

# ASPJ

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### **Moving toward Democracy in Morocco?**

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155 N. Twining Street  
Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6026  
U.S.A.

Telephone: 1 (334) 953-6739  
e-mail: [aspjfrench@maxwell.af.mil](mailto:aspjfrench@maxwell.af.mil)

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# Is Africa at a Crossroads?

*No one knows the history of the next dawn.*

—Yoruban saying

From the early 1960s through the 1990s, the rapid growth and industrialization of the first developing regions in Asia—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan (the “Asian Tigers”)—fascinated the world. In the early twenty-first century, however, attention has shifted to new economic powers in the making—the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Like the Asian Tigers, the BRICs are not only well under way in their economic development but also share huge local markets.

With regard to Africa, though, the widespread occurrence of HIV, civil wars, genocide, corruption, coups d’état, inequality, and insecurity, as well as the persistently high levels of poverty that plague the continent, cast it in a negative light. Nevertheless, breathtaking changes taking place there give us good reason to be optimistic about the future of Africa. Indeed, we may be witnessing the birth of the “African Lions.”

Many of the 53 countries in this diverse continent face considerable political, social, and economic challenges. Some still contend with severe poverty, disease, and civil war. In this context, what future can Africa expect in the globalized world? How can the continent become economically viable and competitive? Can Africa produce its share of countries like the Asian Tigers and BRICs—the African Lions?

Let’s look at some numbers from research recently published by the McKinsey Global Institute:

\$1.6 trillion: Africa’s collective GDP [gross domestic product] in 2008, roughly equal to Brazil’s or Russia’s. . . . The continent is among the world’s most rapidly growing economic regions.

\$860 billion: Africa’s combined consumer spending in 2008

316 million: the number of new mobile phone subscribers signed up in Africa since 2000

60%: Africa’s share of the world’s total amount of uncultivated, arable land. . . . With [this amount of] land and low crop yields, Africa is ripe for a “green revolution” like the ones that have transformed agriculture in Asia and Brazil. . . . [Such a revolution] would be enormous in terms of raising rural incomes, boosting GDP growth, and creating huge new business opportunities.

52: the number of African cities with more than 1 million people each

20: the number of African companies with revenues of at least \$3 billion

\$2.6 trillion: Africa’s [projected] collective GDP in 2020

\$1.4 trillion: Africa’s consumer spending [by] 2020. . . . The continent’s five largest consumer markets in 2020—Alexandria, Cairo, Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Lagos—will each have more than \$25 billion a year in household spending and be comparable in size to Mumbai and New Delhi.

1.1 billion: the number of Africans of working age [by] 2040. . . . Africa’s labor force is expanding more rapidly than anywhere in the world. The continent has more than 500 million people of working age (15 to 64 years old). By 2040, that number is projected to exceed 1.1 billion—more than in China or India.

128 million: the number of African households with discretionary income [by] 2020. . . . Africa already has more

middle-class households (defined as those with incomes of \$20,000 or above) than India. The rise of the African urban consumer is serving as a new engine of domestic growth.

50 percent: the portion of Africans [who will live] in cities by 2030. . . . By 2030, the continent's top 18 cities could have a combined spending power of \$1.3 trillion. . . .

In 1980, just 28 percent of Africans lived in cities. Today, 40 percent do—a portion close to China's and larger than India's—and this share is projected to increase.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, according to the institute,

While poor government policies, wars, and other events could disrupt growth in individual countries, our analysis suggests that Africa's long-term economic prospects are quite strong, . . . propelled by both external trends in the global economy and internal changes in the continent's societies and economies.

To begin, Africa will continue to profit from rising global demand for oil, natural gas, minerals, food, arable land, and other natural resources. The continent boasts an abundance of riches, including 10 percent of the world's reserves of oil, 40 percent of its gold, and 80 to 90 percent of the chromium and the platinum group metals. . . . Foreign direct investment in Africa has increased from \$9 billion in 2000 to \$62 billion in 2008—almost as large as the flow into China, when measured relative to GDP.<sup>2</sup>

Encouragingly, Africa's economic growth comes not only from commodities and natural resources, for which the continent is well known, but also from other areas:

Natural resources directly accounted for just 24 percent of Africa's GDP growth from 2000 through 2008. The rest came from other sectors, including wholesale and retail [(13 percent), agriculture (12 percent)], transportation [and] telecommunications [(10 percent)], and manufacturing [(9 percent)]. Economic growth accelerated across the continent, in 27 of its 30 largest economies. Indeed, we find that GDP grew at similar rates in countries with and without significant resource exports. . . .

Africa's recent growth was so solid that the continent was one of just two economic regions—along with Asia—where GDP rose during the global recession of 2009. Its economic growth rate is already rebounding, from 1.4 percent in 2009 to a projected 4.5 percent by 2011. . . .

The key reasons behind Africa's growth surge include government moves to end armed conflicts, improve macroeconomic conditions, and adopt microeconomic reforms to create a better business climate. In every country where these shifts occurred, they correlated with faster GDP growth.<sup>3</sup>

To analyze growth in Africa, the McKensey Global Institute spurns the traditional partition of the continent into sub-Saharan and northern areas in favor of classifying the economies of its largest countries:

**Diversified economies: Africa's growth engines.** Africa's four most advanced economies—Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, and Tunisia—already have significant manufacturing and service industries. . . .

**Oil exporters: Enhancing growth through diversification.** Africa's oil and gas exporters have the continent's highest GDP per capita but the least diversified economies. . . . The three largest producers [are] Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria. . . . These countries have strong growth prospects if they can use petroleum wealth to finance the broader development of their economies. . . .

**Transition economies: Building on recent gains.** Africa's transition economies—including Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal—have lower GDP per capita than the countries in the two first groups, but their economies are growing rapidly. . . .

**Pre-transition economies: Strengthen the basics.** The pre-transition economies [(including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and Mali)] are very poor, with annual GDP per capita of just \$353, but some are growing very rapidly. . . . Although the individual pre-transition economies differ greatly, their common problem is a lack of the basics, such as strong, stable governments and other public institutions, good macroeconomic conditions, and sustainable agricultural development.<sup>4</sup>

Like democracy, however, the economy is a fragile commodity throughout Africa. Nelson Mandela stressed the interdependence of freedom and economy in Africa, declaring that “freedom is meaningless if people cannot put food in their stomachs.”<sup>5</sup> In the African envi-

ronment, institutional transformation must accompany economic transformation. Can Africa take advantage of its recent spurt of growth and enjoy an economic stimulus as well? Obviously, many of its 53 individual economies face serious obstacles, but the continent has considerable assets: talented people and vast resources. If Africa maintains its hard-won political and macro-economic stability, develops sound growth strategies, creates a more attractive business environment, improves its infrastructure and regulatory systems, and entrenches good governance at an institutional level, African Lions might roar throughout the continent and the world.

Rémy M. Mauduit, Editor  
*Air and Space Power Journal—Africa and Francophonie*  
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

## Notes

1. Charles Roxburgh et al., *Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies* (Washington, DC: McKinsey and Company, June 2010), see the unnumbered pages immediately preceding the “Contents,” as well as pp. 1, 3, 7, 19, 22, 24, [http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/progress\\_and\\_potential\\_of\\_african\\_economies/pdfs/MGI\\_african\\_economies\\_full\\_report.pdf](http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/progress_and_potential_of_african_economies/pdfs/MGI_african_economies_full_report.pdf).
2. Ibid., 1, 3.
3. Ibid., 2, 11.
4. Ibid., 5–6.
5. Quoted in Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, “Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental?,” *British Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 3 (July 2001): 447.

# Africa

## A Light at the End of the Tunnel?

HERMAN J. COHEN\*

Everyone wants Africa to succeed. In the broad sense, African nations have no strategic adversaries. Nor is most of Africa's territory the objective of big-power hegemonic ambitions—with the exception of the eastern Horn, which is geographically close to the oil states of the Middle East. Most of the rest of the world's nations would welcome African states' participation in the global economy as full partners. The major industrial powers would welcome the day when Africa ends its dependence on both economic development aid and humanitarian assistance. None of these powers seek spheres of influence in Africa.

Looking forward to the year 2020, we see that the outlook for the majority of African countries remains mediocre, at best, in the absence of major policy reforms at all levels. At the present time (2010), there is little indication that the required reforms will likely see implementation, with a few exceptions. The key to this bleak prognosis lies chiefly among the large, resource-rich African nations that demonstrate absolutely no political

will to take the necessary steps leading to strong and sustainable economic growth. On the contrary, these countries are hopelessly mired down as prisoners of the status quo and the special interests that want to keep them just where they are. These countries, which should normally be the engines of growth for all of sub-Saharan Africa, include Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Angola. To this unhappy list we must add two smaller African states that showed great promise until the turn of this century—Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire—but which succumbed to civil strife that set both of them back several decades, with no turnaround currently in sight.<sup>1</sup>

The one glimmer of hope among the larger African nations is the Republic of South Africa. Having achieved black majority rule only in 1994, South Africa has managed to avoid most of the mistakes made by those countries that achieved independence between 1957 and 1974. Although South Africa's real democracy has some way to go before consolidation, it appears irreversible.<sup>2</sup> That nation has also preserved a market economy, the rule of

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\*Prior to his retirement, the author served as assistant secretary of state for African affairs in the administration of Pres. George H. W. Bush. From 1993 to 1998, he was a senior advisor to the Global Coalition for Africa, an intergovernmental forum for dialogue between African and donor governments on economic reform. Currently Mr. Cohen lectures at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and, as president of the firm Cohen and Woods International, consults US business in Africa.



law, and a vigorous international trading capability. Nevertheless, South Africa's uncertain political future and the absence of viable opposition to the power structure have caused potential investors to hesitate. In addition, its crime rate, one of the highest in the world, deters investor confidence. In the final analysis, South Africa's natural market is the rest of Africa, and the absence of significant purchasing power to the north continues to dampen growth in South Africa itself.

### The Roots of Stagnation

Why is Africa lagging behind the rest of the emerging world? Some historical reasons, which provide perspective, continue to inhibit progress 60 years later. It is sobering to contemplate that Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea had higher gross domestic products (GDP) per capita in 1950 than South Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia. What happened?<sup>3</sup>

Africa's first generation of leaders, the captains of the anticolonial movement, made some important decisions about their political and economic policies that caused great damage to their nations and that continue to haunt their countries to this day.<sup>4</sup> Virtually all African leaders rejected the Western-style democracy that they inherited from the European colonial powers, considering multiparty democracy incompatible with African cultural norms. As practiced in Europe and the United States, multiparty democracy is adversarial. In Africa, tradition requires the resolution of political issues through a slow process of consensus building from which solutions emerge.

The political system of choice, the "African one-party state," proved all-encompassing, including all citizens as party members from birth. Civil soci-

ety, the singularly important countervailing power that constitutes the backbone of democracy, was co-opted into the single-party structure. The state/party, which prohibited political opposition, owned all media. The party structure became a huge bureaucracy that constituted a parallel state within a state. Without opposition, the single political party became the most important route to fame and fortune. Without multiparty elections, the single party could not be defeated. Hence, careers within the single party provided security as well as power.

Needless to say, the African one-party state at the national, provincial, and municipal levels could not replicate the traditional consensus exercises led by the village chiefs. With so many different ethnic groups and their different languages, and with so many competing interests based on geography and economic resources, government by consensus made no sense. Political opposition would inevitably rear its head to air profound differences. Real conflicts required nonviolent resolution. With opposition forbidden under the one-party consensus system, people who expressed discontent and unhappiness with the party in power faced incarceration. Thus, political prisoners became a fact of life. In addition, political opposition had to be stifled in its infancy. Consequently, the secret police became a growth industry. People were afraid to talk to each other in public places for fear of being overheard. To find out the truth about their own countries, citizens had to listen to the BBC, the Voice of America, or Radio France on shortwave radio.

Having no fear of the populace voting them out of office and enjoying total control over government bureaucracies, the single parties condemned themselves to fall into corruption and malfeasance. To

paraphrase Lord Acton, unchecked power is always abused. In addition, the tendency to bend or severely diminish the rule of law rendered those societies uninviting to private investors, both home-grown and foreign.<sup>5</sup>

### Socialism with an African Face

On the economic side, the initial decisions were no less damaging to the prospects for future prosperity than on the political side. Under the strong influence of their best friends in the United Kingdom and France, most of them ideological socialists, the first generation of free African leaders opted for “African socialism,” the economic counterpart of the African one-party state. That translated into the state’s taking possession of the “commanding heights of the economy.” Within the first five years after independence, most of the large plantations, banks, insurance companies, telecommunications firms, agro-industries, mines, and factories were nationalized with compensation to the (mostly foreign) owners.

Government ownership of enterprises is not necessarily condemned in advance to failure. A number of such enterprises in Africa have proven profitable and expansive, such as Ethiopian Airways and Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière (SNIM), the iron ore mining company in Mauritania. Unfortunately, managers of the vast majority of African nationalized enterprises did not consider profitability and growth a high priority. Instead, government-owned enterprises have created employment for the ruling party’s supporters and their families, many of whom come from rural areas, where salaried employment is scarce.

As the bloating of enterprises expanded, profitability turned into loss

making. The government had to subsidize the enterprises in order to keep them in business. The money funneled into subsidies for enterprises reduced the amount of funds available to pay for vital traditional governmental services, including education, public health, and maintenance of infrastructure. Government borrowing from central banks crowded out applicants for bank credit. All of these developments made it virtually impossible for the indigenous private sector to obtain financing. The net result was an economic vicious cycle, with subsidies to government enterprises reducing government services, which in turn made it more difficult for existing private business to continue operating. As more investors disinvested, revenue from taxes and royalties decreased, and so on.

In most African countries, the economic vicious cycles were masked between 1957 and 1975, when the global economy enjoyed a commodities boom. The many tropical and mineral products exported to world markets by African nations brought in high prices. Thus, those countries could avoid budget deficits, at least to permit the paying of salaries. Where cash was still short, some African governments could use their high earnings as collateral for commercial borrowing from London and New York banks. Sadly, those governments spent a significant percentage of the receipts from exports and borrowing on white elephants rather than on water, roads, and power for the rural majorities.

Between 1975 and 1980, world commodity prices declined steeply. Electrolytic copper diodes exported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, dropped from \$1.40 per pound to \$0.75—a catastrophic loss on copper exports of 400,000 tons per year. It was the same for natural rubber, palm oil,

coffee, and ground nuts. This occurred because of a leveling of demand from industrialized countries after the initial surge of World War II reconstruction, combined with increased exports from new producers in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Because African governments neglected maintenance and new investments in infrastructure in favor of subsidized state enterprises, their exports became less competitive, and they subsequently lost substantial market share to countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. The Republic of Togo, to cite another example, used to supply 5 percent of the European Union's cattle feed with exports of cassava. Togo lost its entire European market to Thailand in the 1970s due to the lack of competitiveness.

## World Bank to the Rescue

By 1980 the World Bank considered the majority of African economies "in free fall," overburdened by debt, incapable of paying government salaries, and suffering from declining infrastructure and essential services. Between 1980 and 1990, most African countries signed on to tough World Bank economic-reform programs in return for substantial debt rescheduling and development assistance. They had no choice. The World Bank gave them significant breathing room on the road to economic recovery. By 1990 African countries that had accepted the World Bank recovery programs, called "structural adjustment," had hit bottom and were steadily working their way back to financial stability. Growth rates of 2.5 percent to 3.5 percent were mediocre compared to those of Southeast Asia but gave hope to some very sick economies.<sup>6</sup>

To make Africa's prospects look even better, multiparty democracy started to break out all over the continent at the beginning of the 1990s. Two new generations of educated Africans, who had not known colonialism, demanded an end to political prisoners, media censorship, government media monopolies, and just plain old dictatorship. They wanted multiparty democracies, and they started to get them.

Here we are today, two decades later, and whither Africa? Well, the answer is that not much progress toward poverty reduction has taken place. Africa's share of world trade has decreased over that period (1990–2010) from 3 percent to 1 percent. Average annual GDP growth continues to move between 2.5 percent and 5 percent. Considering the low bases of most African countries (the growth rate needed to reach sustainable development is 10 percent to 20 percent), Africa still has not produced a single equivalent of the Asian "tiger." What are the problems, and are there solutions?

The structural adjustment programs of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and international donors established a macroeconomic floor for most African countries, reversing the free fall of the 1970s. But that marked only the beginning of the process of achieving sustainable development. Moving upward from that point would require even greater effort. Unfortunately, African nations have encountered too many pitfalls along the way, including civil conflict; loss of market share in international trade through lack of competitiveness; continued neglect of agriculture, which employs the majority of the people at subsistence level; and vagaries of global markets.

## Agriculture: The Key

Among the several reasons for the agonizingly slow progress in African development, the neglect of agriculture is probably the most important. As one African head of state informed me recently, “By neglecting agriculture, we killed the goose that laid the golden egg.”

At the time of independence in the early 1960s, the African continent was a major exporter of tropical products, and most African nations were self-sufficient in food production. Unfortunately, with the notable exceptions of Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, most African governments assigned their highest priority to satisfying the needs of the cities—the centers of political activity. This resulted in taxation of producers of wealth in the rural areas for the benefit of urban dwellers. A corollary of this policy involved maintaining artificially high exchange rates so as to provide cheap imports for the urban populations. Among other results, this practice raised agricultural export prices artificially, thereby causing loss of market share to cheaper producers in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Needless to say, these policies reduced incentives for the farmers to produce for markets and caused major reductions in export earnings. With the lowering of opportunities for young people in farming, migration to cities expanded, thereby increasing pressure on governments to rob Peter (the farms) to pay Paul (the cities).<sup>7</sup>

The World Bank stabilization programs eliminated artificial exchange rates. The devaluation of the common *Communauté Financière d’Afrique* (Financial Community of Africa) (CFA) currency in 13 francophone countries in 1994 provided major relief to farmers, especially in those few nations with active agricultural support programs, such as Côte d’Ivoire.<sup>8</sup>

But the African governments and international donor community failed to follow up with agricultural modernization programs that could have tripled yields for grains, stabilized domestic markets, and expanded exports. The donors had no incentives to help African agriculture in view of their agricultural protectionism at home.

As for local food security, African farmers did a fairly good job of matching agricultural production to population expansion. But they ran out of steam around 1995 when food imports began to expand significantly. From 2006 to 2008, world food prices increased dramatically, causing great hardship in a number of African importing countries that found themselves competing with the gigantic and wealthier populations of China and India. Currently, though, we see signs of African countries paying new attention to agriculture, with talk of improved seed varieties, increased availability of fertilizer, and development of local irrigation schemes. Better late than never.<sup>9</sup>

## The African Entrepreneur: Under the Radar

After neglect of agriculture, the absence of an enabling environment for private investors represents the most important impediment to African development. African entrepreneurs are reluctant to invest. Unless a business person enjoys a close connection to the ruling elites, no rule of law exists; banks extend very little credit; many hurdles impede attempts to start a business; and pathological corruption is extremely stifling. Safety-conscious investors keep their money outside Africa. In the final analysis, the ruling class takes a dim view of African entrepreneurs not closely connected to

the power structure and unable to win special privileges. Countries in Southeast Asia consider entrepreneurs partners in development. Those in Africa, however, often see them as a threat to power.<sup>10</sup>

To make matters worse, the lack of investment in infrastructure maintenance and upgrades over the years has steeply increased the cost of doing business for both local and foreign investors. Electric power is expensive and unreliable. Port operations are slow and inefficient. Workers often do not have needed skills, including basic literacy and a working knowledge of math. Roads to and from ports and neighboring countries are badly in need of repairs, making transport very expensive and slow. All other things being equal, Africa remains noncompetitive for value-added investors.

Civil conflict has taken a heavy toll on a high number of African countries. Internal wars in Somalia, Sudan, Chad, and Ethiopia continue to inhibit development and continue to generate refugees and flows of illegal arms. Countries coming out of conflict have a long, steep hill to climb in order to repair destroyed infrastructure, repatriate refugees, and restore basic services. Because of minority government in a number of African states, civil conflict lurks under the surface and can explode at any time. A monopoly of power residing in one minority ethnic group produces an absence of social capital and a disaffection from government among the excluded ethnic groups—a potentially explosive situation. A number of African countries continue to be ruled by ethnic minorities that have firm control over coercive power, which they show no intention of sharing.

## The Resource Curse: Alive and Well

Countries along the west coast of Africa, known as the Gulf of Guinea, have become both major and minor producers of hydrocarbons. Easy money coming from production-sharing agreements between governments and oil companies has resulted in declines in all other economic activities. Why make an effort in infrastructure, agriculture, or manufacturing when a big monthly check comes in from Houston, Paris, Rome, or London? The resource curse has hit particularly hard in Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon, Angola, and the two Congo republics. In Africa, perhaps only Botswana—the world's biggest producer of high-quality diamonds—has utilized an abundant natural resource wisely.<sup>11</sup>

## The Big Four of Misery

The outlook for Africa as a whole remains discouraging for a special reason which relates to the dismal internal performance of the four countries that are most populous, biggest in land mass, and most fortunate in their abundance of natural resources: Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, and Sudan. All of them are mired down in civil conflict, debilitating corruption, and dysfunctional government.

With a population of 120 million people or more, Nigeria suffers from blockages by powerful vested interests. Such interests in the importation of refined petroleum products, for example, prevent the repair of four government-owned oil refineries. New, privately owned power plants cannot receive allocations of natural gas because vested interests are profiting from imports of diesel generators for

homes and businesses. The stealing of crude oil from oil company pipelines is connected to high-ranking politicians who realize personal profits and finance their political machines from these criminal acts. When democracy returned to Nigeria in 1999 after two decades of military rule, electricity production stood at 6,000 megawatts. Eleven years later, it has dropped to less than 3,000 megawatts. The overall negative outlook appears irreversible in Nigeria. The same holds true for Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, and Sudan—countries that should be the locomotives of development for all of Africa. Sadly, they remain negative economic forces.

### **African Points of Light and Potential World Players**

Moving from the general to the specific, we see individual African countries, or clusters of countries, that seem capable of achieving sustainable development. Their governments are making an effort. In addition, a few African governments can pull some weight on the global scene.

In southern Africa, South Africa knows how to produce wealth and is making an effort to bring benefits to the people. Closely attached to South Africa are the economies of Botswana, Namibia, and southern Mozambique, where good policies encourage activity in the private sector.

In East Africa, the increasingly integrated nations of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda show signs of breakthrough in development. Governance is generally good, if not brilliant, and entrepreneurship is becoming politically acceptable.

In West Africa, the Republic of Ghana has become a role model for democratic transitions, the rule of law, and openness to business.<sup>12</sup> Unsurprisingly, Pres. Barack

Obama chose to visit only Ghana during his first visit to the continent of Africa in July 2009.

In the sector of international peace-keeping operations and diplomatic conflict resolution, some African countries have begun to stand out. Nigeria, Angola, and Senegal have battle-hardened professional militaries that provide leadership in stabilization activities in conflict zones. Its own severe internal problems notwithstanding, Nigeria—boasting Africa's largest population and oil-production revenues—serves as a key diplomatic mediator in conflict countries such as Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic.

In meetings of the G-20 economic powers, South Africa enjoys full membership, indicating its growing weight on trade and investment issues. Within the World Trade Organization, the Africans have become increasingly sophisticated in their negotiations, demanding an end to farm subsidies that undercut African agricultural production.

In the United Nations, Africa retains three Security Council seats on a rotating basis. A consensus of the entire African caucus at the United Nations decides the votes of the three Africans, who have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to tilt the balance between the Western members and China and Russia.

Clearly, despite the weakness of individual states, no one can take collective Africa for granted on the world stage. That continent has begun to carve out its own identity.

### **The Need for a New Paradigm**

What is to be done? What can the international donor community do to make a difference in Africa? Do we need a new paradigm?

To give it much credit, the international donor community has been quite innovative in Africa. After a decade of heated debate, toward 1995 the donors agreed to forgive and reduce debt owed to international financial institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the regional development banks) by the poorest heavily indebted countries, most of them African. The administration of Pres. George W. Bush was particularly creative with respect to Africa, persuading the other donors to move toward grants rather than loans from the World Bank; establishing the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which selectively finds African countries with the best potential for growth and gives them significant amounts of money to implement homegrown development plans; obtaining large appropriations from Congress to begin a huge program in Africa to combat HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis; and expanding duty-free entry for African products, without a requirement for reciprocity, in a program authorized in the final year of the Clinton administration.

The donor partners must contemplate what they can do now to help Africans make the right decisions to achieve breakthroughs in economic growth. Is there a new paradigm?<sup>13</sup>

## The Essentials

*Agriculture* must come back. Only 15 percent of African land is arable, but only 15 percent of the arable land is actually devoted to modern agriculture. However, 15 percent of African land equates to 45 percent of the United States in a continent with fewer than one billion people. It is unacceptable, therefore, that Africa cannot feed itself and must lose scarce foreign currency to import food from

around the world. An additional key element of the modernization of agriculture in Africa involves land reform. Moreover, China and India will probably greatly increase their consumption of protein and cereals as their middle classes grow—a situation that has already caused food prices to rise worldwide, making Africa's self-sufficiency imperative. The other side of that coin, of course, is that Africa can earn money as a food exporter, as it did before the independence wave.<sup>14</sup>

The *private sector* must take the lead in stimulating economic growth—and the most important subset of the private sector is the African private sector. Though always welcome, foreign investors do not necessarily create jobs. The African entrepreneur, if allowed to invest with security, will become the driving economic force.<sup>15</sup>

*Infrastructure* and its multiplier effect represent the key link to a revival of agriculture and to the rise of the private sector. Rural areas need infrastructure to provide irrigation water, roads to markets, and real-time communications for the modern farmer. The entrepreneur needs it to provide reliable power and water, efficient port services, and good road and rail communications. Until agriculture, the private sector, and related infrastructure become priorities in Africa, the rise of African economic tigers will remain elusive.

What about the international donor community? Does it need a new paradigm for Africa? I think it does. The Bush administration's Millennium Challenge Account adopted a policy of selectivity, finding countries that have demonstrated an ability to grow rapidly and giving them a significant financial head start. These countries have made progress in implementing a variety of reforms and have fulfilled a set of criteria, as witnessed by independent observers. The idea that all

developing countries should receive aid regardless of their level of policy reform has essentially been allowed to lapse.

## The End of Dependency

The next logical step, in my view, would involve announcing the phasing out of development aid over a relatively reasonable period of time, such as 15 years. At present, most African nations receiving foreign assistance include this aid in their annual budgets. In essence, those aid recipients have developed a dependency that tends to dull other needed efforts to promote rapid growth. Foreign assistance for the poorest African countries is like the cursed oil resource for oil-producing countries in the Gulf of Guinea.

During those 15 years, foreign assistance should focus on food self-sufficiency

and agricultural exports, an enabling environment for the African private sector, and targeted infrastructure designed to make African nations global competitors. The countdown to the end of foreign assistance will serve as an incentive for a much greater effort on the part of Africans themselves. For those African countries that border on collapse, or which suffer natural disasters, donor humanitarian assistance would remain in place indefinitely.

Some would call this new paradigm "tough love." That is exactly the right term. In the United States, President Obama, a son of Africa, has launched that policy. He is speaking out about corruption without fear of alienating the Africans who hear him. He is also insisting on food security and infrastructure development.<sup>16</sup> □

## Notes

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4. Daniel Etunga-Manguelle, "Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?" in *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, ed. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 65–77.

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6. Robert B. Zoellick, president, World Bank Group, "A Challenge of Economic Statecraft" (speech to the

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7. Philippe Hugon, "Hunger Riots and the Food Crisis in Africa," *Passages*, March 2009, 74–78.

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13. Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009). See chap. 5, "Radical Rethink of the Dependency Model."

14. "African Farmland: Investing for the Long-Term," *Corporate Council on Africa (CCA) Business Report 2009* 6, no. 2 (30 January 2009).

15. "The Corporate Council on Africa Sends Private Sector's Policy Recommendations for Africa to the Obama Administration," press release, Corporate Council on Africa, 5 March 2009, <http://emailwire.com/release/20197-The-Corporate-Council-on-Africa-Sends-Private-Sectors-Policy-Recommendations-for-Africa-to-the-Obama-Administration.html>.

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# Cracks in the Jihad

THOMAS RID, PhD\*

**G**et ready for all Muslims to join the holy war against you,” the jihadi leader Abd el-Kader warned his Western enemies. The year was 1839, and nine years into France’s occupation of Algeria the resistance had grown self-confident. Only weeks earlier, Arab fighters had wiped out a convoy of 30 French soldiers en route from Boufarik to Oued-el-Alèg. Insurgent attacks on the slow-moving French columns were steadily increasing, and the army’s fortified blockhouses in the Atlas Mountains were under frequent assault.

Paris pinned its hopes on an energetic general who had already served a successful tour in Algeria, Thomas-Robert Bugeaud. In January 1840, shortly before leaving to take command in Algiers, he addressed the French Chamber of Deputies: “In Europe, gentlemen, we don’t just make war against armies; we make war against interests.” The key to victory in European wars, he explained, was to penetrate the enemy

country’s interior. Seize the centers of population, commerce, and industry, “and soon the interests are forced to capitulate.” Not so at the foot of the Atlas, he conceded. Instead, he would focus the army’s effort on the tribal population.

Later that year, a well-known military thinker from Prussia traveled to Algeria to observe Bugeaud’s new approach. Maj Gen Carl von Decker, who had taught under the famed Carl von Clausewitz at the War Academy in Berlin, was more forthright than his French counterpart. The fight against fanatical tribal warriors, he foresaw, “will throw all European theory of war into the trash heap.”

One hundred and seventy years later, jihad is again a major threat—and Decker’s dire analysis more relevant than ever. War, in Clausewitz’s eminent theory, was a clash of collective wills, “a continuation of politics by other means.” When states went to war, the adversary was a political entity with the ability to act as one body, able to

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\*Dr. Rid, who holds a doctorate in political science from the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, works at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem and at the Richard Koebner Minerva Center for German History at the Hebrew University. He also is a nonresident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. From 2006 to 2009, he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center and at the RAND Corporation in Washington, DC, as well as at the Institut français des relations internationales in Paris. From 2005 to 2006, he directed the foreign policy program of the American Academy in Berlin. He is the author of *War and Media Operations* (Routledge) and *War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age* (Praeger), as well as coeditor of *Understanding Counterinsurgency Warfare* (Routledge). His articles have appeared in such journals as *Die Zeit*, *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, *Der Tagesspiegel*, *Merkur*, *Policy Review*, *Military Review*, and the *Wilson Quarterly*. Dr. Rid’s main research interests are civil-military relations, particularly the emergence of the local civilian population as a concept in military thinking, and the impact of telecommunication technology on fragile states and armed conflict. He is also working on European and German foreign and security policy.

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end hostilities by declaring victory or admitting defeat. Even Abd el-Kader eventually capitulated. But jihad in the twenty-first century, especially during the past few years, has fundamentally changed its anatomy: al-Qaeda is no longer a collective political actor. It is no longer an adversary that can articulate a will, capitulate, and be defeated. But the jihad's new weakness is also its new strength: Because of its transformation, Islamist militancy is politically impaired yet fitter to survive its present crisis.

In the years since late 2001, when US and coalition forces toppled the Taliban regime and all but destroyed al-Qaeda's core organization in Afghanistan, the bin Laden brand has been bleeding popularity across the Muslim world. The global jihad, as a result, has been torn by mounting internal tensions. Today, the holy war is set to slip into three distinct ideological and organizational niches. The US surge in Afghanistan, whether successful or not, is likely to affect this development only marginally.

The first niche is occupied by local Islamist insurgencies, fueled by grievances against "apostate" regimes that are authoritarian, corrupt, or backed by "infidel" outside powers (or any combination of the three). Filling the second niche is terrorism-cum-organized crime, most visible in Afghanistan and Indonesia but also seen in Europe, fueled by narcotics, extortion, and other ordinary illicit activities. In the final niche are people who barely qualify as a group: young second- and third-generation Muslims in the diaspora who are engaged in a more amateurish but persistent holy war, fueled by their own complex personal discontents. Al-Qaeda's challenge is to encompass the jihadis who drift to the criminal and eccentric fringe while keeping alive its appeal

to the Muslim mainstream and a rhetoric of high aspiration and promise.

The most visible divide separates the local and global jihadis. Historically, Islamist groups tended to bud locally and assumed a global outlook only later, if they did so at all. All the groups that have been affiliated with al-Qaeda either predate the birth of the global jihad in the early 1990s or grew later out of local causes and concerns, only subsequently attaching the bin Laden logo. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, for example, started out in 1998 as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, an offshoot of another militant group that had roots in Algeria's vicious civil war during the early 1990s. Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Taiba, the force allegedly behind the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, that killed more than 170 people, was formed in the 1990s to fight for a united Kashmir under Pakistani rule. In Somalia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other countries, the al-Qaeda brand has been attractive to groups born out of local concerns.

By joining al-Qaeda and stepping up violence, local insurgents have long risked placing themselves on the target lists of governments and law enforcement organizations. More recently, however, they have run what may be an even more consequential risk, that of removing themselves from the social mainstream and losing popular support. This is what happened to al-Qaeda in Iraq during the Sunni Awakening, which began in 2005 in violence-ridden al-Anbar Province and its principal city, Ramadi. Al-Qaeda had declared Ramadi the future capital of its Iraqi "caliphate," and by late 2005 it had the entire city under its control. But even conservative Sunni elders became alienated by the group's brutality and violence. One prominent local leader, Sheikh Sattar Abdul Abu Risha, lost several brothers

and his father in assassinations. Others were agitated by the loss of prestige and power to the insurgents in their traditional homelands. In early 2006, Sattar and his sheikhs decided to cooperate with American forces, and by the end of the year they had helped recruit nearly 4,000 men to local police units. "They brought us nothing but destruction and we finally said, enough is enough," Sattar explained.

The awakening (*sahwa* in Arabic) was not limited to al-Anbar. One after another, former firebrand imams, in so-called revisions, have started questioning the theological justifications of holy war. The trend may have begun with Gamaa al-Islamiya, Egypt's most brutal terrorist group, which was responsible for the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat in 1981 and the slaughter of 58 foreign tourists in Luxor in 1997. As the Iraq war intensified during the summer of 2003, several of Gamaa al-Islamiya's leaders advised young men not to participate in al-Qaeda operations and accused the organization of "splitting Muslim ranks" by provoking hostile reactions against Islam "and wrongly interpreting the meaning of jihad in a violent way."

Another notable revision came in September 2007, when Salman al-Awda, an influential Saudi cleric who had previously declared that fighting Americans in Iraq was a religious duty, spoke out against al-Qaeda. He accused bin Laden in an open letter of "making terror a synonym for Islam." Speaking on a popular Saudi TV show on the sixth anniversary of 9/11, al-Awda asked, "My brother Osama, how much blood has been spilt? How many innocent people, children, elderly, and women have been killed . . . in the name of al-Qaeda?"

Other ideologues have followed, including Sajjid Imam al-Shareef, one of al-Qaeda's founding leaders, who used the

nom de guerre Dr. Fadl. "Every drop of blood that was shed or is being shed in Afghanistan and Iraq is the responsibility of bin Laden and Zawahiri and their followers," he wrote in the London-based newspaper *Asharq Al Awsat*.

In Afghanistan, coalition soldiers see the global-local split replicated as a fissure between what they call "big T" Taliban and "small t" Taliban. The "big T" ideologues fight for more global spiritual or political reasons; the "little t" opportunists fight for power, for money, or just to survive, to hedge their bets. A family might have one son fighting for the Taliban and another in the Afghan National Army; no matter which side prevails, they will have one son in the right place. US Marines in Helmand Province say that 80 to 85 percent of all those they fight are "small t" Taliban. The US counterinsurgency campaign aims to co-opt and reintegrate many of these rebels by creating secure population centers and new economic opportunities, spreading cleared areas like "inkblots." But the Taliban have long been keen to spread their own inkblots, with a similar rationale: attracting more and more "accidental" guerrillas, in the famous phrase of counterinsurgency specialist David Kilcullen, not just hardliners.

Yet even Afghanistan's "big T" Taliban, the ideologues, cannot simply be equated with al-Qaeda. Last fall, Abu Walid, once an al-Qaeda accomplice and now a Taliban propagandist, ridiculed bin Laden in the Taliban's official monthly magazine *al-Sumud*, for, among other things, his do-it-yourself approach to Islamic jurisprudence, as Vahid Brown at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point observed. A number of veterans had criticized bin Laden in the past, among them such towering figures as Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, one of the key architects of the global jihad.

But Abu Walid's criticism was more biting. Bin Laden's organization lacks strategic vision and relies on "shiny slogans," he told Leah Farrall, an Australian counterterrorism specialist, in a much-noted dialogue she reported on her blog. Consequently the Taliban would no longer welcome the terrorists in Afghanistan, he said, because "the majority of the population is against al-Qaeda."

At the root of the disagreement between the two groups is the question of a local, or even national, popular base. Last September, Mullah Omar, the Taliban's founding figure and spiritual overlord, issued a message in several languages. He called the Taliban a "robust Islamic and nationalist movement" that had "assumed the shape of a popular movement." Probably realizing that pragmatism and a certain amount of moderation offer the best chance of a return to power, Omar vowed "to maintain good and positive relations with all neighbors based on mutual respect."

Al-Qaeda's reaction was swift and harsh. Turning the jihad into a "national cause," in the purists' view, was selling it out. Prominent radicals, in a remarkable move, compared the Taliban's turnabout to the efforts by Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza to distance themselves from al-Qaeda. Hamas in particular, perhaps because it is, like al-Qaeda, a Sunni organization, has been the subject of "relentless" criticism in al-Qaeda circles, says Thomas Hegghammer of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. When a self-proclaimed al-Qaeda faction appeared in Gaza, Hamas executed one of its leading imams and many of his armed followers. Jihadi ideologues were aghast. The globalists shuddered at the thought that local interests could compromise their pan-Islamic ambitions. "Nationalism," declared Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's number two, "must be rejected

by the *umma* [Muslim community], because it is a model which makes jihad subject to the market of political compromises and distracts the *umma* from the liberation of Islamic lands and the establishment of the Caliphate."

A few weeks later, Mullah Omar pointedly reiterated his promise of good neighborliness and future cooperation with Afghanistan's neighbors, including China, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—all of whom face their own jihadi insurgencies and are on al-Qaeda's target list.

The Taliban's new tactics are throwing an "ideological bridge" not only to nearby countries but to parts of the current Kabul elite, most notably politically mobilized university students, notes Thomas Ruttig of the Afghanistan Analysts Network. Even the newly moderate Taliban, it should be clear, remains wedded to inhumane and medieval moral principles. Yet Omar's pragmatism immediately affects the question of who and what is a desirable target of attacks.

Perhaps the greatest tension between the local and global levels of the jihad grows out of a divide over appropriate targets and tactics. Classical Islamic legal doctrine sees armed jihad as a defensive struggle against persecution, oppression, and incursions into Muslim lands. In an attempt to mobilize Muslims around the world to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, Abdallah Azzam, an influential radical cleric who was assassinated in 1989, helped expand the doctrine of jihad into a transnational struggle by declaring the Afghan jihad an individual duty for all Muslims. Azzam also advocated *takfir*, a practice of designating fellow Muslims as infidels (*kaffir*) by remote excommunication in order to justify their slaughter. Al-Qaeda ideologues upped the aggressive potential of such arguments and expanded the defensive jihad into a global struggle, ef-

fectively blurring the line between the “near” enemy—the Arab regimes deemed illegitimate “apostates” by the purists—and the “far” enemy, these regimes’ Western supporters.

In the remote areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan that produce many of today’s radicals, however, local and tribal affiliations are powerful. One US political adviser who worked in Afghanistan’s Zabul Province, a hotbed of the insurgency, describes prevailing local sentiment as “valleyism” rather than nationalism. It is a force that drives the tribes to oppose anybody who threatens their traditional power base, foreign or not—a problem not just for the Taliban and al-Qaeda but for any Afghan government. Al-Zawahiri complained of this in a letter after the invasion of Afghanistan: “Even the students (*talib*) themselves had stronger affiliations to their tribes and villages . . . than to the Islamic emirate.” The provincial valleyists, to the distress of al-Qaeda’s more cosmopolitan agitators, are selfishly eyeing their own interests, with little appetite for international aggression and globe-spanning terrorist operations.

The contrast with the character of jihad in the Muslim diaspora could not be starker. For radical Islamists in Europe, the local jihad doesn’t exist. And they understand that toppling governments in, say, London or Amsterdam is a fantasy. These radicals are less interest-driven than identity-driven. Many young European Muslims are out of touch with their ancestral countries, yet not fully at home in France or Sweden or Denmark. For some, the resulting identity crisis creates a hunger for clear spiritual guidelines. The ideology of global jihad, according to a report by EUROPOL, the European Union’s police agency, “gives meaning to the feeling of exclusion” prevalent among the second- and third-generation descen-

dants of Muslim immigrants. For these alienated youth, the idea of becoming “citizens” of the virtual worldwide Islamic community may be more attractive than it is for first-generation immigrants, who tend to retain strong roots in their native countries.

The identity problems of these young people seem to have affected the character of the jihad itself. Like the disoriented Muslim youth of the diaspora, the global jihad has loose residential roots and numb political fingertips. One sign of this disconnection from the local is that al-Qaeda’s rank and file does not include many men who could otherwise join a jihad at home: There seem to be few Palestinians, Chechens, Iraqis, or Afghans among the traveling jihadis, who tend to come from countries where jihad has failed, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Syria.

Al-Qaeda’s identity crisis is also illustrated by how it treats radicalized converts, often people without religious schooling and consolidated personalities. Olivier Roy, one of France’s leading specialists on radical Islamism, has pointed out that convert groups assume responsibilities “beyond all comparison with any other Islamic organization.” Roy has put the proportion of converts in al-Qaeda at between 10 and 25 percent, an indicator that the movement has become “deculturalized.”

These contrary trends, in turn, create chinks in al-Qaeda’s recruitment system. The most extreme Salafists, deprived of identity and cultural orientation, have an appetite for utopia, for extreme views that appeal to the margin of society, be it in Holland or Helmand. Recruitment in the diaspora, as a result, follows a distinctive pattern, not partisan and political but off-beat and outré. The grievances and motivations of European extremists and the rare American militants tend to be idio-

syncratic, the product of unstable individual personalities and a history of personal discrimination. Many take the initiative to join the movement themselves, and because they are not recruited by a member of the existing organization, their ties to it may remain loose. In 2008 alone, 190 individuals were sentenced for Islamist terrorist activities in Europe, most of them in Britain, France, and Spain. "A majority of the arrested individuals belonged to small autonomous cells rather than to known terrorist organizations," EUROPOL reports.

As a result of the change in its membership, the global al-Qaeda movement is encountering strong centrifugal forces. The rank and file and the center are losing touch with each other. The vision of Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, who laid much of the ideological foundation for al-Qaeda's global jihad, blends a Marxist-inspired focus on popular mass support with twenty-first-century ideas of networked, individual action. Al-Suri's aim was to devise a method "for transforming excellent individual initiatives, performed over the past decades, from emotional pulse beats and scattered reactions into a phenomenon which is guided and utilized, and whereby the project of jihad is advanced so that it becomes the Islamic Nation's battle, and not a struggle of an elite." The global jihad was to function like an "operative system," without vulnerable, old-fashioned organizational hierarchies. That method is intuitively attractive for a Facebook generation of well-connected young sympathizers, but the theory contains an internal contradiction. Self-recruited and "homegrown" terrorists present a wicked problem for al-Qaeda. As a bizarre type of self-appointed elite, they undermine the movement's ambition to represent the Muslim "masses."

The problem is embodied in the online jihad. For al-Qaeda, Web forums op-

erated by unaffiliated Islamists have been the most important distribution platform for jihadi materials. But after the arrest of a top-tier online activist in London two years ago, the connection between the forums and al-Qaeda's official media center, al-Sahab, began to loosen. Al-Qaeda has lost more and more control of the online jihad. And, just like others online, jihadi Web administrators face increasingly tough competition for visibility. Within the forums, the tone has become harsher. Brynjar Lia, a specialist on Salafism at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, says that "interjihadi quarrels seem to have become more common and less 'brotherly' in tone in recent years."

Some far-flung jihadi groups are enjoying newfound independence of another kind, as a result of criminal ventures they have established to fund their efforts. This too is intensifying the centrifugal forces within the global movement. Some groups are tipping into a more purely criminal mode.

A cause is what distinguishes an insurgency from organized crime, as David Galula, an influential French author on counterinsurgency, noted decades ago. Organized crime does not have to be incompatible with jihad. It may even be justified in religious terms: Baz Mohammed, an Afghan heroin kingpin and the first criminal ever extradited from Afghanistan, bragged to his coconspirators that selling heroin in the United States was jihad because it killed Americans while taking their money.

A budding insurgency has only a limited window of opportunity to grow into a serious political force. If the cause withers and loses its popular gloss, what remains as a rump may be nothing but a criminal organization, attracting a following with criminal energy rather than religious zeal, thus further damaging jihad's status

in the eyes of the broader public. For some groups, this already appears to be happening. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb funds itself through the drug trade, smuggling, extortion, and kidnappings in southern Algeria and northern Mali. Indonesia's Abu Sayyaf Group and the Philippines' Jamiyah Islamiyah engage in a variety of criminal activities, including credit card fraud. The terrorist cell behind the 2004 Madrid bombings earned most of its money from criminal activities; when Spanish police raided the home of one of the plotters, they seized close to \$2 million in drugs and cash, including more than 125,000 Ecstasy tablets, according to *U.S. News and World Report*. The Madrid bombings had cost the terrorists just \$50,000.

The goal of leading Islamists has always been to turn their battle into "the Islamic Nation's battle," as al-Suri wrote. Far from reaching this goal, the jihad is veering the other way. Eight years after 9/11, support for Islamic extremism in the Muslim world is at its lowest point. Support for al-Qaeda has slipped most dramatically in Indonesia, Pakistan, and Jordan. In 2003 more than 50 percent of those surveyed in these countries agreed that bin Laden would "do the right thing regarding world affairs," the Pew Global Attitudes Project found. By 2009 the overall level of support had dropped by half, to about 25 percent. In Pakistan, traditionally a stronghold of extremism, only 9 percent of Muslims have a favorable view of al-Qaeda, down from 25 percent in 2008. Even an American failure to stabilize Afghanistan and its terror-ridden neighborhood would be unlikely to ease al-Qaeda's crisis of legitimacy.

But it would be naive to conclude that the cracks in al-Qaeda's ideological shell mean that the movement's end is near. Far from it. Islamist ideology may be los-

ing broad appeal, and the recent global crop of extremists may be disunited and drifting apart. Yet in the fanatics' own view, the ideology remains a crucial cohesive force that binds together an extraordinarily diverse extremist elite. Salafism, despite its crisis, continues to be attractive to those at the social margins. One of the ideology's most vital functions appears to be to resolve the contradictions of jihad in the twenty-first century: being a pious Muslim, yet attacking women and children; upholding the authority of the Qur'an, yet prospering from crime; depending on Western welfare states, yet plotting against them; having no personal ties to any Islamic group, yet believing oneself to be part of one.

Al-Qaeda's altered design has a number of immediate consequences. The global jihad is losing what Galula called a strong cause, and with it its political character. This change is making it increasingly difficult to distinguish jihad from organized crime on the one side and rudderless fanaticism on the other. This calls into question the notion that war is still, as Clausewitz said, "a continuation of politics by other means," and therefore whether it can be discontinued politically. Second, coerced by adversaries and enabled by the Internet, the global jihadi movement has dismantled and disrupted its own ability to act as one coherent entity. No leader is in a position to articulate the movement's will, let alone enforce it. It is doubtful, to quote Clausewitz again, whether war can still be "an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will." And because jihad has no single center of gravity, it has no single critical vulnerability. No matter what the outcome of US-led operations in Afghanistan and other places, a general risk of terrorist attacks will persist for the foreseeable future.



In combating terrorism, therefore, quantity matters as much as quality. But some numbers matter more than others. How many additional American and European troops are sent to Afghanistan matters less than the number of terrorist plots that don't happen. Success will be found subtly in statistics, in data curves that slope down or level off—not in one particular action, one capitulation, or even one leader's death. It will be marked not by military campaigns and other

events but by decisions not taken and attacks not launched. Because participation in the holy war in both its local and global forms is an individual decision, these choices have to be the unit of analysis, and influencing them must be the goal of policy and strategy. As in crime prevention, measuring success—how many potential terrorists did not join an armed group or commit a terrorist act—is nearly impossible. Success against Islamic militancy may wear a veil. ◻

# Peacekeeping by Regional Organisations

LT GEN VIJAY KUMAR JETLEY, PVSM, UYSM, RETIRED\*

With the end of the Second World War, there was a general feeling that trouble and strife had ended, heralding a golden era of peace. That was perhaps one of the reasons why in the Charter of the newly created United Nations (UN) Organisation there is no mention of the word “peacekeeping.” The UN at that point of time did not envisage that it would ever have to step in anywhere to restore a situation. This euphoria, however, was short-lived, for, with decolonisation, the UN was besieged with requests for help in trouble spots all over the world.

As resources of the UN were never enough to meet the demand, many regional initiatives were born. These initiatives either resolved prickly issues in their backyards by taking their own initiative or under the umbrella of the UN. Unfortunately, their modus operandi for doing what the UN missions do is still a grey area for most of us.

To understand regional forces better, it is essential to be acquainted with the role of regional organisations in peacekeeping with particular reference to the nature and scope of the involvement of regional

forces, forms of cooperation between regional forces and the UN, and advantages and disadvantages of using regional forces vis-à-vis the UN.

After the Cold War, the concept of regional peacekeeping under the authorisation of the UN Security Council increasingly gained currency. Interstate and intrastate conflicts virtually left no region in the world untouched, compelling the UN to hammer out numerous peace initiatives simultaneously. The existing operational framework and resource level of the UN did not permit it to give its undivided attention to all the conflict-ridden regions of the world at the same time. One had to accept the reality that the worldwide crises of the 1990s have highlighted. It was the sheer complexity and magnitude of these conflicts which often compelled the Security Council to take a controversial stand of selectivity or indifference.

On the African Continent, many inter- and intrastate conflicts have been brought about due to a lack of coincidence between nation and state; suppression of minority communities and ethnic tensions; corrupt and dictatorial regimes, quite often supported externally by inter-

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\*Commissioned into the Dogra Regiment on 25 December 1965, Lieutenant General Jetley commanded the Siachin Brigade and a corps in the northeast, served as force commander of the UN mission in Sierra Leone, and retired as master general of ordnance on 30 November 2004. He is a member of United Service Institution Council.

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national arms traders and the vested interests of nations constituting the so-called civilized society; and chronic poverty leading to underdevelopment and a grinding debt burden.

To combat the problems plaguing it on the African Continent, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) took it upon itself to find a solution. The secretary-general of the OAU (now African Union [AU]), Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, said at a meeting in 1998, "OAU Member States can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the International Community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to find solutions to those problems which in many instances, have been of our own making. The simple truth that we must confront today, is that the world does not owe us a living and we must remain in the forefront of efforts to act and act speedily, to prevent conflicts from getting out of control."

The bottom line of all UN peacekeeping (UNPK) operations in the initial stages was to deal with international conflicts involving governments. Such operations were authorised by the UN Security Council, in exceptional cases by the UN General Assembly (UNEF-1), and were always directed by the secretary-general. The functioning of such UN missions was governed by the fundamental principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence.

Over the last half a century plus, the number of conflicts has increased. They have become more intense and brutal where violation of human rights has become a norm. The UN has not been able to cope with the rush of such conflicts and has therefore had to fall back upon regional peacekeeping forces to retrieve the situation within the geographical limits of their regions. The frequent use of

such forces is becoming the rule rather than the exception.

## Nature and Scope of Involvement of Regional Organisations

The founding members of the UN had foreseen the birth of regional peace organisations and duly provided for them in the UN Charter. Chapter 8 clearly defines the role of regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 52 of the UN Charter encourages regional arrangements or groupings, and even agencies, to make every effort to achieve settlement of local disputes before referring them to the Security Council.

Article 53 states that, where appropriate, the Security Council should utilise such regional arrangements for enforcement actions under its authority, but that no enforcement action will be undertaken without the authorisation of the Security Council. Article 54 further states that the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements.

The Brahimi Panel Report endorses this view by stating that, "where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, within the authorisation of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VIII of the Charter."

The second-generation UNPK operations have taken the form of enforcement actions, wherein the consent of the parties to the conflict was either partially or wholly ignored. More often than not, the force did not have the necessary combat power to be considered a credible force by the parties to the conflict. In such situations, regional organisations with

necessary combat potential and staying power could undertake the enforcement action in a quicker time frame. In cases where the regional organisations are providing the military cover, the UN could go about the task of nation building with the help of other non-military regional organisations.

### Forms of Cooperation between the UN and Regional Organisations

The supplement to *An Agenda for Peace*, issued on 3 January 1995, outlines the forms of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. These can basically be categorised as follows:

- a. *Consultation.* The purpose of this form of co-operation is to exchange views on conflicts that both the UN and the regional organisations may be trying to solve. In some cases, consultation is formal, with periodic reports made to the General Assembly; in other cases, it is less formal, with the secretary-general calling consultative meetings with the heads of all regional organisations and arrangements co-operating with the UN.
- b. *Diplomatic Support.* Regional organisations have participated in peace-making activities of the UN that led to the establishment of peacekeeping operations, and supported them by diplomatic initiatives. The OAU, the Arab League, and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) played this role in supporting the UN efforts in Somalia. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been playing this role, for instance, on constitutional issues in Georgia

and Tajikistan, and the UN has been supporting the OSCE on the issue of Nagorny Karabakh.

- c. *Operational Support.* This co-operation varies according to requirements on the ground. One example was the provision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of air power to support the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. Another was the support provided by the NATO-led multinational Implementation Force / Stabilisation Force (IFOR/SFOR) to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slovenia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in establishing a safe and secure environment in the region of Croatia and the operational support provided by Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) forces to the UN observer mission in Tajikistan. The European Union (EU) has provided support in Eastern Slovenia, Bosnia, and Liberia while the Western European Union (WEU) has provided support to de-mining activities of the UNPK forces in Iraq and Kuwait.
- d. *Co-Deployment.* UN field missions have been deployed in conjunction with UNPK forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and of the CIS in Georgia and Tajikistan. This model has again been followed in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the UN and regional organisation were co-deployed with different mandates. The United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) includes the International Police Task Force (IPTF), which, among other things, monitors

the local police. The NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force (IFOR/SFOR) helps maintain a safe and secure environment. OSCE assists in the organisation of elections, while the EU provides development assistance and the Office of the High Representative is responsible for overall co-ordination.

- e. *Joint Operations.* In Haiti, the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) jointly launched the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), for which the staffing, direction, and financing were to be shared between the UN and the OAS. Strictly speaking, this was initially purely a US operation, which was later converted into a UN operation.

When and if the regional organisations don the mantle of regional peacekeepers, the nature and scope of their involvement will need to be crystallised. The past experiences of a number of regional organisations in this regard need to be analysed to identify strengths and weaknesses and to recommend possible measures to streamline the process. A critical evaluation of the future prospects of regional arrangements for peacekeeping will further assist in deciding the type of relationship and the extent of cooperation/integration between the UN and the regional groupings.

## Analysis of Certain Regional Peacekeeping Organisations: Strengths and Weaknesses

### *African Region*

Africa has a fairly large number of effective regional organisations—the OAU,

now AU, and a number of subregional organisations, some of which have contributed to peacekeeping in their own regions. Africa can be divided into five main subregions, each hosting a subregional organisation:

Arab Maghreb Union      UMA (North)

South African Development  
Community                      SADC (South)

East African Corporation      EAC (East)

Economic Community of  
West African States      ECOWAS (West)

Economic Community of Central  
African States                      ECCAS (Centre)

The OAU has contributed positively in various peace processes in Africa, which includes a number of successful diplomatic negotiations and arbitrations. However, in the face of the enormity of the crisis like the one witnessed in Rwanda, the OAU could not do much to contain violence against humanity. Amongst the subregional set-ups, ECOWAS and SADC have done creditably well in their respective areas. Yet, the African regional organisations have not developed adequate capability to act without considerable UN support. This is mainly because of a paucity of funds and resources. Also, in many cases, troops involved in such tasks were ill led, lacked motivation, and in some cases became part of the problem themselves.

### *European Region*

The other regional and subregional arrangements for conflict resolution in Europe are the EU, WEU, and OSCE. The significant point to note is that regional organisations and arrangements no longer act in isolation but together in a closely co-ordinated and mutually reinforcing fashion.

The experiment of NATO in Kosovo was mired in many controversies, in that it went forward with its air war without obtaining UN Security Council approval. This is the greatest danger involved in growing reliance on regional organisations. Had the Security Council given the “green signal” prior to the launch of the operations, probably the NATO action may have been seen as more acceptable to the international community, since it would have been legitimised as having been undertaken in the interest of the greater good of protecting thousands of terrorised people. NATO continues to remain the most potent regional force in Europe and is expanding.

#### *West Asian Region*

In the Middle East, Jordan has been actively involved in all working groups of the multilateral component, which provides a broad framework for the future of the region and is intended as a complement to the bilateral component. In December 1994, a decision was made by all parties to establish a regional security centre in Amman with related facilities in both Qatar and Tunisia. The concept of establishing a conflict prevention / regional security centre was first introduced and presented by Jordan. However, the arms control and regional security process has been superseded because the co-sponsors of the peace process (the United States and Russia) could not get all parties to agree on introducing structural arms control.

#### *Asian Region*

The experiments in South Asia and South-East Asia as regards regional powers / regional organisations taking the lead in peacekeeping efforts have not met with any significant success, so far. Interventions of the Indian Peace Keep-

ing Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka, a purely bilateral arrangement at the invitation of and with the consent of the host country, failed to achieve the desired result. Pakistan did play her role in Afghanistan, but the whole effort has been dubious and has been tragically counter-productive.

The capabilities of regional organisations like the South Asia Foundation (SAF), South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC) in terms of tackling a conflict situation in their respective regions prove that they have been inadequate. This is because the primary focus of such regional organisations was basically economic development although, increasingly, such organisations are trying to assume a role of preventive diplomacy.

In Central Asia, there are several relatively young regional arrangements that have a potential for peacekeeping roles, such as the

Commonwealth of Independent States	CIS
Central Asian Economic Community	CAEC
“Shanghai Five” or the “Shanghai Forum”	SF

The SF is a successor to Soviet-Chinese border talks between China and the four newly independent states—Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgistan (following the break-up of the USSR). However, from the point of view of the UN Charter, the SF is not a regional arrangement or agency in the sense of Chapter 8.

The CAEC, having four former Soviet Central Asian Republics except Turkmenistan, has some formal attributes of a regional organisation. However, lack of adequate defence capabilities, compounded

by insufficient mutual confidence and trust, negates any attempt to jointly stand for audacious peacekeeping efforts. The Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalions (CENTRASBAT), originally made up of troops of Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan, and Uzbekistan, is paid for by NATO through the Partnership for Peace Programme. The declared goal of this endeavour is to promote co-operation between the participating countries' militaries and to provide a capability that would be made available for UN peacekeeping when the need arises.

### Advantages and Disadvantages of Regional Arrangements vis-à-vis UN Forces

There is no escaping the fact that the strife-torn world is going to remain in the same state, if not a worse one, in the foreseeable future. The resources of the UN are going to prove to be more and more inadequate. Under such circumstances, the UN would have to depend on regional arrangements. Let us therefore examine the advantages and disadvantages that regional arrangements have vis-à-vis UN forces.

#### *Advantages*

- a. *Clearer Perspective of Local Conflicts.* Regional forces tend to have a better understanding of the history of the region and therefore have a clear perception of the root causes of local conflicts. Besides, parties to the conflict sometimes view forces from outside as strangers to the situation, whereas a regional force might be viewed differently and hence have more chances of success.

- b. *No Inhibitions to Undertake Peace Enforcement Duties.* Some of the regional conflicts necessitate enforcement actions. These fall under the definition of peace enforcement, and many troop contributors to the UN hesitate to take part in such operations. In such scenarios, regional organisations with requisite political and military capability can prove to be valuable.
- c. *Similarity of Training Standards.* Another aspect is the similarity of the standards of training and physical and mental make-up of the personnel taking part in the operations as part of regional arrangements.
- d. *Legitimacy and Credibility.* For an organisation or force to succeed in peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance operations, legitimacy and credibility are the key. A UN force comprised of countries who have no relation or relevance in the context of the conflict or crisis has little to justify by way of legitimacy, as against a regional force which, by virtue of its regional location and security concerns, can identify and relate to the crisis. The support and confidence that such a force can generate from the warring factions and population far surpass those of a multinational force that is from outside the region.
- e. *Desire for Regional Stability.* Countries in close proximity of the conflict have a greater desire in ensuring regional stability, lest it spill over and destabilise the whole region. With ethnic and religious affinity far surpassing national identity, spill-over of conflicts to consume the whole region is a potential danger.

This acts as a strong incentive to contribute to peace initiatives in the region and is a motivating factor for regional organisations.

- f. *Balanced Response.* Countries in the region have a better feel for the issue and the root causes of the conflict. Cultural and ethnic affinities and proximity have a role to play in understanding the issues. Hence, their response is likely to be more balanced and apt vis-à-vis multinational forces or organisations from out of the region.
- g. *Role of Regional Leaders.* Coupled with the understanding of the issues is the fact that the regional leaders would be personally acquainted with the leaders of the warring factions, making it easier to interact, negotiate, and be involved in conflict prevention or conflict resolution.
- h. *Early Warning of Potential Flash Points.* Proximity to the source of conflict and regular interaction with the target country help regional organisations to obtain early warning to identify a potential flash point and inform and update the UN of the situation before it explodes into a crisis. This could help in conflict prevention rather than being reactive in conflict resolution.
- i. *Wider Information and Intelligence Base.* Intelligence is key before launching any such operations. The regional players' information and intelligence database would far surpass that of other organisations, and their participation and co-operation are hence critical.
- j. *Interoperability.* For military or peace-keeping operations to succeed, in-

teroperability is a major factor. Communications, language, and methods of conducting operations are vital for the success of a mission. A regional force which has trained and operated earlier as a coherent force can perform better than a force comprised of troops from a grouping of nations which have got together for the first time in the conflict zone.

- k. *Preventive Diplomacy and Deployment.* While conflict resolution is an important function of the UN, the more important facet would be conflict prevention. A regional organisation with a high level of acceptability to all parties concerned could contribute to preventive diplomatic efforts and deployment. The acceptability of a UN force in the early stages of the conflict, where negotiations are still a possibility, is far less than that of a regional organisation.
- l. *Cultural Sensitivity.* Language, customs and traditions, ethnic similarity, and religious affinity play a major part in acceptability of a force into the country. The need for interpreters, communication, and understanding religious norms, customs, and traditions is an inhibitor for the force. Use of a regional force can mitigate this factor to a very large extent.
- m. *Facilitation of Postconflict Reconstruction.* While UN involvement in a crisis-ridden country provides a focal point for international support and resources, regional and subregional organisations/arrangements can be very useful in launching peace-building activities. Co-operation between the UN and such organisations can facilitate postconflict reconstruction. Such co-operation also provides both



entities with an exit strategy, allowing either putting in place or managing successor arrangements that can continue the work begun by the peace-keeping operation.

### *Disadvantages*

Involving regional organisations in peace-keeping/enforcement operations may also have some disadvantages. The major ones are as given below:

- a. *Lack of Political Will.* Lack of political will on the part of the organisations may jeopardise the peace-keeping operations.
- b. *Conflicting Interests.* Conflicting national interests and lack of mutual trust amongst the member countries of the regional organisations may vitiate the fragile framework of the peace process.
- c. *Lack of Military Capability and Resources.* This may result in deadlocks when the regional organisations are switched into action without adequate preparations.
- d. *Hidden Agenda/Influence of Regional Big Power(s).* Even in the regional arrangements, one cannot rule out hidden agendas and the undue influence of the regional big power(s) in the decision-making process.
- e. *Possibility of Marginalisation of the UN.* Overreliance on powerful regional organisations in UN peacekeeping operations may result in such organisations becoming overconfident and at times attempting to marginalise the UN itself. NATO and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) are cases in point. Dangers of

powerful regional organisations are highlighted by Brahimi in his recently published report, wherein he states, "Powerful regional organisation shows a willingness of major powers to commit their own troops as well as massive funds to enforcement even without Security Council Authorisation in Europe, while refusing to send troops to or pay assessments for UN operations dealing with more brutal and intense conflicts in Africa."

- f. *Problems of Command and Control.* However effective and efficient it may be, there is always the possibility of the joint effort between the UN and regional organisation(s) floundering due to command and control problems and deadlocks in the decision-making process in critical situations. Sierra Leone is a glaring example of this.
- g. *Reduced Credibility of the UN.* The UN continues to be the primary organisation for conflict prevention and resolution. However, major roles played by regional organisations could lead to the UN losing its relevance and countries losing faith in the organisation. The role of NATO in the Balkans, though it has its apparent advantages, gives the impression of the UN being defunct.
- h. *Single-State Dominance / Rise of Regional Hegemonic Powers.* Regional organisations have the inherent danger of a single state dominating the organisation. A regional organisation may have a predominant member, which could jeopardise the efforts to serve its own ends and emerge as a regional hegemon if its national interests predominate re-

gional interests. The Nigerian example in Sierra Leone goes to prove this point.

- i. *Lack of Acceptability.* While acceptability of regional organisations is a major factor, it can be an inhibiting one. In Rwanda, the Francophone countries of Senegal, Mali, Chad, and Guinea had a low level of acceptability by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government, due to the perceived links to the Hutu government. The RPF government insisted that these countries be the first to leave in the phasing out of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). There were reservations against the Zambian troops on ethnic grounds.
- j. *Untimely Withdrawal of Troops.* This fear always exists, thereby compromising the whole effort. The regional organisations may pull out if they find their interests not being served or their view not being accepted by the UN with regard to the final outcome of the conflict, and this can jeopardise the whole effort. The unscheduled pull-out of ECOMOG from Sierra Leone is one such example, where the gains made were neutralised by their withdrawal.
- k. *Lack of Expertise and Equipment.* Forces of regional organisations who have not conducted operations of a UNPK nature earlier would lack the expertise and equipment to handle complex contingencies.
- l. *Cultural and Social Impact.* The ethnic, cultural, and regional affinities could have a cultural and social impact on the local population, especially where human rights violations, mass movement of refugees,

and displaced persons predominate operations. These impacts have to be examined before deploying regional forces.

## Recommendations for Streamlining Procedures for Utilisation of Regional Peacekeeping Organisations

In order to overcome the drawbacks/disadvantages of regional arrangements for UNPK operations, the following measures could be adopted:

- a. *No Compromise in Selecting the Regional Organisation.* The criteria for entrusting the UNPK operation to a regional organisation should be carefully worked out and adhered to by the UN. Any compromise in this regard will not only undermine the reputation of the organisation but also jeopardise the whole mission.
- b. *Foolproof Decision-Making Mechanism.* The mechanism for decision making should be absolutely foolproof in the case of joint operations by the UN and the regional organisations.
- c. *Encouragement of Regional Initiatives.* The UN should endeavour to continue to support the initiative of the regional organisations for political and strategic direction and give the required technical assistance and logistics support. There is, however, a need for targeting such efforts on the countries having the requisite political will, military might, and regional standing so that they are not found wanting when called upon to deliver.
- d. *Upholding Regional Awareness.* Regional organisations should use

their advantage of being more familiar with local conditions and the socioeconomic, cultural, and political environment than the UN to break barriers and uphold their status as pacesetters in this challenge.

- e. *Participation by Big Powers.* Member countries should endeavour to demonstrate practical commitment in full readiness to support and contribute forces for active participation in conjunction with regional forces. Unfortunately, First World countries never do.
- f. *Financial Support.* There should be regular financial contributions to sustain regional organisations' funding for future operations.
- g. *Avoidance of Unwanted Interference.* The bigger nations in the operations should not unduly influence issues in the deliberations on the peace effort. Nations on the sidelines who do not commit troops are the ones who normally make the most noise.

## Conclusion

Apart from a host of other factors, one of the main reasons for the transference of peacekeeping to regional organisations is that the donor states are no longer willing to commit their troops to dangerous operations. This syndrome came to a head in Somalia with the killing of US peacekeepers. The savage murder of 10 Belgian soldiers in Rwanda probably

sealed the fate of such commitments to Third World countries.

It is evident that, given the fact that the UN is always strapped for resources and that donor states, especially from the First World, are reluctant to commit their troops, except in their own backyards, the future trend for peacekeeping is likely to see greater involvement of regional organisations.

New concepts of peace incline towards regional organisations playing a more prominent role in association with the UN. OAU has performed peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Congo, and Sierra Leone, as have the OAS in Haiti, CIS in Georgia, and ASEAN in East Timor; NATO has taken on similar tasks in the former Yugoslavia.

There are presently only a few regional organizations around the world involved in UNPK operations (NATO, CIS, SADC, ECOWAS, etc.), yet there are many organisations that could be used to help in times of crisis. Some regional organisations were formed for collective security reasons, others for economic reasons, and still others for trade and development. For whatever purposes they may have been formed, they have a common duty to perform and can help immensely in bringing about peace and stability in their respective regions.

The advantages of using regional organisations must be assessed correctly in consideration of the inherent drawbacks in this arrangement. The UN has an important role to play in strengthening the efforts of regional organisations in overcoming their weaknesses. □

# Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy

COL JIYUL KIM, USA, RETIRED\*

**B**iological and cultural factors determine human thoughts, decisions, behaviors, actions, and reactions. Biological factors are more prominent in determining the thoughts and behaviors of individuals than of human collectivities. At the collective level—the one with which strategy and policy are concerned (e.g., a nation-state)—cultural factors are dominant. Thus the formulation, implementation, and outcome of strategy and policy must consider cultural dimensions.

Policy makers and strategists tend to view situations through their own cultural and strategic “lenses,” without sufficiently considering and calculating other perspectives and interests. However, the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP) offers a systematic and analytical approach to the vital task of viewing the world through many lenses. The national security community is interested in cultural features or dimensions that drive political and strategic action and behavior. The ACFSP identifies basic cultural dimensions—identity, political culture, and resilience—that seem fundamental to determining such behavior and thus are important to the formulation

and outcome of policy and strategy. Identity is the most significant because it ultimately determines values and interests that form the foundation for policy and strategy to attain or preserve those interests. Though not necessarily a definitive approach, ACFSP provides a specific way to approach the complex issue of how culture figures into strategic and political behavior. The key points include the following:

1. Strategy and policy are driven by ends.
2. These ends are determined by interests.
3. Interests are derived from the sense of purpose and core values that a particular collectivity considers foundational to its existence.
4. The sense of purpose and core values arise from elements that constitute the collectivity’s identity.
5. Identity is the foundation for collective mobilization.
6. Such a mobilized collectivity can be put into action for political purposes through its peculiar form of political culture that provides the ways and the means.

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\*Colonel Kim is currently completing doctoral work in history and East Asian languages at Harvard University. An Army intelligence officer, he formerly served as the director of Asian studies and the coordinator for regional studies at the US Army War College. He also served as a Japan and Korea foreign area officer in a variety of field and policy assignments. He has published on Asian policy issues, history, and archaeology. Colonel Kim holds a BA in anthropology and biology from the University of Pennsylvania and an MA in East Asian regional studies from Harvard.

7. The resilience of the group's culture, grounded on the strength of a common identity with a shared sense of purpose and values, can determine the collectivity's flexibility in resisting, succumbing to, or adapting to forces that challenge the shared purpose and values.

### Why Culture?

We face a world without the simple and comforting dichotomy of the Cold War—a world made increasingly more complex by the forces of nationalism and globalization released by the end of the Cold War. During the period following the early 1990s, the post-Cold War era, scholars have become more aware of the growing importance of culture in determining the course of today's complex and interconnected world.

Although scholars may have recognized this phenomenon, practitioners at first did not. We can criticize US national security and foreign policy of the 1990s for its failure to recognize and address the immense, potentially destabilizing, and conflict-generating cultural and political changes unleashed by the end of the Cold War. Much of this force had to do with the release of pent-up demands for self-determination by a variety of cultural groups distinguished by ethnicity, religion, and language. Finding space to emerge, suppressed groups quickly turned into political forces and movements in the pursuit of formerly unattainable interests (separation, independence, domination, etc.) defined by previously unviable identities (ethnoreligious nationalism).

The reemergence of counterinsurgency as a major task has alerted the practitioners of policy and strategy to the importance of culture at the tactical and

operational levels. We might call this the Department of Defense's "cultural turn"—hence, the emphasis placed on culture as a consequential, if not a decisive, factor in countering insurgencies.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, the national security community is recognizing the significance of culture at the policy and strategic levels, although most of the current effort and resources for the cultural turn remain devoted to the tactical and operational fights. Consideration of how culture affects our political/strategic actions and behavior as well as the actions and behavior of others has become a vital strategic task.

### Cultural Dimensions of Leadership, Operations, and Strategy

It is too easy to think of the role of culture in the world of national security strategy and military operations as a single-dimensional phenomenon. That is to say, too often we conflate our consideration of culture to one comprehensive set, conceived and perceived as widely applicable across the length, breadth, and depth of the space we call national security and military operations.

To attain a better resolution of the role of culture, we can consider three distinct dimensions of its intersection with national security and military operations: cultural considerations at the individual level, in tactical- and operational-level military actions, and at the political and strategic levels. This is not to imply that these dimensions are separate and distinct because there are significant areas of overlap and mutually supporting as well as hierarchical relationships among them; nevertheless, the distinction is useful.

Cultural considerations at the individual level encompass the dimensions of

leadership, management, and interpersonal communications and relations. Languages, cultural dos and don'ts, and negotiation skills are examples of what this dimension would consider. The US military's current emphasis on cultural understanding, cultural awareness, and languages addresses this dimension.

Cultural considerations in tactical- and operational-level military actions examine cultural factors that can influence the success or failure of tactical activities and campaigns. At the tactical level, aspects of the tactical battlefield such as tactics, training, small-unit leadership traits, and weapons design have cultural components. To design campaigns with the greatest chance for success at the operational level, we must consider the interplay and harmony of factors such as service/agency organizational cultures and the cultures of allies in forming a capable joint, interagency, and multinational force operating in a foreign land. Additionally, military leaders must consider cultural dimensions of the opponent, such as civil-military relations (political control), military-societal ties (popular support), and military force (senior leadership style, operational-level doctrine and training philosophy, and military culture), among other factors.<sup>2</sup>

Cultural considerations at the political and strategic levels deal with the impact of cultural factors on the formulation, implementation, and outcome of policy and strategy. Such factors can affect political and strategic decisions, actions, and behaviors. The ACFSP gives us one approach for considering this dimension, the area with which we are most concerned, in a systematic manner.<sup>3</sup>

## What Is Culture?

Culture is a fundamental, although not the only, factor for defining and understanding the human condition.<sup>4</sup> It affects how people think and act. Through their culture, humans and societies assign meaning to the world around them and define their place there. We see culture manifested in languages; ideas and ideologies; customs and traditions; beliefs and religions; rituals and ceremonies; settlement patterns; art and music; architecture and furniture; dress and fashion; games; and images—in short, in anything that symbolizes or represents the values, norms, perceptions, interests, and biases of a culture.<sup>5</sup>

The German political economist and sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) saw man as an animal suspended in webs of significance that he himself has spun. The American anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1926–2006) extended this notion by equating culture with Weber's "webs of significance."<sup>6</sup> In Weber's and Geertz's conception, man was like a spider in the middle of his web except that the strands were not made of silk but of values, perceptions, and norms that were significant and meaningful to him. Thus, the main task in analyzing culture entails understanding the specifics of what is significant and meaningful—the meanings represented by the strands of the webs of significance. Conducting this task requires interpretation of symbolic forms and systems to tease out their denotations.

We must recognize that human beings are not born with a particular culture (the webs of significance) but that culture develops through a process of conscious and unconscious socialization and acculturation (human interactions) within the particular situation into which an individual is born. This "particular situation"

can encompass a wide range of factors, from the individualistic and biological, such as gender and race, to an ever-widening circle of social, political, economic, religious, organizational, and ethnic levels of human organization (family, community, ethnic community, religious order, economic class, village/town/city, state/province, nation, region, and world). Therefore, in trying to come to grips with how culture operates, we must recognize that it varies enormously through space and time. Variability over space is reflected by the variety of cultures in the world at a given moment in time. Because history best captures variability over time, it thus becomes, in part, a record of cultural change.

Culture operates at different levels, ranging from the individual to various levels of collectivities. At each level, it is rarely the sum of the cultures of lower levels. At the individual level, culture affects interpersonal communications and relations; at the collective level, it affects intercollective (e.g., interclan, intertown, interstate, etc.) communications and relations. Clearly, an overlap exists between culture at the individual and collective levels, especially if we consider decision makers. But a framework that distinguishes between the two could facilitate a study of the cultural dimension of policy and strategy.

## The Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy

As noted above, policy makers and strategists tend to use their own cultural and strategic lenses for viewing situations, without much regard for other perspectives and interests. That said, how should we approach the task of appreciating and understanding the different lenses through which other people, groups, societies, na-

tions, and regions see themselves and the world? Let us examine the ACFSP's basic cultural dimensions—identity (its definition and linkage to interests), political culture (the structure of power and decision making), and resilience (the capacity or ability to resist, succumb to, or adapt to external forces)—in an American context to understand how they affect American values and interests and, therefore, American policy and strategy. First we should consider the revolutionary circumstances of America's national origin and the founding documents (Declaration of Independence, Constitution, Bill of Rights, Federalist Papers, etc.). The United States' unique revolutionary origin redefined the organization of society. Democracy and republicanism, freedom and liberty, equality, Manifest Destiny, and other fundamental conceptions of man and society combined with a pioneering spirit, individualism, and entrepreneurialism to establish a unique and enduring American identity.

Furthermore, Protestantism combined with capitalism to fan a tremendous appetite for innovation, adaptation, and progress.<sup>7</sup> America became both a synonym and symbol for a land of innovative and adaptive people. Along with growing prosperity came the dominance of middle-class livelihoods, values, and practices that formed the backbone of American society. These ideas and values interacted with history, resulting in a richer—some would say a more “positive”—development of American society and identity.

What does all of this mean in terms of American identity, political culture, and resilience? First, American citizenship and identity are based on place and, more importantly, on the idea of being an American rather than on bloodlines.<sup>8</sup> This foundational notion of the American identity differentiates US citizens from those in the rest of the world who favor

bloodlines. Second, American political culture, having evolved from a revolutionary distrust of strong central authority (kings and tyrants), thus emphasizes the protection of individual/local rights and privileges and the principle of checks and balances even though it may compromise the efficient functioning of the government. This has resulted in a particularly complex political culture. Finally, America's relationship with globalization reflects one test of US resilience. Perhaps more than any other society, that of the United States has been able to innovate and adapt to the forces of globalization. Indeed, America has been and remains one of the engines of globalization. In another test of resilience—the way America integrates with transnational institutions (e.g., the United Nations or the World Trade Organization)—it does so with the determination to protect individual and national prerogatives while remaining open to institutions that support its ideas of liberal democracy, economic openness, and universal human rights.

These cultural considerations affect American policy and strategy. Most Americans have a distinct worldview and beliefs about the United States' place in that world. That view is very much founded on the legacy of eighteenth century enlightenment that also animated America's founding revolution. A democratic world with a capitalist economic system based on free trade is America's idealized utopia, and Americans see their country as destined to have a leading role in bringing about such a world.

Other societies may share aspects of what constitutes American identity, political culture, and resilience, but not identically. In the same manner, every other society reflects a unique combination of identity, political culture, and resilience.

## Common Themes across the ACFSP Dimensions

Two aspects of the modern world that play key roles in all the dimensions—modernity and nationalism—form the first common theme. Modernity has both material (e.g., industrialization, scientific and technological developments, and the information revolution) and ideational (e.g., different ideas about political and economic organization such as democracy, autocracy, and socialism) aspects. Nationalism has taken many forms rooted in the traditional past as well as in the new political and geographical arrangements of the modern era (ethnic, religious, and nation-state political).<sup>9</sup>

Another common theme holds that, as a subjective and emotional entity and process, culture is inherently unpredictable. This contrasts with rationalism or rational-choice theory, prized in social sciences because it seems to provide a way to predict. However, we can see the predictive shortcomings of rational-choice theory as the basis for human thought and action everywhere in daily life, from the unpredictability of the stock market to the uncertainties of international relations.<sup>10</sup> In the world of policy and strategy, prediction is the prize of analysis. Human beings, individually or collectively, do not always think and behave in rational ways. The concept of rationality itself is relative and subject to differing conceptions and definitions, based on culture. At best, people may gain some insight into what might be most probable. Precisely because we are creatures of emotions and passions, we can more fully comprehend our thoughts and actions only through cultural understanding that offers predictive insights into the seemingly irrational patterns of thought and behavior.



Culture is the principal contemporary expression of another common theme—history, the record of people and society. Without history, there is no culture. But history is an interpretive field, more subjective than objective. Thus, we must appreciate each dimension of the framework as the product of both the accumulation of actual historical experience and the revisionism brought by memory and interpretation of that history. In doing so, we must also consider that memory and interpretation of history are often incomplete, selective, or distorted.

History, therefore, serves two important functions: as an agent and a process that determines specific tangible and intangible cultural forms; and as an instrument of culture, usually purposefully distorted or adapted for contemporary and, most often, political purposes. For many modern nation-states, distortion often takes the form of inventing or exaggerating a heroic past that serves to legitimize the regime while inspiring and helping to mobilize the populace for national projects. Examples abound throughout the world and in history: Hitler's Nazi Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union, Saddam's Iraq, and Kim Il Sung's North Korea. More than likely, we could probably find evidence of manipulation of history for political purposes anywhere in the world. When we dig a little deeper into the historiography of a particular society, deliberate distortions, exaggerations, omissions, and even inventions become readily apparent.

### *Identity*

One aspect of culture that seems to matter greatly at political and strategic levels involves those cultural factors that determine identity, perhaps the most important of the ACFSP dimensions because it

ultimately determines values and interests that underlie the policy and strategy designed to attain or preserve those interests. A fundamental trait essential to people and societies, identity can very well be equated with culture.<sup>11</sup> It defines existence, purpose, destiny, and, sometimes, fate; moreover, identity provides a sense of self-worth, dignity, and community. Because people exist both as individuals and members of a group—a collective—an examination of identity must also recognize the existence of differing individual and collective identities. At the individual level, identity begins with a base of biologically inherited features that supports a superstructure of cultural or acquired elements. Clearly, race, gender, and family are the most obvious and consequential biologically inherited identity traits. Superimposed on these are socially inherited features such as ethnicity, religion, clan, class, and tribe. The boundary between biological and social inheritances is often blurred. Ultimately, however, social inheritances are changeable while biological inheritances are not.

Though important for the individual, identity may not necessarily have equal or similar significance at the collective level. Collective identity almost always consists of fewer traits than the sum of the individual identities of its members because, by necessity, collective identity is based on features shared by all or most members of the group. However, in terms of political and social power, collective identity is almost always far more than the sum of the individuals because it has the potential to mobilize the group and thus exert political power. For example, at the nation-state level, leaders who can fuse individual with national identity can inspire the people of the country to sacrifice for survival and glory. The ability to mobilize a nation is essential in strategy and the conduct of

foreign and domestic policy—and absolutely paramount for the enterprise of war. Inasmuch as policy and strategy are oriented toward a particular collectivity rather than an individual, be it a subnational, national, regional, or transnational entity, we are most concerned with collective identity in considerations of policy and strategy.

As with individual identity, collective identity consists of both biologically and socially inherited traits, but often the biological or “blood” traits are more fictional and mythical than real. Ultimately, of most importance is the collective social agreement on what commonality binds the group. Even if all members shared exactly the same features of individual identities, biological and social, they could not form a collective identity unless they agreed on the basis for coming together.

Collective identity also exists in widely ranging forms, creating intricate layers of overlap and hierarchy. Indeed, it would be the rare society that exhibited only one collective identity; thus, we must consider the existence of a multiplicity of such identities. The latter also reveal social and political fault lines that contain the potential for future divisions. Although collective identities exist simultaneously, we can usually define them hierarchically. Some are more important than others. Each individual and group sorts and prioritizes, often consciously but sometimes not. The identity that occupies the top of the hierarchy has the greatest potential for significant and powerful political force, often with implications for peace and conflict. For most of the modern age (i.e., since the late eighteenth century), nation-state political nationalism—the most important and powerful collective—has had direct implications for war and peace. Although suppressed by the confrontation

between capitalism and communism during the Cold War, nationalism has undergone a resurgence during the post-Cold War period. But the form of nationalism that became prominent in that era has been more of the ethnic and religious variety rather than nation-state political nationalism. The era following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 has added to the increasingly complex situation by highlighting the potency of religious and ethnic extremism.

When considering more specifically the sources of collective identity, especially those that result in political power (and, therefore, the power to mobilize the collective toward a common purpose), we cannot escape history, whose principal contemporary expression is culture. We can extend the thought that culture cannot exist without history, that culture is a historical product, to the notion that identity cannot exist without history. History is based on interpretation and is subject to constant revision and reinterpretation. But what is the basis of the revisions and reinterpretations? Here we consider not academic history but the popular mass view of history, usually a simplified and reduced version. New evidence plays a part, but even more so does the collective “memory” of that history—memory that may be real but is more likely selective, subjective, or manufactured. The fact that history can never be definitive points to one of the most important aspects of identity—that identity is dynamic and changeable. It need not be permanent.

Politically, the most potent collective identity in the modern era has been the nation-state. The concept of a nation is old, and, in the traditional sense, membership in a nation is determined by a common identity based on one or more of a number of physical and cultural factors such as origin, ancestry, location, reli-

gion, language, and shared history. In the modern era, the concept of the nation-state that combined national fervor with political organization introduced a powerful new foundation for nationhood. Modern forms of national identity can thus serve as the basis for powerful collective actions, especially in the political, social, economic, cultural, and strategic arenas. The sources of national identity of modern nation-states are often based on a shifting amalgamation of the old and traditional (ancestry, location, and religion) with the new (recent history). Thus, nation-state identity usually arises artificially or deliberately rather than deriving from the natural and spontaneous consequences of a country's history. Every nation glorifies what it is and what it represents and thus tends to gloss over history that does not fit that story (narrative). This becomes all the more evident in nations with arbitrarily created rather than historically evolved boundaries—for instance, countries established by colonial powers, especially in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Thus national leaders commonly evoke and use history deliberately as an instrument of unity and mobilization. In such usage, history is often distorted or even falsified.<sup>12</sup>

Nationalism is not the only basis for collective identity with consequential political power. Transnational identities have also proven effective in generating substantial political power. Some, such as extremism (religious, ethnic, and political) and criminal activity, can be destructive and threatening to order. Others are potentially constructive, such as collective identities that, for example, advocate worldwide human rights, seek to preserve and promote labor rights in the context of a globalizing society, promote an open and tolerant society for the free exchange of ideas and information, build global

consensus over climate change as a common global problem, encourage religious expressions of universal brotherhood, and advance international efforts for the peaceful resolution of conflict. Subnational collective identities such as a tribe or sect have also proven to possess increasingly potent political force in those parts of the world where the nation-state is weak or where the state seems remote from individual or group concerns.

### *Political Culture*

Aristotle famously said that “man is by nature a political animal.” What does this mean in terms of thoughts, decisions, and actions? We are most interested in how being political translates into real-world outcomes. Identity provides collective unity and foundation for mobilization, but politics supplies the instrument and the means to mobilize the group, leading to actions and results.

We can define political culture as the set of values, beliefs, traditions, perceptions, expectations, attitudes, practices, and institutions that a particular society harbors about how the political system and processes should operate and what sort of governmental and economic life it should pursue. Political culture is dynamic and changeable because of its historical derivation. Factors that contribute to the formation of a particular political culture include historical experience, religious tradition, collective values, founding principles, geographical location and configuration, strategic environment (e.g., relative vulnerability or security), economic capacity, and demographics.

The philosophical attitude toward the meaning of progress and development represents a most important factor of political culture. If we accept the notion that modernity and modernization originated

in and became defined by the West, we must also consider the problems of Western bias in the modernization scenario. The essential question in this debate concerns whether there is only one correct path to modernization ("civilization") and its implied sense of progress, or whether there is a multiplicity of paths (e.g., a "Confucian way" that could explain the successful developmental paths taken by East Asian nations). This is an important issue because of its profound effect on the kind of political culture that develops.

Faith and religion have become increasingly important factors in the construction of political culture, especially in the post-Cold War era and in societies with significant nonsecular political traditions. The role of religion in political culture is not difficult to understand if we recognize its role in identity formation. A key issue in political culture entails the extent to which people having a primarily religious or ethnically based identity will also show allegiance to the nation-state and/or transnational institutions.

Political culture also forms two key supporting instruments of its expression that are of interest for policy and strategy: political system and strategic culture. *Political system* refers to the organization of political power, with particular emphasis on identifying and understanding the basis for power, its distribution, and hierarchy. Consideration of the political system includes examination of the role of history, class, religion, race, ethnicity, gender, geography (physical, social, and cultural), demography, and power fault lines that determine power centers, connections, and operations. The world houses a spectrum of political systems, varying from failed states and diffuse power structures to centralized systems such as autocracies. In between these extremes occur various

gradations of systems such as democracies. Within each of these systems resides a spectrum of players and institutions that have political power and influence, usually having differential access to tangible and intangible resources (e.g., material, financial, influential, and moral). Within all political systems are rules of the game about obtaining, using, and transferring power.

*Strategic culture*, a relatively new concept, arose in the post-Cold War era in reaction to two developments, the first of which was the shock of the social scientific approach's failure in predicting the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union and European communism. This precipitated a search for one or more missing factors that could have led to more accurate predictive analysis.<sup>13</sup> The second development—the realization that each nation had a unique perspective which affected the way it perceived, interpreted, analyzed, and reacted to events and developments—amounted to a realization that no single universal "law" governed how all nations behaved. These two developments led to considering culture as an important factor in collective behavior (including that of the nation-state) and, thus, policy and strategy; out of it emerged the idea of strategic culture, thus defined as the concept that considers how cultural factors affect strategic behavior.<sup>14</sup> Strategic culture both enables and constrains actions and reactions regarding strategic choices, priorities, security, diplomacy, and the use of force.

### *Resilience*

As mentioned previously, resilience refers to the capacity or ability of a culture to resist, succumb to, or adapt to external forces. It tests the culture's stability and coherence and measures the endurance of its identity and political culture. Thus,

it can help us understand either the permanence or changeability of the values and interests that determine a particular culture's strategy and policy.

Globalization probably represents the greatest external force that affects cultures around the world and tests cultural resilience. From a historical perspective, although globalization often focuses specifically on the economic and the informational, we should consider it the current phase of modernity that encompasses both material and nonmaterial dimensions. Despite the existence of other periods of globalization, the type that we face today may assume such enormity that we do not yet have the historical basis to inform us of its potential impact.<sup>15</sup>

Although it is a term most often associated with economics and information, we believe that *globalization* in its broadest sense includes economic, social, technological, political, informational, and ideational factors. Key notions to consider include interdependence and a dynamic that is more involuntary than voluntary. Thus we have a sense that we cannot control the globalization force, only accommodate or mitigate it.

An important component of globalization calls for understanding its linkage with anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism. Many people in the world consider globalization synonymous with Americanization or Westernization and identify America as the primary source of globalization, especially those aspects of it perceived to undermine traditional society and values.

Another important test of resilience is how a culture approaches its integration with transnational institutions such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization. A culture may take a paro-

chial position, intent on preserving its own interest at the cost of the larger interest for which the institution was created. Alternatively, it may be willing to sacrifice parochial interest for the good of the larger community. The motivations for and viability of taking these positions offer insight into each culture's resilience.

## Conclusion

The theoretical principles of considering cultural dimensions in the formulation, implementation, and outcome of strategy and policy seem simple enough, but to actually apply them to a specific nation or a group, subnational or transnational, requires intense study and analysis of the history of that collectivity. We will discover no one right answer, but if we hope to formulate more effective strategies and policies, then we must strive to make them more answerable to cultural factors. The very lack of a definitive cultural analysis demands a multiplicity of efforts. Different approaches will emphasize different factors. A historically oriented analysis likely emphasizes different factors than one taking a political scientific approach—anthropological, sociological, economic, psychological, or military approaches focus on yet other factors. Their sum, however, can provide the sort of comprehensive analysis that can move us closer to the truth even if we never reach it. This is the difficult challenge that faces strategic leaders involved in strategy and policy. Identity, political culture, and resilience give us a starting point for that cultural analytical journey. □

## Notes

1. "The *cultural turn* describes developments in the humanities and the social sciences brought about by various developments across the disciplines. Most noted amongst these was the emergence of cultural studies and the rise of the sociology of culture within the discipline of sociology. . . . It describes a shift in emphasis towards *meaning* and on culture rather than politics or economics. This shift of emphasis occurred over a prolonged time, but particularly since the 1960s" (emphasis in original). *Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia*, s.v., "cultural turn," [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural\\_turn](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_turn).

2. The Army's Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, and FM 3-0, *Operations*, February 2008, represent examples of how cultural factors have now become prominent aspects of the tactical- and operational-level fights. Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber offer a five-dimensional approach (physical environment, economy, social structure, political structure, and belief system) to the issue of culture and military operations. This cultural framework for operations is an excellent complement to the ACFSP's three-dimensional framework for strategy and policy. See their book *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008), <http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/mcu/mcupress/opculture.pdf>.

3. Sheila Miyoshi Jager, visiting professor of national security studies at the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, 2006–8, writes of the need for appreciating how the three different levels of political-military operations—strategic, operational, and tactical—require different kinds of cultural knowledge. See her study *On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, November 2007), <http://www.strategicstudies-institute.army.mil/pdf/FILES/PUB817.pdf>. Jager's levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) are different from the three dimensions considered by the US Army War College—policy/strategy, operations, leadership/management. However, the more important point is that the two frameworks agree on the notion that we must differentiate how cultural factors work in different areas—that culture cannot and should not be conflated into a "one size fits all."

4. Two other features that define the human condition include man's biology and the physical environment.

5. The Army defines culture as

the set of distinctive features of a society or group, including but not limited to values, beliefs, and norms, that ties together members of that society or group and that drives action and behavior. Additional aspects or characteristics of culture are: (1) Culture is shared; there is no "culture of one"; (2) Culture is patterned, meaning that people in a group or society live and think in ways forming definitive, repeating patterns; (3) Culture is changeable, through social interactions between people and groups; (4) Culture is internalized in the sense that it is habitual, taken for granted, and perceived as "natural" by people within the group or society; (5) Culture is learned; (6) The distinc-

tive features that describe a particular culture include its myths and legends.

See US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy*, draft. Culture is expressed in the real world through symbols and symbolic systems that represent, reflect, or contain the meanings inherent in cultural features—therefore, values, beliefs and norms. Learning to identify these symbols and symbolic systems and "read" the meanings they reflect, represent, or contain is thus a crucial skill for understanding a particular society and its culture.

6. Geertz founded the field of interpretive anthropology, the dominant variant of cultural anthropology that approaches culture as a symbolic system. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5.

7. Max Weber examined Protestantism and capitalism's complementarity in detail. See his famous treatise *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner, 1976).

8. Ethnicity is a cultural construct usually based on race, religion, language, and way-of-life traditions. It may be possible to conceive of a distinctive American ethnicity that transcends the usual determinants by embracing an ethnic identity based on the American idea.

9. The beginning of the modern era is most commonly defined by the advent of the enlightenment and industrialization in the eighteenth century. The enlightenment created a rational secular world in which man dominated the ideational domain, while industrialization created a material world in which man dominated the physical domain. Divorced from the constraining and limiting premodern fixation on the divine, the modern era increasingly promised a future of unlimited possibilities.

10. The most prominent example was the failure to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union. Two important criticisms of rational-choice theory came from Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis and political scientist Ian Shapiro. Gaddis's criticism of the social sciences and their focus on the quest for the independent variable appeared in his book *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), chap. 3. Shapiro indicted the social sciences and humanities, maintaining that they are driven more by concern over methods—most importantly, rational-choice theory—than by real-world problems. See his book *The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

11. Thus, the study of identity involves the exploration of the same parameters mentioned earlier for the study of culture: formation, agency, process, boundary, variability, stability, coherence, and effect on thinking and decision making.

12. Two important and powerful studies have had an enormous impact on how we view the formation of coherent and stable modern nation-states. Editors Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1983), contains startling studies of how nation-states deliberately invented tradi-

tions to provide legitimacy by tying themselves to their long, traditional past and by consolidating their power through invented symbols and rituals. Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, England: Verso, 1983), examines how printed words played a key role in virtually linking all parts of the modern nation-state. Widespread, cheap printing—"print capitalism," to use Anderson's term—is a modern phenomenon. Its ubiquity was an essential mechanism and instrument for rapidly binding citizens of a nation-state by helping them imagine their membership in that national community. For example, print capitalism helped spread the sort of invented traditions that Hobbsbawm and Ranger considered. For some nations, such as Indonesia, that had never existed as a single coherent community prior to its formation in modern times, the concept of a national community in itself was an invention that print capitalism made possible to imagine.

13. John Lewis Gaddis, perhaps the world's foremost historian of the Cold War, wrote that

the efforts theorists have made to create a "science" of politics that would forecast the future course of world events have produced strikingly unimpressive results: none of the . . . approaches to theory . . . that have evolved since 1945 came anywhere close to anticipating how the Cold War would end. . . . If their forecasts failed so completely to anticipate so large an event as that conflict's termination, then one has to wonder about the theories upon which they were based.

See his article "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992–93): 3.

14. Important works on strategic culture include Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 32–64; Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 5–31; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 65–93; Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Richard J. Ellis and Michael Thompson, eds., *Culture Matters: Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Yosef Lapid, "Culture's Shop: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory," in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).

15. For example, note the globalization based on expansion of European trade between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries or the opening of the Silk Road in the thirteenth century.

# Fearful Symmetry

## How to Achieve Coherence among All the Players

RUMU SARKAR, PHD\*

The Cold War era locked the United States and the former USSR into a political and military standoff based on the grim possibility that nuclear warfare might lead to their mutually assured destruction. The two superpowers were polarized not only in terms of their underlying ideology and means of governance (democracy versus communism) but also in terms of their means of economic production (capitalist-based free-market economy versus state-led socialism).

Further, they also insisted on polarizing the rest of the world. Like the African proverb that says that when two elephants fight, the grass gets trampled, the policies of striving for containment, conducting proxy wars, and creating spheres of influence took their toll on countries extraneous to the conflict. Although the political and economic approaches of the two superpowers were strikingly dissimilar, the overarching “symmetry” of these two actors, the two most powerful nation-states at the time, created the “thesis.”

The contradictions contained within socialist regimes eventually led to their collapse, but the peaceful lull that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was shattered by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11). We now find ourselves in the second stage of the “antithesis” or the “asymmetry” posed by global terrorism acting through nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda and related terrorist groups. In fact, the US military, fully recognizing the so-called asymmetric threats posed by such groups, established the Asymmetric Warfare Group within the US Army in 2005.<sup>1</sup>

Asymmetric warfare is not a new tactic but an ancient one that uses unconventional means to counter the overwhelming conventional military and technological superiority of an adversary. In the current context, such means may include terrorist attacks, weapons of mass destruction, guerrilla warfare, cyber attacks, and information warfare. The asymmetry of these warfare tactics underscores the relative imbalance in size, tactical approaches, and objectives of the actors. Powerful na-

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\*Dr. Sarkar, who holds a PhD in public international law from Cambridge University, currently is the senior legal adviser to CALIBRE Systems. She formerly served as general counsel for both the Base Closure and Realignment Commission and the Overseas Basing Commission, as assistant general counsel for administrative affairs for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and as a member of the Office of the General Counsel at the US Agency for International Development. Prior to her government service, she was an associate in the New York offices of Lord, Day, and Lord and of Gaston, Snow, Beekman, and Bogue. In private practice, she specialized in complex antitrust and securities litigation. Dr. Sarkar was also a long-time adjunct law professor at Georgetown University Law Center, where she taught an LLM seminar on international development law. She has published *International Development Law* (Oxford University Press, 2009), *Transnational Business Law* (Kluwer Law International, 2004), and several law review articles.



tion-states (not just the United States and former Soviet Union) are now threatened by nebulous terrorist groups that have no organized center, armies, or formal structure of governance.

The term “fearful symmetry,” the next stage or “synthesis” we are moving towards, derives from William Blake’s poem “The Tyger,” the first stanza of which follows:

Tyger Tyger, burning bright,  
In the forests of the night;  
What immortal hand or eye,  
Could frame thy fearful symmetry?<sup>2</sup>

Not only are we terrorized by the acts of terrorists (an obvious outcome since that is their aim), but also many of the latter are fearful of (if not actually terrorized by) the perceived threat posed by Western ideals and institutions. In other words, fundamentalist, Islamic-based terrorist networks and operatives find deeply problematic the ideas of universal suffrage and representative government, participatory democracy, respect for the rights of women as well as of religious and ethnic minorities, and free-market economic practices and institutions.

A fundamental change is prompting transformation from the antithesis of the asymmetric threats posed by global terrorism to the synthesis of a fearful symmetry. A palpable shift has occurred from the mere tactical level of posing asymmetric threats by global terrorists to an overarching psychological dimension wherein both sides instill fear in each other. The asymmetric threat of global terrorism is no longer confined to conflict zones with specific military engagements under way; it now affects civilians in every walk of life.

In fact, ordinary life has been transformed to accommodate the impact of global terrorism’s asymmetric threat—

witness the new protocols with regard to airline travel; heightened security in almost every aspect of everyday life; and a new, fearful consciousness of the presence of implicit danger. Moreover, this stage has reached a “steady state” in which neither the targets nor the effects of global terrorism are dissipating—a theme explored later in this article, along with a proposed resolution of the fearful symmetry.

### Global, Fundamentalist, Islamic-Based Terrorism: One Size Does Not Fit All

At the outset, we must make a very basic distinction between Islamic-based separatist (or secessionist) movements that employ terrorist means and the so-called global, fundamentalist, Islamic-based terrorist movement. The reason for doing so is that the nature of Islamic-based terrorism determines, in part, the international response to it, as discussed below.

Palestine, of course, represents the primary example of an Islamic-based separatist movement. It has engaged in a decades-long struggle for autonomy, self-determination, and establishment of its own statehood, the causes and implications of which this article will not address. In light of the fact that the US State Department designated Hamas a foreign terrorist organization, Hamas surprised US and other policy makers by winning the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) general legislative elections in January 2006.<sup>3</sup> It defeated Fatah, the party of the PA’s president, Mahmoud Abbas, thereby setting the stage for a prolonged power struggle.

Although Hamas uses terrorist tactics of conducting suicide bombings along with launching short-range rockets and mortars in order to achieve its political

goals, it also provides basic human services such as educational, sports, health, and religious facilities to its constituents. The fact that Hamas has responded to the basic needs of Palestinians and allegedly has a reputation for honesty, in contrast to the corruption of which Fatah officials often stand accused, may explain, in part, its political victory. In essence, Hamas combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism.<sup>4</sup>

Rather than belabor the point by mentioning other Islamic-based separatist movements, it may be useful to consider whether a historical relationship (however tenuous) exists between the examples cited above and postcolonial movements that established new nation-states. Revolutionary forces in former colonies generally did not have access to organized armies or arms, often resorting to unconventional means for attaining their revolutionary goals (most notably, Mahatma Gandhi, who eschewed violence in order to gain India's independence).

Although Palestine is not emerging from a colonial past per se, it has not yet managed to win its own statehood. The fact that the global terrorism espoused by al-Qaeda now energizes this separatist movement and others reflects a profound departure from the past practice of using international law's principles of self-determination to create internationally recognized statehood. In fact, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict no longer catalyzes global terrorism; rather, in the view of the jihadists themselves, the global jihadist terrorist movements have overshadowed and surpassed it in importance.<sup>5</sup>

## The Failure of the State

A significant underlying theme that unites the examples of Islamic-based separatist movements discussed above is the

failure of the state as an institution of governance that creates an ordered society. A second failure that can no longer be ignored is the disinclination of people to hold their state leaders accountable. Thus, we may view the failure of the state as twofold—in terms of both governing and being governed.

The failure of the state as an economic actor is particularly relevant in this context. In the decades following the independence of most developing nations, the state was the only institutional actor large enough and sufficiently creditworthy to assume an entrepreneurial function. In other words, the state was the only actor capable of borrowing funds and providing for basic human needs, including power generation, transportation, and telecommunications.

In response to the urgent needs of their populations in such sectors, many nations created state-owned enterprises (SOE), which borrowed capital to support the capital infrastructure and other nation-building needs of the state. The SOEs, however, generally engaged in inefficient borrowing practices that burdened numerous developing states with high levels of debt, leading to the debt crisis and the continuing debt overhang of many countries. Over time, the collapse of SOEs, the failure to create adequate private-sector growth and private capital markets, the continuing debt burden, and many other complex factors led to stagnant economic growth and, in some cases, political instability.

The previous discussion drew a fundamental distinction between two types of fundamentalist, Islamic-based terrorism: separatist-based movements and the so-called global terrorism of al-Qaeda and related terrorist cells and networks. The first type is based on a failure of the state,

as described above, but the second arises from a failure of ideology.

The new ascendancy of the “rule of law” on a global scale is certainly worth considering. In the fracas of dying and defunct ideas, a core ideal of Western thought has endured, namely, Adam Smith’s elevation of the drive to acquire material wealth to a classical economic ideal. This, in combination with John Locke’s demand that the state protect private property and individual liberties, sets the stage for liberal political theory. In other words, the pursuit of personal happiness through the material acquisition of personal wealth as well as the state’s protection of individual liberties, has risen to a Western classical ideal. Indeed, the terrifying force of this ideal may be its universality.

While Western societies developed legal structures over the centuries to protect private property (e.g., contract enforcement, mortgages, secured loans, liens, and bankruptcy proceedings) and to ensure the protection of individual liberties—for example, by passing a Bill of Rights and ensuring the due process of law—non-Western societies, for the most part, did not develop similar institutions. What began revolutionizing our world at the end of the last millennium was not adoption of a Western classical ideal by the non-Western world, but adoption of the Western methodology of achieving this ideal through private property, democratic governance, and the rule of law. For the most part, adoption of this Western-based methodology has fueled the legal reform efforts in the developing world for the past 25 years.

If the failure of ideology on a worldwide scale in the past century has led to the superficial ascendancy of Western-based institutions, the failure of ideology in the Arab world in the post–World War II pur-

suit of modernity has been perhaps even more painful and has not led to the same result. According to Fareed Zakaria, “For the Arab world, modernity has been one failure after another. Each path followed—socialism, secularism, nationalism—has turned into a dead end. . . . If there is one great cause of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, it is the total failure of political institutions in the Arab world.” Modernization is now viewed as Westernization, globalization, or—worse—Americanization, but, as Zakaria points out, “importing the inner stuffings of modern society—a free market, political parties, accountability and the rule of law—is difficult and dangerous.”<sup>6</sup> Going back to an earlier theme, neglecting to demand that state leaders take a more informed and critical approach to issues of governance and economic growth—a demand that the governed people legitimately could have made—also constitutes part of the failure of the state.

The profound transformation of the frustration, sense of humiliation, and despair in the Arab world into an ideology of hatred involves a very complex alchemy that lies outside the scope of this analysis. On the one hand, it appears that Islamic-based separatists have responded to the crisis of the state in a secularized fashion, using violence as a means to gain political power. On the other hand, it appears that in response to the failure of modernity and its accompanying ideological foundation, al-Qaeda has developed a more profoundly religiously influenced “new ideology of hate.”<sup>7</sup> This ideology empowers its adherents through hatred and the single-minded pursuit of disruption, terrorism, and the destabilization of Western-styled economies. Its actions, largely of symbolic value, feed off the despair, disempowerment, and disenfranchisement of frenzied young Muslims. Rather than holding

Arab leaders accountable for their actions, this distrust has metastasized into an uncompromising hatred of Western ideals, values, institutions, symbols, and peoples.

The new generation of terrorists has no interest in undertaking the hard work of nation building. In fact, their brand of terrorism is not based on the failure of the state, which has already imploded, as has the failed state of Afghanistan, or is in the process of gradual decline and collapse, as in Iraq unless the civil strife there is reversed. Rather, this type of terrorism arises not only from a failure of Western-based ideology supporting "liberal democracy" but also, and more disturbingly, from the ascendancy of a new ideology of hatred.

### A New Ideological Conflict

The creators and adherents of al-Qaeda's new ideology of hatred are educated, wealthy, privileged, and successful by Western standards, as are their new recruits, who are Western-educated engineers, physicians, and other affluent professionals. This ideology does not advance the economic or political stability of a nation-state in order to create stable, viable, state-oriented structures of governance and economic production—this is not at all the goal of global terrorists. In fact, one may argue that such terrorists emerging from the European context demonstrate that living in stable political economies does not deter them from adopting the ideology of hatred. Nor does it deter them from engaging in acts of terrorism—quite the contrary, in fact.

On a deeper level, the ideology of hatred fundamentally misunderstands man's acquisitive nature. From an outsider's point of view, much of their furious hatred seems based on envy and deep mistrust of the West's economic successes,

political dominance, and cultural hegemony—its luxury goods, in fact. However, the ultimate luxury good is the freedom of choice. The freedom to choose and take risks to support those choices (as institutionalized by the genius of capitalism) is the ultimate freedom.

Deliberately choosing (and imposing on others) the "unfreedom" of having no or few choices dictated by religious leaders or tribal war lords does not constitute real empowerment. Indeed, far from disempowering other nation-states, global terrorism acts to disempower its own adherents by cultivating despair and a lack of hope in the future—or simply the belief that tomorrow will be better than today. Although this ideology claims to be faith based, it mocks universal, faith-based values.

If, on the other hand, Islamic-based global terrorists have not fundamentally misinterpreted man's nature and are willing to kill for it and, more importantly, to die for this state of unfreedom, then we are all lost. They have, in effect, created a new kind of human being impervious to the values of human civilization, not the least of which is the regard for the sanctity of human life. In fact, the systematic indoctrination of a creed of violence and the uncompromising repression of human creativity affecting all spheres of life may give rise to a new, terrifying sensibility that implicitly encourages a wanton disregard for human life. There truly is no real response to someone who is willing to die when we clearly are not.

In order to resolve the fearful symmetry, we must create a "new soldier," who needs to demonstrate the highly subjective qualities of empathy, compassion, wisdom, and heightened intuitive and perceptive abilities that enable him or her to navigate in unknown cultural, linguistic, and emotional terrains. Such a

soldier needs to be both intuitive and wise—thus, we will have to cultivate different cultural values (within the military and, more broadly, in Western-based societies) in order to create this new kind of soldier.

In the final analysis, however, despite any efforts to produce and deploy a new soldier, the fearful symmetry will be resolved only when and if the global terrorists themselves learn to love—not us but themselves. Only by giving up their destructive and self-destructive nihilism and replacing it with a sense of self-respect, and the respect for others, will the fearful symmetry truly end. This is the complex challenge posed by the fearful symmetry, and it is my sincere hope that we may all work together to revive hope and restore faith in the future. The true leaders in the fearful symmetry are those who can inspire hope, faith, trust, and, finally, love. Only when we can live peaceably together will the promise of the future be restored to us. At that point, we may move past the fearful symmetry and welcome a new era of history that will begin when this one ends.

However, creating and cultivating a corps of new soldiers to address global jihadists are extraordinarily difficult undertakings—to which most military establishments are unwilling to commit themselves. The following discussion examines the reasons militating against such a course of action and the reasons why and how we should pursue it.

### Liabilities of the Counterinsurgency

Prof. Michael J. Mazarr succinctly puts into perspective many of the objections to adopting a US-based defense policy aimed at developing counterinsurgency cam-

paigns and approaches.<sup>8</sup> He argues that the post-9/11 shift in defense policy towards military interventions against asymmetric threats, irregular warfare, stabilization operations, and nation-building exercises is misguided and, ultimately, quite dangerous. In fact, it may actually destabilize US national security rather than strengthen it. He correctly points out that

although it is always dangerous to generalize, much of the instability described by theories of asymmetric and nontraditional warfare stems first and foremost from causes other than military aggression. Many rebellions, insurgencies, and civil wars are the symptoms of political, economic, and psychosocial factors that undermine social stability and popular commitment to public order. Once order has collapsed, leaders and groups arise determined to seize power, and the contest can become a clash of power-seekers. Yet, the essential problem in many so-called failed states and other contexts that give rise to civil wars, insurgencies, and the radicalism at large in the Muslim world is a society or a large group of individuals beset with some combination of economic stagnation, cultural resentment, historical grievance, political or national repression, and other factors. These afflictions—injustices, in the eyes of the aggrieved—are not amenable to military solutions.<sup>9</sup>

In other words, these military engagements are not wars at all but small, internecine, and often intrastate and inter-ethnic conflicts.

The list of downstream negative consequences from shifting to a counterinsurgency-focused military approach include, for example, underfunding the research, development, and procurement of systems for war; inappropriately or inadequately training military forces for conventional warfare; underfunding nonmilitary agencies and programs better equipped to deal with the underlying causes giving rise to irregular warfare; and risking the loss of the US strategic and compelling advantage in

conventional-warfare arenas (especially in dealing with Russia's and China's potentially expansionist ambitions).<sup>10</sup>

Moreover, by adopting a strategy of fighting "small wars," the United States, in particular, is positioning itself to lose. Democracies have a limited capacity to absorb the costs of small wars because of an overall commitment to democratic principles and because of the general repugnance to brutal military behavior often found in such conflicts.

Jeffrey Record points out that dictatorships which use violent tactics with their own people and which are not accountable for their actions often have a higher tolerance for small wars than democracies.<sup>11</sup> Thus, the often protracted irregular wars are generally not winnable by major democracies such as the United States. Arguably, this is the case historically even with England and France, as witnessed by the asymmetric nature of many of the struggles for independence that took place in their colonial eras.

Further, the single-minded focus on winning the kinetic-warfare stage tends to make military strategists, policy makers, and perhaps the public as well feel that the war has been won and that the world is now a better place. It overlooks the fact that "military victory is a beginning, not an end. . . . Pursuit of military victory for its own sake also discourages thinking about and planning for the second and by far the most difficult half of wars for regime change: establishing a viable replacement for the destroyed regime. War's object is, after all, a better peace."<sup>12</sup>

Indeed, since many small wars are intra-state rather than interstate conflicts, regime change often becomes a significant factor at the conclusion of the kinetic-warfare stage. However, bringing about political transformation frequently lies beyond the ability of a military force. "Military conflict

has two dimensions[:] . . . winning wars and winning the peace."<sup>13</sup> Military forces, designed to do the first, often do it well, but they are not designed to do the latter and often fare poorly—precisely one of the key arguments against engaging in irregular warfare in the first instance.

Finally, and most importantly, the use of the military in counterinsurgency operations and related engagements substitutes military operations for diplomatic efforts and development assistance. Arguably, this reflects a strategic misinterpretation of Carl von Clausewitz's dictum that "war is the continuation of politics by other means."<sup>14</sup> War is not meant to substitute for politics:

It is thus dangerous to view the military as the lead agency to deal with very diffuse, broad-based asymmetric challenges such as radical Islamism, nation building, stability operations, and even counterinsurgency. Talk of redirecting U.S. military emphasis to asymmetric threats amounts to a form of avoidance, allowing U.S. national security planners to ignore the truly dramatic change underway in the character of conflict. As smart, adaptable, and courageous as U.S. military officers and men and women clearly are and will be, asymmetric challenges demand asymmetric responses—political, economic, cultural, informational, and psychological tools, tactics, and techniques allowed to work organically over time, not retrained military forces whose true purpose is to fight and win wars, which are different enterprises. The strategic trap is obvious: Furnished with a vast, expensive, skillful military tool, policymakers will use it again and again, as they have been doing, without confronting the tougher challenge of shifting resources into nonmilitary tools of statecraft.<sup>15</sup>

By dramatically expanding budgets for foreign aid, public diplomacy, exchange programs, and related nonmilitary forms of power, the United States can do much more to address sources of instability, stagnation, and grievance that underlie state failures, radicals, insurgents, and terrorist groups at large in a globalizing

world. Military power is not the way to defeat such threats.<sup>16</sup>

Incidentally, Robert Gates, US secretary of defense, agrees with this view:

We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between. . . .

But these new threats also require our government to operate as a whole differently—to act with unity, agility, and creativity. And they will require considerably more resources devoted to America's non-military instruments of power. . . .

[There] is no replacement for the real thing—civilian involvement and expertise.<sup>17</sup>

Although there seems to be a fairly broad basis of consensus for devoting more resources to nonmilitary approaches, agencies, and policies in the context of responding to asymmetric threats, we seem to lack the requisite will to implement this need. However, as Gen David Petraeus points out, “power vacuums breed insurgencies.”<sup>18</sup> In his view, these insurgencies typically emerge from civil wars or from the collapse of states. Generally speaking, insurgencies and global terrorism stem, in large part, from the failure of the state. Indeed, the failure of the development process derives from two related aspects of governance. First, within the host country one finds a failure in governing and in being governed. Second, from the perspective of the wider international community—especially advanced nations actively involved in the overall development process—one finds a failure in statecraft. In other words, failed states have experienced a systemic inability to successfully bring about sustainable development (albeit for a complex menu of reasons that lie outside the scope of

this limited analysis). Nonmilitary sources on both a unilateral (state-to-state) and multilateral level have not fully succeeded in ensuring concrete development despite their best efforts to do so.

This leaves the international community with the baleful choice of either ignoring these power vacuums that lead to potential insurgencies, further instability, and endemic corruption—or taking some course of action in response to such conditions. Although the preferred course of action with respect to containing forces leading to the potential collapse of the state should involve nonmilitary actors, clearly this has not occurred successfully in many instances. Yet, the unavoidable conclusion is that neither political transformation nor economic development can take place without security.<sup>19</sup>

As we all know, nature abhors a vacuum. Despite (or perhaps in response to) the failure to devote additional US nonmilitary resources to the effort of quelling and preventing asymmetric threats, the US military paradigm has shifted. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, 16 September 2009, firmly validates the defense policy of supporting stability operations in order to

establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations. In such circumstances, the Department will operate within U.S. Government and, as appropriate, international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the deployment and utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities. . . .

Integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of successful stability operations. The Department shall: . . .

(3) Continue to support the development, implementation, and operations of civil-military teams and related efforts aimed at unity of effort in rebuilding basic infrastructure; developing local governance structures; fostering security, economic stability, and development; and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.<sup>20</sup>

Of course, the United States has certainly intervened nonmilitarily in conflict-ridden areas over the past 60 years. One commentator notes that “Africa has been the recipient of several Marshall Plans worth of foreign aid since World War II’s end, yet it remains arguably as impoverished today as it was in 1946.”<sup>21</sup> This stems in part from the reluctance of bilateral and multilateral aid institutions such as the World Bank to factor security needs into the development equation.<sup>22</sup>

## The New Soldier

It is not certain whether broader non-military interventions in the security, stabilization, and reconstruction process are forthcoming, but military forces (whether unilateral or multilateral) clearly are the first actors in conflict and postconflict situations. Therefore, I would argue for creation of the new soldier, whether acting for a unilateral force or multilateral forces, as a necessary agent of stability and, paradoxically, of change. While the current US military stability, security, transition, and reconstruction paradigm is in effect, creation and training of the new soldier seem inevitable. However, this article has a much broader vision in mind, which encompasses not only US military forces but also any and all military forces faced with asymmetric threats; these include those of France, Great Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, India, Morocco, Indonesia, the Philippines, and many more.

Ultimately, the new soldier corps should reside in multilateral armed forces and peacekeeping units such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union, African Union, and G-8’s Global Peace Operations Initiative, a multilateral program that will create a self-sustaining peacekeeping force of 75,000—largely African—soldiers by 2010. The concept of the new soldier may also be relevant to the Africa Counterinsurgency Operations Training Assistance program and many other military and paramilitary programs.

In my view, multilateral and regional peacekeeping forces are better suited to fighting the wars of the new soldier since such forces are predicated on multilateralism, based on multilingual and multicultural approaches. Indeed, a RAND study points out that multilateral peacekeeping forces have added credibility, lower operating costs, and more access to seasoned professionals who have experience in handling crises created by collapsed states.<sup>23</sup> Thus, rather than create conflicts with standing national armies, perhaps it is time to take a new approach by reinvesting in and developing new forms of militarized interventions for the new soldier.

If we adopt this approach, we may need to negotiate and secure the agreement of members and participants to the underlying commitments, missions, and rules of engagement for reformulated and new military interventions with much broader goals in mind. The far-reaching political implications need to be part of the paradigm shift not only for the US military and its long-term sustenance, but also for other militaries strained by the demands of insurgencies and global terrorism.

Initially the new soldier should focus on such interventions as providing humanitarian relief; security and stabiliza-



tion; and conflict resolution and prevention. Ultimately, the new soldier should create the backdrop for initiating a diplomatic dialogue to end hostilities and begin the process of peace and reconciliation. Thus, the underlying articles of association of multilateral military forces such as NATO, the UN, and related organizations and units may need to be changed or overhauled to reflect the need and support for the new soldier. This may call for broader authority, for example, to intervene internationally by regional military forces, where necessary. For example, the African Union may be tasked with setting up peacekeeping forces in the Philippines.

Further, as we create the new soldier, we also may need to drastically alter recruitment strategies. There is significant concern that changing the emphasis on kinetic aspects of warfare to “softer” skills involved in conflict prevention and reconciliation, as well as nation-building exercises, will clash with and demoralize existing military

structures—after all, established militaries are built on a different set of skills and expectations. Therefore, perhaps we should formulate and promulgate a new military career track to attract officers and other personnel who wish to develop the new skill sets necessary for the new soldier. Since the new soldier has a different mission, based on a different perspective and training, perhaps the core curriculum of military schools needs significant change as well. Retired military officers may wish to lead the effort in order to share their “lessons learned” perspective with others and help shift the military paradigm to include a different kind of soldiering by creating a different kind of soldier. As Defense Secretary Gates put it, “New institutions are needed for the 21st century, new organizations with a 21st century mind-set.”<sup>24</sup> This may be the new challenge: to create the new soldier, not in conflict with the soldier of today but as a new and invaluable partner for the military of tomorrow. □

## Notes

1. See US Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, <http://www.awg.army.mil/> (accessed 6 June 2010).

2. William Blake, *Songs of Innocence and of Experience: Shewing the Two Contrary States of the Human Soul*, 1789–1794 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 148.

3. See US Department of State, fact sheet, 11 October 2005, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm> (accessed 25 July 2007).

4. See Council on Foreign Relations, “ Hamas ” (updated 27 August 2009), <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/> (accessed 6 June 2010).

5. Reuven Paz, “Between Ideology and Strategy,” in “What Does al-Qaeda Want?” edition 31, vol. 3 (18 August 2005), Middle East Roundtable, *bitterlemons-international.org*, <http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=98#397> (accessed 6 June 2010).

6. Fareed Zakaria, “The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?” *Newsweek*, 15 October 2001, <http://www.newsweek.com/2001/10/14/the-politics-of-rage-why-do-they-hate-us.html> (accessed 6 June 2010).

7. Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Place of Tolerance in Islam: On Reading the Qur’an—and Misreading It,” *Boston Review*, December 2001 / January 2002, <http://bostonreview.net/BR26.6/elfadl.html> (accessed 6 June 2010). The author, a distinguished Fellow in Islamic Law at UCLA, alleges that the theological premises of global terrorism derive from “the intolerant puritanism of the Wahhabi and Salafi creeds.” Founded in the early twentieth century, Salafism argued, according to the author, that one should respond to the demands of modernity by returning to the “original sources of the Qur’an and Sunnah (tradition of the Prophet).” Although “Wahhabism narrowly defined orthodoxy, and was extremely intolerant of any creed that contradicted its own,” the author argues that it “does not bear primary responsibility for the existence of terrorist groups in Islam today.” He argues that

Wahhabism is distinctively inward-looking—although focused on power, it primarily asserts power over other Muslims. . . . Militant puritan groups, however, are both introverted and extroverted—they attempt to assert power against both Muslims and non-Muslims.

As populist movements, they are a reaction to the disempowerment most Muslims have suffered in the modern age at the hands of harshly despotic governments, and at the hands of interventionist foreign powers. These groups compensate for extreme feelings of disempowerment by extreme and vulgar claims to power. Fueled by supremacist and puritan theological creeds, their symbolic acts of power become uncompromisingly fanatic and violent.

*Ibid.*

8. Michael J. Mazarr, "The Folly of 'Asymmetric War,'" *Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 33–53, [http://www.twq.com/08summer/docs/08summer\\_mazarr.pdf](http://www.twq.com/08summer/docs/08summer_mazarr.pdf) (accessed 6 June 2010). Professor Mazarr is a professor of national security strategy at the US National War College.

9. *Ibid.*, 35–36.

10. *Ibid.*, 39–41.

11. Jeffrey Record, "Why the Strong Lose," *Parameters* 35 (Winter 2005–6): 16, 20–22, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/05winter/record.pdf> (accessed 6 June 2010).

12. *Ibid.*, 25.

13. *Ibid.*, 26.

14. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87, 89.

15. Mazarr, "Folly of 'Asymmetric War,'" 38.

16. *Ibid.*, 50. Professor Mazarr further argues that "the United States should powerfully enhance its efforts to reduce instability, conflict, and radicalism in key areas of the world and to shore up institutionalization and governance in critical states. It should do so, however, by relying on an expanded and deepened set of nonmilitary tools and do so largely in an anticipatory and collaborative manner rather than an ex post facto and interventionist one." *Ibid.*, 35.

17. Robert Gates, "Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power" (Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, 26 November 2007), <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199> (accessed 6 June 2010).

18. Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, 1-4, <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf> (accessed 6 June 2010). General Petraeus further points out that

recently, ideologies based on extremist forms of religious or ethnic identities have replaced ideologies

based on secular revolutionary ideals. These new forms of old, strongly held beliefs define the identities of the most dangerous combatants in these new internal wars. These conflicts resemble the wars of religion in Europe before and after the Reformation of the 16th century. People have replaced nonfunctioning national identities with traditional sources of unity and identity. When countering an insurgency during the Cold War, the United States normally focused on increasing a threatened but friendly government's ability to defend itself and on encouraging political and economic reforms to undercut support for the insurgency. Today, when countering an insurgency growing from state collapse or failure, counterinsurgents often face a more daunting task: helping friendly forces reestablish political order and legitimacy where these conditions may no longer exist.

*Ibid.*

19. James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 69, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1753/](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753/) (accessed 7 June 2010).

20. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, 16 September 2009, 2, 3, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf> (accessed 7 June 2010). See also FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, a manual devoted to conducting a counterinsurgency campaign, coauthored by Gen David Petraeus, which states clearly that "[counterinsurgency] involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the Armed Forces cannot succeed in [counterinsurgency operations] alone" (p. 1-1).

21. Sean McFate, "U.S. Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm?" *Military Review* 88, no. 1 (January–February 2008): 15, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=6&hid=109&sid=4878c47a-0d64-4da0-bc4f-e55ade516190%40sessionmgr13> (accessed 7 June 2010).

22. *Ibid.*

23. Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building*, xxx, xxxvi, xxxvii–xxxviii.

24. Gates, "Beyond Guns and Steel."

# Intelligence Services in Sub-Saharan Africa

## Making Security Sector Reform Work

DUSTIN DEHÉZ\*

In recent years, the security sector has emerged as a crucial component in guaranteeing lasting peace and security, particularly in countries that arose from bloody civil wars and internal conflicts. Reform of the security sector, therefore, offers a means of ensuring that such countries do not reenter conflicts and wars. In this respect, it is also a part of conflict prevention. Ideally, security sector reform (SSR) addresses the twin challenges posed by security services and security sector governance by transforming military forces to defend their countries against foreign foes and enemies, while at the same time trying to institutionalise civilian oversight and parliamentary control. In order to do so, it aims to strengthen oversight and executive control of all security services, including the army, border control, and intelligence services, while simultaneously attempting to enhance their operational capabilities.

The concept of SSR owes its attractiveness to its twofold function: SSR not only helped identify the missing link between

security policy and development assistance but also, in that sense, led to a turn toward security in the way the West understands and comprehends development and stability. Moreover, SSR provided a coherent concept, the means, to bridge the gap between both fields. Despite this early success, however, SSR has remained largely conceptual; coordination and sequencing of measures taken under the SSR framework remain highly contested issues; governments emerging from conflict situations find it difficult to comprehend the complexity and sophistication of the process; and donors still need to develop a coherent, systemwide approach. Although SSR highlights the importance of well-managed civil-military relations, there seems to be little effort to manage assistance in this realm. Moreover, surprisingly few advances have occurred in understanding these relations in general.<sup>1</sup> The impact of conflicts on civil-military relations has largely been neglected, and the legacy of socialism, particularly in African contexts, has not received much

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\*The author is a historian and visiting professor at the Centre for International Studies at the University of Economics, Prague. He is also a member of the Young Foreign Policy Experts of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and a lecturer in international relations. His articles have appeared in the *Weekly Standard* and the *Journal of American Foreign Policy Interests*, among others.

scholarly attention; the same holds true of specific challenges posed by the incorporation of intelligence services, customs, and border control. Obviously, during the implementation of SSR by development practitioners, little research supports their efforts. Currently the gap between practice and academic knowledge is widening. It is noteworthy that the books published by Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz remain the most influential works in civil-military relations and their role in different forms of statehood.<sup>2</sup> Further scholarly attention will need to focus on civil-military relations, not only to guide efforts in SSR but also to incorporate the history of those relations during the past two to three decades into our understanding of the military in Africa, the Middle East, and those states governed by socialist regimes until the end of the Cold War.

As Andrea Wright put it, when everybody is doing SSR, clearly not everybody knows exactly what to do.<sup>3</sup> Though SSR certainly is en vogue in development circles, indispensable knowledge of the military and security services is thinly spread, especially given the long-standing aversion to the military that has long characterised the development community as a whole. It is therefore feasible to ask whether all donors really have a plan or cohesive framework to guide their efforts. Do they know how to include all national security services? Particularly in the latter case, intelligence services need to be taken into account, but for a variety of reasons, these services have not received the attention they deserve. Against this background, this article focuses on the latter and its role in SSR, aiming to close a gap left both by the lack of academic efforts to describe the role of the intelligence service and by SSR efforts that have largely neglected the intelligence sector. Specifi-

cally, it outlines the role of intelligence services in the national security architecture and their relations with other security services; describes the major problems that SSR needs to address when aiming at cohesive reform of the security sector, including intelligence services; and, finally, draws some conclusions. In doing so, the article concentrates on SSR efforts in sub-Saharan Africa and the particular challenge left by legacies from colonialism and socialism in the African context and the specific impact of the role of the military in African states.

### Defining the Relationship and Identifying Problems

Undoubtedly, security services and governance of the security sector are important features of modern statehood. Representing the heart of any state, security gives nations their legitimacy and their mandate to govern. Ideally, security services provide protection for the population, and the state and its institutions command and control them to that end. In democracies this control would ensure that the military would not undermine the state since the controlling institutions are products of the will of the people. Potentially, however, undemocratic regimes and autocrats could face threats from either outside or inside the country, either from the upper echelons of their own ruling elite or from society itself.<sup>4</sup> Because of this concern for their own survival, many autocrats use security services to further their interests, not those of the state. Especially during the Cold War, national security services in sub-Saharan Africa occupied themselves with regime security, often receiving aid from their Cold War allies for this purpose. This practice has included intelligence services as well. Ideally, in autocracies

the security of the regime translates directly into regime stability.<sup>5</sup> This, however, by no means equates to the stability and security of the state, let alone its population. Quite the contrary, the means employed to secure regime stability have often undermined the soundness of state structures. Efforts to enhance regime stability, therefore, often-times only foster the negative sovereignty of these states, increasing their status as quasi-states—nations referred to as states only because of the international recognition they received earlier.<sup>6</sup>

A majority of African states has at some point tried to develop socialist systems, whether they called it scientific socialism or African socialism. Between the beginning of the decolonisation period and the 1980s, no fewer than 35 of 53 states called themselves socialist at various times.<sup>7</sup> These experiences have left a problematic legacy since socialist regimes tend to highlight regime security even more than other autocracies, often by putting the party and not the state in charge of national security affairs and the army. Communist countries simply would not tolerate anything like a military outside the political realm, since in previous decades they considered it the armed wing of capitalism and the defender of the bourgeoisie. In the eyes of communist leaders, therefore, it was totally legitimate to turn the military into an instrument of the Communist Party, a tool to modernise society and advance socialism. As the case of Ethiopia dramatically illustrates, this dynamic led to a militarisation of society and a politicisation of the military, intelligence, and other security services.<sup>8</sup> Over decades, such a focus on regime security manifested itself in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa in decision-making processes, largely undisturbed by any civilian oversight and control at all. This situation inevitably culminated in ram-

panant corruption and poor management of the national security forces. Corruption, poor ministerial planning, and the lack of oversight have left many of sub-Saharan Africa's armies and intelligence services ill prepared for current challenges, from an increase in the trade of narcotics in Western Africa to the threat of radical Islamism in the Horn of Africa.

This legacy has weakened armies and intelligence services alike, not least because these two institutions share important features. Both exist to protect the state, but both command the power to become its greatest threat. SSR in both areas identifies the need to strengthen civil oversight bodies but at the same time to face the challenge of increasing operational effectiveness. Both have to cope with the legacies of the Cold War. For example, like many military forces in sub-Saharan Africa, intelligence services in autocracies have been and frequently are still dominated by the ethnic group that seized power in the nation, however small that group. Although intelligence services in sub-Saharan Africa originally mirrored their colonial counterparts, they often underwent transformation after these countries gained independence. In Anglophone African states, for instance, most intelligence services originated from within the police, most commonly in the form of the special branch. However, since many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have faced recurrent coups d'état by military forces or presidential guards, the shape and function of these services have often changed rather dramatically.<sup>9</sup> In the wake of such coups, newly established regimes quickly moved to redirect the work of intelligence services to their own safety and often subsumed intelligence command structures under military leadership, creating a highly politicised and militarised intelligence community that

worked solely toward regime security.<sup>10</sup> Often enough, new regimes and juntas created new or rival intelligence services with the sole purpose of maintaining regime security. These security services arose only after a certain force had seized the state and subsequently developed an interest in the consolidation of power. The Gambia is one such case in point.

In 1994, when the army under the leadership of a young officer named Yahya Jammeh staged a coup d'état, it initially had only a tenuous hold on power. The new regime quickly moved to install the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council, which would lead the Gambia for the next two years, before Jammeh would run on a civilian platform for reelection.<sup>11</sup> Regime security, however, remained an important issue during these years, and in 1995 the new regime created the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), which reinforced the ruling council's control over society and radically changed the political atmosphere in the country.<sup>12</sup> Despite the establishment of the civilian platform in 1996—the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction—the country remains a dictatorship, and the NIA has as its top priority the maintenance of regime security. In fact, like other parts of the national security apparatus, the agency identifies dissidents and journalists critical of the regime. Moreover, it may have played a role in fabricating alleged coups from 1996, 1997, and 2006, all of which served as a pretext for the regime to consolidate its hold on power by jailing its dissidents. SSR in the area of intelligence services, therefore, should not only change the ways of conducting intelligence but also alter its ends significantly.

Unsurprisingly, these services have historically been comparatively weak, particularly in terms of countering threats from abroad. During the Cold War, the stronger

intelligence from Western nations or the Soviet Union and its allies by no means compensated for this weakness. In the Congo crisis of the 1960s, for example, the United States relied heavily on Belgian intelligence because it had long neglected to develop its own capabilities in sub-Saharan Africa, believing until the 1960s that the former colonial powers would take the lead in cooperating with the newly independent African states and keeping the Soviet Union out of sub-Saharan Africa. When it finally did establish an intelligence apparatus, it still had problems capturing the entire picture.<sup>13</sup> The end of the Cold War again saw intelligence capabilities with regard to sub-Saharan Africa significantly downgraded, and the West is only slowly rebuilding that capacity. One, therefore, has reason to believe that in the absence of both reliable intelligence on Africa and strong partnerships with African partner services, the West currently might not be in a position to strengthen the operational capabilities of African intelligence services.

But intelligence services differ in one important respect from armies. By their very nature, they are active services—more so than their army counterparts during peacetime. Apart from that, the work of intelligence officials requires a certain distance from politicians and political decision makers for various reasons. On the one hand, they must work partly under covert circumstances, which requires a certain isolation. On the other hand, because political decision makers are not subject to the same scrutiny as intelligence officials, close relationships run the risk of compromising the covert nature of intelligence work. A challenge to civil oversight, this distance renders SSR efforts particularly difficult. Ideally, intelligence services operate under the leadership of some sort of executive au-

thority that, in turn, must report to independent legislative bodies of the state (in democracies, most often a parliamentary oversight committee). In these settings, intelligence services must regularly account for their activities, and the oversight committee must have the power to demand any information it sees fit to implement its oversight function, including the right to issue subpoenas. However, even in fully established democracies, this arrangement is by no means always certain, and security establishments can still exert influence on politics. As Nicole Ball asked in the 1980s, just how much influence is “normal”?<sup>14</sup> Oftentimes one can detect problems with oversight and the implementation of civilian superiority only indirectly—in sub-Saharan Africa, perhaps the most apparent being the extent of control over and public accountability for the financing of intelligence services. Since intelligence services by necessity operate in secretive ways, civilian oversight is harder to implement than in other areas of the security sector, indicating the twin challenges that intelligence presents to SSR. That is, on the one hand, the necessity for efficient intelligence has particular relevance in countries that can apply only limited financial resources (as many times is the case in countries undertaking SSR) and therefore require the use of secret measures. On the other hand, this scenario makes effective civilian oversight all the more important.

Lastly, in implementing counterterrorism measures, intelligence services need to act simultaneously in a deterritorialised, desegregated, and cohesive manner. At the same time, the number of institutional security services has grown on nearly all levels, whether national, federal, or regional. The growing number

of agencies as well as the need to cooperate and at times move beyond the boundary of operational culture therefore constitutes a particularly daunting challenge to the services. But even if they manage these relations rather efficiently, democratic oversight bodies face the task of controlling activities that are becoming ever more complex and sophisticated. The number of agencies and interagency relationships requires efficient oversight bodies. However, these bodies cannot expand in the same way intelligence agencies can, nor can they monitor all interagency communications and linkages, whether within the country or between foreign agencies. Usually based as parliamentary committees, oversight bodies cannot increase in number and cannot have more parliamentarians or staffers allocated to them. Moreover, an expanding system of intelligence and security sectors may require experienced parliamentarians in the oversight committees, but in democracies one always sees some fresh faces in committees. In sub-Saharan Africa, where many democracies have been established only recently, following either the end of the Cold War or civil wars, experienced parliamentarians willing to apply and capable of applying the full spectrum of oversight are in short supply. On top of all that, one must consider the institutional history: some agencies may have come under close scrutiny, perhaps following a need felt in parliament to do so or in the wake of some sort of scandal. Such strict monitoring might not apply to different and recently established agencies, even though they engage in the same activities, simply because of their newness and because politicians have not yet felt the need to establish the same sort of scrutiny.

## Conclusions

Intelligence services are perhaps the least studied instrument of the state's security apparatus in sub-Saharan Africa. SSR in the area of intelligence services ultimately aims to detach those services from political abuse and at the same time strengthen executive and legislative control over them. The challenge, therefore, really lies in overcoming historically grown civil-intelligence relations that focused on regime security and replacing them with relations characterised by stronger ties between oversight committees and intelligence leadership, at the same time ensuring that the services focus on state rather than regime security. Typically, any intelligence service recommends bolstering operational capabilities and putting more analysts in the field.<sup>15</sup> However, for the foreseeable future, many sub-Saharan African countries cannot commit more resources to intelligence, particularly when the recipient states themselves will hold ownership in the aid process. Therefore, clear and specific legislation detailing mandates and fields of operations is as important as the adherence to general principles of civilian control. Moreover, despite scarce resources, security services should be financed by the state only and should have no access to any other monetary sources. Parliaments will need to extend control from oversight of the forces to allocation, weapons procurement, and definition of the rules of intelligence engagement—a challenging task. For outside powers, it is hard to offer help in establishing oversight over intelligence agencies.

Improving capabilities, an important issue in the sub-Saharan Africa context, also represents a question of national security to the Western world. Ever since radical Islamists began challenging the

state in northern Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia, partner agencies have needed capabilities in preemptive intelligence and counterintelligence. States should avoid situations such as the one in Pakistan, where Inter-Services Intelligence is reluctant to cut ties it has nurtured with the Taliban and fight them although they have clearly begun to pose a threat to the state. Strong capabilities of partner services in Nigeria and Eastern Africa are therefore in the best interests of the West.<sup>16</sup> As the Gambian case illustrates, some services exist for the sole purpose of enhancing regime security; consequently, reforming their structures and capabilities will pose a particularly difficult challenge. In such cases, SSR needs to change the way of anticipating threats.

Further research also needs to examine more closely the differences in structure, style, and methods between Western and sub-Saharan African intelligence services. Nearly all developing countries are reforming their security sectors and intelligence services anyway; in recent years, the donor agenda simply overruled these efforts. In this context, sequencing becomes first and foremost a question of where to pick up local reform efforts. Additionally, the fact that most donors still develop their own approaches to SSR catalyses the neglect of SSR efforts in recipient countries and often leads to contradicting donor agendas—creating a specific burden. Moreover, since SSR programmes are relatively new and, in most cases, still in the initial stage of the implementation process, the withdrawal of donors adds a relatively recent challenge that also lends more importance to the question of sustainability. Overall, reform efforts have neglected intelligence and failed to place sufficient emphasis on the training of parliamentarians; moreover, knowledge of intelligence services in sub-Saharan Africa is too thinly spread. As SSR



in sub-Saharan Africa turns into a policy priority of the West and its development assistance, a need exists for more research

into oversight enforcement in Africa and the characteristics of African intelligence services. □

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# Moving toward Democracy in Morocco?

JOHN HURSH\*

*The Arabs, according to international surveys, have the greatest thirst for freedom and are the most appreciative of democracy out of all people in the world.*

—Dr. Rima Khalaf  
United Nations Assistant Secretary-General  
Director of the Regional Bureau for Arab States

*[Arab] regimes have been too resistant to political change and [Arab] democracy movements too feeble to force it.*

—Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic*

Morocco's advantageous geographical location in large part defines its historical importance in world affairs.<sup>1</sup> Bordering the North Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, it has long been an important site for trade and commerce. Historically, commentators have regarded Morocco as the link between Africa and Europe, Islam and Christianity. Although such a simplistic dichotomy is no longer accurate—and, indeed, probably never was—Morocco remains a country of great cultural, social, and religious complexity, a fact that raises important questions regarding its future identity. Prof. Bradford Dillman asks,

As Morocco redefines its place in the world in the new millennium, will it lean more toward Europe, weakening its roots in the Arab world and disassociating itself from the troubles of sub-Saharan Africa? Globalization will pull the country toward its liberal, industrialized neigh-

bors across the Strait of Gibraltar. Nevertheless, this kingdom at the crossroads of many civilizations will continue to orient itself in many directions at the same time. Its future identity will depend on how politicians and citizens respond to global pressures for democratization, economic reform, and human resource development.<sup>2</sup>

As Dillman suggests, Morocco remains at the crossroads of European, Arab, and African policies, traditions, and thought. Given its almost entirely Muslim population, the country has a strongly Islamic identity.<sup>3</sup> Still, European colonialism and a distinct North African culture exert a strong and diverse cultural and social influence on that identity. The influence of the Berbers remains particularly strong, insofar as they account for about 35 percent of the Moroccan population.<sup>4</sup> In addition, the linguistic and cultural influence of the Berbers on Moroccan society—especially through music and dance—is well known.<sup>5</sup>

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\*The author is a JD candidate at the Indiana University–Bloomington School of Law and an MPA candidate at the Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs.

Morocco serves not only as an important cultural link but also as a significant political and economic link between Africa and Europe. In addition to its role as an African-European crossroad, Morocco enjoys a reputation as a moderate Islamic state. Perhaps as a result, it also has a close relationship with the United States, both as a political ally and as a trading partner. Politically, Morocco was the first Arab and Islamic state to condemn the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States.<sup>6</sup> As trading partners, Morocco and the United States exchanged approximately \$860 million worth of goods and services in 2003, before the countries signed a free trade agreement on 15 June 2004.<sup>7</sup> In a press release pertaining to this agreement, US congressional representative Bill Thomas stated that "Morocco is an important U.S. ally, and this agreement will enhance the economic component of that relationship and support Moroccan economic reforms."<sup>8</sup>

This article assesses the likelihood of Morocco's transition from a monarchy to a democratic state. Toward that end, it discusses recent liberal reforms and the threat of terrorism within Morocco as well as political and social changes that resulted from actions of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) and from reforms to the Moudawana (Code of Personal Status). Moreover, the article examines the historical context of the Algerian scenario, inquiring whether Morocco might experience its own version of this scenario and whether the results of the 2007 Moroccan parliamentary elections demonstrate a deepening rift between the monarchy and the Moroccan people. Finally, it addresses the mixed results that King Mohammed VI's liberal reforms have had on Morocco's political and social discourse, as well as the impor-

tance of internally rather than externally imposed reform.

## Moving toward Democracy?

Yet it is already clear that governments in the Middle East will have to cultivate compromise—now, or very soon—to survive in any form. Initiating action on three controversial issues—political prisoners, women's rights, and political Islam—can start the process. Cooperation will signal intent to change. It will require ceding some political power. And it will redefine the social contract between ruler and ruled. . . .

Morocco is the only country that has attempted action on all three.<sup>9</sup>

### *Liberalizing Morocco's Government*

Currently, Morocco is a constitutional monarchy, but it could realistically change to a democratic government and society. The timeframe for such a transition remains less clear.<sup>10</sup> King Mohammed VI, who assumed the Moroccan throne in 1999, wasted little time launching a "relatively ambitious program of political and social reforms," including the establishment of the IER.<sup>11</sup>

Since assuming the throne, King Mohammed VI has made several important reforms designed to liberalize Morocco, the two most important institutional actions being creation of the IER and changes to the Moudawana. Mohammed VI created the IER to investigate and research violations of human rights in Morocco from 1956, when the country gained independence from France and Spain, until 1999, when King Hassan II died and Mohammed VI assumed power.<sup>12</sup> The IER primarily addressed violations that occurred within the *Zaman al-Rusas* (Years of Lead), a period of civil unrest, political violence, and severe government repression beginning in the 1960s and

ending in the 1980s.<sup>13</sup> Any attempt to improve women's rights in Morocco would necessarily require a change to the Moudawana, the set of laws that deal with personal status, family, and inheritance.<sup>14</sup> These two institutional reforms are essential to Morocco's potential transition to a democratic state because they address past abuses of human rights and matters of state repression, thus allowing for reconciliation and the establishment of trust in state authorities. Moreover, they lend legitimacy to women's participation in the country's social, civil, and political life.

In Morocco, recent interaction between the state and society has led to improved human rights and fewer restrictions on women. No assessment of these improvements should underestimate the actions of Mohammed VI, who, after gaining the throne, made bold moves to improve human rights, such as asking longtime political dissident Driss Benzekri to lead the IER.<sup>15</sup> Although creation of the IER largely moved from the state to society, changes to the Moudawana moved largely from society to the state. Grass-roots women's rights organizations and social activists successfully brought women's rights to mainstream social and political thought by deftly maneuvering around religious obstacles, arguing that increased women's rights accord with Islamic principles.

Currently, Morocco's potential transition to democracy depends almost entirely on King Mohammed VI since no political opposition can significantly challenge the monarchy's authority or threaten its power. Democratic transition will take place on the king's terms. If the monarchy continues, a ruler less inclined to Mohammed VI's liberal reforms could obviously undo these changes although he would likely encounter strong opposition. In addition, commentators criticize

the IER and Moudawana reforms for failing to push far or hard enough for change. Perhaps more importantly, some commentators argue that these are reforms in name only, alleging that political and social conditions within Morocco have not changed appreciably and that the rhetoric of reform takes precedence over the substance of reform.

### *The Threat of Terrorism*

Many observers have stressed the challenge that terrorism presents to democracy, particularly within the Middle East.<sup>16</sup> Arguably, Nafia Nouredine, founder of *Jamaa Islamiya Moukatila Maghreb* (the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, or GICM), represents one unlikely example of Morocco's successful reform.<sup>17</sup> GICM has a strong affiliation with al-Qaeda, having received both military training and financial support from Osama bin Laden.<sup>18</sup> The United Nations (UN), United States, and United Kingdom consider GICM a dangerous terrorist organization. On 10 October 2002, the UN issued a worldwide ban on the group pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1267.<sup>19</sup> That same year, the US Department of State designated GICM a foreign terrorist organization.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, under the United Kingdom's Terrorism Act of 2000, GICM membership may result in a 10-year prison sentence.<sup>21</sup>

Authorities blamed GICM for bombings in Casablanca in 2003 that targeted a Jewish community center, a Spanish restaurant and social club, a hotel, and the Belgian consulate, killing at least 41 people and injuring about 100 more, and for railway bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004 that killed 191 people and wounded another 1,841.<sup>22</sup> The events that occurred after these tragic reminders of the destructive power of terrorism illus-

trate several encouraging aspects of Moroccan society. First, the fact that Nouredine stood trial, was convicted, and is serving a 20-year prison sentence in Morocco for his involvement in the Casablanca bombings shows that Morocco is a secure state with a working judiciary.<sup>23</sup> Working with Moroccan officials, the Algerian authorities did not simply capture and kill Nouredine. Likewise, Tamara Wittes characterizes Morocco's domestic security services as "efficient," perhaps because they are "flush with U.S. funding and training."<sup>24</sup> Importantly, Morocco's security does not come at such a high price that it threatens civil society. Despite the devastation of the Casablanca bombings, Moroccan citizens resumed normal life relatively soon.

Second, immediately following the Casablanca bombings, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said that Morocco "stands out in the Arab world as a country that is making significant strides towards democracy and I think the terrorists are opposed to progress."<sup>25</sup> Even though his statement is somewhat self-serving, given the Bush administration's reliance on Morocco in its "war on terror," it demonstrates a different expectation for Morocco than for other Arab states. As Wolfowitz suggests, Morocco "stands out" as an exception to the norm in the Middle East. The United States, or at least the Bush administration, expected a democratic transition to occur in Morocco. Terrorists, Wolfowitz asserts, also perceive this possibility and understand the threat that it poses to their organizations, both in Morocco and, perhaps, regionally. If other Arab states follow Morocco's lead, the terrorists may react accordingly.

Third, when Nouredine could not develop his terrorist organization in Morocco, he had to travel to Taliban-controlled

Afghanistan in 2001 and appeal to bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri for military and material support.<sup>26</sup> Although Nouredine succeeded in bringing substantial violence to Morocco and Spain, the fact that he could not plan and finance these attacks within Morocco is significant. The execution of terrorist attacks, prepared for and financed far from their target, is and will continue to be a threat to democracy and state security in the twenty-first century. Well-coordinated and mobilized terrorist networks and activities are highly problematic to democracy and state security. This is true, however, for all governments and all states, not just Morocco. More importantly, Nouredine's inability to find support within Morocco suggests both a rejection of GICM's philosophy and of terrorism as means of undermining civil society and political participation.

## Equity and Reconciliation Commission

In contrast to combating the violence that GICM, a nonstate actor, unleashed on Casablanca and Madrid, the IER sought to reconcile the Moroccan people with the violence that their government brought upon them between independence in 1956 and the end of King Hassan II's rule in 1999: "What is needed to turn states of a despotic whim into genuine nations of law? In Morocco, many reformers believe, an essential first step is an open reckoning with the abuses that this system spawned in the past. That effort shows the profound limits that real change faces even among Arab nations that have taken tangible steps toward political openness."<sup>27</sup> When the IER attempted to answer this profound political question, its members directly (and Moroccan citizens indirectly) experienced successes, set-

backs, and limitations as the commission moved from an ambitious beginning to a qualified, if not disappointing, conclusion.

Perhaps the most important step in establishing the rule of law and a democratic government within a formerly nondemocratic state is the recognition of past injustices. Without such recognition, finding reconciliation and establishing social trust between the state and its citizens become highly unlikely. The acknowledgment of past injustices—in this case, those perpetrated by his father and grandfather—motivated King Mohammed VI to create the IER. During a speech to commemorate the commission's opening in January 2004, he declared, "Our objective is to ensure that Moroccans reconcile themselves with their history."<sup>28</sup>

Mohammed VI modeled the IER after the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which addressed atrocities that occurred during apartheid.<sup>29</sup> Headed by former political prisoner Benzekri and 16 other such former prisoners or human rights activists, the IER investigated over 20,000 cases of human rights abuses.<sup>30</sup> Benzekri, whose appointment gave the commission credibility, clearly supported King Mohammed VI's objective of reconciliation: "To create a democratic society, people have to know the truth and their history. . . . The report marked a fundamental rupture with Morocco's past."<sup>31</sup> The benefits of the IER remain contested, but nearly all commentators agree on its importance as the first truth commission in North Africa or the Middle East: "No Arab government had ever confessed to widespread abuses, much less tried to investigate the past or reconcile with its victims."<sup>32</sup>

Interestingly, King Mohammed VI's support was perhaps both the greatest advantage and disadvantage to the IER. The commission would not exist without the king's approval and support since his

royal mandate allows it to act effectively: "Royal support means that public institutions and security forces are obliged to comply with all requests for information and assistance."<sup>33</sup> Accordingly, the commission received many, though presumably not all, of the answers to its questions: "To date, there has not been a single occasion when the IER has asked for information, that it has not received. The military and the police have been totally cooperative."<sup>34</sup>

Total cooperation seems unlikely, given the numerous criticisms of the commission, including its limited dissemination of state knowledge—probably the most damaging criticism. Without a complete commitment to establishing and telling the historical truth, it is very unlikely that reconciliation will occur. Indeed, as the commission's work progressed, Moroccans appeared to resign themselves to focusing on future prevention rather than past reconciliation: "Moroccans recognize that the past will not get a full airing. . . . 'Instead, we need guarantees that it won't happen in the future.'"<sup>35</sup> Attorney Mohammed Sebbar, who now heads the Forum for Justice and Truth, is less optimistic: "What we got is the truth decided and provided by the state."<sup>36</sup>

Even though a full disclosure of past wrongs almost certainly did not occur, the commission had its beneficial aspects, social catharsis perhaps the most significant of them. Indeed some commentators argue that the state broadcast of the initial IER hearings on national television created a historical moment in which Moroccans attempted to move forward, letting go of the past.<sup>37</sup> Still, "despite its difficult nature, few doubt the cathartic benefits of airing grievances in such a public manner. However, some human rights organizations accuse the IER of stopping short of justice for its victims."<sup>38</sup> Certainly, hu-

man rights organizations should criticize the IER, but one could argue that, despite the failure to bring justice to each victim, the larger social cathartic function of these public hearings somewhat mitigates the shortcomings of individual justice. It is also important to note that in any post-conflict state or democratic transition that involved large-scale human rights abuses, some victims never receive the justice they seek. Although unfortunate, this reality suggests that some justice is better than none.

In any case, the IER suffers from additional shortcomings. For example, not only were former detainees unable to state the names of those responsible for their torture but also the commission lacked the power to prosecute the perpetrators.<sup>39</sup> However, it did not grant amnesty to them, unlike the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Thus, in theory at least, victims or their families could prosecute the perpetrators in court.<sup>40</sup>

The much more damaging criticism occurred after the IER made its final report to King Mohammed VI. Following the bombings in Casablanca, human rights activists alleged that unlawful detention and torture continued: "The IER is looking at violations up until 1999 but violations are still continuing; the security forces have been taking Islamists to the detention center in Temara and torturing them. It is all continuing."<sup>41</sup> There is perhaps no better way to invalidate a reconciliation commission than to resume the illegal practices and human rights abuses that prompted its creation in the first place. Unfortunately, according to various human rights organizations and social activists, this is exactly what happened.

Reparations also presented mixed results. Unlike the IER, financial reparations mark a carryover from King Hassan II's rule. In 1990 Hassan II created the

Consultative Council on Human Rights to resolve human rights abuses.<sup>42</sup> After his predecessor's death, King Mohammed VI created an arbitration board through the consultative council that distributed more than \$100 million for nearly 4,000 cases of such abuses.<sup>43</sup> Even though this substantial financial compensation seemed a sincere commitment to improving human rights, "the Independent Arbitration Panel in particular set an extremely short deadline for applications, cutting off thousands of people, and paid monetary damages to victims or their families without any concern for reconciliation."<sup>44</sup> In comparison, about 13,000 victims were to receive financial reparations through the IER, which also used a relatively short deadline but did emphasize reconciliation.<sup>45</sup>

Perhaps more than anything, the commission reflects a missed or half-grasped opportunity for Morocco. Certainly, it improved human rights as well as political and social discourse within Morocco: "Activists describe the gradual evaporation of the climate of fear as perhaps the biggest shift in Morocco."<sup>46</sup> Despite these changes for the better, reforms could have pushed further and involved less compromise had the Moroccan government been more forthcoming with state knowledge and more resistant to returning to repressive measures following the Casablanca bombings.

In 2005 Charles Kenney and Dean Spears found a significant statistical relationship between truth commissions and lasting democracy: "This study finds that there is evidence for lasting positive effects of truth commissions on [all] levels of democracy."<sup>47</sup> Despite the fact that the study applies only to South America and that the statistical significance, though valid, is small, its findings are encouraging for Morocco. In fact, the authors conclude with a note of careful optimism: "If the statistical effects of truth commissions

are positive but fragile it is perhaps because the real effects of truth commissions on democracy are positive but fragile—significant but operating among many other factors mediated by variable contexts. This would encourage optimistic but realistic hopes for the impact of truth commissions on democracy.”<sup>48</sup>

Given Morocco’s compromised truth and reconciliation commission and the resumption of human rights abuses as soon as the state faced a security crisis, the first Arab truth and reconciliation commission did not completely meet the initially optimistic expectations. Still, simply having a legitimate, if not ideal, reconciliation commission represents a significant step toward liberal reform and possible democratic transition within Morocco and perhaps the region.

### Reforming the Moudawana

The IER received substantial international attention, but “of the changes carried out by Mohammed, perhaps the most significant is the family law code [Moudawana].”<sup>49</sup> King Mohammed VI did not make these changes by himself. As Robin Wright points out, numerous women and some men of diverse backgrounds campaigned, protested, and lobbied for generations to change the Moudawana.<sup>50</sup> Women had a greater stake in this issue, as illustrated by the social and political movements: “Women’s organizations in particular played a key role not only in generating support for the reformed *Mudawwana*, but also in lobbying for changes in the nationality law (so that women could transmit citizenship to their children) and a gender quota for women in parliament.”<sup>51</sup> Wittes recognizes the significance of reforming the Moudawana, stating that the recent changes have “vastly improved the legal status of women.”<sup>52</sup>

Before the Moudawana underwent reform, women remained minors throughout their entire lifetimes. This code of laws effectively classified women as second-class citizens—always subject to the control of men. Even a woman’s son was her legal guardian.<sup>53</sup> Wright argues that the Moudawana “relegated females to haremlike status” and that it has been the “biggest legal impediment to empowering women.”<sup>54</sup>

Significant changes to the Moudawana include increased women’s rights in marriage, divorce, and citizenship, as well as in child custody and inheritance.<sup>55</sup> Political parties also agreed to reserve spots on a special national parliamentary ballot for women.<sup>56</sup> The reforms allow women both greater personal and political rights. Problems remain, but the improvement is quite significant: “Despite continuing problems of implementation—such as untrained judges and a lack of information among women about their rights—the scope of the reform is considerable and puts Morocco well ahead of other countries in the region on the issue of women’s rights.”<sup>57</sup>

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Moudawana reform involved political Islamic groups’ promotion of democratic change and the near-universal approval they received for doing so—particularly from the United States and Europe. US and European leaders and policy makers would do well to remember the ability of these groups to promote liberal reform and democratic change. Unfortunately, as the next part of this article demonstrates, these leaders and policy makers seldom do.

### The Algerian Scenario

The “Algerian scenario” refers to Algeria’s failed attempt to democratize its government in the early 1990s. Fearing a



democratically elected Islamist government, Algerian authorities halted the country's democratic transition, resulting in a brutal civil conflict that claimed more than 150,000 lives. Autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa consistently return to this scenario and remind oil-hungry industrialized countries of this possible outcome, lest these states push too hard for meaningful democratic reform. Although a true Algerian scenario has never occurred, and the logic of this scenario remains dubious, the scenario has nonetheless prevailed as an effective tool for autocratic regimes to retain power.

### *Historical Context*

In 1989 Algeria suffered from an unprecedented economic crisis, which, combined with basic shortcomings in governance, threatened the ruling regime's existence.<sup>58</sup> Seeking to regain political legitimacy, the Algerian government opened the political system to virtually unhampered democratic reform.<sup>59</sup> The result confounded the expectations of Algeria's ruling elite. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) utilized the democratic process to win broad support from the largely dissatisfied Algerian population.<sup>60</sup> In 1991, after a successful first round of legislative elections, the FIS stood ready to claim a landslide victory of the state's electorate.<sup>61</sup> The second election never took place due to the Algerian Army's intervention.<sup>62</sup>

Following that intervention, the besieged Algerian government reinstalled authoritarian rule, banning FIS and imprisoning many of its members.<sup>63</sup> Rather than accept this defeat, the remaining members of FIS took arms against the Algerian government. The war that followed claimed more than 150,000 casualties and "was characterized by unspeakable brutality."<sup>64</sup> From this conflict, autocratic Arab

states and oil-conscious Western states learned that unleashing democracy within the Middle East and North Africa would not produce desirable political results: "The Algerian failure at democratization and its descent into civil war provided a number of lessons for political actors outside the country and later came to be known as the 'Algerian scenario'—a scenario which was to be avoided at all costs."<sup>65</sup>

Ruling autocratic regimes now argue that allowing truly open political systems will backfire and that unfettered democracy will allow fundamentalists with no real interest in democracy to seize power, doing so, ironically, by winning an election. As a result, typically repressive states that oppose Islamist groups—those endorsing political Islam—simply eliminate or marginalize them within political discourse. Thus, the proclaimed fear of another Algerian scenario allows autocratic states to repress Islamist groups. Numerous contemporary scholars, such as Francesco Cavatorta, have strongly criticized this scenario:

Twenty years ago, Algeria attempted to democratise and it failed to consolidate its progress because an Islamist party was going to be the main beneficiary of regime change. Secular sectors of the domestic polity and the international community sanctioned a "democracy-saving" military coup. The outcome of the Army's intervention has been a brutal civil war and a legacy of authoritarian rule where the socio-economic and cultural situation that gave rise to the FIS is still very much alive.<sup>66</sup>

Strikingly, the Algerian scenario remains a powerful political lesson to many Arabs and Westerners even though the scenario has *never* occurred. Further, despite the numerous theoretical flaws and questionable assumptions inherent in this political conceptualization, autocratic Arab governments continue to justify their rule

and nondemocratic policies by appealing to the Algerian scenario.

The uncritical acceptance of this scenario hinders true democratic reform. First, accepting it allows for simple dismissal of all Islamist groups, including those with liberal and democratic beliefs, thus collapsing the ideologies of violent militants with the peaceful ideologies of democratically minded reformists. Second, Islamist groups will not simply disappear; eventually, they must be included in political discourse and policy discussions. It is a mistake to marginalize these groups now.

Wittes argues forcefully that the Bush administration made this very mistake: "The Bush administration's failure to overcome the legacy of Algeria and to develop a more sophisticated relationship with the region's varied Islamist movements severely hampered the effectiveness and indeed the basic credibility of its democracy push."<sup>67</sup> This article returns to this point during its discussion of the necessity of internal liberal reform versus externally imposed reform in "The Importance of Internal Reform," below. It is reasonable, however, to assume that the Bush administration applied a version of the Algerian scenario when it decided to invade Iraq in 2003. Many commentators argue that, despite initially displaying signs of avoiding this scenario, the Obama administration is currently repeating this mistake. Tariq Ali is particularly critical, characterizing Obama's foreign policy as "imperialism with a human face."<sup>68</sup>

#### *Will Morocco Experience an Algerian Scenario?*

Despite King Mohammed VI's liberal reforms, recent developments suggest that the Moroccan people are ready for democracy. Political participation in Morocco is declining, largely due to the perception that politics are ultimately what

the king wishes, thus making participation a meaningless gesture. In this sense, liberal reform within a constitutional monarchy may have reached its limit. Whether this impasse means that Morocco will endure its own Algerian scenario remains to be seen.

After assuming the throne, Mohammed VI significantly increased the avenues of political participation, including loosening the state's control of the press and opening registration for political parties.<sup>69</sup> Recent restrictions on the press and the intimidation of journalists suggest that these actions might not be permanent. Moreover, such restrictions and intimidation undermine the already limited ability of Moroccan citizens to voice meaningful political and social criticism, inviting comparisons to the Algerian scenario.

Wittes argues that within Arab states, political debate often dissolves into polarized rhetoric between autocratic governments and political Islamist groups because of the built-in advantage that the latter enjoy.<sup>70</sup> The fact that Islamist groups can voice political dissent within the mosque affords them both a guaranteed audience and a relatively secure venue to speak. Secular groups, who do not enjoy these advantages, can be more closely monitored and more easily restricted. For example, autocratic states may successfully restrict secular political dissent by closing the organization's press or simply by banning the organization or its activities. In contrast, autocratic governments have only limited ability to control dissent within the mosque, thereby allowing Islamist groups to occupy a "privileged position" within political and social discourse.<sup>71</sup> Furthermore, the monopolization of political dissent allows Islamism to stand as a "catchall category for political dissent."<sup>72</sup> Islamist groups do not need to create a meaningful political message.

Instead, Islamism becomes an undifferentiated resistance to often unpopular autocratic governments.

Although it is not possible to disregard King Mohammed VI's recent restrictions on the press, some social factors suggest that Morocco might avoid the Algerian problem. *Al-'Adl wa al-Ihsan* (Justice and Benevolence), the leading Islamist social movement in Morocco, refuses to participate in elections but maintains a large popular following.<sup>73</sup> In contrast to the leaders of Islamist organizations in other Arab states, those of *Al-'Adl wa al-Ihsan* advocate a very moderate version of Islam, as well as inclusive democratic participation: "Leaders of the current Moroccan religious movement, *al-'Adl wa al-Ihsan* . . . discard an exclusive understanding of Islam, rely on interpretation and historicizing, and acknowledge flexibility and ambiguity; they reject imposing Shari'a laws or the wearing of the *hijab* and endorse human rights, pluralism, democracy, and separation of powers" (*italics in original*).<sup>74</sup> The liberal views of the most popular Islamist group within Morocco suggest that the usual polarization between autocratic state and political Islamist organization will not occur in that country. Granted, the motivations and goals of both states and social organizations change—sometimes rapidly—and the unlikelihood of a confrontation between the monarchy and Islamist organizations does not mean that one will not occur.

Further complicating the predication of a Moroccan version of the Algerian scenario is Morocco's contradictory and volatile past. During King Hassan II's rule from 1961 to 1999, the country experienced severe repression and political violence, including political killings, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, torture, the operation of secret prisons, the shutdown of newspapers, and the banning of books.<sup>75</sup> During the

1980s, labor movements experienced numerous political successes in Morocco despite severe state repression.<sup>76</sup> For instance, Moroccan labor unions successfully delayed implementation of the International Monetary Fund's recommended structural adjustment programs by creating widespread popular resistance to them.<sup>77</sup> Finally, due to its complex social, cultural, and political past, Morocco defies expectations of conflict: "Morocco also has a history of peaceful pluralism so firm that the population still includes several thousand Jews, who enjoy genuine freedom of worship and close ties to Israel."<sup>78</sup>

### *The 2007 Moroccan Parliamentary Elections*

In large part, the restrictions on the press and intimidation of journalists discussed above occurred leading up to and during the 2007 Moroccan parliamentary elections.<sup>79</sup> The political protest and dissent surrounding those elections suggest not only a growing rift between the government and the Moroccan people but also a strong link between restricting free speech and a general decline in political participation.

This link might be symptomatic of a larger underlying problem within Moroccan society. One of the most troubling aspects of Morocco's current political situation is that the monarchy overshadows Parliament to the point that political participation becomes a substantially marginalized activity. Regardless of Parliament's actions or the people's will expressed through parliamentary voting, the king still makes the final decision.<sup>80</sup>

The fact that only 37 percent of registered voters took part in the 2007 parliamentary elections suggests that Moroccans are growing tired of this political situation.<sup>81</sup> Further, of those voters, nearly one-fifth intentionally invalidated their ballots

in political protest, including writing anti-monarchy statements on the ballots.<sup>82</sup>

Wittes is especially critical of King Mohammed VI's government regarding the parliamentary elections, suggesting that the political protest indicates the monarchy's limited ability both to retain social and political control and to liberalize Moroccan society: "This act of political protest suggests that limited liberalization, even in the best of circumstances, has a limited life span with frustrated citizens."<sup>83</sup> Moreover, she links the failure of free speech to the failure of meaningful political debate: "If the king is ever to be expected to acknowledge the need for reforms meaningful enough to engage citizen participation in politics, the quality of public discussion must improve—and press freedom will be essential to that process."<sup>84</sup> Wittes's analysis suggests that the Moroccan people may be closer to demanding democracy than many commentators think. Whether such a demand for democracy would cause King Mohammed VI to invoke the Algerian scenario remains unknown.

### Mixed Results

Assessing King Mohammed's liberal reforms provides both cause for concern and cause for optimism. Of course, Morocco remains a monarchy and likely will remain as such for some time. Although he does not provide his citizens with democracy, King Mohammed has a commitment to civil and social reform that remains noteworthy and important. Moreover, the relative success of these liberal reforms affirms the necessity of internal reform, as opposed to externally imposed reform. Indeed, Moroccans enjoy expanded civil and social rights due to top-down and bottom-up reform from within Morocco, not externally imposed reform from beyond its borders.

### *Taking the Good with the Bad*

Despite the encouraging actions that Mohammed VI has taken in moving Morocco toward becoming a liberal state, it remains a constitutional monarchy and in all likelihood will remain one in the future—an unsurprising conclusion, given Morocco's long history as a monarchy.<sup>85</sup> Moreover, the king shows no signs of relinquishing power: "King Mohammed, who is 42 [now 47], is seen as far more concerned with humanitarian issues [than King Hassan II], yet not once since assuming the throne in 1999 has he ever suggested diluting his role."<sup>86</sup> Even though Morocco's transition to a democratic state remains unlikely in the short term, the reforms made by King Mohammed VI should not be overlooked. Morocco remains a relatively free and secure society, if not a democratic one.

The importance of Mohammed VI's civil and political reforms perhaps becomes more evident when one examines the civil and political societies of Morocco's Arab neighbors—Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.<sup>87</sup> In 2007 the US Department of State concluded that

Morocco implemented significant measures during the year which resulted in the advancement of human rights, including the government's revision of the Nationality Code to permit Muslim women to transmit citizenship to children and its publishing of domestic violence statistics. In September an overall civic commitment to developing a culture of human rights was reflected in parliamentary elections which were monitored by domestic and international groups.<sup>88</sup>

Interestingly, the Department of State's characterization of the 2007 parliamentary elections differs strikingly from Wittes's stinging critique. Perhaps the key point is that Morocco likely will remain a monarchy for at least the near future, but King Mohammed VI's commitment to human rights is laudable, if not ideal. Criti-

cism is certainly appropriate, but it is too early to label King Mohammed VI's Morocco either a success or a failure.

### *The Importance of Internal Reform*

Although the limitations to implementing democracy in Morocco's constitutional monarchy are readily apparent, one must remember that the successful civil and political reforms of King Mohammed VI and his government came from within Morocco. Top-down institutional changes implemented by the king—combined with bottom-up calls for reform by various Moroccan social and political activists, intellectuals, and commentators, as well as a diverse network of nongovernmental organizations—created meaningful liberal reform.

Morocco provides an important, if sometimes ignored, lesson for implementing such reform in the Middle East and North Africa. Meaningful reform must come from within the state. Externally imposed reforms, democratic or otherwise, that lack legitimacy fail to garner the support of the people that the reforms intend to help. Even the best-intentioned externally imposed reforms cannot offset this lack of legitimacy and public credibility.

Contemporary Iraq represents perhaps the starkest reminder of the failure to implement external democratic reform on an Arab state. Tom Hayden terms this failed policy "democracy at gunpoint."<sup>89</sup> Similarly, Asef Bayat refers to the external imposition of democracy on Iraq as "democracy by conquest."<sup>90</sup> Bayat notes that foreign intervention in the name of democratic change not only has failed as an effective policy but also has often proved counterproductive: "If anything, foreign intervention in the Middle East has historically worked against, and not for, democratic governance."<sup>91</sup> He also ob-

serves that this phenomenon is not limited to the Middle East—that imposed democracies also have failed in the Philippines and Korea.<sup>92</sup>

Among the numerous ways to demonstrate the failure of the Bush administration's plan to democratize Iraq following the removal of Saddam Hussein, the most obvious is the number of civilian casualties resulting from that effort—currently (as of June 2010) between 96,813 and 105,563.<sup>93</sup> Moreover, many people doubt that a secure, democratic Iraq will arise or endure in the future. Instead, Wright argues that since the beginning of the war there in 2003, terrorism has become a greater threat, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has increased, Iraq has become less stable, the war appears unwinnable, and regional sectarian violence threatens to undermine the stability of other Middle Eastern states.<sup>94</sup> In addition, she maintains that US influence is at its lowest point in the region since immediately following World War II.<sup>95</sup> Finally, she declares that the Bush administration's failed attempt to implement democracy in Iraq has greatly reduced legitimate grassroots democracy's chance to take root: "The complete failure in Iraq . . . will only keep other regimes in power longer."<sup>96</sup> Obviously, some of Wright's criticisms seem tempered by recent developments in Iraq, especially after President Bush's largely successful troop surge in 2007 and the still inconclusive national elections of 2010. Moreover, the Obama administration's decision to shift the focus of US foreign policy to Afghanistan also complicates this assessment. The situation in Iraq is not nearly as stark as it was in 2007, but no one can say whether democracy will take root and flourish.

## Conclusion

True to its history, Morocco continues to present complex social and political questions that evade simple resolution. Morocco is and likely will remain a constitutional monarchy. Still, significant areas of social and political freedom exist within the monarchy. Islamism, a social and political force often criticized for supposedly working against liberal reform and the implementation of democratic government, is moderate and encouraging of recent liberal reforms in Morocco. Indeed, according to Wittes, "If Islamism and democracy can ever be proved compatible, it might well be in Morocco."<sup>97</sup> Morocco does seem to rest at a crossroads, poised to transition into a democratic state or to backslide into a repressive autocratic state. Perhaps because of its improved record in human rights and relatively successful civil and political reforms, Morocco stands out from other Arab states in another respect. Specifically, Moroccans generally approve of their government, albeit with some severe reservations—as the political dissent over the 2007 parliamentary elections demonstrated. Accordingly, they face a difficult decision.

A strong and immediate push toward full-fledged democracy may not be likely, but maintaining the status quo also seems unlikely. Of course, this situation might change rapidly. King Mohammed VI is a respected leader working to reform Morocco's civil and political societies and expand human rights, but he will not always be king. Obviously, this is the fundamental problem of any monarchical system of governance—no matter the popularity, success, or political acumen of the current ruler, a less popular, less successful, or less gifted leader may always follow. Thus, King Mohammed VI would be well advised to institutionalize the positive reforms that he has made.

Other commentators take a more critical position: "Ultimately, despite its progress, Moroccan democracy remains a shadow game: democratic institutions have little substantive authority, and citizens' preferences, as expressed at the ballot box, rarely have much effect on government policy."<sup>98</sup> In this sense, Morocco remains a government of the king's sovereign voice rather than a government of "We the People." □

## Notes

1. "Morocco's strategic location has shaped its history." See "Background Note: Morocco," US Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 26 January 2010, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm>.

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3. "Background Note: Morocco."

4. James Stuart Olson, *The Peoples of Africa: An Ethno-historical Dictionary* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 90–91.

5. See Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Contested Identities: Berbers, 'Berberism,' and the State in North Africa," in

*Middle Eastern Minorities and Diasporas*, ed. Moshe Ma'oz and Gabriel Sheffer (Brighton, England: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), 153; and "The Berbers," *An Open Door to the Arab World*, 12 January 2010, <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/background/berber.htm>.

6. "Background Note: Morocco."

7. House, *Implementation of the United States–Morocco Free Trade Agreement*, Hearing before the Committee on Ways and Means, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 7 July 2004, <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS64776>.

8. "[Cong. Bill] Thomas Announces Hearing on Implementation of the United States–Morocco Free Trade Agreement," press release, US House Committee

on Ways and Means, 25 June 2004, <http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/108h/99669.txt>.

9. Robin Wright, *Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 341.

10. Statement of Driss Benzekri, former Moroccan political prisoner and president of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission: "There is a decision in Morocco to go ahead with democratization and reform, including separation of powers, but we are still debating a time frame and how to go about it." Ibid., 350.

11. Tamara Cofman Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March: America's Role in Building Arab Democracy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 72–73; and Wright, *Dreams and Shadows*, 343.

12. Wright, *Dreams and Shadows*, 343.

13. Ibid., 342.

14. Ibid., 366–67.

15. Ibid., 344.

16. See Gérard Soulier, "Terrorism\*," in *The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights: International Protection versus National Restrictions*, ed. Mireille Delmas-Marty, trans. and ed. Christine Chodkiewicz (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 15.

17. Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al-Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 279.

18. Ibid.

19. Security Council Resolution 1267, UN Doc. S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999); and Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, *The Consolidated List Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee with Respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and Other Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Associated with Them*, 4 June 2010, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml>.

20. US Department of State, "Determination Pursuant to Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 Relating to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)," *Federal Register* 67, no. 242 (12 December 2002): 77, 311, <http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/12/fr121702.html>; and US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/> (accessed 14 June 2010).

21. "The traditional primary objective of the GICM has been the installation of a governing system of the caliphate to replace the governing Moroccan monarchy. The group also has an Al Qai'da-inspired global extremist agenda." See "Proscribed Terrorist Groups," *Home Office*, <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/proscribed-terror-groups/proscribed-groups?view=Binary>. See also Terrorism Act, 2000, chap. 3, sec. 11 (United Kingdom), [http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga\\_20000011\\_en\\_2#pt2-pb2-1lg11](http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000011_en_2#pt2-pb2-1lg11).

22. "Terror Blasts Rock Casablanca," *BBC News*, 17 May 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3035803.stm>; and "Spain Names 'Bomb Suspect' Group," *BBC News*, 30 March 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3583113.stm>. According to Angel Acebes, Spanish interior minister, "Our investigation is focusing on two strands: determining the leaders of the organisation and

links to terrorist and fundamentalist groups, particularly the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group." "Spain Names 'Bomb Suspect' Group." See also "Madrid Train Attacks," *BBC News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457031/html/default.stm>.

23. "French Court Convicts 8 of Helping 2003 Casablanca Suicide Bombers," *International Herald Tribune*, 11 July 2007.

24. Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, 73.

25. "Terror Blasts Rock Casablanca."

26. Bergen, *Osama bin Laden I Know*, 279.

27. Neil MacFarquhar, "In Morocco, a Rights Movement, at the King's Pace," *New York Times*, 1 October 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/01/international/africa/01morocco.html?pagewanted=print>.

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29. Wright, *Dreams and Shadows*, 343.

30. Ibid., 344.

31. Ibid., 346.

32. Ibid., 344. See also MacFarquhar, "In Morocco": "The commission's public hearings . . . are without precedent in the Middle East"; and Montague, "Morocco's Truth Revealed," 59.

33. Montague, "Morocco's Truth Revealed," 61.

34. Ibid. See statement of IER commissioner Abdelhay Moudden.

35. MacFarquhar, "In Morocco." See statement of Prof. Muhammad Sassi, University of Rabat.

36. Wright, *Dreams and Shadows*, 348.

37. Montague, "Morocco's Truth Revealed," 62.

38. Ibid.

39. MacFarquhar, "In Morocco."

40. Montague, "Morocco's Truth Revealed," 63.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 61.

44. Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley, *Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition?* Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series, no. 71 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2006), 7–8, [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp71\\_ottaway\\_final.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp71_ottaway_final.pdf).

45. MacFarquhar, "In Morocco."

46. Ibid.

47. Charles D. Kenney and Dean E. Spears, *Truth and Consequences: Do Truth Commissions Promote Democratization?* (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 1–4 September 2005), 1, [http://www.allacademic.com/one/apsa/apsa05/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished\\_manuscript&file\\_index=2&pop\\_up=true&no\\_click\\_key=true&attachment\\_style=attachment&PHPSESID=da9387ac0151ea4082be5a9cd6cf7981](http://www.allacademic.com/one/apsa/apsa05/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESID=da9387ac0151ea4082be5a9cd6cf7981).

48. Ibid., 25.

49. MacFarquhar, "In Morocco."

50. Wright, *Dreams and Shadows*, 352–67.

51. Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco*, 20.

52. Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, 11.

53. Ibid.

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60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., 11.
67. Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, 24.
68. Derrick O'Keefe, "Tariq Ali on Obama: Imperialism with a Human Face," *rabble.ca*, 16 February 2009, <http://rabble.ca/news/interview-tariq>.
69. Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, 72–73.
70. Ibid., 105.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Nathan J. Brown et al., "Islamist Political Parties in Kuwait and Morocco," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27 February 2007, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=967>.
74. Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 189.
75. Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso, eds., *Beyond the Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 164.
76. Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic*, 197.
77. Ibid.
78. Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, 73.
79. Ibid., 107.
80. "Yet the entire system of law rests not on a framework of checks and balances, but on the whim of the king. Morocco's Constitution declares the king both sacred and the 'prince of the faithful.'" MacFarquhar, "In Morocco."
81. Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, 73.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., 73–74.
84. Ibid., 107.
85. "Monarchy dates back 1200 years in Morocco. The current Alouite dynasty dates back to the seventeenth century." Wright, *Dreams and Shadows*, 348.
86. MacFarquhar, "In Morocco."
87. "Morocco has moved further along the reform road than any of its Arab neighbors. Its press is vibrant and outspoken. A family law no longer treats women as chattel. Civic organizations can be formed with relative ease, and scores of them work on everything from improving prison conditions to lowering the country's abysmal illiteracy rate." Ibid.
88. US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Morocco," 11 March 2008, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100602.htm>.
89. Tom Hayden, *Ending the War in Iraq* (New York: Akashic Books, 2007), 214.
90. Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic*, 199.
91. Ibid.
92. "'Imposed democracies,' such as the Philippines and Korea, had plunged into dictatorship by the 1970s." Ibid., 198.
93. "Documented Civilian Deaths from Violence," *Iraq Body Count*, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>.
94. Wright, *Dreams and Shadows*, 416.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid., 417. See statement of Syrian political analyst Sami Moubayed.
97. Wittes, *Freedom's Unsteady March*, 73.
98. Ibid.





## Book Reviews

*Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa: Potentials and Challenges* edited by Omano Edigheji. Human Science Research Council Press, 2010, 326 pp., \$43.31.

*Evaluating Climate Change and Development*, World Bank Series on Development, vol. 8, edited by Rob D. van den Berg and Osvaldo Feinstein. Transaction Publishers, 2009, 438 pp., \$49.95.

The recent volcanic eruption in Iceland grounded many civilian flights across Europe, demonstrating the importance of climate change to our safety and our daily lives. Currently, many African states are celebrating their 50th anniversary of independence. These two subjects—climate change and the developmental state—have emerged as urgent and politically hot topics.

From the efforts of the Kyoto Protocol, Nobel Prize winners Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and the Copenhagen Conference of 2009, among others, the world is gradually coming to its senses regarding the effect of a depleted atmosphere on human beings. On the other hand, as many African states celebrate their 50th anniversary of independence—especially 17 Francophone countries that gained independence in 1960—the issue of good governance takes centre stage since most of these states have failed to respond positively to the needs and aspirations of their citizens.

The concept of development serves to link Rob D. van den Berg and Osvaldo Feinstein's book *Evaluating Climate Change and Development* and Omano Edigheji's *Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa: Potentials and Challenges*. The debate on development, though relatively lukewarm, cannot just be brushed aside. Several traditional yet pertinent issues such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, security, food, trade reforms, and malnutrition appeared on the list of the Copenhagen Conference. Thus, on these issues, one can at least talk of a real consensus on evaluating climate change and crafting a democratic developmental state.

The relationship among developing countries, democratic states, and climate change poses issues that underscore intense debate, most of it taking place among the parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the UN General Assembly or at the Commonwealth or Francophone Conferences. It has become increasingly clear that developing countries will have to carry a large cost burden in repairing the damage caused by international environmental problems—problems having their roots in developed nations. Furthermore, the issue of the weak state construct has its origins in the governance system that departed colonial masters bequeathed to their colonies.

Consensus is growing that use of the Western model of the nation-state, foundational to the current international system, poses many problems. Although it originates from the specific sociohistorical context of Europe, the model is widely applied in former colonies or postcolonial countries in Africa with the assistance or under the influence of the international community.

Mainstream models of state building assume that one can establish state legitimacy and avoid state collapse through international intervention combined with military presence, huge amounts of aid, and democratic elections. Reality, however, leads us to question the effectiveness of these measures, at least in the way they have been implemented. Thus, the need for rethinking the foundations of the state is imperative. Edigheji's collection of essays addresses such issues as the reform of state building, the model of the state, and its transformation in delivering quality services to the people. Far from basing itself on Max Weber's concept of the state, *Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa* tries to tilt the argument towards the expectations and needs of the population as a foundation for state transformation.

African countries have argued and will continue to argue that higher environmental standards, especially those regarding green-

house gas emissions, make it impossible for them to progress to the same level as the developed world. Therefore, to advance their development and achieve global environmental benefits, they would require compensation for the additional costs. The second line of reasoning follows the consequence of climate change and calls for countries to adapt to what is happening.

With regard to the emergence of a democratic state, some commentators maintain that the developed world, especially the colonial powers, handed a form of quasi-independence to their colonies while holding on to real power. Globalisation without Africa's scientific and technological base constrains the continent's participation in global trade, making the state construct a facade. The terms of trade are decided not in Africa but elsewhere. The cost of raw materials and finished products is decided by the industrial powers. Clearly, the existing state construct has followed the wrong path.

Cognizant of these facts, some people argue for constructing a democratic developmental state in Africa and for urging African countries to take appropriate measures to reduce the impact of climate change by adopting a people-oriented strategic approach to development. The politics of inclusion, not exclusion, should take precedence.<sup>1</sup>

Mindful of the failure of the state to deliver development or quality services to the population, community associations that cooperate with citizens to fill the development gap left by the government have flourished in the past decades. Such associations believe that participation has a greater chance than representative governance of ensuring effectiveness and efficiency in development; of promoting transparency and sustainability of development; of empowering people and breaking chains of dependency; of promoting accountability and responsiveness to local needs; and of reducing the vast inequalities between the few rich elite and the numerous poor who suffer in silence.

## Democratic Developmental State

The contributors to *Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa* point to a central fact that a developmental state in South Africa, unlike the twentieth-century developmental state in East Asia, must be anchored by the principles of democratic governance patterned after the Scandinavian developmental states. Moreover, the national development agenda and its policy must strongly emphasize social transformation under the aegis of social policy. That is, a developmental state in Africa needs to be democratic and promote social cohesion and inclusion. In the 1990s, the golden age of democratisation in Africa, the process attained what has been dubbed the "third wave," which penetrated the continent's political landscape. Strong international pressure gave rise to popular protests against a "sit-tight" centralized, dictatorial regime structure, triggering the ground-breaking shift from a monolithic to a multiparty system throughout the continent. By 1997 at least 48 sub-Saharan African countries had embraced multiparty elections.<sup>2</sup>

*Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa* includes 14 papers divided into five parts. Omano Edigheji's introductory paper, "Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa: Potentials and Challenges," sets the tone and conceptual framework. He argues that the developmental state should have the capacity to provide leadership as it defines a common national agenda and mobilises all sectors of society to participate in implementing that agenda.

Edigheji questions whether a developmental state can take root in South Africa because of its constitutional democracy, assuming that democracy and development are incompatible. Does this explain why the "Asian tigers" made progress under what one might call dictatorial regimes, as in Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan? But why have centralised, authoritarian regimes in African not forged ahead with development like East Asian countries, some of which were at parity during the 1960s with many African countries in terms of gross domestic product. Where are these countries today, compared with African states?

Clearly something is inhibiting African states from attaining industrial status.

Part 1, "Conceptual Issues and Historical Experiences," includes five essays—the bulk of the contributions. In "Constructing the 21st Century Developmental State: Potentialities and Pitfalls," Peter B. Evans offers three theoretical groundings for the emergence of a democratic developmental state, namely new growth theory, institutional approaches, and capability theory or capability expansion. Noting the convergence of these three strands of development theory, Evans proposes that "enhancing human capabilities is the central goal of the 21st century developmental states." Developing human capital not only enhances citizens' welfare but also establishes a foundation for social inclusion and sustained economic growth. He concludes that the enhancement of human capital is both a means and an end, in contrast to a tenet of neoliberalism, which conceives of investment in human capital only in narrow, economic terms.

Thandika Mkandawire's paper, "From Maladjusted States to Democratic Developmental States in Africa," proposes useful ways of crafting developmental states on the continent, based on the central thesis that African states have been maladjusted since the 1960s in terms of the downsizing of the state and the collapse of public investment in physical and human capital. He raises important issues about developmental states within the context of democracy, in contrast to Evans and Edigheji, who maintain that democracy is incompatible with development. But Mkandawire holds that constructing democratic developmental states in Africa calls for originality and intelligence, pointing out, for example, that because of the lack of fixed prerequisites for borrowing during the establishment of a developmental state, this process could proceed by trial and error.

In "How to 'Do' a Developmental State: Political, Organisational, and Human Resource Requirements for the Developmental State," Ha-Joon Chang argues that South Africa has the potential to build a developmental state, given the existence of strong mineral/energy conglomerates and the state's lack of control over

the banks, unlike the situation with classical developmental states of the twentieth century. He recommends the establishment of a "development bank" and of other special-purpose banks to overcome the state's lack of control.

Eun Mee Kim's essay, "Limits of the Authoritarian Developmental State of South Korea," substantiates the authoritarian governance of Gen Park Chung Hee that launched South Korea's developmental state, just as East Asian developmental states gained worldwide attention under authoritarian leadership.

In "Foiling the Resource Curse: Wealth, Equality, Oil and the Norwegian State," Jonathan W. Moses focuses on the institutional and political context and policy instruments used by the Norwegian state to manage its oil resources and revenues for the benefit of its citizens. The case of Norway is interesting when compared to oil-producing countries like Gabon, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Angola. Even though Gabon and Nigeria started exporting oil long before oil was discovered in Norway, their people's livelihood remains unchanged; Norway, however, now has a strong economic base in Europe. Why? Moses raises two fundamental issues—visionary leadership and role of civil society in taking development into its hands. Other stakeholders are involved in policy articulation as well.

He shows that, with the right institutional and organisational arrangements, developmental states in mineral-rich countries can avoid both the "resource curse" and "Dutch disease" and that one can draw useful lessons from developmental states like those in East Asia. Centralised hegemonic parties with focused leadership can make significant differences in Africa. Change requires visionary leadership and a vibrant civil society.

Part 2, "Policy-Making and Economic Governance in South Africa," contains three papers. "The Effect of a Mainstream Approach to Economic and Corporate Governance on Development in South Africa" by Seeraj Mohamed examines South Africa's economic governance regime and its impact on the country's ability to construct a developmental state. The author argues that economic policy has largely been driven by the need to maximize shareholder

value and that rating agencies rather than citizens often determine the credibility of policy, inhibiting efforts to construct a democratic developmental state.

In "Can South Africa Be a Developmental State?" Ben Fine sees financialisation as both an expression of post-1994 policy orientation and as one of the main challenges facing any attempt by the country to become a developmental state. Anthony Butler's contribution, "Consolidation First: Institutional Reform Priorities in the Creation of a Developmental State in South Africa," offers a different perspective—a skeptical view about South Africa's ability to craft a developmental state. He raises issues often missed in establishment of such a state, namely, the sequencing of institutional and policy reforms—especially the question of which should come first. Butler cautions policy makers not to use the excuse of citing the difficulty of constructing a developmental state, along with its institutional arrangement and policy orientations, to avoid making the necessary policy decisions.

Part 3, "South Africa's Macroeconomic and Industrial Policy Landscapes," includes Kenneth Creamer's "Towards an Appropriate Macroeconomic Policy for a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa" and Simon Roberts's "Competition Policy, Competitive Rivalry and a Developmental State in South Africa." Creamer argues that the democratic developmental state in South Africa has the primary responsibility of transforming the structure of opportunities by widening access to basic services and physical infrastructure. Roberts addresses competition policy and the role of industrialization and global competitiveness in the context of developmental states. Emphasizing diversity in competition policy, even among the states of East Asia, he argues that competition in industrial development and policy plays an important role in ensuring the formation of a developmental state.

In part 4, "Social Policy and Its Institutional Underpinnings in South Africa: What Hope for a Developmental State?" Karl von Holdt writes about "The South African Post-Apartheid Bureaucracy: Inner Workings, Contradictory Rationales and the Develop-

mental State," pointing to poor organisation and processes as important explanations for the poor state of public health care in South Africa. His analysis shows that the problem extends to other service-delivery sectors and thus impedes the emergence of a developmental state. Holdt proposes the restoration of Weberian logic in public service as a solution.

"Intermediate Skills Development in South Africa: Understanding the Context, Responding to the Challenge," Salim Akoojee's contribution, urges aggressiveness in the development of human capital. The system of governance contributed to a widespread shortage of skills, exacerbating the dysfunctionality of the South African educational system in the postapartheid era. Therefore, the development of human capital is central to both capability enhancement and industrialisation—and, ultimately, to national prosperity.

Sam Moyo's "The Agrarian Question and the Developmental State in Southern Africa," the sole entry in part 5, "Agrarian Reform," notes that agriculture, on which most transitional polities rely, needs structural reformation. One sees the significance of this area, which should not be underestimated in the formation of a developmental state, in terms of assuring food security, improving the levels of employment, reducing poverty, addressing inequality, and transforming productive forces within southern Africa. Moyo points out that agriculture plays a key role in transforming economic, social, and political issues as well as in reducing vulnerability to the vagaries of global markets.

## Threat to the Environment and Human Security

The contributors to *Evaluating Climate Change and Development*, who presented their papers at the International Conference on Evaluating Climate Change and Development hosted by the government of Egypt and the Bibliotheca Alexandrina in May 2008, drive home the fact that ethics remains the missing dimension in climate debate. The inequalities and injustices likely to occur globally as a result of climate

change demand that world leaders carefully examine the moral and ethical dimensions of this phenomenon. Specifically, the effects of global warming pose a serious threat to both global security and human livelihood.

Part 1, "Climate Change, Development, and Evaluation," features essays by Ismail Serageldin, Robert Picciotto, and Joyeeta Gupta on "Food, Feed, Fuel, and Climate Change: Challenges, Threats, and Possible Actions," "Evaluating Climate Change and Development," and "Climate Change, Development, and Evaluation: Can Flexibility Mechanisms Promote Sustainable Development?" respectively.

"Evaluation Techniques for Disaster" by Claudine Voyadzis and Bastian de Laat, one of the five papers in part 2, "Challenges and Lessons Learned from Evaluations," addresses the role of the World Bank in providing national and local authorities funds for the reconstruction of affected areas and developing means for the prevention and mitigation of natural or ecological disasters.

Part 3 examines the "Mitigation of Climate Change" in six essays, including "Contributing to Global Benefits or Supporting Local Sustainable Development: Evidence from a Global Evaluation of UNDP's Program" by Howard M. Stewart, Juha I. Uitto, and Michael P. Wells, and "The Impact of BACIP Energy-Efficient Products on Domestic Fuel Savings in Northern Pakistan" by Nahida Khudadad and Qayum Ali Shah.

The five papers in part 4, "Adaptation to Climate Change," assess the state of the art and identify gaps in evaluation of adaptation to climate change interventions. Note especially the contribution by Merylyn McKenzie and others on "Evaluation of Adaptation to Climate Change from a Development Perspective."

Essays such as "Making Adaptation Work for the Vulnerable: An Approach for Assessing Community-Based Interventions" by Balgis Osman-Elasha and others, one of the six in part 5, "Vulnerability, Risks, and Climate Change," explore a range of tools and approaches for mapping and assessing interrelationships in complex human systems and ecosystems that are particularly prone to the effects of climate change. The contributors also examine local

and national capacity to better plan for, monitor, and evaluate the effects of climate change.

Finally in part 6, "The Road Ahead," Rob D. van den Berg and Margaret A. Spearman present a synthesis of all of the book's papers in their essay, "The Future of Evaluating Climate Change and Development," addressing the challenges faced by developing countries in reducing emissions. The authors point out that, ironically, developing countries—especially those in Africa—that emit the lowest amounts of greenhouse gases will actually bear the greatest cost of dealing with the effects of climate change. Moreover, the fact that climate change will have unequal, severe effects in many parts of the world demands serious soul searching and articulate policy decisions. According to Rajendra K. Pachauri, chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "We have to think at a much higher level. And I think this is where ethics comes in so critically as the missing dimension in this debate."<sup>3</sup> An appeal to world leaders drafted by the Bahá'í International Community declares that "the quest for climate justice is not a competition for limited resources but part of an unfolding process towards greater degrees of unity among nations as they endeavor to build a sustainable, just and peaceful civilization."<sup>4</sup> Something more is needed—good governance.

## Conclusion

Constructing a developmental state in South Africa or any part of the developing world and evaluating climate change and development call into play the ethical and moral questions that lie at the root of the problems involved—questions of justice and equity that will determine the survival of cultures and ecosystems for present and future generations.

Both books reviewed here raise issues of tolerance, inclusion, the system of governance, the influence of capitalism, and the effects of globalisation. The message they drive home is that leaders and societies must commit themselves to pursuing democratic governance and evaluating the effects of climate change, guided by ethical and mo-

ral considerations. Doing so will inspire the trust and confidence of individuals, communities, institutions, nations, and the world to bring about appropriate and humane policies that ensure democratic governance and an environment needed to build sustainable civilizations. The issue of power politics—military or civilian—should be readjusted to concentrate on coexisting harmoniously with nature. Both books' contributors call for a new dimension and use of power that demonstrate trust, justice, solidarity, and a vision of prosperity for the most vulnerable populations. Directly or indirectly, they issue a strong appeal for new political leaders who will exhibit courage and morality as they articulate the vision and secure the foundation for a comprehensive and legally binding agreement to ensure the peaceful coexistence among people, development, and a sustainable environment. As mentioned at the beginning of this review, the recent volcanic eruption in Iceland gave us an indication of our vulnerability and a reason for cooperating for our mutual benefit.

Both *Evaluating Climate Change and Development* and *Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa* will appeal to a broad cross section of the reading public, including students; policy makers; and members of nongovernmental organisations, donor communities, international organisations, and governments in both established democracies and transitional polities. But we must not only read these books, but also—and more importantly—put into constructive action their various recommendations. *Implementation* is the key word. The demise of the apartheid system and the emergence of a government of national unity should be valuable lessons for African countries.

Whether or not a construct for a developmental state arises from Africa, governance, climate change, and development provide areas for constructive social change under the canopy of justice and respect for all human life. These books project messages of using "soft power" to address our underlying dilemmas and thereby reach the goals of equity and justice. Both are essential rea-

ding for those who wish to understand the solutions to national, regional, and global problems.

**John W. Forje**  
Yaoundé, Cameroon

#### Notes

1. See John W. Forje, *Here The People Rule: Political Transition and Challenges for Democratic Consolidation in Africa* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2009).

2. Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and Political Institutionalisation," *American Behavioral Scientist* 40, no. 5 (1997): 562–74; Michael Bratton, "Second Elections in Africa," in *Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 18–33; Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave of Democratization Over? An Empirical Assessment," Working Paper no. 236, March 1997, <http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/236.pdf>; and Patrick Chabal, "A Few Considerations on Democracy in Africa," *International Affairs* 74, no. 2 (1998): 289–303.

3. "Ethics Are 'Missing Dimension' in Climate Debate, Says IPCC Head," Bahá'í World News Service, 23 September 2009, <http://news.bahai.org/story/729>.

4. Ibid.

***America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq: The Great Divide***, revised and updated edition, by Sarwar Kashmeri. Potomac Books, 2008, 176 pp., \$13.56.

Each national election season nourishes the growth of a new crop of policy recommendations aimed at future administrations—just as outgoing administrations tend to produce rich harvests of tell-all books and memoirs. Whatever influence these publications exert is in large part a product of placement and timing. Published in 2008 (updating a 2007 edition), Sarwar Kashmeri's *America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq* should be judged mainly by the circumstances of the time in which it he wrote it. Although subsequent developments have overtaken some of what he writes, the core of his argument about the crisis in the transatlantic relationship still contains an essential kernel of truth: namely, that the poor state of political relations which quickly developed between the United States and Europe over the US invasion of Iraq did

not simply arise from actions taken by the Bush administration. Instead it grew out of deeper systemic problems that a simple change of personnel is unlikely to solve. Efforts aimed at creating a better and more effective transatlantic relationship, the author writes, require substantive changes in (primarily American) policies and practices.

With a background in engineering and information technologies and through his work as a strategic communications adviser to international corporations, Kashmeri approaches the topic largely from a business perspective. His experience as a corporate consultant as well as his participation in numerous forums that bring together American and European business leaders, public officials, and media representatives has shaped his views on European-American relations. In particular his role in advising American businesses about changes created by the introduction of the euro appears to have proven a seminal moment in his appreciation of the growing divide between the Atlantic allies. It put into bold relief America's failure to comprehend "the political and economic dimensions of an integrated Europe" and the "independent political and economic interests" that resulted (p. xii). In short, the United States has not taken Europe as seriously as its increased power and influence would warrant.

Kashmeri directs his argument primarily against the neoconservative/transformationalist "vision that dominates United States policy today" (p. 37), which gives little credence to traditional alliances or international institutions (like the United Nations), preferring instead a go-it-alone approach aimed at promoting the global spread of democracy. This he contrasts with the approach of traditionalist conservatives (many of whom were his interlocutors for the book: James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, and Caspar Weinberger, as well as George H. W. Bush himself) who, Kashmeri says, "work with . . . friends and allies within international organizations" (p. 37). Kashmeri suggests that the policies pursued under George W. Bush crystallized America's long-term inattention to, indifference about, and even resistance against developments in

Europe—which arose in part from a tendency to see Europe through a distinctively British ("special relationship") lens. He encourages US policy makers to seek greater accommodation and closer cooperation with Europe as a whole in order to deal properly with global challenges America cannot face alone.

Kashmeri points to neoconservative statements that a flourishing European Union is not in the broader US interest and claims that neoconservatives "prefer an American policy that actively promotes discord within the European Union's member states to weaken the Union" (p. 98). However, he fails to produce explicit evidence that any substantive policy flowed from this point of view. Although Europeans clearly believe this to be the case—and this in itself constitutes a problem for US policy makers—the author does not convincingly demonstrate that it is much more than a figment of the European imagination. More importantly, the insistence that the United States treat Europe as one entity rather than deal with member states individually overlooks the fact that Europe is not yet such an entity but to a degree remains burdened by internal disagreements and structural deficiencies. Kashmeri tends to ignore shortcomings on the European side (especially in the area of security), focusing instead almost exclusively on what the United States must do to make things better.

Although his diagnosis of the state of transatlantic relations is accurate, his prescriptions for improving those relations are rather general and palliative. He hits on a key issue when he points out that an underlying source of the problems in the Euro-American relationship lies in the different perceptions of the "war on terror" on either side of the Atlantic and that, even more fundamentally, these perceptions in turn flow from differing attitudes toward war in general (p. 43). Kashmeri is right in suggesting that a new consensus must be formulated with respect to the use of force. But his proposal for forging that consensus—the "demilitarization" of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its transformation into a "transatlantic forum" for developing "rules of engagement"—suggests

a decoupling of US-European military relations in hopes that “perhaps in the future a new military role for NATO might emerge” (pp. 110–11). One wonders how any abstract consensus will work if it does not drive new structures or shape concrete actions. Similarly, his proposal that the “Iraq problem” be “internationalized” (pp. 107–8), though laudable in the abstract, has proven a tough sell in reality.

On the one hand, since the bulk of Kashmiri’s argument reflects circumstances as they existed at middecade and is in turn shaped by them, one wonders how more recent events, especially the neoconservatives’ departure from the political stage and the rise of a Congress and White House controlled by Democrats, might modify his proposals. On the other hand, neoconservatism, as an expression of an American impulse to “secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,” remains a fundamental strain of American political culture and, as such, likely will continue to inform US policy in one fashion or another. Ultimately, the United States will need to determine the degree to which a Europe that no longer looks to it for leadership but actively questions that leadership (p. 21) shares the values that underpin America’s sense of itself in the world.

Michael Prince, PhD  
München, Germany

*Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict* by Marc Howard Ross. Cambridge University Press, 2007, 388 pp., \$34.99.

Ethnic conflict makes headlines like nothing else. Civil war in Sri Lanka, the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Tibetan and Uyghur independence movements in China, the Shiite-Sunni divisions in US-occupied Iraq, Muslim riots in France, tribe-centered election battles in Kenya, and the ongoing struggle between Palestine and Israel—these are just a few of the stories that have driven the news cycle in recent years. The ubiquity of ethnic conflict, as well as its longevity, often

leads many media consumers to believe that certain people “just can’t get along,” perhaps ascribing such conflict to inherent differences in the respective groups, based upon a mythical past, such as the Jacob and Ishmael stories that underlie much of the common discourse on Arab-Jewish conflict. Unfortunately, few voices in the media seem interested in either addressing the real issues driving ethnic conflict or offering real-world solutions.

Enter Marc Howard Ross, a renowned expert in the field of conflict management. His latest book, *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict*, examines how culture frames the interests of competing ethnic groups and how peace might be achieved through broadening psychocultural narratives to include other points of view. He opens by discussing the dynamics of group identity, noting that cultural expressions as reflectors of a group’s worldview can play a causal role in conflict as well as exacerbate or inhibit conflict, depending upon the exclusivity or inclusivity of the narratives. Narratives matter precisely because they are the stories through which a sense of communal identity is constructed, and thus they reveal how people understand the conflicts in which they are involved—what Ross calls *psychocultural dramas*, “polarizing events about non-negotiable cultural claims, threats, and/or rights that become important because of their connections to group narratives and core metaphors central to a group’s identity” (p. 25). Citing the power of cultural expression in such ritualized performances as festivals and pilgrimages, Ross notes that, just as ritual can help perpetuate exclusivist narratives, so can it help conflicting groups “re-frame or redefine the symbolic and emotional aspects of the conflict so that the parties can move beyond signed agreements and develop the institutions and practices needed to avoid future confrontations” (p. 86).

After the first three chapters, which outline Ross’s theories as to the role of narrative in conflict and conflict management, the author follows with seven chapters offering concise case studies that detail how these dynamics work across the world in instances where conflict has been actively abated and where



it remains. The first case he tackles centers on Loyalist parades in Northern Ireland. Here, Ross contrasts Protestant parades in Portadown and Derry, demonstrating how the one in Derry has grown into a more inclusive community celebration involving both Protestants and Catholics due to an opening of the central narrative of the parade, while the one in Portadown remains a focus of political resistance. Next he analyzes Catalonia's status as an independent and linguistically unique state within Spain, enumerating the various policies of the central Spanish government that have lowered the potential for ethnic conflict, even though language serves as the focal point for violent resistance elsewhere in the world, as in Sri Lanka.

The issue of archaeological exploration on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem serves for Ross as a microcosm of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, illustrating how each "selectively utilizes historical references to bolster its position in building a non-linear argument. Time collapse is far more prominent than continuity" (p. 187). In chapters that could easily be paired side by side, Ross analyzes the French ban on head scarves, which targets Muslim students, in light of various Republican narratives that underlie French national identity. Later he looks at controversies surrounding public display of the Confederate battle flag, with all its separatist and racist implications, in the context of race relations and the far-different conception of national identity at work in the United States. Finally, two chapters are devoted to cultural contestation issues in South Africa, the first focusing upon the reinterpretation of older heritage sites that served the narratives of the ruling whites, and the second detailing the creation of new sites offering a presentation of the black experience in the nation. The book is illustrated throughout with pictures, maps, and two very helpful, multipage charts that delineate the events most entrenched in the narratives of the Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine conflicts.

"Political analyses tend to ignore, dismiss, or under-theorize the role that identity and emotional framing play in long-term

conflicts," Ross writes in conclusion (p. 312). Indeed, most analysts tend to present longstanding cultural narratives either as mere fronts—schemas of political posturing designed to secure political advantage for a select few—or as markers of irrationality for cultures too backward to devote time and effort in concerning themselves with the "real" issues of economics and power. Such simplifications serve only to undermine the attempt to paint a larger, strategic portrait of ethnic conflicts in the world at large and therefore diminish the chance of transforming zones of discord into truly peaceful regions. This is where scholars such as Marc Howard Ross serve a noble purpose. The key arguments of *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict* are backed by Ross's many decades of work in conflict management and the research he has conducted the world over. In this book, he offers more than just a set of academic musings—these are real guidelines for achieving peace and strategic stability, and those whose business is such would ignore his offerings, not just at their own peril, but at all of ours.

**Guy Lancaster, PhD**  
*Arkansas State University*

***The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: A History of Weapons and Delivery Systems since 1945*** by Norman Polmar and Robert Norris. Naval Institute Press, 2009, 240 pp., \$49.95.

*The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal* provides a useful analysis of nuclear weapons deployed by the United States on land, at sea, and in the air from the end of the Second World War until 2009. Norman Polmar and Robert Norris are both recognized experts on the subject, the former an author who has written on nuclear weapons development for the US Navy, Department of Energy, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and Defense Nuclear Agency, and the latter a senior research associate at the National Resources Defense Council.

The first chapter offers a comprehensive historical overview, while the next seven

chapters focus on nuclear warheads, strategic aircraft, tactical aircraft, strategic missiles, tactical missiles and rockets, artillery, and antisubmarine weapons. The text is well illustrated with numerous black-and-white photographs. There is also a useful glossary of abbreviations and acronyms; appendices on the US nuclear stockpile and the effects of nuclear weapons; and a chart divided into intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and bomber columns listing the numbers of launchers and warheads by year from 1945 to 2008. The volume refers to primary sources throughout; it also includes a useful "Recommended Reading" section.

Although well illustrated, *The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal* is not a picture book. The initial chapter is a good analysis of the evolution of US nuclear weapon systems and doctrine, explaining their development and deployment by the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy. The chapter assumes a strategic perspective, but it considers tactical applications of nuclear power as well—as in the case of the Davy Crockett, designed to give battalion commanders a nuclear battlefield punch. As the authors explain, there were actually two Davy Crocketts (both recoilless rifles): the 120 mm M28 and the 155 mm M29, each firing the M388 projectile with a W54 warhead.

The chapters on aircraft make it clear that most Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft were nuclear capable and that even the venerable Second World War-era *Essex*-class carriers had a nuclear capability in both their attack and antisubmarine warfare roles. Polmar and Norris explain that all of the services incorporated nuclear weapons into their war-fighting doctrine at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels throughout the Cold War.

Air Force readers might take exception to some views expressed by the authors, who refer to the *nuclear triad* as a "term coined by the U.S. Air Force to rationalize the 'need' for three U.S. strategic offensive forces," first publicly used by Gen John D. Ryan, Air Force chief of staff, in 1970 as a way to "help explain the continuing need for a manned strategic bomber" (p. 20). They later state that "three

factors argued against manned bombers," including the vulnerability of Strategic Air Command bases to Soviet SLBM attack, the "fallacy of a principal Air Force argument from manned bombers: that they could be recalled," and the effectiveness of Soviet surface-to-air missiles in Vietnam and the Middle East, which "led many government officials and bomber opponents to argue that the large and modern Soviet air defense network made strategic bombers obsolete" (p. 30). Polmar and Norris clearly question the value of the Air Force's ICBM fleet:

A factor in U.S. Minuteman-Titan ICBM effectiveness was the question of reliability. Of the three components of the Triad, the land-based ICBMs were the only force that was not extensively tested. Bombers regularly took off, flew missions, and dropped bombs; prior to test-ban agreements, bombers dropped nuclear weapons (and dummy bombs) in full-system tests. Similarly, submarines regularly fired unarmed ballistic missiles—sans warheads—on test ranges; and on 6 May 1962, the USS *Ethan Allen* (SSBN 608) fired a Polaris A-1 missile almost 1,200 nautical miles in the Pacific with a nuclear detonation. This was the only full-system test of a U.S. nuclear-armed ICBM/IRBM/SLBM missile from an "operational silo" (p. 16).

The authors continue:

No nuclear-armed ICBM has been launched from an operational silo. Periodically, the silo crews fired various ICBMs from test facilities at the Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and from Cape Kennedy in Florida under highly controlled conditions. But even periodic efforts to launch an ICBM with reduced fuel and no warhead from an operational silo have failed, and Congress has refused approval of full-range test firings from an operational silo that would take even an unarmed missile over urban areas (p. 16).

These passages left this reviewer with nagging questions. As this book notes, "The first Minuteman IA was placed on alert at Malmstrom AFB, Montana, on 27 October 1962, in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis" (p. 171). Although the current Minuteman III is continuously upgraded, it sits in remote silos

in regions subject to highly adverse weather conditions, and those launch facilities were built close to a half century ago. They might be constantly monitored by disciplined crews, serviced by dedicated maintenance personnel, and guarded by diligent security forces, but how many of these weapon systems are actually capable of fulfilling their mission in intricate Single Integrated Operational Plans, as expected?

Given the current effort to restore focus on the nuclear mission, degraded since the end of the Cold War, and the Obama administration's stated commitment to disarmament, publication of *The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal* is timely indeed. Some readers might find parts of the book discomfiting, but Norman Polmar and Robert Norris provide an informed perspective worth serious consideration.

**Dr. Frank Kalesnik, PhD**  
Malmstrom AFB

***Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul*** by Michael Reid. Yale University Press, 2007, 400 pp., \$30.00.

Michael Reid, editor of the Americas section of the *Economist*, has written an exceptionally timely analysis of Latin America's social and economic performance in the last decade. The fact that Yale University Press published it is a strong recommendation—and the book does not disappoint the reader. The title reflects the essential thesis: in spite of its enormous potential in terms of resources and human talent, Latin America, once the most advanced region of the developing world, has been forgotten and has fallen behind other developing regions because it failed to achieve sufficient progress in improving the conditions of its people. As the result of frustration and the fact that some 40 percent of the population lives in poverty, the political force of populism is attracting attention among the underclass in a number of countries, notably Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Populism, which takes many forms, both liberal and conservative, seeks to empower the

powerless and redistribute wealth quickly. Antidemocratic, it concentrates political power in the executive branch, and its historical record suggests that it will once again fail. Despite this record, democracy survives and, amazingly, has sunk deeper roots in Latin America. Reid underlines this fact constantly in this fast-paced book.

Venezuela serves as an example of the allure of populism. Underwritten by vast petroleum income, *chavismo* (a form of populism named after Pres. Hugo Chávez) has reached a high level of support among Venezuelans because of the failure of predecessor governments to channel wealth to improve the conditions of the vast underclass. Though *chavismo* may have already reached its apogee, the continuing, depressing socioeconomic conditions of poverty and social exclusion threaten the legitimacy of democracy in a number of countries. Here, Reid is at his best, drawing on his impressive observations as a journalist to draw comparisons and derive conclusions across various countries, large and small. He possesses unlimited energy and an uncanny reportorial eye to find profound significance in vignettes that define the compelling human condition in cities, towns, and villages. His reporting also takes him to the higher reaches of academic organizations, the news media, government institutions, and diplomacy.

Reid demonstrates a passion for Latin America and obviously admires the region and its people. At the same time, he appreciates the enormous impact of history, seeking constantly to connect the present with the past. He is also an effective analyst of social and economic indicators, such as investment and growth patterns, writing in a style that the nonspecialist audience can understand. He deploys his talented and lively pen to coldly analyze the sources of the problem, the nature of reform efforts, and what he calls "The Stubborn Resilience of Flawed Democracies" (the title of chap. 11). He attributes Latin America's failure to weak and ineffective state systems—that is, to the inability of government ministries to reach the people they are supposed to serve

by providing security, justice, and education, and by promoting vibrant economies that productively employ the maximum number of people.

But state weakness is only one part of the story, according to Reid. National leaders of the last generation embarked on a series of neoliberal reforms espoused by the "Washington Consensus" (p. 6) (pushed by research centers and multinational lending institutions) to remove tariff barriers to trade and investment and get the state out of running enterprises. But progress could not be sustained because the governments did not conduct additional reforms and protections of the most vulnerable, which would unlock their creativity and wealth. Accordingly, an anti-neoliberalism backlash is now generating tensions between the proponents of free-market economies and those who advocate that the central government provide greater direction to the economy, as well as redistribution of wealth schemes. Add to this the awesome insecurity in the streets. Indeed, criminal violence subtracts nearly 25 percent of gross domestic product annually.

This reviewer is sympathetic to this kind of writing. Reid writes well, with an engaging style that captures the reader. To be sure, some simplifications challenge credibility. Note, for example, the statement that "the Catholic Church—which had blessed injustice in Latin America since the moment a Dominican friar had taken a full part in the capture and murder of Atahualpa, the Inca—had an attack of conscience" in the twentieth century (pp. 97–98). But Reid has captured the essence of the Latin American social, economic, and political dilemma. The only disappointment with the book is that he doesn't offer some policy alternatives. Nonetheless, *Forgotten Continent* is a worthy addition to a growing collection of writings on what went wrong and what should be done in Latin America.

**Dr. Gabriel Marcella**  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

*Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War* by Ryan C. Hendrickson. University of Missouri Press, 2006, 184 pp., \$16.95.

Research on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) post-Cold War transformation devotes little analysis to the secretary-general position and implicitly downplays the significance of NATO's post-Cold War military operations. Recognizing the notable absence of scholarly literature on NATO's secretaries-general during this period, Ryan Hendrickson investigates their evolving impact on the alliance, particularly regarding the use of force. Only those secretaries-general who led after the Cold War oversaw NATO's use of military force.

Employing an analytical framework that he credits to Michael G. Schechter, the author examines the first four of five post-Cold War secretaries-general and the roles they played in moving the alliance toward military action. Hendrickson theorizes that the NATO military instrument remains relevant and that the secretaries-general who have served since the end of the Cold War have significantly affected NATO policy, transnational unity, and the use of military force.

Upon completion of a concise yet substantive historical overview of the creation of the office of secretary-general, the author dedicates the remaining chapters to comparative case-study analysis of the first four people who held this position after the Cold War. Although not alike (and thus making for imperfect comparisons), the cases examined are suitably relevant to meet the author's objective. Each chapter focuses on the role that each secretary-general played in contemplating the use-of-force option (e.g., Manfred Wörner—Bosnia; Willy Claes—Operation Deliberate Force against Bosnian Serbs; Javier Solana—Operation Allied Force bombings of Serbia; and Lord George Robertson—post-9/11 defense measures for the protection of Turkey). Personal interviews of key diplomats and NATO policy makers, coupled with the use of professional literature, provide a sound basis for the comparative analysis.

Each of the chapters dedicated to the secretaries-general begins with the process—the behind-the-scenes geopolitical posturing and consensus building that led to their elections. Moreover, the author goes on to describe how their professional and national backgrounds shaped their approaches in leading NATO. This backdrop alone makes the book an interesting read.

One of the many intriguing insights provided in the book occurs in the chapter addressing Secretary-General Javier Solana. In light of his vocal opposition to Spain's joining NATO in 1982 and to the stationing of American military bases in Spain, this Spaniard later led NATO expansion into the former Eastern Bloc states. Finding sufficient legal basis without United Nations approval, he advocated and oversaw NATO's military response to Yugoslavian (Serbian) president Slobodan Milošević's acts of aggression against Kosovo Albanians. Furthermore, Solana aggressively secured member states' support for the operational/targeting plan of Gen Wesley Clark, supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR), which ultimately led to the capitulation of Serbian forces in Kosovo.

In all cases, Hendrickson's comparative analysis supports his theory. Although the position of secretary-general has limited formal authority in the alliance, each leader utilized an assortment of diplomatic tactics and alliance tools to make an impact on major political and military decisions at NATO. The author's findings clearly demonstrate that different personalities and diplomatic styles employed by the secretaries-general seemed to work equally well in promoting consensus, depending upon the circumstances. Furthermore, his findings highlight the importance of the SACEUR's and the secretary-general's viewing the alliance from similar ideological perspectives.

Hendrickson concludes this fine work with summarized findings, offers a comparative assessment of effective diplomatic leadership in NATO, and provides policy recommendations for the improvement of transnational tensions surrounding the office of secretary-general. Of particular note, he emphasizes the tremendous political challenges faced by the office

of secretary-general in promoting consensus if the US preference for "coalitions of the willing," rather than NATO-supported military operations, remains the norm.

This rich yet concise book is very reader-friendly. *Diplomacy and War at NATO* is most suitable for those individuals interested in American foreign policy and NATO's post-Cold War history and politics; those destined to work directly or indirectly with NATO; and scholars and students of political science / international affairs.

**Dr. David A. Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel,  
USMC, Retired**

*US Army Command and General Staff College*

***The Torture Debate in America*** edited by Karen J. Greenberg. Cambridge University Press, 2005, 436 pp., \$27.99.

The editor of *The Torture Debate in America*, Karen J. Greenberg is executive director of the Center on Law and Security at New York University School of Law, editor of both *Al Qaeda Now* and the *NYU Review of Law and Security*, and coeditor of *The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib* (2005). In her introduction to the compilation under consideration, Greenberg notes her objective of raising public consciousness on torture and facilitating open discussion on US policy regarding that subject. Rather than judging the current policy, the contributors to this volume report the facts and provide policy options consistent with domestic and international laws and ethics.

Given the presence of combatant prisoners at the US Navy base in Guantanamo, Cuba, and the wars smoldering in Afghanistan and Iraq, Greenberg and the other contributors, from different disciplines, skillfully tackle the question of whether the United States should allow its military to torture prisoners for information. Following her short introduction is a transcript of a panel discussion by these contributors at the New York University School of Law, including participation by a Judge Advocate General Corps officer who

had recent experience defending detainees at Guantanamo.

The participants contrast recent instances of permitting torture with US democratic ideals. Recognizing the need for timely intelligence, they demonstrate how common positions favoring torture also argue against US policy. Most advocates of torture consider it the lesser of two evils if the information obtained saves lives. Considering some prisoners' extensive time in captivity, several contributors assert that the latter no longer have access to the type of intelligence that could justify torture and point out that the practice violates US ideals of human dignity. Some even suggest that policy allowing torture could harm long-term US interests in the event that enemies reciprocate.

After considering the place of torture in a democracy, the contributors review international law and conventions that govern this practice, all the while avoiding judgmental statements and offering options. After a thorough discussion of applicable international law, they address arguments against torture, the last section glimpsing into the future to predict any ramifications for the United States, given the recent conflicts. Although international laws forbid torture, it remains an option for most nonstate actors that have not signed the pertinent international conventions.

Throughout *The Torture Debate in America*, the contributors allude to the ease of abusing current US policy on this matter and the unfortunate circumstances in which the United States feels it must resort to torture. Readers who lack a background in international law will appreciate the book's presentation of national and international legal precedents governing the treatment of detainees. They will also find useful the biographical details for each contributor and the listing of essential source material.

**Lt Col Steven M. Beasley, USAF**  
Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota

*U.S. Competitiveness in Science and Technology* by Titus Galama and James Hosek. RAND Corporation, 2008, 188 pp., \$32.00.

With the clinical thoroughness characteristic of other works from the RAND Corporation, *U.S. Competitiveness in Science and Technology* takes a deep look into questions concerning the future of America's science and engineering capacity. Fundamentally, the report explores factors affecting US competitiveness in science and technology (S&T), both globally and domestically.

From a global perspective, the report compares historical data on the development of US scientific and engineering to similar data from other technological nations (Russia, India, China, Japan, South Korea, and members of the European Union). Galama and Hosek review such factors as where international students go to earn scientific and engineering degrees, what countries they choose to use those degrees in upon graduation, and what countries are most conducive to research and publication. They then draw favorable conclusions concerning the ability of the United States to compete globally in technology development. In addition, the authors explore whether the United States will continue to compete favorably in attracting and retaining a distinguished international S&T workforce.

Turning their analysis inward, they also investigate whether the United States is doing enough domestically to maintain its role as a fertile ground for developing scientists and engineers. In reaching their conclusions, they break down the US investment in private and public research and development, the viability of the US education system in producing graduates enthusiastic about careers in S&T, and, finally, the job environment and career potential for scientists and engineers in the United States. Here, too, there are optimistic prospects for maintaining favorable trends in S&T in the United States.

This monograph is exhaustively researched, and assertions concerning the health of US scientific and engineering are well supported. The authors break down each broad research question into more focused questions that they analyze, using available data. The comparisons typically span the last 50 years for which data is available. The reader who stays with the report from beginning to end—

no small task, given the extensive amount of information presented throughout—is rewarded with a good-news story. Galama and Hosek quantitatively support their conclusions that the United States has not declined in S&T with respect to historical standing or in comparison to other contemporary technical-oriented nations. They support these assertions by studying the infrastructure, education, and workforce of the United States, which they identify as the building blocks of S&T leadership. In each case, their objective assessment is that reports of the demise of US S&T leadership are greatly exaggerated.

Galama and Hosek do follow up with a level-headed, cautionary note, however, quickly pointing out that their research identifies growth trends in many other technological nations. Without sustained levels of US public and private growth and support across S&T leadership factors, the favorable conditions we currently enjoy could evaporate.

I recommend this report as a ready reference on the topic of US scientific competitiveness to anyone who wants or needs in-depth data that is exceedingly abundant in answering each research question. For anyone else who routinely relies on or influences the development of a robust US S&T workforce, the final chapter, “Discussion and Recommendations,” is a worthwhile read in its own right.

**Maj Nick Martin, USAF**  
*University of Colorado, Colorado Springs*

***Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*** by Zahid Hussain. Columbia University Press, 2007, 232 pp., \$24.95.

If any reader of this journal needs convincing that US foreign policy in the Islamic world is complex and dangerous, he or she can get a good view of it in *Frontline Pakistan*. It will be hard enough for readers accustomed to English to make any sense out of it because of unfamiliarity with the names of Pakistani places and persons, but the labyrinth of politics and religion in a region that hovers

near anarchy will persuade just about anybody of the dilemmas facing decision makers everywhere.

It appears that Zahid Hussain is well qualified in attempting to give us a picture of the situation. A journalist who provides material to the *Times* of London, *Newsweek*, and the *Wall Street Journal*, he possesses a good writing style. Clearly, Hussain is an expert on the region and has had access to some difficult-to-find sources. He organizes his work in topical chapters and in a more or less chronological order. The political landscape is cluttered with military, religious, power-seeking, nuclear-smuggling, and drug interests that yielded an almost impossible problem for former president Pervez Musharraf, who was trying to survive between many mutually hostile domestic groups and the pressures of international politics.

I fear that the reader seeking a coherent picture of what Pakistan and Afghanistan are about is doomed to frustration. Both countries have long seemed ungovernable, partly due to the fact that the central governments have had very limited powers over the regional and local interests. I suppose that the main idea of the book is that there is likely trouble ahead for the United States since Pakistan has been a principal ally during the global war on terror, but that is largely a result of President Musharraf's having sided with the United States, very much against the tide in his own homeland. That cannot go on forever, according to Hussain, and I suppose that he thinks the only possible solution is to permit real democracy in Pakistan. However, given the strength of the local warlords and the growing power of radical Islam, that *would* be a miracle. In addition to that, Musharraf was faced with a tough problem of nuclear proliferation. Pakistan followed India into the elite group of nuclear states, but its control of nuclear secrets has been defective, and its people have been involved in serious underground nuclear proliferation. If that were not enough, he was also utterly dependent upon the loyalty of his military, and that is a little shaky since the latter has an affinity for some

of the radical Islamic groups, who are against secular government.

Hussain does not get into the character of the “liberal” Pakistani groups advocating secular rule, but it appears that they are utterly opposed to radical Islam and to military rule. If that were not enough, there has been a perennial issue with India over Kashmir, and Musharraf was able to contain that up to a certain degree, but this situation is fully capable of boiling over into a disaster for Pakistan’s leaders—and for the United States. Since our campaign in Afghanistan against the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda is highly dependent upon our relationship with the Pakistani government, that means trouble.

Few Americans know much about Pakistan and its surrounding region, and this book will certainly not make one an instant expert on the subject. However, it is readable and will serve as a useful introduction to the problems of the area. I therefore recommend it for a moderately high place on anyone’s reading list.

**Dr. David R. Mets**  
Niceville, Florida

***Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century*** by John R. Deni.  
Ashgate Publishing, 2007, 128 pp., \$99.95.

John Deni, political advisor to US military forces in Europe and lecturer at Heidelberg University, examines how the realities of establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) rapid deployment corps (NRDC) furnish insights into the broader theories of alliance management and doctrine development in this compact if pricey monograph. Deni provides a fine overview of political science and international relations literature on the topic; a detailed narrative of how, when, and why NATO established its NRDCs; and an insightful analysis of how intra-alliance bargaining resulted in compromises that generated suboptimum outcomes. Although this conclusion will hardly surprise those who have served within the bowels of NATO or historians who have analyzed al-

liances at war and peace, the strength of this monograph is its detailed, well-developed insider description of the process of transforming NATO concepts into force structures and doctrine.

The monograph consists of eight chapters, with the introduction and following two chapters setting the theoretical framework of the study. Deni notes that much of the literature on alliances focuses on their formation and dissolution, with much less attention to the dynamics of alliance maintenance. By concentrating on the intra-alliance negotiations and deal making that sustains existing alliances, *Alliance Management and Maintenance* provides a different theoretical perspective. The heart of the monograph consists of three chapters that examine the development of the NRDCs, the alliance’s response to changing threats, and the impact of political bargaining. Here Deni is at his best, providing specific examples of how national interests resulted in the designation of six corps as “high readiness forces” (HRF) despite force structure reviews that called for only three. The penultimate chapter turns to the alliance’s response to terrorism, providing a brief 15-page overview of NATO initiatives that seems oddly disconnected from the study’s previous chapters on force structure and political bargaining. The monograph’s conclusion summarizes and emphasizes the study’s value at the broader theoretical level, noting that straightforward, threat-based explanations of alliance behavior fail to account for NATO’s organizational change in the twenty-first century.

Thoughtful and well researched, this monograph keeps a tight focus on NATO, making no mention of parallel endeavors such as the European Union’s (EU) rapid reaction force. Yet for most members of NATO, the bargaining and negotiation process that sustains alliances occurs at two levels: both within NATO and within the framework of the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy. By focusing solely on the former, this monograph presents an incomplete picture of the multidimensional complexity of European security. Nevertheless, *Alliance Management and Maintenance* offers insight and analysis



that will appeal to both academics and practitioners of security and statecraft. Academics will find Deni's analysis of various theoretical propositions of alliance behavior useful, although his acronym-laden discussion of NRDCs, HRF(L)s, and the MTIWG (Military Transitional Issues Working Group) may prove daunting to the uninitiated. For those who have worked at NATO or may do so in the future, Deni's account of how bargains are struck and how compromises smooth the way for implementation will be most useful. Combining both a clear theoretical framework and a well-researched examination of the realities of alliance management within NATO, this monograph exemplifies political science at its best.

**Douglas Peifer**  
Air War College

***Wolfpack Warriors: The Story of World War II's Most Successful Fighter Outfit*** by Roger Freeman.  
Casemate Publishers, 2004, 256 pp., \$18.95.

In the war-torn skies over Europe, America's 56th Fighter Group entered an almost daily struggle against Hermann Göring's Luftwaffe in a race to achieve air superiority before the planned Allied invasion of the continent. "Zemke's Wolfpack," as it came to be known, played an integral role in dominating the fighter pilots of Nazi Germany. Flying the less glamorous P-47 Thunderbolt, these American pilots fought the Luftwaffe from the beginning of the air offensive against Germany until the last days of the war. Their story, told in yet another wonderful book by author Roger Freeman, is certain to make a significant contribution to the study of the Allied air campaign over Europe in World War II. The author of more than 50 books on that war, Freeman has certainly produced one of his most interesting works in *Wolfpack Warriors*.

The author consulted over 150 veterans during the research for this book and spent 14 years compiling the history of the 56th Fighter Group. In bringing the book alive, he freely quotes men from the unit—pilots,

crew chiefs, maintenance officers, service personnel, and commanders—to give the reader a much better perspective of life within the group. More than any other feature of the book, these first-person accounts bring to life the fears, concerns, victories, and defeats experienced by these men. Freeman gives the reader a feeling of being in the cockpit with one of the pilots or in the barracks relaxing during some downtime. Comments from German pilots who engaged the 56th would have made this aspect of the book even more appealing.

Fortunately for us, *Wolfpack Warriors* is much more than just a shoot-'em-up history of this one fighter group. More importantly, the author takes time to discuss the unit from its peacetime conception and formulation, through its deployment overseas and years of combat, to its disbanding after the war. He also examines in great detail many of the teething problems the unit faced with its P-47 Thunderbolts, the use of drop tanks in an attempt to increase the aircraft's range, and the harrowing experiences of ground-attack missions. When readers finish the book, they actually identify with the men of the unit.

Although reading about World War II is enjoyable, I have never relished accounts of force-on-force combat. Simply knowing that Battalion X engaged Battalion Y has always held little interest. The personalities behind the events hold more fascination for me. The men who made decisions, fought the battles, or engaged other pilots have always been intriguing. In this respect, *Wolfpack Warriors* does not let the reader down. Some of the biggest names in American aviation emerged from this unit: Hub Zemke, Dave Schilling, Francis "Gabby" Gabreski, Walker "Bud" Mahurin, and Robert Johnson, just to name a few, who will always exemplify excellence in air combat. Gabreski and Johnson, for example, led the way for American aces in Europe with 28 aerial victories apiece.

The book also points out several activities that many readers will likely find interesting. For example, in the race to destroy enemy aircraft, pilots got credit for ground as well as aerial victories, a practice that, later in the

war, led to problems in determining actual credit for individual pilots. The Germans in North Africa did poorly in aircraft recognition, and the Americans did little better. On one mission in particular, a 56th pilot in a hurry to score the group's first kill came home only to find that he had accidentally shot down a British Spitfire, as revealed by his gun camera film.

This fascinating book boasts 32 pages of excellent photographs. After all, when reading a unit history that spends so much time discussing the men that made it great, one should be able to see them. Unfortunately, the final product doesn't include maps, charts, or appendices detailing the most important aspects of the 56th Fighter Group or its relationship with other fighter units of the Eighth Air Force. Perhaps a reprint will add these.

My only complaint concerns the title. Perhaps a more accurate one would be *Wolfpack Warriors: The Story of World War II's Most Successful American Fighter Outfit*. During the course of the war, the group destroyed 664 German aircraft. In North Africa alone, German Fighter Group JG 27 destroyed 776 Allied aircraft between April 1941 and December 1942. Likewise, JG 26, on the Western Front, destroyed some 2,700

aircraft, and estimates indicate that JG 52, on the Russian Front, tallied nearly 10,000. The top six pilots in JG 52 accounted for 1,580 aircraft. Some British, Russian, or even Japanese units may also have enjoyed more success than the 56th. Although Zemke's Wolfpack was arguably the best American fighter unit, if the measure of such a unit's success is aerial victories, as alluded to by the author, then the 56th was certainly not the best during the entire conflict.

Notwithstanding these facts, I highly recommend this book. Roger Freeman has done a superb job of bringing us the history of one of America's most recognized and decorated fighter units. Well written, it easily holds the reader's attention. Although Donald Caldwell's incredible book *JG 26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe* remains the standard for aviation combat units, Freeman's work will not disappoint. Readers interested in the European air war and contributions made by a truly elite unit should add *Wolfpack Warriors* to their libraries.

**Lt Col Robert Tate, USAFR, Retired**  
*Montgomery, Alabama*

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