

Sharpening Our Plowshares

Applying the Lessons of Counterinsurgency to Development and Humanitarian Aid

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Since the 1980s, encouraging social, political, and economic development and dispensing humanitarian assistance have become high-priority missions for both national policy makers and international and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). During the Cold War, donor nations often competed among themselves for influence and reputational rewards or from a simple desire to do good in the developing world. This focus on dispensing developmental and humanitarian aid has only accelerated since the fall of the Berlin Wall.¹

In 2005 President George W. Bush promulgated National Security Presidential Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, which underscored America's commitment to providing humanitarian assistance and reconstruction aid to populations in need.² Later, during the Obama administration, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that "where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention."³ More recently, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued that the United States must "elevate development as a core pillar of American power" as part of a strategy of exercising "smart power" internationally.⁴

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Humanitarian relief and successful development, however, are not the sole preserve of international organizations and American foreign policy organizations. National militaries, particularly America's, have become more directly involved in "engagement" and humanitarian assistance.⁵ Although the US Army, which will likely take the lead in future humanitarian operations, has been most proactive in integrating humanitarian assistance / disaster relief missions into its tactical tasks, the other forces have followed suit.⁶ For example, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*—the principal joint strategic document of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—has broken with tradition by designating humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as a core maritime competency.⁷

Similarly, the nongovernmental sector—long engaged on these issues—has redoubled its humanitarian and developmental efforts.⁸ Although less concerned with the ties that bind humanitarian assistance and defense, NGOs unsurprisingly hold many concerns in common with those articulated by official aid givers. For example, World Vision—the largest American humanitarian NGO—claims that it is "dedicated to working with children, families and communities to overcome poverty and injustice . . . [and to] working with the poor and oppressed to promote human transformation, seek justice, and bear witness to the good news of the Kingdom of God."⁹

In spite of this renewed commitment to development and stability, whether multilateral intergovernmental organizations (IGO) (e.g., the United Nations), humanitarian NGOs (e.g., Oxfam) or organs of the United States or other governments (e.g., the US Agency for International Development [USAID] or the military) have distributed the aid, the results have been disappointing.¹⁰ Individual projects have sometimes flourished and some "colors" or types of aid monies have proved relatively less ineffective than others, but the overall development program has generally foundered.¹¹ In light of development aid's inability to realize its promise for whatever reasons, many IGOs and NGOs have recently and aggressively expanded their portfolios to include operations in humanitarian aid.¹²

Unfortunately, humanitarian operations have experienced similarly disappointing results. Although humanitarian organizations have often shifted much of the responsibility for these failures onto the fecklessness of their donors (primarily nation-states and IGOs), some of the blame must still rest with the humanitarians themselves.¹³ In most of these cases of

failure, a certain lack of proficiency on behalf of the aid givers often lies at or near the center of these problems. As argued by Peter Hoffman and Thomas Weiss,

for too long humanitarians have talked about becoming more professional but have been unwilling to accept the discipline and costs that necessarily would accompany such changes. Far too much [stabilization and development] work is still driven by anecdote and angst, not evidence and strategy. Although humanitarians will undoubtedly bristle at the comparison, *professional militaries—unlike professional humanitarians—have a culture that values learning, and they invest substantial sums in the institutional infrastructure to assemble and act on lessons*. Military academies epitomize how this works; previous and ongoing operations are analyzed, new procedures are tried and tested, and student soldiers are educated about best practices and adapting tactics to field specifics.¹⁴ (emphasis added)

This article follows on a small but growing literature that seeks to take up Hoffman and Weiss's challenge: to begin to lay the intellectual foundation for a better "human-capital infrastructure" for proactive civilian, NGO, and IGO development, peacekeeping, peace building, and stabilization.¹⁵ Given the increasing stabilization and peace consolidation role undertaken by American combatant commands, these lessons may be equally applied to militaries fighting the wars of the new century.

Beyond emphasizing the process of "learning" writ large, we might further mine military doctrine and practice to conceptualize how aid givers can confront an amorphous enemy as well as incapacitated host-country clients and partners in conditions of great strategic and tactical ambiguity. In fact the US Army has confronted similar problems (and opportunities) in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment in Iraq and Afghanistan for the past several years—experiences and lessons learned now codified in Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5).¹⁶ This article thus takes a novel approach to aid giving, whether by civilians or their military counterparts, by explicitly considering the parallels between COIN and civilian- and military-led stability operations—and the lessons that the former might take from the latter.

One must appreciate that asking humanitarians to draw lessons from their military opposites will prove controversial, a point addressed below. Consequently, one must note at the onset that this article does not advocate the militarization of aid or aid givers—an ongoing *strategic* concern for

many members of the aid community.¹⁷ Rather, it seeks to encourage aid givers to draw upon those military lessons learned when—and to the extent to which—they assist humanitarians and development specialists in most effectively and efficiently dispensing with the *tactical* and *operational* aspects of their important work.

Toward that end, the article first considers why humanitarian and stabilization efforts are so central to America's and the developed world's foreign policies that they merit our considering a "war" against instability. It then addresses the challenges of foreign development and humanitarian aid as well as the poor record of success that they have experienced thus far. Next, it turns to developing a COIN-inspired strategy for development assistance and stabilization operations, explicitly drawing, again, on FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 in doing so. The article concludes by considering the lessons that we thus might learn and avenues for future research and practice.

A New Kind of War: Why Development, Why Now?

We have fought wars against drugs, poverty, cancer, and terror. In those actions, in which military force remained secondary to social, financial, informational, and diplomatic instruments, the term *war* conveyed the gravity of the challenge and the totality of power and resources employed in the pursuit of victory.¹⁸ The war metaphor unintentionally illuminates one additional aspect of these contests—they can be lost. Indeed, the history of warfare instructs us that even great powers' efforts may falter when employed without a comprehensive strategy for victory. The war metaphor serves as a reminder that wars are won (and lost) not only by the quantity and quality of the forces deployed but also by the skill with which they are employed.

Although America's military and civilian leadership has principally directed its attention to the prosecution of the two kinetic wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as those conflicts wind down, forward-thinking leaders have begun to consider a new, metaphorical war that entails shaping the globalized environment in ways that will avoid future shooting wars before they start.¹⁹ This strategy is predicated on the idea that preempting and avoiding *prospective* crises will prove less costly than resolving them by force of arms or dint of diplomacy after they have become manifest.

The principal axes of conflict in this new war on global instability are the fronts of economic and social development, democratization, and the

development of civil society. Development strategy has been informed by the belief that poverty and the disintegration of traditional social, cultural, and familial networks are real and daunting adversaries. A dawning consensus among students of development aid, however, holds that some of the greatest impediments to the delivery of humanitarian aid, stability, and long-term peace often reside in the very governments of the recipient countries themselves.²⁰

Although partner governments' failings often concern an inability to perform their obligations to their constituents, such weakness enables others to undermine the peace or legitimacy of those governments, even without the commission of violent or disruptive acts. Rather, corruption, simple incompetence, or a lack of administrative capacity proves that, like a cancer, an "enemy" need not be malicious to be malignant. Against such a foe, we must bring to bear new and unconventional tools with which to fight an unconventional war—one in which effective local partnerships, proactive diplomacy, and, most importantly, capacity building stand in for ever-greater aid budgets, larger peacekeeping forces, or more military advisers.

Development and Humanitarian Aid Thus Far: Promises Unfulfilled

The United States, other wealthy nations, IGOs, and private actors like NGOs and "superempowered" individuals such as Bill and Melinda Gates have long sought to redress the extreme poverty and other depredations believed to contribute to instability in the developing world.²¹ Unfortunately, in spite of this commitment to development and relief, the record for economic assistance has been disappointing. A number of empirical studies have shown that higher gross quantities of aid have failed to improve the performance of recipient countries.²² As David Rieff notes, "bureaucratic ineptitude, poor planning, paternalism, financial mismanagement, a lack of any system of accountability, and a smug, self-regarding, and self-perpetuating culture [have] . . . become the hallmarks of the development enterprise in the poor world."²³

Yet, even though greater quantities of aid giving may not be a panacea, a better quality of aid, given to well-governed countries or capable and robust local development organizations, may improve the prospects for economic development and humanitarian relief.²⁴ One humanitarian aid giver, for instance, has advocated an overtly "social or political contract

dedicated to famine prevention [that] constitutes an attempt to infuse social and economic rights into civil liberties,” an approach to aid that stresses the bond between a competent and democratic government and those it seeks to represent.²⁵

These insights have directed more attention to the importance of the quality of the recipient (and donor) governments as opposed to ever-larger aid budgets or ambitious humanitarianism.²⁶ Governments and international-development NGOs have articulated an increased willingness to shape their aid policies to better reflect more efficient and safer practice as well as the recipient countries’ actual needs (even if, unfortunately, donors’ practice has often lagged their public commitments).²⁷ Furthermore, as shown by the charter of the US Millennium Challenge Corporation, for example, donors too are showing a parallel interest in partnering with well-run and well-governed recipients.²⁸ This new political perspective is consistent with (some) members of the NGO community who have, in effect, argued that “there are no humanitarian [or development] solutions to humanitarian problems.”²⁹

Two Communities, Common Lessons

The development community has not been alone in learning the very costly lesson about the importance of effective local partnerships to stabilization and development. Since 2006 the US military has also experienced a sea change in its operational and tactical doctrine: the foundation of the Army’s COIN doctrine, applied with success in Iraq in 2007, and the more recent “surge” in Afghanistan both emphasize the central importance of setting up and working with effective local partners.

Indeed, the importance of local politics and partners has as yet failed to fully gain purchase with the development community, but military “buy-in” for the new COIN strategies has proved significant—particularly given the difficulty of reorienting large bureaucracies like the US Department of Defense and the military services.³⁰ Perhaps this has proceeded from the modern American military’s demonstrated willingness to institutionalize lessons-learned processes.

Lessons of Domestic Partnerships from Army Counterinsurgency

It is true that COIN operations in the distant past may have relied on overwhelming force and civilian reprisals, perhaps best exemplified by the British Army's long and difficult—but ultimately successful—campaign in South Africa during the Boer War. However, in the 24-hour news cycle, one of the lessons that one must take from more recent COIN operations is that even though outside powers cannot ultimately *win* such operations (without Boer-like civilian depredations), they can establish and support local partners and proxies that will. As noted in a perceptive paper by Nori Katagiri, the “gold standard” of COIN operations to date—Great Britain's successful suppression of the communist insurgency during the Malayan Emergency (1948–60)—held a hidden cost. That is, although the British “won” the war, they did so only after they established a credible local Malaysian government partner domestically strong enough that, after the emergency had passed, the Malaysians successfully wrested control of the country from their former colonial masters.³¹

Although the United States did not hold similar colonial aspirations in Iraq, it is notable that in spite of its great material advantages, America's COIN strategy and surge bore fruit only after it produced a reasonably competent set of local partners and only after they had become sufficiently committed to denying safe haven to and, ultimately, defeating the insurgency. Without the Sunni Awakening and that population's direct action against al-Qaeda and the maturation of Iraqi governance from the *nabhiya* (city), to province, to national level, the surge may have failed. It is a most significant but often overlooked fact that the Mahdi army and Shiite militias were cleared from Basra and other southern strongholds by the Iraqi army, as ordered by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki—not by the more materially capable US armed forces.

Lessons Learned: FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency

One finds many of these lessons on successful COIN, civil-military, and military/host-nation (HN) partnerships codified in FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5. Many of the lessons learned by Gen David Petraeus and the other authors of this document should have great resonance with the humanitarian and development communities. By drawing upon FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 and the collective lessons of Army and Marine units, NGOs, IGOs, and

national organizations (civilian and military) will be better able to realize their worthy goals and to develop, shape, and stabilize heretofore restive developing regions. The following examines and expands upon a number of such lessons.

Of necessity, stabilization efforts must stress “unity of effort” and interagency operations. Many organizations involved in the development and distribution of aid—particularly humanitarian NGOs—are inimical to working with governmental organizations generally and the military in particular, for several reasons.³² On the one hand, humanitarian organizations assert that associating with ongoing military organizations reduces their perceived neutrality in these conflicts, thus increasing the likelihood that combatants will target them, which reduces their capacity to reach people who need assistance. For example, one of the most outspokenly independent humanitarian organizations—Doctors without Borders / Médecins Sans Frontières—has argued that “the US government’s strategy of combining relief and military operations increased the vulnerability of humanitarian aid workers, whose work was perceived as a component of the military effort,” while the director of CARE “deplores the increasing trend . . . to ‘use and co-opt humanitarian assistance as an integral part of warfighting.’”³³

On the other hand, the military has had less of a problem with the “nexus” between military adventurism and humanitarianism. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 stresses that

NGOs often play an important role at the local level. Many such agencies resist being overtly involved with military forces; however, efforts to establish some kind of liaison are needed. The most important connections are those with joint, interagency, multinational, and [HN] organizations. The goal of these connections is to ensure that, as much as possible, objectives are shared and actions and messages synchronized. Achieving this synergy is essential.

Almost everything in COIN is interagency. Everything from policing to intelligence to civil-military operations . . . to trash collection involves working with interagency and host-nation . . . partners. These agencies are not under military control, but their success is essential to accomplishing the mission.³⁴

The US government’s perspective is echoed in a recent study on the intersection of humanitarianism and military operations: “Neutrality is an ideal, not a reality. When aid workers operate in close proximity to Western military forces, all sides will inevitably view the aid workers as political actors.”³⁵ Similarly, a recent World Bank study urges us to “use a conflict

lens” since “all choices in governance affect power relationships.”³⁶ Each case underscores an appreciation for the necessity of whole-of-government and whole-of-*nation* approaches, as reflected in National Security Presidential Directive 44 and more recent US government documents.

This stands in stark contrast to the perspectives of aid givers—particularly NGOs, which are quick to reassert their independence and impartiality, in keeping with the principles of humanitarianism.³⁷ Yet, as long as certain subject populations remain of interest to US government organs, as well as humanitarian and development NGOs, this overlap is inevitable. Thus, although arguing in favor of a perfectly neutral “humanitarian space” and a purity of purpose may suit the NGOs’ and development agencies’ desire to emphasize the “intrinsic worth” and “dignity” of those they serve, it is unrealistic in practice. In fact, developing frontiers remain dangerous places for aid workers, no matter their neutrality or provenance.³⁸ Idealism dictates further separation from entangling military operations, but events on the ground argue in favor of greater cooperation and integration between the two.³⁹ As argued by Sarah Lischer, development cannot stand in for security; rather, security, which militaries and nation-states have a comparative advantage in providing, is essential for development to succeed.⁴⁰ This element of security, as outlined in FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 and as practiced in Iraq and Afghanistan, is the first element necessary for the successful prosecution of COIN and the resulting opportunities for sustained development.

On the one hand, as long as developmental and humanitarian organizations wish to fulfill their mission of bringing assistance and development to those in need, they will be best served by working with governments, professionalizing and recognizing the inevitability of military interaction. Indeed, whether they approve or not, this has been an ongoing process within the humanitarian field for the past decade.⁴¹ On the other hand, military and government organizations must become more fully aware of the additional stresses and dangers that the “securitization” of humanitarian and development relief brings to those who have long operated in this field. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 recognizes these realities, asserting that

there is no such thing as impartial humanitarian assistance. . . . Whenever someone is helped, someone else is hurt, not least the insurgents. So civil and humanitarian assistance personnel often become targets. Protecting them is a matter not only of providing a close-in defense, but also of creating a secure environment by co-opting local beneficiaries of aid and their leaders.⁴²

Do more than deliver (security or humanitarian) goods: Build capacity.

It is crucial that providers of development assistance not become overly concerned with the narrow, technical aspects of aid (although technical competence, clearly, is also important).⁴³ FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 argues that a stabilization “effort cannot achieve lasting success without the HN government achieving legitimacy. . . . [Therefore,] the primary objective of any . . . [stabilization/development] operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. . . . [International custodians must] achieve this objective by the balanced application of both military and non-military means.”⁴⁴

Indeed, in the end, *host government capacity*, rather than the availability of large quantities of aid material, is crucial for long-term stability and development. Thus, although substantial aid budgets are surely important for winning wars against underdevelopment, just as adequate surge forces are for winning COINs, neither is as important as the means by which they are employed. Flooding aid into recipient countries without proper consideration of the ends it should achieve is the development equivalent of the military’s previous unhealthy focus on body counts and destruction of the enemy’s force during COIN operations.⁴⁵

To this end, attempting to do *too much* can impede HN capacity building. This can take place in a number of ways. The aid literature, for example, has argued that in their rush to acquire high-quality local workers, aid organizations have often “bought up” the best local talent for their own field offices at wages against which local institutions cannot compete. In so doing, these organizations leave the HN government with a shallow talent pool with which to undertake the very difficult task of building up its own operations—often from scratch.

Beyond personnel issues, another problem outlined in FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 deals with the conduct of operations that may be of concern to aid givers. It maintains that in order for development and stabilization efforts to not just succeed but take hold for the long term,

the host nation has to win on its own. . . . U.S. forces and agencies can help, but HN elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real victory. While it may be easier for U.S. military units to conduct operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions and then assist them. . . .

... T. E. Lawrence [observed] while leading the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1917: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly.”⁴⁶

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 notes, however, that *building* capacity is not the same thing as having a capacity *built*. Until a genuine HN capacity exists, a premature turnover of responsibility in the name of forging that capacity may prove highly counterproductive. The manual thus continues by arguing that “a key word in Lawrence’s advice is ‘tolerably.’ If the host nation cannot perform tolerably, counterinsurgents supporting it may have to act. Experience, knowledge of the AO [area of operations], and cultural sensitivity are essential to deciding when such action is necessary.”⁴⁷

As noted above, it is therefore crucial for custodians (governmental, military, IGO, and NGO alike) to remember that it is not enough to simply ensure that local institutions have the competent talent necessary to “win on their own”—they must have the opportunity to do so. Again, though, this occurs only *after* prior institution building by foreign partners has facilitated their success.

A focus on institutions. Relatedly, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 argues in favor of standing up and building capacity in the institutions having the potential for lasting stability and development: “U.S. forces committed to . . . [development and stabilization] effort[s] are there to assist an HN government. The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself.” To that end, “Soldiers and Marines help establish HN institutions that sustain . . . [a] legal regime, including police forces, court systems, and penal facilities.”⁴⁸ In a separate article on COIN operations, General Petraeus emphasizes this point, writing that custodians must ultimately “help to build institutions, not just units.”⁴⁹

Likewise, one can best realize development goals with a similar commitment to institution building. Too often, humanitarian and development organizations see the giving of aid or the individual project upon which they are working as the end toward which their efforts draw. In so doing, they fail to appreciate the fundamentally social and political aspects of successful aid and development strategies.⁵⁰ Worse, a desire for expediency—getting things done with the *easiest* partners at hand rather than the *best*—can have counterproductive effects if it ultimately undermines critical HN institutions. Although ad hoc and informal partners can sometimes be

effective, as was the case with the Sons of Iraq / Sunni militias in Iraq, one must be particularly cautious when allying with such actors. Thus, some argue that “helping to build the capacity of the informal/non-state governance institutions to complement formal/state functions” can be an effective shortcut when state institutions are incapacitated, corrupt, or nonexistent.⁵¹ However, one must take care not to undermine nascent national institutions and should act only with considerable understanding of the local context.

Fortunately, interest in capacity building has increased, at least in the military and security dimensions.⁵² One hopes that civilian and civil society programs will follow this good example. Perhaps the largely successful democratization programs undertaken in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War might prove a further, helpful template for these sorts of programs. Ultimately, military and civilian organizations alike will likely be best served by making self-sustaining local organizational capacity a key aspect of future aid efforts. In the end, a successful exit strategy for both aid and COIN operations will depend upon the ability of these organizations to succeed in building local institutions up to the point at which they can stand on their own.

Attain buy-in from the HN and, most importantly, its people. According to FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, “Killing insurgents—while necessary, especially with respect to extremists—by itself cannot defeat an insurgency.”⁵³ Similarly, as noted by Clark Gibson, Krister Anderson, Elinor Ostrom, and Sujai Shivakumar, the distribution of aid, while necessary, cannot catalyze development by itself.⁵⁴ In both cases, it is fundamentally important that one build peace, stability, and development upon the solid foundation of the local populace—and not on the efforts of foreign aid or military personnel who, ultimately, will depart.

Buy-in has two aspects: the populace must support the operations of custodians in the immediate term and then must grant legitimacy to the HN’s civil, legal, and security institutions over the long term. Unsurprisingly, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 considers how custodians might realize these goals from a purely military perspective:

Gaining and retaining the initiative requires counterinsurgents to address the insurgency’s causes through stability operations as well. This initially involves securing and controlling the local populace and providing for essential services. As security improves, military resources contribute to supporting government reforms and recon-

struction projects. As counterinsurgents gain the initiative, offensive operations focus on eliminating the insurgent cadre, while defensive operations focus on protecting the populace and infrastructure from direct attacks. As counterinsurgents establish military ascendancy, stability operations expand across the area of operations (AO) and eventually predominate.⁵⁵

Notwithstanding the focus on the martial aspect of security, such observations still offer a useful guide for aid givers, particularly the comment that “victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government’s legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting” spoilers of any type that continue to sow instability and pursue rent seeking for their own narrow ends.⁵⁶

This goal is consistent with the argument—prevalent in the aid and stabilization literatures—that international actors must be accountable to those they serve.⁵⁷ Yet, even when one undertakes to be held locally accountable, the assumption is that it represents “an opportunity to widen the conversation about the politics, power, and ethics that define humanitarian space.”⁵⁸ However, accountability has received far too little consideration to the degree that one sees it as a vehicle for building the sort of local buy-in that ultimately makes these programs self-sustaining and, if successful, bestow valuable legitimacy on the HN government.

Again, the guidance from counterinsurgents, who explicitly seek to empower local agents as part of their war-fighting and exit strategies, might serve as a model for governmental aid givers in their own aid strategies. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 observes that

as the HN government increases its legitimacy, the populace begins to assist it more actively. Eventually, the people marginalize and stigmatize insurgents [e.g., man-made and circumstantial threats to peace, stability and development in the case of aid]. . . . However, victory is gained not when this isolation is achieved, but when the victory is permanently maintained by and with the people’s active support.⁵⁹

To the extent that aid givers’ goals coincide with the counterinsurgents’ on these points, these observations on success will serve them in good stead as they seek to design more effective stabilization and development programs.

When developing these programs, both the counterinsurgent and the aid giver want to shoot for the moon—to design, in the words of former secretary of defense Gates, “exquisite” programs.⁶⁰ Although clearly desirable, such programs are difficult to see through to success in the face of donors’ limited resources. They are harder still for even more resource-constrained local governments in desperate need of quick legitimacy-building

successes. Exquisiteness demands that ever more of the onus be put on foreign custodians, forgetting T. E. Lawrence's advice that it is better that the locals "do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly."

Thus, when designing programs *with local input*, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 notes that custodians "do not try to crack the hardest nut first. . . . Instead, start from secure areas and work gradually outwards. Extend influence through the local people's networks. Go with, not against, the grain of the local populace."⁶¹ Army units in Iraq during the summer of 2003 had significant early successes with their local Iraqi populations, often through the simple repair of mechanical wells or irrigation pumps or canal-cleaning projects, all of which had suffered through over a decade of sanctions following Operation Desert Storm. Later, efforts during and after the Iraqi surge of 2007 were more ambitiously tied to the improved efficiency and effectiveness of Iraqi government institutions. For example, during 2007–8, local farmers' co-ops were nested in the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture, and medical efforts were synchronized with the Ministry of Health and usually focused on inoculations.

Local knowledge is key. If counterinsurgents wish to battle guerilla forces effectively, then they must have local knowledge—and of all that knowledge to master, intelligence about the people, among whom both the insurgent and counterinsurgent must move, remains the most fundamental. Indeed, "cultural awareness is a force multiplier. . . . The people are, in many respects, the decisive terrain, and we must study that terrain in the same way that we have always studied the geographic terrain."⁶² Further, if the aid giver wishes to promote stability safely and successfully or even distribute triage humanitarian aid effectively, similar local knowledge is of the highest possible importance.⁶³ With this simple but often overlooked reality in mind, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 maintains that "an effective counterinsurgent force is a learning organization."⁶⁴ General Petraeus writes that "my own pen and notebook were always handy when soldiering in Iraq."⁶⁵

The proximate objectives of COIN as well as development and stabilization programs are not the same, but their long-term goals are much in parallel. It may thus be instructive for the aid giver to consider FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5's advice to the company commander (the effective equivalent of an NGO/IGO program manager): "Intelligence and operations are always complementary, especially in COIN operations. COIN operations

are intelligence driven, and units often develop much of their own intelligence. Commanders must organize their assets to do that. Each company may require an intelligence section, including analysts and an individual designated as the ‘S-2’ [intelligence officer].”⁶⁶

This local area knowledge, essential for both COIN’s and aid programs’ success, can be as simple as talking with local civilians or as detailed as conducting polling efforts in metropolitan areas. In either case, it can facilitate early successes/victories for the Soldier or aid giver. For example, experience from Afghanistan and Iraq has led US COIN forces to seek to avoid the trap of dictating civil affairs projects to local groups—a trap that, unfortunately, affects Western militaries and aid workers alike. Coalition COIN forces in Iraq found that their greatest successes came only after they sought local Iraqis’ perspectives—such as asking them where children went to school or what sort of medical care had been available in 2003, before the invasion. This intelligence gave counterinsurgents a crucial benchmark toward which they could strive—as well as local insights into expectations and how they might best be met. Only after having achieved preconflict levels of development and stability did the COIN forces attempt further development efforts, in accordance with local Iraqi priorities and in concert with the Iraqi ministries’ efforts.⁶⁷

Although the last example comes from the perspective of the counterinsurgent, the extent to which it applies to the aid giver is clear. Indeed, as noted by Oxfam’s Tony Vaux, “one of the main lessons from the 1980s ha[s] been that Oxfam’s best emergency work transpired when it acted in a developmental way, consulting local people and concentrating on the longer-term issue of rehabilitation.”⁶⁸

One should also note that although local knowledge is important to the individual operator, it is invaluable to the organization and to the projects/operations it runs. Compiling a collective pool of this knowledge is almost as essential as its initial collection. Indeed, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 advises that “it is unlikely the insurgency [aid program] will end during a troop’s tour . . . and the relieving unit will need as much knowledge as can be passed to them.”⁶⁹ One of the benefits of corporate organizations—whether the military, Department of State, IGOs or NGOs—is that they need not limit their local knowledge to a particular individual. “Corporate knowledge,” a

reserve of lessons learned and best practices, is among the benefits of operating large organizations.

Although members of the Department of State or NGO project managers may have the luxury of longer tour lengths than Soldiers in a COIN theater, their terms in-country are similarly time-constrained. Like their COIN counterpart, they should realize that the benefits of corporate knowledge are neither inevitable nor automatic and that they must begin getting ready for their handover from day one. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 advises that field units start

handover folders . . . immediately upon arrival, if they are not available from the unit being relieved . . . [and that these] folders should include lessons learned, details about the populace, village and patrol reports, updated maps, and photographs—anything that will help newcomers master the environment. . . . Keeping this information current is boring, tedious work. But it is essential to both short- and long-term success.⁷⁰

Strategic communication is key. Ultimately, all aid organizations must have access to the resources that allow them to carry out their mandates. American governmental organizations like the Department of State and USAID must maintain the support of Congress, which controls their purse strings. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 points out that “gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a protracted deployment is critical. Only the most senior military officers are involved in this process at all . . . [because this] is properly a political activity. However, military leaders typically take care to ensure . . . that the conduct of operations neither makes it harder for elected leaders to maintain public support nor undermines public confidence.”⁷¹

Moreover, aid givers must keep the support of their constituent and donor countries. NGO fund raising is sometimes controversial; cynics often claim that these organizations raise funds on behalf of the needy and media-friendly for their own selfish purposes.⁷² They too have no option other than raising funds aggressively (whether from private parties and foundations or, increasingly, governments) in order to continue their work abroad.⁷³ In addition to currying favor with home-country and global audiences, however, it is at least as important that aid givers manage their message to the recipients of this aid. They must do so to create the buy-in necessary for the success of their own programs as well as to enhance the legitimacy of their HN and local partners—essential to the long-term prospects for stability and development.

To appeal to these diverse audiences, one must master the information environment. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to overcome biases against Western intervention (although, clearly, the problems faced by the military in this regard are significantly greater than those for civilian NGOs). As noted by FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, which relays the experiences of a particular unit in Iraq, “decades of Arab media mischaracterization of U.S. actions had instilled distrust of American motives. The magnitude of that cynicism and distrust highlighted the critical importance of using information operations to influence every situation.”⁷⁴

Just as these informational aspects of humanitarian and development assistance as well as stabilization and capacity-building operations must draw from and remain sensitive to local communities, so can they *shape* those communities. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 notes that a highly beneficial aspect of strategic communications, both for foreign custodians and the local government institutions to which they will ultimately have to hand off, involves managing expectations: “To limit discontent and build support, the HN government and any counterinsurgents assisting it create and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the populace, friendly military forces, and the international community.”⁷⁵ For example, the American military’s humanitarian efforts in Iraq in 2003–4 often highlighted the singular efforts of US units, but any ground-breaking or opening ceremonies after 2007 have emphasized the importance and significance of Iraqi leadership and participation, reinforcing the sovereignty of the young government.

This is not to propose a manipulative or propagandistic campaign on behalf of aid givers but to urge that they manage the message for their activities. As their interactions and cooperation with state governments and even militaries grow, this essential task likely will become increasingly important.

NGOs in particular have proved (controversially) adept at managing their brand and image for the consumption of their donors at home, a lesson that the US military would do well to learn. Indeed, as noted by one observer, “better branding and commercial skill bec[o]me essential for institutional survival and renewal. . . . The parameters to brand recognition—ethically acceptable partners and practices—are just as crucial for firms such as Borders or Apple or Nike” as they are to aid organizations.⁷⁶ However, strategic communications with the *target* government, institutions, and

people must be foremost in mind as this represents both a threat and an opportunity for aid givers. Managing expectations, building buy-in by local partners and people, and limiting push-back by local and foreign forces that might seek to undermine development and stabilization operations make this aspect of development assistance and humanitarian relief essential. But in the end, actions (aid) speak louder than words or web pages to local constituents.

Realize that, like counterinsurgency, development is for the long term. State building is a long-term vocation that can cause at least two sorts of problems for the aid giver. Firstly, it means that valuable individual and corporate knowledge may be lost due to the passage of time. Additionally, valuable forward momentum enjoyed by successful projects may disappear, or prospectively successful projects will not live long enough to get a chance to get off the ground.

For these reasons, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 stresses the importance of knowledge diffusion and long-term planning by headquarters echelons. Secondly, individuals' or organizations' desire to realize "wins" during their relatively short term of service in the field on a particular project may overshadow longer-term goals sought by the organizations' leaders. This temporal mismatch and the lack of persistence that underlies it infect both civilian and military stabilization operations. We consider each of these problems in turn.

The emphasis that the military places on passing on and diffusing corporate knowledge is driven, in part, by the high pace at which COIN operators rotate through their area of operations (the average length of a combat tour in Iraq was 12–15 months for Army personnel and seven months for Marines). In principle, personnel with the Department of State and USAID are not limited by fixed rotations and tours, but in practice in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have served tours similar in duration to those of their Marine and Army counterparts—indeed, "hardship" assignments for State employees (e.g., those in unstable countries are limited to about two years). NGO personnel, however, can stay as long as necessary. That said, given the length of both COIN and state-building operations—many lasting decades—even the most persistent humanitarians may lose focus (either their own or that of their donors). This is unfortunate because many pro-

grams may pay off if one manages expectations and makes preparations for the long haul.

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 again underscores duration and persistence operations. Although the manual emphasizes COIN operations, its observations once again offer great insights for aid-giving operations as well:

Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources. . . . People do not actively support a government unless they are convinced that the counterinsurgents have the means, ability, stamina, and will to win. . . . U.S. support [and that of other foreign custodians] can be crucial to building public faith in that government's viability. The populace must have confidence in the staying power of both the counterinsurgents and the HN government. . . . Constant reaffirmations of commitment, backed by deeds, can overcome . . . [suspicion] and bolster faith in the steadfastness of U.S. support. But even the strongest U.S. commitment will not succeed if the populace does not perceive the HN government as having similar will and stamina. U.S. forces must help create that capacity and sustain that impression.⁷⁷

This process, which can take a substantial amount of time, must be planned and budgeted at the *onset* of an operation, rather than after the aid-giving agencies' resources and/or will begins to flag under the unforeseen weight of a long and ambitious deployment.

Operationally, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 carries this theme forward as it advises detailers and budget planners to prepare

for a protracted COIN effort [which] requires establishing headquarters and support structures designed for long-term operations. Planning and commitments should be based on sustainable operating tempo and personnel tempo limits for the various components of the force. . . . Even in situations where the U.S. goal is reducing its military force levels as quickly as possible, some support for HN institutions usually remains for a long time.⁷⁸

These observations on the importance of persistence strongly serve to underscore that aid givers and international custodians, like their military counterparts, must be committed to their respective development and stabilization programs for the long term. Although the triage function played by emergency operations does, in some special cases, dictate a certain benign myopia, it remains important to recognize that addressing the fundamental political problems which create these crises can take a very long time.

Individual aid-givers' desire for tangible wins with which to burnish their resume; lobby for more and future donations, contracts, and budgets; and validate their self-sacrifice can have a deleterious effect on development and stabilization projects—particularly those designed to last into the dis-

tant term. Unfortunately, these organizations and programs are often judged by measures of performance such as tons of food delivered, wells dug, refugees housed, and the like—none of which address the less *pressing* but more *fundamental* problems that are engaged by measures of effectiveness, such as those that concern the building of self-sufficiency into recipient populations.⁷⁹

Conclusion

This article does not advocate making aid “go military”—indeed, it advocates sharpening one’s plowshares rather than turning them back into swords. Aid givers, whether from the nongovernmental, intergovernmental, or military services, play a vital role in shaping a more equitable and stable world—a role that the force of arms cannot play. That said, as argued above, aid givers can learn certain *lessons* and draw upon a pool of experience from those who conduct military actions—especially COIN operations.

This is particularly true when the lessons concern standing up and working with local partners (e.g., capacity building) and when corporate knowledge is at a premium. The author hopes that this article is a first step in a process toward a useful cross-fertilization of lessons, ideas, and experiences between two groups that rarely speak but that, ironically, increasingly face overlapping problems within each of their traditional areas of expertise and operations. One hopes that as these groups gain more experience in the difficult environments in which they function—and as the two communities have more opportunities to work with and talk to one another while they are there—there will be more opportunities for an exchange of ideas for best practices, *useful* measures and metrics of success, and effective means by which the aid giver and the war fighter can share the burden more efficiently.

Notes

1. On the proliferation of official aid, see Michael Barnett and Jack Snyder, “The Grand Strategies of Humanitarianism,” in *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics*, ed. Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 143–71; Michael Barnett, “Humanitarianism Transformed,” *Perspectives on Politics*, December 2005, 723–40; Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor, “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows,” *World Politics*, January 1998, 294–323; and David H. Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949–1989* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). On the grand strategy of American aid, see, for example, US Department of State and the US Agency for International Development, *Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2007–2012* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 7 May 2007), <http://>

www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf, which seeks to ensure “a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system” (9). In terms of intergovernmental organizations’ commitment to aid, see the mission statement of the United Nations Development Programme, which maintains that its broad and ambitious goals encompass “helping countries build and share solutions to the challenges of: Poverty Reduction and Achievement of the [Millennium Development Goals], Democratic Governance, Crisis Prevention and Recovery, [and] Environment and Energy for Sustainable Development.” “A World of Development Experience,” United Nations Development Programme, accessed 27 November 2012, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/about_us.html.

2. George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive / NSPD-44: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization” (Washington, DC: White House, 7 December 2005), <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf>. See also Department of Defense, *Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge Operations (MISSS): A Study* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 2007), http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/misss_study.pdf.

3. Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 1 (January/February 2009): 29–30.

4. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations,” Washington, DC, 15 July 2009, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm>.

5. On American military efforts for political and developmental engagement, see Anthony Zinni and Tom Clancy, “CENTCOM,” in Tom Clancy with Anthony Zinni and Tony Koltz, *Battle Ready* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004). See also US Africa Command, *United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement* (Stuttgart, Germany: US Africa Command Staff and US Africa Command Public Affairs Office, March 2009), 4, <http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/USAFRICOM2009PostureStatement.pdf>.

6. Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, and Amy Richardson, *Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 3ff, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG646.pdf.

7. GEN James T. Conway, ADM Gary Roughead, and ADM Thad W. Allen, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of the Commandant of the US Marine Corps, Office of the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, October 2007), <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf>.

8. James D. Fearon, “The Rise of Emergency Relief Aid,” in Barnett and Weiss, *Humanitarianism in Question*, 67–68; and William Easterly, “Foreign Aid Goes Military!,” *New York Review of Books*, 4 December 2008, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/dec/04/foreign-aid-goes-military/?pagination=false>.

9. “Our Mission,” World Vision, accessed 4 December 2009, http://www.worldvision.org/content.nsf/about/our-mission?Open&lpos=lft_txt_Our-Mission.

10. Clark C. Gibson et al., *The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid* (London: Oxford University Press, 2005); and William Easterly, *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

11. Within the context of official aid, multilateral aid is considered more effective—and less politicized—than bilateral aid; there is still a great deal of uncertainty with respect to the relative effectiveness of NGOs against government-to-government aid. On the virtues of multilateral aid, see Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics*.

12. See Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, “Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present,” in Barnett and Weiss, *Humanitarianism in Question*, 1–48.

13. See, for example, Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); and Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict,” *International Security* 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 79–109.

14. Peter J. Hoffman and Thomas G. Weiss, “Humanitarianism and Practitioners: Social Science Matters,” in Barnett and Weiss, *Humanitarianism in Question*, 285. Although the general argument is true, some preliminary efforts at comprehensive lessons learned have occurred within the aid community, particularly in

terms of humanitarian security. See, for example, the InterAction-Based Security Advisory Group and the Minimum Operating Security Standards protocols promulgated by the United Nations Security Coordinator.

15. See the United States Institute for Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, ed. Beth Cole and Emily Hsu (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009). See also Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner Publishers, 1999); and Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa* (Oxford, UK, and Bloomington, IN: James Currey and Indiana University Press, 1997).

16. Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24.pdf.

17. Nicolas de Torrente, “Humanitarian NGOs Must Not Ally with Military,” *European Affairs*, Spring/Summer 2006, 2; Easterly, “Foreign Aid Goes Military!”; and Hugo Slim, “A Call to Arms: Humanitarian Action and the Art of War,” *Opinion*, February 2004, 1–17.

18. Some argue that the war metaphor is overused to the point that its significance has diminished. It can be useful in the ways described here: as a marshaling of resources against a known objective or enemy. For the opposed view, however, see Ralph Peters, “Wishful Thinking and Indecisive Wars,” *Journal of International Security Affairs*, no. 16 (Spring 2009), <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/16/peters.php>.

19. See, for example, Cole and Hsu, *Guiding Principles*; *The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development* (Washington, DC: World Bank on Behalf of the Commission on Growth and Development, 2008); and Conway, Roughead, and Allen, *Cooperative Strategy*.

20. Sarah L. Henderson, “Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Organization Sector in Russia,” *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 2 (2002): 139–67; Steven Knack, “Aid Dependence and Quality of Governance: A Cross-Country Empirical Analysis,” *Southern Economic Journal*, October 2001, 310–29; Jakob Svensson, “Foreign Aid and Rent Seeking,” *Journal of International Economics* 51 (2000): 437–61; Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, the Incentive Regime, and Poverty Reduction,” Policy Research Working Paper no. WPS 1937 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998); Tarhan Feyzioglu, Vinaya Swaroop, and Min Zhu, “A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of Foreign Aid,” *World Bank Economic Review* 12, no. 1 (1998): 29–58; and Michael Maren, *The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity* (New York: Free Press, 1997).

21. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) includes the world’s 30 richest countries, which collectively delivered about \$12.5 billion in gross official, government-to-government development assistance in 2008. Total gross overseas development assistance (ODA) from all countries amounted to just under \$120 billion in 2004. Total private aid distributed by NGOs came to about \$4 billion in 2004, discounting the activities of organizations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. For data on the OECD, see Development Co-operation Directorate, *Gross Official Development Assistance 2008*, accessed 28 November 2012, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/55/42458670.pdf>. For data for ODA and private aid, see Fearon, “Rise of Emergency Relief Aid.” On the historical commitment to global wealth distribution, see Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics*. For an interesting discussion on the role of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in development aid, see Barnett and Weiss, “Humanitarianism: A Brief History,” 14.

22. See, for example, David Dollar and Paul Collier, *Aid, Allocation and Poverty Reduction* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998); and Peter Boone, *Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid*, NBER Working Paper no. 5308 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 1995), http://www.nber.org/papers/w5308.pdf?new_window=1.

23. David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 102.

24. Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” *American Economic Review*, September 2000, 847–68; and Jakob Svensson, “Aid, Growth, and Democracy,” *Economics and Politics*, November 1999, 275–97. See, however, Boone, *Effectiveness of Foreign Aid*; and William Easterly, Ross Levine, and David Roodman, “Aid, Policies, and Growth: Comment,” *American Economic Review*, June 2004, 774–80.

25. De Waal, *Famine Crimes*, 11. De Waal differs in his perspective from more mainstream analysts who advocate political solutions to aid problems, arguing that “a ‘right’ [not to starve] . . . is less real than one that is won through popular struggle” (ibid., 44).

26. For better targeted development aid, see Cole and Hsu, *Guiding Principles*; and *Growth Report*. On the promise and pitfalls of remote management for humanitarian operations, see Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, and Katherine Haver, *Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations*, Humanitarian Policy Group Report 23 (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, 2006), <http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/269.pdf>.

27. See, for example, Sphere Project, *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response* (Geneva, Switzerland: Sphere Project, 2004), 18, <http://ocw.jhsph.edu/courses/refugeehealthcare/PDFs/SphereProjectHandbook.pdf>.

28. “Selection Indicators,” Millennium Challenge Corporation, accessed 28 November 2012, <http://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection/indicators>.

29. Sadako Ogata, *The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 25.

30. Alex de Waal admonishes that “the humanitarian international appears to have an extraordinary capacity to absorb criticism, not reform itself, and yet emerge strengthened.” De Waal, *Famine Crimes*, xvi. See also Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” *International Security*, Summer 1984, 58–107; and Jack Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” *International Security*, Summer 1984, 108–46.

31. Nori Katagiri, “Winning Hearts and Minds to Lose Control: Exploring Various Consequences of Popular Support in Counterinsurgency Missions,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 22, no. 1 (March 2011): 170–95.

32. See, for example, Easterly, “Foreign Aid Goes Military!”; Jeffrey Sachs, *The End of Poverty* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005); and de Torrente, “Humanitarian NGOs.”

33. “MSF in Afghanistan,” Doctors without Borders / Médecins Sans Frontières, 2012, <http://doctorwithoutborders.org/events/exhibits/thephotographer/msf-afghanistan.cfm>; and Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Military Intervention and the Humanitarian ‘Force Multiplier,’” *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 13, no. 1 (January–March 2007): 100.

34. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-22, A-2.

35. Overseas Development Institute, quoted in Lischer, “Military Intervention,” 99.

36. *Growth Report*, 101.

37. The principles of humanitarianism, as articulated by the International Committee of the Red Cross, are humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. See Barnett and Weiss, “Humanitarianism: A Brief History,” 3.

38. Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver (*Providing Aid in Insecure Environments*, 11ff) show a sharp and secular increase in attacks against aid workers with incidents increasing by a factor of 10 from 1997 to 2005. Although on a per capita basis, the increase has been far less severe (as the number of aid personnel in the field has also grown significantly during that period), NGO workers and other civilians have borne a larger share of these attacks.

39. On the existential dangers to aid workers in marginal areas of responsibility, see Laura Hammond, “The Power of Holding Humanitarianism Hostage and the Myth of Protective Principles,” in Barnett and Weiss, *Humanitarianism in Question*, 172–95.

40. Lischer, “Military Intervention,” 99.

41. Barnett and Weiss, “Humanitarianism: A Brief History.”

42. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, A-7. Further, we urge the interested reader to closely read Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver, *Providing Aid in Insecure Environments*, for a thoroughgoing review of the past and present efforts undertaken by aid givers to see to their own protection in unstable environments as well as the compromises and difficulties that these strategies have inevitably entailed.

43. See de Waal, *Famine Crimes*.

44. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-22, 1-21.
45. Ibid., A-8; and Lewis Sorley, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (Boston: Mariner Books, 2007). On the dangers of too much aid, see Thomas W. Dichter, *Despite Good Intentions: Why Development Assistance to the Third World Has Failed* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); Maren, *Road to Hell*; and Bruce Wallace, "The Trouble with Aid," *Maclean's*, 16 December 1996, 34-37.
46. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-26, 1-28.
47. Ibid., 1-28.
48. Ibid., 1-26, 1-24.
49. Lt Gen David H. Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq," *Military Review*, January-February 2006, 50, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art010.pdf.
50. See de Waal, *Famine Crimes*, 4; and Gibson et al., *Samaritan's Dilemma*, 14.
51. *Growth Report*, 99.
52. For example, in military-to-military exchanges in US Africa Command's area of responsibility and in successful counterdrug programs, such as Plan Colombia.
53. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-3.
54. Gibson et al., *Samaritan's Dilemma*, 4.
55. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-3.
56. Ibid. On "spoilers," see Steven J. Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in the Peace Process," *International Security*, Spring 1997, 5-53; and Kelly Greenhill and Solomon Major, "The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords," *International Security*, Winter 2006/2007, 7-40.
57. Janice Gross Stein, "Humanitarian Organizations: Accountable—Why, to Whom, for What, and How?," in Barnett and Weiss, *Humanitarianism in Question*, 124-42; Sphere Project, *The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*; Growth Report; Devesh Kapur, "The IMF: A Cure or a Curse?," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1998, 114-29; Zanny Minton-Beddoes, "Why the IMF Needs Reform," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1995, 123-33; Strom C. Thacker, "The High Politics of IMF Lending," *World Politics*, October 1999, 38-75; and Michael Zürn, "Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems," *Government and Opposition*, March 2004, 260-87. Note, however, that even when aid givers seek to make their projects more closely related to the concerns of the locals whom they wish to help, in practice their efforts on the ground have fallen short. Barnett and Weiss note that "most relief agencies now sheepishly confess that they have largely proceeded without much input from those who are supposed to benefit from their concern." Barnett and Weiss, "Humanitarianism: A Brief History," 47.
58. Stein, "Humanitarian Organizations," 142.
59. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-23.
60. Jim Garamone, "Gates Says People Take Top Priority in Budget Decisions," US Army, 7 April 2009, <http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/04/07/19334-gates-says-people-take-top-priority-in-budget-decisions/>.
61. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, A-5. As with the Sons of Iraq case mentioned above, this might have been a case in which the gamble to work with unofficial partners would have proved worthwhile. Though of equal importance, after 2007 multinational efforts were aggressively pushed through official Iraqi government institutions.
62. Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency," 51. See also the US Army's Human Terrain System Project, catalyzed by much the same appreciation for the decisive impact of the populace in a COIN environment.
63. Stoddard et al., *Providing Aid in Insecure Environments*, 38-39.
64. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-26.
65. Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency," 45.
66. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, A-2.
67. These accounts draw extensively on the experience of COL R. J. Lillibridge, who has had experience in commanding COIN forces at both the company and battalion levels in the Iraq and Afghan theaters.

68. Tony Vaux, *The Selfish Altruist: Relief Work in Famine and War* (London: Earthscan Publications, 2001), 148.
69. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, A-8.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., 1-24.
72. See, for example, Maren, *Road to Hell*; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 2; Robyn Eversole, ed., *Here to Help: NGOs Combating Poverty in Latin America* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003); and Graham Hancock, *Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the International Aid Business* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989), 15ff.
73. Fearon, "Rise of Emergency Relief Aid," 68. Büthe, Major, and Souza note that the goals of self-funding and altruism are not necessarily at odds, given that no overseas operations would be possible at all without first meeting administrative costs. The degree to which administration should claim a share of the organization's budget remains a topic of hot debate, however. See Tim Büthe, Solomon Major, and Andre de Mello e Souza, "The Politics of Private Development Aid" (paper presented at the Second Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society, Stanford, CA, 9 November 2007), 2.
74. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, 4-8.
75. Ibid., 1-24.
76. Stephen Hopgood, "Saying 'No' to Wal-Mart?," in Barnett and Weiss, *Humanitarianism in Question*, 106, 107.
77. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-24.
78. Ibid.
79. Stein, "Humanitarian Organizations," 124-42

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