way in which public opinion, as a constraint, may affect future military operations.

There is much evidence to suggest that the nature (location, type, duration, purpose, etc.) of possible future military involvement is far more circumscribed than planners currently believe. It may be the case that the U.S. now has only one nonnuclear option: to win future conventional wars *quickly* through a *maximum application of force*.

Before examining the public opinion data, it must be stressed that there are several methodological problems in determining what the public attitude really is. Public opinion polls ultimately measure the ability of respondents to react immediately to a series of

questions posed by a pollster. Further, it can be demonstrated that the wording of a question can have nearly as much impact on the response as a substantive change.² What a respondent says he will do under hypothetical conditions and what he actually will do when confronted with a real situation can be quite different. In short, foreign policy is *not*, and has never been, a mirror image of public opinion.

At the same time, while a great many factors enter into the determination of a foreign policy, certainly public opinion is a vital and, as many think, seriously neglected factor. It is, of course, the sustaining source of all national policies in democratic societies.

Within a normative framework, presidents and other representative leaders are supposed to care what the people think in a democracy and to conduct all policy in ways that the people would approve. The President and Congress should also pay attention to public opinion because, simply stated, they want to stay in office. Further, there is much evidence to suggest that national leaders and policy-makers are very sensitive to the public mood. The Congress is often briefed by nationally known pollsters; the State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs has a Public Opinion Analyst and systematically studies the editorials of certain newspapers; and the executive branch, if not immediately responsive, has shown itself to be both receptive and sensitive to opinion data.

But this is nothing new. What has the Vietnam experience done to change the public opinion-foreign policy linkage? There is no question that the resolve of the Congress to reassert its authority in foreign affairs was strengthened during the Vietnam involvement. Although it failed, the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, to set a deadline for withdrawal of all American forces, established a precedent for this type of congressional action in time of war. Congressional restraints were placed on the limits of U.S. involvement in Cambodia and Laos. More important than

any mere precedent is the War Powers Resolution of November 1973, which limits the President's power to use American troops in overseas combat to sixty days (ninety days only if necessary for a safe withdrawal). Of course, Congress can have an extremely important voice in foreign policy well before the question of troop involvement as the actions with regard to Angola have shown.


Many observers anticipate a return to the more active foreign policy role played by Congress prior to 1940 and attribute this to a lack of presidential credibility during the war years, a "changing of the guard" in Congress from old and conservative to young and

liberal, to the increased influence of foreign policy matters on domestic issues, as well as to a new national leadership. Whatever the causes, it is clear that Congress will continue to demand involvement in any discussion of troop commitments and that there will be extremely strong opposition to any presidential initiative that appears to be leading to another Vietnam spiral.

The Vietnam War has again reminded politicians to pay attention to the public's voice from the practical standpoint. There is little doubt that the Korean War issue contributed significantly to the Eisenhower landslide during the 1952 Presidential election. Similarly, the Vietnam War was the primary factor in forcing President Johnson's decision not to seek re-election. While President Nixon was temporarily able to intensify the war despite a nonsupportive public, he had received a tremendous initial mandate at the polls and was bringing the troops home on schedule. That this mandate subsided after the escalation was evident from 1972 election data. The point is that, while our national leaders have some latitude to act independently of public opinion, they certainly cannot disregard it for very long.

The Vietnam War has created a sort of primitive stimulus-response situation in which similar future challenges, not clearly perceived as in our national interest, will elicit a similar response, opposition from the American people. The intensity of the response may even reflect learning as a product of cumulative experience. Angola is a perfect example. Although Henry Kissinger strongly denied it at the time, the structure of the situation was so similar to that of the early Vietnam involvement that it is surprising that the President and the Secretary of State did not do a better job of anticipating the congressional and public response. In December 1975, the Senate, probably feeling a general consensus and looking toward a potential election year issue, voted 54 to 22 to ban further

Figure 1. This graph shows the percentage of Americans saying no to the repeated survey question, "Do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" Data are from John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), pp. 54-55.



covert aid to Angola. Even while Secretary Kissinger was promising to continue to resist the Soviet attempt to "impose its own brand of government" on Angola, the House of Representatives followed the Senate in January 1976 by voting 323 to 99 against providing the "trivial sums" needed to produce a military stalemate.³

Although it was often consciously used before to gain support for policy, the phenomenon of the news leak became a frequent occurrence during the Vietnam War and certainly impacted on public and congressional opinion. The importance of the leak is that it allows national security issues to spill out of the traditional arena and into the public domain. Since bureaucrats or politicians would not normally leak documents or information that would support current policy, this action would potentially create or contribute to public dissent against the administration's contemplated policy. The press is much more receptive to this type of information now than before the Vietnam War and will continue to be ready to print documents such as the "Pentagon papers" or a list of CIA station chiefs. What a few years ago would be considered treason is now often called "good investigative reporting," and the public, armed with previously unavailable information, will be more concerned. The conclusion is that covert warfare or intelligence activity cannot be used by an executive without a much higher risk of exposure.

Finally, if the Vietnam War has any effect on the future of the public opinion-foreign policy linkage, it will be in the lessons which that war taught our enemies. If we fail to recognize the power of the public to affect foreign policy decisions, that power will not be lost on our adversaries. Outside the narrow confines of the party central committees, the capacity of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to intervene militarily is virtually unconstrained by democratic accountability. The American public, largely as a result of the part

it played during the Vietnam War, will present a significant force to the Communists in the future, both as a target for propaganda and as a latent constraint on foreign policy. There can be no question that changing public opinion and political dissent had a sustaining effect on the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. As Leslie Gelb writes, "American public opinion was the essential domino. Our leaders knew it. Hanoi's leaders knew it. Each geared its strategy—both the rhetoric and the conduct of the war—to this fact."⁴ It is important that we understand this reality. Not only is U.S. public opinion affected by the stimulus-response mechanism of the Vietnam memory but it was and will continue to be, as Gelb calls it, "the essential domino"—the critical variable.

What Countries Should We Defend?

Within this framework of the American public's impact on foreign policy, we must assess the importance of the fact that public opinion today is against the use of military force abroad as strongly as at anytime during the last 30 years.⁵ A new president has been elected while promising never to intervene militarily for the purpose of overthrowing a government.

To say that it makes a difference to the American people which country we will support should come as no surprise. What is surprising is (1) how very low the support levels became during the Vietnam War, and (2) that they have remained constant or dropped further since that time.

In a study conducted in November 1976, Bruce Russett and Miroslav Nincic of Yale University reported that the public willingness to employ American armed forces for the defense of other countries was much lower than during the early Cold War years. Further, unlike the response to most foreign policy issues, public response to the question of military support to various countries is highly

selective, generally consistent, and appears to be linked to geographic distance from the U.S. as well as economic ties and military alliance with the U.S.⁶

A recent Gallup poll shows that the only country on whose behalf a majority of Americans would be willing to send troops to combat an attack by Communist-backed forces is Canada. (See Table I.) The percentages favoring sending American troops elsewhere have not changed significantly since the question was asked in 1971, and that in itself is significant. It has remained consistent or dropped since the public became disillusioned with the Vietnam War. In four years, the support levels have not moved upward. What has moved is the percentage favoring the "refuse to get involved" course of action.

Without exception, this has increased. For example, the figure has increased by a surprising 11 percent among those who would "refuse to get involved" if West Germany were attacked. It should be noted, however, that U.S. willingness to send troops to West Germany is virtually the same as it was four years ago. What this suggests is that people who previously believed sending of supplies a sufficient response now would prefer to "stay out" entirely.

One might wonder, since support is apparently so low for West Germany, how the American public feels about other countries where we have clearly demonstrated our national support: Korea and Israel.

A 1974 survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations asked Americans if they

Table I. Question: "In the event a nation is attacked by Communist-backed forces, there are several things the U.S. can do about it—send American troops or send military supplies but not send American troops or refuse to get involved." What action would you want to see us take if (country) is attacked?

country	troops 1971-75	supplies '71-'75	refuse to get involved '71-'75	don't know '71-'75
Canada	-- 57%	-- 19%	-- 14%	-- 10%
Mexico	45 42	26 25	19 23	10 10
England	37 37	33 30	19 24	11 09
West Germany	28 27	41 32	22 33	09 08
Japan	17 16	34 35	38 40	11 09
Brazil	16 15	36 33	33 39	15 13
Turkey	10 09	36 29	37 49	17 13
Israel	11 12	44 42	33 37	12 09
Taiwan	11 08	30 27	45 54	14 11
Philippines	-- 29	-- 34	-- 26	-- 11
Thailand	11 10	36 32	38 46	15 12
Saudi Arabia	-- 07	-- 27	-- 54	-- 12
India	07 07	40 34	39 47	14 12

Source: *The Gallup Opinion Index*, July 1975, Report No. 121, pp. 54-55.

would favor or oppose U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops, ". . . if North Korea attacked South Korea." Only 14 percent favored involvement, and 65 percent opposed. The remainder was undecided.⁷ Because of the wording of the question, opinion data on South Korea are not completely comparable with the others reported. Therefore, change cannot be addressed. Nevertheless, the absolute values are impressive. It may be assumed that more recent revelations concerning Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) involvement in U.S. domestic politics can have only a further adverse impact on U.S. willingness to provide military support.

The low support figures for U.S. troop defense of Korea and West Germany are particularly noteworthy. One might be tempted to argue that the response is meaningless since U.S. forces are presently stationed in these countries and are patrolling within a few hundred meters of the Communist border. Formal commitment exists, and American soldiers would obviously be involved whether the public supports it or not. On the other hand, one might conversely argue that the response is all the more significant since it implies that a growing segment of the public would not support reinforcements in the event of an attack and questions that we are there in the first place. Of course, one can speculate that support levels might rise dramatically if American lives were being lost in an attack, but it is significant that they are so low at the present time.

In the case of Israel, Louis Harris reported in April 1975 that a majority of 62 percent to 24 percent believes that "Israel is friendly to the United States because it wants our military supplies."⁸ In the same article, however, he reports that only one out of four Americans would be willing to send American troops to the Middle East even "if Israel were being defeated by the Arabs." The Israelis would undoubtedly say that the "troops to Israel

question" is meaningless since they have always insisted they would never seek them. But the evidence of limited commitment remains.

In a 1975 publication, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations reported similar findings.⁹ The Council concluded that there is "low public support for getting involved in places where war might actually occur, or where U.S. commitments and interests might actually be tested."¹⁰

The lack of appeal for traditional cold war aims suggested by this survey is also noteworthy. While a majority (54 percent) of the public considers "containing communism" to be "very important," this goal currently ranks ninth in foreign policy priority. Moreover, only 34 percent of a leadership sample considered "containing communism" to be "very important," actually rating it less important than "protecting the jobs of American workers." Among these respondents, it was rated twelfth in priority.¹¹ Similarly, both the public and leadership placed the export of either liberal democracy or capitalism at the bottom of the list of eighteen goals.

Still, the mood was not one of isolationism. Two-thirds of the American public agreed that "the United States should play an active role in the world"; 99 percent of the leaders agreed. The order in which the foreign policy goals were ranked by both the public and leadership indicates what specific forms this role should take: (1) keeping the peace in the world, (2) international cooperation, (3) promoting U.S. security, and (4) worldwide arms control.¹² What seems to be rejected is the idea that a threat exists that can be countered by direct military intervention.

Popular Support and Type of Threat

"Type of threat" has not been a variable used frequently in opinion polls. Whenever it has

been used, it has displayed a very large difference in public willingness to aid a country that is perceived as "attacked by a foreign communist force" or subject to "a serious insurgency movement led by an indigenous communist movement."

In April 1973, special samples were taken from more than 1200 business executives (from the *Fortune* 500) and senior military officers enrolled in the five war colleges (Air, Army, Navy, National, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces).¹⁵ Table II shows the percentage of respondents from both groups who would approve the use of American troops in each case. Predictably, the percentages reflect a greater willingness on the part of business and military elites to commit U.S. forces than on the part of the public. Apparently *no case* exists in which the majority of executives would approve the use of American troops to combat an "indigenous insurgency." The military officers polled would do so only in the case of Mexico. Such low support for committing American troops to counter the

attack of Communist-backed forces (Table I) indicates that only an *extremely* small proportion of the general public would approve of the use of American troops to fight an indigenous insurgency in the countries listed. What all of this suggests is a lasting predisposition against combat intervention.

Popular Support over Time

These public opinion data have the greatest significance for military planners. The question is no longer "How quickly can the war be won?" but rather "How quickly *must* the U.S. combat commitment be *terminated*?"

Time, as it affects public support, is the crucial constraint, and it works to constrain in several ways. The War Powers Act clearly constrains the President. Given the low percentages in the U.S. public favoring military intervention, and past congressional action in the case of Angola, the President must consider that the first test of national

Table II. Percentage of senior American business executives and military officers who would approve use of American troops to fight external attack or indigenous insurgency, 1973

country	Military		Business	
	attack	Insurgency	attack	Insurgency
Mexico	95	53	78	33
West Germany	92	37	51	15
Brazil	71	17	45	11
Japan	80	21	37	08
Thailand	33	10	07	02
Yugoslavia	08	01	04	01
India	05	01	06	01
Sample Size (n)	621		567	

Source: Russett and Hanson, *Interest and Ideology*

Military Implications

support will occur within a two-month period. Within this period, Congress has the power to order the immediate removal of U.S. forces by concurrent resolution that cannot be vetoed.

In contrast, time is definitely on the side of the enemy. If he has a totalitarian form of government, he will have no problem with public constraint. Simply stated, his tactic need be only to match force with force until stalemate and wait for the U.S. to defeat itself.

In a 1974 study, Professors Larry Elowitz and John Spanier convincingly presented such a thesis of time sensitivity in the following scenario of future military interventions:

The American political system "locks in" after an initial period of support. The President has only a relatively short time, therefore, to employ force to gain a politically satisfactory settlement. Once he is caught between a rising level of public dis-sension and a declining curve of congressional support, all of his maneuvering . . . will do little to stem the erosion of his backing. In the end, his party will go down to defeat in the next presidential election.¹⁴

Moreover, they predicted this scenario would occur *regardless* of the circumstances of the particular war. This would indicate that even if Congress allowed the President to continue the war, he would quickly find himself severely constrained by the effects of time on the public mood, should stalemate occur.

The U.S. military leadership might also be sensitive to a new limited war scenario involving uncertainty of victory. A September 1974 survey of the 173 individuals who held U.S. Army general officer command positions in Vietnam during 1965-1972 reveals that nearly 70 percent of the men who *managed* the war in Vietnam did not think the U.S. objectives were sufficiently clear. Furthermore, more than half of them did not feel in retrospect (1974) that it should have progressed beyond an advisory effort or that the results of the war were "worth the effort." Significantly, this survey was taken well before the collapse of South Vietnam.¹⁵

The public opinion data presented here support the conclusion that the outcomes of future limited wars of intervention must be decided *quickly*. This suggests *maximum application of force*. How quickly this can be done depends to a great extent on the first two factors discussed, the country concerned and the type of attack.

It has also been suggested that the war could possibly be kept on the political "back burner" by using a limited number of all-volunteer American troops and by keeping the casualties low. There are problems with this alternative. Even if it were possible for a president somehow to divert public attention from a small-scale intervention and stop unfavorable news leaks, an enemy would quickly turn up the heat on that "back burner" for the benefit of the American public. National leaders would then be left with the inevitable choice between an immediate, but far more dangerous, escalation or a hasty retreat.¹⁶

Some indication of how quickly an enemy can escalate an issue is provided by the "Angola scenario." Although it is reported that the National Security Council's "40 Committee" had authorized a covert American grant of \$300,000 to the Angolan National Liberation Front and Secretary Kissinger had warned the Soviet Union against "running a risk of conflict with us," the Soviets stepped up covert large-scale shipments of AK-47 rifles, machine guns, and rocket launchers through Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire. In August 1975, Cuban and Soviet personnel appeared in Angola, and by late October Cuban arrivals increased. In November, Soviet ships and transport planes were unloading tons of weaponry at Luanda and Henrique de Carvalho, including T-54 and T-34 tanks and 122mm rockets. By late February 1976, an estimated 11,000 Cuban combat troops were stationed in Angola, and the Soviets had provided about \$300 million in supplies.¹⁷ What the U.S. had succeeded in doing by attempting

to keep Angola in the political shadows was, in fact, to signal an unmistakable reluctance to fight over it. The Soviets and Cubans, however, did not slow down their efforts while we debated our position and our options.

Should the President ever decide on combat intervention, swift and decisive military action reminiscent of the Dominican Republic, the *Mayaguez* rescue, or the Sontay raid would appear to be the only option for the U.S. in less than total war for some time to come.

THIS CONCLUSION raises several questions. Does existing joint military doctrine provide a framework for this type of fast war? Will present force structure and weapon systems permit it? Is the U.S. military trained and prepared for this type of action? Is the President capable of mounting a decisive attack without prior congressional approval and the necessary public debate? The answers to these questions, as perceived by ourselves, our allies, and our enemies, are important and may well be crucial to the future of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. The questions must be answered by both the civil policy-maker and the military planner. And the public must understand and accept the rationale for the commitment and be able to

see a real possibility of swift victory. If the U.S. appears weak or irresolute, enemies may deliberately test us, and conflict is inevitable. Moreover, allies will retreat, and shifts in allegiance are certain.

The U.S. cannot afford to continue signaling reluctance to resort to force either through the pronouncements of the national leadership or the genuine disinterest of the American people. The real irony of the public attitude is best expressed by James Schlesinger:

The cry of the American neo-isolationists does not mean there will be no more Vietnams. For if this viewpoint prevails, there will be many, many Vietnams successfully carried out by forces hostile to the United States. In that somber truth lies deeper significance of the deadlock of American policy regarding Angola.¹⁸

Nor can the U.S. falter, once a decision to commit troops has been made. If time is a critical factor, given a popular unwillingness to accept the costs of protracted conflict, then the U.S. military establishment must adapt to it and so structure its forces and doctrines for their employment that a decisive victory of conventional arms can be swiftly won. This is the price of a credible ability to intervene and perhaps the only real deterrent against Vietnams of the future.

Garmisch, Germany

Notes

1. A speech before the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 25 June 1976. Reprinted from the *Department of State Bulletin*, 26 July 1976, p. 109.

2. Norval D. Glenn, "Problems of Comparability in Trend Studies with Opinion Poll Data," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring 1970, pp. 82-94.

3. John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1976, pp. 414-19.

4. Leslie H. Gelb, "The Essential Domino: American Politics and Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1972, p. 459.

5. Bruce Russett and Miroslav Nincic, "American Opinion on the Use of Military Force Abroad," *Political Science Quarterly*, Fall 1976, p. 411.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 425-27.

7. John E. Rielly, editor, *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1975* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1975), p. 18.

8. Louis Harris, "Oil or Israel?" *New York Times Magazine*, April 6, 1975, pp. 21-35.

9. The figures were slightly higher, but the possible responses did not

distinguish troops from supplies.

10. Rielly, pp. 18-19.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

13. Bruce Russett and Elizabeth Hanson, *Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975), pp. 59-99.

14. Larry Elowitz and John W. Spanier, "Korea and Vietnam: Limited War and the American Political System," *ORBIS*, Summer 1974, pp. 512-13.

15. Douglas Kinnard, "Vietnam Reconsidered: An Attitudinal Survey of U.S. Army General Officers," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter 1975-76, pp. 447-53.

16. For an elaboration of this thesis, see previously cited articles by Elowitz and Spanier and Russett and Nincic.


17. Marcum, pp. 414-17.

18. James R. Schlesinger, "The Continuing Challenge to America," *Reader's Digest*, April 1976, p. 65.

R in my opinion

Integrity is complete honesty in any situation. We must determine what is really right and really wrong. Right even transcends the violation of regulations. You must oppose what is wrong and support what is right even if it costs you your life or your career.¹

Lieutenant General John P. Flynn



ARE PROFESSIONALISM AND INTEGRITY ONLY A MYTH?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAYMOND F. HAMEL

SHOULD we emphasize leadership and management? Do we really believe in the importance of this subject? Do we honestly care about the feelings, goals, or aspirations of our people? These questions are simple enough, but the answers are more complex.

Historically speaking, the termination of hostilities in Vietnam and changes in the attitudes and values of Americans demanded some revamping of our military management. Reductions in manpower and money, recruitment of volunteers, and the need to

increase productivity prompted USAF Chief of Staff General David C. Jones to seek improved methods of leadership to motivate our people. Experts representing a cross section of the Air Force served on study groups for the improvement of people and resources management. The consensus of these studies indicated that there was room for improvement in leadership and management throughout the Air Force, which resulted in a new initiative, the establishment of the Leadership and Management Development

Center (LMDC) at Air University. Its objective is to provide a central focal point for research, development, and education in this area. Instruction is under way, and lesson plans are available to provide a progressive exposure to leadership and management thought and application in professional military education (PME) programs at all supervisory levels. Several traveling teams have been formed to serve as management consultants and leadership education specialists in the field.

A step forward for leadership and management? One hopes so. A catalyst for better human relations, productivity or supervision? Perhaps. Any chance of large-scale adoption by leaders and supervisors? Perhaps not; the ballots are still out. Unduly pessimistic? Not at all! Consider the 1970 statement by General Jones when Commander of Second Air Force for Strategic Air Command:

There is no place in this year's Air Force for the commander whose chief leadership tool is fear. The commander who treats people as if they were interchangeable bench stock can hardly expect to obtain commitment, imagination and loyalty from them. I want to emphasize positive, not negative, leadership.²

Are we *saying* anything different now? By the same token, are we *doing* anything different? Complaints about standards and discipline, dissent incidents and alcohol/drug abuse are indications of our organizational health. To be sure, USAF is not fully responsible for societal ills mirrored in our organization. The classic error in management is to ignore those ills, but, if we are to cure some of their less desirable manifestations, we must practice the leadership principles we preach. Our inconsistencies in supervision and command cause some of our people to perceive themselves as unimportant merchandise and to continue to breed dissatisfaction and discontent in the most highly qualified and educated military force in our history.

At this point you may ask why I have

bothered to bring up the subject of leadership and management. As Director of the USAF Commanders' Seminar, now a division within LMDC, I observed and listened to many Air Force commanders. In addition, I have been exposed to many chiefs for more than 20 years, and I have taken the time to speak to many followers. My remarks are based on personal experiences and perceptions, candid conversations, and seminar discussions with wing and base commanders, interviews and rap sessions with military personnel of all ranks, and the findings of Air Force management consultants. This article is a conscientious effort to explore concepts that have received much coverage in Air Force education programs, much lip service, and some practical applications.

Notice that we are discussing leadership *and* management. They are not the same. Leaders work primarily with people in using resources to reach a goal. Managers deal with things to accomplish a goal. Leadership describes those persons who, by force of example, personal talents, charismatic qualities, or some special trait of personality, play a directing role, wield command influence, or cause people to follow. Management is commonly defined as "the art of managing; a more or less skilled handling of *something*; the conducting or supervising of *something*."³ (Italics added.) Last year Admiral Thomas H. Moorer suggested that managers are necessary but leaders are indispensable.⁴

Herein is our dilemma. We understand the need to promote self-fulfillment and job enrichment for our people while we encourage them to accept a selfless dedication for mission accomplishment. We also perceive a personal need to overshadow the masses through errorless management, which is more selfishly oriented. In order to outrun our tough competition for the scarce, prestigious jobs, we are strongly motivated to manage our people to satisfy our goals before we worry about satisfying theirs. It would seem that many

leaders, at all levels, are looking upward while leadership and management theories encourage honest responsiveness to lower echelons as well. My experience indicates that many of us are fine leaders while we occupy lower echelon positions and can easily relate upward and downward in the chain of command. As the competition for promotion and command responsibilities becomes critical, we tend to become much more conscious of self-advancement, especially at the squadron and base levels and special category assignments. While the chief emphasizes increased concern for the welfare of our people to promote greater productivity, many individual leaders seem to parrot the right words while they seek to fill the right squares in the right jobs to impress the right people in the right place at the right time. Our more perceptive personnel, especially the younger ones, who are more adept at reading body language, see through the double standard sham and lose faith in the integrity of the leader. I have yet to find a unit that is completely devoid of self-serving people, and that includes LMDC, which should be a living model of the leadership and management theories being stressed throughout the Air Force. Several factors surface as possible causes of this dilemma. Our professionalism, integrity, and ethical standards are sometimes questionable. Our evaluation programs, promotion system, and command selection process are far from perfect. Communications are often ineffective. We appear to have sacred cows, which we dare not challenge or change.

Professionalism

Professionalism consists of "the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize or mark a profession or professional person (a moral code is the basis)." ⁵ Lieutenant General John P. Flynn, USAF IG, probably best described the Air Force profession as "a specialized calling that requires detailed skills that are self taught or promulgated by experts within the

profession. The calling answers to some ethical code. However, ours is an unwritten code that has survived through tradition and the integrity of our people."⁶

With no written code of ethics and no specific rules for leadership, many leaders attempt to follow a style that has been successful for them in the past or has been used by successful star-rank officers regardless of possible conflict with people programs and mission accomplishment. For example, autocratic leadership is a valid style of managing in an "immature" or "failing" organization, to accomplish the mission in the short run. Commanders are generally assigned to jobs for a short proving period, so it is easier to manage for short-run success despite serious consequences in the long run. How many commanders have been fired for inheriting a condition that began under the misguided leadership of a previous commander?

We do not openly criticize our commander for poor leadership if we perceive that such criticism would be disloyal. Also, we are painfully aware that he has review authority for our effectiveness report; therefore, it is easier to survive a short period of mismanagement rather than criticize and possibly suffer some career setback. Perceptions of the followers indicate that "the man" is trying to make a name for himself. Although not a universal perception, it too often appears that upward mobility is more motivating than commitment to organizational goals. If the leader's commitment to his job is shallow, how can we expect followers to become selfless and dedicated? We decry the eight-to-five job attitude of young officers and airmen; yet, our long hours of duty are often based on "impressing the colonel" (regardless of the burden on our people) or on being "seen" hard at work for personal recognition.

I do not intend to imply that this is true of everyone. Many leaders who are concerned for their mission and their people are unsung heroes, who may or may not be recognized for

their outstanding achievements. However, just as the scandalous minority achieve national notoriety in our publications, so are our poor leaders held in irreverence much longer. When they are promoted and given greater command responsibilities, an important reaction (rightly or wrongly) seems to be that nice guys finish last while the politicians and maneuverers get ahead. We have been told that a professional is one who determines what his boss requires to accomplish the mission and then gets it done. Many who work in this manner are duly recognized by the boss in the overall rating, promotion, job-selection systems, but some do get overlooked or taken for granted. We find it easier to notice self-serving people who spend a great deal of time and effort pandering to the commander's ego needs, because several have appeared to move ahead more rapidly than some of their mission-serving peers. Even in the elite organizations, this type of behavior exists to cause peer friction, poor morale, and feelings of futility for those who "play it straight." When asked by commanders why I included leadership and management principles in the Commanders' Seminar, the highest level course for commanders prior to selection for general officer rank, I replied: "You may know the theory, but inspections and visits to the bases sometimes indicate that very little of this theory is being applied; therefore, we must assume that some of you are not aware of your leadership options and management style alternatives."

In an academic situation covering leadership and management principles and theories, the general response of commanders seems to be, "I know all this. I've heard it all before. I need solutions for dealing with dissatisfaction, not theory." We claim to know all about good leadership, yet we do not practice it in our concern to be "mistake free" in the eyes of our boss.

The following comments are typical of remarks made by commanders in a nonthreatening academic environment:

- "The chief can afford to be creative and concerned for people; he has it made and he doesn't have to work for my boss."

- "I can't afford to take risks on new programs or methods because there are 50 colonels standing in the wings ready to take my job."

- "I'm people oriented, but I have to act task oriented because that's how my boss works."

- "I can't afford to make mistakes so I run a tight ship."

These are all very real perceptions and concerns in our quest for success. If we treat our job as a steppingstone to greater things, how can we really practice what we preach? Can we really demand selflessness from our people when our own priority system is warped? Could the following statement by General Jones indicate that the management "tail" is wagging a leadership "dog"?

Too many commanders are victims of the "look good" syndrome. They become mesmerized by charts and graphs, "in the red" or "on the curve" and other statistical gymnastics. They let themselves be seduced into "chasing squares" and wasting resources to get a bar graph to read green.⁷

The priorities espoused by General Flynn are God, country, mission, service, organization, fellows, family, and self.⁸ This is nothing new. It was taught in military leadership manuals in the '50s and '60s. Unfortunately, too many of us practice a priority system where self-concern is uppermost. Some younger folks tend to place family or self above organization or mission. Do commanders place higher priorities and greater emphasis on excellence in accomplishing an EWO mission or on passing the ORI, which is more likely to occur during their tour of duty? This is no far-fetched or isolated problem. Our measuring tools are management oriented. We tend to look at *what* gets done, rather than *who* does it or *how much* money, people, and materials we use to do it. It

becomes a real dilemma for commanders, who have seen others get fired for failing to meet inspection requirements. Our emphasis on management becomes so pervasive that there is little time or motivation available for concerned leadership. Rather, there is a real concern for protection of self. Perhaps some specified quotas for innovative project failures would reduce our paranoid concern for appearing to be "perfect" at any cost and permit us to become more selfless.

By selflessness, I do not mean a saintly giving of one's self to the service of others. Enlightened self-interest is a normal and healthy thing. We want to succeed and get ahead. We are selfless leaders when we choose to succeed via a primary concern for the mission goals and the needs of our people rather than using the mission and people for our own self-aggrandizement. Professionalism also connotes good "followership." As our boss selflessly leads to satisfy mission goals, he deserves our full effort in his behalf. If he leads selfishly, he still deserves our full effort to satisfy mission goals, but individual integrity will determine whether we will pander to his "ego trips." The selfless professional is the one who continues to give total commitment to his job without seeking constant visibility, recognition, and camaraderie from the boss or supervisor. We do have many of these people in our units, and they do help to keep the mission going. This is why the Air Force has been effective as a service. Good followership not only means that the mission is accomplished happily with good leadership but that it is still effectively accomplished in spite of poor leadership.

Currently it is fashionable to display concern for our people because the chief and key leaders have stressed the issue. But, the egotist who preaches thoughtfulness renders discredit to the sincerity of those leaders who really care. We are far better served by those individuals who announce to the world that they are task oriented and will use people to

achieve their goals than we are in having to work for leaders who merely say the words on cue.

Integrity

General Flynn's statement—"You must oppose what is wrong and support what is right even if it costs you your life or your career"—is repeated for emphasis.

All leaders should display such a selfless commitment to integrity, but it is much easier to bend the standards into a "do as I say, not as I do" mold to avoid conflict or confrontation with the boss. Lieutenant General James R. Allen, Superintendent of the USAF Academy, told a U.S. Senate subcommittee:

We believe that a dedication to the highest standards of integrity is an essential quality for an officer and one which should receive special emphasis in the training of those who are preparing themselves for commissioned service.⁹

This statement was used to support the perpetuation of the Cadet Honor Code, which states, "We will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does." Nontoleration is not to be equated with tattling. Rather, it is the backbone of the code, "recognizing that each cadet, like every Air Force officer, must place his responsibility to the Nation above his loyalty to an individual."¹⁰

Ask almost any officer if he believes in the code, and you receive a fast affirmative. Ask these same officers if they think their superiors feel the same, and the response may not be so rapid nor so positive. Do we really believe what we preach? Is the Honor Code valid? We would like to think so. It is an attainable goal we can live by. But does our society really think this way? How many of us can say that we have never compromised our integrity because of misplaced loyalty, fear of reprisal or censure, or even personal dishonesty? How long can a new and impressionable young officer continue to abide by this rigid standard of integrity when

he sees senior people "pencil whipping" status reports, flying documents, training records, etc., to fill squares? He hears management speak strongly for equal opportunity on one hand and then boast of filling two squares with one body by hiring a black woman. A seat-belt safety program is subverted when a commander sends a large group of his personnel through the checkpoint to keep the organization average up after someone in the unit was recorded as not complying. This is doubly damaging because the safety program suffers, and the people who played the game recognize the lack of integrity of their leader. The double standard is communicated clearly. "The ordinary high standards expected of any officer are even more imperative for a commander."¹¹

None would argue with that statement, yet how many senior people have learned to work with the "real world" and often tend to use the double standard? Recently, a group of 35 commanders assembled in a seminar session concerning integrity were arguing forcibly that we were not compromising our standards. On being challenged to be completely open and honest in all their command responsibilities, a commander very candidly remarked, "Commanders are not martyrs. We did not make it this far by telling it like it really is." The most shocking aspect of this statement was not its brutal honesty but the fact that not one single commander of the remaining 34 objected or challenged this attitude. Command acceptance of "small breaches of integrity" promotes dishonesty, distrust, and egocentrism throughout the force.

Simply consider two perceptual problems generated by a misunderstanding of the real ethics of our priority system. First, a survey of Squadron Officer School Class 74-D, which elicited some 617 responses, indicated a significant lack of faith in the integrity of Air Force management and leadership. Some common examples cited were:

- The requirement to document non-

accomplished training because of the lack of time to do it.

- The requirement to report 100 percent mission accomplishment.
- Flying unsafe aircraft to meet scheduled sortie rates.
- Awards and decorations given as "end-of-tour prizes."
- Undercover warning systems for impending "no-notice" inspections.
- Greater concern over appearance than problems.
- Greater concern with loyalty than with honest reporting.¹²

These practices are not universal. Then, again, these perceptions are not especially exaggerated. When I sought advice on this issue, I was told that these perceptions of our young officers were no longer so prevalent. Hooray! I recently learned from a most reliable source that a young officer in SAC advised his commander that aircraft were being inspected and switches were being left in improper settings in anticipation of a no-notice inspection. In this case the commander ordered an immediate halt to this procedure, but how many leaders and supervisors condoned this effort? We still pick up some "great" perceptions when we see people receiving end-of-tour awards that are more prestigious than what is really deserved. Despite the "looser" requirements for retirement medals, we still see the Legion of Merit or Meritorious Service Medal being given when the Commendation Medal would be more appropriate for the service rendered by the retiree. We have all seen such incidents actually practiced or supported. It is neither a new phenomenon nor one of which we were unaware. In 1971, according to the *Air Force Times*, the Air Force Inspector General criticized commanders for being less than honest in reporting accomplishments or for failing to report discrepancies they knew existed.¹³

A second serious problem in the realm of integrity is our perception of the new Officer Effectiveness Report, a system conceptually good and effective, but can we believe the people who use it? The up-or-out promotion system fuels inflated reports. The "nice guy" syndrome tends to prevent us from telling it like it is when, in fact, the integrity of the OER should make expectations realistic. These facts would be openly stated for the ratee to see. He would not create a self-image of "water walker" only to have his morale crushed when he is not selected for promotion or for special assignment. The lack of trust in our fellows or superiors tends to make us inflate reports to protect our good people because we know "others are doing it," and the boss will probably "downgrade it some to promote his favorite people." Thus, fears and inconsistencies occur, and personnel become obsessed with proving themselves rather than cooperating for the benefit of higher priorities such as unit or mission.

Our biggest failing is our tolerance of the expectation that a minority will try to beat the system. We have heard that some five percent or less of the OERs could be a less-than-accurate picture of the ratee. This sounds good until one perceives himself to be in that fifth percentile. If five percent are cheated by the system, then another five percent benefit unduly. Those who are overrated receive the promotions that rightly belong to others. In the long run, the damage done affects many more than the five percent or less initially cheated. Statements like, "It may hurt a few but overall it's a good system," is not an endorsement of our OERs; it's a denunciation. A senior officer told me that a people-oriented program that "hurts a few" is a nonprogram. I agree. It is an invalid approach and an abomination. The lack of trust generated by perceptions of our people makes the job of leadership and management more difficult because it influences our credibility in all areas.

Sincerity and integrity are definitely required to make our good organization better. We must assume the position that "I will not compromise my integrity" and "the buck stops here," regardless of the consequences or the difficulty of the situation. If we individually adopt the higher professional ethic of acting to serve nation and mission before self, the chances of judgment errors and breaches of integrity will be minimized. Additionally, this sincerity will be honestly reflected in our actions and concerns for people programs and in our efforts to say exactly what our body language communicates. If our management style is to be autocratic or laissez faire, it should be thus communicated to the world. Merely "talking" good people programs quickly exposes the leader as insincere and egocentric.

MY ONE regret in this article is that I have mentioned a preponderance of negatives in our system. It is not my intent to prove that the Air Force is self-serving rather than mission oriented. On the contrary, I sincerely feel that our programs, systems, and people are superior to those of other large organizations. However, in any system as big as ours there are loopholes. We generally promote effectively, but several losers have seeped up through the cracks at various ranks. Our leaders are generally highly qualified, but a few bad ones may have been more noticeable than the majority of good ones. Some questionable performers are selected for professional schools and special-category assignments. However, we can still improve our system, which is basically good and effective.

The "bottom line" solution is a total, personal commitment to practice good leadership and management regardless of our position in the organizational hierarchy. Top Air Force leaders can assist greatly by influencing changes in some of the following areas:

- Assign commanders to duty tours of three or more years to promote long-range, situational approaches for dealing with people to accomplish the mission.

- Develop a positive and workable system to honestly permit a "freedom to fail" in attempting management innovations.

- Take positive action to ensure that evaluations reflect an honest disclosure of performance and potential and that "gaming" will not be tolerated.

- Ensure that any person assigned to instruct or consult in any leadership and management program at Air University or in the field is unquestionably sincere and capable of leading by example, not by edict.

- Re-evaluate promotion criteria, professional school selection processes, and command assignment policies.

- Establish an Air Force assessment center that would provide analytical data on all necessary qualifications and requirements for any key job and the corresponding merits of the potential selectees for that command job. Supervisory reports, self-assessments, and peer

evaluations could be used effectively. In addition, protected, anonymous feedback from people who are led or managed by any candidate in question could be helpful.

Despite the utopian undertones of these suggestions, the message clearly states that we must practice some form of childlike honesty and enthusiasm. If not, it is unlikely that we will alter our politically motivated management procedures for a more ethically oriented style of leadership by example. We must start it ourselves. We cannot wait for "them" to do it. If we are not going to change, we should stop preaching Honor Code, integrity, people programs, and all the rest. Talking about these good things without visible actions to support the words merely causes frustration and disenchantment within the force.

If we do not promise personalized attention, our people will more realistically expect the impersonal treatment they are likely to receive. If we are going to continue publicizing good people programs, then we must honor our promises.

Moody Air Force Base, Georgia

Notes

1. Major General John P. Flynn in an address to USAF Commanders' Seminar, Class 76-A, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 20 January 1976.

2. Lieutenant General David C. Jones, *The Commander's Hotline*, no. 1, Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, 1 April 1970, p. 2.

3. *Webster's New International Dictionary*, 3d ed., s.v. "management."

4. Admiral T. H. Mooter, USN, "Leadership and Management," *TIG Brief*, 28 January 1977, p. 15.

5. Webster, s.v. "professionalism."

6. General Flynn, USAF Commanders' Seminar, 20 January 1976.

7. General Jones, p. 4.

8. See note 6.

9. Statement by Lieutenant General James R. Allen, Superintendent, USAFA, to the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, U.S. Senate, 22 June 1976. Taken from the *Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders*, AFRP 190-2, October 1976, p. 27.

10. *Ibid.*

11. General Jones, p. 2.

12. Major Peter Henderson, "What the Captain Really Means . . ." *Air University Review*, January-February 1976, pp. 97-98.

13. "I.G. Uncovers Fake Reports," *Air Force Times*, 22 December 1971, p. 15.

OPPOSITION TO THE NEW OER

a crisis alert!

MAJOR DANIEL R. PETERSON

IT IS clearly evident across-the-board, from cocktail party conversations to letters to the editor, that the "new" Officer Effectiveness Report (OER) has drawn more flak than any other single subject since our involvement in Vietnam. Opponents of the new system seem to outnumber the proponents by far. Many speak with assured conviction that the new system was conceived, at best, in a filling station somewhere alongside the proverbial road to Abilene. The ardent opponents declare it to be unfair, unjust, and unnecessary. They suggest that it serves only to promote the nefarious behavior of those "other" officers who would stoop to any level to ensure a rating in the top block. Not only is the collective peace of mind of the officer corps in a state of unrest—as the heated flurry of discussion would imply—but many believe that the very foundation of the officer corps is threatened because of the new system's avowed effect on individual integrity and cooperativeness. This, at least, seems to be the theme of the vocal opposition. It is this very perception, this issue—the belief that the officer corps' integrity and cooperativeness are irreversibly on the road to ruin—that needs to be looked at and looked at closely.

We have met the enemy.

The most fervent argument surfaced by the opposition is that backstabbing will replace cooperativeness. It is suggested that this will be the inevitable result because of the cutthroat

competition inherent in the new system's hard quotas for the top block ratings. Is such a claim a valid one? Are backstabbing and cutthroat competition inherent in the new system? Is the new system going to be the cause of diminished integrity and cooperation within the officer corps? Or has the mass outcry of the opposition served to support the possibility that a large majority among us are already suffering the malady of diminished integrity? Why do those opposed to the new system seem to find more support—real or imagined—for their claim of backstabbing and lack of integrity? Does it not seem rather peculiar that the *presumption* of nonintegrity heavily outweighs integrity and cooperativeness? Not only is the presumption of nonintegrity directed against contemporaries but it is directed against reviewing officials as well. These rhetorical questions may have a hard, cold, and sobering answer: a significant number of Air Force officers firmly believe that other officers lack integrity. Collectively, we are those other officers. With this proposition, a corollary exists: Simply stated, you have no integrity, and I have no integrity. A thoughtful consideration of this corollary should serve to put the minds of professional, dedicated officers and national servants into a real state of crisis alert. Might it be true that with implementation of the new OER system we have become enemies? Apparently, there is ample evidence to assert that (in the words of Walt Kelly's Pogo) "we have met the enemy, and he is us."

Why all the fuss?

If one may rightly assume that a majority of officers *possess* that quality referred to as integrity, then one may also be perplexed at the recent fuss the new OER system has evoked. Integrity is defined as utter sincerity, honesty, and candor: avoidance of deception, expediency, artificiality, or shallowness of any kind. If we possess this quality, why does the new system cataclysmically destroy it as opponents would suggest? Granted, people resist change. And when a major change is forced upon us, we reactively resist if for no other reason than to maintain the inertia of the past. But the resistance to the new system has far surpassed the typical and understandable stage of initial discontent. What is it in the new system that seems so vastly different from the old? What is it that makes acceptance of this system so repugnant to so many?

A possible underlying cause might be one expressed to the author by an allied officer and member of the Air Command and Staff College faculty. Unbiased and unaffected by its implementation, he suggests that the new OER system now allows each officer to see and know his competition on a personal—and oftentimes daily—basis. With the assigned quota allotment for the top block rating, we now seem to have personalized the competition. We know exactly who the competition is—names and faces—not merely all others of like grade throughout the Air Force. The diffusion of competition is no more. This seems to be a valid assessment. It is unquestionably a new perception for all of us. Is this any different from the old system? Yes. But why has this new perception made us feel more like Cain than Abel? Perhaps even more of a paradox in this change of attitude is the fact that competition—personalized competition—is a fundamentally acceptable and desirable concept espoused and practiced by Americans. Our free market economy, educational system, sports, political system, and even our love affairs are based on it. Our

country has become a leader among nations in great measure because of it. Are we now to assume that it is undesirable, insidious, and undermining of the integrity and cooperativeness within the officer corps?

How do we view competition?

When individuals or groups compete in some arena, for some desired outcome—victory—one wins and the other loses. Ties are rather frustrating, and as a consequence, when the stakes of the outcome are high, we have excluded the tie concept from the possible outcome. In keeping with our competitive spirit, we Americans have arrived at a solution to the frustration of the tie—*sudden death!* Anyone who has played in the heat of passion associated with this sudden death situation knows the feeling. “Do or die,” “This is it,” “Lose this one and it’s all over,” “No chance to recover,”—all are typical phrases that express the feelings and emotions of the sudden death situation when the stakes are perceived as high. It is not uncommon to witness a rising of tempers under these circumstances. And whose tempers generally rise?—the ones who perceive that they are losing the game! Might it be that we now perceive the new OER system as “sudden death”? Might it be that we perceive ourselves to be losing even before the shot ending the game has been sounded? It is tough to accept defeat in a hard fought competition without the emotional aspect of having to play in the sudden death atmosphere. But when sudden death is being played, as may be the case now perceived in the new OER system, why do we immediately allow our tempers to rise?

An important consideration in the concept of American competition is that when any individual or group is seen to place *total* emphasis on winning, then that individual or group, regardless of outcome, is more likely than not to be labeled as one of questionable character. And it is generally a unanimous

feeling, in the minds of the other players as well as the spectators. In short, nobody likes a bad sport. Each of us probably perceives himself as a good sport. We could easily find consensus on the definition of a good sport. He is the kind of person who puts forth his very best effort into winning, but failing that, recognizes the superior effort of his competition. He accepts it. He dedicates himself to further self-improvement, for himself and for his team. Let us relate this to the feelings generated by the new OER system. If the opponents of the system perceive a new trend of backstabbing and throat-cutting to win, are they not in effect saying that the other guy is more concerned with winning? Are they not saying that everyone else is a bad sport? There may be a rather straightforward answer.

We may perceive that if we lose this game, the game which is now being played for high stakes in the passion of sudden death, we will never be allowed to play again! Simply stated, if we get a lower rating than our personalized competition, we will get passed over for promotion to the next grade and be separated from the Air Force. And this same logic leads us to say ourselves: "I play a good game. I want to continue playing. I should be allowed to continue playing!"—no "he" or "they" in this mentality. "*I*," "*I* want," and "*I* should" seem to pervade our vocabulary. And when we find out "he" got a higher rating than "I," we convince ourselves that it was "his" questionable character and integrity—or the reviewer's—that is to blame. Well! I can play that kind of game, too! It's a dog-eat-dog world and I'm not going to be one of the eaten! Tempers rising? Heavens, the gentleman hasn't even lost his job yet and he's acting and feeling like it! What happened to *his* integrity? If you ask him, he'll probably tell you that he has it, but "they" don't.

Individually, we are so concerned about winning that we may have lost sight of the reason we chose to play the game in the first place. "What's the matter with the team?" The

old high school response, "They're all right!" may not fit under the present circumstance. Is this kind of attitude and self-interest the guidepost we want to believe is typical and desirable for those of us who have chosen to pursue a career of national service? The thought that guardians of the national security have motivations such as this has odious implications. And the continuing fuss about the declared effects of the new OER system would seem to suggest that self-interest far outweighs and outnumbers the ideals of integrity, cooperation, dedication, and self-sacrifice.

a time to reflect

Soldiers who have experienced the sacrifices required for our national security and for the fruits of liberty and freedom often observe that many Americans in the civilian sector do not recognize the linkage. Too many Americans assume security, they say. They declare that the fruits of a secure America were, are, and always will be won only through determination, dedication, self-sacrifice, and setting moral principles above personal gain. Our nation was born of such ideals and principles; we have fought and some have died for these ideals and principles. What would history have shown had all Americans placed themselves above the concerns and security of the nation? We may tolerate, but never fully accept, those among us who are the self-servers—the takers rather than the givers. It would seem that this parasitic element is ever present, in some numbers, in all societies. The impact of a majority of this kind of person on any society, group, or professional body has predictable consequences. But the relevant aspect here in regard to the opposition to the new OER also demonstrates the effect of assumed security some officers may believe exists with regard to their tenure. Just as we would like to awaken those civilians who assume national security, so too should we awaken those in our

profession who would assume tenure.

Those among us who would assume such tenure may well have the perception that the oath of office they executed was nothing more than a symbolic "punching of the time card." To them, public service may be nothing more than "a day's work for a day's pay." This may be an acceptable frame of mind for members of some other profession—but not ours! The bearer of that kind of frame of mind would find self-sacrifice highly incompatible with his lifestyle. We are members of a profession that not only requires self-sacrifice but it also unequivocally demands it! The stakes in this game are too high. There is no place in today's Air Force for the summer soldier. The only assumption we must allow ourselves is that self-sacrifice is a prerequisite for continued membership. It is this basic assumption of attitude or why we wish—or even demand—to remain in service to our nation that is the dividing line between the givers and the takers. The privilege of tenure is earned. It is parceled out, admittedly, through an imperfect system of competition, but it is a system that provides no threat to those who focus their thoughts and actions on service rather than on the system. A giver or a taker, which are you? It is a time for us all to reflect.

teamwork and ambition

The magnitude of our success as part of the national defense team is far less significant than are the consequences of our failure. All the sacrifices we have made and will make to sustain freedom and liberty are mere part and parcel to the alternative. Military history emphatically illustrates that some have sacrificed more than others, but no one needs to keep score on an individual basis. In the broad scheme of events, it has been clearly evident that the totality of individual sacrifices has carried the day—won the battle—secured liberty and freedom for the whole.

In the history of the United States Air Force,

personal ambition and teamwork have heretofore been compatible, compatible because personal ambition did not mean self-interest. But the outcry elicited by the new OER system, with its quotas, its atmosphere of sudden death, its personalized competition, seems to suggest that overnight personal ambition and teamwork have been rendered incompatible. The perception seems to be a collective feeling that no one can win in this new environment of sudden death. We need to take stock of the realities that are involved in ambition and teamwork. *The Air Officer's Guide* provides a clear assessment:

Ambition can be a driving force for self-improvement, and should be. Only one caution is relevant: Set the sights of your ambition no higher than the level of your willingness to work, for the two are linked as iron. . . . Cooperation is the first essential. The Air Force is a team organization, and teamwork is the oil of the machine.

Does the new OER system really cause all the bad things it is said to cause? Is it true that no one can win? As a matter of fact, just as many officers will be nonpromoted—just as many officers will be separated—under the new system as under the old. The *system* is not going to magically change that reality! If you perceived a threat to promotion and tenure under the old system, chances are you perceive the same threat under the new. If you did not perceive that threat under the old system but you do under the new, *it is the extent to which it occupies your mind and influences your concept of collective integrity that should concern you.* Will you continue to focus on the system, or will you get back to service? If you are worried about the integrity of others, recall what Lincoln said: ". . . you can . . . fool some of the people all the time; but you can't fool all of the people all the time." That thought should be reassuring if you are concerned that the wrong people will win the game.

The nature of our officer promotion system is unquestionably a competitive one. That is a fact. It should not, however, be the focal point

for those who enter and wish to remain in the privileged capacity of public servant to the nation. We could debate the merits and demerits of the new OER system—or if there should even be an evaluation system. We must ask ourselves, however, how long we are going to let discussion of this new system and its perceived effect on our integrity and cooperativeness go on. Are we going to continue the dialogue until the atmosphere and working environment are really hazardous due to all the unsheathed knives for backstabbing and throat-cutting? Until we convince ourselves that we really are a despicable lot? Until we suspect that the ambitions of our contemporaries are directed against us? Until the noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel around us are *equally* convinced that we are a rotten bunch of human beings: self-serving, lacking integrity in word and deed? How far and how much longer must we continue this self-destructive, team-destructive discussion?

what our concern should be

All the fuss about the new OER system is indeed a crisis alert. The time to reflect is at

hand. Unless we resolve this crisis, and resolve it swiftly, personally, and collectively, we are heading for a disastrous chapter in the history of the Air Force and the nation. General David C. Jones, as Air Force Chief of Staff, spoke on many occasions of what he refers to as *selflessness*. His remarks seem to reveal a concern that there are some among us who would put self-serving ambition above personal dedication and service to the Air Force and nation. The late General Douglas MacArthur spoke convincingly on this subject, and his words eloquently capture what our concern should be:

. . . your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable—it is to win our wars. Everything else in your professional career is but corollary to this vital dedication. All other public purposes, all other public projects, all other public needs, great or small, will find others for their accomplishment; but you are the ones trained to fight; yours is the profession of arms—the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory; that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed; that the very obsession of your public service must be—Duty—Honor—Country.

Ladies and Gentlemen: Let's get on with it!

Fairfax, Virginia

Feed the body frugally, the mind abundantly—and mix in plenty of exercise and hard work.

DR. PAUL DUDLEY WHITE
The Retired Officer, January 1978

NEEDED: A USAF SUPPORT COMMAND

LIEUTENANT COLONEL NORMAN H. RUNGE

GENERAL JONES has stated that in the future, the Air Force will move more toward a "single manager approach" in the management of Air Force resources. The reason given for this strategy is that as the Air Force decreases in size, "it has become increasingly appropriate and necessary to achieve greater efficiency and mutual support through basic organizational consolidation."¹

A "Support Command," in my opinion, would provide the Air Force with the "single manager approach" that General Jones envisions to the direction and control of air bases, air stations, and certain other support functions. Adoption of the Support Command concept, in addition to providing a single manager, will relieve operational commanders from the wing through the major command level of distractions created by air base management, will create economies, will promote efficiency, and will develop a greater body of expertise in air base management. Besides consolidating the management of installations under a single agency, existing support commands, services, and separate operating agencies could be realigned to this new command, thereby eliminating several headquarters.

Air bases and air stations are now assigned to specific major air commands for command and management purposes. Fifteen different commands or agencies are designated as

operating commands for the installations. Some commands, such as SAC and USAFE, operate and maintain several bases; SAC has twenty-nine and USAFE has twenty-three. On the other end of the spectrum, AAC, AU, and USAFSS operate two installations each.²

Each of the fifteen commands or agencies has staff elements devoted to managing support functions, and some, of course, are larger than others. These staff elements include such areas as civil engineering, security police, transportation, medical, and legal activities. The staff agencies in each of the commands issue directives, gather data, and perform staff surveillance and visits, to name a few of their activities. Usually, these staffs perform identical functions to those of other commands because the support task does not change materially from one command to another; for example, civil engineering or medical support is essentially identical on a MAC, SAC, or TAC base.

All bases support units of commands other than their parent command. Many bases support units of two or more major operational commands. All bases and most air force stations have tenant units of the Air Force Communications and Air Weather services. In addition, the OSI and now the commissaries are also tenants on most Air Force bases.³ Not only do air base groups or wings support many tenants but they frequently are transferred

from one command to another. As examples, Pope and Little Rock were recently transferred from TAC to MAC; also, Moody was transferred from ATC to TAC. Most of the support personnel assigned to these bases remained in place and went to work for the new command with little or no change in duties.

As a result of the practice of bases' being operated by various commands, problems develop and resources are wasted. A recent Defense Manpower Commission report noted that within DOD, "a carefully thought-out, nationally coordinated plan to provide support" is next to nonexistent. The report went on to state that some improvements have been made, but a mechanism is still not in being to plan in detail to provide the support function.⁴ Although these comments do not directly point at the Air Force, the current fragmented structure of managing air bases contributes to this situation.

Not only does fragmentary management lead to noncoordinated planning on a wide scale but it also creates difficulty for tenants in adjusting and complying with another major command's directives. This becomes very apparent in such areas as budgeting and programming. Some commands hold funds at the highest levels and authorize their use on a piecemeal basis; others give the local base units more autonomy and, consequently, visibility in the use of funds over a longer period. As another example, the process for making inputs into the military construction program varies between commands.

Duplication of staff elements in the small commands takes place with no apparent benefit. Operating a legal office or a Central Base Personnel Office should not differ materially from a PACAF to a USAFE base. Providing command-level management for two or three bases requires an "open the door" cost, which is duplicated in each command. This duplication could be minimized through reassignment of base management responsibil-

ities. Not only are staff elements at the parent headquarters duplicative but the directives issued by each of these elements also tend to duplicate others. This leads to increased costs in time and funds to establish and distribute the publications.

Single management has been applied to certain support functions: e.g., communications, weather, air traffic control, audit, and special investigations. These agencies operate on most bases regardless of host command and perform their functions with considerable success and with a single set of directives. The units are operationally responsive to the operating commands they support and administratively and technically to their parent command. This arrangement provides greater functional technical expertise because of the concentration rather than fragmentation of staff elements. Also economies in staff personnel have been realized by merging these functions into single parent organizations.

A support command should be established to operate and maintain air bases and air stations. This command should absorb the function of AFCS, AWS, and the air base groups/wings of all commands. In addition, some separate operating agencies such as the AFOSI, AFMPC, AFAFC, and AFDAAs could be assigned to that command.

The new command would provide wide-ranging services in support of the operating commands that would be tenants on the Support Command's bases. The support base commander would be operationally responsive to the operating units on the base. The services he would provide include air traffic control, airfield management, civil engineering, communications, weather, food, chaplain, legal, medical, security police, special investigation, transportation, personnel support, housing, postal, and central base administration.

This approach to providing support would provide for greater central-coordinated support planning along with economies in operation.

The approach would eliminate many directives and the diffused attention of commanders and staffs of operating commands by enabling them to focus their attention on their primary missions and less on housekeeping. The new command would have greater visibility in the support role and would be able to develop greater expertise in each functional area. The visibility and expertise

should enhance training, mobility, and flexibility in the support functions.

The Support Command concept is a step in the direction of the "single manager approach." It will result in greater efficiency and effectiveness in support of the Air Force Operation.

Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

Notes

1. General David C. Jones, "Keep the Air Force Number One," *Air Force Magazine*, May 1975, p. 54.

2. "Air Force Magazine's Guide to USAF Bases at Home and Abroad," *Air Force Magazine*, May 1975, pp. 142-54. Some of the data will change soon as bases close, as Headquarters Command is inactivated and its functions are

transferred to MAC, etc. The numbers are significant only to make the point. Forecast changes will not alter them significantly.

3. *Ibid.*


4. Phil Stevens, "How Pressure Keeps Military Bases Open," *Air Force Times*, December 10, 1975, p. 19.

The Hummingbird

Aerodynamically the hummingbird should not fly. His wing R.P.M. is 60 times per second, or approximately 3,600 wing beats per minute. That is a high R.P.M. especially since the little bird is less than 3 inches long and his gross weight fully loaded is less than 2 pennies. He derives his name from the humming sound he makes in flight. His performance is fantastic, holding all aerobatic records. He is a combination of jet, helicopter, fighter pilot, and moon rocket. He can hover motionless, can fly backward, straight up and down, and fly forward in a zigzag motion faster than your eye can follow. He can turn his little wings almost completely around and drive away a bird as large as a hawk with his fighter tactics. His fuel consumption is heavy, requiring 50 to 60 stops a day for flower nectar. The hummingbird's range is unbelievable. He flies each fall and spring from Central America to the United States across the Gulf of Mexico which is a non-stop distance of more than 500 miles. HE IS OUR GREATEST FLYER.

Aviation (Illinois Department of Transportation)
January-February 1978, p. 11

books and ideas



MILITARY HISTORY *Four Approaches*

CAPTAIN DANIEL T. KUEHL

ONE can use a variety of approaches in the writing of military history. The view from the trenches can be just as valid as the commander's perceptions. No one approach—biographical, operational, strategic, not even

the historiography of military thought—is more important than another. The historiography of the American Civil War, for example, includes works on economic warfare, grand strategy, and technological innovation, but without the stories of Burnside's Bridge at Antietam, or Little Round Top at Gettysburg, it all seems rather cold and purposeless. What is the essence of warfare, after all, if it is not brave men engaged in battle? Military historians and practitioners of the military art, therefore, divide their reading among these various areas.

Military Thought

At the time of his death in 1970, Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, the renowned British military writer, was working on an anthology on war, a "selection of great writing on military topics," which would include material from antiquity to the present. Sir Basil's son Adrian has completed the volume, and the name Liddell Hart on the dust jacket of a book is reason enough to peruse it. However, the ringing title, *The Sword and the Pen*,† is followed by a rather disappointing collection of military writings—not because the editor is Adrian Liddell Hart rather than his father but primarily because any anthology of the best of military writings would be limited if held to three thousand pages, let alone three hundred. The chronological arrangement of the selections also hampers their effectiveness.

†Adrian Liddell Hart, editor, *The Sword and the Pen: Selections from the World's Greatest Military Writings* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1976, \$10.95), 282 pages.

Because of this space limitation, each author averages three pages of text. One simply cannot do justice to Alfred Thayer Mahan in two pages or to Sir Winston Churchill in three pages. Even Sir Basil himself, who receives five pages of text, is shortchanged. Only in a few instances are the essential writings or teachings of an author successfully captured. One of these is William T. Sherman's "Letter to Major R. M. Sawyer, 1864," which reveals the philosophical basis for Sherman's harsh, though very effective, way of war; another is Adrian Liddell Hart's introduction, in which he expresses his own views on war and the military art. The presentation indicates the compromises the editor was forced to make. He was faced with limiting the number of contributors or publishing a very lengthy book, and the decision to include numerous short selections has resulted in a rather disjointed and superficial book.

The arrangement of the selections also lessens the book's impact. Why the title *The Sword and the Pen?* A potential contrast between military "thinkers and doers" never materializes, and the simple chronological grouping of selections often separates some that logically belong together. Thus, separation of the selections by Onasander and William T. Sherman by 100 pages and 1800 years fails to emphasize their common theme: how an army should conduct itself while operating in enemy territory. The paragraphs from Sir Walter Raleigh's *History of the World* discuss the problems of defending a coastline and accurately predict the situation of the German forces in Normandy on D-Day in 1944, but there is nothing in the text which points this out. World War I is touched on only indirectly, even though there are excellent sources available: Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* or Robert Graves's *Goodbye to*

All That for a view from the trenches, or even Sir Basil's own *The Real War, 1914-1918* for an overall view of that war.

These shortcomings do not completely negate the value of this book, however. The notes that precede each selection are excellent and provide the necessary background on each author and selection. The book is a good guide to further reading, and some of the passages are thoroughly enjoyable, such as nineteenth-century Russian General Suvorov's description of Russian infantry tactics: ". . . bayonet the first, shoot the second, and lay out the third with your bayonet." Although not a general history of military thought, Liddell Hart's anthology gives the reader a broad exposure to military writings from which to choose further readings.

Operations

The number of books written on operational aspects of military history probably equals all others combined. Werner Girbig's brief account of the Luftwaffe's fighter operations on the western front in the closing months of World War II is such a book.† It is not a history of the Luftwaffe nor even a history of one arm of the Luftwaffe, but it does not pretend to be. Girbig's goal is to recount the sacrifices of German fighter pilots as they fought a losing battle against overwhelming Allied air power. Never before has this part of the story been described in such detail.

The book focuses on Operation Bodenplatte (Baseplate), the Luftwaffe's low-level attack on Allied airfields New Year's Day 1945. Girbig develops his story by discussing the operations and losses of the German fighters in the west throughout December 1944 as they tried to oppose Allied bombers while simultaneously supporting German ground forces in the

†Werner Girbig, *Six Months to Oblivion: The Eclipse of the Luftwaffe Fighter Force* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1975, \$16.00), 140 pages.

Ardennes. The extent of this effort is made painfully clear: 53 pilots killed or missing on 5 December 1944, 55 lost on 17 December, and a staggering 197 lost over the three-day period ending Christmas Day. December 1944 cost the German fighter force in the west more than 500 pilots, including many experienced flight and squadron commanders.

Thus the stage was set for Bodenplatte, which Girbig characterizes as a foolish operation that held no hope for improving Germany's strategic situation. In fact it was a disaster for the Luftwaffe. Although the Allies lost approximately 500 aircraft, most of them were destroyed on the ground, and few pilots were lost. On the other hand, the Luftwaffe lost more than 200 pilots either killed, missing, or captured; after 32 years 48 men are still unaccounted for. Girbig's research was meticulous, and he presents a detailed account of the attack on each airfield and attempts to indicate where and how each German loss occurred.

The reasons for these heavy losses become evident. The planning failed to reach many fighter units until it was too late to brief the pilots; many flights took off with the leader merely saying "follow me." The Luftwaffe's anti-aircraft units shot down many of their own planes simply because they had not been informed that the large numbers of aircraft overflying their positions would be German; by 1945 any German anti-aircraft unit that saw a large number of fighters assumed that they were Allied and reacted accordingly. On the other hand, Allied aircraft shot down far more German planes in air-to-air encounters than the Luftwaffe had believed possible. The key point was that each Allied aircraft lost could be replaced in a matter of weeks; each German pilot lost, however, was literally irreplaceable. It is easy to accept Girbig's assessment that Bodenplatte, coming hard on the heels of the

terrible month of December, was the fatal wound to the German force.

Yet, Girbig does more than just chronicle the Bodenplatte disaster. He pays tribute to the courage and self-sacrifice of the German fighter pilots as they continue to fly and fight, even into the last desperate days of April 1945: 31 pilots lost on 24 March 1945, 77 more on 7 April, and the list goes on. One must respect the manner in which these men flew their missions, did their duty, and died. Girbig's book is a fitting tribute to these pilots and one that any student of fighter operations, or of brave men at war, would enjoy reading.

Biographical

Battles are won or lost, and operations carried out, by men. From any great conflict a few personalities emerge who, either through brilliance, eccentricity, or a combination of the two, attract complete admiration or condemnation. Such a man was Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery of Alamein; any discussion of his role in World War II immediately explodes into heated debate. During one of Montgomery's interviews with Lord Alun Chalfont, the author of this new biography,[†] Montgomery stated, "If you are going to write about me you must find out what makes me tick—that's the hub of the whole thing—what makes me tick." This is precisely what Chalfont attempts to reveal in this engrossing study of Montgomery: what forces drove this man, how he could have risen to the pinnacle of his profession while being "prickly, antisocial, graceless." The book is not about Montgomery's skill as a soldier but rather about Montgomery the man, a very strange man who happened to be a soldier.

The first part is devoted to the twin influences that most profoundly shaped his personality

[†]Alun Chalfont, *Montgomery of Alamein* (New York: Atheneum, 1976, \$12.95), 365 pages.

and career: early family life and the Western Front between 1914 and 1918. Montgomery's personality, tactfully described as "difficult," was shaped by his relationship with his mother while he was a young boy. Son of an Anglican clergyman and a strong, determined young woman, Montgomery was, in his own words, "a dreadful boy." In frontier Tasmania, young Bernard was reared by his mother, Maud, firmly committed to keeping control of the family while her husband traveled throughout the island on church business. The boy's inherent rebelliousness caused running civil war with his mother, a war without an armistice and the source of many of his mature attitudes and eccentricities. This is not merely psychological speculation on Chalfont's part; Montgomery's peers and especially his siblings agree that the apparent lack of affection between mother and son was the key to his personality. His determination to strike at his mother probably led to a military career. His obsession with winning—possibly to make up for the early battles lost to her—led to his disagreeing with senior officers and to personalizing conflict, even to the point of putting pictures of Rommel and von Rundstedt, two of his chief World War II opponents, on the walls of his command vehicle.

Experiences on the Western Front during World War I shaped his concepts of how war should be waged. Like so many of his contemporaries, Montgomery was shocked by the waste resulting from trench warfare. He could accept casualties, but he tried to conserve his infantry, the cutting edge of his army, so that he had enough troops to exploit an advantage when one became apparent. It was on the Western Front that he learned the importance of planning and conserving his forces in order to implement his plans. These



Field Marshal Montgomery leaves British command post, Weimar, Germany, spring 1945, followed by British and Russian staff officers.

two lessons formed the fabric of all his subsequent military operations.

Nowhere was this more evident than in the campaign from which Montgomery drew his title. The planning for the El Alamein offensive was meticulous and detailed; each unit, almost every soldier, had a specific role to play. It was a set-piece battle, typical of Montgomery's operations during the war. Indeed some commentators have faulted him for being too methodical, and it is true that he displayed a great deal of caution—some say excessive—in the exploitation of El Alamein. Coincidentally, the one Montgomery operation that was unconservative and seemed hastily planned, Operation Market-Garden, resulted in disaster at Arnhem. Although Chalfont does not evaluate Montgomery as a field commander, his opinions are apparent. Montgomery was a good logistician and planner, but he was unable to follow up a victory swiftly and push forward.

Two other well-known traits of Montgomery must be mentioned: his ability to inspire the troops that fought for him and his aptitude for exasperating and infuriating senior officers, both British and Allied, with and for whom he worked. At El Alamein and Normandy he spent many hours explaining "the plan" to the men who had to implement it. Just prior to D-day he met with one British unit, the Welsh Guards. After asking a guardsman what his most important possession was and receiving the standard infantryman's reply, "My rifle," he said "No it isn't, it's your life and I'm going to save it for you. Now listen to me. . . ." Time and again he worked the "Monty magic" on his troops, who believed he would look after them, as indeed he did.

Officers who served with him, however, remember his lack of tact and his ability to infuriate his peers. Through three major campaigns, the Desert, Italy, and Western Europe, Montgomery's abrasiveness seemed to increase, and probably very few senior officers were not angered by him at some time during

the war. Only the firm hand of General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, held him in line. After one row between an Allied commander and Montgomery, he proudly displayed a message stating "Another Brookie blasting, by gum!" Chalfont details the progressive deterioration of relations between Montgomery and Eisenhower, and charges Montgomery with most of the blame. He never seemed to take "no" for an answer and constantly infuriated Eisenhower by bringing up proposals that Ike thought were settled. Sometimes Montgomery's arrogance distorted his view of the world: as late as the 1960s he was worrying about losing Ike's friendship, when in reality Ike had long since lost all feeling of cordiality toward Montgomery, whom he described as "a liar." Montgomery's insensitivity was the cause of innumerable incidents during his career, many of which Chalfont covers in detail, to the delight of the reader.

In spite of his personal and military shortcomings, however, Montgomery was, in Chalfont's opinion, the right man in the right place at the right time. His eccentricities endeared him to the British public, which was desperate for a high-ranking war hero, and he was the perfect man to fight the war of materiel that finally defeated the Germans. This biography is a fascinating study of the only man who was instantly recognizable merely by his rank—"The Field Marshal."

Grand Strategy

One tremendous advantage Montgomery and other Allied commanders had over their German opponents was advance knowledge of many of the German plans and dispositions. Obtaining accurate intelligence is the job of any good commander, but it is only in the past few years that we have been enlightened as to just how much more intelligence we had than the Germans, how it was obtained, and its accuracy. Anthony Cave Brown's massive

work spells out for the first time how this intelligence was used to assist Operation Overlord, the invasion of Europe.†

The title of Brown's book comes from a remark made at the 1943 Teheran Conference by Prime Minister Churchill, "In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." Thus was born the cover name for Plan Bodyguard, the series of spoofs and deceptions designed to make Hitler and the German high command believe that the invasion of Europe would be made elsewhere than Normandy.

Much of the story of *Bodyguard of Lies* concerns the Allies' use of information gleaned from reading the top secret German message traffic placed in Allied hands by British cryptographic experts. In 1974 the secrets of this operation, called Ultra, were finally told by the Royal Air Force officer in charge of it, Frederick Winterbotham, in his book *The Ultra Secret*. Brown, in laying the groundwork for Bodyguard, goes back even further into Ultra's past than Winterbotham does, beginning with Hugo Koch's invention of a "secret writing machine" in 1919. This device was adopted by the Germans in the 1930s as their "unbreakable" code machine, and it was given the name Enigma. The story of how the British obtained a copy of the Enigma machine is one that outdoes even the best fictional spy thriller. Finally, just at the start of their crisis in 1940, the British were able to unravel Enigma's secrets, and they began reading an increasing amount of the Germans' most vital message traffic, sometimes even before the intended recipients had received it.

At first the Ultra material was not of decisive importance, partly because of the Germans' limited use of Enigma and because the British could not decipher all the traffic. But as the message traffic increased so did British skill in

breaking the codes, and eventually they were intercepting and decoding messages of considerable importance. It was an Ultra message that provided RAF Fighter Command with the targets and plans of the Luftwaffe on *Adlertag* (Eagleday), the day that the Luftwaffe planned to break the RAF and, instead, helped the RAF break the Luftwaffe. Two days later another Ultra revealed the extent of the victory: Hitler began dismantling facilities that were to have been used in the planned invasion of England.

Brown traces the use of Ultra through many of the war's campaigns: Coventry, where Churchill permitted the city to be cruelly mauled by the Luftwaffe rather than risk revealing Ultra; Alam Halfa and El Alamein, where Ultra gave Montgomery detailed knowledge of Rommel's forces, plans, and weaknesses; Normandy, where knowledge of Hitler's planned counterattack at Mortain enabled Allied forces to trap and destroy much of the German army in the Falaise pocket.

The military significance of Ultra is obvious—it provided the Allies with knowledge of what the enemy was planning. British counterintelligence forces achieved the corollary to this accomplishment by eliminating the German intelligence network in England. Not only were they able to eliminate the German agents, they "turned" many of them and used them to pass false information to the German high command. This achievement, described in John Masterman's book *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945*, formed an essential second part of the Bodyguard operations.

This was the background of Bodyguard. Through Ultra the Allies had access to the German plans and dispositions, even the ability to follow the debates between Hitler and his generals over questions of strategy.

†Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975, \$15.95), 946 pages.

Through the operations of MI-5, the British counterintelligence agency, the Allies were able to furnish the Germans false information. Ultra even enabled the Allies to judge the effectiveness of their deceptions. All of this was designed to assist the Allies in carrying out one of the most important and difficult military operations of modern history, the cross-channel invasion of Europe. Bodyguard was composed of seven major deceptions that aimed at inducing the Germans to disperse their forces throughout Europe away from the main theater of operations. The first, Overthrow, was designed to convince the Germans that the Allies intended to invade Europe in 1942, thus tricking the Nazis into keeping troops in France and away from Africa and Russia.

The second, Cockade, hinted at an invasion of France in 1943. The operation was rife with plot and counterplot, agents and double agents. Brown presents evidence that one man even played the role of a triple agent, betraying portions of the French Resistance to the Germans in order to gain credibility, then passing false information to them. It was a cruel situation, Brown asserts, for the Resistance was deliberately misled into believing the invasion to be imminent, thus fooling the Germans into believing the statements tortured from captured members of the underground. Unfortunately, large portions of the Resistance were destroyed for naught since the Germans saw through the plan and actually withdrew troops from France. Cockade was an Allied defeat.

Five of the operations took place in 1944: Zeppelin in the Balkans; Royal Flush and Vendetta in southern France; Fortitude North in Norway; and Fortitude South in France's Pas-de-Calais. This last operation was the key to the plan, and many tricks were pulled from Bodyguard's bag to fool the Germans. Nonexistent units sent messages to other nonexistent units so that the German wireless intercept service could learn that a few more

infantry divisions had "arrived" along the Channel coast. Flamboyant armored commander General George Patton was announced as commander of these "forces," so that his reputation would attract the attention of the German intelligence network. Ultra enabled the Allies to determine what deceptions were succeeding, and they used the "turned" German agents to reinforce the ones the German command doubted.

It is fortunate that we were able to do so. Rommel, commander of the German forces guarding the Normandy coastline, was convinced that the invasion would fall on his sector. Months earlier Hitler stated that he had a "hunch" that the Allies might land there, but after the Invasion he reversed himself and insisted that the *real* invasion would come in the Pas-de-Calais. The Invasion was successful, but only by a narrow margin, and Brown asserts it was Bodyguard that gave the Allies the margin they needed.

Although the basic theme of *Bodyguard of Lies* is the deception campaign surrounding the Invasion, there are numerous subthemes woven into the book, as seen in the tales of the development and use of Enigma and Ultra. Another is the German resistance movement against Hitler, the *Schwarze Kapelle* (Black Orchestra). Brown's book reveals that the conspirators were doomed from the start; they depended heavily on the belief that the Allies would assist them, and they were manipulated by the Allies, who distrusted their motives.

There are portions of *Bodyguard of Lies*, however, that are built on rather shaky ground. The chapter on the aerial battle of Nuremberg (30-31 March 1944), in which the RAF lost more than 90 heavy bombers in a disastrous defeat, is one such example. Brown suggests that the British may have permitted one or more of the "turned" German agents in Britain to warn the Luftwaffe in order to build up their credibility. This premise may or may not be true. But he also theorizes that the raid may have been betrayed in order to lure the

Luftwaffe's night fighters into battle, where they could be destroyed by the RAF's intruder force of Mosquito night fighters. This is foolish. Aside from the fact that it was too small to have had decisive results, this force had been operating previously without significant results. The bombers certainly held no threat to the German fighters; they frequently lost more aircraft to nighttime crash landings than to British aerial gunners. In the event, the German fighters decimated the attacking British force. If the disaster over Nuremberg *was* caused by betraying the raid to assist Plan Bodyguard, it may have been worth it in the long run, but it certainly was not intended to cause an aerial battle in hopes of defeating the Luftwaffe. The weakest parts of Brown's book are his attempts to discuss military tactics and actions.

The fact that he was able to accumulate such a mass of material in spite of official restrictions and the reticence of key participants is a remarkable achievement. A few years ago Ultra and Bodyguard were terms unknown except to a very select circle of men. The publication of *Bodyguard of Lies*, in conjunction with similar works such as *The Ultra Secret*, is forcing a re-evaluation of World War II. The course of many battles and campaigns must be freshly examined in light of this new material. Throughout his book, Brown weaves a masterful tale of suspense and intrigue involving heads of state playing for

the highest stakes possible—national survival. It is an excellent study of possibly the least-known aspect of the war and should be read by all who hope to gain a better understanding of it.

TO MOST PEOPLE, the term "military history" means the story of a battle or series of battles, guns crashing and men charging, a series of colored arrows on a map. As three of these four books demonstrate, however, military history is far more than these popular symbols. If military history means battles and campaigns, it also means the plans that shaped those actions, the men who directed and implemented the plans, and the entire body of military thought that has come down through the ages. These four books are merely a small sample of some of the military history that has been written recently. A few years ago the "definitive" histories of World War II had been written. Now, after the publication of the books by Brown, Masterman, and Winterbotham, the entire history of the war must be reconsidered. The same is true of any past conflict: the books are never closed on any aspect of military history, and as long as this is true, there is something that we students and practitioners of the military art can learn from its study.

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HITLER

Two Views

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THIRTY-three years after the death of Adolf Hitler, historical and legal debate on the German leader still rages. After the initial flurry of post-World War II biographies, autobiographies, memoirs, and historical treatments of Hitler and his frightening historical legacy were published in the early 1950s, a one-sided picture of Hitler emerged. When documentary evidence in both published and easily accessible microfilm form reached avalanche proportions, special studies on Hitler and Nazi Germany portrayed the dictator in more complex form. As a result, the convenient portrayal of Hitler as the easily recognized devil incarnate contrasted with a more complex interpretation. With each specialized study, revision of opinion on the acceptability of the one-sided demonic Hitler changed. A. J. P. Taylor, the British historian, lent credence to this view when he called Hitler a statesman and a simple businessman. Since then, an increasing number of books on Hitler

have been published that reflect these contrasting interpretations. Both works reviewed here aid in our understanding of Hitler and his legacy.

In this debate on Hitler, David Irving's book is a blockbuster.† The author's purpose is not to de-demonize Hitler but to view "the situation . . . through Hitler's eyes, from behind his desk." (p. xvi) Irving has no illusions, knowing that "the facts revealed here concerning Hitler's recorded actions, motivations, and opinions should provide a basis for fresh debate." (p. xvi) It is his intent to see "this tragic moment in history . . . from Hitler's point of view." (p. xvii) The author defines his "biggest problem in dealing analytically with Hitler is the aversion to him as a person created by years of intense wartime propaganda and emotive postwar historiography." (p. xvii)

Irving does not mince words on controversial issues. On the central question of the responsibility for the extermination of the European Jews, Irving states that "the incontrovertible evidence is that Hitler ordered on November 30, 1941, that there was to be 'no liquidation' of the Jews." (Italics added.) (p. xiv) Perhaps this is preposterous. Irving credits Himmler and others with the killings which were "partly of an *ad hoc* nature, . . . and partly a cynical extrapolation by the central SS authorities of Hitler's anti-Semitic decrees. Hitler had unquestionably decreed that Europe's Jews were to be 'swept back' to the east; . . ." (p. xiv) Irving is convinced that Hitler did not order the extermination. Even in 1943, the dictator was still against extermination, even though Himmler's SS and the Gauleiters had virtually finished the extermination task. Irving postulates that postwar interpretations that held Hitler as the demonic leader ascribed all mistakes to him and particularly fixed responsibility for the

†David Irving, *Hitler's War* (New York: The Viking Press, 1977, \$17.50), bibliography, index + 926 pages.

atrocities of killing European Jewry on Hitler's shoulders are all so much "inter-historian incest." (p. xiii)

Major newspapers and national magazines have reviewed Irving's controversial book in scathingly brutal terms. Reviewers have scoffed at Irving's purpose. His views are regarded as attempting to de-demonize Hitler if not completely to exonerate him. Because of Irving's views on the Holocaust, reaction to his book has been heated condemnation that it was even published. Most reviewers have refused to go beyond this initial shock wave of reaction.

The book is nevertheless sensational for other reasons. In attempting to view Hitler's direction of the war, Irving comes to a central conclusion "that Hitler was a less than omnipotent Führer and that his grip on his immediate subordinates weakened as the war progressed." (p. xv) This insight into Führer leadership is central to an understanding of the German successes and failures in the war. Irving lays bare the process of Hitlerian decision-making. In a word, such decisions were made through a tedious process of procrastination. Within this perspective lies Irving's main contribution.

Irving's research effort is impressive. He has purposely avoided the secondary source literature on Hitler and Nazi Germany because of his aversion to historians' incestual interpretations. Instead, Irving has relied almost exclusively on primary documentary materials, unpublished diaries, manuscripts, and a host of personal interviews. For example, Irving consulted the captured papers of Goering's deputy, Field Marshal Erhard Milch, the rarely used war diary of the German Naval Staff, and unearthed a treasure of diaries from formerly reluctant guardians. Irving warns the student of history not to lend total credence to Helmuth Greiner's editing of the OKW operations staff war diaries or to General Halder's footnotes to his own diaries. Last, Irving has also interviewed the surviving members of Hitler's wartime entourage. As a

result Irving paints a convincing picture of Hitler.

Hitler's War is a massive, chronologically organized work which brings out several incisive interpretations. Only a small sampling of the author's views are possible here. From the outset, Irving points out Hitler's irrational desire not to destroy the British Empire while fighting a bloody death duel with her. Hereby, the British author reveals Hitlerian overtures to both England and America in an attempt to settle the widening conflict. On Norway, for example, Irving does much to explain Hitler's rationale for pre-emptive action. Hitler's decisiveness is also explored. In the planning for the invasion of France, Hitler's procrastination method of decision-making is explored. Turning to the invasion of Russia, Irving clearly focuses on Hitler's ideological thought. Further, Irving explores the operational goals and thereby seeks to counter many of the conventional interpretations of Hitler's failure in the east. The author argues that Hitler did not want to take Moscow, rather he was pushed into it by the General Staff. The book goes to great lengths to show that Hitler felt the General Staff was misleading him. Much is made of the intelligence debacle and faulty logistics. The assurances of the logistical planners for the German army that all was ready for the winter campaign are critically evaluated as contributory in Hitler's decision to attack Moscow.

In order to shed long-held illusions about Hitler, Irving repeatedly points out that Hitler sanctioned timely withdrawals in order to blunt Russian offensive attacks. He also explains Hitler's preoccupation with economic and political problems as a basis for military decisions. Hence the pursuit of oil in Rumania and the Caucasus, the rebuilding of the Donets Basin generating capability for coal extraction, the alliance with Finland to protect the valuable iron and nickel ore source in Sweden, the need to hold on to the Crimea to

keep Balkan and Turkish loyalties, the reining in of the U-boat arm to respect American neutrality; all these political and economic aims are brought out to demonstrate Hitler's integration of these factors into military decisions.

The joint command and operational structure of the German armed forces are interesting to military readers. Hitler was the prisoner of his own structure! He is not only supreme commander with an operational and integrated staff (the OKW) but after 1941 he becomes commander of the German army with the General Staff directly subordinate to him. Hitler became increasingly hostile toward the General Staff and sought to degrade its role. As a result, there was inconsistency in Hitler's direction of the war, depending on whether Hitler was listening to the OKW or to the General Staff. Irving clearly points out the inefficiency of the Luftwaffe and then explains why Hitler kept its ineffective chief, Goering. Bungled decisions, such as his failure to develop an effective bomber force, are squarely laid to Goering's ineptness.

Many of Hitler's military decisions seem sound to Irving. For example, Irving insists that Hitler defined the point and time of the Russian breakthrough, sealing the fate of Paulus' Sixth Army; he advocated early launching of Operation Citadel, which would have improved the odds at the Battle of Kursk; he correctly analyzed the D-day invasion site; he was not fooled by the "man who never was" deception operation; he recognized the signs of impending Italian collapse and ordered withdrawal of German forces from the Russian front to Italy (parenthetically dooming Operation Citadel); and last, he did not plan to overextend himself in the Battle of the Bulge. In each case, the author points out how Hitler's decisions were sidetracked by those holding different views. He says that, in the

end, Hitler usually deferred to the views of others.

In short, Irving's book should be read precisely for its revisionist view and for the light it sheds on the Hitlerian decision-making process. Much can be stated on what is lacking, on more conventional interpretations, and on Irving's scholarship. It may not be conventional history, but the book should be known to the student of this period.

IF IRVING'S book is filled with controversy, Bradley F. Smith's *Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg*† is refreshing for its revelations of the judicial decision-making process. The latter's starting point is the acceptance of a central fact: Nuremberg "deserves our attention . . . because it was a crucial episode in modern man's effort to grapple with the responsibility of leaders for unleashing war and causing mass atrocities." (p. xvi) Obviously, he is diametrically opposed to Irving's interpretation on Hitlerian responsibility for the atrocities.

The question may be asked: Why read another work on Nuremberg? Most important, because for the first time a single study uses the "heretofore classified documents of the U.S. and British governments and records from inside the Tribunal's secret deliberations." (p. xvi) Smith masterfully interweaves this fresh documentary material into his narrative. The perspective throughout the work is from the standpoint of the Allied judges on the bench. In their views and deliberations lies the value of Smith's study.

Smith purposefully sweeps aside the various legalistic and historical interpretations which judged Nuremberg itself. Without taking sides, the author summarizes the controversy and accepts the fact of Nuremberg's historical


†Bradley F. Smith, *Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977, \$11.50), bibliography, index + 334 pages.

importance. He traces the motives of the Allies in bringing major war criminals to trial. He concludes that one of the long forgotten but obvious benefits of Nuremberg was that due process rather than summary execution resulted.

The author's study comprises a fine aid by which to walk through that legalistic maze. If, for example, the formulation of the London Charter is taken as the starting point, it constitutes the basic authority for the trial. Through it the difficulties with legal niceties of ex post facto law, the ban on superior orders as a defense, or the inability of the defense to invoke Allied actions as a defense may be overcome.

Smith points to the U.S. as the driving force behind the trial. He traces the origin of the American effort, how the British, French, and Soviets joined later in the war. He indicates the central American effort in having six German organizations declared criminal and trenchantly observes that this motive was to ensure speedy administrative disposition of all the German members of criminal organizations held by the Allies. (Parenthetically Allied Control Council Law #10 declared organizations criminal even before the final judgment at Nuremberg, thus facilitating the final disposition of the large numbers of Allied prisoners.) The author indicates the primacy of American effort in the prosecution through Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, who served as head of the prosecution. Last, Smith identifies several important incongruities. For instance, America, as the world's leading capitalistic power, insisted on placing industrialists on trial; the British in turn did not agree on the trial of the German naval leaders; and, interestingly, the Soviets had reservations on the charges of conspiracy and aggressive warfare.

Another question may be asked: What is important about Smith's analysis? Through the use of new sources, Smith is able to show a remarkable divergence between the Allied



Hitler, circa 1926.

nations' judicial and prosecution teams. He also says that none of the judges, not even the Soviets, followed rigid instructions from their governments and that personal animosity existed between judges and the prosecution. Also recorded is the reaction of the judges to Jackson's decision to overwhelm the court with documentary evidence. In Smith's estimate, that did much to dehumanize the court, and it (but not the prosecution) did recognize the plight of the defense lawyers, who were treated no better than second-class citizens.

Most important is the vivid exposition of each individual verdict. Smith is clearly amazed that the fate of 13 defendants could be determined in two days. Although their end is well known, the book succeeds in bringing out the personal views of each of the judges. The forcefulness of these samples may whet the reader's appetite. For instance, French judge Donnedieu de Vabres characterized Goering simply as a "high-class brigand" (p. 177) and voted for his death by hanging. Some defendants caused intense debate on the method of death—hanging or the firing squad. In the opinion of American Judge John J. Parker, Wilhelm Frick, the former Nazi Minister of Interior, merited mercy simply because "he was really but a bureaucrat." (p. 199) Julius Streicher was convicted for his looks: ". . . he still appeared to be a dirty old man—'the sort,' . . . 'who gives trouble in parks.'" (p. 200) Streicher was ghoulishly portrayed "as the cheerleader for a team of

exterminators." (p. 202) On Albert Speer and Fritz Sauckel, Smith caustically points out: "If Armaments Minister Speer gave the labor quotas to Sauckel, and Sauckel then seized the laborers, can Sauckel be any more guilty than Speer?" (p. 209) Sauckel went to the gallows, while Speer went to jail for 20 years. Both the Americans and the Soviets agreed on the execution of Speer; however, the British and French forced a compromise. Last, Smith writes with great insight into the most difficult sentencing of Doenitz and the acquittals of Schacht, von Papen, and Fritzsche. On Doenitz, the American judges squarely favored acquittal but were foiled through the perversity of the British judge who held out for a severe sentence. This situation brought forth a penetrating comment from the Soviet judge that a "most severe sentence must be accorded to the least guilty." (p. 262) These brief glimpses show Smith's grasp of each of the judges' views, the importance of chance, and the value of compromise at Nuremberg.

Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg is ideal for observing the value of the trial and its limitations. It shows that judges could not "transcend the views of their own time." (p. 304) Yet it also concludes that both the immensity of total defeat and Nuremberg made another stab in the back legend impossible.

Both Irving and Smith, however divergent their views, make a significant contribution to the understanding of Hitler and his legacy.

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PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM AND ZIONISM

National Liberation Movements in Conflict

DR. LEWIS B. WARE

MANY people thought that with the decisive defeat of the Arabs in the June War of 1967 the Palestinian issue had been resolved. And yet the sad truth of Arab-Jewish discord remains to haunt us today as the struggle over Palestine increases daily to even higher levels of threat and counterthreat. Professors J. C. Hurewitz, Walter Laqueur, and Kamal Salibi offer us, by way of their careful historical analyses of the problem, some explanations for this continuing imbroglio in the Middle East.

In his impressive *History of Zionism*,† Walter Laqueur traces the development of Zionism from an effort to preserve Jewish socioculture values in the Diaspora to a feebly articulated political doctrine for the reconstitution of Jewish national life in Palestine. The author points out that this change in Zionist goals is relatively recent, resulting from the rise of Nazism and the subsequent annihilation of European Jewry. Professor Laqueur argues that, up to the appearance of Hitler, there had been some grounds for reconciliation of both Zionist and Arab Palestinian claims, but the need to save individual Jews from certain death, by bringing them to and settling them in Palestine, effectively ended any possibility for Arab-Jewish rapprochement. Thus, the

history of modern Palestine was to be inexorably linked to a series of "discordant rights locked into inflexible attitudes."

The student of Middle East affairs will find this book a moderate, well-written, and well-thought-out presentation of the essential dilemma. Moreover, the instructor will discover in the chapter "Thirteen Theses on Zionism" an invaluable aid for teaching Zionism as a political ideology.

J. C. Hurewitz's book, *The Struggle for Palestine*,†† fills a gap left by Laqueur's masterful study. Professor Hurewitz gives us an account of the Arab-Zionist conflict in terms of the everyday practical politics in mandated Palestine from 1936 to the partition plan of 1947. The student will benefit not only from Hurewitz's painstaking scholarship but also from the fact that he was a firsthand observer of the events he describes. Although originally written in 1950, this analysis is still valid for today, especially with respect to Professor Hurewitz's appreciation of Arab interests during the mandate period. The author makes a number of points about the Arabs abundantly clear: Palestinian nationalism as a force strong enough to counterbalance Zionism never matured. It suffered first from the machinations of the two great families of

†Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1976, \$6.95), 639 pages.

††J. C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (New York: Schocken Books, 1976, \$6.95), 404 pages.

Jerusalem, the Husseinis and the Nashashibis, to control political events for their own selfish purposes; second, Palestinian nationalism was made weak by the political disorganization of the Palestinian peasantry oppressed by absentee landlords; and third, the Palestinian National Movement was rendered ineffective by the sad spectacle of Palestinian needs forever subordinated to the struggle of other Arab peoples to free themselves from European colonialism.

THIS last point is even more poignantly made by Professor Kamal Salibi's study of the recent Lebanese civil war. In his book, *Crossroads to Civil War*,[†] Salibi implies that had Palestinian nationalism not been stillborn at a time when it could have successfully opposed an unformed and as yet directionless Zionism, the need to subvert other Arab regimes in order to establish a base against a now firmly established Zionist state might not have been necessary. This, Salibi admits, is only one aspect of a basically internal Lebanese problem, but an important one nonetheless.

Professor Salibi is eminently well qualified to write the history of the Lebanese civil war. A distinguished historian of Lebanon, he was one of the captives of the conflict in Beirut. His study does much to disentangle the various warring Lebanese factions and make sense of their role and that of the Palestinians in the Lebanese tragedy. Unfortunately, the situation in Lebanon did not enable Professor Salibi to document his account properly, but this does not detract from his credibility as an insightful observer. The Lebanese problem, as Salibi indicates, is one where no Lebanese perceives the Lebanese state as legitimate. Salibi presents a picture of political bosses and their private

armies who, in the absence of political legitimacy, struggle for control of truncated mountain constituencies where semi-ideologized parties endeavor to break the stranglehold of these bosses over the populace by creating overarching national loyalties. The Palestinians attempted to win for their own purposes the allegiance of the dispossessed Muslim masses to whom the system had been particularly unresponsive. When the status quo, which remains the essential cornerstone of Lebanese political continuity, is fractured by some outside event, such as the October War of 1973, a general and usually violent redistribution of power in Lebanon occurs. It was this event on which the Palestinians hoped to capitalize in order to strengthen their hand against the Zionists. If Lebanon could have been brought to heel, Salibi argues, freedom to maintain pressure against Israel, despite Arab defections, might have been realized.

Although Salibi sees the Palestinian-Zionist struggle as a catalyst in the Lebanese crisis, he appears to lay blame on the Christian Phalangists for escalating the conflict. The Phalangists, he claims, form the backbone of right wing Lebanese "isolationism." Rather than yield the privileges accrued over time, this minority Christian party preferred to hold out stubbornly for the integrity of a status quo Lebanon by refusing to recognize the demands of the new majority for power. Ironically, the Phalange and its allies have now become the new "Zionists" of the Middle East.

Salibi's intricate study of this process is arranged chronologically and makes exciting reading. I highly recommend all three of these histories to any reader who wishes to deepen his knowledge of Middle East affairs.

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[†]Kamal Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon, 1958-1976* (Delamar, New York: Caravan Books, 1976, \$15.00), 178 pages.

POTPOURRI

Selected Soviet Military Writings, 1970-1975: A Soviet View translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976, vi + 295 pages.

The 1970s have witnessed a growing awareness on the part of the West of the development and increasing sophistication of the Soviet military machine. This awareness has been paralleled by the belated discovery of the wealth of Soviet literature devoted to military theory, operations, and policy. *Selected Soviet Military Writings, 1970-1975*, the eleventh of an ongoing Air Force series of key translations of Soviet works on military matters, presents both general and specialist readers with a taste of the breadth and depth of current Soviet military thought.

The volume develops four themes: the international situation, theoretical foundations of Soviet military thought, command structure and military organization, and "theory in practice." The selections in each group are preceded by an introductory discussion that highlights the theme of each piece and the background of its author.

The editor, Dr. William F. Scott, Colonel, USAF (Retired) has sought to include the representative thoughts of most leading Soviet military spokesmen and theorists. Marshal Grechko's pronouncements appear no less than three times (though his final entry, "Science and the Art of Victory" adds little to the anthology). Nevertheless, one regrets the absence of any work by Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, whose series of articles on "Navies in War and Peace" in the 1972-1973 issues of *Morskoi Sbornik (Naval Digest)* attracted widespread attention among naval analysts and provided useful insights into the thinking of this architect of Russia's modern blue-water navy.

The reader should also note the editor's caveat that the volume includes no views of anyone fundamentally opposed to the Soviet regime. Such works appear only in the underground *samizdat* literature, not in establishment journals. However, also missing is the work of any junior officer, though a cursory glance at a few issues of *Soviet*

The editor might have included one such essay, if only to contrast the content with that of articles by more senior leaders.

One final caution: this book is not easy reading. Official Soviet prose style is cumbersome at best and filled with obeisances to CPSU sacred cows. Nevertheless, the volume's content and the insights it provides into the nature of Soviet political/military thought more than offset its literary shortcomings. The reader can at least take heart: the West still lags far behind the Soviets in perfecting that abomination of all good language—institutionalized bureaucratese.

Dr. Dov Zakheim
Washington, D.C.

Nimitz by E. B. Potter. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1976, 507 pages, \$16.95.

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz commanded the most powerful naval force ever created in the largest theater of war ever controlled by one man. He did so with competence and professionalism yet with a complete lack of flamboyance and ostentation. At the end of World War II, Nimitz steadfastly refused to write his personal account of the war. He may have made this decision because he was determined never to be party to washing the dirty linen of the Navy in public.

The admiral would undoubtedly be pleased in this regard by Professor Potter's book. The book accurately mirrors the personality of its subject: low-key, down-to-earth, unpretentious. Few reputations will be damaged, and those only slightly, by this account. There is considerable praise and credit to the major subordinate leaders assigned to Nimitz's command but very few new revelations or interpretations of the major decisions and events of the war. True, Admiral Halsey, General MacArthur, and Holland Smith receive some slight criticism, but even they generally are given sympathetic treatment. One has the feeling that if the book were read by these subjects, there would still be no major obstacle to immediate resumption of cordial working relationships with Nimitz.

Perhaps as a result of this low-key treatment of subordinate characters in the book, the principal subject sometimes fails to come across as the warm,

real-life human most other authors show Nimitz to be. Only near the end of the book, after Nimitz had been relieved of his duty as commander in the Pacific, completed a tour as Chief of Naval Operations, and retired from active duty, does the author capture the feeling of frustration and loss of a man who had devoted his entire life to service of his country with little regard for money or personal possessions and suddenly finds no useful outlet for his huge talents. His refusal to use his name and wartime experiences for financial gain, his intensive personal activity around his newly acquired home "Longview," and a period of service with the United Nations which ended without tangible results—all combine to bring into focus this remarkable man in the last years of his life.

The book does have considerable merit for the military historian. Nimitz's view of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Navy politics, the courses of action open in the Pacific, and many other facets of this war may contain some surprises or merely add weight to opinions already formed. The fact that it is the closest thing we will ever have to an "authorized" version of the life of this major figure in American military history requires the attention of the serious student and will reward the casual reader with new insight.

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Task Groups and Linkages in Complex Organizations: A Case Study of NASA by Henry J. Anna. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1976, 64 pages, \$3.00.

As organizations have grown increasingly complex, more flexible, adaptable concepts have supplemented the traditional theories of organizational structure. Henry J. Anna, associate professor of political science and director of the master of public administration program at the University of Dayton, presents an in-depth study of one of the more recent techniques, the matrix approach. Using this approach to analyze the structure and functioning of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in its implementation of the Apollo Space Program, Professor Anna underscores the ability of the matrix technique to explain the interrelationships of complicated organizational structures; he also

hopes to encourage its further theoretical development. The author intends to reach the serious student of organizational structures with this detailed study.

"The matrix approach to complex organizations, as developed by Fremont A. Shull, Jr., rests on a general systems framework, [which] analyzes organizations in terms of an administrative system, a functional system, and working units or task units." The concept classifies working units according to the degree of technology necessary to accomplish a task and the nature of the people comprising the working groups. Four nodes emerge in applying the matrix approach: the routine strategy, the engineered strategy, the craft strategy, and the heuristic strategy—each varying in degree on a spectrum ranging from relative autonomy to relative dependence in the organization.

Anna extends Shull's framework to analyze relationships among task groups and functional groups as differentiated from the remainder of the administrative system. He formulates three additional propositions that seem to characterize these relationships in the engineered strategy: (1) "the potential for conflict [between task units and functional groups] will tend to increase as the task characteristics become more unique and nonrepetitive"; (2) "the task unit will seek to limit and reduce conflict with the [functional] support organization"; and (3) "the attempts of the task unit to reduce conflict will tend to center on the differing orientations of the task unit and the [functional] support organization." While the interview data conflict with Anna's first proposition, they decisively support the latter two.

Despite several typographical errors and occasional tiresome comparisons of his observations with Shull's propositions, Anna demonstrates "that the matrix approach has considerable capacity to explain complex, large-scale organizations because of its ability to point up and explain the significance of many phenomena that are quite often slighted by more traditional approaches to organization theory."

Major William T. McMahan, USA
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Military History of the American Revolution: Proceedings of the Sixth Military History Symposium, USAF Academy, 1974 edited by Major Stanley J. Underdal. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, 198 pages, \$2.70.

n Despite a possible charge of hackneyed expression in using the phrase, the reader must describe this work as the latest in a fine series of publications on military history resulting from the biennial U.S. Air Force Academy Military History Symposium. This event, which has grown steadily in both importance and attendance since its inception, is quickly becoming one of the more eagerly awaited gatherings of military historians. Only publication of the proceedings has lagged—the previous five will not appear until after the next symposium. Proceedings of the sixth symposium, held in October 1974, appeared in early 1976, about 18 months after the meeting, partly because of the subject matter, which made it desirable that the papers be published during the Bicentennial year.

As at any symposium, the papers are of uneven quality. Many, however, introduce new interpretations of subjects that the journeyman had considered closed. There is nothing concerning aviation history, of course. Significantly, the daily sessions focused on the ground forces: the question of strategy and who formulated it (Ira D. Gruber, "The Origins of British Strategy . . .," and Lieutenant Colonel David R. Palmer, "The American Strategy Reconsidered"); the question of what kind of war was fought and the results to the embryonic nation's military defense (Robert M. Calhoon, "Civil, Revolutionary, or Partisan: The Loyalists and the Nature of the War for Independence" and Richard H. Kohn, "The Murder of the Militia System in the Aftermath of the . . . Revolution"); and a broad discussion of American military leaders and soldiers (George F. Scheer, "Washington and His Lieutenants . . ." and John R. Sellars, "The Common Soldier . . ."). The banquet address, however, by Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, USN, Retired, brought the professional military viewpoint to a historically supported contention that the American Revolution was first and foremost a naval war.

Perhaps the major criticism one could make of the symposium came in the final hour. Professor Linda Grant DePauw was called on to comment and instead proceeded, admittedly from the base laid by Dr. Sellars, to introduce an entirely new subject, the role of women in the revolution. While this is certainly a valid topic, it should have been discussed in greater detail in the body of the conference rather than during the summary.

Overall, the papers present little that is new. Rather, they focus on new interpretations as, for instance, Colonel Palmer readily recognized in his well-written and controversial discussion. The most significant new material was introduced by Dr.

Sellars. His research into and statistical compilations of data on the common soldiery open up new social and cultural aspects of the war and further the work of many recent historians, such as Jackson Turner Main and Jesse Lemisch, and other Neo-Progressive and New Left historians, as well as social scientists, such as Robert E. Brown, in the general evaluation of the social nature of the whole period.

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The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy by George F. Kennan. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1977, 234 pages, \$8.95.

Mr. X returns. George Kennan applies his formidable pen to a major statement of his views on current American foreign policy. His is now the pragmatic voice of caution, the voice of a sense of limitations, the voice of moderation. America cannot indulge in world crusades in the name of human rights or in paranoid exaggerations of Russian might and intent.

Of course, Kennan, who requires little introduction, has credentials that earn him a respectful reading. His long official involvement in our relations with Russia and service as ambassador to Yugoslavia are apparent, for he is most explicit and expert in those areas of his book. His other life, that in academia, is also reflected in his splendid writing style and in his effective treatment of the other parts of the world.

Little of Kennan's view is really radical or even at variance with the current Carter program. The idea that we should diminish our efforts in the Third World and concentrate on our vital interests in the political vitality of Europe and Japan has already found wide acceptance in both parties. That we have a firm moral commitment to the continuation of the Israeli state, and that we should achieve this by all measures short of the use of U.S. soldiers, will not be argued by many. The plea that the problems of the Third World are beyond our competence, and that we should strive only for respect there, instead of love, is one that will receive general approval.

It appears to this reviewer that Kennan's ideas on arms control will be more widely contested. The very title of the book is an allusion to the dangers of

the nuclear arms race. Kennan is firmly behind a program of nuclear reduction and wishes to undertake some moderate, unilateral disarmament. He would further have us conclude a no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons agreement with the U.S.S.R. This latter will remind many critics of the fine words of the famous Kellogg-Briand Pact of the 1920s. They turned out to have no real meaning. War continued to be used as an instrument of national policy long thereafter, and the only effect of the pact was that it came to be used as the legal(?) basis for the ex post facto conviction of the war criminals. Thus, Kennan's apparent faith in the efficacy of a no-first-use treaty might be questioned on the grounds that the fine words would mean nothing when a nation perceives its choice to be between extinction in a conventional struggle and violation of a treaty through the initiation of nuclear attacks.

The so-called "dead hand of history" will also be brought to bear on George Kennan's proposal for a limited unilateral disarmament. The critics, citing

the experience with naval disarmament during the early thirties and the subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor, will say that the result of turning the other cheek will be to get it slapped, too. They will argue that the unilateral U.S. decision in the late sixties to level off in the acquisition of delivery vehicles has only resulted in a slap on the other cheek. They will say that the original hope that the U.S.S.R. would be satisfied with parity was a pipe dream.

Of course, a book such as this is necessarily full of subjective judgments. It will, therefore, receive wide criticism. And that is all to the good. It is only through such discussion that new ideas and consensus will be developed. Given the weakness in our natural resources and our disadvantage in numbers, then only through the power of ideas and the strength of national unity can we remain both secure and prosperous in an uncertain world. *The Cloud of Danger* is therefore a book that should be read by every professional officer.

D.R.M.

The major advances in civilization are processes that all but wreck the societies in which they occur.

ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

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
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The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "Laser Isotope Enrichment: A New Dimension to the Nth Country Problem?" by Dr. Robert L. Bledsoe, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida Technological University, Orlando, Florida, as the outstanding article in the March-April 1978 issue of *Air University Review*.

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