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Promoting the Academic Conversation

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The Dark Side of European Integration

Franco-German Dominance and the Structural Reproduction of Informal Empire

Tommaso Pavone



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Editorial

This issue of *Air and Space Power Journal–Africa and Francophonie* contains international articles that highlight the importance of history in our technologically advanced society. The topics included herein range from national issues to international relations and how those relationships have influenced the necessity of modern technology. In “Fourth Generation Warfare and the US Military’s Social Media Strategy,” Dr. Christina Knopf and Dr. Eric Ziegelmayr explain the importance of creating a level playing field on the technological front. They show us the role that social media now plays in the US military and recommend that we embrace technology to gain an advantage over our opponent. The other four articles in this issue demonstrate relationships between nations and ways we can learn from the past to better formulate strategy for the future. For example, in “The Dark Side of European Integration,” Tommaso Pavone observes that the European power nations established during World War II still preside over current European Union (EU) legislation. He talks about the present EU debt crisis as well as Germany’s creation of an informal empire, an action that forced Greece’s hand, and France’s control of the agricultural market. To emphasize another historical lesson, Dr. Liselotte Odgaard unveils the effects of the Cold War on US and Chinese programs of international order in her article “In-between Order.” Dr. Odgaard explains the differences in strategy as seen in US and Chinese foreign policy, addressing how a healthy balance of the two would create an ideal global strategy. Dr. Ssebunya Edward Kasule reveals that Africa could benefit from East Asian, European, and American lessons by learning from these past mistakes. In “Self-Interest in African Regional Economic Organizations,” he unearths the power struggles among member states in Africa’s past, suggesting that they should learn from these blunders to move towards becoming more modern and globalized nations, such as those presently found in Europe or Asia. Lastly, Lt Col Jérôme de Lespinois of the French Air Force sums up the importance of diplomacy among allies in his article “What Is Air Diplomacy?” He guides us through the history of diplomacy in the French Air Force and discusses how each strategy has emerged from a lesson learned from a previous regime. The author goes on to explain the role of the air force as a political tool throughout the course of history and the means by which the French have arrived at their current strategy.

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Fourth Generation Warfare and the US Military's Social Media Strategy

Promoting the Academic Conversation

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ERIC J. ZIEGELMAYER, PhD

Former US secretary of defense Robert Gates cautioned that “the black-and-white distinction between conventional war and irregular war is becoming less relevant in the real world. . . . Possessing the ability to annihilate other militaries is no guarantee we can achieve our strategic goals—a point driven home especially in Iraq.”¹ During the twentieth century, the US military was structured to confront a peer competitor and—maximizing its advantages in intelligence, maneuver, and firepower—destroy the military basis of any threat to national security. In the war on terror, traditional thinking about what constitutes a battlefield as well as an outmoded calculus regarding the metrics of victory complicates the realization of US grand strategy. Access to and control of information alter the battle terrain. Conventional war on traditional battlefields—such as armored warfare, airpower, robotics, privatized forces, space, biological warfare, and counterinsurgency—has received much scholastic attention.² With the notable exception of James Der Derian’s exploration of the military-industrial-media-entertainment network, one finds few studies of military operations in the information environment, other than mass-mediated efforts of public affairs.³ This article, therefore, seeks to draw scholastic atten-

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tion to these matters by connecting the military's social media strategy to theoretical perspectives on war strategy.

The Department of Defense (DOD) wishes to rapidly improve its effectiveness in the mediasphere because victory depends upon the holistic information environment. Gen Peter Chiarelli observes that "the commander who prevails in the information war is almost certain to win the war itself."⁴ The information battlespace of the war on terror is two dimensional: a global space where the world judges US actions and a domestic space where democratic citizens must remain convinced that action is necessary. In the twenty-first century, technology, demographics, and socio-political transitions alter the character of warfare in a manner akin to the changes wrought by the French Revolution. Contemporary military commanders must incorporate the effects of this transformation into planning for future operations. In the self-help arena of global politics, state survival is substantially predicated upon military preparedness to fight and win the next war. Barry Posen points out that the military's doctrine—theories that address how that organization performs its mission—may prove detrimental to state security if it "fails to respond to changes in political circumstances, adversary capabilities, or available military technology," lacking innovations sufficient for the radical environment of international politics.⁵

The organization of military power through doctrine represents one element of grand strategy, the means by which states employ all of the instruments of national power to condition the international environment and realize specific national security objectives—the foremost of which is survival in the anarchic realm of world politics. States that fail to successfully integrate military doctrine with the wider ambitions of grand strategy probably will not attain security.⁶ In the aftermath of World War Two, for example, the United States successfully crafted the grand strategy of containment, which provided generations of policy makers an enduring template to guide American statecraft. The formulation and implementation of American grand strategy are complicated by the demands of the Constitution, which consciously divides war powers, and the *United States Code*, which directs the legal authority of the DOD in title 10 and the powers of the State Department in title 22. The structure of the federal government and American political culture have necessarily conditioned the evolution of US strategic communications policy as an element of grand strategy.

During crises, nations tighten the flow of information and deploy techniques that are in some way propagandist. Early in US history, such measures were temporary, but by the mid-twentieth century, the US government had developed ongoing measures of public diplomacy and public affairs—programs intended to influence the opinions of leaders and populations abroad and those designed to foster understanding of state policies domestically.⁷ In 1965 the phrase *public diplomacy* arose as a euphemism for *propaganda*, though *strategic communication* now enjoys more common usage as an essential element in waging war, particularly the type of irregular war in which the United States now finds itself.⁸ The media have long been central to studying American crises because, as journalist Marvin Kalb asked in a postmortem on news and foreign policy in Operation Desert Storm, “From whom, if not from the press, are the American people to get the information on which to base an intelligent decision on the worthiness of a particular war, or the soundness of their government’s strategies and policies, or the actual conditions on and above the fields of combat?”⁹ Fifteen years later, the answer—and the focus of this article—is the Internet. Battles take place not only on land, at sea, and in the air but also within the minds of adversaries and the hearts of allies.

Information is a commodity receptive to weaponization, and the information environment has become vital to the success of military operations: “The information domain—primarily the internet—is now key terrain to be seized” in the domination of economic and diplomatic influence.¹⁰ Consequently the United States has formally incorporated what Kenneth Payne calls “communication war” into doctrine.¹¹ This shift in strategic thought is apparent in doctrinal statements such as the US Army’s Field Manual 3.0, *Operations*, 2008, which outlines the concept of “full spectrum operations.”¹² The latter aims to advance thinking beyond orthodox “force on force” operations toward victory in the battle of ideas central to the tasks of nation building and the war on terror. Though not the sole driver of doctrinal innovation, technology is vital. In 1939–40 German innovations in doctrine for mechanized warfare shook the world. In the twenty-first century, the efforts of states to understand and exploit the military capabilities of the World Wide Web will prove instrumental to global security. This reality became apparent with the experiences of the Israel Defense Forces in the Hezbollah conflict of 2006, in which Hezbollah masterfully conducted an

information campaign that leveraged new media capabilities against a much stronger opponent, creating a “perception of failure” for the IDF with consequences that eclipsed the actual outcome of combat operations.¹³

The remainder of this article examines new social media—Web 2.0—in modern statecraft and outlines the opportunities and challenges presented by the requirement that the United States formally incorporate social media networks as a pillar of strategic communications strategy. Discussion begins with the (changing) nature of warfare from one of competing strength, to competing weaponry, to competing information, before explaining the DOD’s development of social media strategy and policy since 2007. The article then offers examples of communication issues and successes for the military before concluding with reflections about the Clausewitzian implications for US diplomacy and warcraft.

The Transformation of War

Destruction of enemy forces provides no guarantee of military success. In the Vietnam War, American forces demolished the Vietcong as an effective opponent after the 1968 Tet offensive and defeated the North Vietnamese Army in the 1972 Eastertide offensive. The US military never experienced defeat on the battlefields of Southeast Asia, but, as a senior North Vietnamese officer wryly observed at the Paris peace talks, that fact, ultimately, was irrelevant.¹⁴ Such an incongruous outcome would hardly have surprised Carl von Clausewitz, the foremost theoretician of modern war, who noted, “When whole communities go to war—whole peoples and especially *civilized* peoples—the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy” (emphasis in original).¹⁵ Thus, policy determines the character of war, but he also cautions that “as a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.”¹⁶ These elements correspond to the populace of a country, its army and commander, and the government; the Clausewitzian trinity provides the foundation of military operations.

The blind natural force of primordial violence that Clausewitz describes is conspicuously resident in the population, where it comprises part of what he calls the “moral forces” now recognizable as public opinion.¹⁷ The moral elements are among the most vital in wartime: “One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade.”¹⁸ In the twenty-first century, Clausewitz claims nearly universal acknowledgement as the foremost theoretician of modern warfare. A participant in the Napoleonic wars, he witnessed the apogee of a phase of Western warfare based upon the musket and massed line and column formations of infantry. These tactics reflected the demands of technology and the realities of contemporary society. If Clausewitz was exacting in characterizing the enduring features of war, he was also acutely conscious of the dynamic character of warfare. He recognized social, economic, and political conditions as variables contributing to the distinct structure and character of military institutions. Clausewitz further recognized the evolution of military institutions, observing that “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. . . . It follows that the events of every age must be judged in the light of its own peculiarities.”¹⁹

The social, economic, and political transformations associated with globalization are reshaping warfare for a new age—the fourth generation of warfare. Just as the printing press proved essential to the French Revolution and its wars, so does the new mediascape present a new dimension of the topology of global power: “The information revolution is not just changing the way people fight, it is altering the way people think and what they decide to fight *for*” (emphasis in original).²⁰ The record of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 helps to partially illuminate the dimensions of this new zone of contest. Salam Pax, the pseudonymous Iraqi “Baghdad blogger,” developed a readership of millions through daily online observations, and the global media quoted him extensively. In his postmortem of the US Marine Corps’s battle for Fallujah in April–May 2004, Col Ralph Peters, a *New York Post* columnist, observed that the Marines were not defeated in the physical realm by the insurgency but in the information realm—stopped by fear of poor public opinion in “already hostile populations.”²¹

Technology is sometimes regarded as a separate theory of military superiority, outweighing considerations of material resources, leadership,

maneuver, or valor.²² Two decades ago, a group of military scholars sought to classify and analyze the forces reshaping warfare, specifying technology and ideas as the major catalysts compelling evolution in the relationship between warfare and society.²³ The contours of this “fourth generation warfare” are especially pertinent in any analysis of the ongoing evolution of politics and war. The fourth generation battlefield encompasses the entire enemy society, and—contrary to twentieth century experience—massed force may prove detrimental to victory. The object of military operations becomes collapsing the enemy internally rather than destroying him in combat. Legitimate targets will include popular support for the conflict, and “actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity.”²⁴ The rise of a network society implies networked insurgency, in which organizations exist in parts in the real world, in cyberspace, and in both dimensions. As insurgencies and terrorist organizations skillfully manipulate the media battlespace to their advantage, combatants will strive to weaponize information in order to “alter domestic and world opinion to the point where skillful use of psychological operations will sometimes preclude the commitment of combat forces. A major target will be the enemy population’s support of its government and the war,” making the media more lethal than armored divisions.²⁵

Development of the US Military’s Use of Social Media

The US military created the Internet with its Advanced Research Projects Agency network decades ago and ushered in the use of sophisticated communication for social control a century ago by using telephones and telegraphs to maintain a police state in the Philippines.²⁶ Only recently has the military begun to utilize the World Wide Web in its battle plans.²⁷ In fact, the growth of the Internet in the global mediascape chronologically coincided with the shrinkage of public diplomacy efforts through amendments to the US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, also known as the Smith-Mundt Act.²⁸ Internet-based social networking became a phenomenon between 2001 and 2004, with the development of *Wikipedia*, *Friendster*, and *Myspace*, but not until 2007 did the US military appear to seriously consider the full scope of Web 2.0 usage. At this time, the DOD’s Pentagon Channel posted YouTube videos, and the Army shared rudimentary content on Flickr, *del.icio.us*, and YouTube, including bloggers in an in-

creasing number of conference calls in Iraq and Afghanistan. Concurrently, however, a general derided Michael Yon, a popular military blogger; the Pentagon banned US military personnel worldwide from accessing YouTube; and the Army ordered Soldiers to stop posting blogs or sending personal e-mails without content clearance by a superior officer. Concerns about Soldiers' use of Web 2.0 ranged from bandwidth problems to threats to operational security.

In 2007 Secretary of Defense Gates lamented that America is "miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society. . . . Al Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the Internet than America."²⁹ By the start of 2008, Lt Gen William B. Caldwell, currently the commander of US Army North (Fifth Army) and senior commander of Fort Sam Houston and Camp Bullis, began pleading with the armed services—thus countering Pentagon policy—to allow troops to access and contribute to social media. His plan called for encouragement, empowerment, education, and equipment. By allowing Soldiers to tell their stories, the military would improve its image, give subordinates more initiative, educate personnel on the consequences of their actions, and supply Soldiers with the technology to reach these goals.³⁰ By 2009 Army bases no longer blocked Twitter, Facebook, or Flickr.³¹ Another year passed before the DOD announced a policy more tolerant of, if not entirely open to, troops' use of social media.³² By 2010 the following events had occurred: the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Public Affairs, put a four-part social media strategy in place for Adm Mike Mullen's online and social media presences; the deputy secretary of defense distributed a memorandum about "responsible and effective use of internet-based capabilities"; the Online and Social Media Division of the Army produced a document on social media best practices that outlined tactics, techniques, and procedures; social media was included in initial military training; and the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College included "information engagement assignments." By 2011 the US State Department had abandoned its "static" America.gov website in favor of developing interactive and proactive social media.³³

Battle of the Narrative Challenges

After 1945 US forces were configured to confront those of a peer competitor and swiftly destroy them in classic force-on-force engagements. To

fulfill this objective, the US military now possesses command of the global commons—sea, space, and air—the longtime “key military enabler of the U.S. global power position.”³⁴ Sea lines of communication and geosynchronous orbits lie beyond the sovereignty of individual states but remain vital to global access for communication and transportation. Airspace is controlled by the countries underneath, but only a few states can deny US warplanes access to their airspace above 15,000 feet. However impressive, this capability does not imply planetary control, and American power is not beyond challenge or damage. Indeed, a lack of clarity in its communication approach has hindered US success in recent years.

The US Army War College defines strategy conceptually as the relationship among ends, ways, and means, wherein the objectives must be developed first.³⁵ Military strategy for social media, however, often appears nonstrategic, a fact particularly emphasized in the first of five “key considerations” for such a strategy released by the Army Public Affairs Division: “Have one.”³⁶ Other key components of social media strategy included the advice that online presence was not an adequate goal and that needs should dictate the choice of the platform. As a partial response to the fact that the military put strategy second to engagement in its rush to catch up with social media, an article by Col Thomas Mayfield in the National Defense University’s journal *Joint Force Quarterly* recommends specific social media goals of increased situational awareness, provision of improved public information, and enhanced unity of effort—incorporated across the full spectrum of conflict.³⁷ It is not yet clear that the military is following its own advice. For example, the social media strategy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concentrated on engagement of the audience, alignment of content with priorities, direction of online conversation, and expansion of the audience, seemingly selecting platforms by popularity rather than function and then adjusting content—and its stimuli—to fit.³⁸ Mayfield also notes that the military is struggling with the bottom-up structure inherent in, and required for, effective social media practices.³⁹

Information technology is revolutionizing the structure of global power, wherein the effectiveness of a state’s deployment of information power determines the success of the state in influencing the world politic.⁴⁰ Information is now a weaponized commodity, and the mediasphere is a critical element of the operational milieu for armed forces.⁴¹ The legacy

doctrines of the Cold War have little utility for the US armed forces; this is a learning environment that affords equal opportunity to all players, and this new cyber realm of global power is a hotly contested zone for American authority.⁴² The influence of new media does not merely alter the power equation among states—after all, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 offered no return address; rather, it constitutes “a wholly new sort of global nervous system,” enabling new virtual social communities to thrive and expedite unfiltered communication internationally.⁴³

This new dimension of global social power continually undergoes refinement and expansion; events from the opening of the new era can only partially illuminate the contours of the new terrain and the utility of information operations (IO) in modern conflict. In the 1990s, the Zapatistas organized an insurgency around a core strategy of IO, dominating the Mexican government in the information realm. In 1998 the Chiapas insurrection gained the support of the Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT), which exploited the mediascape to bolster the Zapatista movement. These tactical innovators were among the first to appreciate the mobilization capabilities of the new information environment. Typically, they would publicize an attack long before the actual event, and the EDT used “chat rooms, Internet advertisements and computer conferences” to publicize the insurrection.⁴⁴ The success of any operation was irrelevant—the overall objective was purely political. The Mexican government’s official recognition of the Zapatistas in 2001 and its support of a peaceful solution to the conflict confirmed the logic of the campaign. In the IO realm, the Zapatistas were true innovators, recognized by their peers as information warriors par excellence.⁴⁵

The Iraq War demonstrated that US technology and equipment granted no decisive edge in information warfare against an innovative, opportunistic opponent. As General Caldwell observes, the new media eclipses convention while simultaneously encouraging its manipulation by unconventional adversaries. The advent of “digital multimodality,” a key enabler, allows “content produced in one form [to] be easily and rapidly edited and repackaged, then transmitted in real time across many different forms of media. The potential for engagement is staggering.”⁴⁶ In Iraq the web was a potent amplifier for insurgency, serving effectively as a conduit for tactical

knowledge, including construction and placement of improvised explosive devices, ambush techniques, and briefings on US maneuvers.

Al-Qaeda, however, also conducted a masterful strategic IO campaign on the web to promote Salafist jihad. The Internet allows unrestricted access, and for sympathizers these sites offer discussions from casual chat to sophisticated conversations about ideologies, strategies, and equipment, presented through all the multimedia, interactive formats available on the web. Such exchanges—whether abstract or practical, polemical or intellectual—are designed for organizational, persuasive, and educational purposes.⁴⁷ According to an article in *Parameters*, “A typical al Qaeda format is the ‘martyr video,’ often featuring a suicide bomber who appears to rise from the grave to lecture the survivors about the justice of his or her cause.”⁴⁸ Additional formats include morale-boosting video coverage of individuals like “Juba,” a Baghdad sniper claiming to have killed or wounded dozens of US troops. From the earliest stages of the war in Iraq, insurgent attacks were planned as media events. Through outlets like the As-Sahab media group, al-Qaeda consciously fashions attribution and authority, and skillful IO warriors such as Abu Maysara direct these media labs with great prowess.

The US military, however, has a history of inadequately utilizing information and communication technology. For example, its excessive use of overly complex and largely meaningless PowerPoint presentations is infamous, and even the reputedly web-savvy Obama administration has received only middling appraisal of its online communiqués.⁴⁹ Moreover, US IO strategy and structure in Iraq were limited.⁵⁰ In 2003 the Pentagon awarded an \$82 million no-bid contract to Science Applications International Corporation to establish the Iraqi Media Network; by the time the network printed its first newspaper, 20–30 independent newspapers had already appeared.⁵¹ In the realm of new social media, antiquated organization and regulations confounded the US effort. In 2007 two civilian DOD employees proposed a YouTube channel for the coalition forces in Iraq. From its inception, channel MNF-1 was plagued by an orthodox mind-set and outmoded restrictions.⁵² For all intents and purposes, the overall strategic communication effort following the invasion proceeded from the notion that the truth will tell its own story and invariably triumph over its opponents.

So far, much military use of Web 2.0 appears best suited for domestic communication and public relations. Common application of social media

by the US forces involves contrived discussions about eye-catching pictures of military equipment or service members' favorite military moments, allowing the military to unobtrusively control and/or direct communication in its ranks and in a resource-limited news environment. The "battle of the narrative," as it is called in the *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy*, involves the establishment of favorable reasons for and potential outcomes of a conflict so that opposing narratives become irrelevant, not only in-theater but also domestically.⁵³ Social networking makes it easier for warriors to keep in touch with loved ones, therefore helping to maintain both military and civilian morale as well as further serving military needs of recruitment, retention, and troop support. The military has a significant interest in preserving interpersonal civil-military ties for all its members: "Recruitment, morale, and retention of military personnel are affected by family members' attitudes toward the military life-style."⁵⁴ Soldiers' morale and outlook positively correlate to their assessment of their families' ability to adjust to the military lifestyle, to their perception of the available support for their families, and to satisfactory communication with their families.⁵⁵ Survival of the military depends on the commitment of its members, ensured by emotional and material compensation as well as through normative pressures directly on the service members and indirectly on the members' families—with whom the military competes for loyalty.⁵⁶

Web 2.0 fosters a community for estranged family members and offers an outlet for Soldiers experiencing trauma.⁵⁷ The military branches' Facebook pages promote solidarity—for example, the written cheer "Hooah!" appears as a common response to posts by the Army. Official Facebook pages serve as controlled outlets for both celebrating and griping, as posts to Twitter and Facebook link up Soldiers with the *DoDLive* blogs that ask for thoughts and feelings about various military practices and services. Military wives and mothers frequently add comments, allowing them to form a support network with each other while simulating closeness with their distant service members. "Milblogging" has been called therapeutic and is thought to boost the war effort by increasing camaraderie, efficiency, and communication. Lighthearted "video postcards" on YouTube, such as a viral video of Soldiers in drag re-creating Lady Gaga's *Telephone* music

video, are celebrated by the military for their stress-relieving and morale-building qualities.⁵⁸

The new social media are also generating a shift in the formation and maintenance of communities; people are changing allegiance from nations to causes; and social networking sites create virtual communities larger than many countries.⁵⁹ In the traditional security dilemma, self-help in an anarchic system facilitates the state's quest for survival.⁶⁰ Philip Cerny, however, theorizes a "new security dilemma" in which people's first loyalties are to religion, sect, or ethnicity; allegiance to the modern state, therefore, becomes an unproductive means of security.⁶¹ As Thomas Hobbes recognized, sovereignty ultimately depends upon the willingness of individuals to sacrifice their lives for the survival of the state.⁶² In the era of Napoleonic wars analyzed by Clausewitz, France leveraged aspects of improvements in mass communication to forge a military of revolutionary size and potential. The concept of citizenship was essential to the motivation and success of the *levée en masse* and the French Army.⁶³ Frank Webster, however, argues that "the public are no longer mobilized to fight wars as combatants, they are mobilized as spectators of war—and the character of this mobilization is of utmost consequence."⁶⁴ In recent years, however, even spectatorship is flagging, adding to the military's challenge of informing and wooing the American people.⁶⁵

In a perceptive analysis of the impact of the new media on warfare, Audrey Kurth Cronin submits that as networked media alter the nature of human society, the means and ends of mass mobilization are transformed.⁶⁶ The well-publicized cases of the Iranian, Xinjiang, and London riots emphatically illustrate the organizational and persuasive utility, particularly at the grassroots level, of social media engagement.⁶⁷ Colonel Mayfield explains that "around the world, social media are becoming commonplace tools for political and social activism. If military leaders do not fully understand these tools, they may miss their significant impact on the nature of future conflicts. America's potential enemies are using these technologies now to enhance their efforts. The U.S. military can either engage in the social media environment seriously or cede this ground to the enemy."⁶⁸

Implications and Considerations

Forging an “arc of consent” remains vital to the prospects for victory. New social media deeply condition American commanders’ task of maintaining public animus toward an enemy. The military, comprising less than half of 1 percent of the population, often seems “a breed apart, a closed hierarchical organization resembling a monastic order.”⁶⁹ As a result, in full-spectrum operations, the military not only must gain dominance over the enemy but also educate the American public concerning the necessity of combat and the activities of the DOD in fulfilling American policy abroad. Additionally, it must recognize that “virtually every action, message, and decision of a force shapes the opinions of an indigenous population.”⁷⁰ Web 2.0 and the advent of communication war are also changing the means of carrying out conflict in world politics. IO is intensely political in character, and Clausewitz’s theories on war lose none of their validity in the twenty-first century. In fact, as Randall Collins’s dynamic theory of battle indicates, revolutions in military technology do not require new theories of warfare because technological advancements fall within the broader considerations of material resources, organizational morale, and maneuver.⁷¹ Col William Darley postulates that “Clausewitz’s theory appears to specifically predict contests settled mainly by political rhetoric without violence.”⁷² In the context of global politics of the twenty-first century, US policy makers confront the key task of effectively integrating Web 2.0 and beyond into military planning and doctrine and synchronizing IO doctrine with grand strategy. Web 2.0’s fostering of new forms of community and belonging is altering the character of warfare. Alternatives to the state are flourishing in this new realm while states struggle to respond and catch up to it. Web 2.0 dictates that states must change their traditional mode of operations concerning warfare, both on the front lines and on the home front. Clausewitz claimed that war was “the continuation of politics by different means.”⁷³ In the battle of the narrative, however, politics becomes another means of war.

In the coming century, war will endure as a fundamental, tragic element of statecraft, but the ongoing transformation of the mediascape is altering war and the causes for which people are willing to fight. Clausewitz understood that war alone does not provide a final settlement. In the twentieth century, the social forces inherent in the French Revolution achieved maturity, and France was humbled by these trends in Algeria and Vietnam. The

American experience in Southeast Asia offers further stark evidence that a war could be won militarily and lost politically. The enduring utility of Clausewitz is manifest here, and policy makers and commanders would dismiss these insights at their peril. The potential of the mediascape for changing the political outcome of armed conflict is plain: states and others confront a situation akin to the development of mechanized operations in the interwar era. For America in particular, the test is acute, as opponents have repeatedly witnessed the futility of attempting to challenge US forces on the conventional battlefield and savvy strategists will concentrate new energy to master the infosphere, where the US advantage remains indistinct.

The maturation of Web 2.0 has profound implications for military planning and operations. In traditional engagements, commanders concerned themselves with identifying the Clausewitzian “center of gravity” of hostile forces and directing appropriate force to that point to secure victory in decisive combat. After eliminating Iraq’s military, American commanders realized that the indigenous population represented the new operational center of gravity in defeating insurgency.⁷⁴ In a battle of the narrative, the insurgents swiftly exploited the new social media to depict coalition forces as brutal and incompetent. In this contest, a crucial struggle involved structuring operations to undermine the legitimacy of insurgent forces, convincing Iraqi citizens that the coalition would consistently deliver security and assistance.

As vital as the hostile forces’ center of gravity is to operations, “friendly” centers of gravity also exist, and for US policy makers and commanders, none are as fundamental as the domestic support of the American people. Public opinion is a key element of the decisions made by the elite, and the prestige and popularity of the military in its society are key components of military might and activity.⁷⁵ In the twenty-first century, the United States will obtain strategic goals only if it masters the capabilities of new social media in sustaining and fortifying Clausewitz’s enduring trinity. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan move to closure for the United States, the DOD is incorporating the experience into the task of the complete development of IO as a war-fighting discipline, and the incessant development of the mediasphere implies that doctrine requires a nearly constant process of refinement. If America wishes to command the mediasphere as well as it commands the commons, then it must accord IO equal status with other

combat arms—fused within every operational domain rather than treated as distinct. According to the deputy commanding general of Training and Doctrine Command, “We must have the agility to use our technological advantage . . . so that as a main gun round moves downrange to destroy a sniper position, simultaneously the digital image of the sniper violating the rules of war, plus the necessary information to create the packaged product, can be transmitted.”⁷⁶

Conclusion

Clausewitz maintained that political considerations do not extend to the posting of sentries or the conduct of patrols, but it is becoming apparent that in the new terrain of the mediated battlespace, the distinctions between politics and war are blurring. In the twenty-first century, IO probably will become more relevant and commonplace, with some US operations consisting solely of information campaigns directed by a dedicated IO command and staff. In this new realm, the weaponization of Web 2.0 will become fully realized. Here, vital intelligence preparation of the battlefield will involve the labor of “digital natives” trained as “social media scouts” to reconnoiter the battlespace and the hostile force. Marketing campaigns and online polling will be essential to identifying key constituencies in the area of operations. The transformations needed to realize these capabilities are not limited to military doctrine but of necessity incorporate change throughout the US government in order to uphold the Constitution. In particular, we must re-examine the duties of the DOD and the State Department and update them to clearly delineate missions and responsibilities.

Furthermore, we may need to refurbish the Smith-Mundt Act, a legacy of the Cold War, to reflect the realities of the contemporary mediascape. The act was originally designed to allow and fund US governmental transnational communication through mediated and interpersonal educational, cultural, and technological exchanges.⁷⁷ Beginning in 1972, however, a series of amendments to the act questioned the appropriateness and cost of the US government’s providing international information services. These changes had the effect of slowly rendering Smith-Mundt impotent, creating a “prophylactic effect” under the assumption that American information activities are unclean and must be barred from entering the US public.⁷⁸ The separation of the foreign from the domestic prohibits true global engage-

ment and has made the US government dependent on private media, further contributing to the country's information/media monopoly in an era when news sources are reducing their coverage of foreign affairs. Within the new social media environment, the US government is discovering that it must relearn how to communicate directly with its audiences. Via current Web 2.0 platforms, however, it still depends on private media for its conduit and has allowed the format to direct not only information content but also some government actions. (See, for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strategy of 2010, which specifies the selection of Admiral Mullen's activities according to their appropriateness for social media broadcast.)⁷⁹

Further expansion of warfare into the mediasphere represents a conceptual break with orthodox modes of conflict, but in vital respects there is continuity with the ancient logic of war. The contemporary international security order is fraught with uncertainty, but for the foreseeable future, the military power of the United States will clearly prove indispensable in the maintenance of that order. American command of the commons probably will encounter no serious challenges in the short term, but such doctrine and firepower in themselves likely will not assist in the realization of strategic goals. In this media-based contest, the task involves control of the master narrative, convincing skeptical and often hostile audiences that American power will not be restrained but used judiciously for the greater good—increasing the consequences of the military's interactions with industry and academe.

This inquiry has also highlighted the contemporary issues of irregular war in scholastic terms. Military officers, strategists, and instructors have produced most of the writings and studies on fourth generation warfare, the information environment, and the war on terror. As indicated previously, topics such as armored warfare, airpower, robotics, privatized forces, space, biological warfare, counterinsurgency, and domestic media usage—but not information and media-based campaigns—have received considerable academic attention. Those who study security policy and military strategy should attune to the significance of the military's social media strategy and usage for America in realizing strategic goals against recalcitrant peoples, regardless of power disparities. The challenge for the United States and its allies lies in achieving and maintaining competency, if not superiority, in the constantly evolving terrain of the mediasphere.

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In-between Order

An Assessment of US and Chinese Programs of International Order

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We are confident that the relations between China and India will improve with each passing day and that certain outstanding problems which are ripe for solution will be solved smoothly for sure. Soon after the founding of New China, we established the principles of ways to handle Sino-Indian relations, namely, the principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. There are bound to be problems between two big nations, particularly two big neighbouring countries like China and India. So long as these principles are followed, any outstanding problem which is ripe for settlement can be put on the negotiating table.

—Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, 1953

Zhou Enlai's remarks reveal that coexistence has formed part of China's foreign relations since Mao's proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Nevertheless, only after the Cold War did coexistence contribute to determining right and wrong international conduct at the global level. By contrast, US aspirations for integration on the basis of liberal values have influenced international conduct for the duration of the post-World War II period.

This article argues that contemporary international order is dominated by conflicting US liberal integrationist and Chinese coexistence principles. The most pervasive consequence of the United States' aspirations for international integration—its post-World War II efforts at constructing an alliance system—is based not merely on momentarily overlapping interests but also on common values of liberal democracy and human rights. The most obvious consequence of China's aspirations for international coexistence is

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its efforts since the beginning of the reform and opening-up period in the late 1970s to convince international society that China's rise to great-power status would remain peaceful through its engagement in multilateral security institutions all over the world.¹

In the vacuum left by the Soviet implosion in the post-Cold War era, the liberal integration perspective has been revised to suit the changing international context, and the coexistence perspective has been translated into a program of global international order. The US program involves the right to use a broad interpretation of international norms to counter grave violations of civil and political rights.² The argument rests on the notion that serious threats towards the peace and security of individuals spill over to the international realm and threaten international peace and security. US efforts to revise international order entail the use of existing provisions of international law to establish new legal precedents to promote fundamental liberal notions of democracy and human rights at the global level. The viability of the US alliance system in all regions of the world and the support, especially in developed countries, for US proposals imply that the United States can continue to advocate and implement its program of international order. In particular, the strength of the US alliance system allows Washington sufficient overseas influence to implement its version of international order. US implementation proceeds, even in times of crisis when its policies meet with considerable and prolonged criticism, as when the United States decided to go to war against Iraq in 2003.

In response, China has presented an alternative, revised version of existing UN Charter provisions founded in its peaceful coexistence principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in the internal affairs of others, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.³ The Chinese coexistence concept of international order is a program useful for a would-be great power that does not yet command the military and economic capabilities of a full-blown great power but that has already obtained political influence at great-power level. Coexistence engenders extensive policy coordination for purposes of conflict management and promotes the emergence of a system of comanagement of global security issues between great powers that subscribe to different programs of international order. The Chinese version of international order also draws on existing provisions of international law.

At the center of the Chinese proposal are the principles of absolute sovereignty and nonintervention adjusted to demands from the developing part of the world for enhanced regionalization and specialization of global security management. In the absence of a Chinese alliance system, Beijing relies predominantly on multilateral institutions based on the UN system across the world's regions to spread its version of international order. China's growing role in UN-based multilateral institutions engaged in security governance and support, especially in developing countries, for Chinese policies on global security issues in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) indicate the attractions of the Chinese program of international order.

The article first discusses the US liberal integrationist and the Chinese coexistence programs of international order. It then addresses the issue of US and Chinese strategies for implementing their programs. The article concludes by examining the implications of the findings on order for the dynamics of the international system.

US and Chinese Programs of International Order: Liberalism versus Coexistence

The US Liberal Program of International Order

The United States took the lead in formulating Western political aspirations as a program aiming at enhancing international integration.⁴ The spread of the liberal ideas of civil rights, democracy, and market economy represents the long-term means for preserving the United States' position of dominance. The liberal idea of civil rights arises from the demand for respecting the autonomy of individuals.⁵ A society based on individual autonomy requires the protection of civil rights by means of law to ensure the right to life and property as well as the obligation to respect agreements. No entity—not even the state—ranks above the law, and as such, the state apparatus itself must respect the law. The liberal idea of democracy holds that the people are sovereign and that the will of the people is respected by means of the right to elect representatives for the management of political authority. In essence the liberal democratic model implies that adult members of society determine what constitutes the good life and how it is realized. The liberal idea of the market identifies economic growth as the road to

prosperity. This economic philosophy suggests that the state plays a minor role in the economy, which allows the decisions of market agents to engender the most effective use of resources.

The US interpretation of the concepts of civil rights, democracy, and market economy after the Cold War involves the idea of globalizing these liberal concepts to ensure the strengthening of international peace, security, and prosperity. Economic globalization is not a fundamentally contested issue because of its acceptance worldwide, by and large. The financial and economic crisis of the late 2000s has not given rise to alternatives but to suggestions for revisions in market economic structures so as to make them more robust against abuse. According to some analysts, governments cannot resist the tides of international trade and finance; rather, they compete for the benefits of globalization by accommodating themselves as much as possible to the preferences of market agents to enhance their wealth. In trade this means opening the economy to foreign competition through commercial exchange and direct investment. In finance it means creating an environment of sound monetary and fiscal policies to sustain the confidence of creditors and portfolio managers.⁶ Economic globalization is a more pervasive feature in terms of trade than of finance, but the trend points consistently towards enhanced financial interpenetration. Consequently, at present the principal US concern deals with maintaining the United States as the economic world leader by means of advancing proposals for economic freedom through open markets.

Liberal democratic and legal globalization, however, has yet to take root. The United States still believes that it has a mission to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations with governments that answer to their citizens and reflect their own cultures. Thus, the US national security strategy of January 2012 states that the United States seeks “a just and sustainable international order where the rights and responsibilities of nations and peoples are upheld, especially the fundamental rights of every human being.”⁷ Furthermore, because democracies respect their own people and their neighbors, the advance of freedom will lead to peace. The United States’ belief in the concept of democratic peace means that international peace is best engendered by democracies governed by law. Such states are less likely to go to war against each other because they consider themselves legitimate entities behaving in accordance with common rules of state

conduct.⁸ The United States may trade in the goal of spreading democracy in exchange for stability in the short term, but it remains the long-term objective of US governments. Even the Obama administration, which exhibits tendencies to prioritize stability rather than democratization, fights terrorism and rogue regimes such as Gadhafi's rule in Libya by military means in the first instance to create preconditions for the spread of liberal democracy in the long run, arguing that freedom defined as democracy offers the most reliable foundation for peace and international stability.

One central element in Washington's program of international order, the US alliance system, originates from the Cold War threat of Chinese and Soviet expansion and does not merely encompass the customary understanding of alliances as pacts of mutual military assistance. Rather, the United States developed an extensive system of alignments whose iron core consisted of the actual military alliances. Initially, the Soviet Union was surrounded by a virtual power vacuum along its entire periphery—from Scandinavia and the British Isles, along the rimlands of Eurasia, to Japan and Korea. The United States therefore established and maintained a substantial military presence in and close to the chief Eurasian danger areas, projecting US power across the water barriers.⁹ After the Cold War, the US alliance—or, perhaps more precisely, alignment system—remained in place. One of the fundamental strategic objectives of the United States' national defense involves strengthening the country's security relationships with traditional allies and developing new international partnerships, working to increase the capabilities of its partners to contend with common challenges. The US overseas military presence operates in and from four forward regions: Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian Littoral, and the Middle East / Southwest Asia. The United States has embarked on a comprehensive realignment of its global defense posture to enable US forces to undertake military operations worldwide, reflecting the global nature of American interests. However, the enhanced prioritization of the Asia-Pacific in the US military force posture testifies to the fact that this region is of primary significance to US interests. As such, the United States must assure partners, dissuade military competition, deter aggression and coercion, and remain capable of taking prompt military action in this region. The continued US ability to perform in these capacities constitutes the structure that aids

Washington's attempt to implement the other aspects of its program of international order.

The Chinese Coexistence Program of International Order

Coexistence is characterized neither by extensive cooperation between status quo powers in an international system marked by integration nor by widespread conflict between revisionist powers in an international system dominated by autarky.¹⁰ Instead, coexistence is a program of international order for rising would-be great powers that do not yet command the military and economic capabilities of a full-blown great power, but who have already obtained political influence at great-power level. Coexistence engenders extensive policy coordination for purposes of conflict management and promotes the emergence of a system of comanagement of global security issues between great powers that subscribe to different programs of international order.

The Chinese idea of coexistence as a strategic concept in Beijing's external relations with global great powers emerged from the US attempt to use military instruments during the 1970s to force China to abandon its revisionist international aspirations, including its independent program of international order. Contrary to Soviet responses to US hegemonic aspirations, China emphasized diplomatic rather than military countermeasures.

The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 brought the United States and Soviet Union to the brink of war because of Washington's demand that Moscow abandon plans to install medium- and short-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. In the wake of this crisis, the United States abandoned any further attempts to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that all-out nuclear war would be a rational option. Formulation of the strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) in the early 1960s by US secretary of defense Robert McNamara created a basis for a US-Soviet strategic dialogue premised on a tacit acknowledgement that nuclear war was an option only between the great powers at the center, targeting each other's cities. MAD vindicated President Dwight Eisenhower's insight that if no one could be sure of surviving a nuclear war, there would not be one.¹¹

The strategy allowed Washington to prepare for active commitment in Indochina. US involvement sought to frustrate a Chinese-instigated people's war through the adroit application of US instrumentalities designed to speed

up the transformation of China from an alleged revolutionary, nonrational power into a rational, nonrevolutionary power. The obvious response to this Washington policy towards China would have entailed Beijing's following the Soviet example and building up its strategic nuclear forces to US levels.¹²

Nuclear capabilities at those levels would come at considerable cost due to expenses involved in enriching uranium, but an authoritarian state of China's size would have made this a priority. However, China also would have had concerns about the consequences of acquiring a second-strike intercontinental ballistic missile capability, which would signal its entrance into the club of great powers with the responsibilities and rights of global powers. It remains highly debatable whether China could have carried the costs of the position of a global great power in the 1970s. Rather than nuclear parity, China chose to pursue coexistence. However, only after the Cold War did China obtain sufficient global influence to translate coexistence into a program of international order with significant influence on international conduct.

In its constitution, China defines the five principles of peaceful coexistence as mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in the internal affairs of others, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. On the one hand, the Chinese concept of coexistence is compatible with the global principles of absolute sovereignty, the legal equality of states, and effective territorial control as the legitimate basis of regimes. These principles form the essence of the UN system. This institution for global security management reflects the rules of international conduct, which the Western and Eastern bloc agreed had universal applicability.¹³

Well suited to China's program of international order, the UN system does not devise specific domestic political structures. In addition, China occupies a permanent seat on the UNSC and enjoys veto powers, allowing it to use the UN system as a defensive structure, warding off attempts at making changes to international order that are at odds with its interests. On the other hand, the principles potentially conflict with China's concept of national identity. Chinese nationalism involves a historical understanding of how to define proper international conduct, including a continuous commitment to recover its historically defined territorial rights from the days of the Ming Dynasty. China uses archaeological finds and references to its territorial occupations in ancient history to substantiate such claims and applies the language and practice of international law to give the claims the trappings of

modern legal principles.¹⁴ For example, China has published a map of the South China Sea depicting a tongue-shaped, dashed boundary line that generally follows the 200-meter isobath, considered a traditional sea boundary line by the Chinese. Daniel Dzurek suggests that the traditional sea boundary line, which covers around 80 percent of the South China Sea, defines sovereignty over islands.¹⁵ In addition, China pursues effective control, following the post–World War II practice for sovereignty claims. Examples of initiatives include deployments of military garrisons and the building of cities and airstrips on islands, islets, and reefs in the South China Sea. However, China has never defined the exact course of its claim to maritime space in the South China Sea. Consequently, the extent of China’s claim remains unclear.

China manages to reconcile the dilemma between coexistence and national identity issues because it sees its program of international order as a means to an end—the restoration of Chinese superiority—rather than an end in itself. Coexistence is designed for a world consisting of states; as such, the program offers China protection from the threats of foreign powers while Beijing builds up the economic and military capabilities necessary to change the setup of the international realm. Consequently, China does not intend to use the principles to govern international relations permanently, but temporarily, while China restores its former greatness with an eye towards becoming a full-blown economic, military, and political great power comparable to the United States.¹⁶ Upon completion of this process, China will likely reconsider which strategies are useful for pursuing its national interests.

In conclusion, several differences exist between the US and Chinese programs of international order (see table below).

Table. Comparison of US liberal and Chinese coexistence programs of international order

	<i>United States</i>	<i>China</i>
Program of international order	Liberalism	Coexistence
Type of power	Status quo	Within-system revisionist
Type of international system	Integration	Comanagement
Great-power relations	Cooperation	Coordination

US and Chinese Strategies for Implementing International Order

Ordinarily, programs of international order would address issues that concern securing state survival under conditions of international anarchy. How can states continue to go about their business of pursuing their interests without destroying the condition of international anarchy, which forms the basis of their political authority? Preservation of the states system requires a framework for international order that regulates the use of force, the control of persons and territory, and the entering into agreements with other political authorities.¹⁷ The first requirement—principles on the use of force—is designed to ensure that peace is the normal condition in an international system in which states enjoy a monopoly on the issue of who holds political authority and, as such, form part of the diplomatic community. The second requirement—diplomacy—concerns the power, will, and intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with one's own values. Henry Kissinger points out that the elusive aspect of intellectual and moral impetus, nowadays often called ideational power, is at least as important as the more substantial elements when we address issues of diplomacy and great-power status.¹⁸ Third, influence on international order demands legitimacy in the eyes of other international actors. International legitimacy depends on the collectivity of states' assessment of the righteousness of the designs on international order suggested by a great power. Influence is a function not only of a country's stature but also of its connections.¹⁹ Goodwill with other states and status as a worthy partner form the basis for a state's successful interaction with other states. Reputation is an asset that states cannot afford to take lightly.²⁰ The fact that states routinely look to the collectivity of states for approval indicates that they invariably attach importance to acceptance of their foreign policy decisions from the diplomatic community.²¹ In other words, allies and partners are a necessity if a state wishes to exercise influence on the rules of the game. To avoid the eclipse of common interests due to internal differences, even the most powerful state needs to convince partners that its policies are responsible and feasible.²² The principles pertaining to a particular order will often be nested in actual state behavior rather than in written agreements since decades or even centuries may pass before all states accept a principle as a legal rule. The remainder of this section addresses the issue of

US and Chinese strategies on the use of force, diplomacy, and legitimacy as they are reflected in their international state practices.

The US Liberal Integrationist Program of International Order

US policies on the use of force, which constitutes one of the fundamental elements of international order, consist of three elements: deterrence, unilateralism, and hegemony. In the post-Cold War era, these three elements have formed the principal strategies for maintaining the US position of dominance in the Asia-Pacific. The United States has redefined all three strategies, long-standing elements of US foreign policy, to suit the international security environment of the post-Cold War era. Deterrence—the principal way that Washington deals with threats—is essentially a psychological instrument, its success measured by events that do not happen. One deters by maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon an aggressor at any time during the course of an armed exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike.²³ Deterrence covers a wide range of policy initiatives and options such as the United States' arms exports and its policy of strategic ambiguity with regard to Taiwan, the permanent US military presence on the Korean peninsula, and the US nuclear deterrent. Washington's post-Cold War definition of unilateralism encompasses the strengthening of existing alliances and the building of strategic partnerships, allowing the United States to reorganize its force posture to increase its flexibility and capabilities of rapid power projection. To implement these plans, the United States deploys permanently ground-stationed forces; forward operating bases with pre-positioned equipment; and facilities for training, exercise, and liaison activities.²⁴ The unilateral element in these policies is that Washington remains in control of bilateral asymmetrical relations, allowing it to define order on its own terms. The United States' post-Cold War definition of hegemony entails a commitment to maintain a preponderance of power as distinct from a balance of power.²⁵ This encourages Washington to opt for hegemony through a combination of enforcement and persuasion.

US policies on diplomacy—the second fundamental element of international order—derive from the US alliance system, which rests on the principle of military security guarantees in the event of aggression that threatens the survival of alliance members.²⁶ This alliance system, which

assists Washington in implementing its program of international order, is more correctly termed an alignment system. Washington's formal allies with whom it has pacts of mutual military assistance include states such as Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, and numerous other great, secondary, and small powers across the world. Moreover, the United States has defense responsibilities for areas such as the Pacific Islands of Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, which are US territories, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia, which have signed compacts of free association. Some countries have no formal alliance with the United States but are close *de facto* strategic partners. For example, Singapore hosts a contingency of US Pacific Command or the Unified Combatant Command, testifying to its importance in the US alliance system. Taiwan is not a state *de jure*, but considerable military assistance from the United States and Taipei's participation in the theater missile defense program indicate that it occupies a central position in the US alliance system. Outside this core, the United States has strategic partnerships with states such as Afghanistan and India. Russia is a strategic partner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the very periphery, the United States has military cooperation agreements with states such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Thus, Washington uses its alliance system, which covers all the world's regions, to assure partners that they form part of the US security umbrella; to deter arms races, aggression, and coercion; and to enable the United States and its allies to take military action in this region. Hence, US dialogue with other states occurs in an institutional setting over which it has extensive control.

Concerning US policies on diplomacy, Washington in the first instance looks to members of its alliance system and in the second instance to multilateral security institutions. The involvement of global and regional organizations such as the UN and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is *ad hoc* and conditional, depending on their contributions to US security priorities. If their contribution does not compare with the cost, then the United States prefers to rely solely on its alliance system.²⁷ Washington is concerned about the emergence of multilateral institutions that may tackle security problems without the United States and is anxious that these might duplicate the work of existing institutions. The evolution of exclusionary

regional blocs would greatly challenge US interests.²⁸ Examples that fall within this category include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, consisting of Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and the ASEAN+3, which includes Southeast Asia and China, Japan, and South Korea. Despite this concern, the United States remains the dominant power with the most extensive global network of alliances and strategic partnerships.

US policies on legitimacy, the third element in programs of international order, have their basis in the liberal ideas of civil rights, democracy, and market economy. This civilizational element constitutes the long-term strategy for preserving US preeminence.²⁹ For the most part, economic globalization is accepted around the world as well as in China. Beijing sees this aspect of liberalism as a strategy to resurrect China's historical position as a role model for other states and nations. The United States considers China's intentions with market economic development potentially disturbing; however, Washington's liberal understanding of international relations encourages it to entertain the hope that China's economic changes will socialize its population into adopting a favorable view of the political ideas of liberalism. The United States therefore adopts an approving attitude towards the fact that contemporary China has embraced the international market economic structures. Thus, economic issues are not at the top of the US security agenda with China although issues of contention remain, such as Beijing's reluctance to include the Chinese currency—the renminbi—in a system of floating exchange rates.

Liberal democratic and legal globalization, by contrast, has yet to take root and hence remains a long-term objective of US governments. The rationale behind this element is the idea of democratic peace—that is, democracies committed to the rule of law are less likely to go to war against each other since they consider each other entities that play by the rules. They consider each other less legitimate targets of enforcement strategies by default because it is not merely their governments but the people represented by governments whose decisions and activities are consequently called into question. This is so because in democracies, political structures ensure that governments answer to their citizens.³⁰

The United States, however, does not necessarily pursue its aim of spreading democracy across the world by peaceful means. It conducted the war on terror principally by military means. The war on terror and the use

of force are considered elements in creating preconditions for the spread of liberal democracy and the rule of law in the long run. The US national security strategy of 2012 formulates it as the belief that “regime changes, as well as tensions within and among states under pressure to reform, introduce uncertainty for the future. But they also may result in governments that, over the long term, are more responsive to the legitimate aspirations of their people, and are more stable and reliable partners of the United States.”³¹ So the United States supports democratic reform. Elections are vital. However, democracy also requires the rule of law, the protection of minorities, and strong, accountable institutions that last longer than a single vote. In general, the eradication of terrorism is one of several ways of promoting stability at the domestic and international level. Stability is seen as a precondition for democratization since it is difficult to bring about lasting changes in governmental and legal practices without some measure of predictability in the basic political and military structures. Stability may entail working with authoritarian political establishments in the short run to pave the way for long-term liberal political and legal reforms.

The Chinese Coexistence Program of International Order

China has been good at demonstrating willingness to set aside short-term national interests on issues concerning the use of force and adjust its policies to the realities of relative power, one of the fundamental elements of international order. China has enlisted at least partial support for its policies from most regional powers in the developing world, including countries such as Russia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, and others. Territorial and maritime border disputes are perhaps the most serious barriers to partnerships with some of the countries in the developing world. However, on issues of border disputes that have given rise to serious conflict and the use of force during the Cold War, Beijing is not merely focused on arguments supporting its sovereignty. China has pursued compromises with a view to enhancing international peace and stability on the majority of these issues. Although China takes steps to demonstrate effective control and has not renounced its claim, at the same time Beijing has agreed to shelve its claim in the South China Sea to encourage information exchange and coordination on resource exploration and exploitation between claimant states. These measures serve the purpose of avoiding the use of force. China and Russia

have agreed on a permanent settlement to their border dispute in the form of a roughly equal distribution of disputed territory that takes into account the relative importance of such territory for the contending states. The Indo-Chinese border dispute remains unresolved, in part because New Delhi suspects that China utilizes its current position of relative strength vis-à-vis India to strike a deal that will further diminish Indian influence in the eastern part of the subcontinent. In this area, the small rim states increasingly look to China to balance India's traditional position of dominance. Another reason for the lack of a settlement is that the Pakistan and the Tibet issues form part of the border dispute, causing both China and India to be reluctant to consider modest measures of interaction such as cross-border trade. Even in this protracted dispute, after the Cold War, China and India initiated negotiations at irregular intervals. Arguably, measures such as occasional formal meetings and popular cross-border interaction in an area such as Sikkim ensure that the conflict remains a low-intensity dispute that only rarely involves the use of force.³²

In the diplomatic arena, China has demonstrated concern not only for pursuing its national interests but also for protecting the common interest in preserving international peace and security. China's diplomacy takes the old UN system and its principles of absolute sovereignty and noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states as a starting point. In contrast to the United States, China opposes a more flexible approach to these principles since it sees them as protection against unlawful use of force. In China's view, such unlawful aggression at times originates from states supporting US liberal integrationist aspirations by advocating that serious breaches of individual rights justify the use of force against other states. For example, China strongly criticized what it saw as NATO's misuse of UN Resolution 1973 to intervene in Libya, an intervention that brought about regime change.³³ At least in part, the Chinese position on NATO's intervention in Libya resulted in China's vetoing the adoption of sanctions against Syria in the UNSC. Beijing's argument is that political dialogue rather than forceful measures should be used to solve domestic political disagreements.³⁴

Apart from China's attempt to limit the number and scope of resolutions that allow external actors to intervene in domestic conflicts, Beijing also argues that specialized or regional institutions should have a say in deciding if a threat towards international peace and security exists, remov-

ing decision-making power from the UNSC. China argues that these institutions are often better equipped than the UNSC to make such decisions due to their local or specialized knowledge of the context in which the alleged threat occurs. However, if the UNSC presents irrefutable evidence of a threat to international peace and security, China is willing to approve of actions not in its national interest to demonstrate sincerity in preserving international peace and security. For example, China has voted for Chapter VII resolutions adopting sanctions against Iran on occasions when UN or UN-affiliated institutions have proved that activities of the regimes engender threats against international peace and security. Beijing has voted in favor of these resolutions although it does not approve of using punitive measures as a means of resolving international conflict.

In the case of Myanmar, China has accepted nonbinding presidential statements that criticized the regime for its adoption of punitive measures against peaceful political opponents. China made this decision to accommodate demands from developing countries for protecting what they consider fundamental civil and political rights. China's principal constituency for its coexistence strategy is in the developing world. As a consequence, Beijing tried to meet these demands halfway. Because a presidential statement is not binding, it does not set a precedent in international law that might conflict with the status of absolute sovereignty and nonintervention as the most fundamental principles of international law.³⁵ By supporting the statements, China was able to express criticism of Myanmar's political and civil rights breaches without compromising on its insistence that absolute sovereignty is to be respected if no threat exists to international peace and security.

On the issue of diplomacy, China has combined a principled approach to Western calls for using more Chapter VII operations and for punishing breaches of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with a flexible approach to the implementation of its program of peaceful coexistence. This flexibility entails taking into account the demands of secondary and small powers. China has accepted Chapter VII resolutions on occasions when the UN or UN-affiliated institutions have presented irrefutable evidence that regime behavior engendered threats to international peace and security. At the same time, China has succeeded in limiting the number and scope of UN-approved punitive actions. Furthermore, Beijing has demonstrated

willingness to listen to demands from developing countries that regional and functional organizations be allowed more influence on global security management. When these demands concern breaches of civil and political rights, China has accommodated them by accepting nonbinding presidential statements on unsolicited domestic use of force. As a result, China strengthens its image as a principled power whose political practice corresponds to the principles of international conduct that it promotes. China's policies also strengthen its image as a pragmatic and equality-oriented power that listens to the demands of secondary and small powers.

On issues of legitimacy, China adheres to respect for the territorial integrity of regimes, including the right of governments to use violent means towards citizens who threaten the survival of regimes. The coexistence principles of equality and mutual benefit are interpreted as the prerogative of government to provide its citizens with basic economic and social means to ensure a stable polity. Issues of political legitimacy are secondary concerns controlled by regimes exercising effective control over territory and peoples. Consequently, individual demands for political change or redress are not legitimate cause for intervention into the internal affairs of other states. Beijing portrays great powers that do not demonstrate respect for these principles as irresponsible violators of international law. As such, their entitlement to exercise international leadership is called into question.³⁶

On the issue of legitimacy, China has attempted to sideline entities that challenge its entitlement to a position of great power with sovereign rights over its territory and peoples, globally and politically. One example is mainland China's relations with Taiwan. Here, China has not utilized its growing position of strength vis-à-vis Taiwan to assert its sovereignty claim by using force. Instead, following the election victory of the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) in 2008 and the termination of plans for future referendums on Taiwanese independence, China has resumed political dialogue and initiatives such as direct flights and investments. The initiatives gradually increase economic and cultural interaction between mainland China and Taiwan. Beijing's approach demonstrates China's confidence that Taiwan will continue to be marginalized in international politics and will have to accept some kind of political integration with the mainland at some point.

China's Xinjiang province offers another example. Here, China insists on its prerogative to use violent means against separatist movements that allegedly threaten the unity of the Chinese nation. At the same time, China attempts to step up the assimilation process of the Turkish Uyghurs by means of socioeconomic development initiatives.

A third example concerns China's relations with Japan. With regard to Tokyo, China has engaged in a political dialogue that keeps a lid on conflict between the two powers. However, when Japan appears to challenge China's claim to sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, Japan is treated as an aggressor, which entitles China to use all means necessary to stop Tokyo's alleged violations of Chinese sovereignty. Beijing responded to the Japanese coast guard's arrest of the captain of a Chinese fishing boat that ignored requests to leave the East China Sea by taking four Fujitsu employees hostage, slowing down customs clearances for Japanese companies, suspending the sale of rare earth minerals essential for the production of electronics, cutting off official exchanges at the ministerial level, and rescinding invitations to Japanese youths to attend the Shanghai Expo. China's attempt at sidelining Taiwan, the internal Uyghur opposition, and Japan in the event of challenges to Chinese sovereignty falls on fertile ground. At the international level, Taiwan has experienced a steady downwards slope in terms of influence since its separation from mainland China. Militant Islam, fought by all major global powers, contributes to the unpopularity of Muslim separatism such as that associated with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Finally, Japan's gradual marginalization as a great power with political influence on international order for the past couple of decades does not give cause for much criticism. One reason is that Tokyo never paid much attention to its image as a great power. Another reason is twentieth century memories in numerous Asian neighboring states of the widespread violence emanating from Japanese hegemonic aspirations in the first half of the twentieth century.³⁷

Comparing the US and Chinese Implementation Strategies

The United States' implementation strategy centers on using its alliance system to spread liberal market economic structures and political and civil rights structures with the objective of bringing about integration between states and societies on the basis of common values. China's implementation

strategy centers on using the UN system and its principles of absolute sovereignty and nonintervention to preserve international peace and stability with the purpose of establishing coexistence between states on the basis of common interests. China has an uneasy position as a would-be great power with global political influence without the economic and military resources of a great power alongside US global great-power status. This situation gives rise to an international system without clear rules of the game and without permanent conflict resolution mechanisms. This in-between kind of system is sustained by the fact that China exercises sufficient political influence to allow it to continue promoting and implementing its version of international order. Hence, two competing orders continue to exist in the international system without indications that these will be replaced by one coherent version of international order.

US and Chinese Programs of International Order and the Dynamics of the International System

The US and Chinese programs of international order proceed from different dynamics. The US program draws on liberal values of integration. By contrast, China's program is based on overlapping interests in policy coordination when conflict between great powers poses a risk of the use of force. The two programs are not operating in different geographical hemispheres. Instead, they intersect on numerous issues and across economic, military, and political sectors of the international system in an uncoordinated fashion. This dynamic gives rise to a type of in-between international system not necessarily more prone to the outbreak of war than the Cold War system between the Soviet Union and the United States. However, the system is unpredictable and expensive to operate in because one cannot devise permanent mechanisms of conflict resolution in this type of environment. Instead, ad hoc frameworks of conflict management are used to address security threats. The membership and rules of these frameworks are defined on a trial-and-error basis. Furthermore, in this system secondary and small powers exert much influence because the United States and China compete for their backing and loyalty without succeeding in winning them completely over to their side.

Who benefits from this in-between order of disjointed and intersecting practices of international conduct? The United States has not been in

such an advantageous international position for a long time. In the current international system, Washington can pursue its economic goals without ideological constraints. The financial crisis of 2008 that threatened to derail world economic prosperity due to deficient credit structures has not discredited market economic structures or engendered the emergence or revival of alternative economic systems. China has become an arduous supporter of market economic structures because the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party depends upon the growing prosperity that these structures have helped bring about. Indeed, China seeks to use international economic and financial institutions to outplay the United States on its ideological home ground. For example, China promotes its renminbi as an international reserve currency. Such a development would further weaken the status of the dollar and US possibilities of financing its debt by means of foreign holdings of treasury bonds. In the economic and financial sector, competition and rivalry may be fierce. However, it takes place on the basis of a coherent set of fundamental rules and structures not essentially contested by any major international actors. This is a marked improvement for US goals and strategies compared to the Cold War system managed by the United States and Soviet Union. During the Cold War, Washington had to contend with a competing economic system that challenged the legitimacy of market economic methods for accumulating wealth.

Militarily, the US alliance system in combination with superior US military capabilities continues as a primary source of power and influence, not least because the majority of the world's states rely on US security guarantees. China is building up military capabilities, and the size of its defense budgets in 2011 included a hefty increase—up to 12.7 percent, according to Beijing.³⁸ These figures do not even reflect the true level of resources used by China's national defense because they do not include spending on items such as weapons purchased from overseas, revenue from arms exports, subsidies to the domestic defense industry, and research and development.³⁹ However, without an alliance system, Beijing can use its military capabilities only for very limited purposes beyond access denial. China has strategic partners in its neighborhood such as Russia, Pakistan, and Myanmar, which give Beijing access to military facilities and technology. However, these strategic partnerships are not based on mutual security guarantees that would entail lasting commitments of military engagement and cooperation.

Indeed, the cost of building and maintaining an alliance system lies beyond China's means for the foreseeable future. In addition, its aspirations for restoring the motherland and its national identity policies are not compatible with the establishment of an alliance system that requires a high level of defense integration and mutual commitment to the same fundamental objectives. China has very few loyal partners that would accept extensive exchange of information and expertise between national defenses because they suspect that China will not continue to treat them as independent sovereign entities. These suspicions originate from China's position on national identity issues.

China poses challenges to US visions of international order principally at the international political level rather than in the economic and military sectors. However, Beijing does not seem to threaten the preeminent position of the United States in the international system. Nor does China's behavior prevent the United States from pursuing implementation of its version of international order so long as peaceful coexistence remains the dominant theme in China's programs of international order. Indeed, peaceful coexistence implies that the use of force between the two powers probably will not occur except perhaps by accident. China uses military means principally for domestic purposes as long as it continues to focus on growing economically, increasing living standards, maintaining domestic stability, and catching up militarily by modernizing its national defense. China may challenge the legitimacy of US policies and make it difficult for the United States to keep secondary powers outside the Western hemisphere, such as Russia and India, as strategic partners without paying a very high price for their loyalty. Compared to the minimal, militarized system of the Cold War, however, it is an international system far more amenable to US interests and demands.

For secondary and small powers, the system is also quite attractive because it allows them substantial leverage on international order. The increased role in UN operations of regional and functional security institutions such as the African Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency is a good example. In these institutions, secondary and small powers have more influence than in the UNSC, whose agenda is dominated by the veto-wielding permanent members. Another example involves Russia's ability to cooperate with China, NATO, and the United States in order to

extract maximum security benefits from its attractions as a strategic partner for both Washington and Beijing. By contrast, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States established a common international order based on mutual nuclear deterrence, noninterference in the internal affairs of states belonging to the core of the opposing alliance, and the UNSC as the common forum for great-power management of international peace and security. This minimal order allowed secondary and small powers very little influence because the two great powers agreed to divide the world into separate spheres of influence. Within each sphere, one party implemented different versions of international order without much interference from the other. By contrast, the current lack of agreement between the United States and China on a fundamental structure of the system allows secondary and small powers to align with both Washington and Beijing without choosing sides. This situation increases the freedom of action and influence of those powers on the policies and strategies of the great powers.

In China's view, the current international system is also fairly amenable to its interests and demands. At present, China's influence on the dynamics and principles of the international system far outweighs its economic and military capabilities. The complexity and fluidity of the international system engendered by China's current international position constitute a development of its position as the third power in between the Soviet Union and the United States. China began to carve out this position in 1968 when it decided to make a priority of reaching a bilateral agreement that would restore relations with the Soviet Union based upon China's five principles of coexistence.⁴⁰ This step towards a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union was intended to allow China to pursue its national interests abroad without risking the provocation of violent conflict with Moscow due to a lack of policy coordination. Similar efforts to establish a managerial relationship with the United States to avoid confrontation involving the use of force followed this effort, resulting in the much-publicized US-Chinese rapprochement of 1971. Already at this time, China was pursuing an international position that would facilitate engagement without requiring integration into the partial orders of the Western and Eastern hemispheres.

A principal difference between now and then is that during the Cold War, China did not have status as a political great power, which it needed to implement its concept of peaceful coexistence on a global scale. During

the Cold War, China had the ideas but not the wherewithal, except in a very rudimentary form. Consequently, it remained a secondary power that gravitated towards the Soviet Union as well as the United States without choosing sides. Furthermore, China focused on maximizing its national interests rather than influencing the setup of international order. Contrastingly, after the Cold War, China began to wield the political influence that allows it to punch above its weight in terms of engagement in international politics. This change in China's position produces centripetal forces encouraging it to promote international coordination and comanagement of global security issues and centrifugal forces of national interests. These dynamics ensure that rivalry and competition continue to characterize international order. The advantages that great powers and secondary and small powers derive from the resulting in-between system imply that it will likely remain in place for the foreseeable future.

Notes

1. For a detailed account of the liberal integration-coexistence argument on US and Chinese programs of international order, see Liselotte Odgaard, *China and Coexistence: Beijing's National Security Strategy for the Twenty-First Century* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press / Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 1–22.

2. The debate on US post-Cold War international order is vast. Two major tendencies in the debate, which have been pervasive themes regarding the United States and international order, concern whether the United States is driven merely by the political dynamics of power or if the element of idealism plays a role in its policies, as argued in this article. For arguments that trace such dynamics in US policies on international order, see, for example, Robert Kagan, "End of Dreams, Return of History," in *To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 36–59; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001); and Robert J. Art, "The Fungibility of Force," in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 7th ed., ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 3–22. For arguments that trace the roots of idealism in US policies on international order, see, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *National Interest*, Summer 1989, reprinted in *Foreign Affairs / Council on Foreign Relations, America and the World: Debating the New Shape of International Politics* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2002), 1–28; and Ian Clark, "China and the United States: A Succession of Hegemonies?," *International Affairs* 87, no. 1 (2011): 13–28.

3. For an account of the history of the Chinese concept of peaceful coexistence, see Han Nianlong, chief ed., *Diplomacy of Contemporary China* (Hong Kong: New Horizon Press, 1990), 213–30. For an analysis of peaceful coexistence as China's national security strategy, see Odgaard, *China and Coexistence*.

4. The approach to liberal integration used in this article is based on G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 3–79.

5. R. J. Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 17–36.

6. Benjamin J. Cohen, "Containing Backlash: Foreign Economic Policy in an Age of Globalization," in *Eagle Rules? Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Robert J. Lieber (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 302.

7. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), [i] (statement by President Obama, 3 January 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.

8. Francis Fukuyama, "Democratization and International Security," in *New Dimensions in International Security*, Adelphi Paper no. 266 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991/92), 18.

9. Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 206–9.

10. For an assessment of the literature on China's rise that focuses on the distinction between patterns of conflict and cooperation between China and the United States, see Avery Goldstein, "Power Transitions, Institutions, and China's Rise in East Asia: Theoretical Expectations and Evidence," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, nos. 4–5 (August–October 2007): 639–82.

11. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 79–82.

12. Robert S. Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 33–39.

13. On the origins and principles of the UN system, see Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993).

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20. F. S. Northedge, *The International Political System* (London: Faber & Faber, 1976), 112–13, 150–51.

21. Manning, *Nature of International Society*, 160–61, 176–77.

22. Grotius, quoted in Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1978), 123, 130.

23. Jeffrey Record, "Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation," *Policy Analysis*, no. 519 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 8 July 2004), <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa519.pdf>.

24. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 2004–2005* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), 14–19.

25. For the argument that unilateralism and hegemony are stable features of US international politics, see Gaddis, *Surprise, Security*.

26. For a detailed analysis of the US alliance system and its role in US policies, see Liselotte Odgaard, *The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security: U.S.-China Policies on Regional Order* (London: Routledge, 2007), 169–91.

27. Robert J. Art has described this course of action as selective engagement. See "The Strategy of Selective Engagement," in Art and Waltz, *Use of Force*, 327–48.

28. Anonymous interview with US government official.

29. Clark, "China and the United States," and Ikenberry, *After Victory*, explain how the ideational element of what they call US hegemony serves to preserve the institutional structures of US international order long after the United States has stopped being a hegemon.

30. For an academic exposition of this argument, see, for example, Bruce M. Russett, with the collaboration of William Antholis et al., *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

31. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership*, 2.

32. A more detailed analysis of these arguments can be found in Odgaard, *China and Coexistence*, 87–127.

33. For a detailed analysis, see *ibid.*, 128–52.

34. “China and Russia Veto UN Resolution Condemning Syria,” *BBC News*, 5 October 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15177114>.

35. Odgaard, *China and Coexistence*, 128–52.

36. *Ibid.*, 153–80.

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38. “China Says It Will Boost Its Defence Budget in 2011,” *BBC News*, 4 March 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12631357>.

39. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 2009* (London: Routledge, 2009), 375.

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Self-Interest in African Regional Economic Organizations and Lessons from the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

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Although regional integration is not likely to become a panacea for Africa's difficulties, many scholars and public officials acknowledge that it will solve many of the continent's problems. Economists and investors argue that a bigger market not only will attract more private investment capital but also will likely create economies of scale. Historians and political scientists remind us that many of Africa's current troubles stem from the artificial territories and states produced by the Berlin Conference of 1884.¹ Geographers have also pointed to artificial boundaries as a cause for much of the underdevelopment in the region. Such boundaries, coupled with a lack of natural transportation routes to connect the continent, have limited the growth of commerce and large metropolitan communities essential to economic progress.² One hears repeatedly that minimizing the effects of these boundaries through regional integration will open up avenues for social and economic advancement.

However, identifying a form or course of integration most likely to lead to consistent expansion and deepening of regional integration among African states remains a point of contention. This article maintains that a regional organization's prospects for both expanding and deepening largely depend upon its principal interests. For instance, the European Coal and

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Steel Community (predecessor of the European Union [EU]) was created by the European political elite with the goal of reducing or preventing war on the continent. As the interests of Europeans evolved from the need to prevent conflict to economic development, the regional organization has followed suit to accommodate both political and economic interests. Meanwhile, the North American Free Trade Association emerged to represent the economic interests of big corporations in America, Canada, and Mexico, and its structure reflects those concerns. Consequently, the success of any regional organization depends upon the compatibility of the interests represented and the goals of the organization.

Colonial Rule and Regional Integration

Regional organizations in Africa have performed poorly because the primary interests represented are not compatible with the goals of these organizations. Decisions to create such entities, like most other decisions in Africa, are primarily based on the interests and wishes of political leaders in the countries concerned.³ Many scholars have observed that regional organizations in Africa were created to serve the needs of the state and not those of individuals or society.⁴ To acquire a better understanding of the interests or goals of regional organizations in Africa, one must examine the structures that inspired these institutions.

Formal cooperation among African states began during the colonial era. The colonizing powers, particularly Britain and France, established regional organizations mainly for administrative convenience.⁵ African economies were primarily subsistence, involving minimal exports from one community to another. The regional bodies that arose during the colonial period, therefore, largely served administrative rather than economic functions. The colonial powers did not have enough manpower to administer each colony separately. At independence, the new leaders inherited the regional organizations, together with their modes of operation, even though they claimed that the institutions were intended to promote economic growth and efficiency.

The East African Community (EAC) offers a good example of regional organizations developed to expedite colonial rule in Africa. Now composed of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda, the EAC initially included Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda—countries administered

by Great Britain, which sought to minimize its administrative expenses while maximizing its benefits by coordinating the administration of the three colonies. For instance, Britain constructed a railway line (the first in the region) from Kenya's coastal town of Mombasa to Kisumu, its border town with Uganda. The Kenya-Uganda Railway, completed in 1902, transported cash crops and other resources from the interior (Uganda and Kenya) to the coast for shipment to Britain. Eventually, the railway became the nucleus of the East African Railway Services, one of the core services of the East African Common Services Organization, which, together with the EA Common Market, preceded the EAC.⁶

Another example of colonial influence—lobbying for regional cooperation by the white settlers in Kenya—contributed to integration of the East African colonies. Intending to achieve quicker and greater economic development than other regions on the continent, these individuals petitioned for the integration of the three colonies. For the most part, colonial governors, particularly those of Kenya, conducted the lobbying. Allen Springer reports that governors Sir Robert Coryndon and Sir Edward Grigg, both of Kenya, insisted on regional cooperation—and even federation. They preferred regional integration in spite of skepticism expressed by representatives from other areas of the colonies.⁷

Colonial administrators were primarily concerned about institutions that would facilitate efficient extraction of resources and direction of the three large colonies, but African leaders who assumed the reins of power at independence took more interest in national development. A brief examination of the mechanics of colonial rule reveals the reasons for African leaders' obsession with the development of nationalism immediately after independence.

European powers commonly used what came to be known as the divide-and-conquer technique to dominate a continent many times larger than theirs. These colonizing powers pitted one nation or tribe against another, both to weaken resistance and to employ armies from one country to fight another. In Uganda, ethnic groups from the northern part of the country (Nilotics) were manipulated to become archenemies of the ethnic groups in the southern region (Bantu); in Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani from the north became enemies of the Igbo and Yoruba in the south; in Rwanda and Burundi, the Tutsi and Hutu became lifelong enemies even though they

had intermarried and shared the same language and culture.⁸ All of this meant that peoples in most African countries did not feel like nations at independence and that governments formed at that time did not have internal legitimacy. Given such a political environment, African leaders sought to gain political legitimacy and foster a spirit of nationalism among all citizens of their countries, adopting the strategy of economic development through economic integration to do so.

African Leaders and Regional Integration

Many African leaders and policy advocates at the international level have proposed or tried to follow the trail blazed by the European states. The European model of regional cooperation and integration is based on two theories—the customs union (CU) theory and the Balassa model.⁹ Jacob Viner's CU theory deals with efficiency in production and trade as well as other economic benefits that come with the unification of two or more markets. It draws from the concept of trade creation and diversion, the former involving increases in trade among a group of countries after they remove customs barriers. Theoretically, eliminating tariffs between economies leads to a more efficient allocation of resources, followed by lower commodity prices and more trade. Trade diversion occurs when consumers abandon cheaper commodities available in countries outside their region and settle for expensive goods produced within their area. In short, integration is beneficial if it leads to trade creation and harmful if it leads to trade diversion.

The economic theory of integration concerns the process by which countries increasingly ignore their territorial boundaries to pursue greater economic benefits. Progressive elimination of trade barriers between nations involved in integration arrangements lies at the core of this theory. Béla Balassa best conceptualizes the process as one consisting of five stages: creation of a free trade area, a CU, a common market, an economic union, and total economic integration. When countries initiate a course of economic cooperation, they probably will become more integrated, starting with a free trade area, until they attain total economic integration. Because of the economic benefits that come with cooperation, one assumes that countries continue to extend or intensify their level of cooperation until they reap all benefits.

Despite the anticipated benefits, many Africanists have written about the irrelevance of the CU theory to free trade and integration in Africa.¹⁰ Most criticisms have focused on technical aspects, primarily the mismatch between CU integration and the continent's economic realities. For instance, most African countries export similar products, and their economic structures lack flexibility. In other words, most of them cannot easily adopt new commodities to produce or export. Thus, once markets merge and a free trade area arises, the integrated economies cannot easily adjust to produce commodities in which they have a comparative advantage. In technical terms, such economies do not complement each other. Integration of them does not result in more trade. Furthermore, African countries have tried to use the bigger markets created by regional integration to develop their economies by way of import-substitute industrialization, which has not worked well either. Instead of creating more trade between countries, it has produced trade diversion. Even more frustrating, despite the realization of some economic benefits, problems regarding their equal distribution have undermined the efforts of cooperation.¹¹

A second set of problems with regional integration in Africa involves issues related to politics on the continent, which is plagued by nepotism, corruption, and tendencies for personal rule—all of which undermine the institutional capabilities of regional organizations.¹² Many of the latter have not performed well because of the appointment of unqualified political cronies. Given the underdeveloped nature of African economies, most people look to the government for employment instead of the private sector. In fact, the government is the leading employer in most African countries. The most debilitating political reality, however, remains the tendency for personal rule. Many African leaders, even the ones democratically elected, are unwilling to follow or abide by the law. David Lamb succinctly captures the essence of personal rule in Africa in an account of his experience and observations in different parts of the continent: "Nowhere in the world do individual countries mirror the character of their presidents as much as in Africa. What a country is often depends solely on who the president is. A new man takes over and the country may move in an entirely different direction."¹³

This type of politics is not conducive to efficient functioning of a regional organization, as demonstrated by the experience of the EAC. Although the original EAC weathered several economic problems, the incompatible

personalities and ideological persuasions of the member countries' heads of state (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) precipitated its demise.¹⁴ Gen Idi Amin, president of Uganda, could not work with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania because of the suspicion and contempt the two leaders had for each other. For instance, Nyerere blocked Amin's appointments to top EAC positions and, even more seriously, refused to convene the East African Authority (the supreme organ of the EAC, composed of the heads of state) with Amin in power. Indeed, the East African Authority did not meet for six years because of the relationship between Amin and Nyerere.¹⁵

One limitation of regional organizations in Africa has not received sufficient attention—the incompatibility of the principal interests of African leaders with the goals of those organizations, which they created. Although they established organizations with an institutional design similar to that of the European Economic Community, their interests did not resemble those of the Europeans.

Self- (or National) Interest and Regional Integration

Many scholars have discussed political and technical issues associated with integration in Africa, and several leaders have implemented reforms; however, congruence between interests and objectives remains largely unexplored. This article addresses that issue by examining two models of integration—the European and Southeast Asian. Of all models of regional and economic integration, the European one has proved the most popular thus far. The success it has enjoyed, measured in terms of both the number of states involved and the amount of sovereignty relinquished, is phenomenal. Because of that success, leaders in Africa and elsewhere have chosen to adapt the European model. However, its performance in Europe has not transferred to other regions, as discussed above. Many countries have experienced technical and political problems when they attempt to implement this model. However, these are not the only difficulties.

In his paper “Sequencing and Depth of Regional Economic Integration: Lessons for the Americas from Europe,” Richard Baldwin argues that “the world has relatively little to learn from the European Union as far as the deepening of economic integration is concerned” and that “the EU's supranationality is the key to its deepening and this degree of supranationality would be unacceptable to most nations in today's world.”¹⁶ He contends

that most states would not be willing to give up their sovereignty, as did European nations. A unique set of circumstances made European integration possible. Commenting on these circumstances and the impact they had on integration, Baldwin writes that “this shared misery was critical to the adoption of institutional elements that continue to make the EU’s extraordinarily deep integration an irreproducible experiment even today.”¹⁷ European leaders wished to create and maintain a regional organization because it would help them attain their goal of peaceful coexistence. Collectively, they wanted to contain Germany, a state held responsible for starting both world wars, and to guard against the ideologically opposed Soviet Union.

In addition to security concerns, the nature of politics in Europe led political leaders to pass on the responsibilities of managing the regional institution to supranational organizations. In the early stages of European integration, a high demand for good governance, particularly democracy and rule of law, existed on one side and a desire for economic integration on the other. Because of these circumstances, European leaders found themselves in an unenviable situation whereby they had to make policies for two sets of constituencies—their national and regional citizens—whose needs did not always coincide. Consequently, those leaders were more willing to delegate authority to the EU to extract themselves from a tight spot, which in turn promoted further economic integration.¹⁸

This article argues that the circumstances and interests bolstering integration of the Southeast Asian nations, unlike integration in Europe, provide some lessons and hope for African states. Circumstances in Southeast Asia are similar to those in Africa in that both regions are creating and developing their regional organizations at a time when rapid economic development depends upon an open economy. European countries were lucky enough to develop at a time when their economies occupied the forefront of the industrialization curve; accordingly, their domestic markets absorbed commodities from industries in their region. In other words, those nations did not have to choose between export-oriented or import-substitute-oriented industrialization. Most countries that have tried to create regional economic organizations after European integration have had to contend with developing industries that compete with relatively inexpensive commodities from manufacturers in North America, Europe, and Japan.

Most states that have established regional organizations wish to develop their economies. Using the European Economic Community, together with the CU theory of integration, countries in other regions of the world have sought to create bigger markets that will shape a suitable environment for rapid industrialization and economic development. However, late developers (countries whose economies have or are developing in the late twentieth or twenty-first century) that want to keep abreast of the competition must either carve out a niche for themselves in the international market or concentrate on import-substitute industries in the domestic market. Jochen Legewie contends that Southeast Asian countries adopted both strategies of industrialization.¹⁹ Japanese corporations took advantage of the cheap but highly productive workforce in Southeast Asian countries to produce and export labor-intensive commodities. Meanwhile, governments in these nations pursued a policy of import-substitute industrialization. As a result, Southeast Asian countries could industrialize and develop their economies without exploiting the bigger market brought about by regional integration. According to Legewie,

The main reason for this low degree of intra-regional trade in Southeast Asia, albeit the strong economic and export growth, is the simultaneous implementation of two different economic policy strategies. Starting in the 1970s, all governments began to follow an export-promotion strategy with a liberal trade and investment policy for selected industries, especially in labor-intensive sectors of the textile industry and in consumer electronics. On the other hand, they continued (with the exception of Singapore) to pursue the policy of import-substitution in other areas to protect domestic industries by high tariff barriers and other impediments.²⁰

Legewie's analysis can help us understand important differences and similarities between regional organizations in Southeast Asia and Africa. On the one hand, leaders in both regions are primarily concerned about the development of their countries as opposed to the regions and are highly tempted to develop import-substitute industries and implement beggar-the-neighbor policies. That is, political considerations play a more substantial role in decision making than economic rationale—usually one of the barriers to successful regional organizations. On the other hand, regional organizations in Southeast Asia are more politically stable, and their infrastructure is fairly well developed. These attributes, together with the proximity of Southeast Asian countries to an industrial giant (Japan), have made them a magnet for private foreign capital. Meanwhile, African countries

remain politically unstable, and most of their infrastructure is either undeveloped or falling apart, thereby discouraging many investors from engaging in business with them.

Because of limited amounts of investment capital, attempts to use regional organizations as vehicles of industrialization and development have prompted disagreements between members due to unequal distribution of benefits.²¹ When establishing regional organizations, all African leaders seek immediate gains for their countries, particularly in the industrial sector. However, the economic laws of efficient production lead to the concentration of industries in a few countries. Some of them, usually one in a region, become industrialized and others do not.²² The more industrialized country enjoys greater benefits from the enlarged and protected market, but the less industrialized countries pay higher prices for manufactured products and lose income in the form of import taxes.²³ Of even greater political importance, however, the less industrialized countries will experience further disadvantages in terms of employment opportunities, development of technology and infrastructure, and the prestige that comes with industrial development. All of these problems undermine the commitment of African leaders to the sustenance and enhancement of regional organizations.

The preceding discussion shows that even though political leaders in Southeast Asia and Africa have created regional organizations, the national interests championed by those individuals conflict with the collective interests of the organizations. Specifically, each head of state wants his nation to industrialize and develop faster than neighboring countries; meanwhile, the regional organization wants the entire area to industrialize and develop in the most efficient way possible. This conflict of interest—coupled with political differences, particularly in Africa—has diminished the enthusiasm for furthering or even maintaining regional organizations in Africa. After they have formed regional organizations, African leaders spend more time trying to improve the economies of their own countries vis-à-vis their neighbors' than trying to refine the economic relationship of all countries involved.

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu points to a way out this quandary, contending that the interests and goals of regional organizations will coincide if multinational corporations (MNC) or investors of private capital become important players in those bodies.²⁴ Using the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a case study, Yoshimatsu examines how Japanese

MNCs' need for a larger market, coupled with the government's interest in economic development, has translated into the expansion and enhancement of the organization. He observes that "in 1996, Japanese auto MNCs, which hoped to increase production volume of plants located in the small market, successfully encouraged the ASEAN states to introduce the AICO [ASEAN Industrial Cooperation] arrangement that granted tariff reductions and local content accreditation."²⁵

Yoshimatsu's study demonstrates that although states created ASEAN, the interests of Japanese MNCs should receive credit for strengthening this organization. Member states were more interested in their own economic development by protecting domestic markets for local industries and less concerned with encouraging a free-trade area. Limited by the scarcity of capital, most firms in developing countries tend to cultivate small-scale industries and to seek protection from their governments.

Many such countries have launched regional organizations, hoping that if they complemented them with industrialization, the combination would lead to economic development. For the most part, particularly in Africa, these policies have not worked. Some explanations blame undue interference by governments while others condemn organizational weaknesses of the regional bodies. A number of these criticisms, though true, do not address the reason why regional integration has not proved successful in most regions other than Europe. Although industrialization or business interests remain a central factor in the equation, one must also pay attention to the type of firm or industry. According to Yoshimatsu,

Firms are likely to support the formation of a regional trade arrangement if the formation would enable them to enjoy benefits from preferential access to the regional market where they are heavily dependent, or to procure intermediate parts and components from countries in the region with reduced tariffs. In contrast, firms tend to oppose a regional trade arrangement if they have plants manufacturing products with a high degree of national integration and in markets protected against international competition.²⁶

This suggests that states serious about integration should have guidelines of the type of economic activities likely to encourage integration. The political and economic elite in Africa should encourage or provide incentives to MNCs that would probably operate at a regional level—including those whose industries consist of several sectors, with the goal of having different sectors located in different countries. Once these MNCs take root in a region, they will become the engine for deepening integration.

The proposition that African leaders would advocate policies which encourage MNCs to operate in their countries might not sound practical, but alterations in the international political economy together with the evolution of development strategies will likely change or have already changed the attitudes of these leaders.²⁷ Just as the dynamics of the international economy have changed to accommodate the forces of globalization, so have (or must) the development strategies that third world countries need to adopt. Globalization of the international economy has altered the process of—and the way entrepreneurs think about—production. The development of faster and more efficient technologies for communication and transportation makes physical location of industries less important than it once was. Investors are now moving their capital to countries or regions where they can maximize profit—usually in places with cheap labor and favorable regulations. Such reworkings in production have produced changes in attitudes toward land or the way geography influences economics and politics.

Until the second half of the twentieth century, territory remained the prized possession of any state, just as land was a very important resource in production. In 1648, when the Treaty of Westphalia created the current international system, territory represented one of the defining characteristics of a state. However, as the international political economy evolves, many people question the importance of territory and state sovereignty over that territory. MNCs have moved their capital to countries or regions where they would earn better returns. Although efficient production of a commodity involved minimizing the costs of transportation by making most of its components in close proximity, faster and cheaper transportation methods have reduced the importance of that factor. Consequently, many MNCs are moving their operations to developing countries, which investors no longer see as mere sources of raw materials but as places where cheaper and efficient production can take place. Thus, such nations with economic policies and a political environment favorable to foreign investors have attracted and benefited from foreign direct investment (FDI).

These modifications in the international political economy have changed African leaders' perception of MNCs and foreign investment. A quick review of the economic ideologies of the presidents of three East African countries illustrates this point. At independence, two of the three

East African leaders preferred socialist economic policies or, at best, had doubts about liberal economic policies. Most remembered for his socialist policies of Ujamaa, Julius Nyerere—the first president of Tanzania—subscribed to dependency theory and adopted policies that would shield his country from the exploitative policies of capitalism. With time, however, bureaucrats in Tanzania’s government realized that Nyerere’s policies were inhibiting rather than enhancing the country’s economic development. Citing a study by Matthew Costello, which points to the bureaucracy as the cause of economic liberalization in Tanzania, Robert Pinkney contends that initiatives by bureaucrats were energized by the election of Hassan Mwinyi, a former bureaucrat himself who immediately signed an International Monetary Fund agreement.²⁸

As in Tanzania, Milton Obote, Uganda’s first prime minister at independence, preferred economic socialism to liberalism. Obote was removed from power by Idi Amin in a coup d’état, an action well received by many democratic governments in Europe because they thought he would implement liberal policies. However, Amin continued Obote’s policies—particularly when he expelled Ugandan Indians, referring to them as imperialists or representatives of the exploitative machine of capitalism. Negative perception of economic liberalism by Uganda’s leaders started to change during the presidency of Yoweri Museveni, whose economic policies initially emphasized self-reliance and a state-directed economy.²⁹ In his election manifesto of 1996, though, Museveni asserted that his support (or change of heart, for that matter) of a free market economy was based on a realization that only liberal economic policies could aid Uganda’s pursuit of modernization.³⁰ He has reversed most of the economic policies implemented by his predecessors, inviting Ugandan-Indians to return and help the country develop as well as reclaim their businesses and property.

Support for liberal economic policies and foreign investment in African economies is based not only on the changing perceptions of African leaders but also on outcomes. Research conducted by Todd Moss and Vijaya Ramachandran in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda dispels the myths of African skepticism toward foreign investment.³¹ The authors contend that African governments oftentimes created barriers to FDI, believing that such investors “might control key strategic sectors of the economy or their access to foreign exchange . . . , crowd out local firms that cannot compete because

of size, financing, marketing power, or some other unfair advantage . . . , exploit local labor and make no contribution to the wider economy . . . , [and become a net] drain on foreign exchange.”³² They argue that the regulations against and misgivings toward FDI are unwarranted because African countries benefit in almost all accounts:

In sum, many of the objections to foreign investment in Africa are exaggerated or false. Foreign firms in the three-country sample invest more in local infrastructure, are more likely to train their workers, and are larger and more capital-intensive than local enterprises. Econometric analysis of the data also shows that market power is not a direct factor driving greater profits for foreign firms and that FDI is not a drain on foreign exchange. Instead, the results indicate that foreign firms may be more profitable because they are more productive as well.³³

This research provides tangible evidence that the instincts of African leaders who have decided to liberalize their economies and open them up to FDI are probably correct. It also shows that although some African leaders and political observers may retain a cynical mind-set with regard to the intention of foreign investors, outcomes of FDI in African countries are generally in line with what African leaders want.

Prospective investors should seek out research similar to Moss and Ramachandran’s, together with reports about the role of FDI in Asia that inform African leaders of the benefits of liberalizing their economies—take for example, a publication issued in 1999 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).³⁴ This report provides evidence of FDI’s contribution to the development of Africa’s economy and its integration into the world economy. Even more interesting, it offers data showing a tendency of more FDI in Africa going to the services and manufacturing sectors, a revelation that dispels a common perception of FDI exploiting Africa’s natural resources (investment in the primary sector). The UNCTAD publication cites not only specific examples such as Nigeria, Egypt, and Mauritius to support that assertion but also statistics comparing foreign investment in the primary sector to investment in the services and manufacturing sectors. Foreign investors can use examples like these to convince African leaders that FDI is good for their countries.

Primarily, the UNCTAD report sought to advertise Africa as a region where investments can yield good profits. Just as some African leaders have doubted the benefits of FDI in the past, so have foreign investors doubted the profitability of investing in Africa. It is, therefore, imperative that African

leaders persuade foreign investors that their countries are good places to put their money. The UNCTAD report makes the following observation:

While the problems many African countries face are widely known and dominate the perceptions of the continent as a whole, there are a number of positive aspects that, although highly relevant for foreign investors, are little known. . . . Direct investors need therefore to differentiate. They need to look at Africa country by country, sector by sector, and opportunity by opportunity. As in other continents, there are profitable investment opportunities to be found.³⁵

African leaders should be vigilant in detailing economic, political, and social reforms they have implemented to provide a suitable environment for business. For instance, they should publicize reforms such as privatization of state-owned enterprises, devaluation of overvalued currencies, reduction of inflation rates and budget deficits, and relaxation of regulations dealing with repatriation of profits, most of which aim to increase the role of private foreign investors. Those leaders should also announce international agreements they have signed that deal with FDI issues and should try to woo investors by informing them of treaties that deal with double taxation, bilateral investment, and protection of FDI that their country has signed. Such revelations would instill a sense of security among foreign investors and demonstrate African leaders' goodwill toward them.

Collective Interest and Regional Integration in East Africa

Using the EAC as an example, African leaders can develop an industry within this region with different components of a product manufactured in different countries and can use the comparative advantages of member states as a guide for the location of different sectors. Specifically, Uganda has the most arable land, Kenya has the most well developed infrastructure, Tanzania has considerable unused land, Rwanda and Burundi are densely populated, and Lake Victoria connects the countries. Because politics is usually an important consideration, projects that bind the member states in the long run must have priority.³⁶ Economic efficiency has to be evaluated in tandem with the political goals of member states.

We now turn to a detailed five-year evaluation of the EAC CU by Evarist Mugisa, Chris Onyango, and Patrick Mugoya, using it to estimate the viability of the suggestions offered here.³⁷ Regional cooperation between East African states has a long history, going back as far as 1902 when the

Kenya-Uganda Railway was constructed. Several institutions that bound the countries together developed over time until Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda established the EAC in 1967. The community lasted until 1977, when it collapsed due to technical and political differences. The current EAC, officially launched in 2001, consists of Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi, the latter two countries joining in 2007.

According to Mugisa, Onyango, and Mugoya, “The revived EAC goes beyond the earlier attempts at regional integration by aiming at closer and deeper integration among the Partner States.”³⁸ The partner states established a CU as the entry point to integration, to be implemented between 2005 and 2010 and followed by a common market, monetary union, and, finally, political federation. As an evaluation of the first stage of the EAC’s development, the authors’ study pronounces the implementation of the CU a success. Based on the statistics reviewed and summarized, they conclude that the CU has already generated benefits for the economies of the partner states. The records examined show that the CU has inspired an increase in the level of trade and revenue in all three partner states over the four years. A closer look at the report, however, suggests that some aspects of the community need fine tuning.

For instance, Mugisa, Onyango, and Mugoya note that despite a general increase in exports among all three countries, “a big percentage of the exports [from Kenya to Uganda and Tanzania] . . . constitute re-exports.” Those reexports have consisted of “petroleum products, chemicals, machinery, transport equipment, and manufactured goods.”³⁹ Similarly, Uganda and Tanzania have also reexported manufactured goods to Kenya, though in significantly lower quantities. This is a manifestation of the age-old problem of incompatible trade partners, whereby all three countries export and import similar products. The authors note that

the data seems to indicate no clear signals of consistency in exports of any product. This may be attributed partly to the fact that the products are similar to what is produced in each or most of the countries in the EAC region. As a result Uganda’s exports to the region (especially agricultural exports) increased where domestic production in each of the Partner States fell short or was disrupted by local conditions.⁴⁰

A more extensive development of the CU, particularly along the lines of each of the partner states specializing in commodities that they can produce most efficiently, would go a long way toward mitigating this problem. How-

ever, specialization with regard to comparative advantage depends in turn on the level of stakeholders' awareness of the CU.

Indeed, stakeholders have only limited awareness of the CU. According to Mugisa, Onyango, and Mugoya, most public officers responsible for implementing and enforcing CU regulations either have inadequate training for their jobs or lack the resources necessary to perform the tasks. For instance, some customs officials did not have sufficient copies of documents to facilitate trade at border crossings. In addition, some police officers and health officials do not know enough about CU regulations, so instead of enforcing regional standards or regulations, they resort to national standards. Failure to apply regionwide standards invites corruption and other types of inefficiencies within the regional organization.

Another group of stakeholders includes investors and traders. Private foreign investment has increased in all countries. Most investment capital originates in Kenya and outside the region. In spite of the bigger market, however, specialization in production has not yet taken hold. Producers in the region manufacture similar commodities, though most are for a national market. Awareness of the CU among informal traders may represent the key to changing that dynamic. A high percentage of informal traders has little awareness of the commercial opportunities afforded by the CU. Consequently, the natural/comparative advantages of partner states, upon which private investors would base the development of industrial manufacturing, are not well developed. Unlike Kenya, which has taken advantage of its location as a coastal country to provide transportation and other types of services to the other partner states, Uganda and Tanzania have not leveraged their advantage in the area of food production. The important point here is not only to inform public officials, traders, and investors about the benefits and opportunities of the CU but also to cultivate their interest in its success. The interest of traders and investors will more likely work to the EAC's benefit than would the interest of political leaders or public officials.

A group of investors that seems to offer the most hope for integration in Africa includes African firms that have developed into transnational corporations. Data collected by the UNCTAD reveals a growing number of mergers and acquisitions between firms from South Africa and those from other African countries, leading to the emergence of new transnational corporations. Major companies of this type currently include the Anglo American

Industrial Corporation, Barlow Rand, and Eskom, all located in South Africa; Conserveries Cherifiennes, a Moroccan firm in the food business; and Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines.

Ernest Harsch observes that although African transnational corporations are still relatively small and few in number, they have nevertheless become important regional and subregional players.⁴¹ Stephen Thomsen goes even further by discussing specific attributes that these corporations bring to regional communities, contending that they supply capital, technology, expertise, and prospects of greater diversification of the industrial base of exports.⁴² More specifically, he asserts that transnational corporations will help African countries become more economically efficient, integrated, and prosperous:

Foreign investors can help to bring about greater integration not only with markets elsewhere but also within Africa. Pan-African ownership structures are more likely to foster pan-African solutions. In power generation, for example, Eskom of South Africa has presence in 28 different countries on the continent. In the long run, regional investors such as Eskom might serve to encourage the rationalization of power infrastructure on the continent.⁴³

Thomsen's observation suggests that infrastructural and industrial projects developed by African corporations stand a better chance of creating useful outcomes that have long-term benefits to Africans than those developed by foreign corporations.

Conclusion

This article has maintained that congruence between the interests of the dominant actors and the goals of a regional organization is essential to the latter's development. In other words, a regional organization will more likely expand and develop if the interests of individual members (states) or their constituents are in line with its overall goals. The article examined the EU and ASEAN to illustrate this point. The former, created by the European political elite in the aftermath of World War II as way of promoting security on the continent, has expanded and developed primarily because its member states and the organization as a whole share the goal of security.⁴⁴ The political leaders of Southeast Asian countries, however, created ASEAN with the hope that it would help their countries evolve economically. However, policies that promote economic growth within individual countries sometimes tend to undermine policies that promote economic growth in

the region as a whole. Fortunately for Southeast Asian countries, MNCs, particularly those from Japan, helped them adjust their interests to align more closely with those of their regional organization. MNCs nudged the member nations of ASEAN to support policies that facilitated expansion of the regional organization.

Regional organizations in Africa resemble ASEAN more than the EU, both in terms of the interests of member states and the goals of the organizations. African leaders create these organizations hoping to use them as vehicles for developing their national economies. The selfish interests of individual member states often undermine rather than enhance the goals of the regional organizations; consequently, regional integration has not enjoyed success in Africa. This article recommends that member states, together with their respective regional organizations, implement policies that attract MNCs. Once member countries begin reaping the economic benefits afforded by these corporations, they will have to create authentic free trade areas in which the MNCs can more fully tap the benefits of economies of scale.

Notes

1. Many scholars have put forth this argument; however, the studies identified in this article are more appropriate because of their comparative nature. See Cynthia H. Enloe, *Police, Military, and Ethnicity: Foundations of State Power* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980); and Paul Cammack, David Pool, and William Tordoff, *Third World Politics: A Comparative Introduction* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988).

2. World Bank, *World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009). See the following chapters: "Density," 48–70; "Distance," 73–95; and "Division," 96–121.

3. The nature of political leadership in Africa has influenced the type of regional organizations created. In *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg describe political leadership in Africa as personal rule, whereby policies and politics are contingent upon the skills, abilities, and fortunes of the individual rulers. Meanwhile, in *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle describe political leadership in Africa as neopatrimonial rule. They contend that African politics is a hybrid political system in which elements of patrimonialism coexist with modern rational-legal institutions.

4. Most products exported by African countries are not imported or desired by other African countries, most of which produce raw materials that are imported by Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Thus, individual or group producers and consumers do not benefit from regional economic organizations created by political leaders to realize state objectives. See Jacob Viner, *The Customs Union Issue* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950).

5. Allen L. Springer, "Community Chronology," in *Integration and Disintegration in East Africa*, ed. Christian P. Potholm and Richard A. Fredland (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, ca. 1980), 11–35.

6. It is important to note, however, that the Kenya-Uganda Railway did not integrate the economies of the two colonies. Instead, it integrated the two economies, separately, into the British economy. One could even argue that in spite of the institutional structures of regional integration created by the colonial powers,

African societies emerged from colonialism even more disintegrated. Because of the exports, educational opportunities, and other benefits, some communities or ethnic groups were more attached to colonial power than to neighboring communities in the same country.

7. Springer, "Community Chronology," 11–15.

8. Although ethnic differences existed before colonial rule, they were of little significance (other than those in language and culture) to the indigenous peoples, but the dynamics of divide and rule politicized these differences. For instance, although the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups of Rwanda and Burundi lived next to each other in harmony before colonialism, by the time of independence, they opposed each other.

9. For a detailed explanation of the CU theory, see Viner, *Customs Union Issue*; for the Balassa model, see Béla Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration* (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1961).

10. S. K. B. Asante, *Regionalism and Africa's Development: Expectations, Reality, and Challenges* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); and Ibrahim Gambari, *Political and Comparative Dimensions of Regional Integration: The Case of ECOWAS* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1991).

11. Lynn Krieger Mytelka, "The Salience of Gains in Third-World Integration Systems," *World Politics* 25, no. 2 (January 1973): 236–50; and Balassa, *Theory of Economic Integration*.

12. This type of politics is a result of attempts by African leaders to acquire legitimacy for their governments and to create some form of national unity by bribing communal leaders or representatives.

13. David Lamb, *The Africans* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 65.

14. The EAC came into being in 1967, collapsed in 1977, and revived in 1999.

15. Springer, "Community Chronology," 24.

16. Richard E. Baldwin, "Sequencing and Depth of Regional Economic Integration: Lessons for the Americas from Europe," *World Economy* 31, no. 1 (January 2008): 5.

17. *Ibid.*, 7.

18. Unlike European political leaders, African leaders are less likely to relinquish power because of democratic ideals. However, developments on the continent indicate that African leaders have been somewhat open to giving up some of their powers if doing so would improve their economies. Several African states have adopted economic liberalization reforms, indicating that their leaders might be more receptive to policies suggested by foreign investors.

19. Jochen Legewie, "The Political Economy of Industrial Integration in ASEAN: The Role of Japanese Companies," *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy* 5, no. 3 (2000): 204–33.

20. *Ibid.*, 208.

21. Andrew Axline, "Underdevelopment, Dependence, and Integration: The Politics of Regionalism in the Third World," *International Organizations* 31 (1977): 83–105; and Mytelka, "Salience of Gains," 236–50.

22. Kenya is the most industrialized country in East Africa, as is Ivory Coast in West Africa and South Africa in the southern part of the continent. Successful regional integration and development, therefore, depend on the willingness of member countries to share the benefits of integration. Thus far the Southern Africa Customs Union seems to have done better in this regard. South Africa has been willing to compensate members in its region that have not been as successful at industrializing.

23. Viner, *Customs Union Issue*, 68–75.

24. Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, "Preferences, Interests, and Regional Integration: The Development of the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Arrangement," *Review of International Political Economy* 9, no. 1 (March 2002): 123–49.

25. *Ibid.*, 123.

26. *Ibid.*, 128.

27. Because of Africa's past experience with colonial rule, some people have argued that African leaders are not likely to welcome foreign investors, particularly those from Europe and North America.

28. Matthew J. Costello, "Administration Triumphs over Politics: The Transformation of the Tanzanian State," *African Studies Review* 39, no. 1 (April 1996): 123–48; and Robert Pinkney, *The International Politics of East Africa* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

29. Yoweri Museveni, "The Ten Point Program," in *Selected Articles on the Uganda Resistance War* (Kampala, Uganda: NRM Publications, 1985), 41–78.

30. Yoweri Museveni, *Tackling the Tasks Ahead: Election Manifesto* (Kampala, Uganda: NRM Publications, 1996).

31. Todd Moss and Vijaya Ramachandran, "Foreign Investment and Economic Development: Evidence from Private Firms in East Africa," CGD Brief (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, December 2005), http://www.cgdev.org/files/5307_file_FDI_East_Africa_Brief_Moss.pdf.

32. Ibid., 2.

33. Ibid., 3.

34. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Performance and Potential* (New York: United Nations, 1999), <http://unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiitm15.pdf>.

35. Ibid., vii.

36. In *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), an analysis of the global economy, Thomas L. Friedman argues that countries that are part of the global supply chains for component parts of commodities produced by MNCs are unlikely to engage in war because of the instability and loss in production that such conflicts may cause. In other words, similarities in economic interests can evolve into similarities in political interests.

37. Evarist Mugisa, Chris Onyango, and Patrick Mugoya, *An Evaluation of the Implementation and Impact of the East African Community Customs Union* (Arusha, Tanzania: East African Community, March 2009).

38. Ibid., 2.

39. Ibid., 29.

40. Ibid., 31.

41. Ernest Harsch, "Africa's Untapped Investment Potential," *Africa Recovery* 13, nos. 2–3 (September 1999): 2–3.

42. Stephen Thomsen, "Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The Private-Sector Response to Improved Governance," briefing paper, International Economics Programme (Chatham House, UK: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2005), <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Economics/bpafrika-fdi.pdf>.

43. Ibid., 4.

44. The concept of security has evolved from military to economic security, particularly in economically developed and democratic countries. In turn, as the possibility of war between European countries has diminished, so has the focus on military security. Instead, European states are now more concerned about economic security for their citizens.

What Is Air Diplomacy?

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In his *Mémoires de guerre* (*War Memoirs*), Gen Charles de Gaulle synthesizes the connections between diplomacy and the use of armed forces, noting that foreign policy is governed by three levers: “Diplomacy expresses it, armed forces support it, and the police cover it.”¹ Air diplomacy can thus be defined as the use of air assets to support foreign policy. This extremely vast field is chronologically limited by the advent of aviation in 1903 or of military aviation in 1911 (for France), but it can also include civil aviation.

A diplomat first used the term *air diplomacy*. On 23 August 1927, in an interview with the *New York Times* before boarding to take up his appointment as the French ambassador in Washington, Paul Claudel mentioned air diplomacy in reference to Charles Lindbergh’s transatlantic flight of 21 May 1927: “My task will be facilitated by the air and popular diplomacy admirably initiated by the American airmen, who haven’t even realized their apostolate.”² But Lindbergh had no official assignment. As a passionate and experienced aviator, he was driven only by the desire to take up a technical and human challenge—and perhaps by the \$25,000 promised to the first aviator who crossed the North Atlantic. After the tragic loss of Charles Nungesser and François Coli’s *White Bird* a few days earlier, Lindbergh’s achievement seems to mark the decline of French aviation, compared to America’s very dynamic civil aviation.

In terms of aeronautics, commercial aviation underwent quite a boom, and important airlines opened during the 1920s—the years of Jean Mermoz

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and the Aéropostale aviation company's accomplishments. It thus seems logical for Claudel to highlight the political dimension of Lindbergh's flight because the opening of regular airlines serves as a means of influence for all the major aeronautical nations. The French organizations—the French-Romanian Company for Air Transport (*Compagnie franco-roumaine de navigation aérienne* [CFRNA]), created in April 1920, which in 1925 became the International Air Navigation Company (*Compagnie internationale de navigation aérienne* [CIDNA])—shape their network based on French diplomatic alliances in Central and Eastern Europe, serving the capitals of the Little Entente countries: Prague (April 1921), Bucharest (October 1921), and Belgrade (April 1923) (or Warsaw, Poland, in April 1921).³ In his book dedicated to Sabena, the Belgian national company, Guy Vanthemsche uses the term *air diplomacy* in reference to the opening of the airlines connecting Belgium to several foreign capitals.⁴

Second, in her dissertation, published in 1971, Jacqueline de La Rochère also uses *air diplomacy* to describe US policy related to civil aviation and to show how, due to its technical and economic supremacy, the United States managed to impose its view of public international law on civil aviation. This occurred during important international conferences, such as the one held in Chicago in 1944, and through bilateral agreements like the one concluded with Great Britain in Bermuda—again illustrating how air assets can support foreign policy.⁵

The third example comes from the policy of Pierre Cot, when he became air minister of the Popular Front. From 1936 to 1938, he established cooperative relations in the aviation sector with the Central and Eastern European countries, described by Thierry Vivier as the expression of a genuine air diplomacy.⁶

In August 1938, in the midst of the Sudeten crisis, Gen Joseph Vuillemin, general chief of staff of the air force, went to Germany at the invitation of Hermann Göring. His impressions following visits to Luftwaffe units and aircraft factories played an important role in France's position while its Czechoslovakian ally was threatened by Nazi Germany. Already aware of the French Air Force's inferiority, he described in his end-of-mission report "the truly impressive power of German aviation." On 26 September, the eve of the Munich conference, which would determine peace or war in Europe, the general chief of staff of the air force wrote that

there was “a highly significant disproportion of force in favor of Germany.”⁷ Facing Hitler’s ambitions, as well as the absence of support from British prime minister Neville Chamberlain, and warned by the military chiefs about the inadequacy of the French armed forces, Edouard Daladier, France’s representative at the conference, agreed to abandon Czechoslovakia. After his visits to the Reich’s aircraft factories in July 1936 as well as October of 1937 and 1938, when he could see the technical, industrial, and military advances of German aviation, Lindbergh embarked on a crusade supporting the neutrality and nonintervention position of the United States in the impending war. In both cases, the Luftwaffe and German aircraft companies played a political role as tools of propaganda and intimidation.⁸

More recently, states have abundantly used transport aviation and airlift to support their foreign policy. Examples include the Berlin airlift in 1948–49, during which aircraft transported 2 million tons of supplies; Operation Nickel Grass, conducted by the United States during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, which transported 23,000 tons of material; on a smaller scale, Operation Verveine in April 1977, during which the 61st Airlift Squadron moved 36 tons of freight and 130 vehicles needed for the engagement of Moroccan forces in Zaire during the first invasion of Shaba; and the Sarajevo airlift, the longest in history (June 1992 to January 1996), which provided 160,000 tons of freight, mainly food.

These instances not only show the important influence of military aviation on history or international relations but also indicate that General de Gaulle offered only a limited description of the concept of military diplomacy or air diplomacy as applied to air forces. Besides military aviation, the support provided to foreign policy includes civil aviation and the aeronautical industry as well as air bases and airmen themselves. These are the five main elements of airpower, defined by analogy with the components of maritime power as established by Adm Alfred Thayer Mahan in the nineteenth century.

The term *airpower diplomacy* would most appropriately define the contribution of the air weapon in a state’s foreign policy, where *diplomacy* denotes the relations that one state has with another. Regarding this expansive field, this article aims only to examine the use of the air weapon in overseas operations and its contribution to France’s foreign policy, limiting the dis-

cussion to classical air forces. (The maneuver of nuclear forces plays an inherently political role, but it is very specific.)

The article first defines the conceptual framework of the use of air forces on the international stage so as to place air operations overseas within the scope of airpower diplomacy. It then provides a first, quantitative insight into this aspect of air diplomacy. Finally, the article offers a case study to describe more precisely the political use of airpower.

Contribution of Air Operations Overseas to Foreign Policy

Defining “Diplomatic” Air Operations Overseas

Use of the air weapon outside national territory has a de facto political dimension. Like diplomacy in general, its use can be cooperative or coercive. However, one should distinguish between the coercive use of military force within a diplomatic action and war, which concerns only pure military strategy, described by Michael Howard as “organized coercion.”⁹

The difference between war, which is related to strategy and thus to a logic of might, and coercion, which is related to diplomacy and therefore to a logic of influence, lies in the way one uses the force.¹⁰ Unlike war, coercion involves a narrow application of force, whether in terms of goals or means. In *Gunboat Diplomacy*, James Cable seems to give priority to bounded means, which he depicts as “the use or the threat to use a limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to gain advantage or avoid losing it, whether it is within an international conflict or against the nationals of another State within its territory or jurisdiction.”¹¹

Yet, the most important aspect of coercion is the limited military goal. In war the intended military effect is the destruction of forces or strategic paralysis. Coercion aims at a much more restricted military effect, a distinction made by Gen André Beaufre, who differentiates between “indirect” and “direct” strategy. In “Vue d’ensemble de la stratégie” (An Overview of Strategy), he observes that indirect strategy generates “all forms of conflict that do not seek the decision directly through confrontation between military forces, but rather through less direct practices, whether in the political or economical field, or even in the military one (revolutionary war), using successive actions and negotiations (Hitler’s strategy from 1936 to 1939).”¹²

Drawing upon Beaufre's definition of indirect strategy, which seems to bring together strategy and diplomacy, one could argue that air diplomacy includes both cooperative use of air means in interstate relations and coercive use of military means every time a state seeks resolution, not in a confrontation between military forces but in the negotiation of a diplomatic solution. This definition moves away from the *diplomatie de défense* (defense diplomacy) as defined by French and British doctrinal corpora, none of which includes the use of military assets within operations.¹³ Americans have not conceptualized the notion of military diplomacy or air diplomacy as we have defined it, instead including it in what they call "military operations other than war," which "encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war."¹⁴

Characteristics of "Diplomatic" Military Operations Overseas

The only study dedicated to the new concept of airpower diplomacy is James O. Poss's 33-page dissertation, evocatively titled "Air Power: New Gunboat Diplomacy," defended in 1994 at the Naval War College.¹⁵ The author, an Airman, is surprised that the US Air Force has not developed a counterpart to gunboat diplomacy, as he identifies several advantages of air diplomacy compared to naval diplomacy: speed, range, the low logistical needs of land-based airpower (other than an air base) compared to the logistical flow required to move and operate a combat fleet, the small number of individuals necessary for the implementation of airpower compared to the thousands of people needed to arm a combat fleet, the lethal nature of airpower, its ability to destroy practically all objectives due to its precise weapons and stealthy means of delivery, the low human risk since it involves no ground troops, and the capability of dropping munitions from a distance.

Unfortunately, Poss, who draws largely on Cable's *Gunboat Diplomacy* by borrowing its conceptual framework and adapting it to airpower, doesn't ground his study on substantial sources. The only example he develops to support his argument is the bombardment of Libya during Operation El Dorado Canyon in April 1986, highlighting the continuum between diplomacy and the political use of airpower in a coercive mode.

The Study of “Diplomatic” Air Operations Overseas

Cable analyzed over 200 maritime operations conducted between 1919 and 1979 to show that gunboat diplomacy is not restricted to the nineteenth century. A similar study published in 1978 by two researchers at the Brookings Institution, Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, examines the outcomes of 215 operations conducted between 1 January 1946 and 31 December 1975 to demonstrate the political use not only of America’s naval forces but of all its armed forces. According to the authors, “A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.”¹⁶ They use five criteria to identify the political use of armed force:

1. A physical change in the disposition [of the armed forces] (location, activity, and/or readiness). . . .
2. [The seeking of a political effect through this physical change of the armed forces.]
3. When used as a political instrument, the objective is to influence the behavior of another actor—that is, to cause an actor to do something that he would not otherwise do . . . [when] the activity of the military units themselves does not attain the objective. . . .
4. Decisionmakers must have sought to avoid a significant contest of violence. . . .
5. [The use of armed forces had to be connected to a desire to change some specific behavior of the actors.]¹⁷

When no new overseas base is established, expanded, reduced, or closed up, Blechman and Kaplan exclude from their corpus the role of the forces stationed abroad. They also ignore exercises and maneuvers, humanitarian operations related to disasters or natural catastrophes, and the evacuation of nationals when armed forces do not participate in the confrontations. Their findings show that the use of land-based combat aviation represents the most effective military means of producing a political effect:

The type of force proportionally most often associated with positive outcomes was land-based aircraft. Especially significant was the fact that such aircraft were used most typically in incidents in which at least one major force component was used. Positive outcomes were

less frequent when ground and naval forces were used. However, the greater frequency of positive outcomes when land-based combat aircraft were used as compared with naval or ground forces was more apparent in the short term than in the longer term.¹⁸

These American and British works highlight the value of a rigorous study dedicated to military diplomacy or to airpower diplomacy. Nevertheless, they currently suffer from two main weaknesses. First, conceptually, they depend upon a realistic and very American view of international relations, analyzing the use of military force as a political tool only as a means by which states can increase their power. This view derives primarily from a realistic approach to international relations as conceptualized by Hans Morgenthau in *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (1948). However, as Raymond Aron showed, the balance of power between states is not the exclusive domain of international relations.¹⁹ In his book *Peace and War (Paix et guerre entre les nations)*, Aron identifies three motives of foreign policy, noting that “Clemenceau sought the *security*, Napoleon the *power*, and Louis XIV the *glory*” (emphasis in original).²⁰ Therefore, the study of the political use of airpower must take into account both the increased power supplied by the intervention of the air weapon and its contribution to security policy (e.g., by participating in United Nations [UN], NATO, or European Union operations) as well as its reflection of French values (e.g., by participating in humanitarian operations).

Second, the above-mentioned works date back to the Cold War—a time when, in terms of international relations, the hard or coercive power of states was indicative of their strength. During the 1990s, Joseph Nye’s *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (1990) highlighted the ability of states or international organizations to influence other actors through noncoercive means or soft power.²¹ However, the world has evolved, and if during the Cold War, Aron could paraphrase Max Weber, noting that international society is characterized by the absence of an authority having a monopoly on legitimate violence, today in this uncoordinated international system of sovereign states, the UN maintains a principle of order in the same way as regional alliances like NATO, reflected by the use of UN/NATO air forces in Bosnia or under the sole auspices of NATO in Kosovo.²²

French Air Diplomacy: Quantitative Aspects

To study airpower as a political tool, as did Cable, Blechman, and Kaplan, we should first create a database of overseas air operations. By way of limiting the coercive aspect and considering the air weapon's contribution both to soft and hard power, the corpus should include all air operations. Most of this inventory work has already been done by Lt Col Jean-Louis Grattepanche and a student group of the CID (French War College, *École de guerre*, formerly *Collège Interarmées de Défense*) led by Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, whose efforts identified 415 overseas operations from 1945 to 2004.

If we choose 1962—the end of the decolonization process—as a starting point, we find another 403 operations before 2004, 243 of them conducted with the participation of the air force (109 solely by the air force and 134 jointly with one or several other services). The chronological occurrence of those operations suggests three periods:

1. The first break, in 1974, is related to an evolution of the geopolitical context with détente, to a political change in France with the election of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and the end of Gaullism at the highest level of government, and to the implementation by the air force of modern assets enabling it to intervene overseas: the "1/7" squadron received its Jaguars in 1973 (the DC-8 had been introduced in 1966 and the Transall in 1968). From 1962 to 1974, the armed forces had little involvement outside.
2. The second break, in 1989, is related to the end of the Cold War, which led to a major geopolitical upheaval. Between 1975 and 1989, the Cold War regained strength. Soviet influence spread to Asia and mostly to Africa, but after a period of US withdrawal, President Ronald Reagan decided to reinforce pressure on the "Evil Empire." The number of overseas operations increased significantly, up to an average of 10 a year.
3. From 1990 to 2004, under the influence of the thaw in international relations and of Russia's political weakening, crises became more frequent, leading to a new increase in the number of operations, up to an average of 14.5 each year.

If we study more specifically the operations of the air force, whether alone or in cooperation with another service, we note that they account for nearly 60 percent of interventions overseas. We can classify these operations roughly as humanitarian, evacuation of nationals, peacekeeping, and coercive (i.e., using or threatening to use force). The relative proportion of the various missions evolves by a decrease in humanitarian operations and a significant increase in those to evacuate nationals and keep the peace.

The Political Use of Airpower: A Case Study

Such an initial statistical approach needs refinement. For coercive operations, we should seek their political outcomes in order to classify them, as did Blechman and Kaplan, by their success or failure. Further, the level of the use of force is important. A Jaguar patrol flying over Lome in September 1986 during an attempted coup d'état against President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo does not belong in the same category of coercive violence as a Mirage F-1 armed with one 30 mm cannon destroying Chadian rebel vehicles during fighting with government troops over the city of Birao in the Central African Republic during March 2007. The number of people evacuated and their nationalities are also significant, quantifiable pieces of information. Moreover, quantification of transported humanitarian aid and the political ties that an intervention contributed to, maintained, or forged may help measure the role of armed forces in general or the air force in particular in enhancing soft power. Specifically, when an earthquake devastated Peru in May 1970, more than 10,000 kilometers away, France dispatched four Transalls, one medical component for rapid interventions, and three Alouettes. It intervened alongside the United States, Canada, and the USSR, the only four nonneighboring countries to send aid. We can explain this significant French assistance, second only to that of the United States, by pointing to the strong historic links between France and Peru, dating back to Adm Dupetit Thouars's intervention during the War of the Pacific in 1880, which saved Lima from destruction by Chilean troops. Due to these relations, which have continued (Peru was the first Latin American country to recognize the Free French government in 1943), France sold 16 Mirage V aircraft to Peru in 1968, eight more in 1973, and 26 Mirage 2000s in 1982. Clearly then, a humanitarian intervention such as the one conducted in 1970 in Peru contributes to French soft power.

"Social" conditions accompanying the use of the air weapon as a political tool have evolved greatly since the 1970s. As Michel Fortmann notes, "international security demilitarizes and needs more multilateral approaches; therefore, the concept of power, in its traditional military sense, is increasingly irrelevant in today's international environment."²³ Given the significant decrease in the level of interstate violence, the air weapon used coercively would represent a harsh political use of armed forces. Today, however, rather than an instrument of coercive policy, the military tool reinforces an influence strategy within international organizations (e.g., the contribution of the air force in the creation of a Europe for defense or the reintegration in NATO military structures) to help increase or maintain soft power, as was the case during the intervention in Haiti.

Notes

1. Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires de guerre*, vol. 3 (Paris: Plon, 1960), 627.
2. Paul Claudel, *Œuvres diplomatiques: ambassadeur aux États-Unis, 1927–1933*, vol. 1, ed. Lucile Garbagnati (Paris: L'Âge d'homme, 1994), 103.
3. Sometimes the pilots are former military flying aces like Albert Deullin, using old SEA-4 fighter and reconnaissance planes dating back to 1918, transformed into the Potez 7 and 9. No academic study has examined CFRNA or CIDNA. However, Frédéric Lambard authored an excellent master's thesis on the "Ligne Paris-Saigon, 1926–1954" (University of Nantes), which addresses the role of aviation in French influence abroad.
4. Guy Vanthemsche, *La Sabena: l'aviation commerciale belge 1923–2001; Des origines au crash* (Brussels, Belgium: De Boeck Université, 2002).
5. Jacqueline Dutheil de La Rochère, *La politique des États-Unis en matière d'aviation civile internationale* (Paris: LGDJ, 1971).
6. Thierry Vivier, *La politique aéronautique militaire de la France Janvier 1933–Septembre 1939* (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1997).
7. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *La décadence* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1979), 341, 448. For the Vuillemin report, see Patrick Facon, "La visite du général Vuillemin en Allemagne (16–21 août 1938)," *Revue historique des armées*, no. 147 (June 1982): 110–21.
8. See H. J. A. Wilson, "The Luftwaffe as a Political Instrument," in Eugene M. Emme, *The Impact of Air Power: National Security and World Politics* (Princeton, NJ: D. van Nostrand, 1959), 58–63.
9. Quoted in Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power," in *War, Strategy, and International Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard*, ed. Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes, and Robert O'Neill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 282.
10. According to Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, "Strategy argues in terms of power and diplomacy in terms of influence." *Traité de Stratégie*, 6th ed. (Paris: ISC-Economica, 2006), 93–94. General Forget uses the term *retaliatory operation* rather than *coercion* when a military action "aims at giving a strong warning to a troublemaker. It assumes that, behind the action taken, other more violent and decisive actions are ready to be engaged. It is a way to express the will of not yielding to pressure from the adversary. Retaliation involves an element of surprise, speed, precision and effectiveness against perfectly 'targeted' objectives, the destruction of which

helps create a direct link with the beginning of the crisis.” Michel Forget, *Puissance aérienne et stratégies* (Paris: Economica, 2001), 282.

11. James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1979: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1981), 39. Definition also quoted by James O. Poss.

12. Gen André Beaufre, “Vue d’ensemble de la stratégie,” *Politique étrangère* 27, no. 5 (1962): 440.

13. According to the Defense Staff, defense diplomacy consists of military cooperation, arms control, associated confidence-building measures, strategic monitoring, military prevention, and participation in international prevention and security architectures. *Doctrine Interarmées sur la Prévention*, INS 1100, EMA/Emploi, July 2002, 44.

14. Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 9 September 1993, V-1.

15. James O. Poss, “Air Power: New Gunboat Diplomacy” (PhD diss., Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1994).

16. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1978), 12.

17. *Ibid.*, 12–13.

18. *Ibid.*, 107–8.

19. Raymond Aron, “De l’analyse des constellations diplomatiques,” *Revue française de science politique* 4, no. 2 (1954): 251.

20. Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 73–74.

21. Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

22. See Aron, *Peace and War*, 6, 7.

23. Michel Fortmann, *Les cycles de Mars: Révolutions militaires et édification étatique de la renaissance à nos jours* (Paris: Economica, 2010), 541.

The Dark Side of European Integration

Franco-German Dominance and the Structural Reproduction of Informal Empire

TOMMASO PAVONE*

Even as the sovereign debt crisis threatens the stability of the euro-zone, the European Union (EU) has gained widespread currency as the most prominent model for global governance. Journalists, academics, and politicians continue to make similar arguments for the normative desirability of a “global Europe.” “Could the European model go global?” pondered a *Financial Times* editorial in December 2008 before quickly replying in the affirmative: “It seems everything is in place. For the first time since homo sapiens began to doodle on cave walls, there is an argument, an opportunity and a means to make serious steps towards a world government.”¹ More recently, the newspaper defended its position, claiming that “the alternative is simply to let global problems fester. . . . It is worth struggling to preserve the European ideal—and not just for Europe’s sake.”² Academics have forwarded parallel narratives. In 2004 Andrew Moravcsik wrote that “Europeans remain the strongest proponents of universal human rights and the European Union is a multilateral model for the globe.”³ In 2011 Jeremy Rifkin argued that “the EU is ideally positioned to

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lead the 21st century. . . . The EU has an enormous opportunity to be the flagship for a new model of governance.”⁴ Even politicians have accolades to spare. Jean Monnet, a French diplomat and one of the EU’s founding fathers, posited that European unity “was not an end in itself, but only a stage on the way to the organised world of tomorrow.”⁵ Similarly, in 2007 British foreign secretary David Miliband, not the first person one would look to for euroenthusiasm, stated that the EU “can be a role model that others follow.”⁶

Indeed, the EU appears as the most successful contemporary manifestation of Immanuel Kant’s vision of a federal system of republican states. Kant laid out this view in his essay “Toward Perpetual Peace,” whose second definitive article states that “the right of nations shall be based on a federalism of free states.”⁷ For Kant, fulfilling this requirement is a necessary condition to overcome an anarchic and war-torn state of nature and achieve long-lasting peace. Clearly, many contemporary thinkers agree. But the Kantian model has provoked vigorous resistance, most notably by Edward Said and James Tully, among others. Both scholars highlight and critique the “cultural imperialism” that underlies Kant’s theory.⁸ This prompts the concern that if the Kantian idea of Europe is open to the charge of perpetuating imperial structures, then the modern EU might be vulnerable to similar critiques. In this case, then, much more than the sovereign debt crisis should place the desirability of the European model in doubt.

This article argues that European integration has been leveraged to impose Franco-German interests, thereby reproducing the structures of dependence and subordination characteristic of “informal imperialism.” It begins by providing an overview of the concept of informal imperialism as conceived by Tully and relating it to Charles Beitz’s notion of the “democratic deficit.” The article also addresses Thomas Pogge’s thesis that the Western-imposed global institutional order accentuates structural inequalities that perpetuate poverty in many postcolonial states. It then considers how Franco-German dominance in the EU exemplifies the structural reproduction of informal empire through an analysis of two contemporary case studies. First, an assessment of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a subsidy system for EU farmers largely championed by France, draws attention to the policy’s harmful and exploitative effects on many African postcolonial states. Second, a consideration of Germany’s role in

the Greek debt crisis and the subsequent EU bailout negotiations focuses on the normative consequences of Germany's ability to dictate the terms of the bailout without consulting the Greek people. The article proposes that these cases highlight that European integration can be leveraged to reproduce the structure of informal imperialism both *outside* and *inside* the EU. It concludes with some suggestions for how the union can become a normatively acceptable model for global governance, namely by democratizing, and hence deimperializing, its integrative process.

The Structural Reproduction of Informal Imperialism

A consideration of how one might see the modern EU as informally imperial must start with an examination of how Europe fits into the Kantian vision of global federalism as outlined in "Toward Perpetual Peace." Tully has usefully reduced the Kantian idea of Europe to five core principles. First, Europe is gravitating towards a federation of independent republican states that, second, are founded upon Kant's six "preliminary articles," the cosmopolitan right to hospitality, and the "spirit of trade." Third, the EU appears as a global prototype and precursor to a global federation of free states. Fourth, the integrative process of global federation is described as a natural, historical means of modernization. Finally, this process would mark the end of the European imperial era of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.⁹ Although Tully objects to the general premise of a normatively desirable European-style global federation, he is especially critical of the assumption that a global federation and imperialism would remain mutually exclusive. Tully notes that "the federation accepts and builds on this older imperial foundation, understood as the 'will' or 'mechanism' of 'nature', and does not permit any resistance to it."¹⁰ Further, the realization of the Kantian vision need not occur for imperial structures to emerge: Tully makes clear that the current international order is plagued by "informal imperialism."¹¹

Certainly, the notion that the contemporary international order maintains imperial structures is not new. Tully acknowledges that "there is now a large body of literature arguing that the field of public law and political organisation is characterized better as some form of 'new imperialism' or 'empire.'"¹² Nevertheless, Tully's work on the subject is particularly comprehensive and, as we shall see, helpful for constructing a normative case that

resists elevating the EU as a global model in its present form. He explicates his concept of informal imperialism as follows:

The assumption that imperialism always entails colonies is false. One of the major forms of imperial rule in the West has been non-colonial: that is, the tradition of “informal” imperial rule over another people or peoples by means of military threats and military intervention, the imposition of global markets dominated by the great powers, a local governing class, and a host of other informal techniques of indirect legal, political, educational, and cultural rule, such as spheres of influence and protectorates, without or after the imposition of formal colonial rule.¹³

A few key points require particular emphasis. First, Tully’s concept of informal imperialism is not synchronic but diachronic—a continuation of the European colonial rule of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He emphasizes this point by noting that “these oppressive relationships were built up during the era of formal Western imperialism and they have survived decolonisation and intensified in the current period.”¹⁴ Perhaps this is why Tully chooses to conceptualize an “informal” rather than “new” imperialism; the latter can suggest a process of separation and reconfiguration vis-à-vis formal colonialism, whereas the former implies path-dependency, namely that the essence of imperialism never disappeared and remains largely unaltered. Thus informal imperialism constitutes a structural reproduction of the central dynamics of dependence, exploitation, and hierarchy that characterized formal colonial rule.

A second point that demands emphasis is that informal imperialism operates in conjunction with efforts to leverage globalizing forces to diffuse a capitalist model outside the West, irrespective of local custom, the compatibility of an economic order with said project, and the associated economic consequences. National elites outside the West, writes Tully, were “pressured to open their doors to a highly structured capitalist world economy over which they had no control . . . at the expense of local control of their economic affairs, to subordinate their own legal and political sovereignty over their resources to international law, and to learn to call this imperial subalternisation ‘freedom.’”¹⁵ Central to this process are Western-dominated global organizations, including the Bretton Woods institutions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, that provide for “the successful extension of informal neo-liberal imperialism around the globe.”¹⁶

Pogge's *World Poverty and Human Rights* complements Tully's informal imperialism by highlighting how it contributes to the structural reproduction of global inequalities. Like Tully, Pogge emphasizes that contemporary economic inequality is but a continuation of "a dramatic period of conquest and colonization."¹⁷ He also emphasizes that the current economic order implicates the West in the responsibility for maintaining global structures of inequality: "We are, both causally and morally, intimately involved in the fate of the poor by imposing upon them a global institutional order that regularly produces severe poverty . . . and/or by upholding a radical inequality that evolved through a historical process pervaded by horrendous crimes."¹⁸ Although Pogge stops short of Tully by never explicitly arguing that the maintenance of global economic inequalities amounts to informal imperialism, he certainly implies this conclusion by arguing that the West is responsible for imposing exploitative institutional structures that exacerbate poverty within postcolonial states.

Pogge does not limit his criticism of the international institutional structure to the IMF and the World Bank; he also notes that the EU is part of a "global institutional order [that is] shaped and upheld by the more powerful governments and by other actors they control."¹⁹ Indeed, public policy decisions are made within frameworks like the EU "without input from or concern for the poorer societies."²⁰ This decision-making process engenders a democratic deficit whereby the peoples affected by EU policies have little control or means to shape their ultimate outcome. For this certainly violates the oft-quoted maxim that in order for a decision to be democratic, "*quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur* ('what touches all should be approved by all')."²¹

One could argue that, in practice, the maxim that everyone affected by a decision should be able to directly influence the decision-making process often finds itself subjected to qualifications even within clearly democratic regimes. In this light, one should not apply such a stringent requirement to the EU. Indeed, Moravcsik makes the case that "the EU's appearance of exceptional insulation reflects the subset of functions it performs . . . matters of low electoral salience commonly delegated in national systems, for normatively justifiable reasons."²² Agreeing with Moravcsik that the "what touches all" rule is too stringent, Charles Beitz suggests replacing it with

“the substantive requirement that political decisions should take account of all affected interests.”²³

Even if we accept Moravcsik’s thesis and Beitz’s reformulation, Pogge suggests that decision making in institutions like the EU remains undemocratic since policies are implemented *without concern* for the most vulnerable populations they affect. In other words, even without a formal mechanism of democratic accountability, one can still deem the EU’s policies undemocratic if they fail to consider the interests of all concerned. Tully moves a step further, linking the EU’s democratic deficit to his concept of informal imperialism: “Remaking the major regions in the image of the EU,” Tully submits, “would be no less imperial and anti-democratic” than the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions, for “the project rests on a grand narrative of a particular set of teleological processes of modernisation and juridicalisation that are presented as universal but that are deeply embedded in historical phases of Western domination.”²⁴ This adds a further dimension to the problem of the EU’s democratic deficit which is often ignored in contemporary discourse: that undemocratic decision-making processes are central to the structural reproduction of informal empire.

So much for the desirability of the Kantian idea of Europe! But what substantive evidence indicates that contemporary EU policies are informally imperial? A case study of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and the Greek sovereign debt crisis helps illustrate how two European states—France and Germany—have reproduced informally imperial structures both inside and outside the EU.

France and the Common Agricultural Policy

Historically, the CAP has been the most expensive of all the EU’s policies. Although the union has worked to reduce the share of its budget consumed by the CAP, estimates indicate that in 2013 the policy will still make up 36 percent of all EU spending.²⁵ In 2012 the CAP probably will cost the EU €44 billion, an increase of 2.5 percent over 2011.²⁶ The CAP provides direct support for agricultural products via subsidies, guaranteeing that the EU “support price” for agricultural goods remains significantly higher than world market prices.²⁷ More recently, the EU has slowly shifted towards giving farmers direct income support payments instead of product subsidies. Bruno and Guglielmo Carchedi explain the CAP’s dynamics:

“Given the low level (relative to the European level) of the world market prices . . . the EU commits itself to buying (through intervention offices) the farmers’ products if farmers cannot sell them at a higher price.”²⁸ This presents a problem, however, because “intervention prices are higher than world market prices, [so] traders could buy at world market prices and sell within the EU at the intervention prices. . . . To avoid this, a *threshold price*, higher than the intervention price, is needed. This is the price at which goods can be imported into the EU and is equal to the world market price plus a levy. In this way, EU farmers are protected against foreign competition” (emphasis in original).²⁹ Sugar farmers in the EU, for example, are guaranteed a price three times higher than the world market price and simultaneously benefit from import tariffs as high as 324 percent of market prices.³⁰ This policy of subsidizing the income of European farmers while imposing significant import tariffs engenders large yearly surpluses in EU agricultural produce, particularly with respect to barley, wheat, butter, pork, and cheese.³¹ The surplus is usually “dumped” in the world market in a process whereby the EU offers an export refund to European farmers equal to the union’s internal market price minus the world market price.³²

To this point, the CAP may still seem a standard EU-wide protectionist policy for individual farmers who could not survive global competitive forces. However, the reality is clearly different. Far from mostly benefiting small farms, “80% of the CAP spending goes to only 20% of farmers, overwhelmingly the bigger and richer ones.”³³ This has resulted in the rationalization and centralization of the European agricultural market because “75 percent of all European agricultural produce now comes from 25 percent of its farms.”³⁴ In truth, the CAP benefits—and incentivizes—agribusiness more than it does small, family-owned farms.

But how does the CAP amount to an informally imperial policy? To answer, one must consider the extremely harmful impact of the dumping of EU agricultural surpluses on the economies of postcolonial states. Maxine Frith of the *Independent* notes that such dumping has had a particularly harmful effect in African states. She estimates that “Mozambique loses more than £70 [million] a year—equivalent to its entire national budget for agriculture and rural development” because of the CAP-induced trade distortions.³⁵ In Swaziland, 12,000 workers lost their jobs because of the dumping of the EU sugar surplus.³⁶ In Ghana and Senegal, where frozen

EU chicken produce sells at 50 percent of the domestic price, the market share of domestically produced chicken meat has plummeted from over 50 percent to 11 percent.³⁷ Wheat dumping has also had adverse effects in Kenya and Nigeria, and cheap imports of EU-subsidized powdered milk have had severe consequences for cattle owners in Mali.³⁸ Starkly, the EU has countered mounting criticism of CAP-generated agricultural overproduction by asking farmers to abstain from planting crops in some of their fields. "The point which is usually forgotten," write Carchedi and Carchedi, "is that EU farmers are being paid in order not to produce food within the context of . . . growing hunger in the world. What would be more obvious than distributing the surpluses to the poor?"³⁹

In this vein, one can see the CAP as part of a global institutional order that, as Pogge notes, "regularly produces severe poverty" by upholding structures of inequality that evolved in the period of formal European colonialism.⁴⁰ Despite the CAP's clearly harmful effects, the EU has largely turned a blind eye to African farmers: A recent European Commission publication, *The Common Agricultural Policy Explained*, fails to make any mention of the issue of dumping or the adverse effect that the CAP has had on the economies of postcolonial states.⁴¹ Pogge anticipated that the West preferred to ignore its involvement in perpetuating poverty instead of acting, for "we are less familiar with the assertion . . . that most of us do not merely let people starve but also participate in starving them. . . . Rather than think it through or discuss it, we want to forget it or put it aside as plainly absurd."⁴²

Turning to the issue of France's participation in this scenario, we see that the CAP clearly would not exist, at least in its current form, without French influence. Desmond Dinan, a historian of European integration, argues that "the Common Agricultural Policy . . . owes its existence to [former French president] de Gaulle."⁴³ Indeed, the CAP proved essential to incentivize France to remain an active participant in the process of European integration. Maintaining control of the CAP was so important to de Gaulle that in 1965 he recalled the permanent French representative from the EU Council of Ministers after Walter Hallstein, president of the European Commission, proposed that the commission have greater budgetary authority over CAP payments.⁴⁴ This initiated an "empty chair crisis" that threatened the entire European project, given the unanimity voting procedure

for substantive proposals in the council.⁴⁵ In 1966 a deal was brokered with de Gaulle, who secured continued CAP payments and limited the commission's budgetary discretion.⁴⁶ Today, France remains the largest beneficiary of CAP payments: in 2010 French sugar conglomerate Tereos alone received more than \$223 million in EU subsidies.⁴⁷ In fact, each of the 10 largest French farms receive over €500,000 in support (compared to the €500 in income support for small-scale farms).⁴⁸

To conclude, although protectionism per se does not render the CAP a case of informal imperialism, we see that it allows the EU—and France in particular—to continue to exploit and harm postcolonial states. Indeed, as Carchedi and Carchedi note, “in this case, agricultural protectionism dictates both the type and the quantities of the agricultural products which can enter the EU. In this way, it is the agricultural sectors of the dominated countries which adapt to the EU economy rather than the other way around.”⁴⁹ Additionally, although the EU continues to levy large tariffs on agricultural imports, African states have been subjected to increasing pressure from the IMF “to scrap their own tariffs and subsidies as part of free trade rules.”⁵⁰ It must strike the average African farmer as particularly unjust that the IMF, led by a French managing director for 36 of the last 48 years, would impose liberalizing measures on African states even as France continues to support unreasonably high import tariffs within the EU along with subsidy payments mostly benefiting the largest French farm conglomerates.⁵¹ Not only are such policies undemocratic in Beitz's formulation (for negotiations over CAP funding rarely take the interests of African farmers into account), but they are also informally imperial. As Tully writes, “informal imperialism consists in, firstly, imposing a structure . . . that opens the resources, labour and markets of the imperialised country to the free trade dominated by the great powers.”⁵² In so doing, the CAP helps perpetuate a global institutional order that accentuates global inequalities and contributes to the maintenance of poverty in postcolonial states.

Germany and the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis

Having considered the informally imperial relationships inherent in the CAP, we must note that such structures do not exclusively affect states outside the EU. In this vein, the Greek sovereign debt crisis serves as an illustrative example of imperial processes occurring *inside* Europe.

We should concede at the outset that much of the responsibility for the Greek crisis falls on the shoulders of the Greek state and its people (though we should not forget the complicity of the EU, given that EU member states ignored many of the following problems, addressing them only when their own interests—particularly those of the eurozone—became threatened). The Greek government's control of public expenditures is weak, largely because the Greek budget is printed as separate budget lines, rendering it difficult to track where and how efficiently public expenditures are allocated.⁵³ Indeed, "within this system, not only is there a lack of knowledge on which to assert effective accounting control . . . there is also much scope for clientelistic and corrupt practices."⁵⁴ This is compounded by a chronic tax evasion problem that drains the Greek state of 30 percent of its yearly tax revenue.⁵⁵ Deeply entrenched clientelism and corruption also twice derailed efforts to reform Greece's public expenditure and protectionist market policies in the late 1990s.⁵⁶ But the tipping point that precipitated the Greek crisis occurred in 2009, when Greek finance minister George Papaconstantinou discovered that the previous government had falsified reports regarding the extent of the Greek debt: "I had to call a meeting to look at the budget," recalled Papaconstantinou, and "the next morning there would be this little hand rising in the back of the room: 'Actually, Minister, there's this other €100 to €200 million gap.' . . . We had no Congressional Budget Office. There was no independent statistical service."⁵⁷ Instead of 3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), Papaconstantinou had to revise the budget deficit estimate upward to more than 13 percent of GDP.⁵⁸ The revision sent shock waves across Europe and the financial markets, prompting the Dutch finance minister to tell Papaconstantinou privately, "George, we know it's not your fault, but shouldn't someone go to jail?"⁵⁹

As Greek bond yields began to rise to more than 7 percent (double the percentage for most of the rest of Europe), concerns quickly mounted that the Greek crisis could spread to other European states, particularly Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy.⁶⁰ The fact that Greece could not autonomously repay its borrowings made a bailout package inevitable. Furthermore, it became clear that Germany would be the key player in negotiations to help the Greek state. Initially, Germany appeared to allow the Greek crisis to fester so that it could induce agreement over the smallest bailout package possible, prompting US president Barack Obama to call German chancellor

Angela Merkel and “warn her of the possibility of a Lehman Brothers–style meltdown.”⁶¹ When she finally agreed to participate in the negotiations, Merkel declared that Germany would not support an agreement that did not include “rigorous policy conditions and would substantially involve the IMF,” against the wishes of European Central Bank president Jean-Claude Trichet and French president Nicolas Sarkozy.⁶² The eventual €1 trillion bailout package included €250 billion in loans from the IMF, which attached the classic “Washington Consensus” conditions to the Greek package: severely cutting government expenditure, freezing public-sector pay, and increasing the national retirement age.⁶³ Even the initial rescue was not enough to alleviate fears of a Greek default. February 2012 saw a proposal for a new \$170 billion bailout that included further IMF-imposed austerity measures.⁶⁴ These actions have exacerbated structural inequalities and poverty within the EU. The recent austerity cuts have plunged Greece, which was already one of Europe’s poorest states, into a “catastrophic depression” comparable to the American Great Depression of the 1930s.⁶⁵ Fotis Kouvelis, leader of the Democratic Left party, argues that because of the IMF-imposed conditions, “the middle class is being wiped out. . . . Some 30 per cent of Greeks now live below the poverty line.”⁶⁶

One could plausibly argue in favor of implementing painful austerity measures in order to prevent Greece from defaulting on its debt obligations and precipitating the euro’s collapse. Similarly, one could highlight the incompetence of the Greek state with regard to reforming its budgetary process and cracking down on tax evasion. These realities, however, do not justify imposing such measures without consulting the very people expected to bear the painful consequences. Indeed, the outcome might not be imperial *per se*, but the *process* involved and the *dynamics* it engendered were both undemocratic in Beitz’s formulation and characteristic of Tully’s concept of informal imperialism.

According to Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codifies customary international law, an international agreement is considered valid and binding only if no one has threatened or coerced a party into signing it.⁶⁷ Although we do not know whether the Greek bailout packages legally amounted to coercion, we do know that by unilaterally refusing to endorse any package that did not incorporate strict supervision from the IMF, Merkel pressured the Greek state into accepting extensive

austerity measures to which most Greeks objected. Further, not only did the negotiations regarding the bailout not include Greece but the interests of the Greek people also remained far from the focus of the discussions—it was the euro that needed saving, regardless of the consequences for the Greek state and its people. This prompted one Greek union leader to allege that the bailout package of 2012 amounted to “a brutal, cynical blackmail against an entire nation.”⁶⁸ Similarly, when Merkel declared that “there can be no deal” without Greece quickly accepting the IMF’s conditions, a Greek official characterized her statement as “an ultimatum.”⁶⁹ Merkel even proposed that an EU budget commissioner should have veto power over the Greek budget, prompting Greek culture minister Pavlos Yeroulanos to declare this an “impossible” option.⁷⁰

In assessing Germany’s demands of the Greek state, one must keep in mind that individuals often hail the EU as a model of consensus democracy involving multilateral decision making and compromise among equal member states.⁷¹ Yet the language of Greek officials suggests that Greece was largely excluded from negotiations. Instead, Merkel unilaterally involved the IMF and refused to support any agreement that did not include draconian spending cuts. In this light, deliberations over the Greek bailout packages exposed latent power hierarchies and hegemonic relationships deeply entrenched in the EU’s institutional structure. Importantly, Germany’s economic dominance in Europe allowed Merkel to dictate the terms of any agreement and reproduce the structure of domination and dependence characteristic of informal imperialism.⁷² The case of the Greek sovereign debt crisis is thus a classic example of what Tully describes as the imperial process of “‘structurally adjusting’ an existing constitutional order . . . and, secondly, subjecting this legal and political order in turn to regimes of public and private international laws, again constructed and dominated by the great powers.”⁷³ Merkel’s plan to surrender authority of the Greek budget to an EU commissioner for the purpose of better enforcing IMF austerity measures is perhaps the most evident manifestation of an informally imperial structure. Further, the declarations of Greek officials that Merkel was imposing an impossible deal—indeed, an outright ultimatum—suggest that no one followed Beitz’s rule that “decisions should take account of all affected interests.”⁷⁴ Rather, the interests of the rest of the eurozone, particularly those of Germany, shaped the resulting outcomes.

As the Greek people began rioting in protest of the IMF-imposed austerity measures, Greek prime minister George Papandreou was left to deplore Greece's "partial surrender of sovereignty" and to declare that "our struggle will be to recover our autonomy and *liberate* Greece from the surveillance imposed by the forces of conservatism" (emphasis added).⁷⁵ Papandreou's statement starkly echoes the laments heard during the struggle for independence from formal European colonialism just 60 years prior. Blinded by the sense of urgency apportioned to returning stability to the eurozone, no European state—least of all Germany—appears ready to listen.

Deimperializing European Integration

The foregoing case studies are not meant to characterize the European project or the process of European integration as informally imperial *as a whole*. Rather, they illustrate that European integration *can* and often *is* leveraged by the most powerful actors within the EU to reproduce imperial structures, both inside and outside the EU. Neither does this article contend that the French and German governments are consciously adopting imperial policies, for it is precisely the continuity of colonial structures that facilitates the maintenance of informally imperial processes because they appear "natural."

The overall suggestion holds that the EU, which began as a "common high authority" meant to ensure Franco-German cooperation and peace in the wake of World War II, continues, to a great extent, as a Franco-German project.⁷⁶ Undoubtedly, the economic power of France and Germany has served as the most important factor in maintaining their influence. It is no coincidence that France's ability to defend the CAP has stemmed from the fact that it is the world's second-largest agricultural producer and that Germany's central role in the Greek crisis derives from its status as Europe's largest economy, making up more than 25 percent of the eurozone's GDP.⁷⁷ If the EU is to become a normatively acceptable model of a new form of regional or global governance, however, then it is the degree to which people's interests are affected by a particular course of action—not the economic might of a member state—that should endow a collective group with decision-making influence. Such a move would begin to deimperialize European policy making. But why should this be the focus of reform, and what would this process look like?

The key lies in overcoming the EU's democratic deficit because, clearly, undemocratic decision-making processes facilitate the passage of policies that reproduce imperial structures. The emphasis on mitigating the democratic deficit is not novel. Many people have leveled the "standard version" of the democratic-deficit critique against the EU, charging that the institution lacks ties to European citizens.⁷⁸ This standard critique is rarely delivered as a means of deimperializing Europe; rather, it is often directed primarily to alleviate euroskepticism through the construction of a European demos.⁷⁹ However, one has reason to view this approach as ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst.

According to the traditional narrative, creation of a European demos will help overcome the democratic deficit by linking European peoples to the politics and policies undertaken at the European level, boosting participation in European parliamentary elections. The view is that democratizing European integration depends upon the emergence of a single European identity. In the end, such an approach is misguided. The preamble to the EU's European Charter of Fundamental Rights defines integration as a process whereby "the *peoples* of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on *common* values" (emphasis added).⁸⁰ Therefore, according to the charter's own language, European integration should not be mistaken as a process of standardization and homogenization but one of promoting interdependence—a respect for diversity even as common values are reinforced through what Tully suggests could be open-ended "dialogues or, rather, *multilogues*" (emphasis in original).⁸¹ One should not ignore the fact that the EU motto is "united in diversity," not "united as Europe."⁸² Those who advocate the construction of a European demos seem to disregard the fact that in Europe "there are multiple *demos* but they tend to be overlooked and so either excluded from official integration processes or overlooked in them and subordinated to elite-driven and assimilative procedures."⁸³ Insofar as the EU seeks to subvert this rich diversity in favor of a new European nationalism, it threatens to marginalize many of its own peoples. As Joseph Weiler notes, "The potential corrosive effect on [such values] . . . are [*sic*] self-evident. Nationality as referent for interpersonal relations, and the human alienating effect of *Us* and *Them* are brought back again" (emphasis in original).⁸⁴ Therefore, by

focusing on the creation of a single European identity, those seeking to overcome the EU's democratic deficit threaten to deepen it instead.

It is not difficult to see how ignoring the grievances of African farmers in the case of France and the CAP or Germany's failure to consider the concerns of the Greek people during their country's sovereign debt crisis could be associated with the belief that "they" are not worth listening to because they are not qualified (or have rendered themselves unqualified) to be a part of the European demos. This statement may seem particularly striking vis-à-vis Greece, but in the face of the current crisis, many argue that Greece never should have been allowed to join the EU in the first place.⁸⁵ Thus, following Beitz's "substantive requirement that political decisions should take account of all affected interests," mentioned above, would mean including "them" in a decision-making structure that, after successive iterations, threatens to undermine the creation of a European demos. Exclusion, therefore, is the price one pays to attain a true form of European identity and democracy. This insight certainly contributes an additional, more sinister undertone to calls to "save Europe" by removing Greece from the European Monetary Union.⁸⁶ As Weiler notes, "It would be equally ironic that an ethos that rejected the nationalism of the Member States gave birth to a new European nation and European nationalism. The problem with the unity vision is that its very realization entails its negation."⁸⁷

Consequently, democratizing—and thus deimperializing—European integration actually involves working to *resist* efforts to construct a European demos while leveraging the European demoi that already exist by involving them in Tully's model of open-ended multilogues. "What holds these diverse members together," Tully writes, "and generates bonds of belonging to the community as a whole across continuing differences and disagreements is that the prevailing institutions, procedures and norms of integration are always open to free and democratic negotiation and experimentation with alternatives by those subject to them."⁸⁸ This move not only would consider the consultation of the Greek people in the bailout negotiations part of the process of democratizing the EU, but also, by extension, would facilitate the consultation of peoples outside the union who are nevertheless affected by its policies. For example, groups of African farmers affected by the CAP could be granted "consultative status" in the EU decision-making process, a special treatment similar to that provided for some nongovernmental orga-

nizations in the United Nations.⁸⁹ Clearly, this reform would blur the boundaries of the EU by involving external actors in European policy making, but given the growing perception of an inward-looking and insular “Fortress Europe,” one has little reason not to view a softening of the EU’s borders as a positive development.⁹⁰

A related case not discussed here but that is certainly applicable concerns Turkish accession to the EU. Currently, Turkey is being forced to liberalize and “Europeanize” in a decades-old and remarkably elusive quest to fulfill the required accession criteria and incorporate all of the EU’s extensive body of law, known as the *acquis communautaire*.⁹¹ Instead of imposing a unilateral and informally imperial process of Europeanization on Turkey, it would seem more constructive and normatively desirable to engage in reciprocal consultation and contestation of the requirements that must be fulfilled for a state to rightfully consider itself “Western” or “European.” Undoubtedly, Turkey will have to implement further legal and institutional reforms if it wishes to attain EU membership, most notably in the broad area of women’s rights and gender equality.⁹² However, the scope and substance of these changes should never be set in stone and unilaterally imposed—rather, they must remain malleable and open to revision at every stage of EU enlargement. After all, since the answer to the question “What does it mean to be European?” probably will continue to evolve and remain subject to vigorous debate, why should the criteria for EU membership not follow suit? Ultimately, this shift in perspective does not undermine an illusory European demos. Instead, as Tully suggests, it reinforces the many *demoi* (including communities of Turkish immigrants) that constitute the European landscape, thereby strengthening a democratic pluralism whose foundations are already in place.⁹³ In this light, what can ultimately erode resistance to, or even fear of, this approach is the realization that it does not undermine Europe or democracy—it enhances, and in so doing, deimperializes both.

Notes

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92. According to Meltem Müftüler Bac, the Turkish penal code still includes inadequate punishment for rapists and perpetrators of “honour crimes” (e.g., husbands who kill their adulterous wives) (*ibid.*, 27).

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