Why ROTC?

The Debate over Collegiate Military Training, 1969-1973

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The war in Vietnam precipitated a crisis in the ROTC program. That crisis crested in the late sixties and early seventies in a wave of anti-ROTC protests and demonstrations on college and university campuses across the nation. Worries about the draft and concerns about the costs and morality of the war fueled these disturbances. At some institutions, acts of vandalism and arson were directed at ROTC facilities. At others, ROTC instructors were subjected to threats, intimidation and, on occasion, violence. But even at institutions that did not experience violent manifestations of anti-war or anti-military sentiment, students and faculty often pushed to get the ROTC thrown off campus, relegated to extracurricular status, or stripped of academic credit.

At the same time, ROTC enrollment and officer production plummeted. The gradual phasing out of conscription, the progressive elimination of compulsory ROTC programs, and a sharp drop in officer requirements combined with a hostile campus environment to produce this precipitous decline. The prospects of ROTC looked bleak. In fact, the program’s situation appeared so grave that many, including congressmen, defense department officials and senior military officers, began to question ROTC’s viability as the premier commissioning source for the armed forces. These doubts were reinforced by members of the academic community who, convinced of the basic incompatibility of military training and academic study, recommended that the defense department look for other ways to get its officers.

Scores of alternative commissioning schemes were bandied about in both official and academic circles throughout this period. Most were variants of four basic models—namely, an expanded service academy system, Officer Candidate School (OCS), the Marine Corps Platoon Leader’s Course (PLC), and the off-campus training center. Each, especially the last three, had its ardent champions who insisted that their favorite option could better meet the defense department’s needs than the ROTC.

Yet the ROTC emerged from this crisis stronger in many respects than ever. In the end, the defense department reaffirmed the program as its principal commissioning source and bolstered recruiting incentives to ensure that it remained vibrant in an all-volunteer environment. The intent of this article is to capture the essential points of the debate that surrounded the ROTC at what was probably the most turbulent period in its history and, in the process, shed light on why the government decided to retain a program that many informed and influential observers believed had outlived its usefulness.

Problems with ROTC. The ROTC faced a number of truly formidable problems during the waning stages of the Vietnam war. The major one, as suggested above, involved officer production. Of the three services, the Army, which had the largest commissioning requirements, was in the worst shape in this respect. Enrollment in the Army’s program dropped 78 percent (from 150,982 to 33,200) between 1968 and 1973; officer output fell 67 percent (from 16,306 to 5,367) during the same period. In 1970, the Pentagon projected that the Army ROTC would miss its commissioning objective for 1974 by 1,800. The shortfall would mean that the Army would not be able to meet its active component let alone its reserve accession needs. Other studies gave equally pessimistic production forecasts.¹

ROTC’s allegedly excessive time demands were a source of concern in both the military and academic communities. These demands supposedly inhibited academic performance and repelled many capable students who might otherwise have enrolled in ROTC. Alternatives such as PLC, which entailed the concentration of all military training in two intense summer sessions, had a wide appeal because they eliminated all on-campus instruction. Under such options, military training would not in any way interfere with a student’s academic work or with his participation in
extracurricular activities. Many military officers felt that this would act as a boon to recruiting while university faculty liked it because they felt it would raise the quality of a cadet’s undergraduate experience.\(^2\)

The PLC along with the off-campus training center alternative (which was similar to the existing ROTC program except that classes and training were conducted in an off-campus training site) would, many believed, eliminate another of ROTC’s supposed shortcomings—its essential incompatibility with the aims, goals and methods of a university. This incompatibility, some were quick to point out, was not totally or even primarily attributable to the contention and bitterness that grew out of opposition to the Vietnam war. Rather, this incompatibility stemmed from more fundamental points of contention that had colored military-university relations for decades. Academic critics of the ROTC charged that the content of its courses were “intellectually barren,” that its methods were “inconsistent with the University’s spirit of free inquiry,” that its curriculum and faculty, unlike the curriculum and faculty of any other department, were imposed by an outside agency; that its instructors were, by academic background and temperament, unsuited for teaching in a university setting; and that the purpose of ROTC instruction, which was to indoctrinate and inspire, was antithetical to the purpose of a university education, which was to foster critical thinking. These critics demanded that ROTC instructors be stripped of academic rank, that ROTC courses be deprived of academic credit, that the programs be placed under the tight control of academic departments, and that, in general, the ROTC assume a less autonomous and visible place in the university.\(^3\)

The criticism and close scrutiny to which the program was subjected combined with frequent expressions of anti-military sentiment to make many ROTC instructors feel unwelcome—or worse. An instructor at Rutgers likened the ROTC’s position on his campus to that of a “leper colony.”\(^4\) One civilian professor, in an article that received wide attention at the time, asserted that college faculties generally despised the program, “except for the A&M-phys ed-campus police amalgam and an occasional Army man in the natural sciences.”\(^5\) This was not true on all campuses, or even a majority of them, but the situation described by this professor was sufficiently widespread to occasion many military officers to question the appropriateness and desirability of the university campus as a setting for officer accession programs. This was because, the consensus within the defense department was, ROTC programs could not flourish in a hostile environment. They needed the support, or at least the benevolent neutrality, of the faculty and administration to be successful.\(^4\)

The uncertainty of ROTC officer output bothered many officials. The campus turmoil of the era and the expulsion of ROTC units from certain universities—Yale, Stanford, Harvard and Dartmouth among them—made a deep impression on certain senior military and defense officials, making them chary of relying too heavily on ROTC as a commissioning source. They did not want commissioning programs held hostage to hostile students, faculty members or university administrators. And with the ROTC, this was always a possibility, even if at most ROTC-affiliated institutions, a relatively slight one.

The inflexibility of ROTC production was another disadvantage. The program’s four-year commissioning process simply could not accommodate the frequent fluctuations in the services’ officer needs. During emergencies, it produced too many officers; during periods of lessened needs, it produced too many. In 1972, the Army had to resort to what amounted to an involuntary separation program to deal with its temporary glut of candidates for ROTC commissions who were then lodged in the program’s extended commissioning pipeline. Recruiting, cadet morale and military-university relations all suffered as a result.\(^5\)

Officer Candidate School seemed to many to be an attractive commissioning alternative to the ROTC. Because it was of short duration—it consisted of several months of intense and rigorous training—and because its faculty could be rapidly secured, OCS had a flexibility and a responsiveness that the ROTC could not match. It allowed quick expansion in an emergency and quick contraction in the aftermath of a crisis.\(^6\)

The effectiveness of ROTC training was also an open question. Many interested parties, both within the defense department and without, argued that officer accession programs that concentrated all training in intensive summer sessions on military installations better prepared their charges to fulfill the duties of a lieutenant or an ensign than did the ROTC. On campus, a host of other responsibilities and activities competed for the cadet’s time and attention; moreover, a suitable atmosphere for conducting training was absent. An ROTC study group at Cornell called the attempt of ROTC instructors to create a military environment in the university setting a “farce,” and urged the defense department to eliminate all on-campus training.\(^7\)
Countervailing Considerations. But there were powerful countervailing considerations that, in the end, convinced the armed forces that the ROTC should remain the mainstay of officer accessions. One of these considerations was cost. During this period, the ROTC was by a substantial margin the armed forces' “most economical source” of new lieutenants. While critics maintained that people and resources could be saved by replacing the ROTC with summer training or post-graduation commissioning alternatives, the program’s defenders pointed out that the personnel savings achieved by cutting campus staff would be more than offset by the increased personnel requirements needed to operate an expanded summer camp or OCS system. Moreover, the expanded camp system would place an intolerable burden on the posts and units that hosted them.⁸

The personal characteristics of the ROTC-produced officer was another reason often cited as justification for the program. Educated by “critical thinking” civilian faculty, the ROTC lieutenant or ensign had a flexibility of mind and independence of spirit that the armed forces desperately needed at a time when they were struggling to adjust to the complex social and political challenges of the post-industrial era—an adjustment that had been delayed by the war in Vietnam. Many also viewed the ROTC-trained officer as particularly well-equipped to deal with and relate to the contemporary enlisted soldier, especially the junior enlisted soldier. The prevailing opinion was that they tended to be less authoritarian, less dogmatic and less rigid in their approach to their duties and in their interaction with subordinates than were military traditionalists. The Army Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, asserted that ROTC graduates brought with them into the officer corps an "educated and humanizing" leadership style—a style that seemed very appropriate for a defense establishment being weaned from conscription and attempting to make military service more attractive to the nation’s youth.⁹

ROTC product quality was considered another of the program’s strongpoints. Senior military officers and many academics agreed that ROTC provided the services with the kind of capable and intellectually versatile leader that the armed forces would need in the post-Vietnam era. To be sure, commissioning programs like OCS turned out lieutenants who were more immediately useful to their respective services. As a result of their enlisted experience, many OCS lieutenants and ensigns arrived at their first duty station with a high level of technical expertise and tactical savvy. But the ROTC-trained officer normally possessed what a defense department special committee on ROTC described as professional "depth." The close and extended contact between officer and cadet, regular reinforcement of training, and the protracted period of professional socialization that characterized the two to four year ROTC program is what gave the ROTC lieutenant that distinctive quality. And the services were convinced that this "depth" could be developed only if the training program continued over several years "without interruption."¹⁰

An Associate Professor of Naval Science at the University of Oklahoma elaborated on this point. In the ROTC program, he asserted, the student and ROTC instructor could look at one another "critically" and decide if the other was to his liking. Any decisions enrollment would be made at a time when both parties had the "flexibility of adjusting to prevailing circumstances" and in an environment in which they were not "rushed." Moreover, the extended nature of the program allowed the services to teach cadets in an "orderly manner," imparting to them not "just an array of technical facts" but that "spark" that "every officer worth his salt must acquire somewhere." Developing that "spark" was decidedly not an "overnight affair." It required "time, proper atmosphere and proper input of intelligent physically-fit manhood.’ And, according to the NROTC instructor, nowhere were these things as "well combined as on the college campus."¹¹

The desire of the services and the defense department to fill the officer corps with college graduates also explained ROTC’s appeal. During the period under consideration, it is important to note, the baccalaureate degree and the commission were not as clearly linked as they would later become. In 1960, only 57 percent of active duty officers were college graduates; 70 percent were by 1970 but the still fell considerable short of the services’ goals.¹²

By placing a premium on educational attainment, the services were following the general trend in civilian industry where a college degree had become a virtual prerequisite for entry into management. But the emphasis on civilian education also helped the armed forces address a number of specific needs. The increasing complexity of warfare and the military profession seemingly demanded a more educated and sophisticated officer corps. Understanding the implications of technological advances, adapting to a new and more ambiguous international system, coping with an altered and more anti-military domestic environment, and managing the services’ transition to an all-volunteer force called for officers with a broad range of academic backgrounds and intellectual skills. And individuals with such a diversity of skills and backgrounds could be found in abundance in the ROTC program.¹³
The desire of the services to have leaders intellectually capable of holding their own within a defense establishment that, since the advent of McNamara, had been increasingly dominated by civilian defense analysts and strategists also argued for a heavy emphasis on educational attainment in new officer accessions. The military, it appeared to some, was struggling to protect itself against what Adam Yarmolinsky described as “progressively greater civilian encroachments into its domain.” It was a struggle that many in the early seventies saw the services losing. In the wake of Vietnam and the social upheaval it generated, the stature and authority previously accorded to military opinion on issues relating to military affairs and foreign policy had eroded—“virtually disappeared” according to Yarmolinsky. If they hoped to preserve their institutional prerogatives and effectively defend their interests, the armed forces needed educated officers—officers with the knowledge and intellectual skills requisite for countering the ill-conceived schemes of civilian defense analysts, many of whom, it was felt, lacked an appreciation of the unique requirements of the military services.14

This preference for the baccalaureate degree holder was also bound up with the self-image and self-esteem of the military officer. During this era, some refuted the notion that the “profession of arms” was a profession, at least in the way that word was usually defined in the academic community. There was “little in the way of skills or knowledge” one scholar noted, “that are peculiar to the military.” Public opinion surveys showed that the occupation of military officer had relatively little prestige attached to it. Low pay, frequent reassignments, and the hardships of military life supposedly made a career as an officer unattractive to many of the nation’s most capable youth. Some regarded it as an “easy escape from the rigors of competition for the untalented.” And the idea that it did not take a particularly well-educated person to be an effective officer was by no means the exclusive domain of anti-military activists. The committee appointed by President Nixon to evaluate the feasibility of an all-volunteer military questioned the need for officers to possess college degrees, calling the defense department’s decision to fill the officer corps with college graduates “somewhat arbitrary.” Reasonable intelligent individuals with high school diplomas made fine officers. Besides, their salary expectations were lower.15

Many military leaders saw the combination of the baccalaureate degree requirement and the presence of the ROTC unit on campus as a means of countering the unflattering images of the military profession mentioned above and helping remove the blue collar tinge that still colored public perceptions of the officer corps. Through the ROTC program, the services got college-educated leaders and at the same time, gained entrée into some of the nation’s leading intellectual centers, made military science courses part of university curricula and placed military officers on college faculties. These connections with academe, as tenuous as they were at some institutions, bolstered the social prestige and public respectability of the armed forces; and prestige and respectability seemed especially important in the early 1970s as the services prepared to abandon conscription and compete in the civilian market place for their fair share of college-educated talent.16

An even more determinative factor behind the services’ retention of the ROTC as their premier commissioning program was their conviction that, given the fiscal constraints and qualitative parameters that guided accessions policy, only the traditional campus-based program could attract enough officer candidates of the right type to meet officer requirements. The widely-held assumption that the elimination of training and instruction during the academic year would boost enrollment was expressly rejected. ROTC was the best method of procuring officers for the armed forces, it was believed, because of the close and regular officer-student interaction it entailed. To meet accession needs, the prevailing view within the defense establishment was, officers had to be present on campus, functioning as an integral part of the university system. Otherwise, the services would be unable to recruit a sufficient number of new students or to sustain the commitment and enthusiasm of a sufficient number of enrolled cadets over the course of their undergraduate careers. Officer producing programs where contact between the cadet and officer/mentor was infrequent or intermittent could serve as useful supplements to the ROTC but could never supplant it.17

The services also valued their ROTC programs because they served as one of their principal channels of public education and outreach. The ROTC fulfilled this public education function in several ways. One was by simply training and educating cadets. The vast majority of students who had first-hand experience with the program, whether they pursued a commission or not, purportedly became better citizens and more productive workers as a result. The idea that participation in the program instilled civic virtues, fostered moral strength, developed “dynamic character,” and cemented commitment to the existing order in students had a wide currency.
ROTC as a seedbed of national leadership was an especially popular theme among military officers. As he was nearing the end of his tour as the Army’s Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland observed, "The ROTC program is a prime source not only for Army leadership, it is a prime source nor this Nation’s leadership...it develops the qualities our nation needs if it is to progress and survive." Among the qualities that ROTC developed in its charges, according to the defense department, were "patriotism, respect for authority, the ability to think and reason, the capacity to respond intelligently in a crisis, a sense of honor, leadership ability, the ability to make sound judgments" and "good citizenship," to name just a few.18

But the scope of ROTC’s public education and outreach responsibilities extended beyond the classroom and the cadet to the larger civilian and university communities. The ROTC instructor was a "goodwill ambassador" for the armed forces. In addition to teaching cadets, his responsibilities included "educating the public" and "influencing the public mind." ROTC units and instructors were, in effect, instruments with which the services told their story to America’s educated classes and, it was hoped, gained their support and understanding. Military officers assigned to campuses performed this public education function by becoming active members of the university faculty (serving on faculty committees, teaching classes, overseeing extracurricular activities, etc.), representing their service in civic activities and in civic organizations, and, in general, being active and responsible members of the community in which they lived and worked. Making formal, public presentations outlining the defense department’s position on issues of contemporary interest had a place in this effort too, although a decidedly secondary one.19

Public education and outreach had been part of the unofficial mandate of collegiate military training since the passage of the Morrill Act of 1862, the legislation that required land-grant colleges to offer military instruction. This mandate, however, seemed to assume a special significance in the early 1970s, when the services were converting from a conscript to an all-volunteer system. Many feared that in the post-Vietnam era the armed forces would increasingly diverge from the societal mainstream as an increasingly smaller portion of the American public and its leaders would experience military service. Public support for and understanding of the military would erode as the services became more isolated and alienated from society. Some considered what they perceived as a growing gap between America’s cultural elites to be an especially worrisome aspect of the problem. These elites, it was observed, viewed the uniformed services and the men who led them with something bordering on disdain. The ROTC, based as it was in the nation’s centers of intellectual inquiry, seemed to be one of the most convenient, appropriate and potentially effective instruments available to begin closing some the social and political breaches that the Vietnam war had widened and help avert a future crisis in civil-military relations. The eminent military sociologist Morris Janowitz thought so. He wrote that, with the abandonment of conscription, officer education programs like ROTC would become the principal means by which the services maintained "meaningful relations with the larger society."20

The need for the services to maintain a degree of social, geographical, economic and intellectual balance in their officer corps was a factor frequently mentioned by both civilian and military observers in their support of the ROTC. The program’s supporters pointed out that the ROTC encompassed all 50 states, "all strata of society," and all types of schools. Historically black colleges; Ivy League universities; small, liberal arts schools; mammoth, research-oriented state institutions; and small, teaching-oriented state colleges—each with its own distinct culture and traditions—all hosted ROTC units. This broad sampling of institutions lent a diversity to the ROTC and to the ranks of military leaders that the other commissioning sources did not and, many were convinced, could not do.21

The diversity that ROTC brought to the officer corps had long been advanced as a argument for the program. When the defense department began to phase out conscription in the early seventies, however, this argument took on an even greater relevancy. Some commentators saw the advent of the all-volunteer force narrowing the social base of the officer corps—and that base was expected to contract still further as the professional force took root. In fact, a few scholars suggested that the program’s social, economic and intellectual base was already unrepresentative of the collegiate population at large. The disestablishment of ROTC units at prestigious, private universities in the Northeast, the expansion of the program into small, rural state-supported colleges in the South and West that did not have reputations for academic excellence, and the low participation rates of black students enrolled in predominantly white institutions were some of the factors that sparked their concern. But if the people that ROTC brought into the armed forces were not a true cross-section of the educated public or of America’s undergraduate population, defense officials believed, they were certainly a more diverse lot that the services could hope to get from other commissioning sources, extant or projected.22
By far the most frequently mentioned reason for retaining the ROTC as the principal officer procurement program, however, was that it promoted what one study called “American concepts” of civil-military relations. ROTC officers, it was often suggested, were particularly accepting of and sympathetic to “civilian” values. Their "essentially civilian social, educational, and cultural" backgrounds supposedly inoculated them to some degree against what one study labeled “the prevailing military ethos”—an ethos that, some believed, was not completely attuned to the norms and values of the larger society.23

Many observers, like the Continental Army Command’s ROTC Director, Brigadier General Milton E. Key, looked upon the ROTC as the guarantor of the "citizen-army" concept and the principle of civilian control over the military. A special committee appointed to study the ROTC program by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird also viewed the ROTC in this way. The "most important argument" for the ROTC, the committee wrote in its report (September, 1969), was that it strengthened "civilian participation in and influence upon the military. If the services dropped ROTC, the committee warned, they would be in "grave danger" of becoming isolated from the "intellectual centers of the public," which they were supposed to serve and defend.24

In a 1970 report, the Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges declared that the ROTC was "one of the best guarantees against the establishment in this country of a military caste or clique." At the Continental Army Command’s annual ROTC Conference in 1971, Dr. Lee S. Dreyfus, president of Wisconsin State University at Stevens Point and chairman of the Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs, asserted that the ROTC "is not the presence of the Army on the campus" but "the presence of the university in the Army." He feared the "elitism" that would inevitably emerge within the officer corps if the program was eliminated and described the ROTC as "the key anti-militaristic check balance in the Army."25

Other defenders of the program emphasized that the "interplay between civilian and military subjects" was one of the "most valuable assets" of the ROTC. In a September 1969 speech commemorating the 150th anniversary of collegiate military training in the United States, the Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor called this interplay the "essence of the ROTC program." The intermixing of civilian education and military training, it was asserted, created an atmosphere uniquely conducive to the inculcation of democratic ideals in officer aspirants and uniquely capable of fortifying the principle of civilian control of the military. Those who believed that the services could achieve the same results with summer training or post-graduation commissioning programs, many felt, were mistaken. ROTC was not just about putting college graduates in the armed forces. It was also about integrating civilian studies and military training in such a way that the two merged into one indivisible whole.26

One ROTC instructor summed up this viewpoint quite succinctly. What the nation and the services needed, he argued, were officers

who have received their military education at the same time they were reading Thoreau, who have studied the principles of war and the Sermon on the Mount within the same morning….Men of a mind that has stretched to comprehend these widely divergent views of reality and men of a spirit that will calmly embrace them into a single, balanced view of life bring with them to the ranks of the Armed Forces of a democracy that broad and enlightened understanding of the control of violence that is the saving of our way of life.27

Some also maintained that the ROTC duty promoted a healthy state of civil-military relations through the "broadening" effect it exercised on officers. Most ROTC instructors presumably left campus with expanded cultural and intellectual horizons, a heightened capacity to tolerate diversity of various kinds, and a firmer connection with the society they were supposed to protect. These officers exercised a leavening effect on the officer corps as a whole, making it more attuned to contemporary social and political currents and more responsive to external social and political developments.28

Conclusion. Of course, the defense department officials, military officers and academics who rushed to the defense of ROTC did not suggest that the program should be the defense department’s sole source of officers. They generally agreed that the existing diversity of commissioning sources gave the officer corps a balance and a fullness that it was necessary to preserve and that the academies, OCS and PLC should continue to play an important part in
the services’ officer accession plans. Their focus was on protecting the ROTC from the assaults of military and
civilian critics who advocated the elimination of the program. To make their points, they had to underline the
distinct advantages of the ROTC, and this often involved comparisons with other commissioning programs.

The arguments advanced in support of ROTC in the late sixties and early seventies were not new. They had been
heard in one form or another since the inception of the program in 1916. But the controversy over the program
during this period and the substantial body of literature that grew out of it helped crystallize these arguments into a
semi-coherent form. Taken together, they came to constitute what amounted to an inchoate theory of collegiate
military training. The body of ideas and preferences that undergirded this “theory” laid the foundation for
precommissioning education and training in the ensuing decades and still defines the parameters within which
officer procurement and accessions policies are developed today. Judging by the record of the armed forces since the
conclusion of the Vietnam war, this body of ideas and preferences has, so far at least, served the armed forces quite
well.

Notes

1. (1) LTC W.S. Tyson, DCSPER-RUO, “An In-depth Study of the Senior ROTC Program: Present, Future and
Suggested Actions,” 1970, p.113; (2) LTC James R. Montgomery, “Lost Opportunities: Army ROTC,” USAWC,
Student Essay, 1 September 1972.

2. Report of the Special Committee on ROTC, p.22; (2) "Army ROTC Students Excel Scholastically," Army ROTC
Newsletter, Vol.1—No.2, July-September 1967, p.1; (3) Major Jack L. Bennett, "Actions Speak Louder Than
Words," Army ROTC Education Commentary, Army ROTC Newsletter, Vol.6—No.1, January-February 1972, p.6A

3. (1) Report of the Special Faculty Committee on Military Training, Bulletin of the Faculty, Cornell University,
n.d.; (2) Report of the COP [Committee on Organization and Policy] on the ROTC, Dartmouth College, October 31,
1968, pp.6-7; (3) "Do We Dare To Say No?," The Case Against ROTC at NIU [Northern Illinois University], March
11, 1968.

Military and American Society, p.119; (3) Col. Joseph V. Spitler, Jr., "Army ROTC: How to Revitalize the

5. (1) Edward B. Glick, Soldiers, Scholars, and Society: The Social Impact of the American Military

6. (1) Report of the Special Committee on ROTC, p.20; (2) The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-
Training Corps: Recent Trends and Current Status (Congressional Research Service, April 19, 1974), p.40; (4)
Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The Emergent Military: Civilianized, Traditional, or Pluralistic (The American Political


8. (1) Report of the Sub-Committee of the Educational Policy Committee for the review of the A.F.R.O.T.C.
Program at Colgate University, p.7; (2) Report of the Special Committee on ROTC, p.22; (3) DOD Comments
Regarding "Up-Dating ROTC," contained in LTC W.S. Tyson, DCSPER-RUO, "An In-depth Study of the Senior
ROTC Program: Present, Future and Suggested Actions," 1970, Enclosure 1 to Appendix H.

9. (1) Report of the Special Committee on ROTC, p.19; (2) "Gen. Westmoreland Talks On ROTC And Leadership,"
Army ROTC Newsletter, Vol.V—No.5, September—October 1971, p.3; (3) Victor Bruce Hirshauer, "The History of


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