AIR UNIVERSITY

review

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1982
In 1905, European military professionals ignored the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War. After all, the conflict was far removed from traditional European battlefields, and it was fought by “barbaric” cossacks and even stranger Japanese. Although Germany, France, Britain, and several other nations sent large numbers of military observers to the war, the lessons were not learned. Perhaps the knowledge that was lost could have made the First World War less of a debacle.

Racism fosters hate. While hatred facilitates killing, it also prompts a disregard for the enemy’s virtues and abilities. We Westerners, like most other groups, seem to find it easier to hate an enemy whose skin color, eye shape, or religion differs significantly from our own. In 1942, our propaganda depicted Japanese pilots as bandy-legged, myopic simians flying scrap metal airplanes. Believing that propaganda could buy you a watery plot at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean because Japanese pilots were, at that time, better trained than ours; most of them had the advantage of extensive combat experience that our pilots had not yet gained. Furthermore, until the Grumman F6F Hellcat and the Lockheed P-38 Lightning appeared, the Mitsubishi Zero ruled the skies over the Pacific. Did we learn? During the Korean War we decided that Korean pilots could not fly the MiG-15, so it had to be Russians we faced in combat over the Yalu River. A decade or so later we liked to think it was the North Koreans (evidently having learned to fly in the intervening years) who flew MiG-21s for their less-capable Vietnamese comrades. More recently, we tried to convince ourselves that Vietnamese pilots have found their way into cockpits of MiGs with Syrian and Iraqi markings. It is irrational to think that skin color, the shape of one’s eyes, or religion has anything to do with one’s ability to fly and fight. Subtle racism, which has us holding our enemies in disrepute, can be more than irrational—it can be dangerous. However, Westerners ought not be singled out for criticism. The conviction that one’s own race represents the epitome of development is more or less universal. Thus, the warrior who can appreciate the enemy’s abilities without having to contend with blinding prejudice has a real advantage.

Many of the articles found in this issue of the Review attest to the complexities that seem to be a fact of life on this planet. Established rules for conducting international affairs and old nostrums for fostering friendships and nurturing allies often prove irrelevant. As military professionals, we must understand not only the evident and enormous problems involved in deterring Soviet aggression; we must also address the less apparent and more subtle implications of economic, nationalistic, and political factors that shape the course of events in places like Argentina, India, Vietnam, and China. Battles around Basra and fighting in the Bekaa Valley can threaten our peace and security just as surely as Soviet Backfire bombers and ICBMs. Let me invite you to start with our first article.

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IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY PATTERNS AMONG DEVELOPING STATES

Dr. Edward A. Kolodziej

Several key trends in the security policy behavior of developing states have serious long-term implications for American security policy. I refer specifically to the diffusion of military and economic power among developing states and the growing decentralization of regional and international security systems. The international system has become increasingly characterized by growing numbers of state participants controlling significant economic and military power. Moreover, developing states, hitherto at the peripheries of international decision-making, are progressively becoming central to the system. More and more they affect the outcomes of interstate conflicts, influence and, at times, even determine the regimes in political control of foreign states and their external relations, and regulate access to strategic resources needed by other states.

In a larger sense, these trends imply an increasing role for military force and the threat of its use in international relations. The decentralization of power increases opportunities for the use of force and intervention in the internal affairs of other states. As a consequence, the international security system and regional subsystems appear to be gradually moving beyond the control of any one state or group of states.

The growing instability and volatility of regional and international security pose serious problems for American interests and security policy. The management of security relations becomes more difficult as the military, economic, and political requirements of national security increase and become more dependent on the cooperative behavior of larger numbers of rival states. As American security becomes more dependent on an increasing number of states, our ability to control the actions and decisions of allies and nonaligned states has declined even as, paradoxically, our economic and military power has grown.
Patterns of Developing-State Security Behavior

The diffusion of military power throughout the world and the fascination it seems to have for developing nations deserve attention. First, military spending is growing faster in the Third World than it is in the developed world, including Western Europe. Much of the 14.8 percent growth in world military expenditures between 1968 and 1977 was in the developing states. During this period the military spending of the so-called developed states rose from $305 to $319 billion in constant 1976 dollars, an increase of 4.6 percent, while expenditures among developing states jumped from $54 to $92 billion or 70.4 percent. In the Middle East, military expenditures increased over 270 percent. Many states in Africa doubled their military outlays; in both instances the rate of arms spending exceeded the growth in gross national product (GNP). In three instances, in Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia, a higher percentage of each region's GNP was spent for the military in 1977 than in 1968. As the ratio of military spending to GNP fell for developed states by almost two percentage points (7.4 to 5.6 percent), the similar spending ratio for Third World states held almost steady, falling only two-tenths of a percentage point from 6.1 to 5.9 percent, while GNP increased by almost 80 percent. These GNP military spending ratios are confirmed, as might be expected, in per capita expenditure data. The developed states declined 2.9 percent on this scale while the developing state percentage was up 38.1 percent.

Second, the developing states account for most of the growth of world armed forces since 1968. While the armed services of the developed countries decreased in manpower by almost 11 percent between 1968 and 1977, those of the emerging nations expanded by an average of 25 percent. In this connection, Africa changed most over the ten-year period. There, armed forces have increased from 635,000 to 1,340,000 or 111 percent. The Middle East follows with a 76 percent increase. Surprisingly, Latin America, although it has had no appreciable military conflicts like those in Africa and the Middle East, registered a gain of almost 36 percent in numbers of men under arms.

Third, developing states are arming themselves with the latest in sophisticated weaponry. In 1950, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, no Third World state had supersonic aircraft or missiles, and only one possessed post-World War II armored fighting vehicles or tanks. (See Table I.) By 1960, 38 countries had heavy armor in their inventories; 26 were manning modern war-

Table 1. Number of Third World countries with advanced military systems, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1977

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<tr>
<td>supersonic</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>missiles</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>armored fighting vehicles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modern warships</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>56</td>
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ships; yet only one state (Taiwan) had supersonic aircraft. By 1977, less than twenty years later, almost fifty emerging states had deployed supersonic aircraft, some as advanced as any in the NATO or Warsaw Pact inventories. These included MiG-23s in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Cuba; SEPECAT Jaguars in Oman and Ecuador; Dassault Mirage IIIIs and Dassault Mirage 5s (17 states); and Northrop F-5s (16 states). The trend continues with the Republic of Korea getting the F-16, Israel the F-15 and F-16, Egypt the F-4 and F-16, Saudi Arabia the F-15 and the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and India the MiG-25. By 1977, more than 80 developing states possessed heavy armor; 42 had various missile capabilities; and 67 disposed modern warships in their navies, largely fast, light ships with impressive destructive capabilities.

Fourth, the volume of arms imports can be used to illustrate the rise in military expenditures for the developing states. Using five-year averages for 1968 to 1972 and 1973 to 1977, the Third World countries clearly outdistanced the developed states in the amount and rate of growth of arms imports. From 1968 to 1972, the developing states accounted for 70.1 percent of all transfers; in the next five-year period from 1973 to 1977, the percentage rose to 78.1 percent. The growth rate is all the more impressive since the starting base for developing state imports was greater than that for developed states. The latter increased their imports by nearly 43 percent; the former jumped 163.1 percent. The greatest regional rate of increase in arms imports was in Africa, especially North Africa. Over the last five years, imports into Africa leaped almost 450 percent over the previous five-year period. Additionally, the Middle East is a leader with an increase of slightly more than 300 percent. Latin America ranks third in arms imports, followed by South and East Asia.

Perhaps even more revealing than arms imports is the increasing tendency of developing states to produce their own weapons, either indigenously or under license. These include heavy armor, supersonic and subsonic aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and light warships. The factors prompting this growth are varied and complex, but most prominent is a desire to be independent of foreign suppliers and the pressures they can exert. While these states have not been able to free themselves from foreign dependence, they have been able, for a variety of reasons, to increase their bargaining leverage with the developed states to acquire the weapons they want. Not only are they able to produce more weapons than ever before but they are also able to design and fabricate a larger variety of sophisticated weapon systems. Table II lists the production capacity of 31 states in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. In each of the seven weapon categories

Table II. Number of developing states producing various military arms and materials in 1965 and 1975, respectively

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<th>aircraft</th>
<th>missiles</th>
<th>armored fighting vehicles</th>
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<th>small arms</th>
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<td>15 22</td>
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listed, the number of states producing a particular item has grown; in most instances the number doubled between 1965 and 1975. At least five states (China, India, Israel, South Africa, and Brazil) were producing military equipment in each category in 1975; developments have not slowed since (with countries like Taiwan and Egypt, capable of producing aircraft, missiles, and light warships or Argentina, which can produce these weapons as well as armor and is enlarging its aircraft engine and electronics capability).

These figures also imply a high state of technological development since aircraft, missiles, electronics, and aircraft engines require a broad scientific, engineering, and industrial base. Measured by GNP and per capita income, countries like China and India may not be "developed," but they have begun to master the advanced technologies needed to produce ultrasophisticated weaponry. One can speak metaphorically of a "Belgium" emerging from India or a Skoda arms complex arising from an otherwise underdeveloped China. The same process of modernization, with military technology as the spearhead, is plainly operating in other "undeveloped" states; Pakistan, Brazil, and Argentina are prominent examples. The choice perceived by elites in these states is not the traditional one of "guns or butter" but "butter because of guns." Modernization is seen as partially a function of a modern war-fighting and production system linked to a capacity to sell arms abroad.

The proliferation of nuclear technology and weapon production capability is still another indicator of a state reaching military maturity. India’s detonation of a nuclear device in 1974 ended any remaining illusions that nuclear proliferation might be arrested in the developing world. According to public reports, Pakistan is within reach of exploding the first Islamic bomb. Other candidates for nuclear status include Taiwan, South Africa, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, and Iraq (after it recovers from the Israeli air raid on the Baghdad nuclear facility in August 1981). Many analysts have long assumed that Israel possesses a significant nuclear arsenal.

The diffusion of military technology has been accompanied and partly propelled by a diffusion of economic power, principally favoring the oil-producing states. Table III outlines the dependency of key Western states on imported oil. All of these states except the United States were dependent on oil imports for over 90 percent of their petroleum needs. Only North Sea oil has made Britain and Norway temporarily self-sufficient. Except for the United States and Denmark, more than half of the oil imports to the states listed in Table III came from the Middle East and Persian Gulf states. Additionally, the Soviet Union and its East European allies are increasingly dependent on imported oil. This dependency is expected to grow in the future, setting the stage for intensified competition for scarce oil resources.

Between 1970 and 1979, the Soviet Union increased its oil imports by 50 percent; the East European states doubled their dependence on foreign oil in the same period.

The rise in oil prices in the 1970s from little more than $2 a barrel to over $40 has brought enormous revenues to the petroleum exporting nations and provided funds needed for major weapon purchases. The West has furnished the bulk of the capital for nations like Iran, under the Shah, and Saudi Arabia to become leading arms clients of the United States. France has also sold Libya, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia weapons worth billions of dollars.

European and Soviet dependence on foreign oil, especially from the Middle East, has complicated the meaning of security. The large and growing trade balances between Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and developed states place the latter in a vulnerable position. They need access to oil and to the oil producers’ markets to sell their products. They are also interested in the monetary and investment policies pursued by the oil-producing states. Progressive loss of control
over these economic factors—oil, trade, investment, and monetary fluctuations—shapes trade balances, economic growth, national income, and employment trends in the developed states. To the degree that the social and political fabric of oil-importing states is measured by the strength of these economic indicators, the Arab oil-exporting states in particular have enhanced their bargaining leverage with the developed user nations to acquire arms, technology transfers, and political concessions. On the other hand, a lessened capacity to influence interregional conflicts is suggested by the Iranian-Iraqi conflict. What applies to the nonoil-exporting developed states is magnified in the nonoil-exporting developing states. Many of these states have little except their political support to sell to assure oil supplies.

### Decentralization of the International Security System

The diffusion of military and economic resources and accompanying political influence to the advantage of selected but critically important developing states has fostered a more decentralized regional and international security system. More developing states than ever before are significant actors on the international stage. Their new-found power stems from the greater stock of military and economic resources at their disposal. This stock includes greater national armed forces for direct use or for "lending," large inventories of modern weapons, a growing capacity to produce arms, the ability to sell or transfer arms to third parties, increased control over access to territory, sea lanes, or airspace needed by other states for strategic purposes, large economic reserves by which to purchase arms or finance indigenous or foreign armed forces and operations, and possession of raw materials and economic resources that are needed by other states.

Control exercised by developing states over these assets permits them to play three crucial roles. First, they increasingly influence the outcomes of interstate conflicts. Second, they set limits to the policy objectives and maneu-
verability of other states, including the big powers. Within varying degrees of significance, they can also define, as the Israelis have recently demonstrated in Lebanon, what kind of political regime will rule another nation—or at least wield a veto over what regimes are unacceptable. They are able to project their power either directly by political or military coercion or indirectly by influencing the socioeconomic structure or foreign relations of a third state. Finally, and flowing from the preceding two roles, the developing states have an enhanced power to define regional and interstate issues, their salience, and the time and pace by which they will be articulated or resolved.

Decentralization unquestionably accentuates the importance of military force in international relations. Relations between states are increasingly framed by available military power, and clashes are apt to be resolved by threat or by use of force. Relations become more volatile because nations are increasingly unable to exercise restraint on their allies. Conflicts are widened horizontally among developing states and extended vertically to include the developed states and the superpowers. There are then a larger number of competing states with significant military capability involved in international competition. The result is that no one state or group of states can provide regional or international stability. Security issues gain ascendancy over political and economic questions as states tend to their specific security needs in an uncertain world.

*Influence on the outcomes of interstate conflict*

Regionally, local states have a great say over their security arrangements. With varying control over the economic and military instruments of power noted earlier, they define their own interests and seek to influence their neighbors. In the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli struggle dominates a region transformed by political mutations among Israel's Arab an-
agonists. The Egyptian-Israeli peace accords are clear evidence of the changing nature of regional security arrangements that have restructured regional alignments. Even before the Sinai and Camp David agreements, it was apparent that neither of the superpowers, however important as protector, could dictate policy to its clients. Israel took matters into its own hands in 1956 and again in 1967. If in the Suez War it was forced to withdraw, in the Six-Day War its preemptive attack and swift victory precluded foreign intervention. If under American prompting and blandishments it accepted the Camp David process and relinquished the Sinai, it also secured its flank from Egyptian attack and freed its forces to deal with the PLO and Syrian threats in Lebanon.

The Soviet Union has also had trouble disciplining its clients in the Middle East. Although Egypt and Syria received assistance from the U.S.S.R. in launching their Yom Kippur attack in 1973, they were not under the direction of the Soviet Union. A year earlier, indeed, Egypt had ordered Soviet military personnel to leave the country, and President Anwar Sadat berated Moscow for not furnishing enough weapons to impose a military solution on Israel.

Regional quarrels in the Middle East cannot be reduced to the global struggle between the

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About 75 Mitsubishi F-1s from a Japanese design (right) serve in the Japan Air Self Defense Force. Two-seat trainer versions prepare Japanese pilots for F-104s, F-4s, and F-15s, built under license in Japan by Mitsubishi. First deliveries of Grumman E-2C Hawkeye airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) were made to the JASDF in May. The Japanese have ordered eight AWACS.
superpowers. They arise from sources deeply embedded within the warp and woof of the history, culture, political development, and religious fabric of the region. The Iranian-Iraq War of 1980 had little to do with American, Soviet, or European penetration of the area although their arms contributed to the lethality and scope of the hostilities. Differences between Syria and Iraq also run deep despite the fact that different wings of the Baath socialist party rule in both countries. Rivalries have become so bitter that even traditional adversaries appear at times to be more desirable, if passing, allies than fellow Arabs. At one point in the struggle for the control of Lebanon in the 1970s, Syrian forces armed by the Soviet Union were aligned with Lebanese Christians against Muslim Arabs fighting for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Earlier, King Hussein’s forces mauled PLO units to assure his rule in Jordan.10

Client-sponsored relationships in the Middle East have also become blurred in recent years. American-Saudi relations are a touchstone. If Riyadh depends on American arms and protection, it has not followed that Washington has the final say over Saudi foreign and security policy. The Saudi demand for F-15s (and later for their enhancement in range and armament) as well as for the AWACS system pitted U.S. and Israeli security interests against each other and generated serious splits in Congress over the sale of this sophisticated equipment to Riyadh.11 Saudi money has, furthermore, found its way into the hands of Middle East antagonists of the United States, including the PLO. Saudi influence exerted in Washington also resulted in President Carter’s use of his emergency powers to send arms to North Yemen, thereby shortcircuiting congressional objections and opposition.

The superpowers seem unable to prevent many of their client states from using, more or less at will, weapons that they have provided. In August 1981, Israeli F-16s destroyed the Baghdad nuclear reactor without prior knowledge or approval of the American government. Israel is accused of using cluster bombs in Lebanon, which resulted in civilian casualties contrary to the intent of authorizing legislation approving the transfer of these weapons. In 1980, Iraq attacked Iran, apparently without securing Russian consent to use Soviet arms. In 1974, Turkey used American arms without American approval in invading Cyprus. The subsequent American arms embargo had little restraining effect on the Turkish government. Washington backed down when Turkey closed several U.S. bases, threatened to withdraw from NATO, and warned that American monitoring sites used to track Soviet missile tests might be removed. Libya transferred some of its French-built Mirages to Egypt during the 1973 Yom Kippur War despite French proscriptions against retransfers. In each of these cases, arms provided by the big powers did not assure control over the behavior of their clients.

A similar pattern of local initiative can be found in North Africa. Algeria provides sanctuary for the Polisario and, with Libya, arms the insurgents. France, the United States, and Saudi Arabia provide money and arms to Morocco.12 Meanwhile, Libya used its wealth to arm the Chadian government and moved over 6000 troops into N’Djamena in late 1980 to tip the civil war in favor of the Chadian president. Libya also spends its oil wealth to finance revolutionary and terrorist activities in several regions of the world. The extent of Libyan influence is dramatically illustrated by Libyan support of the Muslim separatist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the southern Philippines. Libyan support of the insurgency, long rumored in the world press, was implicitly confirmed when Libya sponsored negotiations between the Philippine government and the MNLF in Tripoli in 1976.13

In Asia, Vietnam and India have exercised considerable influence over their respective spheres of influence. In 1975, North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam and established a satellite government in neighboring Laos. In
1978, Vietnam extended its rule over Cambodia and, in bloody border clashes with its former Chinese ally in 1979, proved its military prowess to the extent that other nations in the area formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While this association has other objectives besides containing Vietnamese expansionism, it is clearly concerned with the problem.

India similarly dominates South Asia. Its defeat of Pakistan in late 1971 led to the creation of Bangladesh. India’s explosion of a nuclear device and development of a sophisticated arms industry place it in an ascendant regional position since no other state can effectively challenge its military position. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) produces the Kiran ground attack fighter and has built the Marut fighter-bomber, the Pushpak trainer, and MiG-21s under license. An improved version of the British Gnat lightweight fighter, called the Ajeeit, is currently in production. In the spring of 1980, India signed a $1.6 billion arms agreement with the Soviet Union. As a part of this deal, India has received MiG-23s and a reconnaissance version of the MiG-25. It has also purchased SEPECAT Jaguars and has recently ordered Mirage 2000s from France. Additionally, New Delhi gained approval for the purchase of enriched uranium from the United States despite considerable congressional reservations about the absence of effective safeguards required by American law.

Although weaker than India and hard pressed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan continues to play an important international role. There are reportedly 22 Pakistani military missions in foreign countries. Pakistani Air Force pilots serve widely throughout the Muslim world as instructors and advisors. Sizable detachments can be found in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, and Abu Dhabi. In all, approximately 10,000 Pakistani military are serving abroad. Another 20,000 are reportedly earmarked for duty in Saudi Arabia should the need arise. Indeed, Pakistan is second only to Cuba in the number of military personnel supplied to Third World states. High training standards, the professionalism of the officer corps, and excellent discipline make Pakistani soldiers and airmen desirable guests in much of the Muslim world and beyond. Pakistani pilots have been engaged by France to train Arab forces in French Mirages. Pakistani military personnel have flown for Libya and currently fly for Abu Dhabi. Pakistani President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq distinguished himself earlier in his career as a military advisor in Jordan, where he commanded a Pakistani brigade that played an important part in suppressing the Palestinian guerrillas in 1970.

In Latin America, a number of states are also playing critical regional and transregional roles. Cuba is most prominent. It has about 40,000 troops serving in eleven countries. Its involvement in Africa is longstanding. As early as 1963, Cuba sent 300-400 troops to Algeria to support that country in its border dispute with Morocco. The next year, Castro’s regime contacted the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Support for the MPLA grew, and 14,000 Cuban troops were sent to Angola to assist in the struggle against remnants of Portuguese colonialism and, later, to fight to establish Agostinho Neto’s regime against the forces of Holden Roberto and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Additionally, about 17,000 Cubans aided the Ethiopian government in its war against Somali in the Ogaden. According to one listing, Cuba has ten other missions of varying size in Africa besides those in Angola and Ethiopia.

Brazil, strongly nationalist and ruled by a military and technocratic elite, has embarked on an ambitious military modernization program to become self-sufficient in arms production and expansion in foreign arms sales. The views of Brazilian Air Force Minister Joelmir
Campos de Araripe Macedo typify the attitude of Brazilian leaders: "The time has come to free ourselves from the United States and the countries of Europe. It is a condition of security that each nation manufactures its own armaments."22 In 1980, Brazil reportedly sold $500 million in military equipment. Its armored car, Cascavel (Rattlesnake), which mounts a 90-mm cannon, has appeared in Libya and Iraq. Brazil is, additionally, the world’s sixth largest manufacturer of aircraft. Its twin-prop Bandeirante transport has been sold to Uruguay, Chile, and Gabon and is used by several commuter airlines in the United States. The Xavante AT-26 ground attack fighter has been purchased by Togo and Paraguay.23 France’s decision to buy fifty Xingu transports, valued at approximately a million dollars apiece, signals a breakthrough into the European aircraft market.24 Argentina is also an important weapon producer and appears to be preparing to export its weapons. It has developed the twin-turboprop Pucará counterinsurgency aircraft, which saw service in the Falkland Islands War, as well as small naval craft, tanks, helicopters, and trainers.25 Argentina’s defeat at the hands of Great Britain in the South Atlantic suggests the limits of its capacity to challenge a determined...
developed state, but the losses inflicted on British forces, especially warships, by Argentinian aircraft also indicate that the gap between developed and developing countries with respect to the availability and use of advanced military systems is closing.

THE principal military powers in Sub-Saharan Africa are Nigeria and South Africa. South Africa, easily the most powerful nation in the region, has in recent years sent troops into Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Its arms industry is impressive and growing. Through licensing agreements, such as those with France for building Mirage aircraft, South Africa has been successful in circumventing the United Nations arms embargo.

Nigeria is almost totally dependent on foreign arms suppliers. However, it has lucrative oil resources, a large population, and a leadership anxious to be active in African affairs. It is also an attractive alliance partner. Fifteen percent of U.S. oil imports come from Nigeria, and officials in Lagos have hinted that the flow of oil to the United States could depend on U.S. policy toward South Africa.

influence on the outcomes of intrastate conflict

The capacity of some developing states to influence the kinds of regimes that will govern abroad and, as in Indochina, to install a government or leadership group in power is another mark of the growing importance of developing states. One is impressed by the level of activity of developing states in penetrating politically and intervening militarily in the affairs of other states. Equally impressive is the array of assets at their disposal to shape political events and influence security policies abroad.

Vietnam's successes in Southeast Asia have been noted. The large arms cache taken in its 1975 offensive provides a means to influence events in the Persian Gulf and Central America where American-made weapons are in demand. While Soviet economic and military assistance gives Moscow some leverage, Hanoi has attractive bases to offer the Soviets and can, with these assets, maintain a measure of distance from Moscow.

The Middle East is rife with intrigue. North and South Yemen are going in opposite directions. As suggested above, Saudi money and American-bought arms keep the North Yemen government afloat while Soviet arms and Libyan funds support the Marxist regime in South Yemen. Elsewhere, Syria has not recoiled from using its superior military strength, based on Soviet arms, to impress its will on a recalcitrant PLO. For its part, Israel challenges PLO and Syrian influence in Lebanon and extends a protective cover over Lebanese Christians.

From North Africa, Libya stirs up mischief throughout the region and the world. It has reportedly been implicated in assassination plots in Egypt, in the attempt on Pope John Paul II's life, and is alleged to have targeted top U.S. officials for elimination. We know that Libyan troops kept Idi Amin in power until domestic opponents, supported by an expeditionary force from Tanzania, overthrew him. Libya also partially underwrites the Polisario insurrection that threatens the Hassan II regime in Morocco.

The most dramatic success of Colonel Muammar el Qaddafi's government to date has been in Chad. The extension of its power has seriously embarrassed both France and Nigeria. France withdrew its troops from Chad in 1980, but there was no presumption that the void would be filled by Libyan forces. For over a decade the French tried to resolve the civil war, but without success. Its failure in Chad to prevent the Libyan intervention and the temporary withdrawal of defeated elements to the south undermined the credibility of France in Francophone Africa. Various factors explain the French vacillation—presidential elections, the cost of moderating a seemingly intractable civil war, and interest in Libyan oil—but none
The United States is the major arms source for Israel. According to media press releases, the General Dynamics F-16 (above, left and right) has been used in recent air action in Lebanon. . . . Because an American-made engine powers the Israel Aircraft Industries' Kfir-C2 (left), Israel must obtain U.S. permission before selling it to other nations. . . . The assembly line at Israel Aircraft Industries (bottom left) turns out two or three Kfirs each month.
is sufficient to conceal the setback to France's prestige relative to an assertive Tripoli. Meanwhile, Nigerian aspirations in the region were frustrated. The Nigerian-inspired Organization of African Unity resolution to settle the Chadian conflict was predicated on the dubious assumption that Libya would become a stabilizing influence in the region. Libya's assault on N'Djamena dashed these expectations and in the bargain diminished Nigeria's claim as a participant in the Chadian solution. Libya's withdrawal of its troops from Chad in 1981 eased tensions with its neighbors, but it remains a major regional player and a force to be reckoned with.

On the other hand, France, in league with Moroccan troops, ferried by American transports, and partially financed by the Saudis, intervened in Zaire to save the Mobutu regime. Morocco's assistance in Zaire also earned credit for the government of Hassan II in both Washington and Paris in its struggle against the Polisario rebels. By supporting Morocco, the United States and France can influence the outcomes of the war, but veto power over its resolution seems to lie with Algeria.

Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe can be partly attributed to the support the black independence movement received from developing states. Soviet arms filtered through the surrounding states to Joshua Nkomo's forces while Mugabe's movement enjoyed Chinese patronage. Moreover, the willingness of the two revolutionary leaders to accept a negotiated solution derived in considerable measure from the pressures exerted by the front-line states of southern black Africa. Mozambique was particularly strained by the war by having to provide sanctuary and resources for the competing sides and along with its neighbors put pressure on the rebels to negotiate a peace settlement with the white-dominated Salisbury government.

When attention turns toward Latin America,
Cuban foreign policy provides the most striking example of a developing state charging onto the international stage. Marxist governments in Angola and Ethiopia are there in large part because of Cuban intervention. Cubans may also be found in Congo-Brazzaville, Libya, Mozambique, and Benin.\textsuperscript{52} In Latin America, Cuban attempts to export revolution have so far been less successful despite closer geographic and ethnic affinities. If State Department charges are correct, Havana is also shipping arms through Honduras and Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador.\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{influence over the international agenda of security issues}

As the superpowers and the European states have settled their differences in Europe, the developing world has become the focus of big-power and middle-power competition. But developing states are now exercising more influence over the scope, timing, and articulation of regional and international security issues. Their increased influence derives from impressive security assets that many developing states have at their disposal to invest in other developing states, to support revolutionary movements, or to lend to developed powers in return for favors. Their bargaining leverage and maneuverability vis-à-vis the developed world, including the superpowers, have grown proportionately.

Through their control of needed raw materials, sizable monetary reserves, large armed forces, and key geographical locations, the developing states can extract greater concessions than ever before from the developed nations, particularly modern arms. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, India, and Pakistan have diversified their arms supplier portfolios. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has bought much of its ground equipment from France and its naval material from Britain while the United States furnishes much of Saudi Arabia’s aircraft, missiles, and electronics. The reverse situation of supplier dependency on its client is exemplified by the Iranian situation. In an effort to tie irreversibly the Shah’s Iran to American security interests, successive Washington administrations furnished Tehran with the most sophisticated equipment in the U.S. arsenal. The unintended result of these shipments was to undermine the Shah’s regime and turn over American arms to a hostile government bent on eliminating American influence in the Middle East.

France has risked domestic division and international criticism by selling to all comers. It abandoned its own proscription against selling arms to states “on the field of battle” when the Saudi trade was opened in the middle 1970s. Saudi money financed the purchase of Mirage aircraft that were subsequently transferred to Egypt. French Mirage F-1s were sent to Iraq after the outbreak of war with Iran. Moreover, only strong pressures from friendly black African states were sufficient to terminate sales of French military equipment to South Africa.\textsuperscript{54}

Bases and access to territory, facilities, or strategic material, like oil, are important assets of the developing states. Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and South Africa have assumed greater importance in American policymaking circles as Soviet expansion has grown apace. Cooperation with these states often carries a stiff economic and political price tag. The United States risks being drawn into support of an expansionist Marxist regime in Somalia and a racist government in South Africa in exchange for bases, port facilities, flyover rights, staging points, technical facilities, or monitoring and tracking sites.

An example of the pivotal importance of such issues can be seen in the Carter administration’s flawed experiment with human rights as a major foreign policy tool. The presence of key U.S. basing and staging areas in South Korea and the Philippines, for example, set limits to the Carter administration’s human rights policies. The resultant self-contradictory posture subjected the Carter administration to renewed criticism at home and abroad, further eroding its credibility among the electorate.
The Soviet Union has also sought to extend its access to bases and resources in the developing world as parts of its global expansionist policy. It enjoys privileges in Iraq, Syria, South Yemen, and Ethiopia. In exchange, Moscow supplies needed arms and military advice. States like Cuba, in exchange for weapons and economic assistance, provide troops for adventurous international projects which Moscow would find too risky for Soviet forces.

Implications for United States Security Policy

The growing military weight, economic power, and political influence of developing states require a reexamination of prevailing security policy assumptions as well as adjustments in current alignment and alliance strategies. As the Reagan administration affirms its apparent commitment to an East-West interpretation of global events and the basic mode by which security issues will be defined, local states falling along a North-South axis have never been more important in determining regional and global security issues. Conflicts and disruptive influences around the world are not easily traced to either superpower. The latter and their allies are as much prisoners of events and initiatives taken elsewhere by developing states as they are disruptive elements themselves. For example, the Soviet Union quickly recognized India's dominant position in South Asia and furnished New Delhi with the arms it wanted. India, in turn, has provided valued diplomatic support for the U.S.S.R. in its struggle with China. The recent sale by the United States of enriched uranium to India is a belated recognition of India's political and strategic importance in South Asia. A tilt toward India implies a different approach to Pakistan, which, as a buffer to Soviet expansion, is also important for American strategic planning. America's dilemma is that any infusion of arms to Pakistan threatens relations with India and holds the potential of weakening U.S. diplomatic efforts to induce a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The regional preeminence of Cuba and Brazil in Latin America, Vietnam in Southeast Asia, Nigeria in Africa, or Algeria in North Africa are now common features of the security landscape. The rising claims of Mexico, with its large petroleum reserves, promise to add another actor to regional and global security relations. Witness the joint French-Mexican resolution calling for peace in Central America and recent Mexican initiatives to resolve the conflict in El Salvador. Lesser but still crucial players like Argentina and Venezuela in Latin America, Pakistan in South Asia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel in the Middle East, the ASEAN bloc in Asia, and South Africa and Nigeria in Sub-Saharan Africa are currently playing important security roles and have a demonstrated capacity to influence security prospects for themselves and others.

Notions like an East-West split or a North-South division serve to hinder, not help, the construction of regional and international alignments with states and political movements responsive to American security imperatives. Even the concept “Third World” serves poorly as a vehicle to understand the emerging forces of the developing world and how they impact on American interests. Three illustrations—drawn from regional struggles in North Africa and the Middle East and from the competition for oil—highlight the problems of complex interdependence. They also suggest the need for strategies of equal complexity and subtlety to piece together a network of exterior alignments that achieve a modicum of order in support of U.S. security objectives.

The North African case defies reduction into North-South or East-West terms. The polarities are not simply between the rich and the poor or between capitalistic and collectivist societies. Nor is it the free world, including Western Europe and the United States, against an expansionist Soviet Union and its clients. It is all of these things and much more besides, and the
political alignments in the region do not fall neatly along ideological lines. Consider the protagonists and their divergent aims. Morocco's situation suggests just how misleading and simplistic the North/South and communist/capitalistic models are. Morocco seeks to impose its sovereignty on the western Sahara, which it weaned from Spanish control, in the pose of a defender of decolonization. While the viability of Hassan II's government depends on vigorous pursuit of the war because of the current domestic popularity of the cause, King Hassan also needs to end the war as soon as possible to preclude the erosion of his internal support. As allies, Hassan's Morocco has a reluctant Washington, which furnishes arms,

In the late fifties and early sixties, when the U.S.S.R. and Egypt were friendlier, the Soviets gave Tu-16 medium bombers to Egypt (below). In a recent U.S.-Egyptian exercise, these bombers joined SAC B-52s in attacking an "enemy" airfield. The Egyptian Air Force flies 16 Tu-16s, some of them equipped with AS-5 Kelt missiles.
diplomatic support, and economic aid—albeit over the protests of several important factions in Congress and the press—and Saudi Arabia, which helps to finance the war. To round out the picture, recall that Morocco supported Syria with combat troops during the Yom Kippur War and sent an expeditionary force to the Congo with French and American logistic backing to oppose a Cuban and Soviet-backed invasion from Angola.

France, a traditional ally of Morocco, supplies most of its arms (through sales, not grants) and furnishes diplomatic and presumably intelligence support. On the other hand, France seeks to remain on good terms with Libya and Algeria. (Note the recent gas contract with Algeria at prices above the world market.) It wants to avoid an open split with either the Soviet Union over the western Sahara or with the nonaligned world, which tends to side with the Polisario.

Algeria and Libya have overlapping but hardly congruent aims. Algeria provides the Polisario with sanctuaries. Along with Libya, Algeria arms the rebels with weapons largely supplied by the Soviet Union. Algerian support of the Polisario cause variously services a mix of goals. In keeping the Hassan II government off balance and denying it victory in the western Sahara, the Algerian claims to North African hegemony are bolstered, and Algeria’s credentials as a leader of the radical wing of the nonaligned movement are kept intact. Meanwhile, Algeria’s principal trading partner is the United States, to which it currently sells much of its gas and oil. American investments are among the largest in Algeria, totaling over $6 billion, and American oil firms now surpass French oil interests in Algeria. At the diplomatic level, Algeria has performed yeoman work for the United States in freeing the hostages in Iran, although it remains no less committed to internal collectivist notions of economic and political organization than Cuba or Benin. On the other hand, Algeria depends principally on the Soviet Union for arms.

Libya’s interests and objectives are less clearly definable. It has been a consistent opponent of Hassan II’s regime. It supports a Pan-Arab, Islamic movement that would weaken the kind of conservative Islamic order that has evolved in Morocco. Its mischief making in the western Sahara, not to mention Chad, the Middle East,
black Africa, and even East Asia, tends to support Soviet interests, but no close and conscious coordination of Libyan-Soviet strategy has been conclusively demonstrated. At the same time Libya primarily relies on the West to explore, exploit, and market its oil and uses its oil revenues to support its adventurism.

Soviet motivations are less than apparent. Through Libya and Algeria, the U.S.S.R. is the principal supplier of arms to the Polisario. While it claims to favor the independence movement, Soviet economic assistance to Morocco, valued at $2 billion, is the largest of its kind with a non-Communist state. The U.S.S.R. gains access to Morocco's phosphate deposits in return for developing Moroccan roads and transportation networks. The Soviet Union thus becomes an indirect prop of a regime that it is indirectly trying to overthrow.

The Middle East provides additional evidence of a maddening array of conflicting alignments that resist reduction to simple polarities. The United States finds itself the protector of Israel and an important source of arms for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. American arms flow to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, nations which are antagonistic to the Camp David agreements. Meanwhile, Saudi money assists the PLO and buys arms for Syria.

Europe and the United States are at odds in their approaches to the region. The European states have largely lost confidence in the Camp David process. Fearing that the outbreak of violence would disrupt the flow of oil, hamper trade, and facilitate Soviet penetration in the region, the European Economic Community has begun its own peace initiative in the region.

The falling-out between Europe and the United States over the Arab-Israeli issue can be seen as well in the competing strategies pursued by these states in oil policy. With the collapse of the international oil structure in 1973, the wild fluctuations in oil pricing and supplies that have occurred in the intervening period, and the onset of the Iranian revolution, Europeans have felt left to their own devices in the scramble for oil. The previous order, resting critically on American power and corporate control of oil flows, can no longer be relied on to assure adequate supplies of petroleum at tolerable prices. The European states are divided on what strategy to adopt in trying to keep the oil flowing. They are wary of proposals to use or threaten to use military force. Some seek a solution to the Arab-Israeli crisis at any cost—even to the detriment of Israel. The differences among the United States and its allies in responding to the Iranian revolution, the hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reflect the turmoil in the Atlantic Alliance.

Overlaying these conflicts of interest in the Western alliance are divided assessments of national needs and appropriate strategies to achieve them. Western governments are reluctant to join in cooperative ventures that might entangle them in commitments damaging to their domestic positions, however beneficial cooperation may appear from a collective Western or from a narrower American perspective. Oil apportionment schemes, for example, imply preceding accord on a host of economic matters, including national growth rates, income distribution, employment levels, and investment and trade patterns. There are few incentives currently at play in Western economic relations, as suggested in the dispute over interest rates between the Reagan administration and European capitals, that can be relied on to prompt such heroic efforts of coordination of discrete national economic policies. As Washington turns to the marketplace and tax cuts to stimulate the economy (while holding inflation down by monetary controls), France nationalizes key industrial and banking firms to apply traditional socialist and Keynesian techniques of economic pump priming and governmental investment.

A complex bilateralism is evident in the evolving international system. Fluid alignments are replacing rigid alliances. Efforts to reduce,
confine, or rationalize these fractionalized and factious relationships in bipolar, regional, or global terms makes very little sense. The definition of ally and adversary also requires restatement and has to be broadened beyond the assumption of shared political or ideological values. The notion of ally might well include some assessment of the security assets brought to an alignment with the United States and the risks and costs of alignment. The problem facing American policymakers can be resolved into this question: "What combination of bilateral alignments with foreign states are likely to maximize the exterior security assets of the United States or, at a minimum, deny them to foreign adversaries?" The question is fundamentally analytic. What content is given to the response will depend on the policy domain and stakes at issue, the conjunctural forces at play, and estimates of long-term structural need for stable alliance relations.

This perspective does not imply that alignments are essentially short term or opportunistic. They can endure if actor needs, interests, and values are served. Such stability does not imply, however, that differences in other policy domains are always linked or should be connected as a matter of policy, whether as a test of allied dependability or adversary intentions. While this shifting contingent conception of the emerging international scene is not incompatible with security alliances, it does suggest that alliances cannot be automatically broadened unless the nexus of interests in one regional or functional policy area interfaces with those of another. Similarly, to always demand of an opponent in one arena a certain standard of behavior as a litmus test of sincerity in another confuses the actual linkage that may exist between policy domains with the bargaining of states which have incentive to use or not use the club of linkage politics to advance their interests. The question of whether linkage is a good or bad policy toward traditional allies or adversaries cannot be answered in the abstract—it all depends. Linkage is a bargaining tool and not an end of policy as such.

The international system remains divided against itself: it is a self-help system. However, between the optimism of a benevolent interdependence inducing cooperation and the pessimism of rising anarchy and conflict in international relations, a middle course must be charted. It demands candid recognition of the conflicting alignment needs of the United States and an honest appraisal of the varied mixes of states needed to reach strategic, economic, and political goals over varying periods of time. Such a perspective neither rules out cooperation nor rules in conflict—again, it all depends. Such a view has the potential virtue of eschewing slogans about implacable death struggles between East and West or clichés about eternal friendship with current allies that obscure current or emerging differences, some of which may be profound, over political aims and strategies. Constructing a prosperous world safe from flawed alliances or alignments will not be easy—just necessary. Seeking only what is best, defined as ideological or conceptual purity, is the enemy of the good. What seems best, then, may not be good enough.

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Notes


10. For a more extensive discussion of these intra-Arab and interregional quarrels, see the separate articles on the security policies of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Syria in Kolodziej and Harkavy, Security Policies of Developing Countries, pp. 179-202, 227-82.


15. On the shipment of enriched uranium from the United States, consult the U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Tarapur, June 1980.


18. See the chapter on India by Carla Anne Robbins in Kolodziej and Harkavy, Security Policies of Developing Countries, pp. 73-90.


29. See successive issues of Le Monde, January 1-14, 1981.


31. This analysis is not meant to slight the British contribution to the settlement but to emphasize the indispensable role of Chinese guns, the threat of Soviet and Cuban intervention, and the offices of the frontline states in producing a solution for independence and black rule through the ballot box and not by bullets. For a useful review, see Xan Smiley, “Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and the Rise of Robert Mugabe,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1980, pp. 1060-83.


35. Robbins, op. cit.


A FREE and independent Western Europe is unquestionably vital to the well-being of the United States. To be sure, the United States could survive the conquest of Western Europe by the Soviet Union. The price of survival, however, would be high. The Soviet Union would gain control of the world's largest industrial plant; U.S. trade with Europe would virtually cease; democratic institutions even in our own country probably would be forced to give way to those of a garrison state; and American culture would be denied a critical stimulus. In short, America's future is inseparable from Europe's future.

It is thus disturbing to encounter on Capitol Hill, for the first time in over a decade, serious talk of pulling U.S. troops out of Europe. A number of senators and congressmen, includ-
ing House Minority Leader John J. Rhodes and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Ted Stevens, have publicly discussed withdrawing some or all of the 337,000 American soldiers, sailors, and airmen now stationed in Europe.

Although some see withdrawals as a means of reducing defense spending (a dubious proposition unless forces returning to the United States are disbanded), the real foundation of interest in another Mansfield Amendment* is a mounting irritation with the political and military behavior of our NATO allies. It is argued that our allies are refusing to bear their fair share of the alliance's military burdens at a time when the United States is embarked on a major revival of its own military power; that our allies have allowed the lure of expanded economic intercourse with the Soviet bloc to color their political dealings with Moscow; and that our allies, confronting growing antinuclear and pacifist movements at home, are inexorably headed down the road to Finlandization.

Seemingly lost on those who would abruptly alter America's commitment to Europe's defense is that any discussion of issues related to burden-sharing within NATO must start with the recognition that no member of the alliance, including the United States, can come to any such discussion with clean hands. No member of the alliance has done enough for the common defense—although some have done more than others—and we, no less than our European allies, have much to answer for. Can it be that we are dismayed over our allies' refusal to follow our lead within the alliance when we ourselves have failed during the past half-decade to provide firm, constant leadership? Can we criticize our allies' investment in the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline while we continue to subsidize the most inefficient sector of the Soviet economy through massive grain sales to Moscow? Can we pressure our NATO partners to get tough on the new Polish regime while we do little more than burn candles in windows? Can we condemn the antinuclear movement in Europe while ignoring our own and while engaging in loose talk about limited nuclear war? Can we censure our allies' unwillingness to make the necessary social and economic sacrifices for the common defense while we continue to rely on an all-volunteer military that cannot perform adequately even in peacetime without the helping hand of massive unemployment?

There is no doubt that we have spent proportionately more on defense than other members of the alliance. Our defense expenditure per capita and as a percentage of gross national product is the highest in NATO; and the Reagan administration's Fiscal Year 1983 Five-Year Defense Plan calls for annual real increases in defense spending dwarfing those of our allies.

This trans-Atlantic disparity in defense expenditure is, however, attributable in no small measure to the fact that we are a superpower with global military obligations and that we bear—and willingly so—virtually the entire burden of strategic and theater nuclear deterrence. Most of our allies have no defense commitments outside the NATO treaty area, and only two possess nuclear forces of their own. In the case of Germany, the focus of most U.S. military forces deployed in Europe, we are dealing with an ally whose active-duty force levels are limited by treaty.

It can, moreover, be convincingly argued that many of our European allies get more for their money than we do. It is difficult to imagine a weapon design and procurement process more time-consuming, inefficient, and wasteful than our own, and in fact years ago Germany fielded main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, mobile air-defense guns, and multiple-rocket launchers that are qualitatively comparable or superior to those we are still working on. Even more significant is the dis-

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*In May 1971, the Mansfield Amendment (for Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana) proposing a 50 percent reduction in the U.S. combat troops in Europe, then numbering about 300,000, was defeated in the U.S. Senate by a vote of 61-36.
parity in manpower costs. Manpower costs gobble up about half the U.S. defense budget, constraining investment in research and development, procurement, and readiness. In contrast, our NATO allies, most of whom rely on conscription, spend proportionately less on recruiting and retaining personnel.

None of this is to suggest that our European military partners cannot and should not do more for the common defense. They can, they should, and they must. It is to point out, however, that we enjoy no moral or political high ground vis-à-vis our NATO allies with respect to burden-sharing. And it is for this reason that any congressional initiative designed to hold present U.S. force levels in Europe hostage to changes in allied political and military behavior should be resolutely resisted. Attempts to punish our allies for doing or not doing things that we ourselves are doing and not doing will fail to induce desired change. They will fail precisely because they stink of hypocrisy and because no allied government in the 1980s is going to submit to anything that smacks of an ultimatum from Washington.

Does this mean that the present size and character of the U.S. military presence in Europe cannot or should not be altered? Does this mean that we should forever maintain 337,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen in the European theater for fear of incurring the wrath of our allies? Does this mean that we should refrain from criticizing the behavior of allies in cases where their behavior merits criticism? Certainly not. It simply means that abrupt, punitive U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe risk the destruction of NATO itself. The only beneficiary of a new Mansfield Amendment would be the Soviet Union.

There are other genuinely compelling arguments for undertaking significant changes over time in the U.S. military presence in Europe, including a substantial reduction in the number of American ground troops now deployed in Germany. The first is that we face new demands on our military power outside Europe, demands that are expanding at a pace much faster than our ability to meet them. These new demands derive from our growing dependence on fossil fuels and other critical raw materials in increasingly unstable areas of the world where the United States does not, as in Europe, enjoy politically secure military access ashore and the help of militarily competent local allies and client states.

Present U.S. general purpose force levels were tolerable in an era in which we possessed pronounced nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union and regarded overt Warsaw Pact aggression in Europe as the principal threat to the security of the free world. Our nuclear superiority has vanished and with it the utility of NATO’s present heavy reliance on theater and strategic nuclear weapons as a means of deterring nonnuclear Soviet aggression. The strategy of flexible response, the essence of which is a willingness to resort to nuclear fire first in the event of conventional failure, has been irreparably subverted by the combination of strategic parity and emerging Soviet theater nuclear superiority. The incredibility of nuclear responses to conventional Soviet aggression has placed a premium on rebuilding Western conventional defenses.

Moreover, events in Southwest Asia during the past decade have conclusively demonstrated that vital Western security interests can be as readily compromised outside Europe as they can along the inter-German border. Belated recognition of this strategic reality led to the proclamation of the Carter Doctrine, which imposed new and exceedingly difficult obligations on U.S. forces already overtaxed by standing commitments in Europe and the Far East. The gap between resources and responsibilities is evident in the Rapid Deployment Force, which, although earmarked exclusively for contingencies in Southwest Asia, relies almost entirely on air, naval, and ground units that are simultaneously slated for Europe and the Far East. Unless we are prepared to undertake a massive expansion in our military power, we
will not be in a position to meet our military obligations in Europe, the Far East, and Southwest Asia.

In this regard, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger's announced long-term goal of being "able to meet the demands of a worldwide war, including concurrent reinforcement of Europe, deployment to Southwest Asia ... and support in other potential areas of conflict" is grossly at odds even with the increases in U.S. military power proposed in the FY 1983 Five-Year Defense Plan.

The Reagan administration's planned increases in U.S. naval and tactical air power are, to be sure, both welcome and long overdue. It is not at all clear, however, that the administration's ambitious strategy of horizontal escalation can be satisfied even by the creation of a 600-ship/15-carrier battle-group navy and the expansion of active and reserve land-based tactical air power from 36- to 44-wing equivalents. In any event, it is highly doubtful whether the all-volunteer force (AVF) could provide personnel sufficient in quantity and quality to man a 600-ship navy and expanded tactical air forces. The AVF is barely capable of manning the present force structure, and severe shortfalls in critical skills persist. The recent upsurge in recruiting and retention rates is attributable as much to high unemployment as it is to recent increases in pay and benefits. And the worst is yet to come, given the certain relative and absolute decline of the military-aged contingent within the American population well into the 1990s. Finally, it is questionable whether the administration's proposed force increases are fiscally feasible, especially against a backdrop of record-breaking federal deficits, mind-boggling Pentagon cost-overruns, and mounting political opposition to financing defense budget hikes at the expense of domestic economic and social welfare programs.

In short, barring a return to conscription and a comprehensive restructuring of the American economy for the purposes of war, U.S. force planners will be compelled to rely on forces unable to meet the demands of a worldwide war, including concurrent reinforcement of Europe and deployment to Southwest Asia. The strategic risk inherent in reliance on forces allocated to both Gulf and non-Gulf contingencies would be especially profound in circumstances involving a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. By virtue of interior lines of communication, larger forces, and greater proximity to both Europe and the Gulf, the Soviet Union could feint in one area, thus diverting rapidly deployable U.S. forces from the real focus of attack. Whatever the wisdom of a multiregion, worldwide war strategy, it cannot be had cheap, either economically or socially, especially against an adversary possessing a mass conscript army and willing to devote at least 13 percent of its gross national product to defense.

The abyss separating the administration's military ambitions and programs was publicly conceded by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred C. Ikle in February 1982. In a prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Ikle stated that

Even an increase in U.S. military investments as high as 14 percent per year [in real terms], continued throughout the decade, would not close the gap in accumulated military assets between the U.S. and the Soviet Union until the early 1990s. That is a bleak outlook, implying either a further deterioration in our security or a need for a defense increase considerably steeper than what the Administration now proposes.

Ikle's assessment was reinforced by Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer, who also testified before the Committee. In response to Senator Sam Nunn's expressed concern over the expanding gap between the administration's strategy and proposed force levels, General Meyer stated "We are accepting tremendous risks with the size of forces that we have to do what we have pledged to do."

An alternative to massive rearmament, of course, would be to restructure some of our pre-Afghanistan defense commitments with the aim of releasing military forces allocated to those commitments for Southwest Asian con-
tingencies. This brings us to the second argument for undertaking significant alterations in our military presence in Europe: most of our NATO allies, notably those with forces assigned to the defense of the Central Region, are capable of assuming far greater responsibility for that defense than they are now bearing. Indeed, Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands can—and ultimately should—assume full responsibility for the conventional forward ground defense of NATO Center. Full allied assumption of that task would release enormous American military resources: over one-half of the 337,000 U.S. military personnel deployed in the European area are ground troops dedicated to the forward conventional defense of Germany.

That our NATO Center allies possess the money and manpower to assume that responsibility is indisputable. Let us look at some comparative numbers. The United States currently devotes 5.9 percent of its gross national product to defense, a share slated to rise to more than 7.4 percent by the middle 1980s. In contrast is the 3.7, 3.4, and 3.3 percent allocated, respectively, by Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium, the three NATO members lying astride the North German Plain, long regarded as the main corridor of a potential Soviet invasion.

We also maintain more active-duty men under arms as percentage of national population than most of our NATO Center allies. America’s soldier/citizen ratio of 1:107 is considerably better, for example, than Germany’s 1:125, the Netherlands’ 1:138, and Great Britain’s 1:163. If only Germany, the Netherlands, and Great Britain were to match the U.S. soldier/citizen ratio, NATO would be endowed with more than 310,000 additional active-duty military personnel, a number far exceeding the strength of the U.S. Army in Europe. Such an increase in military manpower is certainly obtainable, given the demographic resources of Western Europe. NATO Europe’s substantial national reserve forces, if adequately equipped, could provide a substitute for active-duty U.S. forces withheld in the United States as reinforcements for Europe. Germany and the Low Countries alone maintain mobilizable ground force reserves totaling more than 1,000,000 men, a figure surpassing the active-duty end strength of the whole U.S. Army.

Let me be clear about what I am proposing for the United States and NATO and what I am not proposing. I am proposing:

- a restructuring of the U.S. commitment to Europe’s defense, not the termination of that commitment;
- withdrawals of selected U.S. forces from Europe conducted in small increments over a period of 15-20 years, not an abrupt pullout of all U.S. forces; and
- a program to be undertaken in full consultation with our European allies and a willingness to assist them in adjusting to that program, not a unilateral venture that would further compromise American leadership of the alliance.

Indeed, the United States should make every effort to encourage and assist its NATO partners in assuming full responsibility for Europe’s forward defense on the ground in a manner that would ensure smooth and timely substitution of European forces for withdrawing U.S. units.

What I am proposing, in effect, is the eventual application of the Nixon Doctrine to Europe, whereby our allies would assume full responsibility for their own defense on the ground amidst the continued presence of robust American naval, air, and, of course, theater nuclear forces. Indeed, it can be persuasively argued that the Nixon Doctrine is far more applicable to Europe today than it ever was in Southeast Asia. Unlike our clients in Southeast Asia, our European allies possess both the political stability and the economic and military resources to defend themselves on the ground. That it is in their long-term interest to assume that responsibility—thereby permitting the United States to mount a credible defense of
Western interests outside Europe—ought to be self-evident in their utter dependence on Persian Gulf oil.

The retention in Europe of existing U.S. naval, tactical air, and theater nuclear forces, to which over 150,000 personnel are assigned, would make it impossible for the Soviet Union to avoid early and heavy combat with Americans in the event of war, especially since the preemptive destruction of NATO air bases and nuclear storage sites is accorded the highest priority by Soviet force planners. Thus the claim that a withdrawal of U.S. ground forces is tantamount to an abdication of the U.S. commitment to Europe’s defense would be valid only on acceptance of the preposterous assumption that an American president would simply walk away from a situation in which tens of thousands of U.S. military men and their dependents were being killed or wounded.

In sum, the United States would abandon neither its membership in NATO nor its commitment to Europe’s defense. Only the character of that commitment would be altered. If attended by adequate compensatory allied measures, withdrawal of U.S. ground forces could stimulate a more effective division of labor within NATO. America’s comparative military advantage has always resided in naval and air power, and the qualitative superiority of U.S. warships and combat aircraft remains unchallenged within the alliance. In contrast, the continental military traditions of Germany are still reflected in the Bundeswehr’s primary focus on the land battle. The quality of the German Army and its weapons remains second to none in Western Europe; and it is worth remembering that throughout World War II, even after Anglo-American forces achieved virtually absolute supremacy in the air, German ground forces continued to inflict significantly larger casualties upon allied armies than they themselves sustained.

A division of military labor along the lines already suggested, which ought to be welcomed by those allied political leaders who have expressed serious reservations about the quality of the U.S. all-volunteer army, could encompass U.S. procurement of European ground force weapons and equipment in exchange for European acquisition of U.S. tactical aircraft.

The profound changes that have taken place during the past fifteen years in the global military environment demand profound changes in the structure and distribution of Western military power. As leader of the free world, the United States cannot escape the necessity for fundamental changes in its own military posture, nor can it avoid responsibility for leading its allies and friends in new military directions.

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
FOR almost a third of a century the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Japan have stood as the mainstays of the United States defense system beyond our borders. If these security organizations are to retain their solidarity, however, it will be only on the basis of a mutual coordination of military, political, economic, and technological interests. But now a divergence of these interests threatens this solidarity. Some observers see NATO as a disintegrating alliance. In 1980, our Atlantic connections were assessed in these ominous terms: "The gradual secession of Europe from the U.S.-dominated Atlantic Alliance is
under way.”1 Subsequent events seem to confirm this assessment.

Elsewhere, analysts see a loosening of American-Japanese ties as Tokyo loses confidence in U.S. security guarantees.2 This may be an overstated reading, but the uneasiness is there. So, it may not be entirely unthinkable that our transoceanic links could gradually erode. This possibility—the falling off in the number of our overseas allies—is a contingency that U.S. security planners might well be taking into their calculations. To ignore it is to invite disaster. To offset it may necessitate a sweeping geopolitical realignment.

As a first rule, U.S. security rests upon a satisfactory balance of power with any potential adversary. As NATO and our Far Eastern connections have demonstrated, this balance is more effectively maintained with allies than without. Does this mean, then, that they must be these allies or none? Should our Old World alliances continue to show signs of unraveling, we would be faced with two alternatives: either a ruinous withdrawal behind the borders of our 50 states or the building of a multinational structure of power here in the New World.

Basic to the widening rift dividing the United States from its overseas allies is a move on their part to chart a more independent course. This drift toward separatism is motivated by a relative decline in U.S. economic and political strength, as opposed to that of Western Europe and Japan.3 As a result, our allies not only are more reluctant to rely on American power but also are more inclined to demand a greater share in shaping alliance policies.4

With this new leverage, they are advocating the preservation of détente with the Soviet Union. They support détente largely because of their unwillingness to sacrifice their considerable trade with the Soviet bloc.5 Europeans and Japanese are concerned also with assured access to Middle East oil, which is far more vital to them than it is to America. This accounted for their giving only limited support to the United States at the time of the hostage crisis in Iran. They contend, moreover, that following the U.S. lead in opposing a Palestinian state would jeopardize their oil supplies by alienating the Islamic nations.6

Another bone of contention within the alliance is the reluctance of our European and Japanese partners to support U.S. military initiatives in the Persian Gulf. Our NATO allies are opposed to any collective defense effort beyond the Europe-North Atlantic area.7 And Japan is loath to develop military power on a scale necessary to project power any distance away from their home islands.8

Because of these apparent cracks in the Western alliance, our European and Asian partners are reassessing their national interests and redefining their roles. In July 1980, French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt concluded a summit conference by agreeing that Western Europe must play a more independent and assertive role in world affairs.9 The two leaders also agreed that their region must become an effective counterweight to the rising power of the Soviet Union.10

Both men apparently were aware that European NATO has the basic resources, both material and human, to counterbalance Russia. It is an area with a larger population, greater industrial production, and higher technical know-how than the U.S.S.R. Ray S. Cline points out that Western Europe potentially could become “the most powerful regional center in the world if its resources were successfully mobilized for a common political purpose.”11

The combined gross national product of all European members of NATO is more than twice that of the Soviet Union,12 and their greater economic and manpower resources imply that the means are available for building a strong military force as well. European NATO could provide much more for its own defense than it is currently doing. Although four countries there have per capita incomes exceeding
that of the United States, and two others approach ours, their per capita spending on defense falls far short of ours.\textsuperscript{13}

Even so, European NATO has more troops in Europe than does the Soviet Union,\textsuperscript{14} and any Russian tank superiority may be offset by new antitank weapons.\textsuperscript{15} As for the Warsaw Pact, many analysts discount the Eastern European divisions, arguing that they might be more of a liability than an asset to the Soviet Union.

Also, there is the matter of theater nuclear balance. We hear a great deal about the Soviet SS-20 nuclear missiles and Backfire bombers but little about the British and French deterrents, which are of considerable magnitude. Altogether, these total more than 200 nuclear weapons targeted on European Russia.\textsuperscript{16}

Plans are under way in both Britain and France to expand and upgrade their nuclear firepower. Britain plans to launch four or five new nuclear-powered submarines armed with nearly 100 U.S.-made Trident missiles. Each of these will have a range of 4000 miles and carry eight to ten warheads. These missiles, although British controlled, will be assigned to NATO.

For its part, France is expanding its missile-launching submarine force as well as increasing the range and power of its land-based nuclear missiles.\textsuperscript{17} So, given the will, the Europeanization of NATO is not a totally unreal prospect.

The same pressures that are moving Western Europe in the direction of greater autonomy also are at work in the Far East. There, increasing evidence of a revived nationalism, especially among younger people, appears to be swinging Japan toward greater self-reliance.\textsuperscript{18}

This trend is fed by fears that the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, like that with Taiwan, may be terminated.\textsuperscript{19} The Japanese also are edgy about the prospect of an American military withdrawal from South Korea. These fears, coupled with others focusing on Soviet behavior and the decline in U.S. credibility, already are producing a shift in Japanese policy. Pressure is building to strengthen their armed forces,\textsuperscript{20} and should Tokyo decide to allocate greater resources to a rearmament program, it could develop a military capability far superior to the current modest force.

Raising the present defense budget, which accounts for less than one percent of Japan's gross national product, would be no great problem for that country's powerful economy.\textsuperscript{21} Japan has the capability of becoming a modern military power—even a nuclear power—in a very short time.\textsuperscript{22}

A Japanese arms buildup would be aimed at one target: the Soviet Union. In successive public opinion polls, the U.S.S.R. repeatedly ranks highest as the nation offering the most serious threat to Japan.\textsuperscript{23} A Japanese move from economic strength to military strength and political assertiveness could lead to a fundamental shift in the Eurasian balance of power. Given the political will, European NATO in functional alliance with a rearmed Japan could be an effective counterweight to the Soviet Union.

Western Europe and Japan have a combined gross national product more than twice that of the entire Soviet bloc.\textsuperscript{24} Add the People's Republic of China to this combination and the U.S.S.R. would be substantially outmatched in economic power, manpower, and possibly in conventional military effectiveness as well. Thus the correlation of forces—components incorporating economic and political elements in addition to military factors—would give impressive strength to a potential anti-Soviet coalition.

Quite apart from the previous scenario is another that tends to divide the United States further from its overseas allies. Due to the course of economic evolution in the world, the international economy is becoming fragmented along regional lines,\textsuperscript{25} as individual nations form geographically based common markets. Here the aim is to exploit the economic advantages that larger territorial units can offer.

The nine-nation European Economic Community (Common Market), closely tied to 19
African states, is the best known of these units. Another, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), includes the Soviet bloc. In the Far East some Japanese are thinking of coordinating their economies with China’s and forming a bloc of their own.

If the international economy is drifting apart along regional lines, is it not possible for the nations of the Western Hemisphere to form a bloc of their own? A hemispheric common market might go far toward solving the economic and political woes now besetting the United States and its neighbors.

Another advantage to be gained from regional economic integration is the strengthening of the member states’ defensive positions. If a nation cannot produce within its own borders the commodities essential to its survival, it must seek guaranteed access to outside sources of supply. For the United States, these commodities, mostly raw materials, can be found close at hand. Canada, right next door, ranks only behind the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the production of minerals. Mexico, in our territorial backyard, may command oil reserves equal to that of Saudi Arabia. Beyond Mexico, Central and South America and the West Indies contain nearly all the commodities essential to our economy.

North and South America share a richer collection of raw materials and industrial equipment than is available in any area of comparable size elsewhere in the world. This command of material assets provides the Western Hemisphere with a sound base for unmatched economic, political, and, perhaps, military power. Given the necessary internal cohesion, the New World has the potential for transforming the geopolitical configuration of the globe.

Yet some geopolitical alarmists are prone to minimize New World capabilities by referring to Sir Halford John Mackinder’s Heartland theory of 1904. His contention was:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:

Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:

Who rules the World-Island commands the World.

Although Mackinder’s later work is seldom cited, in it he noted that North America contains a heartland as significant as that in Eurasia. General Karl Hausofer, former head of Germany’s Institute for Geopolitics, also disputed the World-Island theory. He contended that even a united World-Island (Afro-Eurasia) could no more than balance a Pan America.

Yet another point of view is expressed by some writers who maintain that Afro-Eurasia, because of its greater area and population, holds a preponderance of global power. If we subtract the vast desert wastelands from the overall Afro-Eurasian landmass, however, we realize that its greater area yields no significant advantage. The same holds true for population; great numbers are no guarantee of strength. India offers evidence that population figures alone cannot be translated into comparable estimates of political, economic, or military power.

But the power potential of the two regions involves more than the total of their respective material resources, areas, and populations. The balance can be completely defined, as geopolitical analyst Nicholas Spykman has noted, only if the relative integration of the two areas is taken into account. Here, the New World holds a significant lead.

Unlike Afro-Eurasia, the Americas have produced effective and durable instruments for international cooperation and mutual security: instruments such as the Pan American Union, the Organization of American States, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Moreover, cultural unity as well as the relative absence of territorial disputes and national and religious rivalries serves to simplify our regional problems—factors that prompted Pope John Paul II to call the Western Hemisphere “the continent of hope.”
The concept of hemispheric unity is unique in having a long and honorable tradition. Early leaders such as Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and Simón Bolívar recognized that the peoples of the New World were tied together by a common geography. Jefferson wrote that “America North and South has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe and peculiarly her own.” Hamilton, in turn, advocated a strict and indissoluble hemispheric union. Latin American leaders other than Bolívar expressed similar opinions. The late Carlos Davila of Chile, who participated in formulating the United Nations Charter, endorsed a New World “economically, politically, and militarily integrated, self-sufficient, self-protected from pole to pole.”

That more recent United States presidents have also favored the concept of hemispheric unity is demonstrated by Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy and John Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.

The threat of world shortages, particularly those in mineral fuels, suggests that we turn the spotlight on what might provide the New World with a decisive weapon. The Arab’s use of oil as an instrument of influence demonstrated that any bloc controlling a major share of an essential commodity commands a potent weapon. Yet no matter how we rate oil in the scale of importance, it scarcely ranks with food. Although the Middle East controls a major share of the world’s current oil exports, the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina together are responsible for an even greater share of the world’s food grain exports. In contrast, the subsistence of many Afro-Eurasian states—especially those of the Soviet bloc and China—depends in large part on their ability to obtain necessary food from outside sources. This dependence, in turn, makes them vulnerable to New World leverage. In order to implement this leverage, a Pan American commission to set and administer food policy might be established. A move in this direction was initiated by former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Robert Bergland when he proposed a joint U.S.-Canada wheat board to regulate grain exports and prices.

The New World’s economic assets are matched by its geostrategic assets. Our hemisphere is a huge geographic entity, a 16-million-square-mile island. Surrounded by water, its lines of defense are natural ones, which can be maintained by sea and air power when backed by an adequate nuclear deterrent.

Any attempt at overseas invasion must cross the broad moats of the Atlantic or the Pacific. No such force could succeed without command of the sea lanes and the air above them. In support of this thesis, Admiral James Hoolway, former Chief of Naval Operations, has pointed out: “Technology has not changed the basic fact that it is more difficult for a hostile nation to cross the water than to cross a land barrier.” Already we have seen the obstructive effectiveness of a narrow ditch, such as the Suez Canal. Distance is a factor that has not yet been conquered. History seems to have demonstrated that the effectiveness of conventional power is in inverse ratio to the distance from its source.

In his 1975 Defense Department report, former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger pointed out: “We can retreat to the North American continent, and we can perhaps survive there indefinitely.” If this is an accurate assessment, it leads to the conclusion that we can move to a hemispheric position and with some assurance survive there indefinitely.

In this hemisphere there is already an established alliance system in which U.S. military ties with most of the other nations predate those with NATO and Japan. With the signing of the Rio Treaty of Inter-American Defense in 1947, the United States concluded its first peacetime military alliance. By the terms of this treaty, the entire Western Hemisphere, including Canada and Greenland, was placed within a single collective security zone.

The following year, this alliance was formalized by the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS), which now includes
the 28 New World nations to our south. Our ties with Canada are even closer, closer than with any other country, for we are bound together not only by our NATO connections but by others involving the North American Aerospace Defense Command. So, within the framework of mutual security arrangements, the United States is allied with every major nation in our hemisphere, except Cuba.

Although the OAS, unlike NATO, does not involve an integrated military command, this does not imply that one could not be developed. Should circumstances dictate that the United States withdraw from its transoceanic positions, Washington would have almost no other alternative than to sponsor a similar security arrangement in the Americas. If the present direction and support now given our European and Far Eastern allies were to be redirected to the existing inter-American security system, a NATO-type command might be feasible here in the New World.

It has been assumed here that an anti-Soviet combination of European NATO, Japan, and China could maintain the Eurasian balance of power. This may be too optimistic an assumption. There is always the possibility of some of these countries seeking an accommodation with the Russians or of Eurocommunists attaining power in Italy or France. Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility of a rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union; a Sino-Soviet accord modeled on that which prevailed before 1960 would deal a shattering blow to the world power equilibrium.

Any of these eventualities would leave the United States with no other recourse than to go with the hemispheric option. Assuming that a hemispheric design becomes necessary, how do we go about implementing it?

The first step must be to heal the break that we have permitted to develop between us and our neighbors to the north and south. U.S. preoccupation with global strategy and superpower détente has gone hand in hand with a corresponding negligence of hemispheric affairs.

Our foreign aid program offers evidence of our benign neglect. Over one ten-year period, Communist Yugoslavia received more U.S. aid than did all Latin America. In fiscal year 1977-78 the Carter administration requested more than six times as much military aid for tiny Israel as it did for all Latin America.

Today's crises in Central America and the West Indies may be a result of these years of neglect. While we have been focusing on Indochina, the Middle East, and elsewhere, we have permitted a dangerous situation to develop at our very doorstep. Unless checked, the violence there could spread, endangering the strategically vital Panama Canal as well as critical oil supplies in Mexico and Venezuela.

Although American support for Britain during the Falklands conflict may have further strained U.S.-Latin American relations, a number of Latin American and Western diplomats interviewed concluded that most U.S. alliances in the area remain intact. Geography has ordained that we share this insular landmass with our fellow Americans, north and south. These peoples stand in a special relationship to us—economically, geographically, strategically.

The Reagan team may be aware of this geopolitical assessment. During his presidential campaign, Reagan was a strong advocate of a North American common market. And Richard V. Allen, the President's former National Security Adviser, went even further, saying: "Specifically, we must put much stronger emphasis on the Western Hemisphere—Canada and Latin America."

If Napoleon's dictum is accurate, that "the policies of all the powers are inherent in their geography," then in this uncertain era, given an adverse turn of events, the hemispheric option might become the one best geared to America's future. It would reduce the number and range of our dependencies. It would secure the land and sea routes to vital raw materials. And so long as we retain sufficient conventional
and nuclear firepower, it could provide an impregnable, defensive position—one capable of withstanding threats from any conceivable transoceanic combination.

“Power belongs to those who can anticipate the future.”

Corvallis, Oregon

Notes
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 22.
6. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
10. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 124.
32. Ibid., p. 42.
35. Spykman, p. 365.
36. Ibid.
AIR BASE SURVIVABILITY IN EUROPE
Can USAFE survive and fight?

MAJOR STEPHEN C. HALL

HOW far is 150 miles? One hundred fifty miles is roughly the distance between Atlanta, Georgia, and Birmingham, Alabama. One hundred fifty miles, as the crow flies, is all that separates New York City and Baltimore, Maryland, and, as the Flogger flies, it is all that separates USAFE air bases from Warsaw Pact countries.

United States Air Force in Europe (USAFE) aircraft charged with supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are pooled at selected bases in Western Europe. Can these air bases survive a conventional or chemical air attack by Warsaw Pact forces and still execute their assigned missions? This is a disturbing question for planners in European operations, since U.S. air bases have not been subjected to enemy attack for more than 35 years. Does the U.S. Air Force take safe and secure air base sanctuaries for
Has the Air Force concentrated these many years on increasing aircraft capability while ignoring air base survivability? Can USAFE really survive and fight?

USAFE aircraft in place and in reserve comprise a significant portion of NATO’s total air power, and these aircraft are tasked with performing some of the organization’s most difficult missions. The F-111 is the only aircraft that can evade complex defenses, penetrate deep within enemy territory, and accurately deliver conventional ordnance in darkness or inclement weather. The F-15 possesses exceptional beyond-visual-range air-to-air capability and thus carries a major share of NATO’s air defense burden. The A-10 is a key resource for countering the armor advantage of the Warsaw Pact. The venerable F-4 Phantom in the reconnaissance mode provides NATO with its only true capability for reconnaissance at night and in adverse weather. The fighter version of the F-4 and the new F-16 possess both sophisticated air-to-air missile systems and extremely accurate bombing capabilities.

To employ these aircraft effectively against numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces, USAFE must generate many sorties in a short time span. Although specific sortie rates for various aircraft and missions are classified, one need not be a tactical scholar to understand that many sorties per available aircraft must be flown to neutralize a three-to-one enemy advantage in both armor and attacking aircraft. USAFE’s challenge will be to launch the fleet with little or no warning, recover hundreds of returning aircraft, “turn” the fleet (reservice, repair, reload, and relaunch) several times each day, and sustain these surge operations for days. This is a tall order, an order that many believe USAFE may not be able to fill.

### Sortie Generation and Conventional Attack

Literally hundreds of tasks must be performed during surge sortie generation, and examination of each element would require volumes. This article addresses only the most critical elements needed to launch and recover, turn, and sustain high sortie rates during combat operations by tactical aircraft. How will a conventional attack affect these three key elements?

The Achilles’ heel of launch and recovery is the vulnerability of runways and taxiways. An enemy can neutralize an air base without attacking individual aircraft: destruction of runway and taxiway strips will restrict aircraft to the ground for subsequent destruction. This comes as no surprise to Warsaw Pact planners, who consider runway destruction a high-priority task. USAFE air bases are especially vulnerable to such attacks because U.S. aircraft, except for the A-10, do not have “off road” capability. A British Jaguar or a Russian MiG-21 can taxi off a damaged concrete runway onto a stabilized soil strip, but heavy-weight F-111s, F-4s, F-15s, and F-16s are limited to operations on paved areas.

Operations restricted to paved strips present two corollary problems. First, construction of alternate or contingency strips to improve the overall survivability of runways is an inherently expensive proposition. Warsaw Pact bases rely on low-cost strips built of compressed soil for alternate launch and recovery surfaces, but USAFE does not enjoy this luxury. Second, repair of hardened surfaces is a complicated and slow process; thus, an entire squadron of aircraft could possibly be neutralized for several hours because of bomb craters at one or two key chokepoints. This prospect is both probable and unacceptable.

Even if one assumes that launch and recovery surfaces can survive a conventional attack, what about the second key element for sortie generation, aircraft turnaround? Returning aircraft must be fueled, repaired, and loaded in minimum time to support subsequent launches. Similarly, aircrews must debrief and plan their next mission.

Aircraft refueling is a particularly dangerous task. Present USAFE procedures require move-
ment of fuel by trucks from storage tanks to individual aircraft housed in protective shelters. Though relatively safe while awaiting dispatch from their concrete garages, the trucks are completely unprotected at the storage tanks and during transit to and from aircraft shelters. An alternate method is to use fuel hydrants located on the parking ramp, but this technique completely exposes aircraft during the time required for refueling. Loading aircraft with munitions poses similar problems because munitions must be assembled at distant storage sites and transported to the flight line via vulnerable convoys. Finally, aircrews are exposed to enemy attack between missions as they transit to and from squadron facilities for mission planning. Obviously, aircraft turnaround during surge sortie generation is an extremely complex sequence requiring timely performance of a series of complicated tasks. Many of the most essential functions are extremely vulnerable to attack and thus endanger the entire process.

* A-10s with their GAU-8A 30mm guns will help negate the armor advantage of the Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, but to be useful, A-10s must survive initial Soviet air attacks.
RF-4s (left), veterans of reconnaissance missions in Southeast Asia, provide the only night and adverse reconnaissance capability for NATO. In addition to USAF RF-4Cs, the Luftwaffe possesses 60 RF-4Es. . . . The F-111 (below) is the only USAF fighter-bomber able to fly through adverse weather or dark to strike targets deep inside the Warsaw Pact countries.
Arriving in Europe in substantial numbers, F-15s (above) and F-16s (left) give a qualitative edge in air superiority to NATO. Nevertheless, our pilots must shoot down MiG 21s, 23s, and 27s at the rate of 2 or 3 to 1 in order to achieve air superiority over the battle area.

If one assumes for the sake of discussion that USAFE can launch, recover, and turn aircraft with sufficient survivability and speed to meet required sortie rates, can it sustain this level of operations for weeks or even months? The survivability of munitions, spares, and people—three critical sortie sustainers—poses special problems. Individual loads of munitions are vulnerable to attack during aircraft turnaround, but more serious is the vulnerability of munitions stockpiles both on and off base. Limited
real estate on base forces USAFE to concentrate large quantities of munitions in a few centrally located but highly vulnerable storage depots off base. This situation is little better on base because munitions are stocked in high density, easily identifiable storage areas. Much the same conditions apply to aircraft spares. Avionics black boxes, spare engines, and other scarce, expensive parts are often centrally stored in vulnerable supply warehouses. One well-placed bomb, or one lucky “bad” bomb, could totally eliminate every spare radar set, landing gear, and generator on base. Furthermore, aircraft crew chiefs, weapons loaders, and maintenance specialists are housed during sortie generation near the highly targeted flight line in structures no more protective than one’s home. Many of these people will become casualties of direct targeting or collateral damage.

Countless peacetime exercises have shown that operations requiring sustained high sortie rates are difficult under the best of circumstances. Hundreds of complicated tasks must be properly orchestrated to accomplish the mission. When a conventional weapons attack is introduced, an inherently demanding task becomes even harder; when chemical weapons are introduced into the scenario, a none-too-rosy picture becomes even darker.

**Sortie Generation and Chemical Warfare**

The term *force multiplier* in military jargon refers to some tactic or function that increases an existing capability many times over. Command and control, mobility, and a defender’s friendly terrain are often considered to be force multipliers. If these elements are, in fact, force multipliers, then chemical warfare (CW) must surely be a force divider. Chemical weapons introduce a qualitative difference into aircraft operations and can significantly degrade USAF’s capability. Although the United States

*The impact of a 107mm or 122mm rocket caused this hole in the runway at Khe Sanh in 1967. Unlike most Soviet and some NATO fighters, USAF fighters cannot use grass strips and must have intact runways on which to take off and land.*
Routine functions like refueling and loading munitions, arduous enough under normal conditions, will be more difficult for crews encumbered by gas masks and suits to protect against chemical, biological, and nerve agents. Distinguishes between conventional and chemical warfare, the Warsaw Pact nations make no such distinction. They regularly exercise with chemical weapons, and they have incorporated chemical operations into their order of battle. Any task that is simple to perform in a clean-air environment becomes extremely difficult in the presence of toxic chemicals. Protective suits, gloves, boots, and masks currently issued to Air Force personnel protect against liquid and gaseous agents but, at the same time, severely limit one's ability to perform essential tasks. For example, the protective suit acts as a thermos bottle that retains body heat generated during heavy exertion, decreases work efficiency, and requires frequent rest cycles for personal recovery. Tasks requiring tactile dexterity (stringing arming wire on bombs and adjusting electronic components) are very difficult to accomplish in the bulky rubber gloves. The rubber overboots are not only difficult to don; they tend to wear out quickly. Finally, the gas mask severely restricts rapid breathing during exertion. Performance of essential tasks in the protective ensemble will obviously be extremely difficult, and these problems are only the tip of the chemical warfare iceberg. The problems with the protective ensemble become even more significant when one realizes that, with today's state of the art, USAFE personnel will wear those suits for long periods. Since current technology for identifying chemical weapons is so rudimentary, a wing commander must assume that every attack includes toxic chemical agents. Thus, an unarmed enemy aircraft spewing harmless smoke over a USAFE base would automatically force that base into chemical defense and all the inherent degraded capability. Even if personnel can endure and operate in the suit for three or four hours, the basic functions of eating and using the bathroom force removal of the suit and exposure to toxic agents. And the list of problems goes on and on. Must all chemically contaminated aircraft be decontaminated before crew chiefs and weapons personnel reservice and reload? If so, how can aircraft be decontaminated fast enough to meet any realistic sortie rate? Can a radar set from a chemically contaminated aircraft be repaired in the shirtsleeve environment of the avionics shop? Can a chemically contaminated casualty be treated without endangering other patients, doctors, and nurses? If chemical contamination is limited to one portion of a base, how can transient vehicles be prevented from spreading the contamination? As always, the questions outnumber the answers.
Accomplishments in Survivability

The picture is not all gloomy, however, because much has been done to improve survivability against both the conventional and chemical threat, and more improvements have appeared on the horizon. Recognizing that peacetime procedures, facilities, and equipment are ill-suited for employment in a hostile combat environment, the Air Force and USAFE have embarked on a program to improve the survivability of U.S. air power in Europe. The European NATO nations are assisting in this effort with increased emphasis on funding for critical survivability items. Important accomplishments in conventional and CW survivability have been made in the three critical areas of launch and recovery, aircraft turnaround, and sortie sustainability.

The biggest pluses on the launch and recovery scenes are the advent of alternate contingency runways and taxiways and the development of streamlined procedures for base recovery. If USAFE is limited to operations on paved surfaces, the only sure method of improving runway and taxiway survivability is to pay the price and build alternate strips, and USAFE has built such strips at several bases. To repair runway damage after attack, a concept known as base recovery after attack (BRAAT) now combines all key agencies concerned with recovery under a single base director. In combat conditions, the base commander will direct fire fighting and personnel responsible for explosive ordnance disposal, civil engineers, security police, and other key players to ensure the fastest possible response.

USAFE has taken several innovative actions to improve the survivability of critical links in the turnaround sequence. To protect aircraft during refueling and reduce dependence on tank trucks, USAFE is developing a prototype underground fuel pipeline to connect aircraft shelters with the fuel storage tanks. To reduce exposure of trucks and aircraft to enemy attack, operating procedures now permit tank trucks to back into aircraft shelters during refueling. Munitions survivability has been improved with the development of in-shelter storage racks for air-to-air missiles. Missiles can be delivered to aircraft shelters during safe periods to avoid the possibility of attacks on weapons convoys in transit. The installation of small personnel cubicles in aircraft shelters for aircrew briefings and rest between sorties contributes directly to the survivability of aircrews. With proper support, aircrews need not transit to and from operations facilities.

USAFE has also improved the survivability of the spare munitions and critical supply items needed to sustain sortie generation. It has not only developed procedures for dispersing spare munitions and equipment but has also built protective facilities for spare avionics components and aircraft engines. These actions improve USAFE's chances of surviving a conventional attack and are important strides in enhancing total combat capability.

The major accomplishment in the chemical warfare arena is the realization that the chemical threat is here to stay and must be dealt with. Only five years ago, USAFE bases routinely practiced CW defense techniques for only a few hours during five-day training exercises; these token practices did little to instill a sense of imminent threat. Today, all bases generate sorties in a simulated chemical environment for six or more hours at a time. Individual bases test new ways to protect aircrews, decontaminate aircraft, and assemble munitions and fuel tanks, to mention only a few tasks. Furthermore, chemically protected facilities for squadron operations have been constructed at several USAFE bases, and other bases have been programmed for these facilities.

Finally, recent establishment of the Survivability Systems Management Office at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, represents the first Air Force effort to address survivability from one agency specifically designed for such a task. This office will deal with the problem of surviving and fighting worldwide, analyze the
many competing needs of all survivability players, and develop solutions that will enhance combat capability in the near term. Problems as varied as aircrew vision in a gas mask, explosive ordnance reconnaissance, and rapid runway repair are only a few of the areas that will be addressed by the systems management office.6

**Air Base Survivability: The Balance**

What is the final verdict in the case for and against the survivability of European air bases? Can USAFE survive a conventional or chemical attack by the Warsaw Pact and still perform its mission? Is the tremendous U.S. investment in aircraft, facilities, equipment, and people survivable enough for the task at hand? Regrettably, the answer is “maybe” at best and “absolutely not” at worst.

Despite efforts to develop alternate runways and improve capabilities for runway repair, much remains to be done. Severely cratered runways will still require extensive repair, and, with existing capabilities, the repair job will take many hours or perhaps days. Just when high sortie rates will be critical, the time required for repairing runways and taxiways may severely curtail sortie generation. Realistic remedies are not expected in the immediate future.

Survivability of the turnaround operation is only slightly more encouraging. Efforts in developing a complete capability for in-shelter turnaround will certainly go far toward protecting essential fuel, munitions, and aircrews, but because of funding constraints, these efforts may not be fully implemented for years, if at all. Without this capability, fuel, munitions, and aircrews will still be unacceptably vulnerable.

The survivability of logistics spares to sustain sortie production is no better. Although a few protected storage facilities are available, construction of such facilities is an expensive and slow process. Interim remedies, such as dispersal of critical spares, certainly improve survivability, but because of increased delivery times, dispersal also makes it more difficult to supply the flight line.

What would be the impact of chemical warfare on all of these actions? With periodic exercises, USAFE personnel have demonstrated that task efficiency and heat stress acclimation can increase, but the cumbersome protective clothing nevertheless decreases work performance. Personnel protection and the consequent degraded capability to perform critical tasks are only two of many persistent problems, however. Accurate and quick detection and identification of both liquid and gaseous agents remain as pacing issues. How can a base respond properly to a chemical attack when it cannot discriminate a real from a bogus threat, when it cannot quickly isolate the location and boundaries of the agent, and when it cannot speedily and accurately identify the agent? Hand in hand with detection is decontamination. Current decontamination procedures and equipment are antiquated, labor intensive, and use corrosive liquids. Decontamination of aircraft and ground support vehicles is a painfully slow process, limited by existing equipment and the absence of a well-developed decontamination plan. What, in fact, must be decontaminated? How should it be decontaminated? When should it be decontaminated? Who should be responsible? These are basically unanswered questions.

**What is the answer?** Significant progress must be made in three general areas.

First, equipment must be designed and procured, and realistic defensive procedures must be developed to enable field units to defend themselves properly. For too long, survivability has been a catch-as-catch-can proposition. Runways, vehicles, avionics components, and the like must be designed so that they will function not only in peacetime but also in war. Similarly, realistic defensive procedures must be developed and tested and then implemented...
by every operational unit. “We’ll worry about that when the balloon goes up” is simply not an adequate response to the issue. The tendency is to think that all survivability problems can be solved simply by pouring more concrete when, in fact, many survivability problems can be solved by ingenuity, planning, and practice.

Second, the Air Force must press hard for survivability funding, and this is easier said than done. Survivability is not glamorous. It is one thing to spend U.S. dollars for shiny new airplanes whose construction and operation will employ many American workers. It is quite another thing to spend money for a survivable telephone system developed by the Dutch, purchased by the Germans, and installed in U.S. aircraft shelters in Italy. Survivability enjoys no natural constituency and thus competes at a disadvantage for scarce dollars.

Finally, the Air Force must publicize the survivability problem. Survivability is similar to insurance: one tends to ignore it for fear of having to use it. The United States may ignore the problem, but the Soviets do not. They know USAFE weaknesses and can exploit them.

The issues raised in this article are not easily resolved. The stakes are high, the penalties great, and the margin for error slim. The actions needed to improve survivability are neither cheap nor easy. Nonetheless, the military community must attack these problems in earnest to guarantee the effective operation of U.S. air power in Europe. After all, the enemy is only 150 miles away, and 150 miles is simply not very far.

Air Command and Staff College

Notes


coming . . .

in our November-December issue

• What Happens if Deterrence Fails?
• Clausewitz and U.S. Nuclear Policy
• Throw-Weight and Arms Control
• Leadership in Academia and the Military
READINESS AND PRODUCTIVITY: FRIENDS OR FOES

COLONEL JACK P. BUJALSKI

THE only reason for the existence for the Department of Defense is the security of the nation. Should defense leaders be concerned about issues of lesser magnitude, such as productivity? Indeed, are readiness and productivity even compatible, or do attempts to increase efficiency detract from and reduce readiness?

The following examples illustrate the positive effects of productivity.
• A Quality Circle at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, developed a better nickel plating procedure and reduced the parts reject rate from 50 percent to 3 percent.
• At Bitburg AB, Germany, an engine analyzer purchased under Fast Payback Capital Investment (FASCAP) paid for itself in less than eight months through reduced maintenance costs, with a two-year savings of $42,590.
• A civilian employee at McGuire AFB, New Jersey, received $6500 under the Suggestion Program for an idea to locally manufacture and install fiberglass components for the C-141, which resulted in almost $3 million in savings over the contractor price.
• A Job Enrichment intervention at Kelly AFB, Texas, reduced the J79 engine transition duct repair time from 19 days to 8 days.
• A Value Engineering proposal resulted in a C-141 modification to permit fuel to be pumped back to the tanker after inflight refueling practice, saving $16 million per year in fuel costs.

These examples illustrate a few of the programs available to all commanders and supervisors to help them and their people achieve increased readiness through better use of resources, a goal of every Air Force member. These and similar programs fall under the umbrella of the Air Force Productivity Program and provide a menu from which Air Force people can choose to develop and implement ideas. This is a decentralized approach, with full responsibility for productivity remaining with managers, supervisors, and commanders at all levels. The productivity office serves as a focal point, not as a control. The techniques and programs that promote enhancement are categorized as capital investment, methods improvement, and motivation and quality of work life.

**Productivity Improvement**

The Air Force approach to productivity is to develop a long-term program at the grass-roots level, capitalizing on the ingenuity and abilities of people. Consequently, the Air Force Productivity Program emphasis is on enhancement, complementing previously existing programs with new programs in order to provide a full spectrum of productivity techniques from which Air Force people can choose to develop and implement ideas. This is a decentralized approach, with full responsibility for productivity remaining with managers, supervisors, and commanders at all levels. The productivity office serves as a focal point, not as a control. The techniques and programs that promote enhancement are categorized as capital investment, methods improvement, and motivation and quality of work life.

**capital investment**

The Air Force has five capital investment programs designed to provide funds for improvements that will increase productivity. (The motivational aspect of these programs is great, with fringe improvements to productivity that may exceed the direct, reportable payback.) FASCAP provides funds for off-the-shelf purchase of equipment. Cost of the equipment must be less than $100,000, and savings must be generated that will pay off all costs within two years. Project approval lies with the Air Force, permitting rapid turnaround, with a goal to provide funds within 60 days of the request. Aimed at serving the needs at the lowest organizational levels, FASCAP has provided funds for equipment such as engine analyzers, ultrasound scanners, limb chippers, word processors, electronic mailing systems, and roof moisture meters. The sum of $4.3 million spent in one recent program year is projected to generate $30.9 million in savings over the life of the equipment.

The Productivity Investment Fund (PIF) takes up where FASCAP leaves off, with a $100,000 minimum project cost and payback within four years. Due to the dollar cost of these projects, final approval for each project rests with the Congress, thus requiring longer lead times for funding, normally about two years. Projects recently funded by Congress include a sheltered aircraft protection system, costing $8.0 million and saving $9.7 million in the first four years, and numerical controlled equip-
Productivity reliability, availability and maintainability (PRAM) is a program in the acquisition and logistics areas to identify and fund systems improvements that result in long-term saving during the operational lives of weapons and support systems. Examples include a B-52 automatic anti-icing system, improved cargo mobility bins, and an improved TTU-205 pressure test set. The track record for PRAM indicates that for every dollar invested, the Air Force is projected to reduce future costs by $5.

Value Engineering, which could also be classed under methods improvements, is a two-part program. Contractors are rewarded for improvements they make that result in savings in acquisition costs of items purchased under contract. The reward is a share of the savings. Ideas for improvement may also originate within the Air Force, in which case the Air Force keeps all of the savings. Total Value Engineering savings during one recent year exceeded $200,000,000, most of which resulted from Air Force proposals.

The energy conservation investment program (ECIP) provides funds for investment in energy-saving ideas that will pay for themselves within the expected lifetime of the system or facility. Needless to say, many pay off sooner. Project investments often involve construction or refurbishment of buildings to capitalize on the latest technology in solar, thermal, or wind-generated energy or in insulation techniques. In addition, the Air Force is investing in fuel-efficient engines and fuel-saving advisory systems to reduce our requirement for motor vehicle and aircraft fuels.

**methods improvement**

In the area of methods improvement, the Air Force has several programs that provide commanders the means to obtain expert assistance to improve their organizations. The Management Engineering Program, in existence for more than 20 years, develops manpower standards for Air Force jobs, ensuring equitable distribution of scarce resources. Furthermore, productivity savings are thus captured and applied to all similar work centers. Two-thirds of Air Force jobs are covered by standards, and the program has been cited by Congress on more than one occasion as an example for the rest of the federal government.

The Commercial Activities Program, under the provisions of the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, investigates cheaper ways to accomplish nonmilitary essential work loads. Performance work statements, the first step in the cost-comparison process, ensure that work centers are streamlined for maximum efficiency with removal of superfluous work loads. Regardless of the outcome of the cost comparison, whether the work remains in-house or goes contract, the streamlining remains in effect. In fiscal year 1980 the Air Force accrued nearly $200,000,000 in cost advantage through this program.

In addition to these two Air Force-directed programs, consultant services are available at base level to help commanders solve problems. These services are provided on a client-consultant relationship, with release of the results at the discretion of the client. Management advisory studies are provided by the base management engineering team, and these studies bring a manpower and organization perspective to bear on problems. A recent example involved combining motor vehicle administration and operations functions to improve and streamline work conditions. Another source of consultant services is the comptroller at each base through management assistance studies to find less costly methods. A study was recently completed that designed a regression model to predict unscheduled F/RF-4 engine changes as an aid to engine shop management. Finally, the Air Force Audit Agency will provide analytical services and assistance to management through the Commander’s Audit Program. Items of special interest to local unit commanders can
be evaluated by skilled auditors on a time-available basis. On an Air Force-wide basis, the Air Force Leadership and Management Development Center (LMDC) conducts organizational assessments of entire units at the request of the unit commander. They are able to pinpoint work centers where a productivity initiative would have the most benefit for the entire unit and then provide possible solutions for the commander's consideration.

**motivation and quality of work life**

In the area of motivation and quality of work life, the Air Force has numerous programs, many that have been in existence for years. Some of them are the suggestion program, job enrichment, awards and decorations, junior officer and enlisted advisory councils, and quality circles. Not all of these programs are geared toward producing direct, tangible results. However, they all contribute to improving the morale and motivation of Air Force personnel and, that means a direct contribution to the bottom line of getting the job done as effectively and efficiently as possible.

The true source of productivity improvement is people. This does not mean increased productivity by working harder. It means that the individual concerned is normally the one most familiar with the ins and outs of the job and, thus, the one most likely to have constructive ideas on ways to do the job better. It is the commander's task to provide an environment where ideas are encouraged. Unfortunately, leadership is more often than not the biggest impediment to productivity improvement. One reason for this is the American tendency to look to leadership for all solutions. Too many commanders and supervisors are afraid they will lose power, control, or prestige if they share problem-solving. This fear is groundless; sharing problem-solving does not mean sharing decision-making. The decision to select and implement a solution should always be the commander's. An effective leader maximizes the probability that the best solution is implemented by deliberately stimulating multiple proposals from which to pick. One important aspect of free and open communications between workers and leaders is the fair evaluation of all ideas, no matter how small or unlikely they appear. The ideas are there, in the workers' heads; it is leadership's challenge to tap and implement them. As an incentive to commanders, Air Force policy encourages reinvestment of savings at the lowest practical level, provided legitimate deferred requirements exist. If these savings are used against high-priority requirements, they may be kept indefinitely. If not, the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System will reallocate them within two or three years.

**Measurement**

One aspect of productivity that invariably causes concern is measurement. People fear the misuse of measurement data for such purposes as implementing cuts or for comparing units or people. Such use is not, and should not be, the purpose of productivity measurement. Commanders need to evaluate their programs periodically. Every commander already has indices by which programs are evaluated, whether they are "measurement" or simply "eyeball" gauges. Measurement allows the commander to evaluate objectively. A productivity measurement system can be built from these indices for any function if sufficient time and resources are allocated. The need for doing this must be a commander's decision, though, since the cost of developing a measurement system and of gathering data could exceed the benefits obtained, which leads us right back to the opening thesis.

The only reason for the existence of the Department of Defense is the security of the nation. The only productivity measure that matters is one that indicates how well we can ensure that security. However, short of the outcome of an actual war, such a measure does not
exist. Consequently, we are forced to depend on the measure of individual functions or subfunctions, but there is a hazard to this. To concentrate on indicators several levels removed from national security can lead to decisions that may very well improve a low-level productivity indication but at the expense of our overall ability to win where it counts, in war. Many examples can be given where economies can be gained by civilianization and/or contracting, but at the expense of having that capability at the time and place needed, any place in the world our national interests dictate. Productivity measures, then, must be used by commanders with care to avoid the negative impact of misuse and with care not to use them in isolation. Productivity trend analysis is just one consideration among many that commanders should take into account in the decision-making process. Otherwise, productivity could have an adverse impact on readiness, not because of any inherent drawback in the concept of productivity but simply because leadership could end up making some decisions for the wrong reasons.

The Air Force Productivity Program is founded on the belief that the Air Force has a plethora of good leaders. Our commanders are doing their best to meet mission requirements. However, leaders are individuals with individual approaches and techniques. Furthermore, different situations require variations in approach and technique. Rather than try to build a productivity mold into which leaders must fit, the Air Force provides a menu from which leaders can select programs, techniques, and approaches to fit their style and particular situation. The purpose is always the same: to get the right job done and to get the job done right. The United States does not have a bottomless pocketbook, and the Air Force budget is limited. We owe it to ourselves and to every other taxpayer to maximize the defense security obtained for every dollar spent.

How does productivity fit into the context of defense readiness? Many of the functions accomplished by Air Force units in peacetime are similar to what they would be doing in combat. Discovering and implementing improved ways of performing these peacetime functions will both enhance their effectiveness in wartime and free resources for use in improving readiness in other areas. Readiness and productivity are and must be friends.

Hq USAF

The Office of Air Force History is preparing a comprehensive history of air power in the United States, covering the 75-year period since the acquisition of the first military aircraft. The volume will be illustrated with photos from archival as well as private collections.

Anyone who wishes to share suitable materials with the Office of Air Force History for use in this publication is encouraged to contact:

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ISRAELI MILITARY STRATEGY UP TO THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL AMNON GURION
ISRAELI AIR FORCE

It was on 7 October 1973, the second day of the Yom Kippur War, when Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan said:

"We are in the most critical hour since the day we reestablished the new nation. The war is almost lost for us.

The day before at 1400 hours, the Egyptians and Syrians had staged surprise attacks on Israel's two main fronts, the Suez Canal in the south and the Golan Heights in the north. Israeli fortifications and the forces that manned them to protect the borders were no match for the invading forces and collapsed
under classic Soviet tactics. The initial assault relied heavily on artillery and air-delivered weapons, both forms of heavy firepower, followed by a rapid advance of massed armor.

Morale among Israeli pilots in the fighter squadrons that day was not much better than that of their leaders. In the morning of the preceding day, it was already known that war would break out that afternoon. The young pilots were eager to prove their skill in real combat. They had heard much about the achievements of the more experienced pilots during the previous wars. On the morning of 6 October, the chief topic of discussion: Who in the squadron is most likely to become the “ace” of the predicted war?

Bad news describing the situation along our own front lines penetrated the “warfog” and spread everywhere. Attempts early in the conflict to support the ground forces with elements of the Air Force seemed to us a desperate measure. The enemies’ various surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were to cause us many casualties, and we could not be optimally effective under these combat conditions. Actually, we had planned to support the ground battle at a later stage of the action, but not until we had already cleared the area of operation of hostile SAM sites. The Israeli Air Force Commander at that time, Major General Benjamin Peled, described it after the war:

Instead of carrying out air defense suppression operations in an ordinary manner, we rightly preferred to break them in the period between other things more important at that time.2

Thus, it was definitely clear that our fundamental strategic concepts developed as a direct result of the failure of the Six-Day War. The “Deterrence Strategy” and the “Static Defense Strategy” proved to be inadequate for the new politico-military situation facing Israel on the eve of the Yom Kippur War. As General Giulio Douhet wrote in 1921:

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.3

My examination here is of the evolution of these two incompatible strategic concepts that
led Israel to the brink of disaster in the Yom Kippur War, without engaging in a full discussion of the turning point that occurred later on, when the strategy was changed, and, as Douhet said, “Victory smiled” again for the Israeli leaders and the pilots as well. I will concentrate mainly on the Israeli Air Force’s part in the development of the military strategy process.

The Israeli War of Independence in 1948 did not provide Israel with strategic depth. The war was conducted in its primary stages in a predominantly defensive mode to break the enemy attacks without significant loss of Israeli territory. Logic would have dictated that this primary stage be followed by an offensive mode designed to destroy enemy forces and occupy additional territory for a subsequent political negotiation. Such was not the case, but this is hindsight. The war left Israel lacking in strategic depth and thus vulnerable to attack. Israeli leaders became progressively concerned in the 1950s that Arab forces might mount a preemptive strike. Such a strike could cut the ten-mile-wide nation into two parts before forces could deploy for defense. This assessment dictated a new philosophy that adopted the strategy of the offensive in the initial stages of conflict, relying on approval of the resulting borders among members of the international community. The offensive stage would have to be carried out by preemptive Israeli strike whenever an enemy showed any intention and willingness to attack. Defense would thus have a secondary nature under this new strategy. In addition, the purpose of such a preventive war would be to fight it on the enemy’s own territory rather than ours. In this period the international community could and would accept such a realistic scenario in which Israel would attack first. It is interesting to read the observation of Mohammed Hassan Haykal, the editor of Al Ahram (Cairo):

The limited depth of Israel does not allow the broad freedom of movement which a modern war demands. Moreover, the socio-economic structure of Israel, still at the development stage, cannot withstand the battle wounds or painful strikes on Israeli soil. The war must be a blitzkrieg. Israel’s potential in manpower, as well as her economic potential cannot withstand a protracted war.⁴

As a result of this strategy, a revolution in the structure of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) took place. The major change was an increase in the strength of the offensive elements in the force structure. Aircraft, armored units, and parachute troops were added, and the warning system—the intelligence agency—was strengthened. IDF commanders in those days accepted Montgomery’s adage that you must first win the battle of the air before starting a land engagement. Furthermore, they realized the significance of full domination of the air over enemy territory for close air support and interdiction missions as well.

The importance planners gave to the Israeli Air Force (IAF) caused a revision of its strategy. Top priority was given to air superiority, and a new doctrine was adopted. Actually, it was based on a very important part of General Douhet’s 1921 philosophy in which he emphasized the preemptive strike:

Everyone agrees that the characteristics of the air arm make it the one weapon which will go into action first, in fact perhaps even before war is formally declared. For this reason the air arm should always be ready to mobilize and to deploy.⁵

The paucity of resources at Israel’s disposal dictated that the backbone of the IAF must be multipurpose fighters, for such aircraft are capable of undertaking both air combat and bombing missions. This concept has been followed since that time in acquiring aircraft for the Israeli Air Force.

The Sinai Campaign in 1956 and especially the Six-Day War in 1967 proved that for national and military strategies, the IDF and IAF doctrines were fitted together to carry out the national objectives of those years. Unfortunately, we cannot say the same about the stra-
ategic evolution that took place in the period following the Six-Day War and leading up to the Yom Kippur War.

The expansion of the Israeli borders as the result of the 1967 war provided her for the first time with real strategic depth, particularly with regard to Egypt. This resulting depth caused decision-makers to conclude that a preemptive war for protecting the country was not necessary, at least against Egypt. In addition, the political climate in Israel at that time would not support a preemptive strike. The world community that had been accustomed to regarding Israel as the “brave little David” had come to see us as the “bad Goliath” who keeps neighbors’ occupied lands. The Israeli national objective in those days was to retain all the territories until the Arabs would agree to negotiate with us on a peace agreement.

Those conditions and objectives brought decision-makers to the conclusion to reverse the military strategy from offensive-defensive to defensive-offensive. According to the new strategy, defensive forces were to dig in on the front lines in order to break any enemy attack. The second stage would come later by reserve forces mobilized in order to carry out the counterattack. A new term crept into Israeli military jargon: *stiff static defense*, which was defined as protecting the borders from static positions on the front lines themselves, without giving up any territory to the enemy.

During the War of Attrition between 1969 and 1970, Israeli forces operated under this stiff defense strategy. The nature of the strategy itself obliged us to build shelters and fortifications along these lines so the territory could be protected without suffering too many casualties. Later, when the number of casualties had increased beyond what had been anticipated, the IAF was factored into the equation as airborne artillery, targeted against Egyptian artillery batteries, shelters, etc.

With full domination of the air, which could be maintained because of the weakness of the Egyptian pilots and Egyptian lack of sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, the IAF could support the ground forces very effectively. The appearance of various SAMs at the end of the War of Attrition added a new dimension to the air command campaign and changed the scenario entirely. Nevertheless, the basic idea remained the same as in 1921 when General Douhet wrote:

> The command of the air provides whoever possesses it with the advantages of protecting all his own land and sea territory from enemy aerial offensives and at the same time of subjecting the enemy's territory to his own offensive.6

Now a new term came into the IAF jargon: fighters versus missiles dogfight.

Since the SAM had to be attacked from the air, this negated IAF participation in the stiff static defense. In such a situation, the defense must necessarily rely on the ground troops and mobilization of reserve forces. Thus, our military strategy became inflexible and our ability to respond conditioned by others' actions. Lacking a more original alternative, Israel adopted the concept of deterrence. This entailed the acquisition of many aircraft and other offensive weapons integrated to form the elements of deterrence.

Thus, we felt strong, but did our efforts at deterrence really affect our enemies' perceptions? As we can see in Professor Henry Kissinger’s “deterrence formula,”

> Deterrence requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor. Deterrence is a product of these factors not a sum. If any part is zero, deterrence fails.7

Although we had a strong military force structure, we lacked the other necessary components of the formula: offensive objectives, a comfortable political situation, and the will to use the power. We know for certain that the Israeli deterrence concept was denied when we read...
Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat’s statement:

The Israeli enemy has opted, as we can see, for a policy based on intimidation, on claiming a superiority, which the Arabs could never hope to check. This is the Israeli security theory, which relies on psychological, political and military deterrence.8

On the eve of the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli deterrence concept was more an illusion than a reality. The stiff defense strategy was overly optimistic as well. It was based on perfect and fully credible intelligence and very rapid reserve mobilization. There were no viable contingencies to fall back on if any element in the strategy failed to function less than perfectly. Israeli military commanders were quite simply locked into this strategic mode that had worked reasonably well in the War of Attrition. Nevertheless, this stiff static defense strategy no longer fit the Israeli force structure, which under the deterrence concept was now structured primarily to operate in an offensive mode. This lack of congruence between the stiff static strategy and that of deterrence was bad enough. Add to this the enemies’ acquisition of various multiple sophisticated SAM systems and the situation for Israel had become potentially disastrous. As Major General Hayward S. Hansell so aptly said:

No greater or more dangerous mistake could be made than to assume that the same policies and practices that won one war will be sufficient to win the next one.9

These two mistakes in strategy placed Israel in its most difficult and dangerous hours since the reestablishment of the Jewish state. Recovery from this terrible situation could come only when we changed our strategy during the war to one that fit our force structure and potential for action.

As we have seen, the deterrence concept on the part of Israel in the period leading up to the Yom Kippur War was not quite realistic, essentially from a political point of view, and, therefore, failed. We can also conclude that the stiff defense strategy of positioning defensive forces on the front lines was no longer suitable to the Israeli force structure in light of the newer deterrence concept. This concept in itself was flawed because it lacked credibility in the eyes of those it was intended to deter. On the other hand, the stiff defense strategy was itself too complex, requiring the perfect functioning of each element: a timely, credible intelligence warning, a rapid mobilization of the reserves, and integration of air power in support of ground forces. This had to occur at a time when the air arm was facing a technologically advanced high-threat environment.

Retrospect shows that deployment of the Air Force in the stiff defense strategy was no longer a viable way to use this primarily offensive weapon. In the situation facing the air arm during the War of Attrition, prior to the appearance of the various multiple SAM batteries, the Air Force operated with relative efficiency. The appearance of this new counterair threat revealed the inefficiency of integrating the Air Force in the stiff defense strategy unless the SAMs are destroyed. More than this, assuming that the Air Force had successfully destroyed the SAMs, it still would not have been quite so effective if this action were not combined with the ground battle. In other words, it is worthwhile to grind your Air Force down against SAMs to gain air superiority only when it opens new opportunities for the ground battle. Our shifting from these fundamental principles in the beginning of the Yom Kippur War caused us to become confused and even bitter toward the decision-makers.

What should have been done? Probably three things would have helped:

- Increasing strategic flexibility by planning and training for some more alternate contingencies,
- Changing the stiff defense strategy along the border with Egypt to one of mobility in which ground forces could utilize the strategic
depth to wage an agile, maneuverable defense,
• Giving the Israeli Air Force sufficient time and ground support to accomplish the air superiority objective after the decision had been made about the ground offensive in the north against Syria.

Finally, the primary conclusion drawn from the Yom Kippur War is that the principles of air power employment remained as valid as at any time before, but the strategies and doctrines to carry them out should have been sufficiently flexible to contain a “bank of solutions” for the changing situations a modern war brings.

The future will certainly present more difficulties in the employment of air power, mainly a result of the enemy’s employment of mobile and highly maneuverable air defense missile systems. Only those ready to change strategies and doctrines during the ebb and flow of a fast-paced, intensely technological modern war will have any expectation of coming out as the winner.

Air War College

Notes
5. Douhet, p. 113.
6. Ibid., p. 82.

It is a common misperception that military personnel are accustomed to secrecy and to blind obedience: in fact, military men rarely receive orders without complete and frank explanations.

Shlomo Gazit, Major General (Ret), Israeli Army
Former Director of Military Intelligence for Israel (1974-79)
THE FOREST HAS TREES

Colonel George M. Hall, USA

The Battle of Britain was the first major attempt by one nation to subdue another by air power. It failed because Great Britain would not yield air superiority on any sustained basis. The courage of the tactical fighter pilots of the Royal Air Force in refusing to yield to the Luftwaffe is documented beyond dispute. Sir Winston Churchill’s famous tribute remains untarnished.

There is, however, another side to the history of this momentous battle. It does not detract from the courage of “the few to whom so many owed so much,” but it does explain why that courage was effective in defeating an opponent with vastly superior aerial horsepower.
Underwriting that incredible bravery and fortitude was a centralized control center working with a level of detail that might almost be considered painful. Under Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, a small number of personnel became absolute masters of the situation. Of necessity, every gallon of aviation fuel and every hour of flying time was rationed and allocated to effect an optimum defense against a determined enemy.

When the German onslaught was finally turned, there was not much left to fight with. Momentarily, Britain stood at the edge of her grave. But the legacy of courage intelligently directed was not to be denied. The historian F. W. Winterbotham has gone so far as to argue that the real credit for victory belongs to Dowding, though the effort nearly broke him.1

This admittedly extreme example provides an answer to one of the major issues confronting senior practitioners of the profession of arms. The issue asks how much attention should be paid to detail. Many senior officers have fallen short of expectations by becoming immersed in detail. Others have failed for the opposite reason—inattention to detail. One possible resolution of this issue suggests that a senior officer should concentrate on essential detail. Unfortunately, determining what is essential normally requires an immersion in a wider body of information as evidenced by the strain endured by Air Chief Marshal Dowding.

How much detail a senior officer should immerse himself in is a function of circumstance and purpose. The immersion is not an escape from more appropriate but risk-laden decisions. The purpose is to gain sufficient understanding in order to make difficult decisions with a maximum chance of making those decisions succeed of objectives in practice. The reason is simple though easily overlooked. Major or strategic decisions are carried out by thousands of subordinates—all of whom must deal with many problems and obstacles standing between themselves and the accomplishment of their slices of the mission, however thick or thin those slices may be. Altogether too many decisions made at high levels are based on delectable theories that are chewed up by the facts at lower levels.

General Matthew B. Ridgway understood this. He wrote of his experience in the Korean War:

Perhaps the chief advantage I derived from the isolation of my new command post was the opportunity provided for quiet hours of intense map study and uninterrupted concentration on tactical plans for the Eighth Army. It has long been my conviction that a conscientious commander must understand precisely what the circumstances are under which his command must operate, and particularly what obstacles or advantages the terrain offers. To that end I spent many hours before my relief map, supplemented by low-level flights over the disputed area, until I felt that I could find my way around the territory in the night. Every road, every cart track, every hill, every stream, every ridge in that area where we were fighting or which we hoped to control—they all became as familiar to me as the features of my own backyard. Thus, when I considered sending a unit out into a certain sector I knew if it involved infantrymen crawling up 2000-foot
ridges with their weapons, ammunition, and food on their backs or whether they could move heavy equipment in, could ford the streams, or could find roads where wheeled vehicles could advance.2

This same mastery of detail applied equally to concern for his troops. General Ridgway also wrote:

I had taken note myself that many of the troops were without gloves, their hands red and chapped, in the raw December wind, and I knew from personal experience how easy it is to leave a glove behind or to drop it to fire a weapon and then not see it again. In Europe it had been my practice to travel with an extra supply of gloves in my jeep to give to the men I came across who needed them. I now made an immediate effort to have gloves enough supplied to warm the fighting hands.3

Unfortunately, it is easy to carry this concern for detail too far. The senior commander can quickly become involved in the decision-making prerogatives of subordinates. This failing was not uncommon in Vietnam. Notwithstanding the occasional well-known major offensives, small unit operations were the order of the day. In the absence of massed divisional or brigade warfare, many high-ranking officers became involved in company-level actions.

To carry this argument further, Colonel Harry Summers, Jr., has amply proved how all levels of U.S. command fell into the micromanagement trap in Vietnam, hence failed to understand the strategic perspective under which military operations might have been successful in fulfillment of national purpose.4 The point is not to review his thesis here. It is to reiterate that the issue of attention to detail (and for what purpose) is indeed a serious one.

Perhaps the finest example of the way a senior commander should approach the problem of detail can be found in the accomplishments of Admiral Raymond Spruance. An almost unknown figure beyond the pages of naval history, he nevertheless directed or otherwise influenced the employment of more armed force than any other four-star in military history. Of particular interest is his conduct of the Battle of Midway (1942).

The Japanese had intended to decimate United States naval forces. To this end they applied the full weight of their Imperial Navy. Then, due to the sudden illness of Admiral William F. Halsey, U.S. command was thrust on Spruance. Admiral Spruance kept our forces dispersed and where the Japanese least expected them. He then allowed his opponent a good "first lick" at Midway Island. This move forced the Japanese to commit themselves, expose and fix their position, and then wait for the returning planes. At exactly the right moment, with the Japanese air armada helplessly anchored to decks rearming and refueling, Spruance struck the Japanese "center of gravity" and in the process turned the tide of war to United States initiative.5

This shift also afforded Spruance a tactical opportunity to inflict even more damage in pursuit of the retreating Japanese forces. He declined to do so. The same mastery of detail that enabled him to strike the Japanese at the decisive time and place with a superior force relative to the circumstances now told him that all advantages accrued to his opponent. He would not risk U.S. forces past the line of diminishing returns, a decision he would repeat after winning the battle of the Philippine Sea.

That is, Admiral Spruance’s mastery of the situation, balancing audacity with a commanding knowledge of the facts, extended to the hierarchical perspective of war. On the ocean battlefield, he inflicted maximum damage on his opponent with minimum losses to his own forces. In terms of the war effort, however, he realized that victory would come only with severe attrition of Japanese forces. The methodical strategist, he never attempted to win the war with one heroic battle or campaign.

Another admiral would later express the lesson to be learned in more explicit terms:
The man in charge must concern himself with details. If he does not consider them important, neither will his subordinates. Most managers would rather focus on lofty policy issue matters. But when details are ignored, the project fails. To maintain proper control one must have simple and direct means to find out what is going on. There are many ways of doing this; all involve drudgery.

This argument may be restated in more philosophical terms. Returning to the example of the Battle of Britain, we must note that much of the information made available to the operations center resulted from the breaking of the Ultra code. This secret was maintained long after the war. But at least one operative and executive of British Military Intelligence presaged the release of that secret in a novel. Ian Fleming, planting the thought in a homily delivered by agent James Bond’s archrival Spectre, wrote:

Fast and accurate communication lay, in a contracting world, at the very heart of power. Knowledge of the truth before the next man, in peace or war, lay behind every correct decision in history and was the source of all great reputations.

Not surprisingly, once the Ultra secret was made public, historians began a reassessment of World War II leadership accomplishments, precisely on the grounds of that insight. We must therefore again focus on the main argument. Senior commanders master detail in order to ensure that major decisions are capable of implementation at lower levels.

This is by no means an isolated viewpoint. Commentators and historians have often remarked that the best leaders also have been avid readers. They consumed knowledge as the staple of their psychical diet. Moreover, research performed by the Franklin Institute found that successful military commanders shared only one trait in common. That trait was the ability to survey massive amounts of information, analyze it, sort it in terms of both relationships and priorities, and then reform it into what we call intelligence for the purpose of disseminating it, or decisions based on it, to those who must act.

We only need ask then, should this trait be confined to senior levels of command, or is it appropriate at all levels? On this question, the thinking is not perfectly consistent. General Bruce C. Clarke, U.S. Army retired, once addressed a class at the Army Command and General Staff College:

A division commander is not basically a leader. He is a commander and I’m going to point out to you that you should adjust your thinking to a different point of view. I will talk to you briefly about what I call commandship and generalship which are quite different from being a leader. . . . You came here to learn commandship or generalship and that involves the proper organization and utilization of subordinate commanders and staffs to accomplish what you want done. . . . The technique is much different than the technique of getting in front of a platoon and saying, “Follow me,” which is leadership.

In contrast, we might consider the biography of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. His military prowess on the deserts of North Africa meant repeated tactical defeat for more than a few Allied forces’ commanders. Rommel always seemed to know more about our dispositions than we knew about his. (This despite the considerable advantages that Ultra gave us in predicting his logistic state and his dispositions.) He pressed this more complete knowledge to maximum advantage. He met his own defeat only at the hands of greatly superior numbers and persistent attrition warfare. At any rate Rommel was never faced with the same acute embarrassment experienced by a vigilante committee out West long ago, which singularly failed of reconnaissance. They had hung the wrong man. On discovery of this error the following morning, they were obligated to go before the widow and apologize: “Sorry, ma’am, the joke’s on us.”

Rommel’s emphasis on obtaining detailed information was also in evidence twenty-five years earlier. In his memoir of World War I,
Infantry Attacks (1937), two-thirds of his text focuses on reconnaissance. Although he was almost always with his men, he nevertheless refrained from trying to do their jobs. Instead, he concentrated on optimum employment of his relatively few resources against a superior opponent, one he had studied in detail. The result? Lieutenant Rommel kept entire battalions at bay.

We may conclude, therefore, that the most able senior commanders strive to put the lesson here into practice early in their careers commensurate with their level of responsibility.

Notes

3. Ibid., p. 87.
5. E. P. Forrestel, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 40-57. Unforeseen circumstances caused the initial attacks on the Japanese carriers by land-based aircraft and carrier torpedo bombers to fail, but dogged persistence and fine-tuning of tactics, based on attention to detail, ensured success on the second attempt by carrier dive bombers. Admiral Spruance's accomplishments received the unique recognition of his remaining on active duty for life in the permanent grade of four-star admiral, with full pay and allowances. General Pershing received a similar recognition for the Army, one later upgraded to the rank of "General of the Armies." This honor was legislated for all five-star flag officers, but never, with the exception noted, to any three- or four-star flag officer.
9. B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York, 1971), pp. 170-98 ff. Liddell Hart pointed out that German strength figures were repeatedly overestimated, a problem which tended to paralyze British initiative at times.

A leader is best when people hardly know he exists; not so good when people obey and acclaim him; worse when they despise him. But of a good leader who talks little when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say: "We did it ourselves."

Lao-Tse
THROUGH the ages, revolutionaries have been an endless source of fascination for both the scholarly and popular imagination. The democratic revolutions of England, America, France, and Mexico gave rise to such historic figures as Cromwell, Hampden, Pym, and Vane; Washington, Jefferson, Otis, Henry, and the Adamses; Danton, Marat, Mirabeau, and Robespierre; Carranza, Madero, and Obregón. The communist and nationalist revolutions of the twentieth century have catapulted into prominence such men as Lenin and Stalin, Mao and Chou En-lai, Ho and Giap, Castro and Guevara, Arafat and Habash, Nkomo and Mugabe. The list goes on.*

All these men are bent on destroying the existing social order and replacing it with a new one. How they differ among themselves is a question that seldom has been addressed.

Our close examination of a relatively large number of revolutionaries reveals five distinct types: The Founders, The Professional Revolutionaries, The Scholars, The Agitators, and The Generals. Of course, not every individual within each type embraces all traits identified.

*In a work currently in progress, World Revolutionary Leaders, Mostafa Rejai and Kay Phillips are studying 135 revolutionary leaders from 31 revolutionary movements spanning four centuries and all major regions of the world.
their specific professions, they write extensively on a variety of subjects and contribute heavily to the theory and practice of revolution. The Scholars are well exemplified by Alain Geismar of France (a professor of physics), Juan Mari Bras of Puerto Rico (a lawyer), George Habash of Palestine (a physician), and Camilo Torres of Columbia (a sociologist and a priest).

The Agitators, such as the Algerian and Palestinian revolutionaries, virtually mirror the popular stereotype: young, lower class, uneducated, unruly, from undeveloped countries, with a long history of radical activity. This group typically comes from rural backgrounds, has little formal education, and is parochial in outlook. Their early and sustained involvement in revolutionary organization and activity accounts for their frequent arrest and long periods of imprisonment. Their sense of social deprivation is likely to be strong.

Although The Agitators represent a variety of ideological postures, they characteristicly combine shades of leftist doctrines—anarchism, socialism, communism—with strong nationalist commitments. As such, they are most likely to borrow foreign ideologies and adapt them to local needs. The Agitators share some characteristics with The Professional Revolutionaries, but in contrast, their commitment is not firm, final, and unwavering. Given appropriate circumstances, The Agitators may turn opportunist.

The Generals, typified by Robert Devereux, the third Earl of Essex, in the 17th century, constitute a professionally educated group, consisting most likely of middle- or high-ranking military officers who become involved in revolutionary activity late in their careers, either because of acute dissatisfaction or as a response to situations of national emergency. A related group of revolutionaries does not have formal military training but accumulates considerable military experience in the course of their revolutions. The Generals tend to be urban born, well traveled, and cosmopolitan. Coming from relatively prominent families, they have a history of involvement in the traditional politics of their own countries.

The identification of five types of revolutionaries also carries several concrete implications or conclusions.

First, it is no longer possible to stereotype all revolutionaries. Specifically, as we have seen, whereas such revolutionary types as The Founders and The Scholars are far removed from the popular stereotype of the revolutionary, The Professional Revolutionaries and The Agitators are as close to it as one can come.

Second, it is clear that one can no longer discuss revolutionaries in the abstract but, rather, in terms of discrete types possessing discrete personalities. Specifically, there is no such thing as a or the revolutionary personality—only revolutionary personalities.

Finally, as we know, in general terms every revolution requires a group of leaders who possess verbal and organizational skills to undermine the existing social order, articulate the vision of a new (and presumably better) society, mobilize and coordinate all efforts toward the realization of their objective, and give it credence and legitimacy.

More specifically, however, our five-fold typology of revolutionary elites demonstrates that revolution requires a certain specialization of functions, skills, and talents. In this context, The Scholars undermine the existing regime, generate popular discontent, and provide ideological justification for the revolution. The Agitators and The Professional Revolutionaries provoke the regime, create an atmosphere of popular unrest, mobilize the masses, formulate a revolutionary program, and coordinate revolutionary action. The Agitators perform an important additional function by providing a role model for the masses: coming from similar social backgrounds, they are particularly effective in attracting new recruits to the movement. The Generals perform
IN MY OPINION

a military function, taking command of the situation, putting their military skills to effective use, directing and fighting the battles that need to be fought. The Founders institutionalize the revolution and give it respectability and legitimacy.

These functions and skills are found in all revolutions but to a lesser or greater extent, depending on the particular needs of the environment. In other words, although different revolutionary types interact to produce a revolution, different historical requirements will intervene to produce different mixes of revolutionary personalities.

Stated differently, the five groups of revolutionaries constitute ideal types, historically and analytically considered. As such, not all five are universally present in all revolutions. Moreover, the functions the five perform overlap to some extent. Thus, for instance, The Professional Revolutionaries may well discharge some of the functions performed by The Generals and The Founders. The Founders may perform a variety of functions other than institutionalizing and legitimizing the revolution. Revolutionary leadership, in short, is a collective (or corporate) enterprise in which one type or another gains special prominence depending on the sociohistorical context.

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COVERT OPERATIONS: A NEEDED ALTERNATIVE

COLONEL WENDELL E. LITTLE, USAR (RET)

Each year Americans designate Memorial Day as a time to honor those who died for our country in past wars. These wars record that our nation, when faced with dangers from abroad, rejected the options of submission and humiliation. Rather, we elected to fight to preserve our free institutions and way of life. Do we have any other options to spare us the agonizing choice between the two other unwanted alternatives?

Centuries ago Chinese general Sun Tzu wrote: "The most consummate art of war is to subdue your enemies without having to fight them." Nuclear weapons have today added almost an imperative against "having to fight" our main adversary, even with conventional weapons, because such a contest might soon escalate into a nuclear war that was unintended by either side. Yet conflicts continue between nations. What, then, are the means and techniques for conflicts in this last quarter of the twentieth century?
Soviet Policies

Let us first look at our main adversary. To subdue the United States "without having to fight," the U.S.S.R. has adopted twin policies of peaceful coexistence: to avoid nuclear war and support of wars of national liberation.

Peaceful coexistence is basically defensive. It plays on the fervent hope of the free world for peace, and it is designed to disarm the Western allies. Note the very successful misleading propaganda campaign against the neutron bomb that exacerbated relations with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and still leaves the issue in doubt. The preponderance of Soviet tanks facing NATO continues without an adequate defense.

Support of wars of national liberation means subversion and insurrection in those countries not now under Soviet influence, a systematic orchestration of anti-Western changes in the developing Third World. The primary objective is to win the resource war, to deny strategic materials to the West. The main thrust includes political warfare and guerrilla operations using Cuban proxy troops and East German technicians. Success in the resource war will enable the Soviets to squeeze the United States into second-class status without firing a shot. We can manage on less oil from the Persian Gulf region, but we must import more than 90 percent of certain essential minerals—cobalt, manganese, chromium—mainly from Africa south of the Sahara, where the Soviets are making a major effort.

The Soviet daily expenditure of $8 million to support the Cuban economy is a bargain. For this the Soviets get a controlled military strike force effectively used in Africa, where they dared not send their own troops initially, and they also get air and naval bases close to the U.S. mainland. The Soviets thus direct the considerable manpower of the Cuban DGI (Dirección General de Inteligencia), Castro's intelligence service, in areas where Soviet presence would be suspect and counterproductive.

Covert support of Communist parties and other front groups has been effective, especially in Europe. These are low-cost, low-risk, low-casualty operations to accomplish their foreign policy objectives—they hope below the threshold of U.S. response—without any direct military confrontation. Under an umbrella of strategic strength, the Soviets probe for weak points and targets of opportunity, using foreign victories to help nullify considerable domestic unrest. They seek strategic superiority but plan and expect to win without using their own military forces directly against the United States.

Need for U.S. Strategy

The National Defense Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and directed it to perform, in addition to its normal intelligence functions, "such other functions as the National Security Council may direct." Obviously, public laws cannot specify details of secret operations, so Congress used nonspecific language to authorize the President a wide range of options for covert operations.

By midcentury we recognized the need to affect events abroad without use or threat of use of direct military force. Each successive President from Truman to Ford directed the CIA to undertake specific covert operations in support of our foreign policies. We achieved some success and suffered some failures as we struggled to explore ways to avoid the awful alternatives of either surrender or nuclear war.

Then came Vietnam and Watergate. It was the media treatment of these two events that had such a profound impact on America. The drumfire of congressional investigations and media criticism took its toll. Disillusioned, we unilaterally declared an end of the cold war and began to dismantle our intelligence and covert operations in the name of civil rights. Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and the Surveillance Act of 1978 were added to the restrictive laws. Our foreign
friends were dismayed, and our enemies rejoiced. Such actions certainly increased the danger of a massive intelligence failure, but, more important, they tended to leave this nation only the alternative of direct military action to respond to acts of Soviet aggression.

The United States has not fared well recently in the grey area between normal diplomatic actions and direct military force. The methods and requirements of clandestine intelligence and covert operations that function in this grey area place some strain on our concepts of open democratic institutions. But the former is essential to protect the latter. The hard facts of the real world require that we urgently resolve the conflicting claims of civil rights advocates and the needs of national intelligence and covert operations required in support of our foreign policies.

The Third Option—Covert Operations

The third option requires a strong national intelligence system and a substantial capacity for covert operations, including covert economic and political warfare and paramilitary activity.4

What are covert operations? A rather bland official definition states that they are: actions in support of our foreign policies where the hand of the U.S. government is not disclosed or, if disclosed, can plausibly be denied.5 A precise and full description would impinge on the obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods. A rather broad generalization is that of unconventional support and guidance of groups and individuals abroad whose self-interests and actions fit or support the interests of the United States, and who, for a variety of reasons, wish to avoid any overt contact with the U.S. government. One example is the moderate groups in Iran who hope to avoid the impending chaos and escape Soviet domination. For them, any overt contact with an American amounts to a kiss of death. In fact, a number have been executed on such charges.

Covert actions include discreet contacts with and guidance for various forces that influence host governments: pressure groups such as labor, students, professional groups, elements of the media, and even political parties. These groups see their own self-interest and the interests of their homeland advanced by such covert relationships. The objectives of such groups may or may not fit the goals of the host governments. The controlling criteria are that such groups work for and support the goals of the U.S. government, if they are to have our help.

Motivation is usually a mutuality of interests, and operational guidance and financial support are often required. Dirty tricks are rare, despite stories in the media. Actions involving the media are almost always to get the facts, the truth, in print or on the air under circumstances where, without our help, it would not appear. The early days of Radio Free Europe are such an example.

Covert actions include contacts with and efforts to influence the likely successors of any prospective upheaval or change in government. We need covert contacts with the “outs” as well as official contacts with the current rulers. In 1979, moderate groups in Nicaragua were in a fair position to force and win a free election. With proper covert assistance and guidance, their prospects would have been good. But nothing was done, and Castro’s substantial covert help for the Sandinistas put them in power.6

The United States needs some capability to apply military force covertly or otherwise without involving its own uniformed military personnel. As warfare between the United States and the U.S.S.R. becomes potentially more dangerous, we must not leave the use of surrogate forces exclusively to the Soviets.7 We still have allies and friendly nations that recognize the Soviet threat and will work with us for the common defense.

The United States needs to use covert operations to influence events abroad by methods less dangerous than direct military action—
some alternative between a diplomatic protest and “sending in the Marines.”

History shows that political and social struggles within countries may affect world events as decisively as military conflicts between nations. In some countries, groups and individuals are fighting for ideals and policies that support U.S. objectives but cannot have any overt contact with us. They need our help and we need them. Examples of effective assistance have been: the Philippines, 1951-53; Iran, 1953; Western Europe, 1948-53; and the performance of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty from 1951 to 1967.

By abandoning covert actions to the Soviets, the United States is losing the war of resources. Soviet control of resources essential to the West may be our greatest danger.

International terrorism, if not clearly a tool of Soviet foreign policy, certainly promotes Soviet objectives of disruption and conflict. Between 1968 and 1979 only 15 international terrorist attacks occurred in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe compared with 1267 such attacks in Western Europe alone. Terrorism has become a new form of surrogate warfare—an alternative to modern conventional war with marked advantages for the totalitarian societies. Our best defense is good intelligence and covert assets for penetration and neutralization of terrorist groups.

Good intelligence and covert action are needed to expose and counter the massive Soviet disinformation program and their efforts to recruit and subvert Western journalists.

Covert actions may be the most effective, least expensive, and least dangerous way to achieve our foreign policy objectives. Direct military action stakes our total national prestige—this helped to drag us into Vietnam, but if covert operations fail or go sour, we simply deny them and walk away.

The United States deserves a better choice than the simplistic solution of military superiority—probably impossible—or continued losses in the resource war to the point where we have left only the alternatives of surrender or military confrontation that could escalate. No international covenant forbids covert actions in support of foreign policies, and in today’s world, no great nation can risk neglecting them. Clausewitz stated that covert actions are the continuation of state policy by other less dangerous means.

The Decade of the 1980s

The visit of Pope John Paul II to Poland may have set in motion a significant feature of this decade. We now have the spectacle of the Polish workers—in a “worker’s paradise”—attempting to improve their lot, being threatened by a military invasion from (of all places) the Soviet Union. This must cast some doubt on the validity of Communist doctrine and theory even in the Politburo.

In Poland the Soviets are on the horns of a dilemma. If they do nothing, the cries for more freedom will spread to other countries of Eastern Europe; if they move in with force, it will update the brutal Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Their image will suffer a serious blow.

Events in Poland must disturb the confidence of even the Politburo that communism is the “wave of the future.” The Soviets have serious internal problems: the economic situation, the inability to deal with a pluralistic society or to tolerate dissent and now the apparent failure of their doctrine. In responding to these problems, the Soviets may be tempted to exploit their one area of success, brute military strength. This decade will be dangerous.

Since 1945, most conflicts of international significance have been within, not between, nations involving guerrilla warfare and terrorism with direct or indirect intervention from the outside. The ’80s will be a decade of unconventional warfare. With realism and courage, it may be possible to end our post-Vietnam paralysis, halt Soviet expansion, and exploit some of its weaknesses.
First, there can be no substitute for adequate conventional and strategic forces. We, too, need the umbrella of military strength under which we can develop and use the third option to ensure survival. We, too, can probe for weak points and be prepared to exploit targets of opportunity. This is not the place to describe specific covert operations, but we can generalize and mention a possible example.

It is very important that America overcome the "decline in courage" that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn sees in our society and has identified from history as "the beginning of the end of other great civilizations." We must use both overt and covert outlets to explain to the new nations how Communist doctrine has failed. Marxism is dead in Eastern Europe. What remains is Russian nationalism and the Leninist structure of power in a totalitarian order—the Brezhnev doctrine.

A strong human rights policy should be proclaimed to give moral support to the dissidents inside the U.S.S.R., using clandestine methods to supplement Radio Free Europe. America has a stake in the survival of such dissident groups, which are the only force inside the U.S.S.R. working to liberalize its policies and push it toward a more open society that can live in peace with the rest of the world.

International organizations, some under United Nations aegis, cover a wide variety of interests and can often influence world opinions. Our self-imposed restrictions against any clandestine involvement with such groups should be removed. The Soviets are not entitled to a free hand in this important arena.

Our national media must be more responsible, with less exposure of our own secrets and more attention to the very dangerous KGB infiltration of many American institutions. The media should try to ensure that their own journalists have not been recruited by the massive Soviet effort to subvert the Western media. We know that this is one of the KGB's top priorities. When great newspapers fail to check the academic qualifications of applicants and the validity of feature stories, such laxity would make it easy to plant a Soviet agent in our media who could later develop into an important "agent of influence" as well as an excellent espionage agent.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan greatly distressed the entire Islamic world, providing for the first time a basis for unity against Moscow. Working with Islamic religious groups provides an opportunity to exploit the basic conflict between communism and the Moslem religion, but such involvement must be a clandestine operation. The targets may even include the 50 million Moslems now inside the Soviet Union.

The tribes now resisting Soviet domination of Afghanistan—the Baluchi, the Pathan, and Afridi—are the world's toughest fighting men. They make do with very little. Some aid to these tribes would be worth much more than aid now flowing to other allies, but assistance to these tribes can only be by covert means. The logistical channel is through Pakistan, and Moscow has already warned President Zia against providing aid to the Afghan rebels.

Recent events have reinforced the need to resolve the conflicting claims of civil rights advocates and the requirements of secret intelligence and covert operations. The pendulum appears to be swinging back from the days of Senator Frank Church and the distortions of the sensation-hungry media. Legislative and Executive actions are now being taken to repair some of the danger done since 1974. This will help, but much time will be needed to rebuild the basic infrastructure for good intelligence to restore the confidence of our agents and informants that their identity can be protected, to justify risking their lives to help us. We will need to convince the intelligence services of our major allies that the hemorrhages of secrets in America are ended and that we can protect their secrets. This is essential before they can share vital intelligence with us.
and cooperate in joint covert operations against the Soviets.

As we seek to rebuild our clandestine capabilities, we must not ignore the lessons of the past—mistakes were made. We must not adopt the same standards and criteria as the Communists. We can have an effective intelligence service with covert capability and still operate within the framework of our basic values and ideals. Our constitution is not a suicide document.

San Antonio, Texas

The Department of History at the University of Alabama will sponsor the tenth General Wilburt S. Brown Conference in History, 11-12 February 1983 on the subject “War and Society in the 18th Century.” Requests for information and other communications regarding the symposium should be sent to Professor Maarten Ultee, Department of History, University of Alabama, Box 1936, University, Alabama 35486.
I'm only interested in designing fighters; there is no finesse, no skill in designing anything else.

Sir Sydney Camm to Francis Mason, September 1959

THE HARRIER: V/STOL VINDICATED
If aircraft possess a lineage like racehorses, then the British Aerospace Harrier is a thoroughbred. To those attuned to such things, the fine hand of Sir Sydney Camm, chief designer of the Hawker Hurricane of Battle of Britain fame, is apparent in the Harrier's every line. Nor should this be a surprise: a distinct family resemblance is evident in the long line of famous Camm-inspired Hawker fighter designs, extending through the graceful Hunter, the Tempest, Typhoon, and Hurricane of World War II, all the way back to the elegant Fury of the 1930s, the fastest operational biplane fighter ever built.

But however clean the Harrier's lines may be, the tracing of its lineage is a remarkably complex business. During its life span, the Harrier's parent company has changed names from Hawker to Hawker-Siddeley to British Aerospace, with McDonnell Douglas recently acquiring stepparent status for the coproduced American AV-8B derivative. The Harrier and its immediate predecessors, the P-1127 and Kestrel, have been known by no less than six names: The concept that led to the Harrier was initially assigned the Hawker project designation P-1127, under which it flew as a prototype and concept demonstration vehicle. The Kestrel, the ensuing service test version, was named for a species of small European falcon noted for its habit of turning into the wind and hovering over a fixed spot while looking for its prey. The Kestrel also received the United States military designation XV-6A. The definitive Royal Air Force production derivative was named Harrier after a genus of highly maneuverable, low-flying hawks that build their nests on the ground. Sea Harrier was subsequently—and logically—applied to the Fury, which entered service with the Royal Air Force in the early 1930s, was the first of a long line of successful Hawker fighter designs by Sir Sydney Camm. The clean fuselage contours, particularly the distinctive outline of the rear fuselage, vertical stabilizer, and rudder, became Camm aircraft trademarks.
The Hurricane (above, on patrol over France in the spring of 1940) looks like a monoplane Fury with an enclosed cockpit and bigger engine, a 1000-horsepower Merlin as opposed to the Fury's 525-HP Kestrel (both Rolls-Royces), but it represented an enormous increase in capability. The Hurricane's eight .30 caliber machine guns—the Fury had only two—wreaked havoc on Luftwaffe bombers during the Battle of Britain...

The midwar Typhoon (left), powered by a huge 24-cylinder H, liquid-cooled Napier Sabre engine of over 2000 HP, pressed technology and aerodynamic knowledge to the limit. The Typhoon was hampered by a relatively thick airfoil section that caused compressibility problems, leading to its use as a low-altitude fighter bomber.
The late-war Tempest (above left) and Fury (above right) retained the distinctive outlines of a Camm-designed empennage. The Tempest, a Typhoon derivative with a thinner wing section, was arguably the fastest operational piston-engined fighter of World War II. With the Fury (shown in prototype), Camm switched from liquid-cooled engines to the 18-cylinder radial air-cooled Bristol Centaurus of over 2500 HP.

The navalized version. The initial Marine Corps variant was assigned the colorless AV-8A designation.

The formal tracing of names, however, may obscure the main point: the P-1127/Kestrel/Harrier series, as the first operationally viable fighter aircraft capable of hovering flight, represented a clean break with past operational tradition; but that break was made within an engineering tradition which was in many important ways surprisingly traditional, even conservative.

The Harrier first took form in the mid-1950s in Camm's creative brain as he, in common with other aircraft designers, sought ways to come to grips with the turbojet revolution. Turbojets offered the prospect of previously unattainable speeds, but they also presented designers with a basic problem: the design characteristics called for by high speeds, notably small, thin wings, tended to be incompatible with good control at low airspeeds. There were solutions, but they were not free. Camm was keenly aware of weight and performance penalties exacted by the structural and aerodynamic compromises needed to slow a high-performance aircraft down to reasonable approach and landing speeds. He was also sensitive to the vulnerability of runways and parking areas to air attack.

He combined these concerns with an awareness of the potential inherent in the steadily growing thrusts and power-to-weight ratios of turbofan engines and achieved a conceptual breakthrough. He perceived that the problem could be finessed by vectoring the thrust of a fighter's engine downward to permit vertical, or near-vertical, landings and takeoffs. This, if it could be done, would solve both problems at once. A fighter that could slow down and land on vectored engine thrust would have little need for flaps and other high-lift devices, and wing design could be optimized for high-speed flight. The operational advantage of being able to operate into and out of restricted areas spoke eloquently for itself.

Camm was not the only designer to see the operational advantages of V/STOL fighters; but he was the first—and arguably the only one—to combine his perception with a practical engineering solution that would make the idea work. The worth of his solution was not readily apparent to many. The idea of directing the efflux of a jet engine through a series of angled pipes and rotating louvers seemed mechanically complex and aerodynamically inefficient. This was perhaps true in theory, but the practical
Unlike the Fury, its naval derivative, the Sea Fury (above left, in Royal Canadian Navy markings) was produced in some numbers and widely exported. . . . It was followed by the Sea Hawk (above right), jet-powered but, like the Sea Fury, a carrier attack aircraft. . . . With the graceful Hunter (below), Camm returned to the design of “pure” fighters. The Hunter, a Royal Air Force mainstay of the '60s, was widely exported; as recently as a year ago, nearly 350 were still in service with a dozen air forces throughout the world. With the Hunter, the dictates of a tailpipe and swept-back surfaces to delay compressibility rise forced Camm to deviate from his customary empennage contours.
disadvantages of the competing solutions proved far more serious. Both “tail sitters” and configurations with swiveling, wingtip-mounted engines created serious problems with high downwash velocities, and the former were forbiddingly difficult to fly. The value of separate, downward-pointing lift engines embedded in the fuselage is still a matter of debate, the argument hinging on the equivocal success of the Soviet Yak-36 Forger deployed on Soviet Minsk and Kiev class antisubmarine carriers.

But for all the striking originality of Camm’s initial conception, he turned it into reality in a remarkably and typically disciplined, conservative manner. First of all, close consultation with power plant engineers produced support for his ideas about the direct lift potential of turbofan engines, and his faith in the developmental promise of Bristol Siddeley’s BS-53, later to become the Pegasus, was richly rewarded: During the life span of the P-1127/Kestrel/Harrier series, its available thrust has increased by a factor of nearly one and three-fourths, from 12,500 pounds to 21,500 pounds.

Having staked all on the lift capacity of the Pegasus, Camm’s design team ap-

A seagoing hawk in its natural habitat: a Sea Harrier with 100-gallon drop tanks and practice bomb carriers lands vertically on a Royal Navy vessel flight deck.
proached the problem of hover control with a system of reaction jets, or "puff pipes," ejecting compressor bleed air from orifices in the wingtips, nose, and tail to control roll, pitch, and yaw. The reaction jets were controlled by an orthodox stick and rudder, and aside from a small lever to control the angle of the vectored thrust louvers the cockpit layout was completely conventional. This proved remarkably successful.

But having begun with two highly innovative—even daring—concepts, vectored thrust and reaction jet hover controls, Camm's team approached their project in measured, incremental fashion. The initial plan had been to vector only cool air from the precompressor fan stage of the turbofan engine for lift, but experience with the Sea Hawk carrier attack aircraft had shown that a jet engine's exhaust could be routed through two right angle bends with remarkably little loss of thrust. This gave the P-1127 its second set of thrust louvers, establishing the basic configuration for the series. Not surprisingly, there is a strong family resemblance between the Sea Hawk and its V/STOL descendants, particularly in the empennage area.

The design phase of the P-1127 was complete by the fall of 1957, and prototype construction began shortly thereafter. It remained a private Hawker project until June of 1960 when official Air Ministry backing was received. Initial tethered hovering tests began on 21 October 1960, and development proceeded thereafter at a measured pace.

A half-century's evolution of Camm-inspired fighter designs shows in the lines of the Sea Harrier, depicted here with drop tanks, AIM-9 Sidewinders, and a fuselage-mounted 30-mm gun pod. The conical nose cap houses an airborne intercept radar, evidence of the Sea Harrier's fleet air defense mission. The problem of transonic drag rise has been largely overcome since the Hunter, and Camm's characteristic empennage contours reappear!
RAF versions of the Harrier (left, Harrier GR-3s of No. 3 Squadron in formation over West Germany) are optimized for ground attack, as evidenced by the characteristically tubular nose, housing a laser rangefinder and target seeker/designator. The tactical point of the Harrier's V/STOL capabilities is its ability to operate from dispersed, easily camouflaged sites (below, at a training site in West Germany).
with six P-1127s ultimately being built. A contract was let for nine advanced P-1127 derivatives, Kestrels, in May of 1962; between the fall of 1964 and the fall of 1965, these Kestrels underwent extensive testing by a tripartite test group with members from the RAF, Royal Navy, USAF, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and the Luftwaffe.

The Royal Air Force requirement under which the Harrier was procured was issued in mid-1966, and the first Harrier flew in August of that year. The first Harrier unit, Number 1 Squadron, RAF, became operational in July of 1969.

Carrier landing tests were conducted with the P-1127 and Kestrel at an early stage, and Royal Navy interest, sharpened by the pending decommissioning of the last two British attack carriers, led to the first Sea Harrier order in May of 1975. Deliveries commenced in 1978.

In the meantime, U.S. Marine Corps interest in the Harrier had led to extensive operational tests, followed by procurement of the AV-8A with deliveries to operational Marine squadrons starting in early 1971. The McDonnell Douglas AV-8B stems from a 1973 proposal and features a modified wing of increased size making extensive use of new carbon fiber material. It represents the most advanced development of the series to date.

The incremental design changes, which began almost as soon as the first prototype P-1127 flew, have had powerful cumulative effect: Wings were progressively swept back and reduced in size on the Kestrel and Harrier, only to be increased again on the AV-8B. Engine inlet contours have been refined, and total airframe length has increased by about four feet. But maximum gross weights—perhaps the best single measure of increased capacity—have grown by nearly 2½ times.

As an example of successful innovation combined with continuity of engineering practice, Camm’s series of fighter and fighter bomber designs has few rivals. Among individual aircraft designers, Camm, who died in 1966 at the age of 73, has only a handful of peers in terms of success, versatility, and longevity: Igor Sikorsky, Geoffrey de Havilland, and Lockheed’s Clarence “Kelly” Johnson. Sikorsky’s career ranged from the world’s first four-engined bomber in 1913, through highly successful amphibian transports in the 1930s, to the world’s first operationally capable helicopters in the 1940s, and on to their eminently effective turbine-engined derivatives in the 1950s and 1960s. De Havilland reached prominence with a series of successful fighters and light bombers during World War II, featured a wide array of light transports, trainers, and racing aircraft during the interwar period, reached his apogee with the phenomenally successful Mosquito bomber and fighter of World War II, and extended on into the turbojet age with the Venom and Vampire fighters and the Comet, the world’s first jet airliner. Johnson was responsible for, among other projects, the P-38, C-121, F-104, U-2, and SR-71. Though the achievements of all of these men are remarkable by any standard, it is worth noting that of the four, only Camm and Sikorsky made the transition from conventional aircraft to vertical flight.

The Harrier’s thoroughbred lineage fares well even when matched against the progeny of entire companies and design bureaus. Of all other first-line fighters in service today, only Grumman’s F-14 can trace its ancestry, directly and without a break in engineering tradition, to a biplane antecedent, the tubby little F-3F of the mid-1930s.

J.F.G.

We are grateful to British Aerospace, Inc., the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution, and Wing Commander John D. L. Feesey of the Royal Air Force for the photographs in this article; and to Wing Commander Feesey for the Harrier photograph on page 81.
V/STOL: NEITHER MYTH NOR PROMISE—BUT FACT

Wing Commander John D. L. Feesey, Royal Air Force

"V/STOLs—A Myth or a Promise" was an interesting review of some of the recent developments in V/STOL technology, and few would dispute the author's conclusion that more research and development work is required in this field. Yet it is surprising that any serious article on this subject could virtually ignore the most successful of all the V/STOL configurations: vectored thrust. In particular, the author's claim that "... this is the story of V/STOLs: lots of designs, prototype construction, and testing, but no operational hardware" is simply not true. In the Harrier, Sea Harrier, AV-8A, and AV-8B, we have eloquent testimony that the V/STOL is here to stay as a proven and operational weapon system in a variety of roles and in the service of several nations.

The Royal Air Force (RAF) put the first Harriers into operational service in 1969 in the roles of close air support, battlefield air interdiction, and tactical reconnaissance. At present, Harriers equip two RAF squadrons in Germany, a squadron and a training unit in the United Kingdom, and a flight in Belize, for a total buy of some 133 aircraft. The U.S. Marine Corps, given but passing mention in the Siuru article, has bought 110 AV-8A and TAV-8A Harriers, which currently equip three combat squadrons, a detachment, and a training unit and have seen service in the United States, Japan, and aboard several aircraft and helicopter carriers. For operation from its carrier the Dedalo, the Spanish Navy has also bought 13 AV-8As and TAV-8As. A navalized version, the Sea Harrier, is being introduced by the Royal Navy in the primary role of fleet air defense. Thirty-three aircraft are on order, and three squadrons are currently equipped for service on-board the antisubmarine carriers HMS Invincible and HMS Hermes. The Indian Navy has ordered eight Sea Harriers, also.

Nearly three hundred Harriers in service worldwide are surely sufficient evidence to disprove Colonel Siuru's remarkable conclusion.

The capacity of the British Aerospace Harrier for vertical flight is suggested graphically by this photograph of a hovering Royal Navy Sea Harrier.

that V/STOL aircraft "... must prove that they are operationally sound." The U.S. Marine Corps and the Royal Air Force have each acquired more than ten years of operational experience with vectored thrust. They have shown beyond doubt that the concept is viable and that the Harrier is a cost-effective ground attack, reconnaissance, and air defense platform whether flown from conventional airfields, prepared or unprepared strips, or aircraft carriers.

Ironically, the Falkland Islands conflict broke out soon after the article in question was written. Sea Harriers in the South Atlantic rapidly proved to be a match for A-4 Skyhawks, Mirages, and Super Etendards, being credited with 32 confirmed kills of Argentine aircraft while no Harriers were lost in air-to-air combat. In a remarkable demonstration of the inherent flexibility of V/STOL, RAF Harriers flown by pilots with no previous deck experience operated successfully from naval aircraft carriers and the converted cargo ship Atlantic Conveyor. Sea Harriers frequently landed on the helicopter flight decks of destroyers to refuel, thus freeing carrier decks for other uses. A
total of more than 2000 Harrier sorties was flown from aircraft carriers during the conflict, an impressive average of about six per day per aircraft. Any doubts about the effectiveness of the Harrier as a versatile fighter must surely have been removed by its outstanding record in the Falkland Islands War.

As final testimony to their faith in V/STOL, both the U.S. Marine Corps and the Royal Air Force have announced plans for major procurement of the McDonnell Douglas improved Harrier, the AV-8B. The Marine Corps intends to replace all its A-4s and AV-8As with 336 AV-8Bs, while the RAF has placed an order for 60 similar models. Interest has also been shown by the U.S. Navy, which apparently expects to equip each of its reactivated battleships with 20 to 24 AV-8B Plus aircraft in the late 1980s.

If V/STOL has suffered from lack of official interest in the United States (aside from the Marine Corps), it is not because the concept as exemplified by the Harrier has yet to prove itself. More likely, the problem may lie in vested interests by air forces in concrete runways and aircraft shelters and by navies in large, glamorous aircraft carriers; the “not invented here” syndrome may even be to blame. Certainly, Colonel Siuru appears to have exhibited some of the chief symptoms in his article. Perhaps the Soviet designers of the Yak-36 Forger would agree?

Langley AFB, Virginia

Notes


Wing Commander John Feesey is a Royal Air Force exchange officer working as chief of the Fighter Programs Division, Fighter Training Directorate, at Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Virginia.

MORE “ROLLING THUNDER”

Major General J. P. Wolfe, Canadian Defence Forces

IN general, I consider “Rolling Thunder and the Law of War” an admirable account of how not to fight a war.* On the technical-legal side, W. Hays Parks makes two comments with which I have some difficulty. First, he suggests that the standard for “excessive collateral civilian casualties” is a level of such casualties which shocks the conscience of the world. (p. 17) I concede that it is difficult to assess what the proper standard is, but I suggest that Parks has set the standard much too high.

I also disagree with his statement that “the question of whether a nation has utilized illegal means and methods of warfare generally is measured against an overall campaign of war.” (p. 17) This statement implies both that the legality of means and methods can only be

determined after the event and that the end justifies the means.

Still, I did find the article very instructive. Parks does, however, observe that "in 1966, of 106,000 sorties over North Vietnam, only 1000 were against the 22 fixed targets authorized for attack by the White House; the balance were devoted to the armed reconnaissance interdiction campaign. . . ." (p. 9) It would be very interesting to know what types of constraints were imposed on these reconnaissance sorties.

Ottawa, Ontario

Major General Wolfe is the Judge Advocate General, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Ontario.

A RESPONSE

W. Hays Parks

MAJOR General Wolfe has expressed disagreement with the level I established for determining excessive collateral civilian casualties. I confess that I did not originate the level suggested—"shocks the conscience of the world"; it was suggested to me some years ago by a very respected colleague. In my subsequent research of the history of air operations, I have concluded the level established to be correct.

Prior to submitting my article to the Review, I put it before a "murder board" of combat-experienced aviators, targeteers, military historians, and experts in the law of war. I invited each to be merciless in his criticism. While I assume full responsibility for the final product, I have received a number of excellent comments which I believe improved the final product. No one disagreed with the standard I established. I believe the level I have suggested is borne out by history, much of which I discuss in another article, "Conventional Aerial Bombing and the Law of War," in the May 1982 Naval Institute Proceedings. Nevertheless, I realize that reasonable men may differ in their interpretation of the law of war. I would be most happy to entertain any suggestions General Wolfe would care to offer as to what the level of the standard should be—with appropriate historical examples, of course.

This is not an idle intellectual exercise. From 1974 to 1977, the United States and Canada (along with approximately eighty other nations) participated in negotiations in Geneva to update the law of war. General Wolfe was a member of the Canadian delegation. Those negotiations produced a draft treaty that utilizes the standard of "excessive collateral civilian casualties" without defining the level at which the standard should be applied.

Both Canada and the United States are considering ratification of the draft treaty. I believe both nations would do a disservice to the men they send forth on bombing missions if they elect to accept the very vague terms of the draft treaty without defining the level at which "excessive civilian casualties" should be applied. Given the Communist bloc propensity for denial of prisoner-of-war status to "war criminals," as evidenced by the conduct of North Vietnam, this matter cannot be taken lightly. So I welcome General Wolfe's thoughts.

General Wolfe's second point of disagreement is well taken and is an error in my writing. We are in agreement on the law. The ille-
gality of means may be determined at any time, and the United States was the first nation to commence a review process to ensure that all new weapons conform to our law of war obligations. What I meant to suggest was that determining whether there are "excessive collateral civilian casualties" generally has been measured against an overall campaign or war rather than individual targets. I regret the imprecision of my writing and appreciate General Wolfe's careful reading.

With regard to his question of the constraints on armed reconnaissance missions, they were myriad. Attacks on targets in populated areas were prohibited, and the North Vietnamese freely and openly parked their convoys and supply trains in populated areas during daylight hours to take advantage of U.S. restraint. There also were geographic restrictions from time to time, either through overall limitations during particular phases of the campaign (such as few to no sorties north of 20 degrees north latitude during Phases II and III, or specific limitations on armed reconnaissance missions in Route Packages V and VI, the most populous areas of North Vietnam. While no one can say for sure, I have my personal doubts that Secretary McNamara's emphasis on armed reconnaissance caused fewer civilian casualties than would have resulted from implementation of the bombing program recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have no doubt that the White House management of Rolling Thunder did cause greater U.S. casualties, not only among those who flew over North Vietnam but also among those who served in South Vietnam.

Alexandria, Virginia

Editor's note: Subsequent to this exchange of letters, Major General Wolfe and W. Hays Parks agreed to a definition indicating that proportionality was gauged by "casualties so excessive . . . as to be tantamount to the intentional attack of the civilian population, or to the total disregard for the civilian population."

NUCLEAR POLICIES CLARIFIED

Dr. Albert Wohlstetter

We respect the readers of *Air University Review* too much to let pass Major Frederic E. McCoy's intemperate review of *Nuclear Policies: Fuel without the Bomb* in the May-June 1981 issue, page 123. That review is brief but long enough to contain several errors as well as some rather silly emotional charges. No article in the volume recommends "terminating the use of enriched uranium" as a fuel for power reactors. Nearly all power reactors manufactured in the United States presently use enriched uranium with a fissile content of 5 percent or less. All four authors in the volume including Dr. Victor Gilinsky favor enriched fuel used as it is now—"once through." All the authors agree with the policy instituted by President Ford in October 1976 that commitment to the separation of plutonium from spent light water reactor fuel be delayed and that no irreversible commitment be made now to the widespread use of plutonium fuel in thermal or in breeder reactors.

The basis for recommending a delay in decision has nothing to do with "paranoia," as Major McCoy's imprecise and charged language suggests. It does not proceed from insane delusions about hostile powers' pursuing either the authors or the United States. (It is quite
true, of course, that in the real world there are some governments that have been rather unfriendly to the United States or to some of its allies and whom we would rather not see armed with plutonium weapons. Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein come to mind.) The recommendation for delay was based on a very extensive, detailed, and sober analysis of the economics of the supply and demand for the uranium fuel with which plutonium fuel would have to compete; on the economics of reprocessing spent fuel and fabricating plutonium fuel in thermal reactors; and, of course, on the proliferation risks associated with the widespread storage and use of plutonium. (See, for example, Moving Towards Life in a Nuclear Armed Crowd? Wohlstetter et al., 1976, and a long sequence of studies including Brian Chow’s 1981 work on the advantages of improved light water reactors using enriched uranium as distinct from plutonium fuel.) The economics has been confirmed many times, showing that there is no commercial justification for commitment to plutonium now. No one now disputes the fact, long understood in classified work, that reactor-grade plutonium is usable in bombs. Moreover, the Ford Foundation report and Dr. Gilinsky’s work, both of which the author cites favorably, in essentials have accepted and confirmed these conclusions. None of these matters is certain, but the authors state as well as answer (or refer to in the existing literature) the key arguments for the opposing views. It is hard to say what demons pursuing Major McCoy at the Brookings Institution led him to charges of “paranoia.”

Los Angeles, California

Albert Wohlstetter is director of research at PanHeuristics, senior fellow at Hoover Institution, Stanford University, advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and to the Chief of Naval Operations, and author of numerous books and articles on defense-related subjects.

To the Editor:

Your editorial remarks to the effect that “routine should be put in its place” (“The Fifth Horseman,” Air University Review, May-June, 1982) struck me as especially apt at this time, for so many—bureaucrats especially—seem to think routine will “save” us. I was reminded of one of Stephen Vincent Benét’s writings:

You will not be saved by General Motors or the prefabricated house.
You will not be saved by dialectic materialism or the Lambeth Conference.
You will not be saved by Vitamin D or the expanding universe.

All of these are routine “reliances.” But, to repeat, such reliances and other revealed words from Highest Authority are the stock-in-trade of much of our “education.”

J. Andrew Douglas
Mobile, Alabama
The Cat only grinned when it saw Alice. It looked good-natured, she thought: still it had very long claws and a great many teeth, so she felt that it ought to be treated with respect.
Alice's caution was not shared by the intellectuals of the fifties and sixties, most of whom found it impossible to forgive Eisenhower his double trouncing of Adlai Stevenson, his Denver and Newport vacations, his refusal to get excited about their new domestic priorities, his syntax, his friends, and most of all his golfing. As one result, among the so-called opinion-makers his record as U.S. President became clouded by charges of inattentiveness, especially when compared to allegations of glorious new beginnings in Camelot Glen—beginnings soon thwarted in Dallas, consumed in Lyndon Johnson’s self-immolation over Vietnam, and smothered in Watergate, Kissing-erism, and multiple consecutive presidents unschooled in world affairs.

During the 1970s the conventional liberal view of Eisenhower began to shift, slowly at first but with increasing clamor by the opening of the 1980s. “Eisenhower revisionism” is now in full swing on many fronts—the man, the general, the president—and once again, as in 1948, 1952, and 1956, there are those at many points on the political spectrum who see in Ike’s example the answers to many of the challenges now facing us. To be sure, the revisionist efforts of Murray Kempton, Arthur Larson, Gary Wills, and Fred J. Greenstein are still too new and multidirectional for any consensus to have revealed itself. And not everyone who has addressed the topic is wholly convinced of its legitimacy. Ronald Steel, for example, writes derisively of this new “age of Ikophilia” and worries aloud that “the nostalgia for Ike is taking place only because we choose to remember the aspects we like and repress the rest.” That’s a fair enough warning but not, as shall become clear, one that I consider entirely justified.

Two aspects of Eisenhower’s personal style are important to understanding the significance to be attached to the publication of his all-too-occasional diary entries between 1935 and 1967.† One was his preference never to be seen in what he did; the other, his lifelong rule to refuse to discuss personalities, to focus all discussion on the issues rather than the people involved. Both drove General George S. Patton, Jr., to distraction more than once, and both have had the same effect on many early reviewers of The Eisenhower Diaries. This has resulted in descriptions of this important volume as “a disappointing collection of fragments” in which a few “early forays into candor”—in particular, biting remarks about General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Ernest J. King—ended with his elevation to high command. However accurate such observations might be, they tend to mask the superb work of Professor Ferrell of Indiana University in gathering these fragments together in one place and presenting them—many published for the first time—in a finely crafted volume that can serve as a model of its kind.

The entries begin in late 1935 when Major Eisenhower was serving on the staff of General MacArthur, then heading a special mission to the Philippines. They then proceed, intermittently, following no particular pattern, through the war years, the letdown of becoming chief of staff at the end of 1945 (“This job is as bad as I always thought it would be.”), the Columbia University, NATO, and presidential years: the postpresidential papers are still closed at the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. The overall impression one gets is of a man who now and then thought that he would probably some day write his memoirs and that therefore he should keep some notes on matters that would not be automatically available in the official files. Even so, the seeker after “juicy tidbits” will be disappointed. The reader who will not be disappointed is the one who will be satisfied with a close-up picture of Eisenhower.

er's views on such diverse topics as military parochialism, the necessity for a balance between moral, economic, and purely military power, and the role of force in the nuclear age. (For some examples, see the box on page 89.)

In short, while the gaps may well prove irritating and frustrating to many, what is included adds to our understanding of both the man and his era. (For one example, the reader who will add the diary comments to those already published in volumes VII to IX of The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower will recognize that nothing in General David Jones's recent critique of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is tainted by original thinking.) In addition, Professor Ferrell's introduction, connecting passages, and notes are warm, engaging, witty, and precise—than which no more can be asked of an editor. (His concluding section on sources even goes to the extent of identifying the precise location in the archives, down to and including box numbers and folder titles, of every entry in the volume.) Scholars and researchers have been done a true service, the rest of us even more so.

THREE among the recent spate of books focus exclusively on the war years and treat Eisenhower as one player—admittedly the most important—among many. One can be described as truly monumental, another as important, and a third as occasionally entertaining but of questionable lineage. Russell Weigley's account of the 1944-45 campaign in western Europe contributes mightily to the author's emerging recognition as the leading military historian in the United States. Most Americans recall that campaign in a series of set-piece images: the landings at Normandy, the breakthrough at Saint-Lô, the "race across France," Patton's 90-degree left turn to rescue the beleaguered garrison at Bastogne, the seizure of a bridge at Remagen, and a final squabble over whether to proceed into Germany on "a broad front" or concentrate forces for a "single thrust to Berlin." Weigley's most important contribution is to restore the overall campaign to its true dimensions by providing a balanced treatment of all the fighting, in particular the bitter and costly battles along the German frontier. (Who except the survivors and most devout buffs can recall the battles of the Haseich and Monschau Corridors, the Weseling and Ruhr Pockets, the Roer and Cologne Plains, the Saar and Palatinate?)

The forty chapters are arranged in five parts: The Armies (1-76); Normandy (77-187); France (189-304); The Disputed Middle Ground (305-574); and Germany (575-730). The overall theme, hinted at strongly in Part One and nailed down in a short Epilogue, can be paraphrased as follows: The American army lacked a clear conception of war, owing largely to an unresolved conflict between the military values of mobility (built into the force structure) and overwhelming power (since Grant, the preferred style of attack whenever possible). Having created an army of mobility at the expense of power, the generals failed to use that mobility in ways that might best have complemented the power-drive strategy (in bold concentrations aimed at deep exploitation). American


On MacArthur and the 1936 election: The general has been following the Literary Digest poll and has convinced himself that Landon is to be elected, probably by a landslide. [We suggested] that Landon cannot even carry Kansas, but he got perfectly furious when TJ and I counselled caution in studying the Digest report. I don't believe it reaches the great mass of people who will vote for the incumbent. We couldn't understand the reason for his almost hysterical condemnation of our stupidity.... why should he get sore just because we say, “Don't be so d--- certain and go out on a limb unnecessarily.” Both of us are “fearful and small-minded people who are afraid to express judgments that are obvious from the evidence at hand.” Oh hell.

Commander, Mediterranean Theater, December 1942: Through all this, I am learning many things: (1) that waiting for other people to produce is one of the hardest things a commander has to do; [eleven months earlier he had noted, “My God, how I hate to work by any method that forces me to depend on someone else. It's typical navy stuff.”] (2) that in the higher positions of a modern army, navy, and air force, rich organizational experience and an orderly, logical mind are absolutely essential to success.

Views on two important lieutenant generals, one year before D-Day at Normandy: PATTON: He talks too much and too quickly and sometimes creates a very bad impression. Moreover, I fear that he is not always a good example to subordinates, who may be guided by only his surface actions without understanding his deep sense of duty, courage, and service that makes up his real personality. CARL A. SPAATZ: A fine technician, popular with his subordinates, who fits into an allied team very well indeed. I have had an impression that he is not tough and hard enough personally to meet the full requirements of his high position. He is constantly urging more promotions for subordinates and seeking special favors or special consideration for his forces. For example, he wants all his second lieutenants made first lieutenants upon completion of a certain number of missions; he wants a liquor ration provided for the air force and wants additional grades and ratings for all his units, ... My belief in this regard is further strengthened by the type of staff he has accumulated around him. He has apparently picked officers more for their personal qualifications of comradeship and friendliness than for their abilities as businesslike, tough operators. I have been watching him very carefully and have urged him and have pleaded with him to adopt a tougher attitude. While it is possible that his efforts are correct for his particular job, the fact is that I never have great confidence in his recommendations for promotion of personnel and for the special favors he seeks for his own forces. This weakness is his only one. He does not seek personal glory or publicity, and he is a most hardworking and loyal subordinate.

On defense budgets: I'm astounded and appalled at the size and scope of plans the staff sees as necessary to maintain our security position now and in the future. (December 1945; later, in January 1952, while serving as NATO commander, he worried at length about) the danger of internal deterioration through the annual expenditure of unconscionable sums on a program of indefinite duration, extending far into the future.... The only justification for the imposition of an expenditure program that foresees a minimum $14 billion deficit is an immediate prospect of war.... I am astonished that an administration including, after all, many men of conservative and cautious tendencies could have approved or at least concurred in such a budget.

On the French problem in Indochina, March 1951, three years before Dienbienphu: The French have a knotty problem on that one—the campaign out there is a draining sore in their side.... I'd favor heavy reinforcement to get the thing over at once; but I'm convinced that no military victory is possible in that kind of theater.

On atomic nuclear matters, reflecting on his 8 December 1953 address at the U.N.: [I tried] to make a clear effort to get the Soviet Union working with us in some phase of this whole atomic field.... If we were successful in getting even the tiniest of starts, it was believed that gradually this kind of talk and negotiation might expand into something broader—that at least a faint possibility existed that Russia's concern, bordering upon fright, of the certain results of atomic warfare might lead her, in her own self-interests, to participate.... Underlying all this, of course, is the clear conviction that as of now the world is racing toward catastrophe—that something must be done to put a brake on this movement.
generalship by and large was competent but addicted to playing it safe; a bolder generalship might have shortened the war.\textsuperscript{6}

As is characteristic of all his work, Weigley’s line of argument has an unsettling contemporary relevance that finds more sympathy among lieutenant colonels than among lieutenant generals, a point not lost on Drew Middleton, military correspondent for the \textit{New York Times}:

[These ideas] should give contemporary planners in the Pentagon much to ponder. The United States Army and Air Force now in Europe have adopted a completely defensive strategy against possible Soviet invasion. But there are gadflies, civilian and military (e.g., Luttwak, Canby, Lind, and assorted junior officers), stinging the strategists with proposals for a more flexible defense that, in the event of an attack, would send armored columns to assail enemy supply lines. Their ideas have merit. But I think that Mr. Weigley, who understands the hierarchical, conservative bent of American military thinking, would agree there is little chance such proposals will be adopted.\textsuperscript{7}

One does not have to agree with these arguments to conclude that contemporary planners could benefit from a close reading of this long volume. For Weigley provides much food for thought on our seemingly perennial problems related to manpower (reinforcement, rotation, discipline, courage) and supply of forces in the field. The story of the gasoline shortages is fairly well known, but it is sobering to be reminded that the army came very close to running out of artillery ammunition in 1944, at just about the same time its manpower pool went dry—leading to the desperation employment of black troops in combat roles and the offer of pardons to those imprisoned by courts-martial who would agree to go to the front to fight. Even those, led by the West Germans, who approve fully NATO’s forward defense strategy can find in these pages both insights and sustenance from the German “miracle in the west” when the Allies were stopped cold (no pun) in front of the Rhine River at the end of 1944. (The point that will provide encouragement to no one is contemplating full scale war in western Europe without unrestricted, preplanned access to the territory and resources of France!)

A final virtue of \textit{Eisenhower’s Lieutenants} is the pictures it provides of the role of personalities in warfare, a favorite theme of Clausewitz but so frequently and rigidly excised from the curricula of our staff and war colleges. The roles played by ego, ambition, jealousy, irritability, etc. cannot be planned for in advance, so they tend to be discounted; but in actuality they are always present and even occasionally decisive. In these respects Weigley’s volume marks a tremendous advance over the nine-volume official history of the campaign. His heroes (Carl Spaatz, Pete Quesada, Patton, “Lightning Joe” Collins, “P” Wood, Lucian Truscott, Manton Eddy, Troy Middleton) are believably drawn. On Eisenhower, he seems to be ambivalent or at least restrained; Omar Bradley does not shine in this account, and Field Marshal Montgomery’s personality drives Weigley to distraction.

Where Weigley grants an important role to individual personality, David Irving’s \textit{War between the Generals} finds room for nothing else. In a style reminiscent of “Watergate via Woodstein,” Irving pieces together “the great cover-up,” engineered by Ike and Winston Churchill, of the many disagreements and animosities that separated the Allied generals. Deep Throat in this instance is Major General Everett S. Hughes, friend and West Point classmate (1909) of George Patton, who served Eisenhower as his unofficial eyes and ears and whose almost-illegible diaries “have lain for years under the noses of historians” in the Library of Congress.

How it could be possible at this late date for someone of Irving’s background truly to think he has discovered something new in the in-tramural squabbling that marred the Grand Alliance is beyond my capacity to imagine. It is to be sure a fact that Churchill, Eisenhower, George Marshall, and Montgomery were at pains during the late forties to downplay and,
where possible, ignore—even hide—the intimate details of many disagreements. But in this they eventually failed, and the failure is no longer news; see, for just a few examples, any of the following pages in Weigley: 210, 254, 279-83, 347-50, 442, 504-05, 542-44, 564-66, 642, or 710-13! The revelations that Irving trumpets relate almost exclusively to the seamiest sides of life among the conquerors. Thus we have pictures of the infamously flamboyant Lieutenant General J. C. H. Lee, Ike’s deputy for supply, foisted on him by the powers in Washington, dashing about England in his private twelve-car train and later commandeering for his own use the ritziest hotels in Paris; of Bradley, Hodges, and Quesada obtaining hand-made Belgian shotguns under questionable circumstances; of Patton as “a swaggering hothead who womanized ceaselessly and lived in dread of his wife’s finding out.” This is Irving’s thirteenth book, and clearly the sensationalism that marred his first (The Bombing of Dresden, 1963) is still in the saddle.

Such accounts of life behind the scenes can be valuable to students seeking to understand the day-to-day atmosphere in which important decisions are reached; the “true history” of the MACV Command Mess in Saigon, for a more recent example, might reveal important matters never found in official accounts. But they can do so only when they are thoroughly documented and based on verifiable sources. Yet here, despite a concluding note on sources, we have not one single footnote and are therefore left to take on faith every single quotation and reconstructed conversation. To show where this can lead, consider the following diary comment of General Patton about a meeting with Ike, Bradley, and Hodges on 2 September 1944. “Ike was very pontifical and quoted Clausewitz to us, who have commanded larger forces than C ever heard of.” Now consider Irving’s translation:

He pontificated to them about Clausewitz, the great Prussian military philosopher—who had commanded forces, as Patton remarked in rejoinder, that were neither mechanized nor one quarter so numerous as the 450,000 men under his command alone.

Far too much is added here and error is introduced: Patton’s diary lists several items he himself brought up or commented on at the meeting, and this is not one of them; Patton would never make the error of identifying Clausewitz as a commander, etc. In the attempt to recreate the scene, in short, Irving takes liberties that mislead his readers. What, then, are we to conclude when he reports gossip about illegal smuggling by Lord Tedder or describes General Spaatz as “the kind of general who disliked being separated from his bourbon too long?” Perhaps Irving should consider a new career writing so-called docu-dramas for commercial television.

Occasionally, nonetheless, Irving’s insights on issues of importance are suggestive. One example concerns the spring 1945 question of whether to engage in a race against the Russians for Berlin. This question, doomed to eternal debate, has again been reopened by Weigley’s suggestion that such a course was indeed feasible. Irving, on the other hand, offers a three-point answer for Eisenhower’s refusal to go along:

[He] checked the directives that had been issued to him by the CCS. They said nothing about capturing Berlin. He decided to give Berlin a miss—he was getting sick and tired of this war anyway. . . . [And besides,] Kansas plainsman Eisenhower feared no Russians—even later he would explain that in their generous instincts, in their healthy, direct outlook on the affairs of workaday life, the Russians bore a marked similarity to the average American.

Neither of these authors makes much of the point that Berlin was well within the previously agreed-on Russian zone of occupation or that where we did penetrate that zone we quickly withdrew after V-E Day. But (1) add that fact to Irving’s comments about Ike’s being tired of the war and fearing no Russians, and then (2) assume his unwillingness to risk further casualties on a prestige target that
would probably have to be turned over to the
Russians anyway, and then (3) the case for the
gamble suggested by Weigley loses force.

Another great controversy treated by both
Weigley and Irving is the subject of W. W.
Rostow's *Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy*, a
most welcome analysis of a topic of indisputable
current relevance to a service seemingly
forever hung up over targeting questions relat­
ing to air interdiction of surface forces. (Weig­
ley's account captures the essential issues, Irv­
ing's the atmosphere—but with typical excess,
referring to "unremitting strife" [sic] between
General Spaatz and Sir Arthur Harris and at
one point in the debate picturing Harris as
"wad [ing] in, fists swinging." Good grief!)
The question at issue in early 1944 was how
best to employ the bomber forces to pave the
way for the coming invasion—whether to con­
centrate them on marshaling yards inland from
the intended point of assault or, instead, to
make oil—in particular aviation gasoline pro­
duction facilities in Germany—the primary
target, thereby forcing an air battle aimed at
assuring air superiority prior to the landings.
Or at least that's how the question is usually
posed. But as Rostow, an eyewitness to the
events he describes, makes clear

on March 25 Eisenhower was presented with false
alternatives: marshalling yards versus oil. The
ture alternatives were oil [production facilities]
plus a sustained systematic attack on bridges and
[fuel & ammo] dumps, versus marshalling yards
[alone].

How this came about, why General Spaatz al­
lowed it to happen, why General Eisenhower
decided the issue as he did, and how it hap­
pened that by D-Day bridges and oil as well as
railroad centers had become approved targets
are the subjects of this truly engaging memoir.
The acrimony surrounding this debate took
many years to surface, but it is now fully in the

open thanks in part to the 1978 publication of
Solly Zuckerman's autobiography, *From Apes
to Warlords*, a volume revealing personal van­
ity on a scale that would bring a blush to the
cheeks of a Henry Kissinger or Howard Cosell.
Determined to justify the position he had taken
thirty-four years earlier, Lord Zuckerman con­
fused what he knew with what he assumed,
challenged the *bona fides* of other participants,
and mumbled incessantly about the "novices"
he had been required to work with. He still
cannot accept the fact that the final result de­
erived from compromise undertaken for reasons
to which he was not privy.†

In tracing the roots of compromise and ac­
commodation, Rostow takes the reader "into
the arena of power, vested interest, and person­
ality where forces quite different from straight­
forward intellectual argument were at work." It
is in this respect that he performs his most
valuable service—and has managed, in the
process, to produce a ready-made case study of
air interdiction that should be required reading
at the staff and war colleges. The equipment
and specific targets may be different today, but
the arena of decision—strong wills and con­
flicting opinion—is not, computer-assisted
decision-making notwithstanding.

†Stephen E. Ambrose with Richard H. Immerman, *Ike's Spies: Eisen­
hower and the Espionage Establishment* (Garden City, New York: Double­
that the freewheeling Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the fifties owed its loose reins in good part to Ike’s wartime experience with the benefits that can accrue to undercover operations. Little is new in the account of intrigues in North Africa, the deception plan for Normandy (Operation Fortitude), or the glories of possessing the Ultra secret—some seized, as at Mortain/Falaise; some squandered, as during the German buildup for the Ardennes counteroffensive in December 1944. But the author’s brisk and sprightly presentation is a big plus. So also are some of his asides: when FDR secretly dispatched diplomat Robert Murphy to England, General Marshall, concerned that Murphy not be noticed while en route, gave him a false name and fake uniform, commenting that “nobody ever pays any attention to a lieutenant colonel.”

Then, following a capsule account of the CIA’s evolution in the Truman years, Ambrose treats the president’s role in the CIA escapades in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indochina (1953-56), Hungary (1955-56), Indonesia (1958), and involving the U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union (1956-60). Ambrose makes it clear that the operations of the CIA from 1953 through 1960 were considered small potatoes by the President, entrusted in their operational details to Allen Dulles, but always with the clear understanding that the boss had to be brought in if things got serious.

As invariably happens with covert operations, such was not always the case. Ike’s hidden-hand approach led some subordinates to plan everything so as to assure a case for plausible deniability at the top. One result was the agency-inspired assassination plotting against Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba, with which CIA Director Dulles can be connected but regarding which Ike’s knowledge or role cannot be shown. Eisenhower loyalists insist it is inconceivable that he could have ordered up murder plots; Dulles loyalists counter that their man would never have dared move in such matters unless cleared by the president. One suspects that this jury will remain out just as long as the one still trying to decide Henry II’s exact role in Thomas à Becket’s murder in the cathedral at Canterbury on December 29, 1170.

The much-heralded “CIA-inspired coups” in Iran and Guatemala, Ambrose reminds us, were in fact minor involvements that could well have turned out just as they did even had our agents been out of town on vacation. This view accords with that of Ray S. Cline, a former deputy director of the CIA, recently set forth in Cline’s preposterously mistitled The CIA under Reagan, Bush, and Casey; it is also a timely reminder to writers of the post-Vietgate era who see all-powerful spooks everywhere they look. They should also recall that the late fifties’ legend of CIA invincibility was widely accepted at the time as both necessary and good; James Bond may have been a British agent, but most of his fans were Americans.

Three other recent books treating the presidential years merit brief notice. William Bragg Ewald served as a speech writer in the White House (1954-56), then as an assistant to the Interior Secretary (1957-61), and finally as the research assistant to Ike while the retired president was preparing his memoirs between 1961 and 1965. His Eisenhower the President is a delightful compilation of anecdotes centering on fifteen different but significant “features of the man and his presidency.” The thematic arrangement makes for much jumping around in time, but many of the author’s insights are refreshing and suggestive. Particularly intriguing is the inclusion of numerous tidbits from early drafts of Ike’s presidential memoirs,

Worrying about the Future, Way Back in 1956 and in 1961

... from a 1956 letter to his old friend Everett E. "Swede" Hazlett (then Captain, USN, Ret) who in 1910 had convinced Ike to apply for Annapolis. (It turned out that Eisenhower was too old, so he had to settle for West Point.)

American strength is a combination of economic, moral, and military force.... Let us not forget that the Armed Services are to defend a "way of life," not merely land, property or lives. So what I try to make the Chiefs realize is that they are men of sufficient stature, training and intelligence to think of this balance—the balance between minimum requirements in the costly implements of war and the health of our economy.... Some day there is going to be a man sitting in my present chair who has not been raised in the military services and who will have little understanding of where slashes in their estimates can be made with little or no damage. If that should happen while we still have the state of tension that now exists in the world, I shudder to think of what could happen in this country.

(from Ewald, pp. 248-49)

... from his final address to the American people, 17 January 1961

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties.... But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs.... We can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations. This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.... Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite....

As we peer into society's future, we—you and I, and our government—must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

(from Public Papers of the President of the United States, 1960-61, Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1961, pp. 1035-40)
Mandate for Change and Waging Peace.\textsuperscript{13} He struggles manfully with Ike’s weaker moments, as when he failed to come to the defense of George Marshall during the 1952 campaign, his old boss having been outrageously slandered by the likes of Senators McCarthy and Jenner; something about traitorous conduct in having lost China, as if China had ever been anyone’s to lose!

The author’s tone seems a bit awestruck occasionally, but he was young then and undoubtedly quite caught up in the heady atmosphere of Washington (where some who serve fall prey to mistaking their place for the center of the universe). One can only wish that Ewald’s editor and publisher had not cut back so much on what was obviously a much longer manuscript and allowed space for detailed documentation of all quotations and citations. An annotation technique like Ferrell’s in The Eisenhower Diaries would have doubled this book’s value while adding only marginally to its production cost.

Donald Neff’s Warriors at Suez\textsuperscript{†} tells the story of the most bizarre episode of Eisenhower’s years: the British, French, and Israeli attempt in 1956 to seize the Suez Canal following its nationalization by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Both Guy Mollet of France and Anthony Eden of England were totally blind to the emergence of Arab nationalism, convincing themselves that Hitler and Munich had reappeared in the guise of Nasser and the canal. Together with Israeli Premier David Ben Gurion they launched a cynical and ludicrous conspiracy, largely without the knowledge of their respective cabinets, and according to a plan of operations vigorously denounced in advance by the likes of Lord Louis Mountbatten and the brilliant French Major General André Beaufre; commented the latter on seeing the operations plan:

“Indubitably, we are now in cloud cuckoo-land.”

Eisenhower had difficulty believing either that the British were serious or that Britain and France were in covert collusion with Israel; in addition, he too revealed little understanding of Nasser’s goals, especially after the latter had turned to the Russians for military and economic aid after being turned down by the West. Even more important, neither the president nor his advisors understood that for both Arabs and Jews peace was less important than security; that, “in the final analysis, land was perceived as more important by these two ancient Semitic peoples than peace or even life itself. The Eisenhower Administration did not understand this unyielding attitude on both sides any more than later Administrations did.” (p. 124)

As the ensuing \textit{opéra bouffe} unfolded, “the White House crackled with barrack-room language the like of which had not been heard since the days of General Grant,” reported columnist James Reston. Eisenhower’s eventual efforts to help the British save what little face remained theirs to claim speak to his unremitting efforts to seek a balance between extremists in the pursuit of peace. Those given to reading history as an antidote to despair, as proof that no matter how bad things are at the moment they have earlier been worse, will find some solace in this well-told tale. They will also find, as if any more were needed, yet another sobering reminder of the frailty of NATO support for any action that endangers the oil lifeline.

The final book to be mentioned here might well be the best starting place for the general reader seeking only the broad outlines of the postwar topics and themes addressed thus far. In Eisenhower and the Cold War, Robert A. Divine, distinguished diplomatic historian at the University of Texas, presents what must

have begun as four lectures, each of which treats a topic of continuing relevance: Eisenhower and the Presidency; Massive Retaliation and Asia; Eisenhower and the Middle East; and Eisenhower and the Russians.† Each chapter is an essay that can stand by itself, and each stresses one or more of the revisionists' favorite themes: Ike's serenity under pressure; his control over the allegedly freewheeling Secretary of State John Foster Dulles;16 his deliberate ambiguity in responding to questions affecting either individuals or on-going activities; his conviction that nuclear weapons had outmoded war for useful purposes; his preference for conciliation over confrontation; and finally his bitter disappointment at having failed to moderate either the Cold War or the nuclear arms race.

Part of the reason accounting for the revival of interest in the Eisenhower years is undoubtedly pure nostalgia. United States business and industrial production were at the highest level in peacetime history; the nation was steelmaker to the world; imported cars held a miniscule 0.5 percent of the market; the prime rate hovered around 3 percent and never went past 4.5 percent; the two million unemployed represented less than 3 percent of the labor force; inflation was held to an annual rate of 1.5 percent; the Dow Jones industrials rose from 280 to 615 over Ike's eight years in office.17 Eisenhower was genuinely popular and trusted, his Gallup Poll approval rating averaging 64 percent and dropping below 50 percent only twice in 96 monthly polls.

Another part of the reason, however, is rapidly growing concern over foreign and defense policy, the federal budget, and the likelihood of nuclear war—whether "theater," "limited," or all out. To an increasing number of critics, Eisenhower is beginning to look like the last president who had a handle on such matters, the president most superbly equipped by experience and temperament for truly consequential decision that the postwar world has seen.18 And yet, in one of these areas, that concerning nuclear weapons, he failed completely and must bear primary responsibility for leading the public into looking on such weapons as just one more arrow in our quiver. Such was no part of his intent.

Almost immediately following his inaugural he assigned an aide, C. D. Jackson, to prepare a speech informing the world of the new dangers posed by the hydrogen bomb. "Dubbing his assignment Operation Candor, Jackson prepared draft after draft, only to have Eisenhower reject them on grounds that they were too somber and pessimistic." (Ambrose, p. 111) Then, having cut the defense budget from $50 billion to $40 billion, he bowed to the insistence of the Joint Chiefs that their reduced resources would require them to employ nuclear weapons in any major confrontation. NSC 162/2, adopted on 30 October 1953, stated specifically that "in the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions." In his "Atoms for Peace" address before the U.N. General Assembly two months later, he remarked that atomic weapons have "virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services"; on 13 March 1955, at the height of the crisis in the Formosa/Taiwan Strait and in response to a reporter's question about the possible use of "tactical atomic weapons," Eisenhower responded: "Now, in any combat where these things can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else." And so it went, by March of 1956 becom-

ing entombed in NSC 5602/1 (entitled “Basic National Security Policy” but nonetheless classified Top Secret).  

Eisenhower’s penchant for providing broad planning latitude led him to approve such documents, but approval was premised on his holding personal control on the trigger. And the fact was that he had no intention of employing nuclear weapons. He was a finite deterrent man to the core, firmly convinced that an assured capability to obliterate Moscow was all that was needed to hold in check Russian designs against western Europe or the United States. “Massive” retaliation for him was nothing more than retaliation via a few well-placed nuclear weapons. He saw no need for thousands of bombers or missiles to make the threat credible, and never fell for the argument that the United States had to be able to destroy the Soviet Union in order to deter the Kremlin. The so-called bomber and missile gaps of the late fifties he dismissed as nonsense for two reasons: first, he knew, from the U-2 flights, that the Russians had at best a handful of intercontinental ballistic missiles as against our three dozen or so; and second, since a few deliverable weapons would suffice to deter, he worried about a more real and present danger—an uncontrolled arms race that could lead to unmanageable inflation and ultimate bankruptcy. He failed during his lifetime to make these points clear. His calculated ambiguity backfired on him, leading directly toward the results he most feared.  

Our relations with NATO are much in the news these days, exacerbated by differences regarding the proper response to events in Poland, resentments regarding a planned Soviet natural-gas pipeline to the West, and a burgeoning antinuclear movement spawned by the December 1979 decision to deploy nuclear-tipped Pershing II missiles and ground launched cruise missiles, and coupled with genuine fear in Europe about the casualness with which the President and Secretary of Defense have responded to theoretical questions about “theater” nuclear warfare. (In their present mood our allies hardly needed to hear the following comment from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a Senate defense appropriation subcommittee on 2 March: “Our troops are over there to defend the United States. . . . I’d much rather defend in Europe than somewhere back from Europe.”)  

Once again there are mumblings in the Senate about withdrawing some of our forces from Europe, bringing back memories of the Mansfield amendments of the early seventies, a movement that eventually failed in 1978 but by a close vote of 51 to 44. What almost no one remembers today, however, is General Eisenhower’s recommendations of 1963 on troop withdrawals.  

In a little noticed Saturday Evening Post article entitled “Let’s Be Honest with Ourselves,” the retired President recalled that the original purpose for encouraging a coalition in western Europe was to create a means of balancing Soviet power and thereby limit American involvement in European affairs; that this changed in 1950-51 (with the decision to form an integrated military headquarters) to a view that the United States should provide the equivalent of six infantry divisions, “which were to be regarded as an emergency [i.e., temporary] reinforcement of Europe while our hard-hit allies were rebuilding their economies and capabilities for supporting defense.” He then proposed that the emergency had been met and that it was time to withdraw five of those six divisions. “One American division in Europe can ‘show the flag’ as definitely as can several.” It would also be helpful at this time, he went on to put all of our troops abroad on a “hardship basis”—that is, send them on shortened tours of foreign duty and without their families, as we do in Korea. Unless we take definite action, the maintaining of permanent troop establishments abroad will continue to overburden our balance-of-payments problem and, most important, will discourage the development of the necessary military strength Western European countries should provide for themselves.
A few weeks later (17 November 1963), appearing on ABC’s “Issues and Answers,” he presented the same views to a much larger audience, provoking startled responses from representatives of the “eastern establishment” and bidding fair to reopen the whole question of the specific form our European commitment (which he was not about to abandon) should take. The news from Dallas only five days later buried this initiative; it was time to rally round the new president and show support for current policies.

The one defense-related area of growing concern today that Eisenhower managed with unexampled finesse was the defense budget. For more than two decades now, defenders of proposed defense outlays have been at pains to illustrate decreasing expenditures for defense as compared to the percentage of the budget committed to social programs. This is a fact, the relevance of which, however, is judiciously left unstated. The other fact is that the social programs that now command so large a share of our resources did not then exist. Had he been faced with the necessity of including provision for such programs, Eisenhower would have been even much stricter than he was about defense expenditures. He would have striven mightily to force a balance between conflicting requirements. It is quite simply inconceivable to picture him going along with a $180 billion defense increase married to a $750 billion tax cut, let alone accepting projected deficits such as are now proposed. In a curious way, his struggles, had he been faced with such staggering fiscal problems as we now contend with, might well have resulted in his having made more progress in the field of arms control.

On such conundrums do the Ikophiles ponder, as they worry about a secretary of defense who is too frequently interviewed, sometimes even discussing (as one wag put it) “MX missiles as though they were cigarette lighters”; a recent secretary of state clear enough on Europe to be labeled soft by the far right and therefore driven to find opportunities closer by to prove he was hard-nosed; and a president who was perceived during the election campaign as having a respect for the senior military bordering on awe. Their concern on this last point is analogous to that of John P. Roche recalling his days as an advisor to Lyndon Johnson: “On numerous occasions I saw L.B.J. with the Joint Chiefs, and the Commander-in-Chief almost snapped to attention and saluted when all those medals filed into the Oval Office. Ike, by contrast, could tell [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral] Radford that he was out of his tree and then relax at the movies.”

Washington, someone has written, is a town so obsessed with the present that anyone who can remember the Eisenhower administration is viewed as understanding the full sweep of human history. To the extent this is true, perhaps it is not too much to hope that the recent reawakening of interest in those far off days might rekindle an interest in promoting another new look at foreign and defense policies that still, after almost two years of a new administration, have a disconcertingly ad hoc quality about them.

Montgomery, Alabama

Notes
80, pp. 575-99. Greenstein is the Henry Luce Professor of Politics, Law, and Society at Princeton and acknowledged leader of the revisionists. His well-argued and generously documented article is the best short summary of the relevant literature. Disappointingly shallow but nonetheless revealing a full 180 degree turn by its author is Arthur Schlesinger’s “The Eisenhower Presidency: A Reassessment,” Look, May 14, 1979, pp. 40-49. For the truly serious student, the Eisenhower Library (Abilene, Kansas 67410) offers its Selected Bibliography of Periodical and Dissertation Literature (1981, 162 pages, $3.25), which cites 740 articles in more than 300 journals, along with 550 dissertation titles.


3. The theme of Kempton’s article (note 1): “It was the purpose of his existence never to be seen in what he did.” On the second aspect, see the Diaries and the testimony of Ambrose on page 27 of the article cited in note 2.

4. John P. Roche, “Eisenhower Redux,” New York Times Book Review, June 28, 1981, p. 12. Roche, who served as a special assistant under President Johnson and is now dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, has little patience with several of the books mentioned in this essay. His review of four of them (Ferrell, Divine, and Cook) leads with the following right (left?) hook: “These volumes are an ecologist’s nightmare; one shudders to the diaries, pp. xv-xvi.)

5. Volumes VI to IX were published by The Johns Hopkins University Press on January 29, 1979, copyright 1978. (Volumes I to V, The War Years, appeared in 1970 and revealed a man, in J. Kenneth Galbraith’s words, “firmly and unpretentiously literate.” The Johns Hopkins series contains some but not all parts of the diaries for the period December 1941 through February 1948, the period thus far covered; see the discussion in Ferrell’s introduction to the diaries, pp. xv-xvi.)


8. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940-45 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), p. 557; The War between the Generals, p. 270 for quoted lines describing September 1944 meeting; p. 71 for gossip re Tedder; p. 69 for quotation re Spaatz. (On the preceding page, by the way, we are informed that General Spaatz “had a face like a rusty nail.”)

9. Irving, pp. 399-400.

10. Rostow, p. 43.

11. For an earlier account of this controversy, see the present writer’s Strategic Bombing in World War II (New York and London, 1976), pp. 18-20, 75-78, and 174-75; for Lord Zuckerman’s querulous comments on that source, see From Apes to Warlords (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 388-89; for an example of the uproar that followed publication of Lord Zuckerman’s account, see the continuing controversy in the pages of Encounter: November 1978, pp. 39-43; June 1979, pp. 86-89; August-September 1980, pp. 100-02.


14. A recent example, directly related to our subject, is Blanche Wiesen Cook’s The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1981), xxiv + 432 pages. Cook’s tone ranges from agitated to shrill; she seems convinced that Eisenhower was at all times and in all matters fostering the worldwide pursuit of psychological and economic warfare. Ike is seen as a “captive president” and pronounced guilty by association. (This book should not be confused with Virgil Pinklely’s Eisenhower Declassified, a chatty, informal biography by an old friend: Old Tappan, New Jersey: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1979, 400 pages.)

15. Both published by Doubleday & Company: the first, covering 1953-56, in 1963; the second, covering 1956-61, in 1965. For the tidbits referred to see Ewald’s index entries under Mandate for Change and Waging Peace.


18. Murray Kempton (note 1) went even further, ending the sentence paraphrased here with the words, “[that] we may ever have had.”


20. See, in support of this unpopular interpretation, Ambrose, Ike’s Spies, pp. 255, 275-78.


23. On 18 November, New York Times buried its report of the television interview in a short column on page 15. The following day it reported, on page 10, that former Secretary of State Dean Acheson deplored the prospect of another “great debate” on the issue, singling out both the former president and George F. Kennan for raising doubts. On 20 November, James Reston joined the fray in a column headed, “How to destroy the things you love.”


CBS NEWS, GENERAL WESTMORELAND, AND THE PATHOLOGY OF INFORMATION

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EVAN H. PARROTT, JR.

It is often the most successful images that become the most dangerous. The image becomes institutionalized in the ceremonial and coercive institutions of society. It acquires thereby a spurious stability. As the world moves on, the image does not.

Kenneth Boulding
The Image

OVER the past ten years or so, military viewers of television programs from CBS News have not been given much reason to believe that the network could report or document military matters with the degree of thoroughness and balance one might hope for from a national network. We all remember "The Selling of the Pentagon," that flawed, poorly edited 1971 documentary tried to substantiate a charge that the Department of Defense's public relations efforts were just that, designed to sell" Pentagon weapon systems and projects to the public. Instead, and because it tended to focus on short, dramatic, manipulated quotes, caused more criticism of itself than the target or which it was intended. Late in 1981, another CBS-TV News documentary, an ambitious and lengthy prime-time series called The Defense of the United States," ran for five consecutive nights. It was called a "documentary epic" by some; many others (mostly outside the defense industry) were equally infatuated, terming it one of the best programs in TV news history.

The anchorman for the series was Dan Rather, who stated that he hoped the "Defense" series would "start the debate rolling in every town and city in America" about defense ending in general and the Reagan buildup in particular. Special antipathy was directed toward the nuclear aspects of defense. That this program caused the current debate over nuclear weapons is questionable. There is no question, however, that, very much like "The Selling of the Pentagon," it was awash in hyperbole and distortion, inadequately supported by a parade of so-called experts. "The Defense of the United States" series suffered from the same flaws that tend to plague numerous other news documentaries about the military: poor research, perceptual rigidity and analysis, unsupported statements by the narrator-reporter, simplistic and attention-grabbing statistics, and the headline approach to news. Although obviously expensive and slickly produced, the series came across to this viewer decidedly one-sided—that is, against the defense buildup—and intellectually narrow in its scope and explanation of the real issues facing the United States defense strategy these days.

But a more recent effort by the network, despite almost instantaneous criticism, was a little more thorough. Actually, "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception" and featuring Mike Wallace as the principal reporter was quite remarkable. Although it has become extremely controversial since it was shown in January 1982, it met the general conditions of what a documentary should be: it had rather detailed and thorough research, highly quali-
fied experts on camera with many statements pro and con, and, on balance, quite a good approach to a very difficult topic. It was a somewhat painful look back at events that, according to the telecast, led to the Tet offensive—the enemy attack that shook to its roots U.S. public opinion and determination to continue the fight. This topic has been probed deeply before, but this documentary’s central theme was that General William Westmoreland, for political reasons, withheld information from the political decision-makers in Washington. The information he allegedly withheld concerned new estimates of the strength of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese regulars, a strength that dramatically increased in the months just prior to the attack. According to the report, mere acceptance of those estimates, which included a previously “uncounted enemy,” probably would have prepared U.S. forces better for the offensive to come.

Almost immediately, there was an explosion of public comment pro and con. A few days after the broadcast, General Westmoreland called a news conference to denounce the documentary, describing the whole effort as “a preposterous hoax.” Convinced otherwise, columnist William F. Buckley called it a “truly extraordinary documentary” and called for a congressional investigation. Two weeks later, after apparently receiving some criticism for that stance, Buckley reiterated his call for a congressional review, stating he was

... prepared if necessary to be offended, surprised, outraged and to the extent possible... vindicated, in order to use the subpoena power of government to put these people on the witness stand and attempt to find out what went wrong.

Just as quickly, other distinguished commentators came to the defense of General Westmoreland and hotly criticized the broadcast. TV Guide did research of its own and, with the help of inside-CBS sources who leaked unedited transcripts, titled its report “Anatomy of a Smear: How CBS News Broke the Rules and ‘Got’ General Westmoreland.” TV Guide claimed that CBS began the project already convinced a conspiracy had taken place and “turned a deaf ear toward evidence that suggested otherwise.”

It was evident even during the broadcast that CBS did not substantiate the allegation of conspiracy or deception by General Westmoreland or anyone else. That was a major weakness of the telecast and has since cast doubt on the credibility of the entire program. The network did, however, obtain the compelling statements of a group of mostly unfriendly retired military officers who were involved with the production of intelligence estimates at the time. The documentary claimed that new estimates on the enemy’s strength were massaged, manipulated downward in order to make them more palatable to General Westmoreland, the White House, and the Congress. One of the key intelligence officers serving at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) at the time was Colonel Gaines Hawkins. When he brought the revised figures in question to General Westmoreland—figures which included guerrilla-militia members of the Vietcong organization—General Westmoreland allegedly asked Hawkins: “What am I going to tell the press? What am I going to tell the Congress? What am I going to tell the President?” General Westmoreland then reportedly told Hawkins to “take another look at these figures.”

The MACV intelligence officers were said to have sympathizers at other organizations who were also trying to persuade their seniors of the “real” strength of the enemy. The intelligence officer who was central to this issue in the United States was CIA analyst Sam Adams. Adams claimed that, had his views been accepted, the United States would not have been surprised by the Tet offensive in 1968. The basis for Adams’s analysis, as with the analysis at MACV, was captured enemy documents which suggested that an additional 200,000 guerrilla-militia personnel ought to be counted in the armed strength of the Vietcong. These were the “uncounted enemy.” Adams claims he
attempted to report his findings through chan­
nels but, according to his 1975 article pub­
lished in Harper’s:

Nothing happened. No phone calls from any­body. On Wednesday, I still thought there might be some terrible mistake; Thursday I thought the news might have been so important that people were still trying to decide what to do with it. Instead, on Friday, the memorandum dropped back in my in-box. There was no comment on it at all—no request for amplification, no question about my numbers, nothing, just a routine slip attached showing that the entire CIA hierarchy had read it . . . I was aghast. Here I had come up with 200,000 additional enemy troops, and the CIA hadn’t even bothered to ask me about it, let alone tell anybody else.12

There were major weaknesses in the CBS documentary, with that there is no argument. Whether it met or broke the rules of TV docu­
mentary will be debated for some time to come, perhaps in a congressional investigation. CBS has, in fact, admitted that some of the rules of journalistic procedure were indeed violated. Although CBS News Division President Van Gordon Sauter stated that the network still "stands by this broadcast," CBS admitted publicly there were some violations in the production. Sauter even said the term "conspiracy" was "inappropriate."13 One fascinating aspect of the telecast—but not a central theme—was the human tendency to avoid passing on bad news after a position has been firmly taken by the highest decision-makers. That was not treated in any depth in the 90-minute docu­
mentary but came out several times during inter­views. For military members there is a lesson in this entire episode: if there was no "conspir­
cy," there was at least the very human trait of reluctance to accept and pass on the higher­
imates of enemy strength—estimates that ended to challenge and weaken a previous po­
ition firmly adhered to by the MACV staff and possibly higher staffs.

Wallace: Was President Johnson a difficult man to feed bad news about the war?

General Westmoreland: Well, Mike, you

know as well as I do that people in senior positions love good news. Politicians or leaders in countries are inclined to—to shoot the mes­senger that brings the bad news. Certainly he wanted bad news like a hole in the head.14

General Westmoreland appeared to put him­self directly into the middle of the enemy strength controversy during the following se­
quence (which apparently was filmed in separate interviews):

General Joseph McChristian (U.S. Army, Retired): And when General Westmoreland saw the large increase in the figures that we had developed, he was quite disturbed by it. And by (the) time I left his office, I had the definite impression that he felt if he sent those figures back to Washington at that time, it would create a political bombshell.

General Westmoreland: I was not about to send Washington something that was specious. And in my opinion, it was specious.

Wallace: But General Joseph McChristian, a man whom you call a superb intelligence chief, he's the fellow who comes in and says, General, we've been wrong. There are twice as many people out there.

General Westmoreland: Well, I—I have great admiration for General McChristian, and he did . . . a good job. But in this case I disagreed with him—with him, and other members of my staff disagreed with him.15

A bit later in the telecast, General Westmore­
land stated he did not accept the revised figures because of "political reasons." In perhaps the most damaging and dramatic scene, he said on camera that "the people in Washington were not sophisticated enough to understand and evaluate this [militia-guerrilla] thing, and neither was the media."16 If this was not taken out of context, the former commanding general of all forces in Vietnam admitted in front of a national television audience that, for whatever reason, he rejected intelligence information that, with his imprimatur, could have had an impact on higher decision-makers. If true, General Westmoreland's decision had,
to say the least, a “chilling effect” on the production of more realistic and accurate intelligence, at least on the MACV staff.

Another important aspect to keep in mind about the CBS documentary is that rejections of reality are not isolated events. Cognitive dissonance occurs rather frequently in the intelligence business, or in any other career field where imperfect information must be filled in with estimates. And, although U.S. intelligence has a pretty good track record, this system is buffeted by the bureaucratic windstorms that face any large organization which has acquired information that could cause the leadership to “lean forward in the foxhole.” The intelligence process is a system of complex and sophisticated relationships. It is fundamentally strong, but there are parts of the system that have inherent weaknesses that can lead to, or directly contribute to, intelligence failures.

The intelligence system is much like a cobweb, strong as a whole for its purpose but with linkages and connectivity only as strong as each of its major strands. The anchors of the system are the “ints”—like PHOTINT, HUMINT, or SIGINT—that make up the inputs for analysis which is usually the final intelligence product. One of the most common weaknesses in this environment is the tendency to be human. The incapacity of decision-makers, for whatever reason, to handle the nature and flow of information coming to them can be characterized as a human response failure. The key ingredients here are perception and predisposition, and they can be affected by changing situations and circumstances. This tendency does not in itself constitute conspiratorial leanings. It is well known—and well developed in psychological and political-science writings—that perceptions and predispositions govern the way decision-makers, indeed all people, react to events around them. But these misperceptions and predispositions can be the pathogens of any information system. None of this is new; however, understanding these natural human frailties is fundamental for understanding why the MACV senior staff may have acted the way it did when confronted with information that undermined not only the military capability to deal with an enemy but also a personal and public image.

Wallace: . . . put yourself in General Westmoreland’s shoes in the troubled spring of 1967. He had just used very specific figures to assure the President that the enemy was losing strength, that we were winning the war of attrition. And now the President was forcing Westmoreland to put that message on the record [to Congress] for the American public, to assure them that General Westmoreland believed we were on the road to victory.

Despite the label of “deception,” the most that can be said about General Westmoreland’s statements is that he probably did what commanders around the world do every day—make decisions. Commanders, business leaders, and ordinary people make decisions based on information available to them, imperfect as it is, and on their images of reality—perceptions formed over and affected by time, circumstances, and situations. Was it logical and rational to expect the commanding general, a professional soldier deeply committed to and probably firmly believing he was winning a war, to accept another quarter-million pajama-clothed, lightly armed “political cadre” as constituting any real additional threat to his modern American forces? And what about those captured documents that gave the “lone analyst” at CIA his new evidence? It is not too farfetched to note that almost everyone in Vietnam at the time could produce a captured document to “prove” anything. Even another winter-spring offensive was well known. (What apparently was not known was the scope and intensity.) In the brilliance of 20-20 hindsight, many are inclined to say that General Westmoreland should have accepted the new figures and been better prepared for the Tet offensive. But then again, no one could have predicted the consequences of that enemy campaign, at least in terms of the damage to U.S. public support. Would the out-
come of Tet-68 have changed if General Westmoreland had accepted the analysis of his intelligence officers? Is that to say that the Johnson administration would have accepted the revised figures or, more important, would he have accepted the impact those figures could have had on U.S. troop levels? All of that is conjecture and unimportant at this time. We did win the battle, as General Westmoreland insists and informed military analysts acknowledge, but it was a massive "defeat" in the view of the press. Most important, American public opinion, which had only been slightly removed by the drawn-out fighting and remained firmly supportive of U.S. goals in Vietnam, took a fateful and decidedly downward turn after Tet 1968. It is a rather sad fact to note that, when Walter Cronkite declared the war over, the "home front" was effectively lost.20

Several other important observations can be made in reviewing the CBS documentary. First, television news and documentary can, if properly researched and presented, be very effective—even devastating—in impact. Although heavy criticism has been leveled at the program, "The Uncounted Enemy" presented a very substantial case, violations of journalistic procedure aside. It was astonishing to see so many presumably reliable high-ranking witnesses to Vietnam history recount on camera how critical information was weighed, measured, manipulated, absorbed, or discarded.

Even following the Tet offensive, "CBS Reports" claims the official myth of enemy strength persisted for a while.

Wallace: . . . MACV intelligence, meanwhile, went ahead and produced its first official estimate of enemy strength after Tet. . . . And this is Commander James Meacham, the officer in charge of putting out that report. . . . I quote from his letter [home to his wife after allegedly taking the first Order of Battle report after Tet]: "We started with the answer, and plugged in all sorts of figures until we found the combination which the machine could digest. And then we wrote all sorts of estimates showing why the figures were right which we had to use, and we continue to win the war."21

There have been other "CBS Reports" documentaries about the military. Some of them, like the examples cited earlier in this report, had elements of hucksterism and show business, rather than the major elements of thorough research and hard news. CBS News deserves major credit for bringing history up close—some of the personalities, pressure, and lessons of a difficult time in American history. And it is encouraging that CBS launched an internal investigation in response to criticism about the broadcast and hung out some of its journalistic dirty laundry for all to see. It is most unfortunate, however, that the name and distinguished career of an outstanding combat commander have been besmirched by the rather indiscriminate use of the words "deception" and "conspiracy." That is a journalistic excess that should have been caught and changed long before TV Guide obtained excised transcripts from the CBS News cutting-room floor. It will be helpful, however, when CBS News answers all the charges against it for "Uncounted Enemy." The network reportedly is preparing a special broadcast in response to all the charges against its original documentary.

For the military member, the filmed interviews do cause us to focus on yet another important example of the impact of perceptions and predispositions on the decision process. These cognitive processes are formed and fine-tuned over many years and throughout many difficult, problem-solving situations. Success has often been an indicator of previous good judgment and balanced reasoning, not to mention successful estimations using imperfect information. But the desire to achieve unity and making the decision-maker's job as smooth as possible are psychological factors that often play crucial roles, especially in times of crisis. They are also key contributors to the pathology of the decision process. In Vietnam, for exam-
ple, the American public had been promised on several occasions that U.S. forces would be home by Christmas.

It is possible that some on the MACV staff had become so deeply obligated to his previously stated positions that they grew increasingly inflexible—closed to new information that seriously challenged the foundations of the past. The MACV staff's perceptions of the record of U.S. forces and their future capabilities undoubtedly had an effect throughout the estimative process and the combat operations that occurred as a result of those estimates.

It is also important to note that no special group, whether scientists, intelligence officers, or weathermen, is immune from the same pressures of internal politics, organizational structure, and decision-maker perceptions. “CBS Reports” at least tended to document how particular mind-sets can be manifested in, or the result of, a weak decisional process. Personality traits, the establishment of a cognitive reality that is closed to new and challenging information, the distortion of events—all can so condition or affect an organizational structure that it is precariously perched on a foundation of loose gravel.

Decision-makers need some kind of mechanism that will enable competing ideas and analyses to be scrubbed down, dissected, accepted, rejected, or accommodated, no matter how bad the news is in final product. One well-worn idea is the devil's advocate. Aside from its impracticality in modern military life, there is no assurance that the challenge of any “staff devil” will effect the emergence of the correct information. Depending on one's own hang-ups, there is likely to be more confusion and useless information weighing on the decision-maker's mind with such an approach.

A recent contributor to *Air University Review* has suggested a “counterpoint staff” which “would be allowed to create comprehensive assessments and freely question orthodox assessments. . . .” Such a concept is tempting and intellectually appealing but also subject to the vagaries of bureaucratic politics. Witness, for example, the fate of the “Team B” concept that in 1977 challenged and changed U.S. intelligence assessments about the Soviet Union. “Team B” was called together by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and took a friendly adversary stand against a soon-to-be-published National Intelligence Estimate. Although the estimate caused a tougher and more realistic view of Soviet capabilities and intentions, the Carter administration later disestablished the PFIAB, setting an uncomfortable precedent for devil's advocates, counterpoint staffs, or anything else that dares to challenge current policy. The Reagan administration has reestablished the PFIAB.

There remains, however, the need for any decision-maker to be at least exposed in some detail and depth to certain independent ideas and evaluation without being flooded with dubious multiple advocacies. Periodic independent policy assessment can set up the necessary feedback loop for the mature decision-maker to stop, look at the past, challenge the future, seek new ideas, and then chart a new course or press on with the old.

A controlled adversary relationship in a few key policy areas could generally serve the decision-maker well. If such a competition of ideas leads to the same conclusions, the decision-maker's confidence is reinforced. However, when the feedback loop becomes clogged with significant disagreement, the decision-maker should take this as a cue that all may not be healthy organizationally. Sometimes this will be as tough as describing the emperor’s new clothes or changing the intelligence estimate, but it is a necessary function of a staff and should be an aid to any decision-maker.

San Antonio, Texas

Notes
2. Ibid. This article is especially caustic in its analysis of the one-sided CBS documentary. It even accuses CBS of misappropriat-
AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

ing the phrase "Iron Triangle"—meant to mean the Pentagon, the
Congress, and the defense contractors, see p. 46. Overall, according
to the authors, the "documentary" would have more accurately
been called an editorial.

3. Many of the quotes to follow were taken from a transcript of
"CBS Reports 'The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception,'" as
broadcast over the CBS television network, Saturday, 23 January
1982, 9:30-11:00 p.m. EST, with CBS News correspondent Mike
Wallace, copyright MCMLXXXII CBS, Inc. Hereafter referred to as
"CBS Reports."

4. General Westmoreland is quoted from an article written by
Robert G. Kaiser in a reprint from the Washington Post, January
27, 1982, p. 3. William F. Buckley, Jr., "The Uncounted Enemy," as

5. William F. Buckley, Jr., "Westmoreland's Vietnam Numbers
(Cont.)," as reprinted from the Washington Post, February 18, 1982,
p. 23.

6. See, for example, the highly critical opinion on the merits of
the CBS documentary in "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam
Deception, A Dissenting View," Washington Journalism Review,
April 1982, pp. 46-48. In fact, the article alleges willful manipula-
tion and one-sided interviews as "Ambush Journalism." Author
Peter Braestrup states that several pro-Westmoreland witnesses were
refused TV time by CBS. See also General Maxwell D. Taylor's
answering editorial to Buckley's first column in "The Hatchet Job

News Broke the Rules and Got 'General Westmoreland,'" TV

8. Ibid., p. 4. In summing up, TV Guide stated "The inaccura-
cies, distortions, and violations of journalistic standards . . . sug-
gest that television news 'safeguards' for fairness and accuracy need
tightening, if not wholesale revision," p. 15.


10. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

11. Adams first received publicity for this attempt to bring the
"cover-up" to light in "Vietnam Cover-up: Playing War with

12. Ibid., pp. 42-44.


15. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

16. Ibid., p. 6.

17. Major Evan H. Parrott, Jr., "Intelligence Failures: A Typol-
ology and Model to Avoid Misperception," Unpublished Research

18. Ibid., p. 61.


20. The Tet offensive was extremely important in the sense that it
changed forever American perceptions about the "wily Viet Cong." See,
for example, David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New

21. Ibid., p. 23.

22. For an excellent treatment of how psychology plays a major
role in all decision-making, see Robert Jervis, Perceptions and
Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1976). An intriguing one-page article in
a recent journal suggests how even "science" has its major precepts
challenged and changed. See J. Richard Greenwell, "The Dinosaur
Vote," Science, April 1982, p. 42. For a more thorough treatment of
how science evolves, see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scien-

23. Colonel Alton L. Elliott, "The Gatsby Effect in U.S. Strategic

ISRAEL IN FOUR PERSPECTIVES

AMBASSADOR MAURICE D. BEAN

AMBASSADOR Gideon Rafael has written
a book that turns out to be at least four
books. Destination Peace, without question, is
Rafael's professional autobiography.† In addi-
tion, it is a chronicle of Israel's diplomatic
posture, progress, and survival during the first

†Gideon Rafael, Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign
Policy (Briarcliff Manor, New York: Stein and Day, 1981, $16.95), 403
pages.
three decades of its modern independence. It is also a minirecord of Israel's wars and major military engagements since independence. Lastly, Destination Peace is a collection of vignettes of the political, military, and diplomatic leadership of the modern state of Israel. It might have been better had Ambassador Rafael chosen only one of those themes or simply written four separate volumes. Each, taken by itself, could provide a fascinating and consuming tale; taken together, one senses that some aspect of each has been subsumed by one or more of the others.

Having said this, I do not dispatch Destination Peace as being unworthy of the serious reader's attention. However, I do offer the suggestion that the work should be read with all cerebral filtering systems functioning at peak efficiency. Moving through the jungle of detail presented, the reader finds trails of events abruptly halted or changed and/or paths of ideas lost in a morass of reminiscence, only to emerge suddenly elsewhere without warning or guidepost. Thus, while of great interest to readers personally or academically concerned with the Middle East, Destination Peace may not be an easy volume for the general reader to digest. In addition, its hortatory style and verbosity are not likely to earn it a place among the revered reference works on modern Israel.

Destination Peace is useful to the scholar in that it describes many key incidents and actions in Israel's modern history. However, it falls short of the scholar's needs because Rafael does not document or footnote the incidents and actions described in the book, apparently having relied solely on his memory or his personal diary for chronicling many important events. This failing would not be important were the book only an autobiography; however, inasmuch as the work contains much information of possible historical significance, the reader deserves documentary evidence of the events being described. For example, Rafael claims that the "Atoms for Peace" proposal originated with the Israeli Foreign Ministry in 1950 but was not put forward in the United Nations because of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea the same year. (p. 22) Similar assertions are made, without supporting evidence, that the diplomatic basis for Korean armistice negotiations grew from a seven-point plan developed by Israel (p. 28); that Israel and Romania were involved significantly in the establishment of secret diplomatic contacts between the United States and the People's Republic of China in 1971 (p. 97); and that the famous Iron Curtain phrase originated with former Queen Elisabeth of Belgium in 1914 rather than with Winston Churchill. (p. 102) I do not suggest that these assertions or others of historical value are not based in fact but only that their credibility and that of the book in general would be better established if they and other assertions through the book had been better documented. Rafael does an excellent job in identifying and reflecting his personal views about personalities and events. His disdain for John Foster Dulles is made quite clear (pp. 64-65), as is his low opinion of U Thant's involvement in the events prior to, and possibly causatory of, the 1967 War. (Chapter 16) Similarly, throughout the book he reflects a lack of respect for and trust of the U.S. Department of State, often making a marked distinction between the department as an entity and certain of its key personalities at any given time. Rafael also has his heroes and heroines. Throughout the book he is often highly flattering and seldom critical of David Ben Gurion, Golda Meir, and Abba Eban. Other key personalities, Israeli or other nationalities, do not receive his praise as easily nor as often.

Although Destination Peace has a heavy pro-Israeli-policy bias, it is not a totally uncritical work. In several instances Rafael asserts that some important Israeli policy failures were the result of unreconciled differences of view between the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and the Prime Minister's Office (pp. 252-53); Rafael also admits to errors in policy decisions which redounded to Israel's disadvantage, such as a missed opportunity to establish diplomatic
relations with the People’s Republic of China; and a complacent disregard for and misreading of Egyptian capabilities and intentions, which Rafael believes contributed to the initiation of the Yom Kippur War and Israel’s near defeat there. (Chapters 32-33) He also notes that certain Israeli key personalities had biases that colored their judgment at critical times (Ben Gurion, Meir, and Eban in particular). However, these spasmodic admissions of Israeli culpability tend to be overridden throughout the book by continued placement of blame on others for Israel’s problems. He is continually critical of Israel’s friends and allies when they do not accept Israeli advice and blames the United States for the lack of progress toward a permanent peace. There is no hint that Israeli intransigence from time to time may have been a contributing factor.

Rafael admits little justification for Arab attitudes vis-à-vis Israel. Nevertheless, he exhibits considerable respect for certain Arab leaders: Charles Malik of Lebanon, several Egyptian diplomats, and latterly Anwar el-Sadat earned fairly high respect quotients. As might be expected, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Yassir Arafat do not.

Despite its compositional and dictional weaknesses, possible historical inadequacies, and pardonable partisan advocacy, Destination Peace is a useful work. It presents a valuable elementary chronology of Israeli modern history and survival. It also gives the reader valuable informal insights into a three-decade period of Israeli nation-building that are not likely to be found in an ordinary academic or historical work. Rafael’s personal views and his descriptions and assessments of the key Israeli personalities make the book worth reading. The book may not change one’s views about Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict, but one completes the book with a deeper sense of understanding and appreciation for the Israeli personality and the Israeli perspective.

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in quality from one essay to the next, and sometimes they suffer from the effort to pull them all together within a single theme. Nonetheless, they usually contain a gem or two that may make them worth the price of the book.

The two books discussed here tend to tally on the plus side of this equation. Many of the essays are excellent, and a few are truly first-rate. Both books present at least one other side of each issue, either with discussants following each major essay, as in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Covert Action,† or with several essays on each subject, as in Intelligence Policy and National Security.‡‡ Between the two they raise some of the fundamental continuing dilemmas of intelligence and provide even a well-informed intelligence observer with food for thought.

Ten years ago some of the authors (e.g., Ted Shackley, Hugh Tovar, and Don Purcell) would probably have been distressed to see their names associated with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in print, much less share their firsthand knowledge of covert and clandestine action in rather forthright articles as they do in Covert Action. However, times change and so do attitudes. What does not seem to change are the dilemmas: the ingredients of success and failure in covert actions; the gain or loss from dialogue with the public; the proper balance between traditional human agents and high-technology collection devices; how to improve analysis; centralization versus decentralization of intelligence; the relationship between intelligence and policy—to name a few.

In Covert Action, Hugh Tovar, a thirty-year CIA veteran and Chief of the Covert Action staff, made the following statement about the Bay of Pigs failure:

Was it an intelligence failure? Undoubtedly, and in the grandest sense of the term. It is feckless to argue about guerrilla uprisings or the legion’s survival capabilities. They were ancillary considerations at best. The real questions developed on the idea that Castro was so shallowly rooted in Cuba that he could be shaken by psychological pressures, as Arbenz had been in Guatemala, and then ousted by a comparative handful of troops. It is easy to visualize the sequence. The concept once conceived, probably at senior level, is tested on underlings whose instincts and training guarantee an immediate can-do response. Momentum develops rapidly. Conceptualizing is superseded by planning. Policy emerges in high secrecy and, before anyone realizes it, the project is a living, pulsating, snorting entity with a dynamic all its own. Scrutiny by a disinterested body is all but out of the question under such circumstances. The people at the top get the answers they want. Once astride the tiger, options narrow and will becomes a factor in survival. (p. 198)

Perhaps no single ingredient could alone be fatal: neither the spurious assumptions that buttressed the plan, nor the compartmented secrecy which precluded its objective assessment, nor the unwillingness or inability to stop it once in train. But their cumulative effect spelled failure.

Ted Shackley lays out the ingredients for a successful counterinsurgency operation in his very fine prescriptive paper, “The Uses of Paramilitary Covert Action in the 1980’s,” in the same book. His detailed steps to be accomplished in the cadre, incipient, operational, covert war, and conventional war phases provide a valuable systematic road map for making sense out of a kind of warfare that seems on the surface to be amorphous wanderings.

Both Tovar and Shackley, without ever discussing it, make a very persuasive case for sure controls over covert action. Tovar makes a case

† Ray Godson, editor, Intelligence Requirements for the 1980’s: Covert Action (Washington: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., $7.50), 236 pages.
because so much can go wrong so easily when only a few people are in on the action and they all have something at stake in going forward; Shackley because covert actions can be complex and because they are usually inextricable from overt foreign policy initiatives and have such a high potential for undermining them.

For the past half-dozen years, the intelligence community has carefully nurtured a valuable two-way relationship with the two intelligence overseeing committees of the Congress, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Every covert action was briefed to these committees in detail. Their scrutiny—usually before the fact—guaranteed plans were well-thought-out, persuasive in their logic, and politically acceptable. Their concurrence guaranteed that should something subsequently go wrong, the intelligence community would have knowledgeable friends on the Hill who could ensure that congressional comment would be balanced and fair, and the public could be assured that their representatives supported what had been attempted. Without question his process provided a high yet reasonable standard for covert action. Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence during the Carter administration, has stated that his clearance process never prevented the United States from pursuing a covert action that was deemed necessary. The requirement to inform the Congress before the covert action is carried out no longer exists. According to recent comments in the press by committee members, the relationship between the intelligence community and the Congress is beginning to close own, with intelligence officials being less and less forthcoming. While this may make intelligence work easier and may protect against leaks, it also carries the real dangers that Hugh Tovar describes, dangers far more serious in the long run than an occasional leak.

A closed intelligence organization also will affect the quality of analysis turned out. Adda Bozeman in the same book, in an essay titled “Covert Action and Foreign Policy,” says, “. . . the most recent U.S. policy and intelligence failures have ensued from these defects in strategic thought and vision.” (Here she is describing the misperceptions she sees of the real identities of foreign states and other international actors.) “The responsibility here rests primarily with the academic community, not the Intelligence Community and not with the State Department; for it is after all the former which is traditionally charged with providing educational and professional guidance to the latter.” (p. 16)

The article by Ithiel de Sola Pool, “Approaches to Intelligence and Social Science” in Intelligence Policy and National Security, suggests that many in society are engaged in the same kind of interpretive work as the intelligence analysts.

. . . social scientists, newsmen, diplomats, and intelligence personnel all are, to a large extent, doing the same kind of work. They are all “deci-phering” a world in which information is deliberately concealed, in which there are problems of interpretation, in which prediction is difficult, and concerning which they are supposed to be more knowledgeable than the persons to whom they report. (p. 37)

Exchanging ideas, testing assumptions, and engaging in broad-based dialogue are vital to an intellectually vigorous analytic organization, to say nothing of the importance to the analyst of recognition of his work.

More than just permitting dialogue with other academics, the publication of declassified intelligence helps raise the level of public debate by providing unbiased factual data on current issues. Richard Pipes, also in Intelligence Policy, says,

We have superb information in our intelligence community, as can be seen from the publications which the CIA now releases to scholars on such subjects as the Soviet leadership. . . . The studies of the Soviet economy produced by the CIA are of high quality as well. (pp. 74-75)
Unfortunately, in the past year a conscious policy decision was made to discontinue publishing unclassified analysis as well as essentially prohibiting analysts from substantive dialogue with anyone outside the intelligence community. This is an extreme reaction to what was believed to be a burdensome incursion on analysts’ time. In fact, it effectively isolates intelligence analysts, encourages a narrowing of their perspectives, and cuts them off from the continually invigorating interaction with their colleagues outside the community, a process through which the quality of analysis is strengthened. As Richard Betts comments in “American Strategic Intelligence: Politics, Priorities, and Direction,” perhaps the best paper in Intelligence Policy, “the internal tension between security that protects collection sources and dissemination that improves finished analyses will probably continue.” (p. 255) For the moment security is ahead.

Intelligence analysis can also suffer from how analysts are organized and from the character of their relationship with policymakers. William E. Colby, in “Deception and Surprise: Problems of Analysts and Analysis” in Intelligence Policy, says, “intelligence analysis must be organised geographically rather than functionally.” (p. 95) Speaking of the same recommendation mode in 1949, he says,

... economists, the current political analysts, and the military experts were comfortably settled into separate bureaucratic islands, submitting their analyses to wise generalists to integrate into overall assessments. The effect was almost uniformly bad. The generalists approached the problem in categories, attaching supplemental economic essays to political estimates and compromising force projections after adversary proceedings between hawks and doves. Emphasis rapidly focused on current political event reporting at the expense of deeper integrative research. (p. 95)

The CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence has just reorganized itself geographically. There are good arguments for retaining its functional organization, the reinforcement and challenge of working with colleagues in the same discipline, for example, but whenever there was a crisis such as Iran or Afghanistan, an analytic task force was formed combining all the diverse disciplines needed to understand and react to the problem. In the long run it seems to make more sense to look at all problems in this interdisciplinary way.

Richard Betts, in the same article referred to earlier, comments on the generally poor communication between analyst and policymaker.

... the policymakers who consume intelligence seldom tried seriously to define what they need; indeed many had no idea. “Therefore, intelligence requirements reflect what intelligence managers think the consumers need, and equally important, what they think their organisations can produce.” (p. 252)

Unquestionably, most policymakers never learn how to get the most out of intelligence because they either will not or feel they cannot take the time to give meaningful direction to the collection and analysis process. As a result, the most they can hope for is that some prescient intelligence manager guesses right or is quick on his feet.

Another asks how well served is the policymaker despite his traditional failure to take the helm. In “United States Intelligence Activities: The Role of Congress,” Thomas K. Latimer comes to the conclusion that the record is uneven. In citing a study of the analysis of the 1973 oil embargo conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Subcommittee on Collection, Production and Quality, he says:

One of the key findings... was that certain public sources had done as good or a better job of analysing major issues involved... than had the intelligence community. The study also concluded that there had been ample data available to intelligence analysts. They simply failed to analyse adequately that data. (p. 279)

He goes on to cite warning analysis as being a continuing problem but acknowledges the
assignment of a senior intelligence officer by
the Director of Central Intelligence in 1979 as a
“major first step in improving our nation’s
warning intelligence.” He then offers the lack
of adequate warning of the Iranian revolution
as a failure of that system and the ample warn­
ing of China’s invasion of Vietnam in February
1979 as one of its successes.

However, what the average
observer usually fails to concede is that with the
diligent search for clues some kinds of events
should always be predictable while others will
never be. In both cases the warning is only as
good as its use by the policymaker. The inter­
nal weaknesses of the Shah’s government, for
example, were well known to the United States
long before his fall from power. Given the con­
straints on how much spying one can do in a
friendly country without rupturing that friend­
ship, we were surprisingly well informed of
conditions there. What could not have been
predicted then nor could be predicted now in
another country is the decision of the ruler not
to use the levers of power and control at his
disposal when he had always used them in the
past under similar circumstances.

Similarly, when political analysts and com­
puters fail to predict the outcome of the U.S.
Presidential election even though all the facts
are available, it is hardly an intelligence failure
to miss the outcome of a foreign election. What
is in a person’s head, be he a voter or a shah, can
only be guessed at, and that guess will only
have a chance of being right when present be­
havior is consistent with past behavior. The
stress created by the kinds of events we are
primarily concerned with when we talk of
warning does not guarantee high confidence
that behavior will be consistent.

Understanding what intelligence agencies
can and cannot do is really what these two
books are about. The serious observer who
wants a balanced look at those capabilities will
be well served by reading both.

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AFGHANISTAN: THE FAR FRONTIER

MAJOR ROBERT M. YOUNG, USA

AFGHANISTAN is a land rarely under­
stood by either the Middle Eastern or Is­
mic specialist. As part of that realm of orien­
nations sometimes called the Northern
ier, Afghanistan has been conveniently ex-
cluded from the mainstream of contemporary
Arab and Islamic events. A product of back­
wash Muslim invasions in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, it has traditionally sat as a
buffer between British and Russian imperial
interests, as well as more recent Soviet and United States cold war conflicts.

A heterogeneous nation of many diverse cultural and religious groups located in a geographically segmented land, Afghanistan has become a common word to most Americans only since the Soviet invasion in late 1979. Nancy and Richard Newell’s *The Struggle for Afghanistan* and John Griffith’s *Afghanistan: Key to a Continent* are contemporary studies that attempt to clarify some of the mystery that pervades this nation on the Amu Darya River.

An Englishman with a great deal of personal experience traveling and working in Afghanistan, John C. Griffiths devotes more than half of his book to an attempt to bring the reader up to date.† He builds a mosaic of Afghan history, graphically leading the reader along a path blended with the many sectarian and primordial groups found in Afghanistan.

The people are described in narrative form through the experiences of Griffiths while traveling around the country. The Afghan, whether he be Tajik, Pathan, Nuristani, or Hazar, is presented as an independent, free-spirited individualist, traditionally not inclined to be tamed by outsiders. Griffiths traces the pattern of resistance that has enabled Afghanistan to maintain her independence through an era that has seen her once powerful neighbors placed under the imperial control of either the British Raj or the Russian Bear. As Griffiths points out, the British fought four very expensive frontier wars in discovering the stamina of Afghan independence.

The chapter dealing with the Afghan people, “Who Are the Afghans?” is particularly poignant and elaborates the serious problems Afghan governments have always faced in ruling this unruly people:

Though often the most dramatic, relations with other countries are not the most critical of Afghanistan’s problems. The real tasks facing its governments are internal: the problem of unity and minorities; the conflicting pressures, social and economic, of traditionalism and modernization (particularly in regard to the status of women and to Islam); and the difficulties of imposing sophisticated political methods and institutions on old tribal loyalties and attitudes. (p. 78)

It is rapidly becoming more apparent that this problem of national unity has become the single most important factor in the attempt at legitimacy by the present Soviet-sponsored Parcham government.

It is this legitimacy that the Soviet intervention has so clearly abrogated. Consequently, the event has caused a rare sense of national purpose to unite many sectarian minorities, as well as the various majority Pathan groups. This unity of purpose, however, has not developed into a unity of effort. The same cleavages that have caused problems for every Afghan government since the great Shah Durrani have kept the resistance movement fragmented in its attempts to obstruct Marxist governmental consolidation.

The book by the Newells, *The Struggle for Afghanistan,* ‡ gives a good journalistic analysis of the various resistance movements in contemporary Afghanistan and also defines the problems in attempting to coordinate the efforts of these groups:

Attempts to unify or coordinate the resistance have faced great obstacles. Its social basis is the primordial group—the household, the extended kin group, the clan, the sub tribe or tribe, often the hamlet or village or valley neighborhood or sectarian community. (p. 32)

As a result, the Newells point out that:

Inevitably, the fragmented resistance movement has been divided along regional ethnic and sectarian lines. Local groups have coordinated their activities only within the limits of distinct regional or linguistic communities. (p. 65)

In addition to a current analysis of the various guerrilla groups and their objectives, the book also provides an excellent description of the rise of urban Marxism, a phenomenon that has developed primarily out of the University of Kabul and its metropolitan environs. Of particular interest is the account of the factional competition within the Marxist movement between its two principal wings, the Soviet-supported Parcham and the Khalq. It is the rivalry between these revolutionary centers that leads to the rise and fall of the key leaders: Taraki, Amin, and, most currently, Karmal.

Both books are excellent, brief narrative accounts of historical events leading to the Soviet intervention. Both provide the reader with an encapsulated background of Afghan culture and politics. The currency of this information makes it difficult to document, but the long-term experience of the writers in the country and their intimate understanding of the political mechanics help to overcome what, in most cases, has been a barrage of rumors, reports, and partial truths.

These books effectively complement each other. The Struggle for Afghanistan provides a current update of political developments in Afghanistan prior to and during the Soviet intervention. Afghanistan: Key to a Continent gives a good cultural-historical backdrop to these recent political developments. Though neither book can take the place of the scholarly masterpiece on Afghanistan by Louis Dupree, both are well worth reading for their current and timely analysis on a subject that still remains very elusive.

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“Leadership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” will be the theme of a conference to be held at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, on 14-15 October 1982. Some 600 recently declassified NATO documents will be the focal point for the meetings. For further information on the conference or the manuscript materials, contact the Director, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas 67410.

This volume 10 of The Epic of Flight series from Time-Life Books should not be dismissed as just another book of the coffee-table variety. On the contrary, it will deeply interest the serious student of air power and make a perfect complement to such recent detailed but impersonal studies as R. J. Overy’s The Air War 1939-1945 (see Air University Review, January-February 1982, pp. 115-19).

As we have come to expect from Time-Life publications, The RAF at War is a beautifully produced and arresting account of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the Second World War; it is also technically correct and well balanced. With sufficient background and history to answer the reader’s inevitable question about the unpreparedness of the RAF in 1939, Ralph Barker, a wartime RAF wireless operator and air gunner, divides his book into five equal sections: “the first taste of combat and a bitter surprise” (the phony war, the fall of France, early daylight bombing); “the battle for survival” (Battle of Britain); “striking back with bombs” (1000-bomber raid on Cologne in May 1942); “defending the Empire’s distant skies” (North Africa, Burma); and “a winged thrust at the heart of the Reich” (the night bombing offensive 1943-45). He describes a very human saga: despite the onrush of technology, the reader is never allowed to forget the bravery and the blood of those involved—and the obtuseness and stupidity sometimes, too. Few now remember the sacrifices of the early days. So immersed are we in Schweinfurt and Nürnberg, Dresden and Tokyo, that it comes as a shock to read that on 14 May 1940 “...the French implored the British to join them in a concerted attack. Barratt (Air Marshal—the CinC of the RAF in France) had 71 bombers left, and almost all of them were old Battles. In a desperate ploy, he sent all 71 planes into combat; 40 were lost.”

Lavishly illustrated and containing many wartime photographs appearing for the first time, including an eight-page picture essay of Battle of Britain fighter camera gun film, the book makes a distinct contribution to history. With its sensible balance of detail and theory on the one hand and the human drama and fortitude of experience on the other, its results are notable. Sir Arthur Harris is quoted as saying of his Bomber Command aircrews: “There is no parallel in warfare to such courage and determination in the face of danger over so prolonged a period.” All may rest content, for they have been fairly and honorably treated. In the Editors’ words: “As you read The RAF at War...you will come to understand the gallant, poignant RAF motto: ‘Per aspera ad astra’ (“Through adversity to the stars”).


The core of Flying Colors is a series of single- and double-page, full-color spreads depicting the camouflage and markings of more than a hundred historical military aircraft. The book includes from six to a dozen artist renderings of side views of representative examples of each type of aircraft, with captions giving units, dates, and places. In most cases, though not all, the side views are supplemented with top and (where necessary) bottom plan views in reduced scale; this is a welcome touch. (Though the nonspecialist has no way of knowing, most of the aircraft depicted only in side view have standardized, easily researched color schemes.) The subjects are mostly World War II aircraft, with a smattering of between-the-wars types, a handful of World War I aircraft, and a fair, though eclectic, selection of military jets, some as recent as 1979.

Though most of the artwork has been previously published—regular readers of Flying Review International and the Profile series of aircraft pamphlets will find little new here—the expanded format, high-quality paper, and excellent color reproduction will make this book worth the price to many buffs, modelers, and students of markings and camouflage. With the exception of an interesting ten-page introductory essay on the evolution of military aircraft finishes by Bruce Robertson, the text is virtually nonexistent, amounting to little more than brief captions.

In a nutshell, this is a blatantly commercial venture, William Green et al. mercilessly milking the excellent work of their house artists through the good offices of Squadron/Signal publications. That is not necessarily a bad thing if you know what you are getting and your interest matches the purchase price. The real fanatics, though, will burrow back through their old copies of Profile, Flying Review International, and Royal Force Flying Review to get the benefit of the technically informed text that came with the pretty pictures first time around!

J.F.G.


Dr. Kenneth Werrell has done exactly what he set out to do—to create a comprehensive, descriptive bibliography of materials on the Eighth Air Force. The work represents a successful attempt to list all materials that directly pertain

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Flying Review International
to the Eighth Air Force in World War II as well as some indirectly related subjects. The book has no shortcomings and will only need to be updated in the future. It is an excellent guide to Eighth Air Force sources and an asset to any institution specializing in military history.

Werrell's descriptive essays are arranged topically with numerical references to listed works, a technique that permits convenient use for any researcher with a specific topic in mind. The bibliography itself is organized to facilitate researcher efforts and can be used without having to consult the essay portion.

When describing the various repositories containing additional Eighth Air Force data, the author has omitted a bit of practical advice for the researcher. Although listing such Washington, D.C., repositories as the National Archives and the Library of Congress, he has neglected the Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base. A stop at Bolling might save the researcher time, money, and effort, since the Office of Air Force History holds microfilm copies of the unit histories that exist on file at the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Besides listing and commenting on the materials now available, Dr. Werrell has identified areas where further work is needed, such topics as intelligence and training of straggler. Similar gaps exist in accounts of other World War II commands. Any researcher looking for possible topics might be well served to study Dr. Werrell's suggested list.

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Lewis Gann and Peter Duignan, scholarly and articulate advocates of the benefits of colonial rule in Africa, have left the realm of history to offer some suggestions on the thorny issue of United States policy toward Africa in general and South Africa in particular. Their monograph gives a necessary balance to the contemporary dialogue that urges a total break in U.S.-South Africa relations.

Gann and Duignan argue that the Western nations use a double standard to judge South Africa's racial policies, which, although abhorrent, are no worse than the less-publicized racism of Communist countries and other African nations. Since the United States design to cooperate with these other countries on the basis of pragmatic national interest, Gann and Duignan argue that the United States could do likewise in regard to South Africa, particularly given the view of increased Soviet presence in the South Atlantic and Indian oceans. The United States would then gain a dependable, militarily capable, and technologically proficient ally. Moreover, the authors maintain that the increased economic, cultural, and military contacts inherent in such a policy are the best and only feasible means of promoting peaceful change in South Africa.

Although these arguments are compelling, their impact is diluted by an overly brief, seemingly hurried treatment that lacks historical perspective. Given the authors' extensive background in colonial history, this deficiency is surprising. For example, there are statements that tend to reinforce old stereotypes about African society. In Chapter One, the authors refer to the "backward, tribal peoples" who inhabit South Africa and the rest of Africa. As historians, Gann and Duignan should appreciate that African political systems, and European policies toward African peoples, are often artificial categories that facilitate their administration. Further, Gann and Duignan fail to note that South Africa is officially perpetuating this colonial policy today through development of the Bantustans, nominally independent, physically fragmented ministates based on African ethnic affiliation. Finally, use of the terms tribes and tribal will convince readers sensitive to Black African aspirations that the authors look disparagingly on African society.

A more substantial objection to the monograph is that it is based on an essentially reactive policy—that is, U.S. policy toward Africa would be tied to what our adversaries may or may not do in that arena. A policy like this would, in effect, make such adversaries the prime determinants of U.S. policy toward White and Black Africa. Black African nations recognize and resent manipulation by the superpowers today, much as they came to resent manipulation by European colonial powers in the Berlin Colonial Conference of 1884-85. Basing our Africa policy on political and military expediency may have some short-term benefits, but the long-term effects, if history is any guide, are at best unpredictable.

My objections in no way invalidate the balanced and needed contribution that Gann and Duignan have made in their monograph. One would have hoped, however, for a more thorough treatment of this sensitive and important subject.

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Western political scientists are uncomfortable with ideologies. No matter how vehemently they may be advocated, defended, or described as intrinsic elements of their respective political systems, academic analysts insist on regarding ideologies as a kind of camouflage for the underlying structure of interests and institutions that really determine policies. This insistence that ideologies cannot explain "the sustenance survival, or decay" of a state dominates Amos Perlmutter's work. Totalitarianism, he argues, is a philosophical concept. Authoritarianism, on the other hand, is a political system. It may seek to intervene in all aspects of human existence. Yet with the possible exception of the Soviet Union, no modern authoritarian state has
in this sense, a totalitarian state resembles Plato's Republic: an ideal laid up in heaven.

Having cleared away what he considers metaphysical underbrush, Perlmutter proceeds to construct a lucid model of the authoritarian state. It is characterized by its efforts to replace politics with policy, determining behavior through various combinations of single parties, bureaucratic/military networks, and "parallel and auxiliary structures," like the Red Guards or the SS. A stable authoritarian state requires a party able to subordinate and control "the elites, the state, and the opposition," and above all the military. Such a party in turn depends heavily, if not exclusively, on its ability to mobilize mass support, usually in response to challenges posed by development. Authoritarianism flourishes in societies where value systems remain at odds with the consequences of modernization, where secondary institutions are weak, where politically oriented demands for natural rights are muted. But no authoritarian system represents its masses. Instead, it exploits them to maintain and enhance its own power.

The logical conclusion of Modern Authoritarianism is that the essential differences among, for example, Hitler's Germany, Nasser's Egypt, and contemporary Argentina involve nothing more than respective arrangements of institutions and political structures. An authoritarian state becomes a totalitarian state more or less imperfectly actualized. This variation on George Orwell's vision of a boot eternally stamping on a human face overlooks the fact that regime exists for avowed purposes. Those purposes shape the behavior, the attitudes, even the languages of both the ruling elites and the masses they mobilize. Is there not some significance in the fact that Nazi Germany remains beyond the pale of serious revisionism, while Stalin's Russia and Mao's China continue to find defenders and apologists? Institutional analysis by itself is at best a misleading key to understanding the authoritarian state—a state which, as Perlmutter himself demonstrates on page after page, is created and maintained in the name of ideas.

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Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War by Eric Hammel.

In the fall of 1950, American troops, spurred on by the euphoria of the successful Inch'on landing, pushed deeper and deeper into North Korea. With each passing day of this advancement, the Chinese fear of an all-out invasion of Manchuria (their most developed industrial base) became increasingly real—to the extent that by mid-October "whole [Chinese] divisions at a time—paded silently, virtually without a trace, into North Korea." Once there, they began to set a deadly trap for the allied forces south of the Yalu River around the Chosin Reservoir. It is this brutal two weeks of fighting that Eric Hammel recounts in his latest book: Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War.

Hammel narrates this epic encounter in the same personal, small unit focus that he used so effectively in his previous book, 76 Hours: The Invasion of Tarawa. In his own words, "this is decidedly not a book about the machinations of generals and the so-called statesmen of the world. It is a book about ordinary American men, caught up in an extraordinary situation . . . . it is a book about individuals and small units." Because Hammel feels that "battles are won by men who do their duty, and they are lost by generals who do not," he tells the tale of numerous heroic battles of "attacking in a different direction" (to the rear) that were won in his account of the Chosin battle.

In the writing of Chosin, Hammel made an exhaustive research of U.S. Army and Marine Corps records of this campaign. He also contacted more than five hundred participants, of whom nearly 150 made "contributions of time and effort" to this book. The author acknowledges that "it is axiomatic that some men recall and describe life's events in far richer detail than others, but it is the telling that is crucial . . . ." and this is certainly true of Chosin.

This book is not a traditional account of a battle; instead, it is a series of individual actions taking place in noisy, mind-numbing frozen bubbles of space seemingly cut off from any other coordinated activity. Chosin is the story of combat, physical hardships, and heroism. Here Eric Hammel vividly proclaims that, as his title suggests, Chosin (was a) Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War, and he does it very well.

Major Robert R. Tyler, USMC
Naval Air Systems Command
Washington, D.C.

Rome '44: The Battle for the Eternal City by Raleigh Trevelyan.

Raleigh Trevelyan relates the story of the taking of Rome with verve, imagination, and insight. Not only does he cover the military operations and those involved in them from the Anzio landing in January to the eternal city's liberation in June, he also weaves in the reactions of other diverse individuals, including representatives of the high and low in Roman society, Allied agents, resistance leaders, and papal officials, who found themselves caught up in these cataclysmic events. The author is particularly effective when he discusses the maneuverings of Italy's political factions after Italy became an Allied cobelligerent in November 1943.

The military portion of the narrative centers on the Anzio debacle (Trevelyan himself was a participant), the extended battle for Monte Cassino and its famous monastery, and the final drive on Rome, which the Germans evacuated at the last moment, thus saving the city and its inhabitants from needless bloodshed and destruction. Although he tells us little that is new, the events are clearly echoed from both an Allied (including the French and Polish roles) and a German perspective. In addition, controversial episodes such as the removal of American General John P. Lucas, the bombing of Monte Cassino, and the retributive German killing of 335 Romans are handled with fairness and discretion.

Nevertheless, despite Englishman Trevelyan's prodigious and wide-ranging research and his knowledge of
Italy and this period, some of his points are open to question. He does speculate about how Britain’s Ultra intelligence affected the Allies’ Italian operations but not with the precision he demonstrates when describing other issues. He is also at times misled by the postwar recollections of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Germany’s theater commander, and perhaps accepts too readily the exploits of various military units that have become embellished over time. Still, *Rome ‘44* is generally solid and well edited with helpful maps, a list of the dramatis personae, and interesting photographs and cartoons as added features. More important, he writes with a flair that one associates historically with the name Trevelyan. The result is popular history at its best.

Dr. Alan F. Wilt  
*Iowa State University, Ames*


Christopher Robbins subtitles his work as “The True Story of the CIA’s Secret Airlines.” He later clarifies himself by admitting the virtual impossibility of uncovering a story that in all probability will never be revealed. The theme of the book is mainly concerned with the men who flew the planes. The Central Intelligence Agency is repeatedly portrayed as an uncaring and selfish employer who time and again exploited its pilots’ pursuit of monetary reward, infatuation with danger, and, in some instances, sense of patriotism to live up to the company’s motto of “Anything, Anywhere, Anytime—Professionally.”

Robbins traces the beginning of Air America to the Flying Tigers of Claire Chennault. During post-World War II, General Chennault was commissioned to organize CAT, the Chinese Nationalist air carrier entrusted to supply the nationalist cities then under siege. From there Air America’s growth is traced through Burma, Indonesia, Tibet, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Much of the book deals with Air America’s involvement in Laos. Robbins divides the Laotian conflict into the open war and the secret war. The author tends to gloss over any serious involvement that Air America personnel may have had in the thriving opium trade, which strikes me as a rather naïve appraisal of the situation. The chapter recounting the last days of Saigon preceding the evacuation is especially vivid and provides a valuable insight into the prevailing atmosphere.

The majority of research is based on conversations with former Air America pilots. Robbins maintains that he was ever lied to but readily assumes that vast portions of clandestine operations were not revealed to him. *The Invisible Air Force* is of definite interest to helicopter and tactical transport types. “People in aviation say that there is not such fun in flying jets. Avionics has turned pilots into electronic engineers and the touch of the Red Baron has one. Air America fliers had the opportunity to fly planes which real pilots had flown back in the days when aviation as aviation.” If the preceding quotation pertains to you, then the book, with its accepted shortcomings inherent in researching such a secretive organization, is an enjoyable must.

David H. Jacobson  
*Qiryat Ono, Israel*

**MX: Prescription for Disaster** by Herbert Scoville, Jr. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1981, 231 pages, $15.00 cloth, $6.95 paper.

From the title, the reader may get the impression that this book is just one of many written deploring this or that weapon system on the basis of some idealistic principle. To a certain extent, the book advocates the cancellation of the current baseline MX missile system, but it does so in proposing its own alternatives. The rationale is hard to argue with at times, especially when dealing with the great imponderables of developing effective nuclear strategies that deter. The author clearly knows whereof he speaks.

Herbert Scoville is certainly knowledgeable and incisive when dealing with the arms race. His profile of how the arms race escalates is solidly based in fact and close-up observation, with keen insights into the psychology of why weapons are developed. If for no other reason, this section of the book makes it worth reading.

**MX: Prescription for Disaster** was written for several purposes. First, it was commissioned as a counterpoint to the advocates of the MX system by those with their own design solutions in mind. Next, it describes the MX system and its capabilities to inform the reader. Finally, the book shows how pointless the literal explosion of nuclear weapons has been and is becoming. Scoville indicates how stable the balance of nuclear force has been in the past. He explains that the MX, far from ensuring that war will not occur, may push us closer to the brink of war by the apparent development of a first-strike countersilo capability, driving the Soviets either to a launch on warning or a preemptive-strike strategy.

To understand fully the consequences of the MX procurement decision as it is now vice the way it was conceived, one would be less than informed if he is not familiar with the arguments in “the rest of the story” as presented by Scoville. The arguments against more launchers, delivery vehicles, development of countersilo capability, and the adoption of launch-on-warning strategy will be familiar to those in the missile business. But for the reader who has never worked in the missile arena or the uninformed reader who desires more information, *MX: Prescription for Disaster* is thought-provoking, indeed. After all, there are no real answers to the nearly unanswerable questions raised short of the real thing—a SIOP execution.

The book is valuable for its history of the arms race and how the MX fits into that scenario. It is also useful in recounting the decision for procurement, since it appears that the original intent of the MX system may have been lost. Scoville deals heavily with possible outcomes of nuclear war, particularly interesting to those who consider that either side thinks a nuclear war can be “won.”

This is not to say that MX is all interesting reading or that it is entirely valuable. Scoville concludes by reciting
the familiar litany of cost overruns and hidden costs, etc., so familiar to informed military readers. Since Scoville seems not particularly knowledgeable in this area, his discussion shows little understanding of the reality of political constraints and considerations with which systems developers are forced to work. The part dealing with costing may well be ignored. Similar problems arise in his recitation of the MX environmental impact statement without understanding the language used in such documents.

Advocates of the MX missile should read this book for a cogent and informative argument against the system as currently proposed. *MX: Prescription for Disaster* will little affect the MX procurement decision, but it might be worth the time invested to comprehend fully what things we do to ourselves and the world as a community in the name of national security.

Captain L. Parker Temple, USAF

*Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina*


Unquestionably, *The MX ICBM and National Security* by Colin Gray is a quick one-two punch hitting at the most vital strategic issues of our time. It is not only about the MX missile and modernization of the U.S. ICBM force, the environmental impact in Utah-Nevada, the implementation of particular (and controversial) war plans, the course of the strategic arms competition, the support of U.S. allies on the future of the SALT process—to select a few of the book’s themes—it is about all of these elements simultaneously. In fact, it is remarkable that Gray included as many arguments and conclusions as he did in this relatively short examination of the MX issue. Yet it is not that surprising since Gray has established himself as a (if not the) leading nuclear weapons strategist in the United States today.

His superior knowledge of the Soviets, the way they think, and their military strategy is evident throughout. From the first page, there was no doubt as to where Gray stood on the MX issue—full endorsement. Also, the author indicated that the reader would detect “an air of passion and anger” in the book, and he was correct. The reader could not help feeling Gray’s political fervor, but the emotional appeal did not detract from the contents of the work: Gray’s passion actually added a certain zest to a sometimes dry subject. However, there was one drawback to what otherwise would have been an outstanding strategic work—Gray’s literary style. The work, like many of Gray’s other works, is marked by redundancy and verbiage. Nonetheless, with patience, the reader can grasp a number of important concepts.

The meat of Gray’s thought was contained in chapters seven, eight, and nine, where Gray succinctly defines the need for the MX. He states that the main reason for the MX and its multiple protective shelter (MPS) feature is “that the Soviet Union has chosen to design an ICBM program with characteristics of payload, accuracy, and numbers that poses an intolerable threat to the prelaunch survivability of U.S. ICBMs housed in silos.” (p. 68) Later he states that it is not the MX driving the arms race but “the evolution of Soviet weapons programs that is driving the arms competition today.” (p. 98) In addition to the message within the body of the book, it is useful to refer to Gray’s extensive and valuable footnotes.

I highly recommend this book to anyone concerned with the offensive strategic issues of our time. Gray, anticipating negative reaction to the MX proposal, states that even though he prefers the horizontal MPS sheltering, he is willing to accept a vertical sheltering system, and, as it seems, this is the type of MX-basing mode the administration has decided to deploy. Regardless of the standing of the MX issue with the present administration, the real value of Gray’s work lies in the strategic insight it has to offer.

Gray’s concern and basic thrust can be summarized in the closing pages, where he states that “the MX ICBM, far from being an arms race initiative by American ‘hawks,’ is a dangerously belated response to a clear and present danger.” (p. 121)

Captain William A. Ross, USAF

Directorate of Soviet Affairs

Bolling AFB, D.C.


This volume establishes high standards of scholarship, timeliness, and pertinence in dealing with some of the strategic realities that challenge our nation.

Colonel Frank Margiotta, Director of the National Security Affairs Institute at the National Defense University, has put together a group of papers delivered at “dinner seminars” at NDU over several months during 1979-80. Three chapters deal with catalysts for U.S. national security policy, that is, with major challenging issue areas that require significant attention: Soviet policies, U.S.-China relations, and energy. Dr. Vladimir Petrov of the Sino-Soviet Institute at George Washington University contributed a most provocative chapter—a reconstruction of recent Soviet foreign policy from the Soviet point of view, suggesting inter alia that Soviet leadership has decided that détente has failed. Stanford University Professor Harry Harding calls for sensitive management of Sino-American ties, caution regarding any strategic alignment, and emphasis, for now, on consolidating our civilian relations. Melvin Conant argues that energy is the dominant security issue and that the most important energy issue for the next two decades will be the allocation of petroleum resources.

Four chapters deal with constraints on American security policy. Problems of management of the economy are discussed by political scientists James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver. Margiotta himself contributes a chapter on the implications of changing military manpower realities. Sociologist Morris Janowitz argues the case well for eventual adoption of an obligatory universal national service, insisting that we must, meanwhile, assure the success
of the all-volunteer force. The penultimate chapter, "Perceptions of American Power," was written by former Department of Defense official and current professor at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, Earl Ravenal. A final chapter by Margiotta sums up splendidly.

Good reading for the professional officer.

Dr. James H. Buck
University of Georgia, Athens


The "night witches" of the title does not refer to all Soviet women in combat but only to the women aviators of World War II. Bruce Myles's volume offers an uneven blend of memoir—he interviewed many of the surviving aviatrices—aviation adventure story, and sociopolitical didacticism. At the level of good story, the volume works reasonably well. Here we have bright, brave, interesting young women embarking on a challenging, dangerous wartime career. Young women flying the proverbial "orange planes" Po-2 biplanes, in night-bombing attacks on the Wehrmacht hold a reader's interest. Some of the women, like the legendary Lily Litvak, became fighter aces flying the Yak-1. Still others flew close support operations in their Pe-2 fighter-bombers. The successes of the women of the 588th Night Bomber Regiment were enough to win them the coveted title of Guards Regiment. At the level of the night witch's work,

As a didactic exercise making a case for the role of women in combat, it is less successful. Before I am accused of being militant or a male chauvinist, let me make my basic point: there may well be a compelling argument for the combat effectiveness of women aviators, but Myles does not resit it. He never gets beyond the memoir or the good anecdote. Thus, there is little about the society that generated these aerial amazons. Myles offers his readers no background on the role of women in Soviet society or the general tendency toward broadening careers for women at the end of the war. He does not justify it on those grounds.

Didactic claims aside, Night Witches offers an exciting account of the lives—and deaths—of some courageous women. The book needs no other claim.

Dr. Jacob W. Kipp
Kansas State University, Manhattan


To the average reader, the armies of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China have a similar history. One might suspect that both of these huge armies, born of revolution, have had parallel developments since the end of the Russian Civil War and the Civil War in China. This assumption is in fact invalid, and Jonathan Adelman in The Revolutionary Armies: The Historical Development of the Soviet and the Chinese People's Liberation Armies supports an alternate thesis.

Using a comparative history approach based on extensive research (including newly available Soviet and Chinese references), Adelman examines the common origins of the two great Communist armies. Adelman's thesis argues that after the revolutions of 1918-21 in Russia and 1946-49 in China, the Soviet army failed to develop beyond a revolutionary, defensive entity while the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) grew as a military force as well as a social and political influence.

The book is divided into two main sections: "The Civil Wars" and "Two Decades after the Civil Wars." In the earlier section the genesis of the two armies, their effectiveness, and their leadership are evaluated. In the second section, army/party and army/society relations for the Soviet Red Army and the Chinese PLA are reviewed. A conclusion integrates the material and supports the author's thesis with additional examples.

Adelman includes some twenty tables that graphically depict trends in both armies. These tables considerably enhance the reader's understanding. The work is copiously footnoted, and a lengthy bibliography provides more than adequate reference material for interested readers.

Jonathan Adelman's The Revolutionary Armies is an expansive monograph of the comparative development of the two largest Communist armies. It provides long-needed insight into what superficially seems a pair of similar military forces and dispels this inappropriate stigma. For students of Sino-Soviet or developmental military studies, the book is unqualifiedly recommended.

Robert S. Hopkins III
Blacksburg, Virginia

Often the key to a successful venture is effective and responsible financial management. James Chace stresses this same responsibility in the management of American foreign policy in his book, *Solvency: The Price of Survival*. He provides a direct, hard-hitting account of why United States foreign policy is not solvent today and the events that have led to the insolvency over the past twenty years.

According to Chace, the erosion of our foreign policy and military capabilities can be traced in large part to the Johnson administration and the Vietnam War. He explains that the war in Southeast Asia was fought on credit because of a lack of political courage to tax the American people to pay for it. That, coupled with the financing of the Great Society by merely printing more dollars, appears to be the start of our economic woes, which were further fueled by a growing balance-of-payments deficit, declining productivity, and military expenditures abroad. Furthermore, as a result of congressional restraints on foreign policy initiative and the 1973 War Powers Resolution, the ability of the President to effectively direct foreign affairs has significantly eroded.

Chace advocates that we now get a grip on what our vital interests are throughout the world and ensure that we are financially capable of pursuing those interests. He believes that a policy centered simply on anti-Sovietism makes no sense for the United States. We no longer have the capability of being the world’s police force. Nor is protecting every country in the world from any perceived communist threat in the vital interest of the United States, but we should not remain indifferent to the Soviet threat. Defining our interests, then, may involve some true soul-searching.

From a military standpoint, Chace has raised some very provocative questions. He brings up the feasibility of ceasing to approve increases, or abandoning, of land-based intercontinental missile systems because of their vulnerability and expense. He advocates, with some interesting arguments, that our near-term needs lie more with increased conventional capabilities than in the strategic realm. He calls for a “convincing number of well-equipped mobile troops” to protect our vital interests in the Middle East, which sounds like the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). Chace appears convinced that “one of the swiftest—though not necessarily the cheapest—ways to improve the quality of our conventional forces would be to have a low-paid conscript Army... with highly paid [NCOs] and Officers.”

James Chace brings home the very relevant point that we cannot hope to be successful with our foreign policy unless we become financially solvent and maintain our “vital interests” within our financial and military means. *Solvency: The Price of Survival* is extremely well done and is a must for the military professional who seeks a concise look at American foreign policy formulation.

Major Stephen E. Jewett, USAF
Air Command and Staff College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

The *Spymasters of Israel* is a book worth reading. It will satisfy those who have an ardent interest in intelligence organizations as well as those who wish to gain initial exposure to the subject.

The text is an excellent history of the Israeli intelligence services. The Mossad and the Military Intelligence had their beginnings with the birth of the nation. Stewart Steven clearly lays out how the development of both are intertwined and describes the contributions both services have made to Israel’s national security and survival.

*The Spymaster* is also a first-rate study of organizations. One of the more interesting facets is the author’s treatment of the impact of personalities on the direction in which the intelligence apparatus grew. He demonstrates that the character of an organization is that of the individual who controls it. The failures of intelligence services are laid bare. Steven, for example, shows that Israel’s unpreparedness for the Yom Kippur War was directly linked to the then Mossad chief, General Zeria. His tailoring of intelligence to support his “concept” resulted in the complete misreading of Egyptian and Syrian intentions.

Finally, the book is just plain fun reading. It has all the elements of a first-rate novel. Its subject matter is interesting, with a top-quality story line. The characters are dynamic, some unconventional, and all are engaged in exciting work. The events that are recounted rank with the best found in a mystery or spy novel.

This is an extremely worthwhile book—one that is informative and entertaining.

Lieutenant Colonel Steven W. Wollgram, USA
University of Oregon, Eugene


On 23 December 1948 the *New York Times* reported the execution in Japan of seven Japanese war criminals, including General Hideki Tojo; General Kenji Doihara, known as the “Terror” or the “Tiger”; General Matsuji, who had been the protagonist of the rape of Nanking; General Muto, who had been in the Philippines when American forces were compelled to walk in the Bataan Death March; General Seishiro Itagaki, former war minister; Hitaro Kimura, known for the mistreatment of war prisoners; and Koki Hirota (the family name was Hirota), diplomat. The thesis of this moving biography of Hirota is that he was not a war criminal; the only civilian among the seven put to death that day. Koki Hirota is portrayed as an earnest, sensitive, genteel patriot who was caught up in the firestorm of Japanese militarism. Saburo Shiroyama argues persuasively that Koki Hirota, who served for a time as Japanese foreign minister and prime minister, was unjustly associated with a militarism he never endorsed. The real “enemy” of Japan, Hirota knew, was the army (p. 208), which liberal Japanese diplomats and politicians were unable to control. (p. 149)

No wonder. In 1930, the Japanese signed the London

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No wonder. In 1930, the Japanese signed the London
Naval Treaty, which limited and reduced naval armaments. It was to be the last victory of liberal Japanese leaders over the nation’s military leaders. In November 1930, Prime Minister Hamaguchi, who had favored that treaty, was assassinated. On 18 September 1931, the Manchurian incident occurred, leading to the start of Japanese aggression in China. When Prime Minister Inukai started to affirm the power of civilian government, military terrorists murdered him in May 1932. In February 1936, several leading Japanese statesmen were killed. The Japanese military did not have to obtain civilian or parliamentary approval for their actions; they could act in the name of the Emperor without the approbation of the Diet. In July 1937, the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking happened, and a full-scale Sino-Japanese War erupted, with firings even on American (the Panay) and British ships. By October 1941, the last cabinet with any reasonable chance to avert the horrors of World War II—the Konoye government—collapsed, and Hideki Tojo came to power. Two months later, Japan and the United States were at war.

If author Saburo Shiroyama is correct, Koki Hirota served in his ministerial posts with honor and patriotism; a life-long diplomat, he appears in this telling, at least, to have hated the prospect of war, to have worked sincerely for peace and never to have committed any “war crimes.” (pp. 40, 116, 266) Koki Hirota was no Tojo, no Doihara, no Yamashita (who had been executed as a war criminal in February 1946).

This is a very readable and sometimes moving account of a good man involved in a chamber of horrors—a Japanese military Seven Days in May, which succeeded (at least from his standpoint of the militarists) only in helping to involve him in the conflagration of World War II. When the six Japanese generals were hanged, they went to the gallows having cried “Banzai”; Hirota went quietly, refusing to endorse the war cry or the generals “who had branded him throughout his life.” (p. 298)

There are too many quotations in the book without attribution. The author gossips over the Pearl Harbor decision and the surrender decision. And one would like more evidence of Hirota’s resistance to militarism rather than statements about his regretful passivity as his nation slowly arched fascist throughout the 1930s. Still, one concludes that Koki Hirota’s punishment was severe; and one wishes that Hirota, not Tojo, had come fully to power in October 1941.

Saburo concludes that Hirota was “swept along against his will.” (p. 4) Hirota’s story is a tragedy that reflects a tangle of our own lives. This is a serious, sensitive, and empathetic study which can be read as good biography or a significant inquiry into the problem of trying “war criminals.”

handle on a day-after-day basis. However, Klein's overwrought, overdetailed rendition is somewhat tiring, repetitive, and at times even a bore, but the reader continues out of horrid fascination.

No one will ever know the whole-cloth truth, of course, but if one cares to examine another patch... A Nixonophile might as well take it on because Hollywood will never do a movie of this one.

Dr. Porter J. Crow
West Palm Beach, Florida


The true story of the Soviet Union's aspirations and achievements in space has often been garbled and confused by Soviet secrecy and limited public disclosure except for space "spectaculars" and "firsts." The result has been a very incomplete picture in the West of Soviet space progress, prompting numerous rumors of cosmonaut deaths and erroneous conclusions about the U.S.S.R.'s space goals. James Oberg has done a masterful job of analyzing the Soviet space program from its inception to the present and bringing order out of the chaos of information in print.

Oberg is a former Air Force officer who currently works with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in the Space Shuttle program. He has published more than a hundred articles on space-related topics. This book is the product of his lifetime interest in space and of more than a decade's research on Soviet space efforts. His knowledge of the Russian language has given him entrée to Russian sources. His work on the Soviets has twice received the National Space Club's Goddard History Award.

Red Star in Orbit begins with rocketry experimentation following World War II and the launching of Sputnik I in 1957. The author gives an extensive look at the mastermind behind the Soviet space efforts during that period, Sergei Korolev, long known only as the anonymous "chief designer." He then details the evolution of the Soviet space program and Khrushchev's continuous pressure for aberrations to produce political gains against the West.

Oberg explodes the myth about numerous cosmonaut deaths early in the program and reveals the true cause of later admitted casualties, most due to the circumventing of safety procedures and necessary unmanned test flights.

This book is a well-organized and -written examination that provides clear insight into Soviet space priorities and achievements. Because of a lack of verifiable Soviet information and the piecemeal manner in which data become available, many of the author's assertions are admittedly conjecture and unproved. His long-term research and depth of knowledge place the author in good stead in that respect. Unfortunately, the work is not documented.

Red Star in Orbit contains several valuable appendixes including biographies of the cosmonauts, a listing of Soviet manned shots, and an annotated bibliography of other books in print on the subject.

The volume fills a need for information on the Soviets and their space efforts and provides vital insight to their emphasis on specialized technology and their space accomplishments.

Captain Don Rightmyer, USAF
Soviet Awareness Group
Bolling AFB, D.C.


Thirty books in 40 years—that should be testimony enough for a dedicated journalist. Wilfred Burchett in his seventieth year finally takes time out to summarize his life's struggles as "an ideological nonaligned." In the introduction, Harrison E. Salisbury suggests that Burchett is more than just a "flibbertigibbet"—he is "an individualist as far as radicalism is concerned."

His early life in Australia reads like a chapter from Colleen McCullough's novel The Thorn Birds—nature gave nothing freely. His career started as a Cook's travel agent that led to his reporting on Nazi Germany and forty years of meeting personalities on the other side of the fence. Lacking proper credentials made it all that much easier to befriended Chou En-Lai, Ho Chi Minh, Prince Sihanouk, and Fidel Castro. He was the first reporter into Hiroshima to cover the effects of radiation sickness. In North Korea, he interviewed Major General William F. Dean, proving to the United Nations Command that the general was still alive. After the French fell at Dien Bien Phu, he disclosed CIA-directed sabotage in North Vietnam, headed by an Air Force officer. (This episode is omitted from the U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965.) Twenty-five years later, he was markedly shocked by the coldblooded exterminations of Cambodians under the Pol Pot regime.

This book stands in contrast to Theodore H. White's In Search of History (1978). Although White admitted being a "mild Marxist... because that was the fashion of his generation," he never lost his "unabashed love of the American idea." Burchett, on the other hand, considered he had reached his "journalistic Nirvana, free of any built-in loyalties to governments, parties, or any organization whatsoever." This begs the question: What price did he pay for being a modern-day man without a country?

Dr. William R. McClintock
Tactical Communications Division
Langley AFB, Virginia


Terrorist acts have evolved from occasional internal problems to become a significant force in international
relations. As a result, today's defense professional must be knowledgeable in the psychology of the terrorist and the probable outcomes of hostage situations.

A recent Rand monograph on embassy seizures is a good starting point for understanding this problem. Short, fast-paced, and readable, this booklet provides statistics and case studies that support the conventional wisdom. Every television shoot-'em-up addict knows that negotiations must be started and must continue in the belief that most hostages survive and that most demands of the hostage-takers are not met. But if this common belief is true, why are seemingly futile embassy seizures so favored by terrorists?

The monograph carefully explains that the terrorist's criterion of success differs markedly from that of society. His demands may not be his real goal. The cogent explanations supplied by Brian Jenkins make dry statistics not a simple proof of the reader's preconceptions but a very worthwhile hour's reading.

Lieutenant Colonel H. Larry Elman, USAFR
Smithtown, New York


Joseph Pechman and his four associates have provided an interesting and detailed examination of the Reagan budget proposals as of April 1981. The analysis and examination are heavily economic and financial in nature, though Bruce MacLaury, President of the Brookings Institution, tells us in the Foreword that the book reflects inputs from all three Brookings research programs: Economic Studies, Foreign Policy Studies, and Governmental Studies. The primary comparative focus is on fiscal years 1978-82.

The first chapter is a tight but thorough synopsis of the entire volume. It provides both an overview of what is to come as well as a summary of the major points made in the book. The second chapter focuses on the aggregate federal budget for the 1980-82 fiscal years. Separate treatment of the Carter and Reagan budgets appears in this chapter. The budget is also examined in the context of the larger economy, where comparisons are drawn between the current Reagan thrust and the directions set during the Kennedy administration.

Chapters 3 and 4 are detailed examination of the non-defense and defense budgets respectively. Program-by-program analysis and discussion are undertaken in each chapter, with the primary comparison and examination occurring on the fiscal years since 1979. Changes in funding levels and the implications of these changes are presented in these two chapters. The defense budget examination in chapter 4 touches on the major contemporary military issues facing the nation. However, it does not forcefully portray the comparative decline that our military forces have suffered subsequent to the Vietnam War. Sirn Slessor's statement is quite appropriate:

It is customary in the democratic countries to deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting with the requirements of the social services. There is a tendency to forget that the most important social service a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free. (p. 182)

We have forgotten that as a nation!

Chapter 5 places the aforementioned analyses in a somewhat broader perspective by examining our budget history over the past twenty years (1960-80). The concluding chapter, "A Change in Direction," examines the new direction in which Reagan is taking us through an examination of the political and economic histories of Taft, Goldwater, and the Keynesians, among others.

Appendix A is a rather brief examination of fiscal activities outside the budget. Appendix B is an even briefer examination of FY82 tax expenditures.

The volume will primarily be of interest to economists and of secondary interest to students of government. Setting National Priorities: The 1982 Budget is not presented from the holistic perspective of a top administrator, manager, or commander. Rather, it is presented as a staff specialist's analysis. This in part accounts for one of the book's limitations. Since the economic and fiscal analysis is the primary thrust of the volume, the philosophical and strategic management considerations regarding the management of the nation are placed in a secondary role. The material of the concluding chapter does bring us closer to this managerial perspective, but it is almost too little too late. This may be particularly significant in light of President Reagan's own managerial, organizational, and philosophical perspective. His budget proposals are only the consequences of his priorities, beliefs, and philosophy of "Chairman of the Board" and Commander in Chief.

While the book may be of limited value for those most interested in management and organizations, it is a thorough volume which economists and some military specialists will find rather useful as a reference book.

Dr. James C. Quick, Captain (USAFR)
University of Dallas, Texas


Can the President govern effectively today and also manage the domestic side of the government? Ben Heineman and Curtis Hessler, both assistant secretaries in the Carter administration, both former Rhodes scholars and Supreme Court law clerks, try to answer that question for the President himself. They maintain that any president must conduct a "strategic presidency" on the domestic side. Rightfully critical of the Carter administration for its separation of policy and politics—of goals and the practical concessions necessary for attainment—a "strategic" approach is necessary. By "strategic" they mean a plan offering some hope of overcoming the usual obstacles to policymaking: adversary relationships with Congress and competing constituencies of cabinet members, departments, and special interests.
In order to give the President a power base independent of special interests, the authors recommend restoring the political parties to their former status. They see the need for political control over the civil service, and advocate “cabinet government”—which the Reagan administration soon found made theoretical sense and practical nonsense. Cabinet members are rarely chosen for their knowledge; if they have the ability, they become competing power sources and natural enemies of the President.

As a “how to” on the presidency, the Memorandum is probably envisioned on the desk of every office in the government from the President down. Perhaps, but only if somebody else pays for it.

Dr. Paul R. Schratz
Homesassa, Florida


Whether you are venturing downstate or cross-country, Exploring Military America by Marcella and Gladys Thum could well be an indispensable part of your traveling gear. The sisters Thum have compressed into a sturdily bound paperback volume (suitable for your automobile’s glove compartment) both a summary of American military history from 1521 to 1975 (in 24 pages) and a guide to American military sites within the United States. The guide section runs to nearly 300 pages and describes museums and monuments, fortifications and shrines in each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.

Arranged alphabetically by state—Alabama through Wyoming—for easy reference, the fifty-one chapters all start with a one-page survey of each state’s military history. Then, in brief gazetteers ranging from two pages (for Alaska, Iowa, and Nevada) to 14 pages (for Texas and Virginia)—depending on the extent of military activity and extant museums and military landmarks therein—the Thums lead us to a vast array of sites, both well known and less familiar, that military personnel and their families should find of considerable interest.

Directions to each site, what one can expect to find there, and admission information are clearly and concisely presented. A typical (though quite brief) entry found under “Florida, Fort Walton Beach,” reads as follows: “Air Force Armament Museum, Eglin Air Force Base, East Gate. Historical aircraft and memorabilia in outdoors and indoors displays. Free.” (p. 68)

Other entries concerning items of air or aerospace interest (U.S. Army Aviation, Confederate Air Force, USAF, etc.) are cited under Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, etc. The text is supplemented with 26 pages of excellent black and white photographs, generously captioned and

refreshingly free of the cliché subjects you might have expected; included, for example, are interior photos of the Naval Aviation Museum (Pensacola, Florida) and the Air Force Museum (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio), the latter showing Strawberry Bitch, a beautifully restored B-24 bomber.

As with any anthology or omnium-gatherum of the kind, one would probably want to include other “favorites” of his own, but Exploring Military America presents a generous, convenient Baedeker for either armchair or on-the-road exploration. It is well deserving of a place alongside Macella Thum’s earlier fine explorations of black America and literary America.

J.H.M.

“Over There, Twelve Original Recordings from World War One” released by Eastside Record Corporation. New York, 1981, 33-1/3 rpm monaural LP record, 12 choral selections, $8.98. (Available only direct from Eastside Record Corporation, P.O. Box 4022, Grand Central Station, New York, NY 10163.)

Eastside Records should be commended for their originality in releasing this excellent selection of re-recordings of American records cut between 1914 and 1919. This is not music for casual listening or background mood; the records of some sixty years ago leave much to be desired by today’s technical standards. Eastside, commendably, has made no effort to disguise the period flavor of the original cuts. The result is a thirty-minute time capsule. Those whose idea of the contemporary flavor of “Over There” comes from Norman Luboff or the Mormon Tabernacle Choir are in for a surprise! The cadences, humor, and social nuances of the early twentieth century were very different from those of today, as these early recordings faithfully show. The more openly expressed sentimentalism comes through clearly in such selections as “Somebody’s Waiting for Someone,” “But I’m on My Way” and “Where Do We Go from Here?”

The use of light humor—some of it risque by contemporary standards—to disguise serious concern over an uncertain future is apparent in “I Don’t Know Where I’m Going But I’m on My Way” and “Where Do We Go from Here?” The cut of the British favorite “Tipperary,” made three years before America’s entry into the war, contains a broad and undoubtedly authentic streak of sympathetic but condescending Irish ethnic humor.

This modest album provides insights into public attitudes toward war of more than a half-century ago and into the attitudes of warriors of the Great War, which could be obtained through no other medium. We hope there will be more to follow.

J.F.G.
the
contributors

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David MacIsaac (A.B., Trinity College; A.M., Yale University; Ph.D., Duke University) retired from the Air Force as a lieutenant colonel in May 1981 after serving three years on the faculty of Air War College. He is now a staff member at Airpower Research Institute at Air University. He previously taught military history and strategy at the USAF Academy on four assignments between 1964 and 1978 and at the Naval War College. He was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1978-79) and served with the Air Force Advisory Group in Vietnam. Dr. MacIsaac has been a frequent contributor to the Review.
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AWARD

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “Admiral Gorshkov and the Soviet Navy” by Dr. Donald Chipman, U.S. Navy Reserve, as outstanding article in the July-August issue of the Review.
The Air University Review is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air Training Command, or Air University. Rather, the contents reflect the authors' ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thoughtful and informed contributions are always welcomed.
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