

Bombing in the Service of Peace: SARAJEVO AND GORAZDE, SPRING, 1994

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Introduction

"For the first time in military history, air forces won a war"¹ This is the view of John Keegan on how air power was employed to achieve the objectives of the international community in Kosovo. A Canadian military historian supports his conclusion. "The NATO air offensive against Yugoslavia was a spectacular success".² However it appears that there is room for debate on the impact of the Alliance's air assets on the eventual outcome. "Air campaign had little military effect, NATO review says" states one headline. "RAF admits it failed in Kosovo" says another.³ On the other hand it appears that the bombing campaign did affect the Adriatic fishing fleet. Even the question of an "eco-nightmare" resulting from the bombing has been raised. Another, more important question for those considering national security issues, re-surfaces with the evaluation of the results of NATO's 78 day air campaign over the skies of the Former Yugoslavia.

"In Iraq and in Bosnia the first question in debates over American intervention has been, Can air power alone persuade states to alter their behaviour?"⁴ With these words, Robert A. Pape, in *Bombing to Win*, states the case for studying the employment of aerospace and air power resources for coercion. The vital question is whether air power can serve as a suitable instrument of coercion throughout the entire spectrum of war particularly in Operations Other Than War (OTTW).

The argument that air power may be the most flexible instrument of military coercion has been cogently argued within the pages of *Airpower Journal*.⁵ Major Scott Walker cites the merging of SAC and TAC into a single Air Combat Command as recognition that there are no tactical or strategic delivery platforms-only tactical or strategic targets. Carl Builder suggests that the combination of air and space power could perform a "constabulary role" and calls for the appropriate development of doctrine. On the other hand, James Corum is not so sure. He concludes



Type of target that would be identified in the SARAJEVO TEZ, in this case inspected every day as engine wasn't functional.

"airpower and air campaigns are not likely to have a decisive effect in a low-intensity conflict". In their deliberations Haiti is mentioned as much as any Balkan location.

The Balkans, however, is where NATO, and forces from other regions, are now committed to military operations at the lower end of the spectrum. The use of air power in Balkans has also been discussed extensively within the pages of the *Airpower Journal*. Addressing the Balkan conflicts specifically in an 1995 article, an Italian colonel, in contrast to Carl Builder, questioned the employment of a "third wave war form" against "first and second wave forms".⁶ Colonel Corsini was reviewing air operations in support of the United Nations.

Two articles, appearing in successive issues, attempted to summarize, and present the study teams' conclusions as found in the final report of the Balkans Air Campaign Study (BACS).⁷ This study concentrated on "Operation Deliberate Force", the "air campaign conducted against the Bosnian Serbs between 30 August and 14 September 1995". However as Colonel Owen notes in Part 1, "to study the planning of DELIBERATE FORCE is to study DENY FLIGHT",⁸ the previous NATO air operation in support of the United Nations military forces in Bosnia.

The BACS research does investigate the control process and targeting developed for the earlier operations in Bosnia but the summary appears to be written with the Bosnian Serbs always being the target of any planning or operation. In peace support operations lower on the conflict spectrum, the so-called peacekeepers may be required to be **impartial**. The BACS does note that "DENY FLIGHT" was aimed primarily at the Bosnian Serbs which gave use of air power a peace enforcement focus, not a peacekeeping focus. In Bosnia there were two other belligerents, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian government. Thus the question of whether air power can serve a coercive role in peace support operations requiring impartiality remains unanswered in the BACS summary.

Fortunately, there are two cases of the use of air power to compel behaviour in peace support operations in Bosnia that can serve as start points for examining the capability of air power to serve as a tool of military coercion at lower levels of conflict. First there was the role of air power in enforcing of the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone in February, 1994. This air threat applied both to Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government. It would also have been applied to the Bosnian Croats⁹ if that group had also had heavy weapons inside the Sarajevo exclusion zone. Therefore it serves as an example of air power coercion, against more than one belligerent, in a familiar task in the peace support operations spectrum, that of disarming the warring parties.

Then there was the apparent use of air power in bringing about the Gorazde cease-fire in April 1994. Bringing about cease-fires is a key function in any peace support operation. Although applied in the case of Gorazde to the Bosnian Serbs, this coercion model could have been the option used to attempt to stop the destruction of the Mostar designated world heritage bridge by the Bosnian Croats¹⁰ or to stop the raids on isolated Bosnian Serb farming villages by the Bosnian government forces.¹¹ These 1994 case studies provide evidence for consideration of whether bombing in the service of peace is an option in a peacekeeping scenario.

The 1994 Sarajevo Case Study

The political situation surrounding Sarajevo in early 1994 was complex. For example a Bosnian Croat brigade was assisting the Bosnian government in the defence of the city perimeter while scarcely thirty kilometers away the Croats in the Kiseljak Pocket were fighting against the Bosnian

government. Central Bosnia in prewar ethnic maps had large sections coloured "grey" –with no definable ethnic boundaries. In 1994 all sides were attempting to draw ethnic frontiers. Sarajevo, a city that had had 20% of its population identified as of "mixed" ethnic origin, had been under siege for almost two years. Bosnian Serb tanks and artillery continued to bombard the city as an attempt to coerce the Bosnian government into making a permanent settlement and to deter increasingly successful Bosnian government attacks.¹²

The creation of the Sarajevo Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) was triggered by the killing of 68 people and wounding of hundreds more in a mortar attack on a Sarajevo market on 5 February. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting of 9 February, authorized the Commander in Chief of NATO's Southern European forces (CINCSOUTH) to launch air strikes in reply to artillery or mortar attacks on Sarajevo, or against heavy weapons still in the exclusion zone that had not been placed under control of the United Nations in accordance with earlier conditions spelled out on the Decision Sheet.¹³ The threat of the first mission, an air strike to punish shelling, was retaliatory or reactionary and added weight to a cease-fire that the UN Commander was fashioning that same date at Sarajevo Airport between the two belligerents.¹⁴ The threat of the second option mission, an air strike to destroy heavy weapons not under UN control, was clearly coercive, requiring behaviour in accordance with specified terms.

The belligerents in the Sarajevo exclusion zone were given ten days, with one extra day of grace, until 21 February, to place all tanks, artillery, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, anti-aircraft missiles and anti-aircraft guns within 20 kilometers of the centre of Sarajevo, under UN control.¹⁵ In addition, NATO agencies were authorized to assist the UN in identifying violations.¹⁶

The process of identifying weapons and either ensuring their collection, or confirming that the weapons system was inoperable was only one of four parts to the February 1994 peace plan for Sarajevo. Monitoring and maintaining the cease-fire was perhaps more important, at least initially, because no party would permit weapons to be collected if hostilities were imminent. The UN also had to quickly position troops between the belligerents, where possible. Finally efforts were being made to create a Joint Commission to address the issues arising from the cease-fire.¹⁷ The NATO assistance in finding heavy weapon violations was vital as resources to do this on the ground were limited.

Up until 9 February, 1994, only the UN military observers and UN troops involved in escort of humanitarian assistance had had any freedom of movement on the Bosnian Serb side. This meant initially that military observers had to work both at the front lines to maintain a UN presence, investigate violations on the Serb side and also to start the process of searching for heavy weapons. Though the military observers on the Serb side were already for the most part located near Serb gun positions this did not mean that all such weapon sites were known.

By 19 February, the process had developed to one of NATO preparing a target list of possible violations based on aerial surveillance. This NATO list was then passed to UNPROFOR who tasked military observers to proceed to these sites within 24 hours to verify the status of the reported violation.¹⁸ Additional military observers were deployed from other UN sectors to Sarajevo to assist in this and other military observer tasks. The United Kingdom also deployed special teams of what came to be called Joint Commission Officers (JCOs) to help in this role.¹⁹

No air strikes were deemed necessary on 21 February, the deadline specified by NATO. The difficulties of measuring success in peace support operations become apparent when considering this decision. Two hundred and thirty-seven so-called heavy weapons had by that time been collected in 11 sites on the Bosnia Serb side, ten ostensibly under control of UNPROFOR troops with one site only monitored by the unarmed military observers. On the Bosnian government side 47 heavy weapons had been collected at Tito Barracks in Sarajevo itself, also the home of the Ukrainian UN battalion.²⁰ The threat to bomb had been translated into partial compliance on the ground.

The discovery of 15 armoured personnel carriers and several tanks hidden in a Sarajevo tunnel under Bosnian government control was yet to come as were many other surprises. As late as 2 May, 1994, there were still 41 identified heavy weapons that were not under UN control.²¹ Thus the process of identifying heavy weapon violations, monitoring them if they were not moved and controlling such weapons that had been collected did not end on 21 February.²² Was the intent of the NAC meeting of 9 February completely achieved?

There were legitimate explanations for many of the heavy weapons that remained uncollected in the exclusion zone after the NATO deadline. Many could not be moved either for technical reasons such as no engines in tanks, or because, in the case of some towed guns, the snow or mud prevented grouping. These reasons, like some of the other technical difficulties, could be dealt with locally. For example, the exact centre for determining the 20-kilometer radius for the TEZ was not at first specified. It became important as the Bosnian Serbs had guns near Visoko, close to the edge of the TEZ but facing away from Sarajevo into Central Bosnia where hostilities continued. The definition of what constituted a heavy weapon had to be developed, as it was, locally, thus exempting the small infantry mortar of 60mm from the prohibition. Other problems could not be answered in Sarajevo but called into question the achievement of the intended results through NATO's air threat.

Jahorina, a ski resort near Pale, but outside the special two kilometer exempt zone created around the Bosnian Serb political capital, Pale, was consistently shown by intelligence sources to be the site of at least seven tanks and three self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. UN military observers, equally consistently, were denied access: thirteen military observer attempts to investigate were turned back in three weeks May/June 1994. Freedom of access and the creditability of the air threat was at stake. Jahorina was reportedly the headquarters of the Bosnian Serb military leader, General Mladic, when he was not campaigning.²³

Hadizici, a suspected armoured vehicle re-build facility was not placed under UN control. In fact UN military observers, on several different occasions, were prevented from keeping the facility under surveillance. Several violations of the TEZ were associated with tanks or armoured vehicles either leaving or returning to this facility through the exclusion zone. There were other problems with heavy equipment transiting the TEZ. Up until May, there had been 17 reported Bosnian Serb violations of the exclusion zone moving prohibited weapons without escort or clearance or taking weapons from collection points. Fourteen actually occurred after the first NATO air strikes near Gorazde.²⁴ This raised the question of whether to conduct air strikes on moving violations. These were some examples of the TEZ challenges faced on the Bosnian Serb side²⁵

On the Bosnian government side, nothing was done about Bosnian heavy weapons on Mount Igman. UN military observers were denied access. Thus the state of the weapons, as discovered by

NATO aerial surveillance, was never determined. In view of these well-known exemptions, the effectiveness of NATO's air threat has to be called into question. Certainly there were a number of other factors, which could have also contributed to collection of weapons and the continuing cease-fire.

The Bosnian Serbs may well have derived military benefit from the cease-fire. Thus they would have an incentive to fall in with suggestions of the UN even if it meant their advantage in weapon systems was being nullified. The Bosnian government forces had been attacking the Bosnian Serb held suburb of Grbavica in January with some success utilizing their advantage in infantry and manpower. Moreover demands for Bosnian Serb forces elsewhere may have encouraged seeking a cease-fire around Sarajevo.²⁶ Perhaps the Bosnian Serbs already felt that what they lost in weapon availability they would gain in hostages in event of air strikes. Certainly in return for compliance there had to be some expectation that the UN would accept some responsibility for protecting the Bosnian Serbs if the Bosnian government forces attacked.

The heavy weapons collection undertaken by the UN scarcely impacted on the Bosnian government's main asset: infantry. More trouble was experienced with the Bosnians regarding delineation and maintenance of the cease-fire line than with heavy weapons collection. The Bosnians did not want the 10 February line to become permanent and some on the government side certainly saw these arrangements as putting a stop to possible gains in Grbavica.²⁷

A series of events in January, 1994 leading up to the Market Massacre of 5 February suggest that outside intervention was being sought by many people in the Sarajevo region. A sidebar in Maclean's magazine outlines what could be perceived as an attempt to obtain this outside intervention. On January 3, shelling killed 15. On January 22, shells killed six children who were sledding. On February 4, ten were killed by shells while waiting in a bread line.²⁸ Not covered in the media with similar headlines was shooting at the aircraft of the airlift supplying the city with food.²⁹ All of these actions, culminating with the 5 February casualties, did result in outside intervention and a temporary cease-fire. There is an argument based on these events that a party or parties, (from one or both sides) sought foreign action to bring a halt to the war at least in the Sarajevo area.

Therefore, it is difficult to assess what role the NATO air threat actually played in compelling the belligerents to place their heavy weapons in collection points. One might well question whether the air strike threat was even a factor. (It could have been a face-saving excuse to put in place a cease-fire that most fighters wanted with weapons collection an adjunct to the cessation of hostilities.) However, for the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), the UNPROFOR Force Commander, and NATO's decision-makers, air power offered the only available tool in February 1994, with which to threaten the belligerents with force. This was again to be true within months when NATO air power was again asked to play a role in a cease-fire process, this time in the Eastern Bosnia Muslim pocket of Gorazde.

The 1994 Gorazde Case Study

Interestingly enough, Gorazde fell within the purview of UN Sector Sarajevo headquarters. The political positions of the belligerents prior to the first actual use of NATO air power to attack targets on the ground in Bosnia is important in judging whether coercion was a factor in the resolution of the Gorazde situation.

On February 23, 1994, the Bosnian Croats agreed to a cease-fire with the Bosnian government forces. This was followed on 1 March by what came to be called the Washington Agreement, which outlined preliminary steps towards a Federation of these two groups of Bosnians.³⁰ The military balance was changed by these accords. Bosnian Croats had been actively fighting the Bosnian government in Mostar and other locations in Central Bosnia while co-operating, on occasion, with the Bosnian Serbs.³¹ The new military balance was no doubt responsible for the political positions expressed by the two remaining belligerent parties when brought together to negotiate at Sarajevo Airport on 7 April, 1994.

There were two agenda items, a Bosnia-Herzegovina wide cease-fire and a cease-fire to permit insertion of UN troops into Gorazde.³² The Bosnian Serbs, however, were only willing to discuss a cease-fire around Gorazde in the context of a Bosnia-wide agreement. The Bosnian government rejected this proposal, fearing that any cease-fire would lock in place a situation in which the Bosnian Serbs held 72% of the country and the government only 15%. Progress appeared possible when the Bosnians accepted the idea of an interim general cease-fire, which did not fix the boundaries. The Bosnian Serbs rejected this, insisting on total agreement for cessation of hostilities and deletion of all reference to Gorazde. The parties walked out of their joint meeting on 9 April, 1994.³³

The Bosnian Serbs had previously conducted a successful campaign in Eastern Bosnia in 1992/93 which was responsible for the reduction of Bosnian government held-territory to three enclaves in this region.³⁴ Gorazde, unlike the other Bosnian government pockets at Zepa and Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia, had only unarmed UN military observers present as an UNPROFOR presence.³⁵ These had been supplemented on 6 April by a small team of Joint Commission Officers (JCOs).

The rationale that prompted the selection of Gorazde for the Bosnian Serb attack may never be known. The Bosnian government forces may have been attempting to use Gorazde as a base for raids in Eastern Bosnia or may have been in the process of reinforcing it. The Bosnian Serbs may have seen Gorazde as a location where they could attack before the Bosnian government could make use of its surplus forces released from facing the Bosnian Croats. What was clear was that a major attack on Gorazde was taking place. By 10 April, it appeared as if the Bosnian Serbs had secured the ground necessary to dominate the city of Gorazde itself. The assessment of the Bosnian government situation on that date by one military observer was that it was "untenable".³⁶

In view of the seriousness of the Bosnian Serb shelling of the city proper and the Serb advances towards the city centre,³⁷ a warning was given by the UN BH Deputy Commander, in writing, to both the Bosnian Serb political leader, Karadzic and their military commander, Mladic in the afternoon of 10 April threatening air strikes if the Bosnian Serb attacks continued. The attacks did continue. A telephone warning was then made. When these two warnings had no apparent impact, then approval of the SRSG was sought and received for NATO aircraft to attack Bosnian Serb tanks and artillery. Two attacks were then made about 18:20 local time.³⁸

Shelling ceased on the 10th but resumed on the 11th April.³⁹ NATO aircraft made several passes, with pauses to permit UN warnings to be relayed and subsequent reflection on the part of the Bosnian Serbs to take place, before a Bosnian Serb tank was attacked.⁴⁰ Although the UN military observers in Gorazde described this use of NATO air power as "an outstanding display of weapon

technology"⁴¹ a later report advised that after the strikes "there had been heavy fighting in area of hills to SE of the city and continuous shelling of the centre and suburbs of Gorazde."⁴²

In the meantime, on 11 April, the Bosnian Serbs detained the bulk of the UN military personnel on their side of the line. This included three platoons at weapon collection points, a light armoured squadron at the UNPROFOR base at Rajlovac, 58 UN military observers, the 49 personnel and 18 vehicles already held hostage near Hadzici, and two UNPROFOR checkpoints with 14 personnel and 2 vehicles.⁴³ Ominously, UN military observers were moved from accommodations to various Bosnian Serb headquarters, a forecast of the human shield technique that would be exposed to the world on TV in 1995 when NATO launched another series of air strikes.⁴⁴ By detaining UNPROFOR personnel, the Bosnian Serbs were utilizing another form of warfare, psychological in nature, to exert pressure on the UN and ultimately NATO.

In Gorazde proper, it appeared that the Bosnian Serbs were progressing in accordance with their own timetable, unaffected by any threat of air strikes or UN negotiations. Bad weather prevented use of air power for several days but did not stop evacuation of a seriously wounded JCO by helicopter.⁴⁵ On 16 April, resumption of the air strikes resulted in a British Harrier being shot down. This was the last air strike near Gorazde and it had not stopped the Bosnian Serb advances. On 18 April, the JCOs, who had acted as the forward air controllers in Gorazde, were evacuated at the same time as a medical evacuation of the most critically injured civilians took place.⁴⁶

With departure of the JCOs, the use of NATO air power after 18 April would have been limited to control by airborne controllers, a dangerous proposition in an environment which had already cost NATO air forces a high performance aircraft.

On 19 April, 1994, a temporary arrangement for the town of Gorazde was agreed to by Bosnian Serbs and UNPROFOR.⁴⁷ That same day, UN military observers on the Bosnian Serb side near Sarajevo were given freedom of movement. On 21 April, 1994 a three kilometer Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) was created around Gorazde.⁴⁹ On 22 April, somewhat after the fact, NATO authorized CINCSOUTH to conduct air strikes against Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and other military targets within a 20 kilometer radius of the centre of Gorazde.⁵⁰ The UN Security Council Resolution of this same date demanded a cease-fire (which was already in place as of 19 April), demanded a withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces, demanded release of UN personnel and freedom of movement for all UN activities.⁵¹ Again, it would appear that the Bosnian Serbs had already agreed to these terms earlier, and why not?

The Bosnian Serb gains in their three-week Gorazde offensive were impressive. The area held by the Bosnian government was reduced by 20% although the population size remained unchanged. The Bosnian Serbs now held most key high ground and in terms of one intelligence assessment, "commanded the tactical position".⁵² Indeed the Bosnian Serbs could withdraw their heavy weapons and use lower quality soldiers.⁵³ Conforming to the arrangement developed at various forums posed no problems for the Bosnian Serbs. Translation of the attacks on tanks and headquarters on the ground near Gorazde into an effective cease-fire had not taken place. Air power had not stopped the assault, let alone the Bosnian Serbs from apparently achieving their tactical or indeed operational objectives. It is hard to see air power as any thing but an aerial demonstration of NATO's political condemnation of the Bosnian Serb aggression against the Gorazde safe haven.

Moreover, the Gorazde air strikes did expose an UNPROFOR vulnerability, the use of UN personnel as human shields which was to be exploited in 1995. (A what if, is whether the plan to place UN troops on the ground, if implemented before April, 1994, could have deterred this attack. The Srebrenica attack in 1995 suggests that the presence of troops in Gorazde in the Spring of 1994 would not have stopped the Bosnian Serbs either.)

Conclusions

Evidence is still lacking that air power can compel cease-fires under OTIW conditions such as prevailed in Eastern Bosnia in April, 1994. The difficulty remains in translating attacks on specific ground targets into meaningful peace support operations goals, in this case a desire on the part of a belligerent, the Bosnian Serbs, to stop their Gorazde assaults before their particular objectives around that enclave had been reached. On the other hand neither the UN nor NATO had any other military means at their disposal for employing military coercion.

Although many observers see the need for SFOR or an equivalent force in Bosnia for some time to come,⁵⁴ the appeal of air power in substituting for the use of troops, or reducing the use of troops, will be present for politicians, relatives and taxpayers. There is no reason to suppose the presently evolving situation for KFOR will be much different. Certainly arguments in the debate over the role of air power in deterring ethnic cleansing in Kosovo will provide ammunition for those wishing to suggest the use of air power alone, and their opponents. When considering reducing or withdrawing forces on the ground it is important to note the ineffectiveness of air power in compelling a cease-fire in the Gorazde attempt .

The threat of air strikes to force collection of heavy weapons in the Sarajevo exclusion zone may have been a factor in the partial achievement of that goal . Indeed the creation of such demilitarized zones is important in any peace process. However the exemptions suggest that the UN and NATO political will to carry through on destruction of heavy weapons not under UN control was not evident.⁵⁵ As an epilogue, it should be noted that in August, 1994, a NATO air attack on an old tank destroyer apparently convinced the Bosnian Serbs to return five heavy weapons that they had just taken away. How the Bosnian Serbs got this equipment without a fight from the UN security force surrounding the site is another question. Initially, in the case of the Sarajevo TEZ, perhaps other influences, more significant, were at work in persuading both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian government forces to permit collection of their heavy weapons.

Around Sarajevo itself, UN military observers found themselves in a changed atmosphere as result of the Gorazde air strikes. The armed JCOs who had called in the air strikes had been identified as unarmed military observers which put all the military observers under suspicion as no longer being impartial. Moreover, the days as hostages had strained personal relations, and trust, between military observers and their Bosnian Serb keepers. The impact of the Gorazde air strikes reached beyond the Drina basin to put in doubt the impartiality of UN personnel throughout Bosnia. Perhaps an active psychological warfare campaign could have prevented this perception.⁵⁶

The use of air strikes could have been coupled with a psyops campaign to explain to Bosnian Serbs why their friends and relatives were being attacked by NATO aircraft near Gorazde. Messages could have been disseminated pointing out that if the Bosnian Croats attacked near Mostar or if the

Bosnian government attacked into Grabvica, then those forces would be similarly threatened by Allied air strikes if they didn't stop.

For psychological impact, if only one tank was to be attacked, perhaps a B-52 would have made a greater impression as apparently was the case in Desert Storm.⁵⁷ Word of this attack would have spread throughout Bosnia and would have served to underline the NATO commitment to compelling a cease-fire. The psychological preparation needed to accompany the use of air power to compel cease-fires must be considered at the same time as targeting commences.

In both cases, **SARAJEVO, and GORAZDE, air power was the only tool available to the NATO and UNPROFOR commanders** for enforcement. The UN Commander in Bosnia in 1994 publicly credited the presence of NATO airplanes as giving him the confidence to deploy peacekeepers in remote and dispersed places.⁵⁸ Air power is not subject to freedom of movement restrictions on the ground. This is a significant bonus in peace support operations where warring factions use roadblocks and checkpoints to control movement. However attacking a target must be translated into results that do more than destroy a target but further the peace process on the ground. The impact of using the only military force available is difficult to measure. What would have happened in the case of Gorazde if air power had not been used? In my opinion, probably little different from what occurred

What would have happened in the case of Sarajevo? Certainly Builder's suggestion about the use of space for constabulary type actions was partially validated for acquisition of the targets no doubt owed much to satellite surveillance. However, as in many peacekeeping situations, the factors at work created a complex environment in which no one factor can be said to be decisive. Whether these other factors could have resulted in a Sarajevo TEZ without the threat of air power is still difficult to answer.

ENDNOTES:

1. John Keegan, "It was a very strange war" National Post, July, 14, 1999, p.A18
2. David Bercuson, "Air power not to be underestimated" National Post, July 6, 1999, p. A 18.
3. National Post, 22 July, 1999, p. A15 and Ottawa Citizen, 25 July, 1999, A7.
4. Robert A. Pape Jr., *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 2. Pape also suggests that leaders are drawn to military coercion as a perceived quick and cheap solution to an otherwise difficult international problem
5. Maj Scott Walker, "A Unified Field Theory of Coercive Airpower" *Airpower Journal* XI, no. 2, (Summer 1997): 72. Carl H. Builder, "Doctrinal Frontiers," *Airpower Journal* IX, no 4 (Winter 1995): 9. James Corum, "Airpower and Peace Enforcement" *Airpower Journal* X , no.4 (Winter 1996): 24.
6. Colonel Roberto Corsini, "The Balkan War: What Role for Airpower?," *Airpower Journal* IX, no. 4 (Winter 1995):67.

7. Colonel Robert C. Owen, "The Balkans Air Campaign: Part 1," *Airpower Journal* XI, no. 2 (Summer 1997) and Colonel Robert C. Owen, "The Balkans Air Campaign: Part 2," *Airpower Journal* XI, no. 3 (Fall 1997)
8. Owen, Part 1, 13.
9. Some Bosnian Croats were part of the Bosnian government army such as a brigade inside Sarajevo. Obviously these Croats were affected by the coercive attempt.
10. Michael Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia*, (Berkeley, University of California, 1997) provides information on Croatian atrocities including destruction of the World Heritage structure, the 500 year old Mostar bridge.
11. Author report as Senior Military Observer in Sector Sarajevo , in SMO 029 19030A Dec 93, describes raid near Hans Pilesjak
12. Author, "Implementing the February, 1994 Sarajevo Peace Plan for Sarajevo", *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 24, no. 3, (March 1995), outlines the situation surrounding all the aspects of situation in early 1994 in Sarajevo Sector in more detail.
13. NATO Decision Sheet (DS/4), 9 fevrier, 1994 (Document should be available from NATO sources if not NATO registries in national headquarters)
14. Author, *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (CDQ) outlines the situation surrounding all the aspects surrounding General Rose's Peace Plan in more detail.
15. DS/4, 9 fevrier,1994
16. This overcame the problem of passing intelligence from NATO (US?) aerial surveillance to UN authorities . Robert E. Rehbein discusses the question of providing US intelligence to the UN in his book, *Informing the Blue Helmets: The United States, UN Peacekeeping Operations, and the Role of Intelligence*, Centre for International Relations, Queen's, 1996. Intelligence is a vital part of the targeting process.
17. Author previously cited article. As the Senior Military Observer with 70 military observers as the only UNPROFOR presence on the Bosnian Serb side, the author was actively involved in all aspects of the peace plan.
18. Annex C to UN Bosnia Hercegovina Command OPO 2/94 dated 19 February laid out principles for use of air strikes while Annex D detailed OAS mission procedures. As a note on United Nations documents. These should be available from the United Nations headquarters in New York. The author holds personal copies of all UN documents cited. In Haiti in 1995/96, author met a UN archivist who was implementing a collection program for UNMIH documents. This was not the case in Bosnia nor does author know what happened to UN records in the transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR/SFOR.

19. The military observer strength in Sarajevo doubled from a normal complement of about 100 to 200. The Joint Commission Officers (JCOs) were actually SAS teams with the communications that permitted them to guide OAS strikes if required. Other UN military observer tasks are detailed in UNMO Sarajevo Operation Order 1/94, February, 1994 and author's article. With establishment of weapons collection points on the Bosnian Serb side, the Serbs had to agree to having armed UN troops positioned on their territory. On 18 February, Karadzic and the SRSG, Mr. Akashi reached an agreement on freedom of movement for unrestricted movement of UNPROFOR verification patrols (unsigned copy in author's possession). The term "Joint Commission" refers to the body which was supposed to serve as a forum for settling cease-fire disputes but which in the author's opinion rarely functioned as intended.

20. UN Sector Sarajevo Military Information Officer summary as of 1700 hours 21 February, 1994 (MIO was UN appointment title for Sector Intelligence Officer)

21. UN Sector Sarajevo MIO Summary of Sarajevo Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) violations dated 2 May, 1994

22. Typical example is a 4 May 18:08:16 hours capsat request outlining possible targets to be investigated by military observers the next day for the NATO liaison officer. Capsat was the satellite link used to pass written communications between military observer team sites and UNMO Sarajevo headquarters

23. Author attended meeting as part of delegation that met Mladic there in a ski resort hotel.

24. MIO report of 2 May 1994

25. UN Senior Military Observer Brief for Sector Commander on TEZ violations dated 5 June, 1994

26. Author, in CDQ article, also author in report to Force Commander, UNPROFOR, in SMO 029 19030A Dec 93, details how a Bosnian government patrol went hundreds of kilometers behind Bosnian Serb lines to destroy a farming hamlet. Serbs did not permit investigation of further damage inflicted by reported 19 such raids in October-December 93 time frame. NATO aerial coverage of this period can be interpreted to indicate damage to string of villages according to an intelligence source. The author personally saw a Bosnian infantry force late at night in January, 1994 that he mistook for French as they were so well-equipped. The officer identified himself as Bosnian and the direction that the troops were moving was Grbavica.

27. Author, CDQ article

28. "NATO's Ultimatum" Maclean's, February 21, 1994, p. 25

29. Senior Military Observer Brief for Commander on Actions to Watch Airport Approach dated 22 January, 1994. These shootings in addition to shelling creating civilian casualties could be interpreted as attempts to get outside intervention to force a cease-fire.

30. UN S/1994/291_Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to SCR 900 (1994) dated 11 March, 1994

31. This position of Bosnian Croats up to this date had been confusing. A Bosnian Croat infantry formation was in the Bosnian government defence lines around Sarajevo and another was serving with the Bosnian government forces in the Tuzla area. Yet 30 km away from Sarajevo, in Kiseljak, Bosnian Croats seemed to be working with the Bosnian Serbs and in Hercegovina, particularly in Mostar, there was savage fighting between Bosnian government elements and Bosnian Croats. An informal, aperiodic report by L/Cdr Donohue, USN, EUCOM Liaison officer on a visit to Vares, in Central Bosnia in October 93 details evidence of Bosnian Croat efforts to drive out Bosnian Muslims.
32. HQ BH Command Forward, Warning Order, Troops to Gorazde, 062300 B April, 1994
33. UN Civil Affairs Kiseljak, Weekly BH Political Assessment, 10 19:48 A April, 1994
34. Summarized best in UCIRF/66th MI Brigade, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures of Combatants in Former Yugoslavia, Augsburg, Germany, August, 1993, pages VI-10 to VI-13.
35. Plans had been made to place a UN military force in Gorazde in January, 1994 with approval of the Bosnian Serbs (HQ BH Command fax, 20 0840 January, 1994, Deployment of a Second Ukrainian Battalion) but were not followed-up due to the need for troops around Sarajevo in February and then in Central Bosnia in March as result of subsequent peace arrangements.
36. UNMO Gorazde capsat message 10 April 1994 11:21: 55
37. No doubt confirmed by the JCOs (SAs) in Gorazde who had direct communications with the UN BH Commander.
38. UPROFOR Sector Sarajevo 111800 B April, 1994, Sequence of Events of CAS Incident at Gorazde, Cover sheet for sequence prepared for Force Commander, UNPROFOR and weekly political summary already cited.
39. UNMO Gorazde capsat message 11 April, 1994 10:48:13 "Fighting is closing towards the city"
40. Sequence already cited.
41. UNMO Gorazde capsat message: 11 April, 1994 12:55:58
42. UNMO Gorazde capsat message : 11 April, 1994 22:33:11
43. HQ BH Command Forward fax 131610 B April, 1994, Reporting Change in Attitude Toward UNPROFOR Locations, details UNPROFOR personnel at risk.
44. UNMO Sarajevo , Report on Detention of UNMOs by BSA in Sarajevo from 11 Apr 94 to 19 Apr 94 and the Lessons Learnt, 24 April, 1994 outlines what happened to the UN military observers held hostage between 11 and 19 April, 1994

45. Unofficial account of Gorazde fighting by UNMO Team Leader. All official accounts also indicate fighting continued. This document may not be available through UN sources. Copy held by author of this article.
46. UNMO Gorazde team leader account
47. Undated fax copy of document titled "Memorandum of Understanding on the Temporary Arrangements for the Town of Gorazde signed by a Bosnian Serb and UNPROFOR representative.
49. UPROFOR Force Commander , Fax No 5805/3510 dated 21 April, 1994, Agreement on Gorazde
50. NATO Press Release (94) 31, dated 22 April, 1994, Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 22 April, 1994 (1). The previous NATO air strikes were authorized under provision of the threat posed to UN personnel.
51. S/RES/913 (1994) dated 22 April, 1994, UN SCR 913 (1994)
52. UNMO Gorazde capsat message, 20 May 1994 12:44:03
53. Ibid.
54. Charles Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work", *Foreign Affairs* 77, no.1 (January/February,1998):42-55 and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card", *International Security*22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/98):101-137
55. Perhaps Jahorina offered an opportunity to test Pape's category of decapitation which he attributes to Warden, on p. 80 of attacking the leadership, in this case, Mladic
56. UNMO Sarajevo, Production of UNMO PR Material, 16 June, 1994, was a request for a media campaign to explain to all warring parties the role of military observers. The UN did start a campaign of providing TV clips explaining UNPROFOR activities but in opinion of Dr Michael Williams, then the Director of UNPROFOR information, as expressed to author on 24 February, 1998, the UN was too late in starting this process.
57. Group Captain APN Lambert, *The Psychology of Air Power*, (London, RUSI, 1995) has comments on use of B-52 bombers and psyops.
58. General Sir Michael Rose, "A Year in Bosnia: What has been achieved," *RUSI Journal*, (June 1995): 24.