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Alliances and Coalitions

Military alliances had their origins in the notion of collective security, whereby states banded together to ensure their safety as well as promote and defend their common interests. Eventually, however, such alliances came to be based on the distinction between “us” and “others,” the latter perceived as a threat against which alliance members joined forces to protect each other (reflected by the stance assumed by countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization toward those in the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War).

In actuality, true collective security does not differentiate between “us” and “others”; rather, it implies a universal and reciprocal commitment against any entity that would jeopardize the common integrity of nations. Based on a belief in the propriety of international well-being, a coalition reflects the inclusiveness of collective security and thus differs from a military alliance. As a particular type of alliance, a coalition is concerted, temporary, negotiated, complex, and timely.

Rather than assume defensive postures, countries that wish to survive in an increasingly dangerous multipolar world should make a more collective—if not global—response to threats. Given the proliferation of intrastate conflict and weapons of mass destruction, the weakening of the state, terrorism, insurgencies, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, coalitions represent the most appropriate systems in the post–Cold War environment.

Indeed, the capacity of these organizations to avoid the constraints of multilateral military alliances and quickly assemble a group of “allies” has made them the rule rather than the exception in military and international security. According to Guillaume Parmentier, “L’alliance devient alors un choix, une possibilité utilisable ‘à la carte’ et non une obligation inhérente à un des fondements de la politique étrangère de l’Etat” (The alliance is a choice, an option available ‘à la carte’ and not an obligation inherent in one of the foundations of foreign policy of the state).¹

Globalization and the mutable nature of threats justify such ad hoc coalitions at the expense of traditional territorial alliances. Responding to transnational terrorism and organized crime by forming an alliance seems less appropriate since its members do not confront such challenges with equal intensity and duration. In terms of defense, the only certainty in the current strategic context is that the armed forces of a state cannot act outside their borders without establishing a coalition. This implies a converging of rules governing the doctrinal engagement of forces in a theater of operations. In this construct, armies must also remain interoperable at all levels, affecting the entire spectrum of operations—namely, the strategic as well as the operational and tactical aspects.

In light of the increasing complexity of international threats, multilateralism offers a unique way of managing crises and resolving conflicts, made all the more effective because of the number of parties involved. Thus, the military alliance in the traditional sense of the term has now become outdated. As asserted by Stephen Walt’s “theory of the balance of threats,” states now ally against global threats instead of each other.²

Rémy M. Mauduit, Editor

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Notes

1. Guillaume Parmentier, “Les États-Unis et l’OTAN. De l’alliance à la coalition” [The United States and NATO: From the alliance to the coalition], in *AFRI 2005*, vol. 6 (Paris: Centre Thucyde, 2006), 679, http://www.afri-ct.org/IMG/pdf/afri2005_parmentier.pdf.

2. See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

France's New NATO Policy

Leveraging a Realignment of the Alliance?

DR. GISELA MÜLLER-BRANDECK-BOCQUET*

French president Nicolas Sarkozy entered office with the intention of fundamentally revitalizing his country following many years of stagnation—and in doing so he did not shrink from violating one of the long-standing taboos of French defense and security policy. Beginning in mid-2007, Sarkozy gave notice on several occasions that he intended to complete the process begun by his predecessors of reintegrating France into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) military structures and to normalize overall French relations with NATO. The move was officially announced on 11 March and consummated during the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of NATO's founding, held on 3–4 April 2009 in Strasbourg, France, and Kehl, Germany, thus bringing to an end the special status that France had held in the alliance since 1966.¹ The special character of France's relationship to NATO had been aimed primarily at guaranteeing French independence and influence internationally and not only was an integral element of the country's national identity but also placed France in the role of the alliance's *enfant terrible*—often the sole, unequivocal opponent of American dominance of Europe.

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“Speedy Sarko,” as the unusually forceful and lively French president is often called, has broken with the conventions of French NATO policy in such a way as to divide the country’s political establishment and place in doubt the Fifth Republic’s broad political consensus on defense and security policy. The question is, Just what does Sarkozy hope to achieve through such a striking change in policy? Has he joined the Atlanticists? Or does he hope to improve his chances of pursuing long-established French objectives in the alliance? To answer these questions, we must examine the complex strategic thinking on which France’s normalization of relations with NATO rests. This in turn requires that we first assess the special position France has held in NATO.

France’s Rapprochement with NATO during the 1990s

On 7 March 1966, France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military structures and nuclear weapons program though it remained a member of the Atlantic Pact. This was de Gaulle’s reaction to Anglo-American dominance of the alliance as well as to the shift in US strategy to that of flexible nuclear response, which allowed for the possibility of conflict in Europe using nuclear weapons.² Since then, French security and defense policy has been guided by the Gaullist “principle that asserts: Whenever the West is under threat, France will stand in solidarity with the Western community of values; but in times of peace, it will seek to preserve its independence, in particular vis-à-vis the United States.”³

The first noteworthy divergence from this course occurred under Socialist president François Mitterrand (1981–95). Mitterrand was decidedly more transatlantic in his views than were his predecessors. So much so, in fact, that at the time of the NATO Double-Track Decision, he offered the alliance his complete support, even urging approval of the rearmament effort during a speech before the German parliament in January 1983, which included the dictum “Les pacifists sont à l’Ouest mais les missiles sont à l’Est” (The pacifists are in the West, but the missiles are in the East). But even though Mitterrand recognized the paramount role NATO played in Europe’s (and France’s) security, he chose to hold firm to France’s special position in the alliance for the time being. It was only in response to the Gulf War of 1991 that he developed a new NATO policy. France, which had 14,500 troops involved in the operation, suffered the bitter experience of

seeing just how inferior its own military capabilities were in comparison to those of the Americans. “France’s experience of participating in a multinational force commanded by a US general under NATO procedures . . . was both humiliating and revealing—particularly for the military. Any illusion which might have remained about France’s (and Europe’s) capacity to underwrite the collective security of the continent was shattered in the Saudi Arabian desert.”⁴ The Gulf War, therefore, can be understood as the “turning point in French NATO policy.”⁵ By 1993, as NATO involvement in a disintegrating Yugoslavia appeared in the offing, Paris came to the realization that rapprochement with NATO, perhaps even reintegration, could increase France’s influence in the alliance.

After Defense Minister Pierre Joxe declared that France “must be present in the relevant bodies . . . where . . . decisions about our security are made,” Paris once again began participating in the work of the NATO military committee, starting in April 1993.⁶ In 1996 François Léotard became the first French minister of defense to attend a meeting—albeit informal—of NATO defense ministers.⁷ Although some observers at the time reckoned with France’s full reintegration into NATO structures, Mitterrand chose not to go beyond what were on the whole rather limited steps toward rapprochement.

Pres. Jacques Chirac (1995–2007) propelled this pro-Atlantic process a step further. During the war in Bosnia (1991–95), Europe was again confronted with its own military inferiority vis-à-vis America, whereupon Chirac announced in December 1995 that France would officially rejoin the Council of Defense Ministers as well as the military council, leaving one final hurdle to complete the process of reintegration: the return to the alliance’s military structures. Chirac saw an opportunity for France’s full reintegration in the adoption of the combined joint task force (CJTF) concept in Berlin in January 1996, which permitted Europeans to establish their own separate security and defense identity—a European pillar in NATO. The CJTF concept accorded with Chirac’s notion of a new NATO that allowed France “à prendre toute sa place” (to take her rightful place).⁸ Before the CJTF concept could be implemented, however, the command positions within the European pillar first had to be defined. Since NATO’s commander in Europe—the supreme allied commander, Europe—is always an American, Chirac, with the support of Germany, called for the appointment of Europeans to the regional command posts, with selection based on

a rotation system. Chirac was interested in particular in the post of commander of Allied Forces, South Europe, based in Naples. But the United States refused to assign a European officer to this strategically important post in European Southern Command, prompting France to decide to remain outside NATO's military structures. In retrospect, it seems strange that Chirac would commit the tactical mistake of announcing France's return without first negotiating its price.⁹

France's Unsatisfying Position in NATO

Though America's intransigence in 1997 caused Chirac to suspend the process of formal reintegration into NATO, he did essentially move *de facto* rapprochement forward in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. In 2002 he approved both France's massive participation in the NATO Response Force and in the new Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia.¹⁰ Since 2004 France has had a contingent of 100 officers at the integrated command structures (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe in Mons, Belgium, and ACT in Norfolk). But the roughly 280 military personnel detailed to cooperation duties with NATO constitute "only about 10 percent of the German or British" personnel assigned to the same task.¹¹ In spite of France's *de facto* participation in the integrated structures of NATO, its peculiar position within the alliance means that it is not part of the standing chain of command—and consequently occupies none of the senior command posts. There are also two central NATO structures to which France still does not belong: the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defense Planning Committee.

By contrast, French operational and financial contributions to NATO have been substantial. France, which has participated in all out-of-area NATO operations since 2003, contributed (as of 2007) the third largest contingent of troops and was the fourth largest financial contributor in the alliance.¹² This is not compensated, however, by a commensurate level of influence within the alliance, so that from the French perspective, the cost-benefit calculation is a negative one. As a result, Frédéric Bozo has referred to France's "unsatisfactory role" within the alliance since "the involvement of France at decision-making levels is still proportionally much less than its operational participation."¹³ In addition, the development of NATO during Pres. George W. Bush's eight years in office has been characterized by the

operating principle in which the mission determines the coalition, muscling aside any approach grounded in greater partnership and cooperation. President Sarkozy has sufficient reason, therefore, to put an end to France's unsatisfactory, thankless, and untenable position in NATO.

Sarkozy's New NATO Policy: The Announcements

Sarkozy first announced his new NATO policy in a speech delivered before a gathering of ambassadors in Paris on 27 August 2007. This came as a surprise since the topic had not come up during the French election campaign. After appealing for a "new élan" in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), Sarkozy stressed that there was no rivalry between the European Union (EU) and NATO, that they instead complemented one another. "I hope," Sarkozy continued, "that in the coming months we can pursue both the strengthening of the Europe of defense and the renewal of NATO, as well as NATO's relationship to France in general. Each is bound up together with the other: an autonomous Europe of defense and a transatlantic alliance in which we will be able to play our role to its fullest extent."¹⁴

The second time Sarkozy spoke about his NATO plans was in an address before the US Congress on 7 November 2007. He began by first reminding his audience that, in light of global instability, the United States needed a strong and resolute Europe: "There are more crises than there are means of dealing with them. And since NATO cannot be everywhere at once, it is essential that Europe be capable of taking action itself." After he, rather pedagogically, emphasized the "legitimate strategic interest" on both sides of the Atlantic in a strong Europe, he went on to speak of his new NATO policy:

Standing here at this podium before Congress, I say to you: the more successful a Europe of defense is, the more likely it is that France's decision to fully assume its place in NATO will become a reality. I hope that France, a founding member of the alliance and one of its most important troop contributors, will be able to assume an important role in renewing the alliance's means and capabilities and that France will be able to further develop its relationship with the alliance in parallel with the further development and greater empowerment of the Europe of defense.

In closing, Sarkozy spoke of a "credible and strong Europe within a newly structured alliance."¹⁵

Sarkozy broached his new policy approach for the third time on 3 April 2008, during the NATO summit in Bucharest. Having announced prior to the meeting that France would increase the size of its contingent in Afghanistan by roughly 1,000 troops, he repeated to his colleagues his intention not to reduce defense expenditures, regardless of current budget problems. Following this dual commitment by France to stand together with its alliance partners in the fight against terrorism, Sarkozy then went on the offensive. He restated the need for both NATO and a strong Europe of defense. Sarkozy's position found favor with President Bush, who on 2 April 2008 unexpectedly announced, "Building a strong NATO alliance also requires a strong European defense capacity." Sarkozy eagerly took up Bush's comment, thanking him twice in his Bucharest address for the remark. "This opens the possibility for France to fundamentally renew its relationship to NATO." And for the first time, he set forth a date for implementation of the new policy; the process of normalization would be consummated at the NATO summit scheduled for 3–4 April 2009 to be held in both Kehl and Strasbourg on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the alliance's founding. "This act will serve as a symbol of Franco-German friendship, European reconciliation, and transatlantic partnership."¹⁶

The Dual Arrangement in Sarkozy's New NATO Policy

A closer examination of Sarkozy's series of statements shows that it would be a mistake to conclude that his new approach is merely an expression of the new president's "Atlanticism" or that it can be interpreted as a desire to steal the title of Washington's most devoted ally from the British or Germans. Although it is doubtless true that Sarkozy is the most pro-American of any president in the history of the Fifth Republic, his NATO initiative is not an example of that.

Instead, Sarkozy is attempting to resolve the dilemmas of France's existing status in NATO. Based on the foregoing account, these can be described as follows:¹⁷ How can the discrepancy be resolved between France's limited influence in the alliance and its actual contributions? In view of the relative isolation arising from its peculiar status in the alliance, how can Paris obtain effective leverage over the long-term developments in the alliance? And how can France simultaneously place its decades-old efforts toward a Europe

capable of acting on its own in defense and security policy—a Europe Puissance—on a sustained road toward success?¹⁸

The president's solution consists of a dual arrangement that ties France's full reentry into NATO to certain conditions. This in itself signals that Sarkozy has no intention of quietly joining the ranks of the Atlanticists. Instead, he expects that his decision to reenter NATO will lend the ESDP—*l'Europe de la defense*, as he likes to refer to it—a new vitality. This constitutes the first part of the arrangement. A strengthened ESDP that operates in partnership with NATO, whose contribution to international security the United States expressly welcomes, will inevitably increase Europe's standing in NATO. The second part of the arrangement is directly related to this: France will rejoin only a remodeled NATO—a remodeling, as France sees it, in which the asymmetry in favor of the United States that has existed since the alliance's founding should end and in which Europe is recognized as an equal partner in matters of defense and security policy. "A France that fully assumes its role in NATO presupposes an alliance in which Europe is given a greater part to play."¹⁹

Thus, to make France's complete reintegration into NATO palatable to the French electorate, Sarkozy set forth a complex approach linked to a series of arrangements which argued that France would rejoin only a reformed NATO that accepts the ESDP as an equal partner. But to make this approach credible, the ESDP would have to make fundamental progress in moving beyond the rather modest status it had achieved by 1999. According to Sarkozy, a substantive strengthening of the ESDP again presupposes that France relinquishes its special status and becomes a "normal" NATO member. The president takes the view—as all his statements indicate—that France can advance the development of the ESDP only as a full member of NATO since a France that insists on its special status in the alliance only provokes mistrust and a tendency to obstruction on both sides of the Atlantic, owing to persistent suspicions that France is trying to weaken the transatlantic alliance. For decades this was indeed a central reason why an integrated Europe accepted US dominance and explains why it practiced abstinence in defense and security policy matters through the end of the 1990s—and why development of the ESDP has proceeded only sluggishly since then.²⁰ This mistrust is constantly being stoked as a consequence of EU expansion eastward since—aside from a traditionally ESDP-skeptical Britain—the pro-

nounced Atlanticism of the new members in Eastern Europe leads them to accuse France of seeking to weaken the alliance. Sarkozy's new NATO policy, therefore, serves to a great degree to build trust in the EU-27 as a prerequisite for strengthening the ESDP.

There is much that would in fact indicate that France's return to NATO should significantly spur the development of the ESDP, but it remains to be seen whether France's reintegration will lead to greater French influence in the alliance. This is related to—and thus forms another aspect of France's call for a reformed alliance—Paris's view that fundamental NATO reforms are essential and its search for the means to actively shape those reforms. France wants (has wanted for quite some time, actually) to scale down the outsized military apparatus of NATO and adapt it to new strategic needs. Secondly, Paris seeks (again, has sought for years) to limit the growing politicization of the alliance to prevent it from becoming the cornerstone of international order—one dominated by the United States. This defensive action against a globally operating and politicized NATO was initiated under Mitterrand in light of the rapid expansion of the alliance following the end of the Cold War.²¹ In view of American NATO policy during the Bush years—in which the mission determined the coalition and where Washington placed greatest value on the alliance's role in legitimizing American actions—Paris renewed its effort against the “globalization” of NATO, for example, by joining with Germany in opposing quick membership for Georgia and the Ukraine. Included among the classic reform demands France seeks in NATO is the previously mentioned desire to see Europeans given greater influence in the alliance—including high-ranking command posts—to put an end to asymmetry (i.e., American dominance). In light of the far-reaching demands for reform that Paris has always directed at NATO, it seems doubtful that normalization will bring about a reorientation of the alliance in accordance with French designs.²²

Strengthening the European Security and Defense Policy as a Counterpart to French Reintegration: Mission Accomplished?

When President Sarkozy presents his new NATO policy as primarily benefiting Europe, in concrete terms this means that he places highest priority on strengthening the ESDP. France's assumption of the EU presidency during the second half of 2008 presented him with the opportunity

to take effective action in this regard. Sarkozy seized the opportunity and declared the goal of giving new momentum to the ESDP as one of the four main elements of his agenda during France's six-month term in the EU presidency. Specifically, France planned to formulate a new *European Security Strategy* that would replace the document passed in 2007. As his first priority, however, Sarkozy sought to expand the ESDP's military and civilian capacities.²³ Intensified cooperation between the EU and NATO, also part of the presidential agenda, was supported by a paper containing far-ranging proposals for cooperation that France had presented to the NATO Council in October 2003. As one commentator observed, with this step Paris set aside its traditional resistance to rapprochement between the EU and NATO, substantially accommodating the wishes of both Washington and London.²⁴

Given French ambitions and prior concessions, one must ask whether Sarkozy, as EU president, has indeed given measurable new momentum to the ESDP. Or have the turbulent events that occurred during France's EU presidency—Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty on 12 June 2008, the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, and the financial crisis beginning in the fall of that year—thrown Sarkozy off his plans as Europe's senior crisis manager?²⁵

The answer is clearly no, for, largely unnoticed by the general public, the European Council on 11–12 December 2008 “reaffirmed its intention to take concrete steps to lend new momentum to European security and defense policy and thereby take into account the new responsibilities that have arisen with respect to Europe's security.”²⁶ The “Statement of the European Council on the Consolidation of the ESDP” contains everything France had proposed: a revision of the *European Security Strategy*; the pledge to remedy the “inadequacies in Europe's existing capabilities through the gradual improvement of its civilian and military capacities,” together with a detailed “Statement on Improving Capabilities”;²⁷ the commitment to be able to simultaneously conduct up to 19 military and civilian ESDP missions of differing dimensions; an “Erasmus militaire” to promote cooperation in training efforts; and an explicit declaration “to improve cooperation between the EU and NATO . . . in full complementarity . . . within a framework of renewed transatlantic partnership.” For this purpose, “an informal high-level EU-NATO group” should be established, as per France's proposal. The single, albeit serious, deficiency remaining in ESDP resolutions

relates to the highly sensitive question as to the development of an independent European central command and the European Council's inclination to merely endorse the efforts undertaken by Javier Solana "toward the creation of a new integrated structure for civil-military planning" of ESDP operations. It was Great Britain, above all, that rebuffed French plans to add 20–30 additional personnel to the 90 already serving in the still embryonic EU Operations Center.²⁸ Yet, following the summit in December 2008, Defense Minister Hervé Morin declared nevertheless that "everything we put on the table a year ago is now in the works."²⁹

Will Reintegration Mean the End of the "Exception Française"?

Sarkozy's new NATO policy is based on the recognition that France's special role in the alliance has become untenable and is no longer in keeping with French interests. This view was shared by the team of experts who, in June 2008, presented the new white book *Defense and National Security*. "The report backs Sarkozy's position in calling for France to return to the integrated structures of NATO."³⁰

This gives rise to the question of exactly how this "complete reintegration" should occur. Will France become another NATO member like all the rest? Will Paris abandon its motto "Friends, allies, but not aligned" and obediently join the Atlanticist camp? In short, will this mean the end of the "exception française" in matters of defense and security policy?

The answer must surely be no since full reintegration will not be as all encompassing as it sounds. Although France will rejoin the Defense Planning Committee—where central issues such as, currently, the US missile shield will be decided—the same does not apply to the Nuclear Planning Group. This will allow France to retain an autonomous decision-making power over the Force de Frappe. As Sarkozy has stated, "France's nuclear deterrent will remain a strictly national responsibility."³¹ Also, France will still not place any troops under NATO control during peacetime. Lastly, it is not expected that France will commit itself to a quantitatively complete reintegration in the alliance's integrated structures since to be represented in these structures at the same level as Britain or Germany, it would have to increase its presence there tenfold, from 120 to 1,200. Since this is beyond France's capacity over the short term, either financially or in terms of personnel, and since France considers this institution bloated even as it is, an

“integration a minima” seems the more likely outcome, “representing greater symbolic and political than practical or military significance.”³² At the NATO summit of 3–4 April 2009, France let it be known that it will send some 15 generals to the military structures.³³

Also of great symbolic importance will be France’s future access to NATO command posts. The statement “France can only take its place in NATO when it is granted a proper seat at the table” was once Chirac’s, and now Sarkozy’s, mantra.³⁴ According to press reports, Sarkozy—rather, his chief advisor, Jean-David Levitte—has already gotten consent from Gen James Jones, President Obama’s national security advisor, that France can assume the ACT command in Norfolk as well as the regional command in Lisbon, to which Paris has contributed significantly.³⁵

Knowledge of these plans and the general prospect of reintegration sparked a lively debate within France since resistance to Sarkozy’s assault against the Gaullist holy of holies extends beyond the military itself. The general public is also concerned that Sarkozy’s new NATO policy could undermine France’s international clout and reduce its influence and the independence that has allowed it to say things that others only think. Former Socialist foreign minister Hubert Védrine put it in particularly stark terms: Were France to become a “normal ally,” many countries would view this as its “re-subordination under the US”; it would lead to the “marginalization of French power internationally.”³⁶ Others fear the surrender of an important element of French identity.³⁷ Still others demand that the link between reintegration and the Europeanization of NATO be strictly enforced. Especially widespread are the doubts that Sarkozy’s new NATO policy will provide the ESDP the critical momentum it needs. Is it not more likely that, through reintegration, France will sacrifice its traditional ambitions, wonders Laurent Zecchini, who concludes that “La messe atlantiste est dite” (the Atlanticism is only so-called).³⁸

To politically neutralize accusations that the final result of this process would be France’s unconditional reintegration into NATO, Prime Minister François Fillon coupled the parliamentary debate that took place on 17 March 2009 to a confidence vote so that representatives serving in the majority who were opposed to the move would be bound by parliamentary discipline.³⁹ In addition Sarkozy sought to demonstrate his independence vis-à-vis the new US president during the summit marathon in early April (the

G-20 in London, the NATO anniversary in Strasbourg and Kehl, and the EU summit in Prague). Like other Europeans, for instance, he followed through only to a limited degree on Obama's appeal to demonstrate greater engagement in Afghanistan. And he openly opposed Obama's view that Turkey should be made a full member of the EU. A certain degree of competition between the two leaders became evident over the issue of future disarmament policy. As departing head of the EU Council, Sarkozy, as early as 8 December 2008, had gotten EU foreign ministers to agree to a statement devoted to nuclear disarmament. As part of preparations for the review of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, set for 2010, the EU was thus making the first concrete proposals for nuclear disarmament.⁴⁰ Sarkozy wanted to signal the new US president that Europe has a right to have a say in the matter too. Obama, on the other hand, considers the vision of a nuclear-free world—as he proposed to great effect on 5 April 2009 in Prague—an integral part of his claim to global leadership.⁴¹ Sarkozy has downplayed the implications of Obama's scheme, indicating that the US president is merely drawing on existing measures and proposals to camouflage the United States' previous policy of delaying such efforts.⁴²

In summary, one can say that despite having only just completed reintegration into NATO, a France that still reserves certain special privileges to itself while seeking to limit US claims to leadership cannot be said to have simply conformed, nor has it aligned itself as much as one may have thought. A complete end to the exception française is therefore not in the offing.

The Catalytic Potential of France's New NATO Policy: Future Prospects

President Sarkozy carried through on France's full reintegration into NATO because of the significant catalytic potential he attaches to it. The backing he received from Germany at the Munich Security Conference in February 2009 offered the first indication that he was correct. On 4–5 February, he and Chancellor Angela Merkel jointly presented a paper regarding the future of the alliance and of EU-NATO relations, proffering Franco-German proposals that for the first time were set forth without prior consultation with the new US administration.⁴³ What is especially worth emphasizing about this remarkable, content-rich initiative is Merkel and Sarkozy's call for joint decision making within the alliance—since

“one-sided moves would be contrary to the spirit of partnership”—and their demand that strengthening European security policy be a premise of transatlantic equality, saying, “We Europeans must speak with one voice.” Most evident, however, is their shared opposition to the transformation of NATO into a global security agency of the sort the United States has long sought to establish. Paris and Berlin, by contrast, “do not want to reinvent” NATO fundamentals, and they recognize Article 5 of the NATO Treaty as the “core element” of what is an “essentially military alliance.” In this way, Merkel and Sarkozy have established a clearly outlined framework interwoven with Franco-German objectives for the debate over a new NATO strategy now set to begin. And they take the view of the new US administration at its word, as expressed by General Jones, the new national security advisor, who has promised the allies increased cooperation and reciprocal coordination.⁴⁴ It appears that France’s new NATO policy can act as a catalyst to the degree that Germany, with France as a full NATO member by its side, is prepared to strengthen Europe’s foreign and security policy substantially.

On the other hand, the actual consummation of France’s return to NATO has produced no direct vitalizing effects within the alliance. Reintegration became practically a nonevent during NATO’s anniversary celebration. The “Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration” states laconically, “We warmly welcome the French decision to fully participate in NATO structures; this will further contribute to a stronger alliance.” Even point 20 of the declaration, in which NATO “recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence, and welcomes the EU’s efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges,” fails to offer much promise for a Europe of defense.⁴⁵

For that reason, we will have to wait on a new alliance strategy (commissioned at the anniversary summit and expected by 2010) to assess the actual catalytic effect of France’s new NATO policy on Europe’s role in the alliance. It is primarily up to Europeans to achieve substantive changes. Are France’s 26 EU teammates at all ready and willing to credibly divide up power and the responsibilities of burden sharing in a reformed alliance? Only if they are will it be clear that Sarkozy’s gambit has worked and that his new NATO policy has produced a real reorientation of the alliance.

Notes

1. Since Kehl did not offer a suitable backdrop for the ceremonies, the anniversary's evening events were held in Baden-Baden.

2. Jean-Pierre Maulny, "Frankreich und seine zukünftige Stellung in der NATO—eine politische, keine militärische Debatte" [France and its future role in NATO—a political, not military debate], *Frankreich-Analysen der FES*, November 2007, 2, http://library.fes.de/cgi-bin/populo/digbib.pl?f_SER=frankreich-analyse&t_listen=x&sortierung=jab.

3. Winfried Veit, "Bruch oder Bluff? Französische Aussenpolitik unter Sarkozy" [Broken or bluff? French foreign policy under Sarkozy], *IPG*, no. 2 (2008): 33, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/ipg/ipg-2008-2/04_a_veit_d.pdf.

4. Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?*, Chaillot Paper no. 43 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2000), 18.

5. Kai Burmester, "Atlantische Annäherung—Frankreichs Politik gegenüber der NATO und den USA" [Atlantic approach—France's policy towards NATO and the USA], in *Die verhinderte Grossmacht: Frankreichs Sicherheitspolitik nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts* [The indisposed great power: France's security policy after the East-West conflicts], ed. Hanns W. Maull, Michael Meimeth, and Christoph Nesshöver (Opladen: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1997), 107. See also Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, *Frankreichs Europapolitik* [French European policy] (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2004), 111ff, 133ff.

6. Joxe is quoted in Burmester, "Atlantische Annäherung," 101.

7. Wichard Woyke, *Deutsch-französische Beziehungen seit der Wiedervereinigung: Das Tandem fasst wieder Tritt* [German-French relations since the reunification] (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2004), 136.

8. Jolyon Howorth, "La France, l'OTAN et la sécurité européenne: statu quo ingérable, renouveau introuvable" [France, NATO and European security: Status quo unsustainable, new balance unobtainable], *Politique Étrangère*, no. 4 (2002): 1005. An English version is available on the IFRI Web site <http://www.ifri.org>.

9. Dominique David, "France/OTAN: la dernière marche" [France/NATO: The latest march], *Politique Étrangère*, no. 2 (2008): 431.

10. Ibid.

11. Léo Michel, "Liaison dangereuse: Kehrt Frankreich tatsächlich zurück in die NATO-Strukturen?" [Dangerous liaison: France actually returns into NATO structures?], *Internationale Politik*, March 2008, 35.

12. Maulny, "Frankreich und seine zukünftige Stellung," 2.

13. Frédéric Bozo, "France and NATO under Sarkozy: End of the French Exception?," working paper (Paris: Fondation pour l'innovation politique, 2008), 6.

14. Nicolas Sarkozy (speech, Conference of Ambassadors, Paris, 27 August 2007), <http://www.elysee.fr/download/?mode=press&filename=ambassadeur-27-08-07.pdf>.

15. Nicolas Sarkozy (speech, US Congress, 7 November 2007), <http://www.elysee.fr/edito/index.php?id=23>.

16. Nicolas Sarkozy (speech, NATO summit, Bucharest, 3 April 2008), http://www.elysee.fr/documents/index.php?mode=view&lang=fr&cat_id=7&press_id=1243.

17. Bozo, "France and NATO under Sarkozy," 5.

18. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, "The Big Member States' Influence on the Shaping of the European Union's Foreign, Security and Defense Policy," in *The Future of the European Foreign, Security and Defense Policy after Enlargement*, ed. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2006), 25–53.

19. Sarkozy is quoted in *Le Monde*, 18 June 2008.

20. See Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, *Frankreichs Europapolitik*; and Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, "Big Member States' Influence."

21. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, *Frankreichs Europapolitik*, 133ff; and "Wie halten wir es mit Amerika? Die transatlantischen Beziehungen, die Konstruktion Europas und die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit in der Ära Kohl" [How do we keep America? Transatlantic relations, the construction of Europe and the Franco-German cooperation in the Kohl era], *Historisch-politische Mitteilungen: Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik* [Historical and political messages: Archive for Christian-democratic policy], no. 14 (2007): 280ff.

22. Bozo is also skeptical; see his "France and NATO under Sarkozy," 9ff.

23. See point 3.1 of the French presidential agenda, which contains numerous proposals for improvements in capabilities.

24. *Le Monde*, 10 October 2007; and Veit, "Bruch oder Bluff?," 45.

25. Ireland's challenge to the Lisbon Treaty has serious consequences with respect to the priority given to the ESDP because it means that it will not be possible in the foreseeable future to make use of the means for structural cooperation that the treaty would establish—and because it prevents the new office of the European foreign minister from properly developing.

26. European Council, "Conclusions of the Chair," Brussels, 12 December 2008, doc. 17271/08.

27. European Council, "Declaration of 8 December 2008 on Strengthening ESDP Capabilities," doc. 16840/08. Specific projects include, among others, the establishment of a European air-transport fleet, improvements in reconnaissance, and increased cooperation in armaments production to implement the capabilities development plan of the European Defense Agency.

28. Ronja Kempin, "Frankreich und die Annäherung von NATO und EU" [France and the approach of NATO and the EU], *SWP-Aktuell*, April 2008, 2. Regarding the European Command Center, see Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, "Deutsch-französische Beziehungen und das Projekt 'Friedensmach Europa'" [German-French relations and the project "Peace Power Europe"], in *Berliner Friedenspolitik? Militärische Transformation—Zivile Impulse—Europäische Einbindung* [Berlin peace project? Military transformation—civilian impulses—European integration], ed. Peter Schlotter, Wilhelm Nolte, and Renate Grasse (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2008), 233–60.

29. *Le Monde*, 4 October 2008. For a critical view, see Ronja Kempin and Marco Overhaus, "Kein grosser Sprung in der Entwicklung der ESVP: Lehren aus der französischen Ratpräsidentschaft" [No great leap in the development of the ESDP: Lessons from the French presidency], *SWP-Aktuell*, January 2009.

30. Ronja Kempin, "Modernisierung der französischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik" [Modernization of the French security and defense policy], *SWP-Aktuell*, August 2008. The white book also makes the case for an increased Europeanization of French defense and security policy and calls for the expansion of autonomous EU planning and command capacities.

31. Sarkozy is quoted in *Le Monde*, 18 June 2008. See also Sarkozy's address of 11 March 2008, in which he officially announced his reintegration policy, *Le Monde*, 13 March 2008.

32. Bozo, "France and NATO under Sarkozy," 14. See also Kempin, "Frankreich und die Annäherung von NATO und EU," 2.

33. *Le Monde*, 4 April 2009.

34. Sarkozy is quoted in *Le Monde*, 5 February 2009.

35. *Ibid.*; and *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 20 February 2009.

36. Védrine is quoted by Michel, "Liaison dangereuse," 35.

37. Modem-Chef F. Bayrou, *Le Monde*, 5 February 2009.

38. *Le Monde*, 11 March 2009.

39. The general public responded positively to the step, with 58 percent expressing support for the decision—70 percent of the UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) voters and 52 percent of the PS (Socialist Party) voters.

40. Urging, for example, a ban on the production of fissionable materials as well as a continuation of the START Treaty between the United States and Russia. See European Council, "Council Statement on Strengthening International Security of 8 December 2008," doc. 16751/08.

41. With his vision, Obama is aligning himself with the "Global Zero" initiative currently being circulated by a portion of the American security policy establishment.

42. *Le Monde*, 11 April 2009.

43. Reprinted on 4 February 2009 in the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* and on 5 February 2009 in *Le Monde*.

44. See the interview with Jones in the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 9 February 2009.

45. See the "Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration," 4 April 2009, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease. This passage appears verbatim in the "Declaration on Alliance Security," 4 April 2009, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm?mode=pressrelease.

The Return of Grand Theory

Terrorism and the End of Postmodernism

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Before analyzing how suicide bombing negates postmodernism—which, to many observers, sounds disconnected—one must understand grand theory, postmodernism, and suicide terrorism, as well as their connections to each other. In its attempt to explain both social and political life, grand theory interprets the world in terms of grand and totalizing narratives, taking into account historical data related to class, political power, and cultural movements.

Postmodernism or postmodernist theory explains social life in fragmented narratives. There is nothing totalizing about postmodernism, which emphasizes the ambiguity of what is right and what is wrong—or the idea that nothing is right or wrong due to fragmented interpretation. One characteristic of postmodernism, decentering, does not necessarily negate the central theme but accounts for multicentrism as the emergence of many centers and gives each center equal credence. Therefore, many centers of right and wrong refute and replace the central right and wrong of grand theory.

Suicide bombing or suicide terrorism is related to symbolic acts of violence by individuals organized to cause harm to the perceived enemy or affiliates of that enemy for the purpose of furthering political objectives.¹ Such acts are planned and carried out by organizations and groups that are small in number but strong in ideology. The argument here is that one can

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look upon suicide bombing, or terrorism in general, as totalizing (grand) theory in terms of political ideology and culture.

In the 1960s, a certain type of skepticism arose among moral and political theorists that gathered widespread support. Among such theorists were Daniel Bell and his concept of the “end of ideology.”² Due to these new theories, grand theory came to be treated as little better than a confused and outdated mode of interpretation. The effect of all this, according to Quentin Skinner, was that two millennia of philosophizing about the social world had suddenly come to an end.³ This implies that it must be a mistake to suppose that the true concern of moral, social, and political philosophy can ever be to provide us with reasoned defenses of particular ideas or practices.

Grand theories address the problems of modernism. Modernists often search for the origin of social developments while postmodernists work to describe and analyze social issues at different points in time and space. For grand theorists, finding the origin equates to finding the answer. Postmodernists, however, reject the idea of finding an answer. More interested in raising questions, they thrive on discourse, preferring to keep intellectual conversation alive rather than search for answers. Furthermore, modernists emphasize coherence and continuity, whereas postmodernists deal with inconsistencies and discontinuity. These differences are pertinent not only in areas of political or sociological theory but also in realms of morality and ethics. George Ritzer delineates these perspectives as follows:

1. People are neither good nor bad but morally ambivalent, and it is impossible to find a logically ethical code that could accommodate such moral ambivalence.
2. Moral phenomena are not regular and repetitive. Therefore, no ethical code can possibly deal with moral phenomena in an exhaustive fashion.
3. Morality is inherently laden with contradictions that cannot be overcome, with conflicts that cannot be resolved.
4. There is no such thing as a universal morality.
5. From a rational point of view, morality is, and will remain, irrational.⁴

Although postmodernists have adopted the above system of moral belief, suicide bombers and terrorists would find such a system objectionable since it would mean only chaos and an anomic society.

Perpetrator as Victim: The Sociopolitical Logic of Suicide Terrorism

The act of modern suicide bombing has questioned a few commonly held beliefs in the realm of criminal justice. On the international level, criminal justice systems assume that (1) severe consequences will deter someone from perpetrating a criminal act and (2) clear marks of delineation exist between perpetrator and victim. As fundamental nonadherents to these rules, suicide terrorists—through the eyes of their own culture as well as on a broader scale—have established themselves as victims of certain policies rather than perpetrators and therefore as legitimate fighters. Studies of suicide bombings and bombers have consistently shown the existence of sweeping grand theories within both the individual and the organization. According to Robert Pape, suicide terrorists receive social, cultural, and political support.⁵ This would give the suicide terrorist ample reason to believe in the grand narrative that encourages and justifies such acts. According to Pape, the idea of terrorism stems not from religion, maleness, extremism, poverty, or lack of education but from an occupying enemy and those who conspire with that enemy. This underlying reason accounts for almost all suicide bombings and links all modern and, possibly, ancient suicide missions.⁶

The idea of fighting to death against the enemy goes further back than the American revolutionary Patrick Henry, who on 23 March 1775 famously proclaimed, “Give me liberty, or give me death.” It antedates Jesus, perhaps the most cherished martyr in history. It is embedded in the Old Testament with the story of Samson, who kills not only himself but also thousands of Philistines.

Historically, there have been a few organizations whose belief system and religious acts have qualified them as terroristic in the eyes of their enemies. For example, the Zealots-Sicarii carried out assassinations against non-Jewish enemies during the first century CE. India experienced the Hindu Thugs, who assassinated non-Hindus, doing so for almost 400 years, from the seventh to the eleventh century. For almost 200 years, the Muslim Assassins in northern parts of modern Iran fought against their enemies, stabbing them in public and making sure that they (the assassins) were caught during the act.

Terrorism has been around as long as we have observed ourselves in human history. Entire cultures agreed not only on the existence of the enemy but also on the method by which he must be eliminated.

Academic Definitions of Terrorism

Scholars who wish to understand the socioeconomic, cultural, and political causes of terrorism tend to use the constructionist approach in defining the term. Compared to state-related definitions, those from academe take a more objective approach to terrorism and suicide terrorism. Unless they have some sort of direct relationship with the state, academics try not to take sides—a stance that allows them to generate a broader definition.

A dichotomy exists even among academic definitions, however. Some address terrorism from the perspective of those with power and those without, the latter struggling to improve their lot through acts of terror. This group of academics includes prominent scholars such as Bruce Hoffman, Walter Laqueur, Brian Jenkins, Ken Livingstone, Jessica Stern, Alex Schmid, and Martha Crenshaw.⁷ Another group of scholars defines terrorism in terms of violence or the threat of violence to attain a political objective, conducted by either state (legitimate) or nonstate (illegitimate) organizations. A third group consists of more critical scholars, such as Edward Herman, who considers terrorism “government repression” or Iqbal Ahmed, who holds both state and nonstate actors accountable by defining terrorism as “the use of terrorizing methods of governing or resisting a government.”⁸

Postmodernists and Terrorism

Among postmodernist writers who have done extensive research on terrorism and suicide terrorism are Walter Laqueur and Francis Fukuyama, both of whom have argued that terrorism is the symbolic fragmentation of a post-Cold War political world. In this new world order, overarching ideologies pit political sides against each other. As Laqueur observes, in this fragmented universe all opposition is dispersed opposition:

In the past, terrorism was almost always the province of groups of militants that had the backing of political forces like the Irish and Russian social revolutionary movements of 1900. In the future, terrorists will be individuals or like-minded people working in very small groups, on the pattern of the technology-hating Unabomber, who apparently worked alone sending out parcel bombs over two decades, or the perpetrators of the 1995 bombing

of the federal building in Oklahoma City. An individual may possess the technical competence to steal, buy, or manufacture the weapons he or she needs for a terrorist purpose; he or she may or may not require help from one or two others in delivering these weapons to the designated target. The ideologies such individuals and mini-groups espouse are likely to be even more aberrant than those of larger groups. And terrorists working alone or in very small groups will be more difficult to detect unless they make a major mistake or are discovered by accident.⁹

Aberrant ideologies are a possibility, as Laqueur states. However, most terrorist attacks—and more specifically, suicide missions, whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, or Russia—are well organized. Terror organizations work under the auspices of political grand theory. To say that technology allows a lone-wolf terrorist to act unaided is to merely analyze the mechanics rather than an ideological necessity or justification. The number of such attacks is very low; indeed, they have hardly occurred at all in the past few years—not because an individual terrorist cannot obtain the necessary explosives or equipment but because he or she can always find an organization that will sanction the act. Lone-wolf terrorism exists in settings where the actor finds his or her ideology in social-political isolation.

Freedom Fighter or Terrorist?

The difference between a revolutionary group and a terrorist organization is entirely subjective. Unlike what experts have come to define as terrorism vis-à-vis revolutionary groups, the two still exhibit similarities. Let us look at those as well as some differences and determine whether we can delineate an objective difference.

There is a separation between cause and method. Why do such individuals want to change political conditions and through what method? What will they have to do to reach this objective? For both revolutionaries and terrorists, the method of fighting may be the same—violence that targets the perceived enemy.¹⁰ However, their cause differs: terrorists attack the general population, usually indiscriminately, whereas revolutionaries attack people they identify as enemies. Yet terrorist organizations would not agree with the above statement since for them, “civilians” are actually co-conspirators, somehow supporting the enemy, and therefore not innocent at all. They target both combatants and those whom they view as accomplices to combatants. For terrorists the end justifies the means. If their goal is to

destroy a certain building, the presence of civilians in the structure is irrelevant as long as they fulfill their objective.

For revolutionaries, all means are not justified. They seem concerned with who gets killed and whether they are civilians and noncombatants. Terrorists attack innocent people to make a political statement, intentionally targeting them to cause fear and havoc. Revolutionaries, however, consider the innocent “illegitimate” targets.

Suicide Terrorists and Misconceptions

For postmodernists, terrorism—more specifically, suicide bombing—is a tactic that does not seem to follow a particular ideology. This misconception has to do with misinterpretation of a suicide bomber’s contextual belief system, which has more to do with social and cultural support than with isolation. According to postmodernists, before the advent of modern terrorism, guerilla groups followed a grand theory of class warfare and often fought to take over state power by strategically defeating the state and the military. Usually either Marxist or nationalist or a combination of the two, these groups had ideologies on a grand scale. Their political agenda called for (1) destruction of the state and (2) conquest of political power. Destroying the state—either the representative of a dilapidated capitalist system or the lackey of an imperialist nation, probably the United States—resolved most other political issues and cleared the way for constructing a new state.

Much of the political belief system of these groups belonged to the Cold War dichotomy of world capitalism versus socialism. Today, according to postmodernists, terrorists and Islamic radicals do not hold such grand theories as their guiding viewpoint. According to Fukuyama, a movement that wishes to be taken seriously on the historical world stage must “ultimately . . . offer people something attractive, and this thing [radical Islam] seems to be attractive only to highly alienated people in very unsuccessful countries.”¹¹

Fukuyama and Laqueur do not consider the ultimate, underlying reason why acts of terrorism have increased so much and so fast. The fact that terrorist organizations operate under the guiding principle of fighting an occupying enemy earns them the support of their community. The postmodernist misconception arises from treating terrorism as a cause and not a symptom. Most researchers make the following assumptions about suicide bombers: they live in poverty; they are not educated; they are brainwashed;

they are unemployed; they are sexually deprived; they are Muslim fundamentalists; they are religious; they are male; and they are from Arab countries. According to Pape, however, none of those characteristics has a high correlation with suicide bombing—and even less with terrorism.¹²

Advantages of Suicide Attacks

For several reasons, suicide attacks have continued despite relentless efforts to seek out groups that organize them: the attackers' willingness to die makes the act more destructive because they can conceal the weapon (usually strapped around the waist or located in a truck or an automobile); the perpetrators can easily infiltrate the place of attack without suspicion because they are invariably part of the community; and there is no need for an escape plan. Pape notes that from 1980 to 2003 only 3 percent of all terrorist attacks were suicide acts but accounted for 48 percent of lost lives.¹³ Suicide attacks signify that more will come since those responsible have no fear of retaliation. The more such strikes are based on ideology, the more legitimate the attacker's martyrdom—not necessarily in the religious sense but as the ultimate sacrifice. The perpetrators have no qualms about breaching any targeting taboo.

Pape argues that a high degree of correlation exists between national liberation and suicide terrorism.¹⁴ Indeed, the latter is primarily an extreme national-liberation military tactic carried out by organizations against the presence of foreign forces and directed toward a strategic objective (the withdrawal of enemy forces), as is the case, for example, in the following countries (followed by the name of the country, in parentheses, whose forces are present in or occupy that nation): Lebanon (Israel), West Bank/Gaza (Israel), Sri Lanka (Sri Lankan military), Punjab (Indian government), Kurdistan (Turkey, Iran, and Iraq), Chechnya (Russia), Kashmir (India), Saudi Arabia (United States), Iraq (US and allied forces), and Afghanistan (NATO forces).

In all of the above cases, suicide attacks have caused occupying forces to retreat tactically and, at times, strategically.¹⁵ This is precisely why the number of attacks has increased, from 10 per year in the 1980s to 50 per year before the Iraq war and to 157 per year since 2003.

One can find concrete evidence of the relationship between suicide terrorism and grand ideology in the writings and speeches of some of the

leaders of these groups. For them, a direct connection exists between political power and ideology. According to Velupillai Prabhakaran, leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka, “Our martyrs were extraordinary human beings. They chose the noble cause of liberating our people. Having lived and struggled for such a cause they finally sacrificed their precious lives for that higher ideal. . . . Let us continue to struggle to expel the enemy forces who have occupied our sacred land.”¹⁶ Additionally, in 2003 Chechen leader Abu al-Walid al-Ghamidi addressed the oppression of women and their reaction to their humiliation: “As you have seen and noticed, most of the suicide attacks were carried out by women. . . . Their honour and everything are being threatened. They do not accept being humiliated and living under occupation.”¹⁷

Essentially, a suicide attacker’s belief system includes three principal criteria: political, social, and psychological. Politically, is suicide terrorism a rational political-military strategy? Socially, does a community support and encourage such acts? Psychologically, what type of person willingly sacrifices his or her life to commit the act?

One often thinks of the political rationalization argument in terms of nationalism. It is rooted in belief in a community whose members share a distinct set of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and historical characteristics and who are entitled to govern their nation without interference from foreigners. Given the above, the chances of suicide attacks increase if a foreign power occupies the nation militarily, if that power differs religiously and ethnically, and if it controls resources (e.g., water, energy, etc.).

The social support of their community is essential for suicide attackers, who are well integrated into the populace and share its collective goals. They believe in the culture of martyrdom as a means of pursuing their political objective. Such support allows them to avoid detection, utilize walk-in volunteers, replenish membership, and establish contact in schools, universities, and other social groups.¹⁸

Scholars usually cite individual or psychological motivation as the main cause of acts of suicide. According to Rex Hudson, a suicide attacker is detached from his society: “A demented loner is caught in the throes of a depressive nightmare, possibly besieged by demonic illusions, which makes escape through self-killing a desirable end in itself, especially if it is possible to take out some imaginary tormentors at the same time.”¹⁹

On the other hand, suicide attacks qualify as altruistic suicide, committed by an individual who is too much integrated into his or her society.²⁰ Such acts, which are culturally sanctioned and approved, enhance rather than diminish social order, reflecting a high level of social integration and respect for community values: “[Suicide bombers] are rarely brainwashed into accepting such missions through the heavy indoctrination associated with the recent mass suicides by religious cults, but accept the task much like a soldier who accepts a ‘suicide mission’ in an ordinary war.”²¹

Conclusion

Suicide terrorism is a military tactic used to reach a political objective. In most cases, the perpetrators seek national liberation from relatively long-term foreign military occupation. Given the current military presence in a number of countries (e.g., the United States in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan; Israel in Palestine and at times in Lebanon; Russia in Chechnya; and the Sri Lankan military in Sri Lanka), the number of suicide attacks will increase, especially as opposition groups become militarily weaker and less sophisticated, as guerilla tactics fail, and as the enemy becomes stronger. New definitions of terrorism, which cast a wider net to include revolutionary groups, reflect such an increase.

It has been a while since Daniel Bell argued “the end of ideology”—the withering away of all values and ideas in favor of pragmatic benefits. This view runs contrary to the core of the ideology of a suicide terrorist. Rather, terrorists—previously known as guerilla fighters, liberation armies, or revolutionaries—are organized in the realm of totalizing ideas. Terrorism—more specifically, suicide terrorism—indicates weaknesses in military tactics and logistics but not in totalizing ideologies. This, in a sense, is a large, unifying worldview understandable in the context of an ideology not restricted to any fragment of a secular or religious understanding of the world but including religion, culture, and political alternatives that prevail in any society.

Notes

1. For the purposes of this article, I use the terms *suicide bombing* and *suicide terrorism* interchangeably.
2. Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, [1960]).

3. Quentin Skinner, ed., *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 11.
4. George Ritzer, *Contemporary Sociological Theory and Its Classical Roots: The Basics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2009), 43.
5. Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005).
6. Ibid.
7. Hoffman: terrorism related to politics and power, the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to effect political change. See Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). Laqueur: the use of covert violence by a group for political ends. See Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Jenkins: illegitimate force used against innocents for political purposes. See Brian Jenkins, *Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006). Livingstone: warfare on the cheap. See David Livingstone, *Terrorism and the Illuminati: A Three Thousand Year History* (Charleston, SC: Booksurge LLC, 2007). Stern: an act or threat of violence against noncombatants with the objective of exacting revenge and intimidating or otherwise influencing an audience. See Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Ecco, 2003). Schmid: combat against symbolic targets. See Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005). Crenshaw: politically illegitimate attacks on innocent targets. See Martha Crenshaw, *Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes, and Consequences* (New York: Routledge, 2011).
8. Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism: An Introduction* (Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2002), 10, 11.
9. Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 5 (September/October 1996): 34.
10. Some groups that make no distinction between combatants and noncombatants would qualify as terrorist organizations by definition.
11. Herb Keinon, "Fukuyama on Terrorism and Nation Building," *Jerusalem Post*, 18 March 2004, <http://www.israelforum.com/board/showthread.php?5236-Fukuyama-on-terrorism-and-nation-building>.
12. Pape, *Dying to Win*, 23.
13. Ibid., 27.
14. Ibid., 29.
15. Pres. Ronald Reagan's decision to pull American troops out of Lebanon, for example, was a direct result of the suicide attack on the Marine barracks in that country in 1983.
16. Pape, *Dying to Win*, 31.
17. Ibid., 31–32.
18. Ibid.
19. Rex A. Hudson, *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* (New York: Globe Pequot Press, 2002), 33.
20. Emile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson (London: Routledge Classics, 2002).
21. Pape, *Dying to Win*, 173.

Wartime Alliances versus Coalition Warfare

How Institutional Structure Matters in the Multilateral Prosecution of Wars

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Graffiti on the latrine walls at Kandahar airfield in Afghanistan do not make entirely clear who the enemy is. One Canadian says to the Americans, “*Identify your . . . target before you kill.*” And the response is, “*Canadians, first learn how to fight and stop getting your ass kicked every time you go outside the wire.*”¹ Tension within the ranks is normal, especially under pressure-cooker conditions of wartime. Yet the dynamics of intracoalition and intra-alliance politics are largely ignored in advance of decisions on how to prosecute wars and in understanding the politics of state behavior once wars are under way. This is troubling, given the importance of institutional design and its impact on fighting effectiveness.

No one doubts that military alliances are highly consequential in shaping the landscape of international politics. States pursue alliances to preserve themselves in the face of threats or to augment their power. Once formed, military alliances send ripples through the system, shaping the patterns of interaction among states, and may alter the identity politics among members.² Because of the increased threat confronting nonmembers once an alliance is formed, it may alter future patterns of alignment or culminate in military hostilities. The most consequential realm of multilateral action is in the area of military operations, but scholars and policy

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makers think nothing of dismissing coalition operations as unilateral if one country takes the lead in decision making. This is problematic. Any multinational operation requires coordination in command and control and mutual cooperation in ideas and actions. The dynamics within coalitions and alliances are as important as the objectives they are designed to pursue.

Alliance operations during wartime are fundamentally different from coalition operations. What follows is an analysis of these differences, including their formation, cohesiveness, and burden sharing. In many ways, states in coalitions focus principally on operational effectiveness, while political effectiveness becomes of primary concern in wartime alliances. Next, the argument is evaluated in the context of two cases: the first Gulf War coalition and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) operations in Kosovo. Finally, the article presents an analysis of contemporary wars and policy recommendations.

Wartime Alliances versus Wartime Coalitions

Not all wartime partnerships are created equal. In some cases, an alliance concluded during peacetime is called upon to prosecute a war. In other instances, once war is imminent or has already begun, states come together in an ad hoc coalition designed for the express purpose of fighting. Preexisting alliances benefit from preexisting decision-making structures and joint planning, yet coalitions benefit from being tailored for the express purpose for which they are being used. In terms of effective fighting capability, military alliances have the advantage of opportunities for joint war planning; stable relations among allies; the opportunity for creating effective command, control, and information structures; and agreed-upon mechanisms for decision making. All of these factors should make coordinating action during wartime easier than in coalition operations. Yet because alliances that operate in war are usually created during peacetime, the transition is not so easy. This is true for several reasons. First, egalitarian decision-making structures which foster cohesion during peacetime create onerous procedures not well suited to quick, decisive action necessary during war. The emphasis on political rather than operational effectiveness hampers the functioning of the alliance in wartime. Second, not all alliance partners will be equally threatened, nor will they all be likely to desire wartime action equally. In other words, fears of entrapment are likely to outweigh fears of

abandonment during wartime. Finally, threats that are compatible during peacetime do not necessarily translate into compatible threats during wartime.³

Coalitions and wartime alliances are both subsets of multinational operations, which may include other forms of multilateral cooperation, such as peacekeeping missions. *Coalitions are ad hoc multinational understandings that are forged to undertake a specific mission and dissolve once that mission is complete.* They are not wholly analytically distinct from wartime alliances although the latter may have a greater degree of institutionalization and may predate a specific wartime operation. *Wartime alliances are formal or informal agreements between two or more states intended to further (militarily) the national security of the participating states, usually in the form of joint consultation and cooperation to prevail in war against a common enemy or enemies. Such alliances are usually concluded in peacetime in order to prevent or prevail in war but continue to operate under wartime conditions. States augment their joint planning and consultation, and sometimes integrate their forces as their plans for war unfold and are implemented. Member states usually expect that the alliance will endure beyond any specific war or crisis.*⁴ There is a range of commitment levels that alliances may provide. Six can be specifically identified: (1) a promise to maintain benevolent neutrality in the event of war; (2) a promise to consult in the event of military hostilities with an implication of aid; (3) promises of military assistance and other aid in event of war but unilateral and without preprepared or explicit conditions specified; (4) a promise to come to the active assistance of an ally under specific circumstances; (5) an unconditional promise of mutual assistance, short of joint planning, with division of forces; and (6) an unconditional promise of mutual assistance in the event of attack with preplanned command and control and the integration of forces and strategy.⁵

Coalitions forged to combat a specific threat come in various forms. Contemporary coalitions formed by the United States to fight in the first Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Iraq have many features in common yet many differences as well. The advantage to creating such coalitions is that they can be tailored to the specific needs of the mission at hand. Some of these coalitions—namely the one formed for the first Gulf War—are forged out of a genuine desire to collectively address the wishes of the international community.⁶ In other instances—the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—the coalitions are forged as a means toward achieving objectives that

serve the interest of one nation above all, even if the coalitions in the end do not actually serve the interest of the principal state. In reality, contemporary coalitions are often constructed in ways that are not always conducive to the US national interest.

First, the large scale of contemporary coalitions may actually reduce fighting effectiveness by creating additional complexities regarding decision making, interoperability, and burden sharing. Second, contemporary coalitions are being formed with an eye to legitimizing international operations rather than to increasing war-fighting effectiveness (which occurs only rarely), even if those efforts at establishing legitimacy may meet with varied success. However, because coalitions are designed to address a specific military objective, there is some emphasis on operational effectiveness, within certain parameters.

The fighting effectiveness of multinational forces requires a clear chain of command, decision making, interoperability, equitable burden sharing, technology, human power, and resources. Larger coalitions may pose more challenges in this regard. In addition, as the size of a fighting force grows, the more difficult it becomes to manage the differences in rules of engagement. For example, during the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, 14 Australian F/A-18 Hornet pilots defied the orders of their American commanding officers. These pilots independently aborted 40 bombing missions at the last minute because they believed that the objects of attack were not valid military targets or that dropping their bombs would result in an alarming number of civilian casualties. None of the pilots were reprimanded—they were following Australian rules of engagement.⁷

Contemporary coalition warfare differs from its historical counterparts in that coalitions formed by the United States after the Cold War and after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 contain a significant number of American allies. Because the experience of NATO in the former Yugoslavia revealed that the unwieldy nature of the decision-making structure was at odds with the need for quick, decisive action during wartime, the United States opted to construct coalitions in the succeeding missions. Even with its longtime allies, the United States concluded bilateral agreements rather than using the preexisting multilateral framework available through NATO. This has the advantage of fighting alongside allies with shared experience in

training and enhanced interoperability yet with the flexibility in decision-making arrangements available through coalitions.⁸

These hybrids—part alliance, part coalition—make the distinction between alliances and coalitions blurry. What is the efficacy of such fighting arrangements?

Because long-standing, highly institutionalized alliances are usually established during peacetime, their wartime operation may be unwieldy and problematic. These alliances generally have rigid structures unsuitable to effective or efficient wartime operation because of their attention to political harmony during peacetime. Further, the demands on member states regarding integration of forces are high, creating a natural tension with their desires to maintain national control of their troops. Hence, long-standing military alliances will be less cohesive in wartime than ad hoc coalitions. In addition, institutional design may impinge on burden-sharing concerns. Two case studies, Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield and Operation Allied Force, are relevant in drawing out this argument. These cases are not intended to be exercises in proof; rather, they provide assessment and illustration of the arguments.

First Gulf War Coalition

United States Central Command (CENTCOM) was established during the waning years of the Cold War. Following the Iranian hostage crisis, it became clear to US decision makers that the United States needed a rapid deployment force that could be dispatched around the globe quickly in response to such developments. In 1983 the newly established Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was transformed into a permanent unified command. Its area of responsibility was the Middle East, East Africa, and Central Asia. Once the Cold War ended, Gen Norman Schwarzkopf, the CENTCOM commander in chief, began focusing on regional threats. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, CENTCOM responded quickly by dispatching troops to Saudi Arabia to deter an Iraqi attack.⁹

In the immediate aftermath of Saddam's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the United States spearheaded an effort to construct a multinational coalition to respond. The United Nations (UN) played an important role—the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions condemning the invasion, demanding Iraq's withdrawal, establishing sanctions, and authoriz-

ing the use of force if Iraq did not comply.¹⁰ With unanimity in the international community condemning the invasion and enormous effort on the part of Pres. George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker, a large coalition of states was forged. The coalition was built beyond countries threatened by the invasion though Iraq's attack posed a tremendous threat to many countries. In the region, Saudi Arabia was especially vulnerable to attack. The Gulf Cooperation Council countries of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait were alarmed and reacted strongly against the invasion. As Cairo became a center for Kuwaiti refugees, Egypt also responded with alacrity to the invasion. Tensions had already been running high between Egypt and Iraq concerning Egyptian workers in Iraq; the attack on Kuwait deepened those tensions. Syria was also threatened by the attack and responded quickly to the crisis, deploying troops in October.¹¹ The attack was perceived as highly threatening to Western countries sensitive to the vagaries of the oil markets. This high level of threat effectively galvanized the international community, as did President Bush.

President Bush was instrumental in forging the coalition. He used personal diplomacy and ongoing relationships with world leaders to bring the member states together. While Bush took a leadership role, there was widespread sentiment in the international community that action needed to be taken—and taken collectively. The shared norm of sovereignty and the value of its preservation were predominant in the decision to intervene. Bush made a point of constructing a coalition that extended beyond the frontline states. The decision was sanctioned by an affirmative vote in the UN Security Council, and despite the fact that forging a coalition complicated the operational mission, pervasive support for action existed within the international community. Almost 50 countries contributed to the first Gulf War in some capacity. By the end of the operations (both Desert Shield and Desert Storm), 38 countries—including the United States—had contributed nearly 800,000 troops to the coalition. The operations included over 300 combat and combat support battalions, over 225 naval vessels, and nearly 2,800 fixed-wing aircraft.¹² Many countries contributed to the coalition financially—in addition to billions in economic aid to affected countries, the United States received an estimated \$54 billion to offset projected incremental costs of \$61 billion.¹³ The level of threat posed by Saddam's

invasion was instrumental in bringing about the formation of the coalition poised to deter and repel his attack. The high level of threat perceived by the international community was also instrumental in fostering cohesion in the coalition.¹⁴

Cohesion

The partners relatively easily agreed that deterring the Iraqis from invading Saudi Arabia was a key goal. It was slightly more difficult to achieve consensus on pushing Saddam's forces out of Kuwait and back into Iraq. Ultimately, the partners reached consensus and maintained cohesion. The command and control system that emerged enabled the coalition to pursue those objectives effectively, thereby enhancing the cohesion of the coalition.

A joint directorate of planning between the United States and Saudi Arabia was established in the two weeks following Saddam's invasion. A coalition, coordination, communication, and integration center was established and became the cornerstone of the combined operations. It provided the link between the two parallel command structures as well as the place where conflict could be aired, negotiated, and resolved.¹⁵ At first, too few experienced personnel, an absence of mutual operating procedures, and inadequate communications interoperability posed problems, and these relationships changed continuously as more and more countries deployed troops to Saudi Arabia in advance of Desert Shield.¹⁶ The United States took the lead in planning and executing the operations. As Peter de la Billière, commander in chief of British forces in the Gulf War, reported, General Schwarzkopf was the person who "got things done . . . efficiently, and helped and enabled us to win this war."¹⁷

Ultimately, command and control of coalition forces was established with "separate, but parallel lines of authority with US and Saudi Arabian forces remaining under their respective national command authorities."¹⁸ French land forces remained under French command but were under the operational control of the Saudis. British forces remained under British command, but the United States had operational and tactical control of air and ground forces. Eventually Egyptian and Syrian divisions were integrated into the defense. The headquarters for CENTCOM, per its request, was located in the same building as the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation to facilitate coordination of the two staffs.

A separate cell was established to begin planning Desert Storm. A planning team with representatives from the United States, United Kingdom, Egypt, and France was at the heart of the effort. "As with everything else in this war, the development of this plan was a team effort involving literally hundreds of people at every echelon of command across the entire coalition."¹⁹ The process did not always proceed smoothly, and much of the work had to be done by the United States, with one British representative in the planning cell.²⁰

The parallel command structure allowed troops from Arab and Islamic countries to remain under Islamic Arab control, while Western countries maintained control of Western troops. Planners took enormous pains to maintain cultural sensitivities. For example, US personnel deploying to Saudi Arabia had to undergo extensive indoctrination programs to educate themselves about the history, customs, religions, and laws of the region. Alcohol was prohibited in CENTCOM's area of operations, and a civilian dress code was established as well. Broadcasts on the US Armed Forces Radio and Television Service were monitored to avoid giving offense. American women were briefed extensively regarding Islamic and Saudi expectations of female conduct although the Saudis did lift the prohibition against women driving, provided it was part of their official duty.²¹ Tending to cultural differences was essential in fostering and maintaining coalition cohesion.

As the coalition shifted from Desert Shield to Desert Storm, the parallel decision-making structure was augmented by upping the number of liaison officers, who then made changes to the coalition, coordination, communication, and integration center that strengthened and made it more effective.²² The United States and its coalition partners worked very hard to keep the coalition together. The consequences of failure loomed. The "inherent fragility" of the coalition meant that a great deal of effort had to go into negotiating, compromising, and maintaining its cohesion.²³ Tension surfaced among the force commanders in particular, who did not always agree on operational or tactical implementation decisions. In the end, however, the coalition maintained cohesion because of the efforts undertaken by the main coalition partners.²⁴

The first Gulf War revealed command and control challenges posed by coalition warfare in another important way: friendly fire. Coalition partners

must communicate effectively at all levels to prevent lethal friendly fire—the accidental killing of other allied units occurs frequently in coalition warfare. The United States killed as many British soldiers during the first Gulf War as the enemy did. Nearly a quarter of all American casualties during the Gulf War were a consequence of friendly fire.²⁵ In subsequent wars, Afghanistan and Iraq in particular, friendly fire has made task cohesion on the ground more difficult than ever.

Burden Sharing within the Coalition

According to the US General Accounting Office (GAO), by September 1992, the United States had received about \$54 billion in aid to offset the incremental costs of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Table 1 provides a country-by-country summary.

The incremental costs to the United States, estimated by the Office of Management and Budget, were \$61.1 billion.²⁶ In terms of funding the war, burden sharing was handled very effectively. The United States provided the largest deployment of troops by far—540,000 out of the nearly 800,000 total.²⁷ Saudi Arabia was the next largest contributor with troop levels around 50,000, followed by the United Kingdom with approximate 45,000 troops.²⁸ Other contributions to the coalition included observing the embargo against Iraq despite significant lost revenues.

Table 1. Foreign government pledges and contributions to the United States (in millions of dollars)

<i>Contributor</i>	<i>Pledges</i>			<i>Contributions</i>		
	1990	1991	Total	Cash	In-Kind	Total
Saudi Arabia	\$3,339	\$13,500	\$16,839	\$12,809	\$4,046	\$16,855
Kuwait	2,506	13,550	16,056	16,015	43	16,058
United Arab Emirates	1,000	3,088	4,088	3,870	218	4,088
Japan	1,680	8,332	10,012	9,441	571	10,012
Germany	1,072	5,500	6,572	5,772	683	6,455
Korea	80	275	355	150	101	251
Others*	3	26	29	8	22	30
<i>Total</i>	\$9,680	\$44,271	\$53,951	\$48,065	\$5,684	\$53,749

*Italy, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and Luxembourg

Adapted from US General Accounting Office, Financial Management: Fiscal Year 1992 Audit of the Defense Cooperation Account, GAO-NSIAD-93-185 (Washington, DC: GAO, August 1993), 9, table 1.1, <http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat5/149781.pdf>.

Although opinions vary on the equity of burden sharing in the Gulf War, the coalition for that conflict was the most broadly funded of the post-Cold War coalitions formed by the United States. In contrast, the United States has had to pay its coalition partners in the current war in Iraq for their continued participation.²⁹

Studies of burden sharing in the Gulf War also universally acknowledge the importance of the US position in successfully constructing the coalition. Katsuaki Terasawa and William Gates, for example, argue that intense lobbying by the United States culminated in Germany's and Japan's contributing more to the coalition than their return would warrant. Others argue that alliance dependence makes states receptive to contributing to coalitions beyond the immediate gains they may reap.³⁰ This suggests that a powerful state's influence and regard in the international system may be essential to success in forging such coalitions—threat alone is not enough.

The Gulf War coalition experienced challenges of interoperability, and the United States expended a great deal of effort to maintain that organization. Careful thought went into crafting the decision-making structure—a system that could absorb differences of opinion, resolve them, and keep avenues of communication open. The Gulf War coalition was extremely effective—in large part because of the conscious efforts of the United States and its key partners. Certainly conflict occurred within the coalition, but in the end, clear political and military objectives and a resilient coalition structure—as well as a weak enemy—enabled the partners to prevail.

The Kosovo Alliance

In late February 1998, government forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army began to clash. As the latter began making advances in June and July, the Yugoslav government launched a major counteroffensive, which continued through September. Over a quarter of a million people were displaced, thousands of homes were destroyed, and the makings of a humanitarian disaster confronted the international community. Despite attempts to negotiate a cease-fire through the Holbrooke Agreement in October 1998 and negotiations at Rambouillet, France, in February 1999, the fighting on the ground in Kosovo escalated in March 1999. By January 1999, NATO had empowered Secretary-General

Javier Solana to authorize air strikes with the intention of compelling Slobodan Milošević to comply.³¹

US and NATO planning for war began earlier, in 1998. Above all, the strategic concerns of turmoil in NATO's backyard were at issue. The European member states were unable to take action without the strategic assets of the United States. By early spring of 1999, over 40 air campaign options had been considered. It was clear that the United States in particular was unwilling to commit ground forces, and plans for fighting an air war were a political necessity.³² On 23 March 1999, Allied Force began. The air campaign lasted until 10 June, ending with Serbian capitulation.³³

Cohesion

Developing and maintaining cohesion during the Kosovo campaign proved challenging. Despite the fact that NATO was a preexisting alliance with command and decision-making structures, the Kosovo campaign was its most active mission and only the second offensive military mission in its 50-year history. The 19 NATO member states ultimately agreed that ending Milošević's brutality in Kosovo was necessary, but even coming to that agreement was difficult.³⁴ In fact the GAO identified the absence of clear military objectives as one of the principal departures from military doctrine in Allied Force.³⁵ The ambiguity of alliance goals resulted from divergent perspectives within the alliance. The GAO reported that all of the member states had different perspectives on the conflict and on what action should be taken and how:

One member nation, which shared religious and cultural backgrounds with the Kosovar Albanians, was sympathetic to their plight, while another nation had historic and religious ties to the Serbian Yugoslavs. Another NATO nation was led by a coalition government, where part of the coalition supported the NATO alliance operation while the other part of the coalition did not want the bombing campaign to continue and said that it would withdraw from the government if the NATO alliance used a ground force. Even within the United States, there was not a consensus of support for this operation. Although the three newest members of the NATO alliance supported the operation, the level of support expressed by their governments varied. For example, although one nation offered NATO forces the use of its air space and military airfields, it was concerned about Yugoslavian retaliation against a minority population in Yugoslavia that was ethnically related to this nation.³⁶

The alliance struggled to agree on exactly how to stop the Serbian government. Alliance partners agreed on general goals, but it was difficult

to agree on strategies for attaining those goals. Using NATO was the only way to approach this mission; no one country was willing to take action alone. Further, the campaign offered NATO an opportunity to bolster its image in the early post-Cold War years, when its mission and continuance were being questioned. It also gave the United States a chance to strengthen the alliance in the aftermath of the Bosnia experience.³⁷ A unilateral approach to the Kosovo crisis would have involved far more cost than any country was willing to bear; in this case multilateralism was easier, more advantageous. Committing to NATO and keeping the alliance active were important considerations as well.³⁸ Because of reluctance on the part of the countries to act alone, acting via NATO was the only viable and least costly option.

Because of resistance from the United States in particular to placing its troops under the command of others, a parallel command structure evolved (see figure). Unlike the parallel command structure in the Gulf War and despite the fact that many individuals in the structure served two masters, this construct had less structured interface. The chain of command was confusing, with unsuitable organizational structures and insufficient staff integration. Although NATO was necessary to prosecute the war, in the end it “came at the cost of a flawed strategy that was further hobbled by the manifold inefficiencies that were part and parcel of conducting combat operations by committee.”³⁹

Because NATO decisions have to be made by consensus, waging war collectively was extremely difficult. At the start of the campaign, only 51 targets had been approved by the allies. By June 1999, the list included 976. Each additional target had to be proposed, reviewed, and approved by NATO and national authorities before it could be added to the list.⁴⁰ Target requests were denied by some of the allies or by the United States. Delays in approving target requests were common by the United States, as well as other states in the alliance. In some cases, targets were subjected to a domestic legal review to guarantee compliance with international law.⁴¹ According to Lt Col Paul Strickland, a member of the NATO combined air operations center, in the initial 40 days of the campaign, a number of fairly insignificant targets were repeatedly bombed into rubble because of an absence of new, approved target sets.⁴² The Pentagon estimated that some 80 percent of the targets hit in the first month of the campaign had been hit at some point before.⁴³




Figure. Operation Allied Force command structure. (Adapted from Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* [Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001], 208.)

In some instances, the United States withheld information about missions involving the use of “F-117s, B-2s, and cruise missiles, to ensure strict US control over those US-only assets and to maintain a firewall against leaks from any allies who might compromise those operations.” This created potentially dangerous situations when, for example, US aircraft showed up

on NATO radars without advance notice. Even when the United States opted to share information, the process was complicated and cumbersome, hampering the alliance's ability to act effectively.⁴⁴

In addition to being unwieldy and slow, the alliance suffered from other troubles as well.⁴⁵ According to Gen Wesley Clark, supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR), who led NATO's campaign, leaks were a constant source of trouble. As early as October 1998, one of the French officers working at NATO headquarters had leaked key portions of the operational plan for the campaign to the Serbians.⁴⁶

Fissures in the alliance were especially clear in the dispute over the Pristina airport in June 1999, after the NATO air operation had concluded. As the NATO-led Kosovo force was deployed to occupy Serbia, Russian troops and fellow Slavs in collusion with the Serbians moved to occupy the Pristina airport. This event threatened to enlarge a sphere of influence in the north, putting the Kosovo force's mission at risk. Fearing either an expanding sphere of influence for the Russians or a partition, Clark requested that entering troops block the runways at Pristina and seize the airport ahead of the Russians. Sir Michael Jackson, the British general in charge of the operation, balked at the orders. According to Clark, Jackson said he "would no longer be taking his orders from Washington." When Clark countered by saying the orders did not come from Washington but from him as SACEUR, Jackson responded by telling Clark he did not have that authority. When Clark responded that he did have the authority, Jackson told Clark that he would not be starting World War III for him. Jackson told Clark that as a three-star general he should not have to take orders from Clark; Clark's response was that he himself was a four-star general and indeed Jackson did have to take orders from him. The dispute resulted in numerous phone calls to various British and American officials. The French also backed out of the operation at the behest of the British.⁴⁷ Above all, the incident revealed difficulties among the allies in agreeing on goals and on strategies for attaining those goals. It also illustrated the problems associated with multinational command structure, even in long-standing, highly institutionalized alliances such as NATO.

In sum, the alliance was fraught with conflict and difficulty achieving consensus on realizing ultimate objectives and prosecuting the war. According to the GAO, cohesion was so difficult to maintain that it resulted in profound

departures from US military doctrine, further complicating the campaign.⁴⁸ This represents one of the many inherent challenges to alliance war fighting.

Burden Sharing within the Alliance

The top three contributors to Allied Force in terms of sorties and aircraft deployed were the United States, France, and the United Kingdom.⁴⁹ During the operation itself, most of the contributions by allies were made in terms of allied airfields, overflight rights, and logistical support; they also contributed peacekeeping troops after the operation concluded.⁵⁰ Thirteen of the 19 member states contributed aircraft to the operation. Of the approximately 38,000 sorties flown, including those by airlifters, the United States flew over 29,000 while deploying more than 700 aircraft; France deployed about 100 aircraft and flew approximately 2,414 sorties; the United Kingdom was the second largest contributor of aircraft and flew about 1,950 sorties; the Netherlands flew approximately 1,252 sorties; Italy was the third largest contributor of aircraft and flew about 1,081 sorties; Germany flew about 636 sorties.⁵¹

Allied Force cost the United States \$3.1 billion in incremental funds.⁵² The United States provided about 70 percent of the aircraft for the operation and about 60 percent of the sorties during the operation, while the Europeans provided 56–70 percent of the peacekeeping troops after the air campaigns.⁵³ The Europeans, in summary,

have consistently provided the majority of ground troops to support NATO operations and paramilitary specialists who are trained for post-conflict crisis interventions. European allies have also led efforts to support nonmilitary interventions, such as development assistance and personnel to support multilateral operations. Of the almost \$15 billion, disbursed to the Balkans region from 1993 through 1999, the European Commission (EC) and European allies contributed about \$10.2 billion, primarily to fund humanitarian and reconstruction programs such as rebuilding airports, bridges, and roads. During this same period, the US distributed about \$1.2 billion, primarily for emergency relief and institution building. European allies have consistently provided a large number of civilians to support multilateral institution-building programs in the Balkans, including more than 2,000 U.N. civilian police.⁵⁴

Burden sharing in NATO more generally has been an issue of contention during the history of the alliance. As the Department of Defense reported in its annual assessment of allied contributions to defense, the United States pays one-quarter of the NATO common-funded budgets in which all 19 members participated at the time of Allied Force (table 2).⁵⁵

The absence of a strong European strategic transport and logistics capability alone meant that the United States had to undertake the lion's share of the Kosovo campaign. Allied Force also revealed a serious technology gap between the United States and Europe:

More than 70 per cent of the fire-power deployed was American. Only a handful of European allies had laser-guided bombs, and only Britain was able to contribute cruise missiles. Barely 10 per cent of European aircraft are capable of precision bombing and of the European members of NATO, only France was able to make a significant contribution to high-level bombing raids at night. Only the United States could contribute strategic bombers and stealth aircraft for enhanced power projection. European allies also critically lacked reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft.⁵⁶

Table 2. NATO's common-funded budgets, 2000* (in millions of 2000 dollars [2000 exchange rates])

<i>Member</i>	<i>NATO Security & Investment Program</i>	<i>Percent of NATO Security & Investment Program</i>	<i>Military Budget</i>	<i>Percent of Total Military Budget**</i>	<i>Civil Budget</i>	<i>Percent of Total Civil Budget</i>	<i>TOTAL NATO Common Budgets</i>	<i>Percent of TOTAL NATO Common Budget**</i>
Belgium	23.2	4.3	13.9	3.1	3.6	2.8	40.7	3.6
Canada	20.4	3.7	25.6	5.7	7.0	5.4	53.0	4.7
Czech Republic	3.1	0.6	4.5	1.0	1.2	0.9	8.8	0.8
Denmark	18.6	3.4	8.2	1.8	1.9	1.5	28.7	2.6
France	29.1	5.3	28.2	6.3	20.0	15.3	77.3	6.9
Germany	126.7	23.2	76.9	17.1	20.2	15.5	223.8	19.9
Greece	5.4	1.0	1.9	0.4	0.5	0.4	7.8	0.7
Hungary	2.3	0.4	3.3	0.7	0.8	0.6	6.4	0.6
Iceland	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.0
Italy	46.2	8.5	29.7	6.6	7.5	5.8	83.4	7.4
Luxembourg	1.1	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.6	0.1
Netherlands	25.7	4.7	13.9	3.1	3.6	2.8	43.2	3.8
Norway	15.9	2.9	5.7	1.3	1.4	1.1	23.0	2.0
Poland	8.6	1.6	12.4	2.8	3.2	2.5	24.2	2.2
Portugal	1.9	0.3	3.2	0.7	0.8	0.6	5.9	0.5
Spain	13.8	2.5	17.6	3.9	4.6	3.5	36.0	3.2
Turkey	5.8	1.1	8.0	1.8	2.1	1.6	15.9	1.4
United Kingdom	61.1	11.2	80.4	17.9	22.5	17.3	164.0	14.6
United States	136.3	25.0	115.6	25.7	29.2	22.4	281.1	25.0
<i>Total</i>	545.2	100.0	449.6	100.0	130.3	100.0	1125.1	100.0

*Due to rounding, the numbers shown may not add up to the totals.

**Calculation does not include contributions to the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Program.

Source: Department of Defense, *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2001), III-28, chart III-21, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/allied_contrib2001/allied2001.pdf.

The United States' superiority in information systems made communicating with its allies difficult. In other words, despite the fact that NATO was a long-standing alliance, interoperability issues were nevertheless critical.

Findings

The proposition that long-standing, highly institutionalized alliances will be less flexible and overly rigid for effective wartime operations was supported by the cases of the Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign. In the first, a large, ad hoc coalition of countries of widely disparate capabilities and cultures produced a more cohesive and effective war-fighting mechanism than the largely Western, long-standing military alliance of mostly great powers represented by NATO in Operation Allied Force. Because the former coalition could be tailored to the direct needs of the countries in question for the mission at hand, the member states were able to come together in a unified way. The immediate threat posed by Saddam Hussein's invasion was the galvanizing force that produced an effective response. Substantial attention was paid to designing an operationally effective institution to meet the challenges of the tasks at hand. The parallel decision-making structure, communication between the two decision-making hierarchies, and meticulous attention to cultural sensitivities all served to facilitate the effectiveness and cohesion of the coalition.⁵⁷

The parallel decision-making structure in NATO did not work as well. It signaled to its long-standing allies that the United States stood apart from the NATO hierarchy. Part of the problem was the fact that although the Gulf War coalition could operate with countries acting in tandem rather than in an integrated fashion, NATO had no such possibility. Because political considerations during peacetime guided the institutional structure, operational effectiveness was secondary. Further, the NATO chain of command proved ineffective in action; SACEUR Wesley Clark was unable to command with the authority he would have had in an operation executed solely by the Americans.⁵⁸ The decision-making procedures were highly ineffective, not at all conducive to a crisis or wartime situation.⁵⁹

The security threat posed to the coalition members in the first Gulf War, in contrast to the humanitarian challenge posed to NATO in the Kosovo campaign, also affected operations. The security threat galvanized the coalition, gave the member states a clear objective, and helped them

understand their central goals and decide on strategies for attaining those goals. The humanitarian threat in Kosovo did not culminate in a similar benefit for NATO member states. As the alliance faced a humanitarian crisis in its own backyard in the aftermath of the Cold War on the eve of its 50th anniversary, there was a belief that something needed to be done to show that its utility was enduring. However, these were political rather than military or operational objectives. Further, defining these objectives clearly, let alone specifying strategies for attaining those objectives, was difficult. The United States really was the only country with the capability to undertake the mission, yet it did not want to commit ground troops. The European states wanted control of the situation but were technologically not in a place to do so. Rather than providing a template for the future of the alliance, the Kosovo campaign revealed fissures in that organization (table 3).

Table 3. Summary of findings

	<i>Threat</i>	<i>Burden Sharing</i>	<i>Coalition or Alliance</i>	<i>Cohesion</i>
First Gulf War coalition in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm	Immediate threat perceived by some contributors to the coalition although not to all	United States largest contributor, especially in terms of forces, but other countries offset US incremental costs in terms of money to fight war	Coalition	Cohesion relatively easy to maintain and sustain
NATO in Operation Allied Force	Humanitarian crisis that posed threat of regional instability to some member states	United States bore brunt of costs to operation though European allies bore brunt of peacekeeping costs in the wake of the operation	Alliance	Cohesion more difficult to maintain and sustain

Allied Force struggled more with cohesion than the first Gulf War coalition. The emphasis on political effectiveness came at the expense of operational effectiveness. In addition, both the absence of a clear and present threat felt equally by all and the alliance apparatus worked to the detriment of cohesion within the coalition. The Gulf War coalition—despite being an ad hoc organization with possible interoperability problems, definite internal asymmetries, and its members' lack of experience in working together—was effective and cohesive. The coalition worked effectively, despite some interoperability challenges, as a consequence of the clear objectives that allowed the parallel decision-making structure to work. The Gulf War was sanctioned by the UN; Allied Force was not. Although this did not have much effect on the operations themselves, the sanction of the UN, which is

a manifestation of global support for an operation, may bear on the institutional arrangements that are selected to prosecute the operations. In other words, when the UN sanctions action, states may forge an international coalition designed to address the mission at hand instead of relying on a preexisting regional alliance. However, the factors that give rise to UN sanction—such as global legitimacy and support for the mission, a universally understood threat, or a clear violation of an international norm uniformly valued by the international community—are more important than the sanction itself.

Today's Wars

Far deeper and more extensive research on the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would be necessary to make unqualified assertions regarding institutional structure, burden sharing, and cohesion, but these cases offer at least superficial support for the ideas contained in this article. Above all, it is clear that the choice of institutional mechanism matters powerfully in war-fighting effectiveness.

Fighting the war in Afghanistan principally via NATO has culminated in high friendly-fire casualty rates and constant negotiating with allies regarding burden sharing.⁶⁰ The multilayered command structure also offers some challenges. For example, from 2008 to 2009, the International Security Assistance Force, which consisted of about 45,000 troops, including around 15,000 US troops, was under the command of Gen David D. McKiernan, while another 19,000 or so US troops were assigned to Combined Joint Task Force 101, part of Operation Enduring Freedom, under the command of Maj Gen Jeffrey J. Schloesser. Many of these complexities changed over the course of the operations, but, above all, they revealed the difficulties in transitioning a peacetime alliance structure to wartime. These difficulties are also clearly understood in the issue of caveats, which has plagued the International Security Assistance Force. Some 50–80 known caveats limit NATO commanders in their operations in Afghanistan. This profoundly affects operational flexibility and heightens burden-sharing problems. In other words, some countries' troops occupy space on the ground and provide international legitimacy but make little difference operationally.⁶¹

In Iraq the large coalition at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom created challenges in terms of institutional structure as well. The force levels

of participating countries varied dramatically, as did the division of labor. Although the large coalition made it appear that the operation had widespread support around the globe, in fact the United States paid dearly in lives and treasure to ensure that even the smallest countries were well compensated. Partner nations were constricted by their different rules of engagement, and the force size varied dramatically among participating states. Yet we see that the coalition adapts over time to the changing situation on the ground. Multinational Force–Iraq replaced Combined Joint Task Force 7 and then became US Forces–Iraq in January 2010.⁶²

Iraq and Afghanistan offer us more evidence that alliance and coalition design impinge on fighting effectiveness and cohesion. As these cases draw to their inevitable conclusions, more insights will be possible in regard to the principal arguments offered in this article.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

Military alliances—and coalitions—are complex in their operation during wartime. Decision-making structures that foster cohesion and consensus during peacetime hinder wartime operations. The institutionalization of alliances that enhance transparency and facilitate cooperation in peacetime may serve to undermine fighting effectiveness during wartime. Further, alliances that are created in peacetime and that operate during wartime may nevertheless suffer from significant interoperability issues.

Coalitions constructed when war is imminent to address a clear and present threat—one perceived keenly by participating states—may operate effectively when designed appropriately. The aim of coalitions is often operational effectiveness, in contrast to that of alliances, which may focus more on the political dimensions of effectiveness. In the case of the first Gulf War, cultural sensitivities culminated in a decision-making system that worked effectively, especially since staff integration and communication received attention. The absence of political infrastructure in coalitions, ironically, makes operational military cooperation easier. More flexibility and adaptability in design are possible. Strong states can then use coalitions when they want to fight wars efficiently and alliances when they are more concerned about managing broader political issues. For example, the United States may choose NATO as its vehicle in Kosovo and Afghanistan because it wants Europe to be invested in state building, more so than in fighting an

enemy that, militarily, is quite weak.⁶³ In addition, wartime alliances struggle more with cohesion—especially regarding strategies, not necessarily end goals—because *they generally require a greater level of integration than do coalitions*. The demands on such an institutional structure are far greater and likely to create more difficulties in implementing plans for war. In the Kosovo case, these conflicts did not frustrate NATO's ability to achieve its goals, but the path toward achieving them was difficult.

The lessons here bear on the nature of multilateralism and the design of contemporary coalitions.⁶⁴ The exercise of clear objectives, the similar perception of threats by member states, and the recognition of cultural differences will foster and maintain cohesion during wartime; even in the absence of a unified chain of command, effective staff integration is manifest. The implications here are that NATO is a highly useful alliance with great utility during peacetime because of its focus on political effectiveness, but during wartime, more flexible and adaptable institutional structures are necessary for effective war prosecution—more emphasis on operational effectiveness is necessary.

The policy implications are straightforward. First, coalitional war fighting does not guarantee legitimacy. Having a UN sanction is important because it is an indicator of global legitimacy. In the absence of that legitimacy, no matter how large a coalition may be, that legitimacy will not be manifest. Second, when states' participation involves caveats and overly restrictive rules of engagement, the United States may want to assess the implications for operational flexibility before the mission gets under way. Above all, we would do well to take a closer look at American reliance on multilateral war fighting and develop benchmarks to determine whether or not forging a coalition or reshaping an alliance makes sense to address the issue at hand. Of course we cannot make absolute assertions regarding when alliances or coalitions should be used in warfare; however, a close look at coalition size and subsidies to partners is absolutely warranted. The United States should employ coalition warfare whenever doing so reduces the costs of war in terms of lives and treasure. War-fighting capacity is the most important criterion. Flexible coalitions of modest size are likely the answer. Retaining our alliances and deepening our commitment to them in peacetime is absolutely in our interest. How we adjust and transform those institutions under conditions of wartime depends on the mission at hand.

Studies of military alliances in international relations tell us a great deal about the way these alliances are formed, maintained, and managed. Much work remains to better understand how those alliances, once formed, operate during war and how they differ from ad hoc coalitions formed to perform specific missions. Understanding the nuances and complexities of interstate relations—be they within alliances and/or coalitions or between these institutions and their enemies—is critical to success in the future.

Notes

1. Graeme Smith, "The War on the Walls," *Globe and Mail*, 29 November 2007.
2. See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Stephen Walt, *Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Patricia Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Michael C. Williams, "The Institutions of Security: Elements of a Theory of Security Organizations," *Cooperation and Conflict* 32, no. 3 (1997): 287–307; M. C. Williams and Iver B. Neuman, "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000): 357–87; and Vincent Pouliot, "The Alive and Well Transatlantic Security Community: A Theoretical Reply to Michael Cox," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 1 (2006): 119–27.
3. Nora Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984): 461–95; Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*.
4. Peacetime alliances are just formal or informal agreements between two or more states intended to further (militarily) the national security of the participating states, operating when the signatories are not at war. If war begins and the alliance does not dissolve, it transitions into a wartime alliance. If the alliance endures beyond the war, it reverts to a peacetime alliance.
5. Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*, 35.
6. Or out of a desire to craft a response to an international crisis in a way that strengthens global institutions such as the UN so that it might become more effective in other issue areas as well. I am grateful to Nora Bensahel for this point.
7. Frank Walker, "Our Pilots Refused to Bomb 40 Times," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 March 2004.
8. This is a strategy that is not without costs—those alliances may be undermined by an unsuccessful or conflict-fraught wartime mission.
9. "U.S. Central Command History," United States Central Command, <http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/our-history/>.
10. US Department of Defense, *Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1992), 60.
11. *Ibid.*, 62–64.
12. US Central Command (CENTCOM), "Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Executive Summary," 1992, 1. Document is now declassified.
13. US Department of Defense, *Final Report to Congress*, 59–60. Appendix P of this report, pp. 723–31, provides detailed information about the financial and in-kind assistance contributed by coalition partners.

14. I operationalize *cohesion*—as I do in “Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances,” *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (1997): 156–92, and in *Dangerous Alliances*—as the ability to agree on goals and strategies to attain those goals.

15. Nora Bensahel, “The Coalition Paradox: The Politics of Military Cooperation” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1999), 50.

16. CENTCOM, “Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” 6. For a flowchart explaining these relationships, see Khaled bin Sultan, *Desert Warrior* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 244–47.

17. Peter de la Billière, *Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 303. Khaled bin Sultan reports that “working in parallel, Schwarzkopf and I were often in close and instant agreement. Sometimes, however, we disagreed significantly, and at other times we were obliged to negotiate with each other to reach a compromise. He was not an easy man to deal with, but neither was I.” Bin Sultan, *Desert Warrior*, 191; see also 200–204.

18. CENTCOM, “Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” 7. These were parallel, though not equivalent, since the US force commitment was so much larger than anyone else’s. See bin Sultan, *Desert Warrior*, 193–97.

19. CENTCOM, “Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” 11.

20. Bensahel, “Coalition Paradox,” 73.

21. CENTCOM, “Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” 570.

22. Bensahel, “Coalition Paradox,” 60–61; and US Department of Defense, *Final Report to Congress*, 494, 559. Bensahel compellingly argues that the ineffectiveness of Iraqi troops on the ground was one of the most important reasons the coalition worked.

23. Bensahel, “Coalition Paradox,” 90; and G. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 342.

24. Bin Sultan, *Desert Warrior*, 32, 265. See also bin Sultan’s account of his “duels” with French minister of defense Jean-Pierre Chevènement (*ibid.*, chap. 26).

25. See P. A. Weitsman, “With a Little Help from Our Friends? The Costs of Coalition Warfare,” *Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective* 3, no. 1 (2009): 1–13.

26. Incremental costs rather than total costs are a better estimate of costs incurred by the United States. Total costs include expenditures the United States would have incurred even if Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm had not been undertaken (e.g., regular pay of active duty military personnel). Incremental costs are those incurred specifically because of the operations (e.g., imminent-danger pay to reservists, less normal drill pay). General Accounting Office (GAO), *Operation Desert Shield/Storm: Update on Costs and Funding Requirements*, GAO-NSIAD-92-194 (Washington, DC: GAO, May 1992), 2, <http://archive.gao.gov/d32t10/146715.pdf>. See bin Sultan, *Desert Warrior*, chap. 17, for a discussion of the unique contributions of Saudi Arabia and, in contrast, H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, *General H. Norman Schwarzkopf: The Autobiography; It Doesn’t Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), chaps. 19–20.

27. CENTCOM, “Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” 1.

28. See Katsuki L. Terasawa and William R. Gates, “Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf: Lessons Learned and Implications for the Future,” *Defense Analysis* 9 (1993): 171–95, for troop deployments by country.

29. See P. A. Weitsman, “The High Price of Friendship,” *New York Times*, 31 August 2006.

30. Terasawa and Gates, “Burden Sharing”; and A. Bennett, J. Lepgold, and D. Unger, “Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War,” *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (1994): 39–75.

31. Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 10.

32. Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 168–69. The decision to fight an air war was highly consequential, resulting in exacerbated conflict on the ground. See Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (New York: Macmillan, 2001), 96, on Clark’s failure to anticipate this response.

33. For daily reports on developments during the campaign, see “Operation Allied Force, 23 March–10 June 1999,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 26 May 2006, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/all-frce.htm>.

34. Member states include Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The three newest member states—Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—became full members of NATO less than two weeks before Operation Allied Force began.

35. GAO, *Operation Desert Shield/Storm*, 6.

36. *Ibid.*, 4.

37. Thanks to Nora Bensahel for pointing this out.

38. The action took place on the eve of NATO's 50th anniversary, which was symbolically very important.

39. Lambeth, *Air War for Kosovo*, 207, 185.

40. John Peters et al., *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 25–26.

41. *Ibid.*, 28.

42. Lt Col Paul C. Strickland, "USAF Aerospace-Power Doctrine: Decisive or Coercive?," *Aerospace Power Journal* 14, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 21.

43. Peters et al., *European Contributions*, 26.

44. *Ibid.*, 40.

45. See Bensahel, "Coalition Paradox"; and Lambeth, *Air War for Kosovo*, 204–8.

46. Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 175–76.

47. *Ibid.*, 385, 396–99.

48. GAO, *Operation Desert Shield/Storm*.

49. A normal day during Operation Allied Force saw perhaps 500 aircraft taking off from 47 bases across Europe, refueling midair, undertaking bombing missions, refueling again, returning, and taking off for another bombing mission for a total of some 35,000 sorties. James A. Kitfield, "Another Look at the Air War That Was," *Air Force Magazine* 82, no. 10 (October 1999): 39–43.

50. John A. Tirpak, "Washington Watch: The NATO Way of War," *Air Force Magazine* 82, no. 12 (December 1999): 24–27.

51. Peters et al., *European Contributions*, 18–24.

52. General Accounting Office, *Military Operations: Some Funds for Fiscal Year 1999 Contingency Operations Will Be Available for Future Needs*, GAO/NSIAD-99-244BR (Washington, DC: GAO, September 1999), 2, <http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99244b.pdf>.

53. General Accounting Office, *Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion Resulted in Doctrinal Departures*, GAO-01-784 (Washington, DC: GAO, July 2001), 3, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01784.pdf>; and General Accounting Office, *European Security: U.S. and European Contributions to Foster Stability and Security in Europe*, GAO-02-174 (Washington, DC: GAO, November 2001), 1, <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/214.pdf>.

54. GAO, *European Security*, 51.

55. US Department of Defense, *Final Report to Congress*, chap. 2.

56. Elinor Sloan, "DCI: Responding to the US-Led Revolution in Military Affairs," *NATO Review* 48, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 2000): 4.

57. It is also important to note here that NATO member states played an important role in the Gulf War coalition and no doubt facilitated the effectiveness of the coalition. The NATO decision-making structure was not used in the coalition; nevertheless, the long-standing relationships of some of the states in the coalition should be recognized. On the issue of cultural sensitivities, see Schwarzkopf with Petre, *General H. Norman Schwarzkopf*, chap. 18.

58. The fact that each member state retained a significant degree of national control not only is an indictment of the command structure per se but also speaks to the challenges of joint war fighting in general.

59. As Bensahel argues, the experience in Kosovo gives rise to bilateral agreements between the United States and its allies in fighting its subsequent wars.

60. Weitsman, "Help from Our Friends?"; and Mark Landler and Steven Erlanger, "Clinton to Press NATO Allies on Afghanistan Effort," *New York Times*, 4 December 2009.

61. David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, "Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, 15–18 February 2009), <http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/saideman/Caveats%20and%20Afghanistan,%20isa%202009.pdf>; and Auerswald and Saideman, "NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, 2–5 September 2009), <http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/NATO%20at%20War.pdf>.

62. For more, see Operation New Dawn: Official Website of United States Forces–Iraq, <http://www.mnf-iraq.com/>.

63. My thanks to J. Samuel Barkin for underscoring this point.

64. See Bensahel, "Coalition Paradox."

Dangerous Passions

Glory and Honor in International Relations

DR. HAIG PATAPAN*

In *Full Circle*, Sir Anthony Eden's memoir, the former British prime minister makes an unflinching assessment of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who had taken power in 1954:

The West has been slow to read Nasser's *A Philosophy of Revolution* as it was to read Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, with less excuse because it is shorter and not so turgid. But Eastern rulers had read it, and there were many who knew that, if the Egyptian triumphed unchecked, his prowl to conquest would have wider scope and their turn in Syria, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere must follow.¹

In Nasser's character, his imperial ambitions, plans, and intentions, Eden discerned another Hitler. Nasser's plan, according to Eden, was to foster revolutions in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, with the intention of transforming these countries into Egyptian satellites. The strategic threat was to deprive Europe of Middle East oil: "They will have to place their united oil resources under the control of united Arabia, led by Egypt and under Russian influence. When the moment comes Nasser can deny oil to Western Europe and we here shall all be at his mercy."² So when King Hussein of Jordan in March 1956 suddenly dismissed Sir John Glubb, the British commander of his army, it was inevitable that Eden saw this action as Nasser's meddling in the affairs of Jordan. According to Anthony Nutting, his friend and colleague, Eden—in ill health, physically exhausted, and facing domestic political difficulties—became obsessed with Nasser.³ Nutting, who was present in Downing Street when Eden heard the news of dismissal, recounts Eden's violent response: "He blamed Nasser and decided

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that the world just wasn't big enough to hold both of them. One had to go. He declared that night a personal war on Nasser." Nutting described Eden's disposition in the following terms: "Driven by impulses of pride and prestige and nagged by mounting sickness, he began to behave like an enraged elephant charging senselessly at invisible and imaginary enemies in the international jungle."⁴

The subsequent events are well known. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. In response, Eden and Guy Mollet, the French prime minister, colluded with Israel in a secret conspiracy to invade Egypt. Faced with international condemnation, Eden was forced to call a halt to the campaign, less than 48 hours after British troops had landed in Egypt. The "Suez crisis," as it came to be known, precipitated Eden's resignation from office in 1957. Nasser's fate was different:

Far from precipitating Nasser's downfall, the Suez invasion propelled him to a pinnacle of prestige and influence. He was acclaimed and idolised as a latter-day Saladin, the architect of Western defeat and humiliation, the *Raïyyes* or leader who had withstood the "triple aggression," as the Suez war was called in the Arab world, and broken the spirit of imperialism, a miracle-worker possessed of extraordinary vision and wisdom. His photograph was displayed in souks, cafés, taxis and shops not only in Egypt but throughout the Middle East and North Africa.⁵

This account of the Suez incident reveals the importance of leadership and the significance of passions, especially of pride and honor, in international relations. Of course it would be a mistake to interpret the Suez crisis solely in terms of the passions of the leaders. Clearly many more issues were at stake, ranging from the decline in the legitimacy of imperialism, to the rise of Arab nationalism, the communist influence in the region, and the evolving nature of the British-American alliance, to name a few.⁶ But as we see from the reflections of Eden and Nutting, it would be equally remiss not to pursue the possibility that glory and honor may have influenced the actions of these leaders.

What exactly is the role of the passions in international relations? Though politicians, diplomats, foreign policy analysts, and strategists acknowledge the importance of this question, the theme has received insufficient attention from students of international relations.⁷ One of the dominant approaches to international relations—realism—has looked to the passions, but its main focus has been the role of fear.⁸

When it has taken up the importance of other passions, such as honor, realists have interpreted it as “prestige”—that is, a form of power.⁹ Prestige is a form of power, as Martin Meredith’s account of Nasser indicates.¹⁰ Nasser’s victory, especially in acquiring a reputation as the modern Saladin, proved especially useful for his larger, pan-Arabic ambitions. But the case of Eden also shows that the desire for honor can overreach itself. As glorying, it may in pursuit of honor lead to actions and decisions that undermine power. Glory and honor are therefore more complex phenomena than is generally acknowledged in modern realism.¹¹ In this article, I seek to understand the nature of glory and honor in international relations by returning to the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. I do so because of Hobbes’s influence on modern realism—he is not, as some would claim, “another” realist in a tradition that includes authors as far apart and different as Thucydides and Machiavelli, but the major source of contemporary realist thought. His crucial contribution to modern realism was his assessment of the dangers of glory and fear in both domestic and international politics, and the means he employed to moderate their excesses. His very success—in introducing the concept of power and the state, and thereby debunking the claims of honor—obscured the relevance of glorying in contemporary politics and caused modern realism to shift its focus to fear as the crucial passion in international politics. In returning to Hobbes, I hope to recover a more comprehensive realism that takes into account or acknowledges the importance of leadership and agency in international relations.

In the first part of this article, I explore Hobbes’s understanding of the political passions, especially of glory and fear, and the types of human beings animated by such passions. Hobbes’s assessment of these passions is the basis of his famous account of “power,” how power seeking leads to war, and the institutional solution of the “state” he proposes to assure peace and commodious living. Having explored Hobbes’s concept of the passions and their political implications in the domestic context, I then turn to his account of the importance of glory in international relations. As we will see, Hobbes is aware of the dangers posed by sovereigns who are tempted to wage international wars for glory. His solution for moderating such sovereigns combines educational and institutional elements to counter the problem of international anarchy and thereby secure the sovereignty of the state. In the final section I draw lessons from Hobbes’s realist conception of glory and

subtle appreciation of the complex nature of international relations. I argue that Hobbes shows the importance of leadership in international relations and the need to understand the specific history, culture, and religion of each state.

Dangerous Passions

Hobbes is famous for diagnosing fear as one of the passions that leads to war in the state of nature where there is no overarching authority to provide security. He also sees fear as the solution to the problem of violence since the proper application of fear, the passion most conducive to reason, makes possible the stability of the state.¹² Yet we often forget that the artificial *Leviathan* state was intended to be “lord over the children of pride”—Hobbes saw pride as one of the most important sources of war.¹³ While Machiavelli celebrates the role of glory as the necessary means to overcome the disparate interests between the few and the many, Hobbes’s entire project is to undermine its role in politics. This he does with his ambitious educational campaign that has a number of components: introduction of the new concept of power, which reduces and thus debunks all things honorable to power; transformation of scholastic natural law to modern natural rights, to found the neutral, artificial “state” that is indifferent to the potentially honorable distinction between democracy and tyranny; and, importantly, the undermining of the other major source of glory and fear in politics—revealed religion. Hobbes’s formulations thus become crucial in articulating the theoretical foundations of the modern liberal democratic sovereign state, founded by the contractual agreement of individuals who seek to preserve and protect their natural rights. Hobbes is the realist acutely aware of the problem of pride, while being much more hopeful than Thucydides or Machiavelli that we can do away with its pathologies.¹⁴ He is, in a sense, a realist who anticipates or lays out the groundwork for modern liberal internationalism.¹⁵

It is this complex Hobbesian understanding of pride, where he is aware of its crucial role in politics yet thinks he can undermine it, that has come to shape subsequent realist scholarship. I would suggest that the very success of Hobbes’s theoretical and educational project has drawn attention to one aspect of his teaching—fear—at the expense of his detailed and comprehensive account of how fear and pride are related. A recovery of Hobbes’s understanding of glory in international relations is therefore a useful starting point for understanding his comprehensive view of the role of passions

in international politics. It is also an important starting point for seeing how the disparate elements or contradictory aspects of modern realism were originally united in Hobbes's political philosophy.

Hobbes's account of the state of nature is well known. Where there is no common power to keep all in awe, the natural condition of man is that of "warre, as is of every man, against every man."¹⁶ Hobbes's solution to this problem is equally well known: the institution of a *Leviathan* state with a sovereign to keep peace, ensuring security and prosperity. But what exactly is the cause of war in the state of nature? According to Hobbes, there are "three principall causes of quarrell"—competition, diffidence, and glory.¹⁷ In understanding Hobbes's subtle psychological analysis of these three causes, we gain better insight into the role of passions, especially that of fear and glory in politics.

Hobbes is famous for denying the ancients' premise that human beings are "Politically creatures" or lovers of some "greatest Good."¹⁸ He rejects the classical understanding of types of human beings (and therefore regimes) defined by what they love or seek—for example, their love of honor, or wealth, or freedom—on the grounds that "there is no such *Finis ultimus*, (utmost ayme,) nor *Summum Bonum*, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers."¹⁹ Human motion, for Hobbes, is "Vitall" and "Voluntary." Voluntary motion is created by imagination and results in "endeavour," which is felt as either desire or aversion.²⁰ Because there is no "greatest Good," "Felicity" lies in "a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another."²¹ But the feeling of unlimited power does not last because new desires and aversions are always created by the "Senses and Imaginations."²² As a result, Hobbes famously declares that "in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death."²³ Indeed, every good we seek—"Riches . . . Knowledge . . . Honour"—and every passion we feel "may be reduced to . . . Desire of Power" since all things are to us "but severall sorts of Power."²⁴ Consequently, "*Honourable* is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument and signe of Power. And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable; as arguments of Power."²⁵

According to Hobbes, three types of human movement (and therefore human beings) predominate in nature: the diffident, the competitive, and

the glorious. For all three, the unavoidable reality of limited or scarce goods means that in pursuing their “Ends,” they are compelled to destroy or subdue one another.²⁶ Yet each type confronts this scarcity and struggle in its unique way. That is, while all people seek power, they have different judgments about how much power they need and about what confers the necessary power.

The diffident, according to Hobbes, is one of “those men who are moderate”—who wants more power only because he “cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath at present, without the acquisition of more.”²⁷ Diffidence makes a man invade for “Safety” and use violence to “defend” his body and possessions. Thus it seems that the hopelessness of the diffident yields moderation—the diffident will not ordinarily seek to conquer or master all other human beings. But he is forced to counter the competitive.²⁸ The competitive does not simply desire, like the diffident, to secure and defend his possessions. He wants more because he “cannot be content with a moderate power,” and so he goes beyond defending his immediate safety and uses violence to make himself “[Master] of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell.”²⁹ The competitive seeks mastery for “Gain” because he is hopeful that he has the power necessary to overcome other people.³⁰ Yet the competitive never thinks that “Mastery” is anything other than a means to gain; he tends not to derive pleasure in exercising his power over other human beings except in the sense that it indicates, or is a measure of, gain. Consequently, his need to master is always constrained and circumscribed by material gain, and he can tolerate others who do not threaten that gain. In contrast, the glorious seeks a type of “Joy,” which is an “exultation of the mind” arising from “imagination of a mans own power and ability.”³¹ Some individuals can find intense delight in contemplating their “own power in the acts of conquest,” which produces great pleasure at the confirmation to themselves of their power.³² But Hobbes notes that glory seekers often pursue glory “farther than their security requires,” creating the problem that some seek glory even at the risk of their lives.³³ For these people, glory becomes disengaged from its source in the pursuit of the power needed to preserve their vital motion. The difficulty of acquiring and maintaining glory, due to our inability to judge or “value” accurately, the problem of construing “signs” of valuing, and the need of the glory seeker to “extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by example” mean that the glory seeker is compelled to risk himself to show

his power.³⁴ Sustaining the joy that is glory may necessitate harming his body or undermining his power as property. In the extreme case, the glorious may risk his own life to show his power. Therefore, the pleasure of glory is not checked by the moderating demands of security and property in two senses. The first is in the sense that we have noted—the glorious will illogically sacrifice his life for his name. The second is that the pleasure of glory seeks to ever increase its delectation—glory will in social terms seek ever greater mastery, at the risk of security. From this perspective, war for Hobbes is typically due to the tendency of the glorious type to challenge and test each other regarding their worth, thereby compelling both the diffident and the competitive to enter into warfare far beyond what they would ordinarily wage. Hobbes's solution is to provide for the diffident and the competitive while undermining the claims of glorying. As a result, the Hobbesian subjects will not be glory seekers; indeed, they will fear and also have contempt for such displays of pride and hubris.

Glory and International Relations

Though it is possible for these three types of human beings to be sovereign, Hobbes indicates that it is more likely that the sovereign will be a glory seeker.³⁵ If the glorious could exist without struggling—that is, with an assurance of their power—then the diffident (and perhaps the competitive to a great degree) could lead lives as peaceful and productive as those of bees or ants.³⁶ Hence Hobbes offers an institutional arrangement of the sovereign state where challenges to the sole glorious are no longer just or feasible and where the diffident and competitive can prosper in his shadow.³⁷

Hobbes's commonwealth, where each individual authorizes the actions of a sovereign who will protect the natural rights of all by enforcing the social contract, appears to solve the problem of domestic war. But what does Hobbes say about international relations?

Concerning the Offices of one Sovereign to another, which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Sovereign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body.³⁸

By analogy, therefore, it would seem that international relations is identical to the Hobbesian state of nature, a state of war where there is no

right or wrong, justice or injustice. There is the Law of Nature in international relations, but as Hobbes indicates, the Law of Nature is not a law as such but a “precept, or generall rule” that contains the “Fundamentall Law of Nature,” which is “*to seek Peace, and follow it,*” and the Right of Nature, which is, “*By all means we can, to defend our selves*” (emphasis in original).³⁹

Hobbes is aware, of course, that there are limits to such an analogical approach. As he notes, the posture of war between sovereigns, requiring constant vigilance and spying, does not lead to the inconveniences of war for individuals because sovereigns, in providing a common power within each state, uphold the “Industry of their Subjects.” Thus international politics as a state of nature allows for, or is consistent with, the possibility of industry, cultivation of the earth, navigation, commodious buildings, and the general advancement in arts and letters.⁴⁰ Nevertheless he seems to confirm the inherent intractableness, and therefore fundamental dangerousness, of international politics. This “minimalist” understanding of Hobbesian international relations has been especially influential in the modern “realist” schools of international relations.⁴¹ Its limited scope has been challenged, however, by scholars who suggest that Hobbes’s equation of international politics with the state of nature in fact yields a more extensive range of duties and responsibilities for sovereigns. Though not amounting to a comprehensive Kantian law of nations, such an understanding of Hobbesian international relations is much richer than the simple minimalism of modern realism.⁴²

This “maximalist” Hobbesian internationalism has as its starting point an appreciation of the greater efficacy of the laws of nature in international relations.⁴³ The analogy between the individual’s place in the state of nature and the sovereign’s in international relations does not hold in certain important respects. Though sovereigns must assure their own safety and the security of the state, and therefore wars waged for this purpose are just because there is no other recourse, sovereign states are more secure than individuals in the state of nature (for example, they are not all equal; they need not sleep; they are not mortal). Moreover, because sovereigns uphold the “Industry of their Subjects,” alleviating their misery, those passions that incline individuals in the state of nature to peace are less forceful in international relations.⁴⁴ But the absence of a common power in the international realm also means a greater freedom in international relations, so that

the laws of nature need not be silent. As Laurie Johnson puts it, “Peace will not be as urgent a priority as it is in relations among individuals, but the need to violate the laws of nature will also not be as urgent.”⁴⁵

Whether one adopts the “maximalist” or “minimalist” version, the Hobbesian understanding of international relations as analogous to the state of nature in fact presents a serious challenge to domestic peace and stability.⁴⁶ The diffident and even the competitive sovereign will confront formidable obstacles in discerning the appropriate course of action for securing state stability and competitive advantage. But these problems are exacerbated in the case of the glory lover. Where the sovereign is the glory lover, will not sovereignty fuel the pride of the glorious? As sovereign, his own sense of worth (and therefore pleasure in contemplating it) will now be confirmed by success and magnified by the grandeur of office. The greater and more powerful the commonwealth, the more glorious the sovereign. With such greatness comes the increased likelihood of being contemned. Unchecked by common powers, sovereigns in their international relations will easily misconstrue such slights to pride as challenges to security.⁴⁷ Seeking greater pleasure in asserting their glory and attempting to repudiate the challenges to their reputation, sovereigns will defend themselves and their nations by proving their superiority—through the use of increased sovereign power in international relations. To do so, however, they will need to put into place all those elements for successful campaigns, ranging from recruiting of spies to reveal secrets or mislead the enemy, to the construction of forts and defenses, to the raising of armies and navies to wage war. The more successful such ventures, the more the sovereign will be tempted not to disband such machinery but to retain its services in more ambitious undertakings, ostensibly to secure the nation—in fact to enhance its glory. Before too long, the sovereign’s glory will point to a policy of imperial ambitions, stimulated and sustained by its success.

Hobbes, of course, knew of these dangers. As he notes, “Yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Sovereigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators.”⁴⁸ In admitting that there is no real difference between commonwealth by institution and commonwealth by conquest, he indicates the ubiquity of international war as the foundation of sovereignty. His extensive discussion of the laws of nature, especially against revenge, contumely, pride, and arrogance,

show his clear-sighted appreciation of the powerful force of these passions as well as his intention to mitigate their effects.⁴⁹ Hobbes's claim, as we noted above, is that the Law of Nations is identical to the Law of Nature. The fundamental law of nature, "*That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre*" (emphasis in original), yields, according to Hobbes, 19 other laws.⁵⁰ One of the most important of these is the Second Law of Nature—a willingness, if others are also willing, to lay down one's right to all things. The other laws of nature include justice, gratitude, and "compleasance." These laws, the "true Morall Philosophy," are eternal and always bind in conscience but not in practice if there is no security. Each sovereign will therefore have to evaluate the extent to which they can safely be followed. Nevertheless it is possible to extrapolate from Hobbes's account an international realm shaped by such laws of nature. For example, sovereigns and states may legitimately seek peace whenever possible simply because peaceful solutions are more expeditious and less dangerous than recourse to war. Thus one may enter into covenants, contracts, or agreements between states in the spirit of gratitude and accommodation, even if their breach is not technically unjust. Some such arrangements—for example, providing for ambassadorial immunity—are in the interest of all sovereigns, allowing free channels of communication between sovereigns and states.⁵¹ In any case, because for Hobbes coerced covenants—those entered into out of fear—are binding, international relations may be defined by valid contracts between stronger and weaker nations, enforced with the threat of war.⁵² Though war is always available to the sovereign, it should always be for the security and safety of the state and not the desire to avenge a past wrong or out of contumely, arrogance, or pride. Indeed, these principles dictate the way wars should be conducted, limiting as much as possible unnecessary cruelty in the prosecution of war.⁵³

To the charge that the Hobbesian state exacerbates the problem of glory, Hobbes may also reply that the danger of glory will depend on the circumstances of each country. It is only the sovereign of the wealthy, powerful, and strategically or geographically well-placed commonwealths who will be tempted to seek glory. Yet his account of the continuous skirmishes by the "infinite number of little Lords" in Germany suggests that glory (with its attendant "insatiable appetite, or *Bulimia*, of enlarging

Dominion”) may be a problem for all sovereigns.⁵⁴ Hobbes may also argue that, given the identity of public and private interests in a monarchy, the welfare of the people and the dangers and costs of war will provide a natural check on this glorying. Sensible sovereigns do not take “any delight, or profit they can expect in the damage, or weakening of their Subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth their own strength and glory.”⁵⁵ Clearly, continuous warfare that impoverishes its people and ruins a state will make it much more likely to be dissolved or conquered by neighbors. In this way Hobbes seems to provide a powerful reason for sovereigns to restrain themselves for the sake of preserving their glory. But it is the nature of glory seekers to risk all for all. Though aware of such arguments, which suggest a sort of natural justice for unreasonable actions, the glorious will excuse and justify themselves as the exceptions to the rule who are destined for success, and in failure blame everyone but themselves. The lessons learned from failure may be either too late or disregarded by the glorious sovereigns.

Leadership and Culture in International Politics

Our examination of Hobbes’s account of glory reveals a comprehensive understanding of the passions, especially of the link between glory and fear; an institutional solution to the problem of anarchy; and a subtle appreciation of the complex nature of international relations. In the discussion that follows, I argue that Hobbes’s understanding of the passions and their political consequences provides two related and valuable insights into the nature of international relations: he shows the importance of leadership in international relations, and he reminds us that to understand the role of glory in international relations, we require a subtle appreciation of the historical, cultural, and religious elements in a state.

Leadership in International Relations

Glory seeking by individuals in the international realm is one of the major causes of instability for Hobbes. It would seem, therefore, that for Hobbes, leadership matters in international relations. Because individuals will differ regarding their skills, aptitude, and virtues, it seems that Hobbes’s “new science” depends fundamentally on the prudence and judgment of political leaders.⁵⁶ He admires, for example, Sidney Godolphin, the brother of Francis

Godolphin, to whom he dedicates the *Leviathan* for his many virtues, “not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature.”⁵⁷ He also concedes an important difference between the *justice* of laws and their *goodness*. Though all laws made by authorized sovereigns are by definition just, not all just laws are good laws. As Hobbes says, “A good Law is that, which is *Needfull*, for the *Good of the People*, and withall *Perspicuous*” (emphasis in original).⁵⁸ Therefore it is possible to judge the reasonableness of a sovereign’s actions even if we cannot question or challenge their justice.

But it seems that Hobbes’s attempt to educate sovereigns (and subjects) in what constitutes *reasonable* action is an admission that most can be educated.⁵⁹ An important aspect of this education is that it is possible to replace individual discretion with institutions so that, in a sense, anyone can be the sovereign. As he states in his dedication to Francis Godolphin, “I speak not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those simple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noyse defended those within it, not because they were they, but there).”⁶⁰ Where you are, it seems, is more important than who you are for Hobbes. This view is supported by his debunking of the Aristotelian understanding that some should command because they are more prudent and wise. Hobbes’s response is that “for there are very few so foolish, that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others.”⁶¹ Natural equality means equality in prudence: “A plain husband-man is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a Privy Counsellor in the affaires of another man.”⁶² It would seem, then, that “who” the sovereign is may not actually matter, given proper Hobbesian instruction. To the extent that Hobbes succeeded in taming the individual sovereign with his new invention—the artificial institution that is the Leviathan state—it is possible to argue that he was instrumental in making individual glory irrelevant. The *raison d’être* of the modern constitutional state is arguably the negation of individual glory. This fact explains to large extent the neglect of glory by modern structural realism.

But this observation means that glorying is dependent on the complexity of constitutionalism of the state under consideration. Whether glory matters, and the extent it matters in international relations, will depend on the specific nature and character of leaders and the authority they are

permitted by the state. The makeup of states will permit the possibility of “gladiators” that Hobbes initially confronted and sought to restrain. For example, the international policy of Cuba, where Fidel Castro is attempting to preserve his reputation and achievements, or of Singapore, where Lee Kuan Yew is celebrated as founder, will inevitably involve a different view of glory from nations where leaders occupy constitutional and limited-term offices. Kim Jong Il will readily sacrifice the lives of millions of North Koreans to preserve his glory. Glory therefore matters in international relations, but its influence is not systematic.⁶³ If institutions make an important difference in how individual passions are translated into political actions, then Hobbes’s understanding of glory allows us to see when leaders matter and, in doing so, look behind the notion of the “state” to see how each nation will act in a particular context.⁶⁴

This discussion reveals once more the tendency of modern realism to simplify and thereby distort Hobbesian insights. As we have seen, there is a core ambiguity in Hobbes regarding the role of leaders in international relations. His analysis of glory seeking seems to confirm the importance of individuals in world politics, yet we also find in Hobbes an attempt to deny leaders such a role. This ambiguity, inherent in Hobbes, can be understood as merely another instance of the two aspects of Hobbes we noted above: Hobbes who assesses the problem of glorious gladiators and Hobbes who wants to deny glory this power by constitutionalizing and legalizing individual discretion. We see here a tension in Hobbes’s thinking regarding leadership resolved by modern realism by favoring structural or institutional influences over the individual.⁶⁵

History, Culture, and Religion

In the *Leviathan*, Hobbes lists all those aristocratic elements—coats of arms, birth, traditions—said to be honorable. Though acknowledging their influence as a source of power, he also effectively debunks their intrinsic claims. Hobbes thereby indicates that the precise content and contour of honor—our sense of what is honorable—will inevitably be shaped by history, culture and religion.⁶⁶ The lesson for realism is that though there are obviously some common elements to what is honorable or shameful in all countries—all agree that disregard is a form of loss of face—it is inaccurate to assume that a universal code of honor exists in international relations.

Consequently realism needs a fine appreciation of the character of any specific country, including its traditions and cultures, to make a prudent assessment of how glory will affect its leaders and therefore the state's actions. The angry reactions by China and Korea to the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2001 were influenced, no doubt, by a concern for "security." But it would be difficult to understand the full international import of this apparently domestic incident without an appreciation of the significance of "face" or honor for all three nations, as defined and interpreted by their common history and their rapidly changing power relations.⁶⁷

Hobbes shows the importance of such detailed understanding in his examination of ecclesiastical commonwealths, which makes up the second half of *Leviathan*.⁶⁸ Religion poses a twofold problem for Hobbes. He traces the source of religion to "Anxiety" or perpetual fear for the future, especially of fear of death. This fear was exploited by the "Gentiles," such as the Greeks and Romans, who made religion subject to politics to secure the peace of the commonwealth. In contrast, according to Hobbes, the religion of the Jews and Christians (and Islam) proclaimed a Kingdom of God, which subordinated politics to religion and thereby made no distinction between "Temporall, and Spirituall Domination."⁶⁹ In asserting that the present Church is the Kingdom of God ("that is, the Kingdome of Glory, or the Land of Promise"), the Church of Rome, and thereby the Pope, is able to exercise international political power over Christian princes by claiming that to disobey the Pope "was to disobey Christe himselfe."⁷⁰ Thus the "Militant" Church poses the most serious problem for Hobbes's political plan—it undermines peace while using the Hobbesian device of fear. Significant for our purposes, however, is what is implicit in Hobbes's analysis regarding the unique role of glory in ecclesiastical commonwealths. Because an essential aspect of the political power of the Pope, as well as of bishops and presbyters, is the Glory of God, they are compelled to defend their glory by defending the Glory of the Kingdom of God. The contemporary Hobbesian lesson is that the international relations of ecclesiastical commonwealths (or states dominated by those religions where the political is subservient to the pious) will always seek to defend the Glory of God—not incidentally but as a crucial aspect their sovereignty. This argument suggests that Middle East politics is shaped by glory as much as security, albeit the

Glory of God as reflected in the actions of His ministers. A. Q. Khan, the scientist widely credited as the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, noted in his recent article lamenting the loss of "ghairat"—the sense of honor, courage, bravery, and loyalty displayed by great Muslim leaders at all crucial moments of history—that

throughout history there have been certain individuals who achieved recognition in certain areas. Shaikh Saadi said: "Honour is not earned, it is conferred by the One Who Confers." According to this concept, if a great deed is accomplished by someone, he should regard it as a gift of God rather than "the muscles of his own arms." It is a special favour from God that a particular individual is selected by providence and singled out for a specific task.⁷¹

To what extent does the argument above apply to modern liberal democracies, based on separation of church and state and apparently adopting many Hobbesian principles? Does glory play any role in their international relations? I would suggest that it does in two important respects—nationalism and human rights. The Hobbesian solution to the problem of glory, with its overwhelming educational and missionary zeal, mimicked the glory of ecclesiastical states by instituting new bases for glorying. Above, we saw Hobbes's attempt to moderate the glory of the sovereign by tying his fate to the prosperity of the nation-state and the welfare of the people. Thus Hobbes locates the new source of power—and therefore glory—in a new institutional structure that is to become the model for all governments. To the extent that the state became the focal point for the idea of the "nation," nationalism was instituted as an independent source for glorying, reflected in the actions of all those who protected and advanced the national interest.⁷²

The notion of natural rights inaugurated by Hobbes provides a similar account. Hobbesian rights, transformed and expanded to human rights, have become a foundational principle for modern constitutionalism. They have therefore become an important modern means for defining what is honorable—the defense of rights and the protection of popular sovereignty or democracy have thereby become honorable principles in modern democracies.⁷³ They have in turn come to shape their foreign policy. As potentially limitless foundations for glorying, they reveal important insights into liberal internationalism as well as American exceptionalism.⁷⁴ Thus the importance of the divine as an independent source for glory in ecclesiastical states is mirrored in modern secular states in the ideas of nationalism and rights.

Conclusion

In this article I have sought to explore the role of the passions in international relations. My starting point has been the fact that though one of the most powerful passions, fear, has received considerable attention, especially from modern realist scholars, the passion of glory has been relatively neglected. In returning to the thought of Thomas Hobbes, one of the seminal theorists of modern realism, I have attempted to recover a comprehensive realist account that understands fear within the larger context of the powerful passion of glory. This Hobbesian account has yielded two important insights into the character of international politics. Glory does matter in international relations, but in determining the extent to which it matters, we need to take into account two related factors—the character of the leader and the makeup of the state, especially the way its history, culture, and religion define what is honorable and thereby shape and constrain the leader's discretion. There are, of course, considerable limitations to Hobbes's understanding of human nature and the passions.⁷⁵ Yet to the extent that Hobbesian realism compels a subtle appreciation of the specific facts and circumstances of any particular international issue, then surely he is simply endorsing what has always been the approach of diplomats, security analysts, and ministers of state. To this extent our engagement with Hobbes allows us to liberate ourselves from the artificial constraints of modern realism; his theoretical insights, however contested, provide a welcome justification for the exercise of prudent judgment in practicing the complex art of international policy making.

Notes

1. Sir Anthony Eden, *Full Circle: The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden* (London: Cassell & Company, 1960), 543. For recent biographies of Eden, see David Dutton, *Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Robert James, *Anthony Eden: A Biography* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1987); and Jonathan Pearson, *Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

2. Eden, *Full Circle*, 465.

3. On the extent to which Eden's judgment may have been impaired due to his ill health, see Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, 422–24.

4. Cited in Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 39–40. See also Nutting's account of Eden's phone call on the evening of 1 March 1956. According to Nutting, Eden screamed, "What is all this poppycock you've sent me about isolating Nasser and neutralizing Nasser? Why can't you get it into your head I want the man destroyed?" I said, "OK. You get rid of Nasser, what are you going to put in his place?" "I don't want anybody," he said. I said, "Well, there'll be anarchy and chaos in Egypt." "I don't

care if there's anarchy and chaos in Egypt. Let there be anarchy and chaos in Egypt. I just want to get rid of Nasser." Cited in Peter Hennessy, *The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders since 1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2000), 215–16.

5. Meredith, *State of Africa*, 42–43. On Nasser generally, see Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political Biography* (London: Allen Lane 1971); Anthony Nutting, *Nasser* (London: Constable 1972); and Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation* (London: Croom Helm, 1978).

6. According to Paul Kowert, the fear that Egypt would fall within the communist orbit outraged British elites and public opinion. Most notable about the outrage for Kowert was the emphasis placed "on Nasser's personal character (that is, his identity) as the explanation for his behavior and as sufficient reason for British reprisals." "Nasser's identity (and Egypt's to a lesser extent) had clearly become very salient to Eden and his cabinet," Kowert explains. "They made frequent reference to his untrustworthiness and his sympathy to communism. Their opposition to him thus came more from who he was and what he represented—a communist, or possibly a fascist, and clearly an enemy of Britain—than from what he had actually done." Paul Kowert, "Agent versus Structure in the Construction of National Identity," in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubáľková, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (New York: M. E. Sharp, 1998), 115, 113.

7. A number of recent students of international relations have commented on the need to undertake a systematic analysis of the role of emotions in international relations. See Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," *International Security* 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000): 116–56; Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, "Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics," *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 1 (2008): 115–35; Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Richard Ned Lebow, "Reason, Emotion and Cooperation," *International Politics* 42, no. 3 (2005): 283–313; Lebow, "Fear, Interest and Honor: Outlines of a Theory of International Relations," *International Affairs* 82, no. 3 (2006): 431–48; and Andrew A. G. Ross, "Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 2 (June 2006): 197–222.

8. On realism generally, see Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Jeffery W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 5–55. On structural realism, see Kenneth N. Waltz, who denies the relevance of the internal makeup of states' or leaders' motives, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979). On offensive structural realism, see John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). On defensive realism, see Charles L. Glaser, "The Necessary and Natural Evolution of Structural Realism," in *Realism and Balancing Power: A New Debate*, ed. John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003). On fear and the "security dilemma," see John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (1950): 157–80; Herz, "The Security Dilemma in International Relations: Background and Present Problems," *International Relations* 17, no. 4 (2003): 411–16; Barry Buzan, "Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research* 21, no. 2 (1984): 109–25; Ken Booth, "Navigating the 'Absolute Novum': John H. Herz's Political Realism and Political Idealism," *International Relations* 22, no. 4 (2008): 510–26; and Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

9. Prestige, defined instrumentally as "reputation for power," is a subject of many realist thinkers. See Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006); Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma"; and Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). But the neorealism of Waltz, in *Theory of International Politics*, with its materialist ontology and systemic framework, rejects prestige altogether. On a discussion of instrumental prestige and deterrence theory, see Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics*; Dale C. Copeland, Paul K. Huth, and Jonathan Mercer, "What's in a Name? Debating Jonathan Mercer's Reputation and International Politics," *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (1997): 32–113. For a brief discussion of different national conceptions of prestige, see Harold Nicolson, *The Meaning of Prestige: The Rede Lecture, 1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937). For an extended discussion of deterrence theory that draws upon social psychology to undermine the claims of reputation as an end, arguing "we should never go to war because of our reputation," see Jonathan Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," *International Organization* 59,

no. 1 (2005): 77–106. For the importance of symbols in international relations, see Barry O’Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

10. Meredith, *State of Africa*.

11. Daniel Markey, in “Prestige and the Origins of War: Returning to Realism’s Roots,” *Security Studies* 8, no. 4 (1999): 157, 159–62, provides a thoughtful analysis of the problem of “glory.” He argues that contemporary realism understands prestige in its instrumental sense, as reputation, credibility, or resolve, and not as intrinsic or an end in itself. Starting with realist “forefathers” Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, he recovers a “Prestige Motive” as an end in itself, with four essential characteristics: “Prestige is a relative good, it is sought perpetually, it is irrational, and it is social.” For Markey, prestige is an insatiable desire for public recognition of eminence that is materially irrational—it does not “always yield optimal material outcomes,” and it lacks rational “proportionality” in the “means-ends calculus.” I contend that Markey does not sufficiently acknowledge the extent to which Hobbes sought to moderate, if not extirpate, glory.

12. The Machiavellian insight that only passions could counter passions was deployed by subsequent philosophers such as Hobbes in founding the sovereign state and by Montesquieu to defend separation of powers and a commercial republic. See generally Paul A. Rahe, *Republics Ancient and Modern* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); and Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).

13. For an insight into the character of Hobbes’s piety, compare the “Leviathan,” a creature of the Lord, set over the children of pride (John 41:34), with Hobbes’s artificial body, made by the “Art of man,” whose business is “*Salus Populi*” or the people’s safety. See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968), introduction, 81.

14. See Harvey Mansfield, *Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), on the way Machiavellian virtue was constitutionalized.

15. On the contrast between Thucydides and Hobbes regarding the efficacy of fear, see Peter Ahrensdorf, “The Fear of Death and the Longing for Immortality: Hobbes and Thucydides on Human Nature and the Problem of Anarchy,” *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 3 (2000): 579–93. Kant’s critique of Hobbes, developed in *Perpetual Peace* and “Idea for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” is that the problem of a perfect civil constitution cannot be solved unless the problem of external relations with other states is addressed. On the relationship between Hobbes and Kant, see Howard Williams, *Kant’s Critique of Hobbes* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003).

16. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 13, 185–86.

17. *Ibid.*, 183–86.

18. *Ibid.*, chap. 17, 225; chap. 11, 160.

19. *Ibid.*, chap. 11, 160.

20. *Ibid.*, chap. 6, 118.

21. *Ibid.*, chap. 11, 160.

22. *Ibid.*, chap. 6, 124; chap. 11, 161.

23. *Ibid.*, chap. 8, 139.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*, chap. 10, 155.

26. *Ibid.*, chap. 13, 184.

27. *Ibid.*, chap. 11, 161; and Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law: Human Nature and De Corpore Politico*, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), chap. 14, 3.

28. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 13, 185.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, chap. 6, 123.

31. *Ibid.*, 125. There are two types of glorying: confidence and vainglory. Confidence is a “constant hope of ourselves” based on “the experience” of our “own former actions.” Vainglory is imagining power based “on the flattery or others; or onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it” (*ibid.*, chap. 6, 39). On the problem of glory, see generally Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its Basis and Its Genesis*,

trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); Gabriella Slomp, "Kant against Hobbes: Reasoning and Rhetoric," *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 4, no. 2 (2007): 207–22; Slomp, *Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory* (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press, 2000); William Sacksteder, "Mutually Acceptable Glory as a Cause of Conflict," in *The Causes of Quarrel: Essays on Peace, War, and Thomas Hobbes*, ed. Peter Caws (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 97–113; Jean Hampton, "Hobbesian Reflections on Glory as a Cause of Conflict," in Caws, *Causes of Quarrel*, 78–96; and Andrew Altman, "Glory, Respect, and Violent Conflict," in Caws, *Causes of Quarrel*, 114–27.

32. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 13, 184.

33. *Ibid.*, 185.

34. *Ibid.*

35. It is possible, of course, that once the whole world has accepted Hobbes's principles of natural right, the sovereign will be the competitive or the diffident. But where sovereignty by acquisition is commonplace, the sovereign will be a glory seeker.

36. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 17, 225.

37. Other glory lovers besides the sovereign are soberly advised by Hobbes not to attempt to attain "Sovereignty by Rebellion" lest they perish in the try (*ibid.*, chap. 15, 205).

38. *Ibid.*, chap. 30, 394.

39. *Ibid.*, chap. 14, 189–90. In reducing the Law of Nations to Hobbesian Law of Nature, Hobbes implicitly repudiates stoic notions of *ius gentium* (law of nations). See Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrens Dorf, *Justice among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 144–53.

40. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 13, 187, 186.

41. For the influence of Hobbes on modern realists such as Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, E. H. Carr, Herbert Butterfield, Robert Osgood, George Kennan, Charles Beitz, and Henry Kissinger, see Cornelia Navari, "Hobbes, the State of Nature and the Laws of Nature," in *Classical Theories of International Relations*, ed. Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press, 1996); Michael Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986); and Howard Williams, *International Relations in Political Theory* (Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 1992). On his continuing influence on neorealists such as Waltz, see Pangle and Ahrens Dorf, *Justice among Nations*, 239–57.

42. It became the basis of the so-called English school of international relations. See Hedley Bull, "Hobbes and International Anarchy," *Social Research* 41, no. 4 (1977): 717–38; Claire Cutler, "The Grotian Tradition in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 1 (1991): 41–65; Martin Wight, *International Relations: Three Traditions* (London: Holmes and Meier, 1992); and the discussion in Michael C. Williams, "Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration," *International Organization* 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 213–36.

43. I draw on Laurie M. Johnson, *Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Interpretation of Realism* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993), 87–94. For similar or more ambitious attempts to develop a Hobbesian law of nations, see Donald W. Hanson, "Thomas Hobbes's 'Highway to Peace,'" *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (1984): 329–54; and Francis Cheneval, "The Hobbesian Case for Multilateralism," *Swiss Political Science Review* 13, no. 3 (2007): 309–35.

44. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 13, 187–88.

45. Johnson, *Interpretation of Realism*, 87.

46. On whether Hobbes's "new" political science, with its promise of an "everlasting" commonwealth, is undermined by his understanding of international politics, see Haig Patapan, "The Glorious Sovereign: Thomas Hobbes on Leadership and International Relations," in *British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier*, ed. Ian Hall and Lisa Hill (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 11–32.

47. Without denying, of course, that slights may in fact constitute such a security threat.

48. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 13, 187.

49. *Ibid.*, chap. 15, 210–12.

50. *Ibid.*, chap. 14, 190.

51. *Ibid.*, chap. 23, 293.

52. *Ibid.*, chap. 14, 198.

53. This complex of bilateral and multilateral covenants, treaties, obligations, and arrangements does not, however, lead to a world government because the impulse to such an arrangement is less compelling and because, for Hobbes, sovereignty can never be divided or shared (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 29, 363–64; chap. 19, 240). For a discussion of these themes, including the Kantian critique of Hobbes, see Nancy A. Stanlick, “A Hobbesian View of International Sovereignty,” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 37, no. 4 (2006): 552–65; Ernst B. Haas, “Reason and Change in International Life: Justifying a Hypothesis,” *Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (1990): 209; Charles Covell, *Kant and the Law of Peace: A Study in the Philosophy of International Law and International Relations* (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press, 1998); and Williams, *Kant’s Critique of Hobbes*.

54. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 10, 158; chap. 29, 375.

55. *Ibid.*, chap. 18, 238.

56. On the idea of “normative prudence” in international relations, see Alberto R. Coll, “Normative Prudence as a Tradition of Statecraft,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 5, no. 1 (1991): 33–51.

57. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, “The Epistle Dedicatory,” 75.

58. *Ibid.*, chap. 30, 388.

59. On counsel to the sovereigns, see Gerald M. Mara, “Hobbes’s Counsel to Sovereigns,” *Journal of Politics* 50, no. 2 (May 1988): 390–411. On the rhetoric, see Quentin Skinner, “Thomas Hobbes: Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality,” *Proceedings of the British Academy* 76 (1990): 1–61; Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Bryan Garsten, *Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

60. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, “The Epistle Dedicatory,” 75.

61. *Ibid.*, chap. 15, 211.

62. *Ibid.*, chap. 8, 138. Note, however, how he seemingly retracts this position—equality must be the new consensus, even if not true (*ibid.*, chap. 15, 211).

63. On Fidel Castro, see his autobiography, *My Life: Fidel Castro*, rev. ed., ed. Ignacio Ramonet, trans. Andrew Hurley (London: Allen Lane, 2007). For an examination of the character and ambitions of Lee Kuan Yew, see James Minchin, *No Man Is an Island: A Portrait of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew* (North Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1990); and Michael D. Barr, *Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs behind the Man* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000).

64. To this extent, this research favors the neoclassical realism of Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?,” *World Politics* 44, no. 2 (1992): 235–69. See also Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, “Malign Autocracies and Major Power Warfare: Evil, Tragedy and International Relations Theory,” *Security Studies* 10, no. 3 (2001): 46–79, who emphasize the role of different state motivations as well as domestic institutions and structures.

65. It does so by assuming their “rationality” and therefore abstracting from individual differences. On the problem of “agency” in realist international relations theory, see Johnson, *Interpretation of Realism*, 148–200.

66. For a discussion of the evolving nature of codes of honor, see James Bowman, *Honor: A History* (New York: Encounter Books, 2006); and especially Sharon Krause, *Liberalism with Honor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

67. For a game theory approach to national honor and “face,” see O’Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War*, 85–214. O’Neill concludes that “states still fight over honor” (245). On Koizumi’s visit to the shrine, see Peng Er Lam, “Koizumi: The Iconoclast Who Remade Japanese Politics,” in *Dissident Democrats: The Challenge of Democratic Leadership in Asia*, ed. John Kane, Haig Patapan, and Benjamin Wong (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 129–46.

68. See in this context his detailed analysis of the causes of the English civil war (Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth or The Long Parliament*, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990]).

69. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 12, 178.

70. *Ibid.*, chap. 47, 704. On the means used by “priests” to exert political control, Hobbes lists the religious power to crown; the inability of priests to marry (thereby denying priesthood to princes); the determination of lawfulness of marriages; the power to decree heresy, thereby limiting a subject’s allegiance; exclusion from

criminal jurisdiction; and the source of independent income from religious services. Hobbes attacks not only the “Catholiques” but also “that Church that hath presumed most of Reformation” (ibid., chap. 12, 182; chap. 47).

71. For a discussion of “Ghairat” and its opposite “Beghairati,” see Khan’s blog site at <http://draqkhan.com.pk>. On the importance of honor or prestige in the development of nuclear weapons, see Jacques E. C. Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

72. For an overview of the scholarship on nationalism and its implications for international relations, see Lars-Erik Cederman, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 409–28.

73. For a discussion of the American Declaration of Rights as a new code of honor, see Krause, *Liberalism with Honor*.

74. On American exceptionalism and the importance of promoting democracy, see, for example, John Kane, *Between Virtue and Power: The Persistent Moral Dilemma of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); and Mercer’s discussion of whether America is more concerned about its reputation than are other countries (*Reputation and International Politics*, 19–25).

75. I do not claim that Hobbes’s understanding of honor and glory is sufficient—to do so, one must revisit and adjudicate the debate between Hobbes and those traditions he sought to repudiate. We thus need to recover the classical understanding of *thumos* or spiritedness and the difference between the glory lover and honor lover. See, for example, Lebow’s focus on *thumos* as a necessary starting point for understanding the emotions in international relations in “Fear, Interest and Honor.” On the classical understanding of *thumos*, see Thomas Pangle, “The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato’s *Laws*,” *American Political Science Review* 70, no. 4 (1976): 1059–77; Waller R. Newell, *Ruling Passion: The Erotics of Statecraft in Platonic Political Philosophy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000); and Lorraine Pangle, “Moral and Criminal Responsibility in Plato’s *Laws*,” *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 3 (2009): 456–73. We also need to know the way classical conceptions were redefined by the pious rejection of pride: see, for example, Bowman, *Honor*, regarding the concept of the “Christian gentleman.”

Washington's Newest Bogeyman

Debunking the Fear of Failed States

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The American foreign policy establishment has identified a new national security problem. Over the past two decades, foreign policy scholars and popular writers have developed the ideas that “failed states” present a global security threat and that, accordingly, powerful countries like the United States should “fix” the failed states.¹ However, the conventional wisdom is based on a sea of confusion, poor reasoning, and category errors.

Much of the problem stems from poor scholarly standards that characterize the research on state failure. The definitions of a failed state are now nearly as numerous as the number of studies about the subject. That ambiguity confounds analyses that seek to correlate threats with the “failedness” of states. Nevertheless, the idea received a boost after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11). Analysts concluded en masse that since Afghanistan was both a failed state and a threat, failed states were threatening. Interest in remedying state failure grew after the United States toppled the rickety structure of the Iraqi state, when it became clear that attempting to administer a failed state was difficult. Believing that these difficulties can be overcome, many analysts suggest that if the United States can prevent state failure or repair failed states, it can reap gains in both international development and national security.

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This article calls into question the validity of the concept of failed states and highlights the consequences of integrating the fear of failed states into American grand strategy. It considers four areas. First, we outline the theoretical and historical ideas from which the concept of state failure emerged. Second, we provide evidence of growing concern on the part of US policy makers about state failure, including structural changes in the US national security bureaucracy that aim at remedying state failure. Third, we sketch out some of the methodological problems with the research on state failure, pointing out that the very term *failed state* carries little meaning and even less policy instruction. Finally, we outline the high costs and dubious benefits of a policy focused on state building.

From Turbulent Frontier to Warmed-Over Wilsonianism

As great powers grow more powerful, they tend to define their interests more broadly.² In many cases, this can include a tendency toward threat inflation. This is as true now as it was for the British, who came to see monsters under every bed. Intent on maintaining their grip on the Empire, the British, at the height of their power in the nineteenth century, began focusing on the “turbulent frontiers” of their colonies of India, Malaya, and South Africa. Despite London’s professed reluctance toward further intervention and expansion, statesmen regularly found themselves pulled beyond their own holdings in attempts to tame rambunctious populations. As one observer put it, “It was necessary to advance our dominions farther and farther for the mere protection of what we already possessed. Feuds on the border must be subjugated as a safeguard against the infection of rebellion at home.” The effort to bring order to ungoverned areas instead of securing the Empire’s hold on its existing territories served only to further expand Britain’s perceived interests.³

Obviously, the British experience is an imperfect analogy to America’s current situation, but American strategists are exhibiting similar thinking today. The US foreign policy establishment thinks of American interests in strikingly broad terms. As early as 1980, American policy makers sounded very ambitious. That year, president-elect Ronald Reagan’s national security team concluded that “‘no area of the world is beyond the scope of American interest’ and that the United States needs to have ‘sufficient military standing to cope with any level of violence’ around the globe.”⁴ This attitude was

geared toward the perceived demands of the Cold War, but interestingly it did not die with the Soviet Union. In supporting cuts in military spending after the Cold War, Gen Colin Powell famously admitted from his post as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “I’m running out of demons. I’m running out of villains. I’m down to Castro and Kim Il Sung.”⁵ The choice was clear enough: cut defense spending or find new threats.

President Clinton’s administration harbored a deep ambivalence about foreign policy as compared to domestic policy. But underpinning the administration’s foreign policy was a belief that any problem in the world, regardless of scale and no matter how remote, was in principle rightly the purview of US foreign policy. The administration expanded the mission in Somalia and intervened in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, with its inaction in Rwanda serving as the exception that proved the rule. One reason for Clinton’s expansive view of American interests was the argument, gaining currency during the 1990s, that state failure (more generally, weak states) was the next important security threat.

With America’s greatest enemy overcome, the Clinton administration developed what John Bolton aptly described as “an instinct for the capillaries.”⁶ It wholeheartedly embraced nation building as an important part of US national security policy. America’s foreign policy thinkers joined in, cultivating concerns over failed states and drawing up proposals for repairing them throughout the 1990s. Retired diplomats Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner proclaimed in 1993 that “it is becoming clear that something must be done” about them.⁷

Following Helman and Ratner, Robert Kaplan warned about what he saw as “the coming anarchy.” In a widely read and influential article of 1994, Kaplan urged Western strategists to focus on “what is occurring . . . throughout West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world: the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.”⁸ Kaplan went on to warn that “the coming upheaval, in which foreign embassies are shut down, states collapse, and contact with the outside world takes place through dangerous, disease-ridden coastal trading posts, will loom large in the century we are entering.”⁹ Basing his case heavily on Malthusian economics and the notion that “the environment . . . is . . . *the* national-security issue of the early twenty-first century” (emphasis in original), Kaplan predicted that compe-

tion for scarce resources and collective-action problems of environmental degradation would precipitate conflicts.¹⁰

Notwithstanding the fact that many of Kaplan's suppositions were rhetorically overheated, his and others' contributions to the national debate over foreign policy after the Cold War pointed in an inevitable direction: toward the idea that insecurity and instability in far-flung corners of the globe should be placed at the top of the list of US foreign policy concerns. Indeed, Kaplan's argument appeared in the comments of prominent Clinton administration officials such as Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers, both of whom were concerned with the environmental and economic impacts of failed states. In congressional hearings, State Department official Timothy Wirth recommended the article to members of Congress, saying, "Even if we wanted to be disinterested in the world, the world will always be interested in us; its problems will make their way to our shores, and become problems for us and our children. . . . This is not about pie-in-the-sky humanitarianism, it is about vital, very specific, national interests." Wirth concluded by promising to aim at "structuring a world community more hospitable to our interests and more in keeping with the values that we share with men and women of goodwill the world over."¹¹

Turbulent-frontier thinking of the sort proffered by Kaplan had an enduring effect on President Clinton. Asked in an interview with *Foreign Policy* magazine in 2009 whether the war on terror would last longer than the Cold War, Clinton responded by endorsing once again Kaplan's view that "we are, de facto, no matter what the laws say, becoming nations of mega-city-states full of really poor, angry, uneducated and highly vulnerable people, all over the world." Clinton warned that if Kaplan were right, it meant that "terror . . . could be around for a very long time."¹²

During the campaign for the presidency in 2000, Republican candidate George W. Bush seemed skeptical about the utility and necessity of nation building. Bush argued that the role of US foreign policy should be to protect the vital interests of the United States. During the second presidential debate, he took a shot at the interventionism of the 1990s: "I'm not so sure the role of the United States is to go around the world and say, 'This is the way it's got to be.'" ¹³ Bush pointed to the high costs and dubious outcomes of nation building, concluding, "I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation building. . . . I mean, we're going to have

some kind of nation-building corps from America? Absolutely not.”¹⁴ Condoleezza Rice, Bush’s national security adviser during the campaign, famously described the Bush view thusly: “Carrying out civil administration and police functions is simply going to degrade the American capability to do the things America has to do. We don’t need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten.”¹⁵

After 9/11, however, the Bush administration changed course dramatically. Based on the idea that failing states posed a greater threat than strong ones, the national security strategy of 2002 made “opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy” a central plank of America’s response to the 9/11 attacks. Part of the administration’s new security policy would be to “help build police forces, court systems, and legal codes, local and provincial government institutions, and electoral systems.” The overarching goal was to “make the world not just safer but better.”¹⁶ The reasoning of the 2002 national security strategy placed the Bush administration squarely in the Wilsonian tradition.¹⁷ Clearly, the president had changed his mind about the wisdom of attempting to build nations.

With Bush’s conversion to Wilsonianism came a bevy of new allies. Academics and pundits endorsed and amplified Bush’s worry that state failure was a serious security issue. For example, Lawrence Korb and Robert Boorstin of the Center for American Progress warned that “weak and failing states pose as great a danger to the American people and international stability as do potential conflicts among the great powers.”¹⁸ Francis Fukuyama, professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, flatly stated that weak and failed states constitute “the single most critical threat to US national security.”¹⁹

Once an idea of the left, the belief that failed states are threatening found a home on the political right as well. In July 2005, longtime Republican realist Brent Scowcroft cochaired a task force on postconflict capabilities convened by the Council on Foreign Relations. Although somewhat less hyperbolic than other reports, the task force’s report proceeded from the assumption that “action to stabilize and rebuild states marked by conflict is not ‘foreign policy as social work,’ a favorite quip of the 1990s. It is equally a humanitarian concern and a national security priority.”²⁰ The report advocated tasking the national security adviser with directing stabilization and

reconstruction missions and making stability operations a top priority for the military, among other objectives.²¹

Barack Obama exhibited little disagreement with these assumptions during his run for the presidency. In an essay that appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in 2007, Obama argued that “since extremely poor societies and weak states provide optimal breeding grounds for disease, terrorism, and conflict,” the United States must “invest in building capable, democratic states that can establish healthy and educated communities, develop markets, and generate wealth.”²² As may be seen below, these ideas have permeated the foreign policy establishment and, consequently, have affected US foreign policy.

The Growing Focus on Nation Building in the US Government

In July 2004, the State Department opened the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), borrowing funds and personnel from elsewhere in the department.²³ Creation of the office was inspired by a “sense of Congress” resolution spearheaded by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and cosponsored by Senators Joe Biden (D-DE) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE).²⁴ The resolution sought to develop a civilian-response capability with the purpose of carrying out stabilization and reconstruction work in countries beset by conflict. This new capability would be a core mission of the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID).²⁵ Explaining the bill at a March 2004 hearing, Lugar argued that “international crises are inevitable, and in most cases, US security interests will be threatened by sustained instability.”²⁶ A few weeks later on National Public Radio, Lugar said that “the sea change, really, in our foreign policy is that now it is acceptable and, in fact, desirable for Americans to talk about successful nation building.”²⁷ According to a Congressional Research Service report published at the time, the desire to create new stabilization and reconstruction capabilities was rooted in concern over the ongoing Iraq operation and the desire for greater civilian involvement in the postconflict phases of military operations.²⁸

In addition to “monitoring political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for mobilizing United States and international assistance for countries or regions [in, or in transition from, conflict or civil strife],” the office is tasked with “determining the appropriate non-military [responses of the] United States.”²⁹ Although the law created a legal basis

for the S/CRS, Congress starved the office of funding in the 2006 foreign operations bill. Although Congress allocated \$24.1 million to staff the S/CRS, it zeroed out the \$100 million request for a “conflict response fund,” which would have created a standing corps of nation builders.

Over time, however, the office began to receive greater funding. The Obama administration’s fiscal year (FY) 2010 budget request included \$323.3 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI), roughly a fourfold increase over the Bush administration’s budget for FY 2009. Congress cut the figure down to \$150 million, including \$30 million to the USAID, but that still represented a doubling of the CSI budget in one year. For FY 2011, the Obama administration asked for \$184 million for the CSI.³⁰

Despite previous setbacks, the Obama administration wants to continue the work of establishing a standing corps of nation builders. The budget proposal for FY 2011 argues for a continued effort in building up a 2,250-member Civilian Response Corps. This number includes 250 active members plus another 2,000 standby-component members.³¹ The corps cuts across at least eight federal agencies, including State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and the USAID.³²

As the above numbers indicate, the US government’s state-building efforts are still decidedly limited. The S/CRS is playing only a very minor role in Iraq and Afghanistan. An S/CRS team deployed to coordinate US government support for the Afghan presidential elections in August 2009 and has provided modest support for similar activities in Iraq. Beyond these missions, the office’s activities have been limited to planning exercises and coordinating financial support in places such as Haiti, the Congo, and Bangladesh.

Similar gaps bedevil US efforts to deploy so-called provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite forceful national security appeals for Americans to join PRTs in those countries, the results have been unimpressive.³³ As of 2008 in the 12 US-led PRTs in Afghanistan, 34 of the 1,055 personnel came from civilian agencies. In Iraq in 2008, the situation was somewhat better: roughly 450 Americans were serving in the 28 US-led PRTs, 360 of whom were from civilian agencies.³⁴ Still, this result came only after top State Department officials toyed with the ideas of forcing Foreign Service personnel to deploy to Iraq and adopting military rather than diplomatic security standards governing their deploy-

ments.³⁵ These proposals encountered significant resistance within State, indicating an apparent institutional rigidity likely to hinder any effort to develop a workable and sizeable corps of on-call nation builders.

In late 2009, Stuart Bowen, the US special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction, offered a new proposal for coordinating reconstruction and stabilization: a US Office for Contingency Operations. According to Bowen, the new office would “solve the unity of command problems encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . [and have] full responsibility for managing the relief and reconstruction component” resulting from future US conflict by acting as the single point of contact between military and civilian reconstruction teams.³⁶ Though only a proposal, it is yet another example of the continued growth of a bureaucracy being built around the idea that America should attempt to fix failed states.

Along with changes in the State Department and other civilian agencies, the US military has made significant changes to its doctrine to protect the United States from the threat posed by the supposed state-failure/terrorism nexus.³⁷ Senior military officers have taken their cues from civilian opinion leaders who contend that the US government must improve its capacity for nation building. In particular, two new field manuals are rooted in the idea that to protect the country against terrorism, Washington will have to create effective governments in other countries.

Of particular importance is Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine Corps War-fighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, released in late 2006 to an unusual amount of attention.³⁸ After being downloaded 1.5 million times within the first month from the Fort Leavenworth and Marine Corps Web sites, the manual was published by the University of Chicago Press and reviewed by the *Chicago Tribune*, *Los Angeles Times*, and *New York Times*, where it received an editors' choice award.

The interest is understandable. As field manuals go, it is a page-turner. The writing team went out of its way to avoid bland, jargony prose and reached out to civilian experts on matters of substance. Georgetown University professor Colin Kahl called the new field manual “the single best distillation of current knowledge about irregular warfare.”³⁹ Yale University's Stathis Kalyvas described the sweep and breadth of the document, noting that it proposed “a strategy of competitive state building combining targeted, selective violence and population control, on the one hand, with the

dissemination of a credible mass ideology, the creation of modern state structures, the imposition of the rule of law, and the spurring of economic development, on the other.”⁴⁰

The Army released FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, two years later.⁴¹ Perhaps anticipating public skepticism toward a repeat of recent wars, Lt Gen William B. Caldwell IV, commander of the US Army’s Combined Arms Center, predicted that “America’s future abroad is unlikely to resemble Afghanistan or Iraq, where we grapple with the burden of nation-building under fire. Instead, we will work through and with the community of nations to defeat insurgency, assist fragile states, and provide vital humanitarian aid to the suffering.”⁴²

As demonstrated above, the assumptions underlying these doctrinal developments are consonant with the emerging consensus in Washington. The stability operations field manual asserts, for example, that “the greatest threat to our national security comes not in the form of terrorism or ambitious powers, but from fragile states either unable or unwilling to provide for the most basic needs of their people.”⁴³

Still, the reason for focusing on counterinsurgency and stability operations is the belief, as Caldwell described it, that today’s is an “era of uncertainty and persistent conflict” and that these conditions are likely to endure into the future.⁴⁴ But one searches in vain for a time when the US military justified its doctrine on the assumptions that the age was characterized by certainty and abating conflict. Moreover, as journalist Thomas Ricks has pointed out, the title of the manual is inaccurate. Ricks noted that the United States did not invade Iraq or Afghanistan to provide stability but to precipitate social and political change, and suggested that a more apt description of US policy in these countries would be “revolutionary operations.”⁴⁵

As the lead authors of the counterinsurgency manual noted in *Military Review*, the United States’ superior capabilities in conventional warfare make it likely that future opponents will be more inclined to resort to irregular methods, such as terrorism and insurgency, to achieve their political goals and prevent the United States from achieving its goals.⁴⁶ Accordingly, it is not surprising that military leaders are taking steps to prepare for waging counterinsurgency and postconflict stabilization missions. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, declared that stability

operations constituted a “core U.S. military mission” for the Department of Defense and placed such operations at the same priority level as combat.⁴⁷

Even budget priorities are slowly beginning to shift toward capabilities for nation building. In 2007 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that because it was hard to conceive of any peer competitor arising in the coming years, an increasing share of the national security budget should be dedicated to influencing political change in small, weak countries.⁴⁸ In keeping with this view, Gates has justified efforts to cut conventional platforms such as the F-22 on the grounds that they are irrelevant to today’s wars.⁴⁹ Although sizeable cuts to conventional platforms do not appear on the horizon, it is clear that counterinsurgency and nation-building enthusiasts have taken a seat at the Department of Defense’s table and are working to expand their shares of the budget.

Given the growing acceptance of arguments about failed states and the fact that these ideas have begun to affect US foreign policy, it is striking how ill defined the terms of debate have been. How can we measure state failure? What are the historical correlations between the attributes of failed states and the supposed security threats they pose? Below we show that, by the established definitions of state failure and a reasonable interpretation of the word *threat*, failed states almost always miss the mark.

Impressionism as Social Science

A survey of the formal studies of state failure reveals a methodological wasteland. Analysts have created a number of listings of failed states that, in fairness, have overlapped considerably; all are populated by poor countries, many of which have been wracked by interstate or civil violence.⁵⁰ However, instead of adhering to basic social-scientific standards of inquiry, in which questions or puzzles are observed and then theories are described and tested using clearly defined independent and dependent variables, analysts began by drawing up a category—failed state—and then attempted to create data sets from which theoretical inferences could be induced.

To take one prominent case, the authors of the *State Failure Task Force Report* contracted by the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence chose to adjust their definition of *failed state* after their initial criteria did not produce an adequate data set for the quantitative tests the researchers wanted to perform. After dramatically expanding the definition,

the task force produced almost six times more countries that could be coded “failed” as compared with their original criteria and then proceeded with their statistical analysis. They justified this highly questionable decision on the judgment that “events that fall beneath [the] total-collapse threshold often pose challenges to US foreign policy as well.”⁵¹ Subsequently, the task force changed its name to the Political Instability Task Force and appeared to back away from the term *failed state*.⁵²

Beyond methodological shortcomings, the lists of failed states reveal only that many countries find themselves plagued by severe problems. The top 10 states in the 2009 *Fund for Peace / Foreign Policy* magazine Failed States Index include two countries occupied by the United States (Iraq and Afghanistan), one country without any central government to speak of (Somalia), four poor African states (Zimbabwe, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic), two resource-rich but unstable African countries (Sudan and Guinea), and a nuclear-armed Muslim country, population 176 million (Pakistan).⁵³ The sheer diversity of the countries on the lists makes clear that few policy conclusions could be drawn about a country, based on its designation as a failed state.

In fact, analysts have seized on an important single data point—Afghanistan in the 1990s and 2000s—and used it to justify a focus on failed states more broadly. Because Afghanistan met anyone’s definition of failed state and because it clearly contained a threat, analysts concluded en masse that failed states were threatening. When confronted with the reality that the countries regularly included on lists of failed states include such strategic nonentities as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and East Timor, advocates of concentrating on state failure routinely point back at the single case that can be justified directly on US national security grounds: Afghanistan.⁵⁴

Even in Afghanistan, however, remedying the condition of “state failure” would not have eliminated the threat, and eliminating the threat—by killing or capturing Osama bin Laden and his confederates—would not have remedied the “failure.” When viewed in light of the diverse and mostly nonthreatening states deemed “failed,” the fact that expansive claims about the significance of state failure have been used to market studies of the subject leaves the impression of a bait and switch.

For instance, on *Foreign Policy's* cover, the update of the Failed States Index in 2007 promises to explain “why the world’s weakest countries pose the greatest danger.” The opening lines of the article declare that failed states “aren’t just a danger to themselves. They can threaten the progress and stability of countries half a world away.” Strikingly, then, the article does little to back up or even argue these claims. Instead it shrugs that “failing states are a diverse lot” and that “there are few easy answers to their troubles.”⁵⁵ By 2009 the index was conceding that “greater risk of failure is not always synonymous with greater consequences of failure” and that the state failure–terrorism link “is less clear than many have come to assume.”⁵⁶

Given these concessions undermining the idea that state failure is threatening, one wonders why scholars continue to study failed states at all. As seen above, the countries on lists of failed states are so diverse that it is difficult to draw any conclusions about a state’s designation as failed. But the purpose, one would think, of creating a new category of states would be to unify countries that share attributes which can inform either how we think about these states or how we craft policies toward them. Instead, the scholarship on state failure has arbitrarily grouped together countries that have so little in common that neither academic research nor policy work should be influenced by this concept. Despite repeated claims to the contrary, learning that a task force has deemed a particular state “failed” is not particularly useful.

Start with the Conclusions and Work Backward

Existing scholarship on state failure seems to indicate that the conclusion led to the analysis rather than vice versa. Scholars who argue that “failed state” is a meaningful category and/or indicative of a threat provide a rationale for American interventionism around the globe. Given the arbitrary creation of the category “failed state” and the extravagant claims about its significance, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that research on failed states constitutes, as one analyst put it, “an eminently political discourse, counseling intervention, trusteeship, and the abandonment of the state form for wide swaths of the globe.”⁵⁷

The policy proposals offered by state-failure theorists certainly meet this description. In 2003 retired diplomats James Hooper and Paul Williams argued for what they called “earned sovereignty”—the idea that target states

would need to climb back into the good graces of the intervening power to regain their sovereignty. In some cases, this would mean that domestic governments would perform whatever functions were allowed by the intervener, but other duties would be retained by the outside actor. "The element of shared sovereignty is quite flexible . . . as well as the time frame of shared sovereignty. . . . In some instances, it may be indefinite and subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions as opposed to specified timelines."⁵⁸ The premise seems to be that countries will be returned to the control of their indigent populations when the intervener decides it is appropriate.

James Fearon and David Laitin, both political science professors at Stanford University, promote a new doctrine that "may be described as neo-trusteeship, or more provocatively, postmodern imperialism."⁵⁹ As they see it, this policy should not carry the stigma of nineteenth- or twentieth-century imperialism: "We are not advocating or endorsing imperialism with the connotation of exploitation and permanent rule by foreigners." On the contrary, Fearon and Laitin explain that "postmodern imperialism may have exploitative aspects, but these are to be condemned."⁶⁰

Although perhaps not intentionally exploitative, postmodern imperialism certainly does appear to entail protracted and quasi-permanent rule by foreigners. Fearon and Laitin admit that in postmodern imperialism, "the search for an exit strategy is delusional, if this means a plan under which full control of domestic security is to be handed back to local authorities by a certain date in the near future."⁶¹ To the contrary: "For some cases complete exit by the interveners may never be possible"; rather, the endgame is "to make the national level of government irrelevant for people in comparison to the local and supranational levels."⁶² Thus, in Fearon and Laitin's model, *nation building* may not be an appropriate term; their ideas would more accurately be described as nation ending, replacing national governments with a supranational governing order.

Stephen D. Krasner, director of the State Department's policy planning staff under George W. Bush and a leading advocate of focusing the department increasingly on state building, believes that the "rules of conventional sovereignty . . . no longer work, and their inadequacies have had deleterious consequences for the strong as well as the weak."⁶³

Krasner concludes that to resolve this dilemma, "alternative institutional arrangements supported by external actors, such as de facto trustee-

ships and shared sovereignty, should be added to the list of policy options.”⁶⁴ He is explicit about the implications of those policies and admits that in a trusteeship, international actors would remain in control indefinitely. The intervening power would maintain the prerogative of revoking the target’s sovereignty and should make no assumptions of withdrawal in the short or medium term.⁶⁵

Krasner’s candor about the implications of his policy views, however, was not equaled by a willingness to label them accurately. “For policy purposes, it would be best to refer to shared sovereignty as ‘partnerships.’ This would more easily let policymakers engage in organized hypocrisy, that is, saying one thing and doing another. . . . Shared sovereignty or partnerships would make no claim to being an explicit alternative to conventional sovereignty. It would allow actors to obfuscate the fact that their behavior would be inconsistent with their principles.”⁶⁶

Development experts with an interest in state failure agree that seizing political control of weak states is the answer. Paul Collier, for example, writes that outside powers should take on the responsibility of providing public goods in failed states, including security guarantees to indigenous governments that pass Western democracy tests—and the removal of guarantees coupled with the encouragement of coups against governments that fail such tests.⁶⁷

In part, these sweeping admonitions to simply seize politico-military control of the countries in question result from the failure to determine which of the “failedness” indicators should be addressed first or whether there is any order at all. Some studies have proposed hierarchies of objectives, starting with security and ending with development, but it is clear that for many analysts, the causal arrows zigzag across the diagram.⁶⁸ Each metric is tangled up with others, forcing those individuals who argue for intervention to advocate simultaneous execution of a number of extraordinarily ambitious tasks. David Kilcullen lists “cueing and synchronization of development, governance, and security efforts, building them in a simultaneous, coordinated way that supports the political strategy” as only one of eight “best practices” for counterinsurgents.⁶⁹ In Afghanistan, the flow chart of the December 2009 strategy seeking to repair that state looked more like a parody (see figure).

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics




Figure. Afghanistan stability/counterinsurgency dynamic. (Joint Chiefs of Staff chart posted online by Richard Engel, "So What Is the Actual Surge Strategy?," MSNBC.com, 2 December 2009, <http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2009/12/02/2140281.aspx>.)

Discussing this dilemma of interlocking objectives in the context of Afghanistan, Rory Stewart remarks that

policy-makers perceive Afghanistan through the categories of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, state-building and economic development. These categories are so closely linked that you can put them in almost any sequence or combination. You need to defeat the Taliban in order to build a state and you need to build a state in order to defeat the Taliban. There cannot be security without development, or development without security. If you have the Taliban you have terrorists, if you don't have development you have terrorists, and as Obama informed the *New Yorker*, "If you have ungoverned spaces, they become havens for terrorists."⁷⁰

Not only do all bad things go together in these analyses but also it becomes difficult if not impossible to discern which objective should be the primary focus of state-building efforts. Similarly, on the issue of state building and democracy, Fukuyama informs readers that "before you can have a democracy, you must have a state, but to have a legitimate and therefore

durable state you must have democracy.” Acknowledging the circularity of this argument, Fukuyama offered only the rather unsatisfying concession that the two ends “are intertwined, but the precise sequencing of how and when to build the distinct but interlocking institutions needs very careful thought.”⁷¹ This platitude should be cold comfort to policy makers who are being urged forward by the same experts to perform these ambitious tasks.

The High Costs of Targeting State Failure

We have argued that the “failed state” category is a vacuous construct and that the countries frequently referred to as failed states are not inherently threatening. For those whom we have not convinced, however, we now examine the historical record and attempt to examine the costs of a national security policy that placed a high priority on attempting to fix failed states. It is of course impossible to determine the precise cost of any mission beforehand. Historically, however, such operations have been extremely costly and difficult.

In a study for the RAND Corporation, James Dobbins and his coauthors attempt to draft a rule-of-thumb measure for the costs of nation building in a hypothetical scenario involving a country of five million people and \$500 per capita gross domestic product (GDP).⁷² For less ambitious “peace-keeping” missions, they calculate the need for 1.6 foreign troops and 0.2 foreign police per 1,000 population as well as \$1.5 billion per year. In the more ambitious “peace enforcement” scenarios, they figure 13 foreign troops and 1.6 foreign police per 1,000 population as well as \$15.6 billion per year.⁷³

Curiously, though, Dobbins and his coauthors approach this problem by deriving average figures from eight historical nation-building (“peace enforcement”) missions, five of which they had coded in a previous study to indicate whether or not they had been successful. One of these (Japan) they coded as “very successful,” two (Somalia and Haiti) were “not successful,” one (Bosnia) was a “mixed” result, and one (Kosovo) was a “modest success.”⁷⁴ The authors then simply average the costs of these missions and deem the resulting figures a rule of thumb.⁷⁵ It is unclear why future missions should be based on historical experience when the historical examples used to derive the figures produced successes, failures, and results in between.

Our methodological criticism notwithstanding, even taking Dobbins and his coauthors on their own terms reveals how remarkably costly it is to

attempt to fix failed states. Using the model laid out in their study, we calculated the cost of nation building in three countries: Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. A peace enforcement mission in Yemen would cost roughly \$78 billion the first year, whereas a peacekeeping mission would cost roughly \$12 billion the first year. Similar missions in Somalia, with a smaller population and a smaller per capita GDP, would cost only around \$30 billion and \$3 billion, respectively.⁷⁶

In the case of a larger country, like Pakistan, the costs would be significantly higher. A peace enforcement operation in Pakistan would cost approximately \$582 billion the first year, while a peacekeeping operation would cost around \$81 billion. In all these examples, the peace enforcement numbers contain very high military costs. According to the RAND study's model, a peace enforcement operation in Pakistan would require more than two million international soldiers costing about \$200,000 each.⁷⁷

Analysts Frederick Kagan and Michael O'Hanlon suggest that even for the minimal task of trying to tip the balance of an intra-Pakistani conflict, the "international community" would need to contribute between 100,000 and 200,000 troops (only 50,000–100,000 of whom would be from the United States, they suggest) and that this represents "the best of all the worst-case scenarios."⁷⁸ As quickly becomes clear, intervening in any of the frequently mentioned failed states implies significant costs.

As Kilcullen observes in the context of counterinsurgency, a corps of state builders should be available to stay in the country indefinitely. He proposes that "key personnel (commanders, ambassadors, political staffs, aid mission chiefs, key advisers, and intelligence officers) in a counterinsurgency campaign should be there 'for the duration.'"⁷⁹ But it is unlikely that Western governments possess large pools of workers willing and well equipped to deploy to Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or Haiti "for the duration." Western civil services—and even most, if not all, Western militaries—are not comprised of a separate class of citizens who live in far-flung locales, away from family and country, indefinitely. For this reason, in addition to the structural changes highlighted above, a number of policy reports have called for radical overhauls of the national security establishment in the United States so that it can be better tailored to repair failed states.⁸⁰

Failed Thinking, Not Failed States

From new military doctrines and budget priorities, to state-building offices in the State Department, to myriad proposals for transforming the entire US national security establishment, a long-term strategy of fixing failed states would entail dramatic change and high costs. More appropriate—and far less costly—than such dramatic changes would be a fundamental rethinking of the role of nation building and the relevance of state failure to national security planning. However, this does not appear likely. Thrust forward by the claims of threat but unequipped with the expensive tools necessary for the task, policy makers look likely to persist in the failed approach to the subject that they have applied in recent years. If we intend to embark seriously on a plan to build nations, we must be prepared to bear heavy costs in time, money, and lives—or we must be prepared to fail.

Moreover, no matter how evenhanded the United States may attempt to be, if US personnel are on the ground in dangerous parts of the world, Americans could be forced to choose sides in other countries' internal conflicts, and the nation could become entangled militarily when its vital interests are not at stake.⁸¹ For instance, if our nation builders are killed in the line of duty, will the United States respond militarily? It seems likely that Congress and the American people would demand military retaliation, and at that point, the United States could find itself facing a choice of either a spiraling military escalation (as in Vietnam) or a humiliating retreat (as in Somalia). Both of those prospects are troubling but may emerge if policy makers pursue a strategy of fixing failed states without broad public support.

The essence of strategy is effectively balancing ends, ways, and means. Squandering scarce resources on threats that exist primarily in the minds of policy makers is one indication that, as Richard Betts has pointed out, "US policymakers have lost the ability to think clearly about defense policy."⁸² The entire concept of state failure is flawed. The countries that appear on the various lists of failed states reveal that state failure almost never produces meaningful threats to US national security. Further, attempting to remedy state failure—that is, embarking on an ambitious project of nation or state building—would be extremely costly and of dubious utility. Given these connected realities, policy makers would be wise to

cast off the entire concept of state failure and to evaluate potential threats to US national security with a much more critical eye.

Notes

1. A very limited survey includes Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," *Foreign Policy* 89 (Winter 1992/93): 3–20; Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 2003); Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States," *International Security* 28, no. 4 (2004): 5–43; Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, "Addressing State Failure" *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 4 (July/August 2005): 153–63; Brent Scowcroft and Samuel R. Berger, "In the Wake of War: Getting Serious about Nation-Building," *National Interest*, Fall 2005, 49–53; Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); and John E. Herbst, "Addressing the Problem of Failed States: A New Instrument," *Prism* 1, no. 1 (December 2009): 21–26.
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3. John S. Galbraith, "The 'Turbulent Frontier' as a Factor in British Expansion," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2, no. 2 (January 1960): 152.
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5. Quoted in Fred Kaplan, "Powell Says Cuts Can Be Made: Head of Joint Chiefs Says U.S. Is 'Running Out of Demons,'" *Boston Globe*, 9 April 1991.
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7. Helman and Ratner, "Saving Failed States," 3.
8. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly* 273, no. 2 (February 1994): 48.
9. *Ibid.*, 54.
10. *Ibid.*, 58.
11. Senate, Timothy E. Wirth, *Testimony before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations*, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 1994.
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13. Quoted in David E. Sanger, "Rivals Differ on U.S. Role in the World," *New York Times*, 30 October 2000, 1A.
14. "2nd Presidential Debate between Gov. Bush and Vice President Gore," *New York Times*, 12 October 2000, 22.
15. Quoted in Michael R. Gordon, "Bush Would Stop U.S. Peacekeeping in Balkan Fights," *New York Times*, 21 October 2000, 1A.
16. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 17 September 2002), 21, 31, 1. The national intelligence strategy of 2005 asserted that "the lack of freedom in one state endangers the peace and freedom of others and that failed states are a refuge and breeding ground of extremism." Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, October 2005), 8, <http://www.dni.gov/NISOctober2005.pdf>. The "whole-of-government" counterinsurgency manual of 2009 claims that state failure ultimately represents "a threat to global security." See Department of State, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide* (Washington, DC: Department of State, January 2009), [iv], <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf>.
17. For a useful discussion of the relationship of liberalism and Wilsonianism to contemporary American strategy, see Michael C. Desch, "America's Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy," *International Security* 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/8): 7–43.
18. Lawrence J. Korb and Robert O. Boorstin, *Integrated Power: A National Security Strategy for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2005), 7.

19. Francis Fukuyama, comment on Center for Global Development task force's report *On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security*, http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_archive/weakstates. For similar claims, see also *Play to Win: Final Report of the Bi-partisan Commission on Post-conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies / Association of the US Army, 1 January 2003), 6, <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/LGEL-5JVD76?OpenDocument>.

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22. Barack Obama, "Renewing American Leadership," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 4 (July/August 2007), <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=6&hid=8&sid=de70aa41-755a-4a71-81f9-232cdbc2ff7f%40sessionmgr14&dbdata=JnNpdGU9ZWwhvc3QtbGl2ZSszY29wZT1zaXRl#db=aph&AN=25610437>.

23. This section draws heavily from Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, *Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building Office*, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 560 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 11 January 2006), <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa560.pdf>.

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26. Senate, Richard Lugar, *Statement at Hearing on the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 3 March 2004.

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29. Potential responses were "including but not limited to demobilization, policing, human rights monitoring, and public information efforts." 22 *United States Code* 2651(a) note.

30. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification: Volume I: Department of State Operations Fiscal Year 2011," 1 February 2010, 471-77.

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35. Glenn Kessler, "Embassy Staff in Baghdad Inadequate, Rice Is Told," *Washington Post*, 19 June 2007; and Kessler, "Rice Orders That Diplomatic Jobs in Iraq Be Filled First," *Washington Post*, 21 June 2007.

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53. "Failed States Index" (2009), 83.
54. See, for example, the remarks of John Herbst in Jessica Wanke, "U.S. Civilians Recruited to Help Troubled Nations," National Public Radio, 31 July 2008, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92752144>. More recently, a report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted that "several high ranking U.S. intelligence and defense officials suggested that Yemen was becoming a failed state and consequently a more important theater for U.S. counterterrorism operations. In February 2009, CIA Director Leon Panetta said he was 'particularly concerned with Somalia and Yemen. Somalia is a failed state. Yemen is almost there. And our concern is that both could become safe havens for Al Qaeda.'" See Senate, *Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 21 January 2010, 10, <http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Yemen.pdf>.
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60. *Ibid.*, 12n19.
61. *Ibid.*, 36.
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66. *Ibid.*, 108. See also Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

67. Paul Collier, "Development in Dangerous Places," *Boston Review*, July/August 2009, <http://bostonreview.net/BR34.4/collier.php>.

68. James Dobbins et al., *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007): 14–15.

69. David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 265. Although distinctions exist between population-centric counterinsurgency missions and stabilization and reconstruction missions, we consider the two tasks points on a spectrum rather than discrete categories.

70. Rory Stewart, "The Irresistible Illusion," *London Review of Books* 31, no. 13 (9 July 2009), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/stew01_.html.

71. Francis Fukuyama, "Stateness' First," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 1 (2005): 88.

72. Dobbins et al., *Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, 255–59.

73. *Ibid.*, 256–57.

74. James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), xx–xxi.

75. In Dobbins et al., *Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, the authors repeatedly refer to nation-building "success" but do not define the term. In Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building*, success is defined as "the ability to promote an enduring transfer of democratic institutions" (p. 2), which would seem to be both quite narrow and to conflate nation building with forced democratization.

76. The calculations are based on population and per capita GDP numbers from the *CIA World Factbook*. Figures are rounded to the nearest billion. There were slight inconsistencies between the equations presented in some of the chapters of Dobbins et al., *Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, and the final example given in the conclusion. However, these did not significantly affect the calculated costs of the examples offered here.

77. Dobbins et al. note in the context of Pakistan that "considerations of scale . . . suggest that the transformational objectives of interventions in larger societies should be sharply restrained to account for the relatively much more modest resources likely to be available for their achievement." Dobbins et al., *Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, 258.

78. Frederick Kagan and Michael O'Hanlon, "The Case for Larger Ground Forces," in *Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide*, ed. Derek Chollet, Tod Lindberg, and David Shorr (New York: Routledge, 2008), 71.

79. Kilcullen, *Accidental Guerilla*, 266.

80. An incomplete list includes Clark Murdock et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004); Clark Murdock and Michèle Flournoy et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005); Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities* (Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, 2004); Neyla Arnas, Charles Barry, and Robert B. Oakley, *Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Contingency Operations* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, August 2005); Martin Gorman and Alexander Krongard, "A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 39 (October 2005): 51–58; Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "After the Fight: Interagency Operations," *Parameters* 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005/2006): 47–61; Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, "In Search of Harmony: Orchestrating 'The Interagency for the Long War,'" *Armed Forces Journal*, no. 37 (July 2006): 36–39; Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: Assessing "Whole of Government" Approaches to Fragile States* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007); Greg Kaufmann, ed., *Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008); and Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2009).

81. Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994): 20–33. See also Christopher Preble, *The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 129–31.

82. Richard K. Betts, "A Disciplined Defense," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 6 (November/December 2007): 68.

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