the commander in war and peace

War is a special activity, different and separate from any other pursued by man.

Carl von Clausewitz,
On War

The basic function of the peacetime military is to prepare for war. Accomplishment of this difficult task is not facilitated by students of military affairs who do not distinguish between the military at peace and the military at war, as in the case of a 1980 article on women in combat which contains this statement: “Indeed, the imagery of many arguments against female participation in combat is derived from trench warfare or jungle encampments, even when the arguments undermine their own imagery by discussing the eight-to-five, civilianized technological nature of today’s military.”

But for remarks about female participation in combat, the writer’s comments could have been penned on the eve of World War I, when technology had also revolutionized warfare. One hundred years earlier, the troops of Wellington and Napoleon had converged on the fields of Waterloo at a rate of ten miles per day. Soldiers fired smoothbore, muzzle-loading muskets with an effective range of 50-to-75 yards and a firing rate of 3-to-5 rounds per minute. The mainstay of artillery was the smoothbore, muzzle-loading cannon that fired directly at the enemy from the immediate vicinity of its own infantry lines. By 1914, European armies were equipped with machine guns that fired 600 rounds per minute with an effective range of over 1000 yards. Artillery now fired from positions several miles removed from infantry battle lines, and its high-explosive shells produced hundreds of lethal fragments as opposed to the 2-to-5 fragments of Civil War shells. Finally, railroads permitted armies to move a hundred miles and more in a single day.

In contrast to this background of revolutionary change, Army life in America continued at its leisurely peace time pace. In 1913, Lieutenant George S. Patton, Jr., complained of the hectic pace of his duties at Fort Riley, Kansas: “This is the most strictly army place I have ever been in and also the most strictly business. We start at eight o’clock and get through at three thirty which is more work than I have ever done in the army.” Scarcely five years later, Colonel Patton was seriously wounded while leading an attack in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign and was awarded a Purple Heart and a Distinguished Service Cross for his leadership and bravery.

Patton was an officer who could make the transition from peace to war, but not all officers can. Michael Howard has noted that a high proportion of senior commanders fail at the outset of war because they have been so occupied by the administrative details of the peacetime military that they could not think about their “real business: the conduct of war.” According to Howard: “These unfortunate men may either take too long to adjust themselves to reality, through a lack of hard preliminary thinking about what war would really be like, or they may have had their minds so far shaped by a lifetime of pure administration that they have ceased for all practical purposes to be soldiers.”

Two examples illustrating Professor Howard’s point come readily to mind. Napoleon III fancied himself the military as well as the governing descendent of his great uncle until he saw his first battlefield and was sickened by its carnage. George B. McClellan was unmatched as a trainer and organizer of armies, but because of his lack of boldness he was no match for the likes of Robert E. Lee, even at Antietam when he possessed Lee’s battle plans.

Today, our nation is at peace. And while few of us have had the luxury of Patton’s 0800-to-1530 days or even an 0800-to-1700 day, life in the Air Force has its pleasant, quiet moments. But just as in the years before World War I, there are ominous thunderheads on the horizon. Two mighty armed alliances glower at each other across the border between East and West in Europe. Each side is armed with weapons as revolutionary as was the machine gun in 1914. Should World War III come, its battles could make Verdun and the Somme look like picnics. Thus, the contrast between war and peace continues to be stark and the military’s mission of preparing for war in time of peace no less difficult than in Patton’s time. Today, as we work to develop a military organization that will be effective in war, we would do well to avoid the work of scholars and analysts whose thinking does not reflect an understanding of the fundamental difference between the military at war and the military at peace. In shaping the Air Force, we must be guided by experience in war, whether it be firsthand experience, observation of current wars being fought by other nations, or the “universal experience” of military history. If we do, if we ask ourselves how every policy and policy change might affect our ability to fight and fly, then we will not only have competent peacetime commanders but, more important, we will have commanders who can function in the demanding environment of war.
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OF SABER CHARGES, ESCORT FIGHTERS, AND SPACECRAFT

the search for doctrine

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A

N aphorism of Frederick the Great, "Good fortune is often more fatal than adversity," offers a lesson for us to ponder. The teachings of failure, which subvert old ideas and established facts, serve the military institutions of the future better than do successes. Failures teach humility and are the nurse of progress. Successes stimulate blind pride and complacent self-confidence, which invite failure in future battles. So let us turn to some historical failures and learn from them.¹

To begin with, suppose we look to our horses. By the end of the Napoleonic era, there were four rather clearly defined functions of cavalry: the charge, galloping knee to knee, boot to boot, with lance or saber in shock actions akin to modern armor; reconnaissance, where horsemen served as the eyes of the army, probing out ahead of the main force to locate the enemy; screening, where small elements of rapidly moving horsemen could cover exposed flanks and serve as a trip wire against surprise moves by the enemy; and strategic cavalry, where large forces of horsemen deliberately avoided the enemy's main forces and penetrated deeply into the rear areas to disrupt his communications, burn his bridges, destroy his supply dumps and production centers, while at the same time dislocating enemy plans and calculations.

All of these cavalry missions depended on two critical factors. First was the relative speed differential between a mounted horseman and the footsoldier, roughly 3 to 1. Second, the success of cavalry was in varying degrees dependent on the inferior qualities of the muzzleloading musket with its slow fire and short range. Unfortunately for the horsemen, scarcely a decade after Waterloo the development of the conoidal bullet (better known as the Minié ball) drastically altered the military equation.² Rifled weapons with ranges of up to a thousand yards strongly suggested, at least to the observant, that the day of the cavalry charge was over. Even before the Civil War in the United States, some regular cavalrymen urged the elimination of the saber. Sabers, one wrote, are "simply a nuisance; they
jingle abominably, and are of no earthly use." The Surgeon General's Civil War wound statistics certainly confirmed this view. After months of operations in which the Union forces suffered tens of thousands of bullet wounds, only 18 authenticated cases of sword injury could be identified.5

Probably the most successful cavalry action of the Civil War was a strategic raid by General James Wilson, who, incidentally, became a major general at the age of 27. Leading a force of 14,000 cavalrymen armed with Spencer repeating rifles, Wilson set out from Tennessee. He cut a swath clear across Alabama, destroying arsenals, foundries, and supply dumps and tearing up rail lines. On the few occasions when this fast-moving force was unable to evade Confederate concentrations, it fought dismounted.4

One would think that the experience of the Civil War in the United States would have drastically altered the conception of cavalry throughout the Western world. But the social prestige of crack cavalry regiments and their brave showing on parade made it difficult to read the historical record realistically. European military writers—one cannot say military thinkers—were inclined to blame poor leadership rather than faulty doctrine for the failures of cavalry in the face of rapid-fire infantry weapons.5

In Britain, toward the end of the nineteenth century, Lord Roberts, the beloved commander in chief who was popularly known as "Sir Bobs," saw the facts with a clear eye and directed the cavalry to abolish the lance and be prepared generally to act dismounted. But horsemen in a foxhunting country were not so easily dislodged.6 The Cavalry Journal had been founded in 1904 in Britain for the express purpose of defending the notion that, even under modern conditions with rapid-fire weapons, cavalry was still extremely important in war. One observer, reviewing the first issue of the Cavalry Journal, summed up the whole tone and temper of the enterprise succinctly:

It is evident from the number of articles devoted to ... the subject that the editors have deliberately elected to commence with an exposure of the ridiculous contention of the mistaken school of thought by whom it is fatuously asserted that the days of the Cavalry. . . . are over; and at the same time to illuminate, if possible, the dense intellects of others who have merely failed to comprehend the true functions of cavalry in modern war.7

The strength of the cavalry lobby in Britain is evident when one notes that despite the commander in chief's directive, the 1907 Cavalry Manual continued to espouse the traditional doctrine:

The essence of the cavalry spirit lies in holding the balance correctly between firepower and shock action. It must be accepted in principle that the rifle, effective as it is, cannot replace the effect produced by the speed of the horse, the magnetism of the charge, and the terror of cold steel.8

This romantic eyewash appeared in the official British Army cavalry doctrinal manual. Instead of providing a whetstone for contradictory opinion, the Cavalry Journal only reinforced the romanticism, asserting grandiloquently, in 1909,
The charge will always remain... it will be the cavalryman's pride to die sword in hand.9

Again, one would think that the experience of World War I would have spelled the virtual demise of cavalry. To be sure, horsemen did prove useful in certain peripheral theaters: Allenby in Palestine and the czarists in those vast areas of Russia where the nature of the terrain precluded vehicular traffic. But in the main theater on the Western Front, British cavalry divisions ate tons of costly fodder waiting for the day that never came when they hoped to exploit a breakthrough: 10,000 horses consume as much weight in fodder as the food for 60,000 infantrymen, so the logistical cost was high. None of this experience seems to have made much impression.

The Superior Board of GHQ, American Expeditionary Force, assembled after the Armistice to cull out the important doctrinal lessons of the war, concluded that there were few reasons to change the prevailing cavalry doctrine.10 True, some advances had been made. U.S. Army cavalrymen had substituted the Colt .45 for the saber. As one wag somewhat sardonically commented, this was a case of mounting "the inaccurate on the unstable."11 The same spirit prevailed in Britain. What, fumed one irate cavalry officer, "replace the horse with a tank? Why you might as well attempt to replace our railway system by lines of airships!"12

But J. F. C. Fuller, the military historian and close student of doctrine, was more perceptive. The cavalry is doomed, he said, and must give way to the tank. With his broad knowledge of history, however, he foresaw difficulties in replacing the horse with armored forces. "To establish a new invention," he cautioned, "is like establishing a new religion—it usually demands the conversion or destruction of an entire priesthood."13

In the United States, the cavalry priesthood proved remarkably persistent. As late as 1938 General Walter Krueger, the Chief of the U.S. Army War Plans Division, was still opposing the formation of a mechanized cavalry division. The Chief of Cavalry, Major General J. K. Herr, was more broad-minded. He favored the creation of mechanized cavalry provided this were done not by converting existing horse units. It was this kind of thinking that led to the presence of two regular horse cavalry divisions at the Army maneuvers in Louisiana in 1940, long after courageous but futile Polish cavalry lancers had been decimated when charging invading Nazi panzer columns.14

What can we learn from this cavalry story? By virtue of hindsight we can perceive many of the horsemen's failures with considerable clarity. Clearly, cavalry doctrine was not kept abreast of technological advance. Armies of the time lacked appropriate organizations and procedures to perfect suitable doctrines. Too often those who thought about the problem at all were swayed by romantic or emotional considerations and failed to assess the problem objectively.

Surely a rational, scientific approach would suggest the desirability and the necessity of a patient and exhaustive search for data from operational experience, at home and abroad, experience in wartime and in peacetime maneuvers. Logically, this data gathering should be followed by a careful assessment of the evidence to screen out opinion and ensure a high degree of objectivity in the evidence from which one attempts to formulate doctrine.

What is doctrine? Simply this: doctrine is officially approved prescriptions of the best way to do a job. Doctrine is, or should be, the product of experience. Doctrine is what experience has shown usually works best.

Doctrine is not the same thing as dogma. Where dogma is frozen, fixed, unchanging, and arbitrary, based on authority, akin to "revealed truth," doctrine is open-ended. Doctrine is subject to continual change as new developments, new experience, technological innovations, and the like, require us to reconsider and impel us toward a revised statement of official doctrine.15

In the abstract, it is not very difficult to de-
scribe what is needed to decide how best to apply the horse, the airplane, the spacecraft, or any other asset as a military weapon. We simply proceed in a truly scientific spirit in search of objective evidence on which to build our decisions. Unfortunately, what seems simple and straightforward when described in so many words turns out to be exceedingly difficult in practice.

To begin with, actual battle experience is elusive; oftentimes, it turns out that even the participants are not sure what happened. It is difficult to be objective, to rise above the din, to attain true perspective. Further, by no means all who participate record their experiences. Even those who do record them incompletely or inaccurately. Consequently, the so-called evidence that becomes available for analysis is all too often partial, fragmentary, and not infrequently a vital portion of evidence is missing. One of the drawbacks of history is that we cannot rerun the episode or the battle in the same way we can rerun a scientific experiment in the laboratory to pick up the observation we missed the first time around. In the long intervals between wars, we must rely on tests, exercises, simulations, and maneuvers, bloodless battles, which only imperfectly provide the kind of evidence we need. As if these inherent drawbacks were not enough, there are other obstacles in our path which make the search for objective data difficult and sometimes seemingly impossible.

Military organizations are not ideal instruments for use in the search for truth. Military organizations are hierarchical: two stars out-rank two bars. But what does this really mean? Where matters of opinion are concerned, rank certainly has its privileges. Greater rank presumes greater experience and therefore greater respect for its opinions. Let us never forget, however, that this applies only to opinion. As Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger used to say, "You're entitled to your opinion but not to your own exclusive set of facts." Where we are dealing with questions of fact, two stars do not outrank two bars. Sometimes stars forget that bit of truth. One is reminded of that perceptive nineteenth-century soldier General Sir Edward Hamley, who cynically defined tactics as "the opinion of the senior officer present."

Caricatured in this fashion, we all instantly recognize the absurdity of all attempts to impose the authority of rank on what are or should be matters of objective fact. Yet, absurd or not, the record of how technological innovations have been integrated into the armed forces as weapons is strewn with examples of wishful thinking and failures to distinguish fact from opinion. Our past is littered with examples of failures in mustering objective evidence for orderly, systematic, and dispassionate evaluation.

And why has this been so? Largely, it appears, because military men have been slow to devise organizations and procedures explicitly directed to the perfection of doctrine. Traditionally, armed forces have attracted activists, men generally better at "doing" than "reflecting." This is understandable; philosophers do not make good shock troops. What is more, philosophers and military intellectuals tend to give Delphic responses. They tend to speak ambiguously. They do not give clear-cut answers or easy-to-follow lessons learned; they speak only of insights. Military historians are exasperating fellows; they profess to help the decision-maker, the activist military commander, to seemore deeply into his problem. They are exasperating because instead of simplifying the commander's problem they only show him how much more difficult it is than it appeared at first.

To illustrate the trouble commanders have with intellectuals, I must digress a moment to recall Napoleon's dilemma in Russia. He had led the Grand Army deep into the enemy country and occupied Moscow, the symbolic heart of the nation. Winter was threatening, but the emperor wanted to remain in Moscow as long as he could for the advantage it gave him when negotiating the peace proposals he hoped the Russians would offer him. On the other hand, Napoleon knew he must extricate his army from its dangerously extended position before the
Russian winter closed in. So he turned to his chief scientist, Pierre Simon Laplace, and asked him to determine how long the French troops might safely linger in Moscow. On the available meteorological data from past seasons, Laplace calculated that there was a 100-to-1 probability that extreme cold would not set in before 25 November. Napoleon acted on this advice and stayed. On the sixth of November the thermometer dropped precipitately, winter swept in with more than usual severity, and the French Army was virtually destroyed.17

Napoleon was clearly on the right track when he employed a leading scientist on his staff. But in this pioneering effort at operational research, he learned the hard way that even when one tries to be objective in looking for evidence from past experience, the process is fraught with difficulties.

Why this exasperating historical mucking around with horses when the discussion here is to address the problem of space? Because this tale of cavalry can teach us much about the problem of doctrine.

The airplane that the Wright brothers brought to the Army in 1903 was a rather flimsy contraption. After looking it over, General Ferdinand Foch, who later became the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in France, dismissed it out of hand by stating: "That's good sport, but for the Army it is of no value." Foch was no bonehead; he was a thoughtful student of warfare whose volume of Principles was widely used in war colleges. His spurning of the airplane was, however, a classic example of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. To be sure, the Wright brothers' aircraft was just a flimsy box kite with only the slenderest margin of weight-lifting capacity. If military intellectuals such as Foch failed to perceive the latent powers of the airplane, it is easy to see why officials in the United States had some difficulty in soundly conceptualizing the potential of this innovation at a time when the Army was still a horse-drawn institution.

How should the airplane be exploited? A good case could be made for visualizing aircraft as the logical successor of the horse. The speed differential the airplane enjoyed over infantrymen would enable it to perform many traditional cavalry missions to great advantage. The ability to fly over obstacles and avoid enemy blocking forces on the ground held high promise of performing the deep penetration, independent strategic mission into the enemy's heartland, a mission already well defined doctrinally by the cavalry. But the horsemen would have none of it. Already threatened by the appearance of the gasoline-powered truck and the scout car, the cavalrymen saw the airplane as just another challenge to their traditional perquisites. What is more, the noise and smell of internal combustion engines frightened their horses!

So the airplane was adopted by the U.S. Army Signal Corps. There was a good deal of logic in this decision. In 1903, Signalmen were the most scientifically inclined officers in the Army. Moreover, the decidedly limited lifting capacity of existing aircraft precluded any immediate application of airplanes to strategic missions requiring heavy bomb loads capable of significant destruction in the enemy's rear areas. It followed naturally, then, that the Signal Corps would develop the airplane to provide yet another tool, along with the telephone and telegraph, in the service of information.

Although it may have seemed logical at the time, the decision to assign the airplane to the Signal Corps was to have profound consequences. The Signal Corps was a service, not a combat arm. Its officers saw themselves as ancillaries, assisting the three combat arms to carry out their tactical missions. In this context it was virtually inevitable that the airplane would be developed as an observation platform. Airplanes would be employed as the eyes of the Army rather than as offensive weapons geared to a strategic mission in emulation of the strategic role already well defined by traditional cavalry doctrine.
At least in part as a consequence of this accident of organizational or institutional sponsorship, the Army emerged from World War I with a genuine appreciation of the importance of the airplane as a useful adjunct to the ground forces. On the other hand, the case for the airplane as a weapon of strategic potential had not been adequately demonstrated to the satisfaction of those in command.

The story of how a small band of zealots, true believers in strategic air power, struggled for the next twenty-five years or more to implement their ideas is too well known to require repeating. General “Billy” Mitchell as prophet and idol and his younger disciples Arnold, Andrews, Spaatz, and Eaker—all contributed to the struggle in varying ways. They deserve their place in history. However, the emphasis here is not to celebrate success but instead to look behind the façade of success to analyze failures. For the purpose is to understand better how doctrine may be kept abreast of technological innovation and examine how the Air Corps developed doctrine for strategic air power.

The task of formulating doctrine fell largely to the faculty of the old Air Corps Tactical School. In many respects the problem confronting these men was not unlike the problem confronting those who are trying to devise suitable doctrine for space. With no more than an exceedingly slender base of actual combat experience with strategic bombardment in World War I, air arm officers had to extrapolate, making imaginative projections as to what bomber operations in the future would involve. The air arm officers were further handicapped by the usual and inevitable peacetime shortage of funds, which slowed the development of progressively better hardware.

ADVERSITY, lack of funds, and limited numbers of men and aircraft put a premium on perfecting procedures to ensure that all experience was properly squeezed to produce its quota of information for use in concocting doctrine. Unfortunately, though, Air Corps officers too often seem to have been unaware of, or insensitive to, the need for developing rigorous standards of objectivity when assessing the meager shreds of available evidence. A brief look at a crucial episode at the Air Corps Tactical School will illustrate my point.

In the early years of the Tactical School when the memory of World War I was still fresh in everyone’s mind, the boys in the Bomber Branch displayed considerable realism in their thinking. When they projected long-range strategic bombardment missions, they visualized fighter escorts going along to fend off enemy attacks. This view persisted at least down to 1930, but thereafter the picture changed radically. The bomber enthusiasts began to move into positions of power and influence in the Air Corps, and they secured additional funds for the development of significantly superior bombers.

The appearance of the Martin B-10 bomber, which could outfly the older fighters in the Air Corps inventory, ushered in a whole new attitude. If the bombers could outrun fighters, what could stop them? Fired with a new enthusiasm, some of the bomber boys began to suggest that there was no longer a need to invest funds in other types of aircraft. By 1934 the official Air Corps text on “Air Force” was asserting unequivocally that the bomber was the principal weapon, and its offensive role was the principal mission of the air arm. The Air Corps text asserted that all other forms of aircraft could be developed only by diverting funds which could be used to perfect the bomber. Not surprisingly, the pace of fighter development lagged.

Gradually it became an article of faith with the enthusiasts that the bomber was invulnerable. “A determined attack, once launched,” said a Tactical School instructor, “is most difficult if not impossible to stop.” An official umpire after an elaborate air defense exercise at Wright Field declared, “it is impossible for fighters to intercept bombers.” On the West Coast in 1933 Lieutenant Colonel Henry “Hap” Arnold de-
cided to put the issue to a test, pitting P-26 pursuits against B-12 bombers, improved versions of the Martin B-10. On the basis of this trial, Colonel Arnold concluded that pursuit aircraft would rarely intercept bombers and then only accidentally. He envisioned pursuit aircraft in the future as limited to operations against other pursuit or observation planes. “It is doubtful,” he concluded, “whether such operations justify their existence.” This virtual dismissal of fighter aircraft was the conclusion of the man who would subsequently command the mighty Army Air Forces in World War II.

Not everyone was willing to swallow the results of Colonel Arnold’s test so readily. At the Tactical School, the head of the Pursuit Branch was Captain Claire Chennault. He subjected Arnold’s report to a thoroughgoing, objective analysis and observed that Arnold had stacked the deck, using an obsolescent fighter against the very latest model bomber. “Technical progress,” Chennault observed, “within a very short time may make the estimates of time and place wholly obsolete. The principles involved, however, will remain constant . . . .” Then he proceeded to enumerate the factors that should enter into a determination of the ability of pursuit aircraft to intercept bombers: the type of airplanes on hand, the location of their airfields, the availability of a warning net to give timely information on the location of the attackers, weather conditions, and the relative firepower of the opposing forces.

Chennault concluded, on the strength of his analysis, that what the Air Corps needed was a single-place fighter with substantially extended range. This would facilitate interception of attacking bombers and at the same time would permit fighters to serve as escorts for bombers on long-range strategic missions into enemy territory. Subsequent events were to confirm the validity of Chennault’s objective analysis. Unfortunately, Colonel Oscar Westover, the commander of the General Headquarters Air Force, the strategic air arm of that day, chose to ignore Captain Chennault’s findings while accepting Colonel Arnold’s highly subjective conclusions which rested more on opinion than on fact. Bombers, Westover asserted in his official report, can accomplish their mission “without support.”

The failure of those in command in the Air Corps to insist on the most rigorous analysis of the available evidence when developing bomber doctrine was to have the gravest consequences when World War II broke out. Bomber doctrine, when subjected to the brutal test of actual warfare, was found wanting. The Royal Air Force (RAF), while attempting daylight bombardment missions beyond the range of fighter escorts, suffered prohibitive losses. So appalling were these losses that the British authorities switched their doctrine and limited their deep penetrations to night raids when interception was infinitely more difficult. The survival rate went up at least temporarily, but there was a sharp decline in their ability to find and hit strategically significant targets; this decline went far to nullify the concept of strategic air power.

These facts were known to the Americans well before Pearl Harbor, but the knowledge did not bring about an alteration of the prevailing bomber doctrine. When General Carl Spaatz took the first elements of the Eighth Air Force to England in the summer of 1942, he faced a painful dilemma. On the one hand, RAF leaders with combat experience behind them asserted that daylight bombing could not be done without unacceptable loss. On the other hand, Air Force doctrine, as yet untested and resting largely on faith, held that daylight precision bombing would be successful. The bombers would get through to perform their strategic mission without escorting fighters if that mission required penetrations beyond fighter range. Which view was the right one? Only a test would decide.

So the Eighth Air Force began its tentative probing of Hitler’s Fortress Europa with the limited resources at its disposal. The first few missions were successful. Not until the tenth mission did the bombers suffer a loss. These were shallow penetrations close to the coast and
within the range of escorts. In October 1942, a 38-bomber raid struck German targets in France accompanied by 400 escorting fighters. Not surprisingly, the raid was a success. But what did such raids prove? Did they warrant the optimistic report sent back to the United States that “day bombers in strong formation can be employed effectively and successfully without fighter escorts”?24

After a mere fourteen heavily escorted shallow penetrations, the commander of the Eighth Air Force made an inferential leap, reaching the unwarranted conclusion that bombers could successfully perform strategic missions without fighter escorts. Clearly, this faulty inference was an act of faith, not logic, but the dreadful consequences were to be masked for several months by a number of circumstances. Throughout 1942 and during the early months of 1943, three-quarters of the German fighter force was tied up in Russia or in North Africa. Moreover, diversions of cadres to build up Allied air units in North Africa weakened the Eighth Air Force so seriously that it was unable to mount a large-scale assault for many months. As late as February 1943, an average of only 70 bombers was available for each Eighth Air Force attack on the Continent. So a true test of bomber doctrine was deferred.25

The Germans were, meanwhile, developing some formidable defenses. They improved their radar screen, arranged for a more appropriate positioning of fighter bases, and perfected the lethal tactic of nose attacks on incoming bombers whose frontal firepower was then deficient. These actions on the part of the Germans began to take their toll.

During the summer of 1943, loss rates for Eighth Air Force bombers soared sickeningly. The Schweinfurt raid suffered 28.2 percent losses with 50 percent of the survivors requiring extensive repairs, which delayed launching further attacks. Statistical studies quickly showed that unescorted raiders suffered losses seven times greater than those undertaken with escorts.26 That the Eighth Air Force continued to press its strategic assault in the face of these devastating losses is a tribute to the courage of the crews if not exactly a monument to the existing system for devising appropriate doctrine.27

As we know, the solution to the escort problem was the drop tank. The P-47 had an initial range of only 175 miles. By expanding internal tankage, this range was extended to 230 miles. During July 1943, by adding 75-gallon drop tanks, the maximum range was extended to 340 miles. By February 1944, hanging on two 150-gallon drop tanks gave the P-47 a range of 475 miles. By then, the P-51 with drop tanks was going 560 miles—all the way to Berlin.28

If the drop tank was such an obvious solution to the problem of providing long-range escorts, why was it so long in coming? Wasn’t it obvious at the time? Technically, there were many problems to solve. Someone had to design sturdy pylons and bracing to prevent buffeting by the tank in flight and to devise a valve to control the internal static pressure of the tanks. Another problem was that of installing pumps which proved necessary when extracting fuel above 20,000 feet. One model drop tank involved 159 parts, including its mounts and external plumbing. This required the services of 43 different manufacturing firms.29 These, of course, were all perfectly normal developmental problems. Given time, each of the difficulties could be surmounted.

More serious, however, was the conceptual failure that lay behind the decision to use drop tanks. In February 1939, when a manufacturer came in with a scheme for developing drop tanks, the Chief of the Air Corps, Hap Arnold, decreed that “no tactical airplane will be equipped with droppable auxiliary fuel tanks.” More curious still is the decision of the Chief of the Plans Division in the Office of Chief of the Air Corps, who in March of 1941 turned down a proposal to add drop tanks to extend the range of fighters. By this date the RAF had already abandoned daylight bombing in principle, and the challenge to existing Air Corps doctrine was evident.30

The officer who made this fateful decision in
1941 was none other than Carl Spaatz. The document which articulated his disapproval spelled out his reasoning: "It is believed that," he wrote, "to permit carrying bombs or drop tanks would make for "unnecessary weight and operational complexities incompatible with the mission of pursuit." The document further noted that the accretion of "extraneous details" not only would give aircraft designers "confused ideas" regarding the essential requirements for fighter aircraft but would also provide opportunities for "improper tactical use" of these airplanes.51

Literally hundreds of crewmen lost their lives because escort fighters of suitable range were not ready when needed. The lack of escort fighters jeopardized the whole effort to prove the feasibility of strategic air power. What an irony that he who was to command the Eighth Air Force and suffer the brutal losses incurred in ramming home the Combined Bomber Offensive in 1943 and 1944 had it in his power in 1941 to provide the solution but did not.

I wondered who had done the staff work that lay behind this document signed by Spaatz. The working papers in the archives gave the answer—the initials were those of Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who would later become the second chief of staff of the newly formed postwar Air Force, following on the heels of General Carl Spaatz. Vandenberg, before coming to the Plans Staff, had been an instructor in the Pursuit Branch at the Air Corps Tactical School. Manifestly he had not inherited Captain Chennault’s gift for rigorous and objective analysis.

The story of how doctrine was devised for the airplane bears a painfully striking resemblance to the story of how doctrine was or was not developed for the horse cavalry. I conclude this foray into history by attempting to distill a few useful insights from the record of experience and hope that even a past on horseback may have a message of significance today.

We are on the verge of a great age in space when it will be of the utmost importance to exploit the spacecraft as a weapon to its fullest potential in our struggle for survival. On the analogy of the horse and the airplane, we must explore the full range of the offensive and defensive capabilities of spacecraft and study no less avidly their limitations. Again, on the analogy of the airplane, we must not delay our effort to conceptualize the eventual combatant role of spacecraft even if current treaty obligations defer the actual development of hardware.

If the record of the past tells us anything, it is almost certain that we shall make as many mistakes in formulating space doctrine as we did with cavalry doctrine and air power doctrine—if we do not first get our house in order. We must ensure that we build a truly effective organization for formulating doctrine and that it is staffed with the best possible personnel.

What is a sound organization? Ultimately, no organization is better than the procedures devised to make it function.52 Yet on every hand in the armed forces today, we see men in authority assigning missions and appointing leaders to fill boxes on the wiring diagram while seriously scanting the always vital matter of internal procedures. It is the traditional role of command to tell subordinates what to do but not how to do it; nonetheless, it is still the obligation of those in authority to ensure that the internal procedure devised by their subordinates meet the test of adequacy.

And what do we mean by the best people? We must have officers who habitually and routinely insist on objectivity in their own thinking and in that of their subordinates. This does not rule out imagination and speculation by any means. But we must have officers who insist on hard evidence based on experience or experiment in support of every inference they draw and every conclusion they reach.

We need officers who will go out of their way to seek and welcome evidence that seems to confute or contradict the received wisdom of their own most cherished beliefs. In short, we need officers who understand that the brash and barely respectful subordinate who is forever
making waves by challenging the prevailing posture may prove to be the most valuable man in the organization—if he is listened to and providing his imagination and creativity can be disciplined by the mandate that he present his views dispassionately and objectively.

As wise old General Sir John Burnett-Stuart put it to Liddell Hart shortly after being given command of the British experimental armored force in 1926: "It's no use just handing over to an ordinary Division commander like myself. You must [assign] . . . as many experts and visionaries as you can; it doesn't matter how wild their views are if only they have a touch of the divine fire. I will supply the common sense of advanced middle age."33

Duke University
Durham, North Carolina

This article is based on an address delivered to the first Annual Military Space Symposium at the Air Force Academy on 2 April 1981.

The Editor

Notes


2. Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 1946) V, 70ff.


7. Ibid., pp. 198-99.

8. Ibid., p. 316.


13. Ibid.


17. Ibid., pp. 45-46.


20. Ibid., pp. 55-56.


25. Ibid., pp. 233, 237, 308.


27. Craven and Cate, Vol. II, p. 635. As late as May 1943, the AAF Policy Group was still contemplating strategic attacks on Germany "usually supported by fighters because of their deficiency in range."


31. Chief, Plans Division to Executive, 10 March 1941. SHRC Microfilm reel A1422, frame 1396-7.


DEFECTIVE LEADERSHIP: AMERICA'S GREATEST PERIL

LIEUTENANT COLONEL G. E. SECRIEST, USAF (RET)

Never yet was a worthy adventure worthily carried through by the man who put his personal safety first.

Theodore Roosevelt

A LEADERSHIP crisis of substantial magnitude has placed the United States of America in great peril. America has lost military superiority and is faced with a shrinking scientific-technological advantage. Defective leadership has been largely responsible for the potentially catastrophic trends toward military and scientific-technological inferiority. Five manifestations of defective leadership have
become alarmingly prevalent: careerism, intolerance of dissent, substitution of politics for principle, disparity between rhetoric and reality, and obsession with image. The combined impact of these deficiencies has caused a bona fide leadership crisis in military organizations. One of the major consequences of defective leadership has been the loss of what once was an overwhelming worldwide U.S. military superiority. I will focus on America's leadership crisis from the military perspective and discuss these five manifestations of defective leadership and their consequences within the framework of national security.

Career-First Orientation

One significant manifestation of leadership deficiency is the career-first orientation that permeates much of the present Air Force officer corps. This attitude is reflected by excessive concern for self-enhancement at the expense of principle and mission effectiveness. Selflessness, devotion to duty, and the courage to challenge difficult and controversial problems are subjugated to behaviors perceived as requisites for an outstanding officer effectiveness report (OER) and necessary to create and maintain a promotable image.

The malady of careerism is readily detectable by those close to the military. Captain Frank R. Wood conducted more than a hundred hours of unstructured interviews with Air Force junior officers in their first ten years of service and reported a trend away from concern for group welfare in favor of personal well-being. He described the tendency as the emerging "me first" attitude. This is consistent with evidence that depicts the military as moving away from an institutional orientation where the job is viewed as a "calling" toward a civilian job outlook which emphasizes self-interest.

Richard Gabriel has claimed that the U.S. Army, over the last two decades, has spawned a careerism so extreme that protection and advancement of career may have become the primary objectives of a large number of officers. Others have carried the notion of careerism even further by stating that a brutally self-serving orientation is necessary for a military officer to attain the rank of general.

Career-first behavior by a leader is in conflict with commitment to mission effectiveness. In Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale's terms, error avoidance and careerism take the place of positive achievement. The direction of substantial energy and talent toward career considerations and promotion alters personal values and priorities. Conformity, control, and compulsive coordination become a typical behavior pattern in order to reduce risk of error. The propensity to avoid risk or "play it safe" is driven by the fear that a mistake or failure might tarnish one's image and put promotion and career progress in jeopardy.

The consequences of unwillingness to put one's career on the line, reluctance to take risks, and failure to stand up for principle are severe, often precluding innovative breakthroughs and superior effectiveness. Unfortunately, similar deficiencies contributed to even more serious consequences such as the My Lai atrocities, Watergate, the deplorable conduct of the Vietnam War, and the recent erosion of U.S. military strength and technological advantage.

Intolerance of Diversity and Dissent

Another manifestation of defective leadership is the inability to handle dissent constructively. Various euphemisms are used to describe this passion for conformity: e.g., don't fight the problem; don't make waves; don't rock the boat. There is far too much emphasis on being a "team player" rather than on innovation, originality, and independent thinking. Colonel Edsel Field has pointed out the relationship between the tragedies of Vietnam and Watergate and the lack of open dissent on important decisions from those in key leadership positions. It has become more important to be a good "team
player” than to object strenuously to unwise, unlawful, or immoral decisions.

Some have suggested that pressure to be a team player in the military is so strong that the role of devil’s advocate is considered a hindrance to action, often precluding constructive debate regarding alternatives. Yet, greater effectiveness and efficiency result from questioning, debating, and dissenting prior to decisions rather than trying to recover from poor decisions. Diverse viewpoints, participation, and debate ultimately strengthen final decisions and engender greater commitment and motivation in implementing decisions. Although debate and dissent yield substantial advantage, it takes strong, self-confident, and visionary leaders to create conditions conducive to the expression of diverse viewpoints and novel ideas.

Maureen Mylander has argued that the drive for conformity has eliminated many of the most resourceful and best qualified officers. The periodic ostracism of superior officers for daring to question policy and morality gives credence to this supposition and serves as a harsh example to those with a predisposition for dissent. The loss of extraordinarily valuable and gallant officers is magnified by the constraining influence of such ostracism on the moral behavior of others.

Intolerance of dissent is not limited to the lower levels of government but, on the contrary, reaches the highest echelons. Former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt reported that he was threatened with both the loss of his job and Navy budget reductions if he spoke his mind concerning administration policies. Such circumstances promote paranoia and duplicity rather than candor and honesty.

The federal bureaucracy perpetuates intolerance for diversity through a selection and promotion process that tends to advance people who pose no threat to its management. The prime criterion for advancement is not performance but willingness not to cause trouble. Under such a system, it is almost impossible for anyone but “team players” to reach the top levels of management. By contrast, those who refuse to be part of the “team player” network arouse considerable animosity because of their honesty, impatience with incompetence and corruption, and persistent embarrassing questions.

The marked failure of U.S. military officers to resign or speak out against policies or decisions that violate moral principles or are not in the best interests of the nation can be contrasted with the behavior of Canadian officers; in Canada more flag officers or generals have publicly put their careers on the line over matters of principle than have their fellow officers in the United States. This is consistent with Colonel Field’s observation regarding the lack of contemporary officers with Billy Mitchell qualities.

Another side of the “team player” matter also merits consideration. One should keep in mind that when an organization’s goals are worthy and its means or methods honorable, individuals can easily identify with and internalize organizational values, rendering superfluous the insulting plea to be a “team player.” The fact that it is necessary to coerce individuals into being “team players” is in itself a symptom of defective leadership. When an organization’s leadership feels threatened by dissent, is overly defensive of the status quo, and perceives disagreement to be synonymous with disloyalty, an unhealthy rigidity is created that severely restricts innovation, adaptation to change, and organizational effectiveness.

Basically, military organizations reward and support those who show the greatest conformity. They reinforce behaviors that are often the antithesis of innovativeness and effectiveness. They reward the organization man, the yes man, the individual who never makes waves, fills all the squares, and parrots accepted form and procedure. The sad consequence is that excessive conformity results in loss of initiative and imaginative, innovative, and creative thinking—the kind of bold and daring perspective and behavior necessary for significant achievement and dramatic increases in mission effectiveness.
Substitution of Politics for Principle

An excessive preoccupation with expediency as manifested by the substitution of politics for principle is another visible leadership deficiency. It explains much capricious behavior and gamesmanship on the part of senior officers. When political sensitivities are greater than moral sensitivities, loyalty is vested in people rather than in principle or absolute value standards. This condition spawns a plethora of miniature Watergates, artificial crises, distortion and hoarding of information, extreme parochialism, and the investment of energy in accumulating political gratuities.

The politicizing of the officer corps in this manner is a matter of great concern and one that exacts an unacceptable toll in diminished effectiveness and compromised integrity. In the less extreme case, it involves paying lip service to the "right words" and seeking to fill the right squares in a highly visible manner—all aimed at impressing the "right people." More disastrous consequences of substituting politics for principle were traumatically demonstrated during the Vietnam War when the pervasiveness of deceit reached epidemic proportions. It appears that there was more "official duplicity" during this war than in any other in American history.

More recently, the ascendant position of politics remains undisturbed, with shortcomings, failures, and the lack of definitive progress often excused due to the imperatives of bureaucratic politics. R. P. Dunwell has described the military profession as over politicized and as having regressed to the point where the combined effects of politics and excessive bureaucratic layering have severely diluted U.S. Armed Forces military capability. Major General G. J. Keegan reached the same conclusion with regard to the intelligence effectiveness of the United States, stressing that the highly politicized mind-set of the intelligence process has dramatically reduced the performance of the national intelligence agencies.

Rhetoric versus Reality

The rhetoric from defense leaders asserts unequivocally that human capability is the premier American resource. General Lew Allen has repeatedly stressed that U.S. capability rests more on people than on weapons and that our greatest advantage over the Soviet Union is the caliber of our personnel. It has been noted that the present Air Force is critically dependent on quality people, particularly in view of the 30 percent reduction in personnel over the last ten years, the sophisticated high-technology equipment in use, and the austerity in military funding. Comparable statements by other high-level leaders can be found throughout contemporary Department of Defense literature.

The unique abridgments of constitutional rights accepted by military personnel (e.g., constraints on freedom of speech, political/organizational activity, working/living conditions) and the extraordinary rigors and sacrifices of combat jobs and certain support occupations have been duly recognized. Yet, despite the rhetoric on the importance of our scarce human resources and an acceptance of the constraints and hazards of the military profession, there is little tangible evidence that this discourse has translated into reality in terms of appropriate intrinsic rewards or, until very recently, adequate extrinsic compensation.

The relative diminution of extrinsic compensation during the 1970s combined with the destruction of intrinsic incentives by bureaucracy and defective leadership to produce a vastly inferior motivational climate. The severe restriction of intrinsic incentives within bureaucratic organizations in the form of drastically curtailed opportunities for growth, use of valued abilities, exercise of initiative, involvement, and self-control has resulted in only marginal realization of human potential.

Although a few top-level Air Force leaders have made attempts to decentralize and restore authority to those closest to the work, these efforts have not permeated to a level where they
might have significant salutary impact. For the most part, such attempts have been nullified by countervailing actions at intermediate levels of command.

In essence, the rhetoric emphasizes the importance and value of human resources, while reality paints a picture of more than a decade of neglect for extrinsic quality-of-life compensations; and stifling bureaucratic encumbrances choke intrinsic motivation and suppress the full utilization of human talents and capabilities. In the research and development (R&D) environment, for example, Air Force leadership has identified the biggest management challenges as the creation of an atmosphere that fosters and encourages new and innovative ideas and a proper environment for high-quality scientific work.

So much for the rhetoric. In reality, the R&D bureaucracy is pervaded by micromanagement, overregulation, and a highly process-oriented management and inspection system that together comprise formidable barriers to the high-quality scientific and innovative environments espoused in the rhetoric.

The disparity between the professional ideal and contemporary reality is also obvious outside the R&D arena. There is evidence that both flying and support officers are frustrated by lack of control over work process, inflexibility of higher level management, and insufficient decision authority.

The Air Force has advised officers not to be afraid of mistakes, that a person whose career is free of mistakes probably isn’t doing anything. Likewise, the Air Force urges its members to dare to innovate, spark new ideas, and create ways to do things better. Again, the rhetoric is unquestionably valid, but in reality the system is so rigid and intolerant of mistakes that too many officers “play it safe,” remaining timidly indecisive until sufficient consensus can be obtained.

The problem of retention is another reflection of the rhetoric versus reality gap. The inability to attract and retain quality people is well documented. Inadequate compensation and blunted opportunity for real involvement and growth have contributed heavily to the exodus of skilled professionals so indispensable to Air Force scientific-technological advantage and mission effectiveness. As General John Roberts stressed, lip service to problems or legitimate grievances causes disenchantment and retention problems.

The rhetoric versus reality gap extends far beyond the confines of the military; it pervades much of our society. An especially grave consequence of this condition is declining confidence in our institutions, expressly government institutions. Our young people, in particular, are keenly sensitive to hypocrisy, duplicity, and lack of integrity. The substitution of politics for principle and the disparity between rhetoric and reality are, to a large extent, responsible for our young people being “turned off” by government. Hypocrisy and the resultant loss of credibility in the military translate to serious recruiting and retention problems such as those experienced in recent years.

**Obsession with Image Enhancement**

The creation of image at the expense of substance has become a prevalent form of military organizational behavior. Image should be a byproduct or corollary of genuine capability. The elevation of image to stature as a goal or end in itself can be extremely costly.

Many of the ills of bureaucracy can be traced to the proclivity to establish and maintain an image of efficiency and effectiveness. Effective leadership or management is gauged in shallow terms corresponding to measurements of the management process. In effect, measures of management process are substituted for valid figures of merit or criteria of effectiveness such as mission performance, quantitative and qualitative excellence, scientific-technological breakthrough, breadth and profundity of innovation, improvement in operational capability, etc. The primary result of image-oriented thinking is
that the “process” of management becomes the main product.

Preoccupation with image and process stimulates the promulgation of management and staff positions. Management/staff positions and process emphasis function as expanding reciprocities, each position generating additional process-oriented activity, information requirements, and internal redundancy. The additional process activity, in turn, produces and justifies increased staff and management positions.

The layered bureaucracy and passion for image-related trivia strangle line or primary mission functions in a morass of micromanagement, planning exercises, reporting requirements, briefings, management reviews, paperwork, etc. Then, to ensure stringent compliance, the Inspector General (IG) conducts exacting and tedious process-oriented inspections. In fact, in the R&D area, IG inspections are almost totally a process-oriented activity. A particularly insidious consequence of management/staff proliferation and obsession with process is the lack of single point authority and responsibility so prevalent in Air Force organizations.

Another serious consequence of the obsession with image enhancement is the tendency to give the image treatment to deep-seated personnel and organizational problems. One example is performance appraisal. A considerable amount of evidence exists substantiating the inadequacies of the Air Force OER system; yet, no scientifically based lasting solutions have been achieved.31

Performance appraisal is a vital cornerstone for nearly all significant personnel and career decisions. Further, the effectiveness of the institutional reward structure and its motivational potency are directly related to the extent that valued rewards (e.g., promotion, recognition, awards, etc.) are contingent on performance. However, performance-contingent reward systems are not possible without valid performance appraisal and open, honest feedback.

Performance assessment is essentially a highly complicated metric problem that requires the concerted efforts of top scientific talent. It will take sustained, intensive effort by highly qualified professionals to produce performance appraisal systems that have scientific and quantitative validity, management/operational credibility, and acceptance by the personnel being evaluated.

Another serious organizational problem concerns the need to develop an improved scientific foundation for leadership and management practices. As in the case of performance assessment, a strong, continuing organizational research program, employing high-caliber scientific talent, is required; not arbitrary, cosmetic treatment. The organizational environment or climate created within a job setting by the synthesis of leadership style, management practices, organizational policy, and unit structure can have a decisive influence on human effectiveness.32

With few exceptions, the Air Force has met these fundamental personnel and organizational issues with an ad hoc task group approach. A smoke screen of highly visible, frenetic activity has been created, but little significant progress toward long-term resolution of problems has occurred. Ad hoc work groups fail to marshal the necessary expertise and in-depth, continuing research required for substantive, lasting improvements. Consequently, the Air Force has not been able to tailor management practices and organizational environments to the unique characteristics of its varied missions and personnel to attain the totally supportive, finely tuned institutional framework which produces superior effectiveness.

High-quality, full-spectrum (research, development, applications, and feedback) R&D programs in leadership, management, motivation, organizational climate, and performance do not exist in the Air Force. Equally unfortunate is the lack of systematic, scientific efforts to screen, validate, and apply personnel and organizational research accomplished by other laboratories and institutions to Air Force organizations. Without these programs, Air Force leaders are
denied the scientific-management expertise required to optimize organizational effectiveness and fully realize human potential.

Other significant detriments associated with image-enhancement activities involve misuse of manpower, waste of material resources, and loss of respect and confidence in leadership. Moreover, excessive concern for image by senior officers creates a ripple effect which makes image enhancement the primary concern of subordinate elements of command. Full and rational utilization of our scarce human resources demands that central concerns be aligned with major mission responsibilities, not peripheral, superficial matters.

The combined influence of all aspects of image enhancement in terms of reduced effectiveness, improper use of human resources, and loss of confidence in leadership is substantial. General David C. Jones has identified one of the causes of the problem and described its main impact:

If we even try to make perfection the standard, we run the risk of creating artificial pressures for people to concentrate more on image than substance. The "look good syndrome" is the enemy of personal integrity and professional reliability.

Cosmetic approaches and image-enhancement activities never bring lasting solutions to problems. Problems might be temporarily obscured by a short-term facelift, but they will most certainly recur and often with more serious consequences. Emphasis on form and structure must be curtailed and the principal focus placed on substance and content. Looking good, square filling, and giving the appearance of quality must be replaced by a strong motivation to achieve genuine in-depth fidelity in all aspects of mission effectiveness.

The five manifestations of defective leadership interact and combine to produce a loss in leadership credibility, inappropriate and detrimental management practices, and organizational environments hostile to effective performance and the realization of human potential.

The late General George S. Brown outlined several major advantages that American military personnel have over their Soviet counterparts. These advantages, which relate to being reared in the American society, include greater willingness to take responsibility, independence of thought and action, flexibility and initiative, and the ability to innovate when required by the situation. Unfortunately, the five leadership deficiencies create conditions that suppress the expression of the very characteristics which can give America a decisive advantage.

America faces unprecedented challenges during the next decade, which dramatically increase the urgency of correcting our leadership deficiencies and reversing ominous trends toward the loss of military and technological superiority.

San Antonio, Texas

Notes


12. Ibid.
15. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond F. Hamel, "Are Professional-
Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition

Winners of the 1983 Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition will be announced in the November-December issue of Air University Review.
"SIR, I ASSUME COMMAND"

COLONEL PETER A. LAND, USAF (RET)

WITH those words of the title and an exchange of salutes, I began the most challenging, frustrating, rewarding, satisfying, aggravating, broadening, and time-consuming job of my Air Force career. As base commander of Scott AFB, Illinois, I was at the helm of the 375th Air Base Group—1500 military and civilian personnel. I was charged with the responsibility of operating and maintaining an installation with physical assets valued at more than $615 million and of supporting some 22,000 people who lived, worked, and played there. We supported Hq Military Airlift Command (MAC) and Hq Air Force Communications Command with fifteen general officers residing on base.
As base commander I learned a number of lessons, some of which may prove useful to others assuming command of a major organization. I would like to discuss how one gets up to speed quickly in such a job, then share some thoughts on my philosophy of command, and finally track a few typical problems one may encounter.

**How** does a person who has never commanded anything assume such a position only three days after arrival on base? There is no formal break-in period; the full responsibilities transfer to you on the effective date of the assumption of command orders. However, from a practical standpoint there is a brief honeymoon period when your boss and subordinates and the public expect you to "learn the territory." Unfortunately, from the outset, you are under close scrutiny by everyone. The people have a natural expectation that the "new kid on the block" will do something positive relatively soon to improve the organization. I have found that several new commanders fell into this trap because of the pressure to "take command and do something spectacular." My challenge was simply—"How do I learn the job quickly and create a positive impression on my people without doing something dumb on day one?"

One advantage I had was having spent three years as the Director of Management Consultation at the Leadership and Management Development Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. In that capacity, I worked closely with many senior commanders in diagnosing and solving organizational problems; therefore, I had a feel for the role of a base commander. However, there were some preparatory actions I took which may be useful if you are scheduled to take command without the luxury of having served as a deputy or vice commander.

Before departing Maxwell AFB en route to Scott AFB, I visited with the Maxwell base commander. I attended his staff meetings, shadowed him for a few afternoons, and made orientation visits to each of the major functional areas under his supervision: Civil Engineering, Personnel, Security Police, Disaster Preparedness, etc. I also chatted with a few Air War College and Air Command and Staff College students who had recently completed tours at Scott AFB.

The Base Commander's Management Course (BCMC) is a four-week program designed to prepare prospective base commanders and deputy base commanders for their jobs. Since it is taught at Maxwell, I managed to attend a few classes and scrounged copies of their handouts, which gave detailed information on the various functions of air base groups and combat support groups. Many evenings were spent studying the BCMC information. When questions developed, I called the local base functional expert for clarification.

I contacted the Scott AFB Public Affairs Office and requested several back issues of the base newspaper and asked them to send a copy each week until I moved to Scott. One can learn much about a base by studying the base newspaper in detail. The point is that considerable information may be available at your present base pertaining to a command position you are scheduled to assume.

During the three-day overlap with the incumbent, he offered candid views of the strengths and weaknesses of the organization. He introduced me to my new boss, my deputy and staff, as well as selected key people, including certain civilian dignitaries. In the evenings I read recent correspondence files and reviewed the base and wing regulations and operating instructions. I took driving tours of the base with a map in order to become familiar with major facilities, street names, and key areas.

After the change of command ceremony, I met with the command section—deputy, executive officer, and our two secretaries. I stressed that the deputy would be advising me heavily, and they could expect me to follow his advice in most cases. I think it is important to develop a close team spirit among the staff in your immediate
office complex—good, open communications and trust are essential elements of command.

That same evening I had dinner with my boss, the wing commander. I asked what he expected from me and my organization, what was important, what issues were politically sensitive, etc. It is absolutely essential to get all the cards on the table as soon as possible—"tis far better than finding the jokers the hard way.

Within a few days I had appointments to pay courtesy calls on each general officer on base. The thrust of my remarks was mainly social, but I asked, "What can the base do to serve you and your organization better?" They seemed to appreciate an active willingness to serve and listen, and my visits also established good rapport that proved later to be invaluable when problems and sensitive issues were raised.

Perhaps the toughest aspect of commanding an organization with which you have had little experience is becoming technically knowledgeable and competent to discuss issues or make decisions. Hq Military Airlift Command has a Commander’s Orientation Program that includes briefings not only from each functional directorate and an assessment of its function on Scott AFB but on MAC policy as well. These briefings are very helpful in providing background on certain critical issues.

Next was a formal introduction to the Air Base Group. The functional orientation used was taken, in part, from a command transition model used in the U.S. Army; I adapted it to my situation. For sake of simplicity, I will discuss the Civil Engineering orientation as an example of how I approached every function under my supervision. The first step was to study recent management effectiveness inspection and staff assistance visit reports concerning civil engineering. I also reviewed my notes from my orientation briefing presented by Hq MAC Civil Engineering.

The next step was to obtain an organizational-functional chart of Civil Engineering, including the names of key personnel. I asked the base civil engineer to get his staff together and prepare a formal in-brief to be presented in his conference room with key staff present. I stressed that they cover any subject they felt appropriate, but I wanted the following topics addressed as a minimum:

- mission,
- concept of operation,
- manning situation,
- financial status,
- main customer population,
- feedback systems from customer population,
- greatest challenges,
- goals and objectives,
- major achievements,
- key coordinating units,
- training program, and
- base commander’s role.

I have found that when a staff discusses its mission, goals, objectives, etc., teamwork and communications tend to improve. Perhaps the greatest benefit of my orientation was realized in the unit during the preparation for my visit—that was one of my main objectives.

Suppose we look briefly at each of these topics to see why they were selected.

**Mission.** Reviewing the mission statement reinforces a unit’s purpose and gives meaningfulness to the efforts of all assigned personnel. When discussing the unit’s mission, I also stressed that we have an implied mission to develop our people professionally while accomplishing the stated mission.

**Concept of operation.** I wanted an overview of how the unit performed its mission; this helped me to see the “how” of an organization. I was looking for broad processes, not detailed procedures.

**Manning status.** In addition to learning the total numbers of authorized as opposed to assigned personnel, we were equally concerned with grade structure, skill levels, and overall experience and quality of supervision. These were key factors in determining a unit’s organizational maturity.

**Financial status.** A few pointed questions can
disclose what active controls are established to track and reduce costs. What are the valued incentives to demonstrate skilled financial management at unit level?

Main customer population. If a unit is in the support business, such as an air base group, determining the major users of a particular service being provided is helpful. For example, the base chapel serves the entire family, with the majority of its flock coming from families quartered on base.

Feedback systems. "What systems or procedures are there to learn from your main customer population whether they feel you are meeting their needs?" On occasion, a staff assistance visit may result in praise of your housekeeping and paperwork, but the key question is, "Are you actually accomplishing your service mission?" A feedback system will help answer that question.

Greatest challenges. "What does the corporate body see as the greatest challenges of the next six-twelve months?" Developing this phase of the briefing helped set standards of excellence and improved teamwork. This is the platform on which action plans are built.

Goals and objectives. This is similar to challenges except that goals are more positive and tend to stimulate creativity. People tend to set goals for themselves that are more ambitious than those imposed from above.

Major achievements. Citing major achievements stimulates pride if the record has been good or fosters humility if there is not much to boast about. (I make mental notes to comment on as I visit the individual in his work area.)

Key coordinating units. The commander has a special responsibility to ensure there is a positive relationship between key coordinating units. For example, the interaction between the legal office and the security police is critical to the administration of discipline. On occasion, the nonverbal cues can suggest problems when an organization describes its key coordinating units. That is one area to fix quickly—teamwork and mutual support are essential.

Training program. A unit's long-term performance is usually as good as its training program. Key supervisory support for training can be spotted quickly; ensure that there is an aggressive, well-organized, honest training program with the commander or director heavily involved; it will pay big dividends in performance and morale.

Base commander's role. The final question I ask is, "If this unit could control 100 percent of the base commander's time, in what order of priority would you list things you would have me do to assist in your mission?" The units usually prepared a "dream sheet" of duties and services I could perform to support them. After an orientation visit to each functional area, I selected the most important duties from each list and made a determined effort to organize them into my work schedule. Such a plan made for a busy day, but my people developed a stronger conception that I was working on their behalf.

After completing the orientation briefing, the squadron commander or functional manager would escort me on a walking tour of the entire unit. I sought to shake hands with every member of the air base group. During the visits I was prepared to chat somewhat knowledgeably about their concepts of operation and compliment them on recent major achievements. Since first impressions tend to be lasting, I found the orientation plan helped me get off to a positive start fairly quickly.

Over the years, I have observed many commanders at close range. Both positive and negative examples and considerable study have shaped my own personal philosophy of command.

Train and delegate

Effective delegation is great therapy for most Air Force organizations. By applying generous doses of time, training, and trust—the three Ts—you can move the focus of decision-making down the organization. This practice gets your people...
involved and frees senior officers for handling the bigger issues. You must let your people know what is expected. You must send a clear, consistent message to your staff indicating what you expect in terms of standards and professional excellence—that you expect them to be experts in their field. Early in the game, I passed along the critical points my boss shared with me. Doing so helped my staff understand the pressures I was experiencing; it helped them understand my decision process.

When I had an experienced and mature staff, I tasked for performance in mission-oriented terms; I was not much concerned with methods. This opened an avenue of creativity for them to find better ways of getting the job done. I stressed with equal vigor the responsibility everyone shared in developing subordinates. I frequently asked the colonels—"What have you done recently to help your lieutenants grow?" This subtle pressure served to reinforce professional standards for the senior officers and tended to motivate the junior officers to learn the business more thoroughly.

The open-door policy has become military dictum, but I modified it slightly. My door was open to my staff for informal discussions on problems they were wrestling with in their units. The relationship was that of a coach and player. I rapped with them without giving orders or making the decisions. They could use my experience and background as a nonjudgmental sounding board. If they gave me the problem to solve, I would become a victim of "reverse delegation," which runs counter to our goal of decentralization and subordinate development. This relationship took time to develop, but it provided me a window into the unit and a firsthand view of the subordinate's judgment, values, and decision-making skills.

One other point should be noted with regard to delegating decision-making and action to the lowest level. There are a few situations in which the base commander should be actively involved at the lower-level unit. For example, the headquarters section commander is normally a junior officer with administrative command over enlisted personnel working for senior officers. On occasion, the enlisted personnel have divided loyalties, and, of course, the senior supervisor usually wins out. The base commander needs to do some "down-field blocking" and lend his position power to support his headquarters section commanders.

**positive reinforcement**

The old adage "you spend 90 percent of your time on 10 percent of your people" is true since the chronic troublemakers seem to demand a disproportionate share of a supervisor's time. Consequently, there are only a few minutes a day to recognize and express appreciation to those people accomplishing the mission on a daily basis. Since most of our people are operating at the recognition/self-esteem level, they value sincere positive reinforcement from supervisors.

Not only did I stress public praise when appropriate, I also instituted several positive reinforcement policies. For example, the previous base commander indicated that he was not satisfied with the image and personal appearance of the Security Police Squadron. Part of the problem was that the previous squadron commander had departed PCS several months before and the new commander would not be on board for a few more weeks. A young lieutenant was acting squadron commander. Although he was working the big problems well, the unit was lacking senior leadership. I attended a guard mount shortly after taking command and conducted the usual open-ranks inspection; I could easily understand my predecessor's concern. Fortunately, there was one staff sergeant in the rear rank who looked exceptionally sharp. I stepped in front of him and commented: "Staff Sergeant Dixson, you look exceptionally sharp today. I see your shoes are in good repair and well shined, your trousers are touching the tops of your shoes without a break, your belt is properly adjusted, etc." What I actually did was
define a high standard of excellence for everyone in the flight. I concluded with, “You’ve made an extra effort to be a professional, so I authorize you an extra day off some time within the next 30 days; work out the details with your supervisor.” When departing the area in my staff car, I noticed that the flight members were gathering around a beaming sergeant to congratulate him and to learn the new standards. At the next guard mount with another flight, no one’s appearance warranted an extra day off. I called the flight chief, a technical sergeant, off to one side. “Sergeant, how do you think your troops look today?” “Oh, they look so-so.” “Yes, that’s right, and they all look just like you do.”

The flight had a three-day break immediately following that shift. It was not until 0600 Sunday morning that I could check them again. When I stepped in front of the flight chief, he saluted proudly. “Sir, B-Flight is prepared for inspection.” I could not believe my eyes! Any one of those security policemen could have been used on a recruiting poster. I had a compliment for practically everyone.

I completed my open-ranks inspection and stepped in front of the flight. “Gentlemen, this is, without a doubt, the sharpest, most professional flight of security policemen I have ever inspected. This unit not only has pride but reflects excellent supervision.” I addressed the flight chief with, “Sergeant, you have a day off some time within the next 30 days; work out the details with your supervisor.” As I departed the area and they were dismissed, there were much backslapping and handshaking. After the arrival of a strong lieutenant colonel commander who also advocated high standards and positive reinforcement, the squadron went on to excel in practically every measure of merit.

teamwork

I am persuaded that the average person really wants to be part of a successful team—there are very few bona fide “loners.” Building team spirit in an air base group staff is challenging because many of the functions do not relate naturally in a mutually supporting way. There may be a tendency for the units to “suboptimize” performance—enhance their mission at the expense of a sister unit’s mission. There are several techniques that can improve the team spirit on such a staff. First, never criticize anyone individually at staff meeting—if you are not pleased with a trend or problem in the group, fuss at the entire staff and press for ways to solve the problem, together. Later, when the problem is solved, you can praise the entire group for working the problem successfully. This sets a tone of teamwork.

When one function reported a problem or concern at staff meeting, I would occasionally imply that other units in the group would be happy to help them with the problem—another infusion of “it’s not his problem, it’s our problem.” I also had social functions in my home, allowing functional managers and their spouses to know fellow team members socially.

When tension was noted between two areas, I resolved it; later I would man major projects such as fund drives, committees, etc., with members from those two units. This “force feeding” of communications and contact always improved rapport and teamwork.

The bottom line in team building is that the commander is the personal embodiment of the unit’s mission. He must be positive and visible to keep his mission positive and visible in the minds of everyone in his unit. The tone and tenor of my actions with my staff were to get them to focus their unit’s energy and resources on the broader mission of the entire air base group. There is greater psychological reward when a larger mission is accomplished.

effective decision-making

Very little of a senior commander’s daily work involves routine decisions. If so, he has probably centralized decision-making too high in the organization and needs to go back and read about “train and delegate.” For the sake of our
discussion, let us assume the focus of decision-making is properly established in your unit. What are some guideposts to assist in navigating the rough terrain of executive decision-making?

First, a relationship of absolute candor between a commander and his advisers must exist. The commander can establish an atmosphere that either encourages or discourages open and frank communications. How one handles bad news, disagreements, and mistakes are the keys to turning people into survival-oriented self-servers or mission-oriented team players. I explained to my staff that I had a dubious talent for taking good inputs and making bad decisions, but no one can take poor inputs and make good decisions. I stressed that quality decision-making was a joint venture between the commander and those doing research, developing alternatives, and offering recommendations. The quality, timeliness, and honesty of their work was borne out in the final decision of the boss. I insisted also that they distinguish between facts and opinions; a decision-maker needs both, but he needs them identified accordingly.

The second point to remember in decision-making is to be sensitive to the appropriate decision time. I recalled that during my consulting work a major general asked me to study his staff relationships—he sensed that his staff was rarely genuinely supportive of many of his decisions. He reported that after he had made the final decision, his staff would often ask to "discuss the matter further." After considerable interviewing with the general and throughout his organization, the following perceptions surfaced: The general felt his role was to make decisions; he abhorred indecisiveness. He remarked proudly, "If anyone comes to me for a decision, he will have one before he leaves my office." The flaw in the staff relationship was poor sensitivity to when a particular decision was actually required. If it were rendered too early, then there were often critical variables that surfaced between when the decision was made and its implementation. In such cases, the staff felt free to "discuss the matter further," and afterward a different decision was often made. Over time, the staff members were never sure when the general had made a final decision on a subject.

When I discussed this perception with the general at the outbriefing, he agreed completely with the diagnosis and set about to discuss the situation with his staff. He later reported to me that he and his staff benefited greatly from our suggestions in that area. The first thing you should resolve with your staff in any decision situation is when a particular decision should be made. A decision made too early is just as dysfunctional as one made too late.

The next question I ask my staff is, "What are the current limits of my authority in this matter?" I expect them to check the currency of our guidance and advise me of any trends or modifications to current policy. This "window of discretion" is important in evaluating our range of alternatives.

The final question I posed to my staff was (assuming they are oriented to the larger mission of the air base group), "What course of action do you recommend?" It is important for a staff officer to become personally identified with a decision; it tends to improve acceptance and gets him personally involved in the outcome.

The bottom-line understanding I had with my staff was that when they provided me with current, candid inputs with a recommendation focused on the higher mission, then I would take all the "heat" if the decision generated negative repercussions. I found that, on occasion, a senior officer who was not pleased with one of my decisions would register his views with a junior member of my staff. If my decisions were to be discussed with anyone, I was the point of contact. This pledge of downward loyalty generates a reverse effect of upward loyalty to the commander and the mission of his organization.

The normal duty day of any base commander is punctuated with problem situa-
tions ranging from relatively minor misunderstandings to serious, high-impact crises. I would like to discuss briefly a few problems that served to keep my job interesting and challenging.

First, a problem, by definition, has at least one solution. If a situation has no solution, then it is not a problem but a state-of-being you must learn to live with. This quick test, “problem or state-of-being,” helps move you and your team into a “solution-oriented” mind-set because there are very few situations that cannot be solved eventually.

I found that the most misunderstood function of management was control. A great number of problems I encountered seemed to be rooted in someone’s failure to understand or apply the control function correctly. Even when managers can recite the four classic elements of control, they frequently misapply them, thereby undercontrolling or overcontrolling. Let’s clear the air on this critical aspect of effective command and review what constitutes a proper control system.

First, you must have goals or objectives stated in measurable terms, preferably quantifiable (dollars, rates, percentages, etc.). Second, there must be a system to measure actual performance accurately in a timely manner; this measurement must be in the same terms as the stated goal. Third, you must be able to compare the actual performance with the desired goals. Finally, you must have action plans designed to return actual performance to desired performance. These seem bone simple, but I have witnessed an avalanche of miscues, such as only vague and general goals, measuring systems that take months to read out and then only with an “apples-to-oranges” comparison, using the comparison as a threat rather than useful management information systems and, of course, the “fire someone” mentality instead of productive corrective action. When you assume command of any unit, ensure that your people understand control and apply it correctly.

Another situation that requires your best efforts is union relationships. Most union leaders are dedicated to the unit’s mission and focus the energies of the union on getting the job done. Other officials seem to be consumed by the political high jinks of internal union activity and play the unit’s mission to serve union ends. These self-serving types are rare, but if you encounter one, he will give you fits. Work the union relationship business hard and bring those folks into your team.

Another facet of command that is potentially hazardous to your health is equal employment opportunity (EEO). The average Air Force supervisor is basically honest and sincere; the bona fide bigots do not last long. However, the world of EEO case law resulting from suits and appeals is complex and growing at an exponential rate. The laws are such that well-meaning people may unwittingly err and create expensive problems for you. Be sure your EEO training programs are well presented and attended by everyone concerned. The best way to prevent EEO problems is broad-based education.

Another cross that all base commanders must bear is the excessively broad span of control. The Scott AFB commander has fifteen subordinates reporting directly to him. Many of these relationships were established by law. For example, the base commander must authorize searches, discharge of enlisted personnel under AFR 39-10 and AFR 39-12, represent the government to the union, etc. In addition to interacting with his subordinates, he functions on the wing commander’s staff with seven coequal senior officers; he serves on six off-base boards, panels, and councils; and he performs a myriad of representational duties, both on and off base, as the “mayor” of Scott AFB.

The final problem that needs mention is the confusion associated with the title of “base commander.” Most civilians, and many dependent wives, think the base commander does, in fact, command the entire installation and every person on it. I assure you nothing could be further from the truth. When civilians call to complain about someone assigned to one of the tenant units, they feel the base commander
should be able to “order” a solution instantly. John Q. Public just cannot grasp why a base commander does not actually command the base. “If I were king,” I would change the title to support group commander. Granted, I would be facing some historical headwind with such a suggestion, but I am confident the change more closely reflects the facts and would eventually better serve both the Air Force and our supporting public.

I HAVE OFFERED a few tips on how to hit the ground running when you assume command, discussed the philosophical framework on which my command performance was based, and touched briefly on a smattering of problems that make up a day in the life of a base commander. I strongly encourage each senior officer to enrich his service to our great nation by aggressively seeking any opportunity to state, “Sir, I assume command.”

Air War College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

coming...

in our November-December Issue

- Coexistence and Succession
- Factors in Soviet Strategy
- Soviet Strategic Air Power at 65
- Supporting Soviet Air Regiments
Military Leadership 
in a Changing Service

MAJOR EARL H. TILFORD, JR.

HISTORY provides us with an image of military leadership that stresses the commander's role in war. To many, military history is Alexander the Great charging the enemy at the head of his cavalry, Robert E. Lee guiding his tattered gray brigades to victory at Chancellorsville, or Teddy Roosevelt leading his Rough Riders up San Juan Hill.

The first great air power leaders appeared on the stage of history during World War I, and once again the emphasis is on combat in the examples of leadership that have been preserved for posterity in writings about World War I. Virtually everyone is familiar with the exploits of Germany's Red Baron, Manfred von Richthofen, who led his Flying Circus through deadly encounters over the Western Front.
General William "Billy" Mitchell returned from the Great War convinced that air power would play a key role in future conflicts. He worked to establish a strong, independent Air Force but found that most of the defense establishment did not share his vision for air power.

Giulio Douhet, an Italian officer during the war, continued to develop his ideas on the use of air forces and became one of air power's first intellectual leaders after the war. America's war effort thrust to the fore men like Benjamin Foulois and Billy Mitchell, who led our air service in war and then worked in peace to establish the foundations creating an image of the fighter pilot as a modern knight of the air.
Accomplishing the Air Force mission in today's aerospace environment requires leaders who effectively blend the efforts of personnel of diverse skills and background. Skilled enlisted technicians (left) mate the nose cone to a Minuteman III missile. A B-52 pilot (right) holds his place in formation en route to a target during the Vietnam War.

for an independent Air Force. These were men who had a vision of what had to be done, and they did it.

Between 1919 and 1939, other American air leaders developed the doctrines, strategies, and tactics that would be employed by the USAAF in the Second World War. Men like "Hap" Arnold, Carl Spaatz, Haywood Hansell, and Claire Chennault possessed the technical knowledge necessary to wed the new machines of war to new forms of warfare.

During the Second World War, we had first-rate leadership throughout the air service. At the top level, Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker typified this leadership. While commanding the famous 8th Air Force, he helped convince President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
The effective use of firepower has been a concern of leadership since the introduction of gunpowder weapons. On the eighteenth-century battlefield, soldiers marched into battle in long parallel lines that were designed to maximize firepower, and leaders controlled their men through their physical presence and a system of harsh discipline. In the skies over World War II Europe, bomber crews flew in tight formation to concentrate defensive firepower, and leaders guided their men by instilling self-discipline in their crews before the battle and by giving instructions by radio during battle. Although Luftwaffe fighters and German antiaircraft gunners took their toll, American bomber crews pressed home their attacks, establishing a tradition that continues through the Vietnam War and on even to the present day.
Churchill that daylight precision bombardment of German industrial targets was an appropriate application of air power. At lower levels, that leadership took the form of a commander's voice crackling over the radio to urge tight formation flying as German fighters swarmed over the bomber formation or maintenance NCOs and officers coaxing exhausted ground crews into extra efforts in the small hours of the morning, extra efforts that meant another operational fighter for the next day's mission.

When the *Enola Gay* dropped the first atomic bomb, air power became a decisive arm of combat. During the late 1940s and through

*General Curtis LeMay is remembered for his tough, no nonsense approach to leadership, exemplified by some of his decisions during World War II. In the air war against Japan, he had his B-29s stripped of their armor and armament so they could carry more fire bombs for low-level raids against Tokyo and other cities. Partly because of the way air power was used against Japan, an invasion that would have cost hundreds of thousands of American and Japanese lives was avoided. After World War II, it was LeMay who made the Strategic Air Command into the world's most powerful weapon for war and the nation's greatest hope for maintaining the peace through strategic deterrence.*
Today, as always, the Air Force needs leaders. But the situations in which leadership must be exercised proliferate as warfare becomes more complex. . . . While the peacetime Air Force is often characterized as a bureaucracy and a technocracy, it is also a military organization that must be prepared for combat under a variety of circumstances. These members of an Air Force Security Alert Team (below) respond to a Vietcong attack on the perimeter of Tan Son Nhut Air Base during the Tet offensive of 1968.
At the unit level, leadership depends on the ability of company grade officers and noncommissioned officers to motivate people to do things they might not otherwise want to do, things like loading bombs in 120° heat on an air base ramp during the Vietnam War. Had these bombs been improperly hung and armed, the air strategy devised by our leaders and the bravery demonstrated by our air crews would have come to nothing. . . . A formation of F-105s (below) flies toward a heavily defended target in North Vietnam. Airmen in such flights gained a certain psychological support from the presence of comrades in other aircraft. But once a target was taken under attack, the tactics used frequently resulted in the disintegration of formations so that each pilot was on his own—man, machine, skills, and fears. On such missions, a flight leader may have dropped his bombs and been miles away before the last aircraft in a formation reached the target.
the 1950s, a number of men led the Air Force into a new era when technological advances quickened the pace of change in weaponry, tactics, strategy, and force structure. Vision, flexibility, determination, and courage were the hallmarks of leaders like Hoyt Vandenberg and Curtis LeMay. Both had proved themselves in tough World War II leadership roles, and both provided leadership after the war in establishing and developing the Air Force as an independent service.

Leadership is a vital part of today's Air Force from top to bottom. Top leaders advise with Congress, make policy, and set the tone of our service. At the operating level, others motivate people and guide their units toward the accomplishment of the many Air Force missions. Today, company grade officers and noncommissioned officers with leadership ability are as essential as colonels and generals who have a vision of what has to be done and the courage to make the vision a reality. Indeed, today as in the past, we need leaders.

*Maxwell AFB, Alabama*
... we have no power to choose the social order and its techniques of control. They are already in existence and the most we can do is combine and mould them to best advantage.

Karl Mannheim

The All-Volunteer Force is on the ragged edge of survival.

Charles C. Moskos

THE two great democracies of North America, Canada and the United States, are concerned with the issue of an appropriate evolutionary model, or blueprint, for the all-volunteer armed forces. While rather obvious differences between the two countries exist in international salience, scale, and military traditions, they share a common "crisis of adapta-
tion" in their volunteer military institutions. The litany of military manpower difficulties, both in regular and reserve segments, is remarkably the same in both countries.4

It is extremely difficult to assess the current all-volunteer force (AVF) situation without a model of desirable future institutional parameters. With notable exceptions, those engaged in the shaping of AVF manpower policies do not appear concerned with longer-term developmental goals or trends.5 In their headlong rush toward the future as part of the social scientific growth industry involved in solving the discrete bureaucratic problems of AVFs, they have lost sight of the military as an institution in society.6 Policy choices are being induced rather than deduced from a model of institutional development, with the result that there are no guarantees other than blind faith in bureaucratic rationality, that a particular policy choice will articulate with others in the longer term. The institution begins, in essence, to drift out of control. A central focus here will be on policies and organizational changes likely to achieve the apparently contradictory goals of increased civil-military integration and increased internal integration within the military, especially in the ground force segment.

One further point is in order: I support Morris Janowitz’s argument that in the longer term the idea of national service7—a military manifestation of Daniel Bell’s Civitas8—must provide the ideological umbrella for military participation and manpower supply. At the same time, Janowitz’s assessment that the immediate concern must be with the survival and adaptation of the AVF concept remains valid:

Unfortunately, I estimate that ten years of planning, experimenting, and training would be necessary to develop a meaningful national service even if we started in earnest tomorrow. But, since we will not start tomorrow, we must ensure the success of the all-volunteer force and perpetuate the ideal of the citizen soldier as the first steps in an effective transition to national service.9 Although one can agree in principle with Professor Janowitz’s assessment, difficulties remain with the term “success of the all-volunteer force.”

Success and Control of AVFs

The debate between critics and advocates of the AVF concept has gradually changed through time into a debate over the relative success and effectiveness of current practices. What is now controversial is not the decision to implement an AVF model but rather the need and scope for institutional change. It is here that the same indicators of manpower supply are interpreted in completely different lights.

Charles Moskos has asserted that the AVF in the United States is “on the ragged edge of sur-
vival," at least if we consider various human resource indicators. This is surely a controversial diagnosis and one that many would question. Yet one is not so sure that the AVF as a complex federal bureaucracy is on the ragged edge of survival, for it is quite clearly a going concern. It is a beehive of activity, as studies proliferate, recruits enter and are trained, and military personnel flit through its structure. Its technology does not seem in danger of imminent collapse, and the process of acquiring new technologies is proceeding apace. Nor can one say with any degree of authority that the AVF is on the ragged edge of survival as a deterrent or effective "fighting" force. The assessment of cohesion and operational effectiveness in peacetime is a complex undertaking.

But even the most ardent defender of the current status quo would not deny that there is room for improvement in manpower practices and personnel policies, for the limited set of manpower indicators of some reliability and validity do suggest there is a gap between goals and performance, both in the regular and reserve components. This holds for both Canada and the United States. It is more important, though, to ask questions about the blueprint for organizational adaptation and the degree of control being exerted over what Moskos would call the "emergent military." In short, where is the AVF going, and who is shaping its development?

One's tentative answer to this question may be far more worrisome than Dr. Moskos's assertion, for the AVF appears to be drifting out of control toward the paradoxical shoals of social isolation and unrestrained civilianization. A blueprint for institution building seems to be lacking despite the policy-planning effort being expended. One has the impression that civilian and military leaders are on a runaway stagecoach. They have neither a grip on the reins nor a map of where they are going in relation to the environment. In the stagecoach itself, there is bedlam as the passengers are bounced about and the horses are frothing at the mouth.

This is only an impression, for it is hard to document the degree of control being exercised over the developmental fate of the AVF, just as it is difficult to document the degree of cohesion in military units in North America. One indicator, though, lies in the discrepancy between public and private viewpoints of members of the officer corps, those individuals who nominally are in control of such development. Having just completed a fairly extensive survey of serving Canadian officers, I am struck by the fact that the majority of experienced officers, especially in ground combat units, decry current trends when interviewed in private. They do not like what they perceive as a trend toward civilianization and are in fact estranged from the very institution they are deemed to control. Yet (and this is perhaps the ultimate paradox of the AVF) they are precisely the same group that is making the system a going concern and shaping its future by a "can-do" approach to the implementation of policies. It is this estrangement which suggests that there is some validity in the "out-of-control" proposition. In effect, it represents the particular trap sprung upon an officer corps that accepts an ethos of uncritical loyalty on the part of subordinates.

The issue of control over developments in the AVF is raised because it appears central to any discussion of strategies for institution building in the longer term. One must presuppose that the ability and the willingness to control and shape future development exists, otherwise we are engaged in a purely academic exercise. It is clear, though, that there are limits to the degree of control which can be exerted over the AVF institution-building process. For example, the shaping of future events will be constrained by the requirement to operate within the traditions of democratic social control and voluntaristic military participation, both of which are essential features of liberal democracies. At the same time, bureaucratic inertia will have to be overcome, and military and civilian leaders will play a key role in this process. It is difficult to project any meaningful institution building without assuming consensus and commitment among
leaders regarding long-term goals.

Some of the strategies for institution building outlined here will not, of course, require agreement among military and civilian leaders. Some, like concrete steps to reduce personnel turbulence at all levels of the AVF, do not require civilian approbation at all, and the only consideration is the military's willingness to bring turbulence under control. However, involvement of civilian, political, bureaucratic, and educational leaders would be necessary to implement strategies of the type advocated by Moskos in his article on "saving" the AVF because legislative and budgetary allocation changes would be required. In the same way, one suspects that the creation of a viable regimental system for the American Army would require extradepartmental support.

Internal and External Integration of the AVF

A sociological concern with AVF institution building requires the examination of the interdependent issues of the linkages between the armed forces and society and the internal cohesion and effectiveness of the military as a unique social system with combat goals. The requirement is to develop a blueprint for shaping both convergent and divergent trends to create an emergent military that is operationally effective as a deterrent or combatant force and firmly embedded in a society where the public perceives military service as an essential component of adult political life. It requires a blueprint which fuses civitas and the traditional military ethic of unlimited liability for those in uniform. In the long run, the AVF should reflect high internal and high external integration.

These objectives are not, as many analysts would have us believe, mutually exclusive and contradictory. I do not agree with those who argue that institution building in the AVF should be only concerned with developing internal cohesion and martial virtues in the armed forces, in effect treating the military in isolation from society. Many of the manpower problems of the AVF are linked to qualitative trends in recruitment from society as marginal citizens become problematic soldiers. There are enormous risks in concentrating solely on building up linkages between the military and the wider social order without considering the issue of operational effectiveness. As one analyst has pointed out, we need to seek the middle road:

Solutions to the dilemma facing the military profession fall somewhere between two unacceptable extremes: returning to traditional professionalism, involving withdrawal from society; or discarding traditional values and severely impairing cohesiveness and discipline. Obviously, the two should be reconciled, but the prescription of preserving essential military values while maintaining a close relationship with civilian society is inordinately difficult.

The task is difficult but not impossible, and it does not necessarily have to involve an attempt to socially engineer a segmented military of the type advocated by William Hauser, for example.

It is crucial that AVF planners break away from the traps inherent in "zero sum" thinking about developmental thrusts for the AVF. An attempt to increase internal cohesiveness does not necessarily have to mean a corresponding decrease in linkages with civilian society. A cohesive and committed military does not necessarily have to be isolated from contamination by civilian values, and highly committed members of the military profession need not live out their careers in splendid isolation within the military community on posts or bases. Similarly, we must not assume that attempts to increase military-civilian linkages always and irrevocably lead to a corresponding decline in operational effectiveness, cohesion, and commitment within the military. Both lines of thinking represent what I would term the tyranny of concepts and what others might well refer to as a fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

In thinking through the issue of AVF institution building, it seems appropriate
to focus our thinking on the idea of integration. Integration, despite its definitional ambiguity, implies a drawing together of disjunctive elements in society and as such is related to the analysis of linkages between the military and society and within the military itself. In this regard, the distinction between internal integration and external integration is of particular usefulness in thinking through these issues. (This distinction provided the conceptual basis for an article by John D. Blair on attitudes among members of the AVF in the United States.)

External integration refers to social and normative linkages between the military and society, while internal integration refers to linkages within the military, and thus implicitly to the issue of internal cohesion.

Employing the traditional categorization of levels into high and low along each dimension, we obtain a two-by-two matrix which can be useful in orienting our thinking about the current character of AVFs and their future developmental alternatives. These possibilities—which are rudimentary ideal types—are shown in Figure 1.

Four possible images of the AVF are indicated in Figure 1: (a) military which is low on both internal and external integration; (b) a military which is low on internal integration and high on external integration; (c) a military which is high on internal integration and low on external integration; and (d) a military which is high on both internal and external integration.

Where one places the current AVFs of Canada and the United States will obviously depend on one's frame of reference. It is possible, as Moskos and Lissak have shown, to identify indicators of both convergence and divergence in current AVF dynamics. One might suggest, though, that a review of a wide range of indicators points to one classificatory alternative rather than others in assessing the current AVFs, and it has already been argued that the long-term development or adaptation of the AVF concept must be toward the high external and high internal integration model.

Searching for the middle ground between analysts who see the AVF as becoming more isolated from society and those who see the military's traditional institutional character being eroded by the process of civilianization, one is pushed toward the conclusion that the current AVF approximates the low internal and low external integration type. It is high on neither dimension but has become a specialized bureaucracy with weak ties to society while, at the same time, exhibiting low internal integration due to a high degree of structural and attitude differentiation. In slightly different terms, its linkages to society and its internal cohesion have both suffered in recent years.

A number of indicators that point in this direction have been drawn from the literature. No attempt has been made to weight them, and their classification into external and internal types is left deliberately inexact, for there are indicators that are linked to both. Some indicators of low external integration are the following:

Figure 1. Developmental images of the AVF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Integration</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The current AVF?</td>
<td>The &quot;convergent&quot; image of a civilianized and ineffective military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Normative</td>
<td>The &quot;divergent&quot; image of an isolated cohesive military</td>
<td>The future AVF?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linkages between the</td>
<td>AVF and Society</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
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• a narrow, marginal recruitment base,
• unrepresentative social backgrounds,
• high rate of self-recruitment,
• sociopolitical alienation of junior troops,
• generally low military participation rates,
• decline of reserve infrastructure,
• professionalization of reserve system, and
• lack of integration between military service and educational systems.

Some indicators of low internal cohesion are as follows:
• high rates of early career attrition,
• personnel turbulence in units,
• manning crisis in ground combat arms,
• dissatisfaction of junior personnel,
• internal attitudinal conflicts,
• increasing use of bureaucratic controls, and
• estrangement of experienced officers from current developments.

My reading of the literature suggests that these AVF integration indicators are virtually the same for Canada and the United States.

The list represents a series of areas where there is scope for improvement. In this sense, it becomes obvious that scope for improvement exists along both the internal and external dimensions. The process of AVF institution building requires that we be concerned with strategies oriented toward the improvement of both internal and external integration; the blueprint must be aimed at both sets of indicators. Again, one must break away from the trap of zero sum conceptualization: there are some strategies that contribute to increases along both dimensions, even though their primary focus may be on one or the other.

### Strategies for External Integration

The immediate adaptive problem faced by all-volunteer forces is the management of a recruitment crisis brought on by demographic shifts and by the increasing competition between military service and postsecondary opportunities. This problem takes priority over that of manning the reserves. The need is to expand the recruitment base and achieve a more representative distribution of backgrounds among recruits. As it stands now, the participation of middle-class youth is low and the quality of recruits problematic, creating high loss rates in the in-house training system for enlisted personnel.

The definition of military service as a job rather than a stage in the transition to political adulthood in a democracy simply reinforces this crisis. It is the educational system, itself facing a decline in enrollments, that beckons middle-class youth as a steppingstone to civilian careers. In this context, the overreliance on economic incentives to attract a career force tends to perpetuate existing patterns of marginal recruitment.

Although a future objective could be the development of a concept of national service, in the short run strategies must be found that increase the integration between military service and educational institutions. This strategy seems most appropriate for broadening the social base for participation in the AVF and improving the quality of recruits. This approach is currently being developed in Canada and has recently been advocated by Moskos in the United States.

Essentially, this strategy involves a shift in emphasis from a "career" professionalized force ideal to acceptance of the concept of a two-tier career system as the main building block in manpower plans. It is a social fact of life in industrial democracies that most youth will turn their backs on a military career, however economically attractive that career may be. On the other hand, there may be many, especially with the appropriate combination of incentives, who would find a short military tour attractive. If military participation for this group were to be linked to funding of educational benefits, as Moskos advocates, participation would likely increase.

This external integration logic underlies strategies being developed in Canada to broaden the recruitment base. Again, we are not aiming at procuring a great increase in the number of
career personnel but only at expanding the recruit market through a better fit between military and civilian educational structures. Among other things, the Canadian military is developing concepts of lateral entry, whereby individuals are brought in for a short service period into trades that match their civilian qualifications. Another experimental strategy being tried is a program to have military technicians trained in civilian vocational schools in two- and three-year-courses. Civilian administrators have shown an interest in adapting existing programs to meet military requirements (these adaptations are relatively minor), and students are enrolled in the military throughout their course and spend their summers training in military settings. At the end of their course, these students serve a period of obligatory service.

What is unique about this training program is that the participants are enlisted personnel destined for employment in that capacity in the regular military. The program builds linkages between the military and society by placing military personnel in civilian settings and sensitizing civilian educational authorities to aspects of military service as well as reducing training costs by transferring them from military to civilian institutions.

Whether recruits are attracted to military training by the prospect of subsequent educational benefits or attracted to civilian schools by the prospect of military benefits is not really the issue here: in both cases the result is an increased integration of the military and society. One suspects that this form of institution building in the AVF will increase through the coming decade, although internal resistance can be expected as career personnel decry benefits offered to those who have not "started at the bottom." Its general impact will be to increase external integration. However, we cannot assume on a priori grounds that such strategies will weaken internal cohesiveness. Again, the trap of zero sum thinking looms on the horizon.

Another factor that may undermine this institution-building strategy is an insensitivity to national strategic goals on the part of civilian political, educational, and media leaders. The AVF replaces the moral nexus of national service and citizenship with the cash nexus of the marketplace, and since military participation rates are lowered, civilian leaders are less likely to have served in the military. Today, the great majority of middle-class youth enter adult roles without military experience. One can expect them to be insensitive and apathetic toward the issues of military service and military manpower supply.

Perhaps the preceding comments are more applicable to Canada, with its three decades of AVF experience, than to the United States. I am continually struck by the fact that the great majority of adults I meet in this middle-class segment of life have had no military experience. (This does not apply, of course, to the older generation with World War II experience.) In many instances, especially in a university setting, I have found myself the first military officer ever encountered by participants. These recurrent personal experiences are more convincing than survey data, and they illustrate the fact that under the AVF scenario, military service and middle-class life are disconnected. One suspects that this will become the situation in the United States as the years of AVF experience accumulate. But unless the middle class comes to define military service as a social problem, public support for strategies of external integration is unlikely to be mobilized.

It is in this context that a further strategy for external integration merits consideration even though it will be reacted to negatively in some quarters. The military should consider encouraging a high proportion of its career personnel, i.e., those who manifest high internal satisfaction, to live off-base and interact with the civilian community. It is important to distinguish between the first-termer, who requires immersion in the military community, and what we in Canada are coming to conceptualize as the "mature serviceperson." The latter has demonstrated a commitment to military service and is

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also locked in after approximately ten years due to pension considerations. There is not much risk in encouraging career military personnel to live off-base, and a considerable number of potential benefits can accrue to the external integration of the AVF.

Zero sum thinkers who advocate an isolated AVF will see this strategy as potentially contributing to further civilianization and erosion of the military community which has such nostalgic appeal. Yet one is not so sure that such would be the case if the personnel involved were what have been termed “mature” servicepersons. The argument that isolation of the military throughout their careers is necessary for maintaining promilitary values is not supported empirically by research.

Such a strategy could also be linked to institution building in the less visible segment of the military: the reserves. Residential stability and community involvement of regular military personnel might facilitate transition into local reserve units after a period of professional military service. If reserve service of exprofessionals were linked to educational benefits, as Moskos advocates, this possibility would be increased.

The manning of the reserves is one of the most difficult institution-building tasks facing the AVF. Without the pressure of the draft, there are few current incentives to participate. Middle-class community participation is negligible, and, in Canada at least, the majority of reserve soldiers are high school and university students earning tuition money. They constitute a highly unstable manpower pool, and annual turnover is high. Reserve service tends to be a stepping-stone to service in the professional AVF rather than vice versa. In Canada, roughly 40 percent of professionals have reserve experience prior to enlistment. The professional military feeds on the reserves and returns little to its feeding ground.

One of the compounding factors is the trend toward professionalization of the reserve system. Citizen soldiers find their lives increasingly controlled by military professionals and centralized controls. The self-esteem of the enthusiastic amateur suffers in such a situation, and the incentive for participation is eroded. Overall, an arguable case can be made that success in strengthening the reserves under the AVF concept will hinge on the professional military’s willingness to relinquish control over local systems.

There does not appear to be an easy solution to the “withering away” phenomenon of reserves under the AVF umbrella. One must agree with Moskos’s conclusion that “. . . without much greater reliance on prior-service personnel, there seems to be no way to salvage Army reserve components in an all-volunteer context,” but the current dynamics are all in the other direction. Support is needed, for the reserves, as citizen soldiers whose voluntarism is grounded in local communities, constitute a crucial factor in external integration of the AVF. Their problems will not be solved by making them a more attractive “moon-lighting” alternative.

Strategies for Internal Integration

Economic solutions are unlikely to provide an effective institution-building strategy for increasing internal integration in the AVF. During the 1970s, pay increases for Canadian personnel consistently exceeded rises in the consumer price index, and yet manpower problems also increased. Research in both Canada and the United States consistently points up the role of noneconomic factors in personnel retention and unit morale. Economic incentives disproportionately attract a segment of the potential recruit market which has a lower probability of first-term survival and successful integration into the AVF. Low-quality recruits produce high training wastage rates, which create turbulence, etc., in a vicious circle.

Three issues stand out when considering institution building along the internal integration dimension: retention and first-term attrition, especially in the ground combat arms; internal value cleavages; and unit instability.
and personnel turbulence. The AVF planners have to develop adaptive strategies for coping with or reducing first-term attrition, reducing attitudinal conflicts, and lowering current levels of personnel instability in military units. Some strategies for internal institution building address more than one of these issues. The Canadian practice of streaming recruits into the combat arms for three years, followed by voluntary reassignment to technical and administrative support trades, is a case in point, for it improves manning of the combat arms and reduces attitudinal tensions between combat and support elements.

Youth in industrial democracies exhibit a tendency toward job experimentation in the initial years of work. The question then centers on the degree to which AVF planners can adapt to this social phenomenon by either distinguishing in personnel and career policies between temporary citizen soldiers and career soldiers, or by building opportunities for job shifting into career trajectories. In either case, one is moving away from the single-track career pattern toward a dual track, or even multitrack, career system.

The case for a two-track (or tier) career system in the United States Army has been put forward by Moskos and will not be discussed here. This system accepts the evidence that the majority of new recruits to the AVF cannot be expected to become career personnel—despite the decided preference of planners for this outcome—and proposes a policy change in light of it. Whether it will have consequences for internal integration, one cannot say. It does seem to be a segmentalist approach, in that it implicitly accepts differences in career values and military sentiments among junior and senior personnel.

The two-track system used in the Canadian Forces since 1976, on the other hand, increases internal integration within Canada's AVF. Originally proposed as a solution to problems in combat arms recruitment, it has since been broadened to include naval trades. Basically, an increasing proportion of recruits are streamed into the combat trades for a first tour of three years. At enlistment, they are given guarantees that if they meet standards they will be reassigned to a technical or administrative support trade after that period and given the appropriate trade training, continuing their military careers in that second path. Correspondingly, recruitment of individuals directly into support trades is reduced. A cadre of career individuals is retained in the combat arms and given the incentive of accelerated promotion to command positions. Its formal title is the Land Operations Trade Reassignment Program, abbreviated to LOTRP (pronounced low-trip).

LOTRP represents an adaptation for the AVF that increases the numbers and quality of recruits to the ground combat arms, the force segment historically plagued by shortfalls and low-quality recruits. Recruiting objectives have become easier to attain in the Canadian context since 1976, and, moreover, wastage rates on support training courses have been extremely low among individuals transferring from the combat arms. This means that training costs (which tend to be higher in technical support trades) are reduced. As one senior trainer commented during a recent survey of attitudes in Canada's Army: "We'll take all we can get; they are already soldiers and keen as hell to learn a support trade." Similarly, a commander in a service battalion (combat support unit) wrote that "The LOTRP Master Corporal with an arms background stands out like a sore thumb in this unit . . . you can be confident that he will pull his weight in the field."29

These comments point up the further institutional consequences of the LOTRP program: it reduces attitude cleavages between combat and support personnel by leavening Army support trades with personnel experienced in land combat units. As such, it acts to increase the internal integration with Canada's AVF. Crosscutting ties are being forged which will have significant payoffs in the longer run for the social cohesion of the field army.

Personnel turbulence, or instability, is another
focus for AVF institution building along the internal dimension, both in Canada and the United States. It is linked to career management practices that emphasize individual mobility and career development over unit cohesion, as Kurt Lang noted somewhat prophetically in the mid-sixties:

The entire military establishment in many respects ceases to be the world of a profession but instead becomes geared to the mobility needs of individuals... Rational organization and automated personnel systems are designed to allocate resources and improve the organizational effectiveness of the contemporary military establishment... Yet these same practices and programs also have disruptive impacts.50

These disruptive impacts are becoming increasingly visible and call into question the practice of uncritically applying civilian managerial techniques to military systems: organizational effectiveness and combat effectiveness are not the same thing.

Differences exist between instability at the unit level and instability at the senior command and staff levels. Instability in the former instance reduces unit cohesion and alienates those led from their leaders, especially in combat units.31 Instability at the senior officer level—what Lewis Sorley terms the “Will-o’-the-Wisp General” phenomenon—weakens the accountability of senior officers for their decisions and contributes to institutional drift.32

The adaptive solution in both instances is clear and entirely within the control of AVF authorities: slow down what Canadian troops derisively call the “ping pong game” at all levels of the AVF hierarchy. This logically implies decisions to extend tour lengths, to increase geographic stability, and to deemphasize the use of short-run statistical indicators in the assessment and allocation of promotion opportunities. The key question, however, is whether senior AVF authorities will be willing and able to make those decisions. If they cannot implement institution-building strategies in this particular instance, then the chances of success in other, infinitely more complex, areas will be minimal. Increased personnel stability is an essential ingredient for team building within the AVF deterrent force; a team that makes wholesale changes in players and senior management year after year is unlikely to win many pennants.

The current concern for increased stability provides an organizational climate for the implementation of a modified regimental system for the combat arms of the U.S. Army and for the strengthening of the existing regimental system in Canada. Regiments can provide geosocial stability for the career employment of combat personnel and a focus for commitment. The attachment of Canadian soldiers to their regimental system remains high; even after a decade of change in which regimental symbols and practices were downplayed, more than 75 percent of all Army personnel and 100 percent of senior combat officers believe that it “has an important place in a modern force and should be retained at all costs.”33

Probably a modified regimental system along British and Canadian lines could be implemented in the United States. A recent study coauthored by Canadian and British liaison officers assigned to TRADOC reached this conclusion and presented specific plans for its implementation.34 They estimate that full implementation would take a decade or so, a period which would converge with Janowitz’s proposed citizen-soldier concept.

Paradoxically, this most divergent of institution-building strategies can also increase external integration between the AVF and society. Since regiments are geographically stable, the possibility of interaction in local settings is increased, especially when tours are lengthened. Communities have been known to take pride in the local regiment, and it is possible to have reserve units affiliated with regular regiments in the same general locality. If regular and reserve service were to be linked, as Moskos has suggested, those linkages could become part of the community social fabric. In effect, an institution would have been built.
THE IMAGE of a cohesive military with wide public support and participation has a great deal of intrinsic appeal, but its realization in Canadian and American society is a long way off. Visions of the future are comparatively easy to produce: it is much more difficult to implement them. This article provides only a rough blueprint, blurred at the edges, and an extraordinary amount of effort both within and without the military will be required to ensure that the future comes to approximate that blueprint.

Even then, we have no guarantee of evolution along the line suggested here. The stability of the international order in an age of scarcity cannot be assumed, and the process of institution building may well be violently interrupted.

Royal Military College of Canada

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C.A.C.
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31. For example, a survey of Canadian junior combat troops indicated that 68 percent had changed direct leaders four or more times in the previous two years. For a discussion of findings and their organizational consequences, see Cotton, Military Attitudes and Values of the Army in Canada.


33. Charles Cotton, Military Attitudes and Values of the Army in Canada, pp. 56-60.


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The Editor
THE AIR FORCE OFFICER CORPS IN THE 1980s
receding professionalism

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DONALD R. BAUCOM

The support people are not interested in providing support to operations. . . . They can't identify with the airplanes on the base. . . . Most people outside operations see the airplanes as just getting in the way. They are a nuisance.'

TODAY'S peacetime Air Force is a large, incredibly complex organization with an officer corps of nearly 102,000. These officers are divided among 217 occupational specialties that are themselves based on 60 different academic disciplines.

Given this diversity, it is not surprising that three recent studies present evidence indicating a weakness in the unity and sense of purpose of the officer corps. Captain Frank Wood reported in 1980 that younger officers think service in the support areas is more rewarding and has greater prestige than service in the operational portion of the Air Force.2 More recent reports on officer professionalism by Major C. Anne Bonen and Captain James H. Slagle indicate that substantially more than half of the officers in today's Air Force identify more closely with their career fields than with the officer corps.3

What is the significance of this situation? I believe it signals a possible recession of professionalism in the present Air Force officer corps. I develop this thesis by first arguing that Samuel P. Huntington's The Soldier and the State still constitutes a valid perspective from which to view current professional developments.4 Huntington's views, combined with Philip Abrams’s article on recession of military professionalism in England, lead me to believe that officer professionalism may be in a recession in today's Air Force.5

The Continuing Relevance of Huntington's Soldier and the State

When evaluating events, one must always have some standard, some perspective by which to judge. Professor Huntington's classic study on military professionalism offers an excellent perspective from which to evaluate this current situation despite recent criticism by Major Bonen. She questions the continuing validity of
Huntington's study on two grounds: it is not based on data collection and is Army-oriented. Her position seems untenable to me.

Granted, one cannot survey the dead, but what then are we to do with history? Are we to deny the value and relevance of past human experience simply because historical studies cannot be based on opinion polls? Attitudes and values are expressed in the writings of the past and can be developed in historical studies. No thoughtful person can review the documentation of The Soldier and the State and fail to be impressed by the material Huntington reviewed while preparing his study. Surely, there is some degree of validity in a study supported by such massive scholarship, even if the study was completed in 1957.

What about Bonen's criticism that the study is Army-oriented? Does this matter? The U.S. Air Force did not exist until 1947, and the Army was its predecessor. The fathers of the Air Force—Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, Vandenberg, Twining, White, LeMay, et al.—were products of the interwar Army, and all but Eaker and LeMay were West Point graduates. Furthermore, many of the top leaders of the post-Vietnam Air Force—Generals George Brown, Bryce Poe, Lew and James R. Allen, Charles A. Gabriel, and Bennie Davis, to name but a few—are also West Point graduates. The single most widely known and often-used statement of our professional creed is the West Point motto: Duty, Honor, Country. Does one improve his understanding of professionalism by denying his heritage, his past? The roots of Air Force professionalism pass through the Army from the plain at West Point!

Given the significance of our professional heritage and the sound scholarship of The Soldier and the State, I think it safe to say that Huntington's book offers quite an important perspective from which to view developments in today's Air Force officer corps. Let us now look briefly at what Huntington wrote in 1957, for there is more to his thesis on military professionalism than the oft-repeated words: corporateness, expertise, and responsibility.

The Soldier and the State is probably the single most important book from the standpoint of legitimizing the military's claim to professional status. Its major thesis is that "the modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man." To prove his thesis, Huntington developed his famous model of professionalism and showed how it applied to the military. The military is a profession because it exhibits the same characteristics—expertise, corporateness, and responsibility—that the principal civil professions exhibit.

While Huntington does define each of the characteristics of professions early in his book, we gain a fuller understanding of the meaning of expertise and corporateness when he sets about describing the process through which the American officer corps became professionalized, a process that occurred in the nineteenth century. There were two major facets in this process: establishing the "conduct of war" as the focus of military expertise and the development of a corporate identity in the officer corps. These two facets are intimately related.

Prior to the Civil War, the good officer was one considered competent in some "technical skill such as civil engineering, ship design, cartography, or hydrography." Officers were not trained in a military skill that they shared with other officers. As a result, the officer corps tended to be divided into subgroups that were "likely to be more closely tied with a segment of civilian society than with other segments of the corps."

In the years following the Civil War, line officers in the Army and Navy increasingly emphasized that the conduct of war should be the center of the military's professional interest. The articulation of this viewpoint was a major step toward the development of the military's conception of itself as a "learned profession in the same sense as law and medicine" but without a counterpart in the civilian world.

Thus, the professionalization of the American officer corps occurred when Army and Navy officers recognized that the focus of their
professional expertise is the art and science of war. This focus served as a central theme, uniting specialists and line officers into a single corporate group, the professional officer corps.

RECEDING PROFESSIONALISM

I have read many discussions of Huntington’s work by military officers and have discussed it with many other officers. All of these officers focus their attention on Huntington’s static model of professionalism: corporate-ness, expertise, and responsibility. Either they have not read all of Huntington or choose to ignore the more dynamic portion of his thesis, the process by which the American officer corps achieved professional status. Recognizing that there was a chain of events leading to the achievement of professional status is important, for it permits one to understand that having achieved professional status does not guarantee that an organization will continue to maintain that exalted status.

When viewed from the perspective of the Huntington professionalization process, the situation described earlier in this article becomes a cause for concern. Today’s Air Force officer corps seems to be regressing to the preprofessional status that prevailed in the American officer corps during the first half of the nineteenth century. A majority of Air Force officers already identify primarily with others in their own career fields. Furthermore, the quotation at the beginning of this article, plus other signs of misunderstanding evident in the Wood paper, indicate that confusion exists about the focus of officer expertise.

This view of the status of professionalism in the Air Force is reinforced by Philip Abrams’s 1965 article on the recession of professionalism in the British Army. According to Abrams, the recession of professionalism is marked by these characteristics:

- the loss over time of its monopoly of the knowledge relevant to the performance of a particular service; growing confusion as to the nature of the service the group is expected to perform or the social devaluation of all the services it can perform; growing dissensus among group members as to the normative implications of membership; an internal and external denial of competence leading to a degeneration of authority-relations within and a loss of access to decision-making affecting the group throughout.10

On looking at the current defense milieu in the United States, one finds an impressive array of specifics that fall into the categories of characteristics outlined earlier.

One indication that the military no longer has a monopoly on relevant professional knowledge can be seen in the area of strategy making. Since World War II, “social scientists, economists, natural scientists, and mathematicians” have increasingly dominated national security matters. Strategy making has become the work
of civilian experts with military men largely excluded from the process.11

The existence of the “Reform” group is further evidence that the military is no longer the exclusive possessor of professional military expertise. The “Reformers,” including congressmen, civilian analysts, and retired officers, are currently challenging Department of Defense judgments on everything from the types of weapons to buy to how to employ weapons on the battlefield.12

With regard to confusion about the service the military is to provide, two things come readily to mind. One centers on the basic function of military forces. Many officers agree with Bernard Brodie’s view of the use of military force in the nuclear age. In 1946 Brodie wrote:

Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.13

Other officers believe that Brodie was wrong and the military still exists to fight the nation’s wars, such as the two wars the United States has fought since 1946.

A second element of confusion regarding the military’s purpose is government policies that authorize use of the military for nonmilitary purposes. Two examples of such nonmilitary functions are combating drug traffic and training civilians who cannot meet minimum military standards (Project 100,000).

Evidence of a dissensus with regard to “normative implications of membership” in the profession emerges from the Bonen, Slagle, and Wood articles. Some support officers seem to view support activities as ends in themselves. No more than 48 percent of the officers between lieutenant and colonel can agree on what it means to be a military professional. And fewer than 50 percent of the officers in the Air Force identify primarily with the officer corps.

Finally, although I know of few internal criticisms of military competence, there have been numerous charges of military incompetence from outside the military. The words of Steven Canby are typical:

The study of war has all but atrophied in the U.S. The best minds in the U.S. military have become managerial and technical experts; but they have not studied their own professional discipline.14

In my view, the Air Force officer corps is regressing to a preprofessional status because of a blurring of the focus of officer expertise and a related decline in the officer’s sense of corporateness. There are two basic ways of responding to this situation.

One may simply define the problem away by saying that traditional professionalism is outmoded and herald the beginning of a new era, the era of the situational or pragmatic professional. But let us not deceive ourselves into believing that nothing is lost in the process. There are certain characteristics essential to organizations that would claim the title of profession. Among these are the concepts of service and sacrifice. You simply cannot compromise where these characteristics are concerned, for when you do they cease to exist. As Richard Gabriel puts it in his book To Serve with Honor:

With regard to sacrifice, it is the basis of professionalism. The military is sworn to serve the state and the society. This inevitably means that at some point the members of the profession will have to pursue the interests of their client instead of their own.15

A second approach is to recognize that something vital is being lost and take action to remedy the situation. Since the situation is too complex to be dealt with in so small a space, I would only offer a few tentative suggestions at this point.

First, one must recognize that not everyone who wears officer insignia can be or even should be a “professional.” Whereas our rank structure is a pyramid sitting on its base, the professional structure should be thought of as an inverted pyramid. Everyone in the grade of lieutenant colonel or above should show clear
signs of commitment to the officer corps and understand that the basic mission of the Air Force is to "fly and fight," to use an old Air Force cliché. Thus, of the nearly 102,000 officers in the Air Force, we would expect about 20,000 to be "hard-core" professionals.

Implied in the idea that professionalism should increase with time in Service is the idea that socialization is a process that goes on throughout one's career. But saying that socialization is a career-long process does not exempt the Air Force from working to improve its socialization activities. More effort needs to be expended in formal educational activities so that officers better understand the professional prescriptions and proscriptions of officership. The lack of consensus among officers as to the meaning of professionalism, as revealed in the Bonen article, is a clear indication of a failure in socialization within the Air Force officer corps.

An important part of the expanded socialization activities would be an emphasis on those aspects of officership that transcend occupational skill groups. These would include the following:

- The unlimited nature of the officer's obligation to serve. Sir John Winthrop Hackett has referred to this as the "unlimited liability clause"
in the officer's "contract." All officers share to some degree the risk of death in combat or combat support during time of war.

- The ultimate purpose of the Air Force—to conduct successful aerial warfare in support of national objectives. The legitimacy of one's wear of the Air Force uniform is based on the support one gives to the accomplishment of this basic mission.

- The heritage and traditions of the U.S. Air Force.

- The Air Force uniform itself. It is a symbol of acceptance into the professional officer corps. When an individual wears it, he says that he agrees to support and maintain the standards of the corps.

- The officer's responsibility for maintaining standards of appearance, discipline, and performance.

While there may be other elements of unity in the officer corps, these are among the more obvious. Strong emphasis on these unifying threads could begin to rebuild our sense of corporateness and restore focus to our professional expertise. In this way, the Air Force might at least stop and possibly reverse the recession of professionalism that is presently under way in the Air Force officer corps.

Maxwell AFB, Alabama


THE simple statement "you manage things, but you lead people" has received much attention among Air Force officers who are studying their profession. The simplicity of the statement conveys an appealing message to people in search of stability and identity in a complex and changing military environment. But as a prescription or model of behavior for Air Force officers, it is reminiscent of the old home remedy, "starve a fever, feed a cold." It may have an element of truth, but it is essentially misleading and, possibly even dangerous.

It is misleading because it promotes the idea that leadership can function without management and vice versa. Even worse, it glorifies leadership and denigrates management. What ambitious young officer, after hearing this homily, would ever seek duty in a management posi-

Major James McDermott
tion? Perhaps the real danger in this simplistic solution to the problems of professionalism is that it sidetracks serious discussion about officership and adds another potentially divisive issue to an officer corps already struggling with such divided loyalties as operations versus maintenance, line versus staff, rated versus nonrated, pilot versus navigator, fighter pilot versus multiengine type, etc. Surely, the officer corps can do without creating a division between leaders and managers. Furthermore, the idea that people are led and things are managed in no way clarifies the roles and requirements of officers—it suggests nothing about the nature of officership.

Why, then, is the statement receiving such attention? Is there truly a schism between good leaders and effective managers? Is officership one or the other, or is there a model of Air Force officerhood that integrates leadership and management in a practical prescription of behavior? These basic questions are addressed in this article. The thesis is that leadership and management are deeply interrelated concepts and that both are vital elements of sound officership. If leadership stems from the heart and management from the mind, then I suggest that mindless leadership is as detrimental as heartless management. In other words, the Air Force must have leaders who can manage (i.e., make decisions and evaluate the cost of human effort) and managers who can lead (i.e., motivate people and understand their needs). Therefore, the Air Force should not seek to separate these concepts or concentrate on one at the expense of the other.

Current Views of Air Force Leadership

Traditional views of the officer as a gentleman, a leader of men, and a master of the art of war have been stated in the works of S. L. A. Marshall and Samuel Huntington. Their views have been shaped largely by the history and traditions of the Army in combat, and they strongly promote such qualities as loyalty, bravery, initiative, and concern for the welfare of the soldier. But, as noted more recently by such analysts as Morris Janowitz, Charles Moskos, Frank Margiotta, and Sam Sarkesian, the combined impact of the technological explosion, the simmering cold war with its political ramifications for the military, and the nation's changing social values has added new dimensions to the officer's role. The most important dimension is the need for effective management of the complex military organization.

Much current interest about the nature of officerhood focuses on the changing roles of officers and the environment in which they must perform. Traditional views have come under intense questioning by the officer corps itself as concepts of leadership and professionalism become increasingly more difficult to apply in the highly technical, specialized, and centrally controlled modern military establishment. Present conditions demand definitions of officerhood oriented toward greater reliance on managerial skills and management tools to aid in decision-making.

Air Force General Bennie Davis has defined officerhood as a blend of leadership, management, and professionalism. Although this definition recognizes the basic ingredients of officerhood, it does not clarify the meanings of complex subordinate concepts or provide a guide to establish the proper mix. These are precisely the issues that are questioned and debated by Air Force officers seeking lasting values and strong identities in trying times.

Recently, the search has seemingly taken the form of a crusade to reinstate the traditional view of the officer as first and foremost a leader. Large doses of leadership education are now prescribed for officer precommissioning programs and professional military schools where only a few years ago, leadership emphasis was either implied or developed in blocks of curricula labeled "management." Senior commanders frequently address gatherings of officers and cadets on the need for more leadership. Cer-
tainly, the schools and commanders are correct in stressing military leadership, but in their efforts they have drawn, intentionally or not, clear distinctions between leadership and management.

The line of argument pursued by senior Air Force officers and developed in professional military education polarizes the officer corps into people who lead and people who manage. Such sentiments as "we're spending too much time being managers and too little time being leaders" and "you manage things, but lead people" make it clear that the Air Force apparently prefers leaders to managers. One Air Force general refers to management as "a system of bookkeeping that is primarily concerned with statistics." Another general contends that "the leader evaluates information, makes appropriate decisions, and directs and controls the execution of decisions," which to officers trained in management theory strongly hints of effective management. It is as though the word management has been stricken from the officers' professional glossary. One wonders whether the blend of leadership and management in General Davis's definition has lost its balance. In any event, the coupling of these loud and clear demands for more leadership and less management with vague definitions of the terms creates confusion and misunderstanding among members of the officer corps who face real problems in the Air Force.

The demands on Air Force officers are perhaps greater today than at any other time in Air Force history. Technology has always been the basic ingredient in the Air Force mission, but the explosive growth of and reliance on scientific breakthroughs in weaponry and support systems in the last twenty years have created new sources of stress on traditional concepts of officership. For one thing, the Air Force now requires technical experts in narrow fields of specialization often far removed from "the management of violence." The high state of technology and the political ramifications of applying military force in the current international environment make it not only possible but necessary to exercise increasingly centralized control over military operations at all levels. The result has been the growth of scalar organizations with large functional staffs and less direct authority available to line officers at any level. For the officer corps, this has required greater reliance on technical competence, the ability to influence others, and mastery of bureaucratic politicking, all of which run counter to traditional concepts of officership.

Another vexing problem for the Air Force has been the all-volunteer concept, which forces the military to compete in the civilian job market for skilled people and to adopt unique motivational techniques to retain these people. In some instances, the all-volunteer force has raised the specters of "occupationalism" and "careerism" instead of traditional "service to country" as primary motivators for professionalism. For the officer corps, it has certainly meant an often frustrating increase in new "people" problems that do not respond well to traditional military discipline and authoritarian styles of motivation.

Finally, changing social values external to the Air Force have generated a number of problems for its officers. The greatly enlarged roles and numbers of women in the Air Force have placed tremendous administrative and psychological strains on the entire organization. Minority issues generate new demands on the morale, welfare, and personnel support systems. Drug and alcohol abuse problems coupled with critical manpower needs require innovative responses from command authority. And issues of "single parents" and "married members" have compelled the Air Force to reexamine its concepts of combat readiness and personnel assignment policies. All of these issues are alien and threatening to the traditionalist view of the officer, for they not only require officers to exercise greater innovation, flexibility, sensitivity, and self-control, but also undercut traditional beliefs about professional officership. These issues have, in fact, sent officers casting about for new models of officership.

Current definitions of officership in response
to the complex problems already outlined stress leadership as the answer and imply that management is part of the problem. Two current models of officership seem to have won general acceptance in the military community. The model reflected in the statement about leading people and managing things holds that officership is leadership and that management is a tool used in dealing with nonhuman resources. If this model accepts the management role of the officer at all, it does so reluctantly and relegates it to a subordinate concern. This model perceives management as a method of obtaining the necessary authorizations of manpower, funds, and supplies for people to use while the officer leads them in accomplishing the mission. In this sense, managing is seen as a dirty job, to be performed by someone else if possible. This model sums up the frustrations of the officer corps in trying to do its professional best in a technologically complex, centrally controlled, bureaucratically organized environment.

Another model accepts management as an aspect of the officer’s role but places management at one end of a spectrum of officer behaviors and leadership at the other end. It is expressed in General Davis’s statement, “We have drifted too far toward management.” This model recognizes that pure leadership is a theoretical extreme for a military organization, but it views management as a pragmatic extreme at the other end of the spectrum. The leadership extreme is overly concerned with people, but the extreme of management is devoid of human concern altogether. Thus, too much leadership is a problem of striving for an unreachable ideal, but too much management reflects a lack of idealism. Somewhere in the middle lies the proper relationship of idealism and pragmatism that an officer must apply if he expects to motivate his subordinates and accomplish the mission.

Is either of these models valid? Do they provide effective guides for officers in developing practical leadership and management roles? I contend that much recent research and theory in both leadership and management contradict these current views of professional officership.

New Views of Leadership and Management

Theories of leadership and management over the past thirty years suggest a unified concept that makes it increasingly difficult to determine where leadership ends and management begins. The difficulty results from the combination of behavioral research into group dynamics, which has replaced academic assumptions or raw speculation with empirical data on the exercise of leadership, and a systems approach to the analysis of organizations, which focuses on processes and outcomes. Behavioral studies have confirmed the interdependence of the leader, the followers, and the situation in the successful attainment of group goals. Organizational systems theory, on the other hand, has offered the view that management is a process that cuts through every level and subsystem of organized activity and, in essence, provides the glue that holds the organization together. Side by side, behavioral research into leadership and systems theories of management highlight the overlapping concerns of motivating human endeavor to achieve collective goals.

On the leadership side, behavioral studies have transformed the subject from a mystical set of qualities possessed by select individuals to a recognizable process of group dynamics. Beginning with studies at Ohio State University in the early 1950s, researchers have made rapid progress in identifying the major behavioral patterns applied by leaders. By isolating a number of significant variables in the group process, social scientists have determined that leadership is a function of the leader’s behavior, the makeup of the group, and the nature of the situation or problem confronting the group. Perhaps the most important finding has been that the two dominant patterns of a leader’s behavior—initiating structure and consideration—depend on the specific task and the group’s motivation/
maturity level. In his dual concern for people and mission, the leader must achieve a dynamic balance between situational and interpersonal factors.

For all the research and behavioral analyses, there is still much confusion over the definition of leadership and its practice. Prebehavioral definitions of leadership have been limited by an apparent lack of rules in exercising leadership, and they have generally been reduced to such statements as “the art of influencing people to progress with cooperation and enthusiasm toward the accomplishment of a mission.” Although this approach conveys the important idea that leadership is concerned with producing desired objective results and creating positive mental conditions among followers, it is really too broad to offer much practical value. On the other hand, strict behavioral definitions, such as “the initiation of structure in expectation and interaction” may be too narrow. Between these two extremes are definitions that focus on the leadership process. Even though “the process of influencing human behavior so as to accomplish the goals . . .” may appear as fuzzy as the earlier definition of leadership, the importance of this approach is that it identifies leadership as a process that can be observed and analyzed and that effective leadership follows certain rules and procedures.

Leadership as a process that focuses human effort on the accomplishment of organizational objectives is an important distinction for several reasons. First, leadership viewed in this context places emphasis on actions rather than attitudes. As one leadership text states, “your job as a leader is not to change people's 'insides'—your job is to influence their observable behavior.” Leadership requires understanding of human behavior, judgment regarding environment/situational constraints, and action to motivate people. The value of perceiving leadership as a behavioral process is that the process and the behaviors can be taught.

The second important aspect of the leadership process is the organizational setting in which it takes place. Leadership is a function of the individual interactions within the group and the group's interaction with its environment. Research and experience have shown that when leadership is out of step with the character of the organization, either failure to achieve organizational goals or a breakdown in the organizational structure will result. The leader's role in this process is to maintain continuous balance between three organizational outputs: the product or goal, the group's cohesiveness or morale, and its drive or desire to produce. The value of perceiving leadership as a process of organization is that its effectiveness can be measured in terms of finite results: organizational objectives.
A final characteristic of the leadership process is its multidimensional nature requiring a variety of skills. The basis of the process may be "a personal relationship" between the leader and each of his followers, but the leader cannot merely specialize in interpersonal relations. Exclusive concentration in this area would create an imbalance in the relationship of goal, morale, and drive and result in an ineffective, inefficient, or fragmented group. "The business of influencing men to accomplish a mission almost invariably involves the application of a wide range of skills, and that certainly includes the managerial skills...." In this sense, leadership is clearly related to management.

This relationship is also reinforced from the management perspective with the development of systems theories of management. In viewing an organization as a system composed of human and nonhuman resources, such men as Peter Drucker, Ralph C. Davis, and Ralph M. Stogdill have shifted the focus from management as an independent set of mechanical functions to management as a pervasive process concerned with linking organizational resources to organizational goals. In systems theories, the management process, like the leadership process described in behavioral research, is concerned with motivating people. "The job of the manager essentially is to make sure the workers have the tools, the information, and the understanding they need to do the job." In the systems view, the organization is a complex organism that responds to internal and external stimuli; thus, changes in any environmental condition produce effects throughout the system. Management is the process that analyzes external and internal stimuli and their effects on the organization and takes action to keep the system in balance while it moves toward accomplishment of goals. In practice, the manager is responsible for creating the organizational climate in which people accept and accomplish goals. In this respect, "management is an essential activity which arises as individuals seek to satisfy their needs through group action...." The systems view of management as an organizational process thus closely resembles the behavioral view of the leadership process.

In fact, behavioral analyses and systems theories have blurred any practical distinction between leadership and management. Both leaders and managers are concerned with human motivation in group settings; both deal with people, not things. It is certainly difficult to determine the difference between management as a process of "achieving objectives through others" and leadership as the process of "influencing people to accomplish desired objectives." Effective leadership and management rely on identical motivational behaviors and require similar techniques to maintain the proper balance between group morale and the accomplishment of organizational goals.

Any distinctions between leadership and management stem more from emphasis than from category. For example, managers are appointed in the sense that external forces place them in positions of formal authority. On the other hand, leaders are anointed in the sense that they hold positions of informal authority by virtue of internal group dynamics. But the merger of formal and informal authority in the leader/manager is an essential element of effectiveness and stability in a structured organization such as the military. In a practical sense, the health of the organization requires the manager to nurture the informal consensus of the group for his leadership, and the leader must acquire and consolidate formal authority to be effective in promoting organizational goals. In either case, the overlap of management and leadership behaviors is necessary for effective organizations.

From the standpoint of effective military organizations, the new concepts of leadership and management provide a framework for constructing a balanced model of officership along the lines of the Model of Organizational Leadership developed by Paul Bons. That conceptual framework is a way of looking at the structure of organizations. Its basic premise is that leader-
ship is the personal relationship established between a unit commander and the subordinates within his immediate personal contact group, and management is the organizational relationship established between the commander and subordinates at all other levels in his command. In this construct, the motivational behaviors exercised by the commander to influence the members of the contact group comprise his leadership role. He exercises both task-directed and people-oriented behavior to promote organizational cohesion (morale). The same behaviors exercised in the form of policies beyond the contact group to and through the larger organization comprise his management role. In effect, this framework recognizes that a commander at any organizational level is a leader/manager. From the leadership point of view, the commander's role is to promote personal ties with his subordinates; from a management perspective, his role is to use those ties to create organizational effectiveness. In simple terms, the commander as leader/manager seeks a balance between group cohesion and organizational responsibility.

A Balanced Model of Officership

Leadership and management should be corporate concepts in Air Force officership. While some sources view management as "the strong right hand of all leaders" and others perceive leadership as an essential element of management, I view leadership and management as two arms of a single body. The body represents the sum of the theoretical knowledge, practical experience, unique institutional values, and the externally imposed environmental conditions that characterize officership. The arms represent the practical behaviors employed by the officer to transform the knowledge, experience, values, and environmental factors into group motivation and mission effectiveness. Both arms must be used in a coordinated and balanced effort to ensure a successful organization.

A balanced model of officership is based on the concept of leadership and management as overlapping organizational processes. The leadership process is immediately concerned with the motivational needs of individual followers, and it evolves in the structure of the leader's personal contact group. The management process concentrates on the needs of the entire organization, and it functions beyond the manager's personal contact group. The processes overlap in the areas of developing, maintaining, and directing human effort.

Leadership and management are complementing forces in those areas. The officer's leadership role is to establish the network of personal relationships required for group cohesion and to motivate the group in achieving organizational objectives. His management role is to instill in people a responsibility to the organization and to determine the best way to use their efforts in accomplishing the mission. The officer exercises leadership through personal efforts to train, discipline, and care for subordinates. He exercises management through analysis of organizational capabilities and costs and by making decisions to accept or reject certain costs in pursuit of the mission. If leadership is "felt," then management is "understood." Management is the mind, and leadership is the heart of officership.

The organization suffers when either arm of the model is out of proportion to the other. Officership that ignores leadership may produce short-term organizational results, but it eventually faces unit disintegration as informal leaders not committed to organizational goals inevitably emerge. This is essentially the situation described by Paul Savage and Richard Gabriel concerning the U.S. Army in Vietnam, where overemphasis on management concerns eroded the leadership position of the field infantry officers and caused a breakdown of authority and discipline at unit level. On the other hand, too much reliance on leadership and neglect of management concerns can be equally devastating. Even though leadership may be strongly emphasized, morale will eventually suffer when
a unit repeatedly fails to achieve its goals or accomplishes its mission at extremely high costs. The near collapse of the French Army at Verdun in World War I is an excellent example of this situation. The French officers had been indoctrinated with the idea that bold leadership was their only concern. Full of "cran" and "élan" but totally unconcerned with human costs, these officers launched repeated offensives against the entrenched enemy until their exhausted and depleted troops rebelled. Clearly, an imbalance in either direction is detrimental to the military organization.

Military officers must be concerned with both people and mission related through the concept of the organization. After all, the organization is a group of people with a mission to perform. The mission is justification for the organization, and the people are ultimately the only means to carry out the mission. Thus, the officer's leadership role is to infuse his organization with loyalty, cohesion, and discipline, and his management role is to use wisely the motivated organization to accomplish the mission. He can ignore or overplay either of these roles only at the expense of organizational health.

A balanced model of officership suggests a twofold value for the Air Force officer corps. It defines leadership and management as overlapping functions that contribute positively to organizational effectiveness. It avoids unnecessary divisiveness about the nature of professionalism and channels debate into fruitful discussion in which all officers benefit regardless of rank, position, or area of assignment. It also provides a starting point for examining specific behaviors necessary for organizational success, and it creates a framework for analyzing behavior on the basis of results rather than attitudes or values.

The model is based on strong research evidence and supported by applied systems theories that should put to rest the erroneous idea that officers lead people but manage things or that leadership and management represent opposing influences on officer behavior. I believe that an integrated concept can contribute to healthier views of professionalism. Anyone who has systematically studied leadership and management, officership and professionalism, and the informal opinions of other officers, knows that there is no single answer to all the questions and no general consensus about the terms. Thus, how the terms are defined is perhaps less important than the continuing efforts to define them.

In the final analysis, the study, critiques, and debate of the issues must lead to a stronger, more dedicated professional officer corps.

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Notes
5. See, for example, ACSC Readings and Seminars, vol. 1, August 1975.
9. Huntington's categorization of military professionalism in The Soldier and the State.
10. See, for example, Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Emergent Military: Calling, Profession, or Occupation," in Margiotta, pp. 199-206.
13. For a good survey of management theory, see David A. Whit-
There is a difference between leadership and management. Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of personality, vision, and training. Its practice is an art. Management is a science and of the mind. Managers are necessary; leaders are indispensable.

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN
TIG Brief, 28 January 1977, p. 15

The power to decide on an action and the strength to see it through are probably the most fundamental qualities of a great soldier.

Blumenson and Stokesbury
Masters of the Art of Command, p. 2

The Army has excellent management and terrible leadership. Management is collecting data, using computers and systems analysis to develop trends. . . . But you cannot take an Army unit, which is a single entity, and run it through a computer. But that's what we're doing in the Army today. It's all statistics.

Army lieutenant colonel quoted in

Take any number of outstanding men, some noted for intellect, others for their acumen, still others for boldness or tenacity of will: not one may possess the combination of qualities needed to make him a greater than average commander.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War
(Howard and Paret edition), p. 178
THE current controversy over technical specialization as a detriment to military leadership has crystallized a basic split between so-called warriors and technocrats. Perhaps the time has come to place this controversy in its twentieth-century context: to identify it as a microcosm of the larger schism between science and human values in the national arena. A broad review of the issues and a brief study of one historical figure who bridged this apparent
gap—Charles A. Lindbergh—may offer a model for military professionals on opposite sides of the question to resolve their differences. In any event, dualistic distinctions must be reconciled before contemporary “great warriors” can integrate essential technical knowledge with ethical values that support war-fighting capability.

People who lament the influence of technology on military leadership usually think in “either-or” terms. For instance, Project Warrior highlights war-fighting characteristics based on values such as courage and loyalty but downplays management and technical specialization. Lieutenant Colonel Donald Baucom has expressed concern about the displacement of “warriors and warrior-leaders” by “legions of managers, engineers, technicians, and bureaucrats.”

Another example may be the use of Samuel Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* as a text at Air Force professional military education schools, since Huntington stresses the management of violence in the military profession and denigrates technical specialties as “auxiliary vocations.”

A third indication of dualistic thinking is the argument about simplicity versus complexity in Air Force weapons, which was a “hot item” in 1981 and 1982. Although “gold-plating” of systems, or designing to wishes rather than needs, is a problem in the acquisition cycle, no amount of nostalgia for a pretechnical world will overcome a real, existing threat. As General Robert T. Marsh, Commander of Air Force Systems Command, points out, reasonable complexity is justified if it pays off in mission effectiveness. Yet if these sophisticated systems do not result in high performance and improved capability, advocates of complexity share the naivety of people who say “simple is better.”

Once again, however, extreme points of view seem to dominate this discussion. Generally, the typical identification of leadership as an art and people as its medium suggests that leadership is at odds with technology, which consists of “things” to be managed (i.e., force to be controlled). Although this reaction to bureaucratic and technical complexity is understandable, it will be a liability in the high-technology environment of the future.

The antitechnology ideas of current movements toward simplicity and war-fighting skills reflect a classic bifurcation between science and human values, first identified in America by Henry Adams. In *The Education of Henry Adams*, he suggested that the unifying moral force of medieval Christianity had given way to a multiplistic force characterized by the dynamo, or flywheel-driven generator, displayed at the Chicago Exposition of 1893. This electromechanical device, quietly and perpetually humming, seemed to generate a force totally independent of human qualities. Adams recognized that these inner and outer forces theoretically should be traceable to a common center, but he also knew that they have always been differentiated and opposed in human experience. He predicted that modern industrial society would worship at the dynamo rather than the statue of the Virgin and would thus establish the supremacy of mechanistic principles over the intuitive unity of religion and moral values.

Subsequent industrialization and urbanization in America appeared to validate this prediction. As technology has led to pollution, destructive weapons, and massive invasions of human privacy, however, it has become increasingly difficult for some people to worship science. According to Robert Pirsig, well-known lecturer and author of *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*, people see the force that gives rise to technology as something undefined but inhuman, mechanical, lifeless—something that makes them “mass people” and dehumanized strangers in their own land. This dilemma has resulted in a population largely divided between those who reject or fear technology as an immoral force and those who immerse themselves in technology without concern for its ultimate impact.

Since a major task of this century has been to reconcile technology and human values, genuine contemporary great warriors must continue this reconciliation rather than reject or attempt to escape it. As Jacob Bronowski has observed,
"We live in a world which is penetrated through and through by science and which is both whole and real. We cannot turn it into a game simply by taking sides." Bronowski has shown the similarities between science and other humanistic pursuits and called for bridging of the gaps in such attitudes.

Robert Pirsig believes that hatred or fear of technology is self-defeating and suggests that the "Godhead" resides just as comfortably in the circuits of a digital computer as in the petals of a flower or the soul of mankind. On a more secular level, Pirsig suggests that a sense of quality exists at the top of the world hierarchy and stimulates people, through their environment, to create every part of the world in which they live. Thus, any splitting of the mind precludes a unified approach to life.

Morris Janowitz, in *The Professional Soldier,* asserts that the military must also learn to integrate these views. He calls for a balance among the three roles of heroic leader, military manager, and military technologist but does not offer examples. Therefore, rather than concentrate on leaders with narrow warrior mentalities, this discussion recognizes one historical leader who consistently integrated technical expertise and values.

From early boyhood, Charles A. Lindbergh showed the ability to integrate technology, nature, and ethical values. As a child, he felt equally the allure of nature and science. He loved the woods near his hometown of Little Falls, Minnesota, enjoyed animals of all kinds, and regularly slept on a screened porch to be closer to the birds and trees that surrounded his home. At the same time, he felt the influence of technology directly because he lived a short distance from a large dam and sawmill. And since his mother was a high school chemistry teacher, he had access to her knowledge and library of scientific books. He also visited his maternal grandfather's dental laboratory in Detroit, Michigan, where he became enthralled with chemical experiments. His grandfather was a leader in dental technology and a willing mentor for Charles, who carried his interest in science into his life and work on the farm. As a child of 10, he constructed an ingenious slide, cart, and pulley system that enabled him to move large blocks of ice from the frozen river into his home. At 11, Lindbergh learned to drive and maintain the family car. While a teenager, he installed an open well in the basement of his home, including all plumbing and equipment for a gasoline engine, pump, and pressure tank, and he experimented with concrete construction, such as a concrete duck pond that has now survived more than 60 Minnesota winters. This early experience as a technician and "Yankee tinkerer" exemplifies Lindbergh's belief that technology is closely related to rather than opposed to nature. Throughout his life, he used the terms science and technology almost interchangeably, consistent with Francis Bacon's view that science exists for the good of humanity and in the manifestation of works.

Lindbergh's epochal flight to Paris in 1927 further illustrates his integration of technology, values, and vision. His courage in undertaking the solo flight is well documented. After taking off in the rain and mud at Roosevelt Field (while Richard Byrd and Clarence Chamberlin sat on the ground), Lindbergh braved fog, fatigue, and other difficulties to land at Bourget Field 33 hours later. The feat itself would not have occurred, however, if Lindbergh had not first recognized the value of such a flight to the development of public confidence in, and support for, air travel and then pushed the boundaries of aeronautical technology to achieve this success. He was involved in nearly every phase of engineering design for the *Spirit of St. Louis.* He selected a single-engine monoplane, for example, because it was simpler, more efficient in design and weight, and capable of high performance. He also selected the Wright J5C Whirlwind radial engine since it promised high power, efficient fuel consumption, and proven reliability. To reduce airframe drag, Lindbergh
placed the fuel tank at the front of the plane. Although this arrangement obstructed forward vision, he overcame the problem with a unique retractable periscope. Several of the navigational aids were chosen and modified according to Lindbergh’s specifications, to the point that the Spirit of St. Louis had the best long-range instrumentation display of its time.\textsuperscript{10} The aircraft as a whole was a major achievement in technical design. Specialized planning was as important to the success of Lindbergh’s flight as were the daring, skill, and vision of the man himself.

Lindbergh’s pre-World War II projects in rocket propulsion, surgical medicine, and commercial aviation exemplify a similar combination of vision and technical exactitude. As early as 1929, for example, he investigated jet propulsion as a potential booster if an airplane lost power during a flight. He queried Du Pont Company engineers to determine how the rocket engine would work. This interest led him to obtain Guggenheim sponsorship for Robert Goddard, an early pioneer in rocket propulsion, and to continue backing Goddard through numerous failures until rocketry became a reality.

In an entirely different field, Lindbergh learned that surgery on the heart and other major organs was impossible in 1930 because no artificial pump was available to circulate blood through these organs and thus keep them alive and free of infection. Again, Lindbergh had both the vision to see the value of such an apparatus and the mechanical understanding to work on a solution. His investigations led to a series of important discoveries, including a method of washing blood corpuscles for experiments on living tissues, a quick way of separating serum from whole blood by means of a centrifuge, and the glass perfusion pump needed by the medical world.\textsuperscript{11}

Between 1927 and 1937, Lindbergh continued his primary interest in commercial aviation. With his wife, Anne, he mapped continental and transatlantic air routes from the United States to the Caribbean, South America, Asia, Europe, and Africa. On each of these established routes, for safety reasons, he insisted that twin-engine aircraft capable of single-engine takeoffs under full loads be used. He also demanded careful mapping, meteorological studies, advanced radio networks, airport lighting, and extensive training programs for ground crews and pilots on the routes accepted for commercial service.\textsuperscript{12} Although the Lindberghs matched adventurous and courageous pioneering with careful technical planning on these routes, the latter assures their existence today. In all areas, Charles Lindbergh combined a concern for his fellow human beings with vision and technological expertise to stay on the leading edge of change.

The consistency of Lindbergh’s world view extended through the difficult years of World War II. His prewar opinion that the United
States should stay out of the European conflict, for instance, was based on his belief that a general war would destroy the common heritage of Western civilization and thus lead to Soviet dominance. Contrary to accusations by opponents of the America First Committee, he was neither a Nazi sympathizer nor a pacifist. His admiration for the accomplishments of the German people was consistently balanced by his disdain for Hitler’s maniacal pronouncements and anti-Semitic policies. He found it especially ironic that people called him a pacifist, however, for he disagreed with no philosophy more than pacifism. In fact, he was convinced that the complacency of France and Britain regarding their defense technologies encouraged Hitler’s adventurism and willingness to risk war. This pragmatic view emerged in turn from his thorough knowledge of aviation technology throughout Europe. Since he was the only person with a wide range of expertise available to the Office of the Military Attaché in Berlin, he was called on several times between 1936 and 1939 to provide intelligence on German aircraft developments. He personally flew every type of plane available to Germany at the outset of the war, including the advanced Me-109 single-wing fighter, and he toured many German factories, airfields, and research institutions. His testing of numerous other European and American planes, as well as his theoretical knowledge of aviation, led him to believe that “aviation constituted a new and possibly decisive element in preventing or fighting a war.” His technical knowledge also convinced him that the countries engaged in such a war would be devastated by that same power, especially since the German Luftwaffe had achieved absolute technical dominance and the potential for a massive production rate by 1938. Thus, he repeatedly called for research and development in the American aviation industry to prepare the United States for adequate defense against armed conflict, but he spoke out just as persistently against unnecessary involvement. Unfortunately, subsequent world events confirmed his prophetic views, and the United States entered the war relatively unprepared.

Despite Lindbergh’s stance against American involvement in World War II, he wasted no time in volunteering his services once war was inevitable. Barred from actual military service by White House instructions to the War Department (he refused to recant his prewar views), he put his expertise to work in the civilian aviation industry. Initially a technical consultant for Henry Ford’s project at Willow Run, Lindbergh worked on a variety of production problems with the B-24 Liberator bomber. He became especially concerned that the armor plating on the B-24 was insufficient to protect its crew and took charge of a special project to improve it. In Lindbergh’s opinion, previous inattention to such a vital detail stemmed from the chief production engineer’s “love of the machine,” which had “somewhat crowded out his love of the man who must run it.” He insisted on careful coordination with the Army to provide information on vulnerable points for enemy bullets, their penetrating power, weight that could be devoted to armor, and other similar data, and then recommended meticulous planning to avoid future problems of the same kind. His experience at Willow Run is still another example of his balancing of the human and technical aspects of design.

Lindbergh exercised equal care on other projects, including ignition of an experimental P-47 engine at high altitudes, studies of cylinder head problems in a radial aircraft engine designed by Pratt and Whitney, experiments on human physiological behavior during simulated high-altitude flight (with the Mayo Foundation’s Aeromedical Laboratory), and studies of turbojet aircraft design with engineers of the Vought Company. Although he played down
the dangers inherent in his flying duties, many of these tasks required more than simple office work. He almost lost his life during one high-altitude flight in a P-47 and several times suffered oxygen deprivation in the experiments with the Mayo Foundation. Regarding accidents and death in aviation, he had this to say:

If one took no chances, one would not fly at all. Safety lies in the judgment of the chances one takes. That judgment, in turn, must rest on one's outlook on life. Any coward can sit in his home and criticize a pilot for flying into a mountain in a fog. But I would rather, by far, die on a mountainside than in bed. Why should we look for errors when a brave man dies? Unless we can learn from his experience, there is no need to look for weakness. Rather, we should admire the courage and spirit in his life. What kind of man would live where there is no daring? And is life so dear that we should blame men for dying in adventure? Is there a better way to die?17

Lindbergh's own actions were truly courageous, but he was willing to endure discomfort and the threat of death because he recognized the implications of technological research for America's war readiness.

The same combination of technical skill and courage was evident during Lindbergh's stint in the South Pacific in 1944. As a civilian technical representative for United Aircraft Corporation, he studied combat conditions in relation to the design of new fighter aircraft. At Roi Island, he was the first pilot to take a Navy F4U Corsair fighter carrying 3000 pounds of bombs off the airstrip. Not satisfied with this achievement, he designed a special bomb rack with the help of a Marine lieutenant and then took off in a crosswind with a 4000-pound load.18 These innovations led to increased firepower capabilities throughout the Pacific. In New Guinea, he refined long-range cruise control techniques that enabled American P-38 fighters to increase their combat radius from 570 to 750 miles. Although official orders restricted him to observer and test pilot status, he in fact flew combat missions in both Corsairs and P-38s, including bomber escort, dive-bombing of Japanese positions, destruction of barges, and scouting duties. Forty-two years old at the time, Lindbergh confounded the skeptical young P-38 pilots of the 475th Fighter Group by flying extra hours and appearing indefatigable under all conditions. During one of his bomber escort missions, he found himself on a collision course with a Sonia-type Japanese fighter, which was apparently bent on crashing into him at more than 500 miles per hour. He kept his cannon and machine guns going until he scored a hit and, then, literally had to hurdle the Japanese plane at the last second before it pitched into the sea.19 His destruction of the enemy aircraft was confirmed, proving once again that the technician and the warrior were aspects of the same man.

Lindbergh's balanced views of technology, progress, and human values continued on into his postwar activities. After the Nazi surrender, he joined a Navy technological mission in Germany to study the enemy's progress in developing jet aircraft, rockets, and missiles. Despite his awareness that scientific materialism had run amuck in Germany, Lindbergh advocated broad American postwar programs in aerospace research because his experiences in the South Pacific had taught him that "without a highly developed science modern man lacks the power to survive."20 Thus, he played an active role in the evolution of bombers,munitions, and missiles for the Strategic Air Command and in studies of air-to-air weapon systems for the Army under Project Chaff. He again relied on his technical knowledge of flight and navigation to help map efficient methods of operation for the Berlin airlift, participated with the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board in studies of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and served as a member of the advisory board panel on ballistic missile defense. At the same time, he continued as a consultant with Pan American Airlines and advised the company to acquire America's first jet transport, the Boeing 707. He also maintained his interest in aviation medicine, especially as it applied to manned space flight—the ultimate test of human physiology at high alti-
tudes. In 1966, Lindbergh and several colleagues published, in *Cryobiology*, the results of their work on freezing whole organs from large animals for transplantation. Lindbergh’s contribution was an enlarged and improved version of his perfusion pump, now constructed from new plastic materials developed by the Corning Glass Company for extremely cold temperatures. Each of these activities was an extension of Lindbergh the technologist.

Technology did not overwhelm Lindbergh to the detriment of human values, however. Indeed, his earlier view remained consistent and unified. He realized that the Germans had worshipped science above the quality of life but had not gained the power to survive. He believed that survival, in the last analysis, "was fully as dependent on the quality of life as on the power of arms—dependent on a perpetual balance of spiritual and material forces." Consequently, he demanded a responsible approach to technological development. For example, when the supersonic transport proved deleterious to the environment, he lobbied vigorously against its employment and succeeded in having it deleted from Pan American’s acquisition list. Lindbergh’s increasing devotion to projects for the conservation of resources, agencies for the protection of endangered species, and the study of primitive societies, such as the gentle Tasaday of the Philippines, reflects a deep regard for the essential qualities of life.

Although Lindbergh remained enthralled by technical achievements epitomized in the launching of Apollo 8 in 1968, he dismissed a desire to reenter the field of astronautics because "decades spent in contact with science and its vehicles" had directed his "mind and senses to an area beyond their reach." He believed that the adventure of the future lay in voyages that "can be attained by the application of our scientific knowledge not to life’s mechanical vehicles but to the essence of life itself." He also supported the work of the Congressional Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development (1970) because it took a "new approach to scientific research and development through consideration of its effect on the future welfare of mankind." These statements signify not a rejection of technology but rather a tempering and balancing of its effects on modern life.

**HOW, THEN,** does one apply this thumbnail sketch of Charles Lindbergh’s character to the issue of military leadership? Surely, he is one example of the warrior-technician who should be the mainstay of a future United States Air Force. His awareness of both the limits and the potential of technology is an essential element of military command, for leaders must thoroughly understand both to succeed in modern warfare. Technology never resolves human dilemmas of employment or application, nor does it relieve leaders of the ultimate responsibility for determining how to use it most effectively. Technical knowledge may well be limitless, but it is most certainly meaningless if unguided. At the same time, history is replete with the failures of commanders who rejected the importance of technical superiority, without which America’s success on two fronts during World War II would have been impossible. Future leaders will need technical expertise and wisdom based on a broader view of history and society to succeed in an increasingly complex environment. They must not sacrifice technical knowledge on a pilgrimage to warriorship. Perhaps the continued study of such leaders as Charles Lindbergh will help military professionals change current "either-or" mentalities in favor of an integrated vision vital to the nation’s future.

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Notes


9. This feat and succeeding examples are recounted in Charles A. Lindbergh, Boyhood on the Upper Mississippi (Saint Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1972), pp. 18-20, 26-30, 32, and 43.


15. Ibid., p. 857.

16. Ibid., pp. 627-731 passim.

17. Ibid., p. 60.


Genius is an immense capacity for taking pains.

George S. Patton, Jr., in Blumenson, Patton Papers, I, p. 132

Given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time. Whenever he has to fall back on his innate talent, he will find himself outside the model and in conflict with it; no matter how versatile the code, the situation will always lead to the consequences we have already alluded to: talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with practice.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Howard and Paret edition), p. 140

Genius may be born, but generals are made.

Blumenson and Stokesbury Masters of the Art of Command, p. 39

... there is no valid scientific procedure for selecting heroic leaders or for screening military strategists.

Morris Janowitz Professional Soldier, p. 122

... what genius does is the best rule, and theory can do no better than show how and why this should be the case.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Howard and Paret edition), p. 136
GOOD commanders, those who get the best out of their subordinates and thereby produce positive results for their units, are the keys to organizational success. Therefore, it is not surprising that much research has gone into trying to define just what motivates good commanders and how to describe them so that their characteristics can be objectively measured and identified.

Successful commanders are not motivated by a need for personal aggrandizement, or by a need to get along with subordinates, but rather by a need to influence others' behavior for the good of the whole organization. In other words, good commanders want power. They also know that power must be tempered by maturity and a high degree of self-control. Power, too, must be disciplined and controlled so that it is directed toward the benefit of the organization as a whole.
Affiliative commanders are those who make so many ad hominem and ad hoc decisions that they almost abandon orderly procedures. Their disregard for procedure often leaves their subordinates with a sense of uncertainty.

Commanders who are motivated by a need for personal power are somewhat more effective. They are able to create a greater sense of responsibility in their units and, above all, a greater team spirit. They can be thought of as managerial equivalents of tank commanders such as General George Patton, whose own daring inspired admiration in his troops. However, according to empirical research at Harvard University, these commanders rate rather low in the amount of organizational clarity they create.

Persons motivated by personal power are not disciplined enough to be good institution (or unit) builders, and often their subordinates are loyal to them as individuals rather than to the unit they both serve. When a personal power commander leaves, disorganization often follows. His or her subordinates' strong group spirit, which the commander has personally inspired, often deflates.

Of the managerial types, the "institutional" commanders (e.g., those high in power motivation, low in affiliation motivation, and high in inhibition) are the most successful in creating an effective work climate. Their subordinates feel that they have more responsibility. Also, these commanders create high morale because they produce the greatest sense of organizational clarity and team spirit. If such a commander leaves, he or she can be more readily replaced by another commander because subordinates have been encouraged to be loyal to the unit.

Successful and effective commanders have two characteristics that are part of the profile of the very best commanders: a great emotional maturity, where there is little egotism, and a coaching managerial style. Effective commanders also know that individual growth through job enrichment is the key to organizational health and higher productivity.

When Zorba the Greek was asked if he had a wife, he purportedly replied, "A wife, children, a house, an army, the whole catastrophe." Unfortunately, some commanders today feel that they, too, have "the whole catastrophe." A great deal of this frustration lies in the use of power. It is easier to talk about money than it is to talk about power.

Access to resources and information and the ability to act quickly make it possible to accomplish more and to pass on more resources and information to subordinates. For this reason, people tend to prefer bosses or commanders with clout. When subordinates perceive their commander as influential, upward and outward, their status is enhanced by association, and they generally have high morale and feel less critical of or resistant to their commander. More powerful leaders are also more likely to delegate, to reward talent, and to build a team that places subordinates in significant positions.

Powerlessness, or the inability to develop and use power, in contrast, tends to breed bossiness rather than true leadership. In a large military (or civilian) organization, it is powerlessness that often creates ineffective, desultory management and petty, rules-minded managerial styles.

Accountability without power—responsibility for results without the resources to get them—creates frustration and failure. People who see themselves as weak and powerless and find their subordinates resisting or discounting them tend to use more punishing forms of influence.

The effectiveness that power brings evolves from two kinds of capacities: first, access to the resources, information, and support necessary to carry out a task; and, second, ability to get cooperation in doing what is necessary.

In an effort to gain more information on power, we could consult the "wise old Turk," Zorba's reputed source of all practical wisdom. First, however, let us take a look at some approaches to the subject of power to see the advantages and disadvantages of each and how they relate to organizational development.

The installation of motivating factors into an individual's job was the original intent of job
enrichment. The basis of the idea is that motivators are the factors that meet a person's need for psychological growth, especially achievement, recognition, responsibility, advancement, and opportunity. These factors are concerned with the job content, the work itself. The hygiene factors are concerned with the job environment—conditions and treatment surrounding the work, specifically policy and administration, supervision, relationships with others, salary, personal life, status, and security.

Motivators are concerned with using people well and, when combined with a good hygiene program, with treating people well. The result will be motivated performance.

One basic principle of the psychology of learning and performance is that knowing the results of one's behavior is essential to efficient learning and performance. This is usually referred to as feedback. Two of the most important ingredients of a good job are that the results of a person's performance be given directly to him or her rather than through any supervisor, performance review, or bureaucratic administrative innuendo and that this feedback be nonevaluative and timely.

When the commander tells them how they are doing on a job, most people tend to interpret the message as a characterization of themselves, not of their performance. Thus, nonevaluative behavior on the part of the commander can increase the learning impact of feedback by reducing the personal threat to the subordinate. Also, the more timely the feedback on performance, the more potent and accurate is the content of the message.

A very simple example of the proper use of feedback in job enrichment comes from the small arms qualification range. Targets consist of electronically controlled silhouettes scattered at varying distances which fall instantly when struck by a bullet. If the target is missed, there is no ridiculing by target spotters—the target just stands there until it gets hit. Feedback here is direct, instantaneous, and nonevaluative. Success with this method has been dramatic in terms of savings in both money and time needed to train effective marksmen.

Good commanders—those who rate extremely high in total effectiveness—care about institutional power and its use to stimulate production. This feeling or need for power, however, is at variance with most Americans. As a rule, Americans are not very comfortable with power or with its dynamics. We often distrust and question the motives of people who we think actively seek power. We have a certain fear of being manipulated. Even those people who think the dynamics of power are inevitable and needed often feel somewhat guilty when they themselves mobilize and use power. Simply put, the overall attitude and feeling toward power, which can easily be traced to our nation's birth, is negative. In his popular book *Greening of America*, Charles Reich reflects the views of many when he writes, "It is not the misuse of power that is evil; the very existence of power is evil." Power, it seems, is America's latest dirty word.

One of the many consequences of this attitude is that power as a topic for rational study and dialogue has not received much attention, even at command and staff colleges or war colleges. If the reader doubts this, all he or she need do is flip through some textbooks, journals, or advanced command/management course descriptions. The word *power* rarely, if ever, appears.

This lack of attention to the subject of power merely adds to the already enormous confusion and misunderstanding surrounding the topic of power and management, both in the military and in the business world. This misunderstanding is becoming increasingly burdensome because in today's large and complex military structure the effective performance of most command positions requires one to be skilled in the use of power.

Throughout the military, including the Air and Army National Guard, a large number of commanders perform significantly below their potential because they do not understand the dynamics of power and because they have not
nurtured and developed the instincts to acquire and use power effectively.

Why are the dynamics of power necessarily an important part of command?

How do effective commanders acquire power?

How and for what purposes do effective commanders use power?

One of the distinguishing characteristics of a typical commander is how dependent he or she is on the activities of a variety of other people to perform his or her job effectively. A commander can be dependent in varying degrees on superiors, subordinates, peers in other parts of the organization, the subordinates of peers, unions, regulating agencies, and many others. Dealing with these dependencies and the commander's subsequent vulnerability is an important and difficult part of a commander's job because, while it is theoretically possible that all of these people and organizations would automatically act in just the manner that a commander wants and needs, such is almost never the case in reality. All the people on whom a commander is dependent have limited time, energy, and talent, for which there are competing demands.

A great paradox of command is that as a person gains more formal authority in an organization, the areas in which he or she is vulnerable increase and become more complex rather than the reverse. To be able to plan, organize, budget, staff, control, and evaluate, commanders need some control over the many people on whom they are dependent. Trying to control others solely by directing them and on the basis of the formal power of one's position frequently will not work—first, because commanders are always dependent on some people over whom they have little if any formal authority and, second, because virtually no one in any of today's modern organizations will passively accept and completely obey a stream of orders from someone just because he or she is the "boss."

Trying to influence others by means of persuasion alone will not always work either. Although it is very powerful and possibly the single most important method of influence, persuasion has some serious drawbacks, too. To make it work often requires much time, skill, and information on the part of the persuader. Persuasion can also fail simply because the other person chooses not to listen or does not listen carefully.

This is not to say that directing people on the basis of the formal power of one's position and persuasion are not important means by which successful commanders cope. They obviously are. But, even taken together, they are usually not enough.

Successful commanders cope with their dependence on others by being sensitive to it, by eliminating or avoiding unnecessary dependence, and by establishing power over those others. Good commanders then use that power to help them plan, organize, staff, budget, evaluate, etc. In other words, it is primarily because of the dependence inherent in command positions that the dynamics of power necessarily form an important part of a commander's processes. To help cope with the dependency relationships inherent in their jobs, effective commanders create, increase, or maintain four different types of power over others.

One of the ways is to create a sense of obligation. When the commander is successful, the others feel that they should—rightly—allow the commander to influence them. Recognizing that most people believe that friendship carries with it certain obligations ("A friend in need . . ."), successful commanders often try to develop true friendships with those on whom they are dependent.

A second way successful commanders gain power is by building reputations as experts in certain matters. Commanders usually establish this type of power through visible achievement. The larger the achievement and the more visible it is, the more power the commander tends to develop.

A third method by which commanders gain power is by fostering others' unconscious identification with them or with ideas they "stand for." Sigmund Freud was the first to describe
this phenomenon, which is most clearly seen in the way people look up to charismatic leaders. Generally, the more a person finds a commander both consciously and (more important) unconsciously an ideal person, the more he or she will defer to that commander. Commanders develop power based on others' idealized views of them in a number of ways. They try to look and behave in ways that others respect. They go out of their way to be visible to their subordinates.

The final way that an effective commander often gains power is by feeding others' belief that they are dependent on the commander either for help or for not being hurt. The more they perceive they are dependent, the more most people will be inclined to cooperate. There are two methods that successful commanders often use to create perceived dependence.

In the first, the commander identifies and secures (if necessary and possible) resources that others require to do their jobs, that is, resources not possessed and not readily available elsewhere. These resources include such things as authority to make certain decisions; control of money, equipment, and office space; access to important people; information and control of information channels; and subordinates. Then the commander takes action so that others correctly perceive that the commander has such resources and is willing and ready to use them.

A second way effective commanders gain these types of power is by influencing other persons' perceptions of the commander's resources. In settings where many people are involved and where the manager does not interact continuously with those he or she is dependent on, those people will seldom possess "hard facts" regarding what relevant resources the commander commands directly or indirectly, what resources he or she will command in the future, or how prepared he or she is to use those resources.

Insofar as one can influence the judgment of others, a commander can generate much more power than one would generally ascribe to him or her in light of the reality of available resources.

Of course, commanders always have formal authority—those elements that automatically come with a commander's job—perhaps a title, an office, a budget, the right to make certain decisions, a group of subordinates, a reporting relationship. Effective commanders use the elements of formal authority as resources to help them develop any or all of these four types of power, just as they use other resources such as their education.

GOOD commanders—"the wise old Turks"—tend to share a number of common characteristics. (1) They are sensitive to what others consider to be legitimate behavior in acquiring and using power. They recognize that power carries certain obligations. (2) They have good intuitive understanding of the various types of power and methods of influence. They recognize that professionals tend to be more influenced by perceived expertise than by other forms of power. (3) They recognize that any of the methods (types of power) used under the right circumstances can help contribute to unit effectiveness with few dysfunctional consequences. (4) They establish career goals and seek managerial positions that allow them to develop and use power successfully. (5) They use all of their resources, including formal authority, and power to develop still more power. They sometimes actually look for ways to invest their power where they might secure a high positive return. (6) They engage in power-oriented behavior in ways that are tempered by maturity and self-control. They seldom, if ever, develop and use power in impulsive ways or for their own aggrandizement. (7) They also recognize and accept as legitimate that, in using these methods, they clearly influence the behavior and lives of others. Good commanders further recognize, often intuitively, that the establishment and the use of power are necessary for the successful fulfillment of their command roles.
INTEGRITY

the military professional and society

MAJOR W. H. MARGERUM, JR.

Integrity is one of those words which many people keep in that desk drawer labeled “too hard.” It’s not a topic for the dinner table or the cocktail party. You can’t buy or sell it. When supported with education, a person’s integrity can give him something to rely on when his perspective seems to blur, when rules and principles seem to waver, and when he’s faced with hard choices of right or wrong.

Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale, USN
INTEGRITY is a primary element of military professionalism and the hallmark of the professional officer. Without it, the profession loses the trust of the society it serves, and lack of public trust ultimately threatens the nation's ability to maintain the force levels necessary for peace and security. In other words, a lack or perceived lack of integrity can have a devastating effect on the military profession and its relationship with civilian society.

Society expects and requires integrity of its leaders. The official policy of the United States government addresses the subject of integrity in these words: "Where government is based on the consent of the governed, every citizen is entitled to have complete confidence in the integrity of his government." Air Force Regulation 30-1 states, in part, that "... a member of the Air Force . . . must practice the highest standards of integrity. . . . [His or her] 'sense of right and wrong' must be such that . . . behavior and motives are above suspicion." Both statements imply a relationship between integrity and society's expectations. Can a relationship be established between society's perception of institutional integrity and its acceptance of the military institution? An answer to this question should help the military professional clarify his relationship to his profession and to the society he serves.

A Concept of Integrity and Professionalism

Most military readers undoubtedly feel that the meanings of integrity and professionalism are well known. But even though officers know the meaning of professionalism, the officer corps apparently has no common understanding of the term. For example, a survey conducted at Air University in 1981 suggests that

Air Force officers should clearly define what they mean when using the word "professional." Since almost all officers consider themselves to be professionals, the use of the word, without clarification, is meaningless. The key is to zero-in on the specific behaviors that, in the eye of the beholder, are positive or negative influences on the profession of Arms.

Each officer's definition of professionalism is shaped by his education and experience. Similarly, integrity is a well-known but not completely defined term. A common reference point is essential to understanding the relationship between integrity, the profession, and society.

According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, integrity is "an uncompromising adherence to a code of moral, artistic, or other values: utter sincerity, honesty, and candor: avoidance of deception, expediency, artificiality, or shallowness of any kind . . . the quality or state of being complete or undivided." The words "utter sincerity, honesty, and candor" imply that a person of integrity is truthful in all things, that he can be trusted, and that his word is his bond. Integrity is the very essence of one's life. Major General Henry F. Meade stated that "integrity is the state of my whole life, the total quality of my character." Thus, integrity is the foundation of the professional officer's character: it determines all that he is or ever can be. Having integrity requires ethical behavior and correct actions.

Courage—physical and mental—is also an important element of integrity. A person of integrity insists on doing what is right at all times, not only when he knows that a superior or subordinate is watching him. It is the courage to complete a bombing run when one knows full well that the chance for survival is poor or nonexistent or the courage to admit failure rather than falsify a report. It is the determination to take the proper course of action at all times, not merely when it is expedient. Lieutenant General John P. Flynn, whose personal integrity under extreme pressure was proved as prisoner of war in North Vietnam, defines it in these terms:

Integrity is complete honesty in any situation. We must determine what is really right and really wrong. Right even transcends the violation of regulations. You must oppose what is wrong and support what is right even if it costs you your life or your career.
In other words, integrity means more to the professional officer than the dictionary definition. It means honesty, truthfulness, reliability, impartiality, sincerity, openmindedness, trustworthiness, and courage. It means totally ethical behavior at all times and in all situations, regardless of the consequences. It cannot be turned on and off as desired; it is the focus of the professional’s life.

*Webster’s Third New International Dictionary* defines *professionalism* as “the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize or mark a profession or a professional person . . . the characteristics, standards, or methods of professionals.” And *profession* is defined as a calling requiring specialized knowledge . . . [and] maintaining by force of organization or concerted opinion high standards of achievement and conduct, and committing its members . . . to a kind of work which has for its prime purpose the rendering of a public service.

Aims and qualities; a calling; high standards of achievement and conduct—all are intrinsic elements of professionalism. Of particular interest is the phrase “high standards of conduct,” which implies standards above the norm and beyond the usual. Standards higher than those required of nonprofessionals mark the professional as someone to respect and trust.

Four major characteristics distinguish a profession from other occupational pursuits. A profession is a calling characterized by a certain expertise or specialized area of knowledge, an inherent responsibility to the client to provide the expertise, a formalized institutional identity, and institutional and individual integrity. Samuel P. Huntington identifies expertise, corporateness, and responsibility as the three primary characteristics of a profession, and these characteristics are basic to any discussion of professionalism. But Huntington did not include institutional and individual integrity as one of his characteristics.

Of course, one could define integrity in relation to responsibility, but integrity involves more than responsibility. From Huntington’s perspective, the responsibility of a profession stems from the requirement to provide professional service when needed by society. Doctors are responsible for the health of their patients; lawyers are responsible for the personal rights and freedom of their clients; and the military is responsible for the survival of society itself. However, the profession must demonstrate the integrity necessary to generate trust in its competence to provide the service. Trust is critical in all instances.

Integrity is treated as a vital element of professionalism in the writings of a number of authors. For example, Sam C. Sarkesian and Thomas M. Gannon state that “the basic themes of military professionalism are integrity, obedience, loyalty, commitment, trust, honor, and service.” Army Lieutenant Colonels Zeb Bradford and Frederic Brown speak of integrity thus:

> The professional officer must be an unconditional servant of state policy, he must have a deep normative sense of duty to do this. . . . One cannot do his duty unless he has courage, selflessness, and integrity. The military profession must have these group values as a functional necessity.9

General Maxwell D. Taylor wrote that “. . . an ideal officer is one who can be relied upon to carry out all assigned tasks and missions and, in doing so, get the most from his available resources with minimum loss and waste.” In describing the traits displayed by the ideal officer, he added: “Without priority in importance, I can identify the following: justice, patriotism, reliability, integrity, sense of duty, self-discipline, human understanding, loyalty, strength of will, and inspirational power.”10

The traits described by General Taylor, Bradford and Brown, and Sarkesian and Gannon all have one characteristic in common: the one that implies the highest standard of ethical behavior—integrity.

**Integrity—A Critical Characteristic**

The professional must either live up to the professional code of ethics or accept the status of
nonprofessional. The doctor who maintains his expertise through constant study, practices his skills, maintains active membership in professional organizations, but overprescribes drugs to satisfy the habits of certain patients is no more a professional than the doctor who fails to keep abreast of the advances in his specialty. The lawyer who provides the best possible service to his client, maintains his expertise, actively participates in professional organizations but cheats on his income tax is no more a professional than the lawyer who consciously fails to defend his client to the best of his ability. The military officer who excels in his specialty, unhesitatingly volunteers for the most difficult and hazardous duty, actively promotes esprit de corps in his unit but falsifies a report to cover up a deficiency in his unit's training records is no more a professional than the officer who blames and punishes others for his own failures. The military officer who fails to live up to the ethical standards of the profession violates the principle of integrity and thus lacks professionalism.

Numerous studies from 1970 to the present suggest that integrity is a significant problem for the military profession. A report entitled "Study on Military Professionalism" by the U.S. Army War College highlighted integrity as a problem among Army officers. Representative comments illustrate some of their concerns:

Major: The Army talks about integrity . . . an officer’s word is his bond or it should be . . . yet a bank or a store will accept my checks but I have to show an ID card and fill out a personal history form on the back of a check to cash it at the PX . . .

Captain: Nobody wants to make waves. The name of the game is cover-up. Get a 240 on your OEL and move out smartly . . . protect yourself and protect your boss . . .

Captain: Junior officers are afraid to use their initiative because they lack support from above . . .

Although the study does not purport to represent a cross section of the Army’s officer corps, the fact that all interviewers received similar comments from all ranks of the officer corps indicated "widespread and often significant differences between the ideal ethical/moral/professional standards of the Army—as epitomized by Duty-Honor-Country—and the prevailing standards."12 In other words, the Army recognized at least a perceived problem with integrity.

Individual officers have also noted problems in the area of integrity. Lieutenant Thomas M. Hall referred to the open-door policy in these terms:

. . . many junior officers I have talked with felt they could not go to their commander or operations officer with problems or suggestions. Maybe it was a fear of reprimand, or maybe they did not want to jump the chain of command. Maybe there is a feeling of distrust. I will not pretend to be able to explain it any further, but it is a problem of integrity that even the most sincere commander must overcome.13

Major C. Anne Bonen's survey of Air Force officers in 1981 supports the results in the Army War College study already cited. The survey revealed that 63.4 percent of the students at Squadron Officer School, 89.6 percent at Air Command and Staff College, and 69.8 percent at Air War College had felt pressure from their organizations or senior officers to compromise their integrity. These officers also felt that other officers had compromised their integrity. The percentages are striking. The survey included four possible responses (never, rarely, sometimes, and often) to a question on the frequency that other officers compromised their integrity. The percentages are striking. The survey included four possible responses (never, rarely, sometimes, and often) to a question on the frequency that other officers compromised their integrity. The percentages are striking. The survey included four possible responses (never, rarely, sometimes, and often) to a question on the frequency that other officers compromised their integrity. The percentages are striking.
by Majors Joseph R. Daskevich and Paul A. Nafziger at the Air Command and Staff College in 1980. In that survey, 88 percent of the officers felt pressure either from their organizations or from their superiors to compromise their integrity, and 100 percent felt that other officers had violated their integrity in varying degrees.15

Although the studies cited made no effort to sample a representative cross section of the officer population, the results indicate at least a perception of a problem among highly select groups of Air Force officers. And lack of integrity equates to a lack of professionalism. Whether the problem is real—a true lack of integrity—or whether officers only perceive a lack of integrity, the issue must be a major concern for the profession. It must be concerned for the internal and external impact of the problem. The internal problem is serious. The external problem is potentially devastating, however, for it reflects the relationship between the profession and society.

Declining Trust—A Sign of the Times

Social researchers have noted a disturbing trend in American society during the past two decades—a declining trust in American institutions and leaders. Events like the Vietnam War, Watergate, and Abscam have taken their toll. The perceived decline in U.S. power and prestige, economic troubles caused by rising oil prices and government spending, and an apparent inability to control or moderate world events have also had an adverse impact on society and its perception of itself. Society thus tends to judge leaders and institutions in harsher terms as it searches for something or someone to trust and respect. Society’s search for national heroes at least partially accounts for the outpouring of emotion that occurred when the American hostages returned from Iran, but that event did not alleviate the problem. Daniel Yankelovich underlines the severity of the problem:

The statistical record of this growth of mistrust is simple, stark and dramatic: in 1964, seven out of ten Americans believed in the competence of government officials. . . . By 1976, the number of Americans continuing to have this confidence had shrunk to 44 percent. By 1978, it had further declined to 30 percent.16

And in a continuing study of the public’s trust in the federal government, the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan found an increasing level of distrust of government, rising from 11 percent in 1958 to 52 percent 20 years later. The data are remarkable because they are consistent across age groups, race, and educational levels. It is not localized but is diffused across the entire population.17

Other sources report similar data. For example, the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan reports: “On a three-point scale reflecting high, medium, and low levels of political trust, 60 percent of voting age Americans indicated distrust of government in general, while only 16 percent gave it trust ratings.”18 More significant, a Harris poll identified the following declines in public trust from 1966 through 1980: higher education from 61 percent to 33 percent; medicine from 73 to 30 percent; the press from 29 to 22 percent; and major companies from 55 to 19 percent.19 These figures vividly portray declining trust in national institutions and leaders; the military and its leadership have not been immune to this trend.

A Gallup poll in April 1979 rated ten institutions on the basis of the confidence expressed by respondents toward each institution. The military ranked third behind organized religion and the banking industry and ahead of public schools, newspapers, and Congress. The biennial survey showed that ratings for the military dropped slightly below the 1977 and 1975 polls, from a high of 58 percent to 54 percent in 1979.20 But opinions of military leadership have dropped significantly. The results of a Harris poll indicate that the percentage of Americans expressing “a great deal of confidence” in military leadership has dropped from 61 percent in 1966 to 33 percent in 1979 and 1980. The magnitude of the
drop, alarming as it is, reflects findings of the Roper Organization that "...the public has more trust in American institutions than in the people who lead them."21

Society as a whole expresses declining trust in American institutions and their leaders. Our young people are perhaps the most important segment of society to the military because it must depend on youth for its manpower resources, both officer and enlisted. How do young people feel toward the military? The 1979 Gallup poll shows that 49 percent of 18-to-24-year-olds expressed "a great deal or quite a bit" of confidence in the military in contrast to 54 percent of the total sample for the same two measures.22 The Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan polled high school seniors nationwide in 1979 and found that, of those planning to attend college, 44 percent felt that the military had done a good job. The military ranked fourth among 11 institutions behind colleges and universities, the national news media, and churches, but, in contrast, only 5 percent of future college students and 8 percent of noncollege-bound students felt that the military offered a desirable place to work. Fifty percent of college-bound and 48 percent of noncollege-bound students rated the services as unacceptable, and 21 percent of the college-bound students perceived considerable dishonesty and immorality in the military.23 Thus, young people express less acceptance of the military institution than members of the larger society. Although I have been unable to find data on attitudes of the young toward institutional leadership, such data would probably indicate levels of trust or confidence slightly lower than other segments of society. Such a conjecture is consistent with available data that indicate a slightly lower level of confidence in the military institution among the young.

Declining trust of the military among young people suggests a similar decline of young people willing to serve in the military. The result will be greater difficulty in recruiting and retaining qualified men and women in the nation’s Armed Forces. All other things being equal, the number of volunteers for military service will decline as the economy improves and employment opportunities increase in the civilian community. Declining trust in the military is one more strike against the military as a potential career for young people.

The Professional and Society

Two decades of diverse shocks to American society have brought numerous expressions of cynicism and declining trust toward governmental institutions. In the face of declining trust in institutional leadership, the military profession must approach the decade of the eighties with a rekindled sense of professionalism, and the cornerstone of that professionalism must be integrity. One needs only to mention the word Watergate, and the implications are unquestionable. Many American people have apparently come to believe that success cannot be achieved without resorting to devious or underhanded methods. And on the basis of this belief, declining levels of trust in the leadership of society’s institutions are to be expected.

The military institution is not isolated from these perceptions. But when the members of the profession perceive a lack of integrity in the military institution, one is not surprised that society expresses similar perceptions. Declining trust in military professionals is the sure result. If the military profession loses the trust and confidence of society, it will become increasingly difficult to develop and maintain the consensus necessary to support adequate levels of defense spending. This is the stark impact of a lack, or perceived lack, of integrity.

Each member of the military profession is responsible for the public’s perception of his integrity and the integrity of his profession. Whether on- or off-duty, whether active or retired, he continues his status as a military professional. Any event or condition that tarnishes the image of the military profession or raises doubt about its integrity will have negative con-
sequences. Like all professions, the military profession is judged against higher standards than the rest of society, but since its unique status makes it "... responsible for military security to the exclusion of all other ends," society expects the military to adhere to the highest of standards. These standards require the highest level of professionalism and, by implication, integrity. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General John D. Ryan perhaps said it best in these words:

Integrity is the most important responsibility of command. Commanders are dependent on the integrity of those reporting to them in every decision they make. Integrity can be ordered but it can only be achieved by encouragement and example.

IT IS TIME for military professionals to open up that desk drawer labeled "too hard" and take a good look at the principle of integrity. Integrity should be the topic of conversation at the dinner table and at cocktail parties. Above all, it must be the topic of discussion on the stages and in the classrooms of the military professional schools. It must be dissected, discussed, and studied. Integrity must be internalized; it must become second nature for every officer. Anything less is unworthy of the Profession of Arms.

Offutt AFB, Nebraska

Notes

12. Ibid., p. 30.
21. Shaver, pp. 46 and 44.
24. Huntington, p. 15.
A NY operational squadron commander has waited a long time to assume such a role. By and large such a commander has had a wide variety of experience at many levels of line and staff, has observed the good and the bad, and presumably has developed a philosophy for handling command responsibilities if and when afforded the opportunity. It is a position wherein the major learning for the job has theoretically transpired and the immediate application of command and leadership is expected at assumption. The process for selection of squadron commanders is such that relatively few attain the position. It must be assumed that a certain higher-level confidence exists that those selected to be the key interfaces between the mission and the personnel charged with its accomplishment are capable.

The operational squadron, not the wing staff, is the gut of mission accomplishment. But for the existence of the squadron, the staff is unnecessary. The concept of "Buck Stop" (putting decision-making authority at the lowest level of reasonable capability) supports this view. Buck Stop is not new; it is simply a reaffirmation that field leadership, not centralized management, is the vital ingredient of command. The fact of that reaffirmation is evidenced by ever more-present examples of the responsibilities tasked to the squadron commanders—from crew proficiency to drug/alcohol rehabilitation. In order to uphold the multifaceted responsibility inherent in the position, the squadron commanders must be given wide latitude and authority. It is universally recognized that they may err from time to time; opportunities for error must be allowed to persist.

An old physical principle states that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. A more recently established natural hypothesis which keys on this states: "You cannot do just one thing." This is an oversimplification of the premise that for every single action, such as dropping a stone into a smooth pond, there are always many other actions resulting from the first. Inasmuch as the squadron commander must be responsible for mission accomplishment and the proficiency of crews, command must be accomplished with an eye to how this responsibility is effected and affected by morale and discipline. Therefore, each decision, each directive, and each action must be weighed with a view to its multiple reactions—a comprehensive view. You cannot do just one thing, ever.

The point of all this is that the squadron commander must be allowed to command. By virtue of attaining the position, the commander’s knowledge, authority, and integrity must be accepted by superiors in light of the fact that the commander's subordinates demand such attributes. The commander’s ability to make correct decisions is not only determined good or bad by superiors but also by subordinates and how such decisions affect them. Each decision is a reflection on the integrity of a promise to support the mission through a demonstration by the commander that every action is considered in a comprehensive, squadronwide perspective. The commander’s goals are to accomplish the mission and achieve the greatest good for the greatest number in the long run. As such, the squadron commander should rightly expect support in those goals from higher command levels, ancillary organizations, and intrawing organizational staffs. Though the squadron commander’s views and initiatives may not always be accepted, they must always be considered because the squadron commander has a comprehensive view of the organization that no other individual can possess.

390th Strategic Missile Wing (SAC)
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona
DURING the past year or so, a new element has entered into the national defense debate: the Military Reform Movement. The Military Reform Movement is a loose alliance of members of Congress, civilian defense analysts, and military personnel (mostly junior). Its goal, simply stated, is to bring our defense policies and priorities back into line with what is important for
winning in combat. Generally, people are most important, strategy and tactics come second, and hardware is only third. Therefore, the reformers are more concerned with people and ideas—issues such as unit cohesion, officer education, and tactical innovation—than with defense procurement.

However, as one military reform briefing states, "weapons that don't work or can't be bought in adequate quantity will bring down even the best people and the best ideas." The reformers have accordingly begun to question some procurement programs, especially those which have led to weapons of inordinate complexity with poor readiness rates and such high costs that we cannot buy the number we need.

Elements within the Washington defense establishment have already begun to strike back, not by addressing the reformers' concerns but by distorting them. They are attempting to say the debate is between advocates of "quality" equipment and proponents of "quantity." The services, supporters of "quality" hardware, are said to want only the best weapons—weapons which ensure that each American soldier, sailor, or airman has the greatest possible edge over his Russian opponent. This leads, they argue, to very expensive, very complicated weapons: the Army's M-1 tank, the big nuclear carrier, the F-15 fighter.

The reformers, labeled the "quantity" side, are portrayed as so worried because the Russians outnumber us in tanks, ships, planes, etc., that they are willing to accept weapons of inferior quality but lower cost in order to get larger numbers.

This is a false picture of the hardware issue. The debate is not between quality and quantity. Rather, it is between two very different definitions of quality. The defense establishment and the contractors with which it works largely define quality in technological terms. The reformers define quality tactically, by looking at what is important on the battlefield.

The defense establishment definition is evident in the sales pitches it gives to the Congress. The stress is on "faster," "higher performance," "more electronics," or the favorite catch-all, "highly capable." These supposedly desirable qualities are seldom discussed in terms of what happens in actual combat. Instead, Congress and the public are given "test results" or "computer studies," which are usually based on unrealistic proving-ground experiments. They are often heavily doctored, reflecting the fact that the testing agency serves the research and development bureaucracy that developed the weapon. And they seldom reflect competition among prototypes.

The defense establishment's concept of quality leads to weapons that push the technological state of the art but often do so in areas that have little relevance to actual combat. These weapons also tend to be fragile and difficult to maintain in the field, often fail to perform under combat conditions—which are very different from conditions on proving grounds—take decades to develop, and are extremely expensive both to buy and operate.

The military reform view, the view mislabeled "quantity," uses a different measure of quality. It looks not to the technological state of the art but to combat experience. It asks: What qualities have tended to make weapons effective on the battlefield? Five seem to shine through much modern experience:

**Weapons should be small and hard to detect.** Often, to be seen or heard is to be killed. Big ships, be they the Bismarck or the Nimitz, tend to become the hunted rather than the hunter. Big fighters like the F-15 fall victim to smaller, more agile fighters they never see, such as the F-16. Tanks with big signatures (like the intense heat from the M-1's turbine engine) quickly become targets for antitank weapons.

**Weapons should be reliable and easy to maintain.** Ships that spend much of their time in port undergoing repairs, planes stuck in hangars awaiting maintenance, or tanks that break down constantly in the field are liabilities, not assets. Combat is full of mud, confusion, broken-down supply systems, and tired soldiers. The high-quality weapons sought by the defense establishment are hard to maintain even in peace-
time. How will we maintain them in the much more difficult environment of actual war? How many will be “ready” after the first few days of combat? the first week?

Weapons should be agile. Agility means many things. In tanks, it means good cross-country mobility (the M-1 throws its treads in rough terrain). In fighters, it means good energy maneuverability and the ability to transition quickly from one maneuver to another. In all weapons, it means an ability to change as the nature of combat changes. Sometimes the ability to change and adapt can be designed in: aircraft carriers built during World War II are still useful ships because we can put new aircraft on them; cruisers and destroyers of the same vintage, with their weapons built into the ship, are obsolete. But often agility means getting rid of a weapon before it is physically worn out because the opponent has figured out how to defeat it. Superexpensive weapons are too expensive to throw away, so we keep them in service long after they are obsolete.

Weapons should achieve their effect quickly. Weapons such as the TOW antitank missile,* the Sparrow radar-guided air-to-air missile, or the Copperhead laser-guided artillery shell require the operator to expose himself for a long time to guide the system to the target. The enemy has a chance to react and counterattack. The devotees of complex technology promise that future weapons will be “fire and forget.” But we had fire-and-forget weapons years ago, in the form of antitank cannon and recoilless rifles, air-to-air cannon, and infrared missiles—weapons the technology junkies have pushed into the background.

Weapons should be affordable in adequate numbers. Quantity is a quality and an important one in determining who wins and who loses. Sending our boys to fight with “less than the best” is not attractive, and the reformers propose no such thing. But sending them to fight heavily outnumbered may endanger them even more.

Interestingly, many of the qualities that make a weapon tactically effective also lessen its costs so we can afford sufficient numbers. Pierre Sprey, one of the military reformers’ authorities on tactical aircraft, argues that the best individual fighter aircraft would be very small (smaller than an F-5) and have primarily passive avionics and no radar-guided missiles. While it would cruise above mach 1, faster than any current fighter, it would not have to have a mach 2 top speed, which is seldom used in combat. These characteristics would make it cheap—less than $4 million, compared to about $25 million for the F-15. Thus, we could afford a larger quantity of these individually superior fighters.

The choice is not between quality and quantity. It is between technological quality often irrelevant to combat and tactical quality with quantity. We can choose between a small number of relatively ineffective weapons or a larger number of effective weapons. The real question is, why does the defense establishment prefer the former?

* TOW—Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided.

Alexandria, Virginia
ANALYSIS BY HYPERBOLE

COLONEL ALAN L. GROPMAN

The speaking in perpetual hyperbole is comely in nothing but love.

Francis Bacon

OBJECT to William Lind's "Quantity versus Quality' Is Not the Issue" on the grounds of his rhetoric and on the basis of his core belief. Lind's rhetorical approach is a sure turnoff to all those honest officers and civilians in the Pentagon and elsewhere who are maligned by Lind and other so-called reformers because they believe that advanced technology is the correct approach to enhancing the capabilities of our fighting forces. Calling such people "technology junkies," as Lind does, is likely to be seen as an insult and will not improve the atmosphere for this serious debate. Lind's basic antitechnology bias, furthermore, is ahistorical and, I believe, a prescription for failure in the twentieth century. I will begin with his rhetoric.

Taking Lind's parting shot first: just who are those in the Pentagon who want the U.S. military to buy and use "a small number of relatively ineffective weapons" over "a larger number of effective weapons?" Who are these malefactors of national trust? Of course, Lind is writing rhetorically for he knows, as do we, that nobody in the Pentagon is deliberately choosing small numbers of inferior weapons over larger numbers of better ones. But stating it Lind's way is bound to exacerbate tensions and add only heat to the debate and no light.

Beyond his hyperbole, Lind creates strawmen. He and the reformers, he asserts, believe that "people are most important, strategy and tactics come second, and hardware is only third"; therefore, "the reformers are more concerned with people and ideas than with defense procurement." This is an unfair, invidious comparison. All the uniformed leaders and nearly all the ranking civilians I know put matters in the same priority. The desperate fight to raise pay and keep it livable and an increasingly higher percentage of the defense budget that goes to people are evidence. The fact that all the chiefs recently told the Secretary of Defense that they would rather cut back on procurement than see their people suffer a pay freeze testifies to their regard for people.

Regarding ideas, all the services put officers at least equal to their best in their respective doctrine and strategy offices, and the U.S. Army demonstrates its emphasis by assigning a four-star general to its Training and Doctrine Command. Lind and the reformers are right: people and ideas are more important than things, but the people in charge believe that, too. Lind cites a quotation from a military reform briefing—"weapons that don't work or can't be bought in adequate quantity will bring down even the best people and the best ideas"—which would suggest that the Defense Department leadership thinks otherwise, and that unstated assertion is false.

Lind establishes an equally insubstantial strawman when he argues that the services see themselves as forced to buy "very expensive, very complicated weapons: The Army's M-1 tank, the big nuclear carrier, the F-15 fighter." Nonsense. The services do not buy weapons because they are big and expensive, they buy because they believe that the system will improve mission capabilities. The M-1 tank comes in response to the size and numbers of Soviet tanks. The big carrier comes from the need for the United States to be able to project real power around the globe. The F-15 comes from the need to defeat large numbers of enemy aircraft threatening us and our allies.

One would think that in light of brilliant Israeli victories with the F-15 and F-16 aircraft over large numbers of Soviet lesser-technology aircraft without a single loss (81 to 0), critics would find another bone to pick. Similarly, the large carriers are built that size because of Navy doctrine. I know the debate in the Navy continues at levels below official statements and
that there are distinguished former four-star admirals (like Stansfield Turner and Elmo Zumwalt) who advocate smaller carriers, but small carrier advocates do not argue that big carrier enthusiasts want such systems just because they are expensive.

Lind asserts that weapons should be small and hard to detect. Well, no first and yes second, because weapons, before they are so small the enemy cannot see them, must be big enough to do the job. He writes "big ships, be they the Bismarck or the Nimitz, tend to become the hunted rather than the hunter." This is bad history. The Bismarck was hunted not because it was big but because it was a hunter with a devastating record of success. One is forced to ask, how small is the small carrier? If it is half the weight of the Nimitz, it is still heavier than the Bismarck, and it carries enough aircraft to make it an exceptionally attractive target.

The length and width of the carrier, moreover, will still be defined by the size of the carrier deck because of the need to take off and recover aircraft simultaneously. While the Harrier is a superb vertical takeoff and landing fighter, it will be decades before the necessary tankers and airborne command and control aircraft will be similarly designed (if ever). Satellites or Backfires using radar will have no trouble finding carriers half the weight of the Nimitz.

More germane is the effect that halving the size of the carrier has on mission capability. Because more than half the aircraft on a carrier are either defensive fighters to defend the carrier and its battle group or support airplanes (interceptors, tankers, comand and control aircraft, etc.), the size of the strike force on a carrier is limited. A small carrier will still need a great amount of protection, and, necessarily, its strike power will be limited.

Lind's other strawman is his assertion that the "defense establishment largely and the contractors with which it works define quality in technological terms. The reformers define quality tactically, by looking at what is important on the battlefield." I do not know to whom he has been talking in the "defense establishment," but they are not the people I have worked with or known. There is only one way to define quality and that is tactically, and I know no ranking officers who do not think of it in that way. How could it be otherwise? Most uniformed leaders got to the top by demonstrating success in combat by inherently adhering to real combat qualities.

Regarding Lind's argument on what he calls "unrealistic proving-ground experiments" or "computer studies," in the absence of real combat, testing provides the only way. Naturally, one would want to make all tests as realistic as possible. Once again one reaches for the F-15, because here again the tests were computer- and proving-ground-based, and one finds that the aircraft is an enormous success. Because I disagree with Lind does not mean that I believe all is well in this arena, because it is not. Systems attract advocates, and too often these are either involved in or responsible for testing and evaluation; and the services need to be vigilant in this arena.

Lind's comparison of the size and capability of the F-15 and the allegedly "smaller, and more agile" F-16 that supposedly cannot be seen by F-15 pilots is similarly faulty. Anybody who thinks the F-16 is small has not seen one. While it is about half the weight of the F-15, it is three quarters of the length, has three quarters of the span, and stands 83 percent as tall. The F-16 is eminently visible to both the F-15 pilot and his radar—as would be any airplane that can compete in the skies with either the F-15 or F-16.

On Lind's approach to technology, I would argue in opposition that the military-technological frontier must be relentlessly pushed. Good people with sound ideas need better technology than their opponents if they are to fight outnumbered and win. That is a clear message from military history. I am concerned that the so-called reformers—most of whom have not seen battle and have no sense of what superior technology does for morale and improving the fighting man's spirit—will stunt the traditional
emphasis in our military. From ancient times when the Bronze Age superseded the copper only to fall to the iron, technological superiority has most often provided the margin for victory. Does technology complicate matters? Certainly—as the British radar in 1940 and its command and control network complicated the Royal Air Force approach to defense. But looking back on the summer of 1940, it is known that technology—radar—provided the narrow margin of victory in a titanic battle with enormous consequences. There are dozens of similar examples.

DO WE NEED to improve our approach to using technology? Certainly. Must we constantly scrutinize test and evaluation in order to prevent human weaknesses expressed by parochialism and advocacy from invalidating tests? Of course. Do we need to resist technological gold-plating? Always. Are there problems with a relentless technological push beyond mere expense? Absolutely. But the consequences of turning away from the highest technological approach could have the most condign consequences for our way of life in these dangerous times.

_Hq USAF_

Another difference between times past and now applies wherever you may happen to be stationed: Namely, it is much more difficult to be a commander or supervisor today than when I was your age. Many years ago, commanders had at their disposal the tools necessary to maintain a high degree of discipline and unit esprit; nowadays, they almost need a lawyer at their elbow to advise on what can and can't be done.

General David C. Jones, speaking to a Boston University graduating class (Heidelberg, Germany) 1980
ON DIRECT SATELLITE BROADCASTING

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DONALD S. HARLACHER

THE concern raised by Lieutenant Colonel William J. Wallisch in his article is one that has received international attention for at least fifteen years now.* The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, a standing committee of the United Nations, has sought since 1968 to develop a set of legal principles to regulate the use of direct satellite broadcasting (DBS) technology.

On the one hand, the international community generally acknowledges that DBS technology offers the potential to broadcast educational, health, and public service programming to widely dispersed populations, remote areas, or even to countries without sophisticated communication infrastructures. This capability was amply demonstrated during the mid-to-late 1970s when the United States and India joined in a cooperative effort to bring farming, hygiene, and safety information to an uneducated population in largely inaccessible areas of the Indian subcontinent.**

But DBS technology, as Colonel Wallisch aptly points out, is a two-edged sword. It can also be used to spread propaganda or misinformation across international boundaries; and it is the widespread international concern over this issue that has deadlocked negotiations within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space these many years.

The principal obstacle to a consensus formulation of DBS principles has been none other than the United States, not because of any concern that the "national psyche" would fall prey to "slick Soviet TV" propaganda (as Colonel Wallisch implies) but rather because of the concern that these principles, unless carefully constructed, could actually inhibit the free international exchange of ideas and information that was affirmed in Article 19 of the 1948 United

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**The cooperative effort was known as the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) and used a NASA-developed applications technology satellite (ATS-6) in geostationary orbit.
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and again the 1975 Helsinki accord, and which has long been a basic tenet of American foreign policy.

U.S. concern about this issue is not unfounded, given the fact that the vast majority of the international community which has spoken out on the DBS question strenuously objects to unrestricted direct satellite broadcasting. The Soviet Union, for example, has argued that broadcasting across national boundaries violates a country's sovereign rights unless prior agreements have been entered into by the broadcasting and receiving parties and has warned that, in the absence of such agreements, it reserves the right to destroy the offending satellite system. This is a threat not to be taken lightly in light of the demonstrated operational nature of the Soviet antisatellite (ASAT) system, and concern about the possibility of future "illegal" broadcasts undoubtedly provides at least one "justification" for the very existence of the Soviet ASAT system.

Many Third World countries have similarly voiced support for a "prior consent" regime and additionally have expressed a concern that DBS technology could be used as a tool of cultural or economic imperialism. These countries fear that program content and unwanted exposure to the Ronald McDonalds and Cheryl Tiegses of the Western advertising world could disrupt the social fabric of their developing nations and thus create a demand for consumer goods that is inconsistent with national plans for social and economic development.

Colonel Wallisch's implicit support for a "prior consent" regime, in my opinion, represents a stinging rebuke to the objectivity and reasoning power of the American citizen. If the Soviets were to beam "slick programming" direct to U.S. home receivers via direct broadcast satellites in geosynchronous orbit, an event I consider unlikely, such programming would probably attract a large audience at least initially. However, the appeal of Soviet programming would stem more from curiosity than latent ideological fervor on the part of the American public. As any reader of the Soviet press knows, or for that matter as any German-speaking American GI stationed in West Berlin with access to East German television can attest, the shallowness of Communist society and political thought is quickly exposed by sustained exposure. I venture that the same would prove true for Soviet programming regardless of how it was packaged.

The real concern, then, lies not with the potential susceptibility of the American public to Soviet propaganda but rather that the United States may be persuaded not to use DBS technology to exploit recognized Soviet vulnerabilities to such programming and thus in effect would abandon the large Warsaw Pact clientele that Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Voice of America have so assiduously developed over the years—a clientele that seeks not propaganda but the truth and does so despite great personal risk.

Washington, D.C.

Colonel Harlacher is the Air Force research associate at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies and a lecturer on space-related issues.
LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1980s

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE B. PICKETT, JR., USA (RET)

SINCE the United States became a nation, our military leaders have written about and discussed the problem of leading the fighter of a republic steeped in individuality. The problem is more complicated in the 1980s because of the large number of persons of military age who are far more vociferous about their rights than their responsibilities.

During World War I, General John Pershing sent a request to Peyton C. Marsh, the Chief of Staff: “Send me men who can shoot and salute.” This simply meant then and means now: on a battlefield only disciplined individuals skilled in the use of their weapons or in their technical specialty will survive. For as General Patton put it, “Your job is not to die for your country but to see that the poor son of a bitch dies for his.”

THE book *The Spirit of America* by Hugh F. Kayser provides many useful insights into leading the soldiers of a free people.† It

consists of the story of how 40 of the 273 living recipients of the Medal of Honor won that medal. Dwight D. Eisenhower once stated that he would rather have the right to wear the Medal of Honor than be President of the United States.

Included in each account is the recipient's opinion of what it means to be an American as well as his personal advice for today's youth. Almost universally these Medal of Honor winners advise youth to get the best education possible and to be prepared and willing to fight to perpetuate the freedoms handed down to them by those who fought and died to secure them.

The most pungent advice, almost Pattonistic in its style, was that given by Sergeant Maynard H. "Snuffy" Smith, who stated, "Being an American means freedom of speech, of choice, unlimited opportunity, and the protection of my person and property." He continued:

My advice to American youth: Get your hair cut, look like a human being instead of some kind of an animal. Get off the pills, the pot, and the hippie scene. Go to work or join some branch of the military service. And get over the idea your country owes you a living.

Although The Spirit of America was not written with emphasis on leadership, there are certain battlefield leadership lessons that can be learned from it. First, the examples themselves are good motivational material for young officers and enlisted men.

During World War II we motivated young soldiers and sailors with the series "Why We Fight." As a young captain in 1942, trying to make those less-than-exciting canned presentations lively and interesting to the men, I could have used the stories about Louis Van Iersel and Phil Katz to great advantage. Of course, if it had been available then, such a book would also have included the stories of Samuel Woodfill, Alvin York, Frank Luke, and others.

Each story puts meat on the bones of a famous remark by General George S. Patton, Jr.: "If you are assigned an objective, and you fail to take it, and you are not either dead or dying, you have not done your full duty." Patton included this in the first General Order he issued as Commanding General, 3d Army. He expressed it primarily as a guideline for tactical unit commanders. A study of Kayser's book discloses that each of the forty episodes had one common thread: do your duty at any cost or personal sacrifice. These men acted out in real life the type of heroism that Congress gave John Wayne a medal for portraying on the movie screen.

But there were no staged or programmed heroics in their acts. This is vital for a junior officer or noncommissioned officer to realize. Gallantry is useful in leading only when it is necessary in order to get the job done. Anyone who decides "I think I'll be brave today" usually won't; and most of the Camp Polk braggarts of 1942 were the first not to be brave and get battle fatigue in 1944.

To motivate men in battle, medals must be awarded fairly and equitably. Many stories came out of the Vietnam War about how medals were obtained. Many medals were allegedly awarded pro forma, to such an extent that men who had earned the same decoration in Europe under Patton felt its value and meaning had been eroded. But the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs insisted that the Medal of Honor could not be approved or awarded except with their expressed sanction. As the Vice Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I was present at some of their discussions concerning recommendations for the Medal of Honor and can state affirmatively that they safeguarded high standards for its award.

Too many medals and awards destroy their own motivational value. Kayser cites a list of 15 medals that can be awarded by the Army and the Air Force. Seven of these (and nine on occasion) can be awarded to people who never hear a shot fired in anger. Some medals were awarded in Korea and Vietnam for the number of landings and takeoffs in aircraft. At least five of these medals could be abolished and the motivational value of the remainder enhanced.

The list of medals constantly grows, mostly to
provide peacetime motivation and reward. If the trend continues, there may be an award for "not being stoned on pot for 60 days" or something similar. Civilians see all this mass of color on a uniform and assume it has some significance. Several officers were on a train going home from Europe on leave in December 1945. One officer who had served on Eisenhower's staff had an assemblage of easily obtained foreign ribbons on his jacket. In the same group, another wore the Distinguished Service Cross, the award just below the Medal of Honor, and went almost unnoticed by civilians admiring the staff officer.

All forty Medal of Honor winners cited by Kayser possessed a high degree of initiative. When something had to be done positively and quickly to meet a deadly challenge, all these men reacted with initiative. Simply stated, they took charge, and they all showed the ability to recognize the key to a situation and take the timely action to rectify a situation or exploit an opportunity.

The British equivalent of the Medal of Honor is the Victoria Cross. At 2:00 A.M. on 28 May 1982, 2d Battalion, Parachute Regiment attacked the Argentine defenders of Darwin and Goose Green, Falkland Islands. Heavy machine gun and mortar fire from more than 1500 Argentines held up the advance. Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones quickly ran to the front of the assault force and personally led the charge that overran the guns. He was killed in the assault.

But his second in command, Major Chris Keeble, exploited Jones's success by rallying the troopers and drove home the attack. The fight was over by 6:00 P.M. At 10:50 A.M. on 29 May, the Argentine Garrison surrendered to a force that it outnumbered 5 to 2. Jones earned the Victoria Cross, and the Queen has awarded it. Unfortunately, it was presented to his next of kin. Gallantry and initiative are still alive among the English-speaking people in the 1980s.

Obviously personal courage is required in a leader, but moral strength is just as important. The term more frequently used is moral courage, and examples are cited to show how the courage to make a decision saved thousands of lives or won a great success. One example is Eisenhower's decision not to postpone D-day past 6 June 1944 in the face of adverse and worsening weather conditions. But moral strength requires more and demands that the leader set the proper example at all times. One often hears the expression, "Old so and so is a rowdy drinker, but he'd be a whiz in combat." Not so. Drinking usually reflects a sense of insufficiency, not a trait desired in a leader. Inevitably, the booser and the womanizer lose the respect of their subordinates, and the day of reckoning always arrives.

"Never ask your men to do anything you wouldn't do yourself" has been stated by many hero leaders. How can an immoral leader expect to produce moral subordinates? Moral strength emphasizes the human element in leadership. An excellent recent book highlights this human element.† Follow Me is a compilation of 58 entries of "Red" Newman's columns, "The Forward Edge," which have appeared in Army magazine and its predecessor, The Infantry Journal. Newman states in chapter one, "Famous Generals have written books about their lives and the deeds that made them famous. This book is by a not so famous general about the human element in military service."

Newman is far from being a "not so famous general." As a colonel at Red Beach at Leyte, in the Philippines, 1944, he performed a single act of leadership and bravery that has been recorded in the "US Army in Action" series. This was the spot where Douglas MacArthur kept his promise "I shall return." General Newman describes it in Follow Me:

On the beach there was confusion and men were pinned down. The company commander had been killed when I landed, and when I called upon the men to move inland, they did not respond. But we had to move. All that had happened was not clear to me, but there could be no question of what must be done. We simply had to move inland. So I stood up and moved forward. And my men went with me. (p. 251)

Colonel Newman actually said to the men, "Get the hell off the beach! God damn it, get up and get moving—Follow Me." The captain on the "Army in Action" poster says, "The regimental commander, Col. Aubrey S. Newman, arrived on the beach and taking in the situation at a glance, shouted to his men, 'Get up and get moving: Follow me.'" As Newman says, "Just a little gentle censorship."

The great value of Newman's book is the applicability of the lessons and stories. He stresses that an essential trait in a leader is that he cares for his men. Prior to World War II, officers had a custom of going last through the mess line after all the enlisted men had been served. This taught young lieutenants the value of hot food as well as instilling the habit of caring for their men.

In early December 1950, the U.S. Eighth Army had been defeated on the Chongchon River in Korea. Units were withdrawing, rear area troops panicked, roads became congested, units became intermingled, and around Kunuri confusion was rampant. A lieutenant colonel found two lost kitchen trucks and crews from tank units. Both trucks still had turkeys, fruit cakes, and other goodies aboard. This was the Thanksgiving dinner that the tank soldiers never had a chance to eat. He ordered the mess sergeants to pull off near a crossroads in a big field and cook up what they had.

The lieutenant colonel then stood in the road and waved down every stray tank and vehicle from tank and reconnaissance units. The men were told, "Hot chow right over there." In less than eight hours, this officer had reorganized parts of three different battalions and reconnaissance troops. Those units were then moved back as a cohesive force, not lost remnants. Although no great recognition or reward ensued from his superiors, he became a respected personality to the armored units and not just another "damn staff officer from higher headquarters." His interest in those men had been genuine, and they knew it. That was his real satisfaction.

General Melvin Zais stated many times that "You have to care." He emphasized this in a speech at Air University in 1978—shortly before he developed cancer and died. Newman quotes Zais in Follow Me and also makes the point: "Great Commanders have always recognized the importance of individuals under them." A good leader values people regardless of rank or position.

A good leader also has to gain and maintain the interest, zeal, and enthusiasm of his people. Once he accomplishes that, he is well on his way to succeeding in his task. A commander may be able within the capabilities of modern electronics to give a speech outside of a battle area to thousands of soldiers on television. But how is this done in the field and especially in combat areas? There are several excellent examples in Follow Me. During World War II, after a major operation at Hollandia, Major General Frederick A. Irving, a division commander, wanted to get a special message across to his officers and men concerning their next task, so he arranged to talk to the division in battalion-sized groups.

General Patton always strove to keep in touch with his men. During the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944, the overcast weather prevented close support of his forces by friendly aircraft. He called in a chaplain to prepare a special prayer for clear weather. Patton had that prayer and his Christmas greeting to every man in Third Army printed back-to-back on a card.

All leaders must indicate their interest and keep in contact with their followers. But as General Newman also highlights, "This does not mean undue familiarity for a definite professional posture is required." In the past, leaders have sometimes lost that touch with reality needed to make good decisions. The isolation of
Adolf Hitler from reality was so complete in April 1945 that he was issuing orders to armies long after they ceased to exist.

Mutual understanding is essential at all levels in the service. Just after Thanksgiving 1950, Eighth Army was forced to retreat from North Korea. The critical road junction in IX Corps was at Kunu-ri on the Chongchon River. The corps commander echeloned most of the staff to the rear to set up a new command post. He remained at Kunu-ri with a skeleton staff of about 30 officers and men to control the withdrawal.

The critical area for withdrawal of the Second Infantry Division was the mountain pass just south of Kunu-ri that was made famous as the gauntlet in S. L. A. Marshall's The River and the Gauntlet. One of his staff officers requested the corps commander to send a tank company, one of the few units available, through the mountain pass to secure it. The general agreed, and orders were issued for a company. Prior to this decision, a different staff officer had secured permission to send a platoon of tanks and then laid down to get a few hours sleep. While he slept, the other officer issued orders for a tank company to move.

The first officer, upon awakening, sent the second to get some sleep. He then saw the message ordering the tank company into the gauntlet. Recalling the decision made before he went to sleep, he changed the order back to only a platoon. This made the corps commander unhappy, but both were at fault: one for not asking why the order was issued different from his understanding and the other for not thinking to tell him.

As it turned out, even if the full company had been sent, that small number of tanks could not have coped with the thousands of Chinese deployed in the mountains along the gauntlet. But suppose that one error had caused the debacle in the gauntlet?

Actually, had adequate and timely information been available to the corps commander, no troops would have been ordered into the gauntlet at all. IX Corps could have moved to the west and withdrawn southward in echelon behind I Corps. General Patton always said, "Information is like eggs, the fresher the better." He was referring to information of the enemy. Up-to-date information helps ensure that leaders themselves work from proper "whys."

Soldiers do best when they know why they must do whatever must be done. In the film Quo Vadis, a victorious Roman legion is ordered by a Praetorian Guard messenger to halt and remain outside the city of Rome until further notice. He gave no "why" for the halt. The legion commander obeyed, but he rushed into Rome to see the Emperor Nero. There he found that the legion had been halted so that he and his men could be awarded a full triumph the next day. When queried by Nero as to why he had not given a "why" for the halt, the Praetorian stated, "Caesar needs to explain his reasons to no one."

American military personnel are not accustomed to obeying a Caesar; hence, it is even more important to keep them informed and a leader's actions speak louder than words. He usually reflects his priorities by the things he most often inspects.

General Bruce C. Clarke, Commander, U.S. Army in Europe in the early 1960s, had two phrases that every wise leader understood: "An outfit does best those things the commander checks," and "Anything that has not been inspected has been neglected." In Follow Me Newman illustrates the point, "trust everybody but check performance."

The Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division in Korea, 1966-67, learned the truth of the old biblical statement, "They have eyes yet they see not." That general had two principal subordinates. One, when sent out, usually came back with great charm and reported how he had visited a particular outfit, had a delightful lunch and chat with the officers, and all was well. The second would go out and inspect as requested and return with a list of the good and the bad
and recommendations on what needed to be done to meet established standards. It is obvious which one was the most useful to his commander.

A LEADER does not just look around. He establishes standards, determines what "symptoms" of those standards to look for, and inspects for those symptoms.

Discipline must always be one of those standards. General Patton stated, "There is only one kind of discipline, perfect discipline. A commander who fails to enforce discipline is a murderer." He also stated it this way, "Any commander who fails to praise excellence and correct deficiencies is a failure in peace time and a detriment in combat." Establishing standards and checking for the symptoms obtains discipline as well as getting a task done.

In Follow Me General Newman emphasizes the necessity for discipline but points out that at times stern measures are required to obtain it. Sergeant Major Alan B. Chesser, Sergeant Major Second Armored Cavalry Regiment in 1961-63, informed his colonel "Sir, it's OK. The men know you are tough; but they know you are fair—and that's more important." One of the people who helped put two stars on that colonel was Sergeant Major Chesser. Throughout Follow Me, Newman refers to how a succession of sergeants made significant contributions to his future success and enabled him to command "the best damn company in the Army" as a young captain.

In today's armed forces, the noncommissioned officers do not have the authority or the support they need. One of the greatest leadership needs in the military service today is to let sergeants be sergeants with "the rawhide toughness" necessary to obtain the standards of performance needed.

Obtaining standards involves far more than issuing voluminous instructions. Almost every military professional has heard the term "CYOA paper." In principle CYOA involves issuing orders that cover everything required by every higher headquarters directives, regulations, and expressed desires. Then, inspectors cannot fault the issuer if an error or omission takes place. But one can make a mockery of leadership by doing this. In practice never issue an order that cannot be obeyed.

In Follow Me the advice is "avoid issuing unenforceable orders." As a young lieutenant in Hawaii, Newman was told to halt the booing at boxing matches. Wearing his military police brassard, he would bear down on boozers on the right and halt them only to be rewarded by booing on the left. The order was clearly unenforceable as the commanding general ultimately realized. He then rescinded it.

CYOA is more insidious. In April 1946, the 2nd Battalion Eighteenth Infantry was on occupation duty in Germany around Hof and the Shirnding crossing of the Paris to Prague Express. There were eight officers in the unit, counting the battalion commander, a dentist, and a Catholic chaplain. Every officer had an overload almost indescribable. Also, only about 20 percent of the authorized noncommissioned officer strength and 25 percent of the authorized privates were assigned to the battalion.

But orders from every conceivable higher headquarters had special tasks requiring 79 officers a day to implement. Hence, the commander had noncommissioned officers performing many tasks. A corporal was in charge of the crossing at Shirnding performing a task that required an officer. One morning a passenger refused to open his compartment on the train and show his identification papers as required by U.S. Army Europe regulation. So the corporal did what seemed appropriate: he kicked the door open. In flagrante delicto was a male passenger with diplomatic immunity and a woman—not his wife.

A diplomatic protest to the U.S. State Department resulted in an investigation to "crucify

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*Newman refers to it as rawhide toughness, and the term certainly applies to what is needed.
that stupid battalion commander." However, when the investigation was over, the battalion commander was commended for doing as much as he did with the few resources at his disposal.

The ability to cooperate efficiently with others is a mandatory trait for a leader. The inability to cooperate or get along with others was the greatest failure of Confederate General Braxton Bragg. Although he won a major tactical victory at Chickamauga in 1863, his inability to get along with James Longstreet resulted in the absence of the most veteran corps and corps commander in the Confederate Army when the showdown with Grant came at Chattanooga.

Bragg had been this way as a lieutenant and captain. No one doubted his courage; it was legendary in Mexico in 1846. But Bragg loved to be cantankerous. Longstreet claimed that as a company commander in the west prior to 1861, Bragg got into heated correspondence with the post quartermaster, also Braxton Bragg. Finally, the correspondence from Bragg to Bragg and back to Bragg again and again got him so worked up that he endorsed the whole mess to the post commander for decision. The post commander told him, "Mr. Bragg, you have not only argued with every officer in the army; you are now arguing with yourself."

"Billygoating" is a good term for this kind of buttheadedness. Newman says, "Billygoating is like Russian roulette; if you keep it up you're going to lose sooner or later, and it may be sooner."

Cooperation involves coordination. The Armed Forces Staff College taught "foot coordination." Newman refers to foot coordination as "get off your duff and go see the man." It obviously is easier to reach an understanding face to face than over a phone or by writing letters like Braxton Bragg. Unfortunately, messages, telephone conversations, and paperwork cannot be eliminated, but there are times when getting up and going to see some other officer or noncommissioned officer is the only way for a leader not to flounder.

Any leader can flounder if he fails to acquire the technical and professional knowledge and skills required for each assignment. Schools are not the only means of acquiring this knowledge and skill. For example, Lieutenant General Nathan Bedford Forrest, Confederate States of America, was one of the most successful generals on either side during the American Civil War. His "hit 'em on the end" and "get thar firstest with the mostest" were as effective as the schoolish "outflank the enemy" and "obtain superiority at the decision point."

Yet, professional knowledge is useless unless utilized and imparted to others who need to know it. Follow Me contains the story of how then Captain Newman congratulated a soldier at inspection for having a very clean and shiny aluminum mess kit. "Thank you, sir. Corporal ____________ showed me how to clean it with fine sand." That story has two points. First, it illustrates the point of how the corporal (squad leader) passed on his skill to his subordinate. It also shows how in the "old Army" credit was given where credit was due.

How many men today would simply say, "Thank you, sir," leaving the impression that he was the smart one?

Never try to take credit for another man's effort. He sometimes may be in a position to expose you, and besides, all your subordinates will peg you for what you are.

Although showmanship and tricks of the trade have their place in leadership, do not steal from others by mimicry. Also, showmanship can hurt a leader as well as help him on occasion. When General Matthew Ridgway arrived in Korea in late 1950, he toured the units of Eighth Army. Firmly taped to the shoulder harness of his web field gear were two hand grenades. Ridgway was a paratrooper—and an unknown quantity to the Patton-oriented tank men. The hand grenades may have impressed paratroopers, but to most tankers they drew laughs. Everyone knew they were taped on so that to be safe they could never be used timely. Hence, to many of his men he looked ridiculous and drew laughs, thus reducing his leadership
potential. No one on a battlefield wants to risk his life for someone who is a joke. In truth, Ridgway was both brilliant and courageous; but he got ahead in spite of those grenades, not because of them.

In July 1950 a young lieutenant colonel was ordered to Korea on 24-hour notice. He tossed all his old World War II gear into a footlocker and left. By chance, an old tanker's jacket was in the footlocker. In Korea, our troops were fighting long before an adequate supply system was established so that old field jacket came in handy when winter arrived. This fellow visualized himself as a flamboyant type, and that old jacket soon became well known as did its wearer on the IX Corps Staff.

But one night, while he was sleeping, another officer, who had imbibed too freely of the local drink, put it on and forced his way into a restricted area at pistol point. Naturally, the real owner of the jacket was identified and placed under arrest. It took two days for an investigation to locate the real culprit. Luckily, two people who knew the actual offender had wondered why he was wearing lieutenant colonel X's jacket.

That smelly, faded old jacket, a relic of three wars and one expedition, now rests in well-earned retirement in the museum at Fort Polk, Louisiana.

Wearing special distinctive and unique items of gear or clothing can backfire or become so overdone as to be useless; use these techniques sparingly and carefully.

The best example of useful gimmickry during World War II was the "AAA-O" of Paddy Flint. When Colonel Flint assumed command of the 39th Infantry in Sicily in 1943, it was not a good fighting outfit. Paddy immediately had "AAA-O" stenciled on the helmet of every man in the regiment.

When questioned by his corps commander, who had issued orders against such stenciling on helmets, Paddy explained, "That means anything, anywhere, any time bar nothing." It was so-explained by General Omar N. Bradley in A Soldier's Story, but junior officers in the 39th said they could lick, "Anybody, anyplace, any time bar none." Regardless of the version, it worked, and Flint made the 39th one of the best-fighting outfits in Europe.

Bradley and the corps commander overlooked the violation of orders. They showed good judgment, for as Newman says, in discussing the Monkey Principle, "Anyone who decides to break some rule or regulation will do so at his peril, and the same applies to the commander who tolerates a violation." There is no substitute for wisdom and good judgment in making your decision to be a Paddy Flint-type.

The value of the Paddy Flint story and the other insights into leadership contained in Follow Me can best be expressed in the words of a young reserve lieutenant who said, "I wish to hell I had it when I was on duty at Fort Polk."

Wherever and whenever old soldiers, sailors, and airmen get together, there will be stories reflecting on the leadership or the lack of it on the part of some superiors in the past. When the bitterness and exaggeration are extracted, these experiences can be useful to the young professional. For, as Bismark said, "Any fool can profit from his own experiences but I prefer to profit from the experiences of others."

Many old soldiers, sailors, and airmen write books and tell stories. Yet no book or article has explained everything pertinent to leadership and command. But the thoughts provoked by as well as the insights gained from these two books can be extremely valuable to the true professional.

Montgomery, Alabama
Several recent books have added to our understanding of American military leadership. These include Leonard Mosley’s *Marshall: Hero for Our Times*, William S. McFeely’s *Grant: A Biography*, Fred I. Greenstein’s *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader*, Richard Nixon’s *Leaders*, and *Alanbrooke* by David Fraser. Greenstein’s book covers Eisenhower’s political career rather than his military leadership, but it does cite some startling paradoxes in Dwight Eisenhower’s character. In one chapter, Nixon discusses Douglas MacArthur and gives perspective to his complexities and achievements. Fraser’s book focuses on Lord Alanbrooke but also adds some material on Dwight Eisenhower. When these five volumes are added to prior works on American military leadership, an intriguing picture emerges. These earlier works include William Manchester’s *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964*, Douglas S. Freeman’s *Lee*, and Edgar F. Puryear, Jr.’s, *Nineteen Stars.*

A major characteristic of successful field commanders was their savagery, their lust for battle. In a society saturated by liberal TV values, this quality may not be appreciated. Nonetheless, a field commander must have this lust for war to survive the ordeal and win. General Ulysses S. Grant displayed this quality prominently. For example, he laid siege to Vicksburg and starved and shelled his opponents into unconditional surrender. Despite terrible losses at Bloody Angle in Spotsylvania and at Cold Harbor, Grant continued his attack in Virginia at Petersburg and Richmond. Unlike Hooker at Chancellorsville, Grant did not retreat after defeat and relatively heavy casualties. When he was stymied at Peters burg and Richmond, Grant sent General Sherman on a rampage to Atlanta and Sheridan into the Shenandoah Valley. On 7 August 1864, he congratulated Sherman with a strong message of approval for his campaign: “Your progress . . . has received the universal commendation of all loyal citizens as well as of the President . . .” (McFeely, p. 180) Grant instructed General Sheridan to follow the enemy “to the death” and produce a “barren waste” in the Shenandoah Valley. (Ibid.) Grant stated that whenever any of


Mosby's raiders were caught, they were to be hanged without a trial. Grant rejected Lincoln's suggestion that he and Lee agree not to burn farms and towns. Grant told General Thomas that if General Hood retreated, he should continue to attack Hood and "give him no peace." (Ibid., p. 193) This last phrase perhaps best catches the spirit of Grant's relentless attack and hostility toward his enemy. When he felt that he needed more troops, he wanted convalescents to be cleared out of military hospitals and sent to the front. Lee, on the other hand, did not terrorize the North in his two invasions that culminated at Antietam and Gettysburg nor did he loot and burn the towns (Harpers Ferry, Frederick, York, and Gettysburg) and farms in his path. He even instructed his men to pay farmers for provisions (in Confederate money). Lee was a relatively humane field commander, and this may be one of several reasons why he lost. A comparison of Grant and Lee suggests that Lee should have shed his gentleman-like behavior on the battlefield.

General George Patton sought to stir up hatred in his troops. He constantly gave speeches to his soldiers in order to work them to a pitch. Two quotations from Puryear's Nineteen Stars give the tenor of the mood Patton sought to convey. In 1942, he stated:

And where we can do the most good is where we can fight those damn Germans or those yellow-bellied Eyetalians, And when we do, by God, we're going to go right in and kill the dirty bastards. We won't just shoot the sonabitches. We're going to cut out their living guts—and use them to grease the treads of our tanks. We're going to murder those lousy Hun bastards by the bushel. (p. 245)

He described war to his troops thus:

War is a killing business. You've got to spill their blood, or they'll spill yours. Rip 'em up the belly, or shoot 'em in the guts. (p. 248)

The objection might be raised that Eisenhower was a good field commander but, unlike Patton, was not known for his savagery. However, Eisenhower achieved distinction as Supreme Commander by skillfully handling temperamental generals from widely divergent backgrounds. According to Lord Alanbrooke, Eisenhower as a field commander had considerable difficulty in coordinating his attacks in North Africa and was promoted upstairs where he could handle political problems. (Fraser, pp. 315 and 323-24) Alanbrooke and General Montgomery were highly critical of Eisenhower's strategy in Western Europe, when the latter went into the field again. (Ibid., pp. 454-67) They believed that Eisenhower failed to concentrate his forces and allocate sufficient reserves to counter the unexpected. These deficiencies, they maintained, made Allied forces vulnerable to the Ardennes offensive in December 1944. Eisenhower's ability as a field commander is therefore open to question.

A second main characteristic common to these military leaders was their flexibility, their ability to adapt. Lee's background and experience in the Army was that of an engineer. By the time of the Battle of Chancellorsville, Lee had become a master of both strategy and tactics. (Freeman, p. 303) He was able to survive physically four years of warfare in his late fifties during which he lived on a horse or in a tent. He had emotional resilience that permitted him to continue fighting effectively, even after the disaster of Pickett's charge at Gettysburg and the horror of the Battle of the Wilderness (May 1864).

General MacArthur was anything but the rigid stereotype of a bygone era, as the popular press has implied in recent years. When he became superintendent at West Point, he sought to broaden the offerings in the humanities and add social sciences to the curriculum. He called for officers who understood human feelings. When World War II began, MacArthur did not understand the uses of air power, but he soon learned to utilize this resource. Unlike the leaders of the Marine Corps, he had not participated in the development of amphibious warfare doctrine before the Second War. Nonetheless, he mastered this technique and made eighty-seven amphibious landings in the South Pacific. (Manchester, p. 322) His Inchon landing during
the Korean War may be studied in the future as one of the classics of amphibious warfare. MacArthur had seen the bloodletting of frontal assault during World War I, and he shifted to an indirect strategy in the South Pacific. He simply bypassed such strongholds as Rabaul and seized relatively weak islands. He constructed airstrips on the latter and used air attacks to neutralize the strongly fortified islands. MacArthur considered the frontal assaults of the Central Pacific to be a waste of lives. He appreciated the mobility of Genghis Khan.

Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, the main proponent of indirect strategy, had deep respect for MacArthur’s strategy. (Manchester, p. 322) Lord Alanbrooke, never one to heap praise on American commanders, had the highest regard for MacArthur’s strategy and visited the general in Japan after the war. (Fraser, p. 507) MacArthur had never been a political leader before 1945, but he ruled Japan so capably that the Japanese people came to regard him with awe. He achieved a land reform bill so that by 1950, ninety percent of the farm land in Japan was owned by farmers themselves. (Nixon, p. 115) He gave women the right to vote; consequently, 39 women were elected to the Diet in 1946. (Ibid., p. 116) He established unions, and this may be one factor that has kept the Japanese Communists relatively weak. He was ordered to conduct limited war in Korea and quickly recognized that the American people would not accept this concept. In the next decade the American political leadership required another limited war, this time in Vietnam; it was a wrenching trauma domestically, to learn what MacArthur had recognized immediately. MacArthur could adapt—he could seize a new weapon, grasp the essence of a new situation (e.g., political leadership), or apply an old concept (mobility) to a new situation, and achieve maximum results. He may have given the impression of unbending rigidity in his dispute with President Truman, but flexibility was a theme that ran throughout his career.

A third characteristic of the more successful American military leaders is an ability to perceive the whole. Grant was able to grasp the whole of the Civil War. He did not use charts and pins to perceive the whole. He simply thought in terms of the whole. An example can be found in his orders of September 26th and 27th, 1864. On those two days, he sent clear, concise orders and information to Generals Sheridan, Sherman, Butler, Halleck, and Meade. (McFeely, pp. 186-87) He knew what had to be done in each sector of the total effort. General George C. Marshall demanded and got good briefers, officers who enabled him to see a world war in its various theaters of operation. (Mosley, pp. 270-71) He listened to everything that occurred—from a minor raid to the latest information on German strategic moves. One of MacArthur’s main problems may have been his inability to see the whole of American interests. For example, in the congressional hearings after his dismissal in Korea, MacArthur made recommendations concerning the global policies of the United States but admitted that he was not acquainted with the European studies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Manchester, p. 801) Nevertheless, he had been quite able to perceive the whole of his theater in the Southwest Pacific during World War II.

A fourth characteristic of American military leaders emerges, but it applies specifically to field commanders. Successful field commanders were able to control the generals who fought under their command. Grant did not tolerate insubordination from his generals; he relieved General John McClernand for insubordination. When Grant went to Tennessee, he refused to go to see General Hooker; Grant stated very clearly that if Hooker wanted to see him, Hooker could come to him. Thus he quickly established the position of ascendancy over his generals. In Virginia, Grant withheld authority from Meade. He wrote to Secretary of War Stanton that if General William Rosecrans did not attack, he should be arrested (unless the President would agree to his being relieved). (McFeely, p. 187) Grant refused to allow General John Thomas to go into winter quarters after the victory at Nash-
ville. There was no doubt among Grant's subordinate generals as to the locus of authority.

Lee, on the contrary, failed to control the obstreperous General James Longstreet. Longstreet had insisted before the invasion of the North to Gettysburg that the campaign was to be offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics. Lee failed to remind him bluntly who was chief. (Freeman, p. 308) On 2 July 1863, Longstreet delayed the attack at Gettysburg until Lee rode over to his forces. Lee should have placed him under military arrest at that moment. On 3 July 1863, Longstreet argued against attacking Meade, and so Lee was left with the alternative of having Pickett make his ill-fated charge. After this disaster, Lee still failed to remove Longstreet. After he surrendered at Appomattox, Lee told Longstreet: "My interest and affection for you will never cease." (Freeman, p. 498) Surely such noble sentiments would not have come from Grant for a disobedient general.

During training exercises in California in 1941, Patton let his officers know exactly who was their commander. He trained his officers and troops in temperatures averaging 120°. At the end of the day, he forced his officers to run a mile, while he himself ran a mile and a quarter. (Puryear, p. 253) He ordered his officers to paint their rank insignia on their helmets, despite their objections that this made them targets for snipers. In one incident, he relieved a commander for going around a town instead of through it. He watched medical reports, and if a unit had excessive cases of trench foot, Patton relieved its commanding officer. There could be no doubt in the Third Army about who was the top commander. One can debate whether Eisenhower was actually able to control Montgomery, and one can also argue whether Eisenhower was a first-rate field commander.

A final characteristic to be noted among American military leaders is the complexity of their personalities. In May 1861, Grant was a quiet clerk in a hardware store in Galena, Illinois. People talked of his "vacant expression" as he walked to and from work each day. (McFeely, p. 66) In 1863, Lincoln was in danger of being replaced as the Republican candidate in the 1864 election, and Grant was being discussed as a possible replacement. In December 1863, Grant announced publicly that he would not be a candidate in 1864, since his first business was to crush the rebellion. In two and one-half years, Grant went from a depressed hardware clerk to a famous general and possible presidential candidate. Surely, this is one of the strangest stories in American history. As a general, Grant was politically shrewd. He first visited the White House without his wife, who would probably have aroused the jealousy of Mary Lincoln. He knew the importance of Sherman's victory for the Republican Party in 1864 and described the occupation of Atlanta as a "political campaign." (McFeely, p. 188) At the end of the war, he had Lincoln at his side in City Point, Virginia. When Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox, Grant tried to get Lee's help in dissolving the Confederacy. However, when he became President, Grant's political naiveté contributed to a presidency marred by its corruption.

Lee's personality is obscured by Freeman, who gushed about this gallant Southern gentleman. Freeman could describe the War Between the States with a calm objectivity, but when he turned to the subject of the Southern gentleman (Lee), all proportion broke down, and he presented a one-sided, stilted version of a person about whom we would like to know more.

Patton was by no means the single-minded warrior presented to the public by journalists during the war years. Patton was able to use his neuroses to lead men to victory. He was an exhibitionist. His clothes were specially tailored and had brass buttons. He wore pink riding breeches and two pearl-handled pistols, each decorated with four stars. He had his helmet shellacked and stars had been painted on it. When he came to inspect a unit, his arrival was announced by a siren or a multiple tone French horn. (Puryear, p. 250) But he used his problem (exhibitionism) to lead an army. He stated that troops fight for
hero worship and a desire for glory. Patton made himself that hero to the advantage of his country. Whatever his emotional constellation may have been, he sublimated it in the interests of leading troops for the defense of his country. The ability to sublimate indicates a complexity in the personality of a man otherwise thought to be childlike in his simplicity.

General Marshall had a “sixth sense,” an intuitive grasp that enabled him to select outstanding leaders (e.g., Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton). He may not have appreciated MacArthur as a person, but he recognized his ability. Consequently, he urged President Roosevelt to order MacArthur to leave for Australia to lead the Allied forces. On 7 December 1941, Marshall’s competence could be questioned. When he finally realized the importance of the intercepted Japanese messages and ordered a warning sent to Pacific commands, the Army signal service between Washington and Honolulu had broken down. A subordinate used the ordinary commercial cable system to inform Pearl Harbor, and the telegram arrived after the Japanese attack. Marshall should have made sure that the message got through on time and not relied on the word of Colonel Bratton that “everything was in order.” (Mosley, p. 182) Or he could have called Pearl Harbor by phone, despite the danger of interception. His exceptional performance during the war as chief of staff cannot be doubted. His performance in the postwar era as secretary of state was exceptional. The Marshall Plan, for example, was a major factor in keeping the Communists from seizing power in France and Italy. Marshall appeared placid but was a bundle of contradictions.

Fred Greenstein’s work on Eisenhower’s presidency shows the enormous divergence between the “public Eisenhower” and the “private Eisenhower.” His public self was that of a golfer, but he worked constantly. He appeared to be amiable and good-natured, but in private he was cold, determined, and had problems controlling his temper. He claimed that he was not a politician, but he knew how to make the government function in a highly effective manner. He prevented crises, so the intellectuals saw his presidency as dull. Only recently have scholars begun to value the political leadership of Dwight Eisenhower.

MacArthur was certainly a complex man. Under President Hoover, he had led the expulsion of the veterans who marched on Washington for a bonus during the depression. His speeches on his return to the United States after his sojourn in Korea sound like the outpouring of the most dogmatic reactionary. His rule of Japan, however, was remarkable for its liberal reform. In World War I, he was a fighter who showed no fear of battle. Yet when he was informed of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at 3:40 A.M. on 7 December 1941, he did not order the American air force at Clark Field to attack Japanese troop ships. This air force was consequently destroyed, largely on the ground, by a Japanese attack somewhere between 12:10 and 12:35 P.M. the same day. (Manchester, p. 237) How can his inability to react immediately to the Japanese attack be explained except by paralyzing fear?

None of the authors considered in this review were able to explain the complexity of these military leaders. In no instance was an author able to clarify how various causative factors interacted to produce a military leader. Somehow, these military leaders appear to have had inborn qualities that cannot be explained by reference to their early backgrounds or training or experience. They were extraordinary men, contradictory, and in some undefinable way set apart from their contemporaries.

In summary, these American military leaders showed several salient characteristics: savagery, adaptability, an ability to perceive the whole, an ability to control their subordinates, and complexity of personality.

Although the military leaders of the United States Army and Navy during World War II have attracted numerous biographers, the generals who led the Army Air Forces have been largely ignored by popular and scholarly writers. The reasons for this omission are puzzling in view of the mountain of papers, both official and personal, which have been available to researchers for many years. This biography of “Hap” was encouraged and supported in part by some of General Arnold’s close wartime associates in an attempt to correct this omission.

Graduating from West Point only four years after the Wright brothers’ historic 1903 Kitty Hawk flight, Arnold served in the Philippines before he was taught to fly by Wilbur and Orville in an airplane that had an operational window of seven miles per hour between maximum and stalling speed. “Hap” left aviation three years later. Coffey writes, discouraged by several crashes and a fear of flying. Marriage, another Philippine tour, and return to flying status in the United States all occurred before his meteoric rise from captain to temporary colonel in World War I. After exile to Fort Riley, Kansas, because of his support of the court-martialed “Billy” Mitchell, Arnold’s future appeared behind him, a major twenty years out of West Point with a growing family of four children. He remained in the service, however, and, as with many Air Force personnel today, found the greatest personal satisfaction in command. He was responsible for March Field in the early thirties, and he became assistant chief of the Army Air Corps as a brigadier general in 1936. The author devotes more than 60 percent of the book to the period prior to Pearl Harbor, and although the character of the wartime leader is clearly developed in this early treatment, the result appears to slight Arnold’s World War II problems and accomplishments by comparison.

Wartime leadership involved Arnold’s projecting American air power over every part of the globe from his Washington headquarters, where he quickly discovered that not all enemies of the Army Air Forces were in Germany and Japan. The story is an intriguing one of Arnold’s insisting on remaining part of the Army and resisting for the time those few who pushed for the immediate creation of a separate Air Force. His attempts to accommodate to the demands posed on him by his wartime obligations with the needs of his family and the limitations of his personal health (suffering several heart attacks in the process) tell much of the mettle of this aviation pioneer. Arnold was the architect of the one-hundred-fold expansion of the Army Air Forces at the same time he commenced planning for air power in the uncertain postwar world. He disparaged long-haired scientists but fully appreciated the role of basic research and technological development in the Air Force.

Readers of this volume will be pleased with Coffey’s lively writing style, which together with the well-drawn vignettes of his associates make the book an enjoyable reading experience. The author captures the essence of Arnold’s character, and the mores of this small-town physician’s son never really leave him as he moves freely but inconspicuously among the World War II greats: Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt. He retained a wholesome, gee-whiz attitude that Coffey portrays as he sets forth Arnold’s impetuosity, his workaholic habits, love of his family, and obsession with the efficacy and potential for air power.

There are too many serious flaws in the volume, however, for the book to become the definitive biography the publisher’s book jacket proclaims it. Errors abound, and the historian who has delved in the sources quickly discovers that Coffey is more inclined to rely on the recollections and good stories of the octogenarians he has interviewed than the less-exciting but more accurate documents that are listed in the bibliography but do not appear to have been used extensively. Quotations from Arnold’s papers are not faithful to the originals, attributable most likely to haste or carelessness in research. Difficult policy issues, which require extensive and intensive research, are either ignored or treated superficially. For example, Arnold’s participation in the Quebec Conference of September 1944 is limited to nine lines of text while Coffey provides greater coverage of Arnold’s brief visit with his family at a summer retreat en route to this meeting. Recent authors such as DeWitt S. Copp have shown that the personalities as well as the shortcomings of the Army Air Forces leadership can be handled with tact and discretion, but Coffey’s excessive dwelling on the peccadillos of some of his family and Arnold’s relations with his wife made me as uneasy as an eavesdropper.

In this eighthieth year of manned flight, blue-suiters are reminded that they are only the third generation of Americans involved in aviation and that a rich heritage of leaders such as Arnold whose biographies, problems, accomplishments, and failures need to be assessed and written. HAP is a very readable but not very trenchant account of one of the first and best of this generation—but he deserves better.

Major General John W. Huston, USAF (Ret) United States Naval Academy


Robert Pisor is a Detroit television journalist who covered Vietnam for the Detroit News in 1968-69. His book attempts to recreate the reality of the 77-day siege at Khe Sanh during the 1968 Tet offensive, where some 6000 marines were surrounded by an estimated 30,000 regular North Vietnamese troops in a battle that so worried Lyndon Johnson that he
ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to sign a document agreeing that Khe Sanh could be defended.

The style of this book suggests that it is aimed at the general reader who loves nothing better than a crackling account, full of gore, in which our side trounces their side. If such unreflective readers exist, they will surely be disappointed by the argument of this book, for it is revisionism by an author who does not have his facts straight and who is unsure of his own convictions. Pisor accepts the claims of those who think Khe Sanh was a feint or a diversion in which thousands of American troops were uselessly tied down while the real action of the Tet offensive took place in Hue and Saigon. He hints at the solution to the 30,000 North Vietnamese Army troops supposedly killed by B-52 arc-light raids around Khe Sanh—the enemy slipped away to fight at Hue. (p. 179) Pisor insists that American casualties during the battle were alarmingly high (though this was covered up) and that in reality sufficient supplies could scarcely be airlifted in to cover elementary marine requirements. The water supply for the base could have easily been polluted, forcing surrender.

The problem with Pisor's revisionism is his reluctance to advance his claims in a clear fashion and his inability to gauge the worth of his sources. He seems to feel that all official information is by definition untrustworthy and that comments of malcontents (officers who did not win some official information is by definition untrustworthy and that comments of malcontents (officers who did not win some official information is by definition untrustworthy and that comments of malcontents (officers who did not win some


This book is a collection of essays about Vietnam by authors of diverse backgrounds. Individual chapters discuss the how, what, and why of selected aspects of U.S. military activities in Vietnam from 1962 to 1972. The authors' concerns focus on the pacification program, "the other war," or counterinsurgency. The first three chapters are a historical/political analysis of the Vietnam War. The remaining four chapters are interpretative articles that examine a broad range of issues. The essays are well-written, extensively researched with excellent end notes, and provide interesting insights into the longest war in U.S. history.

The book begins with James Dunn's assessment of the early (1962-65) U.S. advisory effort to Vietnam. He contends that with a lack of experience and limited training, U.S. advisers contributed what they knew best to their Vietnamese counterparts, recommendations on conventional offensive military operations; by 1965, with the arrival of U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam, the American adviser became more a liaison officer than adviser.

Focusing on the period from 1965 to 1968, Richard Hunt discusses some of the inherent conflicts between a pacification strategy and the military strategy of attrition. It is argued that the war was fundamentally a political contest to win the support of the rural population with military force playing a subordinate role. In his concluding remarks, the author writes, "The gravest danger to the Republic of Vietnam in the long run was the unabated spread of unresponsive and corrupt government administration, poor civilian and military leadership, and lackluster indigenous forces."

An extensively documented study by Richard Shultz of the Vietnamization and pacification strategy during the period 1968-72 reveals that the alleged success of the strategy was illusory. Its failure, Shultz suggests, was not in the plan but in the area of execution. Drawing from new material, Shultz analyzes two major anti-infrastructure programs, Chieu Hoi and Phuong Hoang, and concludes both were seriously flawed and largely ineffective. In addition, an analysis of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) reveals a system with a built-in bias which invalidated many of the HES statistics regarding security and control.

Lawrence Grinner, in chapter 4, is convinced that pacification, a population security strategy, could have succeeded in Vietnam, avoiding the financial and political costs of attrition. However, the strategy never got a fair test and was
orphaned to the “big unit war.” Just as critical, according to Griner, was the lack of a viable South Vietnam political community.

The argument is then made that the sources of U.S. frustration in Vietnam must be equally charged to the Americans and Vietnamese. Douglas Blaufarb believes that the American failure was twofold: ignorance of the arena in which the Vietnam conflict was fought and failure to adopt a population control military strategy. From the Vietnamese side, “the most glaring weakness was the total inadequacy of the performance standards of military and civilian services caused largely by the politicization of the military.”

Donald Vought holds that even though pacification was a recognized strategy throughout the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, it was the type of effort least amenable to U.S. style. Two factors, he argues, inhibited our advisory effort: first, we equated combat experience with knowledge of low-intensity warfare; second, to a degree, the entire United States performance was institutional ignorance of low-intensity conflict. Vought suggests that the competitive pressure and the twelve-month tour exacerbated the problems of poor preparation and the thirst for visible success; the Star Trek style of command, i.e., the captain does everything, permeated our army in Vietnam.

The concluding essay, by Richard Shultz and Alan Sabrosky, is very timely and relevant to national security problems confronting U.S. policymakers. Entitled “Policy and Strategy for the 1980s: Preparing for Low-Intensity Conflict,” the authors present a very sound argument that because of the disillusionment with U.S. foreign policy involvement in Vietnam, the United States has only prepared for conventional high-intensity warfare. This “security oversight,” not preparing for the most probable type of challenges, e.g., insurgency, guerrilla wars, terrorism, has had a significant impact on U.S. force structure and operational planning. Shultz and Sabrosky present very detailed steps that the United States must take to parry such challenges.

This excellent book will appeal to the military professional, scholar, and general reader. It should be required reading for the senior-level policymaker and War College student.

Colonel James B. Motley, USA
Washington, D.C.


MX has been the most controversial weapon system in U.S. military history. Strident advocacy and opposition have surrounded the missile and various basing proposals ever since it came on the public scene in 1973. MX is without doubt the most talked and written about weapon proposal of the thermonuclear age and has produced a voluminous if largely polemic literature.

Super Weapon: The Making of MX is the first book-length treatment of MX that attempts a dispassionate analysis, tracing the missile from its inception through the tangles of Pentagon, presidential, and congressional politics and public debate. John Edwards’s method for accomplishing this task has been through extensive interviews with scores of politicians, military professionals, and civilian analysts, which he weaves into a chronological analysis. His purpose is a chronicle of the twisted and convoluted history of the missile program in much the same manner as John Newhouse’s insider account of SALT I, Cold Dawn, and Strobe Talbott’s Endgame (1980). In the main, he succeeds in his task, presenting a highly readable account that should be of considerable interest to those who might find themselves in analogous situations in the future.

The heart of the MX controversy has been disagreements over whether the missile is needed or not (and if so, which version is best) and over where it can be based in a survivable mode. The problem, according to Edwards, is that the two aspects, crucially interrelated in fact, have generally been treated in isolation by decision-makers. Referring to the Carter administration’s critical 1979 decision to proceed with the 92” diameter version of MX rather than the 83” model (which has become the Trident II D-5 Cleardock), Edwards argues that the decision process is to blame. As he states it: “a set of temporary pressures forced the administration into making the decision in a rush, with studies no more satisfactory and for reasons no more compelling than they had been . . . four years before. It was a final decision that was to be just as fragile and untenable as the final decisions that had preceded it.” (p. 128)

Much of the problem, according to Edwards, has been the tendency to separate the basing decision from the decision to build MX, with basing being pushed to the back burner. This tendency, he feels, “has been fundamentally wrong, because the 92” MX precluded many sensible options for basing . . . A big missile was hard to hide, hard to move. It was a detail, it was unnoticed at the time, but it was the biggest mistake in the whole history of the MX program.” (p. 203)

Although he attempts to be evenhanded in his analysis, Edwards fails in the end to do so. As he reveals in a final chapter that is the weakest in the book, he simply opposes MX in any form, concluding that

Since there is no military purpose in deploying MX in either a protected or unprotected mode, and if we accept the fact that American security is not increased by threatening Soviet missiles, it is plain enough that the simple answer to the decades-old controversy over the missile is to scrap it. (p. 273)

One can, of course, take issue with that conclusion, but the author’s conclusion is not what makes Super Weapon an important work. Rather, the value comes from studying the decision process that got us into the “MX-Basing Mode Muddle” (to borrow the title of an article I wrote for the Review in the July-August 1980 issue). That decision trail is one of confusion, shallow analysis, and tactical blundering, and it must be avoided in the future if sound weapons decisions are to be reached. If there is truth in the old saw that we can learn from our mistakes, then John Edwards has provided us ample opportunity to start.

Dr. Donald M. Snow
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa

Petro Grigorenko is a phoenix. He rose from being the son of a peasant in tsarist Russia to general-major in the Soviet Army of the 1950s. He became a political prisoner and was consigned to the mental conflagration of an insane asylum for his political activism. “Rehabilitated,” Grigorenko became a respected member of the dissident community before he was forced again to endure disgrace and physical and mental torture during his second commitment for insanity. Freed to appease President Nixon and later allowed to leave the Soviet Union for treatment of a heart problem, Grigorenko’s Soviet citizenship was revoked by the U.S.S.R. to prevent his return.

Memoirs is a compelling, well-written description of life in the Soviet Union and how it has or has not changed since Grigorenko’s birth in 1907. Thanks to an excellent translation by Thomas Whitney, Grigorenko comes across with the same forcefulness and conviction he displays in person. Despite the gloom that underlies much of the book—especially the first chapter, “I Did Not Have a Childhood,” and the long passages describing Grigorenko’s enforced institutionalization—Memoirs should prove quite interesting for most readers of military and political affairs.

There are three basic themes in Grigorenko’s book: Soviet military affairs from the 1930s through the 1960s; Soviet political affairs from the Revolution through the 1970s; and the intellectual quest for truth. Each is intriguing in its own way.

Grigorenko entered the military after several years as a party activist and organizer. The student of military history will be especially impressed with Grigorenko’s sections on the construction—and intentional destruction—of the Black Sea to Baltic fortifications, pre-World War II service in the Far East, and a Soviet ground commander’s view of the war itself. Beyond this, however, Grigorenko’s description of the purges alone makes the book worthwhile.

Because of his early service as a komsomol, Grigorenko was in a favorable position to observe and comment on the Soviet political scene. His observations range far from those simply concerned with military life and operations. And as Grigorenko observed the system from within its own theoretical construct, his views are valuable to those who might wish to appreciate how Stalin’s activities were perceived by party members.

Finally, the thread that ties together Grigorenko’s views on both the military and politics is his reasoning as to the cause of the events he saw around him—and underpinning that is his state of intellectual maturity. Grigorenko is especially apt at describing his rationale for various conclusions. We find Grigorenko moving from blind acceptance of party decisions, to questioning the ideological purity of the leadership from within a Marxist-Leninist construct, to cynical rejection of the Soviet system.

As with most memoirs, this book’s greatest failing lies in its ascribing omniscience to its subjects; Grigorenko always has the right answer, consistently baffles his detractors, and is never at a loss for words. Perhaps it is our failing in this regard which will preclude our own memoirs. Especially during Grigorenko’s interrogations in Soviet mental hospitals, his ability to run circles around his antagonists strains the credibility of this book. Nonetheless, Grigorenko’s explanation of how he rationalized what he saw and thought adds a significant dimension to the work.

Memoirs is a different kind of autobiography. It provides an insight into the thought processes of an individual who was there as a faithful follower of Stalin, who questioned the system from within, and who finally rejected the system as a sham. In this vein, it is perhaps without equal.

Major Gregory Varhall
Air War College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama


Unfortunately, Professor Warren Young’s book betrays the title’s inherent promise and does not delineate minority status worldwide. While a well-written first chapter summarizes the uses of minorities in military organizations from pre-Hellenic civilizations to the present, it is not the catalyst for either a generalized examination of minorities in present-day militaries nor an in-depth study of problems encountered by various minority groups throughout the world’s military organizations.

Professor Young selected Belgium, Canada, the British Commonwealth, and the United States and presents a detailed case history on each. Of these four case studies, the germane discussions of the British Commonwealth and the United States (countries in which color serves as the effective stumbling block to assimilation) impart the only relevance. Arguing that the “subject of minority groups and military service should be dealt with not only in a military context, but also in terms of societal context,” Professor Young fails to address this topic, preferring a “feint and retreat” approach which arouses the reader’s desire for pertinent information but never satisfies it.

The book cannot be faulted on its historical accuracy. However, Young’s style of presenting material is dull. The in-depth historical observations and interesting quotations from relevant sources are immersed amidst detailed statistical charts and long, obscure passages. In his shortest chapter, he discusses the United States and omits information or discussion of the military contributions of Hispanics, Asians, native Americans, and women with the exception of a cursory aside on black females. Furthermore, the reader may be offended by the author’s use of the term Negro, which long ago ceased to be a viable nomenclature in scholarly works. The book closes with an appendix consisting of a bibliographic essay on the term minority and an extensive listing of sources generally published in the 1960s and 1970s.

For all its faults, Professor Young’s work underscores a depressing fact: throughout history people have formed themselves into groups. Eventually, one group becomes dominant and oppresses other groups based on actual or
perceived differences. Unfortunately, *Minorities and the Military* does little to add to our knowledge of why this happens.

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The title of this book is perhaps misleading. James Payne believes, rightly in my view, that for the statesman, "the national threat is a vital instrument for upholding national values and for warding off the dangers of major war." (p. x) It is Payne's view that U.S. foreign policy over the years has suffered setbacks because U.S. policymakers have not threatened enough. The Soviets have repeatedly been emboldened to move forward because they were convinced that we would not react, except with words. Thus, in 1962, the missile crisis came about "because the Russians did not believe that we would act." (p. 51)

But words, according to the author, are not threats. "A threat is the enemy's belief that you have the will and the capability to fight. ... Making an enemy believe this is a task demanding considerable insight, skill and courage." (p. 54) Kennedy demonstrated in Laos that American threats were uncertain, that the United States might compromise and, consequently, give things up rather than fight a war. "When the enemy has conquered two-thirds of this nation you have sworn to protect, when you publicly acknowledge this conquest and brand it as 'aggression' but do nothing about it, and then announce a desire to reduce your involvement, what can it mean?" (p. 60)

Referring to Afghanistan, the Russians had to consider the risk that the United States would respond militarily. But the United States had been timid and intellectual in recent confrontations—Angola, Cuba, Iran. "The American President, Carter, had been particularly shy about upholding traditional American values. As the Russians saw it, there was a high probability that the U.S. would not respond if they invaded Afghanistan." (p. 142) And once in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union can use brutal force while "the West looks on in dismay." We have, in effect, adopted a policy of "making sure our hands are clean when we wring them." (p. 142)

A turning point was Vietnam. By allowing South Vietnam to fall, the lack of U.S. will was then demonstrated: "the American threat declined; opponents pressed forward—in Cambodia, in Laos, in Angola, in Afghanistan; and for years to come, the danger of a war of miscalculation was increased." (p. 168)

The author quotes Kissinger: "Perhaps the most difficult lesson for a national leader to learn is that with respect to the use of military force, his basic choice is to act or to refrain from acting. He will not be able to take away the moral curse of using force by employing it halfheartedly or incompetently. There are no rewards for exhibiting one's doubts in vacillation; statesmen get no prizes for failing with restraint. Once committed they must prevail. If they are not prepared to prevail, they should not commit their nation's power." (p. 208)

Payne concludes: "The American public must learn to accept the sacrifices of limited war. If the war protesters ever succeed in depriving our statesmen of the option of limited war—and that is, in effect, what they are tending to do—they shall have placed us still closer to the cataclysm we all dread. It would not be the first time in history that an honest but naive search for peace has led further down the road toward war." (p. 322)

This is such a good book that I am going to use it as the text for my foreign policy course in the fall. I cannot recommend it too strongly.

Dr. Anthony T. Bouscaren  
Le Moyne College  
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Students of unconventional warfare, terrorism, and intelligence operations have long been hindered by the lack of comprehensive, unclassified bibliographies of these subjects. Publication of *The Secret Wars*, a major bibliographic guide to the literature in English, is a significant aid to both scholars and students. The three-volume series contains more than 10,000 unannotated entries and includes unclassified books, monographs, scholarly papers, journal articles, government documents, and dissertations. *The Secret Wars* is published as part of the War—Peace Bibliography Series developed in cooperation with the Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament of California State University, Los Angeles, and is available either as a complete set or individual volumes: Volume I, "Intelligence, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, Resistance Movements, and Secret Operations, 1939-1945," 1980, $42.50; Volume II, "Intelligence, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, Covert Operations, 1945-1980," 1981, $67.50; and Volume III, "International Terrorism, 1968-80," 1980, $37.50.

Each volume has a brief introduction to the subject and a useful select chronology of events. Volume I is indexed by both author and subject while Volumes II and III are indexed by author only. All three volumes address their subjects both in general topical headings and in sections dealing with specific countries. Volume I focuses on World War II and addresses topics such as cryptography, Ultra, campaigns influenced by intelligence operations, special forces, and resistance movements. Volume II lists references for post-World War II psychological warfare and intelligence sources and also contains useful charts outlining the organization of the Soviet and American intelligence communities. Volume III outlines references for terrorist psychology, tactics, weapons, countermeasures, and worldwide terrorist operations.

*The Secret Wars* is an excellent bibliography of materials dealing with unconventional warfare, intelligence, and terrorism and a superior research tool.

Captain George A. Reed, USAF  
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U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado

Scores of official and unofficial histories have been printed about Air Force combat units in World War II. It has been my observation that most of them have been of the yearbook variety with more thought given to fraternal appeal than to literary substance. This puts The Long Campaign into a class by itself.

As official historian for the 15th Fighter Group, John Lambert devoted many hours researching available records pertaining to the unit's combat activities. He also corresponded with and interviewed dozens of wartime members to capture their recollections of people and events. The result is a well-rounded, thoroughly researched, and captivating account of the group's wartime experiences.

Purely academic historians will find flaws in the work. It is not footnoted, is not written in a scholarly tone, and does not provide penetrating historical analysis of the unit's experiences. Some public historians may also find fault. The book is not written in the dull mechanical prose often associated with official histories. What Lambert has attempted to do is to bring the combat history of the "fighting" 15th to life in the words and deeds of its gallant airmen. In this, he has succeeded admirably.

Lambert has honestly and ably captured the essence of the 15th's airmen in vivid detail, as he takes them in their own colorful language from routine duty at Wheeler AFB, Hawaii, to the shock of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and through "the long campaign" of the Pacific air war.

Flawed by a few editorial distractions such as a formation of P-40s depicted upside down on page 34, the book is handsomely bound and contains choice photographs of the 15th's airmen at war. The book also has some useful appendixes pertaining to the unit's combat record.

I thoroughly enjoyed The Long Campaign. It contains something for everyone who treasures air power history.

Warren A. Trest
Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center
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Alanbrooke is not the best known World War II figure, yet he was the Commander of the Imperial General Staff and as such was Britain's first soldier. As Commander of the Imperial General Staff, Alanbrooke's position was analogous to that of General George C. Marshall. This book is the definitive biography of Viscount Alanbrooke and provides a valuable and interesting perspective on his life and contributions. The book draws heavily from Alanbrooke's personal notes and diary, which he kept throughout World War II. Alanbrooke was written by General Sir David Fraser, a veteran of 40 years of service in the British Army. General Fraser is an admirer of Alanbrooke, and there is no question of this bias. However, Fraser has not let his preferences interfere excessively with the substance of the book.

Alanbrooke, like Marshall, was primarily a staff man, not a field general. Therefore, this book does not describe in great detail any of the decisive battles of World War II. Rather, it uses them as points of reference for the equally significant staff battles that Alanbrooke waged. The description of these staff battles, which formed British strategy in World War II, is the essence and significance of this book. The rationale and struggles behind the German first decision, the North African campaign, Italy, and the cross-channel invasion in 1944 are among the high points of the book. One cannot read this book without realizing, once again, the profound impact of British strategic thought on U.S. strategy and the relative excellence of British staff work prior to joint U.S.-British meetings. From this standpoint alone, the book is worth reading. Apparently, Alanbrooke regarded the Pacific theater as a sideshow, as the book covers it in a very cursory manner. However, this may be because British participation in the Pacific was far less than the American effort and Alanbrooke's belief that the British Empire was in its twilight. Therefore, he deemed the European theater to be far more important than the Pacific.

The only disappointment of the book is its treatment of other generals and leaders whom Alanbrooke dealt with. There are brief passages describing what Alanbrooke thought of Marshall (a good organizer but not a military strategist), Eisenhower (effective in leading a coalition but not a military leader), Stalin (the only political leader who understood the relationship between policy and war strategy), as well as several British generals. Although I suspect Alanbrooke's personal notes would contain a much fuller description of his impressions, the book did not add to my knowledge of the personal strengths and weaknesses of the leaders he dealt with.

If you would like a deeper understanding of British strategy formulation during World War II as well as a better insight into the impact of this strategy on American strategy, David Fraser's Alanbrooke is well worth reading.

Captain Bruce B. Johnston, USAF
Detachment 220, AFROTC
Purdue University, Indiana


This first volume is a gem. The editors have limited their commentary to very few pages; therefore, one easily falls into Marshall's shirt pocket and bounces through this 59-year period close to him.

Marshall's tours and his exposures and experiences made him privy to the candid camera that was portraying U.S. growth from puberty to adulthood. From fighting the Philippine Insurrection of 1902-03, to keeping peace in China during the 1920s, to a demanding and frustrating job with the Civilian Conservation Corps and National Guard in the 1930s, Marshall never stopped growing and learning; in fact, every page of this book is an insight. From each experience he profited intellectually and evaluated empirically. That is perhaps the reason for the reaction of so many observers to Marshall—many call him the only twentieth-century "heir
to the founding fathers." I will agree; indeed, he is a modern U.S. founding father and probably the only one we will get this century.

In 1920, after the U.S. lessons in Europe of 1918 had begun to be studied, Marshall wrote to General Leigh-Mallory about what it takes to be a good war leader. Marshall cited the usual: common sense, endurance, strength, and professional soundness. Then he cited the unusual: optimism, cheerfulness, energy, loyalty, determination, and attitude. In 1923, while speaking to a Headmasters convention in Boston, he spelled out in careful yet vivid phrases the level of U.S. unpreparedness that greeted our war declaration in 1917: "It was a year before an American soldier could attack the enemy." (p. 220) By 1925 Marshall had learned the hard lessons of leadership, support, and training. They would carry him well.

The papers show very frankly the trust and respect that had developed between Marshall and General John Pershing—never a sign of obsequiousness, only honest trust and loyalty. It makes for inspirational reading. In one particular lengthy letter that Marshall sent Pershing from China (U.S. Army Post—Tientsin, 1926), Marshall discusses the situation he finds there with a depth of understanding uncommon in Americans of that era. Marshall sees among the Chinese the bitter and deep anti-Western feelings most assuredly evolutionary in the means but very possibly revolutionary in the end. This was a particularly interesting period in Marshall's life.

In 1937, while commanding Vancouver Barracks, Oregon, Marshall outlined his thoughts on the staff college problems at Fort Leavenworth to the Deputy Chief of Staff. First, he urged realism, especially in technique so that the officers could effectively lead half-trained, hastily organized men since that was the manner in which the United States seems to enter its wars. Later, he urged producing better map readers, better disciplinarians, and men better trained at knowing when to make the important decisions rather than solely what decision to make. Of course, all these things are very hard to teach and impossible to measure.

In a speech before the American Legion in 1938, Marshall cited a score of examples of unpreparedness in U.S. military history. Because his approach was so calm and reasonable rather than shrill and dramatic, the Legion became more supportive of U.S. Army needs as Congress debated appropriations in the heated post-Munich atmosphere.

In 1939, in another speech where both the Secretary of War and the Army Chief of Staff were present, Marshall lectured about and cautioned against our leaders' becoming beguiled and enthralled by the mysterious new war technologies at the expense of the United States having enough good, well-trained infantrymen to conclude any conflict successfully. Shortly after that speech in September 1939, Brigadier General George C. Marshall became Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the rush was on.

Marshall, from Uniontown, Pennsylvania, to center stage Washington, D.C., was a dynamic character. Reading his papers is a humbling yet rewarding experience. I recommend it.


*Marshall: Hero for Our Times* is an important and most timely biography of one of the greatest leaders the world has ever known. It was inspired by the genius, integrity, and leadership of General of the Army George Catlett Marshall, who orchestrated the Allied victory in World War II and the economic and social recovery of Europe in its aftermath. Author Leonard Mosley deals with the strengths and weaknesses of the human being inside the renowned soldier-statesman. Structurally, this anecdotal, single-volume biography of General Marshall is organized into four parts. Part One, "The Road to the Top," relates the general's childhood and education and details his career beginning with his commissioning as a second lieutenant through his formative years as an officer and service during World War I, into the frustrations and many years-in-grade stagnation accompanying service in the peacetime Army between world wars, and culminating with appointment as Army Chief of Staff. One gets insight into Marshall's true sense of loyalty, devotion to duty, and personal honor and integrity from the relationships with Generals Pershing and MacArthur and the depiction of endless staff assignments.

Part Two, "Top Man," provides the opportunity to watch military genius in action. It is as if one receives General Marshall's personal tutelage in planning, coordinating, staffing, and controlling at the highest levels. We see the complexities of interservice and allied relationships and a portent of our current Joint Chiefs of Staff and Nato operations. We are also introduced to the distasteful "political decisions" that can often impact global strategic and tactical missions.

Part Three, "The Statesman," and Part Four, "Recall" detail General Marshall's experiences in the State Department and as Secretary of Defense, respectively. Of particular interest is the view of the Truman-MacArthur controversy during the Korean Conflict.

More serious students of military leaders, history, and warfare will find the twenty-four pages of Source Notes and eleven-page index particularly well done. The primary sources referenced in the source notes are indispensable for in-depth study of particular facets of the general's life.

*Marshall: Hero for Our Times* is extremely well written and well edited. This book is definitely recommended reading for all officers, noncommissioned officers, and airmen interested in true leadership. To all who are looking for a model of leadership-by-example and adherence to the highest standards of personal integrity and selfless devotion to duty, this is it.

Professor Murray R. Berkowitz
Graduate School of Management
The University of Dallas
Irving, Texas


*Lancaster in Action* provides a detailed description of one of the better known World War II bombers and includes an overview of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command's con-
siderable contribution to the theory and practice of strategic bombardment. R. S. G. Mackay's crisp writing style is crafted for the layman but includes sufficient technical detail to satisfy the air power specialist. The fast-paced chronological narrative begins with the Lancaster prototype derived from the underpowered Manchester and carries through the war to the Lancaster's photographic reconnaissance and air-sea rescue variations. Don Greer's photographs are tastefully arranged and perfectly complement Mackay's text. This book is one of the best of the Squadron Signal Publications series and provides an exciting and detailed account of a unique aircraft in relatively few pages.

Colonel Jack L. Cole, USAF
Burke, Virginia


"We crashed not because we ran out of gas, but because we ran out of knowledge." This inscription on "The Cup of Good Beginnings and Bad Endings" trophy at McCook Field (now Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio) conveys Richard Hallion's impression of the test pilot. The book is filled with experiences of test pilots running out of knowledge.

Richard Hallion covers the role of the test pilot from 1000 B.C. with the kite to the Space Shuttle in 1981 and from Robert Goddard's 1920 postulation of a trip to the moon to Neil A. Armstrong's 1969 "one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind" on the moon. Hallion presents a graphic picture of America's aviation weaknesses and the role of the test pilots in making our aviation stronger. He records such an instance in the episode of a test pilot, in September 1918, shooting for an altitude record. After reaching 28,900 feet and running out of fuel, and almost out of oxygen, the pilot made a dead-stick descent to earth, landing with only a broken propeller. Hallion points out the priority placed on test pilots by the establishment of Britain's Empire Test Pilots' School, in 1913, with the motto "Learn to Test—Test to Learn." He emphasizes the difficulties that became evident during World War II. "How to recognize an acceptable test pilot. Obviously, one had to have that sense of adventure (as distinct from recklessness) that is so critical to the professional test pilot."

Test Pilot is an excellent book for anyone interested in aviation development and test pilots in particular. Richard Hallion has crafted a well-rounded, informative, readable work.

Captain Quinton D. Davis, USAF (Ret)
San Antonio, Texas


Because America's code breakers were reading the most secret Japanese communications in the fall of 1941, our military should have been well warned of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The success of the surprise attack has caused speculation for more than forty years that President Roosevelt "caused" the whole thing and/or later covered up the extent of advance knowledge. Even his more ardent supporters admit that Roosevelt had a well-earned reputation for duplicity. However, it has been hard to credit the more bizarre accusations against Roosevelt because they imply total collaboration with him of a large number of American Army and Navy officers.

John Toland's latest book is a study of the investigations that occurred after Pearl Harbor. It shows a pattern of ruined careers among officers whose worst offense was trying to tell the truth about pre-Pearl Harbor events. Like the book How the Battleship Maine Was Destroyed (1976) and more recent books about Vietnam, Infamy is a classic study of the con-
flict between military ethics and national statecraft. Those interested in either national defense or international relations should consider it mandatory reading.

The book contains two curious defects or omissions. A large portion of the book is devoted to consideration of whether the “Winds Execute” message was ever intercepted by American intelligence. This message was intended as a warning to Japanese diplomats to destroy sensitive materials on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities. Knowledge of this message could have provided time to warn American forces of an impending attack; no copy of the interception of this message can be found in American files.

A number of recent books on the subject (notably Ronald Lewin’s The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers, and the Defeat of Japan, 1982) claim that the nonexistence of this message today implies it never existed and further argue that even had it been intercepted it would have made no difference. That view, in effect, labels Captain Safford, USN, as a “nut” for risking his career to tell Congress (and others) of the message. Toland takes a contrary view, showing that Safford was not alone, providing repeated evidence that the message was intercepted, and finally pointing out that its removal from the files is clear proof of some sort of cover-up. I must give greater credence to Toland’s view of the matter but find it curious that Toland never tried to use Japanese records to corroborate the American intercepts. Toland is not only a historian of wide reputation in America but one who is popular and respected in Japan and has had extensive experience searching Japanese files of this period. There may be no historian better equipped to corroborate this message from Japanese sources, if it still exist.

The other curious defect involves a dispute between Toland and Minoru Genda, a key naval officer aboard the Japanese attack force. An entire chapter of Infamy is devoted to the tracking of that force for five days before the attack by following its radio transmissions. On 13 March 1982, the New York Times reported that Genda and another Japanese naval officer who was present disputed Toland’s position by claiming that the attackers maintained total radio silence. For Genda and Toland to be in disagreement on such a fundamental point is puzzling. I am of the opinion that a possible explanation could be ionospheric bounce of radio signals originating in Japan and sent to the force while the force maintained radio silence. The physics involved in the explanation have been examined by an electronics warfare expert and are consistent with the comments of both Genda and Toland. However, a serious question remains as to whether the technology available to the Japanese Navy in 1941 was consistent with this hypothesis.

Regardless of these two points, Infamy is absorbing, well written, and well documented. It deserves a place on the bookshelf of any modern historian or military officer who must consider the questions of ethics in international relations.

Lieutenant Colonel H. Lawrence Elman, USAFR
Smithtown, New York


Beware of any treatise that proclaims itself the first truly objective study, the definitive enterprise. This often forewarns a polemic, and Vietnam Verdict qualifies. Joseph Amter, retired lawyer and banker, founder of the Peace Research Organization Fund, and former cochairman of the White House Conference on International Cooperation during the Johnson administration, asserts that the full story of Vietnam has not been told: “...in surveying all the literature on our twenty-eight-year Vietnam involvement, I found no document or book that tells what really happened there, analyzes who was responsible for each action, and traces how that act affected subsequent events.”

Amter, as private citizen and novice scholar, commissions himself to fill the void; the result is a pathetic effort. He implies, from his investigation into recently declassified documentation, that he has uncovered previously unknown or suppressed facts. In truth, the author relies almost exclusively on selected secondary sources and does not make a single new contribution. The themes are shopworn, old shibboleths are resurrected as established fact, questionable proclamations abound, and Amter continually draws incredible interpretations from the most flimsy evidence.

I wish that space would allow a chapter by chapter dissection of the narrative. It will have to be sufficient to say that the volume is a throwback to the late 1960s when such tracts were in vogue. Then it might have been acceptable as an argumentative essay; but today its pronouncements are so inconsistent with recent scholarship and the candid admissions now coming out of Hanoi that Amter seems to be from another time.

If one is nostalgic for the exhilarating days of Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, Mary McCarthy, and Tom Hayden, then by all means read Vietnam Verdict. But if one believes that the time has come to move beyond simplistic and moralistic condemnations or defenses of the war, to seek more sophisticated assessment of the complexity of that experience, and to address the process and reasons for policy decisions, then this genre serves little function today. Much better scholarship, some equally damning of the Vietnam involvement, is available.

Surely, we have suffered enough bad books on Vietnam—by hawk and dove alike. Amter would inflict yet another, one of the worst, upon us. Let us applaud his efforts as a concerned citizen; but as for the book itself, it is out of place, out of time, and should quickly be put out of mind.

Dr. Joe P. Dunn
Converse College
Spartanburg, South Carolina


This book is the published proceedings of the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism held in July 1979. A compilation of scholarly essays and speeches, it tells us little new about terrorism but a lot about Israel’s concern for the problem. In a symbolic sense, the conference was a call to arms, an effort by Israel to awaken her Western friends to the growing danger of international terrorism. Playing on the
“spirit” of Entebbe, which demonstrated the benefit of timely and determined action, the conference sought to focus public attention on the nature and threat of terrorism and on the need to forge a Western alliance against it. From the published dialogue, the careful reader learns much about Israel’s deep concern about terrorism in general and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in particular.

Organized into seven sessions, the conference provided a forum for more than 50 Western leaders, scholars, and public figures to explore the nature of terrorism, the challenge it poses to democracies, the manner in which it exploits the media, and the importance of taking action against it. The speeches and discussion surfaced several themes that are more widely accepted today than in 1979. These themes supporting Israel’s position include: Support by radical states is responsible for terrorism’s rapid growth; the Soviets are a major supporter of terrorism although they don’t direct it; and acquisition of mass destruction weapons by terrorists will threaten all societies; and the West today faces an international terrorist “network” dedicated to undermining (possibly even destroying) its democratic foundations.

From the speeches of Prime Minister Begin and other Israeli leaders, the reader picks up Israel’s own sensitivity about the use of terrorism in the founding of their state. It is ironic that the PLO’s scenario for establishing a Palestinian state is so similar to that followed by early Zionists against the British. Like its Israeli predecessors, the PLO sees itself fighting for freedom, not committing terrorism. In his remarks to the conference, Mr. Begin felt compelled to reject the PLO claim and brand them as terrorists because they “systematically” attack civilians to include women and children. He asserts the Israelis were true freedom fighters because they fought fairly against the British military. In light of Israel’s current bombing of southern Lebanon, the distinction is certainly a subtle one, but then there is little about terrorism that is black and white. From the proceedings, it is obvious that at least a few Israelis equate the intentional targeting of innocent women and children to a form of genocide that deserves an instant and unmitigated response.

The editor notes in his summary that the conference was a turning point in the world’s understanding of international terrorism and the danger it poses. There may be some truth to this assertion. Current U.S. policy is significantly different from that of the Carter administration and echoes many of the themes surfaced at the conference. The conference’s contribution to this shift would be much clearer if we could from that of the Carter administration and echoes many of the themes surfaced at the conference. The conference’s contribution to this shift would be much clearer if we could question Vice President Bush. Professor Pipes, Senator Henry Jackson, Senator John Danforth, and Representative Jack Kemp, who were key participants and today play important roles in shaping national foreign policy.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard Porter, USAF
Special Plans Office
Hq USAF


This book is a catalog of some 250 military helicopters, apparently a scissored-and-paste job done from more than fifty years of the Jane’s annuals, dressed up with a very nice collection of well-chosen photos. If at first glance some machines seem to be “missing,” it is because they are civil types; this book is limited to military machines. Those who are not intimate with the world of rotary wings inevitably tend to regard helicopters as “helicopters.”

No distinctions are made between helicopters designed for combat performance and those used in less-demanding roles, e.g., high versus lower disc loadings, much less the significance in the percent “solidity” of the disc vis-à-vis resultant performance. In these pages a “military helicopter” is simply any rotary-wing machine purchased by a military organization, including obscure “X” types.

There is an elementary flaw in the book that deprives it of at least half the value it would have had otherwise. Its text makes no attempt to explain anything, and the great clutter of information fails to provide data that would enable even half-way knowledgeable users to explain things to themselves.

Although the expression “rotary wing” is used in the subtitle, it is clear enough that the authors do not appreciate what this means because in their data they fail to include any machine blade area, and this is a helicopter’s wing. Reference books on fixed-wing aircraft invariably give the wing area, a figure from which many illuminating and useful calculations can be made. Any book that claims to be a basic reference on rotary-wing aircraft should have as much, and this one does not. Rotor diameters are given, but users who wish to know the area of the disc are stuck with the drill of D^2 x .7854. When it is appreciated that there are some 250 machines in this book, working up the data which the authors or their publisher should have thought to provide, the user is given a wearisome refresher in this aspect of plane geometry. Someone should have had the wit to provide the area of the disc and the disc loading.

Too many of the “flying machine” books on the market today are reminiscent of the baseball cards which once-upon-a-time came with a penny packet of bubble gum; bound together they are called a book. This is such a book. It should have been an eminently useful “one-stop” reference, and with only a little thought it could have been. As it stands, it is like a would-be reference on airplanes without mention of wing area; about lighter-than-air craft without cubic volume; ships without displacement; and guns without muzzle velocities.

Failing to meet the needs of the interested but essentially ignorant, who would like to understand what makes a helicopter so different from fixed-wing aircraft, and failing to meet the needs of the knowledgeable, this book is for uncritical buffs who get their kicks from a plethora of facts and fascinating photographs.

Dr. Richard K. Smith
AIR International
Washington, D.C.

The current debate between the Soviet Union and the United States over nuclear arms limitation proposals serves as an excellent backdrop for Harold Brown’s newly released study of American national security. Dr. Harold Brown, a former member of the SALT delegation and President Carter’s Secretary of Defense, is currently serving as Distinguished Visiting Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Brown’s work is not merely an analysis of weapon systems and military hardware or a brief summary of American foreign relations. He identifies and analyzes numerous problems confronting contemporary national security planners including energy shortages, defense spending and budget deficits, deterrence, and nuclear arms limitation. Also included are several regional studies of U.S. interests in Europe, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Third World. The final section of Brown’s sixteen-chapter study concentrates on the organization and management of national security policies.

Brown does not believe, as President Reagan recently suggested, that laser antithallistic missile systems are the answer to preventing a nuclear holocaust. Instead, he prefers to rely on upgrading early warning capabilities, command and control communication systems, and Triad forces. Brown favors putting 100 to 150 MX missiles in multiple protective shelters in lieu of the dense pack plan, and he recommends continued use of B-52 as penetrating bombers and cruise missile launchers until a stealth advanced technology bomber could be phased in by 1990. Brown concurs with the decision to equip sixteen submarines with the larger D-5 missile or the more accurate Trident I. He believes that this total package, which might require a 5 to 7 percent annual real growth in the defense budget, would provide the United States with a balanced deterrent force.

Although the former secretary scores the popular nuclear freeze “overkill” concept as misleading, he is a strong supporter of arms control negotiations. He argues that the arms control agreements can improve stability by reducing the extent to which weapon development and competition aggravate political conflicts. He reasons that the SALT II limitations must be preserved either by continued voluntary observance or by a new agreement. Contrary to popular belief, Brown contends that the Soviets have been forthright in forwarding information required by the SALT agreement. Moreover, his view of past U.S.-Soviet negotiations is positive, and he concludes that the United States has gained at least as much in the talks as has been given up.

Brown’s experience in the Department of Defense (DOD) led him to reserve his harshest criticisms for the organization and management of security problems. He offers suggestions for streamlining the DOD and reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The latter should be accomplished, he concludes, in order to reduce interservice competition among the joint chiefs and contest civilian influence on the executive branch in national security matters. Brown advises making each of the service chiefs advisers to the chairman. The chairman should also be given a deputy, control over appointments and promotions, and serve as the primary national security adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, and Congress.

Thinking about National Security is a comprehensive analysis of current and future national security questions. Brown has made a conscious attempt to examine all aspects of national security but is clearly more vigorous in treating military and defense matters. This advance copy of an uncorrected manuscript contained only a few explanatory footnotes and no bibliography; yet, it is systematically organized. Each chapter contains a brief historical overview, analysis, and recommendations for improving the problem. The book will appeal to a significant audience including students and laymen with special interests, the military, and public officials who must debate the issues. Academicians will perhaps not judge Brown’s work as the definitive study, but the strength of the book is that the author approaches the subject as a former cabinet officer who has had the experience of dealing with the most critical issues of our time.

Dr. William Martin
Department of History
Florida Junior College at Jacksonville


On the centennial of the birth of South Carolina’s distinguished politician, jurist, and statesman James F. Byrnes, a group of eminent diplomatic historians and political scientists gathered at the University of South Carolina to examine Byrnes’s role in the origins of the Cold War. At this 1979 Institute of International Studies Symposium, four scholars presented papers generally favorable to Byrnes, on which Robert Ferrell, Walter LeFebre, and Louis Gerson commented. Kendrick A. Clements, an Associate Professor of History at the University of South Carolina and a prolific writer on early twentieth-century American foreign policy, edited the proceedings and wrote a lengthy introduction and afterword; he also included his edition of Byrnes’s controversial Stuttgart speech in September 1946, which the American public heard as Byrnes’s declaration of the Cold War.

In general, the essays suggest the Truman administration was united on broad goals but divided about how to attain those objectives. Byrnes and Truman disagreed about how to counter the Soviet leadership. Byrnes, because of his commitment to Wilsonian principles and believing in the concept of internationalism, saw a need for the United States to solve the world’s problems under the concept of collective security; he believed the Soviets certainly should be a player in the world arena. Perhaps Byrnes was overly optimistic in 1945. In fact, evidence in these essays suggest Byrnes’s 1946 “get tough with the Russians” rhetoric during the Iranian crisis was really a façade; Byrnes was not really committed to the hard-line approach. Instead of getting tough, Byrnes eventually accepted the concept of a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe in return for unstated Soviet concessions. As Professor Patricia Ward noted, “Roosevelt might have understood that approach, but Truman did not.” Truman, although close in age to Byrnes, came from a different political background. He believed the lessons from Munich indicated that aggressors must be resisted firmly. “The lesson of history was no longer Wilson and the League; it was Hitler and Munich.”
Contrary to popular belief, Professor John Gimbel persuasively argued that Byrnes did not advocate a permanent division of Germany. In a variety of ways and at a variety of levels, Byrnes tried to convince the Soviets that Germany should be united. Gimbel suggested that Byrnes never gave up hope of finding a formula with the Soviets to reunite Germany. His shift from a "soft" to a "hard" policy regarding Germany never occurred.

This short work clearly illustrates the contradictory nature of Byrnes's eighteen-month stewardship as Secretary of State. While publicly he took a stubborn attitude toward the Soviets, especially in the latter half of 1946, privately he used give-and-take diplomacy with the Soviets to garner the treaties ending World War II for which he could receive credit. Byrnes's long political career, spanning the years from 1910 to 1955, reached its nadir while he served as Secretary of State; he faced problems beyond his abilities and forces beyond his control.

Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Mank, Jr., USAF
Department of History
USAF Academy


Jerrold Green's study of the revolution in Iran is both unusual and valuable. The book is unusual because Green, a University of Michigan professor, has drawn from an all-too-often dense body of social science theory and produced a very readable work that artfully integrates theory and fact. Such books are not commonly encountered.

Much of the research for Revolution in Iran was conducted on the scene. In fact, Green remained in Iran through early 1979, and as we might expect of an intelligent, perceptive observer, he supplies his readers with a nice combination of solid analysis and enlightening anecdotes.

In its broadest sense, this book is a study of the political development of a Third World state. Drawing on the work of well-known theorists, such as Karl Deutsch, Myron Weiner, and Leonard Binder, Green explores how the growing demands of a mobilized population were met by the regime of the Shah. It is well understood that as a previously quiescent population was educated, urbanized, and introduced to modernity, the Shah's dilemma was how to meet the increasing demands of his subjects while maintaining his autocratic power. Rather than encourage genuine political participation, the Shah attempted to channel and control political participation through the creation of various devices, including the transparent National Resurgence Party. As Green shows, rather than provide for meaningful participation, the Shah only offered the opportunity for pseudo-participation, thereby increasing the enmity of the Iranian people for their ruler.

In the end, the Shah only succeeded in creating an environment ripe for the mobilizing efforts of a clerical counterelite. The crux of Green's book is an exposition of how those counterelites brought down the Shah. As Green notes, "the Iranian Revolution may not be perceived as a single-minded attempt to establish a theocracy, but rather as a desire to oust the Pahlavi Dynasty." One quotation from a prominent Iranian academic sums up the political sentiment so well described by Green, "I hate Khomeini, but if anyone says anything bad about him I get angry. Why you ask? Because I hate the Shah even more."

Revolution in Iran holds great appeal for the area specialist as well as those merely interested in reading an informative and intelligent book that transcends the more common journalistic treatments. The book includes a detailed chronology covering the period from 1977 through February 1979 as well as an extensive 25-page bibliography. If you are going to read only one or two books about the fateful events in Iran, be sure to include this one.

Major Augustus R. Norton, USA
United States Military Academy
West Point, New York

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "Air Power in Small Wars: The British Air Control Experience" by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Dean, USAF, as the outstanding article in the July-August 1983 issue of the Review.
the contributors

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Colonel Peter A. Land, USAF (Ret) (A.B., The Citadel; M.S., University of Southern California), is President, Peter A. Land Associates, a management consulting firm. He was Vice Commandant of the Air War College before his retirement in October 1982. His Air Force career included air operations, project management, education and training, management consulting, and command assignments. Colonel Land is a graduate of Armed Forces Staff College and a Distinguished Graduate of Air War College.

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Lieutenant Colonel G. E. Secrist, USAF (Ret) (B.S., University of Utah; M.S., Purdue; Ph.D., University of Utah) is a research scientist for Technology Incorporated, Life Sciences Division, San Antonio, Texas. During 21 years of Air Force service, he served as a research scientist and technical director of biotechnology and human resource research and development programs. Other assignments included Titan II senior standardization crew member, Strategic Air Command missile forces, and crew safety project officer for the Manned Orbits Laboratory Program with Air Force Systems Command. Colonel Secrist has published numerous articles in professional journals.

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Colonel Elvin C. Bell

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attention

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