The drawdown of the US presence in Afghanistan in 2014 does not call for complete removal of our forces. In particular, air assets will remain to support the infant Afghan national government. The job description of Air Force security forces, the primary line of defense for US airpower, puts them specifically at risk of insider attacks. US and coalition Airmen as well as US airpower assets present tantalizing targets for an insurgent enemy force, as witnessed in the strikes on Camp Bastion on 14 September 2012. Insurgents wearing American uniforms penetrated air base defenses and managed to destroy six US Marine Corps Harriers and kill two Marines before being killed.1 This attack illustrates the significant challenges of force protection in an unstable forward environment. Figure 1 shows the tremendous increase in the number of insider attacks from 2011 to 2012, the
totals for 2013 indicating reported casualties only through 16 May 2013. However, these numbers do not reflect reports from the 2013 spring offensive, which usually begins in late April or early May. Taliban leaders, cognizant of their successes, issued a statement on 27 April 2013 promising to continue the use of insider attacks during that time.2

![Table]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insider Attacks</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
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<tr>
<td>On US Forces</td>
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<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>On ISAF Forces</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
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*ISAF* - *International Security Assistance Force*


Any attempt to integrate a nineteenth-century society into the twenty-first century encounters a number of obstacles. Illiteracy and innumeracy rates are high, and repressive social values are embedded in the culture. The situation is complicated by the lack of basic utilities or commercial infrastructure to support growth. Under these conditions, it is not reasonable to expect the Afghan security forces to advance quickly enough to incorporate a first-world internal security and defense program into a third-world nation. Therefore, we must reconsider the way we think about our training objectives and factor these points into our force-protection training for future deployments in other conflicts as well. Elements of the Air Advisor Academy program...
(Special Order G-12-13)—namely, portions of the fieldcraft-skills section—could easily be taught to all deploying Airmen. This article explores options to modify existing predeployment training curricula to focus more on the safety and security of the individual Airman in any battlespace. If we protect the Airman, we protect the asset.

**Background: How Did We Get Here?**

The history of Afghanistan is long and storied, but this article examines the most recent events that contributed to the unstable situation our forces found in 2001. Afghanistan was born in the forge of a proxy war between Russia and Britain in the region—one that led to a disastrous engagement in the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1839. A coalition of warlords and tribal leaders decimated the entire force of more than 4,500 British soldiers dispatched by the governor of India. Shortly thereafter, British imperialism prompted two more Anglo-Afghan wars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The “graveyard of empires” forced the British home, ending with the Treaty of Rawalpindi in 1919 and leaving the British Empire on a long, slow road to obscurity. The middle of the twentieth century was a relatively stable time for Afghanistan. Under the leadership of Zahir Shah, the last king of Afghanistan, the country saw a move towards real modernization. Although never fully implemented, the country's democratic constitution—established in 1964—provided for universal suffrage, civil rights, and the free election of parliament.

According to Kenneth Katzman,

Afghanistan's slide into instability began in the 1970s, during the Nixon Administration, when the diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader who established a dictatorship with strong state involvement in the economy. Daoud was overthrown and killed in April 1978, during the Carter Administration, by People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, Communist party) military officers under the direction
of two PDPA (Khalq, or “Masses” faction) leaders, Hafizullah Amin and Nur Mohammad Taraki, in what is called the Saur (April) Revolution. Taraki became president, but he was displaced in September 1979 by Amin. Both leaders drew their strength from rural ethnic Pashtuns and tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bringing more women into government. The attempt at rapid modernization sparked rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves.4

After the overthrow of Zahir Shah in 1973, Afghanistan fell into a cycle of endless warfare. In 1978 the communist-backed PDPA assassinated Mohammad Daoud and implemented sweeping but ill-conceived social reforms. Afghan civilians were introduced to land reforms and gender politics virtually overnight. Land-redistribution projects effectively carved up traditional tribal areas, sowing resentment among the population. These events, combined with the sudden inclusion of females in the political and bureaucratic machine, led Afghans to believe that their traditional values were under attack. This situation presented a moral dilemma for the United States, ultimately forcing it to side with Islamist groups against the communists.

We are still dealing with the repercussions of this alliance. The situation exploded in February 1979 when the Soviet Union deployed 100,000 troops to support the PDPA regime, starting yet another proxy conflict in the Cold War. The United States established a policy of indirect support of the mujahideen rebels through the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI). Despite warnings from within the State Department and other agencies that we should direct our support to groups like those of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the United States ceded operational control to the ISI. The Pakistani government, led by Benazir Bhutto, aligned itself with factions that were less than America’s ideal choices—namely, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Sirajuddin Haqqani, and Osama bin Laden.

In hindsight, these decisions proved disastrous, mostly because of internal conflicts and bloody retributions between the Pakistani-supported militias and various factions in Afghanistan—such as Massoud’s—that re-
sisted ISI influence. Abdul Haq, an ally of Massoud, famously said, “How is [it] that we Afghans, who never lost a war, must take military instructions from the Pakistanis, who never won one?” Infighting among the various militias precluded any chance of a unified opposition to the PDPA regime, which remained in power after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. This created difficulties for the Afghan opposition when it tried to make tangible progress against the Soviet-supported regime, especially considering the sheer volume of arms left to the PDPA by the withdrawing Soviets. With Soviet technical support for the thousands of tanks, planes, helicopters, and artillery pieces in its control, the PDPA maintained power until 1992.

Pakistan's intention to install Hekmatyar as dictator forced Massoud's Northern Alliance fighters to defend themselves from both the PDPA forces and those of the ISI-backed Hekmatyar. The personal war between these two factions allowed the PDPA to survive, although not for long. However, the communists had begun to experience internal strife of their own as the Soviet Union collapsed, weakening their position among the PDPA-allied tribes. Two decades of war had eviscerated the economy in Afghanistan, and the Soviets had to provide everything, from fuel to food. Unfortunately, for the PDPA, Boris Yeltsin pulled support after the collapse of the USSR and set the stage for yet another civil war to follow the fall of Kabul in 1992. Amin Saikal writes that “Islamabad could not possibly expect the new Islamic government leaders . . . to subordinate their own nationalist objectives in order to help Pakistan realise its regional ambitions. . . . Had it not been for the ISI's logistic support and supply of a large number of rockets, Hekmatyar's forces would not have been able to target and destroy half of Kabul.”

Pakistan was not the only player in Afghanistan after the Soviets left. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and even India engaged in a campaign of influence to fill the vacuum left by the PDPA. Unfortunately, this regional proxy war created the Taliban when the various factions of Islam, such as the Wahabbis, Sunnis, and Shia, began to compete for the loyalty of the people. Each group tried to “outdevout” the other, a situation that
quickly degraded into executions for social infractions like blasphemy. Repression soon followed, and the best chance for the success of future American foreign policy in Afghanistan died with Ahmed Shah Massoud on 9 September 2001. Breaking this 40-year cycle of constant regional and civil war—the unenviable task of our policy makers—lies beyond the scope of this article. However, the study does allow us a glimpse at the various factors that must be included in our force-protection planning if we wish to avoid the same endless caregiving that the Soviets inherited.

**Objective: Why Do They Hate Us?**

This article addresses the primary issue of the dramatic increase in the number of insider attacks on coalition forces in 2012. Most logically, one should begin by examining the existing technological gap between Western society and the Afghan population. Arming and equipping forces of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) with high-maintenance weapons and equipment only add to the time and effort necessary to train the individual soldier. Considering the fact that more than 70 percent of the population is functionally illiterate, how do we expect to close this gap without a massive education program to support it? Miscommunication is the breeding ground for a targeted killing when US instructor personnel are asked to bring ANA soldiers up to speed. Frustration builds when students are unable to perform the most basic tasks, such as loading a magazine to specified capacity, because they cannot count: “When [Lt Gen William Caldwell IV] visited a firing range and discovered that most recruits were not just illiterate but innumerate—if the instructor wanted them to load 10 bullets in their rifles, he told them to count by placing one bullet next to each of their fingers—Caldwell expanded boot camp by two weeks to include basic education.”

Abdul Samad Haidari notes the following:

> Perhaps, literacy, peace, security, and democracy are the foundations for the development of a country; all areas that are strengthened by the existence of a self-sustaining critical mass of literate and productive citizens.
However, more than three decades of conflict in Afghanistan have created generations of people who have lost out educational opportunity. As a result, Afghanistan has one of the highest illiteracy rates in the world today, and according to the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) the estimated national adult literacy rate (aged 15 and above) is 26 percent, with 12 percent for women and 39 percent for men. In rural areas, where approximately 74 percent of all Afghans reside, the situation is more acute, with an estimated 93 percent of women and 65 percent of men lacking basic reading and writing skills [fig. 2].


Although school attendance rates have improved slightly since US intervention in 2001, one must meet the basic security needs of the civilian population before aggressively addressing the literacy problem. This requirement, coupled with the cultural void that exists between the Airman and the civilian, presents a quandary. Every member of the US military knows the phrase *attention to detail* as a unifying concept—a manifestation of the Airman's sense of duty to country. It is the basic rule that governs every job we do, from flying advanced aircraft to polishing brass. Successfully applying it to a military command structure requires a shared national identity, but how can we possibly hope to build a sophisticated organizational relationship with Afghani-
stan based on a Western model? We must build one that promotes communication and trust on an individual scale—at best, a difficult endeavor when one side is literally starting from scratch. The answer, perhaps, is to allow tribal leaders to create the shared concept of exceptionalism necessary to build esprit de corps inside the ANA: “A community defense initiative should begin from the bottom up, not from top-down efforts by the Afghan government or coalition forces. This development is critical; a local defense force will only be effective where locals view it as in their interest” (emphasis in original).10

Additionally, a cultural gulf exists among the Afghan national forces that further complicates any partnering efforts. The languages of Afghanistan include Pashto from the south and Dari from the north, all with a sprinkling of Punjabi, Urdu, and a host of others thrown in. The complex nature of that subject prevents this article from even attempting to address the various religious sects vying for power. This rich mixture presents its own problems when one seeks to develop a standardized curriculum for technical-skills training in a military environment, especially when the primary International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) instructors speak none of these languages.

**If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It**

How can we expect the new recruit from the provinces to succeed when faced with such an unreasonable learning curve? ISAF commanders have responded by instituting remedial classroom instruction, including reading, writing, and arithmetic. Though necessary in a twenty-first-century military force, these skills increase the time necessary to make the new recruit field-ready. Generally, US forces deployed to support the ANA training program are assigned to mixed units that lack the essential team element required to present students with a unified instructor staff. Team spirit allows staff to become comfortable enough to say something when a teammate is culturally insensitive to the host nation’s students. Instructors also bring a wide range of expertise from local, state, and federal law enforcement—not just
the military—and disagreements often arise as they prepare a curriculum. When aired in public, these differences give the appearance of disunity, which will undermine students’ faith in the staff and the lesson. This volatile combination of frustration within the ANA ranks, language barriers, and social faux pas creates situations that lead to insider attacks.

Moreover, Rajiv Chandrasekaran asserts that “the U.S. military has imposed unnecessary methods and impractical equipment on the Afghans. American commanders funded large, U.S.-style division headquarters with command centers that feature wall-mounted plasma screens and staff officers schooled in making PowerPoint slides, even though many of those facilities lack reliable electricity. Critics within the U.S. ranks contend that dry-erase boards and paper maps would have been sufficient.”

The average Afghan male has spent his entire life using, maintaining, and fighting with the venerable AK-47 and other Soviet-era weaponry that has been a part of Afghan culture since Zahir Shah began importing them in the 1950s. Even after the Soviet invasion in 1979, the United States did not attempt to convert the population to the M-16—a fine weapon but one that demands significant maintenance and care while Afghans make AKs by hand in the local markets. Attempting to instruct a soldier on an unfamiliar weapon system when he could not read the manual if he wanted to is counterproductive:

Instead of equipping Afghan soldiers with AK-47 rifles, which Afghans are well versed in firing, the U.S. military gave them M-16s, which are far more complicated to maintain and tend to jam when not cleaned properly. The decision was the result of pressure from former defense minister Abdul Rahim Wardak, who argued to Pentagon officials and members of Congress that American weapons would make his army appear more professional, despite concerns from U.S. commanders in Afghanistan that the soldiers would be unable to care for the guns.

This does not mean that technology is useless in the Afghan theatre. In fact, when we look at methods employed in the targeted attacks, we find that the opposite is true. The various tactics used to commit a tar-
geted killing depend heavily on the personal motives of the attacker. Did an ISAF member slight the attacker in some way? Many people have identified the culture clash as the single most significant factor in the recent rise in insider attacks. Extortion and kidnapping follow close behind when the local Taliban threaten the family of a recruit far from home. Motivation plays a central role when they determine a plan of attack.13 The Asymmetric Warfare Group at Fort Meade, Maryland, created “Insider Threats in Partnering Environments: A Guide for Military Leaders,” an extremely thorough, graphic representation of the decision matrix and course-of-action guidelines useful in the senior staff-assessment and decision-making process.14 However, it is not a practical quick reference for the Airman at the gate.

The Culture War

Western society is rightfully proud of its social contract and first-world status. We enjoy liberties alien to populations in many parts of the globe. Yet, when we exercise these rights, which are as natural to us as breathing, we open ourselves to the unintentional insult (fig. 3). Personal space, gender politics, and even casual body language can be misinterpreted as a direct, personal insult by our Afghan allies. Something as simple as a pat on the back after a job well done or putting one’s feet up after a long day could be interpreted as a personal offense. Some of the slang terms we use—*hajji*—for example, is actually an honorific title given to elders or those who have completed the pilgrimage to Mecca (the hajj). Using *hajji* to address a local who feels undeserving of the title could be taken as a personal slight.
Evidence suggests that personal insults to Afghan forces and civilians appear to be the primary motive behind the recent attacks.

Impostors continue to be the highest threat to deployed assets. Impostors generally lack the information necessary to target a specific individual but pose a grave threat to facilities and equipment.

Figure 3. Culture war, infiltrators, and impostors

Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. wrote that “the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. . . . The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”15 In writing for the unanimous majority, Justice Holmes described the point at which we smack headlong into our own rights regarding freedom of speech. American citizens have the right to say nearly any foolish thing that comes to mind, but we still cannot shout “fire” in a crowded theatre. The same principle applies here. When speech presents a “clear and present danger,” commanders must take the initiative when explaining this to their troops. Casual comments and good-natured ribbing aside, why risk exacerbating an already-tense relationship just for a laugh? Trainers must take steps to address this issue during predeployment training cycles by clearly explaining that Airmen are diplomats as well as combatants. Leaders who choose to ignore this point do so at the peril of those under their command.

Perhaps the darkest epoch in Afghan society is its reliance on the drug trade. One should never assume that a poor village in the provinces would ignore the income potential from drug operations run by the local warlords (and sometimes by the local Afghan police). Although no central Afghan authority supervises and executes interdiction operations in the borderlands, one could make real progress in this area—specifically, by initiating locally supported agricultural initiatives and community-infrastructure projects.16 Without stable utili-
ties, illicit cash crops like poppies and hashish will continue to dominate farming:

The southern and southwestern provinces of Afghanistan account for 92 percent of that country’s illicit poppy cultivation. Taliban insurgents are also active in this area. Narcotics traffickers provide revenue and material support to insurgents in exchange for protection to the growers and traffickers. Insecurity continues to be a problem, but improvements in Afghanistan’s infrastructure have helped to create some viable economic alternatives to poppy cultivation. While Helmand continues to be the largest poppy cultivating province, according to both UNODC [United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime] and USG [US government] estimates, cultivation there was down between 3 and 19 percent this year [2012], respectively. These reductions were the result of improved security, a significant alternative livelihood program supported by the international community, and strong political will on the part of the governor.17

A corrupt government in Tajikistan, providing safe smuggling routes for heroin and other illicit narcotics, exacerbates the problem. ISAF decision makers for the Afghan conflict are obviously wary of neighboring regimes and their attempts to influence events there, but they are limited in their response options. The illicit drug trade in Afghanistan is also a clear example of the hypocrisy displayed by the Taliban philosophy. During their rule, poppy cultivation and heroin production were “officially” prohibited and punishable by death. However, these executions were usually just a method of territory control in the drug trade.

**Who Are These Guys?**

Many families have only one male breadwinner and are reluctant to risk their lives by engaging the local warlord. This behavior is familiar to our troops during joint operations and civil-affairs patrols with ANA forces. Animosity grows when our troops witness a reluctance to engage the enemy and turns to pure anger when they sustain casualties.18 We must also consider the emotional health of the Afghan soldier—usually the sole provider, far from his home province. Will that
soldier risk the livelihood of his entire family simply because we say he must?

According to Gareth Porter, “The truth of course is that these two explanations of personal grudges and infiltrations are not mutually exclusive at all. And the reality is that these attacks are motivated by grudges, by people who are unhappy with the people that are coming in contact with in the US and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] military forces. But also by the broader context of what they hear and see these forces are doing in Afghanistan. Specifically, for example, breaking into people’s homes and taking away the males in these homes and detaining them.”

In the United States, one leading factor paved the way for the civil rights movement of the 1960s. On 26 July 1948, President Truman signed Executive Order 9981, fully desegregating the military. World War II had created an internal migration in America that brought the rich variety of cultures together as never before. This mingling, coupled with new forms of mass communication, set the stage for integration of the armed forces. Virtually overnight, whole families went to new postings coast to coast. Integration created an atmosphere, albeit a rocky one at first, that fostered the understanding necessary to integrate the nation. Integration allowed base housing to become a safe place for minority families to make a home. So why not reverse the process in Afghanistan by using base facilities that remain after the American drawdown for ANA/ANP family housing? This program would address at least three problems with one solution. First, it could effectively integrate the country while providing a modicum of security for the individual Afghan soldier and his family. Second, having families in base housing ameliorates separation anxiety and improves the mind-set of the ANA soldier, making him more effective on joint operations with the ISAF. Third, opportunities for family members to use base medical and educational resources will begin to lower the illiteracy and innumeracy rates and improve the general health of the Afghan citizen. As Dr. Seth Jones points out,
Establishing security in Afghanistan has generally been a combination of top-down efforts by the central government, whose forces have established security in major cities and along key roads, crushed revolts and rebellions, and mediated intratribal disputes, and bottom-up efforts from local tribes and other communities, whose forces have established security at the village level in rural areas.

... Local forces have often been most effective when they are viewed as supporting nearby interests, especially defending villages for the sake of the village rather than the central government or foreigners.21

Local politics rule in Afghanistan, optimistically making the development of a national identity a long-term project.22 Average ANA/ANP recruit candidates come from these rural villages to build a better life for themselves. Most are young, male, functionally illiterate, and desperately poor. If they have immediate family, then they are likely the breadwinners. Unfortunately, the same qualities that make them attractive recruits for the Afghan national forces are also attractive to the Taliban and foreign intelligence agencies. Luckily, the United States is in the best position to make a difference in this area because we can effect real change in the lives of the average Afghan recruit by providing the tangible benefits of American friendship. It is possible to implement a number of simple measures immediately. Current pay rates—for new recruits, about $200 a month—are not competitive in a market that offers 10 times that amount to produce heroin or kill Americans. The inclusion of family-benefit packages could address a number of the deficiencies identified previously in this article. Principally among these is the desire to keep one’s family together in a safe, stable home. A closer look at the perpetrators of previous attacks reveals three distinct personality types likely to initiate a green-on-blue attack (fig. 4).
Defectors - The most common and the most dangerous. This soldier feels personally aggrieved and will commit some act of revenge before deserting.

- Specific individuals are targeted in advance.
- Defectors usually plan the attack with care and consider escape routes.
- Occasionally the soldier is the subject of blackmail and is forced to act or face retribution in some form.

Infiltrators - Primary loyalties lie with their tribal leaders, not the national government.

- Infiltrators use the absence of an integrated vetting system to join the ranks.
- They will attempt to gather and transmit intelligence before an attack.
- They will attempt to recruit like-minded confederates.

Impostors - Apply standard irregular warfare tactics. Used to great effect against the Soviets in the 1980s.

- Impostor fighters are loyal to the enemy, using subterfuge to penetrate coalition defenses.
- Surplus uniform items, available on the open/gray market provide access to facilities.
- The problem of impostors is best solved with technological solutions.
- Radio frequency identification
- Biometrics
- Embedded security markers

Figure 4. Defectors, infiltrators, and impostors

Conclusions: Where Do We Go from Here?

Now we arrive at the crux of the issue. Regardless of how the enemy attempts to access our facilities, the primary target remains the same: the Airman. The insurgency seeks to disrupt the mission of coalition forces by any means necessary, and its strategy hopes to do so by driving a wedge of suspicion between the ISAF and the fragile Afghan central government. If successful, insurgents would destabilize Afghanistan and force NATO to extricate itself with little to show for its considerable efforts. Whether by deity or design, enemy tactics are working to a degree:

During 2011 and thus far in 2012, insurgents appear to be making increasing use of infiltrators within the Afghan security forces, persons impersonating Afghan security personnel, or recruits to their ranks from among the security forces. Afghan security force attacks on U.S. and other coalition personnel in 2012 have killed 43 coalition soldiers during January–August 2012, of which 25 were American. There is debate as to whether these attacks are a result of infiltration, or were self-inspired by disgruntled members of the Afghan forces—perhaps reacting to perceived slights such as the mistaken burning of Qurans by American soldiers in 2011.
U.S. commanders say about 25% of the attacks were the result of militant infiltration. Afghan officials have tried to increase monitoring over the sale of military-style clothing that might be used for such attacks, and U.S. commanders have altered some of the procedures governing how U.S. forces interact with their Afghan counterparts.\textsuperscript{23}

The rise in insider attacks has negatively affected the mission in Afghanistan by forcing ISAF commanders to implement stopgap measures to protect their troops. As a result, ISAF commander Gen John Allen designated certain troops as “guardian angels.”\textsuperscript{24} These overwatch troops are selected members of ISAF combat units working alongside or interacting with ANA/ANP forces. Specifically tasked with personal-protection duties, guardian angels watch their team and limit interpersonal contact (which serves only to convey mistrust.) The guardians also apply deadly force when required. Despite its effectiveness, this strategy has considerable downsides, including the depletion of ISAF manpower because Airmen must perform more tasks on a given assignment. The added stress from the mistrust of ANA/ANP personnel serves only to reduce the long-term combat effectiveness of the Airman. The most tangible victory the enemy has reaped from this strategy is the forced suspension of missions. The cancellation of operations creates an opening for the enemy to make advances, leaving the ISAF in a continuously defensive position in this regard.

The ISAF's force-protection planners seek immediate elimination of green-on-blue attacks in future joint operations. At its most basic, force protection is designed to protect the individual Airman, the Air Force's most valuable asset—not aircraft, bases, or equipment. Hardware is replaceable; an Airman is not. Consequently, force-protection training must concentrate on enhancing the combat skill sets of the individual Airman.

Figure 5 presents force protection in concentric rings of security, each complementary to and dependent upon the adjacent rings. The outermost ring is information gathered by projected means, including signals intelligence, human intelligence, various media reports, after-action reports, and mission debriefs. They all combine to paint an in-
complete picture of the situation outside the fence. Next, the expeditionary force projects power beyond the perimeter, forcing the enemy to respond before he can regroup and launch an attack on our facilities. This brings us to the perimeter fence itself—the most visible of the rings and the most vulnerable. The Airman is most likely to encounter the enemy face-to-face at the access control point. A fixed structure has serious drawbacks, as the French discovered on the Maginot Line. In particular, an airfield is a massive facility, and security forces must protect a large, open area filled with state-of-the-art aircraft. Although technological solutions remain the best option for the long stretches of desolate fencing, the attack on Camp Bastion proves that fresh eyes on the fence line work best.

![Figure 5. Rings of force protection](image-url)
A man can seldom—very, very, seldom—fight a winning fight against his training; the odds are too heavy.

—Mark Twain

Because of their regular contact with non–US military personnel overseas, the US Air Force's security forces are well suited to aid in developing an advanced training module (fig. 6). Those forces' unit-level training instructors conceived the Green Force Identification Training (G-FIT) module as a response to the increased number of green-on-blue attacks launched by insurgent forces in Afghanistan in 2012 (fig. 7). The G-FIT module directly addresses threats to our forces from insider attacks by adapting Air Force small-arms and defensive-tactics courses for the Airman. This training seeks to increase personal survivability by amending current predeployment training courses to focus on critical thinking and situational awareness. Here, the goal is to improve the ability of the Airman to identify enemy personnel and impostors quickly and correctly in an evolving battlespace. Airmen with these skills greatly increase the commander's odds of mission success.

- Small-arms training must be increased for all personnel. Weapons handling and self-defense are the first line of defense for the deployed Airman. Intimate familiarity with the M-9 and M-16/M-4 platforms must become basic skills for advancement. Muscle-memory drills are key to achieving this.

- These invaluable skills are best taught using scenario-based training and role players. Awareness of the surrounding environment increases the chances of victory.

- Deploying personnel should receive training specific to the destination area of operations.

- Unit-level exercises with dye-marking cartridges provide value-added training to commanders and allow for the evaluation of tactics, techniques, and procedures.

**Figure 6. Specific recommendations for training**
G-FIT was developed to teach Airmen a combination of weapons handling, personal defense, and psychological skill sets necessary downrange to identify and neutralize threats in real time and under battlefield conditions. The technical research emphasizes field-ready options for personnel identification, such as radio frequency identification as well as integrated technology solutions for access control during expeditionary operations. Developing a visual identification process that incorporates both technical and observational methods allows the soldier to quickly and positively identify personnel from allied forces in the ANA and the Afghan national/local police. The G-FIT technical components are a low-maintenance, high-reliability solution for combatant personnel, specifically designed to integrate seamlessly when applied to existing force-protection tactics, techniques, and procedures. The module is intended to supplement and seamlessly integrate with existing predeployment training modules currently in use (e.g., Shoot, Move, and Communicate). G-FIT offers a unit-level solution to guide the modification of tactics, techniques, and procedures.
used by the US joint forces community and assist in establishing a cross-service standard for identification-friend-or-foe processes on the battlefield. A number of technologically based solutions will address specific weaknesses in our defenses against insider attacks. Research encompasses many scientific disciplines to meet mission requirements, including robotics, electromagnetic waves (communications), visual-spectrum physics, nuclear medicine, microelectronics, materials science, and chemistry. Currently, some off-the-shelf examples are available to support a positive-identification and access-control program. With a few improvements and some systems integration, we can make new, technologically advanced tools available to the war fighter. Of course, a myriad of variables affects the outcome of an insider attack, and technology is never the only solution. That said, the scientific and technological advantage that our forces maintain over the enemy is a significant force multiplier. When incorporated into the force-protection mission, these systems greatly increase the likelihood of success.

As we anticipate the planned drawdown of NATO forces in 2014, the path forward for coalition commanders to protect remaining combat assets is unclear. A number of obstacles impede successful extraction of our combat force in Afghanistan—primarily the internal Afghan rivalries, which are complicated by interference from external parties in the region (i.e., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran). The intelligence services of these nations are very active in Afghanistan because their proximity to each other places the future stability of the region in their interest. A concentrated, budget-responsible solution such as giving Airmen the skills to defend themselves is a force multiplier. As the force drawdown in 2014 approaches, our remaining forces will find themselves at increased risk unless we implement sustainable countermeasures such as G-FIT. US commanders will have to defend fixed assets like air bases with smaller numbers, but they must remain vigilant, knowing that the enemy will continue to use insider attacks to great effect.\textsuperscript{26}
Notes


9. Haidari, “High Rate of Illiteracy.”


12. Ibid.


22. Ibid., 12.

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Mr. Aykens is a civilian contractor and small-arms instructor at Joint Base Lewis-McChord and Fairchild AFB, Washington. Prior to assuming his current position, he was a writer and researcher for television documentaries on military history. Mr. Aykens has two decades of firearms-training experience as a competitive shooter and as a member of the US Navy. He is a member of the Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association, a factory-certified M-16 armorer, a member of the National Range Officers Association, and a certified instructor in simunitions scenarios. Currently, Mr. Aykens is co-owner of Cascadia Tactical opposing-force training services—specialists in force-on-force field exercises based on red-team and green-force scenarios.

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