

Operation Allied Force: The View from Beijing

by

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When NATO began bombing Yugoslavia, the Chinese press reacted with a storm of furious complaints that rose to a crescendo after the attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on May 7. Although the tone eventually softened somewhat, Chinese opposition to Operation Allied Force remained outspoken, and press coverage heavily stressed the Yugoslavian point of view. Do articles in open sources shed light on Chinese military thought, or are they sheer propaganda? This essay will argue that despite the venomous rhetoric that reflects the Chinese government's displeasure with U.S. actions in the Balkans, Chinese writings on Operation Allied Force are indeed important sources of information and speculation about the nature of future warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

Chinese open sources naturally have their limitations, and should be used cautiously. Many important Chinese strategists are not permitted to publish in the open press.¹ The influence on official Chinese policy of those who do publish is often impossible to gauge, since many articles are unattributed, provide no information about the author, or are pseudonymous. Articles in PRC-owned periodicals usually take a bombastic tone, and employ Aesopian language or other forms of indirection to confuse the unwary reader. Despite these drawbacks, valuable insights can be gleaned from the open literature, and analysis must begin with consideration of sources. For example, China's National Defense University (NDU) and Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) are the PLA's leading think-tanks, and their staff and alumni have written extensively on future warfare and the RMA.² Articles by authors affiliated with these institutions therefore deserve close attention. Chinese leaders educate their domestic audience on strategic and political issues by means of the PLA newspaper, *Jiefangjun Bao*, and the Communist Party newspapers, *Renmin Ribao* and *Guangming Ribao*. Authors in these publications are military officers and Party members, and their views, which represent the official "party line," also deserve attention. This paper will examine these and other sources,³ and will focus on Chinese views of six topics:

- American political purposes in launching the air campaign
- Implications of Allied Force for future warfare
- Information Operations before and during the campaign
- NATO mistakes and weaknesses revealed by Allied Force
- The bombing of the Chinese Embassy
- What lessons China should learn from Allied Force

Political Purpose

Most Chinese sources were strongly critical of the use of force without UN sanction, and rejected the ostensible rationales for Operation Allied Force – to protect human rights and halt ethnic cleansing.⁴ They noted that these rationales could be used to justify intervention practically anywhere on earth, since a great many countries have ethnic conflicts in progress, and intervening on behalf of separatists in Kosovo will only encourage separatists elsewhere. Moreover, they believed that these rationales were simply fig leaves used to cover larger American geopolitical purposes. The Chinese considered that these purposes included removing obstacles to NATO's eastward expansion, reducing Russia's sphere of influence, and using NATO as a tool for "global hegemony."

Many Chinese journalists interpreted Operation Allied Force as "anti-Russian" in character.⁵ They noted that NATO expanded eastwards in order to occupy Russia's "strategic space" (the traditional Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe) and deprive her of a base for resurgence in Europe. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic enthusiastically embraced NATO, but the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which has always had good relations with Russia, represented an obstacle to further expansion. Air strikes and the occupation of Kosovo split and weakened the FRY, thereby punishing a traditional Russian ally and setting the stage for further NATO expansion. NATO's use of force without UN Security Council authorization diminished Russia's role in European security and the international community.

Some journalists contended that the next step in the "strategic conspiracy" is to expand NATO's area of interest into Central Asia, the Middle East, and even the Asia-Pacific region.⁶ Another author considered that one goal of Allied Force was to "open up the Balkan corridor" to EU military, political and economic influence. This would serve to secure a land/river route for the flow of oil and gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia to Western Europe.⁷ The author predicted that in the aftermath of the Balkan War, the U.S. would intensify its efforts to contain China. Containment would entail support for India's missile programs, encouragement of separatists in Xinjiang and of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and strengthening the defenses of Taiwan and Japan.⁸

Senior Colonel Yao Youzhi of the Academy of Military Sciences argued that Eurasia plays a "decisive position in global geopolitical strategies."⁹ He claimed that the U.S. views North America as its base, South America as its backyard, Africa as a "broken continent that cannot be lifted up," and Eurasia as the "serious hidden danger to global dominance." America plans to control Eurasia by keeping Russia weak, by manipulating NATO, and by containing China through military alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand.

Another researcher at the AMS, Cheng Guangzhong, interpreted Operation Allied Force from the standpoint of geopolitics.¹⁰ He contended that after the Cold War, the U.S. became a python: "It uses its thickset body to coil tightly around the world, and prevent any country from possessing the ability to stand up to it." Currently, the Python is principally concerned with tightening its control of Eurasia through NATO expansion into

Eastern Europe, dual containment of Iraq and Iran, and expansion of the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

According to Cheng, Kosovo was an important step in the implementation of the Python Strategy. In Allied Force, the U.S. experimented with an expanded role for NATO in order to set the stage for future globalization of the alliance. NATO expansion "further squeezed the strategic space of Russia," and intensified the antagonism between Western Europe and Russia. The punishment of Yugoslavia removed an obstacle to NATO expansion, and built a bridge between Europe and strategically important peripheral regions in the Black Sea and Caspian. Weakening Russia and expanding NATO will permit the U.S. to shift its strategic emphasis to the Pacific, and in this respect Kosovo was "an important preemptive chess move for a possible conflict with China in the 21st century."

These darkly suspicious – even paranoid – views of the United States in some ways recall Chinese propaganda during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, but there is no way to determine whether Chinese leaders actually believe their rhetoric. However, Allied Force may well have strengthened a pre-existing tendency to believe that an eventual clash with the United States – especially over Taiwan – is probable, and that China should prepare her defenses accordingly. If so, then China will doubtless revise her military doctrine to incorporate the lessons of Allied Force.

Kosovo and Future Warfare

The Gulf War was a powerful incentive for China to modernize her military, and the Chinese have devoted considerable effort to deriving the correct lessons from this war.¹¹ After the Gulf War, Chinese military writings emphasized the importance of air power, long-range precision strikes, information warfare, and small, well-trained ground forces. Chinese writings stressed that an inferior force could defeat a superior force by means of "nonlinear" or asymmetric methods, such as pre-emptive blows on key centers of gravity.¹² Allied Force has drawn Chinese attention away from the problems of repelling large U.S. ground forces, and has focused greater attention on issues of air defense (particularly cruise missile defense), electronic warfare, and information warfare. Moreover, Chinese authors are more aware than ever of the importance of space control to U.S. military operations.

Professor Zhang Zhaozhong of China's NDU asserted that before the airstrike, NATO had "already told the FRY what targets it planned to hit, including the time and method."¹³ This showed the transparency of the modern battlefield and the NATO desire to "threaten the FRY psychologically" with its ability to place every strategic target under accurate surveillance. The characteristics of the NATO airstrike were as follows:

- Long-range cruise missiles were coordinated with short-range weapons and high-altitude bombing.

- All strikes were carefully planned and executed, and every move underwent intensive computer simulation.
- Yugoslavian air defenses and command-and-control systems were struck for three days (a much shorter period than during the Gulf War), after which strikes focused on ground troops and logistics.
- Attacks came from all directions, in all weather, and at all times of the day.
- Attacks escalated in three ways: in types of targets (from air defense and C2 to ground troops to economic targets), in geographic region (from south of the 44th parallel to north of it), and in intensity (additional forces joined the attack after the first three days).

Ji Wenming of the General Staff Office noted that the airstrike was a "war of all dimensions" (sea, air, land, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum), and the wars in each dimension were launched "in intrinsic coordination."¹⁴ Intensive surveillance from space and electronic warfare preceded the airstrikes and ensured that NATO was in a superior "information situation." Although U.S., British and French forces predominated, the airstrike involved many nations, and was a "basically successful" multinational unified action. Ji considered that NATO logistic support was highly effective, particularly in the realms of in-flight refueling, the preparation and launching of cruise missiles, and the ability to achieve a rapid aircraft sortie rate.

Su Size noted that the increased use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) and advanced imaging technology in Yugoslavia showed that Allied Force had a "higher information technological level" than Desert Storm.¹⁵ Su pointed out that Allied Force demonstrated several other trends that would be prominent in "local high-tech wars" of the future:

- Aircraft will fly at lower altitudes in order to recognize targets, despite the danger from anti-aircraft fire.
- All targets will be nodes of a network, and the most critical node will be the "supreme command headquarters." Su observed that Presidential Palaces were bombed in both Serbia and Iraq.
- Defenders will wage an anti-information campaign with counter-stealth, counter-reconnaissance, and counter-electronic warfare components, and that employs flexible tactics, dispersion, concealment, and the use of decoys. In addition to passive measures, the defense will strike back at the offense with electronic interference and network intrusions.
- The demarcation between "strategic" and "tactical" weapons and systems will be more obscure, as will the distinctions between the military services and between front and rear.
- "Large-scale annihilation of the enemy's effective strength will no longer be regarded as the target of war."
- Administrative structures will be streamlined, and command structures will be "short in length and wide in breadth."
- "Unconventional, asymmetric, nonlinear, nondeterministic, and nontraditional" methods will be used. Commanders and soldiers will be

encouraged to be creative, and military training will seek to cultivate "independent and active combat skills."

Several Chinese authors asserted that Allied Force was an example of American asymmetric warfare against the FRY. Senior Colonel Jia Weidong, for example, defined asymmetrical warfare as "avoiding strengths to attack weaknesses."¹⁶ The U.S. Air Force specializes in asymmetrical warfare based on technological and information superiority, and this depends on "a perfect global early warning reconnaissance and intelligence system," GPS navigation, and precision guided munitions. Jia considered that asymmetrical warfare is developing into "no-contact warfare" that strikes the enemy and leaves him unable to retaliate, thus reducing American risks and combat losses. Integrated use of space, air, land, sea, and electronic forces makes "asymmetrical warfare much smarter."

Jia also asserted that the "age of smart warfare has arrived," and traditional ideas of warfare are no longer valid. Mass tank battles "will no longer be seen again," and China will be faced "mostly with an enemy who uses advanced smart weapons and long-range precision guided weapons to launch asymmetrical strikes." PLA weapons will remain inferior to American weapons for a long time, and closing the technology gap is an urgent task for China. The PLA must increase the "S&T information quality" of its officers and men, "stressing information as a new combat-effectiveness growth point." China must also develop its own "asymmetrical combat theory" based on special weapons:

"The side with the marked technical inferiority can still use certain special means to conduct nuclear, biological, and chemical strikes, either destroying the enemy's advanced information network, or striking with modern guerrilla warfare tactics such as unconventional warfare and terrorism. So developing our own asymmetrical combat theory, and studying new battle tactics that will enable us to win on high-tech terms, is our unavoidable choice."

Two senior PLA officers observed that NATO's "asymmetrical" strikes employed "a number of new combat modes."¹⁷ Allied Force consisted of "a series of informationalized, digitized, and networked combat operations that surpassed those in the Gulf War." In their view, networked fighting centers will replace individual fighting platforms in future warfare, and "networked" military organizations will replace "tree-shaped" military organizations. The United States uses air raids, electronic warfare, and information control operations to maximize the asymmetric advantages of its high technology. Therefore, the PLA should "learn and master" anti-air raid, anti-electronic warfare, and anti-information control operations.

Information Warfare

Reporter Ye Lu observed that the U.S. goal is to gain mastery of battlefield information, and that the information enhancement of U.S. weapons systems is already "an order of magnitude" greater than in the Gulf War.¹⁸ Before initiating combat,

"Reconnaissance satellites, relay satellites, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, and low- and medium-altitude pilotless aircraft of all kinds are to be deployed in continuous, uninterrupted, all around, dynamic intelligence reconnaissance against military and civilian targets in Yugoslavian territory... while at the same time numerous intelligence organizations and every means of intelligence collection are to be marshaled to conduct repeated position fixing and simulated attack exercises against all military and non-military targets that might be encountered in the battlefield to come."

Ye considered that despite all the U.S. advantages, "information supremacy" was not gained in Yugoslavia. This he attributed to the expansion of the information domain through radio and computer networks that enable "both aggressors and defenders to attack and counterattack to the best of their abilities." Ye drew the following conclusions from Operation Allied Force:

- China should research and develop high-tech precision weapons, and should upgrade the information systems associated with existing weapons.
- China should develop information warfare equipment and techniques, especially that which can "reliably put constraints on the power of hostile forces."
- China needs a "corps of knowledgeable and experienced military information security personnel."
- China should create her own software for national defense, and should find military applications for civilian high technologies.

Senior Colonel Wang Baocun noted that U.S. space systems played a crucial role in Operation Allied Force.¹⁹ Some 50 reconnaissance, communications, data relay, and weather satellites were used (this total probably includes 24 GPS navigation satellites). To complement the space systems, NATO extensively employed aerial reconnaissance, ground stations, and "more than 400 spies" to collect visual, communications, and electronic intelligence. Unfortunately, Wang provides no indication of where this number (400) came from.

Wang considered that "beheading" is a major principle of IW, and therefore NATO struck the Yugoslav command system first. Information was a major enabler of this strike and of the air campaign that followed. For example, the MiG-29 was not intrinsically inferior to NATO's fighters, but NATO's early warning and control aircraft provided information that placed the MiGs at a decisive disadvantage. NATO electronic warfare planes cut Yugoslav forces off from their sources of information, and prevented them from organizing an effective defense. NATO used television and radio propaganda for psychological warfare. NATO publicized the effectiveness of the airstrikes and the brutality of the Serbs, thereby winning the support of their own people and demoralizing

the enemy. At the same time, destruction of the Serbian broadcast facilities hindered the Serbs from broadcasting their version of events and informing their people.

Wang did not believe that NATO gained total "information supremacy." He contended that the FRY's defensive IW campaign was quite effective, principally due to intelligent use of camouflage, concealment, and deception. Command centers were dug in deeply, and radars were turned on only intermittently. Military equipment was dispersed and camouflaged, and movement only took place when NATO satellites were not overhead. The FRY also used websites to spread their version of events, and spammed NATO sites. Wang concluded that all these measures denied NATO complete success, and enabled the FRY to preserve its strength and to maintain some degree of effective command and control.

NATO Mistakes and Weaknesses

Chinese authors generally viewed the U.S. as casualty-averse. Journalist Yuan Bingzhong, for example, predicted in May that the U.S. would not launch a ground war, because the complex terrain and stubborn defenders could create a "quagmire" that would lead to heavy casualties and an upsurge in anti-war sentiment.²⁰ Another author claimed that "modern Americans have a fragile psychology and very poor endurance for war."²¹

Somewhat at odds with the extensive commentary on NATO's sophisticated precision bombing capabilities were the frequent complaints about the "indiscriminate" nature of the air campaign. Chinese journalists asserted that "homes, schools, hospitals, industrial plants, and communications infrastructures" were wantonly bombed. Some authors argued that this was a deliberate effort to pressure the Serbs psychologically.²²

Space scientist Wang Zudian considered that Allied Force demonstrated what is now "the basic mode for recent and future high-tech regional war," in which "cruise missiles are the vanguard, aerial strength is the main power, and the ground, sea, air, space, and electromagnetism are integrated."²³ However, Wang observed that NATO made a number of mistakes, and therefore the airstrikes failed to achieve their initial goals. Firstly, "the strategic airstrike was insufficiently prepared and failed to be a surprise attack." The Yugoslavs had plenty of time to prepare for the attack and to consult with Iraq on defensive methods. NATO could obtain and transmit pictures of targets on the battlefield in "approximately real time," but accuracy was still degraded by terrain and weather. Moreover, according to Wang, "the United States does not dare to dispatch ground reconnaissance troops to conduct on-the-spot reconnaissance." NATO sent in many spies, but Yugoslavia responded with intensive counterintelligence operations, and also conducted "numerous e-mail attacks."

Major General Guo Anhua of the Army Command College faulted NATO underestimating Yugoslavia, and especially her air defenses.²⁴ NATO failed to send enough ECM aircraft, and did not have sufficient reserves of cruise missiles when the operation began. Guo criticized NATO for commencing operations in March, when

unfavorable weather supposedly reduced cruise missile effectiveness by 70%. Curiously, Guo, like many other Chinese authors, overestimated the number of U.S. combat aircraft shot down ("more than 20"). It is not clear whether Chinese authors uncritically accepted Serbian claims (and thus reached faulty conclusions about the effectiveness of Serbian air defenses), or whether they were aware of the true situation but cited the Serbian claims for propaganda purposes.

The Chinese Embassy Bombing

Chinese sources universally rejected the view that the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was an accident. There was a range of views regarding the purpose behind the "conspiracy," including the derailment of a political solution to the Balkan crisis and a test of China's mettle. Unfortunately, there is no way to determine whether Chinese leaders actually believe these conspiracy theories.

Zhang Zhaozhong claimed that the embassy bombing could not have been accidental, because the vast array of American intelligence means focused on Yugoslavia precluded such a mistake.²⁵ He sardonically asked "why do you provide NATO with today's maps for today's bombing, and provide an old map for bombing the Chinese embassy?" He also observed that the use of B-2's from U.S. territory showed that the order for the mission "was given by the United States in a manner concealed from NATO." The B-2 carried missiles that penetrated the embassy through the roof, then exploded on the ground floor. Therefore, the U.S. goal was not to flatten the whole building, but to destroy a specific target within the building – "a surgical strike to take out a vital organ." This further supported the view that the bombing was no accident.

Zhang asserted that the deliberate bombing of the embassy served a number of purposes. The United States wanted to abort an unsatisfactory peace proposal, and wanted to test Chinese reactions to a provocative move. The United States also wanted to see whether a strong stimulus could provoke internal chaos within China that would cause a change in China's orientation.

Similarly, two reporters contended that the tactics and ammunition employed in the embassy attack indicated that there was "no accident."²⁶ The authors insisted that either AGM-130 or AGM-154 missiles were used, and that the missiles were launched from two or three planes firing from different directions at high altitude. The purpose of the bombing, in his opinion, was to intimidate China, because after Kosovo the U.S. expected to shift its strategic focus to Asia, where China would become the "main target of attack."

Columnist Jen Hui-wen described the bombing as a "planned and premeditated military provocation."²⁷ The purpose of the attack was to punish China for supporting the FRY, to probe China's reactions, and to warn China not to use force against Taiwan. The bombing also sought to distract China from economic development and to "impose a heavy war burden on China."

Journalist Li Tzu-ching reported that the "premeditated" embassy bombing provoked a jingoistic clamor in the People's Liberation Army, which vowed to settle the "blood debt" with the United States.²⁸ In response to the bombing, the PLA would seek to modernize its military equipment, train its troops for a high-tech war against the United States, and prepare for "triphibious modernized warfare over blockade and anti-blockade of the Taiwan Strait." The PLA could not match U.S. conventional power, and consequently nuclear weapons would have to be used in a war with the United States. According to Li, the PLA General Staff proposed an expansion of the Second Artillery Corps and accelerated production of "tactical nuclear weapons and neutron weapons." Interestingly, several other journalists argued that the U.S. would not have bombed Yugoslavia had that country been armed with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.²⁹

Lessons for China

Major General Guo Anhua asserted that China's 1993 military reforms did not go far enough, because they "failed to pay sufficient attention to the favorite game of a strong high-tech enemy – long duration, multiple targets, large area, intensive precision strikes."³⁰ Therefore, China should study ways to resist these strikes, to thwart long-range reconnaissance, to use ground forces to defeat air forces and to use "low altitude fires to control high altitude fires." Solutions to these problems will require China to upgrade her technology, her tactics, and her national psychology.

Guo argued that the Yugoslavians won a moral and psychological victory against a materially superior enemy. They fought a "guerrilla air war" while maintaining their national pride and confidence, and refused to give up. A "people's war under high-tech conditions" requires the involvement of every sector of society, and therefore China's national defense education should be increased, and national pride and confidence should be fostered throughout the country.³¹

Guo claimed that the Kosovo conflict demonstrated that given high-quality military personnel, an inferior force could overcome a superior enemy in a high-tech war. Thus, education and training should have a high priority within the PLA, and Chinese soldiers should be taught how to use low-tech equipment creatively to defeat a high-tech enemy. The author called for intensive study of U.S. equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to learn their weaknesses and defeat them.

Finally, NATO air strikes applied strategic and operational weapons (long range bombers and cruise missiles) against tactical targets. This allowed NATO to attack targets in hours or minutes that could formerly be engaged only from the ground over the course of several months. Such strikes required the suppression of enemy air defenses, and therefore the survival of air defenses is of great importance. The author concluded:

"We must do our best to combine defense of selected spots and the whole area in our deployment, extensively achieve mobility in the battlefield,

combine cover for specific targets with cover for whole areas, preserve our own strength in mobile operations, and eliminate or weaken the enemy."

Major General Su Enze of the Air Force Command Academy agreed that China has not paid enough attention to the problem of withstanding airstrikes, because the previous consensus was that "future wars will mainly consist of attack and defense on land."³² He argued that China should improve her capabilities in four areas:

- *Civil Defense*: The people's air defense consciousness should be raised, and city planning and construction should take air defense into account.
- *Electronic Warfare*: This is a weak link in China's defenses, and further research is necessary.
- *"Air Defense from the Land"*: China will have little capability for defensive air-to-air combat in the immediate future, and thus her air defense must be mounted from the ground. China requires quick firing weapons that use terrain for concealment and that can employ highly flexible strategies.
- *Organization*: Centralized command is too easy to disrupt or destroy. China should create a networked system in which each node is capable of some independent action.

Song Xinzhi claimed that NATO airstrikes were not entirely successful, because the FRY managed to employ clever tactics to frustrate a superior opponent.³³ He highlighted Yugoslavia's use of mobility, dispersion, camouflage, concealment, and deception, and their decision to permit some targets to be destroyed in order to conserve their defenses for counterattacks. He contrasted this with Iraq's rigid efforts to protect key targets during the Gulf War, which quickly resulted in the annihilation of the Iraqi defenses.

Song considered that a modern air defense system should seek to impose at least 1% combat losses on the enemy over a prolonged period of time. This requires the defender to preserve a counterattack capability, and to avoid defending any given place to the death. China should focus on enhancing the survivability of her air defenses, principally by improving their mobility. Air defense weapons must be able to fire quickly and then move before the enemy responds. Fighter planes must have STOL capability and be able to operate from primitive strips. All forces must be sheltered and camouflaged, and there must be active measures to defeat enemy precision guided weapons:

"Smokescreens are very effective for countering laser-guided bombs, spraying water to reduce the temperature of infrared-guided bombs is rather effective, and jamming navigational signals will make GPS-guided bombs lose control. Setting up decoys and electronic deception means could also play important roles in protecting the safety of targets."

Huang Guanghan noted that "long-range air attacks have become an important pattern of modern war."³⁴ Such attacks can be launched rapidly, involve multiple means of

attack, and cause tremendous destruction and casualties. Typically the full depth of the defending country is attacked over a long period of time, and attacks focus on command, control, and communications centers, missile facilities, airfields, and transportation hubs. Therefore China must learn to camouflage and protect such major targets, and one method is to use underground shelters. China should create "in-depth protection works... in possible battlefields... major cities and at strategic points." Command posts and communications hubs should be hidden deep underground, and full use should be made of "cliffs, valleys, caves, ravines, jungles, and other natural shelters and structures." Smoke screens could be used as an additional camouflage.

Huang observed that deception was of fundamental importance in Yugoslavia:

"In future war, we should also skillfully set up false targets and false positions to confuse and deceive the enemy; we should use imitative materials, civilian vehicles, and scrapped weapons and equipment to set up fake command posts, fake airports, fake radar stations, and fake positions to attract the enemy's firepower and to preserve our combat forces."

Movement serves to enhance survivability, and therefore "firepower and troops should be extensively mobile." An "integrated air-ground strike system" should be prepared to strike back at the enemy, and to hit "boldly and powerfully" at enemy weaknesses and vital centers.

Huang emphasized the role of information as an enabler of both enemy long-range strikes and friendly counterstrikes. In his view, "our army should step up the building of a theater digitized information network and build a relatively systematic, complete... all-army information system." For defensive purposes, China requires the capability "to disrupt the enemy's intelligence transmission system and to weaken his ability to wage information warfare."

Yao Yunzhu, a member of the Foreign Military Department of the Academy of Military Sciences, argued that given the disparity in strength between the opponents, the FRY's performance was "exceptional."³⁵ The FRY adopted the correct combat strategy: "to protect real strength and persist in resistance." The FRY refused to confront NATO strength directly; instead, the Yugoslavians hid their combat aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles, and preserved their radars by turning them on only sporadically. Yugoslavian forces were dispersed in difficult terrain, hidden among civilians in Kosovo, and fought even when isolated from higher command levels. Yao believed China should adopt all these measures in the future.

Four PLA officers from the Guangzhou Military Region held a forum on the implications of Allied Force, and published a summary in *Jiefangjun Bao*.³⁶ They reached the somewhat banal conclusion that "high-tech training on the basis of existing armament" should be a priority in the PLA, because such training could potentially compensate for deficiencies in equipment. Moreover, Allied Force showed that "counter-air raid combat"

deserves close study. The Yugoslavs made clever use of climate, terrain, flexible command and control, and high-quality, well-trained officers and men in their resistance to NATO strikes, and China should learn from these techniques.

Conclusion

If these articles accurately reflect Chinese opinions, then the Chinese believe that long-range precision strikes will play a very prominent role in any future Sino-American conflict. This contrasts with their previous view, held since the Gulf War, that future warfare would be primarily characterized by a clash of ground forces. They consider that American long-range precision strikes would be preceded by intensive overhead reconnaissance, and by electronic warfare and computer network attack. The initial American targets would be airfields, air defense sites, and C2 nodes.

The Chinese recognize that they will not be able to confront an American long-range precision strike campaign directly for quite some time, and therefore they hope to defend themselves through asymmetric methods. These could potentially include passive defenses (deep underground shelters, camouflage, concealment, and dispersion), active defenses (smoke screens, sprays, and jamming), and deception (multispectral decoys). The PLAAF would not fly except in exceptionally favorable circumstances, or when an opportunity arose for a decisive counterblow. Meanwhile, the PLA would seek to attrit the U.S. Air Force through the use of air defense guns and missiles that could fire rapidly and then immediately move. They would focus their computer network attacks on U.S. communications links, and the use of weapons of mass destruction could not be excluded.

Several other significant conclusions can be inferred from Chinese writings. Firstly, the Chinese view the U.S. as casualty averse, and thus they would probably try to inflict maximum casualties on U.S. forces and possibly also the U.S. civilian population. They would certainly attempt to hide their own forces among the Chinese civilian population. Finally, many Chinese writings focus on the crucial importance of U.S. space assets. This suggests that the Chinese would seek to find ways to deny, disrupt, or degrade these assets, either through anti-satellite warfare or some other more indirect means such as Special Operations Forces attacks on ground stations.

References

1. Michael Pillsbury, ed., *Chinese Views of Future Warfare* (Washington: NDU Press, 1997) xvii.
2. In his excellent book, Stokes notes that China's NDU and AMS have "flooded China's strategy community with writings on information warfare." Mark A. Stokes, *China's Strategic Modernization* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999) p. 28. Many of the authors translated by Pillsbury are affiliated with these institutions.
3. Other publications surveyed for this article included *Xinhua* (the official Chinese news agency), *Zhongguo Tongxun She* (a PRC-owned news agency), *Keji Ribao* (Science and Technology Daily), *Ta Kung Pao* (a PRC-owned daily newspaper), and *Cheng Ming* (a non-PRC-owned monthly magazine, which FBIS states has a "tendency to sensationalize").

4. The CPC Politburo laid out these essential principles after Jiang Zemin returned from Europe in early April 1999. See Yueh Shan, "Beijing Sets Forth New World War Theory," *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), 1 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0516. Yueh is a reporter.
5. He Chong, "The U.S. Purpose in Instigating NATO to Attack Yugoslavia," *Zhongguo Tongxun She* (Hong Kong), 26 March 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0326. Zhang Xiao, "The Essence of NATO's New Strategic Concept," *Guangming Ribao* (Beijing), 28 April 1998, FBIS-CHI-1999-0507. Wang Naicheng, "Failure of the New Strategic Concept," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 22 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0601. Yan Zheng, "What Are NATO's Motives in Bombing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?" *Renmin Luntan* (Beijing), 16 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0516. He, Yan, and Zhang are journalists. Wang is a researcher at the China Institute for International Strategic Studies.
6. Wei Wei, "Ulterior Motives in Military Intervention," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 25 March 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0331.
7. Li Yung-kang, "U.S. World Strategy Viewed in Kosovo Crisis," *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), 26 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0619. Li's identity is unknown, but he is probably a journalist.
8. The best-known separatist issue in China concerns Tibet, but there is also ethnic tension in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. In Xinjiang, the westernmost portion of China, there is a large population of ethnically Turkic Sunni Muslims. Xinjiang has seen constant unrest since the 1980s, including terrorist bombings, assassination of government officials, riots, and street fighting. The territorial dispute in the South China Sea involves the Spratly Islands (claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei) and the Paracel Islands (claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam). China expelled Vietnamese troops from the Paracels in 1974, and fought a naval battle with Vietnam over the Spratlys in 1988. See Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997) 115-117 and 196-200.
9. Ma Ling, "Interview with Yao Youzhi: U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century," *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), 3 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0515. Ma is a reporter.
10. Cheng Guangzhong, "The Kosovo War and the US Python Strategy," *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), 2 June 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0625.
11. Stokes, pp. 12-13. See also David Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang, eds., *China's Military in Transition* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 192-194.
12. See, for example, Senior Colonel Shen Kuiguan in Pillsbury, pp. 213-219.
13. Zhang Zhaozhong in "Discussion of the Kosovo Crisis Among Experts at the National Defense University," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 13 April 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0518.
14. Ibid.
15. Su Size, "Kosovo War and New Military Theory," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 1 June 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0701. Su's background is unclear.
16. Jia Weidong, "Future Warfare Trends Viewed from Kosovo," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 17 April 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0510. Jia is a researcher at the General Staff Headquarters and an army senior colonel.
17. Zhu Wenquan and Zhao Taizhong, "High-Tech Learning in Light of the Kosovo War," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 25 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0625. Lieutenant-General Zhu Wenquan was recently promoted to head the Nanjing military region, which oversees the Taiwan area. Zhao Taizhong is political commissar of the Nanjing Military Area Command.
18. Ye Lu, "Strategic Thought on Weapons Development," *Keji Ribao* (Beijing), 20 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0621. Ye's background is unclear.
19. Wang Baocun, "Information Warfare in the Kosovo Conflict," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 25 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0623. Senior Colonel Wang Baocun frequently writes about information warfare.
20. Yuan Bingzhong, "Why Is the United States Vague About a Ground War," *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), 25 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0525. Yuan is a journalist.
21. Liang Jie, "Interview with Military Expert Quan An," *Guangming Ribao* (Beijing), 15 June 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0627. Liang is a journalist, and Quan An "works for a military organ and has long been involved in the research on military theories."
22. "NATO Using Banned Weapons in FRY," 21 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0521. See also Ma Shikun and Zhang Yong, "How Can the United States Extricate Itself from a Dilemma," *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), 24 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0525. Ma and Zhang are US-based reporters. Wang Zhimin, "NATO in Dilemma in Yugoslav War," 26 April 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0427. Wang

- is a reporter. Xie Wenqing and Liu Wanping, "International Observation," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 23 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0601. Xie and Liu are reporters.
23. Wang Zudian, "The Offensive and Defensive of High-Technology Arms Equipment," *Xinhua* (Beijing), 24 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0526. Wang is a researcher at the Space Technology Information Research Institute of China.
 24. Guo Anhua, "Evaluation and Thoughts on Kosovo War Situation," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 4 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0520. Maj. Gen. Guo Anhua is superintendent of the Army Command College.
 25. Ma Ling, "Interview with Renowned Military Commentator Zhang Zhaozhong," *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), 17 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0518. Ma is a journalist.
 26. Su Chin-lung and Hsueh Hsiang, "Embassy Bombing Premeditated," *Hsein-Tai Chun-Shih* (Hong Kong), 11 June 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0626. The authors backgrounds are unknown.
 27. Jen Hui-wen, "China's Reaction to the Bombing of its Yugoslav Embassy," *Hsin Pao* (Hong Kong), 14 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0517. Jen is a reporter and columnist.
 28. Li Tzu-ching, "The Chinese Military Clamors for War," *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), 1 June 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0626. Li is a reporter.
 29. Xiao Feng, "World Trends Under U.S. Global Strategy," *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), 31 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0601. Ma Shikun and Zhang Yong, "United States: Winner or Loser?" *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), 11 June 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0611. Ma and Zhang are journalists. Xiao's background is unknown.
 30. Guo Anhua, "Evaluation and Thoughts on Kosovo War Situation," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 4 May 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0520.
 31. Another author argued that "ethnic cohesiveness" and "lofty patriotism" enabled the Serbs to withstand the NATO airstrikes: "Soft force formed from national morale and will has been the most important factor in defending against the foreign enemy. It has been a valuable treasure that is most worthy of learning from." Wang Yu in "Discussion of the Kosovo Crisis Among Experts at the National Defense University," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 13 April 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0518. Wang is a Master's Candidate at National Defense University.
 32. Su Enze in "Discussion of the Kosovo Crisis Among Experts at the National Defense University," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 13 April 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0518. Major General Su Enze is a professor of the Air Force Command Academy.
 33. Song Xinzhi, "Transform Air Defense Concepts," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 27 April 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0507. Song's background is unknown.
 34. Huang Guanghan, "Countermeasures Against Long-Range Air Attacks," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 22 June 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0710. Huang's background is unknown.
 35. Yao Yunzhu in "Discussion of the Kosovo Crisis Among Experts at the National Defense University," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 13 April 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0518. Wan Fayang of the Office of the 2nd Artillery Headquarters made essentially similar observations in the same article.
 36. Duan Zhiming, Mei Lijin, Liu Jianmin, and Xiang Zihui, "Warning From the Flame of War in Kosovo," *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), 20 April 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-502. The authors backgrounds are unknown.