When Soviet invasion forces crossed the Afghan border in December of 1979, the reaction of American commentators, following initial cries of shock and outrage, was nearly uniform: The Soviets, it was argued, had made a "serious miscalculation"; they had reckoned without the forces of religiously inspired nationalism; they had gravely underestimated the seriousness of their transgression in the eyes of world opinion. The phrase "Russia's Vietnam" was repeated with monotonous regularity, and an optimistic few perceived the Soviet Union as sliding inexorably and helplessly into an unwinnable quicksand war.

The Vietnam analogy fails on at least two levels. First, it would be difficult to invent an economic geography and military topography more unlike the rice paddies and jungles of Indochina than the bare, arid valleys of the Hindu Kush and the Paropamisus mountains. Living in the midst of relative agricultural abundance, small Vietcong and Vietminh units could generally steal, extort—or grow—enough food for survival. Cover and concealment were abundant; water was almost never a problem. The contrast with Afghanistan's fragile ecosystem is stark. Low rainfall and a short growing season translate into endemic scarcity, and the disruption of a single planting or harvest season can mean disaster. Concealment is sparse, and water sources are apt to be tactically exposed. The schools of mujahiddin guerrillas have a very shallow sea in which to swim.

The second failing of the Vietnam analogy is more subtle: How can we evaluate Soviet chances without an understanding of Soviet objectives? We cannot be definitive, but our lead author provides the outlines.

From this observation flows another: Do Soviet means mesh with Soviet ends, or are they inherently incompatible? Our second article, "The Grammar and Logic of Conflict," offers a disciplined approach to these fundamental questions.

J. F. G.
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THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

Dr. Seth Singleton

The foreign policy of the Brezhnev Politburo, consistent since 1965, has four major interconnected elements: détente with the West, defined as the pursuit of mutually beneficial trade and strategic arms control; consolidation and coordination of the Socialist community of communist nations under Soviet leadership; military growth of all types of forces; and expansion of Soviet and allied Socialist influence and presence in Asia and Africa as opportunity allows.¹

Popular American opinion to the contrary, the first three elements have been considerably more successful than the last. In the late 1970s, as evidence of the military and expansionist character of Soviet policy mounted, several Soviet-connected Asian and African
nations have cooled toward the Soviets or defected outright. China, the most important developing nation, now leads the anti-Soviet crusade. In the Islamic world the list of former Soviet friends is long and growing: Sudan, Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia, Guinea, Nigeria, Iraq, Bangladesh, and now Afghanistan.  

Times Have Changed: The Militarization of Soviet Policy

Since Lenin and the first Congress of the Peoples of the East in August 1920, Soviet political and ideological appeal has assumed a mutual interest against Western imperialism between Third World peoples and the Soviet Union. But as Asian and African nations achieve independence and gradually consolidate control over their national economies, internal and local conflicts emerge to replace anti-imperialism as the dominant issues. By the 1970s, Soviet policies relying on community of interest against the West and bolstered by Soviet aid had assured no permanent Socialist gains; nationalist such as Gamal Nasser, Ben Bella, Sékou Touré, and Mao Zedong used Soviet aid and political support for their own ends and then rejected it when convenient. Stronger policies binding Asian and African states to a permanent Soviet orientation would have to be developed. At the same time, Soviet military power made a Soviet connection highly desirable for governments and movements needing military protection or the resources to win civil or local wars.

Soviet emphasis on military intervention began with Soviet aid to Cuba and Vietnam. Both countries faced confrontations against the United States. Military aid to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq was directed at Israel, considered an outpost of American imperialism. The Angolan intervention of 1975 began to blur the anti-imperialist justification. While the Angolan opponents of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) were supported by the United States, China, and South Africa, they were also African liberation movements in their own right, as the Organization of African Unity acknowledged. The next intervention, in Ethiopia, brought Soviet power into a local war. Ethiopia was fighting Soviet-aided Somalia and a Marxist Eritrean secessionist movement, and Soviet betrayal of the
Moslem Somalis and the Moslem Eritreans did their image little good in the Middle East. Fidel Castro tried and failed to mediate the conflict and promote a Marxist revolutionary federation among Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Yemen. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, in January 1979, showed Soviet military support against communist allies of China, and Soviet commentary at the time left no doubt that China itself might become a legitimate (in Soviet eyes) victim of Soviet attack. Finally, in Afghanistan in December 1979 the Soviet army was sent to repress a popular revolt against a revolutionary government without immediate invitation. The only remaining escalation of the contexts of Soviet military intervention would be direct attack against a noncommunist country that had never invited a Soviet presence.

The Soviets now claim that their military power is the necessary condition for the liberation of anyone else. The changing correlation of forces has become almost a synonym for Soviet military superiority, and in the Soviet view this shift in the world balance of power is all-important. Unlike earlier eras, the Soviet Union claims to defend local revolutions against external enemies (always assumed to be some form of “imperialist aggression”) and internal opposition—even against the vast majority of the people if necessary, as Soviet sources acknowledge. In addition to external and internal defense, the Soviet Union and its Socialist allies are to provide direct assistance in party-building and in ideological development, toward the transition from military rule to government by a vanguard party.

Nothing so far indicates that where they have undertaken a strong internal presence (Cuban troops, East German security police training, Soviet advisers) the Soviets and their allies have found some magic key which transforms Third World friends into communist members of the Socialist community. Cuba may be the model, but other Asian and African national leaders, including national Marxists or communists, continue to seek independence of foreign control when their need for protection diminishes. Soviet proclamations about the tighter bonds of “socialist orientation” do not change that unless the tighter bonds are somehow enforced.

Soviet policy has been increasingly squeezed into a narrow military mold because, as military capabilities grow and grow, other capabilities diminish. The Soviet economy is in consistent, long-term, and perhaps accelerating decline, and one of the many ramifications of this overwhelmingly important fact is that the Soviets are limited in providing economic or even military aid to their friends on concessional terms. Even the poorest “socialist orientation” countries such as Ethiopia are pushed to repay Socialist aid with hard currency earned by exports to the West. Soviet subsidies to Cuba (perhaps $3 billion a year) and Vietnam (perhaps $1 billion a year) in support of counterinsurgency wars reduce the amounts available for other, more peaceful purposes.

In undertaking military interventions in Africa, Indochina, and now Afghanistan, the Soviets wished to create the image of overwhelming clout and victory. They have gambled that demonstrating “the changing correlation of forces” might encourage more regimes “of socialist orientation,” and the creation of new allied military forces capable of undertaking “defense of the gains of Socialism” on a broader and broader scale. What actually has happened is that the Cubans are bogged down in Angolan garrisons against the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and in Ethiopian garrisons against the Eritreans and the Somali guerrillas of the Ogaden. The Vietnamese have some 200,000 troops in Kampuchea and are continuing to maintain, even intensify, a militarized garrison state to sustain the conquest of Indochina.
Afghanistan caps the image of Soviet policy as imperialism against growing people's resistance, an image increasingly shared by Africans, Southeast Asians, and Islamic nations of the Middle East. This was not what the Soviets had in mind. But the Afghanistan invasion was necessary to preserve any hope of success for the policy of world prestige based on victory and "the changing correlation of forces."

Militarization of policy must include the home front, and the domestic policies of the later years of the Brezhnev Politburo provide ample evidence that the economy, the legitimization of the regime, and the very concept of Soviet citizenship are taking a more military cast. In spite of economic difficulties, and obviously in response to domestic critics of military spending, Brezhnev and his colleagues have remained adamant that the Soviet military budget is not to be touched. As Brezhnev put it in 1976:

"Nor should there be any doubt in anyone's mind that our Party will do everything to have the splendid Armed Forces of the Soviet Union provided, in the future as well, with all the necessary means for filling their responsible task of standing on guard over the Soviet people's peaceful labor and acting as the bulwark of world peace."

Politburo spokesmen have since constantly reiterated the sanctity of the military budget, citing NATO rearmament and nuclear missiles for Europe, Chinese aggressive designs, and now the world outcry over Afghanistan. Massive diversion of resources to military production accelerates Soviet economic decline; opportunity costs include the diversion of technical manpower and creativity as well as resources away from the civilian economy, and the disruption which occurs when civilian production is arbitrarily interrupted to fill shortfalls in defense industry. Soviet leaders take pride in the efficiency of the military economy, which has become the leading example of the economic capability of socialism.

The Soviet citizenry is increasingly restless. Everyone from dissidents to the Politburo cites laziness and apathy among the workers as an overwhelming problem; workers have recently begun to form illegal unions and mount strikes. National tensions persist, although they should not be overemphasized as an imminent danger to Soviet stability. The intelligentsia persist in refusing to be inspired by shopworn Soviet Marxism. None of these circumstances can be quickly or easily changed without basic reforms that the present leadership is unwilling to consider. So the regime increasingly relies on patriotism and national security for its legitimacy. Since 1976, when Brezhnev called for glorification of Soviet military exploits in the Great Patriotic War against the Nazis, propaganda celebrating the military "guardians of peaceful labor" has proliferated. Soviet world prestige linked to military prowess has been emphasized: Soviet citizens are told, simply, that their country cannot be pushed around any more.

The constitution of 1977 proclaims military service as a "sacred duty" of all citizens. The constitution also mentions Soviet patriotism in a way that indicates its function of integrating the nationalities. General Aleksandr Altunin's civil defense program seems more another means of inculcating national security consciousness among citizens than a prelude to nuclear attack. Other measures, such as oath-taking at military induction ceremonies and the activities of military reservists in the schools, reinforce the military flavor of Soviet patriotism and communist legitimacy.

The internal prestige of the Communist Party and its leadership would suffer, perhaps severely, if in its first campaign since World War II the Soviet Army were to fail to subdue ill-armed and disorganized Afghan tribesmen. That the Soviet people are told that the Afghan people are really on the Soviet side just compounds the problem; vic-
Modern Soviet equipment used in Afghanistan contrasts starkly with the primitive means available to the resisting mujahiddin soldiers of Islam, pausing beside a burned-out Soviet BTR-60 armored personnel carrier (facing page). At a caravan stop (right), and—to underscore the point—tribesmen proudly display a wildly varied assortment of personal arms (above), including sporting rifles, Belgian FN automatic rifles, and bolt-action British .303 Enfields—or copies thereof.
tory should be easy. To the extent it is not easy, “imperialist aggression,” not local resistance, must be put forward as the reason, and this too must heighten internal pressures toward the garrison state and a new cold war.

Thus the rebellion in Afghanistan, about to topple and replace the revolutionary regime of “socialist orientation” established in 1978, presented the Soviet leadership with an immensely important decision affecting Soviet credibility and the success or failure of past and current policies. Unlike Africa or Indochina, Afghanistan was clearly the Soviets’ own show and sole responsibility—in Afghanistan “proletarian internationalism” meant that the Soviets must carry the burden. If the Soviet Union touted its military might as the necessary condition for the triumph of socialism in the Third World, then failed to use it in a neighboring country of long-standing predominant Soviet influence when “socialist orientation” was about to be defeated, the consequences within the Soviet-led Socialist community and among its “socialist orientation” allies might be immense. Cuba and Vietnam could easily draw the conclusion that in spite of their bluster the Soviets were willing to defend the gains of socialism only to the last Cuban or the last Vietnamese. Well before the Afghan invasion Soviet writers had mentioned rollback of socialist orientation, particularly in Africa, as a serious problem. If the “April revolution” in Afghanistan were defeated by rebels favored by China, the West, and anti-Soviet Islamic nations, the example might be contagious. Ultimately, “the changing correlation of forces” could be reversed, thus bringing down the whole recent edifice of Soviet policy.

In this context, discussion of the offensive or defensive nature of Soviet policy misses the point. The Soviets were pushed into opting for “defense of the gains of socialism” by the only means available, an invasion by Soviet troops.

Relations of a New Type among Equal and Independent States

The invasion of Afghanistan was undertaken to uphold credibility and save a position in which a great deal has been invested. But it stretched Soviet claims that Soviet power is used only to defend threatened peoples against imperialism when invited to do so. Earlier claims for Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, and even Ethiopia were credible (although less and less so) in that regard. Afghanistan was not. By sending an invasion force to depose and replace the existing government, by taking over administration of the country, and by lying about the circumstances, the Soviets, willy-nilly, crossed a major policy threshold.

The direct use of Soviet combat troops outside the Warsaw Pact countries broke a precedent of Soviet restraint upheld since World War II and naturally raised fears of a new policy of Soviet conquest. But the more serious change in the rules of the game was Soviet intervention apparently without an invitation from the existing Afghan government of President Hafizullah Amin. The invitation, or lack of it, distinguishes legally sanctioned intervention from international aggression.

The Soviets say that “the USSR acceded to a request which the Afghan government had repeatedly made during 1977-78; a request for military aid in response to armed intervention by imperialist forces which began immediately after the April revolution and which is continuing to this day.” This statement does not claim an immediate invitation, only a “repeated” one made at least a year before when Afghanistan’s government was led by Prime Minister Taraki, not Amin. As far as “imperialist aggression” is concerned, the growing internal rebellion certainly received sanctuary and some aid via Pakistan but little from elsewhere. A Soviet article of March 1979 contains a reasonable descrip-
tion of the rebellion, if the usual rhetoric is discounted:

A “holy war” has been proclaimed against the Revolution by the so-called Muslim Brothers, a reactionary terrorist grouping of a conservative Muslim orientation. Demagogically exploiting “Islamic” slogans, the Afghan Muslim brothers, who have extensive ties with similar groupings in other countries of the East, are trying to exert pressure on the socially backward masses of working people in both town and village. They serve the interest of the reactionaries in the region and are being exploited by imperialist circles to conduct activities directed against the national interests and the people’s Revolution of Afghanistan. Postinvasion statements now attribute the rebellion almost entirely to “imperialist aggression,” citing the United States, Britain, China, and Pakistan as the sources of the rebellion and claiming that conflict would cease the minute the outside agitators stopped their activities.

It is interesting to compare the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with Soviet aid to North Vietnam a decade before. Soviet vocabulary has not changed at all: defense against “imperialist aggression” justifies aid to threatened governments as a duty of “proletarian internationalism.” Circumstances have changed entirely: in 1972 Soviet surface-to-air missiles were shooting down B-52s over Hanoi, but in 1980 Soviet forces cross an international boundary without invitation and are instrumental (the details remain murky) in the murder of a friendly president, with no “imperialists” anywhere in sight.

The Soviet leadership was not willing to say that they could not afford to lose, and that they now considered Afghanistan their turf and would not tolerate a hostile government, which would be a true if not commendable explanation. Instead, the Soviets have resorted to stonewalling by propaganda and to a degree of lying unheard since Stalin’s time. The genuflection now required from Soviet friends as part of “proletarian internationalism” hurts the credibility of those who fall into line, for example the French Communist Party. Cuba, notably, has remained largely silent.

Until Afghanistan, only communist countries had been subject to a Soviet veto backed by force of arms over their internal evolution. “Limited socialist sovereignty” was first applied to the nationalities of the Soviet Union and their ostensibly separate Republics; later to Eastern Europe (the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine). The invasion of Kampuchea to remove an unbelievably brutal regime, like the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian interventions in Europe, was justified as restoring true socialism in a communist country. But Third World countries “of socialist orientation” were presumably free to change their orientation, as Egypt and Somalia and now Iraq have done. The Afghanistan precedent indicates that the Soviet Union will now decide when and where “socialist orientation” is to be made “irreversible” by intervention.

Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of December 1978 provides for military cooperation, and Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky cited this article to the Security Council as a basis for intervention. Another article of that treaty provides for mutual consultation and appropriate action—presumably whatever the two parties agree to—in the event of a threat to the peace. All the Soviet treaties of friendship and cooperation contain almost identical language, and nothing in any of them implies any unilateral action. In the past, these treaties intimated Soviet backing for local wars; India’s 1971 treaty preceded by four months the war with Pakistan over Bangladesh, Egypt’s 1971 treaty preceded the 1973 October War, and Vietnam’s November 1978 treaty preceded the January 1979 invasion of Kampuchea.* Afghanistan was

* Vietnam has similar treaties with Laos and Kampuchea. The April 1980 visit of Heng Samrin and Pen Sovan to Moscow did not produce a Soviet-Kampuchean treaty.
The Politburo has made no proclamations about the universal “irreversibility” of “socialist orientation” and will choose “irreversibilities” according to specific circumstances. For example, Mozambique is now adopting a more capitalist economic policy, and the new Zimbabwe government of Robert Mugabe which was helped to power by Soviet and Cuban arms shows every sign of joining Zambia and Tanzania in non-alignment. The Soviet Union has at present neither the capability nor the intention of controlling political events in southern Africa. But the Afghanistan precedent must unsettle Mengistu of Ethiopia or dos Santos of Angola, where large Cuban forces are already present, or the regime in South Yemen. The fate of Hafizullah Amin serves as a warning—or as an incentive to establish security independent of Soviet power.

Geopolitics: Preventing Encirclement and Opening Possibilities

Geopolitics is often a refuge for the lazy analyst, and American writers generally over-emphasize geopolitical and military-strategic explanations for Soviet policy. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a response to the Afghan rebellion, and no available evidence indicates any Soviet master plan or timetable for conquest of the Middle East or of Asia. Soviet policy generally responds to opportunities and accepts setbacks as they arise. The style of Soviet policy is also generally to focus on one country at a time rather than on regions. Nevertheless, the invasion of Afghanistan was prompted in part by strategic considerations, and its consequences certainly include military threats to neighboring countries and the possibility of further Soviet adventures.

What the Soviets fear is the grand encirclement of the Soviet Union linking China, Japan, the United States, and Western Europe. The most serious change that has occurred in the world position of the Soviet Union over the past twenty years has been the defection of China and, now, the rapidly burgeoning Chinese-Japanese-NATO entente cordiale. Today, China is singled out as the most evil adversary, not only “the 16th member of NATO” but the equivalent of Nazi Germany. Soviet policies designed to split China from Japan and the West and to isolate China in Asia have failed completely. Japan opted for a Chinese connection in spite of Soviet pressure by signing the Japanese-Chinese friendship treaty of August 1978, which contained the anti-Soviet hegemony clause. Soviet initiatives to create an Asian security treaty isolating the Chinese failed to win Indian or Southeast Asian support. In this as in other areas the Soviets then turned more toward military means, encouraging and aiding the Vietnamese to conquer Kampuchea and eliminate the Pol Pot government allied to China.

The Chinese response to the Kampuchea invasion, which the Chinese now tout as a prelude by proxy to the Afghan one, was invasion of North Vietnam and demonstration of will against Soviet threats and acceleration of the rapprochement with the United States to a point just short of military alliance.
Chinese-Soviet talks failed in September 1979. The response of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was stiffened opposition to the Vietnamese and the Soviet Union.

On the other front, NATO finally decided in December 1979 to counter Soviet military supremacy in Europe with new American theater nuclear weapons. Soviet efforts failed to persuade West Germany to reject the new weapons, which would have aborted the decision. Secretary Brezhnev’s gesture of withdrawing troops from East Germany was spurned. The increased pressure against East Europe dissidents, notably the Prague Charter 77 trials in October 1979, had no effect. Thus, in Europe as with China, Soviet efforts to pressure, influence, or divide the enemy coalition had failed.

The Iranian revolution drastically increased the stakes in Afghanistan. While the demise of the Shah was a major Soviet gain, Iran had the wrong revolution. In the long run, Islamic resurgence and self-assertion pose a major threat to the Soviets, blocking opportunities for Soviet influence and carrying the possibility of dissent among 50 million Soviet Moslems. An anti-Soviet Islamic Afghanistan, complemented and aided by Islamic governments in Pakistan and Iran, would create an anti-Soviet Islamic bloc on the border of the Central Asian Soviet republics. A link between that bloc and China or the West or both—a role played by Pakistan since the mid-1960s—would complete encirclement of the Soviet Union from Norway to Japan.

Conversely, the Iranian revolution might be strongly influenced by a Soviet demonstration of will and authority, which the Soviets could contrast to American weakness, vacillation, irresolution, and incompetence. The Soviets are avid, sometimes too avid, students of history who realize that Iranian foreign policy has traditionally bent toward external pressure, be it Russian, British, or American. A Soviet Afghanistan demonstrating Soviet resolution and power and the inability of Islamic forces to contain the Soviet military juggernaut could lead to numerous future opportunities to steer Iran, or Pakistan, or both, in a Soviet direction. Soviet aid to the Baluchis in Pakistan and Iran could be used as a lever to pressure those countries or divide them. Iran or Pakistan might accept the sort of Soviet aid and friendship provided Afghanistan in the twenty years before the 1978 coup, perhaps with ultimately similar results.

Thus, Soviet efforts to split the encirclement or achieve a favorable détente in Europe or with China had already failed. The West Europeans and Chinese had made their decisions. The Americans had decided to “gamble on the Peking card” and were moving toward rearmament, with the rest of NATO reluctantly in tow. The record of the Carter administration and its necessary preoccupation with the hostages in Teheran would imply an ineffective American response. These circumstances, plus the threat from Islamic Afghanistan and the favorable possibilities of Soviet Afghanistan, impelled the invasion.

One widely held view sees the invasion of Afghanistan as part of a military pincer movement designed to encircle the Persian Gulf with the other part of the pincers in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Afghanistan may eventually be useful in that regard. But if the Soviet game was control of Gulf oil, why not concentrate on Iran or Iraq and do the job directly? Why frighten and alienate all the Gulf nations without arriving there? Afghanistan is a landlocked country far from the water and relatively far from the oil fields. Alienating Iran and accelerating Iraq’s shift to a European orientation hardly helps the Soviets control the Gulf. The demonstration of European communist soldiers shooting down Moslems has not helped the Soviet cause on the Arabian peninsula either.
Saudi Arabia has recently patched up its quarrel with North Yemen. The Soviet Union has reportedly advised Mengistu of Ethiopia to start seriously negotiating with the Eritreans—yet another sign that the Soviets must now placate anti-Soviet Islamic opinion and policy. All the talk of warm-water ports notwithstanding (much of it originates in China), Afghanistan seems the wrong place to invade as part of a strategy of military control of Persian Gulf oil.

Will the Soviets' own oil needs impel more invasions? Depending on whose estimate is accepted, and understanding that exploration and the marginal costs of increasing production are as variable and unpredictable in the Soviet Union as anywhere else, the Soviets will probably be short of oil sometime.
during the 1980s. They have several options: cut domestic consumption, cut back on deliveries to Eastern Europe, buy more oil, or expropriate oil on the cheap by military conquest of an oil field and the nation that happens to contain it.

The last alternative seems the most unlikely. The Soviet nuclear energy program is designed to provide an alternative energy source. The Soviets buy many essential goods now from nations of all political persuasions—Moroccan phosphates, Iranian natural gas, Malaysian rubber, American, Canadian, and Argentine grain. Opportunities to make favorable deals for oil with sympathetic regimes “of socialist orientation” would certainly be welcome. The Soviet Union will certainly try to encourage friendly or allied governments among the oil states, probably to guarantee supply to Eastern Europe while Soviet oil is consumed at home. Certainly the temptation to persuade, pressure, or intimidate oil states may increase as Soviet military power grows and the economic squeeze intensifies. But the Soviets have shown no inclination so far to disrupt the world oil business, of which they are now a major and interconnected part.

Soviet control of Europe’s oil supply is worth worrying about, but that control is not likely to come by direct military conquest—or to be deterred by commitments against invasion. Put differently, the Ayatollah Khomeini’s efforts to purge the University of Teheran probably have far more bearing on Soviet control of the Persian Gulf than do the American aircraft carriers standing offshore.

Probably most important to Russia have been the political profits gained by treating Afghanistan with generosity and careful respect. Friendly relations and assistance have demonstrated to the rest of the Muslim world, especially Turkey, Iran, and the Arab states, that the Russians are willing to help a Muslim people whom they could easily conquer or exploit. Newell is not wrong; for the period 1919 to 1978, he is quite right. Times change.

Soviet-Afghan contacts began when Amir Amanullah Khan expelled British control during the Third Afghan War, a minor affair lasting some three weeks in May 1919. Amanullah invited Soviet envoys to Kabul and hoped to rely on the new Soviet power as a counter to the British. From the Soviet side, cooperation with Afghanistan was part of the general effort to incite the Moslem world against the British, who were then supplying the White Russian armies in the Russian civil war. The keystone of Soviet policy was alliance with the Turkish nationalist movement of Kemal Pasha, later Atatürk, who, like the Soviets, wanted the British out of Constantinople, the Transcaucasus, Iran, Afghanistan, and even India. Amanullah of Afghanistan thus developed cordial relations with both Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia, promoted by the propaganda of the Comintern encouraging nationalism and liberation of the peoples of the East from British imperialism.

This Soviet-Islamic alliance of mutual interest had a Central Asian flaw. In the aftermath of the revolution, Central Asian Moslems rose in revolt against the reestablishment of Russian rule. The Russian settlers and the Soviets called the rebels basmachi—bandits—and sent forces to suppress them. Turkish and Soviet aspirations clashed when Enver Pasha, leader of the Turkish triumvirate during the world war, was sent by the Soviets to Central Asia to organize Moslem forces against the British. Enver went over to the basmachi instead but
was killed in April 1922 before he could mold an effective force against the Russians. The Red Army drove the *basmachi* out of their city bases at Bokhara and Khiva (sites of the khanates conquered by Russia in 1868 and 1873) and away from the valleys, then gradually suppressed rebellion in the hills. Mopping-up campaigns against the *basmachi* including Soviet forays against sanctuaries in Afghanistan continued until 1931.

Amanullah treated with the Central Asian leaders at Bokhara as well as with the Soviets, but the Soviets refused to respond with hostility. The Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty of February 1921 even recognized the independence of Bokhara and Khiva "in accordance with the wishes of the people"—wishes which turned out to be those of the Soviet troops. In return, Amanullah promised not to actively aid the *basmachi*. While historical parallels must be treated carefully, they are interesting in this case. The Soviets use the term *basmachi* in speaking of the Afghan rebels and are following much the same counterinsurgency strategy. They also are trying to gain friendship and neutrality from Pakistan despite Pakistani sympathies, ethnic links, and sanctuary for the Afghans.

Taking Kemal's secular nationalist Turkey as his model, Amanullah attempted reform and modernization in the 1920s with Soviet aid. The 1921 treaty included a Soviet subsidy of a million rubles a year and provisions for technical assistance. The Soviets provided a small air force whose purpose was to put down rebellion by the tribesmen opposed to unveiling of women, secular education, and other reforms. A British official reported that "the so-called Afghan Air Force is to all intents and purposes a Russian service and may indeed be regarded as a Russian advanced base." Amanullah was overthrown in 1928 by rebellion sparked by announcement of measures against corruption and the local authority of the mullahs and by the unveiling of the queen. The British were probably involved (Colonel T. E. Lawrence was then serving on the northwest frontier under the alias of "Airman Shaw"), and the Soviets did not intervene. Half a century later, in somewhat similar circumstances, the Soviet Union did intervene to prevent Islamic conservatives and the tribes from deposing another friendly antitraditional Afghan regime. This illustrates rather precisely what the Soviets have in mind by "the changing correlation of forces."

Soviet influence again became paramount after the rise to power of Prince Daud, which coincided with the death of Stalin in 1953. Daud chose political dictatorship and economic development and turned to the Soviets as his main source of help. Political energies were diverted to the cause of greater Pushtunistan, reuniting Pushtuns across the Pakistan border with the Afghan kingdom. Pakistan's membership in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) made a tilt toward the Soviet Union logical. Khrushchev and Bulganin stopped in Kabul on their 1955 tour, which opened an active Soviet foreign policy in Asia on the basis of economic aid and political support for "national democrats." The Afghan army became Soviet supplied and trained; by 1976, a total of 3725 Afghan officers had received Soviet training. (That so many have recently deserted is one more testimony that instruction does not ensure political loyalty.) Modern roads were built from Central Asia to Kabul and Kandahar and the Kabul airport also. Newell says the Soviet aid program was generally efficient and unobtrusive.

The Soviets accepted Daud's removal in 1963 and Daud's return in 1973 in the coup that toppled the monarchy and Zahir Shah. In 1975 a major credit of $437 million was extended, equal to about one-fourth of all previous Soviet aid. When the April 1978 coup occurred, Soviet influence was already established. Soviet involvement in the coup is
uncertain; Hannah Negaran raises the possibility that Soviet pilots may have flown the planes that tipped the battle against Daud's forces. The two Marxist factions which cooperated to overthrow Daud were *Khalq* (masses) and *Parcham* (flag). Both groups grew from a common organization founded in early 1965. According to Negaran, *Khalq* is based among Pushtuns, the largest ethnic group, and *Parcham* among Tadzhiks, the largest minority who share nationality with the Tadzhiks of the Soviet Union. *Parcham* was stronger among students at Kabul University and among military officers, while *Khalq* had more rural support. The revolutionary government after the coup was a coalition with Taraki of *Khalq* as President and Hafizullah Amin, also of *Khalq*, as foreign minister. Babruk Karmal, leader of *Parcham*, became vice president. In the ensuing purge of *Parchamis*, Karmal was exiled as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, then recalled. He elected to stay in eastern Europe to return in December 1979 with the Soviet forces.

Soviet advisers operated throughout the Afghan army and the government from the first year of the new regime. Many civilian advisers were Tadzhiks and Uzbeks (also a minority in Afghanistan). The Soviet Central Asians were recalled in summer 1979 as rebellion grew. Strident Marxist secularism and too many Russians bred rebellion in a pattern like that of the 1920s. The September 1979 coup that replaced Taraki with Amin led to even more direct repression and coercion (for example, the village massacre widely reported in the Western press), which accelerated army desertions and the breakdown of administration. As Amin's army and the Afghan government withered away and Kabul itself became insecure, the decision to invade was taken in Moscow.

Karmal has tried to placate and conciliate as much of the opposition as possible, presenting himself and his *Parcham* government as more gentle and reasonable. In contrast to Taraki and Amin, who jailed and executed recalcitrant mullahs, Karmal promises religious freedom from persecution. His officials begin speeches with readings from the Koran. Political prisoners were released from Kabul prison in January; the crowds turned the release into an anti-Russian riot. Ethnic out-groups such as the Hazaras of central Afghanistan have been promised more equitable treatment. But such efforts to defuse hostility do not overcome the resistance to the foreign occupation on whose back the Karmal government exists, nor do they create an effective army or administration. As army and administrative cadres continue to defect, they are replaced by Soviets, which worsens the problem. ReCreating an Afghan army and administration will take a long time even if open rebellion recedes. Soviet occupation may be accepted and Afghanistan become another Mongolia, with Soviet advisers including Central Asians permeating the government and Soviet soldiers permanently stationed in the country. True legitimacy allowing the Karmal government to survive without a substantial permanent Soviet presence seems out of the question.

Soviet-managed counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is a combination of politics, propaganda, and firepower designed to stabilize the Karmal regime. Its major elements seem to be the following:

- Isolation of the cities from the countryside by military control of urban areas. This seems reasonably well in hand following the suppression of the general strike in Kabul in late February.
- Creation of a political organization to control the population, within the urban and settled areas. The earliest model in Soviet experience is the Red Guards of the Russian revolution; later models are the Ethiopian *kebelle*, or revolutionary committees
organized as armed cells in urban neighborhoods and in villages under party control.

- Disruption of the rural bases of revolt, by tank and helicopter attacks that do not risk heavy casualties to Soviet troops. The Soviets seem to accept that the end of the revolt in rural areas need not come quickly. A strategy of slowly isolating the mujahiddin from settled areas implies a long Soviet stay in Afghanistan but also allows the number of troops, recently estimated at some 85,000 within Afghanistan and another 30,000 on the Afghan-Soviet border, to be kept as low as possible. The origins of such a strategy in Russian military history extend even beyond the basmachi campaign to the Russian campaigns against Shamal’s Islamic resistance movement in the Caucasus in the mid-nineteenth century.

- Depopulation, if necessary, of some rural areas and the consequent creation of a refugee population in Pakistan. The rural areas are the bastions of reactionary opposition and one way to eliminate the sixteenth century life-style on which that opposition rests is physically to remove the population before eventual rural resettlement and development. By summer 1980 there were about 600,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan; 500,000 (largely Pushtuns) in the Northwest Frontier Province and another 100,000 in Baluchistan. By late 1980 the number was closer to one million. The refugees may serve as a recruitment base for the guerrillas, but without an effective central guerrilla organization the camps may become centers of political rivalry inhibiting the resistance. Most important, the refugees destabilize Pakistan and thus increase Pakistan’s willingness to come to terms with Soviet Afghanistan and send them home.

- Intensive radio propaganda designed to impose Soviet definitions of reality. The major message is that the rebellion represents American, British, Chinese, and Pakistani aggression, combined with the underlying message that the Soviet Union has won and will impose its will regardless. This basic message can be widely received if constantly repeated.

- Use of Afghans from one area or tribe to repress others. This is, of course, the classical technique of imperial conquest and control.

- Diplomacy to isolate the rebellion from outside support. The propaganda about foreign inspiration for the resistance is one way to do this; any country effectively aiding the rebels will thus confirm the Soviet view. Talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and India’s Mrs. Indira Gandhi, between the Soviets and the Pakistanis, and the Cuban Foreign Minister’s March 1980 visit to Pakistan and India were all designed to gain Pakistani acceptance of the Karmal regime and the Soviet presence supporting it in return for Soviet and Indian guarantees to Pakistan. Soviet proposals that Ethiopia negotiate with the Eritreans and possible moves toward defusing the potential confrontation in the Yemen may be part of a diplomatic strategy to appease the Saudis and Iraqis and others and divert them from providing encouragement or assistance.

- Containment of disaffection among the Soviet population by minimizing casualties and by focusing public attention on the American grain embargo, the Olympic boycott, and other anti-Soviet acts to put Soviet reaction in the context of national solidarity directed at the West.

How effective will Soviet counterinsurgency be, and how effectively will Soviets be at sealing off major outside aid to the guerrillas? As of mid-April 1980, Drew Middleton reported that approximately 100,000 guerrillas are in the field, that the border with Pakistan cannot be effectively sealed, and that Soviet tactics are roadbound and therefore unable to eliminate the guer-
The vulnerability of the Afghan agricultural economy to military action is suggested by the primitive food production and distribution system (right). Mawla Jalal Eddin, a military leader of the Hezb i Islami resistance organization working out of Peshawar, symbolizes the divergence among mujahidin groups (lower right).

rillas. One evident conclusion is that the insurgency will be strong and widespread enough to receive effective aid if anyone is willing to provide it and Pakistan is willing to allow the transit of arms.

Who are the insurgents? Those fighting in Afghanistan are called simply mujahidin, soldiers of Islam. As the case with most insurgencies, divisions exist among political exile groups based in Pakistan and between the exile politicians and the guerrilla commanders, although we have little information about the commanders. Among the exile groups, the largest is Hezb i Islami, the Islamic Party, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Like Karmal, Hekmatyar's political training came in student politics at Kabul University, but on the other side; Hekmatyar led a successful student movement to oust Parcham and Khalq control of Kabul University student council in 1973. Hezb i Islami claims that most of the mujahidin belong to its movement. In Pakistan, Hezb i Islami is opposed by a coalition of five other groups, of which the strongest is Jamiat Islami, the Islamic Society, led by Burhanidin Rabanni, also formerly at Kabul University as professor of Islamic law. So far Hekmatyar and Rabanni have been unable to agree on sharing of power between Hezb i Islami and Jamiat Islami and its partners. This division could easily become a pattern of allegiance to different national sources of money and arms or alliance with opposed groups and factions within Pakistan. Rabanni is reported working with the Saudis, while some anti-American statements of Hezb i Islami sound much like Iranian ones. A split between Iranian-sup-
ported and Saudi- and Iraqi-supported rebel factions could introduce, and perhaps already has introduced, the fundamental Iranian-Arab conflict within Middle East Islamic politics into the Afghan rebellion.

Islamic Self-Determination, Soviet Imperialism, and American Response

In Afghanistan, the increasing Soviet reliance on military means of policy has spilled over into international aggression. While the invasion involves the clash of Soviet and American principles and interests and has changed American perceptions of Soviet policy, the people most affected are the Afghans and their neighbors. Ayatollah Khomeini’s remark that the danger of communist powers is not less than that of America means two things. First, the Soviet threat is recognized in Iran and throughout southwest Asia and the Middle East. Second, the Islamic peoples and their governments want self-determination against any and all outside forces. Thus, one subtle yet crucial distinction for United States policy is between aiding Islamic resistance to Soviet imperialism and uses of American power that ignore interests of Islamic nations.

While the invasion of Afghanistan was probably not part of a preplanned Soviet strategy to control Persian Gulf oil, a stabilized Soviet Afghanistan indeed would be a step in that direction. Should a line be drawn and, if so, where? Lest we become mesmerized by spaces on maps, the obvious point is that any threshold requires cooperative relations with the people who live, and those who rule, in Pakistan, in Iran, and throughout the Arab Middle East. As Iran demonstrates most vividly, these nations may have conflicts with the United States quite apart from the relations of either with the Soviet Union. Be the issue hostages, Pakistani nuclear plans, or the Palestinian question, the United States must decide what is more important than what else.

Afghanistan is now engaged in people’s war against a foreign invasion that has become a brutal counterinsurgency campaign. American principles upholding self-determination imply direct aid to the resistance. Feasibility is another matter. Direct assistance acts to confirm the Soviet claim that the Afghan mujahiddin are merely extensions of “imperialist aggression” against socialism. But lack of effective assistance leaves moot the unspoken Soviet claim that in southwest Asia they are the only ones with the power to control events and the will to make their decisions stick. Will the example of Soviet conquest stiffen Islamic resistance to further imperialist adventures or impel Islamic nations to bend toward the side of superior local power?

Apart from the specific importance of the Middle East and southwest Asia, the invasion of Afghanistan raises a more general question: Under what circumstances, for what reasons, and to what extent will the United States act in support of those resisting Soviet and allied military intervention? The other current cases include Kampuchea, Eritrea, the Somali guerrillas of the Ogaden, and UNITA in Angola. What if armed resistance develops in Poland or elsewhere in Eastern Europe? A coherent policy demands criteria for making these decisions.

Ultimately, United States response depends on perception of Soviet policy and the nature of the Soviet regime. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn argues that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a united faction so ingrained in its hostility to all other forces, so wedded to the use of coercion, and so impermeable to outside influence that the only choice for any reasonable policy future is to wage war, hot or cold, against it. Soviet power will be used to its limits for repression and expansion, hence the only variable is the strength and will of the forces opposing
Soviet communism. The other view holds that while Soviet leaders are confirmed Leninists they are relatively rational people, perhaps unfortunately tempted by a recent absence of clear signals concerning détente or the international rules of the game. The Politburo can accept a range of different policies as it evolves from the Brezhnev era (as it must, for Brezhnev and other key figures such as Suslov and Kirilenko will retire; Kosygin now is gone). While the recent trend has been toward an increasingly Russian nationalist and militarist policy, Soviet behavior can be altered by what the United States and other nations do.

Evidence including the origins of the invasion of Afghanistan indicates that within basic Leninist precepts Soviet foreign policy is pragmatic in the search for opportunities and reactive to circumstances. It is not necessary to force Soviet communists to renounce Lenin to get them to pursue gains of socialism by means other than military aggression. The aim must be to dissuade the Soviets from their present militarist course.

The photographs were taken by Galen L. Geer, courtesy of Soldier of Fortune magazine.

Notes

1. See Secretary Brezhnev's Report of the CPSU Central Committee, XXth Congress of the CPSU (Moscow, 1976), pp. 5-41; also N. I. Lebedev and N. M. Nikol'ski; editors, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (Moscow, 1976, in Russian); Brezhnev's speech and its official excerpts are divided into sections on the Socialist community, national liberation, and relations with the West (defense), with a final section that integrates them as part of "the world revolutionary process."


3. Soviet publications have begun to acknowledge the shift from anti-imperialism to local conflicts; see, for example, E. Tarabrin, "Africa in a New Round of the Liberation Struggle," World Politics and International Relations, February 1979, p. 36 (in Russian).

4. As the Soviets threatened "hands off Socialist Vietnam!" in radio broadcasts and in the press, Pravda said that the Pol Pot government had been overthrown because it was a Chinese-type regime and therefore violated Socialist principles. The author was "Alekstrov," the name over which Politburo pronouncements appear.

5. "The decisive success in the struggle for freedom and independence which the national liberation movement in Asia and Africa attained were predetermined by the growth of the might of the USSR." Emphasis added. This quotation, from The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, p. 101, is representative of many similar statements, usually linked to Cuba, Vietnam, or Angola.

6. Soviet General V. F. Samoilenko, in a paper delivered in 1978 entitled "Social Essence of Modern Wars and the Armies," argued that the function of the army in countries "of socialist orientation" is "to oppress organized and nonorganized resistance" of any capitalist or pre-capitalist group. This would certainly include more than 90 percent of the population of Afghanistan.

7. Boris Ponomarev, "Practical Socialism and Its International Significance," Communist, No. 2, January 1979 (in Russian) provides the CPSU's authoritative definition of socialist orientation and assistance to it, which emphasizes building a vanguard party and also effective development.

8. Mozambique is a current example. Now that the Zimbabwe war is over, Mozambique may be expected to reduce Cuban and East German presence and concentrate on economic development.


10. Samoilenko, "Social Essence of Modern Wars and the Armies," states that "the external function of these armies of countries of socialist orientation ... is secondly, to render possible military support and help to other peoples struggling for their political independence.


14. The recent rediscovery of the national question in the Soviet Union by American analysts and the informed public has exaggerated the presumed degree of animosity among the nationalities. Isolated terrorist acts such as the 1978 Moscow subway bombing by an Armenian group may occur but are very infrequent. The now widely reported fact that Tadzhik and Uzbek Soviets cadres were withdrawn from Afghanistan in summer 1979 may have been due more to Afghan resentment of their modernized ethnic compatriots than to sympathy of the Soviets for Afghan resistance.


20. "The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and that each is opposed to efforts of any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony." Text in Peking Review, 18 August 1978.


22. Baluchis live in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Baluchi guerrillas supported from Afghanistan have held out against Pakistani army forays for several years.

23. The Soviets noted U.S. Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau’s visit during the Chinese-Vietnamese border war in early 1979 and particularly Vice President Mondale’s August 1979 speech in Peking, when Mondale emphasized mutual security interests as the basis for Chinese-American cooperation. Now the United States is beginning military-related sales following Secretary Brown’s visit.

24. The Chinese emphasize a geopolitical interpretation of Soviet activities that they now call a “dumb-bell strategy” directed at China, with the Strait of Malacca joining the Pacific and Indian Oceans. As for Afghanistan:

A Soviet Afghanistan plus a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean would lead to a grip on the Gulf oil supply lane and a crowning military move to outflank Western Europe.


35. The Times (London), March 18, 1980.


38. Most recently, see A. Solzhenitsyn, “Misconceptions about Russia Are A Threat to America,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 1980. Solzhenitsyn’s views and similar ones are less easy to dismiss in 1980 than in 1970 or 1960.

39. On the Russian nationalist trend, see Alexander Yanov, The Russian New Right, University of California Press, 1977. While Yanov pessimistically predicts a tightening merger of Soviet communism and traditional Russian nationalist authoritarianism, his analysis is that of various social groups and policy positions that may vary in strength.

Islamic Concept of War

War is ordained for Muslims who must fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against them. Fighting for the right cause is an act of worship in Islam. It is our religious duty to prepare for defence, acquire weapons, train and willingly accept any challenge. In fact no act of worship can surpass the sacred duty of bearing arms but all this must be done for the sake of Allah. Our wars are not to be fought for loot or plunder but to preserve our way of life and to promote it.

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Essays should address problems of strategy, doctrine, leadership, or some combination thereof, within the overall context of military exploitation of the aerospace medium.

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Essays in the competition should be 2000 to 4000 words and typewritten, double-spaced, on standard-size paper. The author's name and address should appear only on a cover-sheet title page. Address entries to The Editor, Air University Review, Building 1211, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 36112. Entries for the first competition must be received or postmarked by 1 June 1981. Essays are submitted with the understanding that rights of first publication belong to Air University Review, the professional journal of the Air Force, to be released after the competition at the Editor's discretion.
THE GRAMMAR AND LOGIC OF CONFLICT

differing concepts by statesmen and soldiers

Colonel Thomas A. Fabyanic
In the opening lines of his final major work, *War and Politics*, Bernard Brodie reminds us of the Clausewitzian axiom that “war has its own language but not its own logic.” The language, of course, is the military means to achieve the political objective in war, which presumably is derived through logic. Despite the fact that the axiom may be self-evident, both statesmen and soldiers* periodically have had to be reminded of its fundamental importance. Perhaps, for reasons all too obvious in the current and projected world environment, further need for such a reminder ought to be more than the international community should be asked to tolerate. Yet, the recent history of conflict suggests that the relationships of ends and means require our constant attention. Moreover, the growing sophistication of the former and the quantum increases in the potential of the latter argue persuasively for more precise analysis and greater clarity. Such outcomes are both necessary and possible, and perhaps they can be achieved through properly structured intellectual efforts that affect both the attitude and behavior of those who concern themselves with the means and ends of conflict.

My fundamental hypothesis is that those who practice statecraft and the art of war apparently do so as a consequence of learned behavior, acquired through formal education and practical experience. In a relative sense, the latter is a limited source of knowledge for any one individual, simply because one’s adult experience is too narrow to serve as a basis for questions of war and peace. Formal education, by contrast, offers the benefit of man’s collective wisdom and appears to be the dominant influence for those involved in issues of conflict.2

However, those who practice statecraft and thus set the political objectives for which wars are fought and those who pursue correlative military aims are exposed to intellectual studies that tend to focus primarily on either political or military aims. The argument here is not that statesmen and military professionals tend to ignore the relationship of means and ends in conflict situations but rather that each retains a circumscribed emphasis or focus that reflects one’s formal education. One is reminded of former Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s statement shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor: “I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of... the Army and the Navy.” and General George C. Marshall’s response to a British proposal during World War II: “I would be loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes.”3 This apparent lack of an interdisciplinary approach becomes more significant when viewed in the context of the increasing complexity of conflict in the modern period, wherein political objectives reflect sophisticated notions of deterrence, behavior modification, perception and misperception in international politics, and other equally abstract ideas. Likewise, military aims are becoming more complex, and at certain levels of conflict the “theory and practice of war” reflects more of the former than the latter to such an extent that the synthesis of the two needs careful and continuing examination.

The complexities of ends and means tend to become more obvious when viewed through an analytical framework that attempts to identify and assess various categories of uncertainty. Four categories of uncertainty, defined as incomplete knowledge, are used in this analysis of political and military objectives. Though initially developed in analysis of the impact of uncertainty on weapon system procurement, these categories appear to have general analytical validity.4
- The first category is process uncertainty,
and it is external in nature. It is a function of issues largely beyond the control of the military in that it results from initiatives undertaken by one’s own government or an actor in the international community. For example, although the military may have a say in its government’s deliberations concerning arms limitations or arms transfers, the military professional must react to the eventual political decision. Likewise, the military professional must assess and, when appropriate, attempt to respond to political and military initiatives undertaken by existing or potential adversaries. In these and other types of situations, the military’s role is reactive, that is, it accommodates to uncertainty created by processes external to the military institution.

- By contrast, program uncertainty is internal in nature and occurs as a consequence of the interaction among various institutional components. For example, how well a combined arms force can be expected to operate as an orchestrated whole would be, in part, a function of its program uncertainty.
- The third category is target uncertainty. For our purposes, target refers to the real or perceived military aim or objective.
- The final category is technological uncertainty; it attempts to identify the degree to which incomplete knowledge exists about the strategic and tactical reliability of technological systems. This categorization notwithstanding, one should recognize that some overlap exists, and that the degree and type of uncertainty exist at arbitrary points across a continuum of incomplete knowledge.

Complexities of Political and Military Objectives: A Broad Framework for Analysis

In an effort to determine political and military objectives, the thought process, decisions, and actions of statesmen and military professionals must, of necessity, reflect a similar set of factors or variables. However, because the two groups tend to view the variables with differing and at times contrasting perceptions, the normative relationship of means and ends is not support of the latter by the former but a relationship that is reciprocal in nature. In theory, the political objectives are formulated with sufficient clarity to permit the establishment of military aims that serve the ends of policy. But in reality, the complex nature of political and military objectives leads to an interactive process that results in outcomes more representative of a synthesis than a priori reasoning.

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Perhaps the most important element to be understood in the process of arriving at political and military objectives is the differing perceptions held by statesmen and soldiers. Statesmen appear to view objectives in relatively abstract terms, if for no other reason than to permit some latitude for determining whether objectives eventually are achieved. Moreover, the objectives frequently are characterized by a degree of ambiguity that allows for modifications as events unfold. In short, statesmen usually formulate objectives that seek to affect a change in behavior through the flexible use of force, and they reserve the right to determine when that condition has been achieved.

By contrast, the military professional tends to view military objectives in more absolute terms. While recognizing the preeminence and characteristic abstractness of political objectives, the military professional is required to establish military objectives of sufficient
clarity to permit the orderly planning, organization, and employment of military forces. Precise and explicit language is essential in order to assure comprehension and compliance through various levels of organizational command. As the military professional establishes the objectives, certain values, norms, and traditions tend to influence the manner in which he proceeds. For example, by training and education, the professional officer is dedicated to the goal of winning. Expressions such as “Damn the torpedoes! Go ahead!” and “In war there is no substitute for victory.” are learned responses that often reach the conscious level and most certainly exist in the subconscious of many professionals. Such notions condition the manner in which the professional officer establishes and pursues military objectives.

One could argue, therefore, that the learned behavior of those responsible for articulating political and military objectives leads each in different directions. Statesmen strive for abstractness and a measure of flexibility while military officers would consider the establishment of an unclear or uncertain military objective as totally unprofessional. These differences become more pronounced as one moves from the issue of formulating objectives to questions concerning the levels at which conflict occurs and the actual process of using force.

The Levels of Warfare and the Process of Using Force

The levels of conflict have undertaken notable change since the end of World War II, and it is instructive to note that the new formulations are primarily the result of efforts by civilian theorists from within the academic community. Two of these concepts—strategic nuclear deterrence and coercive diplomacy—are at opposite ends of a continuum of conflict and reflect relatively abstract notions of how military force should be used to attain political objectives. For the most part, military professionals have been forced to accommodate themselves to these new formulations. They have done so reluctantly because of the fundamental assumptions that underlie the concepts are at odds with the learned behavior of the military professional. Of these two concepts, deterrence probably has caused the most concern and some frustration among the military.

**strategic nuclear deterrence**

In 1946 four civilian analysts at Yale University published a major work that established the basic rationale for the concept of deterrence in the nuclear age. Their analysis led to conclusions that differed markedly from traditional military views.

Thus, the first and most vital step in any American security program for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind. The writer in making that statement is not for the moment concerned about who will win the next war in which atomic bombs are used. Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.

Thus, at the outset of the nuclear age, an American civilian educational institution became the source of a concept that challenged the basic objective of conflict as seen by the military professional. Although the notion of deterrence has since become the cornerstone in U.S. defense policy, some military professionals continue to challenge certain aspects of the deterrence concept. Fortunately, little disagreement, if any, exists between statesmen and soldiers about the basic need to deter nuclear war, for it is a widely accepted axiom that no political objective could justify initiation of nuclear conflict. The divergence of views between the two groups stems from difficulty the military officer experiences in an attempt to translate
into practice the concept of deterrence; that is, how does an officer translate the abstractions of conceptual thought into military terms that lead to practical application? The civilian theorist can argue that the ultimate objective is to deter nuclear war and that nuclear weapons possess utility only for that end. But it is the responsibility of the military officer to go beyond deterrence and, as Michael Howard stated recently, “think what to do if deterrence fails.” It is at this point that the learned behavior of the statesman and soldier diverge. Both can accept the validity of deterrence as an objective, but the soldier finds it difficult to establish a compatible military objective.

Some military officers argue that deterrence will possess credibility only if a nuclear war-fighting capability exists. Others carry the debate further by calling for nuclear forces that are capable of “winning” a nuclear exchange. In essence, such arguments by officers are attempts to reduce the degree of uncertainty associated with the deterrence concept. Military training and education make clear to the professional officer that an analysis of the categories of uncertainty is required for any challenging situation, and, given the lack of empirical data about nuclear war, such an analysis becomes essential. Of the various categories of uncertainty, the officer understands that process uncertainty is of utmost importance because it is external to the military scheme of things and thus beyond the military’s influence. As examples, the status and capabilities of one’s allies could change; one’s own government, intentionally or otherwise, might place the military at a disadvantage by political action; or the potential adversary could effect a significant technological breakthrough. In each of these instances, the professional officer needs to consider the net consequences in terms of one’s own capability and, perhaps more important, how to hedge against such eventualities.

Other uncertainties associated with deterrence are just as significant, yet they fall within one’s internal structure and thus are subject to some control. The first of these is program uncertainty—a function of what Clausewitz refers to as friction. It is the element that makes the simple things of theoretical war so difficult in practice. “Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.”

Perhaps the only means through which one can reduce the consequences of friction is through practice and experience. But since practice and experience are unavailable and unlikely for nuclear war, the professional officer must accept a high degree of program uncertainty or friction. The only real alternative option for the professional officer is to convey his sense of concern to the statesmen and quite frequently that approach results in demands for redundant military capability, that is, larger force structures. If the demands are viewed as unreasonable, statesmen can rationalize rejection by pointing out that the military officer “will always argue that the danger of war requires increased armaments; he will seldom argue that increased armaments make war practical or desirable. He always favors preparedness, but he never feels prepared.” In such an instance, statesmen may tend to minimize real or perceived uncertainty by relying on assumptions that may have little basis in fact.

Another internal category of uncertainty that produces tension between soldiers and statesmen is the issue of targetry, and the establishment of deterrence as the cornerstone of U.S. defense policy has intensified this stress. The military officer who concerns himself with the question of targetry in strategic warfare tends to place primary emphasis on the need for counterforce targeting, that is, the use of one’s strategic forces against selected military capabilities of the adversary. By contrast, statesmen concerned
with the issue of deterrence quite often view such an approach as dangerous because counterforce targeting may be perceived by the adversary as a threatening first-strike capability. Thus, what the professional officer sees as risk avoidance is seen by the statesmen as risk escalation.

statesmen usually formulate objectives that seek to affect a change in behavior through the flexible use of force, and they reserve the right to determine when that condition has been achieved. . . . the military professional tends to view military objectives in more absolute terms.

The final category of uncertainty, classified as technological uncertainty, is particularly serious within the context of deterrence. Military professionals are aware that an inverse relationship usually exists between technological sophistication and tactical success when new weapon systems are employed. Rarely do highly sophisticated weapon systems perform "as advertised" until the "bugs" have been worked out in extensive operational use. Therefore, there is concern about the reliability of systems integral to the concept of deterrence, and a perceived need exists to reduce the uncertainty in ways that may not be acceptable to statesmen. For example, the military professional may insist on various means of testing weapon systems under conditions as realistic as possible in order to increase the confidence factor. Alternatively, he may argue for considerable redundancy, which at times requires the use of backup systems of more proven reliability. Statesmen, of course, may well view such approaches as expensive, wasteful, and provocative, the complexities of technological uncertainty notwithstanding.

coercive diplomacy

At the opposite end of the conflict continuum is the notion of coercive diplomacy, and like deterrence, it is a product of scholars and not soldiers. Coercive diplomacy is characterized by attempts to affect the motivation or will of the opponent; it is more a test of commitment or resolution and less a test of strength or capability. Coercive diplomacy calls for the use of military power in "an exemplary, demonstrative manner, in discrete and controlled increments, to induce the opponent to revise his calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict." Force is coupled and orchestrated with inducements and incentives to produce a "carrot and stick" approach to conflict resolution.

Under appropriate circumstances, statesmen would tend to favor such an approach to conflict for several reasons. Perhaps foremost is the fact that military force clearly is subordinated to political objectives throughout the process of force application. The circumscribed tasking of the force tends to limit its size and capability and, moreover, permits the exercise of direct, high-level command and control systems and procedures. Such characteristics provide greater assurances to statesmen that military organizational structures and their tasking can be controlled to accommodate a changed political environment. Since compromises, negotiations, and bargaining with the adversary are part of the conceptualization of the employment of military force, the use of limited force and the existence of high-confidence command and control capability permit a relatively assured
response to escalation and deescalation efforts. Coercive diplomacy has a measure of appeal to statesmen in that its aftermath presents fewer political problems and thus tends to assure a greater degree of stability to the settlement.

However, the very factors that make an approach to the use of force attractive to statesmen are those that cause concern to soldiers. Indeed, translating into practice a theory calling for the use of force in a discrete and controlled manner poses formidable challenges and provides a major test for military competency.

The first and perhaps most difficult task is the establishment of the military objective that correlates with the political objective of modifying the calculations of the adversary. Unlike more traditional approaches, wherein the military objective could be the acquisition of territory, neutralization of the opponent’s military capability, or some modification of the adversary’s political or socioeconomic system, coercive diplomacy requires military efforts that appropriately can challenge the resolution of the adversary. In the Cuban missile crisis, for example, the United States established a quarantine of Cuba as a tactical military objective. Formulated by statesmen and not soldiers, it could do little to affect the Soviet missiles already deployed in Cuba. Nevertheless, it conveyed the proper message, and subsequent steps taken by the United States added to its viability. The United States quickly withdrew inward the perimeter of the quarantine by about one-third of the original distance, and eventually it allowed two ships to pass before halting a Panamanian ship under registry to the Lebanese but chartered by the Soviets. For the military planner, who must consider a multiplicity of contingencies for the type of operation described, the establishment of a clear and forthright statement of the military objective becomes extremely difficult.

Moreover, the execution phase of such an operation challenges the learned behavior patterns of the military professional. Actions that he may wish to take as a matter of prudence concerning the size, composition, capability, and disposition of force may be viewed by statesmen as inappropriate or counterproductive. The timing of force deployment and employment, viewed as critical by the statesmen, may be inconsistent with established military procedures. More significantly, it may become necessary to pass command and control of the tactical situation to the statesmen. On this latter point, one should recognize that the military finds it professionally embarrassing to have civilians interfere in the conduct of military operations, the rationale for such control notwithstanding.

Precise and explicit language is essential in order to assure comprehension and compliance through various levels of organizational command.

In addition to the obvious complexities inherent in the process of coercive diplomacy, its intricate nature becomes more fully manifest when viewed in terms of the various categories of uncertainty described earlier. Process uncertainty, which is external in nature and beyond control of those employing coercive diplomacy, is a major issue of concern. Successful coercive diplomacy requires the existence of numerous preconditions, some of which largely are dependent on the perceptions one holds of the adversary. For example, the belief by the United States that there exists a favorable asymmetry in motivation between it and an adversary may prompt the United States to apply coercive diplomacy. But if the asymmetry favors
the adversary (as was the case in Vietnam), then coercive diplomacy is unlikely to succeed. How to hedge against this major source of uncertainty is a formidable problem for the soldier and one that is likely to place him at odds with the statesmen. The former understand that if the asymmetry in motivation or resoluteness is judged erroneously, then the most likely eventual military recourse is to embark on a course of graduated escalation, an option that probably will not be favored by the U.S. military for the foreseeable future.

Of equal seriousness is that element of incomplete knowledge we have referred to as program uncertainty or friction. Coercive diplomacy is highly sensitive to precise timing for threat conveyance, force application, and force withdrawal. Because of friction (once again we use the term in a Clausewitzian sense) and the inherent nature of coercive diplomacy, a well-orchestrated military undertaking cannot be assured. The military professional must deal adequately with numerous, complex, and interrelated variables such as lack of high-confidence level intelligence, hastily organized units from different services, unorthodox procedures, possible geographic remoteness of the target area, limited combat support, and a host of other factors. Both the nature and number of these variables suggest that operations to which they apply will not be characterized by efficiency and that the probabilities of success can be increased only slightly through detailed planning and a high degree of competence at every level of command.

An equally significant category of uncertainty associated with coercive diplomacy is the proper identification of the target. Since the political objective of coercive diplomacy focuses on the calculations and not the capabilities of the adversary, it is likely that the military professional will find it particularly difficult to identify a suitable target. In a sense, the vagueness of the political objective virtually assures similar uncertainties about the military objective. Some military officers might find this condition sufficiently frustrating to warrant abrogating this responsibility to statesmen who, by training and education, feel more comfortable with abstract notions. But aside from the issue of formulation, there remains the uncertainty about attainment. Since a fine line appears to exist between realistic perseverance and stubborn adherence, one may not know when a

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Modern conflict, with all its potential for sophistication and destruction, can find relevance in the Clausewitzian axiom that “war has its own language but not its own logic.”

given level of military effort has achieved its purpose. One should also recognize that the learned behavior of the military professional would tend to encourage him less toward prudence and more toward assertiveness.

Finally, coercive diplomacy lends itself to high levels of technological uncertainty, particularly because the demands are quite high and the margin for error is small. The inverse ratio between technological sophistication and tactical reliability referred to earlier is particularly relevant for coercive diplomacy. Since the right amount of force, used in the appropriate manner, remains an essential ingredient in this process, one must have a high confidence level in the systems to be employed. Higher than expected failure rates for certain systems might significantly reduce force capability and send an erroneous signal in what is essentially a test of resoluteness. On the other hand, adding redundant systems to compensate for possible tech-
nological failure may send an equally erroneous signal.

There are other dimensions to technological risk that deserve mention. The first concerns the perceptions of less technologically advanced adversaries who may be unable to comprehend the potential capability of high technology systems. The high-kill probabilities offered by precision-guided munitions, for example, may not have the desired influential effect on an adversary whose frame of reference is quantitative and not qualitative. The second dimension concerns the extent to which proliferation of advanced systems within the world community affects the planning and execution phases of future military operations. Although one might be aware of the types and numbers of technologically advanced offensive and defensive systems in the adversary’s force structure, the actual combat readiness capability and the effectiveness of such systems may not be known with sufficient certainty to plan a precise operation. Consequently, one could err considerably in the attempt to determine how much force is necessary. Too little force would demonstrate lack of commitment, while too much force might “entail costs in prestige, reputation, or self-respect that outweigh the threat.”

Likewise, the formulation of the grammar of war requires an understanding of the logic to such an extent that explanations about means and ends between statesmen and soldiers would become unnecessary.

Modern conflict, with all its potential for sophistication and destruction, can find relevance in the Clausewitzian axiom that “war has its own language but not its own logic.” Although both the means of war and its objectives have changed considerably since Clausewitz’s time, the need for their comprehension remains. Indeed, even the briefest and most cursory examination of modern conflict demonstrates that the complexities of means and ends demand that their respective practitioners, soldiers and statesmen, reach a level of analysis hitherto reserved for a small, intellectual minority within each group. Moreover, the complexities of means and ends, the levels of warfare, and the process of using force, as well as the attendant categories of uncertainty, suggest that both statesmen and soldiers are involved in pursuits that increasingly appear to be characterized by reciprocity. Therefore, the effort to define the logic of modern war must go far beyond the relatively narrow conceptual frameworks used earlier. Likewise, the formulation of the grammar of war requires an understanding of the logic to such an extent that explanations about means and ends between statesmen and soldiers would become unnecessary.

At present, however, it appears that the efforts of statesmen and soldiers continue to move largely along independent lines, that is, focus by the former on the logic of war and concentration by the latter on its grammar. Moreover, each group continues to reflect an intellectual preference for conceptual frameworks derived from circumscribed learned behavior. Perhaps we have reached a phase point in the history of conflict wherein the extant learning of statesmen and soldiers is no longer appropriate and the immediate task for both is to unlearn. If this tentative conclusion is correct, then perhaps the first step to affect change would be an attempt at modification of attitudes and behavior.
through an extensive and systematic cooperative studies effort. How, where, and under what circumstances this approach should be attempted requires considerable analysis. But that it must be attempted appears to this soldier as a moral and professional imperative.

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Notes
4. I am indebted to Lieutenant Colonel John F. Guilianici, USAF, for this conceptualization. For further discussion, see Colonel Robert R. Lochry et al., "Final Report of the USAF Academy Risk Analysis Study Team," United States Air Force Academy, 1 August 1971.
6. Ibid., p. 76. Emphasis in the original.
11. Ibid., p. 18.

Four weeks after Dresden we attacked the ancient cathedral city of Würzburg and shattered one of the finest Tiepolo ceilings of Europe in the bishop's palace. The bomber crews were particularly happy to obliterate Würzburg because they knew that the deadly German tracking and fire-control radars were called Würzburg radars. Nobody told the crews that the city of Würzburg had as much to do with the radars as our own cathedral city of Winchester had to do with Winchester rifles. I began more and more to envy the technicians on the other side who were helping the German night fighter crews to defend their homes and families. The night fighters and their supporting organization put up an astonishing performance, continuing to fight and to cause us serious losses until their last airfields were overrun and Hitler's Germany ceased to exist. They ended the war morally undefeated. They had the advantage of knowing what they were fighting for. Not, in those last weeks of the war, for Hitler, but for the preservation of what was left of their cities and their people. We had given them at the end of the war the one thing that they lacked at the beginning, a cause clean to fight for.

Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (New York, 1979), p. 39
ICBM VULNERABILITY, MOBILITY, AND ARMS CONTROL

the decisional horns of dilemma

DR. DONALD M. SNOW

MUCH heat and controversy in the last Presidential election focused on the state of American strategic nuclear forces and their comparison with Soviet counterparts. A lightning rod in this debate, discussed in extensive forums that included the floor of the Democratic National Convention, was the projected vulnerability of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to a preemptive strike by counter-force-capable Soviet missiles, a problem that one leading commentator has described as "the strategic issue of the 1980s."1

The ICBM vulnerability problem has, of course, been the product of ongoing and projected improvements in multiple-warhead and guidance technologies that have decreased circular error probables (CEPs) spectacularly, to the point of achieving a high single-shot kill probability (SSKP) against even hardened targets like ICBM silos (so-called hard-target kill capability). This achievement is significant both for targeting against retaliatory systems and the vital command and control links needed to manage strategic resources in a wartime environment.
Much of the current debate of what to do about ICBM vulnerability has centered on proposals to utilize constrained mobile basing (the multiple protective shelters or MPS system) of the missile experimental (MX) as a countermeasure. As I argued in the July-August 1980 edition of the Review, the proposed system has conceptual problems that render it less than an optimal solution. Implicit in that assessment, the MPS system seeks to please two masters, force invulnerability and arms control verifiability, when these two requisites are not entirely compatible. By seeking to compromise these two ends, the result is a less than satisfactory overall resolution. The purpose of this article is to explore some of the reasons why incompatibility exists.

One of the basic problems with the proposed solution to ICBM vulnerability is that it appears to be a discreet response to a specific problem. This narrow view may be mistaken. The implications of hard-target kill capability and how it is countered have consequences for the entire strategic deterrence system. If uncountered, improved accuracy threatens the survivability of retaliatory forces that has been a prime ingredient in the retaliatory strategy underlying American policy. If countered by recourse to a deceptively based mobile system like MX, the results could greatly complicate arms control processes based in the ability to monitor compliance by nonintrusive means.

The purpose of deterrence is to convince a potential aggressor not to attack. It is accomplished through one or both of two threats. These threats are the promise that you have sufficient counterforce to stop and thus frustrate aggression, thereby denying goal accomplishment, or to inflict such massive punishment on the aggressor as to make the costs prohibitively high. Since deploying effective missile defense systems is outlawed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the absence of defense has made the punishment threat the deterrent base and has formed the basis of strategy and force requirements.

In the early 1960s, this threat definition was canonized as assured destruction and became mutual as the Soviets built their own nuclear forces to parity. With both sides possessing secure second-strike forces, preemptive incentives were minimized, and the result was stability in the nuclear relationship. Klaus Knorr explains, “As long as . . . the conditions of the mutual balance of terror . . . prevail, it is hard to think of conflict objectives valuable enough to justify the deliberate initiation of large-scale nuclear war.”

Regardless of whether forces are aimed at population concentrations or infrastructure targets, the basis is the punishment threat. Once the force levels necessary to assure destruction threat are established, the emphasis moves toward stabilizing the relationship. As Fritz Ermarth puts it:

The essence of U.S. “doctrine” is to deter central nuclear war at relatively low levels of arms effort (“arms race stability”) and strategic anxiety (“crisis stability”) through the credible threat of catastrophic damage to the enemy should deterrence fail.

Two corollaries relevant to the missile accuracy improvement question flow from these basic preferences. The first relates to force characteristics. Forces must be invulnerable to preemptive attack to ensure their availability for retaliatory missions (survivability) and they must be capable of overcoming adversary defense efforts and reaching targets (penetrability).

Accuracy improvements affect these requirements in different ways. Accuracy improvement approaching hard-target kill capability makes fixed offensive systems vulnerable and thus decreases retaliatory capacities, but improved accuracy also strengthens the assured destruction threat by enhancing single-shot kill probability. Fewer warheads need to be dedicated to given
targets, creating the ability to broaden target coverage or to keep more forces in strategic reserve.

The second corollary relates to targeting plans. Assured destruction strongly implies countervalue targeting or aiming retaliatory forces at things people value most, such as their lives and the necessities for postwar recovery like factories, roads, and electric power generators. Countervalue targeting does not require enormous accuracy, although accuracy improvements do allow greater target discrimination away from gross urban concentrations to more discrete targets like recovery capacities.

The alternate targeting strategy is counterforce, and counterforce targets can be divided into two categories: strategic retaliatory forces and residual forces remaining after an initial nuclear exchange. Counterforce strategy against retaliatory forces (ICBMs and command and control facilities) requires attainment of hard-target kill capability, since a missile not destroyed can be used in retaliation. To the extent that attaining counterforce capability makes the targeting plan attractive, the result is a threat to invulnerability and is destabilizing.

Missile accuracy improvement began in earnest during the latter 1960s, largely because of two interrelated factors. First, the early McNamara Defense Department’s decision not to deploy more than 1054 land-based ICBMs and 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) meant that enhanced American capability would have to come from improvements in existing systems. Second, Soviet strategic expansion was evident by the latter 1960s. For a variety of political, bureaucratic, budgetary, and technological reasons, it was decided that American strategic advantage was best served by engaging in a qualitative rather than quantitative competition.

Once engaged, the outcomes of this process were unpredictable, incremental, and difficult to control. The creative nature of scientific research and decentralization of the American research system make the results of efforts difficult to predict and control. The basic nature of science and engineering is precision, so that “regardless of official doctrine, teams of scientists and engineers do and will inevitably discover ways of improving system performance.”

Control is made more difficult because what happens “... is a composite of behavior taking place in at least three distinguishable, but overlapping arenas [war planning, system and force acquisition, and the public debate].” In that organizational setting, coordination problems are inevitable.

Accuracy improvements in reentry vehicle (RV) and warhead design have been the result of two technological processes: reductions in warhead size, allowing more guidance equipment to be placed in existing systems; and computer miniaturization, permitting more guidance to fit in available space. The first notable breakthrough was the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) bus, which is a postboost vehicle that was a technological by-product of the space program. Its testing was completed in 1968, with initial deployment in 1970. These breakthroughs in guidance technology have allowed spectacular CEP reductions and new possibilities across the spectrum of weapon systems.

The cumulative effect has been to create the possibility of hard-target kill and, hence, counterforce capability. At the war planning level, these developments...

... affect the entire spectrum of accuracy, mobility, the multiplicity and discrimination of available strike weapons, yields, surveillance, command, control, information and communications, as well as associated means for obtaining intelligence and for analysis and decision.

The ability to select targets with a high degree of confidence also strikes at some long-held notions about how nuclear war would be
fought: "What we see here is nothing less than decoupling of two ideas which have been closely conjoined since 1945 and perhaps since 1861: the ideas of strategic warfare and of mass destruction."§

These technological developments attack the heart of the strategic consensus based in the assured destruction threat. Considerations of preemption to dilute retaliatory capacity and target selectivity to limit damage challenges basic tenets without offering obvious alternate bases. One observer concludes that "technology can destabilize the strategic balance and thus provide less, rather than more, security."[9] Senate Frank Church, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, worried about the mutual effects on secure second-strike calculations: "If these forces are deployed, each nation's fear of a first strike will be dramatically increased."[10] These potential consequences have forced attempts to rationalize what technology has made possible.

Justifications for missile accuracy improvements have been and continue to be highly controversial. The basic reason for this controversy is that the capability is Damoclean in nature and thus produces schizophrenic explanations about its good and bad effects.

The positive and negative edges of the Damoclean sword can be restated. Positively, improved accuracy broadens target coverage by permitting fewer warheads to be aimed at various targets and, once achieved, allows targeting of things beyond the capabilities of less accurate delivery systems. Negatively, retaliatory systems like the fixed, land-based ICBMs are among those additional targets. The result is the ICBM vulnerability issue and countermeasures to it.

This Damoclean character makes discussions of accuracy improvement schizoid. In the American debate, this schizophrenia can be summarized as follows: American possession of counterforce capability is stabilizing because it enhances flexibility and improves our deterrent position; Soviet attainment of the same capacity is destabilizing because it will tempt them to launch a preemptive attack against our ICBMs. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger authored this American position and explained it before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

We have to distinguish among disarming first strike, no first use, and counterforce. Counterforce can go against any military target. It can go against IRBM sites as opposed to ICBM sites. It would go against airfields or army camps. It has a range, and one can go counterforce rather than countervalue without necessarily putting himself into a position of having a disarming first-strike capability.[11]

Tammen elaborates the virtues attributed to the American improvement program:

Two points generally are made in favor of a new hard-target warhead program. First, it would increase efficiency by reducing the number of warheads now targeted against one hard facility. Second, it would allow greater flexibility and hence effectiveness in targeting command posts, nuclear weapons storage facilities, communications centers, and other hardened sites that may remain vulnerable in a second-strike environment.[12]

This retaliatory-preemptive division makes the discussion schizophrenic. Because we maintain that our basic intentions are retaliatory, possession of a capability with obvious preemptive implications will tempt the Russians to think about striking first but will not create the same temptation for us.

Such a distinction is simply incredible and creates a Jekyll-Hyde dichotomy wherein Dr. Jekyll's role is assigned to the United States and Mr. Hyde's to the Soviets. Further, it assumes that the United States would not be tempted to swallow the potion counterforce capability provides and assume Hyde-like qualities. The argument becomes especially strained when applied to damage limitation arguments; in a retaliatory strike, we could destroy empty Soviet ICBM silos to prevent their reloading or holding missiles in reserve but would not engage in the more fruitful
damage limitation activity of destroying those silos before their deadly contents had been dispatched. Any Soviet planner who accepted our reasoning would be a quite rightful candidate for assignment to a Siberian power station.

The problem underlying this inconsistency is, of course, the relationship between capabilities and intentions and the extent to which intentions can be inferred from physical capacity. Defenders of the Schlesinger thesis do not deny that hard-target kill capability is an outgrowth of our accuracy improvement program (in fact, they generally applaud it) as well as that of the Soviets. Rather, the imputation of a Soviet preemptive intent derives from Soviet public disdain for the assured destruction concept and their advocacy of counterforce targeting as part of war winning and recovery should deterrence fail. Similarly, the controlled, second-strike application of our counterforce capability is supported by our public advocacy of second-striking and our emphasis on limiting a nuclear war should it occur.

That the Soviets must find this distinction suspicious is pointed out by Paul Warnke: “The fine tuning of our nuclear weapons and delivery systems could create fears of counterforce attack on the other side and hence be destabilizing.” Speaking directly to the so-called Schlesinger doctrine, William Kincade argues:

In terms of perceptions, however, his separation of targeting doctrine from hardware and his denial of first-strike intentions were somewhat academic, since the U.S. was pursuing simultaneously a warfighting targeting and employment doctrine and missile accuracy improvements which lend themselves to first-strike interpretation.

Raymond Garthoff adds that espousing the virtues of counterforce represents a doctrinal movement away from assured destruction and ties the issue to the SALT process:

The reversal of American stated policy on the destabilizing nature of counterforce capabilities, and the open pursuit of such capabilities since 1974 has considerably raised Soviet suspicions, especially as it accompanied the failure to reach a SALT agreement based on the Vladivostok accords.

The emergence of counterforce-capable weapon systems and their justifications are controversial and create very real problems for both sides. The thorny nature of these difficulties is well demonstrated in the ongoing debate about the MX, which adds an arms control dimension to the controversy.

The proposed MX would be an extremely sophisticated addition to the current American ICBM inventory of Titan, Minuteman II, and Minuteman III missiles. The MX is extremely powerful, with a “... throw-weight that would be at least four times as great as ... the current Minuteman III” which has about half that of the Soviet SS-18 “heavy” missile. The MX has hard-target kill capability with a CEP now estimated at .05 nautical miles, compared to projections for the Soviet SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 counterparts in the 1000-foot range by the early 1980s.

What makes the MX all the more remarkable is the variety of modes in which it can be deployed. MX could be housed in silos or in a variety of mobile modes without seriously degrading its performance.

This MX quality adds an arms control dimension to the whole problem area. A mobile MX responds directly to ICBM vulnerability, but its enormously sophisticated guidance system makes it hard-target kill capable and raises the range of controversy that counterforce capacity engenders. The debate becomes arms-control relevant because, as a hedge against Soviet hard-kill capability, MX is most effective when using some deceptive form of deployment (so that the Soviets would not know which aim points to target and consequently would have to destroy them all, in the process depleting a large part of their warheads). Deceptive deployment can violate national technical
means of verification provisions that have formed the basis of successful arms control agreements and hence creates concerns within the arms control community. Each characteristic merits elaboration.

It is no surprise that land-based, fixed-site ICBM forces should be the first system to become vulnerable: they are in known, immovable locations and are hence the easiest to target. Since a large portion of each side’s arsenals are ICBMs (about one-third of deliverable U.S. megatonnage and over 80 percent of Soviet megatonnage), “The question for the decade, for both superpowers in the 1980s with respect to the structure of their strategic forces, should be what to do about land-based ICBMs.”17

John Newhouse summarizes the various ways to deal with a vulnerable Minuteman force: “(1) dismantling all or part of it; (2) superhardening the silos; (3) defending it; (4) putting it on mobile launchers.”18 Adopting a launch-on-warning (LOW) firing policy can be added to this list. Each possibility has advantages and disadvantages that can be summarized:

—Dismantling the ICBM force is advocated by those who maintain that: a non survivable force component creates a temptation to preempt and is worse than no force; and it makes more sense to invest in more survivable systems like SLBMs (as reflected in the United States “one-way freedom to mix” proposals in SALT I). Dismemberment is opposed on the grounds that: ICBMs have positive characteristics not shared by other systems (e.g., positive prelaunch command and control, delivery accuracy, high payload); and the ICBMs have important missions (e.g., creating “corridors” for penetrating bombers by destroying Soviet air defenses) and pose offensive and defensive problems for the Soviets that would not be present in their absence (essentially a defense of the Triad concept).

—Additional hardening of existing silos or siloing in alternate, harder sites such as deep caves generate little support. Objections arise from two sources: the activity is very expensive, and its effects would be temporary. Colin Gray summarizes these objectives: “...the arithmetic is not promising for its effectiveness (e.g., and increase in nominal silo blast resistance from 2,000 to 3,000 psi ... can be offset by an improvement in missile CEP of 50 feet.)”19

—Missile defense was actively debated in the latter 1960s and early 1970s (the Johnson Sentinel and Nixon Safeguard proposals), and a Safeguard configuration was built at Grand Forks and was operational for a short time. ABM was ultimately rejected because of questionable effectiveness and cost given projected offensive improvements like MIRV. In addition, the incompatibility of active defenses with strategy was raised (an effective ABM system would make penetrability questionable and partially undermine deterrence stability notions), and the debate culminated with the ABM Treaty. Projected breakthroughs in laser and charged-particle beam research20 have ballistic missile defense potential, however.

—If other options are rejected, the remaining possibilities are to move to a LOW firing plan or to go mobile. LOW involves firing missiles when one detects an incoming missile force to ensure that forces are not destroyed in their silos and is often condemned as crisis destabilizing. Unless an alternative antidote to the vulnerability problem is found, however, “Those branches of American and Soviet military services that believe they must continue to press the case for land-based missile forces will ... be even more tempted to stress launch-on-warn ing as an option.”21 Some form of mobility thus becomes more attractive than the alternatives.

MX’s hard-target kill capability causes concern, not only because counterforce capability challenges traditional deterrence
stability notions (as discussed earlier) but also because of Soviet force structure. The Soviet Rocket Forces are the preeminent arm of Russian strategic capability. As a result, ICBM vulnerability is a much greater Soviet than American problem and makes MX a particularly threatening possibility: “MX could appear to the Soviets to constitute a credible first-strike threat against their land-based missiles, which are the backbone of Soviet strategic forces.”

A credible U.S. counterforce capability could force the Soviets into a mobility decision for most of the same reasons as are being discussed in the United States. The Soviet’s more limited technological base would be a disadvantage for them in a “mobility race”: targeting from a fixed site is considerably easier than targeting the same weapon from a variety of potential points, the correct one of which can only be known in advance if one plans to preempt. A Soviet decision not to compete in mobile missiles could lead them to other firing options like launch-on-warning. The potential effect would be “... crisis instability and preemption incentives that are undesirable,” and there is some evidence that the U.S.S.R. has already recognized this problem.

Even if the mobile missile question is detached from counterforce capability (e.g., a less accurate mobile missile), mobility remains an arms control problem. The basic problem is that the more mobile a basing system is, the more secure it is, but that security is bought at the expense of arms control verifiability. The result is a basic dilemma for policymakers: the purpose of mobile systems is to evade the detection that would allow an enemy to destroy them. The more efficiently the systems are hidden, the more secure they are against counterforce-capable Soviet weapons. While verification improvements are possible (e.g., cooperative agreements to open silos periodically for inspection, only constructing missiles near launch sites so they can be counted in a manner similar to nuclear submarines), some counting imprecision occurs; as Newhouse puts it, arms control “stability relies on knowing what the other has.”

Even supporters of mobile systems like MX agree there is an arms control cost in the decision to go mobile. Gray, for instance, states bluntly that... most of the land-mobile possibilities would place intolerable strain upon national technical means of verification. American officials might be compelled to choose between a SALT III regime that cannot be adequately verified and the demise of the SALT system.

Sidney D. Drell agrees, stating dourly, “The verification problems raised by this option [mobile missiles] could mean the end of arms control by negotiated agreement.”

There is an obvious paradox in this situation. On the one hand, arms race stability is best served by verifiable limitations through arms control agreements like SALT. On the other hand, crisis stability is best served by having secure forces. If land-based systems are to remain part of the deterrent force, mobility is the most effective way to sustain that security. Thus, the accomplishment of the dual U.S. preferences for arms race stability and crisis stability are subjected to strain in a world of hard-target kill capable weapon systems: verifiable agreements require adversary knowledge of launcher numbers that entails simultaneously some increase in the ability to target systems. Knowing that forces are vulnerable raises incentives for preemptive or launch-on-warning firing postures and contributes to crisis instability.

Attempts to reconcile this dilemma are troublesome. First, if a U.S. decision to go mobile is followed by a Soviet decision to do likewise, it is quite possible that the Soviets would go to a less verifiable mobile basing mode, such as road mobile. Second, deception and precise verification are not entirely compatible. The extra missile shelters in the
MPS system, for instance, could be loaded with excess missiles in a crisis, and even randomly opening holes for inspection does not entirely overcome the cheating potential of putting extra missiles in the shelters. Certainly the United States would suspect the Soviets of attempting such deception, and there is little reason to believe the U.S.S.R. would not harbor the same suspicions about our system. The only way to reinstate precise verification is through cooperation and intrusive monitoring. As one analyst puts it, “In terms of the intrusiveness of the monitoring procedures and the amount of U.S.-Soviet cooperation required, verification in an MPS environment is without precedent in strategic arms control.”

If precise verification and mobility are incompatible and the decision is reached to sacrifice arms control security for secure forces, one possible outcome is “... that mobile deployments would touch off a destabilizing arms race.” Georgi Arbatov, director of the Soviet U.S.A. Institute, concurs in this conclusion:

The arms race could take a course ... which would make new agreements on limiting and reducing armaments far more difficult, if not altogether impossible, due to the insurmountable obstacles for their verification.

There is not universal agreement either that mobile missiles are arms control destructive nor that the ICBM vulnerability issue warrants developing and deploying such systems. Gray, one of the leading advocates of the MX, poses the interesting argument that the vulnerability-mobility problem only becomes an arms control issue if the United States moves ahead in developing the system: Silo vulnerability ... does not become an arms control problem capable of being addressed seriously in SALT, until it is first approached as a defense problem. When the Soviet Union ... observes that the United States is in the process of both solving its silo-vulnerability problem, and ... is developing a major threat to Soviet silo-housed ICBMs, then silo vulnerability ... should become an arms control issue relevant to SALT.

Gray bases this observation on the contention that MX development is necessary to motivate the Soviets to a serious concern about the issue: “MX is the system that should persuade very tough-minded Soviet officials that the hard-target counterforce race cannot be won.” Thus, continued MX development to whatever point it takes to convince the Soviets becomes a bargaining chip for future arms control discussions.

This argument raises objections. If MX deployment becomes inexorable because of perceived necessity or if it requires deployment to convince the Soviets to take the issue seriously, there is the very real question of whether there would be anything substantial to discuss in post-MX arms control negotiations.

Some observers question how serious the ICBM vulnerability problem is. On the basis of elaborate computer simulations of potential Soviet attack scenarios taking into account a variety of variables, John D. Steinbruner and Richard L. Garwin maintain that a successful attack would require such substantial force depletion as to make the prospect unappealing. They conclude:

The strategic forces of the Soviet Union, even if very aggressively modernized, will not be sufficient to threaten with true credibility the decisive destruction of the United States Minuteman force.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, stressing the number of unpredictable factors such an attack would entail, agreed in 1978:

In recognizing that the MINUTEMAN vulnerability problem is a serious concern for us, we also realize that the Soviets would face great uncertainties in assessing whether they have the capability we fear ...

Others disagree about whether vulnerability in one Triad leg would seriously tempt the Soviets to attack the ICBM force. Some observers, for instance, contend that unless all retaliatory systems can be attacked...
simultaneously (including bombers and submarines), the Soviets will remain deterred. Since the Soviets have neither the depressed trajectory SLBM capability to attack alert bombers nor effective antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capacity to pose a threat to SLBM forces, U.S. retaliatory capabilities are not seriously compromised. Critics of this position counter that survivable systems in all three Triad legs are necessary for deterrent stability; that the surviving forces are the least accurate (SLBMs) and most questionably penetrable (bombers); and that once an attack was completed, the United States could be left with the unattractive alternatives of retaliating with a massive countervalue attack inviting a similar response or of accepting a fait accompli.

The preceding discussion has attempted to convey the complexity and contentiousness of the ICBM vulnerability-mobility issue. Despite fundamental disagreements about the nature of the problem and its solution, some central realities must be dealt with. These realities require solutions with important long and short run consequences for the strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The central fact, of course, is that both the United States and Soviet Russia will attain hard-target kill capability in the next few years. The history of abstinence from deploying technologically possible innovations is sufficiently dismal as to suggest that pinpoint accurate systems will enter strategic arsenals soon. This likelihood is enhanced by the fact that the kinds of improvements that lead to greater accuracy (e.g., computer guidance) are very difficult to verify. Bans or limits on numbers of such warheads, even if adequate definitions could be reached, are unpromising; as with MIRV, the only way physically to ensure that limits are being honored would be through constant, on-site monitoring (to guarantee warheads are not switched). The SALT II solution on MIRV (any system tested as a MIRV is considered against the limit) simply encourages deployment to that limit.

If deployment is either highly likely or inevitable, a second reality must be faced: we do not truly know what the consequences of ICBM vulnerability are. This uncertainty is important for at least two reasons. First, uncertainty itself is destabilizing in terms of traditional notions about stable deterrence based in the sure belief that any nuclear usage would be suicidal. To the extent that counterforce attainment allows calculating potential advantage through preemption, the basic threat mechanism is weakened.

Uncertainty has a second effect that makes deployment more likely than it would be otherwise. Although predicting with absolute confidence the effect of ICBM vulnerability may not be possible, enumerating the possibilities is. Some of these possibilities could be no less than catastrophic, providing considerable momentum to counter the “worst case.” In the case of ICBM vulnerability, the most effective countermeasure is the development of deceptively based mobile systems.

The decision either to develop and deploy MX or not to do so contains implications that could alter significantly the strategic nuclear balance. The final determination inevitably places one on the horns of dilemma: the decision not to go to mobile systems inevitably has negative consequences for traditional notions regarding stable deterrence; the decision to do so raises negative arms control implications that even the most ingenious verification schemes do not entirely overcome. It does not appear possible to have it both ways.

There is legitimate contention about the extent vulnerable ICBMs threaten strategic
stability but it is undeniable that there is some impact. Minimally, this is true because deterrence is at heart psychological: one is deterred to the degree that one believes in the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear attack. The more certainly one believes that a nuclear action would be suicidal, the more firmly is one deterred, and thus the more stable is the nuclear relationship.

The simple fact that people can and do calculate the potential advantage that an uncountered hard-target kill attainment provides weakens the deterrent threat. Such discussions have concentrated on the effect of Soviet attainment on the integrity of U.S. deterrent posture, but the reverse is equally true. Given the heavy ICBM dominance in Soviet forces, American attainment of the capability is even a great concern to them, and they necessarily must assume that the United States is engaged in calculations about the same advantages attributed to their possession. This Soviet problem may create an equally important horn of dilemma for them in terms of how they can counter American hard-target kill capability.

Realizing these contingencies would bring into question both the survivability and penetrability of second-strike forces that have been the linchpins of deterrence stability notions for twenty years. At best, vulnerable forces are a tempting target for preemption and create pressures either for a preemptive or launch-on-warning counter doctrine that would be crisis destabilizing. At worst, large-scale system vulnerability could force examination of deterrent system maintenance, with no alternative basis readily apparent.

The decision to develop deceptive mobile systems is no less damaging to arms control efforts. The Gray argument that continued development is needed to make missile accuracy part of the arms control agenda is unconvincing; the cat would clearly be out of the bag at that point. The ability to develop precisely verifiable agreements was a major item in the SALT II ratification debate as is advocacy of the proposed MX system. As the discussion has tried to demonstrate, these two positions are not as compatible as some have argued and raise some thorny problems to be resolved.

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Notes

5. Erman, p. 142.
8. Ibid., p. 289.
20. Dr Barry J. Smirnoff, “Strategic and Arms Control Implications of Laser Weapons: A Preliminary Assessment,” Air University
Air University Establishes the Airpower Research Institute

The Air University has established, within the Air War College, a new organization called the Airpower Research Institute (ARI). The Airpower Research Institute will provide a setting in which in-depth background studies relating to airpower as an instrument of national policy can be conducted to provide a sounder basis for decision-making at the highest echelons, where the formulation and evaluation of options and recommendations on airpower strategy and policy take place. The basic assumptions of the Institute are that military forces cannot be employed successfully without adequate conceptual preparation and that the Air Force mission will continue to face formidable challenges in the areas of doctrine, strategy, and employment.

Research projects at the Airpower Research Institute are to be pursued by both active-duty and reserve Air Force officers and civilian research associates who will normally work individually, though an interdisciplinary approach may be used on projects which require a variety of backgrounds for comprehensive analysis.

This mix of academics, military officers, and civilians from the Department of Defense, in which a variety of viewpoints and backgrounds will come into play, coupled with close interaction with Air University professional military education institutions, is expected to provide an atmosphere that will be a constant source of intellectual stimulation.

The Airpower Research Institute will concentrate its efforts on (1) technical, politico-economic, and military trends that are pertinent to the long-range planning efforts of the USAF and its major components; (2) past, present, and future airpower-employment concepts in terms of doctrine, strategy, and technology; and (3) military professionalism and the challenges of military officership in a changing environment. Its products will be published by Air University and receive wide dissemination throughout the Air Force, the Department of Defense, other government agencies, and relevant civilian communities.

Those desiring more information on the Airpower Research Institute may write Airpower Research Institute, Air University (ATC), Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 36112, or call (205) 293-7074 or AUTOVON 875-7074.
EXECUTIVE STRESS
the symptoms, the cause, and the cure

COLONEL RAYMOND G. TROXLER
LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRY P. WETZLER

FORTY is the most common age for heart attacks in the Air Force. Studies have shown that Air Force members between 32 and 42 years of age are increasingly vulnerable to cardiovascular disease, and the incidence of heart attacks goes up dramatically during these years. After age 40 the
rate in the Air Force begins to decline but continues to rise in the civilian population. It is well documented that age increases one's risk of a heart attack. The decline in the rate of heart attacks in the Air Force after 40 may be due to an increase in retirement of those personnel at risk.

Evidence will be presented to show that this rapid rise in heart attacks between 32 and 42 may be related to psychological stress. In a recent issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association, it was reported that "stress related conditions are responsible for $10 to $20 billion annually in loss of industrial productivity." The key question that must be answered is what causes increased stress in military members as they approach age 40? We know that stress is caused by change, and the severity of the stress is related to our confidence in our ability to handle that change. Between 30 and 40 we begin to consider making changes in our lives. We begin to wonder about our ability to handle our rapidly increasing job responsibilities and the increased competition for promotion. We worry about whether we should retire, and if we retire, how can we make enough money to afford advanced education for our children? Gail Sheehy, in her book Passages, has identified the age between 30 and 40 as the adult "midlife crisis." She claims it is accompanied by a sudden change in the proportion of safety and danger we feel in our lives. Quoting Sheehy, "Somewhere between 35 and 45 if we let ourselves, most of us will have a full-out authenticity crisis."

What is stress? Stress is anything that requires the body to change. Since the only objective evidence of life is growth, and growth is a change, then it follows that stress is an inherent part of life.

The real question is how do we separate the beneficial stress that results in growth from the harmful stress that can harm our bodies? First, we must define harmful stress: Harmful stress is best defined as a real or perceived real threat to our physical or psychological self. When we experience a stress, our body's physiological and psychological defenses are mobilized to meet it. The result is known as "tension." As the brain perceives a stress, the resulting tension releases adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH), which in turn releases a second hormone, cortisol. The presence of cortisol helps the body fight stress by increasing mental alertness and muscle strength and by pushing up blood pressure and accelerating heart rate. The hormone also plays a vital role in providing emergency energy by breaking down stored sugar and fat and releasing these elements into the blood.

Cortisol is so vital for the resistance of the human organism to stress that when patients do not produce enough of the hormone, surgeons must give it to them the day before their surgery so they can survive the stress of the operation. The daily level of cortisol varies by a preset pattern. This pattern is called the diurnal curve of cortisol. It is set by our exposure to light and dark. (See Figure 1.) When we cross more than one time zone,

![Figure 1. Daily cortisol curve](image-url)
between mental stress and atherosclerosis. Why do stress hormones increase the amount of cholesterol if high blood cholesterol can cause coronary artery disease? Blood cholesterol level is adjusted by an enzyme called HMG CoA reductase. When the cholesterol level in the blood is high, the enzyme is turned off. It is turned back on when the level is low. The mechanism works like a faucet that turns the flow of cholesterol into the blood on and off. Unless this adjustment mechanism fails, blood cholesterol will remain normal.

The body must be able to adapt to an imbalanced diet. So it uses any of the major elements of food — starch, protein, and fat — to substitute for a deficiency in any of the three. The central compound that allows this substitution is acetyl coenzyme A (acetyl-CoA). The majority of the blood cholesterol is manufactured by the body from acetyl-CoA. (Normally only one-third of cholesterol comes from the diet.)

The stress hormones adrenalin and cortisol spur cholesterol production by increasing the amount of acetyl-CoA. This upsets the body’s natural balance. In addition, it has been recently reported that, in tissue culture, cortisol activates the HMG-CoA reductase faucet. It is possible that when stress is combined with a high cholesterol diet in humans the increased production of cortisol, caused by the stress, could lead to a higher blood cholesterol. A high blood cholesterol is known to result in coronary artery disease.

Why would the body produce too much of a substance so harmful to itself? The purpose of the biochemical effects of stress on the body was to give primitive man the emergency energy supply he needed to cope with danger. The stress response increased man’s chances for survival because increased levels of blood sugar (brain fuel) and blood fat (muscle fuel) gave him the power to cope with stress.

In our so-called civilized society, stress still evokes the same primitive response. However, instead of burning this sugar and fat as fuel, we sit behind our desks and fuss and fume. There is no place for the increased blood fat to go except into the arteries.

If we are really convinced that stress contributes to high blood cholesterol and atherosclerosis, we have no alternative but to attack the cholesterol problem by finding the main sources of stress in our lives. Knowing about the relationship between stress and coronary artery disease may give us a chance to reduce our risk of having a heart attack by identifying the stress in our environment and either eliminating it or learning to cope with it more effectively.

The Symptoms

On the average, the main source of stress in our lives is related to our jobs. In an American Management Association survey of middle and top managers, 2685 reported on job stress. The following were listed as the main causes of job stress: heavy workloads with the time pressure of unrealistic deadlines, conflicting personal goals and supervisor’s goals, reward systems not based on job performance, lack of feedback, responsibility without authority, and uncertainty about the future of the organization.

Psychologists who have studied the relationship between performance and stress tell us that putting more pressure on subordinates usually leads to more performance. We get less work from those individuals who do not care about their performance and are under no stress. But when some pressure is generated and anxiety increases, so does performance. (See Figure 2.)

If the executive is already a high achiever who has risen in the system because of his production, he probably generates his own stress. At the optimum stress level one shows
that most women pause to reconsider both the inner and outer aspects of their life and try to find the proper balance between their innate talents and their aspirations. Men, on the other hand, react to the midlife crisis with the thought that it is their last chance to pull away from the pack. Men begin to neglect all other aspects of their personalities to fit the narrow role of the organization man. Corporations encourage their employees to feel that their performance is the only criterion of their self-worth.\textsuperscript{11}

The effect of any stress on an individual is the additive effect it has on the sum of the external and internal stresses already present in that individual. The stress comes from our jobs, our degree of hostility, our age (with its associated crisis), our perception of time pressure, and our feelings about our own performance. But there is one final source of stress often overlooked. This is the stress posed upon us by our society. Our society sets certain goals for us that society feels are worthwhile. These goals are based on our age. Between 30 and 40, according to society, we should (as a result of our hard work) have a comfortable home, a happy marriage, and feel as though our future is secure. If an individual has accepted society's timetable, when he does not meet it, he finds himself questioning his self-worth. This questioning of one's self-worth is often the basis for the midlife crisis. Our perception of our self-worth is at the root of the majority of our stress.

Excessive job pressure is associated with a kind of behavior identified as "Type A behavior" by two cardiologists named Friedman and Rosenman. Individuals with Type A behavior have a two-to-six times increased risk of heart attack.\textsuperscript{12} The essence of Type A behavior is hurry and hostility. When the Type A executive is pressed to his maximum, he feels a severe sense of time urgency. In response to this time urgency, he tries to work on two or more projects simultaneously. He may also try to think about two or more things at the same time. (For example, even though someone is speaking with him and is asking for his attention, he thinks about something else.) He begins to neglect all aspects of his life except his work. He finds it difficult to take leave. He eats, works, and moves rapidly. He talks as fast and as explosively as he can. As the time pressure builds even further, he finds himself becoming irritated in traffic jams and while waiting in lines. He becomes extremely impatient and irritable with those around him. He does not trust others, he takes on excessive responsibilities because he thinks his co-workers cannot handle them nearly as well as he can. He tries to fight battles he knows he will probably lose and then becomes upset when he loses the battles. As his hostility builds, he begins to feel lonely, and it becomes difficult for him to confide in anyone. He becomes isolated from his family, friends, and from his work group. As a result, he has trouble solving family problems and delegating responsibility. Worst of all, he feels too guilty to relax. Even if he realizes that he is on the wrong side of the stress curve, he feels guilty when he tries to relax and recover his efficiency.

The Type A executive is a high performer; he has acquired his current position because of his high performance. In his drive for advancement, he generates much of his own stress. If he is a peak performer, he is almost always at the top of the stress-performance curve. When additional stress is generated by his superior, his subordinates, or his environment, his stress tolerance is taxed to the maximum. And, if the stress continues unabated, then the executive begins to become inefficient.

Anyone who drives a sports car or flies an airplane knows that these machines have tolerance limits or red lines on their instruments. What we often do not realize is that our body also has a red line. When we go
Beyond this, we are in danger of stressing our bodies beyond their capabilities. Not only do we feel time pressure, hostility, and inefficiency, we also endanger our health. This is especially dangerous for the high-performance executive who thinks that the solution to all of his problems is simply to work a little harder.

The real solution, of course, is to withdraw temporarily from the stress, consider alternative coping mechanisms, and choose the appropriate one. If one has difficulty with a chosen coping mechanism, then he should seek help.

The Cure

Two of the best ways to cope with executive stress are time management and effective delegation.13 The most important aspect of time management is to schedule daily uninterruptable planning time; usually this is done at the beginning or the end of each work day. The executive should take that time to make a list of those things which he has to do (both long- and short-range goals should be listed). He must prioritize his list, placing the most important things at the top. He must list a reasonable number of things to do and set realistic deadlines for himself and for those who work with him. Deadlines must be realistic because the executive and his subordinates need sufficient time to do a good job. He or she should make every effort to finish the first item on the list before beginning another. The executive should concentrate on one task at a time; just as it is impossible to add three columns of numbers at the same time, it is impossible to work on three problems simultaneously. We should study each problem in-depth in order to avoid making superficial decisions. We should also avoid partial decisions because we often have to retrace our steps to complete the decision. This wastes even more of our time.

Without guilt, we should include daily "relaxation" time. Unfortunately, society’s work ethic makes one feel it is a sin to relax. After a stressful day, the only way we can remove ourselves from the downside of the stress-performance curve is to schedule some relaxation time—even if we think it is a sin. Why is it a sin to relax, if it makes you a more efficient executive? If the job pressure is high, we should get away from the office at lunch time, and we should not talk about business during coffee breaks or at lunch time. If we worry about our work problems at home, this also prevents us from getting proper relaxation. A good mechanism to counteract this worry is to develop a hobby that demands total concentration. It is impossible to think about work problems while engaging in such a hobby. Finally, we should carefully plan our day so that we never neglect our family time. Family time can give us a great escape from our worries. Failing to spend time with our families usually causes family problems that will increase our stress.

Another important part of off-duty relaxation is to plan leisurely, less-structured vacations. If we rigidly “flight plan” our vacations (for example, schedule ourselves to be in Philadelphia by 8:00 A.M., New York by 6:00 P.M., and Boston by the next morning), we will return from our vacation more exhausted than when we left. Leisurely vacations are our best chance to get back to the effective side of our stress tolerance. The secret of managing our time is to withdraw from our stress to give ourselves more planning and creative time and enough time to do a better job.

Regarding delegation, the question is not “Can the executive delegate?” but “Since he has the power to delegate, why doesn’t he?” There are certain prerequisites for proper delegation. We must have realistic goals clearly in mind before we can ask others to help us with them. We have to learn to accept our limitations so we will know when to ask
for help. And we have to accept others’ limitations so we will know when we have pushed them beyond their limitations. Furthermore, we have to learn from our own mistakes, which are inevitable, and teach our subordinates to learn from theirs. Giving ourselves excessive negative self-talk about our mistakes decreases self-confidence and, therefore, our ability to delegate. It would be better for our whole team to learn from their mistakes and then just “press on.”

Another factor in delegation is the communication link between the top and the bottom of our organization. The chief of the organization should periodically talk directly with the lowest ranking individual in the organization. If we find that those in the trenches have a different concept of our organization than those at the top, we can only conclude that there is something wrong with our communication system. Poor communication decreases effective delegation. Another advantage of occasionally talking to those in the trenches is that they, after talking with the boss, will feel that the organization thinks that what they do is important. Those who think their work is important work harder with less stress and more readily accept tasks delegated to them.

Another way to show people that their work is important is to integrate goals of the organization with the goals of subordinates. This is a good motivator to help people accept delegation. As leaders, we should ask ourselves, “Of the so-called ‘paper-pushers’ in the Air Force, how often do they feel that what they do is contributing to the mission of the Air Force, to fly and fight?”

We need to expect the best from everyone who works for us. If we assume that a subordinate is a poor performer, then when we delegate to him, he generally will not disappoint us. We also need to improve the communication skills between subordinates and superiors. One of the main reasons our orders are not carried out exactly to our liking is that we communicate them poorly. One of the main problems with communication is that the higher the executive goes, the more he is expected to listen. While he was taught how to read and write in the educational system, no one has ever taught him how to listen. Effective listening is an art. Not only do we not listen, but we occasionally interrupt people so much that they cannot finish explaining to us what they really wanted to tell us yet we expect them to listen to our orders.

Above all, we need to keep our sense of humor because angry people lose their creativity and do not delegate well. When we delegate, we have to give both negative and positive feedback. For example, we may criticize our subordinates for not meeting suspense dates, but how often do we, in turn, give positive feedback when someone does meet a suspense date?

In general, a thorough knowledge of our jobs increases our power to delegate, which gives us more time to plan and be creative, increases our success, and decreases our stress. New jobs are stressful because we lack this job knowledge. The better we know our jobs, the less our job stress.

The Prevention of Stress

The basic causes of job stress are the fear of not being able to do a job adequately to satisfy our superiors and ourselves and not being able to accomplish goals we consider worthwhile. Another way of saying this is that job stress is a lack of confidence in our ability to do an adequate job or accomplish something worthwhile.

If we define doing a good job as success, we know that our successes in the past have raised our level of self-confidence. Logically, then, success should raise our self-confidence and lower our stress or at least increase our tolerance for stress. Since a certain minimum level of self-confidence is necessary before
one can attempt to succeed, the road to success must begin by finding a way to gain this minimum level of self-confidence.

Self-confidence is the outward expression of our self-image. Self-image comprises the sum of all the negative and positive beliefs we have about ourselves. If a person has more negative than positive beliefs, this person has a negative self-image. If the reverse is true, the person has a positive self-image. Our self-image is acquired not only from the opinion we have of ourselves but also from the feedback and social responses we get from those people in our lives who are important to us—our work group, our family, and our friends.

Our job is a key factor in our self-image. If we intend to prevent stress in our lives, it is very important that we choose our job very carefully. If at all possible our job should be chosen with respect to our natural talents and our personal expectations of ourselves. Expecting to succeed too soon in our lives often results in personal disappointment and a lowering of our opinion of ourselves. People who fail to live up to their own expectations are especially prone to stress.

One's job should be chosen with personal goals in mind. Attainable, well-defined goals are easier to achieve and thus help lower one's personal stress. Commit your goals to paper. Be positive and specific. A goal "to become a better person" is neither specific nor measurable, and since successful attainment of this goal cannot be defined, the goal cannot be achieved.

Once a job is chosen, acquire as much knowledge about that job as possible. This will ensure that those you work with will think of you as an expert source of information. Their reliance on you for information will boost your opinion of yourself.

Next, learn to set mutually beneficial goals. When you get someone to agree to help you achieve a goal, make sure he gets as much out of it as you do. Try to enjoy helping the other people in your group succeed. If you give them positive feedback on their successes, you will build their self-esteem. But never forget that negative feedback, given appropriately, makes positive feedback even better.

Success breeds even more success. It becomes addictive; the more the members of the group succeed, the more they want to succeed. The more confidence they have in themselves, the bigger the challenge they will accept. The greater the challenge they accept, the greater their successes will be. This intoxicating spiral does have a limit. The bigger challenges present bigger opportunities of success as well as bigger chances of failure. To continue to succeed, one must be able to handle the risk of failure that accompanies a big challenge. A group can best handle a large risk if that group has synergy. Synergy is mutually beneficial goal setting in its highest state of perfection. There is almost no challenge or risk too big for an organization that possesses a large amount of synergy.

The first beneficial effect of synergy is that the members of the organization develop a great amount of loyalty to the group and to the group leader. Second, synergy results in a highly developed form of teamwork which increases chances that the group will succeed. Finally, studies have shown that synergy decreases psychological stress. Thus, synergy is the key to success without distress.

A low level of synergy can be created by the group leader. Low synergy develops when beneficial group goals are perceived as personally beneficial to each member of the group. High synergy develops only when each member of the group accepts the group goals as beneficial, not only to himself but also beneficial to his or her "significant others." Our "significant others" are all those who depend on us to do a good job (for example, our family and the other organizations that are dependent upon our group). The highest degree of synergy is achieved when each member of the group perceives...
the group goals as beneficial to the Air Force and the nation.

Air Force groups develop their highest degree of synergy in wartime. The goal to win the war becomes everyone's goal. Winning the war is obviously beneficial to each member of the group, their families, the other organizations that are dependent on the group, the entire Air Force, and the entire nation. Studies claiming that synergy reduces stress may also apply to wartime. I had a one-year combat tour in Vietnam at one of the largest outpatient clinics in Southeast Asia. During that entire tour, I never had to treat a heart attack nor did I hear of any other physician's treating a heart attack. While this may be partly attributed to precursive medical screening, the complete absence of heart attacks in what would normally be considered a very stressful situation is very significant.

The high group comradery (synergy) that develops in wartime is evidence that synergy increases the ability of each member of the group to take a risk. This is proved by the fact that in wartime risking one's life becomes a common, everyday occurrence.

SUCCESSFUL leaders actively promote group synergy. The real challenge for peacetime military commanders is to set goals for the group that the group members can believe will be worthwhile to themselves, their significant others, the Air Force, and the nation. This is difficult because the common enemy in peacetime is mediocrity and apathy as well as those who would deprive our country of its freedom.

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The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions and assistance of Dr. Eugene A. Sprague and Anne E. Shermer in the preparation of this article.

Notes

5. Ibid., p. 4.
10. Sheehy, p. 244.
11. Ibid., p. 273.
In Joseph Heller’s novel *Something Happened*, Andy Kagle, a principal character, believed his excellent sales record was his ticket to success. However, he misjudged the situation:

Kagle is one of those poor fellows who started at the bottom and worked his way up; and it shows. He is a self-made man and unable to hide it. He knows he doesn’t fit, but he doesn’t know when he doesn’t fit or why, or how to alter himself so that he will fit in as well as he should... He has a good sales record as head of sales, but that hardly matters.1

THE MILITARY COURTIER AND THE ILLUSION OF COMPETENCE

Dr. Donald D. Chipman
True, he had a good record, but as Heller states, this was not important. Kagle soon learned his untidiness and his inability to “fit” were signs of incompetence. Eventually, a neat, accommodating person replaced him, and the corporation moved on.

Though the account is fiction, Heller focused on one of the more perplexing problems of our time: the difficulty of evaluating competence. For years corporations have used sophisticated methods to select competent executives. Despite this, recent reports indicate these procedures are often “replete with problems.” Like corporations, the military has had extensive experience with personnel assessment. Yet, continual modifications in the officer effectiveness reports (OERs) indicate that problems exist here, as well. According to sociologist Morris Janowitz:

After forty years of research and development of military personnel selection practices, it is abundantly clear that there is no satisfactory and reliable technique for locating personnel with leadership potentials.

Although the military and corporations have had sophisticated personnel assessment programs for some time, the public schools are just now adopting them. After years of falling scholastic scores and increasing social promotions, educators have decided to be more specific in their evaluations of competence. Florida, Oregon, and other states are attempting to accurately assess student competence. In some cities, even teachers were administered competency tests; nevertheless, most of these efforts produced vague results. In fact, a recent Harvard journal essay questioned the validity of evaluating educational competencies:

Discussions often proceed as if competencies or skills can be easily identified. Efforts have been made to use experts or “objective analysis” to determine those skills needed by adults to “function” or to “survive” in society. These efforts have resulted in very detailed specifications of competencies and life skills. But brief reflection suggests that the meaning of minimum functioning in society is very hard to pin down. People function differently in society and some do it in ways offensive to others.

In addition the difficulty of defining the term competence exacerbates the problem. According to Peter Drucker, the exact criteria for competence change as the situation changes. For instance, ordinarily a hospital considers only surgeons capable of operating, yet in a dire emergency any medical doctor, even a psychiatrist, could operate. Similarly, United States Air Force Regulation 60-1 outlines a number of skills each pilot must possess before participating in flight operations; yet section 1-7 specifically allows commanders to waive “any regulation when necessary to carry out a combat mission.” Thus, based on the situation, the term competence is open to broad interpretation.

Generally, competence is a value judgment assigned to some type of performance. It is a social concept that includes a comparative assessment of worth within differing situations. To judge competence, one must compare achievement within the specific circumstances to the very best instance of a similar performance, for example, an excellent pole vault to the world’s best pole vault. In many organizations this type of evaluation occurs every day, but as Kagle’s situation indicates, performance is sometimes not the significant criterion.

Today competence is judged in terms of two basic considerations in relation to the task:

- **Technical skills** — how well a person uses his vocational knowledge to accomplish the task;
- **Social skills** — how well a person understands and motivates people.

Recently, social skills have become increasingly significant. John D. Rockefeller said he would pay more for “the ability to deal with people than any other ability under the sun.” Military professionals have constantly emphasized interpersonal skills as an
important officerlike characteristic. In the corporate world, Michael Maccoby has discerned that social skills have become such a fine art that a new breed has emerged—the corporate gamesman. In this era where appearance often takes precedence over substance, where process often counts as much as result, and where “being people-oriented” is as important as “sales records,” there is little wonder that too often competence is misjudged.

Evaluating the competence of the teacher, officer, or corporate executive is indeed difficult. Over the years the criterion has changed and the process has become more complicated. Placing definitive parameters on the social or the technical dimensions of competence and then trying to delineate the minimum performance is not an easy task. Yet, this was not the case for the educator, officer, and businessman during earlier times. At the turn of the century, competence was a one-dimensional term based on primarily technical skills.

In the first years of this century, nearly 80 percent of the American work force was engaged in production of goods. America was a nation of independently owned farms, factories, and small businesses. These builders, farmers, and artisans were the craftsmen whom Maccoby described as the employees imbued with a sense of self-worth based on “technical skills, discipline, and self reliance.” Competence was determined by the quality of a product or the cash value of a service. Usually, there was a tangible object that could be compared to a similar item. The employee knew if he failed to produce a good product, he would be fired. Thus, in most cases the employee developed his technical skills to do the job competently.

Similarly, the teacher of the 1900s was also technically oriented. Typically he did not worry about developing social skills, since these were taught by the family and church. High school students were required to study a few basic courses, and discipline was rigid. In 1893, the Committee of Ten found only 27 different subjects being taught in most high schools. Thus, schools were an unchanging system saturated with rules, catering to the demands of colleges. Subject matter was committed to memory, and the teacher’s job was to drill the students. By such means, one historian noted, attention, imagination, judgment, reasoning, discrimination and “other powers of the mind” were taught. Competence was assessed in terms of how well the teacher imparted information, drilled for mastery, and disciplined the class. If the teacher failed, he was technically incompetent.

Determining the competence of the military officer during the nineteenth century was also an uncomplicated task. Competence was judged in terms of the number of years an officer had served. The more senior the officer, the more competent he was. Although efficiency reports appeared, they were short and without much forethought. For example, the following was extracted from one of the earliest Army reports on record:

I forward a list of officers of the ______ arranged agreeable to rank. Annexed thereto you will find all the observations deem necessary to make. Lieutenant Colonel ------ A good-natured man.

Ensign ------------------------ The very dreg of the earth. Unfit for anything under heaven. God only knows how the poor things got an appointment.

While seniority was an archaic system, many officers believed any other method was unthinkable:

Promotion by selection would be subjected to political influence, that ambitious officers would be prone to devote more of their time to bootlicking than to soldiering, that men of long and faithful service would be victimized by juniors with political influence leaping over their backs.

Thus, the evaluation of the businessman, the teacher, and the officer during those early years was a fairly uncomplicated process.
Competence was judged in terms of technical skills while social skills remained insignificant. The ultimate test for competence rested on tangible factors in either the production of goods, recitation of facts, or total active military service.

But time brought change. By the mid-twentieth century, less than 50 percent of the American working force was producing goods. According to Maccoby, only 18 percent of all workers were self-employed. With this social change, competence gained an additional meaning. As giant corporations developed and governmental bureaucracies grew, social skills became an important part of competence.

By the 1940s business managers were saying society had evolved from a world of things to a world of people. Too long, Elton Mayo complained, businessmen had neglected the human side of organizational development. According to Mayo, professional schools were failing to equip young managers with a single special skill that could be used in ordinary human situations. Thus the prospective junior executive began receiving intensive humanistic training in management methods. He had to read about group dynamics, organizational development, and motivational theory. “Dignity,” “satisfaction,” “inspired leadership,” and “effective teamwork” became the common elements of this humanistic vocabulary. This training provided the proper blend of managerial technical skills and social skills.

Out of this era emerged the “organizational man,” an individual who believed the group was a source of sustenance and creativity. A worker was still evaluated by his job, but in addition he was asked to promote organizational rapport. Concern for the group’s well-being assumed additional value in the judgment of performance. Consequently, in the evaluation of a businessman’s competence, social skills gained additional value as a basic criterion.

In a parallel development, teachers began experimenting with various adaptations of John Dewey’s progressive philosophy. During the 1940s, “Life Adjustment” was a concern of educators as they changed their classroom techniques to account for group socialization. Teachers were prompted to set aside discipline and memory lessons in favor of group activities. For the first time, classroom topics included such lessons as “How to be liked,” “Developing school spirit,” and “Clicking with the crowd.” This entire movement, commented Richard Hofstadter, forced students to abandon the old virtues of competition, ambition, creativity, and analytical thought for the new values of consumption, social compliance, and graceful adaptation to a passive hedonistic style.

Before this era, teacher competence was judged by how well students mastered subject matter. But as the Dewey philosophy became more accepted, competence was judged by the teacher’s ability to generate group interaction. A teacher who constantly forced his students to dwell exclusively on subject matter, wrote William Whyte, “often found himself censured.”

These mid-century changes had an effect on the Armed Forces. Not only was Dewey a controversial figure in education, he was criticized in some military circles. For the most part, stated Samuel Huntington, the military blamed Dewey’s “inadequate and worthless philosophy” for graduating students who failed to respect traditional American values. Concurring, Major General Norman T. Kirk, Army Surgeon General, in 1943 claimed that Dewey’s “progressively educated” students were the “first to crack under the strains of war.”

Influenced by this progressivism, the old military standards of competence were reevaluated. After World War II, concern for group cohesion became a part of the military leadership philosophy. A 1948 study of the
German army indicated effective fighting units were often the by-product of officers who demonstrated concern for cohesive social relations. A Doolittle committee was convened to review these theories and redefine the role of the military leader. Eventually, wrote Janowitz, the leader's image changed from that of a commander to a "junior executive" and the Doolittle committee institutionalized the philosophy of basing discipline on "manipulation and group consensus." Since promotion based on seniority was no longer the criterion, efficiency reports were used to judge competence. Besides judging an officer's effectiveness, these reports often "measured how well he pleased the boss." Military competence, therefore, was no longer simply a measure of technical skills but one involving social skills.

Thus, nurtured by a progressive philosophy in education, business and military, social skills gained acceptance as a criterion in the judgment of an individual's competence. To be competent, one had to display both technical and social skills.

For a while, a competent person was expected to possess a balanced portion of both social and technical skills. But as the nation poised to enter the seventh decade, once again, the meaning of competence changed. Out of the promise of affluence and the threat of nuclear holocaust, there developed a denunciation of the old values. Corporate life with its tendency to minimize individual differences became a part of the "establishment." Dallas, Watts, and My Lai ushered into focus what many individuals believed was an undue reliance on technology without humanistic concerns. Some people felt the military-industrial complex had become all encompassing, decreasing the individual to an automaton. "Do not fold, spindle, or mutilate" came the call from individuals who believed that they were being treated as mere objects.

Implying that anyone who lacked social skills was slightly inhuman, Charles Silberman opened this era with a plea to de-emphasize technology. Don't forget, he insisted, a few years ago a German technical society devoid of human concerns annihilated six million Jews. The racial riots, assassinations, and Vietnam War were signs that American humanism was eroding. During the 1970s, Silberman wanted schools to teach students to understand their own personal feelings and those of others.

Following Silberman's plea, schools experimented with the open classroom philosophy. Adopted from the British, this teaching mode provided opportunities for students to move about the class developing social skills as they interacted with their peers. Colleges, in a continuing effort to be fair to all students, lowered standards as they gave away high grades to keep some young men from the draft. Other institutions bent over backward to keep students eligible for federal work-study programs and to sustain their enrollment.

With slipping standards, teacher competence more and more was judged by student classroom critiques. Popularity became a standard by which many ambitious educators conducted their classes. In a sense, social skills had become an institutional necessity.

In the business world, the gamesman appeared. Too independent and too unorthodox to be recognized earlier, this individual viewed projects and human relations in terms of career options as if they were a game. In American folklore, wrote Maccoby, Tom Sawyer was a prototypic gamesman who motivated others to do the job by "manipulating them." Describing a contemporary gamesman, Maccoby wrote of an executive who created a seductive environment by the proper placing of his glamorous secretaries. Although the gamesman often worked to accomplish his goals, he seldom failed to advance the organization. Yet the old
ethics were eroding. For instance, in one 1973 survey, businessmen perceived that “the ability to promote oneself” was more important in the corporate world than being honest. As in education, social skills had become a critical corporate attribute.

While business and education were in the process of making subtle changes, the military introduced vast modifications. After Vietnam, the Armed Forces adopted an all-volunteer concept based on the rationale of making the military similar to corporations. The trend was obvious, and Charles Moskos traced the significant indicators in his essay “From Institution to Occupation.” Though not as astute as the gamesman, officers realized career advancement and the assessment of their competence often depended on personal relationships. To succeed, suggested Sarkesian, an officer had to do more than simply fulfill his technical responsibilities:

He must be politically astute and seek out the centers of power and manipulate them. An officer on the way up must be able to identify the tickets that need punching and must also have access to those superiors or peers who can open appropriate doors.

Thus, as teachers became overly concerned with student critiques, as corporate gamesmen became commonplace, and as officers became politically astute, social skills gained additional importance. Now it was not only an advantage but an absolute necessity to be able to manipulate others. Within this social context, a new character appeared. While Whyte’s organizational man was primarily concerned with group cohesion and while Maccoby’s gamesman focused on developing amusing strategies, this new breed employs social skills to enhance his image. Unlike the organizational man and the gamesman who were concerned with institutional goals, this individual is entirely self-centered. He is a product of the “me generation” and believes he is entitled to his share. He is an image maker who constantly manipulates people and events, to ensure he is perceived as a competent person.

Just when and where this character began appearing is difficult to determine. Harper’s editor Lewis Lapham first identified this individual as an “American Courtier.” In a sense, commented Lapham, he is similar to the Renaissance man of the court who spent all of his time trying to please the prince. Borrowing from the works of La Bruyère, Lapham described the courtier as:

... a man who knows the ways of the court, is master of his gestures, his eyes, and his face; he is deep and impenetrable; he pretends not to notice injuries done him, he smiles to his enemies, controls his temper, disguises his passions, belies his heart, speaks and acts against his real opinions.

The courtier attempts to project himself as a competent individual who is wise in the ways of organizational politics. He has read all the books on how to dress properly, exercise organizational power, and play the assertiveness games. He admires everything and praises whatever he is expected to praise. The courtier knows that in these times of imitation food and imitation materials, appearance can be deceptive. Concurring, two managerial experts recently told businessmen that all the competence in the world is useless if “the right appearances are not properly made.” Former U.S. Senator J. William Fulbright made this assertion concerning the increasing numbers of courtiers in the nation’s capital:

The new breed of Congressperson seems more inclined to test the market first, to ascertain what is in current demand, and then to design a program to fit the market. Products of the media age, the new breed of legislators, it seems, aims not to convey an idea but to project an image.

Is there no concern for the job? Yes, but the courtier uses the job as another means of
developing his image of competence. In education, the courtier uses the classroom to perfect his social skills. One such professor told me he always graded according to who was influential in his class. Not surprisingly, the local mayor's son graduated with honors. Since, in this particular institution, student critiques were influential in deciding promotion and tenure, this particular courtier made sure he projected an image of competence.

After learning the schedule for the next classroom critiques, he planned his strategy. He sent a colleague to meet his class the day before the critique. His colleague, a gruff, scholarly old gentleman, was not in class very long before he began debunking progressive educational methods. After this harangue, the students looked forward to the return of their courtier. The next day they welcomed him back eagerly. Gallantly, he returned with a number of their papers upon which he had written words of praise. Now, with the class in the proper mood, the secretary was urged to administer the student critiques. With a high score on the only instrument designed to evaluate his job performance and with continual use of his courtier social skills, this professor was singled out as one of the most competent college teachers. He was promoted and tenured. The courtier had succeeded, and in the process the job had become another means of furthering his end—"building the right image."

The courtier believes his values are noble since accomplishing the job is not always important. In budget-based organizations, such as education and government, incompetence, indifference, and misdirection are often suspected but difficult to prove. To the courtier, making a decision is not as important as projecting the right image of a person who actually knows what he was doing.

In the process, more and more, competence becomes a judgment of one's social skills. Delegating the job as a secondary consideration has initiated new ethical considerations. No longer is it improper to retire on the job. The employee who has gained tenure in his organization can with all due respect simply let his daily assignments slide. For example, a New England probation officer often leaves the office "to do some checking on a couple of court cases," but instead he goes home to work in his rose garden. If he maintains good relations with the other levels of the organization, such action is condoned. In many organizations employees are retained despite the fact they accomplish little more than maintaining rapport.

In addition, the federal government and large unions have increasingly emphasized the job as a "means" rather than as an "end." No longer is the quality of the product or service the only criterion of organizational policies. Today, if a product or a service is judged "good," it must satisfy regulations governing the conditions of its development; thus, any company producing a quality object is under censure if in the process the air or the water is polluted. A society that once was primarily "result-oriented" has become more "process-oriented." And what are the critical judgment elements of competence in a process-oriented organization?

Labor unions are traditionally process-oriented. Working hours, pay, and sick leave are their prime interests. Seldom does a union strike to improve the quality of a product. Today, even professors and other white-collar workers have joined unions in quests of better working conditions.

In England, where more than twelve million are represented by unions, political conservatives are claiming this "process orientation" is bankrupting the society. One official noted that Britain produces no more steel than it did in 1957, no more cars than it did in 1960, and despite the North Sea oil, the country's standard of living compares favorably only with that of Brazil. 32

Like unions and businesses, contemporary
government has an inclination to be social skills oriented. Big government, one expert agrees, tends to undermine the significance of job efficiency. In the United States one of every five workers is employed by government. This constant growth has increased the difficulty of deciding where one employee’s responsibility ends and another’s begins. Government workers in the pay grade of GS-4 may be assigned entirely different tasks; yet, when salary increases are announced, few go empty-handed. Government, states Tom Bethell, is increasingly dominated by one of the most ominous trends of our time: A person solving problems on paper will be paid more than the person who is out on the production line actually working, contributing real input to provide solutions.

In some ways the federal government is insisting we follow the British example of focusing on the process instead of the product. When private industry has a federal contract, for instance, often the quality of the final product is partially determined by the company’s degree of compliance with government regulations. The completion of a federally funded rapid transit system is judged in part by how many jobs the company provided for the hard-core unemployed. An entire government bureau was established to ensure these policies, the regulating of the job process, are properly administered.

And so by insisting that the process of a job is in compliance with regulations and paying high salaries to those who develop regulations, the government indicates the product is of secondary importance. In this situation, the courtier can refine the social skills, make the right appearance, and successfully move up the organizational ladder.

A critic might point out there have always been courtiers. This, I do not dispute. Yet never have so many institutional forces encouraged the development of this character. Schools and unions, government and corporations, and the military all condone the courtier. Trying to succeed, an employee attempts to determine for himself the hierarchy of organizational values. On seeing the successful individuals, the ones with influence and high incomes, are those who perfect their image, the diligent worker adopts these values. The courtier develops not out of deviousness but out of the complexity in organizations that are process-oriented. Ultimately he arises out of the narcissistic culture in organizations that have allowed individuals to use their manipulative social skills for self-aggrandizement.

The institutionalization of social skills has initiated new research on how to utilize this craft. Nationwide advice is available on how to avoid work and yet succeed. Books and magazines clearly present the message: Forget the job and concentrate on refining your social skills. If you want a bigger salary and control of others, then you must learn to grab for power. Since power is the most important organizational ingredient, you must learn how to get it and how to use it. With just a few lessons, notes one expert, you can learn to intimidate others. Another author claims you should not worry about others, they are neurotic anyway; you need to spend more time promoting yourself. A recent magazine article reported women are failing in business because they tend to focus too much on the job and not enough on developing office alliances. Pick up any magazine and you can learn how to perfect your courtier skills for a more successful life. Seldom is work or job performance mentioned.

Paraphrased from the best selling book Power: How to Get It, How to Use It by Michael Korda, here are some typical suggestions for the fledgling courtier:

- To gain recognition, create an artificial catastrophe, then proceed to fix it.
- In offering your opinion, be silent, impassive, alert, visible until everyone else
has spoken his piece, then fire away in complete safety.

- When accepting bad news, pretend that you could care less.
- When you are approached for a pay raise, make the person feel guilty and force him to apologize for being so obtuse. (A good technique: Ask the person to get you some aspirin because you are so sick.)
- Create a legend outside the organization by attending the right parties and conventions.
- On every paper make a minor correction telling the originator that you are just adding the finishing touch.
- To be promoted, pattern your style after a recently promoted worker and try to be dramatically different from the individual who was fired.
- Before retirement try to create an aura of an elder statesman. Write no memos, enter no arguments, acquire a reputation as a peacemaker, and if possible smoke a pipe.
- To encourage another to retire, keep him involved in all decisions and make him feel uncomfortable by constantly referring to pop music, new dances, and posh restaurants.
- Women should learn that flirtation, flattery, and seductive innuendos can be turned into a technique of control.

The preceding list is from one book. There are, however, several books written to take advantage of this crisis in competence. For the most part, they are filled with suggestions for promoting flattery, gestures, and passion into full-fledged courtier power plays.

Although these books are for the corporate executive, many of the suggestions have become a part of the military way. As the military adopted corporate techniques, inevitably the courtier followed. In the years after World War II, the military, by the very nature of its complexity, had to use systematic business techniques. During the 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara incorporated cost effectiveness, systems analysis, and zero defects into the U.S. Armed Forces. Eventually the military also adopted some related business ethics. The organization man, the gamesman, and the courtier found their way into the profession. Commenting on this, Gabriel and Savage wrote:

The cumulative impact of this change in ethical perspectives within the military has been to bring about the rise and emulation of the "officer as entrepreneur," the man adept at managing his own career by manipulating the system.

Although many have accused Gabriel and Savage of sensationalism, in part their book was based on the Army War College study. In 1970, an Army War College team traveled to Vietnam to survey the professionalism of officers. The results were so controversial the report was not released until several years later. In Vietnam, among other things, they found the courtier. In some situations, stated this report, officers were so occupied with "maintaining an image of personal success," they failed to develop effective fighting units. Thus, using social skills to his advantage, the courtier made his transition from the corporate world to the military.

The military is aware of the courtier ethic and has begun to deal with it. Many are calling for a return to "officership" and a reappraisal of old ethical considerations of Duty, Honor, and Country. A joint conference on professional ethics is meeting to consider the consequences of these new ethical values. Yet, as author-sociologist Daniel Bell notes, the future for the courtier looks bright. In the coming decades, writes Bell, society will be structured almost exclusively upon services, thus:

In the daily round of work, men no longer confront nature, as either alien or beneficent, and fewer now handle artifacts and things. The post-industrial society is essentially a "game" between persons.
This is the reality of the new courtier ethic. No longer is man's relationship to nature or to the machine a primary concern. We have evolved into an era in which man must intensify his awareness of others. In this environment the refinement of social activities will become increasingly important, but we need to ensure that these courtier skills are not subverted by a few with narrow interests.

What began as an attempt to bring social skills into the evaluation of competence, has through the years, evolved into misuse of these concerns. Contemporary authors have filled books with ways in which an individual can parlay social skills into courtier power plays for self-aggrandizement. In those institutions which fail to recognize this new ethic, the courtier will multiply. In this environment, the courtier, unlike Heller's character, Kagle, proclaims his importance, declares his ability to "fit," and manipulates the system to reinforce his own significance. Yet if there is any truth to Samuel Huntington's statement that the subordination of the "will of the individual to the will of the group," rates high in the military value system, then one can easily see the courtier's self-aggrandizement is ethically dangerous.

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Notes
9. Ibid., p. 51.
18. Whyte, p. 56.
25. Maccoby, p. 141.
28. Sarkesian, p. 75.
34. Hennig and Jardin, pp. 252-310.
THE United States is increasingly concerned with ethics. More professors are teaching courses in ethics and more students are studying ethics than ever before. Incidents in Vietnam and Washington have reminded us that people in all walks of life are vulnerable to doing what is wrong. Professional groups—lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers, business managers, and others—are structuring codes of ethics for their members. Throughout the past decade, military professionals at the service academies and educational centers have shown increasing interest in the study of ethical principles. Most officer training schools now include at least an elective on professional ethics, in which officers are encouraged to construct codes of ethics for the military service. Perhaps we are realizing that right and wrong may differ from common
practice, majority opinion, or what the system will tolerate. Perhaps we as a nation are beginning to see the fallacies in the ethical relativism of "doing your own thing." We may even be ready to acknowledge the complexity of ethical decision-making and move beyond the dominating principle of personal or public happiness. Some of us are ready to assert that, in addition to such preeminent values as beneficence and justice, ethical behavior also involves past commitments, present relationships, and future hopes.

This article will probe some of the complexities of acting ethically within the military system. I propose to direct your thinking in three ways: (1) to identify the fundamental pressures that are upon us all, that is, the ethical bases or theories to which we are responsive; (2) to highlight the importance of certain areas where ethical problems abound; and (3) to reaffirm some basic principles to guide us.

The Complex Ethical Pressures

The complex ethical pressures upon the military professional are the rules, goals, and situations that provide the context and criteria for determining what is right and wrong, good and bad. The moment of decision-making or action-taking for the military professional is crowded with signals emanating from rule-oriented obligations, goal-oriented aspirations, and situation-oriented demands. Each individual is responsible for juggling the moral claims from these sources and for determining which signals merit priority.

rule-oriented obligations

Rules most commonly provide the primary criteria for ethical judgments. The questions "What ought I to do?" and "What is right for me to do?" reflect not only a sense of obligation but also an awareness that a standard exists for establishing what is obligatory and what is right. Originally, these were religious questions referring to the will of God. They now have become questions for the citizen and military professional.

Military personnel, more than most citizens, live under a sense of oughtness, aligned with a strong base of order, obedience, and discipline. We have taken oaths admitting us into the ranks of the military. As officers we affirmed a commissioning vow. We swore to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States."

As citizens we are also obligated to honor constitutional justice, civil law, and the social and ethnic mores of our communities. The primary ethical pressures upon us, however, are such formal mandates as telling the truth, keeping promises, respecting property, and preserving life. These constitutive or universal norms are the mortar without which social institutions would crumble. While such norms need not be regarded as absolute moral restrictions, the burden of proof is always upon those who would take exception to them.

Rule-oriented living has a long history in Western religions. The orthodox Jew, by the beginning of the Christian era, lived under an elaborate complex of conditional and unconditional laws. The covenantal requirements of Mosaic Law consisted of 613 injunctions: 365 "thou shalt not" prohibitions and 248 "thou shalt" obligations. Far from burdensome, the Law clearly defined what God would have the believer do and not do; it provided the moral framework for life. The Law was significant by omissions as well as inclusions, an observation memorialized in the following rhyme.

Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife; His ox thou shalt not slaughter. But thanks be to God there is no law Against coveting thy neighbor's daughter.

For the Christian, law has been redefined as living in an obedient relationship with God through heeding the teachings of Jesus.
The Sermon on the Mount, the ethical catechism of the early Church, and the Thomistic understanding of moral law have provided a deontological* interpretation of morality. The pressure upon the Christian is not to be conformed to this world but to be transformed in order to prove what is the good and acceptable and perfect will of God (Romans 12:2).

Today the followers of Islam are more rigidly fundamental than either Jews or Christians in their understanding of morality as obedience to a set code or to religious leadership. Islam means “to submit,” and a Muslim is “one who has submitted.” The Koran, the recited teachings of Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, defines the essential duties decreed by Allah and binds the believer to loyal subjection.

The rule-oriented approach to ethical theory establishes in given standards the criteria for determining right and wrong. Dilemmas exist when two or more obligations conflict. One must sometimes choose between what one believes God commands and what the state requires, between what a superior officer orders and what regulations prescribe, or between what law exacts and what personal conscience dictates. The philosopher Immanuel Kant is the premier exponent of a method for determining fundamental obligations. For Kant the supreme principle of morality is good will, and “the first proposition of morality is that to have moral worth an action must be done from duty.”1 irrespective of consequences. The subject maxim by which duty is determined is the categorical imperative, that which is binding without exception. Two expressions of the categorical imperative are especially meaningful. The first is: “I should never act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a universal law.”2 For example, should I submit false reports—whether of body counts, flying hours, or materiel readiness—when I perceive my best interest lies in false reporting? No, for this maxim cannot be universalized without destroying the maxim by rendering all reporting invalid. A second valuable expression of the categorical imperative is: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.”3 (We will return to this self-explanatory binding rule later.) Kant did not discuss what one should do when categorical imperatives conflict.

In addition to citing rules, we determine which decisions and actions are ethical by referring to goals. The previous question was “What ought I to do?” The questions here are “What is good?” or “What goal should I seek?” The criteria for determining right and wrong are no longer historical standards but future consequences. The good decision or action is measured by its ability or promise to attain a desired goal. Aristotle defined the good all men seek as happiness.4 Jeremy Bentham elaborated this happiness principle of ethics as the principle of utility, “that principle which states the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question, as being the right, proper, and only right and proper and universally desirable, end of human action.”5 In the hands of John Stuart Mill, the greatest happiness principle was enlarged to include the general good of all: “the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned.”6 Popularly stated, this goal is “the greatest good for the greatest number.”

For the military professional, goal-oriented aspirations are a combination of the public good and personal happiness. On the public side is an array of national goals and military

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*As relating to the ethics of duty or moral obligations.
objectives. Our aim is to assure the security of the United States, defend against aggression, and aid our allies. The more immediate objective is accomplishing the mission. This may range from training personnel and maintaining weapon systems to delivering personnel and supplies, striking targets, or defeating enemy forces. On the personal side, we want job satisfaction, recognition, promotion, financial security, high OER/APR ratings, a happy home, and an overall sense of fulfillment in life.

I have identified the ethical theories by which we judge right and wrong as pressures because the signals we get from these theories are frequently in tension. Our goals are often at odds with each other. Conflict between goals and rules, moreover, is also common. This confusion in life may be likened to a football game. While ultimately the goal is to score points, immediate choices have to be made among short-yardage plays, long-yardage plays, passing, running, kicking, field goal, or touchdown efforts. Whatever the decision, all actions are governed by set rules and called plays. If the ball is advanced but the rules violated, the team can be penalized valuable yards. If the signals are ignored, a broken play and lost yardage may result. Sometimes when the quarterback sees that the play called in the huddle will not work, he resorts to calling an "audible," that is, he adjusts to an unexpected defensive alignment. The audible introduces us to a third type of ethical judgment, the situation-oriented decision.

situation-oriented decision

In the early 1960s a popular way of making moral decisions received new definition: situation ethics or the new morality. Both leading proponents, Joseph Fletcher and John A. T. Robinson, were churchmen. The significant questions they asked were "What is appropriate to the situation?" or "What is fitting?" In situation ethics the particular circumstances of a situation provide the criteria for determining right and wrong. Here, each situation is unique, without precedent. Judgments must be relative to the circumstances; the circumstances determine what actions should be taken. Without the binding and unexceptionable absolute of love, situation ethics would have mirrored the permissive society in which it emerged. Of rule-oriented judgments, Fletcher said, "Situation ethics keeps principles sternly in their place, in their role of advisers without veto power."

A major limitation of situation ethics is its focus on the unusual, once-in-a-lifetime circumstance. It is not geared to day-by-day living; it provides no game plan. The situations in which we must make ethical decisions, after all, have a sameness about them to which rules or goals do apply. Any realistic person knows that under certain conditions we must act situationally. When shot down behind enemy lines, we know we will lie or steal to survive and return to friendly forces. This admission, however, does not mean that ethical theory should tolerate lying or stealing or should make easy my evasion of the formal mandates on which civilization is structured. While none would fault the importance situationists place on acting in a loving manner, love is a motive, an attitude; love is not a program with content. Situation ethics resists systematization; it can never be normative. Without appropriate checks and balances, situation ethics could lead to ethical anarchy. Military professionals do occasionally find themselves in circumstances where regulations and mission objectives fail to provide sufficient guidelines. In those rare instances the aptitude for innovative leadership can be a virtue.

When followed inflexibly, any of the three approaches to understanding the bases for our ethical judgments can result in moral aberration: exclusive attention to rules can result in legalism; rigid adherence to Mill's
utilitarian goal of the greatest good for the greatest number can promote a tyranny of the majority; and preeminent attention to situations can result in loss of directives and moral chaos.

The Predominant Ethical Problems

Studying ethics theories without relating them to the predominant ethical problems of military professionals would be merely an intellectual exercise. These theories are tools to help us think more clearly about our decisions and actions. Three overlapping areas in which our theories may be applied to problems are people, integrity, and career.

people

Human needs are a military commander’s prevailing problem. I asked a newly appointed group commander what he considered the hardest part of his responsibility. Without hesitation he replied, “Making people decisions is the most difficult part of being a commander.” He was rapidly discovering the complexities of leading people. People have needs, they have frailties, and they have great potential. People need consideration, recognition, stroking, and encouragement.

In 1976 as a group project, students of the Air Command and Staff College prepared Guidelines for Command: A Handbook on the Management of People for Air Force Commanders and Supervisors. Chapter 2 is entitled “Solving Problems Involving People.” This chapter lists 57 entries on problem situations from “AWOL” to “Weight Control.” It makes no mention of such human problems as abortion, incest, homosexuality, sexual deviance, gambling, marital problems, moral problems, religious problems—the kinds of problems chaplains confront on a regular basis. These are problems people have which a commander cannot ignore. A recurring complaint included in the 1970 Army War College’s Study on Military Professionalism is this: “Across the board the Officer Corps is lacking in their responsibility of looking out for the welfare of subordinates.”

Being a commander is working with people. The military is people. America is people. The military exists to serve the people of America. However it may have been understood in the past, military leadership is now measured by management and motivational skills. Leadership is more than giving orders; anyone can give orders. The skilled leader knows how to motivate the people on whom he depends to accomplish the mission. People are the focus of every command and the heart of every mission.

integrity

The second major ethical concern for military professionals is probably integrity. I asked the Commander of the North Carolina Air National Guard what he considered to be the greatest ethical problem in the Air Force; he answered: “Integrity, especially in reporting.” The Army War College’s Study on Military Professionalism (1970) supports this perception. Integrity is a major concern of that study. Typical of the remarks from questionnaires were these:

CPT: ... reluctance of middle officers to render reports reflecting the true materiel readiness of their unit. Because they and their raters hold their leadership positions for such short periods, they feel that even one poor report will reflect harshly upon their abilities.

MAJ: I am concerned with honesty—trust—and administrative competence within the Officer Corps... Command influence impairs calling a “spade a spade.”

MAJ: ... The system forces unethical reporting and practices, and punishes variation.

This last remark is especially significant, for it places the blame on the system. The system does create pressure, and it is certainly
not errorless. Integrity, however, is a human concern; people operate, perpetuate, and validate any system. Responsibility for moral integrity cannot be shifted. Some systems may make honesty more difficult than others, but the system only reveals what an individual’s values really are. Ethically alert military personnel will always be disturbed by the variances between the ideal standards proclaimed by the services and the actual practices that overtly deviate from those standards. At a meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society meeting at Maxwell Air Force Base in October 1976, a graduate of the Air Force Academy voiced his great disillusionment after only four months at his first assignment. The discrepancies between the ideals espoused by the USAF Academy and the operative standards of an Air Force base were leading him to consider resigning his commission.

career

Integrally related to the problem of integrity is the problem of placing career before honor. The military professional should be concerned about his or her career. Achievement ranks high in the officer’s code of values. A fine line, however, separates valid concern of one’s success in the military from excessive, unhealthy careerism. Crossing this fine line is a problem not unique to the military. John Dean’s *Blind Ambition* and John Ehrlichman’s *Washington behind Closed Doors* confirm the prevalence of excessive careerism. Whatever the profession, personal ambition can cloud ethical judgment and make fools of us all. In the military, preoccupation with career can lead us to be yes-men for the commander instead of constructive critics. It can lead us to cover up for the commander. It can lead us to keep unwelcome reports from him. It can lead us to cover for ourselves in our effort to look good at all costs. It can lead us to do what we know is morally wrong. As one officer in the *Study on Military Professionalism* observed: “It takes a great deal of personal courage to say ‘the screwup occurred here’ rather than passing the blame to the lower level.”

The September 1977 issue of *Human Behavior* magazine reported the results of a survey of 173 American generals conducted by Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard (U.S. Army, Retired). All the generals had served in Vietnam between 1965 and 1972. This article was summarized by the *Washington Post* and reprinted in local newspapers. The summary reads:

Kinnard found an uneasiness among generals over handling of the war. More than half, for example, felt search and destroy missions at the center of the American strategy should have been better executed. Asked why generals had not spoken out during the war, Kinnard, now a political science professor at the University of Vermont, said, “The only thing I can think of is careerism.”

General George C. Marshall once observed that decisions requiring moral courage are much harder to make than decisions pertaining to physical courage. The reason? “This is when you lay your career, perhaps your commission on the line.” Establishing priorities between goal-oriented career aspirations and rule-oriented obligations may be the most difficult moral choices officers face.

The Abiding Ethical Principles

Military professionals can never stray from the time-honored principles of “Duty, Honor, Country” and remain true to their calling. The three ethic theories outlined—rule-oriented obligations, goal-oriented aspirations, and situation-oriented decisions—are useful in the service of “Duty, Honor, Country.” These theories together with the three abiding principles can be applied to the difficult problems suggested under the subtopics of people, integrity, and career.
duty: conduct
person-oriented leadership

The military services are just that—services. They exist to defend and support human values. The key personnel in the military for promoting these services are the military professionals. The duty of the military professional is to conduct person-oriented leadership, leadership consistent with the fundamental commitments of this nation.

Most military professionals are aware that those they seek to lead are people first and soldiers, sailors, or airmen second. They have entered the military with unique personalities and individual sets of motivations, interests, attitudes, and values. They share basic needs for survival, belonging, esteem, and self-realization. Each of these needs must be met in turn for the next to become operative. Although servicemen wear uniforms, they also participate in an intricate network of civilian relationships. They have wives, children, husbands, parents, hopes, fears, dreams, religious ideals, and names. The successful leader remembers that he or she is dealing with whole beings, people who are infinitely more than mechanics, clerks, typists, technicians, artillerymen, or pilots.

In our desire to achieve our military missions successfully, we are sometimes tempted to depersonalize those with whom we work along with those against whom we fight. The latter attitude is especially prevalent. We reduce the enemy to objects; we take away their names and nationalities and call them “Huns” or “Gooks” or simply “little yellow bastards.” We try to protect our own self-image by pretending that the enemy we are killing is less than a human being with a name and with a family. Similarly but more subtly, we depersonalize our associates in the military when we treat them as hands or troops who are there to do our bidding or to advance our careers. Person-oriented leaders respect the personhood of each individual in the command; they establish I-Thou rather than I-It relationships. Kant’s dictum applies: people are ends in themselves, never means. The real obscenity in the world is objectifying people, treating them as things rather than as persons. I like the counsel of a staff officer associate. He advised me as follows: “I have never gone wrong by treating those under me as people and respecting them as such.”

honor: exemplify moral integrity

Any code of ethics devised for military professionals undoubtedly will contain articles that emphasize the importance of professional and personal integrity and that recognize the professional officer’s responsibility to be an example of integrity for subordinates. The current Chief of Army Chaplains, writing for Parameters some years ago, reported on a study of ethics among businessmen conducted by Harvard Business Review. The study revealed a double-edged situation: some businessmen felt pressured to compromise their integrity in order to please their superiors; others felt pressured by bosses who expected integrity. The study concluded: “If you want to act ethically, find an ethical boss.” The lesson for the military is: If you want integrity to prevail in the military, act ethically yourself and expect ethical actions from your subordinates.

Integrity, like person-oriented leadership, is a whole-person concept. A former Chief of Air Force Chaplains reminds us:

... integrity is not just truth-telling, or kindness, or justice, or reliability. Integrity is the state of my whole life, the total quality of my character, and it is witnessed by the moral soundness of my responses in every life situation.

Integrity is not something that can be turned on and off. It reflects the value systems in which our lives are grounded. The recent series of articles on integrity in TIG Brief has purposefully sought to generate discussion and thought about integrity throughout the military. The remarks by General Bryce Poe
II. Commander, Air Force Logistics Command, merit particular attention. He said:

We must remember the complete meaning of “integrity”—that it includes not just honesty but also sincerity and candor. Our code of behavior must not tolerate shallowness, expediency, or deception. This rigidity and uncompromising adherence to standards does not in the least mean that we must be self-righteous or lack compassion. On the contrary, individuals who recognize that people make mistakes, even when they are doing their level-best, not only display integrity themselves, but reinforce that of their subordinates.

In the last analysis, integrity is an entirely personal thing. Important to anyone, it is absolutely vital to the military professional who has responsibility for human life and public property. As General Douglas MacArthur once said, our code “embraces the highest moral laws and will stand the test of any ethics or philosophies ever promulgated for the uplift of mankind. Its requirements are for the things that are right, and its restraints are from the things that are wrong.” Whether we label that code, “Duty, Honor, Country,” or simply, “Integrity”—the requirement is the same.11

Few officers have tried so vigorously to inculcate an appreciation of integrity among those for whom they had responsibility as Admiral James B. Stockdale. While president of the Naval War College, he inaugurated a course on the “Foundations of Moral Obligation.” His course was built on principles that became profoundly meaningful for him during 2,714 days of imprisonment and torture in Hanoi’s Hoa Lo prison. He claims that he was sustained as a prisoner of war (POW) more from what he had learned in philosophy than from what he had read in survival manuals. He knew that man needs more than buzzwords and acronyms; he needs the enduring principles articulated by mankind’s most thoughtful spirits. His students read from Job, Epictetus, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Mill, Emerson, Dostoevski, and the existentialists. He said:

I think this is the only way to teach a sophisticated audience “duty, honor, country.” I’m not trying to make fundamentalists out of them. I’m not trying to make warmongers out of them. I’m trying to make more self-confident leaders who will realize half of what comes into their baskets is crap and that they should worry about things that are important.12

Admiral Stockdale would have us regain our moral bearings and rediscover the power and the courage available when we have committed ourselves to fundamental integrity.

country: initiate moral concern in America

The moral quakes of Hiroshima, My Lai, and Watergate have fractured the confidence of many in America’s current commitment to honor, integrity, and high humanitarian ideals. Those events have changed the way Americans think about themselves; they have produced a tidal wave of moral uncertainty, self-doubt, alienation, and rebellion. Just as thinking well of self is vital for personal mental health, so apparently must a nation have a good self-image for its corporate well-being. One of the great national tasks for the 1980s, therefore, is the recapturing of a spirit of moral integrity in America. Military professionals with their avowed commitments and goals occupy a favorable position in the United States. They can lead the way. They can become the catalysts who initiate throughout society a reawakening of integrity and moral awareness.

Through philosophy and ethics, is it possible for the military—and through the military for the nation—to regain its moral concern and its concomitant moral self-confidence? Wilson Carey McWilliams has projected this possibility. In Military Honor After Mylai, he tentatively conjectures that “perhaps the Army may, in its own interest, help free civilian America to rediscover its own honor.”13 He implies that the Army can first find its own moral compass. McWilliams and Sir Thomas More have similar hopes. Long before he was made Henry VIII’s Lord Chancellor, More debated whether moral philosophy had any place “in
the council of princes." His conclusion was yes, but only subtly and obliquely. "You must strive," he wrote, "to guide policy indirectly, so that you make the best of things, and what you cannot turn to good, you can at least make less bad. For it is impossible to do all things well unless all men are good, and this I do not expect to see for a long time." 14

The wisdom of More has supplied a necessary clue to the reality of the human situation. Military professionals can pioneer a return to fundamental integrity, though not by bold frontal attacks. They must start with themselves as individuals who, like Thomas More, commit themselves to first principles and to selfless goals. They must be courageous people who place "Duty, Honor, Country" ahead of careers, people who say the cover-ups stop here. The exploitation and objectifying of people can stop if leaders in sensitive positions consistently treat people as

ends never as means to ends; consistently perceive enemies, peers, subordinates, and superiors as persons of great value. Dishonesty, misrepresentation, and false reporting can only be reversed if key professionals insist on honor and exemplify integrity. Selfish careerism that exalts personal advantage above the well-being of others and of the whole can only be reduced if commanders stop rewarding self-aggrandizement and become models themselves of responsible service. Reshaping the moral climate within the military and the nation needs only a few dedicated professionals to make a beginning. Then, beyond the level of individual example, must come unit example—a squadron, a company, a battalion, a group, a base, a post, a division, a major command, a service. To that noble end studies of ethics in the military are committed.

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Notes
2. Ibid., p. 18.
3. Ibid., p. 47.
I WANT to talk about the VAN bomb. No, VAN does not stand for Vanadium Anhydrous Nucleus. VAN stands for van, as in Chevy, Dodge, delivery, or moving. Call it a truck bomb if you like. My main point, which I will put right here to ensure understanding, is that the U.S.S.R. has some fine nuclear delivery vehicles (pardon the pun, but it fits in every form) that are perfectly invisible to ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS), sound and surveillance system (SOSUS), or satellites. Not only are we open to nuclear devastation but we have little or no way to respond.

The name of our national defense strategy has gone through many contortions. We have
heard the creative name game go from massive retaliation, through essential equivalence, to mutually assured destruction. These names share one feature: commitment to second strike. We have vowed not to strike the first strategic nuclear blow. This position has led us to invest great sums and energies in tactical warning devices. These warning devices are meant to detect incoming missiles so we can give our own military forces and elements of national power a few precious minutes to launch, hide, or harden. Sophisticated radars scan space, space satellites watch the ground, and ground radars watch for intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) attack. SOSUS aids in keeping track of SLBM submarines. We have erected electronic trip wires that will give warning if the enemy tries to sneak into our camp. But, as an old saying goes, the best way to penetrate a fortress is to be on the inside when the gates are closed. If the enemy is inside our fortress walls and our ring of warning devices, and then if our warning devices survive, they might tell us only of the incoming second strike.

For purposes of this discussion, we will assume that the enemy is the Soviet Union. Actually, there are many foreign governments and organizations operating within the geopolitical borders of the United States that could fit the scenario, but we will name the U.S.S.R. as the hypothetical enemy. The Soviets have held a steady course in foreign policy and military affairs. As Joseph Alsop put it:

Since the Grand Prince of Moscow first claimed sole rule of Muscovy, the Russians have always pushed forward; have often been pushed back; but have invariably ended up by pushing forward farther than before.

The Russians continue to use all of their elements of national power to benefit their expansion. Correspondingly, the United States will use its instruments of power to counter Soviet expansion moves. The confrontation of opposing goals is bound to bring instability. If the conflict reaches the "sticking point," where neither side will back down, it could escalate to the use of conventional armed force. Being able to think a move or two ahead, the Soviets probably realize that if U.S. forces begin to lose, the nuclear threat will become a more inviting option to U.S. leaders.

At this point, we have to step in and conjecture that the U.S.S.R. does not want an all-out nuclear exchange. They may talk about surviving such an exchange, but it would certainly be less than a winning proposition. At the very least, they would like to limit severely any destruction of their homeland. One way to preclude an opponent from taking such a threatening position is to occupy that position first.

The delivery of nuclear weapons can be viewed as a logistics problem. You have an item (a warhead) you want to have at a certain place at a certain time. If you think like a logistician, you see you have many alternatives for delivery. You can use special messengers (like missiles and bombers), which are expensive; you can rely on common carriers (truck, rail, etc.); you can preposition the item; or you can use all three approaches. We think a lot about stopping (or at least spotting) the special messenger, but we are wide open to delivery of unwanted goods by the common carrier and to prepositioned devices. But, then, we could hardly expect a U.S. common carrier to deliver a Soviet nuclear warhead, could we? We could indeed!

The Soviet Union operates at least five commercial companies in the United States which do business in freight. Amtorg (New York) is the oldest. It was incorporated in 1924 to trade in U.S., Soviet, and third country goods. It is wholly owned by the Soviets and has a branch in Moscow called Mosam-torg. Other companies in the United States with open Soviet interests include a tractor
company, Belarus Machinery of U.S.A., Inc. (Milwaukee); a shipping agency, Morflot American Shipping, Inc. (New Jersey); a fishing and fleet service organization, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Marine Resources Company, Inc. (Seattle); and a chartering agent, Sovfracht (U.S.A.), Inc. (New York). These companies use their own trucks and ships, lease and charter transportation, and consign shipments to other carriers. If I were a Soviet logistician trying to deliver a package in the United States, I would certainly consider using these companies. Other countries and power groups have similar, but perhaps not as extensive, commercial connections.

If we were to develop a scenario for the use of van bombs, we would start with the United States and the U.S.S.R. eyeball-to-eyeball in some part of the world—with neither side blinking. We would postulate a dangerous but conventional military conflict in progress or threatening. We could see the Soviet leaders wanting another option besides nuclear destruction or backing down. As insurance, they would have inserted a number of nuclear devices into the United States during more quiet times to provide the “other option” or an element of surprise. These could be brought in under diplomatic seal, disguised in freight shipments, or by simple smuggling. (If thousands of tons of marijuana can enter the country successfully over predictable routes, certainly a determined power could bring in a few tons of contraband.) Standard commercial shipping orders would start some large crates moving from pre-positioned locations within the United States to places like Washington, D.C., Omaha, Grand Forks, Great Falls, Bremerton, Norfolk, and Honolulu. These crates would be large and heavy, perhaps needing power attached for “refrigeration.” A suitcase- or satchel-size nuclear weapon may exist, but not in practical form. A warhead capable of being handled safely, going off when planned, and doing considerable damage (20 kilotons as a minimum) is still a large, heavy package. But it could be handled by truck. A twenty-kiloton surface burst can destroy armored vehicles and hardened structures out as far as 550 meters. It can destroy airplanes in the open and communication facilities at many times that distance. The bomb size could be practically several times 20KT.

The United States depends on warning and real-time command and control. Warning will allow the use of existing communications to launch bombers into survivable positions and will tell us who the enemy is. Warning will also enable the National Command Authorities to get into safe havens. If we are deprived of warning, our command, control, and communication systems will be very lucky to survive. If we are simply deprived of communications, we will be in a very poor position to survive blackmail or coercion. The van bomb could be used as either a first strike or as a blackmail weapon. In either case, the targeting strategy would be to destroy the retaliatory weapons on the ground (missile capsules and bombers), destroy the links to the survivable forces (communications), and prevent the National Command Authorities from reaching safety. Certain “deliveries” would involve a little deception: a truck breakdown on a rough Montana highway a few hundred yards from a Minuteman control capsule, for instance. But most deliveries in cities like Washington, D.C., could be to previously rented offices and garages and to legitimate freight depots. The target planners will have no problem obtaining an adequate circular error of probability with this delivery system.

The Russian approach to military operations concentrates on shock, surprise, and mass. Blackmail is not their style, but the use of infiltrators, deception, and surprise certainly is. If we ignore the complex blackmail scenarios and simply examine a first strike from within by perhaps two dozen van bombs, we can easily postulate the loss of the
IN MY OPINION

Top leadership, the loss of much of the bomber and some of the ICBM force, and the almost complete severing of the standard communication links to the remaining retaliatory forces. The confusion factor over the source and nature of the destruction would be tremendous. The identity of the striker could only be inferred, and then not hastily. By the use of this one simple, inexpensive weapon-delivery system, the Soviets (or any other power so inclined) could achieve total surprise, create chaos, and greatly reduce the counter-strike capability of the United States.

The “command link” to a van bomb can range from the absurdly simple to the esoteric. Most large cities in the United States have direct distance dialing with Moscow. Agents could simply receive orders over the telephone. The appearance of a certain ad on network TV could be a message to move. Direct bombs commands relayed by satellite to the van bombs could also be used. Links like these could enable the plan to be initiated without automatically going full course.

Now we come to the point where we must ask what action is appropriate and practical to stem this threat. We are an open and free society. We cannot shut down commerce and restrict trade because of “what if” scenarios. We will probably never espouse a “first strike” strategy. Prudent action would, however, close a few “chinks” in the armor. I cannot speculate on covert actions or actions to provide for the increased survivability of the National Command Authorities, but these should be considered. One of the most obvious holes to be patched is in the area of vulnerable communications. Our national web of communications is much like cotton candy—it is thick and made up of millions of threads, but terribly soft. When exposed to any heat, it melts away. We have some stronger threads embedded in that cotton candy, but we need to add a few bands of steel to strengthen the survivable communication links to all nuclear strike forces. We have a credible retaliatory capability only if we can control and launch our retaliatory forces. Communication satellites are still physically survivable, but their transmission paths are certainly vulnerable to the atmospheric effects of nuclear explosions. Extremely-low-frequency (ELF) radio signals seem to be usable despite atmospheric disruption, but the installation of any meaningful ELF system has been put off by environmental factors. We must get our priorities in order and find the solutions needed to provide solid links of communication that will survive the intrusion of a Trojan horse into our fortress. We must be able to pass the order to fight even if the alarms do not ring first. Providing adequate and survivable communications is the most effective practical solution to the threat of surprise attack from any source.

The prospect of internal sabotage leading off a nuclear exchange has not been discussed very often, but it certainly is a potential avenue of attack in a free society. We can do little to limit commerce and the movement of goods and people, but we can shore up our own internal system so as to better withstand attack from inside our own walls.

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Note

Author’s note: After this article was submitted for publication, the White House issued a series of Presidential Directives concerned with continuity of government, flexible response, and telecommunications policy for national security.

Other Sources
Patriotism, Uncle Sam Needs You!

Major James Burkholder

Patriotism must not be stored in closets and brought forth for airing only on holidays and special occasions. Patriotism is a living quality that must be nurtured and examined to ensure positive growth. Once matured, it must be strong enough to survive the challenges of criticism, conflict, imprisonment, or personal sacrifice. Military personnel need to become involved in a continuing process of giving life and substance to patriotism, for it is a basic element in the survival of both our military and our nation. Yet there is little if any training or instruction in patriotism. We study leadership, tactics, management, and politics, but what of patriotism? Is it any less important in today’s military organization and age of technology?

Individuals have their first formal contacts with the military through our recruiting programs, and in these programs we appeal to the basic emotions and patriotic motivations of our potential recruits. Of course, our modern posters and slogans make more subtle appeals than the posters and slogans of the past, but they retain their basic appeals to patriotism and individual emotions. Many people view the Revolutionary War poster with its cry “God Save the United States” and many of the posters and verbal appeals from World War I and World War II as overly dramatic for a technological society. Thus, we no longer see such phrases as “Be an American Eagle!” “Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory,” and a painting of Uncle Sam saying “I Want You.” Instead, we use posters and slogans that emphasize opportunities for training and self-improvement. Nevertheless, the subtle images of “Duty, Honor, Country,” and patriotism undergird all of these more sophisticated appeals. The simple fact remains that appeals to patriotic beliefs are important, if not vital, elements of our recruiting programs. But this must always be a basic tenet because a military force “drawn from an apathetic population and motivated mainly by high pay rather than service to the nation is a thin reed upon which to lean.”

However, the use of patriotic appeals in recruiting is not the real issue before us. The important issue is the action taken in the years following a person’s enlistment to sustain and reinforce the patriotic ideals that may have motivated the enlistment in the first place. All too often, the military can be compared with the individual who saves and sacrifices to purchase a new automobile and then fails to maintain it properly. In much the same manner, we recruit with patriotic appeals, but, once the people are ours, we often ignore their basic motivations and leave them to their own resources.

Major commercial firms consider employee motivation and job satisfaction as vital elements of the management process. Numerous and diverse personnel programs extol company virtues and products. They strive for a sense of belonging and purpose among their employees, and reinforce the workers’ allegiance, production goals, and company products.

I believe the Air Force could profit from industry’s example in this respect. The military community provides services unequaled in the civilian community, for our “product” is protection of our American way of life: independence, freedom, and deterrence from aggression. As military officers, we are professionally obligated to motivate our people, extol our products, proclaim our goals, and reinforce our patriotic ideals.
Patriotic motivation is not a peculiar requirement of our American society. The Soviet military depends on patriotic training and reinforcement to a far greater extent than the U.S. military. It may seem somewhat strange to equate patriotism with communism, because we tend to categorize patriotism, human rights, freedom, and equality in the section of our mental bookshelves labeled “America.” Nevertheless, the Soviet military considers patriotic motivation a matter of primary importance. Lieutenant Colonel Bondarenko of the Soviet army provided some insight into Soviet philosophy when he wrote:

The Soviet way of life itself creates favorable conditions for the patriotic education of servicemen and the whole of the people. This education occupies a prominent place in ideological work in the Soviet Armed Forces. It is carried out as a complex, with a variety of means, forms and methods.

Colonel Bondarenko further stated that patriotic education includes “political instruction, thematic get-togethers” and “... apart from regular political studies, wide use is made of lectures, reports, talks, meetings with veterans of the Great Patriotic War and of specially selected slides and motion pictures.

Soviet patriotism is not an abstract notion. It finds its expression in everyday military service. The Soviet serviceman lives up to his lofty mission, stitting no effort in his self-denying labour for he realises his personal responsibility for the security of the Soviet Union and of the entire socialist community.

Numerous other military publications contain lengthy discussions of the “military-patriotic indoctrination” of Soviet youth and the fact that “of all patriotic obligations, the ‘sacred duty’ of military service ‘in defense of the Motherland’ is the highest calling.” Such articles should be more readily available to U.S. Air Force officers because they provide interesting insights into the patriotic training and motivation employed by the Soviets. I am not an advocate of such lengthy and periodic “patriotism seminars” as those expounded by Colonel Bondarenko. Nevertheless, the principles and goals underlying Soviet programs demand examination, consideration, and possible application within our military.

Any study of the Air Force and patriotism should consider the problem of retaining officer and enlisted personnel. Normally, reasons for separating from the service include a number of complex interrelated issues such as pay, lack of responsibility, lack of job satisfaction, or rating disparities. However, many of the irritants may stem from more subtle issues. For example, do our people lose their drive, their purpose, or their sense of accomplishment because of a lack of patriotic reinforcement or encouragement? Have they perhaps lost the feeling for the basic qualities of “Duty, Honor, Country,” and patriotism once envisioned in their idealistic youth or discussed with their recruiters? At the risk of suggesting an improper assumption, I must confess I have never heard anyone state that he was leaving the service because of excessive emphasis on patriotism or emotional appeals to patriotism. Correlation between patriotic motivation and retention would be an elusive task. Nevertheless, all Air Force officers must give more than passing consideration to the problem.

What actions can officers, commanders, and future commanders take in reinforcing the patriotic ideals of our people? What are some of our possible options and solutions? There are obviously no hard and fast, irrevocable rules. And our difficulties are often compounded by tendencies to classify patriotic fervor as religious beliefs. Many people consider patriotism and religious convictions as personal issues closed to public analysis and inspection. But professional officers must not hesitate to discuss their patriotic understandings, beliefs, and emotions rather than store them in the hidden recesses of their minds.

We may not be as straightforward and
open as the late General Daniel "Chappie" James, Jr., but he certainly provided an outstanding example for emulation when he expressed his professional commitment in these words:

I am a member of the military. I make no bones about that. I chose to be in the service of my country because I felt it was the best way that I could serve this great nation of mine. And I consider myself very fortunate to call myself a practicing American and to try to demonstrate at every turn that I possibly can, that I consider this the highest honor afforded any man.

Develop for yourself the pride that must be necessary for you to develop your power of excellence—it's the only power on Earth that's worth investing in. And, you use that to propel yourself to the top of your field no matter what it might be; and from up there on top with authority, you can do more than satisfy the ills of your people below, than you can from under the bottom with a brick. Don't tear it down—build it up. Perform, perform, excel, excel, contribute, contribute, be patriotic, and be proud, be American—that's all I ever knew, and that's all I know now.7

The Air Force, in my opinion, badly needs more outspoken members like General James—individuals who are not afraid to speak openly of patriotism and their inner motivations.

The average officer or noncommissioned officer may not be so eloquent as General James but like him he needs to become a "practicing American." We can take up the challenge posed by General Paul Carlton in this statement:

... let's every one of us resolve that we'll get back on that patriotic bandwagon, proudly wave the flag, and set ourselves back on the path of service to country...

and strength of character which defies any adversary to try to disrupt our orderly growth and diminish our aspirations through chaos, violence, or subversion.8

Another noted military leader expressed the idea that we must be able to motivate even the young airman who drives a car for the motor pool day after day. We must, in some way, be able to motivate him and instill within him a feeling that he is performing an important service for his country and helping his country accomplish its goals. A task of this magnitude is complex and challenging, particularly if we have not sorted out in our minds the motivations that drive us toward our own missions. We must not only understand ourselves and know our beliefs but also provide examples for others to emulate.

Ultimately, we must examine our patriotic attitudes and convictions, refuse to hide them in mental storage closets, and muster the courage to express them openly. And we must not feel ashamed or humiliated in appealing to patriotic ideals in our efforts to motivate ourselves and our people. The words expressed by General John Roberts as commander of the Air Training Command, perhaps best describe the real spirit of dedicated officers:

When I speak of leadership, I mean the spirit which enables us to rise above the mundane, to see beyond the narrow, parochial interests of our immediate requirements. I mean the ability to lead those under us to share our vision, to share our commitment, and to join us in serving this nation with pride in their own professionalism and love of country.9

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Notes

4. Ibid., p. 37.
5. For example, see Lieutenant Commander David M. Gist, "The Militarization of Soviet Youth," Naval War College Review, Summer 1977, pp. 115-29.
6. Ibid., p. 118.
ON STRATEGIC PLANNING

A Comment by
Captain Frederick G. Beisser

In his article "Military Strategy. The Forgotten Art," Lieutenant Colonel William T. Rudd makes a number of very valid points which suggest much-needed changes in our military strategy.* He has, however, tasked the Department of Defense with some actions that exceed its authority but which must occur prior to the successful implementation of his major command-level strategic planning functions; he has also overlooked several potential changes at the departmental level which could be made now to increase the military strategic planning awareness and the capabilities of our officer corps at minimum cost.

As noted in his article, the absence of a grand or national strategy and related objectives has seriously affected military thinking and resulted in a resource allocation mode of thinking. I would add that this has also caused an unnecessarily large amount of crisis management, confused both our allies and our enemies as to our reaction to changing world situations, and degraded our weapon systems through on-again off-again budgeting support for long-term off AGAIN budgeting items such as the F-1 bomber and naval strategic needs.

Improving Grand Strategy Development

The cure may lie in making a "purple suit"* national strategic analysis and planning system or organization which reports on an independent basis to the President as suggested. Note, however, that we already have the National Security Council, which was created by statute in 1947, to advise the President on integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security so as to enable departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.1 The council is not a decision- or policymaking body, which may contribute to the problem. It is, by its nature, a crisis management forum to assist the President. But within the


*Consisting of members from more than one of the military services.
council there is an interdepartmental committee known as the Planning Board. Its members guard their departmental interests (on the negative side) and must resort to interagency bargaining for what the traffic will bear to arrive at final positions on policy which originated in their department and are being coordinated through the council. Budgetary considerations are very general, and proposals do not undergo cost benefit or economic analysis. Last, the Planning Board is not creative in areas of uncharted policy, only reviewing and adjusting to existing policy.2

The President already has the option of using the National Security Council (Planning Board) as a policymaking instrument. However, to eliminate the problems of partisanship and agency parochialism, a significant term of appointment is needed that exceeds the President’s term of office and once appointed cannot be revoked. The Planning Board should become the “purple suit” of the National Security Council and should be headed by a fifteen-year appointee, as is done with the Comptroller General of the United States.

Staff members should come from a form of joint career service of carefully selected officers from Defense, State, and several other departments. These military and civilian officers (at the 06 level after reaching the Planning Board) should be groomed for this service through assignments in a number of different departments or agencies,3 culminating in a permanent switch to the Planning Board. Subsequently, these Planning Board members in “purple suits” would also serve tours with the Air Force, Navy, Army, or higher strategic planning staffs in DOD, State, and perhaps, the Office of Management and Budget, bringing with them strategic planning expertise.

The importance of making changes in developing national strategy cannot be overemphasized. This becomes painfully obvious when one realizes that “the annual budget is the basic planning document of the federal government.”4 The most significant issues in defense policy are to define the military purposes of the United States forces and allocate defense resources in a manner to achieve these purposes.5 The continued dispute over these issues certainly supports Colonel Rudd’s request to improve our strategic planning. After many years, the major problem in our strategic force policy continues to be whether merely to offset U.S.S.R. capability to threaten our strategic forces or to acquire a matching capability to destroy U.S.S.R. land-based missiles. The specific implications of this (Carter administration’s) policy (countervailing at time of writing) have not been clarified. The composition of the strategic forces continues to be determined in a piecemeal way.6

A natural result of all this is that the “basic military purposes of U.S. Forces are in serious dispute.”7 Our strategic force policy has proceeded on a piecemeal basis, which is no longer acceptable. Such vital factors as threat assessment, strategic stability considerations, future affordability of alternatives, and SALT considerations dictate the need in our government for a coherent worldwide national strategy for a longer term and one to which the purpose and structure of our forces is closely linked.

Improved strategic planning must also be coupled with appropriate funding, aimed to support attainment of strategic objectives. Too frequently, congressional budget cuts have been aimed at end items or commodities in operating budgets that by themselves appear innocuous. A recent article by Lieutenant General Hans H. Driessnack, Comptroller of the Air Force, explains the problem.8 Perhaps it is time for Congress to begin using a mission-oriented method of collecting budget requirements as the executive branch has done. Then, cuts in particular commodities can be readily evaluated as to their effect on meeting national objectives.

Improving Strategic Planning Abilities

It is interesting to note that our colleagues in the U.S.S.R. have significant opportunity to study military science at advanced levels. There are over 100 military schools with courses ranging
from four to five years. Major areas of study are doctrine, strategy, operational art, and tactics. It is also estimated that several hundred Soviet officers hold Candidate of Military Science degrees. Viewed another way, graduate military universities in the U.S.S.R. offer advanced schooling in military science at 17 locations, equivalent roughly to master's degrees. In addition, postgraduate work is also encouraged in military disciplines at the doctoral level.

Compare these with a review of The College Bluebook, which shows only five institutions in the United States offering a bachelor's degree in military science and none at the master's level. There must be corrective action soon.

**THE** Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) can easily encourage more intense study of strategic planning. Several suggestions seem in order:

- Ensure that all larger base libraries are stocked with appropriate books to allow independent study. Effective supervisors encourage professional reading so the books will not be unused. The Air University can quickly develop a suggested list in four basic sections covering military science, military history, strategic planning and policy analysis, and defense studies. In addition, each library should carry the entire Soviet Military Thought series, which few now do.
- Encourage on-base programs to provide degree programs at larger bases in curricula useful to the military rather than merely creating a foundation for an officer's second career. Present programs do not need to be eliminated, but DOD could contractually require the offering of M.S./M.A. degree programs in strategic policy analysis, international relations, or military history from currently participating institutions. Interschool cooperative agreements could allow expansion to smaller bases by guaranteeing transferability of course work.
- A change in the requirements for tuition assistance would ensure participation in these programs. Either eliminate the two-year active-duty service commitment for military science degree programs presently required of officers or pay full tuition if a grade of B+ or higher is achieved.
- A recent step in the right direction is the AFIT program in strategic and tactical sciences. However, the number of officers able to participate will be limited.

If the above changes were to be implemented, a not-so-long-range benefit might be the opportunity for the doctor of military science degree to become a reality in the United States.

**IN GENERAL,** I agree with Colonel Rudd. Strategic planning has been seriously neglected. Now is the right time to improve strategic planning at both DOD and national government levels with taxpayer support reawakened by recent world events.

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**Notes**

2. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
3. Ibid., p. 12.
5. Ibid., p. 15.
6. Ibid., p. 16.
7. Ibid., p. 163.
Comment by
Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence J. Hillebrand

Lieutenant Colonel Rudd makes three valid points: that there is a need for a national strategy which is well organized and has widely based political support; that a military strategy to complement the national strategy must be developed; and that elite military strategists should be identified, trained, and used to best implement the national military strategy.

Colonel Rudd supports these points by identifying many logical benefits, such as unity of purpose, developing effectiveness, minimizing interservice disharmony, and keeping the focus on ability to meet the need—not just the program-management goals of time, performance, and cost. The logic of his position is unassailable. However, he makes no recommendation about how the diversity of the American national character could contribute to national security. The issue is not whether the military Services could be better organized and managed to meet national objectives but what our national objectives are.

Our nation has been characterized by its reactive unplanned behavior. United States political and military involvement has sprung from social pressures, not reasoned, long-planned acts of expansion or avengement. The war with Mexico, the Civil War, the Spanish American War, and World Wars I and II were preceded by considerable periods of time to gain public support and overcome isolationist tendencies; they required the exploiting of some dramatic anti-American action. The recent war in Southeast Asia with its planned finite application of power without a clearly defined condition of victory, failed. We have succeeded when the goal was plain and easily perceived and not so well otherwise, which supports Colonel Rudd’s obvious point that we need clear, unambiguous objectives. But what strategies then can there be?

The state has been likened to an organism, and in this context it can have three strategies: growth, maintenance of status, and decay. Disregarding the latter, perhaps an error to those who espouse zero growth or the inevitability of decreasing resources and energy, we have two national strategies remaining:

- Maintenance of current status—defined as maintenance of the “American Way.” Diversity, no limitation on rewards for initiative, no limitation to the accumulation of material possessions, free competitive markets, no restrictions on travel or the other blessings that make our country best.
- Growth—an increase in politically controlled geography, or percentage of energy and resources consumed per capita; increase in wealth, power, and population.

Of these two, the military implementing strategy is easiest to develop and implement to achieve growth. Growth is the easiest to define, measure, and, if the means are available, accomplish. Great military leaders (e.g., Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon, and Hitler) were able to achieve success in meeting their plans for growth. The objective was clear, the enemies’ capabilities measured, and conflict successfully planned on the political, social, and military level. Little intraservice bickering on the relative value of tactical versus strategic Marine versus Army tactical air versus helicopters was necessary because leaders could relatively easily ascertain whether that solution could meet the need.

Maintenance of the status quo is the most challenging. It requires maintaining capabilities to overcome from all levels of threat and conflict. It is most difficult to define a status quo that includes “spheres of influence,” changing political attitudes and desires by the citizenry, and rising expectations by the world at large.

If the United States should choose an aggressive posture to overcome some threat, out-produce or develop a superiority over or defeat
some political entity, the strategy is simpler to design, defining the required means is clearer, and positive contributions are easier to identify and attain. On the other hand, maintaining a status quo is basically defensive, reactive, and, according to some scholars who decry maginot line thinking, doomed to essential failure.

There is no denying that having a clearly defined goal is best. Implementing a national military strategy in these uncertain times requires great flexibility and risk. The military establishment requires capabilities ranging from those against terrorist to mutual assured destruction. It follows that there will be changes in priorities as these capabilities cannot all be supported to the same degree at the same time. Colonel Rudd is correct. The military must be "can do," however, for as citizens we are always charged with defining what we want—a much more difficult task.

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Revelations about Abscam (Arab Scam), the FBI's "sting" operation involving corruption among congressmen, are but the latest in a series of incidents of ethical or moral lapses of wrongdoing. Within the past decade, two dozen other congressmen were charged with illegal acts. Continuing exposés of vice and
not-so-petty corruption among public officials at every level of government result less in moral outrage and more in a vague sense of moral ill-being—a nonspecific malaise about morality and ethics, an uncertainty about the state of human conduct.

Although Mark Twain wrote a century ago that there probably is “no distinctly native American criminal class except Congress,” it is unfair to single out public officials for unethical conduct. Others deserving mention include corporate personnel tied to bribes and other unsavory activity with foreign governments, corporations, labor racketeers, government bureaucrats, and military personnel who engaged in or tolerated immoral and unethical activities in Vietnam and elsewhere.

Probably man’s conduct today is not more distant from his ideals than it was in earlier times. Yet, his awareness of transgression is heightened remarkably by the instantaneous visual coverage of Watergate, the media massage of Vietnam, Koreagate, and the constant drumming of the print media.

All professions are affected by unease about ethics (the intellectual concept of right conduct) and morality (the act of doing right). Lawyers seek to reestablish a reputation for integrity sullied by Watergate; doctors struggle with the ethical aspects of abortion, DNA experimentation, mind control, and test tube babies; and the courts have ruled that biotechnicians may patent novel living organisms which they invent, reasoning that life is largely chemistry, calling forth the counterargument that this is not so. In any event, ethics is being more widely debated lately; although one wonders if it is not like the weather that everyone talks about but no one does anything about.

However, the book War, Morality, and the Military Profession does do something significant.† This splendid anthology provides the raw material for learning about ethics through logical grouping and graduated exposure to 31 authoritative and intellectually appealing articles by a variety of scholars. Edited by Colonel Malham M. Wakin, Associate Dean of the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), Professor of Philosophy, and long-time teacher, this work was developed as a text for the ethics course required of all juniors at the USAFA. Throughout, it deals with the kinds of questions that are worth the attention of all professionals.

Clearly, the military has engaged in some serious thinking about ethics over the past several years. This introspection has been diffuse, but two themes predominate.† The first theme is an underlying personal dissatisfaction with the military’s status in society, coupled with a desire both to preserve a unique life-style and to strengthen the autonomy of the military within its professional sphere. The second theme is the concern with ethics, primarily the gap between professional ideals and professional behavior. Ethical conflicts result when institutional demands and organization behavior are counterposed to individual ethics that reject careerism.

Concern with ethics is not new to military professionals. Historically, a hereditary military class, or more recently, corporate military groups have seen themselves as conservators of the crucial elements of a society’s ethics. Generally, the society has reciprocated and looked to the military as the moral exemplar. No doubt there are mixed opinions about the American case; maybe exemplar is too strong a word. Nevertheless, cheating at a service academy makes national headlines while academic chiseling goes unnoticed almost everywhere else. The American

public may well believe that the military function so crucially involves moral integrity that any hint of dishonesty must become a matter of paramount concern. Certainly military officers insist on integrity; at the same time, some are obsessively watchful that their self-image is not tarnished by those who fail to measure up or by those who point out that the institution or their colleagues do not measure up.

Expectations for the professional military, as Professor Wakin points out in his introduction to *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, are indeed demanding:

Military knowledge and competence are not enough; we insist that they be conjoined with courage, loyalty, obedience, subordination of the self to the greater whole, and most importantly, with moral integrity.

The virtues of loyalty, obedience, selflessness, and integrity are praiseworthy personal attributes for any endeavor, but they are not fundamentally necessary to all that passes for success in modern America. To the military officer, however, they are absolutely crucial to his professional function; and, hence, their exaggeration is imperative.

Professor Wakin argues correctly that this nonexclusive set of virtues is a major moral tie between morality and the military professions. The second major connection lies in the nobility of the profession: doctors save lives; lawyers preserve law and justice; the military protect and secure the institutions and quality of life in a morally sound nation.

The readings are grouped into two parts: (1) Ethics and the Military Profession and (2) War and Morality.

The first part includes samples of seminal civilian scholarship which has so informed the professional officer about his own state: writings by Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Charles Moskos. A reading of these selections will hardly settle the seemingly interminable and emotionally charged arguing about *professionalism, officership, leadership* and *management* (Are these words really mutually exclusive?) and whether the military is evolving as an occupation rather than a profession. What it will do is refine the parameters of discussion and provide the basic stuff for reasoned discourse about the nature and future of the profession. Three excellent selections by General Sir John Winthrop Hackett include “The Military in the Service of the State,” wherein Hackett concludes that “the highest service of the military to the state may well lie in the moral sphere.” (p. 125) Separate treatment is given by various authors to the topics of “Integrity,” “Truthfulness and Uprightness,” “Duty, Honor, Country,” “Loyalty, Honor, and the Modern Military,” and to “Conflicting Loyalties and the American Military Ethic.” Colonel Wakin’s enlightening chapter, “Ethics of Leadership,” untangles ethos, ethics, and military honor; illuminates some of the complexities of obedience, loyalty, and moral commitment in terms of real cases (the Lavelle incident); evaluates the utility of formal written codes of behavior; and discusses the need to understand that one’s approach to ethics must go beyond the simple bifurcation between relativism and absolutism and to know that pragmatism and relativism are not identical. What we ask of today’s leader, Wakin writes, is that he be neither absolutist nor relativist but retain a balanced perspective that understands the full complexity which characterizes the interweaving of moral value with military function. We ask him to be that good man, that wise man, that the Greek philosopher could advise subordinates to find and imitate. (p. 216)

The second part of the anthology is about the morality of and in war. The morality of war has generally been dealt with historically, in the Christian world, in terms of the classi-
cal just war theory. This theory, essentially a set of criteria to judge whether a war is just or unjust, is critically reviewed in Donald A. Wells's chapter, "How Much Can 'The Just War' Justify?" The theory holds that a war is just if it is declared by a legitimate national authority, is embarked on for a just cause, if fought with the right intention, and employs just means. Furthermore, the use of force must have some chance of success, else it is irrational. Wells doubts that war had moral significance in the past; he is certain that today the just war justifies Armageddon if our hearts be pure, and this is to justify too much." (p. 270)

Other contributors deal with twentieth-century views of just and unjust wars (one might speak with equal accuracy of moral and immoral wars). To the pacifist, who is also necessarily absolutist, all war is immoral. To F. R. Struckmeyer, defense against active attack is morally justified, as he points out in his chapter "The Just War and the Right of Self-Defense." Richard Wasserstrom provocatively analyzes the assertions that warlike response to aggressive war is justifiable and that the initiation of war is never justifiable. Elizabeth Anscombe deals with the killing of the innocent and the principle of double effect in her essay "War and Murder."

Several chapters highlight the moral dilemmas inherent in war. Telford Taylor, Columbia University law professor, former brigadier general, and Chief U.S. Counsel for the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, writes about "War Crimes" and "Superior Orders and Reprisals." British philosopher R. M. Hare answers the question "Can I Be Blamed for Obeying Orders?" Richard Krickus examines the moral ambiguity and legal uncertainty about the use of chemical and biological weapons. A final chapter by Gregory S. Kavka explains "Some Paradoxes of Deterrence."

A marvelous amount of human intellectual energy has been spent in the quest for a world without war, and this elusive goal continues to engage the world's political leaders. Some success has been achieved: at least the major powers of World War II have found ways, so far, to avoid making war on each other. Theoretically, a world without war is possible; actually, wars seem more frequent and more widely distributed geographically. So long as the probability of war exists, the professional military must be concerned with the moral and ethical dilemmas of war and in war.

**REQUIRED** reading for the military, *War, Morality, and the Military Profession* focuses attention on the serious ethical dimensions that invade and guide the thinking of military leaders. Careful reading and study of the more complicated dilemmas presented by this anthology can serve several important purposes. It can stimulate the moral imagination, help to dispel moral myopia, encourage sensitivity to the moral aspects of everyday life, develop analytical skills, aid ethical reasoning, and contribute to an understanding and toleration of the moral ambiguity which, by its very nature, comprises the dilemmas of ethical reasoning and moral choices.

Dr. Wakin's frequent observation that "the unexamined ideal is not worth dying for" is correct. Ethical dilemmas merit frequent and serious discussion by the military profession. The easier it is to discuss them now, in peace-time, the easier it will be to make sound ethical decisions in the face of wartime pressures.

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**Note**

JAPAN: THE STUDENT BECOMES THE TEACHER

Dr. James H. Toner

In 1853 and again in 1854 American warships under the command of Commodore Matthew C. Perry anchored in Tokyo Bay. Perry had been sent by the United States government to open trade relations with Japan. The signed treaty opened two Japanese ports to American trade and ended Japan’s isolation from other countries. Of the signing of the agreement on 31 March 1854, Perry’s chronicler offered this account:

It was now sunset, and the Japanese prepared to depart with quite as much wine in them as they could well bear. The jovial Matsusaki threw his arms about the Commodore’s neck, crushing, in his tipsy embrace, a new pair of epaulettes, and repeating, in Japanese, with maudlin affection, these words as interpreted into English: “Nippon and America, all the same heart.”

Four score and seven years later, the Japanese and Americans were at war.

An American Naval officer, Perry, helped to bring Japan into the family of nations in 1854. In 1867, Emperor Mutsuhito regained his power—the so-called Meiji Restoration—from the Shogun, the military governor of Japan whose warrior class had held power since 1192. During this post-Perry period of enlightened rule, Mutsuhito and his successors eliminated the feudal system, ended the samurai or warrior class, proclaimed Japan’s first constitution in 1889, generally modernized the country, and increasingly entered into international trade. In fact, the samurai had given way to the zaibatsu, the financial moguls who helped to develop, in the late nineteenth century, some of the firms which are today internationally known. By 1930, however, a major power struggle had thrown Japan into political turmoil. The assassination of Prime Minister Yuko Hamaguchi, in November 1930, led to the seizure of power by his rivals, the militarists, who invaded Manchuria the next year. Japanese expansion continued. The Japanese militarists strengthened their hold on the government, and in late 1941 General Hideki Tojo became Prime Minister.

An American Army officer, MacArthur, helped restore Japan to the family of nations after World War II. Allied Military Occupation of Japan began in late August 1945 and officially continued until 28 April 1952, when the Japanese peace treaty went into effect. During the occupation, Japanese war criminals were tried—seven were executed—and a remodernization and democratization of Japan were begun. On 3 May 1947 the new Japanese constitution went into effect; the emperor’s divinity was renounced; the army and navy were essentially dissolved, and war was abjured as an instrument of statecraft. Serious and substantial reforms were introduced into practically every aspect of Japanese life.

When the occupation ended, Japan’s total production was about one-third that of Britain or France. By the late 1970s, her gross national product was as large as that of Britain and France combined and more than half that of the United States. Ezra Vogel, chairman of Harvard’s Council of East Asian Studies and author of Japan as Number One: Lessons for America, points out that if Japan were an American state it would rank fifth in geographical size, following Alaska, Texas, California, and Montana.† Its 115,000,000

†Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (Cambridge: Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979, $12.50), 272 pages.
people live in that fairly compact archipelago, making it the most densely populated major country in the world. About thirty percent of its food supplies must be imported, and about eighty-five percent of its energy resources must also be obtained from foreign suppliers. Given their rather exigent circumstances, one can see why the Japanese have turned, with astonishing success, to international business and commerce. President Charles de Gaulle of France once rather peremptorily dismissed a Japanese prime minister as a “transistor salesman.” But as Herman Kahn and Thomas Pepper point out,† “Japan is almost certain to become . . . the largest . . . trading nation in the world.” Japan, says Kahn, is very likely “to become a superpower as well as a state.”² Some transistor, some salesman!

Ezra Vogel’s book is readable, informative, and provocative. He wonders in print whether a Western nation can learn from the East. Vogel does not look on Japan as a utopia, but he contends that “Japan has dealt more successfully with more of the basic problems of postindustrial society than any other country. It is in this sense . . . that the Japanese are number one.” It is incorrect, Vogel asserts, to regard Nippon (meaning “source of the sun”) simply as “Japan, Inc.” Vogel contends that the Japanese economic powerhouse is, in part, the product of a relatively homogeneous society in which “communitarian values” provide purpose, cohesion, and loyalty. Although Vogel praises Japanese social purpose, he admits that the strong pressure for conformity could help restrict dissent and stifle individualism. He doubts, however, that there is any prospect of a return to power of a totalitarian dictatorship.

Vogel’s book, which may be read with high profit by both Asian specialists and general readers, is particularly optimistic about Japan’s politics.³ “If the term ‘democracy’ is used to signify the expression of diverse interests in the political arena and the capacity of the government to satisfy those interests,” Vogel writes, “it could be argued that Japan is now a more effective democracy than America.” Japanese parliamentary democracy, institutionalized in the bicameral Diet, appears to be remarkably stable and strong.⁴ Emperor Hirohito performs ceremonial duties as head of state; the prime minister is chosen by the Diet and is, as head of government, particularly accountable to the 511-member House of Representatives. The Liberal Democratic Party has been the chief political actor in Japanese politics, but its domination seems no longer assured.⁵ The Japanese Communist Party is politically weak and, according to the forecast of Rodger Swearingen, the JCP seems to be “insinuating itself into the ranks of Eurocommunism.”⁶ In short, Japanese political institutions and procedures appear resilient and mature.

How much we in the United States—with our federal, presidential, pluralist political system—can learn from the Japanese unitary, parliamentary system can be debated.⁶ Increasingly, however, American businessmen are turning to their Japanese counterparts to study Japanese industrial practices. As Vogel put it: “No structure in the West compares with the Japanese firm in its capacity to introduce rapid change and to provide iden-

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tification for a substantial part of the population.” In this connection, Rodney Clark’s book is essential.† The book is a clear, concise, and relatively complete study of management practice in contemporary Japan. Clark agrees with Vogel that the term Japan, Inc. is incorrect. Although Clark’s book will be of interest primarily to the close student of international economics or of comparative business management, the generalist will find Clark’s chapter “The Company, Society, and Change” to be useful for its insight into the nature of authority, the sociological background of company structure, and the principal organizational differences between American and Japanese firms. This book, in conjunction with Kahn and Pepper’s, will be valuable reading for anyone whose goal is to understand the procedures and prospects of the mercantile Japanese.

The student of international affairs will want to read Swearingen’s book, which is a lucid treatment of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan. World War II ended formally between Japan and the U.S.S.R. in 1956, when they agreed to sign a peace pact; Japan entered the United Nations the same year. But Swearingen contends that there remain “fundamental issues” to be resolved between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. His book is a coherent catalogue of difficulties in the Russo-Japanese relationship, dating particularly from the war of 1904-1905 (which was ended, of course, at the behest of President Theodore Roosevelt, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 for his efforts). For example, questions still exist about Sakhalin Island, about the Kuril Islands, about certain other islands across the Nemuro-kaikyo Strait at 44°N and 146°E, and about other matters which appear intransigent. Complicating things is the question of China. Swearingen uses a Chinese Communist military document, which was intended to assure cadre and soldiers that China’s tilt toward the United States was merely tactical and temporary (p. 169), as a basis for his conclusion that the Asian strategic situation is increasingly complex—and perilous.

Despite Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution—the “MacArthur Constitution”—the Japanese appear to be embarking upon a “substantial course of limited rearmament, dictated, it would seem, in no small measure by the alarming Soviet naval buildup in the Pacific area and the increasing military stature of the People’s Republic of China and of North Korea concomitant with decreasing U.S. commitments in Asia.” (p. 203) Swearingen’s conclusion: “All of this suggests, rather ominously, that—Moscow’s policy of détente notwithstanding—we may be witnessing only the first stage of the escalating Soviet challenge in Northeast Asia and of the increasingly vigorous Japanese response.” (p. 220) Valuable, too, are 80 pages that give the texts of 38 treaties between the U.S.S.R. and Japan from 1956 to 1977.

The Japanese have much to teach us in the West. As Kahn and Pepper put it, the Japanese have learned to combine the machine and the garden. They write that “... Japan is the quintessential example of a country that consciously sought a marriage of traditional and modern, native and foreign, East and West. The slogans of the Meiji era—for example, ‘Western knowledge, Eastern morals’—show a deep-rooted belief in synthesis.” (p. 32) Perhaps it is time, at least in some areas of politics and business, for the Japanese to become the teachers and for us, the countrymen of Perry and

MacArthur, to become the students. Then, perhaps it can again be said, as it was in 1854: “Nippon and America, all the same heart.”

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Notes


2 This quotation may be found on p. xii of the Kahn and Pepper book. To pursue this subject, see Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).


4 The student of government will be impressed at the comparisons to be made between the Bonn government in the Federal Republic of Germany and the post-World War II Japanese government. The former employs a federal system, a parliamentary system with a bicameral parliament (Bundestag and Bundesrat), a ceremonial presidency, and a chancellorship. The latter employs a unitary system, a parliamentary system with a bicameral Diet (House of Representative and House of Councilors), a constitutional monarchy with the emperor as ceremonial head of state, and a prime minister. Both nations use a variation of proportional representation in electing legislators, and both nations seem to have accepted the fundamentals of democracy in political cultures which, before 1945, probably would have correctly been called “authoritarian.”

5 At the time of writing, Prime Minister Ohira had been defeated in a surprise no-confidence vote. He had dissolved the House of Representatives and set 22 June 1980 as the date for general elections. The Japanese were also scheduled to choose half of the 252 members of the House of Councilors on the same day. Ohira died on 12 June 1980.

6 The term unitary is often misused. A unitary state is one in which regional or local governmental institutions do not have legal or constitutional guarantees of autonomy. Although Japan does have nine “large regions,” forty-seven “prefectures,” and a “metropolis” (Tokyo), its government is unitary, as is that of Great Britain. By contrast, the American, Swiss, West German, Australian, or Canadian governments are “federal” because their states, cantons, laender, or provinces have certain assurances of limited autonomy. That a country chooses a unitary structure of government by no means indicates that it is not democratic or pluralistic.

COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION

an interpretation of Soviet-American relations

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DALLACE L. MEEHAN

There are now two great nations in the world which, starting from different points, seem to be advancing toward the same goal: I allude to the Russians and the Americans. . . . Each seems called by some secret design of Providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world.

Alexis de Tocqueville, 1835

THE crucial challenge for security in the world today revolves around relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is true, of course, that in recent years we have witnessed a trend toward global interdependence and the development of multipolar power relationships. Since World War II, in particular, there have been major changes in alliance systems, financial relationships, and the relative strengths of the major powers. We have seen the reemergence of a strengthened Europe, the economic and industrial miracle of Japan, sweeping changes in a post-Mao leadership that appears to be establishing a radically new Chinese foreign policy, and new complexities associated with the Third World caused largely by the growing dependence on natural resources by the industrialized nations of the West.
But while all of these changes introduce complications in the international system, the very survival of that system, indeed the physical security of the world, continues to depend most importantly on relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was true at the end of World War II, when the Soviet Union was largely a continental power, and is even more apparent now that she has matured into a major superpower of global military dimensions.

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are usually examined in light of our post-World War II experiences, often beginning with Stalin’s expansionist policies and the development of the Soviet bloc of satellites in Eastern Europe. But as Tocqueville’s analysis shows, it was already clear to the careful observer of a century and a half past that Russia and the United States were destined to play the most influential roles in the world.

In this light, historian John Gaddis traces the roots of contemporary Soviet-American relations back some two hundred years to the American Revolution. For nearly a century, although there were some antagonisms, relations between the two states were relatively cordial. Those disputes that did arise (mainly territorial and commercial) did not occur because of the wide gap in ideological principles that separated them. It is interesting to recall that it was the Russian autocracy that played the role of established governmental conservatism during those years, while the young American republic was in many ways the most revolutionary (and expansionist) government of its day. Both nations seemed determined to keep diplomacy insulated from ideology and even territorial disputes were reconciled largely as a result of the sale of Russian-American (Alaska) to the United States.

The purchase of Alaska by the United States marked a high point in Russian-American cordiality, however, and a gradual deterioration in relations set in, stemming largely from a conflict of interests in the Far East. After the turn of the century, World War I soon garnered the attention of the world, and it was not until the Russians’ own revolution in 1917 that U.S. attention again turned to the eastern giant. Unfortunately, that attention revolved around the folly of misguided intervention in the Russian Civil War, a chapter in U.S.-Soviet relations that Russians are not likely long to forget. American involvement can be summed up as a classic case of attempting to project commitment beyond capability resulting in bitterness, frustration, and recrimination.

What followed were the years of nonrecognition, 1920 to 1933, during which commercial relations and trade flourished. American reluctance to extend official recognition rested largely on ideological grounds with Soviet world revolutionary activity the chief justification. Relations based on the abstract principles of ideology gave way to common interests during the 1930s when the growing power of Germany and Japan served as the impetus for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1933. But as Gaddis quotes from American Ambassador William C. Bullitt, writing in 1935: “It is perfectly clear that to speak of ‘normal relations’ between the Soviet Union and any other country is to speak of something which does not and cannot exist.” Thus, it came as no surprise when the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 was announced.

Russia’s World War II activities, including her attack on Finland, despite the illusions of

the Grand Alliance following Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, were clear indications of the impasse in Soviet-American relations that would soon mature under the descriptive title of the Cold War.

A SOVIET point of view of early U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, as set forth by Professors Sivachev and Yakovlev in a volume prepared for a University of Chicago Press series entitled “The United States and the World: Foreign Perspectives,” differs surprisingly little from that presented by John Gaddis.† The Sivachev-Yakovlev volume thus serves as an excellent companion to the Gaddis book in that the two are nearly parallel in size, scope, and documentation. By the time of the World War II Grand Alliance, some differences in Soviet and American viewpoints become more apparent. While both books clearly illustrate that the Soviet Union bore the brunt of the war (the Red Army confronted more than 200 enemy divisions throughout most of the war, whereas, until the Normandy invasion of 1944, the British and Americans rarely faced more than 10 German divisions at one time), the Soviet version understandably devotes twice as much space to the war years as does the Gaddis book.

Perhaps most interesting and certainly instructive is the Soviet Union’s sense of impatience that characterized her feeling toward the Western Allies. Coupled with a traditionally defensive complex or “siege mentality,” it is little wonder that the delay in opening the second front at Normandy in 1944 helped convince the Russians that the West considered the Soviet Union mere grist for the Nazi mill. Herein, both books make clear, lay the motivation behind Stalin’s expansionism into Eastern Europe and the creation of the Soviet’s own version of a cordon sanitaire.

THE development of Stalin’s European empire is treated in much better detail by Professor Vojtech Mastny, himself a native of Eastern Europe.† † Mastny not only explains the roles played by Stalin and the Western leaders but, more important, gives a graphic account of political developments within the Eastern European countries themselves. It is customary to credit Stalin with an inexorable expansion of Soviet dominance toward the West. But while unmistakably more aggressive since the Yalta conference early in 1945, the pattern of Soviet policy was still erratic and inconsistent rather than premeditated and methodical. Contrary to popular opinion, Yalta decided no partition of the world. In all probability, Mastny contends “the map of Europe would look very much the same if there had never been the Yalta conference at all.” (p. 253) Often overlooked in Western analyses of World War II political developments and the Cold War it ushered in is the crucial role of domestic politics within the individual countries and nations of Eastern and Central Europe. The Polish uprising, the Czechoslovak model, Romania’s coup d’état, the division of Germany, and a nonaligned but Communist Yugoslavia and Albania are all persuasive arguments in favor of Primat der Innenpolitik.


the determination of foreign policy by domestic issues.

Perceptions by the United States of Soviet-American relations are often clouded by moral judgments of, and emotional reactions to, the alien political and social system of communism, especially in view of developments since World War II. Hugh Seton-Watson, distinguished professor of Russian history at the University of London, provides a well-balanced account of the trends in world communism during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s.† There have indeed been substantial gains in the growth and spread of communism throughout the world. The resurgence of Communist parties in the politics of Western Europe, so-called Eurocommunism, is but one of the more contemporary developments that cause concern in the West. Communist influence in the Third World is another. Professor Seton-Watson puts these phenomena in excellent perspective as he highlights the successes and failures of communism in virtually every country where it has played a significant role.

With regard to Soviet-American relations, however, one must be careful not to confuse moral disdain for the political and social precepts of communism as an ideology with the more traditional conflict of interests between major powers. American obsession with Communist “ultimate objectives” beclouds issues and endows communism with an omniscience it does not deserve. The U.S. post-war policy of containment, for example, while originally conceived as a selective measure designed to counteract Soviet expansionism, was strategically sound during the late 1940s and early 1950s. But when foolishly adulterated into a grandiose scheme of anticommunism, it lost its usefulness as a practical doctrine of foreign policy. With the benefit of sharp, if not perfect, hindsight, it should be apparent that the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R.—and especially Soviet expansionism under Stalin and his heirs—has been motivated first and foremost by considerations of security and defense of the Soviet Union to which the interests of international communism were sacrificed time and again.

It should follow that what is at stake, pronouncements of détente notwithstanding, is not a permanent settlement of all differences in Soviet-American relations but rather the elimination or at least the neutralization of specific and immediate issues to minimize the risks of war.

Soviet-American relations are likely to remain in the limelight of U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future. Those relations will continue to be characterized by elements of both cooperation and competition in an increasingly complex international environment. An ideological war against communism is too simplistic a rationale for American foreign policy. In the words of George Kennan, “Americans are going to have to learn to curb their traditional impatience and settle down for the long haul of competitive coexistence with the Soviet Union in a turbulent world.”³

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Notes
2. Testimony by Charles E. Bohlen before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Senate, 83d Congress, 1st Session, 1953, p. 34.

THE RIGHT STUFF: EMBARRASSED HERO WORSHIP

CAPTAIN JOHN M. THOMSON

THIS is not the first time Tom Wolfe has described "the right stuff." A number of years ago he published a piece entitled "The Last American Hero" about Junior Johnson, a stockcar race driver in North Carolina. Johnson was admired by the good old boys and girls, not only for his racing victories but also for his driving in "the whiskey business." Both required risk-taking, and both proved that Johnson was a possessor of the sort of physical courage that is a primary component of the right stuff. In fact, moonshining, because of its illegality, may have been the more significant of the two activities. Wolfe calls Junior Johnson the "last" American hero, apparently because there is nothing particularly heroic about him in the old-fashioned sense. He is no paragon of virtue, and there is nothing chivalric about his treatment of women. All he shares with the heroes of romance is his willingness to face danger and risk his life.

The Right Stuff is a celebration of some other latter-day American heroes, the test pilots of the 1950s, especially those who became the Mercury astronauts.† Like Junior Johnson, the pilots who tested the century series, and later the X-series, were risk-takers, men who found meaning in life by "pushing the outside of the envelope," by "hanging their hides out over the edge." But of course the pilots could not be in the air all of the time, and they found off-duty activities to complement their dangerous profession in the manner that moonshining complemented Junior Johnson's. Owning and driving a fast sports car and showing up punctually for beer call at the Officers' Club thus became two more components of the right stuff.

John Glenn did neither. In fact, in his unabashed patriotism and religious devotion and (worse yet) his embarrassingly public declarations on those subjects, he was something of an anachronism. Unlike the others, Glenn performed more than the required amount of physical exercise, something which, as Wolfe observes, fighter jocks as a breed avoid, preferring instead to abuse their bodies horribly by heavy drinking and going without sleep just to prove they can still perform like champions. Instead of a sports car, Glenn owned an old Peugeot and while stationed at Langley AFB, Virginia, drove it home to Arlington on the weekends to be with his family. Most true brothers of the right stuff would never admit that wife and children had such importance in their lives. The Right Stuff is really just an updated version of the code of American masculinity, previously described in such classics as The Red Badge of Courage and A Farewell to Arms. The protagonists of Stephen Crane's and Ernest Hemingway's stories who abide by the code know that it is forbidden to talk about such subjects as honor and heroism. John Glenn violated the code by actually speaking forbidden words—words such as God, Honor, and Country. There was no doubt, however, that Glenn was a possessor of the right stuff; his was just the Presbyterian variety. For although he was not selected for

the first flight, he proved his election to sainthood, as Wolfe puts it, by being selected for the first orbital flight and becoming the one most fawned upon by the press and most lionized by the public.

The other astronauts found themselves having to play the role that John Glenn had created. Aside from their death-defying profession, they were ordinary men who had heroism thrust upon them by a press and public whose patriotic fervor was a reaction to the Cold War. Behind the scenes they were cheating on their wives, getting drunk, angling for the first flight, trying to get enough money to move into a nice neighborhood, and grouching about the way they were being treated. By letting us see the human comedy behind the scenes, Wolfe deflates our heroes and emphasizes the irrationality of the apocalyptic panic that we indulged in when the Russians put a satellite into space before we did.

One characteristic shared by all “the boys” is the Pilot Ego. In fact, says Wolfe, they would not have minded, once a year, “a little adulation on the order of the Pope’s.” Consequently, the glory heaped on John Glenn was difficult for the others to accept. To think that Glenn, who substituted the Protestant ethic for the “holy coordinates” of Flying & Drinking and Drinking & Driving (Wolfe’s ironic upper case), should achieve such a triumph! Wolfe savors the irony fully, for it is the sort of thing typical of the Mercury Program and, indeed, of service life in general. For example, one irony that the astronauts were acutely aware of, but which the rest of the world seems to have missed entirely, was the fact that they were not going to do any flying; the flights would be programmed. They were mere passengers, riding, they noted, in a capsule, not a ship. In fact, as Chuck Yeager pointed out to them, a monkey was going to make the first flight! They were going to be “lab rabbits.” That truth was repeatedly brought home, beginning with the humiliations they suffered during their physical and psychological testing and continuing into the operational phase. Even on the day of the first launch, while the world was kept waiting for four hours because of cloud cover at the Cape, Alan B. Shepard, America’s first astronaut, found himself begging for permission to go to the bathroom. Having expected the flight to last only fifteen minutes, the designer of the spacesuit had not provided a means for him to void his bladder. By the end of the four-hour wait Shepard was in agony. Finally, after much consultation, the flight controller allowed Shepard, pilot and superhero, to urinate into his suit.

Tom Wolfe has been matched only by Joseph Heller in his ability to capture the ironies of life in the armed forces. “If you can’t take a joke, how come you’re in the Air Force?” That is the sort of remark a fellow is likely to hear when, after three years in a missile silo in North Dakota, he is reassigned to Thule, Greenland, or when, with a wife just about to complete her ninth month, he gets 24-hour notice that he is going on a 90-day TDY to Okinawa.

Wolfe finds much about the experience of being a pilot amusing and misses no opportunity to poke fun. For example, in the wake of the hysteria following Sputnik, President Eisenhower decided that the astronaut candidates would be selected from among the military test pilots. Those who met NASA’s requirements were ordered to Washington to be given the opportunity to volunteer. The project and the orders were Top Secret, so the men were ordered to report to the Pentagon “disguised as civilians.” This proved impossible. Aside from such undisclosable physical characteristics as crewcuts, suntans, and “the unmistakable cocky rolling gait of fighter jocks,” the 35 pilots assembled were all wearing the same clothes—“pathetic-looking civilian suits” that cost about a fourth as much as their wristwatches.

The pilot’s fancy wristwatch, with, accord-
ing to Wolfe, “dials for recording everything short of the sound of enemy guns,” is one of the telling details that ensure that *The Right Stuff* will be enjoyed by members and former members of the Air Force. We recognize immediately Wolfe’s description of the watches “as practically fraternal insignia among the pilots.” The expensive, complicated watch is as much a part of a pilot’s gear as his sunglasses. I would like to ask Wolfe, though, if he still finds pilots or military men in general as easy to spot in their civvies as he did in 1959. It seems to me that, partly because they are better paid and partly because they have grown more sophisticated about such things, military men no longer look so out of place in civilian clothes.

For all the delight that Wolfe takes in describing the trappings and rituals of the men with the right stuff, he does not denigrate their achievements in the history of aviation. One comes to realize that the satirical tone only barely conceals his admiration for them—an admiration verging on hero worship. He points out, for example, how fickle we have been in awarding them fame. Chuck Yeager waited a long time before he was recognized as the first man to break the speed of sound, and it only came about in connection with an inaccurate movie. Such records, however, are not what this book is about. For Wolfe, the fact that these men were facing death everyday is enough to make them heroes. He contrasts Pete Conrad, a Princeton graduate, with other members of the Class of ’53. Conrad went to work everyday knowing that the mortality rate of test pilots was 23 percent and frequently found himself attending funerals for fellow flyers. The greatest mortality risk his Princeton classmates faced, says Wolfe, was “choking on a chunk of Chateaubriand.” During one 36-week period at Edwards AFB, California, 62 pilots were killed. One need only read Wolfe’s account of Yeager’s unsuccessful attempt to take the NF-104 up to 115,000 feet. After reaching an altitude of over 100,000 feet, Yeager lost control of the plane and was eventually forced to eject. Even though the experiment was a failure, Wolfe manages through a virtuosic display of New Journalistic techniques to make the reader understand the courage and intelligence required to come out of such an experience alive.

In fact, Wolfe’s mockery is directed not so much at the men themselves as it is at their image—an image created by the press in reaction to the national panic following Sputnik. Wolfe makes clear the ludicrousness of the panic, particularly among politicians and the press “and other technological illiterates with influence.” In such places as Congress and the *New York Times*, our race to catch up with the Soviets took on the dimensions of “Armageddon, the final and decisive battle of the forces of good and evil.” This does not sound like the same *New York Times* that provoked the ire of Spiro Agnew. In fact, the press comes in for at least as much satire as the pilots do. Of the unanimously sycophantic reaction of the press to the astronauts, Wolfe says, it seemed as if the press “were a great colonial animal... made up of countless clustered organisms responding to a single nervous system.” In “matters of national importance,” the press was determined to establish (and the ironic italics are Wolfe’s) “the proper emotion, the seemly sentiment, the fitting feelings.” The press, says Wolfe, was a Genteel Beast, “the consummate hypocritical Victorian gent,” simply getting rid of “all information that muddied the tone and weakened the feeling.” As Wolfe sees it, the press has not changed in the intervening years. These days it presents a unified front on the subject of official corruption, setting the properly indignant tone.

**Tom Wolfe** is one journalistic organism who has succeeded in separating himself, for
the most part, from the Genteel Beast. Or has he? In reading his work it often seems that nothing is sacred, that, like “Saturday Night Live” or National Lampoon, his purpose is amusement, no matter at whose expense. Nevertheless, a serious message does emerge from The Right Stuff, and it might be one well worth heeding in these days when politicians and the press are telling us that, as a result of pressure from the oil cartels, the imprisoning of Americans in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the proper emotion (italics mine) is jingoism. Commentators have remarked that the nation is returning to the mood of the 1950s. We Americans have a tendency to overreact, to regard everything as a crisis. The danger of developing a war mentality is that this time it may not lead to the moon.

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THREE STUDIES IN LEADERSHIP

DR. JOSEPH O. BAYLEN

The three books reviewed here are disparate in subject matter but have a common theme—the character of the men who made Britain a great world power in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and helped the nation survive during its decline in the twentieth century. As such, these works are relevant to students of history as examples of leadership and decision-making.

Horatio Nelson is an excellent subject for the psychohistorian, a classic example (like his inveterate enemy Napoleon Bonaparte) of the slight, short man compensating in his work and personal life for feelings of physical inferiority. During his early inconspicuous career, he demonstrated courage and high spirits. Nelson, once emerging from a deep depression, told a friend: “I will be a hero, and confiding in Providence, I will brave every danger.” His rapid early advancement in the Royal Navy can be ascribed to the influence of his navy captain uncle, though his own charm and simplicity endeared him to both superiors and subordinates. Nelson’s intense dislike of the French and strong distrust of the reformers of his time were exceeded only by his hatred of corruption.

In 1793, Nelson became commander of the Agamemnon and by 1796 was a commodore, well on the way to becoming an admiral. But the year was not a happy one for Britain. Everywhere the French were successful, and Nelson was beginning to feel the strain of war.

During the serious British naval mutinies in 1797, Nelson was transferred to the Theseus and lauded for his commands at the siege of Cadiz and in the battles of Abukir Bay, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar. Britain needed a hero; thus Nelson

returned to sea in March 1798 and soon was in command of a Mediterranean fleet. His main task was to determine the objective of Bonaparte and his expedition, which had sailed southward from Toulon. Nelson guessed that the French were set either on the conquest of Sicily or Egypt. On 1 August 1798, he found the French fleet at Abukir Bay. In the battle that ensued, Nelson vanquished the French and isolated Napoleon in Egypt but was himself blinded temporarily by a forehead wound. It was one of the most complete naval victories ever recorded, and he was now the "brave, gallant immortalized Nelson," a hero to all of Europe. Nelson returned to England where he was hailed as a conquering hero and invested with a peerage.

As the Napoleonic wars intensified, Nelson returned to sea and became second in command of the Channel Fleet. On 2 April 1801, he brilliantly destroyed the fleet of Napoleon’s Danish ally and assured Britain’s dominance in the Baltic Sea and the dissolution of the League of Armed Neutrality.

From 1803 to 1805, Nelson parried and chased the skillful French Admiral Villeneuve and the combined Franco-Spanish fleets in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the West Indies. The final contest occurred at Cape Trafalgar in late October 1805. Although the battle was a resounding victory for Nelson, he was defeated by death.

Nelson has been the subject of numerous biographies, but few (including a more recent study by David Walder) surpass Bradford’s study in detail, clarity, and interest, and presentation of Nelson as a great naval commander with all the frailties of an ordinary human being. Bradford’s biography certainly has far more substance than John Watney’s pleasant, but thin, portrait of the Churchill family.

**Author** John Watney takes the reader on a hurried view of the Churchills from Arabella in the seventeenth century to Winston in the twentieth.† Emphasis is on the family tradition of military service, which is apparent only in John Churchill, first Duke of Marlborough; Winston’s father, the tragic Lord Randolph Churchill; and Winston himself. There is no denying that the family was “creative, eccentric, gifted, elegant.” Of course, the real hero of the book is Winston, and its most original part is Watney’s brief reminiscence of “Winston at War.” For a history of the Churchills, one must still turn to A. L. Rowse’s chronicle of the family.

**Churchill’s close associate and political heir, Sir Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, was quite unusual in the way he wrote his autobiography.** ‡‡ For political reasons, he began with the last period of his life and worked backward. Thus, while the previous three volumes are the record of his career as Foreign Secretary for Neville Chamberlain and Churchill and Churchill’s successor as Prime Minister, the fourth volume highlights his childhood and youth.

It is an interesting account of Eden’s soul-searing experiences on the western front in World War I. It is a restrained and poignant memoir of service in one of the deadliest wars in human history by a man who endured senseless carnage and rose from platoon

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leader at the age of eighteen to adjutant at nineteen to brigade major at twenty. But the real meaning of Eden's early years is summed up in the remark: "I had entered the holocaust still childish and I emerged tempered by my experience and bereft of many friends, but with my illusions intact, neither shattered nor cynical, to face a changed world." Eden certainly epitomized the courage and resilience of the last generation of that class born to rule Britain, even though historians recorded him as one of Britain's least successful prime ministers.

In a sense, these books are a commentary on and study of leadership—two successes and one failure. But then stories of success and failure are proof of the fact that nothing is an unqualified success or an unmitigated failure in the lives of men.

Georgia State University, Atlanta

Potpourri


Both of these books are comprehensive, accurate, and current, but neither has achieved any degree of originality, flair, or creativeness. Page after page of dry facts and figures punctuated only with black and white photographs and a few drawings do not tend to generate much enthusiasm in the reader. Ireland's book is the second in a three-part series on combat ships and is arranged alphabetically by country, listing the designation or name of each class of ships followed by the function served (destroyer, frigate, etc.). Vessels within each class are then identified by name and pennant number. For those ships procured from the navies of other nations, the original name and pennant number are also listed. For each ship the author gives the year laid down, year launched, and year completed as well as the typical displacement, length, beam, draught, machinery (power plant), armament, helicopters assigned, and members of the class that have been transferred, disposed, canceled, or lost in combat. Short paragraphs accompany each entry that give descriptions of the equipment or ordnance and identify any nonstandard configurations. An index of ship names and a list of pennant numbers are also included.

The Taylor and Swanborough compendium is divided into two parts: "first-line aircraft—fighters, bombers, tactical and strategic transports and antisubmarine aircraft," and "second-line aircraft—combat aircraft, obsolescent types, light transports and trainers." Each part is arranged alphabetically by aircraft manufacturer; information provided includes engine type, span, length, empty weight, maximum gross weight, maximum speed, range, and armament. The authors also give a brief history of the system's development and significant foreign sales. In addition, front, top, and side aspect drawings accompany all entries in part one. The index lists each aircraft by manufacturer, nickname, model number, and NATO designator.

Ireland's book on escort vessels is the more valuable in that it treats a subject which is not already represented by a plethora of similar works. Taylor and Swanborough's book is just one of several such almanacs available.

Captain James H. Smith, USAF
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The saga of fossil fuel continues to take victims and make villains the world over. From cutbacks in flying to devising ways to fight energy-austere wars, the professional Air Force officer knows what it means to be on the short end of an energy crisis. In America we find ourselves in gas lines for the second time in six years, with monthly utility bills now greater than the average mortgage payment of not so very long ago and the energy consumers are the victims.

Many individuals and institutions must share the blame for our fuel-starved status simply pointing fingers at OPEC or the Department of Energy will not do. That is why the professional officer needs compendiums such as *Energy Crisis* to get an enlightened point of view.

Beginning with the embryonic signs of shortages in 1969, Sobel will guide you along energy’s ever-worsening destructive path as fuel supplies grow into a crisis of monolithic proportions. Getting their contents from the weekly publications of *Facts on File*, these volumes describe energy happenings through January 1977, the brink of our present energy debacle. Each volume mixes chronological and topical organization along with a handy subject index. Of course, many of the reports are controversial, so the editors take delicate care to produce a balanced viewpoint throughout.

Whether your energy research takes you to personalities, nations, events, institutions, discoveries, cartels, or statistics, these works are sure to elevate your knowledge—and blood pressure.

Lieutenant Colonel David C. Whitlock, USAF
Department of English
United States Air Force Academy


For those who believe individuals shape the course of history, *Political Leadership in NATO* will be a welcome addition to the study of diplomacy. Robert Jordan’s purpose is to portray the first four NATO secretaries-general as individuals within NATO rather than to describe NATO history as a political system or a military coalition. He reviews the tenures of Lord Ismay, Paul-Henri Spaak, Dirk U. Stikker, and Manlio Brosio as they led NATO during 1952-71. Jordan continually emphasizes the importance of individuals and their personalities as he chronologically examines the course of international events from NATO’s inception through West Germany’s reconciliation, France’s defection, and, finally, NATO’s revitalization under Brosio by 1971.

While Jordan’s study is of significance to the political historian, it is also noteworthy to the military leader trying to grasp the complicated issues of the NATO alliance. Past troop cuts, military squabbles, and nuclear weapon problems are woven into the analysis by balancing NATO’s military aspects with the political and economic. In the process one gets a feel for the military’s place in the realm of international affairs. Moreover, Jordan shows how a military leader who understands the intricacies of NATO and the multinational politics, like the brilliant and adroit Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Norstad, can have a profound influence on the NATO establishment.

Easily readable and well documented, Jordan’s study captures the importance of the individuals who shaped NATO’s history.

Captain James B. Smith, USAF
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Burns’ s work is a well-written overview of perspectives on arms control and disarmament. He effectively discriminates between the two, and then offers an excellent argument that arms control is part of an overall process seeking world peace and stability. His discussion of the impact of the nuclear era on the international scene is comprehensive. However, a word of caution! If this presentation is used as an introduction to the subject, the reader should be aware that much more extensive research will be required in some areas to completely understand them. For example, his discussion of deterrence strategy and international attempts at nuclear control and nonproliferation policies are rather brief. On the other hand, if the work is used as a refresher by someone well versed in the field, it is excellent.

Lieutenant Colonel William A. Wuest, USAF
Air Command and Staff College
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The growth of the Socialist and Communist parties in Western Europe has caused concern in the United States about the stability of individual countries and the viability of the NATO alliance. Bernard Brown's compendium of the works of ten scholars provides an excellent insight into the politics of the contemporary European left.

The preparation of the volume was initiated by a symposium at the City University of New York in late 1976. Only those European countries with at least 10 percent of the legislative vote for Socialist or Communist parties were considered. These countries were Britain, Germany, Sweden, France, Italy, and Portugal. The ten authors evaluated these six countries in recent (since 1960) historical perspective. Although the style and format of the authors vary, their overall approach is to evaluate the impact of modernization on the left in each country.

Modernization has brought about a dramatic increase in productivity, created new wealth throughout society, and changed the balance of social forces. The left has, in the post-World War II reconstruction era, had to reevaluate the role of the working class in this increasingly complex and scientifically oriented economy. The size of the intellectual class and number of students have also grown markedly. Additionally, the rapid growth of the European economy has been able to satisfy, in part, society's requirements for higher wages and increased social welfare and still leave cash flow for reinvestment for profits into corporate capital investments.

The left has been faced then with the problem of deciding how this new wealth should be redistributed and on what principles it should be based. Leadership must decide if the left's historical demands for equality can be achieved within the current political systems.

The volume provides an excellent, scholarly look at the left in Europe and should be of value to those interested in contemporary European politics or the study of socialism and communism.

Major Frederic E. McCoy, USAF
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The author of this biography met General von Ravenstein only once, while von Ravenstein was a prisoner of war (POW) in Egypt and the author was one of his guards. Although the only words spoken were a brace of "Good Mornings!" the effect on the young guard must have been profound for him to have written a biography three-and-one-half decades later. Ryder has painted a glowing portrait of von Ravenstein the man: brave, resourceful under all circumstances, chivalrous, a peacemaker after the war. In this sense his book is a success.

In others, however, it is a disappointment, especially for the military historian. Three times as much space is devoted to his experiences as a POW, for example, rather than to his wartime experiences as a panzer commander in Poland, France, the Balkans, and especially North Africa. Ryder fails to address some questions that need answers. How did von Ravenstein develop the leadership qualities that he demonstrated throughout his career? Why was he selected for the panzer corps in 1937, when he had been militarily inactive for much of the 1920s and 1930s, and had been an infantry officer prior to that? Why was he so successful as a panzer leader? His exploits as commander of the 21st Panzer Division in North Africa deserve more attention than they receive, particularly during the swirling tank battles of Operation Crusader and Rommel's "Dash to the Wire." In this sense the book fails to do justice to von Ravenstein, and anyone seeking fresh insights into armored operations during the war will be disappointed.

Captain Daniel T. Kuehl, USAF
Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota


During World War II tens of thousands of American airmen and thousands of American aircraft were stationed on the "unsinkable" aircraft carrier, Great Britain. Using a then and now technique, this book deals with 68 airfields linked with the largest of the American air forces, the Eighth. A brief history of each field (up to the present), a map, and "then and now" photographs are included. The result is a well-done collection, which although of limited value to the student of the air war, will be of interest to any who flew from these bases.

A Noble Treason tells the story of a group of German students, called the White Rose, which produced anti-Nazi leaflets between the summer of 1942 and February 1943. The author relates the background of those involved, what they did, and the outcome.

At first glance the story is one of high idealism and courage. But the way the story is told indicates that the students attempted to bring down a brutal regime with a mimeograph machine while making no preparation for the inevitable efforts of that regime to crush them. Their efforts at times read more like a college prank than a serious effort to undermine or overthrow Hitler.

The problem is of course in the telling. The narration is much overdone. The author is forced to pad the story; there is just not enough material for a 300-page book. In addition, it seems as if the story was written to be seen, not read. As the author has done a number of things for television, this may be the case.

Besides making a good short story, a poor long one, the book is marred by the failure to put the story into context. The reader is never told if there were other German groups similar to the White Rose or what impact this group had. By confining the story to the background, activities, trial, and execution of the members of the organization, the reader is left in a vacuum. So while the record of this unusual band of students should be known, it is unfortunate that Hanser has written this way. The White Rose deserves better.

Kenneth P. Werrell
Department of History
Radford University


In a critical assessment of the Carter administration's handling of national security affairs—during its first two years in office—this volume gives the administration rather low marks. The gap between policy pronouncements and resulting national security capability, under President Carter, is carefully scrutinized by several authors. Almost in unison, they arrive at a similar conclusion: "The President . . . is unable to inspire confidence, provide a firm sense of direction, and manage his staff in developing cohesive policies."

Editor Sam C. Sarkesian has done an admirable job in organizing this book. Each chapter provides a different viewpoint on defense policy, yet, taken altogether, the reader gains a better understanding of the overall policy process as well as the problems of policy implementation. Credit must be given to the editor for this result. A few chapters, however, tend to read much like a textbook; however, even here, one can glean some valuable information from the statistics, graphs, and tabulated data.

As for some of the details, this volume claims that the Carter administration's handling of defense policy has strengthened NATO's military capability vis-a-vis that of the Warsaw Pact. This redress of American neglect receives high marks from the authors, because it is a reversal of a trend that began prior to this administration.

With regard to the rest of the globe, however, the gap between defense policy rhetoric and military capability poses a problem. This is best demonstrated in Africa where American security policy is described as ineffective by the authors.

The overall conclusion of this volume is that the United States is in a period of global military retrenchment, while the military posture of the Soviet Union—throughout the globe—is on the upswing. Perhaps the major fault of this entire book is that the authors offer very few policy prescriptions. The editor does attempt to alleviate this shortcoming by suggesting some "general directions" the administration ought to pursue and these are interesting.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Slowik, USAF
19th Bombardment Wing
Robins AFB, Georgia


"Are we alone?" With this question, Isaac Asimov begins his new book on one of the most provocative and popular topics of recent thought and discussion: intelligent life and civilization beyond our earth. With his usual wit and style, Asimov gives the reader some thought-provoking (though possibly disappointing) answers.

The most significant conclusion that Asimov reaches is that there are approximately 350,000 planets with advanced civilizations in our galaxy alone! This result may sound somewhat staggering, perhaps even unbelievable, but the number is arrived at by using calculations based on fundamental astronomical observations and a few reasonable assumptions.

Apparently, then, extraterrestrial civilizations abound in our galaxy. If this number is correct (and Asimov assumes that it is), the next logical question is, "Where is everyone?"
After discounting “UFOs” (unidentified flying objects) as extraterrestrial vehicles, he concludes that the earth is not being visited by celestial neighbors simply because the distances between these civilizations are too large. The 630-light-year average separation between planets with advanced civilizations, combined with the assumption that the speed of light is the ultimate speed limit, accounts for our seeming “aloneness” in the galaxy. Even a short “hop” under these restrictions would take thousands of years, which makes interstellar travel extremely unlikely.

This book will serve as an excellent introduction to the subjects of “life in space” and “extraterrestrial civilization,” especially for the interested individual with little background in astronomy. Asimov uses a logical, straightforward approach to his subject, holding the reader’s attention with details, facts, and anecdotes.

Unfortunately, the book lacks some features that would have made it more useful and instructive, such as diagrams and photos. Some of the concepts presented might be easier to comprehend if accompanied by a “visual explanation.” Also, Asimov makes no reference to the vast literature in this field; a bibliography would be helpful to the reader who wishes either to check out Asimov’s facts and assumptions or investigate the subject further. Even so, Extraterrestrial Civilizations serves as a good introduction to the fascinating subject of intelligent life in space. I would recommend it highly to anyone wishing to learn something more about this cosmic question.

Captain Joseph P Bassi, USAF
Learmonth, Australia


“I led a more exciting life than any American in my century.” These words of Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall present the theme of his memoir. Military professionals have been entertained and educated by his previous twenty-nine works on combat and leadership, but only after reading his memoir can one come to know this giant of a soldier-writer and appreciate his long, illustrious service and worth to our nation.

One of America’s most renowned, honored, and prolific military historians, Marshall describes his own career as no other author could do. A military analyst and historian, war correspondent, strategist, tactician, and combat leader who rose from private to brigadier general, he states that he probably had personal experience with more troops in the field, by the tens of thousands, than anyone in history. This work is “his story”—from his first test under fire at age seventeen to his final encounter with combat at age sixty-eight. He writes in an easy-to-read, direct style and departs from the detailed and descriptive combat reporting which made him famous.

Under Marshall’s expert tutelage as a soldier-writer, you will have a firsthand view of World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam. You will see the behind-the-scenes dealings between high military command and heads of state and marvel at Marshall’s influence on such leaders as Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton. If there is one dominant trait that led to his success, you will agree it was his love for the human element in combat and his calling to stay with combat danger long enough to understand the ordeal of troops.

This book will captivate your attention, kindle your interest in Marshall’s previous works, and impress on you that his life was just as exciting as he had advertised.

Major C. R. Armstrong, USMC
Air Command and Staff College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama


The authors have combined a wealth of excellent photos with a well-written narrative spiced with numerous firsthand accounts to tell the story of the development and role of the Hawker Typhoon and Tempest fighters.

Originally designed as a replacement for the Hurricane and Spitfire, the first Typhoon prototype was completed in September 1939, but production delays and the Battle of Britain delayed introduction into operational service until September 1941. Although plagued with serious airframe and power plant problems, the Typhoon eventually won acceptance from aircrews as an outstanding low-altitude interceptor and ground support aircraft.

The Tempest aircraft was plagued also by technical problems and other delays, but, fortunately, it was introduced into service in time to help counter the V-1 threat to London and was responsible for the destruction of 632 V-1s.

Typhoon and Tempest continued to perform admirably in the ground-attack role during the Allied invasion and conquest of Germany, however, the coming of the jet age sealed the fate of these outstanding propeller-driven fighters and they faded into history at the end of World War II. An attempt was made to resur-
rect the propeller aircraft with the introduction of the Sea Fury into the Royal Navy, but this was doomed to failure and ended with their removal from service after the Korean War.

Major Robert J. Scuzzillo, USAF
Mountain Home AFB, Idaho


Vivien Hart grounds his study in Demosthenes' suggestion that democracy depends on the capacity of a people to govern themselves, a capacity sustained in spite of continuing suspicion of officeholders and institutions.

Suspicion (or distrust) is defined as the perception of a discrepancy between the democratic ideal and the political reality. This perception is reflected from frustration at the failure of the process to meet expectations and demands.

If Hart's book sounds like a dissertation, it is. His work began as a doctoral thesis for the Department of Government at Harvard. The slowest reading and most baroque writing is at the beginning. Once Hart finds his own voice, though, the content moves fairly rapidly to succinct conclusions.

American readers will be especially interested in "Grass Roots Politics in Kansas" and the discussion of "Rank and File Liberalism." Much of the content is profound in its implications concerning commitment, civic duty, social concern, and problem-solving. The trick in studying Distrust and Democracy is to pause from time to time, to savor the profundity before going on. For example:

... man is in various ways diminished against his full potential. Thus, man is creative; but his creations come to control him and dispel his natural spontaneity. Further, the act of production has become a means to other ends, not a satisfaction in itself. Man should be free and self-directed; but his life has become subservient to external constraints. Man should be social; yet he is isolated from other men by those same social circumstances which prevent fulfillment . . . . (pp. 20-21)

By focusing on the dimensions and impact of selected groups of political attitudes and political distrust, Hart tries to take a step toward identifying unavoidable limitations on understanding as well as finding more substantial answers to significant political questions concerning democratic processes. Finally, he appears to vindicate the judgment of the distrustful, especially those of the last generation, and demands that they be taken more seriously.

This discourse may be tough going for the military mind in a military setting, where questions and crosscurrents of opinion cause organizational and institutional problems. Nevertheless, the book sheds light on historical movements and may give helpful insight to those who wonder why discontent rises sharply at certain times, as it did in the 1960s. Such insight makes reading Distrust and Democracy worthwhile.

Dr. Porter J. Crow
West Palm Beach, Florida


To the popular imagination, the Islamic revolution in Iran is a puzzle. The apparently cavalier relinquishing of power by the Shah, the spectacle of religious zealots running chaotically in the streets, and the sudden entrance upon the political scene of vituperative clerical revolutionaries have shocked Western sensibilities. The mind of the average citizen in the West finds itself prey to a demonology of bearded mullahs and, in desperation, attributes a stupidity to Ayatollah Khomeini that might be adequately explained by malice alone.

The root causes of revolution in Iran are, of course, extraordinarily complex, not the least of which is the search for a balance between secular and religious power. To these ends, Shahrough-Akhavi has written an impressive historical sociology of the relations between the clergy and state during the Pahlavi period. Professor Akhavi has not written a typology of the revolution; rather, he restores perspective to a much-neglected causal factor at the heart of the Iranian dilemma as he strips away its obscurity and exposes to analysis the component parts of a deceptively monolithic institution.

The problem of Iranian state-clerical relations, as Akhavi points out in his excellent introduction, is the adjustment of Shi'i theory of government to changing historical circumstances, the basis for which is the Koranic injunction that requires the clergy to "command good and forbid evil." The power of arbitration that the clergy exercises over the community in the gradual elaboration of this principle is immense. Ac-
cording to the author, the ultimate authority for the interpretation of this injunction did not lie with the clergy but with the word of the Hidden Imam. It was the clergy who, in the natural process of historical evolution, arrogated to themselves this authority and acted as though they had been deputized by the Imam to prepare for his kingdom on earth. In the process of assumption, a dispute arose in the 18th century between two schools of thought: the Akhbari school, contending that in the absence of the Imam no cleric had the right to exercise independent judgment on matters of law when the Imam’s word was available in religious texts; and the Usuli school, on the other hand, claiming the need for mujtahids—those exercising independent judgment. It was the latter school that prevailed in view of what they saw as inevitable conflicts of interpretation.

In a short review it would be impossible to do justice to Iranian history. The richness of its primary documentation and its exhaustive detail are prodigious, and the author must be congratulated for a first-rate job of research. Therein lies the book’s great strength and, perhaps, its greatest weakness. Akhavi claims to have written a preliminary essay; the fact of the matter is, he has attempted a definitive study. Scholars do tend to want the last word, and in this author’s case, it has made him too cautious in his conclusions: Professor Akhavi concludes that modernization by secular rulers ignored the traditional sectors of society at a cost to their own efforts; that the clergy miscalculated the meaning for its own institution of social change in the twentieth century; that a weak state always encourages greater social involvement by the clergy; and that no categorical statement can be made concerning the illegitimacy of temporal power in the Shi‘i view. I was very much disappointed, not because what the author says is false but because the reader can learn the same truisms by reading any number of inferior works. Dare one suggest that Professor Akhavi provide us with a theory that can carry and sum up the generalizations implicit in his scholarship?

Despite these reservations, Akhavi has produced an important piece of work. I look forward to his next opus and hope that it will be more accessible to the general public.

Dr. Lewis Ware
Documentary Research Division
Air University (ATC)


Mao Tse-tung (1893-1976)—or if one romanizes Chinese characters in the pinyin manner, Mao Zedong—is one of a few “great men” to have emerged in the 1930s and 1940s to play a leading role on the stage of world politics. Mao was the “Great Helmsman,” the “Supreme Leader,” or the “Red Sun of Our Hearts.” Zedong means “Anoint the East,” and that is, essentially, what Mao tried to do throughout his lengthy life: to anoint the East with the chrisms of Sino socialism. A voracious reader, a lover of poetry, a man of iron will, Mao Zedong was an insatiable revolutionary.

Ross Terrill argues that one cannot understand Mao without knowing something of the oppressions visited upon China by those who sought to plunder the Middle Kingdom. Mao himself once gave the Opium War (1839-1842) as the base date for his revolution; he seemed never to forget the signs he had seen as a young man in a colonized Chinese city: one barred dogs from a city park and the other barred Chinese. From his early experiences, Terrill contends, Mao fashioned both his own character and the character of his revolution. Although he very narrowly averted a firing squad in 1927, Mao had “a personal fire in him” that fueled his inexorable quest for power. He contended that an army was like fish; the people, like water. He believed, as Marx probably did not, that peasants could and would triumph in the revolution. Despite the suffering of the Long March, in which about ninety percent of his troops were lost, Mao fashioned an armed force, a strategy, and an ideology, which, by 1949, captured China.

“Political power,” Mao wrote, “grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Although Mao is remembered principally as a guerrilla strategist, Terrill persuasively points out that Mao was more a scholar than a soldier. Terrill fairly lauds Mao for sitting in his study and working out his own ideas: “Few modern rulers of a major nation—de Gaulle was one—have done that.” Mao was a devotee of the night-long philosophical discussion, poetry, and precision in writing; but, he was equally at home as the student of realpolitik, in contending, for example, that the West was having the wool pulled over its eyes by the Soviet Union. As Mao told the late President Georges Pompidou of France, American power was ebbing. During his latter years, Mao seemed to be trying to protect China by enlisting the support of the United States.

Terrill’s book will be valuable background reading for anyone interested in Asian politics. Events in Asia—particularly events in China—are described through the eyes of Mao, who is treated, on balance, rather sympathetically by Terrill. This will not be the definitive biography of Mao if only because of Terrill’s writing, which is too often choppy and poorly developed. Consider, for example, this metaphor: “Jiangxi [Province] had been mere masturbation, alongside this
full intercourse with the radiant bride of China (at least a portion of her), in a well-protected place with no serious interruptions.” (p. 162) Such terrible writing mars what is otherwise a good general biography of Mao and a useful survey of Chinese politics during his lifetime.

One wonders if Premier Hua Guofeng or Zhao Ziyang will one day condemn Mao as Khrushchev did Stalin in 1956. Terrill glosses over the horrors of Mao’s totalitarian China and concludes that “China might have been better off if he had died twenty years earlier than he did.” (p. 431) Yet the book is generally flattering in its accounts of Mao’s rise and rule.

As the end neared for Mao, he could tell the Australian prime minister, “I have an appointment with God.” (p. 381) Those who read Terrill’s book may find themselves wondering how the appointment went.

Dr. James H. Toner
Norwich University
Northfield, Vermont


Can the world survive with 70 percent of its population poor and 30 percent affluent? Do the earth’s limited resources make it possible for lesser-developed countries (LDCs) ever to reach the levels of living achieved in the United States or Europe? These are important questions.

Philip Hauser, Director Emeritus of the Population Research Center at the University of Chicago, has assembled in this volume the research results of 34 scholars from many nations, who take stock of world population problems. The book is both an inventory and an appraisal of the problems of population and development in a world divided more and more into “haves” and “have nots.” As the position of the LDCs worsens relative to the more developed countries, the LDCs are increasingly aggressive in their drive for their “fair share” of the world’s bounty.

To match the 1970 European per capita gross national product (GNP) by the year 2000, the LDCs, even with no population increase, would have to increase their GNP about tenfold, compounded annually at least 8 percent. Such is probably hopeless, even under this totally unrealistic population assumption. Yet incremental improvements are possible. Contributors to this volume address such topics as women, population, and development; investment in population quality; theories of fertility decline; resource and environmental consequences of population and economic growth; population redistribution; human aspects of population programs; and the management of national population programs. The general tone of the work is pessimistic for the short run and optimistic for the long run.

Some chapters are probably too technical or detailed for the general reader, but the 60-page introduction and epilogue by Professor Hauser merit close reading by those who need to understand the national security environment. Hauser concludes that the short run will bring more human misery arising from rapid urbanization, mass migration, and population maldistribution. For the long term, if the relation of levels of living between the LDCs and more developed nations takes on the aspect of a zero-sum game, the prospects are heightened for more tension, alienation, hostility, and violence.

Dr. James H. Buck
University of Georgia, Athens


Ellen Kay Trimberger’s Revolution from Above presents an abstract sociological model of an increasingly common type of revolution. Trimberger, a sociology professor at a California State College, defines a revolution from above as one directed by high military and civilian leaders of the old regime, involving little participation and violence by the masses, undertaken pragmatically, and destroying the economic and political base of the former upper class. She bases her model on four revolutions previously considered unusual: the 1868 Meiji Restoration in Japan, Atatürk’s 1923 takeover in Turkey, Nasser’s 1952 assumption of power in Egypt, and the formation of the Peruvian military government in 1968.

Trimberger contends that mass revolutions from below are exceptional historical phenomena, possible only when the apparatus of the state loses its ability to support the status quo and initiate a revolution from above. It is her judgment that the preconditions for revolutions from above are becoming prevalent in many Third World nations.

The focus of this study is purely theoretical in an academic sense, rather than practical, and will interest most military personnel only in a tangential sense. The author admits that “there can be no general theory of revolution (or of social change) applicable to all
societies at all times . . . Every revolution is unique in some respects . . . all general theories of revolution have been useless as analytic or predictive tools. We cannot predict the outbreak or outcome of revolution.” (pp. 1-2)

Captain Steven E. Cady, USAF
Hq USAF


This is a sad tale, plainly told, of military disaster and what might have been. The author’s father, Sir Henry Karslake, retired from service as a lieutenant-general in 1938 and described by a friend as “the best general in the British army,” was plucked from a Hampshire village on 22 May 1940 and sent to France to try to mend the British Expeditionary Force’s broken lines of communication. This book recounts how neither he nor anyone else could have succeeded.

It is full of lessons, old and new. For example, to have no clear chain of command is and always has been a certain recipe for trouble; so it is now to try to operate on the ground without air support. Very senior generals like to promote their friends, are angry when someone else promotes their rivals, and are not always large-minded enough to keep planning and personalities apart.

1940—The Last Act records several heroic stories, one of which tells about the battalion of the Royal Sussex Regiment that went into action near Amiens 701 strong; after every round of ammunition had been fired, the 70 survivors surrendered. Karslake is no admirer of Gort or of Brooke, or of the French high command in general. Repeatedly, he explains how plain fighting men like Brigadier Beauman could accomplish while staff officers and politicians doubted.

He might have taken “The Triumph of Doubt” for a subtitle. In one chapter Franklin D. Roosevelt would have dismissed as “iffy”; he maintains that the Cherboung peninsula might have been held by resolute men against Rommel’s exhausted tank crews in mid-June 1940, a foreshadowing of the great “Sledgehammer” delusion of American planners in 1943. By mid-June, there were not many resolute men left.

Understandably, Karslake writes with his mind made up and unravels confusion with great skill. His readable book carries conviction.

Dr. Michael R. D. Foot
London, England


Amidst a current atmosphere of international economic turbulence, it is rather obvious that such issues as inflation and the energy crisis have a definite impact on the responsive formulation of U.S. national security policies. Along this line, Professor Krasner’s highly original work provides a refreshing reassessment of the complex set of relationships between U.S. foreign policy and American economic interests abroad. Rejecting two major interpretations of the basic interrelationships between state and society, i.e. interest group liberalism and Marxism, Krasner contends instead that the state is an autonomous entity acting primarily out of national interests that cannot be explained merely by class or group motivations. Particularly for its efforts to define precisely the dimension of contemporary U.S. national interests abroad, his work should prove to be thought-provoking reading for interested military professionals and serious students of international affairs.

His “statist” approach, by which Krasner attempts to reach a clearer definition of the contemporary thrusts and scope of U.S. national interests, is progressively developed on the basis of fifteen case studies that cover twentieth-century American raw materials policy from the days of U.S. “gunboat diplomacy” in Latin America to its controversial involvement in Chile during the 1970-73 rule of Marxist President Salvador Allende. Of special interest as background for current events is Krasner’s treatment of American-Iranian relations in the context of oil resources over the past three decades. On the basis of his case studies, he asserts that during the present century, American national leaders have generally been able to formulate and execute a consistent array of foreign policy objectives that have assured a steady flow of resources into the United States, even in the face of substantial international and domestic constraints. His painstaking effort in detailing twentieth-century U.S. foreign policy development in line with trends in the private sector’s raw materials investments makes a solid case for both his “statist” interpretation and for reaching a fuller comprehension of a state’s national interests in politico-economic sphere.

Since the resource-rich Third World can be expected to play a key role in the development of U.S. foreign policy and in the overall progress of global economic interdependence in the years ahead, this work deserves more than a passing glance. While well-researched and amply supported by much tabular and graphic data, its original and highly innovative analyti-
cal approach to this complex topic might offer reason enough to recommend this work as a “must-read” item.

Dr. Joseph E. Thach, Jr
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

Versatile Guardian: Research in Naval History

Despite the inordinate time lag between the excellent National Archives Conference on Naval History (1974) and the publication of its proceedings, this book in most ways fulfills the promise of the meeting from which it derived. There are only two faults worth noting: the dating of two of the papers (those on Admirals Bradley Fiske and Chester Nimitz) and the unevenness of quality and approach of the articles. For instance, it seems curious that two articles in a volume sponsored by the National Archives contain no documentation and a third makes only a few references to secondary sources.

However, attention should be given to those contributors to Versatile Guardian who have done well. Most of these papers are thoroughly documented, informative, and cover a broad range of American naval history—World War II, the Revolution and wars of the nineteenth century, international relations and the navy, and technology. In keeping with the format of the conference, many of the authors pay special attention to archival sources available for research in naval history. Among these are Dean Allard, “The Naval Historical Center and the Resources of Naval History,” K. Jack Bauer, “The Navy in an Age of Manifest Destiny,” and David F. Trask, “Research Opportunities in the Spanish-Cuban-American War and World War I.” Bauer and Trask, for example, suggest 147 topics for research in naval history and are helpful in suggesting types and locations of sources where these and other naval history questions may be researched.

Another of many provocative articles in the volume—actually a commentary on three of the papers about World War II—is that by Clark Reynolds. He goes beyond the scope of the typical commentary by raising interesting observations about research opportunities: the need for a career profile of World War II naval leaders and a study of such subspecialty groups as the Gun Club (officers who before and during the war were identified with the battleship force of the U.S. fleet).

Versatile Guardian offers a good mixture of worthwhile papers and discerning commentary. Despite its belated appearance, it will be a valuable research aid for the student of naval history who will be delighted to find appended to it an extensive bibliography, albeit one with surprising lacunae. For the military professional, it has less to offer but does suggest the range of questions historians are asking about the U.S. Navy, questions that may also be asked about the other services.

Dr. Lloyd J. Graybar
Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond


Robert J. Young goes beyond the clichés about the folly of the Western democracies in the 1930s and reconstructs—not uncritically—the diplomatic and strategic thought of French leaders. His well-researched account shows that the French did not neglect German power; indeed, they were almost obsessed by it. Unable to match Germany’s demographic and industrial strength and taking for granted continuing German hostility, France unsuccessfully sought safety in alliances. British support was uncertain, and allies in eastern Europe proved liabilities, not assets. Rather than preventing war, security pacts with these nations threatened to draw France into war should Hitler move east. Unable to match German power, France could only hope to contain it diplomatically.

Young’s study of interwar France is worth attention of American military readers since the United States today finds itself in a similar situation. In an international system without a sovereign, each state must rely on its own efforts to survive. Geography and the limitations of conventional weaponry and later our superiority over the Soviets muted for Americans the dilemmas posed for less fortunate states. France’s struggle to deal with a military threat from a position of strategic inferiority is thus a story of unusual significance at a time when America’s privileged position is disappearing.

Dr. Daniel F. Harrington
Indiana University, Bloomington

With increasingly compressed schedules and sedentary work routines, greater numbers of blue suiters are turning to the weight room—and with good reason; there are few ways to pack more conditioning into less time. For the individual pressed for time (or with a less than all-consuming passion for distance running or racketball) who wants to maintain a reasonable standard of fitness, this little book offers a surprising amount of usable information.

The first problem is getting past the dust cover illustration; a shaven, oiled, and flexed Boyer Coe, displaying his best professional Mr. Universe/Mr. America form. But don’t be turned off by the transparent narcissism; there is something to be said for doing anything constructive supremely well, and the authors undoubtedly know an enormous amount about the care and feeding of the human body.

The bottom line is that the straightforward, well-written text has a great deal of commonsense—and often counterintuitive—information for those who want the conditioning benefits of weight training without becoming a Charles or Charlene Atlas. We are told which exercises develop which muscles and why. We are cautioned about the hazards of inadequate warm-ups and the dangers of overdeveloping one muscle group at the expense of the others. Cautions on the use of drugs and steroids are included; there are also useful tips on diet, which are of value even to those who, like myself, have serious reservations about the need for desiccated liver, no matter how good it may be for you. Finally, there is an informative afterword on bodybuilding and women; the female reader who has endured this far will be relieved to learn that she can gain the toning and conditioning benefits of weight training without looking like a defector from the East German Olympic swimming squad. Getting Strong, Looking Strong is a useful book even for those who are not interested in extremes of musculature.

J. F. G.

First Strike by Douglas Terman. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1979, 368 pages, $10.95.

“His eyes flicked down to the altimeter now and watched it unwind through a thousand feet. We’re far beyond structural limits, he thought abstractedly, but the air speed was bleeding off. It’s worth a try, he thought, and hit the flap switch.” What else would “Our Hero” do with an Aztec caught in a thunder-bumper?

Douglas Terman, a former Air Force officer, has drawn heavily on his flying and yachting experience to produce a thriller in which the lonely protagonist must save the world from the implacable Soviet menace. But hold on; it’s not that bad. The situation is believable, though unlikely, the characterizations are realistic, and the action is of the edge-of-your-seat variety. And, for once, the military, political, and cultural details are well researched and cleverly described.

First Strike will make an enjoyable respite between professional military education lessons on a rainy Saturday.

Captain Julius F. Sanks, USAF
Los Angeles AFS, California

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “Soviet Perceptions of the Strategic Balance” by Dr. Daniel S. Papp, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, as the outstanding article in the January-February 1981 issue of the Review.
the contributors

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Colonel Thomas A. Fabyanic (B.A., Syracuse University, Ph.D., St. Louis University) is Director, Airpower Research Institute, Air University (ATC). He served as an air operations staff officer, United States Strike Readiness Command, Chief, History of Warfare Studies, Air War College, and USAF Research Associate at Columbia University. During the war in Indochina, he completed 200 combat sorties in the F-4 Phantom aircraft. He is author of Strategic Air Attack in the United States Air Force. A Case Study (1977) and several articles on military subjects. Colonel Fabyanic is a Distinguished Graduate of Air War College and a previous contributor in the Review.

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Donald M. Snow (B.A., M.A., University of Colorado, Ph.D., Indiana University) was visiting professor of National Security Affairs, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, before returning to the University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, on 1 January 1981, as associate professor of political science and Director of International Studies. Dr. Snow is the author of Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World: American Policy in the 1980s (1980). He has published articles in professional and academic journals and is a previous award-winning contributor to the Review.

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