

Document created: 3 January 01

**Organizing for Success:  
Theater Missile Defense in Korea**

**by**

**Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier**

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JOHN A. BENNETT  
SSG, USA

Security NCOIC/S2 Air and Missile Defense Division

Combined Forces Command and US Forces Korea recently completed a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) re-organization initiative that is proving to be an innovative solution to a serious warfighting challenge. The initiative grew from a problem shared by many of the geographical CINCs and may prove to be a model for other theater level TMD organizations. Prior to this initiative, missile defense responsibilities in Korea were spread between several component staffs and service specific organizations. This situation produced confusion, lacked unity of effort and contributed to needless friction and inefficiency. Additionally these organizations lacked the proper structure and resources for the execution of theater missile defense.

Recognizing this problem US Forces Korea approached it from the view that theater missile defense is inherently a combined and joint mission area. It then created a new organization, the Combined and Joint Theater Missile Operations Cell or CJTMOC that reflected the combined and joint nature of the mission. The CJTMOC combines elements of the joint and combined staff, air component staff and the US based 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC). It pulls together the various theater missile defense players into one combined and joint organization capable of planning, integrating and executing theater missile defense operations at the theater level.

What caused Korea to relook its organization and doctrine? Combined Forces Command Korea (CFC) faced a serious warfighting dilemma that if unresolved could jeopardize its mission. CFC faced a growing theater ballistic missile threat, possibly equipped with weapons of mass destruction, without a theater level missile defense command to counter the threat. Although each service has some theater missile defense capability, no service can provide any warfighting CINC with his own organization capable of producing integrated missile defense plans. The only active organization with this capability is the 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command (32d

AAMDC) at Fort Bliss Texas.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately the 32d AAMDC is only available to a CINC during actual crisis and major exercises.

So what options were available to the Command? The best option was to create in peacetime a distributed theater missile defense organization that merged elements of the in-theater staffs with the AAMDC and operate it as a theater focused unit regardless of geographical location.

This option had several advantages. By merging in-theater staffs with the AAMDC, you combine theater expertise with missile defense expertise. This merging produces a theater level organization more capable of integrating all of the services' missile defense capabilities into a coherent operation. Merging also gives the AAMDC, a greater voice during peacetime in the development of the theater's missile defense concepts and plans. Together these factors should produce better plans, a faster, smoother transition during a crisis, and better integration of missile defense operations, all of which directly contribute to improved warfighting.

Creating such an organization required three components, a distributed structure, defined lines of authority, and the requisite communications connectivity. By using a distributed organizational structure that merged in-theater missile defense staff sections with elements of the 32d AAMDC and providing it the coordinating authority needed to function, CFC created the structure of the organization. Modern communications enabled the organization to function as one regardless of geographical separation. The result was a split-based organization capable of meeting CINC requirements, without the added force structure costs.

Combined Forces Command Korea is testing the Combined and Joint Theater Missile Operations Cell concept. The CJTMOC, working for the Air Component Commander, merges elements of 32d AAMDC, the Combined and Joint Staffs and the Air Component Staff into one team, a team that is equipped and staffed for planning and execution of joint and combined missile defense operations at the theater level.<sup>2</sup> During peacetime (Armistice in Korea) the cell is a split organization based in both the United States and Korea.<sup>3</sup> In a contingency with the deployment of the 32d AAMDC to Korea, it would physically merge together as one.

The Combined Forces Command's intent is to better use available resources to produce a synergistic organization that supports a seamless transition from peace to war. This concept involves more than exchanging of liaison officers or establishing a "reach back" capability. It represents a new way of organizing separate staffs into a specific mission focused organization. Combined Forces Command's experiment, if successful, may serve as a model for other theaters facing similar challenges.

To understand how the new organization improved theater missile defense, we must review how the previous organizations operated. Prior to February 2000 there were three different and competing staff organizations that could claim proponency of theater missile defense in Korea.<sup>4</sup> While each contained some expertise in theater missile defense, individually they lacked both a combined and a joint in-theater perspective. Additionally their efforts were not well integrated at the theater level.

The first organization was the Air and Missile Defense Division that was part of the Combined and Joint Staff. The division consisted of one US Army Air Defense Colonel and two Republic of Korea Air Force and Army Air Defense officers, supported by "borrowed" Air Defense personnel from the Eighth US Army.<sup>5</sup> Although combined, the staff was not joint and it lacked expertise in anything other than ground based air defense operations.

The Air Component Staff was the second organization. The Air Component Commander, as the Area Air Defense Commander, is responsible for theater missile defense and needed his own missile defense staff to assist him.<sup>6</sup> He therefore created his own Theater Missile Defense Coordination Cell; an "ad hoc" minimally manned organization staffed by US 7<sup>th</sup> Air Force personnel and a Republic of Korea Air Force liaison officer. The result was a predominately US Air Force cell that focused on air power attack operations and the passing of ballistic missile early warning.<sup>7</sup>

This structure produced an odd relationship between the Combined Staff, the Joint Staff, and the Air Component missile defense staffs. Rather than focusing on theater level and component level issues they focused on different elements of theater missile defense.<sup>8</sup> The Combined and Joint Staffs wrote active defense policy, plans and procedures while the Air Component wrote attack operations policy, plans and procedures. This separation blurred the areas of responsibility between the combined and joint headquarters and the component headquarters, which contributed to a lack of integration in missile defense plans and procedures.

The third organization with missile defense responsibility was the 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command. Based in the United States, the 32d AAMDC has worldwide theater air and missile defense responsibilities.<sup>9</sup> Although it lacks joint representation, it is organized and equipped for theater level planning and coordination of all missile defense activities including; attack operations, active defense and passive defense. Unfortunately the 32d AAMDC is not in position to participate in Korea's day to day theater missile defense operations. As a result, the two in-theater cells developed missile defense plans and operating procedures without much input from the 32d AAMDC. This lack of coordination meant that in a contingency the 32d AAMDC was expected to coordinate and execute operations that it had little voice in developing. During exercises this situation contributed to needless confusion and produced more than a fair amount of friction.<sup>10</sup>

According to current joint doctrine, theater missile defense is clearly a joint mission area.<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately, all three organizations are service solutions to a joint mission problem. Despite doing their best to "think joint" they were service specific in their areas of expertise and perspective. Lieutenant General Heflebower, the Combined Air Component Commander, realized that if you coupled the in-theater experience of the Air Component, Combined and Joint Staffs, with the expertise and robustness of the 32d AAMDC, you would have a joint and combined organization ideally suited for executing the theater missile defense mission. Such an organization would be capable of pulling together the separate missile defense plans into a synergistic theater missile defense plan.

In November 1999, to exploit the potential strength of such an organization Lieutenant General Heflebower directed a theater missile defense reorganization.<sup>12</sup> He had a simple premise, train

and organize as you fight. He wanted to use the strengths of each organization to balance the other's weakness. His intent was to gain efficiency and unity of effort by merging parts of the three competing organizations into one planning cell under the leadership of one person. His guidance was to create and train a combined and joint theater missile operations organization that integrated, located and aligned missile defense expertise and functions under the Combined Air Component Commander. Lastly it should be organized the same in armistice as in war to facilitate a seamless transition.<sup>13</sup>

The Combined Air Component Commander's role as the theater's Area Air Defense Commander provided the doctrinal foundation for the creation of the CJTMOC. To assist him, the Commanding General of the 32d AAMDC was designated the "Theater Air Defense Advisor for Theater Missile Defense." (US joint doctrine uses the term Deputy Area Air Defense Commander. The two terms are synonymous.) Since the Commander of the 32d AAMDC, as the Theater Air Defense Advisor for Theater Missile Defense, is responsible for executing a combined as well as a joint mission he logically requires a combined and joint staff to assist him. Hence the creation of the CJTMOC.

In December 1999 a working group met and designed a Combined and Joint Theater Missile Operations Cell that met Lt. Gen. Heflebower's intent. The working group's first step was to redefine the functions and responsibilities of the existing staffs and the new organization. This step was necessary because the different commands established the three existing staffs independently and never deconflicted their functions. This conflict caused confusion, and needless friction during combat exercises. The working group decided that the Combined and Joint Staff's Air and Missile Defense Division would be responsible for developing theater policy and guidance. The new organization, the CJTMOC, would be responsible for theater level planning and execution. After defining areas of responsibility the next step was resourcing the new organization.

The working group took the existing Operations and Intelligence sections of the 32d AAMDC and combined it with the existing Air Component's Theater Missile Defense Coordination Cell to form the base of the new organization. Then the working group added positions for Korean Air Force officers to increase the Korean military's contributions to theater missile defense, particularly in attack operations and passive defense. Because the CJTMOC picked up additional planning requirements from the Joint staff, three newly approved joint positions were moved to the cell to provide the planning nucleus. The incumbents in these positions included a Navy Surface Warfare officer with Aegis experience; an Army Patriot experienced officer and an Air Force Space Operations officer. These positions along with the Korean Air Force positions made the in-theater portion of the cell truly joint and combined.

The concept is that the in-theater portion of the cell works day to day Korean specific missile defense issues while sharing information and ideas with the 32d AAMDC. Working collaboratively they would produce plans and procedures. The Commander of the 32d AAMDC, as Chief of the CJTMOC, would provide guidance and approve products for forwarding to the Combined Air Component Commander for his approval.

The CJTMOC has two main divisions, operations and intelligence. The operations division is responsible for current operations and future planning. It has four sections representing each of the pillars of theater missile defense; Active Defense; Attack Operations; Passive Defense; and Command, Control, Communication, and Computers. A fifth section contains liaison teams from the 32d AAMDC that are sent to the various component headquarters in wartime to assist in plan execution. The intelligence division has a plans and operations section that focuses on Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and targeting intelligence to support active defense and attack operations.<sup>14</sup>

The organization is Army heavy, but this is a strength not a weakness. Continuous operations in wartime require the robustness that the 32d AAMDC provides. Although manned predominately by Army personnel, the organization has a solid mix of joint and combined skills. Consider the fact that the Army slice includes not only Air Defense Artillerymen, but also Army Aviation, Special Operations, Chemical, Field Artillery, and Intelligence personnel.<sup>15</sup> When combined with Korean air defenders, and pilots, a US Navy surface warfare officer, and US Air Force pilots, space operators, communicators and intelligence personnel, the CJTMOC is a well structured organization capable of joint and combined theater level missile defense operations planning and execution. Remember theater missile defense is more than air defenders shooting Patriot missiles, and these additional non-air defense specialties bring the unique skills required for combined and joint theater missile defense.

However, to make the CJTMOC work in armistice and to have a seamless transition in war, it needed the staff authority and communications technology to operate. During armistice the CJTMOC operates in a split-based mode, but is connected electronically. The 32d AAMDC's portion is in Texas, while the Air Component's portion is at Osan Air Base in Korea. However, the two portions actually belong to different commands, the 32d AAMDC belonging to US Army Forces Command and the Osan cell to the Air Component Command. To make the organization work as one the Commander of the 32d AAMDC, as Chief of the CJTMOC, needed the authority to directly consult and coordinate theater missile defense issues with the Combined Air Component Command's staff. To give him this authority Forces Command and the Air Component Commander approved "Direct Liaison Authorized" for deliberate planning.<sup>16</sup> This authority allows the cell's armistice split-based elements to staff and coordinate the development of plans and procedures as if they were one organization. However, it is a cell with a specific and defined purpose, deliberate planning of theater missile defense operations. The authority does not give either commander the ability during armistice to command, task or compel agreement. Additionally the parent units of the personnel that make up the cell retain Administrative Control over their personnel.<sup>17</sup>

The second requirement was communications. Existing phone and computer systems provide the ability to work together using video teleconferencing, net-meetings, and classified and unclassified e-mail and voice systems. Sharing ideas, information, and draft plans now occur on virtually a daily basis. The only difficulty is the time difference. Despite the differing time zones, the communication between the US and Korean cells is fostering a "one team concept" and is breaking down archaic organizational barriers that once supported a "we versus them" attitude.

There are several positive aspects of this new organization. The theater Commander in Chief, as well as the Air Component Commander, now has a single point of responsibility for theater missile defense operations. The Commander of the 32d AAMDC, as the Theater Air Defense Advisor for Theater Missile Defense (Deputy Area Air Defense Commander) now has a combined and joint staff with day to day in country experience to assist him. The CJTMOC also gives the Commander of the 32d AAMDC a larger voice in the development of plans and procedures that he is expected to execute in war. Additionally the in-theater cell has the facilities and most of the communications and intelligence architecture and equipment in place ready for the Commander and staff of the 32d AAMDC to fall in on. All of this facilitates a seamless transition where the only major action is physically moving to Korea. Combined Forces Command expects these positive aspects to replace inefficiency and friction with synergy and improve overall theater level air and missile defense planning and execution.

As with any unproven concept, the CJTMOC does have its critics. One area of concern is the increased workload this may place on the 32d AAMDC. The fact is the 32d AAMDC already has worldwide mission responsibility and this initiative does not add to those responsibilities. What it does is provide an improved structure that should make executing those responsibilities easier. Will the 32d AAMDC be able to participate in planning for Korea given its other responsibilities? We believe so. We also believe that the investment in the planning of the Korea mission will pay huge dividends in the event of war. Regardless, this is an experiment and the workload will be tested and adjusted as lessons are learned. However, the burden on the 32d AAMDC should be manageable because the in-theater staff's functions and personnel have been redistributed enabling them shoulder more of the burden.

Another concern is what happens in a contingency if the 32d AAMDC is already committed to another theater? Simple, the command initially fights without them the best it can. Given the current force structure, this lack of a second quickly deployable AAMDC is a real concern and emphasizes the need for in-theater CJTMOC like organizations to fill the gap. In a war, with or without the 32d AAMDC, the CJTMOC will have produced sound, integrated missile defense plans and procedures in a collaborative effort with the best subject matter experts available and the theater will be better off for it. If another AAMDC is activated (The Army National Guard is organizing an AAMDC) and deploys, Korea will have the plans and procedures for them to use. If there is no missile defense command, then the in-theater cells will work harder, but they will have a sound product to work with. Either way the command is better prepared.

The CJTMOC has the potential to provide insights for improving joint doctrine. While many assume that the J-3 has the lead in theater missile defense, joint doctrine actually takes a "committee" approach to theater missile defense. Joint Publication 3-01.5, *Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense* says, "The J-2, J-3, J-4, and J-6 are the primary staff elements responsible for JTMD [Joint Theater Missile Defense] operations at the joint force level."<sup>18</sup> Each of these staff sections certainly have roles in missile defense, but can four different staff sections actually share primary responsibility? Many will argue that the J-3 has "primary responsibility" and that the other staff sections only support. However, joint doctrine further confuses the responsibility issue by saying the Joint Force Commander, normally assigns overall missile defense responsibility to the Area Air Defense Commander.<sup>19</sup> Does this mean parts of the joint staff or J-3 work for the Area Air Defense Commander? Probably not. The CJTMOC avoids

these issues and offers a better simpler way. It provides the Area Air Defense Commander, who has been given the responsibility by the Joint Force Commander, with a staff capable of assisting him in that responsibility. Additionally it relieves the joint force staff from detailed missile defense planning requirements.

Combined Forces Command is testing this organization in exercises and continues to study and refine it. No one is claiming that this organization is "the way" to organize for theater missile defense, but it is certainly "a way" that may provide useful insights. The missile defense cell may also provide insights into other joint and service doctrinal questions. For example, does the joint theater missile defense mission area require a "functional component command" similar to special operations commands? Should the 32d AAMDC be a jointly manned organization? Is the Army Air and Missile Defense Command best utilized by working for, the Joint Force Commander, the Air Component Commander or the Land Component Commander?

Combined Forces Command, by reorganizing and using communications technology, solved its dilemma of not having its own theater level air and missile defense command. As a result the CINC now has a "train as you fight" organization designed and resourced to coordinate and execute joint and combined theater missile defense.

Is this organization a model for other theaters? The strategy of a small forward military presence relying on US based reinforcements suggests the answer is yes. Given the resource-constrained environment the CJTMOC concept may be a way to provide critical war-fighting capabilities without adding force structure. The concept of merging small in-theater assets with more robust US based assets via electronic means in armistice and in reality in war is certainly worth exploring.

## Notes

1. US Army Air Defense Artillery School, *FY 00 Air and Missile Defense Master Plan*, USAADASCH, Ft Bliss, TX, 1999. P. 9-5.
2. COL Eikmeier, *Executive Summary: Korean Theater Missile Operations Restructuring Initiative*, USFK, Korea, 3 Jan 2000.
3. A peace treaty in Korea has not been signed. Therefore a state of war exists under armistice conditions.
4. Unpublished working papers and author's notes from the Theater Defense Missile Operations Workshop, USFK, Yongsan Korea, 10-14 January 2000.
5. Eighth United States Army, *TAADS-R Document, P8W5GMAA*, 15 Sep. 1998.
6. Dept. of Defense, *Joint Pub 3-01.5: Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense*, DOD, Wash. D.C., 1996. P. X
7. Unpublished working papers and author's notes.
8. Joint Theater Missile Defense is made up of four elements, C4I, Active Defense, Passive Defense, and Attack Operations. Joint Pub 3-01.5, P. I-3.
9. HQ. Dept. of the Army, *Table of Organization and Equipment #44601A00*, Effective Date October 1997.
10. Author's observations as Chief Air and Missile Defense Division CJ3 CFC/USFK, during Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens 99.

11. Dept. of Defense, *Joint Pub 3-01.5*: P. I-1.
  12. Discussion between Lt Gen Heflebower and COL Eikmeier, OSAN AB, Korea 15 November 1999.
  13. Ibid. Nov 1999 through January 2000. and *Executive Summary: Korean Theater Missile Operations Restructuring Initiative*, USFK, Korea, 3 Jan 2000.
  14. Unpublished working papers and author's notes.
  15. HQ. Dept. of the Army, *Table of Organization and Equipment #44601A00*.
  16. BG Vane e-mail to LTG Petrosky, Subject CJTMOC Approval, 25 February 1999, and discussions between COL Eikmeier and Lt Gen Heflebower, November 1999 through January 2000.
  17. Discussion between Lt Gen Heflebower and COL Eikmeier, OSAN AB, Korea January 2000.
  18. Dept. of Defense, *Joint Pub 3-01.5*: P. II-2.
  19. Ibid. p. X.
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This article has undergone security and policy content review and has been approved for public release IAW AFI 35-101.

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