

# Aiming for Squadron Success

## The Tailored Command Philosophy

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### Introduction

Philosophies matter. Philosophies guide people through events, hone personas, and prompt development. Deliberateness matters. Deliberately choosing behaviors encourages the selection of practical paths that lead toward the guiding light provided by a philosophy. Emerging leaders tend to bring their time-tested personal leadership philosophy with them into squadron command, which is essential but not enough. Command complexity today and in the future requires advanced and innovative squadron command preparation versus more-of-the-same leadership behavior. A tailored command philosophy is an advanced and innovative method of preparation. Budding squadron commanders aiming for success should deliberately convert their personal leadership philosophy into a tailored command philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

### The Need

Something is wrong. A look back at news reports from the past few years reveals far too many ousted commanders. Even a cursory review of social media postings can infer the perceptions of underwhelming military leaders. Finally, a routine academic assignment involving two squadron command-centric courses conducted from 2018–19 at Air University highlights this irregularity. Instructors asked students attending these courses to share experiences from two perspectives. First, they asked students to discuss the best squadron commander they have known and then share variables that led to their choice. Second, students put forward examples of negative leadership they have witnessed in the context of squadron command. Student responses to the “best squadron commander” question were mostly reassuring. However, hundreds of students shared stories of former commanders whose practice of management, leadership, power, and adaptation fell below their expectations.<sup>2</sup>

All this provides evidence of an oddity. Officers hone and demonstrate leadership acumen for years before squadron command opportunities surface. During this formative time, promising leaders transition from tactical to operational perspectives. They mature in character and ethical development. They improve communication skills.<sup>3</sup> Senior leaders identify, retain, groom, and then select promising leaders for squadron command. However, some candidates who demonstrate a propensity for executive leadership along the way struggle. Some transform into poor commanders. Some fail.

Viewpoints fluctuate when diagnosing issues and prescribing remedies aimed to preempt command failure. This fluctuation is because command failure is hard to define, predict, generalize, and sometimes even notice. Graduated commanders may sport a successful legacy when, in fact, timing, obscurity, luck, and even deceit may have masked gaffes that should have halted their climb to greater authority and responsibility. Disappointing cases suggest that demonstration of leadership in the early years may not be wholly adequate to predict command potential. Perhaps unsuccessful commanders misconstrue their propensity for command. Possibly, they fail to comprehend or leverage command-unique facets of management, leadership, and power. Maybe unsuccessful commanders come to be incapable of adjusting to, adapting for, and acclimating into a squadron with a distinctive organizational structure, mission, climate, culture, and degree of health.

Commanding an element of national power, amid the changing character of war in a disruptive environment, is an exclusive leadership challenge.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, the Air Force needs to pursue advanced and innovative squadron command preparation versus more-of-the-same leadership behavior because failure in command is unacceptable. A tailored command philosophy is an advanced and innovative method of preparation.

### **Untidiness—Leadership and Command Philosophies**

Commanders scanning literature while tailoring a command philosophy may become frustrated. This frustration is because scholars and practitioners put forward differing ideas, concepts, opinions, and thoughts on the subject, but this should not distract. Untidiness is common in academic literature and real-world workplaces.

Fortunately, brilliance emerges through the seemingly untidy diversity of perspectives. Different figures, approaching the topic as scholar-practitioners from the Air Force, Navy, and Army, and as career scholars, highlight different aspects. Broadly, these topics include using a focus on the mission to translate leadership into command, embodying command through appearance and expertise, emphasizing tough and challenging performance to express command, and using pragmatism at the operational level of war to orient command.<sup>5</sup>

Such perspectives suggest valuable principles and prescriptive lessons, but they do not standardize the jargon. The challenge of untidiness regarding a personal philosophy of leadership, and a tailored command philosophy remains.

### **Tidying up—Leadership and Tailored Command Philosophies**

Researchers manage untidiness by developing and using conceptual definitions. Conceptual definitions are neither true nor false but are instead symbols to permit communication. According to social sciences researchers Chava Frankfort-Nachmias and David Nachmias: “Put simply, the definition is what the definer says it is.”<sup>6</sup> Accepting and using conceptual definitions, defined by a definer and recognized by colleagues as communication tools, brings about order, coherence, and efficiency.

One can conceptually define a personal leadership philosophy as the foundation of how one aspires to lead based on their past. Previous experiences shape beliefs, values, principles, personalities, deficiencies, and other individual factors. A personal leadership philosophy informs and guides personal development and behaviors. Most leaders reflect on years of training, education, and experience as they develop and refine their leadership philosophy. A leadership philosophy is a fine starting place for emerging leaders to reflect upon as they prepare for and then enter squadron command.

A tailored command philosophy, conceptually defined and consistent with the aforementioned examples, is a pragmatic philosophy of how one plans to lead within a specific military command opportunity. This philosophy helps commanders complement personal leadership aspirations with command-unique facets of management, leadership, and power. The tailored command philosophy goes on to inform and guide squadron commanders as they adjust to, adapt for, and acclimate into a squadron with a distinctive organizational structure, mission, climate, culture, and degree of health.

### **Commanding—Management, Leadership, and Power**

Emerging leaders bring capabilities formed earlier into command. However, and most likely for the first time in their careers, squadron commanders discover command-unique facets of management, leadership, and power. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 1-2, *Commander’s Responsibilities*, charges commanders to leverage these command-unique facets toward specific duties and responsibilities.<sup>7</sup>

For example, commanders shape management processes within their particular squadron. Commanders are duty-bound to serve as creative and entrusted stewards of scarce people, funds, and time as they shepherd their squadrons toward innova-

tion and mission success.<sup>8</sup> Scores of midlevel professionals manage people, funds, and time nobly as consumers and stabilizers. They focus on “managing things right.” Commanders certainly “manage things right.” However, they retain considerable autonomy that allows them to choose many of the “right things to manage.”<sup>9</sup>

AFI 1-2 also charges commanders to “lead by personal example and pay judicious attention to the welfare and morale of their subordinates.”<sup>10</sup> Midlevel professionals may certainly lead within organizations. However, commanders should leverage their prominent position and conspicuous visibility to enhance their status, influence, and ability to carry out assigned duties and responsibilities.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, commanders exercise power through rules such as the Uniform Code of Military Justice to “engage in the lives of subordinates [and] establish a healthy command climate which fosters good order and discipline.”<sup>12</sup> Commanders penalize, demote, fire, and even jail people. Their disciplinary power affects troublesome subordinates as well as the spouses, children, extended family members, and even survivors of those punished.<sup>13</sup> “The power of the chief executive officer of General Motors does not approximate the wide breadth of responsibility or depth of power of the military commander.”<sup>14</sup>

### **Commanding—The Squadron Matters**

Squadrons are quirky. They may seem similar at first blush, but all are peculiar. Down-reaching peculiarities root below the obvious. Midlevel professionals destined to command within a familiar institution, and certainly those who will command outside their area of expertise, should deeply assess their organization. Perceptive squadron commanders reflect on this assessment as they adjust to, adapt for, and acclimate into a squadron with a distinctive organizational structure, mission, climate, culture, and degree of health.

Traditional organizations share a foundational principle that affects structure. Organizations are social institutions that justify their existence by their overall contribution to society.<sup>15</sup> Rationale architects of civilian organizations satisfy this foundational principle by organizing work arrangements to carry out socially acceptable functions. They may combine top management, middle management, technical support, administrative support, and a core of people who do the basic work. Air Force squadron architects also satisfy this foundational principle. National security contributes to society. Squadrons similarly pattern functional work arrangements. Squadron commanders carry out directed missions that enhance national security with an organized collection of staff, technicians, and professionals.

Organizations also differ. Raymond Miles and Charles Snow introduce a framework that categorizes organizations into four types.<sup>16</sup> Defenders seek stability and maximum efficiency through standardized rules, established processes,

and division of work. Prospectors embrace flexibility as they try new things in dynamic and uncertain environments. Analyzers, by either design or ambivalence, tightly control some activities while permitting some risky ideas and undertakings. Mindful analyzers deliberately accommodate both stable and dynamic operations.<sup>17</sup> Happenstance analyzers who drive risky innovation while advocating for efficiency and reliability may appear vacillating and unsure of themselves.<sup>18</sup> Finally, and most troubling, are reactors. Reactors lack consistent response mechanisms to pop-up ideas and issues.<sup>19</sup> Squadrons fit into one or more of these types. A squadron focused on flight testing might favor a prospector frame. A squadron that exists as part of a larger bureaucratic organization with strict parameters, such as an acquisition unit, may favor a defender frame. Any squadron may inadvertently transform into a happenstance analyzer or unstable reactor.

Organizations also exhibit climates. Climate normally is a visible artifact of culture.<sup>20</sup> One can easily observe artifacts such as uniforms, plaques, and rituals throughout an organization. This observation should not surprise Air Force professionals. Culture enhancing accouterments such as awards, decorations, and patches commonly display heritage and pride. Insiders cherish artifacts. Outsiders, including an unversed commander new to the job, might find some artifacts incomprehensible.

This incomprehensibility may occur because symbols exist as a manifestation of culture shared by insiders.<sup>21</sup> Again, this should not surprise Air Force professionals. Most quickly learn to recognize the aforementioned accouterments as they assimilate into Air Force culture. However, squadrons also strengthen preferred culture by way of their symbols. Like-minded people within a squadron may also assimilate into niche-like subcultures and display conforming symbols. These may include risk-taking sports and hobby enthusiasts.<sup>22</sup> Partisan political cliques and home-based business entrepreneurs may inculcate and then solicit within a squadron. Gang affiliates, drug users, criminals, and malcontents may insidiously form harmful yet still detectable countercultures within a squadron. Commanders oblivious to artifacts, cultures, subcultures, and countercultures within their squadron may fail to manage a preferred culture. They may instead find cultures, subcultures, and countercultures managing them.<sup>23</sup>

Finally, organizations reflect a degree of health. The Organizational Health Diagnostic & Development Corporation (OHDDC) defines *organizational health* as the “ability to function effectively, to cope adequately, to change appropriately, and to grow from within.”<sup>24</sup> OHDDC consultants focus on dimensions such as optimal power equalization, cohesiveness, and morale. Air Force Equal Opportunity offices, similar to OHDDC consultants, help commanders measure squadron health by way of unit climate assessments (UCA). Lt Col Jeffry Smith,

USAF, author of *Commanding an Air Force Squadron in the Twenty-First Century*, advocates for UCAs but warns these are only snapshots in time.<sup>25</sup> Clever commanders constantly complement formal assessments, diagnose, and then reinforce those things that contribute to squadron healthiness, restore ailing squadrons, and tailor their strategy toward command success.

Squadron commanders who accurately self-assess their propensity for command and figure out command-unique facets of management, leadership, and power may indeed succeed. Yet some still struggle as they make their way through command. It would be ideal for commanders to further develop and prepare by genuinely assessing and molding the organization to which they will command.

### **Four Steps to a Tailored Command Philosophy**

Emerging leaders aiming for squadron command success should deliberately develop a pragmatic philosophy tailored to their specific command opportunity. This tailored command philosophy should complement personal leadership aspirations with command-unique facets of management, leadership, and power. It should go on to address distinctive squadron elements related to organizational structure, mission, climate, culture, and degree of health. A tailored command philosophy comes about via a four-step approach.

The first of four steps midlevel professionals approaching squadron command should accomplish is to revisit, revise, or even rewrite their leadership philosophy. Life happens. Desires toward advancement change. Burdens accumulate. Strengths may build over time. New opportunities surface. Marci Martin explores personal strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) in her article titled, "Conducting a Personal SWOT Analysis for your Career."<sup>26</sup> A personal SWOT analysis provides valuable insight. Genuinely self-assessing propensity for command by way of a midcareer introspection with a personal SWOT analysis, and then documenting perspectives in a fresh personal leadership philosophy, is a helpful first step when contemplating a squadron command opportunity.

Second, promising commanders should quickly discover, comprehend, and be able to leverage command-unique facets of management, leadership, and power in pursuit of duties and responsibilities that go with squadron command. Preparation is key. AFI 1-2 is a must-have instruction that "establishes broad responsibilities and expectations of commanders in the Air Force."<sup>27</sup> AU-2, *Guidelines for Command*, is a nonregulatory handbook with articles and tips for Air Force squadron commanders.<sup>28</sup> *Commanding an Air Force Squadron in the Twenty-First Century* provides practical tips and techniques for squadron commanders.<sup>29</sup> Gen David L. Goldfein, the 21st USAF chief of staff, published *Sharing Success—Owning Failure: Preparing to Command in the Twenty-First Century Air Force*

when he was a colonel in 2001. This book provides timeless counsel for officers selected for command as well as young officers aspiring to someday command.<sup>30</sup> Finally, *The Military Commander and the Law* is a helpful reference that provides general guidance, helps clarify issues, and identifies potential problem areas.<sup>31</sup> Complementing these readings are Air Force education, training, and orientation courses that focus on management, leadership, and power. Commanders should seek out and seize learning opportunities.

Third, commanders should assess their squadron's organizational structure, mission, climate, culture, and degree of health. They should learn organizational nuances and business practices. Commanders should watch for curious symbols and cryptic artifacts that might reveal squadron climate, culture, subcultures, and countercultures. They should gauge squadron health by perceiving general ambiance like the hinting of fatigue or positive energy in the air. Finally, they should gain insight on internal strengths and weaknesses while identifying external opportunities and threats. Researchers introduced the idea of a business-centric SWOT analysis in 1965 through their book titled *Business Policy: Text and Cases*.<sup>32</sup> Today, SWOT references and applications populate organizational leadership literature.<sup>33</sup> Commanders should learn and then use SWOT-centric concepts and models to assess their particular squadron. In fact, commanders should use all tools available to detect and then mindfully assess conditions within their squadron that affect organizational structure, mission, climate, culture, and degree of health.

Finally, after completing the above three steps, squadron commanders should convert their personal leadership philosophy into a tailored command philosophy. Tim Berry explains how business strategists convert SWOT analyses into doable strategies by way of a TOWS analysis.<sup>34</sup> TOWS is an acronym that demonstrates the mirroring of SWOT and refers to threats, opportunities, weaknesses, and strengths. These strategists overlap organizational strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to maximize positive influences while minimizing the negative. They may maximize an external opportunity by leveraging a company's internal strength. They may minimize a company's weakness by matching that deficiency to an external opportunity. A TOWS analysis provides four offsetting strategy combinations, and including strength-opportunity, strength-threat, weakness-opportunity, and weakness-threat. Business strategists advance ideal strategies after completing a TOWS analysis.

Squadron command, however, goes beyond strategy selection. Commanders mindfully choose actions based on personal leadership aspirations, the authority of command, and the uniqueness of a squadron. This mindset is why converting a personal leadership philosophy into a tailored command philosophy is more complex than a TOWS analysis. In fact, while a TOWS analysis produces four offset-

ting strategy combinations, a comprehensive personal leadership-to-command philosophy conversion, by way of the tailored command philosophy worksheet in the table, produces 16 actionable combinations.

**Table. Tailored Command Philosophy Worksheet**

|                               |                                   | Organizational SWOT                                                                                   |                                 |                                   |                                       |                                |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Personal SWOT                 | Command-Unique Facets             | Internal Strengths                                                                                    | Internal Weaknesses             | External Opportunities            | External Threats                      |                                |
|                               |                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management</li> <li>• Leadership</li> <li>• Power</li> </ul> | "My squadron is good at..."     | "My squadron struggles with..."   | "My squadron benefits from..."        | "My squadron is limited by..." |
|                               | <b>Internal Strengths</b>         | Combine both strengths.                                                                               | Offset weakness with strength.  | Combine opportunity and strength. | Offset threat with strength.          |                                |
|                               | "I'm good at..."                  |                                                                                                       |                                 |                                   |                                       |                                |
|                               | <b>Internal Weaknesses</b>        | Offset weakness with strength.                                                                        | Manage or reduce weaknesses.    | Offset weakness with opportunity. | Manage or reduce weakness and threat. |                                |
|                               | "I struggle with..."              |                                                                                                       |                                 |                                   |                                       |                                |
| <b>External Opportunities</b> | Combine strength and opportunity. | Offset weakness with opportunity.                                                                     | Combine both opportunities.     | Offset threat with opportunity.   |                                       |                                |
| "I benefit from..."           |                                   |                                                                                                       |                                 |                                   |                                       |                                |
| <b>External Threats</b>       | Offset threat with strength.      | Manage or reduce threat and weakness.                                                                 | Offset threat with opportunity. | Manage or reduce threats.         |                                       |                                |
| "I'm limited by..."           |                                   |                                                                                                       |                                 |                                   |                                       |                                |

Commanders converting their leadership philosophy into a tailored command philosophy begin by synthesizing their freshly revised personal leadership philosophy. Leadership philosophies might integrate personality, goals, gifts, vision, flaws, faith, family, values, and external influences. Commanders then translate personal issues they feel are significant into internal strengths, internal weaknesses, external opportunities, or external threats and then list them in the vertical SWOT column of the tailored command philosophy worksheet (table).

Next, commanders synthesize their squadron organizational assessment. Distinctive elements related to organizational structure, mission, climate, culture, and degree of health might include perception of commander, inspection results, mission performance, facilities, awards, promotion rates, morale, and squadron ambience.<sup>35</sup> Commanders then translate organizational issues they feel are significant into internal strengths, internal weaknesses, external opportunities, or external



threats and then list them in the horizontal SWOT row of the tailored command philosophy worksheet (table).

Completing this worksheet reveals to commanders how personal strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats extracted from their leadership philosophy overlap with strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats discovered from assessing their particular squadron. Suggestions in overlapping areas such as “leverage both strengths” and “offset threat with opportunity” illustrate how commanders can maximize positive influences while minimizing the negative through overlaps, offsets, and counterbalancing. The note at the top-left of the table reminds commanders to consider command-unique facets of management, leadership, and power as they select and carry out actions to influence desired outcomes. Creative commanders can go beyond SWOT categories and match other commander-squadron dynamics at play, such as office behavior, teambuilding endeavors, and off-duty activities.

Finally, and unlike a business-centric TOWS analysis that focuses primarily on organizational inadequacies and capabilities, the tailored command philosophy worksheet captures the personal leadership aspirations of the commander, the authority of command, and the uniqueness of a squadron. A thoughtfully completed worksheet provides ample visualization to support the conversion of a personal leadership philosophy into a tailored command philosophy.

### **Commanding with a Tailored Command Philosophy**

General Goldfein shared that his book on command preparation does not provide “how to command” answers.<sup>36</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Smith straightforwardly explains that his book on squadron command is not “full of checklists [with] simple cookbook approaches to problems.”<sup>37</sup> Lt Col Mike Hower, USAF, retired, shares that the Commanders Connection Team, who published AU-2, never intended it to be a prescription for command.<sup>38</sup> Similarly, a tailored command philosophy is not a lone recipe for squadron command success. Instead, it joins other resources aimed to help emerging leaders develop habits of mind that will move them toward squadron command success.

Commanders armed with a tailored command philosophy learn to approach issues both deductively and inductively. Deductively, commanders reason that outcomes will follow established patterns. They integrate leadership acumen developed along the way, traditional culture, rules, command-unique facets of management, leadership, power, and other time-tested premises into their command philosophy and then project command “top-down.” Inductively, the brightest also reason that squadron quirkiness tends to disrupt predictable patterns. These commanders certainly benefit from acumen, tradition, rules, and positional power. However, they

also invest considerable time observing and comprehending squadron events, trends, processes, and problems. In so doing, these “bottom-up” leaders notice conditions deep within their particular squadron and then mindfully diagnose issues in context. Then, from means available, and including drawing from their tailored command philosophy, they select actions that best influence desired outcomes.

Colonel DeMarco suggests in his integration piece that a leadership philosophy is the North Star for a leader. This suggestion is certainly true. A thoughtfully crafted leadership philosophy provides direction and vision. “Like a compass,” Colonel DeMarco says, “it helps keep you, the leader, on course.”<sup>39</sup> Aviators benefit from compasses. Leaders benefit from philosophies. Fortunately, advanced and innovative methods help aviators and leaders find their way through challenging conditions. The crucible of squadron command presents such a challenge. A tailored command philosophy is an advanced and innovative method. Commanders who command with a tailored command philosophy will best appreciate the compass analogy. A tailored command philosophy increases the probability of success for those navigating a squadron command journey.

## **Conclusion**

Mindful commanders self-assess their propensity for command and then confidently thunder forward with a fresh leadership philosophy. These commanders learn and then leverage command-unique facets of management, leadership, and power. The brightest continue to aim for success with advanced and innovative command preparation. These commanders continually develop and prepare by genuinely assessing and molding the organization to which they will command. In so doing, they smartly adjust to, adapt for, and acclimate into a squadron with a distinctive organizational structure, mission, climate, culture, and degree of health. Their tailored command philosophy balances their leadership aspirations, the authority of command, and the uniqueness of their squadron. Squadron commanders should deliberately develop a tailored command philosophy. ✪

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### **Notes**

1. Commanders and executive directors at all levels of leadership should develop a tailored command philosophy. This article pragmatically binds the discussion to commanders of USAF squadrons.

2. A two-year look back (not a scientific study) at 842 student responses. The first batch came from the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) Online Master's Program, LC-5510 *Practice of Command* course from January–December 2018 with 28 sections and 394 students. The second batch came from the combined ACSC and Air War College/LDR 845A *Squadron Command* course from March–December 2018 with nine sections and 104 students. The final batch came from the LC-5510 *Practice of Command* course from January–December 2019 with 30 sections and 344 students.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01E, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, 29 May 2015, A-A-4. CJCSI 1800.01E proposes the expected broadening of skills and perspectives through military ranks in the context of professional military education (PME).

4. Minutes of meeting with Secretary of Defense and Military Education Coordination Council Working Group on PME, 10 October 2018. From these minutes: "Understanding the changing character of war in a disruptive environment appears to be a key concept for the target of JPME."

5. These scholars and practitioners are: Col William J. DeMarco, USAF, retired; Capt G. Mark Hardy, Navy Reserve; Lt Col Danny R. McKnight, Army, retired; and Scott Bowden and Bill Ward. DeMarco, in a 2013 faculty paper at Air University, synthesized several arguments to emphasize vision setting, empowering, defining of mission and tempo, and the leveraging of authority as ways to translate personal leadership into command. Hardy noted the utility of maintaining an impeccable appearance, knowing the job, and recognizing outstanding effort via well-written evaluations. McKnight emphasized tough and challenging performance-oriented training, maintenance, and accountability of equipment, especially in harsh conditions, and insistence on the proper use versus abuse of soldiers. Bowden and Ward viewed Confederate Gen Robert E. Lee's command philosophy as a philosophy of war or generalship that maximized the strategic impact of his numerically inferior forces in a way that prolonged Confederate efforts despite the eventual defeat. See Col William J. DeMarco, *Leadership Philosophy 101: Who Are You?* (Maxwell AFB, AL: ACSC, 2013); Capt G. Mark Hardy, "Template for a Command Philosophy," *Naval Reserve Association News* (June 2003): 24; Lt Col Danny R. McKnight, "Command Philosophy," <http://www.dannymcknight.com/>; and Scott Bowden and Bill Ward, *Last Chance for Victory* (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2001): 78.

6. Chava Frankfort-Nachmias and David Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences* (New York: Worth Publishers, 6th ed., 2000), 27.

7. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 1-2, *Commander's Responsibilities*, 8 May 2014, 2.

8. AFI 1-2, 3.

9. Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, *Leaders: Strategies for Taking Charge* (New York: Harper-Business Essentials, 2003), 20. Emphasis italicized in original: "*Managers are people who do thing right and leaders are people who do the right thing.*"

10. AFI 1-2, 2.

11. AFI 1-2, 3.

12. AFI 1-2, 3.

13. Col John W. Blumentritt: "It's not just about you. Injuries or death from misconduct can result in lost benefits for family members," *Torch* 16, no. 2 (March–April 2009): 4.

14. Col Timothy T. Timmons, USAF, retired, introduction to *Commanding an Air Force Squadron in the Twenty-First Century* by Lt Col Jeffrey F. Smith (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2003), xv.

15. Professors Henry Mintzberg, Robert Simons, and Kunal Basu, quoted in Arthur A. Thompson Jr., A. J. Strickland III, and John E. Gamble, *Crafting & Executing Strategy: Text and Readings*, 15th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2007), 316.
16. Synopsized in John Parnell, *Strategic Management in Theory and Practice*, 3rd ed. (Mason, OH: Cengage Learning, 2008), 160–62.
17. Raymond E. Miles and Charles C. Snow, *Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 74.
18. Donald C. Hambrick, forward to *Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process*, xi.
19. Miles and Snow, *Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process*, 81.
20. Edgar H. Schine, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4th ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2010), 24.
21. Schine, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 24.
22. AFI 91-202, *The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program*, 29 April 2019, 167, <https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/>. Directs commanders to identify and engage with subordinates who participate in off-duty high-risk activities such as skydiving and scuba diving.
23. Schine, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 22.
24. Organizational Health Diagnostic & Development Corporation, accessed 24 April 2019, <http://www.organizationalhealth.com/>.
25. Smith, *Commanding an Air Force Squadron*, 31.
26. Marci Martin, “Conducting a Personal SWOT Analysis for your Career,” *Business News Daily*, 15 November 2015, <http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/>.
27. AFI 1-2, *Commander’s Responsibilities*, 1.
28. Air Command and Staff College, AU-2, *Guidelines for Command*, 2nd ed. (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2015), vii.
29. Smith, *Commanding an Air Force Squadron*, i.
30. Maj Gen Charles D. Link, USAF, retired, in forward to *Sharing Success—Owning Failure: Preparing to Command in the Twenty-First Century Air Force* by Col David L. Goldfein (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2001), v.
31. Judge Advocate General’s School, *The Military Commander and the Law* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 15th ed., 2019), I, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/>.
32. Martin, “Conducting a Personal SWOT Analysis,” 2. Martin shares the 1965 genesis of SWOT as a business tool while introducing her advocacy for a personal SWOT analysis.
33. Tim Berry, “What is a SWOT Analysis?,” Bplans, accessed 24 April 2019, <https://articles.bplans.com/>. Mr. Berry provides a comprehensive discussion of SWOT-centric tools.
34. Tim Berry, “What is a SWOT Analysis?”
35. Lt Col Matthew Atkinson, LDR 845A *Squadron Command Course*, Notional Unit Analysis assignment. Lieutenant Colonel Atkinson selected these eight elements to sort squadrons into three ordinal categories (i.e., low-down, middle-of-the-road, and high-flight), curriculum development circa 2017.
36. Goldfein, *Sharing Success—Owning Failure*, ix.
37. Smith, *Commanding an Air Force Squadron*, xiii.
38. Lt Col Mike Hower, (former Commanders Connection program manager and editor of AU-2, 2nd ed.), interview by the author, 3 May 2019.
39. DeMarco, “Leadership Philosophy 101,” 3.