

# Dangerous Passions

## Glory and Honor in International Relations

DR. HAIG PATAPAN\*

**I**n *Full Circle*, Sir Anthony Eden's memoir, the former British prime minister makes an unflinching assessment of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who had taken power in 1954:

The West has been slow to read Nasser's *A Philosophy of Revolution* as it was to read Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, with less excuse because it is shorter and not so turgid. But Eastern rulers had read it, and there were many who knew that, if the Egyptian triumphed unchecked, his prowl to conquest would have wider scope and their turn in Syria, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere must follow.<sup>1</sup>

In Nasser's character, his imperial ambitions, plans, and intentions, Eden discerned another Hitler. Nasser's plan, according to Eden, was to foster revolutions in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, with the intention of transforming these countries into Egyptian satellites. The strategic threat was to deprive Europe of Middle East oil: "They will have to place their united oil resources under the control of united Arabia, led by Egypt and under Russian influence. When the moment comes Nasser can deny oil to Western Europe and we here shall all be at his mercy."<sup>2</sup> So when King Hussein of Jordan in March 1956 suddenly dismissed Sir John Glubb, the British commander of his army, it was inevitable that Eden saw this action as Nasser's meddling in the affairs of Jordan. According to Anthony Nutting, his friend and colleague, Eden—in ill health, physically exhausted, and facing domestic political difficulties—became obsessed with Nasser.<sup>3</sup> Nutting, who was present in Downing Street when Eden heard the news of dismissal, recounts Eden's violent response: "He blamed Nasser and decided

---

\*The author is a professor in the Department of Politics and Public Policy, Griffith University, Australia. His research interests are in political leadership, political philosophy, and democratic theory. His recent publications include *Machiavelli in Love: The Modern Politics of Love and Fear* (Lexington, 2007) and the coedited books *Dissident Democrats: The Challenge of Democratic Leadership in Asia* (Palgrave, 2008) and *Dispersed Democratic Leadership: Origins, Dynamics, and Implications* (Oxford, 2009).

that the world just wasn't big enough to hold both of them. One had to go. He declared that night a personal war on Nasser." Nutting described Eden's disposition in the following terms: "Driven by impulses of pride and prestige and nagged by mounting sickness, he began to behave like an enraged elephant charging senselessly at invisible and imaginary enemies in the international jungle."<sup>4</sup>

The subsequent events are well known. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. In response, Eden and Guy Mollet, the French prime minister, colluded with Israel in a secret conspiracy to invade Egypt. Faced with international condemnation, Eden was forced to call a halt to the campaign, less than 48 hours after British troops had landed in Egypt. The "Suez crisis," as it came to be known, precipitated Eden's resignation from office in 1957. Nasser's fate was different:

Far from precipitating Nasser's downfall, the Suez invasion propelled him to a pinnacle of prestige and influence. He was acclaimed and idolised as a latter-day Saladin, the architect of Western defeat and humiliation, the *Raïyes* or leader who had withstood the "triple aggression," as the Suez war was called in the Arab world, and broken the spirit of imperialism, a miracle-worker possessed of extraordinary vision and wisdom. His photograph was displayed in souks, cafés, taxis and shops not only in Egypt but throughout the Middle East and North Africa.<sup>5</sup>

This account of the Suez incident reveals the importance of leadership and the significance of passions, especially of pride and honor, in international relations. Of course it would be a mistake to interpret the Suez crisis solely in terms of the passions of the leaders. Clearly many more issues were at stake, ranging from the decline in the legitimacy of imperialism, to the rise of Arab nationalism, the communist influence in the region, and the evolving nature of the British-American alliance, to name a few.<sup>6</sup> But as we see from the reflections of Eden and Nutting, it would be equally remiss not to pursue the possibility that glory and honor may have influenced the actions of these leaders.

What exactly is the role of the passions in international relations? Though politicians, diplomats, foreign policy analysts, and strategists acknowledge the importance of this question, the theme has received insufficient attention from students of international relations.<sup>7</sup> One of the dominant approaches to international relations—realism—has looked to the passions, but its main focus has been the role of fear.<sup>8</sup>

When it has taken up the importance of other passions, such as honor, realists have interpreted it as “prestige”—that is, a form of power.<sup>9</sup> Prestige is a form of power, as Martin Meredith’s account of Nasser indicates.<sup>10</sup> Nasser’s victory, especially in acquiring a reputation as the modern Saladin, proved especially useful for his larger, pan-Arabic ambitions. But the case of Eden also shows that the desire for honor can overreach itself. As glorying, it may in pursuit of honor lead to actions and decisions that undermine power. Glory and honor are therefore more complex phenomena than is generally acknowledged in modern realism.<sup>11</sup> In this article, I seek to understand the nature of glory and honor in international relations by returning to the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. I do so because of Hobbes’s influence on modern realism—he is not, as some would claim, “another” realist in a tradition that includes authors as far apart and different as Thucydides and Machiavelli, but the major source of contemporary realist thought. His crucial contribution to modern realism was his assessment of the dangers of glory and fear in both domestic and international politics, and the means he employed to moderate their excesses. His very success—in introducing the concept of power and the state, and thereby debunking the claims of honor—obscured the relevance of glorying in contemporary politics and caused modern realism to shift its focus to fear as the crucial passion in international politics. In returning to Hobbes, I hope to recover a more comprehensive realism that takes into account or acknowledges the importance of leadership and agency in international relations.

In the first part of this article, I explore Hobbes’s understanding of the political passions, especially of glory and fear, and the types of human beings animated by such passions. Hobbes’s assessment of these passions is the basis of his famous account of “power,” how power seeking leads to war, and the institutional solution of the “state” he proposes to assure peace and commodious living. Having explored Hobbes’s concept of the passions and their political implications in the domestic context, I then turn to his account of the importance of glory in international relations. As we will see, Hobbes is aware of the dangers posed by sovereigns who are tempted to wage international wars for glory. His solution for moderating such sovereigns combines educational and institutional elements to counter the problem of international anarchy and thereby secure the sovereignty of the state. In the final section I draw lessons from Hobbes’s realist conception of glory and

subtle appreciation of the complex nature of international relations. I argue that Hobbes shows the importance of leadership in international relations and the need to understand the specific history, culture, and religion of each state.

### Dangerous Passions

Hobbes is famous for diagnosing fear as one of the passions that leads to war in the state of nature where there is no overarching authority to provide security. He also sees fear as the solution to the problem of violence since the proper application of fear, the passion most conducive to reason, makes possible the stability of the state.<sup>12</sup> Yet we often forget that the artificial *Leviathan* state was intended to be “lord over the children of pride”—Hobbes saw pride as one of the most important sources of war.<sup>13</sup> While Machiavelli celebrates the role of glory as the necessary means to overcome the disparate interests between the few and the many, Hobbes’s entire project is to undermine its role in politics. This he does with his ambitious educational campaign that has a number of components: introduction of the new concept of power, which reduces and thus debunks all things honorable to power; transformation of scholastic natural law to modern natural rights, to found the neutral, artificial “state” that is indifferent to the potentially honorable distinction between democracy and tyranny; and, importantly, the undermining of the other major source of glory and fear in politics—revealed religion. Hobbes’s formulations thus become crucial in articulating the theoretical foundations of the modern liberal democratic sovereign state, founded by the contractual agreement of individuals who seek to preserve and protect their natural rights. Hobbes is the realist acutely aware of the problem of pride, while being much more hopeful than Thucydides or Machiavelli that we can do away with its pathologies.<sup>14</sup> He is, in a sense, a realist who anticipates or lays out the groundwork for modern liberal internationalism.<sup>15</sup>

It is this complex Hobbesian understanding of pride, where he is aware of its crucial role in politics yet thinks he can undermine it, that has come to shape subsequent realist scholarship. I would suggest that the very success of Hobbes’s theoretical and educational project has drawn attention to one aspect of his teaching—fear—at the expense of his detailed and comprehensive account of how fear and pride are related. A recovery of Hobbes’s understanding of glory in international relations is therefore a useful starting point for understanding his comprehensive view of the role of passions

in international politics. It is also an important starting point for seeing how the disparate elements or contradictory aspects of modern realism were originally united in Hobbes's political philosophy.

Hobbes's account of the state of nature is well known. Where there is no common power to keep all in awe, the natural condition of man is that of "warre, as is of every man, against every man."<sup>16</sup> Hobbes's solution to this problem is equally well known: the institution of a *Leviathan* state with a sovereign to keep peace, ensuring security and prosperity. But what exactly is the cause of war in the state of nature? According to Hobbes, there are "three principall causes of quarrell"—competition, diffidence, and glory.<sup>17</sup> In understanding Hobbes's subtle psychological analysis of these three causes, we gain better insight into the role of passions, especially that of fear and glory in politics.

Hobbes is famous for denying the ancients' premise that human beings are "Politically creatures" or lovers of some "greatest Good."<sup>18</sup> He rejects the classical understanding of types of human beings (and therefore regimes) defined by what they love or seek—for example, their love of honor, or wealth, or freedom—on the grounds that "there is no such *Finis ultimus*, (utmost ayme,) nor *Summum Bonum*, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers."<sup>19</sup> Human motion, for Hobbes, is "Vital" and "Voluntary." Voluntary motion is created by imagination and results in "endeavour," which is felt as either desire or aversion.<sup>20</sup> Because there is no "greatest Good," "Felicity" lies in "a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another."<sup>21</sup> But the feeling of unlimited power does not last because new desires and aversions are always created by the "Senses and Imaginations."<sup>22</sup> As a result, Hobbes famously declares that "in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death."<sup>23</sup> Indeed, every good we seek—"Riches . . . Knowledge . . . Honour"—and every passion we feel "may be reduced to . . . Desire of Power" since all things are to us "but severall sorts of Power."<sup>24</sup> Consequently, "*Honourable* is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument and signe of Power. And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable; as arguments of Power."<sup>25</sup>

According to Hobbes, three types of human movement (and therefore human beings) predominate in nature: the diffident, the competitive, and

the glorious. For all three, the unavoidable reality of limited or scarce goods means that in pursuing their “Ends,” they are compelled to destroy or subdue one another.<sup>26</sup> Yet each type confronts this scarcity and struggle in its unique way. That is, while all people seek power, they have different judgments about how much power they need and about what confers the necessary power.

The diffident, according to Hobbes, is one of “those men who are moderate”—who wants more power only because he “cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath at present, without the acquisition of more.”<sup>27</sup> Diffidence makes a man invade for “Safety” and use violence to “defend” his body and possessions. Thus it seems that the hopelessness of the diffident yields moderation—the diffident will not ordinarily seek to conquer or master all other human beings. But he is forced to counter the competitive.<sup>28</sup> The competitive does not simply desire, like the diffident, to secure and defend his possessions. He wants more because he “cannot be content with a moderate power,” and so he goes beyond defending his immediate safety and uses violence to make himself “[Master] of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell.”<sup>29</sup> The competitive seeks mastery for “Gain” because he is hopeful that he has the power necessary to overcome other people.<sup>30</sup> Yet the competitive never thinks that “Mastery” is anything other than a means to gain; he tends not to derive pleasure in exercising his power over other human beings except in the sense that it indicates, or is a measure of, gain. Consequently, his need to master is always constrained and circumscribed by material gain, and he can tolerate others who do not threaten that gain. In contrast, the glorious seeks a type of “Joy,” which is an “exultation of the mind” arising from “imagination of a mans own power and ability.”<sup>31</sup> Some individuals can find intense delight in contemplating their “own power in the acts of conquest,” which produces great pleasure at the confirmation to themselves of their power.<sup>32</sup> But Hobbes notes that glory seekers often pursue glory “farther than their security requires,” creating the problem that some seek glory even at the risk of their lives.<sup>33</sup> For these people, glory becomes disengaged from its source in the pursuit of the power needed to preserve their vital motion. The difficulty of acquiring and maintaining glory, due to our inability to judge or “value” accurately, the problem of construing “signs” of valuing, and the need of the glory seeker to “extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by example” mean that the glory seeker is compelled to risk himself to show

his power.<sup>34</sup> Sustaining the joy that is glory may necessitate harming his body or undermining his power as property. In the extreme case, the glorious may risk his own life to show his power. Therefore, the pleasure of glory is not checked by the moderating demands of security and property in two senses. The first is in the sense that we have noted—the glorious will illogically sacrifice his life for his name. The second is that the pleasure of glory seeks to ever increase its delectation—glory will in social terms seek ever greater mastery, at the risk of security. From this perspective, war for Hobbes is typically due to the tendency of the glorious type to challenge and test each other regarding their worth, thereby compelling both the diffident and the competitive to enter into warfare far beyond what they would ordinarily wage. Hobbes's solution is to provide for the diffident and the competitive while undermining the claims of glorying. As a result, the Hobbesian subjects will not be glory seekers; indeed, they will fear and also have contempt for such displays of pride and hubris.

### Glory and International Relations

Though it is possible for these three types of human beings to be sovereign, Hobbes indicates that it is more likely that the sovereign will be a glory seeker.<sup>35</sup> If the glorious could exist without struggling—that is, with an assurance of their power—then the diffident (and perhaps the competitive to a great degree) could lead lives as peaceful and productive as those of bees or ants.<sup>36</sup> Hence Hobbes offers an institutional arrangement of the sovereign state where challenges to the sole glorious are no longer just or feasible and where the diffident and competitive can prosper in his shadow.<sup>37</sup>

Hobbes's commonwealth, where each individual authorizes the actions of a sovereign who will protect the natural rights of all by enforcing the social contract, appears to solve the problem of domestic war. But what does Hobbes say about international relations?

Concerning the Offices of one Sovereign to another, which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Sovereign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body.<sup>38</sup>

By analogy, therefore, it would seem that international relations is identical to the Hobbesian state of nature, a state of war where there is no

right or wrong, justice or injustice. There is the Law of Nature in international relations, but as Hobbes indicates, the Law of Nature is not a law as such but a “precept, or generall rule” that contains the “Fundamentall Law of Nature,” which is “*to seek Peace, and follow it,*” and the Right of Nature, which is, “*By all means we can, to defend our selves*” (emphasis in original).<sup>39</sup>

Hobbes is aware, of course, that there are limits to such an analogical approach. As he notes, the posture of war between sovereigns, requiring constant vigilance and spying, does not lead to the inconveniences of war for individuals because sovereigns, in providing a common power within each state, uphold the “Industry of their Subjects.” Thus international politics as a state of nature allows for, or is consistent with, the possibility of industry, cultivation of the earth, navigation, commodious buildings, and the general advancement in arts and letters.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless he seems to confirm the inherent intractableness, and therefore fundamental dangerousness, of international politics. This “minimalist” understanding of Hobbesian international relations has been especially influential in the modern “realist” schools of international relations.<sup>41</sup> Its limited scope has been challenged, however, by scholars who suggest that Hobbes’s equation of international politics with the state of nature in fact yields a more extensive range of duties and responsibilities for sovereigns. Though not amounting to a comprehensive Kantian law of nations, such an understanding of Hobbesian international relations is much richer than the simple minimalism of modern realism.<sup>42</sup>

This “maximalist” Hobbesian internationalism has as its starting point an appreciation of the greater efficacy of the laws of nature in international relations.<sup>43</sup> The analogy between the individual’s place in the state of nature and the sovereign’s in international relations does not hold in certain important respects. Though sovereigns must assure their own safety and the security of the state, and therefore wars waged for this purpose are just because there is no other recourse, sovereign states are more secure than individuals in the state of nature (for example, they are not all equal; they need not sleep; they are not mortal). Moreover, because sovereigns uphold the “Industry of their Subjects,” alleviating their misery, those passions that incline individuals in the state of nature to peace are less forceful in international relations.<sup>44</sup> But the absence of a common power in the international realm also means a greater freedom in international relations, so that



the laws of nature need not be silent. As Laurie Johnson puts it, “Peace will not be as urgent a priority as it is in relations among individuals, but the need to violate the laws of nature will also not be as urgent.”<sup>45</sup>

Whether one adopts the “maximalist” or “minimalist” version, the Hobbesian understanding of international relations as analogous to the state of nature in fact presents a serious challenge to domestic peace and stability.<sup>46</sup> The diffident and even the competitive sovereign will confront formidable obstacles in discerning the appropriate course of action for securing state stability and competitive advantage. But these problems are exacerbated in the case of the glory lover. Where the sovereign is the glory lover, will not sovereignty fuel the pride of the glorious? As sovereign, his own sense of worth (and therefore pleasure in contemplating it) will now be confirmed by success and magnified by the grandeur of office. The greater and more powerful the commonwealth, the more glorious the sovereign. With such greatness comes the increased likelihood of being contemned. Unchecked by common powers, sovereigns in their international relations will easily misconstrue such slights to pride as challenges to security.<sup>47</sup> Seeking greater pleasure in asserting their glory and attempting to repudiate the challenges to their reputation, sovereigns will defend themselves and their nations by proving their superiority—through the use of increased sovereign power in international relations. To do so, however, they will need to put into place all those elements for successful campaigns, ranging from recruiting of spies to reveal secrets or mislead the enemy, to the construction of forts and defenses, to the raising of armies and navies to wage war. The more successful such ventures, the more the sovereign will be tempted not to disband such machinery but to retain its services in more ambitious undertakings, ostensibly to secure the nation—in fact to enhance its glory. Before too long, the sovereign’s glory will point to a policy of imperial ambitions, stimulated and sustained by its success.

Hobbes, of course, knew of these dangers. As he notes, “Yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Sovereigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators.”<sup>48</sup> In admitting that there is no real difference between commonwealth by institution and commonwealth by conquest, he indicates the ubiquity of international war as the foundation of sovereignty. His extensive discussion of the laws of nature, especially against revenge, contumely, pride, and arrogance,

show his clear-sighted appreciation of the powerful force of these passions as well as his intention to mitigate their effects.<sup>49</sup> Hobbes's claim, as we noted above, is that the Law of Nations is identical to the Law of Nature. The fundamental law of nature, "*That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre*" (emphasis in original), yields, according to Hobbes, 19 other laws.<sup>50</sup> One of the most important of these is the Second Law of Nature—a willingness, if others are also willing, to lay down one's right to all things. The other laws of nature include justice, gratitude, and "compleasance." These laws, the "true Morall Philosophy," are eternal and always bind in conscience but not in practice if there is no security. Each sovereign will therefore have to evaluate the extent to which they can safely be followed. Nevertheless it is possible to extrapolate from Hobbes's account an international realm shaped by such laws of nature. For example, sovereigns and states may legitimately seek peace whenever possible simply because peaceful solutions are more expeditious and less dangerous than recourse to war. Thus one may enter into covenants, contracts, or agreements between states in the spirit of gratitude and accommodation, even if their breach is not technically unjust. Some such arrangements—for example, providing for ambassadorial immunity—are in the interest of all sovereigns, allowing free channels of communication between sovereigns and states.<sup>51</sup> In any case, because for Hobbes coerced covenants—those entered into out of fear—are binding, international relations may be defined by valid contracts between stronger and weaker nations, enforced with the threat of war.<sup>52</sup> Though war is always available to the sovereign, it should always be for the security and safety of the state and not the desire to avenge a past wrong or out of contumely, arrogance, or pride. Indeed, these principles dictate the way wars should be conducted, limiting as much as possible unnecessary cruelty in the prosecution of war.<sup>53</sup>

To the charge that the Hobbesian state exacerbates the problem of glory, Hobbes may also reply that the danger of glory will depend on the circumstances of each country. It is only the sovereign of the wealthy, powerful, and strategically or geographically well-placed commonwealths who will be tempted to seek glory. Yet his account of the continuous skirmishes by the "infinite number of little Lords" in Germany suggests that glory (with its attendant "insatiable appetite, or *Bulimia*, of enlarging

Dominion”) may be a problem for all sovereigns.<sup>54</sup> Hobbes may also argue that, given the identity of public and private interests in a monarchy, the welfare of the people and the dangers and costs of war will provide a natural check on this glorying. Sensible sovereigns do not take “any delight, or profit they can expect in the damage, or weakening of their Subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth their own strength and glory.”<sup>55</sup> Clearly, continuous warfare that impoverishes its people and ruins a state will make it much more likely to be dissolved or conquered by neighbors. In this way Hobbes seems to provide a powerful reason for sovereigns to restrain themselves for the sake of preserving their glory. But it is the nature of glory seekers to risk all for all. Though aware of such arguments, which suggest a sort of natural justice for unreasonable actions, the glorious will excuse and justify themselves as the exceptions to the rule who are destined for success, and in failure blame everyone but themselves. The lessons learned from failure may be either too late or disregarded by the glorious sovereigns.

### **Leadership and Culture in International Politics**

Our examination of Hobbes’s account of glory reveals a comprehensive understanding of the passions, especially of the link between glory and fear; an institutional solution to the problem of anarchy; and a subtle appreciation of the complex nature of international relations. In the discussion that follows, I argue that Hobbes’s understanding of the passions and their political consequences provides two related and valuable insights into the nature of international relations: he shows the importance of leadership in international relations, and he reminds us that to understand the role of glory in international relations, we require a subtle appreciation of the historical, cultural, and religious elements in a state.

#### ***Leadership in International Relations***

Glory seeking by individuals in the international realm is one of the major causes of instability for Hobbes. It would seem, therefore, that for Hobbes, leadership matters in international relations. Because individuals will differ regarding their skills, aptitude, and virtues, it seems that Hobbes’s “new science” depends fundamentally on the prudence and judgment of political leaders.<sup>56</sup> He admires, for example, Sidney Godolphin, the brother of Francis

Godolphin, to whom he dedicates the *Leviathan* for his many virtues, “not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature.”<sup>57</sup> He also concedes an important difference between the *justice* of laws and their *goodness*. Though all laws made by authorized sovereigns are by definition just, not all just laws are good laws. As Hobbes says, “A good Law is that, which is *Needfull*, for the *Good of the People*, and withall *Perspicuous*” (emphasis in original).<sup>58</sup> Therefore it is possible to judge the reasonableness of a sovereign’s actions even if we cannot question or challenge their justice.

But it seems that Hobbes’s attempt to educate sovereigns (and subjects) in what constitutes *reasonable* action is an admission that most can be educated.<sup>59</sup> An important aspect of this education is that it is possible to replace individual discretion with institutions so that, in a sense, anyone can be the sovereign. As he states in his dedication to Francis Godolphin, “I speak not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those simple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noyse defended those within it, not because they were they, but there).”<sup>60</sup> Where you are, it seems, is more important than who you are for Hobbes. This view is supported by his debunking of the Aristotelian understanding that some should command because they are more prudent and wise. Hobbes’s response is that “for there are very few so foolish, that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others.”<sup>61</sup> Natural equality means equality in prudence: “A plain husband-man is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a Privy Counsellor in the affaires of another man.”<sup>62</sup> It would seem, then, that “who” the sovereign is may not actually matter, given proper Hobbesian instruction. To the extent that Hobbes succeeded in taming the individual sovereign with his new invention—the artificial institution that is the Leviathan state—it is possible to argue that he was instrumental in making individual glory irrelevant. The *raison d’être* of the modern constitutional state is arguably the negation of individual glory. This fact explains to large extent the neglect of glory by modern structural realism.

But this observation means that glorying is dependent on the complexity of constitutionalism of the state under consideration. Whether glory matters, and the extent it matters in international relations, will depend on the specific nature and character of leaders and the authority they are

permitted by the state. The makeup of states will permit the possibility of “gladiators” that Hobbes initially confronted and sought to restrain. For example, the international policy of Cuba, where Fidel Castro is attempting to preserve his reputation and achievements, or of Singapore, where Lee Kuan Yew is celebrated as founder, will inevitably involve a different view of glory from nations where leaders occupy constitutional and limited-term offices. Kim Jong Il will readily sacrifice the lives of millions of North Koreans to preserve his glory. Glory therefore matters in international relations, but its influence is not systematic.<sup>63</sup> If institutions make an important difference in how individual passions are translated into political actions, then Hobbes’s understanding of glory allows us to see when leaders matter and, in doing so, look behind the notion of the “state” to see how each nation will act in a particular context.<sup>64</sup>

This discussion reveals once more the tendency of modern realism to simplify and thereby distort Hobbesian insights. As we have seen, there is a core ambiguity in Hobbes regarding the role of leaders in international relations. His analysis of glory seeking seems to confirm the importance of individuals in world politics, yet we also find in Hobbes an attempt to deny leaders such a role. This ambiguity, inherent in Hobbes, can be understood as merely another instance of the two aspects of Hobbes we noted above: Hobbes who assesses the problem of glorious gladiators and Hobbes who wants to deny glory this power by constitutionalizing and legalizing individual discretion. We see here a tension in Hobbes’s thinking regarding leadership resolved by modern realism by favoring structural or institutional influences over the individual.<sup>65</sup>

### ***History, Culture, and Religion***

In the *Leviathan*, Hobbes lists all those aristocratic elements—coats of arms, birth, traditions—said to be honorable. Though acknowledging their influence as a source of power, he also effectively debunks their intrinsic claims. Hobbes thereby indicates that the precise content and contour of honor—our sense of what is honorable—will inevitably be shaped by history, culture and religion.<sup>66</sup> The lesson for realism is that though there are obviously some common elements to what is honorable or shameful in all countries—all agree that disregard is a form of loss of face—it is inaccurate to assume that a universal code of honor exists in international relations.

Consequently realism needs a fine appreciation of the character of any specific country, including its traditions and cultures, to make a prudent assessment of how glory will affect its leaders and therefore the state's actions. The angry reactions by China and Korea to the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2001 were influenced, no doubt, by a concern for "security." But it would be difficult to understand the full international import of this apparently domestic incident without an appreciation of the significance of "face" or honor for all three nations, as defined and interpreted by their common history and their rapidly changing power relations.<sup>67</sup>

Hobbes shows the importance of such detailed understanding in his examination of ecclesiastical commonwealths, which makes up the second half of *Leviathan*.<sup>68</sup> Religion poses a twofold problem for Hobbes. He traces the source of religion to "Anxiety" or perpetual fear for the future, especially of fear of death. This fear was exploited by the "Gentiles," such as the Greeks and Romans, who made religion subject to politics to secure the peace of the commonwealth. In contrast, according to Hobbes, the religion of the Jews and Christians (and Islam) proclaimed a Kingdom of God, which subordinated politics to religion and thereby made no distinction between "Temporall, and Spirituall Domination."<sup>69</sup> In asserting that the present Church is the Kingdom of God ("that is, the Kingdome of Glory, or the Land of Promise"), the Church of Rome, and thereby the Pope, is able to exercise international political power over Christian princes by claiming that to disobey the Pope "was to disobey Christe himselfe."<sup>70</sup> Thus the "Militant" Church poses the most serious problem for Hobbes's political plan—it undermines peace while using the Hobbesian device of fear. Significant for our purposes, however, is what is implicit in Hobbes's analysis regarding the unique role of glory in ecclesiastical commonwealths. Because an essential aspect of the political power of the Pope, as well as of bishops and presbyters, is the Glory of God, they are compelled to defend their glory by defending the Glory of the Kingdom of God. The contemporary Hobbesian lesson is that the international relations of ecclesiastical commonwealths (or states dominated by those religions where the political is subservient to the pious) will always seek to defend the Glory of God—not incidentally but as a crucial aspect their sovereignty. This argument suggests that Middle East politics is shaped by glory as much as security, albeit the

Glory of God as reflected in the actions of His ministers. A. Q. Khan, the scientist widely credited as the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, noted in his recent article lamenting the loss of "ghairat"—the sense of honor, courage, bravery, and loyalty displayed by great Muslim leaders at all crucial moments of history—that

throughout history there have been certain individuals who achieved recognition in certain areas. Shaikh Saadi said: "Honour is not earned, it is conferred by the One Who Confers." According to this concept, if a great deed is accomplished by someone, he should regard it as a gift of God rather than "the muscles of his own arms." It is a special favour from God that a particular individual is selected by providence and singled out for a specific task.<sup>71</sup>

To what extent does the argument above apply to modern liberal democracies, based on separation of church and state and apparently adopting many Hobbesian principles? Does glory play any role in their international relations? I would suggest that it does in two important respects—nationalism and human rights. The Hobbesian solution to the problem of glory, with its overwhelming educational and missionary zeal, mimicked the glory of ecclesiastical states by instituting new bases for glorying. Above, we saw Hobbes's attempt to moderate the glory of the sovereign by tying his fate to the prosperity of the nation-state and the welfare of the people. Thus Hobbes locates the new source of power—and therefore glory—in a new institutional structure that is to become the model for all governments. To the extent that the state became the focal point for the idea of the "nation," nationalism was instituted as an independent source for glorying, reflected in the actions of all those who protected and advanced the national interest.<sup>72</sup>

The notion of natural rights inaugurated by Hobbes provides a similar account. Hobbesian rights, transformed and expanded to human rights, have become a foundational principle for modern constitutionalism. They have therefore become an important modern means for defining what is honorable—the defense of rights and the protection of popular sovereignty or democracy have thereby become honorable principles in modern democracies.<sup>73</sup> They have in turn come to shape their foreign policy. As potentially limitless foundations for glorying, they reveal important insights into liberal internationalism as well as American exceptionalism.<sup>74</sup> Thus the importance of the divine as an independent source for glory in ecclesiastical states is mirrored in modern secular states in the ideas of nationalism and rights.

## Conclusion

In this article I have sought to explore the role of the passions in international relations. My starting point has been the fact that though one of the most powerful passions, fear, has received considerable attention, especially from modern realist scholars, the passion of glory has been relatively neglected. In returning to the thought of Thomas Hobbes, one of the seminal theorists of modern realism, I have attempted to recover a comprehensive realist account that understands fear within the larger context of the powerful passion of glory. This Hobbesian account has yielded two important insights into the character of international politics. Glory does matter in international relations, but in determining the extent to which it matters, we need to take into account two related factors—the character of the leader and the makeup of the state, especially the way its history, culture, and religion define what is honorable and thereby shape and constrain the leader's discretion. There are, of course, considerable limitations to Hobbes's understanding of human nature and the passions.<sup>75</sup> Yet to the extent that Hobbesian realism compels a subtle appreciation of the specific facts and circumstances of any particular international issue, then surely he is simply endorsing what has always been the approach of diplomats, security analysts, and ministers of state. To this extent our engagement with Hobbes allows us to liberate ourselves from the artificial constraints of modern realism; his theoretical insights, however contested, provide a welcome justification for the exercise of prudent judgment in practicing the complex art of international policy making.

### Notes

1. Sir Anthony Eden, *Full Circle: The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden* (London: Cassell & Company, 1960), 543. For recent biographies of Eden, see David Dutton, *Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Robert James, *Anthony Eden: A Biography* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1987); and Jonathan Pearson, *Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

2. Eden, *Full Circle*, 465.

3. On the extent to which Eden's judgment may have been impaired due to his ill health, see Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, 422–24.

4. Cited in Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 39–40. See also Nutting's account of Eden's phone call on the evening of 1 March 1956. According to Nutting, Eden screamed, "What is all this poppycock you've sent me about isolating Nasser and neutralizing Nasser? Why can't you get it into your head I want the man destroyed?" I said, "OK. You get rid of Nasser, what are you going to put in his place?" "I don't want anybody," he said. I said, "Well, there'll be anarchy and chaos in Egypt." "I don't



care if there's anarchy and chaos in Egypt. Let there be anarchy and chaos in Egypt. I just want to get rid of Nasser." Cited in Peter Hennessy, *The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders since 1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2000), 215–16.

5. Meredith, *State of Africa*, 42–43. On Nasser generally, see Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political Biography* (London: Allen Lane 1971); Anthony Nutting, *Nasser* (London: Constable 1972); and Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation* (London: Croom Helm, 1978).

6. According to Paul Kowert, the fear that Egypt would fall within the communist orbit outraged British elites and public opinion. Most notable about the outrage for Kowert was the emphasis placed "on Nasser's personal character (that is, his identity) as the explanation for his behavior and as sufficient reason for British reprisals." "Nasser's identity (and Egypt's to a lesser extent) had clearly become very salient to Eden and his cabinet," Kowert explains. "They made frequent reference to his untrustworthiness and his sympathy to communism. Their opposition to him thus came more from who he was and what he represented—a communist, or possibly a fascist, and clearly an enemy of Britain—than from what he had actually done." Paul Kowert, "Agent versus Structure in the Construction of National Identity," in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubáľková, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (New York: M. E. Sharp, 1998), 115, 113.

7. A number of recent students of international relations have commented on the need to undertake a systematic analysis of the role of emotions in international relations. See Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," *International Security* 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000): 116–56; Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, "Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics," *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 1 (2008): 115–35; Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Richard Ned Lebow, "Reason, Emotion and Cooperation," *International Politics* 42, no. 3 (2005): 283–313; Lebow, "Fear, Interest and Honor: Outlines of a Theory of International Relations," *International Affairs* 82, no. 3 (2006): 431–48; and Andrew A. G. Ross, "Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 2 (June 2006): 197–222.

8. On realism generally, see Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Jeffery W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 5–55. On structural realism, see Kenneth N. Waltz, who denies the relevance of the internal makeup of states' or leaders' motives, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979). On offensive structural realism, see John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). On defensive realism, see Charles L. Glaser, "The Necessary and Natural Evolution of Structural Realism," in *Realism and Balancing Power: A New Debate*, ed. John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003). On fear and the "security dilemma," see John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (1950): 157–80; Herz, "The Security Dilemma in International Relations: Background and Present Problems," *International Relations* 17, no. 4 (2003): 411–16; Barry Buzan, "Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research* 21, no. 2 (1984): 109–25; Ken Booth, "Navigating the 'Absolute Novum': John H. Herz's Political Realism and Political Idealism," *International Relations* 22, no. 4 (2008): 510–26; and Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

9. Prestige, defined instrumentally as "reputation for power," is a subject of many realist thinkers. See Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006); Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma"; and Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). But the neorealism of Waltz, in *Theory of International Politics*, with its materialist ontology and systemic framework, rejects prestige altogether. On a discussion of instrumental prestige and deterrence theory, see Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics*; Dale C. Copeland, Paul K. Huth, and Jonathan Mercer, "What's in a Name? Debating Jonathan Mercer's Reputation and International Politics," *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (1997): 32–113. For a brief discussion of different national conceptions of prestige, see Harold Nicolson, *The Meaning of Prestige: The Rede Lecture, 1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937). For an extended discussion of deterrence theory that draws upon social psychology to undermine the claims of reputation as an end, arguing "we should never go to war because of our reputation," see Jonathan Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," *International Organization* 59,

no. 1 (2005): 77–106. For the importance of symbols in international relations, see Barry O’Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

10. Meredith, *State of Africa*.

11. Daniel Markey, in “Prestige and the Origins of War: Returning to Realism’s Roots,” *Security Studies* 8, no. 4 (1999): 157, 159–62, provides a thoughtful analysis of the problem of “glory.” He argues that contemporary realism understands prestige in its instrumental sense, as reputation, credibility, or resolve, and not as intrinsic or an end in itself. Starting with realist “forefathers” Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, he recovers a “Prestige Motive” as an end in itself, with four essential characteristics: “Prestige is a relative good, it is sought perpetually, it is irrational, and it is social.” For Markey, prestige is an insatiable desire for public recognition of eminence that is materially irrational—it does not “always yield optimal material outcomes,” and it lacks rational “proportionality” in the “means-ends calculus.” I contend that Markey does not sufficiently acknowledge the extent to which Hobbes sought to moderate, if not extirpate, glory.

12. The Machiavellian insight that only passions could counter passions was deployed by subsequent philosophers such as Hobbes in founding the sovereign state and by Montesquieu to defend separation of powers and a commercial republic. See generally Paul A. Rahe, *Republics Ancient and Modern* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); and Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).

13. For an insight into the character of Hobbes’s piety, compare the “Leviathan,” a creature of the Lord, set over the children of pride (John 41:34), with Hobbes’s artificial body, made by the “Art of man,” whose business is “*Salus Populi*” or the people’s safety. See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968), introduction, 81.

14. See Harvey Mansfield, *Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), on the way Machiavellian virtue was constitutionalized.

15. On the contrast between Thucydides and Hobbes regarding the efficacy of fear, see Peter Ahrensdorf, “The Fear of Death and the Longing for Immortality: Hobbes and Thucydides on Human Nature and the Problem of Anarchy,” *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 3 (2000): 579–93. Kant’s critique of Hobbes, developed in *Perpetual Peace* and “Idea for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” is that the problem of a perfect civil constitution cannot be solved unless the problem of external relations with other states is addressed. On the relationship between Hobbes and Kant, see Howard Williams, *Kant’s Critique of Hobbes* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003).

16. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 13, 185–86.

17. *Ibid.*, 183–86.

18. *Ibid.*, chap. 17, 225; chap. 11, 160.

19. *Ibid.*, chap. 11, 160.

20. *Ibid.*, chap. 6, 118.

21. *Ibid.*, chap. 11, 160.

22. *Ibid.*, chap. 6, 124; chap. 11, 161.

23. *Ibid.*, chap. 8, 139.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*, chap. 10, 155.

26. *Ibid.*, chap. 13, 184.

27. *Ibid.*, chap. 11, 161; and Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law: Human Nature and De Corpore Politico*, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), chap. 14, 3.

28. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 13, 185.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, chap. 6, 123.

31. *Ibid.*, 125. There are two types of glorying: confidence and vainglory. Confidence is a “constant hope of ourselves” based on “the experience” of our “own former actions.” Vainglory is imagining power based “on the flattery or others; or onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it” (*ibid.*, chap. 6, 39). On the problem of glory, see generally Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its Basis and Its Genesis*,

trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); Gabriella Slomp, "Kant against Hobbes: Reasoning and Rhetoric," *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 4, no. 2 (2007): 207–22; Slomp, *Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory* (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press, 2000); William Sacksteder, "Mutually Acceptable Glory as a Cause of Conflict," in *The Causes of Quarrel: Essays on Peace, War, and Thomas Hobbes*, ed. Peter Caws (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 97–113; Jean Hampton, "Hobbesian Reflections on Glory as a Cause of Conflict," in Caws, *Causes of Quarrel*, 78–96; and Andrew Altman, "Glory, Respect, and Violent Conflict," in Caws, *Causes of Quarrel*, 114–27.

32. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 13, 184.

33. *Ibid.*, 185.

34. *Ibid.*

35. It is possible, of course, that once the whole world has accepted Hobbes's principles of natural right, the sovereign will be the competitive or the diffident. But where sovereignty by acquisition is commonplace, the sovereign will be a glory seeker.

36. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 17, 225.

37. Other glory lovers besides the sovereign are soberly advised by Hobbes not to attempt to attain "Sovereignty by Rebellion" lest they perish in the try (*ibid.*, chap. 15, 205).

38. *Ibid.*, chap. 30, 394.

39. *Ibid.*, chap. 14, 189–90. In reducing the Law of Nations to Hobbesian Law of Nature, Hobbes implicitly repudiates stoic notions of *ius gentium* (law of nations). See Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrens Dorf, *Justice among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 144–53.

40. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 13, 187, 186.

41. For the influence of Hobbes on modern realists such as Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, E. H. Carr, Herbert Butterfield, Robert Osgood, George Kennan, Charles Beitz, and Henry Kissinger, see Cornelia Navari, "Hobbes, the State of Nature and the Laws of Nature," in *Classical Theories of International Relations*, ed. Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press, 1996); Michael Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986); and Howard Williams, *International Relations in Political Theory* (Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 1992). On his continuing influence on neorealists such as Waltz, see Pangle and Ahrens Dorf, *Justice among Nations*, 239–57.

42. It became the basis of the so-called English school of international relations. See Hedley Bull, "Hobbes and International Anarchy," *Social Research* 41, no. 4 (1977): 717–38; Claire Cutler, "The Grotian Tradition in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 1 (1991): 41–65; Martin Wight, *International Relations: Three Traditions* (London: Holmes and Meier, 1992); and the discussion in Michael C. Williams, "Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration," *International Organization* 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 213–36.

43. I draw on Laurie M. Johnson, *Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Interpretation of Realism* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993), 87–94. For similar or more ambitious attempts to develop a Hobbesian law of nations, see Donald W. Hanson, "Thomas Hobbes's 'Highway to Peace,'" *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (1984): 329–54; and Francis Cheneval, "The Hobbesian Case for Multilateralism," *Swiss Political Science Review* 13, no. 3 (2007): 309–35.

44. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 13, 187–88.

45. Johnson, *Interpretation of Realism*, 87.

46. On whether Hobbes's "new" political science, with its promise of an "everlasting" commonwealth, is undermined by his understanding of international politics, see Haig Patapan, "The Glorious Sovereign: Thomas Hobbes on Leadership and International Relations," in *British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier*, ed. Ian Hall and Lisa Hill (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 11–32.

47. Without denying, of course, that slights may in fact constitute such a security threat.

48. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 13, 187.

49. *Ibid.*, chap. 15, 210–12.

50. *Ibid.*, chap. 14, 190.

51. *Ibid.*, chap. 23, 293.

52. *Ibid.*, chap. 14, 198.

53. This complex of bilateral and multilateral covenants, treaties, obligations, and arrangements does not, however, lead to a world government because the impulse to such an arrangement is less compelling and because, for Hobbes, sovereignty can never be divided or shared (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 29, 363–64; chap. 19, 240). For a discussion of these themes, including the Kantian critique of Hobbes, see Nancy A. Stanlick, “A Hobbesian View of International Sovereignty,” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 37, no. 4 (2006): 552–65; Ernst B. Haas, “Reason and Change in International Life: Justifying a Hypothesis,” *Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (1990): 209; Charles Covell, *Kant and the Law of Peace: A Study in the Philosophy of International Law and International Relations* (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press, 1998); and Williams, *Kant’s Critique of Hobbes*.

54. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 10, 158; chap. 29, 375.

55. *Ibid.*, chap. 18, 238.

56. On the idea of “normative prudence” in international relations, see Alberto R. Coll, “Normative Prudence as a Tradition of Statecraft,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 5, no. 1 (1991): 33–51.

57. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, “The Epistle Dedicatory,” 75.

58. *Ibid.*, chap. 30, 388.

59. On counsel to the sovereigns, see Gerald M. Mara, “Hobbes’s Counsel to Sovereigns,” *Journal of Politics* 50, no. 2 (May 1988): 390–411. On the rhetoric, see Quentin Skinner, “Thomas Hobbes: Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality,” *Proceedings of the British Academy* 76 (1990): 1–61; Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Bryan Garsten, *Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

60. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, “The Epistle Dedicatory,” 75.

61. *Ibid.*, chap. 15, 211.

62. *Ibid.*, chap. 8, 138. Note, however, how he seemingly retracts this position—equality must be the new consensus, even if not true (*ibid.*, chap. 15, 211).

63. On Fidel Castro, see his autobiography, *My Life: Fidel Castro*, rev. ed., ed. Ignacio Ramonet, trans. Andrew Hurley (London: Allen Lane, 2007). For an examination of the character and ambitions of Lee Kuan Yew, see James Minchin, *No Man Is an Island: A Portrait of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew* (North Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1990); and Michael D. Barr, *Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs behind the Man* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000).

64. To this extent, this research favors the neoclassical realism of Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?,” *World Politics* 44, no. 2 (1992): 235–69. See also Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, “Malign Autocracies and Major Power Warfare: Evil, Tragedy and International Relations Theory,” *Security Studies* 10, no. 3 (2001): 46–79, who emphasize the role of different state motivations as well as domestic institutions and structures.

65. It does so by assuming their “rationality” and therefore abstracting from individual differences. On the problem of “agency” in realist international relations theory, see Johnson, *Interpretation of Realism*, 148–200.

66. For a discussion of the evolving nature of codes of honor, see James Bowman, *Honor: A History* (New York: Encounter Books, 2006); and especially Sharon Krause, *Liberalism with Honor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

67. For a game theory approach to national honor and “face,” see O’Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War*, 85–214. O’Neill concludes that “states still fight over honor” (245). On Koizumi’s visit to the shrine, see Peng Er Lam, “Koizumi: The Iconoclast Who Remade Japanese Politics,” in *Dissident Democrats: The Challenge of Democratic Leadership in Asia*, ed. John Kane, Haig Patapan, and Benjamin Wong (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 129–46.

68. See in this context his detailed analysis of the causes of the English civil war (Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth or The Long Parliament*, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990]).

69. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 12, 178.

70. *Ibid.*, chap. 47, 704. On the means used by “priests” to exert political control, Hobbes lists the religious power to crown; the inability of priests to marry (thereby denying priesthood to princes); the determination of lawfulness of marriages; the power to decree heresy, thereby limiting a subject’s allegiance; exclusion from

criminal jurisdiction; and the source of independent income from religious services. Hobbes attacks not only the “Catholiques” but also “that Church that hath presumed most of Reformation” (ibid., chap. 12, 182; chap. 47).

71. For a discussion of “Ghairat” and its opposite “Beghairati,” see Khan’s blog site at <http://draqkhan.com.pk>. On the importance of honor or prestige in the development of nuclear weapons, see Jacques E. C. Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

72. For an overview of the scholarship on nationalism and its implications for international relations, see Lars-Erik Cederman, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 409–28.

73. For a discussion of the American Declaration of Rights as a new code of honor, see Krause, *Liberalism with Honor*.

74. On American exceptionalism and the importance of promoting democracy, see, for example, John Kane, *Between Virtue and Power: The Persistent Moral Dilemma of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); and Mercer’s discussion of whether America is more concerned about its reputation than are other countries (*Reputation and International Politics*, 19–25).

75. I do not claim that Hobbes’s understanding of honor and glory is sufficient—to do so, one must revisit and adjudicate the debate between Hobbes and those traditions he sought to repudiate. We thus need to recover the classical understanding of *thumos* or spiritedness and the difference between the glory lover and honor lover. See, for example, Lebow’s focus on *thumos* as a necessary starting point for understanding the emotions in international relations in “Fear, Interest and Honor.” On the classical understanding of *thumos*, see Thomas Pangle, “The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato’s *Laws*,” *American Political Science Review* 70, no. 4 (1976): 1059–77; Waller R. Newell, *Ruling Passion: The Erotics of Statecraft in Platonic Political Philosophy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000); and Lorraine Pangle, “Moral and Criminal Responsibility in Plato’s *Laws*,” *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 3 (2009): 456–73. We also need to know the way classical conceptions were redefined by the pious rejection of pride: see, for example, Bowman, *Honor*, regarding the concept of the “Christian gentleman.”