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Editorial

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Editorial

Challenges for National Identity

In the context of culture and nationalism, scholars have difficulty agreeing on what national identity stands for. Such divergence on its various aspects saw the emergence of a number of theories. The concept of a nation is a recent creation: the First World War gave birth to the League of Nations, and the Second World War to the United Nations Organization. Since then, this concept has attained worldwide recognition as the only legitimate basis for the state.

The fact that nations consist of people who identify themselves as different from other individuals makes states nationally homogeneous. The most extreme method of attaining such homogeneity—the "ethnic cleansing" recently witnessed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda—occurred frequently in the twentieth century, culminating in the Nazis' attempt to rid Germany (and Europe) of a myriad of minorities.

The major obstacles to national identity reside in states whose different ethnic groups live in the same geographic spaces and claim them as their ancestral homeland. Africa falls into that category. Creating and nurturing a national identity can become difficult and complex because most political boundaries between these nation-states are the legacy of European colonialists who drew them with little concern for African needs, culture, and traditions. Such disregard for human beings confined more than 3,000 ethnic groups in 53 countries (including six islands). Furthermore, in addition to the three lingua francas (English, French, and Arabic), Africa has more than 800 languages. Nigeria, home to over 154 million people (as of 2009) representing more than 250 different ethnic groups, offers an excellent example of the compounded problems plaguing Africa in terms of national identity.

Thus, Africa faces the prospect of an exclusivist national identity that splits states into morsels exploited by dishonest political leaders—a situation that might lead to civil wars and human misery, as in Côte d'Ivoire, or create larger entities, as prophesied for Europe more than a century ago by French historian Ernest Renan: "Nations are not eternal. They had a beginning, they will have an end. A European confederation will probably supply their place on that continent."[1]

We have at our disposal many evolving ways of realizing national identity, which itself is fluid and changeable. For instance, individual emotions, which should not be discarded as irrelevant and/or irrational, will continue to play an integral role in the process of forming a national identity. Jeannette Bougrab, a member of French president Nicolas Sarkozy's *Conseil d'État*, is a daughter of a "Harki," a term for the more than 100,000 Algerian irregulars who fought on the French side during the Algerian war. Disarmed and abandoned by the French government when Algeria won its independence in 1962, those who survived and reached France (like her family) found themselves interned in

camps and segregated from the local population for decades. Bougrab, who had every reason to resent and reject France, instead proclaimed that "for me, France is an ideal. I vow to France a genuine love and a limitless passion. This country is mine. . . . I feel French and I am proud of being French."[2]

The fact that national identity is the sum of millions of individual emotions like this one gives us hope.

Rémy M. Mauduit, Editor
Air and Space Power Journal—Africa and Francophonie
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Notes

1. Ernest Renan, "*Qu'est-ce qu'une nation*" (lecture delivered at the Sorbonne, Paris, 11 March 1882). See John Joseph Lalor, ed., *Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States*, vol. 2 (Chicago: Melbert B. Cary and Co., 1883), 930.

2. "Pour moi, la France est un idéal. Je lui voue un véritable amour et une passion sans limite. Ce pays est le mien. . . . Je me sens française et fière de l'être" (translated by the editor). Jeannette Bougrab, "Une certaine idée de la France," in Institut Montaigne, *Qu'est-ce qu'être français?* (Paris: Hermann éditeurs, 2009), 19–20.

Air and Space Power and Multidimensionality of the Battlespace

Some Elements on the Future of Military Engagements

Capt Grégory Boutherin, PhD, French Air Force*

In a study published by the RAND Corporation, David Johnson refers to "the future Air Force as an evolving idea," particularly highlighting that

> unlike the Army, whose learning has been largely framed by its constancy in adhering to its traditional central doctrinal tenet that wars are won by ground forces closing with and defeating the enemy, the Air Force has shown a greater capacity for adaptation throughout its history. In many cases, it was a service focused on proving an idea: that independent air power can be a decisive, war-winning instrument in and of itself. In the post-Cold War period, the Air Force has employed warfighting strategies whose broad conceptual approaches were quite diverse in the pursuit of this idea. In the 1991 Gulf War, the air campaign was initiated at the start of Desert Storm, and it combined counterair, SEAD [suppression of enemy air defenses], strategic attack, and interdiction. During the ground war, these components of the air campaign continued, but the Air Force also provided CAS [close air support] to ground forces. In Operation Allied Force, Air Force officers believed that the appropriate use of air power was to employ it against strategic targets in Belgrade, rather than against Serb forces in Kosovo. In Afghanistan, air power showed its greatest utility in attacking Taliban and al Qaeda forces in the field, tipping the battlefield balance against these forces and in favor of the Northern Alliance and other Afghan forces. Finally, in OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom], the Air Force selectively attacked strategic targets but made its most significant contribution during major combat operations by shattering Iraqi forces in the field. During war the basic idea of the decisiveness of air power evolved to meet operational realities.[1]

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Without going back to the origins of military aviation, this general overview shows the adaptive capacity of air and space power, which has really become "diverse and flexible."[2] Moreover, it also underlines changes within the confrontational environment in the two decades following the first Gulf War. Today, Afghanistan and Iraq, together with the Israeli interventions in south Lebanon (2006) and the Palestinian Territories (2009), show how a certain number of evolutions in the nature of conflicts, intervention environments, and adversaries, as well as in the use of air and space power. This use is completely different from the strategic, short, and effective air campaigns of the 1990s, which, by establishing the central role of the third dimension and of precision-guided munitions in a war, let us think that airpower would become "the perfect expression of a new warfare model showing that powers are powerless, national interest is relative and, finally, war is disincarnated."[3] Today's operations are in fact very different from the Operation Desert Storm or Allied Force "models," which, after acquiring air superiority (especially through missions like SEAD), destroying troops on the ground, and conducting campaigns of strategic bombing, left quite a small role for ground forces: occupying the field. Things are different today regarding adversaries, intervention environments, and political goals, and this difference determines the use of air and space power to replace traditional air interdiction and deep operations with, among other actions, a show of force or fire support. In this respect, Rebecca Grant points out that "if the Afghan war stretched the concept of strategic airpower, Gulf War II broke it wide open."[4] But should we see those evolutions as having an essential impact on future engagements?

In December 2006, during a workshop organized in Paris by the Centre for Air and Space Strategic Studies (Centre d'études stratégiques aérospatiales) of the French Air Force and dedicated to airpower in the next 20 years, Maj Gen Denis Mercier, then chief of the Plans Office of the French Air Force Staff, explained (paraphrasing Air Marshal Sir John C. Slessor) that if there is a more dangerous attitude than to suppose the next war will be just like the last one, it is imagining that this next war would be so different that we can afford to ignore all the lessons of the previous one.

This idea illustrates the core of the prospective approach and points out its importance, particularly for the preparation of forces. It is in fact one of the main lines of the *French White Paper on Defence and National Security*,

published by the French government in June 2008: "It is the ambition of France to be in a position where it does not have to submit to the effects of uncertainty; its ambition, rather, is to have the capacity to anticipate, respond to and influence international developments." With this aim, the white paper established the "knowledge and anticipation" function as the first of the five main strategic functions forming the architecture of French strategy, together with prevention, deterrence, protection, and intervention.[5] If this strategic function of knowledge and anticipation, presented as "a country's first line of defence," includes intelligence of all types, it also involves the prospective approach.[6] The latter appears all the more important since most armed forces have started to adapt their tools in accordance with the evolution of the international environment. The French Air Force is also subject to such evolution and has therefore initiated a similar process that it should carry on until 2025. Thus, the transformation must be accompanied by more global thinking on the conflictual environment and the battlespace in which air and space power could be engaged by 2025, when it would be "perfectly integrated in a global and interoperable system, controlling all the effects air and space force has at the heart of joint actions."[7]

However, questions about the evolution of the battlespace will not find any obvious answers. Moreover, they lead to analysis of many aspects, such as the evolution of the strategic environment, types of engagements and forms of conflict or technological evolutions, potential breakdowns, threat levels, and so forth. This is quite a complex task, reflected by the many exercises that have grown in number over the past years within the military staffs and bodies in charge of defense and security policies.[8] The works carried out by the US Air Force also show the extent of prospective thinking. We all remember the Air Force 2025 project, conducted by Air University in 1995/1996 and designed to identify the concepts, capabilities, and technologies that would enable the United States to preserve its air superiority over the next 30 years. The study involved almost 300 officers and over 40 studies, producing more than 3,300 pages of text. In 2006 Air University was tasked to conduct similar research with respect to the following 20 years. The work already completed by the Blue Horizon project, which mobilizes students of the Air War College and Air Command and Staff College each year, covers a wide range of fields, such as the use of biofuels as an alternative

solution to oil dependence, cyberspace issues, nanotechnologies, efficiency of directed energy weapons, and battlefield surveillance, among others.

Colin Gray, however, warned of the "perils of prediction," acknowledging that "the more detailed a prediction the more useful it should be" but pointing out that "unfortunately, degree of detail correlates closely with likelihood of error." Consequently, he recommended that we "beware of experts who have grown fond of the comforting, but highly misleading phrase, 'the foreseeable future.' The future is not foreseeable. No one has unique access to a trustworthy crystal ball. That granted, fortunately it so happens that we are in possession of information that should yield guidance for understanding a great deal about the future, including the future of warfare. But, making sense of that information is no simple matter."[9] So we should humbly approach prospective thinking and keep in mind that two strategic surprises—the fall of the Berlin Wall and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001—occurred less than 15 years apart. Without even mentioning strategic breakdowns, did we imagine in 1995 that—although four years earlier, Desert Storm had established the triumph of airpower and although North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces were about to conduct a series of raids and precision strikes on Bosnia and Herzegovina during Operation Deliberate Force—5 years later the bombing in Central Europe would give way to close fire support or show-of-force missions in Central Asia? Did we imagine four years later, during a 78-day air campaign aimed at forcing Serbian leaders to stop their ethnic-cleansing policy against Albanian-speaking populations in Kosovo, that the threats and adversaries of today would be nonstate and that missions would mainly relate to counterinsurgency (COIN)?

This article does not exhaustively study the evolution of the conflict environment or approach all the challenges that could confront air and space power in the near future. Neither does it draw up a typology of engagements over the next 15 years, not to mention predict the future of warfare. To do so would be ill advised. At most, this article points out certain trends that could prove essential for future conflicts and offers an analysis of how the multidimensional and changing battlespace of the future could affect the employment of air and space power.

Air and Space Power between Counterinsurgency and Conventional War

In addition to the idea that conflicts are likely to remain lengthy and take place on more distant theaters, one of the main trends that seems to define them in the 10 or 15 years to come is related to the nonstate nature of adversaries that Western armed forces would have to confront. This is almost a truism because it seems obvious that, in the near future, conflicts will be mainly related to COIN. Nevertheless, however commonplace that idea may seem, we mustn't ignore a less obvious fact: that these adversaries can cause real harm. That is, we should not succumb to the sin of pride by thinking that armed forces with great technological potential cannot be defeated by weaker adversaries.

A More Complex Battlespace

From that point of view, we must never underestimate these adversaries' capacity of analysis. Like Western forces, they pay special attention to the feedback of experience and to postengagement analysis in order to take advantage of weaknesses and difficulties observed in the armed forces. That, indeed, is why they favor certain environments such as the urban one, which, due to its human dimension, enables adversaries to exploit the normative and ethical constraints that Western armed forces must observe. But these actors' capability to inflict harm is also related to another aspect: the fact that they deploy, to a greater or lesser extent, advanced technological means, either to use the third dimension themselves or to prevent its use by Western forces. This contributes greatly to diminishing the traditional opposition between conventional and nonconventional warfare. One of the most symptomatic illustrations of this evolution, relating back to the technoguerilla notion, is, without any doubt, Hezbollah, which uses both rudimentary means (particularly related to communication) and more advanced technologies.[10] The events of the summer of 2006 in southern Lebanon demonstrated that the use of rockets, missiles, or drones (capable of carrying a military load and having a low radar signature) was not the exclusive privilege of armed forces having great technological potential but that nonstate actors (supported by certain states, of course) had access to such weapons. The employment of drones, even not very sophisticated ones (e.g., the Mirsad-1), or of antiship missiles (e.g., the C-802 Noor) is particularly significant. As

explained by Joseph Henrotin, one of the main European experts in strategic studies, "Today's guerillas are not a-technological objects."[11] In the future, insurgent or, more generally, irregular forces are likely to continue using the most rudimentary tactics, techniques, and technologies (with no radar signature, a low radar cross section, etc.) and at the same time the most advanced ones (both surface-to-air defense and armed drones). In order to face this wide range of threats, air and space forces will need to be capable of using sophisticated systems, in particular, those related to detection and identification. In the end, we need to keep in mind the adversary's determination and his capacity to adapt, which will without any doubt lead him to use surprising means.[12] That is the very essence of warfare: surprising one's enemy.

In addition to the intrinsic nature of the adversary and his likely means of operating, the nature of the intervention environment is particularly important for the preparation of forces. In this respect, it is interesting to point out that because theaters are extended, air mobility capabilities become even more crucial during deployment, support, or intratheater-maneuver operations. These essential capabilities enable forces to overcome the physical constraints of the field, gain speed in intervention, and avoid the inherent dangers of ground movements (improvised explosive devices, roadside bombs, ambushes, etc.). Today's conflicts demonstrate the importance of this air-ground synergy and the crucial role of maneuver and heavy-lift helicopters, as well as of projection capabilities, both tactical and strategic.

Analysis of the intervention environment also indicates that engagements and conflicts tend to be set in complex, uneven, or populated areas. This trend follows an ancestral principle of warfare: bringing the enemy into a known and controlled field. According to Sun Tzu, "Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him."[13] This principle is even stronger within a COIN framework. David Galula observes that "the role of geography, a large one in an ordinary war, may be overriding in a revolutionary war." He even believes that "if the insurgent, with his initial weakness, cannot get any help from geography, he may well be condemned to failure before he starts."[14] Thus, leveraging the environment is clearly a

means of leveling the power struggle and a strategy that enables the weaker adversary to bypass the force of the stronger one. Two relevant examples are the wars pitting the Israeli Defense Forces against Hezbollah (2006) and against Hamas (2009). Moreover, the Shiite militia in southern Lebanon has used the environment to take advantage of buried and hardened infrastructures linked by tunnel networks (imperceptible to air forces) and of the presence of civilians within the fighting areas.[15]

From this point of view, several reasons suggest that it is crucial to consider the urban environment when analyzing the evolution of the battlespace. First, cities are likely to remain at stake in conflicts due either to their concentration of political, economical, social, and cultural power or to their symbolic value. Second, urbanization of the world population is an increasing phenomenon: by 2025 almost 60 percent of the world population will live in cities (compared with less than 49 percent today).[16] Furthermore, 15 of the 22 megalopolises of the planet will be located in developing countries.[17] If urbanization rates are higher in developed countries than in emerging ones (53.2 percent compared to 42.7 percent), the latter will face more difficulties, particularly related to sanitary conditions and infrastructure. This situation would increase tension, which could only worsen the sanitary and pandemic crisis, the uneven distribution of resources, and the social, economic, or ethnic imbalance. Third, as previously pointed out, cities allow adversaries to bypass a stronger force's capabilities, especially its airpower. On the one hand, urban infrastructures (vertical and horizontal planes, urban canyons, underground networks, and so forth) place significant constraints on operations. On the other hand, the environment facilitates the deployment and concealment of surface-to-air capabilities (surface-to-air missiles as well as man-portable air defense systems). These aspects are also highlighted in Joint Publication 3-09.3, *Close Air Support*, which lists the main constraints of urban CAS operations, identifying among them difficulties related to urban configurations, communication problems (radio/video connections), disruption of infrared targeting systems, or the exposure of air platforms (particularly the rotary-wing ones) to significant threat. It also addresses all of the human-related constraints of engaging in an urban environment: restrictive rules of engagement, interweaving of armed forces with the adversaries and local civilian populations, and risks of incidental damages.[18]

Indeed, cities are a particularly complex environment where civilians naturally mingle with the fighting parties. This human dimension significantly increases the loose nature of threats and target elusiveness so that in an urban environment, warfare "involves *hitting the bull's-eye*" (emphasis in original).[19] This interweaving of forces with adversaries and civilians, as well as the difficulty of distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants, heightens constraints related to the rules of engagement, no-strike lists, or ethical and legal considerations. This situation generates a form of normative asymmetry in the sense that counterinsurgent forces are subject to a set of legal, operational, and ethical rules, which may just appear as so many constraints that do not weigh on the insurgents, whose "acts are not hindered by any article of the Geneva Convention. Their actions observe no ethical code."[20] The fact that civilian populations are widely exploited by adversaries only makes things more difficult. Once more, examine the wars in the Near East: Hezbollah and Hamas do not hesitate to conceal launchers near (or within) populated areas (schools, mosques, hospitals, etc.) or to "invite" the population to gather on roofs in order to dissuade Israeli Air Force pilots from using their armament. Of course, this is not a recent phenomenon witness the recourse to human shields in Iraq and the Balkans. But it is likely to increase all the more as the superiority of Western armed forces, particularly their air forces, will continue to lead adversaries to find parries not necessarily in order to win but at least to prevent such forces from reaching their objectives and political goals.

COIN, Only COIN, Nothing but COIN? Overcoming the Counterinsurgency Tropism

If force identification, precision, and control must be at the core of concerns about air and space power, we should not concentrate only on immediate issues or consider that in the future, cities would be the only environment where rivalries and power struggles could take place. We must not underestimate two other environments yberspace and space hat already appear as "future" theaters of operation or new "confrontation fields," as noted by the *Force Deployment Concept* published by the French Air Staff.[21]

It is true that cyberspace is not a particularly recent topic.[22] Still, it has become a crucial issue, in particular due to the dependence of modern armed forces on this environment. And all types of dependence are sources

of weakness. For example, the attacks on Estonia in 2007 and on Georgia in 2008.[23] But this threat is not generated only by state actors, as indicated by the Predator drones pirated by Iraqi insurgents, reported by the *Wall Street Journal* in December 2009. Moreover, such a threat does not require particularly complex means. In this case, a simple movie and MP3 download software proved sufficient to carry out the intrusions. Despite their rudimentary means, it seems that the hacker insurgents managed to obtain the data filmed and transmitted by the drones, partly due to the fact that, in order to accelerate the transmission, the data transferred from the platform to ground stations had not been encrypted. The US Air Force thought that insurgents would not be able to take advantage of this flaw, but they did. Imagine how difficult the situation could become if insurgents finally managed to nullify the tactical-operative advantages of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and partly take back the initiative by knowing what those aircraft are watching, and all this for $26.00![24] This is an especially interesting example to analyze because it illustrates so well the fact that cyberthreats are not generated solely by state actors. On the contrary, modern armed forces depend so much on cyberspace that a weaker adversary will strive all the more to damage them in this environment, not only because the technological, financial, and human investment is minimal, but also because it offers a way of harming armed forces without confronting them directly.

What we have here is a modern example of bypass strategy. Air and space power is particularly concerned with cyberspace since it operates and conducts missions by relying to a great extent upon information and communication systems and upon the use of networks such as the Rover system or tactical data link 16. More generally, the importance of drones within the modern battlespace and the increasing data exchanges between ground troops and aircraft (particularly for fire support procedures) are also relevant for this evolution. Whether it is about command and control; piloted aircraft or RPAs; satellite resources used for geolocation, communication, or observation purposes, today's air forces depend entirely on cyberspace. Therefore, in order to prevent any risk, the US Air Force entrusted its Cyber Command with the mission to "provide combat-ready forces equipped to conduct sustained operations in and through the electromagnetic spectrum, fully integrated with global air and space operations."[25] Furthermore, it is symptomatic to point out that, since December 2005, that service's mission

has been to "deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its global interests to fly and fight in Air, Space and Cyberspace."[26]

Cyberspace appears as a common environment, and that is why analysis of its vulnerabilities and threats and more generally its surveillance must rely upon a shared approach (inter-armed forces, interagencies, interservices, and interdepartments). Nevertheless, for outer space, the Air Force has a special, if not natural, responsibility. Just like cyberspace, extra-atmospheric space has become critical, if not indispensable, to every military operation due to its applications in terms of telecommunications, observation, navigation, advanced warning, and so forth. Because new military actors are emerging in this environment, it needs increased surveillance as threats, passing through or remaining there, tend to grow, whether they are deliberate (antisatellite weapons, jamming capabilities, etc.) or not (space debris).[27] In case of an open conflict, a crisis, or a period of high tensions, the struggle for power might find itself relocated in outer space. Belligerents might try to restrain the employment of command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems through jamming maneuvers against telecommunication or control networks, or through direct attacks aimed at space segments. Throughout the 15 years to come, few actors will find themselves in a position to conduct such offensive actions. However, space control will remain critical as the inherent risks of space increase; thus, surveillance of that medium needs to be enhanced. More generally, space, which tends to become an area of contention between states, illustrates what we may call war's absence of irreversibility. That is, total or mass war might not come back in the short term, but interstate confrontations will continue, as will crises particularly those concerning proliferation. War will not necessarily remain a phenomenon limited to so-called irregular forms, even if this seems the "dominant form of belligerency" throughout the coming years.[28]

Today, we pay great attention, both from an academic or doctrinal perspective, to irregular warfare and COIN. We are rediscovering old books, republishing the proceedings of conferences held almost a half century ago, and writing more COIN and irregular warfare manuals within the armed forces.[29] These include the US Army and Marine Corps common manual (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5), *Counterinsurgency*; COIN doctrine published by the French Army; and US Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, *Irregular*

Warfare.[30] Such studies are welcome indeed; however, we mustn't think that COIN will inevitably and invariably be the only form of warfare in the next 15 years. This is what Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, the Royal Air Force chief of staff, warned about in his speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London: "Afghanistan must serve as a *prism* to view the future, not a *prison* for our thinking."[31] By limiting the approach, particularly the prospective one, to COIN combat, we might confine ourselves to a model that will not necessarily reflect the possible trends of future conflicts. According to the capability approach, we mustn't limit air and space power's means of action to the "Afghan model."[32] It would be dangerous to think that, in the midterm, air and space power will not be used against adversaries who are similar or at least capable of challenging the full control of the third dimension by Western armed forces. The proliferation of air and space technologies and of surface-to-air systems in particular must be considered a factor of concern. This is all the more important because air and space operations are currently conducted in a permissive or semipermissive environment. To date, however, even though adversaries have not disputed the Western powers' control of the third dimension and if practically no air-to-air or surface-to-air threats exist, nothing guarantees that this situation will last forever, especially regarding the absence of surface-to-air threats. In other words, it would be an illusion to imagine that Western air and space powers will have perfect and systematic control of their environment in the future. The same is true of thinking that adversaries will not have access to capabilities, technologically advanced or not, or to various tactics likely to challenge the air superiority of Western armed forces. Furthermore, we haven't even mentioned the risks and threats related to ballistic missile proliferation, another air and space issue. Some crises and tensions demonstrate that we need to weigh all these risks carefully and preserve the capabilities and competences we need to face irregular engagements, state threats, and high-intensity conflicts. These capabilities and competences must enable Western armed forces and their air and space powers to engage in high-technology conflicts, however limited they may be, that might turn into hybrid conflicts. Threats tend to increase rather than diminish, as explained by Gen Stéphane Abrial, former chief of the French Air Staff, when he warned about excess confidence generated by Western armed forces' air superiority: "If we rest on our laurels . . . and if we don't take action to

maintain this advantage, we might pay dearly to rediscover an old principle."[33] In other words, we must not let ourselves be captivated by the "all COIN" siren song and risk ignoring the form of war, so well-known in the past, that we call conventional. Above all, we must maintain our capabilities and competences in order to face a wide range of threats and preserve the air superiority that will continue to be crucial, regardless of the type of engagements in which armed forces will be involved.

The War of Times

In addition to complexity, another characteristic of modern conflicts is the importance of tempo□ no re precisely, tempos□ n the battlespace. The plural form is necessary since both the armed forces, in this case air and space power, and their adversaries, particularly the nonstate ones, tend to act according to various tempos. Time has clearly become one of the main characteristics of today's conflicts and a critical element for future ones.

A Wide Range of Tempos

We know that, like height and reach, the control of short time, long time, and speed is one of the main characteristics of air and space power. In this respect, the *French Air Force Concept* emphasizes that "in theory, an air force in control of these three fields would be capable of making its country fully benefit from the advantages provided by the third dimension."[34] Because it controls the short time, air and space power can reduce the intervention, movement, and deployment times. But in modern conflicts, the use of long time also becomes crucial for operations, particularly for the weakest elements trying to prolong engagements. By attempting to exhaust the armed forces or at least give the impression that they are bogged down, adversaries seek to make local populations perceive counterinsurgent troops as occupation forces and thereby influence opinions of the national and international publics, which tend to withdraw their support for lengthy operations. In order to do that, adversaries of Western armed forces resort more and more to manipulating various media, trying to influence public opinion on the legitimacy of the intervention or take advantage of the public's "low" resilience. In this case, if adversaries make "strategic" use of long time, they act on a

double time level and give priority to the short time, using elusiveness and concealment tactics.

Western armed forces take the opposite approach by trying at a strategic level to reduce as much as possible the duration of their operations, aware that public support decreases as deployment time increases. At the tactical and operational levels, they combine the two paces and try to control the long time in order to act in a short time. Today's operations show us every day that RPAs are crucial. In addition to the fact that they keep people away from the risk area, RPAs have the advantage of long-time control: the ability to persist in the area. This is an undeniable operational gain because having not only control of the air for the long term but also networking sensors and receivers enables armed forces to acquire full situational awareness, a comprehensive vision of the battlefield, and a common picture of the operational situation. At the tactical and operational levels, this advantage allows control of the long time so that armed forces can act in the short time by capturing the elusive moment. In this respect, Col Jean-Christophe Noël of the French Air Force explains that "the systematic control of the short time in a theater like Afghanistan provides new possibilities to review the air maneuver but the 'structural' approach is prevailing and the division of work on the battlefield depends too much and too often on the responsibility areas allocated to each component."[35] Even though the Kosovo War may have demonstrated that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms were limited in some respects, their persistence during all types of weather, day and night, appears today as an actual tactical-operative innovation providing area coverage, as well as continuous, instant information to both air and ground forces. From now on, whether in Lebanon or Gaza, Iraq or Afghanistan, no armed force engaged in a conflict can ignore the persistence provided by drones, which "have become a critical component of modern air-ground operations," either during engagements or prior to them, as shown by the four months of intelligence acquisition and georeferencing before the second offensive in Fallujah (November 2004).[36]

Elusiveness versus Reactivity

It is all the more important for armed forces to operate platforms capable of controlling the long time in order to act in a short time since adversaries' elusiveness is one of the main characteristics of modern conflicts. Within

COIN conflicts, flight persistence has become crucial for capturing these fleeting moments. Among the numerous examples illustrating this idea, retired US Air Force general David Deptula, who served as deputy chief of staff for ISR, reported that even though it took only six minutes for an F-16 patrol to deliver fire on Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, the Predator had previously performed almost 6,000 hours of target observation, tracking, and localization.[37] Thus, time control is the critical issue here; other than the advantages drones provide in terms of intelligence and information control, they are particularly important because they enhance force reactivity.

This is not a new issue, and it lies at the core of the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop concept and of the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) six-stage target cycle.[38] But today's operations, either the ones carried out by Israel or those conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq, prove the critical nature of this aspect and the importance of performing dynamic targeting and dealing with time-sensitive targets. The necessity of controlling short and, ideally, real time appears to be one of the main evolutions of the battlespace.[39] By trying to blend in with the population or take advantage of the dark areas that cities and their outskirts provide, adversaries attempt to impose their rhythm and control the initiative. In order to stop them, forces need to control the long time (persistence) and diminish the time span between observation and action. In this respect, drones offer a huge advantage; specifically, their persistence, together with the capacity to transmit information on a direct, continuous, and real-time basis, ensures acceleration of pace and time control.

In terms of reducing action time, weapon systems like the Harop Israeli drone or the British Fire Shadow missile seem particularly useful. Both are capable of persistently flying above an area, just like a traditional ISR platform, to provide missile use and enable instant strike of a target.[40] But armed drones are more than "disposable" platforms; they also have the advantage of combining persistence of flight and acceleration of the engagement cycle. This compression of the OODA loop is all the more essential because most of today's offensive missions of air and space power are dynamic, targeting adversaries who avoid direct confrontation and bypass the force. This is one of the reasons that countries other than the United States have become extremely interested in these armed platforms. The United

Kingdom and Italy already operate MQ-9 Reapers, and it seems that Turkey is considering acquisition of them. Since 2001, and more particularly, after 2008, the employment of armed drones has increased considerably. For instance, a New American Foundation study points out that drones operated in Pakistan by the United States performed 53 strikes in 2009 and no fewer than 18 during the first two months of 2010, compared to nine between 2004 and 2007 and 34 in 2008.[41] It seems that the Egyptian Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Sheik Saeed al-Masri), al-Qaeda's "number three," was killed by a drone in May 2010 in North Waziristan.[42] By combining persistence and instantaneity, these platforms have become a "weapon of choice" in modern conflicts.[43] This combination provides yet another advantage. Like a show of presence and show of force, armed drones can have a tactical deterrence (persistent) function, contributing to the controlled use of force. By maintaining a continuous armed presence above an area, suggesting to adversaries that they are under constant control and that armed forces tend to react in a progressively shorter time, drones influence decision making and dissuade adversaries from acting. This dissuasive function of armed RPAs contributes to a controlled use of force, critical in COIN or stabilization operations, especially since forces must avoid causing damage that might turn the population against them.

Due to the central place and increasing role of drones in modern conflicts, but also because of the evolution of threats, we need to protect such platforms. Despite their great importance, drones remain vulnerable to both air-to-air and surface-to-air threats. Two examples are particularly relevant: the Israeli Heron brought down in 2006 by Syrian surface-to-air defenses and the Georgian drone that filmed its own destruction by a Russian MiG-29 in April 2008.[44] This vulnerability underscores the fact that acquisition of air superiority will continue to be a must for future engagements, even in the case of an asymmetric or irregular conflict. This principle is even more crucial because adversaries, whose capacity to adapt shouldn't be underestimated, will inevitably try to diminish the drones' tactical and operative advantages. Network security is also of great importance, as reflected by the Predator piracy cases in Iraq.

Accelerating the Tempo through Decentralization

If current engagements prove the significance of the "observation/strike" tandem, they also show that tempo control implies high decentralization, which does not lack impact in terms of organization. One of the main lessons of these past few years is the apparent rediscovery of CAS missions, suggesting an evolution of the employment of forces towards a real air-ground synergy. This phenomenon contradicts Edward Luttwak's assertion that within COIN, air and space power is "of little use" and that, although it can provide surveillance and transport, "the insurgents are rarely stable and contrasted targets attackable from the air."[45]

Even if CAS missions have not been used in the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts, the latter illustrate the importance of today's combined operations of ground and air forces. Those missions have evolved and are now quite different from the ones conducted, for example, in Bosnia during Operation Deny Flight. The chain of command was so complex then, that "the advantages of air power were finally annulled."[46] By showing the critical nature of air-ground integration and of the transition from airpower to the "interdependence of armed forces," such missions prove the importance, in terms of reactivity, of the distribution of control and execution, as well as of air-ground contacts (particularly for data exchange).[47] It would be profitable to consider intensifying the decentralization of air mobility (not of command but of control and execution), another form of air-ground integration. Doing so could prove particularly useful in commanding and guiding additional units sent to support troops in contact. This alternative form of CAS would enable a forward air controller to direct maneuver helicopters from the ground in order to guide additional ground units intended to support troops in contact. By extending the distribution of control, a different but adapted and reactive one could provide support whenever classical support missions are not an optimal solution due to constraints generated by the environment or the interweaving of forces with civilians or adversaries.[48]

People, Perceptions, and Media: The Human at the Heart of the Battlespace

This interweaving demonstrates the importance of the human dimension of engagements today. As mentioned above, adversaries of Western

forces try to prolong engagements, hoping that the population would either refuse to support or withdraw its support of those forces.

Nowadays, the battlespace has become globalized and multidimensional. New "confrontation" fields have augmented its classical definition: a physically delimited field where two or several forces confront each other by military means, each trying to impose its will on the other. If space and cyberspace are two examples of the battlespace, then the media and the psychosociological sphere of perceptions appear to be fundamental elements. This leads to a kind of paradox: despite remarks about a "robotization" phenomenon, in reality, war remains a fundamentally "human" activity.

COIN operations have highlighted the key role that populations play whether they are an objective (acquiring their support) or an instrument (human shield). Again, that aspect is not new, as Galula has already pointed out that populations were the ones really at stake in conflicts. More recently, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) *Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance* asserted a similar principle, noting that "protecting the people is the mission. The conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy. ISAF will succeed when [the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] earns the support of the people."[49] Numerous authors, both military and academic, have written about this subject, one of them being Gen Rupert Smith, who meditated on the "war amongst people."[50] Another example is a book, recently published by three colonels of the Mountain Infantry of the French Army, entitled *Principes de contre-insurrection* (*Counterinsurgency Principles*), which emphasizes the human dimension. The authors also point out the necessity of pacing, asserting that " '*winning the hearts and minds*' of the local populations, which is crucial in order to defeat insurgency, is a long drawn out work, incompatible with the lightning war pattern deeply fixed in the western people's mentalities. Since they are 'in a perpetual hurry,' western people think a long war necessarily drags on" (emphasis in original).[51] In the end, given the importance of populations and their key role (whether deliberate or not) in modern conflicts, we may wonder if they haven't become actual centers of gravity in the sense used by retired Air Force colonel John Warden. More generally, we may extend the reasoning and consider that a COIN pattern includes several centers of gravity. As Henrotin explains, if Warden's typical adversary "was a State, within a systematic vision we may extend the

reasoning to the insurgent groups: they also operate with a leadership (leaders and ideologists), 'organic essentials' (e.g., media online platforms), 'infrastructures' (financial system or smugglers), a 'population' (supporting the insurgents) and 'fielded forces.'"[52]

This pressing necessity to acquire and preserve popular support demonstrates the importance of perceptions in war. Their role within foreign policy is not really a recent issue, as reflected by several studies, poised between international relations theories and cognitive sciences, referring in particular to the role of perceptions within decision-making processes and more precisely related to nuclear deterrence. These include the works of Robert Jervis and, in particular, his study *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, published in 1976, which remains topical.[53] Today, perceptions do indeed play a key role in a mainly counterinsurrectionary conflict environment, where the media are of great importance.

In the *Revue française de science politique* (1986), Michael Hearn explains that "it is interesting to study perception in order to analyze the image in foreign policy, which means to identify the representation the decision-maker has on the national, regional or global environment."[54] Even if populations and public opinions might not be decision makers in Hearn's sense, their influence is real. In particular, within COIN operations, where winning hearts and minds has become a key objective. The problem is that both parties share that objective. Thus, by a symmetric effect, armed forces need to dispute this support to the adversary. Therefore, the population's perceptions and empathy become a target. Analyzing the Afghan conflict, Andrew Exum explains his interest in Pakistani press releases because, in this perpetual battle, it is less important how many civilians actually have been killed by the engaged forces than how many the population thinks have been killed.[55] Once again, the insurgents use a roundabout strategy, bypassing the armed forces and trying to shape the public's perceptions in order to make them withdraw their support from the counterinsurgent forces. Their final objective is to make those forces leave the battlefield prematurely.

Air and space power is directly concerned with these issues, especially due to perceptions that the public might have about the means it employs. For example, drones do indeed play a key role for the armed forces but are subject to largely negative popular beliefs associated with no-pilot aircraft, robots, and so forth; additionally, they may seem counterproductive because

the local public considers them a sign of weakness or because of their association with the notion of collateral damage.[56] However, we mustn't ignore such perceptions just because they are wrong. Moreover, we have a very techno/industrial-oriented approach to drones instead of a global one. This is even more important since the media do not do justice to these aircraft, not necessarily because they intend to tarnish their image but because the lack of information about these platforms, together with a need to simplify the information available, makes them spread false impressions. Perceptions must be taken into account when using these aircraft in conflicts in which cultural approach and opinions are important, and when planning and defining the intended effects. This is an essential approach because the image of RPAs is likely to cause loss of support from the public. Such an admission does not equate to questioning the operational importance of these platforms. That is an undeniable fact. However, this global approach should help define a specific communication strategy in order to explain what armed drones are and, of course, what they are not. Otherwise, their use could prove counterproductive during long-term operations that depend upon the public's support. One must anticipate the commentary related to armed drones and adopt a proactive approach. Deprived of other sources of information, populations know little about these platforms, a situation that makes them vulnerable to the insurgents' propaganda, which can create a negative opinion about the drones. As Hearn writes, "What really matters is not the force, but how the force is perceived." He also points out that "the perception of the reality overtakes reality itself."[57]

Apart from this aspect specific to drones, armed forces have become aware to some extent that the battlespace has expanded to the sphere of perceptions, as reflected in the most recent doctrine. In FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, the term *perception*, for example, appears 59 times, excluding the tables of contents and indexes. Furthermore, the last editions of France's *Force Deployment Concept* stress that "the 'battle of perceptions' becomes offensive and defensive, strategic and tactical, and it is essential when planning and conducting an operation." Highlighting the polymorphous nature of today's conflicts, the *Concept* notes the "critical importance" of that battle in COIN conflicts, where adversaries favor psychological actions.[58] It is in fact what Cori Dauber refers to when writing that

> waging war against terrorists (or insurgents using a terrorist playbook) is a qualitatively different enterprise from earlier, or different, wars. By definition, terrorists are too weak to fight conventional battles. The question is what kind of battle, then, are they fighting? They fight a battle to shape the perceptions and attitudes of the public[illegible] battle over the public's very will to continue fighting, whether that is the indigenous public insurgents seek to intimidate or the domestic American public they seek to influence so as to force counterinsurgents to withdraw from the battlefield prematurely. And in the modern world, this will, of necessity, be a battle to shape media coverage.

Further on, the author explains that today the fight must occur on two fronts:

> The *ground war*, meaning the war that has to actually be won on the ground, the state of play on the ground as it exists in reality. But there is also the *air war*, meaning the war as it exists on the nation's front pages and television screens. For a democracy, winning one and not the other will always mean losing, and losing in a very real sense, because the loss of public support means that the war will come to an end, period.
>
> This means that the terrorist attack is a media event in the sense that it is designed to attract the attention of the media, to gain the media's attention, the same way that a political campaign event is a media event, designed to attract the media's attention and thus garner coverage. As in the case of the presidential campaign, when we discuss *media attention* we are really first and foremost talking about television. When we are talking about gaining television's attention, we are really talking about gaining the attention of the cameras[illegible] nd the way to do that, of course, is to provide *good visuals*, however those are defined in a particular context (emphasis in original).[59]

The perceptions issue is closely related to the role of media in modern conflicts. It is all the more central as they are not only omnipresent, particularly in cities, but also used[illegible] ven exploited[illegible] y adversaries. Moreover, today the role of the media[illegible] f mass communication[illegible] s atomized and thus any individual, even for a short moment, can turn into a receiver or sender of information in real time. This evolution has been made possible by advances in information and communication technologies that have become very accessible (e.g., mobile phones and the Internet). Today, an isolated individual can influence perceptions by broadcasting worldwide a piece of information or a message. Two examples illustrate this phenomenon: the proliferation of blogs and the role played by citizen reporters in media coverage of the suppression of demonstrations following the 2009 presidential election in Iran. We can easily imagine that in a few years, individuals could follow up conflicts live on various platforms, starting with mobile phones. More than simple "wartainment," it would constitute an actual "mobile war"

era.[60] Since people could follow up the conflict in real time, pressure on armed forces will increase greatly, as well as the need to control the effects particularly through precision. That has to be considered since adversaries use subversion, coercion, and persuasion strategies aimed at influencing populations and public opinion. Thus, propaganda key component of this bypass strategy comes into play at local, national, and international levels to "influence perceptions of potential supporters, opinion leaders, and opponents in the favor of the insurgents; promoting the insurgent cause and diminishing the government's resolve."[61] Making the same observation, James Corum writes that

> we have to be ready to counter a large scale disinformation campaign mounted by insurgent and radical groups against military operations. A senior commander today, operating against irregular enemies, needs a highly trained specialist cadre who can handle media and information operations. The poor Israeli response to the conflict with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in the summer of 2006 ought to be a warning about the need to anticipate the opponent's media campaign and to proactively develop responses using themes, words and images that will appeal not only to our own public, usually the audience for our own media campaigns, but also to the people of the region. When we catch our opponents using lies and disinformation, or the western media uncritically repeating the disinformation, we need to be able to quickly and effectively counter such propaganda campaigns. Counter-insurgency is still about winning hearts and minds, and effective media operations are one of the main weapons we have.[62]

In other words, a confined environment, deep interweaving with the civilian population, and omnipresent media and real-time broadcasting produce increasingly complex operations tolerating no margin of error; the smallest collateral damage can be instantly broadcasted worldwide. Such things already happen today, and this is only the beginning. Once more, we note a clear evolution during the past 15 years: in 1993 US forces landed on the Somali beaches, followed by cameras of the major Western media. Today, in Gaza, YouTube broadcasts the war of images and communication.

Conclusion

Two decades ago, Martin van Creveld wrote that in the future, war "will not be waged on a battlefield his kind of space doesn't exist anymore all over the world but within more complex, natural or artificially created environments. It would be a war of listening, car bombs, hand-to-hand fights. . . . It will be endless, bloody and atrocious."[63] What more can we say

about the conflicts that will involve air and space power during the next 15 years? Van Creveld's remark holds true not only for today but also for tomorrow. Future wars will likely occur in particularly complex environments, whether cities, exoatmospheric space, or various human spheres. Moreover, they will probably cover the entire spectrum of conflict, from stabilization to high-intensity confrontation. Threats could be conventional and symmetrical or completely asymmetrical, mixing rudimentary means and high technology. With regard to the armed forces, this situation will require sophisticated systems, especially those related to detection and identification, maintenance of competences, and development of capabilities in order to carry out all missions, from a show of force to high-intensity engagement.

The capacity to act in the third dimension, a necessity and prerequisite of all forms of engagement, will remain an essential factor for the success of operations. Due to the wide range of means it offers, from the extremely rapid projection of forces to the identification and destruction of high-value targets, passing through fire support, air and space power is more than a simple tool used to assist actions; rather, it actually gives armed forces a "critical advantage."[64] Control of the third dimension will remain crucial for future operations, regardless of their nature and the environment of engagements, because it enhances force and efficiency as well as contributes to delivering fire and acquiring situational awareness. It will be as essential tomorrow as it is today for freedom of action. If the evolution of engagements and environments demands that we adapt our methods and means in order to control effects, flexibility, and reactivity, it is certain that "the capabilities of the third dimension are not used as an additional contribution to the ground fighting anymore, but as a major component thereof."[65]

Notes

1. See in particular David E. Johnson, *Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 182.

2. Rebecca Grant, "The Redefinition of Strategic Airpower," *Air Force Magazine* 86, no. 10 (October 2003): 34.

3. Joseph Henrotin, *L'*Airpower *au XXIe siècle: Enjeux et perspectives de la stratégie aérienne* (Brussels: Bruylant, 2005), 388. (Original version: "L'expression parfaite d'un nouveau modèle de guerre montrant l'impuissance des puissances, la relativité de l'intérêt national et, *in fine* une guerre désincarnée.")

4. Grant, "Redefinition of Strategic Airpower," 35. The author concludes by pointing out that "Gulf War II should put to rest the false debate about what strategic airpower can or cannot do on its own. Operation Iraqi Freedom was a mosaic of action at all points on the compass and at different levels of intensity. Fighters, bombers, and even Predator UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] served as 'strategic' weapons by striking high-value targets. Strategic airpower will continue to be a major advantage for U.S. military forces, but it need no longer be tied down to its historical baggage" (38).

5. "The aim of prevention is to avoid the emergence or aggravation of threats to our national security. An effective preventive strategy will rely on a broad range of diplomatic, economic, military, legal and cultural tools, co-ordinated at the

international, European and national levels." *French White Paper on Defence and National Security* (Paris: Odile Jacob/La documentation Française, 2008), 143.

6. Ibid., 125.

7. Col Michel Friedling and Lt Col Philippe Cexus, "Faire Face 2025: Un grand projet pour l'armée de l'air," *Penser les Ailes françaises*, Centre d'études stratégiques aérospatiales, no. 10 (June 2006): 9. (Original version: "Parfaitement intégrée en un système global, interopérable et maître de l'ensemble des effets de la force aérospatiale au cœur de l'action interarmées.")

8. Among the many prospective studies, we recommend those published in France under the aegis of the Defense Staff and/or the Delegation for Strategic Affairs (French Ministry of Defense), the Multiple Futures Project of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Global Strategic Trends Programme initiated by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre of the UK Ministry of Defense, or *Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment* (2006). More generally, see Paul Braken, "Net Assessment: A Practical Guide," *Parameters* 36, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 90–100.

9. Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Phoenix, 2006), 37–38.

10. See in particular Joseph Henrotin, "Les ré(é)volutions du caméléon: Combat futur et formation des structures de force entre *Transformation*, guerres hybrides et nouvelles formes d'application des conceptions de techno-guérilla," *Les Cahiers du RMES* 5, no. 2 (2008/2009): 75–127.

11. Ibid., 91. (Original version: "Les guérillas contemporaines ne sont pas des objets a-technologiques.")

12. See, among others, Noam Ophir, "Back to Ground Rules: Some Limitations of Airpower in the Lebanon War," *Strategic Assessment* 9, no. 2 (August 2006).

13. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, chap. 6, "Weak and Strong Points."

14. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 23.

15. See in particular Sarah E. Kreps, "Air Power's Role in Asymmetric Operations: The Case of the Second Lebanon War," in *Air Power, Insurgency and the "War on Terror,"* ed. Joel Hayward (Cranwell, UK: Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies, Royal Air Force College, 2009), 143–55.

16. United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs, Population Division, "World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database," http://esa.un.org/unup.

17. Nicole Gnesotto, *Le monde en 2025* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2007), 26.

18. Joint Publication 3-09.3, *Close Air Support*, 8 July 2009, v, 86–87.

19. Maj Benjamin R. Maitre, "The Paradox of Irregular Airpower," *Air and Space Power Journal* 21, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 36.

20. Sylvain Tesson, Thomas Goisque, and Bertrand de Miollis, *Haute tension: Des chasseurs alpins en Afghanistan* (Paris: Gallimard, 2009), 28–29.

21. French Air Staff, *Concept d'emploi des forces*, no. 004/DEF/CICDE/NP, 11 January 2010, 12.

22. In this respect, review the various works of John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, including "Cyberwar Is Coming!," *Comparative Strategy* 12, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 141–65; (eds.), *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, MR-880-OSD/RC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997); and *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, MR-1382-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). More recently, see Henning Wegener, "Harnessing the Perils in Cyberspace: Who Is in Charge?," *Disarmament Forum*, no. 3 (2007): 45–52; and Lt Col Mel Deaile, "Cyberspace Warfare: The New Frontline," *Journal of the JAPCC* [Joint Air Power Competence Center, NATO], no. 8 (2008): 58–61.

23. See in particular "Cyber Attack on Estonia Stirs Fear on Virtual War," *International Herald Tribune*, 18 May 2007; "The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia," BBC News, 17 May 2007; "Estonia Urges Firm EU, NATO Response to New Form of Warfare: Cyber-Attacks," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 May 2007; "Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia," *Guardian*, 17 May 2007; and Maj Leland Bohannon, *Cyberspace and the New Age of Influence* (Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, June 2008), 43–51.

24. See Siobhan Gorman, Yochi J. Dreazen, and August Cole, "Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones," *Wall Street Journal*, 17 December 2009. As the article points out, according to US authorities, there would be no proof that insurgents could take control of the drones or interfere with their flights.

25. US Air Force, Air Force Cyber Command, *Air Force Cyber Command Strategic Vision*, February 2008, 1. This document also points out that "cyberspace integrates operations across all other domains, facilitating interdependent offensive and defensive operations to achieve dominance at the place and time of our choosing. Controlling cyberspace will allow us to create the full spectrum of desired effects across future integrated battlefields. The Air Force has routinely employed electromagnetic capabilities to engage the enemy, establishing and sustaining the air and space superiority that has proved decisive in winning the nation's battles and wars. We will leverage this expertise and further develop capabilities enhancing our freedom of action while limiting the flexibility of our adversaries" (4). See also Lt Col Shane P. Courville, *Air Force and the Cyberspace Mission: Defending the Air Force's Computer Network in the Future*, Occasional Paper no. 63 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, December 2007);

and, of course, the *National Space Policy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 28 June 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national _space_policy_6-28-10.pdf.

26. Richard Mesic et al., *Air Force Cyber Command (Provisional) Decision Support* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 2n5.

27. See, among others, Lt Col James Mackey, "Recent US and Chinese Antisatellite Activities," *Air and Space Power Journal* 23, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 82–83.

28. Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, 24.

29. Note the symposium held in April 1962 by RAND, in which Galula participated: Stephen T. Hosmer and Sibylle O. Crane, *Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16–20, 1962* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006).

30. Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006; French Army, Forces Employment Doctrine Center (Centre de doctrine d'emploi des forces), *Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level*, January 2009; and Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, *Irregular Warfare*, 1 August 2007. See also *The 21st Century Air Force: Irregular Warfare*, January 2009; and Richard Mesic et al., *Courses of Actions for Enhancing U.S. Air Force "Irregular Warfare" Capabilities: A Functional Solutions Analysis*, MG-913-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010).

31. Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, Royal Air Force chief of staff, "Dominant Air Power in the Information Age: The Comparative Advantage of Air and Space Power in Future Conflict" (address, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 15 February 2010), 4.

32. See Stephen D. Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 2 (March/April 2003): 31–46; and Stephen D. Biddle, "Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq," *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 161–76.

33. Général d'armée aérienne (Gen) Stéphane Abrial (address, 59th session of the Institute for Higher National Defence Studies [Institut des hautes études de Défense nationale], Paris, 7 March 2007). (Original version: "Si nous dormons sur nos lauriers et n'agissons pas pour maintenir cet avantage, le prix à payer pourrait être très élevé pour redécouvrir un vieux principe.")

34. French Air Force, *Concept de l'armée de l'air*, September 2008, 8. (Original version: "Une armée de l'air qui maîtriserait ces trois domaines serait théoriquement capable de faire bénéficier pleinement son pays de l'ensemble des avantages que procure la troisième dimension.")

35. See Col Jean-Christophe Noël, "La manœuvre aérienne en question," in *Guerre et manœuvre*, ed. Christian Malis (Paris: Economica, 2009), 202. (Original version: "Que la maîtrise systématique du temps court sur l'ensemble d'un théâtre comme l'Afghanistan offre de nouvelles possibilités pour repenser la manœuvre aérienne alors que l'approche 'structurelle' domine et que la division du travail sur le champ de bataille reste souvent bien trop dépendante des zones de responsabilité attribuées à chaque composante.") More generally, see Robert R. Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994).

36. Général d'armée aérienne (Gen) Jean-Paul Paloméros (French chief of Air Staff) and Général de corps d'armée (Lt Gen) François-Pierre Joly, "Drones en Afghanistan, la nécessaire complémentarité des vecteurs," *Défense nationale et sécurité collective*, no. 720 (June 2009): 67. (Original version: "[Les drones] sont devenus une composante essentielle des opérations aéroterrestres modernes.")

37. Michael W. Isherwood, "Roadmap for Robotics," *Air Force Magazine* 92, no. 12 (December 2009): 31.

38. On this notion, see in particular Adam J. Hebert, "Compressing the Kill Chain," *Air Force Magazine* 86, no. 3 (March 2003): 50–54.

39. See Christophe Pajon and Grégory Boutherin, "Persistance et maîtrise du temps au cœur du champ de bataille contemporain: Les drones comme instrument de contrôle des 'présents,'" *Défense et sécurité internationale: Technologies*, no. 19 (September/October 2009): 8–12.

40. See Akram Ghulam and Col Peter Tomlinson, "The Fire Shadow Project: A Big Step towards Rapid Acquisition," *RUSI Defence Systems* 11, no. 2 (October 2008): 77–80.

41. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, "The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2010," Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper (Washington, DC: New American Foundation, 24 February 2010).

42. Eric Schmitt, "Strike Said to Kill a Top Al Qaeda Leader," *New York Times*, 31 May 2010; and Greg Miller and Craig Withlock, "Al-Qaeda No. 3 Yazid Reported Killed by U.S. Drone," *Washington Post*, 1 June 2010.

43. Christopher Drew, "Drones Are Weapons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda," *New York Times*, 17 March 2009.

44. Ben Moores, "A Preliminary Military Assessment of the Lebanon Conflict," defense-aerospace.com, 18 August 2006, http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/72377/a-preliminary-assessment-of-the -lebanon-conflict.html.

45. Edward N. Luttwak, "Les impasses de la contre-insurrection," *Politique étrangère*, no. 4 (2006): 850. (Original version: "Les insurgés constituent rarement des cibles stables et contrastées pouvant être attaquées depuis les airs.")

46. Henrotin, *L'*Airpower *au XXIe siècle*, 279.

47. Général de corps aérien (Lt Gen, French Air Force, retired) Jean-Patrick Gaviard, "L'héritage d'*Allied Force*," *Défense et sécurité internationale*, no. 51 (September 2009): 40. (Original version: "interdépendance interarmées"). See also Joseph Henrotin,

who refers to an "interdépendance naturelle," soulignant que celle-ci "est déjà établie *de facto* dans un certain nombre de secteurs." Joseph Henrotin, "Les facettes et défis de la puissance aérienne au 21ème siècle: Vers une approche synergistique?," *Les Cahiers du RMES* 6, no. 1 (Summer/Fall 2009): 74–75.

48. On the inherent difficulties of air support, see in particular Olivier Zajec, "L'appui aérien dans le cadre de la guerre irrégulière," *Stratégique*, nos. 93/94/95/96 (2009): 477–90. More generally, see Tim Ripley, "The Right Call," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 46, no. 44 (4 November 2009): 38–43.

49. International Security Assistance Force Headquarters, *ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance*, August 2009, 1.

50. Gen Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin, 2006).

51. Col Hervé de Courrèges, Col Emmanuel Germain, and Col Nicolas Le Nen, *Principes de contre-insurrection* (Paris: Economica, 2010), 28. (Original version: "*La conquête des cœurs et des esprits* des populations locales qui est indispensable pour vaincre l'insurrection, est une œuvre de très longue haleine qui s'accommode mal de la culture de la guerre éclair profondément ancrée dans les mentalités des peuples occidentaux. Pour ces derniers, les 'éternels pressés,' une guerre qui dure est forcément une guerre qui s'enlise.")

52. Joseph Henrotin, "Peut-on penser une campagne COIN en stratégie aérienne? L'apport de Warden," *Défense & sécurité internationale*, no. 54 (December 2009): 29. (Original version: "Une vision systémique permet d'étendre le raisonnement aux groupes insurgés: eux aussi fonctionnent avec un leadership [dirigeants et idéologues], des 'organes essentiels' [plates-formes médiatiques en ligne, par exemple], des 'infrastructures' [système financier ou de passeurs], une 'population' [soutenant les insurgés] et des 'forces déployées.'")

53. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). See also "Deterrence and Perception," *International Security* 7, no. 3 (Winter 1982/1983); and Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13, no. 1 (May 1969): 75–94. Among the studies related to nuclear deterrence, see R. Harrison Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4, no. 2 (1992).

54. Michael Hearn, "La perception," *Revue française de science politique*, no. 3 (1986): 323. (Original version: "L'intérêt de se pencher sur la perception est d'analyser l'image en politique étrangère, c'est-à-dire identifier la représentation que se fait le décideur de l'environnement national, régional ou global.")

55. Andrew Exum, "On Drones," 22 October 2009, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/10/drones.html. Currently a researcher at the Center for a New American Security, Andrew Exum is a former officer in the US Army Rangers and close adviser of Gen Stanley McChrystal, with whom he has collaborated in order to define the new American strategy in Iraq.

56. See in particular, Marc Mazzetti, "The Downside of Letting Robots Do the Bombing," *New York Times*, 22 March 2009; Doyle McManus, "U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan 'Backfiring,' Congress Told," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 May 2009; and David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum, "Death from Above, Outrage Down Below," *New York Times*, 17 May 2009.

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58. French Air Staff, *Concept d'emploi des forces*, 23. (Original version: "La 'bataille des perceptions' revêt ainsi un caractère à la fois offensif et défensif, stratégique et tactique, et dans tous les cas essentiel dans la planification et la conduite d'une opération; 'L'importance décisive' de cette bataille dans des engagements contre-insurrectionnels où les adversaires privilégient des actions dans les champs psychologiques.")

59. Cori E. Dauber, *YouTube War: Fighting in a World of Cameras in Every Cell Phone and Photoshop on Every Computer* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College/Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 28.

60. By analogy with the notion of "infotainment" ("information" + "entertainment"), referring to the TV shows mixing information and entertainment.

61. US Department of State, Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, U.S. *Government Counterinsurgency Guide* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2009), 9, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf.

62. James S. Corum, "Air Power and Counter-insurgency: Back to the Basics," in Hayward, *Air Power, Insurgency and the "War on Terror,"* 216.

63. Martin van Creveld, *La Transformation de la guerre* (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 1998), 269. (Translation from the French version: "Ne se déroulera pas sur un champ de bataille. Ce type d'espace n'existe plus de par le monde. Elle a lieu au sein d'environnements plus complexes, naturels ou artificiellement créés. Ce sera une guerre d'écoutes, de voitures piégées, de tueries au corps à corps. . . . Elle sera sans fin, sanglante et atroce.") See also Martin van Creveld, "The Transformation of War Revisited," in *Non-state Threats and Future Wars*, ed. Robert J. Bunker (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 3–15.

64. Général de division aérienne (Maj Gen, French Air Force) Denis Mercier, "Une vision renouvelée de la puissance aérospatiale," *Défense nationale et sécurité collective*, June 2007, 52.

65. Général de division (Maj Gen, French Army) Jean-Claude Allard, "L'US Army à la recherche de la rupture tactique: La *Task Force Odin*," *Défense nationale et sécurité collective*, April 2009, 148.

Whose Mission?

A Comparison of French and US Perspectives on American Civil Religion

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American civil religion is a cultural phenomenon of malleable political significance. In its broadest forms, civil religion supplies Americans and their leaders with a bland repertoire of religious symbolism to adorn their dollar bills and presidential addresses. More narrowly, however, civil religion can facilitate religious nationalism in the United States and lend to policy programs the unyielding righteousness of orthodoxy. Because civil religion employs *religious* and, more specifically, *Christian* language and symbols to articulate the national story, even its rote invocations maintain a cultural climate that privileges Christian constructions of American politics and identity.[1] Thus, every time a president finishes a speech by repeating the boilerplate "And may God bless the United States of America" — in other words, every time a president makes a speech of any importance whatsoever — those members of American society inclined towards religious nationalism receive renewed confirmation that theirs truly is

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a Christian nation. This implicit marriage of American national identity and Christianity also impresses outside observers, feeding the perception that the United States is inordinately confident in its own virtue and for reasons rooted in a particular faith tradition.

Elaborating its connection with nationalism allows us to consider both how civil religion functions today in American politics and how it influences the way that others, in this case French analysts, perceive the United States. National identities structure the way individuals interpret events, politicians motivate their publics, and outsiders define nations as collective actors.[2] Nationalist symbols can therefore be easily manipulated for political purposes. Civil religion is an integral part of this dynamic, making it easy for those in the United States who argue that America is a Christian nation to legitimate their political preferences by using its motifs.[3] In the American political process, policy proposals defined as un-Christian and, by extension, un-American can be sapped of crucial support, while practices that seem to represent Christian values are more easily defensible using patriotic vocabulary.[4] In this article, we argue that America's civil religion is a construction that allows religious conservatives to justify their policies as representative of "true" American values, which gives their ideas greater purchase on the identity of the United States in the eyes of outsiders.

Those seeking to define the United States as a Christian country with all the policy implications that follow ave exploited civil religion's essentially unchallengeable place in the heart of the national identity by developing four embedded themes within it.[5] These themes include the idea of American mission, the Protestant work ethic, the notion of a transcendent "free market," and the belief in an Edenic American history to which the United States must return if it is to recapture its lost promise. French observers have interpreted these motifs as indicating essential aspects of American national identity, although they seem to recognize that not all Americans embrace these ideas with equal solicitude. By comparing how French and American analysts describe American civil religion, we can see that conservative Americans have been able to perpetuate two beliefs: that the United States is a "Christian nation" and that this identity shapes American politics, including its foreign policy.[6] Our conclusion is that civil religion remains a potent political tool that is both difficult to impugn due to its integration with the national identity and, despite its seeming ecumenism,

particularly susceptible to manipulation by cultural conservatives seeking to secure their vision of what America should be.

We develop this argument in four stages. First, we explain how civil religion functions as a form of religious nationalism that has been used to inject conservative Christian norms into American political discourse. Second, we elaborate the four-part model described above. Third, we survey how French observers have construed the nature and significance of American civil religion, and we connect their analyses with a broader overview of French perceptions of the United States. Finally, we consider the possibilities of maintaining a "civil religion" in the original sense of the term in today's climate of political and cultural polarization, when shared narratives of a unified national identity seem difficult to articulate.

Nationalism and Civil Religion in the United States

Robert Bellah coined the term "civil religion" in 1967 to denote America's collective expression of the basic human need to assign meaning and purpose to one's existence.[7] All political communities are social constructions without any permanence or value beyond that with which their members choose to endow them. Each nation or state therefore must justify itself, pronouncing that *this* way of organizing and demarcating oneself rather than *that* potential alternative is meaningful enough to warrant continued loyalty. Typically, polities attain coherence in two basic ways: they define themselves, in tribal fashion, against "others" who do not belong, or they ground their essence in a higher reality not easily challenged.[8] These two strategies easily coincide, as Anthony Marx observed when he wrote of the emergence of nationalism in early modern Europe: "A chosen people are all the more inspired by their election and cohered when under threat, much as the cohesion of any group is solidified by conflict with some out-group."[9] As a consciously created nation-state, the United States felt a particularly acute need to attain existential confidence. Along with Enlightenment teleology and race, civil religion has helped to perform this task from the nation's origins, through its Civil War, and continuing to the present.[10] It defines the United States in religious terms with the effect that the nation itself seems to have religious importance. As Bellah explained in the classic article in which he gave civil religion its name, "civil religion at its best is a genuine apprehension of universal and transcendent religious reality as seen

in or, one could almost say, as revealed through the experience of the American people."[11] In other words, civil religion is the expression that we use to describe the American people's quest to situate themselves within a higher, essentially religious framework of meaning.

Although its focus is America itself, civil religion is closely related to Christianity. Its terminology, indeed its very existence, implies that the United States is a community of biblical significance (e.g., it is a "chosen nation," "the New Israel," or "favored by Providence" to identify some popular historical constructions). As a result, civil religious expressions and practices impart an unmistakably Christian aura to American patriotism.[12] This blending of Christianity and American identity reflects the ordinary pattern of cultural construction, wherein societies take from the conceptual materials they have at hand to articulate themselves in a mutually intelligible way.[13] Thus, American civil religion "borrowed selectively from the [nation's dominant] religious tradition in such a way that the average American saw no conflict between the two."[14] This tethering of the United States to a specific religious tradition, however, implicates the state in that religion's values and identity, a practice that becomes more clearly at odds with America's democratic ethos as its religious pluralism increases. Given civil religion's roots in the broader culture, it is unclear whether the United States would boast such a richly religious national myth if it were founded today. Imagining their state to occupy a distinctive role in the Christian firmament can be difficult for those now-numerous Americans who are not also Christian.

The "religious tradition" from which civil religion emerged was in the first instance Christian, though, because the colonists who specifically tasked themselves with creating a political entity on the North American continent were not only Christian but also exceptionally vigorous in their faith. Intending their polity to be comprised only of Saints, the Puritans covenanted with God to create the City of God that England had failed to become.[15] Their entire conceptual apparatus was biblical, and it generated the earliest vocabulary of national self-understanding among those who would eventually become the American people.[16] The continuing prominence of Christianity in American society☒ ven Jefferson articulated his Enlightenment ideas on occasion by using Deist language☒ nsured that Puritan motifs would continue to structure American interpretations of

their identity and destiny.[17] Civil religion evolved naturally out of a broadly Christian culture, and its ecumenical ambitions exist primarily within the confines of that faith tradition.[18] Cultures do not change easily, especially those as dedicated to their founding myths as the United States has proven to be; civil religion benefits from its deep association with both the historical identity and the still-dominant religious culture of the United States.

This cultural stickiness is not without consequences. Civil religion, as a theodicy that places the United States within a specifically religious conceptual terrain, allows its Christian members in particular to conceive of their national project as consistent with their most basic moral and religious beliefs. John F. Wilson persuasively argued that civil religion is not a "religion" in the traditional, institutional sense of the term.[19] Nevertheless, the label captures an important dynamic in that the role which civil religion plays for Americans comports with that of religion more generally: to provide coherence and confidence in the "continuing viability" of relevant social structures by lending them "ontological status" within a sacred, cosmic frame of reference.[20] Complex cultural phenomena like religion provide individuals and groups with their identities and norms; America's civil religion is essentially the solution that Americans came up with to allow them to remain loyal to both their religious beliefs and their nation without undue tension. It gives them a moral vocabulary and a cosmic foundation for their patriotism, especially if they are Christian. As outsiders in particular have noted, American nationalism has also absorbed at least one other quality of religion in addition to its power to generate stories of ontological significance: it provides Americans with a basis by which to ascribe *moral* relevance to their actions.[21] Thus, responding to the human need for moral self-legitimation, civil religion often finds expression in a fiercely moralistic vocabulary.[22]

In his sweeping overview of American political development, James Morone characterizes American history as "a moral tale," writing that "political life constantly gets entangled in two vital urges edeeming 'us' and reforming 'them.'"[23] The Puritans established this pattern by seeking to create a City of God heir "city on the hill." By characterizing their political project as the creation of God's beachhead in a sinful world, they gave to themselves the huge responsibility of serving as the caretakers of Providence's plans for humanity.[24] This meant that their labors pertained not

only to their own experiences but also to the destiny of the human race as a whole; everything they did had ramifications beyond themselves.[25] Other states have at various times adopted such a self-understanding, but in America a sense of global responsibility has persisted along with its underlying moralizing impulse.[26] America's national identity presumes that the nation's values have universal meaning and that the United States is the highest embodiment of those values.[27] This sentiment has yielded noble crusades to help oppressed individuals around the world (and the sense of moral outrage driving its interventions against Spain in 1898 and the Nazis in World War II, for example, was sincere), but it also implies that the United States occupies an unimpeachable moral vantage from which it can pass judgment on others around the world, almost as if they were not equal human beings.

Analyses of civil religion describe the two moral "urges" that Morone identified as reflecting its "priestly" and "prophetic" dimensions.[28] The priestly role is basically that described above: the notion that the United States has some sort of official relationship with God. It is a source of national self-esteem: we *must* be worthy because we have been *chosen* to be God's partner in reforming the world.[29] As Kenneth Wald put it, "God blesses the nation because it serves a sacred purpose. So long as the nation conducts its affairs according to some higher purpose, it warrants allegiance from its citizens on grounds other than mere self-interest."[30] Critics note that this attitude, among other things, essentially constitutes the co-optation of religion by the state, which uses religion's normative power for its own purposes.[31] For American patriots, however, such criticism withers before the pride that the combination of civil religion / great-power nationalism engenders. The belief that the United States was *created* because it is special translates into a sense of being anointed, and this spirit of borrowing God's moral authority to legitimate secular state interests has been ubiquitous in American history, especially in the realm of foreign policy.[32] We discuss it below in its form as the idea of American mission.

The prophetic function, meanwhile, refers to the requirement that the United States honor its divine obligations lest it suffer God's judgment.[33] The Puritans introduced the prophetic dimension to America's civil religion as a logical concomitant of the priestly role.[34] The posture that they helped to establish in America was one of intense moral vigilance: any slippage in

the hostile environs of the New World would lead God to withdraw His favor, which meant sure destruction for their delicate wilderness experiment. Undoubtedly, Americans have continued to believe that the United States is destined for greatness or, in recent decades, is deservedly enjoying the greatness befitting its moral stature. But the prophetic side of America's civil religion tells the nation that such greatness belongs only to those who continue to earn it.[35] Sin, and you forfeit God's support, without which the national project cannot be sustained.[36] "Prophetic rhetoric," Wade Roof reminds us, "de-emphasizes notions of chosenness and uniqueness and, at its best, calls the country into question when it fails to live up to its own ethical ideals."[37]

Among members of American society, conservative Christians are most apt today to resort to any sort of civil religious language, but the decided trend in their tone seems to tilt in the priestly direction. Criticisms of the United States are typically unwelcome in their ranks, and the prophetic function appears most commonly invoked, as in the earliest era of religious nationalism, to identify moral outliers already within the United States whose exclusion from the body politic (or conversion) would provide the surest path to collective redemption.[38] The "culture war" literature thus catalogs conservative or "orthodox" Christians seeking national redemption by changing the behavior of those who, unlike them, believe in evolution, "practice" homosexuality, get abortions, have problems with leading classrooms in Christian prayers, and so on. Despite their priestly tendency to celebrate American greatness as evidence of Providential support, in other words, conservative Christians have proven adept at turning civil religion's prophetic judgmentalism against American "others."[39] Below, we develop four themes that have become associated with America's civil religion, especially for French analysts, but which on closer inspection are actually platforms for the conservative Christian agenda in American politics. If by "American civil religion" we mean a consensual understanding of America's theodicy, then that concept no longer holds analytic water for describing American culture and politics. However, it remains a relevant concept for describing the country using vaguely Christian language; its more comprehensive application, however, has been co-opted by the American religious right, thus shaping how French analysts define the United States.

The Religious Right and the Four Themes of American Civil Religion

Bellah cites presidents' inaugural addresses as important ceremonial events in which religious references accord legitimacy to the nation's highest political authority.[40] Looking for references to the Almighty in these addresses is akin to carrying coals to Newcastle. These speeches, and many other forms of political discourse, are replete with rhetorical attempts to accord a divine purpose to America's existence and mission. Discussions of American civil religion often focus on these ceremonial and ritualistic aspects. By exploring the *theological* dimension of America's civil religion— n other words, the nature of its fundamental beliefs— ne can gain greater insight into how members of America's religious right have appropriated its motifs. In this discussion, we provide a broad overview of the nature and origin of civil religion's four theological tenets (mission, work ethic, free-market fundamentalism, and "lost Eden") and survey in general fashion how they have historically played out in American politics and law.

As noted above, American civil religion was forged in the early days of English colonialism in the Americas. Starting with Jamestown in 1607, the founding of the American colonies had a strong religious dimension, and references to God and the Almighty are infused in early colonial charters, state constitutions, and most conspicuously in the Declaration of Independence.[41] Many founders cited their religious faith in their writings, and some saw divine Providence as a central reason for the independence of the United States.[42] As it evolved, this religious patina was heavily influenced, if not practically dictated, by the Calvinist doctrines implanted by the Puritans, the Presbyterians, and other religious groups. Calvinism wholeheartedly embraced predestination, hard work, rigorous self-improvement, and the accumulation of capital.[43] Once transferred to the New World, where these doctrines were free to develop without excessive hindrance from the English government and ecclesiastical authorities, they gradually formed the basis of the American character.[44] How did this Calvinism later evolve into American civil religion? Without pretending to encompass the totality of political beliefs that have a religious dimension, this article now explores four core beliefs of American civil religion, around which many other contemporary political beliefs orbit. This overview highlights aspects of the

American project most clearly articulated by conservatives, especially those influenced by Calvinist motifs.

The Idea of American Mission

The *American missionary spirit* is a force that helped to accord a divine imprimatur to territorial expansion to the West, the ideological battles of the Cold War, and everything in between.[45] One can conceive of "mission" in two important ways. On the one hand, there is the sense of mission as an objective. On the other, like religious missionaries, it takes on the sense of inculcating a distinct political worldview within another people. We see its beginnings in the religious convictions of many colonial Americans who considered it their mission to create a New Jerusalem or a shining city on a hill.[46] It manifested itself in the increasingly assertive American foreign policies after the War of Independence, the notion of manifest destiny, and the subsequent imperial undertakings during the Spanish-American War.[47] Its contemporary interpretation maintains the assertion that the United States has a divinely inspired moral obligation to spread democracy and free markets throughout the world.

Given the doctrine of predestination, Calvinist theology does not emphasize the practice of conversion. Salvation is for the elect, so the conversion of individual souls is not a priority for Calvinists per se.[48] However, Calvinism contains several elements that animate the missionary spirit, among them the creation of a holy community through work. Puritans, as a chosen people, felt they had something to teach the rest of humanity.[49] This confidence in their enterprise brought them to encourage others to follow their example. In this way, Puritans sought to spread their ethics and practices but not necessarily their theology. Puritanism was missionary more through its influence than its specific intent.[50] The most significant legacy of Puritanism for the idea of American mission was its interweaving into colonial culture and thereby into American nationalism the notion that the United States had a specific, divinely ordained role to play in the human drama. It was to be, in Ernest Tuveson's phrase, the "Redeemer Nation."[51] Interpreted prophetically, the idea that the United States occupies a discrete place in millennial history would suggest a fastidious attention to keeping the country's moral slate clean in preparation for end-time judgment. In practice, however, it has meant that the United States can dispense with the

frivolity of judging itself. "It's just fine, thank you very much." Focusing instead on evaluating others and, inevitably, bringing them up to America's (and God's) standards.

Throughout US history, therefore, America's sense of mission has had a particularly profound effect on foreign policy.[52] Because they conceive of their country as the embodiment of universally meritorious values, advocates of the idea of American mission argue that America's interests are coterminous with mankind's.[53] Globally extending American power thus fulfills American interests (whether defined economically, geopolitically, or otherwise) while also serving both God and freedom. American actions abroad are ipso facto moral, and opposition to them is immoral, because the expansion of American power and influence also extends the realm of the City of God.[54] Civil religion embeds in American nationalism the exceptionalist notion that the United States is a factor in millennial history, a deeply rooted cultural construct that inevitably inspires moral self-confidence and, sometimes, missionary zeal.[55] Unsurprisingly, then, one finds conservative Americans today lamenting multilateralism as "capitulation" and American power as good not for itself alone but as a force for peace in world affairs.[56]

Protestant Work Ethic

The second pillar of American civil religion is a strong *Protestant work ethic*, especially its emphasis on social grace through work. This idea finds its roots in the Calvinist notion of predestination, which, as Max Weber pointed out, holds that an individual's worth to God is indicated by his or her propensity to work.[57] The more one works, the more material wealth one gathers, and the more one is held to be favored by God and likely to be saved. Although the doctrine of predestination largely passed from the pulpits in the wake of the Second Great Awakening, given the evangelical emphasis on salvation through worldly works rather than uniquely for the elect, the association of wealth with morality retains a hold on the imagination of Christian conservatives. Michael Lienesch describes members of the New Christian Right as "contemporary Calvinists" for their emphasis on material indications of spiritual election: "They assume a close connection between salvation and success. Moreover, since they equate economic enterprise with moral value, they tend to see success as synonymous with

wealth. . . . By the same token, they describe poverty as punishment, frequently deserved by dint of moral and spiritual failings."[58]

During the Gilded Age, the association of Calvinist election, social Darwinism, and material accomplishment achieved an unusually persuasive synthesis in American culture. The reverence with which such cultural financial icons as John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and Bill Gates are held affirms this enduring sentiment. The flip side of this ethic is that laziness, unemployment, and poverty are held to reflect God's disfavor with the individual. As Henry Ward Beecher wrote in 1871, "The highest prosperity, then, is associated with spiritual good."[59] One need look no farther than the debate over welfare reform in the 1990s to see the degree to which economically disadvantaged groups are even today held out for particular scorn among conservatives, based on the perception that they are poor because they don't want to work.

Americans' association of work with virtue and the possession of wealth with having a strong work ethic (leading to the association of wealth with virtue) emerged in part from the unique history of the United States. The amount of labor involved in constructing such a vast territory led America to become a country where hard work is literally existential. Throughout the slave era and the massive industrialization of the late nineteenth century, workers built the infrastructure that made the United States such an economically powerful nation. Millions of immigrants came through Ellis Island and other points of entry to feed America's insatiable appetite for manual labor. As mechanization became more and more widespread, the intrinsic meaning of work evolved, making it more of a commodity and less of a calling. For many today, the American dream of prosperity through hard work is being replaced by mere survival through very long hours in unrewarding employment, but the protean association of work with success remains fixed in the national mythology. Given the reality that social mobility is now as limited in the United States as it is elsewhere, American civil religion has played an important role in sustaining Americans' confidence that their labor has intrinsic value, their belief that through work they exhibit their virtue, and their conviction that American society is uniquely beneficent in rewarding the truly deserving.[60] The Calvinist inheritance, in other words, has helped to secure a deep cultural commitment to the economic Darwinism of the Gilded Age.

God's Free Market

The third canon of American civil religion is the belief that the *"free market" is a transcendental force*, beyond the control of humans. It is held to share many of the same attributes as the Christian God: omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and omnibenevolence.[61] When economics articles speak of the market as "jittery" or "nervous" or "confident," they implicitly transfer a quasi-divine sentience to an infinitely complex set of commercial transactions. Adam Smith's "invisible hand" and Milton Friedman's profound faith in the providential nature of the market established this association and helped structure the conceptual framework for modern free-market conservatism. This "free-market fundamentalism" holds that the market not only is worthy of reverence but also is a panacea for social and economic problems. Thus, the divinely ordained market must remain completely separate from the inherently impure government, just as the City of God must remain apart from the City of Man. Despite the current economic difficulties in the United States, the market, rather than the government, is still widely viewed as the main motor for economic growth and prosperity; American civil religious ideas have supplied these ideas deep cultural roots.

Although the Calvinists neither invented nor articulated the notion of a free market, it is nevertheless possible to affirm an abstract relation between Puritan economic practices and Smith's invisible hand, noting the correlation between Calvinist predestination and the "economic predestination" suggested in the *Wealth of Nations*. Conservative religious thinkers have employed civil religious logic to link free-market fundamentalism with American national identity, spelling out a biblical theory of economics.[62] For example, George Gilder wrote that "socialism is inherently hostile to Christianity and capitalism is simply the essential mode of human life that corresponds to religious truth."[63] At a more fundamental level, the commercial practices and attitudes that the Puritans and other Protestants in the New World bequeathed to Americans contributed to the formation of free-market fundamentalism. The Puritan emphasis on individualism, honesty, education, probity, rigorous administration, and commercial innovation became core free-market values.[64] The loathing of *big government* by many free-market conservatives demonstrates their belief that the state is in-

herently incompetent and that socioeconomic affairs are invariably better left to the market.

Arguments over the proper economic role of the government in American society have occurred since colonial times. English colonies in America were founded to be part of the mercantilist system, under which the Crown and Parliament developed a complex network of taxes, customs, and import duties among the colonies which financed the British army and further imperial expansion. The fact that the Stamp Act, the Tea Act, and other economic measures taken by the British Parliament were major causes of American independence attests to the primordial importance Americans attribute to economic liberalism. Since independence, we have observed a swinging of the pendulum between strong laissez-faire economic policies and more government intervention. After independence and throughout the nineteenth century, expansion and the progressive construction of government institutions in the states left little scope for meaningful federal economic intervention. Classical liberal economists increasingly viewed the market as the solution to social ills, according it a moral force beyond simple commercial transactions. Drawing on their ideas in the late 1970s, politicians such as Jack Kemp and Ronald Reagan embraced free-market ideology with evangelical fervor, prescribing tax cuts and regulatory reductions as cure-alls for the difficult economic conditions afflicting American society.

Reagan's election in 1980 ushered in an era of tax cuts and deregulation, and faith in the free market began to reach an apex. According to this ideology, everything associated with the free market was good. Government was the problem, not the solution. "Big government" became a synonym for incompetence, corruption, and inefficiency. Such a notion fostered an increasingly widespread perception of the government as an economic bully, choking the market with burdensome regulations and taxes. The free market was perceived as the key not only to maximizing financial gain but also to resolving society's ills. This dual conception fuelled the conservative economic ascendancy throughout the 1980s and 1990s. George W. Bush's administration promoted the freedom of the market through tax cuts, largely to upper-income individuals and large corporations. The financial crisis that began in 2008 has not visibly shaken conservatives' faith in free-market fundamentalism.

Lost Paradise

The final precept that characterizes American civil religion is the notion of *lost paradise* in American political discourse. Broadly speaking, one can detect a political narrative, especially among religious conservatives, that mirrors the biblical one of paradise, the fall of man as the consequence of original sin, and redemption. In the American political version of this narrative, "paradise" was the period between the founding and the 1950s, during which moral values were stronger, divorces and out-of-wedlock babies were rare, and individual piety was rampant. For the Calvinist colonists who came to the New World to escape religious persecution, their mission was the establishment of a paradisiacal holy community. Many contemporary conservative Christians who view this mission as a success feel that this paradise has recently been compromised. The "fall" occurred during the 1960s and 70s, when the counterculture, hippies, Woodstock, and Vietnam War demonstrators purportedly undermined traditional moral values that had hitherto characterized US society and diminished the moral authority of governing institutions. The religious purity that had ostensibly existed since the birth of the nation was no more. A conservative Christian perspective holds that a secularization of American society brought this about, with a major trigger of the above calamities provoked by Supreme Court rulings in the early 1960s that found teacher-led public school prayer in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

This narrative, culminating with the desire to restore this lost paradise, has remained a dominant theme within the modern Christian conservative movement. The mid-1970s witnessed the emergence of efforts to bring about such a restoration, during which an increasing consensus emerged among politically activist Christians that a prerequisite to returning to this state of national grace was the election of their kindred to all levels of government. Pat Robertson summed this up rather artfully in a 1986 interview. Comparing non-Christians in places of authority to termites "who destroy" governing institutions, he opined that "the termites are in charge" and that a "godly fumigation" was necessary.[65] Stated less lethally, conservative Christians hold that electing like-minded candidates to office is necessary to bring about a return of moral/family values, bring God back into the public sphere, and bring the United States back more squarely into God's favor. According to Richard John Neuhaus, this era did not signal a re-

evaluation of the moral state of the United States; rather, the belief that the "forces of righteousness" could do something to change direction gained broader currency: to "set the divinely willed eschatological scenario back on course."[66] Collective national redemption became politically conceivable among those who felt that the tenets of civil religion had been violated by allowing America to slide into a moral abyss.

The electoral strategy to bring about this moral restoration has varied in form over the last 35 years. Jimmy Carter campaigned in 1976, openly proclaiming himself a born-again Christian. He garnered significant support from southern Christians, but that was not to last. In 1980 Ronald Reagan openly sought the support of religious conservatives. He received it, and the Moral Majority, led by Jerry Falwell, further enhanced the participation of conservative Christians within Republican Party politics. At the same time, Reagan by no means accomplished all of their objectives. Abortion was still legal, teacher-led prayer in public schools was still banned, and "secular humanism" was still present when he left office. The Moral Majority dissolved in 1989. Robertson, longtime host of the 700 Club, ran for the Republican nomination for president in 1988. He lost to George H. W. Bush, but the Christian Coalition was subsequently created from the remaining structure and mailing list of his presidential campaign. The 1990s witnessed a rise and sharp fall of the influence of religious conservatives. They seemed to have reached their apex in 1994, when Republicans broke Democratic control of the three branches of government. The participation rate in the election fell to an all-time low, but among conservatives it was high. This tipped the balance towards the Republicans. In 2000 George W. Bush openly proclaimed his personal relationship with Jesus Christ and made the "faith-based initiative" a centerpiece of his campaign. The war against terrorism seemed to take the steam out of his domestic faith-based initiatives. This past decade has witnessed a reevaluation of priorities of Christian conservatives, and the culture wars do not have the same resonance as before. Time will tell to what degree this narrative of "lost moral paradise" continues to hold purchase on conservative politics, but the absence of the traditional "wedge issues" of abortion, school prayer, and homosexuality from the inchoate tea party movement suggests that its relevance has waned.

These four concepts form the core of the theology of American civil religion, according to this interpretation. They are the beliefs which render that which is religious, political and what is political, religious. In this analysis, we have emphasized the means by which the religious right has developed particularly pointed and politically salient articulations of civil religious ideas in a way that has captured its normative center. By contrast, progressives have proven relatively impotent in aligning their policy positions with civil religious motifs.

French Interpretations

Generally speaking, the French, as is the case with many other Europeans, are struck by the degree to which Americans overtly express religion within political contexts. Given the bloody religious wars that have characterized Europe's history, it is unsurprising that the separation of church and state there is more absolute. So the American president's taking an oath of office on the Bible raises questions in Europe about America's commitment to secularism. It is through this prism that the French view American civil religion: as a symbolic political expression of a profound religiosity that expresses itself through broad policy orientations. French academics studying American civil religion interpret it from a perspective that idealizes secularism and regards religious politics as a deviation from that ideal. As outsiders from the American political arena, moreover, they are susceptible to conflating Christian conservative beliefs and attitudes with American identity. Below, we survey the analyses of four French observers of American civil religion before drawing some broader lessons about how their external vantage point generates distinctive insights into that subject.

Although he does not directly address the notion of civil religion per se, Denis Lacorne, one of the foremost Americanists in France, views the American credo, which comprises American civil religion, as indissociably linked to Anglo-Protestantism:

> American democracy, in spite of its republican architecture and contrary to great European democracies, has not succeeded in secularizing. Its "political credo," unchanged for three centuries, remains fundamentally Anglo-Protestant, marked by the myth of its Puritan origins. This is despite the increased presence of Irish, Italian, Polish, Hispanic and Asian immigrants, of which the culture of origin by definition escapes the grasp of Protestant values.[67]

In these remarks, Lacorne effectively discerns the origins of civil religion but seems to view the "culture of origin" as unrelated to the fundamentally Protestant "political credo" as if the two are mutually exclusive. Lacorne seems to underestimate the malleability, not the exclusivity, of American civil religion. The fact that Irish, Italian, Polish, Hispanic, and Asian immigrants can wholeheartedly embrace this credo and even serve in the military and die for it attests to civil religion's capacity to transcend religious and cultural differences. Far from "escaping" from it, cultural heterogeneity is an integral element. It is the inclusion of the "culture of origin" within American civil religion—diversity within unity—that renders it so effective and unquestioned.

In his book *Dieu bénisse l'Amérique: La religion de la Maison-Blanche*, meanwhile, Sébastien Fath finds the chief significance of American civil religion to lie in the perceived messianism that it contributes to America's international relations (the missionary spirit evoked in the previous section). Though he views the American president as the high priest of American civil religion, Fath agrees with John F. Wilson that relatively few parallels exist between American civil religion and traditional religion:

> The [American] civil religion is not in itself a "religion" in the complete and strict sense of the term. It appears more as an ideal construction, an ideal type in the meaning provided by Max Weber, than a religion analogous to Islam, Buddhism, or Christianity. Through several rites, events, and charismatic leaders, it crystallizes the evolutions of an "imagined community," without necessarily presenting something comparable to that which a religion can offer to its members. . . . Although insufficient to qualify [as?] the emergence of a new religion as such, on the other hand [multiple indications] furnish enough elements to confirm the hypothesis of a significant reorientation of the American civil religion in the beginning of the nineteenth century.[68]

Fath views American civil religion as consisting of three historical phases. The first, "mainline," period lasted from the founding to the 1950s, during which time American civil religion emphasized the hope for a better world, a healthy humanism, and self-limitation founded by a transcendent God. The second, "evangelical," period began in the early 1960s, emphasizing the individual over the institution, the local group over the infrastructure, and concrete engagement over theology. Inspired by the frontier spirit and evangelical Christianity, "rebirth" and "born again" became central concepts, and civil religion became more moralistic.[69] Finally, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) triggered the beginning of a "secular

neomessianic" stage, which Fath argues is less closely tied with Christianity. Uncle Sam rather than God would solve the problem of evil. Neoconservatives and Rambo are held to be "anxious metaphysicists" of this faith. This phase emphasizes a "contemporary utopia of an American model intrinsically invested with attributes of the supreme power. As if the American society became its own absolute."[70]

Fath is able to detect elements of civil religion hitherto unobserved. In addition to the standard emphasis on messianism in American foreign policy, his historiography seems to trace the influence of Christian leaders/ideas on presidents and public policy, but the nexus between the two is not precisely defined. It is not entirely clear from his writings what exactly he is observing that leads to these stages. For example, in the "evangelical" period of the 1960s, what led him to generalize about the supremacy of the individual over the institution and engagement over theology? What led him to quantify them as such? His post-9/11 secular neomessianic stage is held to be less religious than the preceding stage, but George W. Bush's distinctly religious rhetoric argues the contrary. Rambo's place in the pantheon of civil religious metaphysicists is also open to question. More intricate, exact definitions of the key concepts he employs would allow one to better appreciate the truly innovative and valuable outside perspective he brings.

In her book *Etats-Unis: Imposture messianique? Genèse et sources*, Nicole Guétin also views American civil religion through a messianic lens. She reiterates the Puritan origins of the founding and its profound effect on religious expression in American politics. Guétin detects within the American psyche a "spiritual arrogance" that has fuelled manifest destiny and its foreign policy outgrowths. She views Thanksgiving Day and especially the elocutions on Memorial Day as reminders that America must continue its divine mission in the name of liberty.[71] Though she is effective in broadly summarizing many of the beliefs held within American civil religion with some degree of accuracy, the very title of her book, *The United States: Messianic Impostor*, suggests that it's just a "sham." Even if the mythical origins of the American missionary spirit are a valid subject of debate, it seems foolhardy to dismiss this messianic spirit as fraudulent. It is at the root of too many real foreign policy decisions, wars, and truly altruistic foreign aid to be negated in that manner.

Camille Froidevaux-Metterie, in her book *Politique et religion aux Etats-Unis*, sees American civil religion as a solution to what she calls the theocratic-secular enigma.[72] Recognizing that civil religion goes beyond a catalog of habits, she considers it the "national spiritual pedestal." According to this conception, God presides over the destiny of the nation, and the republican model offers an example to the world, the values of which are worthy of defense at home and abroad. According to Froidevaux-Metterie,

> The expression of the "civil religion" is in fact rather misleading: it does not consist of a religion in the strict sense of the word, because it does not furnish the ultimate justification of human finitude, any more than it pretends to put the here and now in relation with the beyond. The American civil religion simply designates the phenomenon of minimal religiosity which characterizes the United States and which makes this country so different in appearance from other Western nations. Theism, exemplary nature, and messianism together form the spiritual pedestal without which the vast majority of Americans would consider their national destiny to be void of meaning. As a system of values and ensemble of rites, the civil religion achieves the combination, fragile but sufficient, of the spirit of religion and of secularism, and public religiosity through which the principal aspiration is expressed. Adhesion to the national model and its constitutional corps fulfills the second.[73]

Like her compatriots viewing US civil religion from abroad, Froidevaux-Metterie captures what could be characterized as a "cloudy-but-accurate" vision of the American credo. For example, she paraphrases the narrative of Americans as a "chosen people" chased from Europe to the "promised land" and holds that contemporary Americans want to "keep the flame."[74] Her analysis holds in a very broad sense, but she fails to go beyond generalizations to discern what different groups of Americans believe and why. This is by no means to dispute the coherent frames of reference established by Froidevaux-Metterie and others, but to emphasize the importance of *how* these views are held because they are not always believed in the terms they are portrayed. If one asked the average American, "Do you believe that the Pilgrim fathers who came over on the *Mayflower* were a divinely chosen people who came to the promised land of the New World?" one could expect a baffled stare in reply. If one asked, "Do you believe that the Pilgrims who came to America to escape persecution were blessed with the land they received?" one would probably get more coherent assent. An exploration of the contemporary expression of these beliefs, unclad in specific religious-national rhetoric, would have been useful to better discern the character of American civil religion.

Taking these conceptions together, one can deduce that the French view the *nature* of American civil religion as a set of rituals and beliefs linking God with the national destiny. They largely cite the work of Robert Bellah as a basis and add their own perspective. The rituals include the president swearing the oath of office, "in God we trust" on the currency, "under God" in the pledge of allegiance, Thanksgiving, and so on. The emphasis on Thanksgiving as an important ritual seems somewhat out of place, in that for many Americans it is more a celebration of family and cuisine than religion and Pilgrim fathers. French authors cite the president's Thanksgiving declaration as an important expression of civil religion, but it is arguable how many Americans even know that it exists or pay any attention to it.[75] French analysts seem to miss the fact that the original meaning of many rituals has been transformed, secularized, or simply ignored. Furthermore, they seem to see notions such as exceptionalism or messianism as encompassing the totality of civil religion's beliefs, which they then identify with American identity as a whole. In this way they accord greater significance to minor rituals and sectarian notions than the broader culture would support. This skewed emphasis is unsurprising in that they are on the outside looking in.

On the other hand, French authors are very perceptive concerning the *meaning* that civil religion contributes to American identity. They understand that civil religion gives transcendental status to being American, as expressed, for example, by the concept of Americans being "elect." As George H. W. Bush opined, "I believe America will always have a special place in God's heart, as long as He has a special place in ours."[76] Of course the French tend to view this negatively, seeing it as an expression of "spiritual arrogance," in the words of Guétin.[77] French authors also discern civil religion's conservative tethering of American identity to its cultural roots. For a country composed of so many peoples, religions, and cultures, civil religion lends continuity. They correctly see civil religion as providing an explanation for national origins, the present, and eschatology. It asserts an unbroken chain between the Pilgrim fathers and modern American society, making sense of history, establishing a metaphysical connection between the past and the present, and furnishing the ultimate national destiny as a beacon of liberty and free markets for the world to emulate. It is thereby America's destiny to change the world for the better.

French authors have incisively discerned the *functions* of civil religion. The first is to promote national cohesion through Fath's notion of an "imagined community." One could interpret this as inferring that America is not a "real" community, but it could also mean that the basis for the community is an artificial construct that is nevertheless shared among Americans. Furthermore, civil religion is considered an "element of stability which allows the understanding of the nature of the American political ethos beyond the diversity of those who embody power," thus serving as a key to understanding the American political psyche.[78] In addition, civil religion becomes a public religiosity through which national aspirations are expressed. Finally, it is a mechanism that justifies imperial undertakings. From manifest destiny to the war in Iraq, the belief among Americans that they have a God-given mission to spread their values has proven very effective in garnering public support for such enterprises.

Conclusion

Identities are not problems to solve but expressions of becoming. They are always works in progress and only partially susceptible to conscious manipulation. Americans today struggle to define their country, as they have since they first gathered in Philadelphia to explicate who collectively they wished to be. The debates change, overlap, and recur, but they always take place wherever societies are comprised of real people and not clones. Religion has never been absent from these debates, and civil religion has never been a feature of American public life that politicians of national aspiration could safely ignore. The debate over American civil religion has thus centered on its salience to actual policy making. What does it mean, practically speaking, to claim that America is a Christian nation? Does it require imposition of the Christian equivalent of Sharia, as argued by those who believe that the Ten Commandments have a place in American courts as guides to judicial interpretation of the Constitution? Or is civil religion empty window dressing, signifying nothing? The answer, now as always, lies somewhere in between. There is no definitive answer, only the constant struggle to impart meaning to the national project and define who Americans are and why they should pursue the goals that they do. At the moment, though, it seems that Christian conservatives have gained the upper hand

in appropriating civil religion's legitimating force for their political projects, and it seems likely to remain this way for the foreseeable future.

French authors depict American culture and American civil religion as having a distinctively conservative cast. To be sure, the impressionistic history of the intersection between religion and politics in the United States provided here, which itself reflects a perspective partially developed in the French Academy, supports that view. As Morone would note, the abolitionist and civil rights movements, among others, harnessed a decidedly more liberal religious spirit to achieve political ends than those surveyed here, but the dominance of conservative voices in civil religious discourse today makes it difficult for outsiders to recognize the relevance of any others.[79] In 1988 Robert Wuthnow wrote about the fragmentation of American civil religion into liberal and conservative versions. His observations on liberal civil religion support our claim that religious conservatives have proven more adept in recent years at appropriating religious nationalism's power to lend legitimacy to concrete political programs insofar as the civil religious ideas surveyed in the literatures above correspond to the conservative view almost perfectly:

> Few spokespersons for the liberal version of American civil religion make reference to the religious views of the Founding Fathers or suggest that America is God's chosen nation. References to America's wealth or power being God's means of evangelizing the world are also rare and religious apologetics for capitalism seem to be virtually taboo. . . .
>
> . . . Liberal religious leaders offer little that specifically legitimates America as a nation. Instead, they appeal to broader values that transcend American culture and, indeed, challenge some of the more nationalistic assumptions it incorporates.[80]

The conservative version seems clearly ascendant, capturing the moral vocabulary that we most frequently hear today to describe American history, purpose, and destiny. The dominance of conservatism in American civil religion, however, in combination with the unshakable place of civil religion at the heart of American national identity, strongly suggests that French and other analysts will continue to have good reason to suspect that "European-style" notions of progressive biblical justice are unlikely to characterize American policy in the near future. The cultural divide between the continents is not closing anytime soon.

Notes

1. "Christian" is a broad[illegible] ossibly overly broad[illegible] erm, but the conscious ecumenism of civil religion allows it to be consonant with most varieties of that tradition. In its origins, civil religion had a more clearly Protestant flavor, with special accents on millennial versions of Protestantism of the sort espoused by modern evangelicals.

2. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (Norfolk, CT: Thetford Press, 1986); Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Anthony W. Marx, *Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

3. Michael Lienesch, *Redeeming America: Piety and Politics in the New Christian Right* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, *America's Battle for God: A European Christian Looks at Civil Religion* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2007); Wade Clark Roof, "American Presidential Rhetoric from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush: Another Look at Civil Religion," *Social Compass* 56, no. 2 (June 2009): 286[illegible]301; and Rhys A. Williams and Susan M. Alexander, "Religious Rhetoric in American Populism: Civil Religion as Movement Ideology," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 33 (March 1994): 1[illegible]5.

4. As we will see below, evangelicals and conservative Catholics have all but monopolized what counts as "Christian" values today, but in earlier decades mainline Protestant sects had greater influence on the national mores and vocabulary.

5. Conrad Cherry, ed., *God's New Israel: Religious Interpretations of American Destiny*, rev. and updated ed. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); and Thomas M. McFadden, ed., *America in Theological Perspective* (New York: Seabury Press, 1976).

6. Hugh Heclo, "Is America a Christian Nation?," *Political Science Quarterly* 122, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 59[illegible]8; James A. Morone, *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003); and Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).

7. Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," *Dædalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 96, no. 1 (Winter 1967): 1[illegible]21, http://www.robertbellah.com/articles_5.htm.

8. Conor Cruise O'Brien, *God Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); see also Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; and Cherry, *God's New Israel*.

9. Marx, *Faith in Nation*, 38.

10. Cherry, *God's New Israel*; Winthrop S. Hudson, ed., *Nationalism and Religion in America: Concepts of American Identity and Mission* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996); Sidney E. Mead, *The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); and Arthur M. Schlesinger, "America: Experiment or Destiny?," *American Historical Review* 82, no. 3 (June 1977): 505[illegible]22.

11. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America."

12. Kenneth D. Wald, *Religion and Politics in the United States*, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997); and Müller-Fahrenholz, *America's Battle for God*.

13. Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967); and McFadden, *America in Theological Perspective*, vii.

14. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America."

15. Edmund S. Morgan, *Visible Saints: The History of a Puritan Idea* (New York: New York University Press,1963); Daniel J. Elazar, *Covenant and Constitutionalism: The Great Frontier and the Matrix of Federal Democracy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Mead, *Lively Experiment*; Bellah, "Civil Religion in America"; and Cherry, *God's New Israel*.

16. Francis J. Bremer, *The Puritan Experiment: New England Society from Bradford to Edwards* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1995); and Ernest Lee Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

17. Hudson, *Nationalism and Religion in America*.
18. Ibid., xxxii; and Heclo, "Is America a Christian Nation?"
19. John F. Wilson, *Public Religion in American Culture* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1979).
20. Ibid., 24–25; Berger, *Sacred Canopy*; and Roderick P. Hart, *The Political Pulpit* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1977), 28.
21. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 126–27.
22. Müller-Fahrenholz, *America's Battle for God*.
23. Morone, *Hellfire Nation*, 3.
24. Bremer, *Puritan Experiment*; Hudson, *Nationalism and Religion in America*; and Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation.*
25. Mead, *Lively Experiment*; and Hudson, *Nationalism and Religion in America*.
26. William R. Hutchison and Hartmut Lehmann, eds., *Many Are Chosen: Divine Election and Western Nationalism* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994); H. W. Brands, *What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*; Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1995); and Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansion in American History* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935).
27. Walter Brueggemann, "Patriotism for Citizens of the Penultimate Superpower," *Dialog: A Journal of Theology* 42, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 336–43; and Lipset, *American Exceptionalism.*
28. Martin Marty, "Two Kinds of Civil Religion," in *American Civil Religion*, ed. Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 139–57.
29. Cherry, *God's New Israel*; and Marty, "Two Kinds of Civil Religion," 144–46.
30. Wald, *Religion and Politics*, 63.
31. Brueggemann, "Patriotism for Citizens"; and Earl Zimmerman, "Church and Empire: Free-Church Ecclesiology in a Global Era," *Political Theology* 10, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 471–95.
32. See, for example, Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*; Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation*; Cherry, *God's New Israel*; and Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny*.
33. Marty, "Two Kinds of Civil Religion"; and Wald, *Religion and Politics*.
34. Bremer, *Puritan Experiment*; Perry Miller, *The American Puritans: Their Prose and Poetry* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956); and Morgan, *Visible Saints*.
35. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America"; Hudson, *Nationalism and Religion in America*; and Cherry, *God's New Israel*.
36. Morone, *Hellfire Nation*.
37. Roof, "American Presidential Rhetoric," 294.
38. Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1997); Marx, *Faith in Nation*; Lienesch, *Redeeming America*; and William Martin, *With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America* (New York: Broadway Books, 1996).
39. Martin, *With God on Our Side*; Lienesch, *Redeeming America*; Wald, *Religion and Politics*; Robert Wuthnow, *The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith since World War II* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Martin E. Marty, *The One and the Many: America's Struggle for the Common Good* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); and James Davison Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
40. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America." See also Hart, *Political Pulpit*; and Wilson, *Public Religion in American Culture*.
41. Morone, *Hellfire Nation*; Elazar, *Covenant and Constitutionalism*; and Wald, *Religion and Politics*.
42. Cherry, *God's New Israel*.
43. R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study* (London: Murray, 1926), 84.
44. Miller, *American Puritans*, ix.
45. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny*; Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*; and McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*.
46. Cherry, *God's New Israel*; Miller, *American Puritans*; Mark McNaught, *La religion civile américaine: De Reagan à Obama* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009).

47. Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*.
48. Lienesch, *Redeeming America*.
49. Cherry, *God's New Israel*.
50. McNaught, *La religion civile américaine*.
51. Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation*.
52. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*; and Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*.
53. Brands, *What America Owes the World*.
54. Roof, "American Presidential Rhetoric."
55. Brands, *What America Owes the World*; and Morone, *Hellfire Nation*.
56. Roof, "American Presidential Rhetoric"; and Lienesch, *Redeeming America*.
57. Max Weber, trans. Talcott Parsons, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003), 79.
58. Lienesch, *Redeeming America*, 95.
59. Quoted in Cherry, *God's New Israel*, 236.
60. Lipset, *American Exceptionalism*, 83; and Lienesch, *Redeeming America*, 98–100. See also Wuthnow, *Restructuring of American Religion*, 249.
61. Harvey Cox, "The Market as God: Living in the New Dispensation," *Atlantic Monthly* 283, no. 3 (March 1999): 18–23, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/99mar/marketgod.htm.
62. Lienesch, *Redeeming America*.
63. Quoted in Wuthnow, *Restructuring of American Religion*, 248.
64. Lipset, *American Exceptionalism*.
65. Michael Kramer, "Are You Running with Me, Jesus?: Televangelist Pat Robertson Goes for the White House," *New York Magazine*, 18 August 1986, 22–29, 24.
66. Richard J. Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1986), 45.
67. Denis Lacorne, *De la religion en Amérique: Essai d'histoire politique* (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), 9–10.
68. Sébastien Fath, *Dieu bénisse l'Amérique: La religion de la Maison-Blanche* (Paris: Seuil, 2004), 227.
69. Ibid., 63–67.
70. Ibid., 195–97.
71. Nicole Guétin, *Etats-Unis: Imposture messianique? Genèse et sources* (Paris: Harmattan, 2008), 104.
72. Camille Froidevaux-Metterie, *Politique et religion aux Etats-Unis* (Paris: La decouverte, 2009), 106.
73. Ibid., 110.
74. Ibid., 107.
75. Ibid., 111.
76. George H. W. Bush, "Transcript of Bush Speech Accepting the Nomination for Another Four Years," *New York Times*, 21 October 1992, sec. A., col. 1, p. 14.
77. Guétin, *Etats-Unis: Imposture messianique?,* 106.
78. Froidevaux-Metterie, *Politique et religion*, 113.
79. Morone, *Hellfire Nation*.
80. Wuthnow, *Restructuring of American Religion*, 250, 253.

European Identity Formation in Central and Eastern European Countries after Accession by the European Union

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European identity, a notion with vague delineations, has been conceptualized in multifaceted ways. As a deriving point for analysis, this definitional divergence entails clashes among different schools that explain the phenomenon of European identity formation. Still, the sociopolitical notions of collective identity and multiple collective identities underlie every conceptualization of European identity. That is, its content framing in terms of culture, civic involvement, or common history changes, but its structural core as either of the two basic typologies remains. In Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper's threefold categorization of collective identity, European collective identity falls under the group membership heading.[1] Juan Diez Medrano clarifies the notion of multiple collective identities as a multitude of group identities that can exist in two structural positions to one another: horizontal (not exclusionary, coexisting) and vertical (mutually exclusive).[2] Although some scholars claim that the relationship between European identity and national identities is horizontal, others provide evidence that it may be vertical.[3] Regardless of their precise structural correlation, scholars agree that the two collective identities influence one another (e.g., European identity brings about Europeanization of national identities and collective memory as a result of expected solidarity with other member states).[4]

The majority of scholars view the Eastonian model of affective and utilitarian loyalties as relevant to European identity.[5] Thus, it provides a

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framework for classification of theoretical trends expounding the emergence of European identity by means of which one can categorize them as constructivist oriented, relying on the concepts of social learning and socialization (soft constructivists [i.e., modernists and postmaterialists] and hard constructivists [i.e., communitarians]), and rationalist oriented, emphasizing cost-benefit analysis and material incentives (utilitarians).

Modernism explains identity as either a cultural or historical construction. Scholars exploring the impact of modernity and globalization on the phenomenon of European identity formation apply the logic of national identity formation onto the emergence of a European Union (EU) postnational identity. In this respect, Gerard Delanty articulates the distinction between two types of collective identities in terms of design in regard to outsiders (i.e., exclusivist / guided by the formal notion of polity [state centered] and participatory / solidarity based).[6] Modernist authors argue that the European project as a universalizing idea should abide by the second type whereas the exclusionary type should be considered a feature of national identity, unfit for the supranational one.[7] Frequently, Émile Durkheim's model of a differentiated society, in which social integration calls for cultural cohesion by way of generalized values deriving from a common cultural framework, is mentioned as the basis for conceptualizing identity as a product of the modern organization of society.[8]

Characteristically, the modernist approach to collective identity specifies the cultural component as the main building block of identity. Thus, one views European identity as a social project that utilizes culture as a political instrument for its construction.[9] This modernist emphasis on culture opposes more utilitarian approaches by establishing that totalizing visions of unity should prevail over collectively mediated mercantile goals to ensure stability of loyalty towards the identity. Modernists conclude that the EU should not attempt to reproduce the national model of identity formation. Instead, it should ignore the demos and ethnos as irrelevant for the supranational level and focus on the emerging power of knowledge and the potential of culture to cause convergence of identities.[10] Symbols and common cultural discourse are the converging points whereas history and language should be downplayed.[11] The EU's successful appropriation of the European cultural identity will allow the union to mold it so as to achieve an "imagined" community.[12] In addition, modernists account for elite socialization.

Thus, Cris Shore argues that the EU elite, having acquired European identity, fosters spillover to create a cultural space and collectivity.[13]

Communitarians provide another modernist standpoint that determines formation of thick identity grounded in common history and culture as the foremost prerequisite for the perpetuation of collective European identity. They stress communal bonds and social interactions as a basis for the formation of loyalty and solidarity with a political community, which opens up culture to differences.[14] Soft constructivists (modernists and postmaterialists) differ from communitarians in their conviction that the thick identity so much featured in communitarianism is not an absolutely necessary precondition. For them, the increase in social interactions' facilitation of mutual understanding serves as the prerequisite for European identity formation.[15] Some soft constructivists claim that the EU has already started to generate this interaction by means of its mobility programs.[16]

Postmaterialists focus on European identity as a political identification with the EU. Again the emphasis here is on knowledge not as a tool to raise awareness of common cultural characteristics, as in modernist writings, but as a means for acquiring aptitudes to think abstractly. Ronald Inglehart utilizes European identity (as referring to a supranational political community) to explain public support for the integration process. The author has contributed two fundamental theories, which supplement each other, to the postmodernist school. His Cognitive Mobilization theory claims that the more education and skill that individuals have in assimilating abstract information, the more inclined they are to have postmaterial needs related to identity fulfillment and hence satisfy those by reference to the common European identity.[17] The Silent Revolution theory looks into the link between EU identity and political and economic value orientations.[18] It underlines the role of the socioeconomic milieu that conditions the individual during preadult years and instills certain social values. That is, values concerned with economic and physical security are bound to entail a materialist way of thinking that impairs postmaterialist identification with abstractly constructed supranational identities.[19] In contrast to the utilitarian view, Inglehart acknowledges economic considerations as a factor influencing aptitudes for material/postmaterial thinking but not as a possible foundation for identity formation. Since identity is highly abstract, it can be de-

signed only in the realm of postmaterial cognitive patterns, where weighing of benefits is no longer a consideration.[20]

The utilitarian school, in turn, stresses loyalty and hence identity generated by an evaluation of perceived benefits or satisfaction with policy output. Matthew Gabel reasons that, because the EU is prevailingly concerned with economic integration, individual appraisals are connected mainly with economic gains. Therefore, those are the source of identification with the supranational entity.[21] Education/knowledge as a factor features in the utilitarian theory but not as a prerequisite for abstract thinking and, consequently, identity formation.[22] Rather, for utilitarians it is an element determining to what degree individuals can benefit from economic integration.[23] Analyses on national, individual, and regional levels that employed David Easton's concept of utilitarian loyalty deduced that economic factors have important influence on public attitudes.[24]

Despite the identified differences, all theoretical trends try to solve the same problem in regard to European identity: to conceive a model that will generate EU legitimacy, mainly because, as Jos De Beus argues, a common European identity can decrease democratic deficit as a cause for popular alienation.[25] Although the current article acknowledges the plausible validity of the utilitarian view, the greater endurance of political identity theorized by postmaterialists as an outcome of cognitive mobilization renders particularly important the scrutiny of Inglehart's hypothesis in regard to the new Central and Eastern European member states after accession.[26] Testing the validity of the hypothesis for these countries will contribute to the currently available literature on European identity formation through the accumulation of observations and qualitative comparative analysis for a group of states where the process remains unexamined.

Methodology

Drawing on previous research in the field, this article tests Inglehart's hypothesis of cognitive mobilization applied to the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) following accession to the EU.[27] The hypothesis in question specifies two steps of European identity formation: cognitive mobilization (becoming aware of the EU is a necessary though not a sufficient condition for supranational affiliations to emerge) and internalization of values (attitudes towards the EU depend on both exposure

to and content of information).[28] Inglehart's hypothesis deals with aspects of individual attitudes, such as value orientations and cognitive aptitudes. Thus, the behavioralist approach is most suited for the purposes of the current study because it provides for testing Inglehart's logic at the individual level.

In terms of method, this article employs the qualitative comparative method of fuzzy sets.[29] Thus, it avoids the disadvantages of purely quantitative/qualitative methods by conducting a qualitative comparative analysis of findings grounded in quantitative data. The method allows for testing the validity of Inglehart's hypothesis of cognitive mobilization for CEECs (i.e., determining whether awareness/knowledge of the EU and internalization of its values represent necessary and/or sufficient conditions for European identity formation in Central and Eastern Europe).

The method of fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) operates with membership of cases in conceptual sets constructed from the independent (i.e., causal conditions) and dependent (i.e., outcome) variables. Raw data on the selected variables is calibrated into scores of membership in the qualitatively defined conceptual sets. The fsQCA software translates the membership scores of those cases in both the causal conditions and the outcome into a truth table that offers both an overview of the different configurations producing the outcome and a measurement of the importance of each of those combinations in explaining the end result.[30] This truth table serves as the basis for developing the current qualitative analysis, both in regard to the overall pattern of necessary, sufficient, and irrelevant conditions for the outcome, and the exceptional cases diverging from those overarching trends.

In order to test the two aspects of Inglehart's theory, this study constructed eight variables: (1) perceived knowledge of the EU, (2) trust in the EU, (3) support for the euro (the common currency), (4) support for a common defense and security policy, (5) trust in national government, (6) perceived loss of cultural identity (due to EU developments), (7) meaning of the EU as freedom of travel, and (8) support for EU membership. Through the calibrated fuzzy sets corresponding to the eight variables, the article examines how membership in the sets of the seven causal conditions influences membership of cases in the set of the outcome (i.e., support for membership, used as a variable for measuring identity formation). The justifica-

tion for utilizing support for membership as an approximation for European identity formation in Central and Eastern Europe proceeds from the argument established in the literature on postcommunist politics that, for Central and Eastern Europeans, being European is perceived as a confirmation and an official recognition of national identity.[31]

The fuzzy sets constructed through the selection of variables allow for membership scores of individual cases between 0 and 1. Calibration of variables is the process of translating the raw data available on those variables for each case into fuzzy scores of set membership. This article employs the direct method of calibration conducted by the fsQCA software after setting three qualitative anchors chosen on the basis of theoretical knowledge of the cases, to allow for an objective assessment. The software used the following anchors to calculate set membership scores for raw data: (1) crossover point at 0.5 (maximum ambiguity of membership in a fuzzy set), (2) threshold of full membership, and (3) threshold of full nonmembership in a set. The thresholds correspond to different values from the raw data for the separate variables, whose selection is justified by objective knowledge of the peculiarities influencing set membership. The selection of qualitatively grounded anchors to determine scores of set membership guarantees the minimization of subjectivity and ambiguity of results. The study avoids possible criticism of the calibration as artificial by disregarding variation among members of a particular set, considering it irrelevant.

Eurobarometer surveys (Standard, Special, and Flash) provide the data. The raw data on the constructed variables (expressed in percentages) stems from answers to selected questions, which also offer data for all years, with the exception of a few cases for which, in the absence of the relevant questions, the study uses proxies. Since for most years, the selected questions were asked in both spring and autumn Standard Eurobarometers, the author has entered the average of the respective percentages as a raw value for the variables so as to guarantee data precision. To retain consistency of data, the study takes each country per year as a separate case. To assess identity formation in CEECs after accession, the research looks at the span 2004 (accession of the first group of CEECs) to 2009 (last publication of Eurobarometer data).

Data Analysis and Findings

Aimed at determining causal conditions for European identity formation in Central and Eastern Europe, this analysis does not explore correlational connections; rather, it examines explicit set-theoretic connections (i.e., connections that could be asymmetric).[32] The strategy adopted derives from the fsQCA truth table algorithm. The analysis bases its conclusions regarding the necessity and/or sufficiency of causal conditions/configurations on the scrutiny of cases producing the outcome, which establish subset/intersection relations between the outcome and the causes.

The truth table obtained indicates that one necessary condition determines European identity formation: trust in the EU.[33] The necessity of this causal condition derives from the lack of instances in which the outcome occurs in its absence. Since, however, there is no case in which the condition generates the outcome on its own, it does not display both necessity and sufficiency. Therefore, identity formation is the product of the combination of the necessary but not sufficient condition of trust in the EU and other conditions that vary in different configurations, but without whose accompanying effect the outcome does not occur.

Comparative estimation of membership values in the sets of causal conditions and the outcome determines three possible configurations for European identity formation:

- trust in the EU combined with support for a common defense and security policy and the meaning of the EU as freedom of travel;
- trust in the EU accompanied by perceived knowledge of the EU and support for a common defense and security policy;
- trust in the EU in combination with perceived knowledge on the EU and the meaning of the EU as freedom of travel.[34]

Levels of Cognitive Mobilization: Perceived Knowledge

Trust is interrelated with knowledge as part of a cognitive circuit. Russell Hardin argues that trust in a certain political actor amounts to a presumption of knowledge about it. Political trust occurs through a process of generalization of acquired knowledge.[35] Consequently, it is not so much actual knowledge that sways public attitudes but the perception of

knowledge, designated in Eurobarometer surveys as "subjective knowledge." Since this article seeks to explore identity formation at the individual level, it scrutinizes this particular type of knowledge.

Over the years, perceived knowledge across the entire EU has been fairly low, predominantly below 65 percent. A comparison of old member states and CEECs reveals relatively higher subjective knowledge in new member states. Interestingly, the percentage difference weighs in favor of CEECs when the data is analyzed in juxtaposition to the founding member states, a group of countries in which one expects the highest perceived and actual knowledge. Raw data variation also uncovers another peculiarity: in CEECs that joined in 2004, perceived knowledge dropped for the second year after accession (2005) and then gradually started to increase. This pattern coincides with the fluctuations in support for membership and indicates the relationship between levels of perceived knowledge and membership support. As regards Bulgaria and Romania, neither a decrease in levels of subjective knowledge nor a fall in support for membership occurred in the postaccession years. Seemingly, variation in trust follows the fluctuation of membership support. Hence, those three variables are interlinked: perceived knowledge, trust, and support for membership vary along coinciding patterns. This fact confirms that explicit connections exist between the conditions of trust and perceived knowledge in the causal configurations that include both. Since trust is a necessary but not sufficient condition, perceived knowledge enhances its effect and thereby produces the outcome.

Two components□media coverage and the positions of domestic political actors□ eed into perceived knowledge. Their content affects attitudes towards the EU and thus influences the relationship between perceived knowledge and support for membership and trust (i.e., not only the amount of information but also its quality and subjective implications matter).[36] Hence, not all kinds of information increase perceived knowledge or necessarily result in the intensification of support for membership or trust. Framing the EU positively in terms of benefits increases support for membership, whereas framing it negatively (e.g., in terms of conflictual situations) decreases EU enthusiasm.[37] The media in CEECs has been unable to generate debate and increase the understanding of EU issues.[38] This inadequacy of media coverage also seems to influence perceived knowledge.

The differences between the issues underscored by the European Commission and the national media yet again reduce the legitimacy of the EU and thus affect individual assessments of the sufficiency of subjective knowledge.[39] Negatively tinged media coverage upon accession can account for the decrease during 2005 in both perceived knowledge and support for membership in CEECs from the 2004 accession wave. The importance of the content of information could explain the exceptional cases in which a surge in subjective knowledge did not accompany a rise in membership support and trust (Latvia and Hungary in 2005). Cases that did not involve a fall in support for membership following a drop in subjective knowledge (Czech Republic and Poland in 2005) imply that, occasionally, existing levels of support stagnate rather than decrease as a follow-up to a decline in perceived knowledge.

Consensus on EU membership as a priority among national political elites and intellectuals was present in all CEECs with the exception of Poland, which ascribed unpopular economic reforms to EU pressures.[40] The lack of strong challenges to the inevitability of membership created a monolithic discursive framework prior to accession; thus, the focus on aspiration for membership prevented debates on particular policy issues.[41] Neither the media nor political actors scrutinized the implications of membership until the realities of accession eventually brought them to the foreground. Citizens' realization of that lack of adequate knowledge about the repercussions of membership could account for the drop in support during 2005. Preaccession knowledge focused on cultural and political symbolism to such an extent that it practically equaled to minimum acquaintance with the political and economic mechanisms of the EU. Another possible rationalization of the emergence of soft skepticism following accession is the insurgence of radical anti-EU discourse from the fringes of the political spectrum. In the Bulgarian case, for instance, discursive uniformity was vulnerable to the emergence of radicalized alternative discourse upon accession.[42]

The Trust Factor: Cognitive Internalization of Values / Trust in the European Union and Trust in National Governments

Trust in the EU represents the necessary but not sufficient condition for identity formation in CEECs. In comparison to the other causal conditions,

it displays the strongest explicit connection to the outcome. The current findings indicate that identification with the EU occurs only in the presence of established trust and confidence in the union.

The notion of the union as a community of both political stability and liberal democracy is inherently linked to this trust. In Central and Eastern Europe, discontent with[illegible]nd in some states, aversion towards[illegible]he communist regimes cultivated citizens' eagerness to embark on the democratic experiment anew. Due to the lack of successful previous democratic experiences (with the exception of the Czech Republic), for CEECs EU membership meant not only a return to Europe but also an opportunity to establish political stability that would prevent the resurgence of communist or authoritarian rule (e.g., Slovakia came very close to authoritarianism under Vladimir Meciar). The EU had played this role before (e.g., Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese accessions)[illegible]n important one for the future stability of the region. Dismissing a purely liberal intergovernmentalist framework, Frank Schimmelfennig argues that eastward expansion presents a conscious endeavor of the EU-15 to integrate postcommunist countries into the community of liberal states, pursued even in contradiction with the logic of sound strategic calculations.[43]

Faced with the task of integrating the CEECs, the EU has attempted to generate reforms through conditionality so as to respond to Central and East Europeans' expectations for postcommunist changes and to prevent disillusionment.[44] The soft power of the union has manifested through the so-called phenomenon of Europeanization. Since most reforms occurred in the preaccession period, one can explain trust in the EU after accession by noting the perception of the EU as a guarantor for the continuation of the reform process, which the public views as necessary and favorable. This notion of the EU explains support for membership despite the near-absence of trust in national governments.

The protraction of the accession process, however, resulted in an eventual disillusionment with the actual benefits of membership, which provoked a less enthusiastic and more critical attitude on the part of CEECs.[45] The fall in support for membership in proximity to the time of accession lends empirical evidence to these allegations. In this respect, the EU's commitment to the process of CEECs' accession has been criticized in various ways. One strand of criticism exposes the lack of full-swing

liberalization of trade with candidate states in the Europe Agreements, which would have alleviated many of their persisting economic problems.[46] Others have condemned the biased utilization of conditionality whereby important issues for member states were prioritized in negotiations with CEECs.[47] Such criticism emphasizes that the EU's attitude towards CEECs could have decisively harmed popular trust in the union.

Despite the difficulties of the preaccession period, this study finds that trust in the EU not only has remained intact but also has established itself as a prominent factor in identity formation. The increase in support for EU membership in CEECs after 2005 and its steady values of more than 50 percent on average confirm the dimension of this trust. Also, the drop in public support for membership did not reoccur in 2007, when Bulgaria and Romania joined the union.

The practical implications of this trust have become evident on occasions when the public welcomed actions by the EU in cases of domestic political actors deviating from EU standards. Central and Eastern Europeans have accepted the freezing of funds, critical reports from the European Commission, and infringement procedures as a useful part of the postaccession monitoring system. Trust in the EU can explain why the union's requirements for domestic-level reforms are not seen as excessive interference but as benevolent assistance aimed at guiding national elites in the right direction.[48] The EU's imposition of disciplinary measures did not damage popular trust in and support for the union in CEECs. Conversely, in the older member states, popular opinion has prevented excessively negative evaluations and penalizing actions from the commission. Lower rates of trust in national governments in Central and Eastern Europe could explain the higher legitimacy of EU claims to protect common European and national interests by imposing penalties.

The union's record of successful economic integration and growth is yet another generator of CEECs' trust in the EU. Economic segregation from Western Europe has accompanied political isolation during the communist period. Membership in the EU is thus particularly important for economic development and trade creation in CEECs.[49] Answers to the Eurobarometer question on perceived benefits from membership place the contribution to the economic growth of the country among the first three options and thus support this claim.

Trust in national government has also been established as an important determinant of support for EU membership. Empirical studies on Western Europe have identified several alternative models of the interdependence between this trust and support for EU membership. One model postulates that with governments expected to cater to national interests and curb excessive integrationist efforts, the more trust in those governments, the more support for integration.[50] Another account claims that support for the EU results from the interplay between national and supranational politics. Within its logic, the worse the domestic political system works, the higher the support for the supranational governance because individuals perceive lesser costs associated with transferring national sovereignty to the supranational level.[51]

The present findings reveal that the connection between trust in national government and support for EU membership is much less important in CEECs than in the models developed for Western Europe. In those postcommunist states, trust in the national executive does not play an explicitly significant role for European identity formation. On the basis of the majority of cases, however, one can observe a negative connection between the two. High support for membership is most frequently accompanied by low levels of trust in the national government. This seems to suggest that Central and Eastern Europeans perceive the EU as a disciplinary factor able to monitor national elites and solve inherent problems present since the fall of communism (e.g., corruption scandals, abuse of office, dubious privatization of former state property, creation of circles of influential businesses connected to government officials, etc.). Although this last allegation echoes Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca's claim for a connection between trust in national government and support for EU membership in the West, the resemblance is only superficial and does not hold under all circumstances.[52] Since corruption and abuse of political power are particularly problematic in postcommunist countries, CEECs' citizens do not view integration as a transfer of sovereignty but as an opportunity to discipline national elites in safeguarding the nation-state's sovereignty more effectively. Therefore, public opinion supports penalizing actions from Brussels, which involve freezing funds or bringing cases against national governments before the European Court of Justice.[53]

One finds the only exceptions to the overall pattern of support for membership accompanied by distrust in national governments in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Here the explicit connection seems positive, and high levels of support for EU membership accompany high levels of trust in national governments. Cultural and performance theories account for this phenomenon of relatively consistent trust in the national executives (i.e., it results from a combination of high levels of interpersonal trust and satisfaction with government performance).[54]

Cognitive Feasibility of Multiple Identities / Loss of Cultural Identity and Freedom to Travel

In Central and Eastern Europe, the genesis and development of national identity are primarily rooted in ethnic consciousness and culture. That is, membership in an ethnically and culturally differentiated group is a prerequisite for acceptance in the political community.[55] The cases of Latvia and Estonia illustrate the importance of ethnic belonging attached to citizenship. Upon their independence from the Soviet Union, both countries initiated constitutional developments that constructed an exclusive concept of citizenship based on ethnic background to prevent further assimilation by the Russian speakers resettled in their territories during the Soviet period.[56] Although Latvia modified its naturalization and citizenship laws, Estonia has not yet introduced substantial changes.[57] Thus, Estonian formulation of citizenship still contradicts EU principles on nondiscrimination by categorizing the Russian minority as noncitizens.[58]

National cultural identity has hitherto been guarded by political and social rights attached strictly to national citizenship, by national symbols, and by border controls. Hence, the EU's facilitation of mobility (legal intra-EU migration) and attempts to establish common symbols of Europeanness could instill fears of loss of national cultural differences.[59] Simultaneously, the intensity of national identity has become an important factor that influences affiliations of individuals with the EU (i.e., feelings of strong national identity lead to lower support for the EU in Western Europe).[60] The perception of a threat to the national cultural identity, therefore, will likely translate into skepticism towards the supranational identity.

This interdependence in the West has been explicitly linked to migration. Since migration is the focal point of the interrelated dynamics of

identity, borders, and orders, migration inflows in older member states intensify the fear of losing cultural identity.[61] Hostility to other cultures and nationalist concerns are more influential than utilitarian cost/benefit analysis in relation to the decrease in support for integration.[62] Some scholars have debunked this allegation, claiming that although a large number of Western Europeans perceive the EU as a threat to national identity, this feeling does not have a unique impact on overall support for membership.[63] Although rejecting the exclusive effect of the fear of losing national identity in outweighing other factors, this later claim does not entirely discredit it as an important determinant. It simply notes that occasionally other factors can be of equal or greater importance.

This article's findings on CEECs resonate with Lauren McLaren's argument for Western Europe.[64] Loss of cultural identity is frequently outweighed by other considerations, and European identity formation occurs regardless of its presence. Given the relationship between migration and loss of cultural identity in the West, the lower levels of perception of loss of cultural identity due to EU membership indicate that migration does not affect EU affiliation negatively in CEECs. Since outward migration to richer member states is viewed as a necessary evil of economic transition in those countries, it is not framed as loss of identity but as a demographic problem.[65]

Similar to tendencies in the West, the fear of losing cultural identity is visible in marginal extreme-nationalist discourse, though geared towards national minorities and not towards the EU or migrants from other member states. A straightforward connection to the EU within such nationalist discursive framing in CEECs occurs when national policies concerning minority groups change as a result of Europeanization.[66] Even populist extreme-right parties seem to exhibit a cautious attitude towards the EU and a reluctance to depict it as a threat to national identity.[67]

For the most part, loss of cultural identity in Western Europe relates to the effects of the right to free movement. Still, paradoxically, a large portion of EU citizens perceives freedom of travel as one of the central meanings of the EU. The lack of a significant, explicit connection of the loss of cultural identity to European identity formation in CEECs, however, explains why freedom of travel appears as a relevant causal condition here. Two of the

configurations producing the outcome indicate that it facilitates the consolidation of a common European identity.

Some scholars suggest a connection between freedom of movement and identity formation, arguing that creation of EU citizenship with the Maastricht Treaty introduced a political aspect to the previously economically dominated concept of mobility by extending it to economically inactive individuals.[68] Still, in reference to CEECs, freedom of travel is predominantly associated with economic migration and "social welfare tourism."[69] Given the wage gap and the discrepancies in economic development between Western and Eastern Europe, for Central and Eastern Europeans this right presents opportunities for access to better living and employment. If the new EU citizens seized those opportunities, Western labor market developments could entail social dumping.[70] Thus, for the older member states, the eastward expansion of the area of free movement—particularly the provisions of the Schengen Agreement—replaced Cold War anxieties of military invasion with the soft-security considerations of immigration overflood and rapid growth of cross-border crime.[71]

Studies on repercussions of the Eastern enlargement predicted both a negligible aggregate effect on Western labor markets and large-scale implications due to economic migration in a quest for social benefits and better living standards.[72] The ones conducted in the aftermath of enlargements during 2004 and 2007 conclude that migration levels have indeed increased but that their impact was limited to certain member states (e.g., United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Spain) and did not display an overall sweeping importance for EU labor markets.[73] In practice, forecasts of large inflows of Central and Eastern European workers overwhelming the EU labor market did not materialize. Moreover, estimates indicate that the overall internal EU migration flows (including effects of the Eastern enlargement) increase substantially slower than migration rates on the global level.[74]

Though not fully exploiting freedom of movement to sustain economic migration, Central and Eastern Europeans regard freedom of travel as one of the most important aspects of EU membership. Provisions in the accession agreements allowing for the suspension of labor mobility of up to seven years for CEECs' nationals could provide part of the explanation for the absence of a boom in economic migration from the new member states.

Legal scholars have claimed that the "2+3+2" suspension formula of those agreements violates the nondiscrimination principle of EU legislation.[75] Imposition of these disproportionate restrictions and the asymmetry of obligations and benefits incurred by CEECs during the initial period of membership have not hampered overall appreciation for the freedom of movement, and it explicitly contributes to European identity formation in the region.[76] Since all member states (with the exception of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden for the first round of Eastern enlargement) have taken advantage of the possibility of limiting access to their labor markets, freedom of movement for CEECs to a large extent amounts to mobility only for noneconomic purposes.[77] Therefore, the prospect of traveling for leisure as well as cultural and educational experiences explains the importance that Central and Eastern Europeans ascribe to this freedom. For them, it does not simply amount to an economic right but to a political one, an acknowledgement of their belonging to a united Europe.

This appreciation of travel opportunities for noneconomic purposes builds upon CEECs' precommunist Western European connections and postcommunist drive to "return to Europe." For the Central and Eastern Europeans who saw communism as an alien implantation imposing cultural practices and norms separating them from their European (i.e., Western European) cultural roots, the opening of the borders carried symbolic as well as practical connotations.[78] Even in cases of economically motivated migration, Guglielmo Meardi has found that the cultural aspect of mobility remains evident. Based on the differences in the lifestyle of Central and Eastern European migrants compared to that of immigrants from previous migration waves (frequent travel and strong connections with the native country, combined with efforts to integrate in their host community), he doubts the justifiability of labeling them "immigrants" as opposed to "cosmopolitans."[79] This cultural and symbolic dimension of freedom of movement as a concept not necessarily involving entitlement to economic rights in other member states clarifies the role of the variable in producing the outcome of European identity formation. In the prevailing absence of utilitarian calculations imposed by the transition arrangements, one can explain the involvement of freedom of travel in the molding of European identity in the region in terms of its contribution to the internalization of

common values. This internalization is a prerequisite for the emergence of supranational identity within Inglehart's theory.

Supranationality: Cognitive Aptitudes to Identify with European Union Policies / Support for the Euro and a Common Defense and Security Policy

The importance of the common currency for European identity formation derives from the connection between currency and identity that has developed historically at the national level. Matthias Kaelberer argues that national currency is a marker defining the boundaries of political entities.[80] Theoretically, a reciprocal connection exists between money and identity: money is a purposeful tool of identity construction, and a sufficient degree of collective identity is a prerequisite for proper functioning of the currency.[81] Thus, the common currency is a symbol of deeper integration aimed at increasing affiliations with the EU.[82] Its adoption represents not only a substantial loss of monetary sovereignty but also a leap forward towards construction of the EU as a new political entity.[83]

Introduction of the common currency affects Eurozone citizens' identification with the EU because it makes the European project palpable and therefore serves as a reification of its political order.[84] The symbolic meaning of the common currency underlies the continuous support for the euro in Eurozone members despite initial popular disappointment with its short-term economic implications.[85] Still, variation in attitudes towards the common currency across counties exists. Yet again, the symbolic value of the euro and its interplay with national collective identification patterns explain those divergences.[86] This study's findings indicate that trends of attitudes towards European currency in Central and Eastern Europe do not differ substantially from those hitherto observed in Eurozone member states.

Utilitarian considerations of the benefits of joining the Eurozone in terms of taking full advantage of the single market partially explain the relatively high support for the common currency in CEECs. The elimination of exchange and transaction costs, the eradication of exchange-rate volatility, and the prevention of competitive devaluations and speculation are especially important for CEECs since those states need to overcome inflation and hyperinflation repercussions from the 1990s, to attract foreign investments, and to increase the creation of trade.[87] Previous studies suggest that in those postcommunist countries, macrolevel aspects of economic

and historical-ideational factors have the predominant impact on individual support for European currency. Microlevel indicators of economic self-interest do not influence support for the common currency extensively; thus, aggregate national performance acquires the prevailing importance.[88] Consequently, disillusionment with the short-term effects of euro adoption induces only temporary decreases in support for the common currency.

Despite this feasible explanation for the predominantly high levels of support for the euro, the results of this article indicate that this support is not universally present. Furthermore, it is not a condition in any of the causal configurations for identity formation. Temporal and case-specific fluctuations testifying to the weaker explicit connection between this condition and the outcome could be expounded in two alternative ways.

Scholars who support the view that attachment to national currencies causes the lack of consistent support for the euro point to the symbolism of banknotes as references to the historical past and reproductions of national narratives.[89] In practice this would mean that citizens in CEECs give precedence to national sovereignty and identity, disregarding utilitarian considerations. With support for a common defense and security policy (another policy with great implications for national sovereignty and identity) consistently high and present as a condition in two of the three possible recipes for identity formation, such an explanation of the lack of support for the euro is questionable. An examination of individual cases of lower support for the euro suggests that the emergence of populist discourse that generates debate on the harmful effects of the euro causes the phenomenon.[90]

Skepticism towards the common currency could derive from more practical considerations as well. Adoption of the euro, although part of the *acquis* obligations of CEECs, is not an issue of straightforward immediacy. So far, only Slovenia (2007) and Slovakia (2009) have fulfilled the Maastricht convergence criteria and joined the Eurozone. Most of the other new member states still require substantial preparation before becoming eligible to join the common currency.[91] One could also view the Greek crisis over the budget deficit as part of the explanation insofar as it adds salience to the discouraging aspects of Eurozone membership for two reasons. First, it demonstrates how problems in one state could pose a peril for the stability of the entire Eurozone. Second, it illustrates the necessity of strictly abiding

by Eurozone rules and the constraints they place on national governments when solving similar situations.

The analysis of support for the common currency indicates that increasing the level of awareness of the positive economic effects of the euro and presenting a realistic view on its potential negative implications, as explored by scholars utilizing the Optimum Currency Area theory, would entail higher levels of support (i.e., cognitive mobilization would have positive results).[92] Simultaneously, it shows that occasionally negative attitudes towards the euro in CEECs are not due to identity considerations but to utilitarian concerns (CEECs' citizens do not have anything against the symbol as such).[93] Moreover, those utilitarian concerns do not transfer in a negative attitude towards the EU as a whole and do not prevent support for membership and a feeling of Europeanness. Like some instances in Western Europe, the desire to belong to Europe accounts for support for the euro in the majority of the cases in CEECs (i.e., positive attitude towards membership transfers to tolerance and support for the European currency).

As a supranational initiative, the common defense and security policy is a component of political integration that would change the nature of the EU's external relations.[94] Hence, measuring its relationship to support for membership in CEECs is an important aspect of studies on identity formation in those member states.

CEECs are characterized by close ties with the United States in the realm of security and by general skepticism for the EU's ability to provide for their security as effectively as America has, ever since the end of the Cold War.[95] The union's inability to react to conflicts during the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia further consolidated this skepticism. Hence, in terms of support for a common defense and security policy, the affiliation with the United States becomes a central issue to consider.[96] Several instances reflect the importance of the relationship with the United States and NATO: the US invasion of Iraq, for which the Visegrad countries granted support to the US administration despite the Franco-German stance against an intervention; the Vilnius Letter (sent on the same occasion), expressing confidence in US reasons for intervention, signed by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, among other countries; and the antimissile shield launched as a project by the Bush administration, which involved the Polish and Czech positions clashing

with the stance of French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who asked for a moratorium of the initiative and was thereupon accused of overstepping his mandate as presider over the EU-Russia summit in 2008.[97]

The CEECs' concern with Russian influence and its possible association with EU security and defense initiatives reflects the foreign policy legacy of the Cold War. Polish foreign policy, for example, has consistently aimed at decreasing Russia's political impact, not only in the domestic politics of Poland but also that of other countries. (It supported the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and vetoed the start of the talks between Russia and the EU in 2006, thereby blocking negotiation of the new partnership agreement.) In the process, Polish foreign policy complicated the EU's external relations agenda, occasionally hampering EU-Russian relations. In this context, the United States is viewed as the balancing counterpower in military terms.[98]

In accord with qualitative knowledge on the affiliation between CEECs and the United States in the field of security, one would expect fairly low or at least fluctuating support for the common defense and security policy over the years. This study's findings, however, testify to the opposite: support is consistently high. One could explain this discrepancy by citing the fact that Central and Eastern Europeans believe that EU membership will bring security not only in economic but also in political terms. Regardless of the shortcomings of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, citizens of the new member states associate accession with membership in a club able to protect its members.

Popular responses seem to contradict the expected cautious attitudes geared towards striking a balance between support for an EU common defense and cooperation with the United States. The high rates of positive answers to Eurobarometer questions on a European foreign policy independent of the United States indicate that the average CEEC citizen prefers an EU-based defense system distinctive from that of the United States, though not necessarily in competition or confrontation with it. This conclusion signifies a decreasing sensitivity on the part of citizens for the necessity of maintaining a balance between EU and NATO affiliations due to better US defense capabilities. Thus, one can argue that support for an EU defense and security policy is predominantly based on the desire to feel European and not so much on perceptions of actual strategic advantages of the policy.

Since the latter still have not extensively materialized for CEECs and since the United States has played the crucial role in the region's security in the 1990s, the argument remains particularly relevant. The presence of the causal condition of support for a common defense and security policy in two of the configurations producing the outcome, in turn, allows one to conclude that the prospect of its existence makes Central and Eastern Europeans feel more European and thus contributes to identity formation.

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33. One infers necessity of a condition when membership in the outcome is less than or equal to membership in the cause. For more, see ibid.

34. For clarity, those configurations have been simplified by eliminating the irrelevant variables—those whose presence has no explicit impact on the outcome. The subsequent analysis of findings includes the irrelevant variables so as to explain the contribution that their irrelevance makes to the current conclusions on the peculiarities of determinants of European identity formation in CEECs.

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US Policy Shifts on Sub-Saharan Africa

An Assessment of Contending Predictions

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It is perhaps understandable that literature on US interests in Africa often focuses on the humanitarian-developmental problems that afflict the continent. Many, if not most, states in the sub-Saharan region are plagued by poverty, poor infrastructure, and violence. These issues sometimes do (and should) garner the attention of American policy makers. Yet, the region also poses challenges threats as well as opportunities of a more material nature. Contemporary research indicates that sub-Saharan Africa is a burgeoning hot spot of anti-Western terrorist activity; it further suggests that African leaders have become increasingly savvy about granting outside access to the region's wealth of natural resources.[1]

In the Horn of Africa, for example, lawlessness and state failure in Somalia and Sudan provide ideal conditions for the growth of militant Islamist and terrorist organizations.[2] In Central Africa, China continues to make progress in securing access to natural resources via bilateral "development deals." The United States, in turn, maintains tenuous economic relations with many of these states, largely due to the conditional nature of US investment and lending practices.[3] Though the United States maintains stronger trade ties with states in Western Africa, it has done little to address the risks stemming from heightened regional political instability. This is particularly true of the United States' role in Nigeria, the fourth-largest supplier of US crude oil imports.[4] In Southern Africa, finally, Robert Mugabe's continued hold on Zimbabwe threatens to destabilize the region. This could pose risks to South Africa, one of the United States' two strategic partners (South Africa and Nigeria) on the continent. Further, Mugabe's

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rule contributes to the ever-present risk that the country's cholera-AIDS epidemic will spread through the region, and perhaps beyond.[5]

It is apparent that US policy makers face an ever-expanding array of challenges to American interests in sub-Saharan Africa. In today's increasingly globalized environment, they cannot afford simply to write off that area's problems as "local" or "regional" issues.

Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold War Era

The United States' primary relationships with Africa stem from its former attempts to protect Western interests in the continent during the Cold War era. By the 1960s, President Kennedy's advisers had begun to establish relationships with leaders in the newly independent African states, fearful that Europe's retreat from the continent would allow for a power vacuum in which anti-Western (Soviet-communist) forces could thrive.[6] In the Horn of Africa, for example, Washington backed Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie in an attempt to counter Moscow's support for Somalia's Siad Barre.[7] The Kennedy administration's efforts to "facilitate an orderly transition from colonialism to independence" were somewhat undercut by the subsequent redirection of American interests to the Vietnam War (under Johnson and Nixon).[8] Carter's subsequent shift towards a foreign policy anchored in human rights and development assistance was ultimately short-lived; the Reagan administration restructured the United States' Africa policy along regional security interests.[9]

By 1989 internal crises in the Soviet Union had prompted Moscow to cut ties with its client states in Africa. Washington, in turn, distanced itself from its Cold War allies in the continent. The absence of Cold War competition, along with reports of a growing rash of human rights violations, prompted the United States to suspend support for states like Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya.[10] Coupled with the lingering effects of Europe's colonial withdrawal from the continent, the crumbling of the US-Soviet rival bloc support system undercut Africa's progress towards good governance and economic development. Problems of weak infrastructure and limited force projection left African states, particularly those in the sub-Saharan regions, vulnerable to armed conflict and humanitarian crisis. In response, African leaders turned to increasingly authoritarian means of rebuilding their governmental and economic systems. This, in turn, provided additional justifica-

tion for the American trend towards severing ties with former African allies. Many predicted that US foreign policy makers would opt to fully disengage from Africa's "areas of marginal interest."[11]

Post–Cold War Africa: "New" Directions in US Policy?

To some extent, the aforementioned prediction proved valid. The United States' rapid exit from Somalia in 1993 and its nonresponse to the Rwandan genocide of 1994 were in keeping with speculation that American concern for Africa was on the decline. Further, many Western leaders adhere to the now-popular "African solutions for African problems" approach.[12] This, however, presents the possibility that African solutions may not align with Western preferences. Africa's post-Cold War leaders are committed to rebuilding strong governments and strong economies; they are not necessarily committed to ensuring that those governments are democratic or that those economies are rooted in open-market practices. Yet, Western-style democratic and economic reforms do not represent comprehensive solutions either. As Marina Ottaway notes, neither free elections nor open markets will necessarily lead to the prevention of political violence or humanitarian disasters.[13]

According to Ottaway, if "the most important precondition for a sustained revival in Africa entails restructuring its many failed states," then the West must be prepared to reassess its role in post-Cold War Africa.[14] One could argue that this is particularly true for the United States. Despite the spotty nature of past involvements and the tenuousness of present-day relationships, American strategic interests in Africa (particularly sub-Saharan Africa) are considerable. As the global war on terror continues, US leaders may be more likely to regard Africa's ungoverned territories as havens for Islamic extremists. Furthermore, given the seemingly ever-present threat of an energy crisis, they may be more inclined to pursue means of securing American access to Africa's wealth of hydrocarbon resources. Finally, some may come to view the region's humanitarian challenges, at least indirectly (insofar as they complicate America's other interests in Africa), as greater cause for concern.[15]

Academic and policy assessments of the United States' post-Cold War role in Africa, however, remain divided. Some contend that US involvements with the continent have lessened and continue to do so. Others suggest

that criticisms of nonengagement in the 1990s overshadow the United States' more recent efforts in the continent. The election of Barack Obama in 2008 both complicates and enhances this debate, as questions regarding the president's intentions for the scope and direction of US-Africa relations remain largely unanswered.

In an effort to shed light on the new dimensions of the "Africa policy question," this article examines various predictions regarding Africa policy under the Obama administration. It then compares the speeches of President Obama and Obama officials with those of previous presidents and their foreign policy advisers; in turn, it compares the new administration's initial actions in sub-Saharan Africa with the efforts of the previous three presidential administrations. The article uses these comparisons to identify trends in post-Cold War US-Africa relations and to develop predictions on the Obama administration's approach to the Africa policy question.

Obama's Africa: Competing Policy Predictions

1. *Change is on the horizon. Obama's election heralds a new era of heightened attention for sub-Saharan Africa. The administration will pursue "common priorities" of good governance (democracy), development, conflict resolution, and improved access to health care and education.*

Both policy analysts and Africa scholars advance the position that Obama's approach to sub-Saharan Africa will be more active and comprehensive than that of his predecessors.[16] Many claim that the president's heritage—particularly his Kenyan roots—will prompt him to seek closer US ties to Africa. Some suggest that his Senate record—his cosponsorship of the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, condemnation of Zimbabwean dictator Mugabe, focus on health-related projects in sub-Saharan Africa, and attention to Kenya's postelection instability—will translate to continued presidential action on Africa. Others, in turn, cite the president's decision to surround himself with Africa experts—the appointment of Susan Rice as the US ambassador to the United Nations and the influence afforded to the assistant secretary of state for African affairs (Johnnie Carson)—as evidence of his commitment to addressing Africa's challenges.[17]

Adherents of this position dispute claims that Africa will remain a low-level priority under Obama. Fears that the president will be "distracted"

by domestic economic problems and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, they say, are largely overblown.[18] Rather, the president's goals for Africa (further integration of Africa into the world economy, improved levels of peace and security, and strengthened political and civil institutions) are well suited to the current environment. Numerous "hopeful developments" have occurred in the sub-Saharan region: improved economic growth, West Africa's transition from civil warfare to relative stability, and initial indications of successes for the Bush administration's HIV/AIDS and debt-relief programs.

According to Chinua Akukwe, the broad range of *probable* reasons for increased US involvement with Africa is perhaps less significant than the slightly narrower range of *necessary* reasons for increased US-Africa ties. The current international environment will prevent the Obama administration from ignoring Africa's value as a source of oil and trade. Although proponents of this view typically couch their statements in the language of cautious optimism, their position is clear: "Barack Obama . . . will pay attention to Africa."[19]

2. *There will be little change in the United States' post-Cold War approach to sub-Saharan Africa; the region will remain a low priority for foreign policy makers. Hopes that Africa will receive greater attention from the Obama administration will not be met; the administration will focus the great bulk of its efforts on addressing domestic economic concerns and higher-order international challenges (Iraq and Afghanistan).*

Numerous policy analysts questioned President Clinton's approach to sub-Saharan Africa, depicting it as a continuation of the continent's low-priority status under the George H. W. Bush administration. Clinton, claims Rachel Stohl, initially seemed "interested in helping undo the damage caused by years of neglect."[20] However, the president's pro-Africa rhetoric was largely undercut by two highly publicized foreign policy missteps: the rapid withdrawal from Somalia following the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 and the nonresponse to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Perhaps in reaction to criticisms of these choices, Clinton officials and their supporters in Congress adopted a new position: "African solutions for African problems."[21] Critics attacked the administration's lack of attention to the West African diamond conflicts and instability in the Horn of Africa, decrying the president's observation that the United States "cannot respond to every humanitarian catastrophe in the world."[22]

Observers were similarly quick to condemn George W. Bush's early take on Africa. When asked about his plans for Africa during the 2000 presidential campaign, he responded with "There've got to be priorities."[23] He commended Clinton's decision to avoid US intervention in Rwanda, claiming that he too would opt against direct US engagement in cases of African genocide.[24] Critics not only attacked these comments but also highlighted his decision to cut funds for international organizations that provided family planning and reproductive health services in Africa. They further criticized Bush's lack of support for proposals to allow Africa to "import or produce generic versions of HIV/AIDS medications."[25]

Many contend that Obama's Africa policy will represent a continuation of Clinton-Bush policy that the current administration will fail to meet hopes for a more active and comprehensive approach to the continent. They depict expectations of increased US attention and support for Africa as unrealistic, suggesting that Obama's Kenyan heritage is no guarantee that his Africa agenda will "somehow be unique or different than his predecessor's."[26] Some argue that more pressing issues economic troubles and ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will act as constraints against a more proactive Africa policy.[27] Most adherents to this viewpoint suggest that we would be foolish to "expect too much" of Obama's emerging Africa policy, but some have gone so far as to predict that "Africa may actually fare less well than it did under Bush."[28] Others have been quick to criticize the new president's early speeches on Africa, claiming that admonitions like "Africa's future is up to Africans" are misplaced and ill deserved.[29] They fear that there is little hope for an enhanced role for Africa on the US foreign policy agenda because Obama has essentially "repackaged the same old views in less diplomatic language."[30]

3. *Obama will make modest adjustments to Bush's post-9/11 "militarization" policy. Hopes that sub-Saharan Africa will play a greater role in US foreign policy will be partially met; the administration will support Bush's US Africa Command (AFRICOM) and counterterrorism initiatives.*

The previous two arguments share an assumption about the nature of the United States' post old War involvements with sub-Saharan Africa; namely, that despite intermittent periods of increased attention, the region was a low-priority concern for American decision makers. Some depict this assumption as faulty, though, suggesting that recent administrations have

increasingly focused on Africa's importance to the United States (analysts remain divided on the appropriateness of this new focus). For example, Dana Hughes contends that, in certain respects, "Africa was a priority under former President Bush."[31] Aid to Africa exceeded $5 billion per year by the end of his second term, a number that far exceeds assistance levels under George H. W. Bush or Bill Clinton. Some trace this trend of renewed American interest in the continent to the late 1990s and early 2000s, citing leaders' concerns for the security risks posed by Islamic extremist organizations and for US access to African oil reserves. Presidents Clinton and Bush both took steps to counter al-Qaeda's influence in the Horn of Africa and surrounding regions. Further, both supported legislation that called for increased US trade ties with sub-Saharan Africa.[32]

Although Hughes lauds Bush's attention to Africa, particularly the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, others suggest that Bush's post-9/11 "fixation on security" has resulted in a dangerous militarization of US Africa policy.[33] The Bush administration, claim critics, went far beyond providing strategic assistance for counterterrorism activities— it launched a new unified combatant command, AFRICOM, in 2008. The administration defended the actions necessary for enhanced African stability and the progress of the global war on terror, but some fear that these steps will accomplish nothing more than "flooding [the continent] with even more guns."[34]

Some suggest that President Obama will continue to pursue the militarization efforts initiated under Bush, noting that he is "set to oversee significant increases in US security assistance programmes for African countries."[35] The current administration plans to uphold Bush's foreign military training and international military education and training programs; further, its 2010 budget included calls for increased spending for security assistance programs and AFRICOM operations. "This shows that— at least initially— the administration is following the course laid down . . . by the Bush administration."[36]

Assessing the Policy Predictions: Underlying Assumption of Predictions One and Two

Gauging the validity of the contending predictions first requires an assessment of the underlying assumption of the first two positions: since the end of the Cold War, sub-Saharan Africa has been a low-priority item for American foreign policy makers. A standard count-measure of presidents'

public statements (1989–2010) reveals little about the importance of the region (as compared to other regions) to administrations of the past two decades (table 1).

Table 1. Presidential attention to sub-Saharan Africa in the post–Cold War era: public statements (or papers) on sub-Saharan Africa versus other regions

Administration/Year	Africa	Asia	Europe	Middle East	Latin America
Bush 1989	69	85	275	46	44
Bush 1990	87	58	323	91	60
Bush 1991	76	76	252	145	31
Bush 1992	66	105	247	91	50
Clinton 1993	97	137	273	122	83
Clinton 1994	184	109	308	188	50
Clinton 1995	135	115	270	207	49
Clinton 1996	179	150	239	174	48
Clinton 1997	187	178	296	191	114
Clinton 1998	352	403	277	269	102
Clinton 1999	348	256	379	240	117
Clinton 2000	435	256	235	287	119
Bush 2001	157	162	250	194	44
Bush 2002	139	151	209	256	42
Bush 2003	294	122	253	341	19
Bush 2004	305	137	285	484	34
Bush 2005	199	160	284	312	29
Bush 2006	249	190	272	388	32
Bush 2007	281	177	287	339	95
Bush 2008	361	209	369	355	76
Obama 2009	159	133	174	139	35
Obama 2010	25	23	28	21	4

Source: Information obtained from the American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/. Results derived from region-name search for each world region, for each presidential-administration year, and for the years 1989–2010. Count is based on those search results in which the title of the document highlighted the region name.

Applying the same statement count-measure to congressional floor statements on sub-Saharan Africa (1989–2009) , however, yields somewhat more telling results. The 1989–2009 period included roughly 1,300 statements on Africa per Congress (average). In contrast, statements on other

regions exceeded 2,000 statements per Congress during the same period.[37] This provides at least some indication that African issues and challenges may have held less interest or, at least, registered as lower-priority items for members of Congress than issues and challenges stemming from other regions of the world.

The comparison of statement count-measures may provide only rough estimates of sub-Saharan Africa's relative importance to post-Cold War policy makers, but an analysis of the content of these statements allows for a more nuanced assessment. Table 2 provides an overview of the breadth of presidential-administration statements on sub-Saharan Africa (per year, for the 1989–2009 period); it also provides an overview of the nature and content of those statements (most common themes per year for the 1989–2009 period). As indicated, the immediate post-Cold War era was defined by George H. W. Bush's somewhat narrow or 1989, nonexistent take on US interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Clinton, who devoted very little attention to the continent during his first years in office, ultimately came to focus on issues such as US-Africa trade ties, democracy, and concerns about health and humanitarian aid. Pres. George W. Bush, in turn, adopted a seemingly expansive (and expanding) series of policy objectives for the region. In some respects, this information seems to conflict with the assumption that the United States has generally ignored Africa during the post-Cold War era.

Table 2. Scope and nature of presidential-administration statements on sub-Saharan Africa, 1989–2009

Administration/Year	Statements on Sub-Saharan Africa
Bush 1989	NA
Bush 1990	Humanitarian/refugees
Bush 1991	Humanitarian/refugees
Bush 1992	Humanitarian/refugees
Clinton 1993	NA
Clinton 1994	General: Africa as US foreign policy priority
Clinton 1995	NA
Clinton 1996	Free trade and development
Clinton 1997	Free trade and development
Clinton 1998	Free trade (African Growth and Opportunity Act [AGOA]), democracy
Clinton 1999	Free trade (AGOA), democracy

Table 2 (continued)

Administration/Year	Statements on Sub-Saharan Africa
Clinton 2000	Free trade (AGOA), disease, crime, humanitarian aid
Bush 2001	Free trade (AGOA)
Bush 2002	Free trade (AGOA), security, HIV/AIDS
Bush 2003	Free trade (AGOA), security, terrorism, HIV/AIDS
Bush 2004	Free trade (AGOA), Sudan crisis, HIV/AIDS
Bush 2005	Free trade (AGOA), democracy, humanitarian
Bush 2006	Free trade (AGOA), Darfur crisis
Bush 2007	Humanitarian/refugees, Darfur crisis, HIV/AIDS, poverty
Bush 2008	Humanitarian/refugees, disease, security, Darfur crisis
(Obama 2009)	Good governance, democracy, free trade (AGOA), violence in Central Africa

Source: Information obtained from American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/. Results reflect the "year average" of presidential-administration messages. Results derived from content analysis of each presidential-administration statement on sub-Saharan Africa and for each presidential-administration year (for those search results in which the title of the document highlighted the region name).

One could argue that the willingness to support US interests in Africa with the use of force (table 3) is decidedly more limited than presidential-congressional rhetoric would indicate. The great majority of the United States' post-Cold War interventions in the sub-Saharan region were motivated by the concern for evacuating American citizens from areas of conflict. Yet, since the late 1990s and early 2000s, military interventions have increasingly (re)focused on US security and counterterrorism interests in the region. The validity of this trend is supported by related data on US foreign aid spending on sub-Saharan security concerns.

Table 3. Post–Cold War military action in Africa

Year	State(s)	Military Operation
1990	Liberia	Evacuation of US citizens
1991	Zaire	Transportation of Belgian and French troops and evacuees
1992	Sierra Leone	Evacuation of US citizens
1992	Somalia	Response to humanitarian crisis
1996	Liberia	Evacuation of US citizens
1996	Central African Republic	Evacuation of US citizens; embassy security
1997	Congo, Gabon	Standby evacuation forces
1997	Sierra Leone	Evacuation of US citizens
1998	Guinea-Bissau	Standby evacuation force
1998	Kenya, Tanzania	Medical and disaster relief following embassy bombings
1998	Sudan	Air strikes on suspected chemical (weapons) factory

Table 3 (continued)

Year	State(s)	Military Operation
1998	Liberia	Standby evacuation force
2000	Sierra Leone	Evacuation support operation
2002	Côte d'Ivoire	Evacuation of US citizens
2003	Liberia	Standby evacuation force; embassy security
2003	Djibouti	Counterterrorism assistance
2004	Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea	Counterterrorism activities
2007	Somalia	Aerial strike on al-Qaeda operative and Islamist fighters

Source: Information obtained from Ellen C. Collier, "Instances of Use of United States Forces Abroad, 1798–1993" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 7 October 1993), http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/foabroad.htm; and Larry Van Horn, "United States Military Campaigns, Conflicts, Expeditions, and Wars," 2006, http://dir.groups.yahoo.com/group/KLOS_Impact/message/9508.

Significant increases in spending on security assistance occurred during the late 1990s and early 2000s, particularly in the immediate post-9/11 years (fig. 1). This information, coupled with the scope and themes of the Clinton and Bush administration statements on US interests in Africa, suggests that the underlying assumption of predictions one and two (regarding the lack of American concern for Africa following the end of the Cold War) is faulty. This possibility is further substantiated by data on other types of US aid (see below).



Figure 1. US security aid for sub-Saharan Africa, 1988–2008 (in millions of constant US dollars). (Information obtained from US Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2008* [aka the *Greenbook*] [Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, 2008].)

US spending on development and humanitarian aid also evolved considerably during the course of the past decade (fig. 2). Funding for (through) aid programs has increased since the early 1990s; further, recent administrations have been increasingly likely to support a broader range of aid programs. Again, this information undercuts the notion that post-Cold War foreign policy leaders have tended to "ignore" sub-Saharan Africa.



Figure 2. US development-humanitarian aid for sub-Saharan Africa, 1988–2008 (in millions of constant US dollars). (Information obtained from US Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2008* [aka the *Greenbook*] [Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, 2008].)

The Obama Administration on Sub-Saharan Africa: Presidential-Administration Statements, Initial Indicators

Content-based analysis of Obama's speeches allows for some degree of insight into the president's understanding of US interests in Africa (see table 2). An assessment of the president's statements from his first year in office suggests that he intends to focus on the following issues: good governance, democracy, free trade (via the African Growth and Opportunity Act), and violence in Central Africa. However, given that these statements are derived from a limited time period, it is important to consider additional

sources of information. Not surprisingly, an analysis of Obama officials' statements from 2009 to 2010 indicates a significant level of alignment with the president's "Africa message." In some areas, though, members of the Obama foreign policy team appear to branch out considerably beyond the president's key themes on US interests in Africa.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave several Africa-themed speeches in 2009. Most of these focused on the president's commitment to upholding the "Africa objectives" he outlined during the 2008 campaign. In her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2009, however, Clinton offered greater detail on Obama's plans for US action on sub-Saharan Africa.[38] The president's agenda for Africa, she noted, included broad-ranging commitments to security, political, economic, and humanitarian interests. She gave particular attention to development-humanitarian goals such as improving access to public health and education, fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS, and addressing the ongoing crisis in Darfur. Yet, she also focused on a series of security- and stability-related issues. Obama's foreign policy team, she asserted, was committed to "combating al-Qaida's efforts to seek safe havens in failed states in the Horn of Africa; helping African nations to conserve their natural resources and reap fair benefits from them; stopping war in Congo; [and] ending autocracy in Zimbabwe."[39] Clinton characterized the troubles of Africa's failed states piracy along the coast of Somalia, corruption and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe, and unchecked violence in Eastern Congo s problems that threatened the stability and progress of the continent as a whole. Africa's failed states, Clinton indicated, not only are "breeding grounds . . . for the worst abuses of human beings" but also are "invitations to terrorists to find refuge amidst the chaos." The secretary of state argued that emphasis on the president's "social development" policies would be essential to the realization of American interests in Africa.[40]

Clinton's depiction of the Obama administration's interests in sub-Saharan Africa appears to be largely in keeping with (and influenced by) themes advanced by Johnnie Carson, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs. During the first year of the Obama administration, Carson repeatedly drew attention to Africa's continued and growing importance to the United States.[41] "Despite the serious and well known challenges that confront Africa today," said Carson, "we remain committed to Africa's future."

He focused on the continent's changing role in the post-Cold War environment, saying that "the 21st century will not be shaped merely in the capitals of the super and near superpowers, but also by the continent of Africa and its leaders as well."[42] The Obama administration, said Carson, would devote efforts to "five areas of critical importance" for the United States and Africa: strengthening institutions of democracy and good governance, fostering sustainable economic development, improving public health care, preventing and resolving interstate and domestic conflicts, and addressing new global threats (narco-trafficking, climate change, resource exploitation, pandemic diseases, and energy security).[43]

An overview of the administration's stated positions on sub-Saharan Africa provides a useful jumping-off point for assessing predictions on future US involvements in the region. However, statements alone cannot be afforded too much predictive value; they must be considered within a broader context (against administration efforts to back up its "Africa message" with action). A review of the president's 2010 budget offers at least some indication that the administration intends to uphold its commitments to Africa.

With respect to development-humanitarian aid, Obama called for a 63 percent increase, or an additional $550 million in funding for the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) (more than half of MCC beneficiaries are African states). Ultimately, Congress voted to increase the MCC budget by 26 percent. However, this did raise the total MCC budget to roughly $1.1 billion. Numbers for health-related issues remain less certain. For example, the 2010 budget did not call for increased funding for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief although the proposed 2011 budget does request a 2.2 percent increase. The 2010 budget does include increased or new funding for several peacekeeping programs: $42 million for continued implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accords (Sudan), $10 million for creation of a professional peacekeeping force in Liberia, $67 million for the African Union (peacekeeping mission in Somalia), and $96.8 million for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (which provides, in part, training for African peacekeeping forces).[44]

Security-stability assistance programs for Africa fared relatively well under Obama's 2010 budget. The administration called for increased funding for the foreign military financing program, which provides loans for

weapons and purchases of military equipment. It also requested $25.6 million for arms sales to Africa for fiscal year (FY) 2010 (up from $8.3 million for FY 2009). The president's 2010 budget proposed smaller funding increases for international military education and training programs for African states, asking for $16 million as opposed to the previous year's $13 million. The president requested a doubling of the previous year's funding for counterterrorism programs and proposed modest increases to AFRICOM's budget.[45]

The president has also demonstrated willingness to address African security-stability matters with military intervention and the use of force. He authorized the use of force against Somali pirates in May 2009 and has responded to Somalia's Islamist insurgency problems with strikes on suspected al-Qaeda operatives. He stepped up plans to address Mali's insurgency problems by deploying 300 special forces troops to train government forces in counterinsurgency techniques.[46]

Conclusion: Addressing the Policy Predictions

The information presented above suggests that all three predictions on Obama's Africa policy are likely to be somewhat inaccurate. The relatively broad scope of the president's statements on Africa, as well as those of his immediate foreign policy advisers (a group largely composed of persons with experience in African affairs), suggests that he is not likely to ignore Africa in the coming years. Further, his 2010 budget requests, on the whole, represent steps towards increased funding for existing and new development-humanitarian programs, as well as security-stability programs, for sub-Saharan Africa. As such, it seems implausible that the president's concerns for domestic economic troubles and higher-order international concerns (the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) will prevent him from addressing US interests in Africa.

Claims that the president will pursue a "militarized" approach to sub-Saharan Africa seem similarly exaggerated. The president has indicated through his public statements, funding for security programs, and military interventions that he is willing to pursue and support military options in the region. However, assertions that his policy agenda is centered on military-security issues, to the extent that it is detrimental to other areas, seem somewhat overblown. The administration's stated priorities for Africa, as

well as its Africa-budget patterns, are just as comprehensive if not more so than those of the previous three administrations.

Finally, claims that the Obama administration will bring sweeping change to US policy on sub-Saharan Africa are largely overstated. The president seems to have indicated a willingness to afford the region slightly greater policy priority than some of his predecessors. This, however, cannot be interpreted as an indication that his approach will significantly deviate from that of previous administrations. In fact, much of the evidence presented above suggests that Obama's agenda for sub-Saharan Africa will look remarkably similar to that of George W. Bush.

Given the findings addressed above, it seems most plausible that Obama's approach to Africa will represent a modest "step forward" on the policies pursued by Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. In all likelihood, Obama's Africa agenda will be an active and comprehensive one. It will not, however, include radical changes to the overarching trend of US-Africa relations during the post-Cold War era.

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