Defense Diplomacy and the Arab Spring
New Ventures and the French Presence in the Persian Gulf

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The present situation forces us to consider a new “arabo-muslim” era, and a structural crisis that will be long and unpredictable.

—Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2011

The year 2011 was marked by a wave of Arab Springs that collapsed several regimes. Western countries did not anticipate this “black swan” and now have to revise their thinking about the Middle East. These forces, encouraged by different sources of popular support, have transformed a society once considered fossilized. Because of these uprisings, which are shaking Arab governments, the French presence in this region undoubtedly takes on a new dimension. Particularly well established in the Arab world, France must now reposition its external policy. In this respect, the defensive diplomacy that it has used in the Persian Gulf deserves reexamination. France can pride itself on having solid, strategic alliances in the Persian Gulf due to its active traditional diplomacy in the Arab world. This dynamism is evident in such diverse sectors as higher education and culture; hence, implementation of l’Université Paris–Sorbonne in Abu Dhabi and, in the near future, that city’s own Louvre, will aid in the diffusion of French “soft power” in the region. The defense and security domains also constitute a combined effort having strong potential.

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The Persian Gulf: A Strategic Space in the Arab World

The Persian Gulf is a strategic location in many ways. In terms of energy procurement, it boasts more than 65 percent of the world’s oil reserve and 40 percent of its gas (including Iran and Iraq). Beyond these resources, the countries of the Persian Gulf exhibit considerable economic wealth because of their banking system, which functions under “sharia compatible” precepts, which, in turn, shelter it from the failures of a casino economy. The gross domestic product of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG) should, therefore, reach $2 trillion in 2020, making it one of the region’s most prosperous institutions.

However, this strategic space remains plagued by instability, crises, and a degrading security policy. The threat of Iranian nuclear programs, the crisis in Yemen, persistent insecurity in Iraq, tension with Pakistan, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continue to complicate the situation. Several risk factors jeopardize the stability of the region. Paradoxically, they also present opportunities for the Gulf states to equip themselves effectively with ambitious military tools in this uncertain time. Moreover, the difficulty they face in overcoming internal rivalries in order to develop a security structure forces them to depend upon the guaranteed security offered by the superpowers. This situation explains the ferocious competition between the United States and Europe—even between certain European countries—for the lion’s share of the market. For France the stakes are even higher because since 1980 the Persian Gulf represents the recipients of more than half of its arms exports.

The French presence in the Gulf is actually recent, coinciding with the withdrawal of British forces from the region in 1971. France has one of the first, though discreet, European partnerships with the CCASG in terms of defense. (That is not to discredit the American and British forces, who remain resolute partners.) Until the first Gulf War, France had a presence in Iraq, developing important armament cooperation that supported Iraq during its war with Iran from 1980 to 1988.

A defense agreement signed by several monarchies in the Gulf in the 1990s marked the turnaround of French diplomacy in the region. Little by little, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) eclipsed Iraq by developing close ties with France. The new defense diplomacy is now more regional and marked by a strong political willingness to assume an active role in the Gulf states’ individual security issues. The challenge remains sizeable in a space
largely dominated by Anglo-Saxon and American influence. But France has important assets that it intends to put to use, including a traditional diplomacy renowned for its profound understanding of the Arab world and its more measured position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as well as the crises in the Middle East. France has some facility in reviving the dialogue with the Persian Gulf’s monarchies and presents itself as a credible actor regarding security in the region. Under former president Nicolas Sarkozy, French diplomacy clearly worked in favor of a cooperative defense in the Gulf region. The French White Paper on Defence and National Security (2008) confirms this interest by creating a zone essential to a French strategy in the region.

Defense diplomacy aims to consolidate regional security by fighting against any and all forms of destabilization, such as proliferation, that could harm French interests. Specifically, France wishes to protect energy procurement as well as profit from a market of considerable possibilities. In theory this takes the form of not only exporting and transferring state-of-the-art industrial technology but also contributing to the formation of locale elites.

Defense Diplomacies Implemented in the Persian Gulf

The study of defense agreements with various Gulf partners shows not one particular diplomacy but several. Indeed, defense cooperation between France and the CCASG states is not homogeneous but varies in accordance with political, economic, and commercial relations. One can also notice two types of partners: “privileged,” with whom France makes defense agreements and/or important arms contracts (UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait), and “peripheral,” historically marked by the trusteeship of Britain (Bahrain and Oman).

Privileged Partners

France has long–held ties with Kuwait; the agreement concluded in 1994 addresses military technical aid. Today, Qatar and the UAE form the pillars of French defense cooperation in the region. The French-Emirates defense relationship thus rests on operational arms and intelligence cooperation as well as on structural security and defense cooperation—one of the most developed in the Gulf. The UAE, therefore, has bought more than half of its military equipment from France whereas Qatar is equipped with nearly
Cooperation between France and the UAE is framed in bilateral, binding agreements that represent a strong political engagement. The two countries signed the first agreement in 1977, followed in 1991 by a military and arms cooperation pact. Another agreement, dated 18 January 1995, defined the modalities of France’s participation in the UAE’s defense and the terms of bilateral military cooperation. This document provides for joint exercises involving the air force, army, and navy. On 15 January 2008, France and the UAE signed an intergovernmental agreement calling for creation of a permanent French military establishment in UAE territory. The strategic scope of this implementation is undeniable, significantly reinforcing French presence in an area previously under Anglo-American domination. Finally, a new cooperative defense agreement concluded on 26 May 2009 between the governments of the French Republic and the UAE updated the obsolete agreement of 1995. French diplomats described it as “the strictest defense agreement and the most binding one ever signed by France.” A security clause provides a gradual response to all threats up to and including the engagement of French forces if the vital interests of the UAE are threatened. This engagement reveals France’s strong political desire to become a leading actor in the security of the UAE. The document also seeks to formalize cooperation in training and joint exercises as well as consolidate the outlets for each defense industry. Thanks to diverse contracts, French savoir faire radiates through Mirage 2000-9 fighters, MICA missiles, LeClerc tanks, and stealth frigates. Given its ability to defend the airspace and to attack outside the country’s borders, the UAE air force remains at the forefront of the national defense. That service can also pride itself on being one of the most modern and well-equipped forces in the Middle East.

As for Saudi Arabia, defense cooperation essentially includes an operational dimension and support for arms exportation. Thus, that country is France’s third client in terms of arms equipment. It seems that the presidency of François Hollande intends to put Riyadh back at the center of the region. Even though France has become one of the leading partners in the CCASG states, it has not succeeded by imposing an exclusive relationship on its contracting partners. The diplomacy of the Gulf states is characterized by diversification that seems to reflect a type of mistrust. These countries do not wish to lock themselves into a partnership that creates a marked
dependence on another state; rather, they prefer to make stability in the
region a common good by multiplying their contributors. Rather than estab-
lish an exclusive partnership, they decided to entrust several countries with
their security, therefore creating competition.13 This logic of diversification
sometimes duplicates certain areas of cooperation.

Peripheral Partners
Peripheral partners occupy a lower level because they are countered by
entangled cooperation with the United States and Great Britain. The British
maintain a marked presence in Oman—a situation that explains the modest
cooperation with France. An intergovernmental cooperation agreement
between France and Oman, signed 2 June 1989, exists with regard to defense
equipment, but it was never implemented. Cooperation takes the form of
some navy calls, arms contracts, and exercises. Each year, the North American,
British, and French navies participate in the Khanjar Hadd exercise, and
some exchanges take place in the formation of elite organizations (e.g., a
war college and the Institut des Hautes Études de Defense Nationale).
Oman’s sultan did have some interest in the strategic plan because his
country represents a maritime focal point in the Arabian peninsula. Lo-
cated at the crossroad of the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean, Oman
commands the Strait of Hormuz and maintains good relationships with
Iran. But for now, France does not seem to want to extend its regional ap-
proach of military cooperation to the sultanate.

Regarding the Kingdom of Bahrain, the defense agreement concluded
in 2009 was based on the monarchy’s desire to create a quick-reaction force
within the Royal Guard. For France, it had to do with investing in a coop-
eration area where the British had lost ground. Even if they unevenly in-
volve France, these diverse agreements contribute to consolidating its pres-
ence in the Persian Gulf region. However, one can ask if the Arab revolutions
did not add a new dimension to this defense diplomacy.

The Arab Spring: What Consequences
for Defense Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf?

Its diverse cooperation gives France a presence in the Persian Gulf
and consolidates its influence in the Arab world. Today, however, one
must understand this presence in terms of the new cartography drawn by the Arab Spring. Because the profound mutations set off by this rising force are still at work, coming to a conclusion regarding the success or failure of these uprisings would be premature. Facing the reconfiguration of the Arab world and its uncertainty, France should play a role in line with its position on the United Nations Security Council and with its global power ambitions. This implies perpetuating clear autonomy in the region in order to have sound comprehension and appreciation of that area. France should reinforce its influence here by maintaining an awareness of the Gulf’s geopolitics and the leverage that the CCASG states can exert on events playing out in the rest of the Arab world.

The Arab Spring: A Strategic Upset

One must take a second look at defense agreements in light of events that overturned the Arab world and gave rise to a new balance of power. Indeed, 16 of the 22 member states of the Arab League faced political instability in 2011. This phenomenon displays a type of spontaneity that makes it difficult to predict. If we could not foresee this occurrence, then we know even less about the result, which depends largely upon presenting durable economic solutions to frustrated youth. Certainly, though, the changes brought about by these revolts are without precedent and mark the beginning of a new era in what we hastily call the Arab world.

Among these transformations, the emergence of a political Islam can very well characterize the majority of these regimes born of revolution. It remains to be seen what form this type of Islam will take. Surely, some of the nations have democratic aspirations, but it is too early to determine if such yearnings will materialize when these countries face a hard Islamist movement such as the Salafism financed by the Gulf states. More than ever, the Middle East—an already fragile region—confronts destabilization, and the crisis in Syria feeds this regional instability. Amplified by the Arab revolutions, the rift between Sunnis and Shiites has become more structured in interstate relations and constitutes the same major strategic risk. One element of uncertainty involves the succession of King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia, the world’s leading oil reserve; another is that the region appears headed to an arms race, all the while seeking a deterrent in case Iran proceeds with its nuclear plan. Some new actors have become part of the inter-
national scene and intend to play a crucial role. Qatar, for instance, claims to be Egypt’s successor as the grand mediator of the Arab world. This small emirate has distinguished itself with hyperactive diplomacy as well as involvement in the Arab revolutions—notably with its television station Al-Jazeera. The year 2011 marked a turning point in Qatar’s international politics, which took advantage of several factors: the absence of leadership in the Arab world; the victory of the Islamic party Ennahda in Tunisia, with which Qatar has excellent relations; and the diplomatic and military actions taken in Libya. Moreover, this military contribution marks an evolution in Qatar’s external politics. The emirate has decided to adopt its own tools of military intervention to support its foreign policy, by force if necessary. Ready for diplomatic activism, the country now indicates more clearly its desire to return to a hard-power strategy—yet another element to consider when reexamining this ever-changing Arab world.

In light of these upheavals, “these Arab Springs constitute one of the principal strategic ruptures France has confronted since 2008.” Furthermore, the notion of an *arc of crisis*, a term coined in 2008 to mark this new evolution of international politics, is unsatisfactory because of its excessively reductionist nature. We have a tendency to forget that the white paper, mentioned above, is also “an exercise in public diplomacy” and that certain Gulf partners do not appreciate their place on said arc of crisis. Joseph Maïla, director of foresight for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore suggests that we speak of “an era of major strategic investments.” Undoubtedly, the wave of Arab Springs has the virtue of shedding light on the plurality of this Arab world; regrouping different cultural areas under the term *arc of crisis* does not do justice to this diversity. One cannot compare Afghanistan to Qatar. Given these changes, French diplomacy in the region must update its plan of action. Defense diplomacy should also allow for this new data.

**What Kind of Defense Diplomacy after the Arab Spring?**

The Arab revolutions have profoundly modified the strategic landscape, but they have also validated the political choices that one must pursue. More than ever, defense diplomacy in the Persian Gulf needs development and focus, taking into account the primary objectives of defense cooperation. Interoperability becomes a more pressing issue than before because we no
longer have simple exercise partners in the Persian Gulf but operational partners, called upon to intervene with us in new coalitions. France should also reinforce its influence in this strategically decisive zone—more so to solidify its interests than to assume a position of global power.

**Developing Interoperability**

Libya has proved that this new genre of coalitions could work, even with new partners. Participation of these countries in coalition operations brings a new Arab reassurance that is indispensable because of the impossibility of viewing these operations as Western interventions. The UAE is the second Arab country, after Qatar, to take part in military operations to uphold Resolution 1973 of the UN’s Security Council in Libya. Defense diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, therefore, should work by developing enhanced interoperability between France and its partners—witness the joint military exercises Gulf Shield, which married elements of Qatar’s army with those of the UAE; Green Shield, with Saudi Arabia; and, most recently, Gulf 2012—jointly organized by the UAE and France. Further, the Abu Dhabi military base prefers joint military training with French forces.

Such exercises not only demonstrate the quality of French equipment (with an eye toward exportation) but also assure true interoperability among forces. According to Gen Jean-Paul Paloméros, former chief of staff of the Armée de l’Air (French air force), “If our Air Force acquires an international dimension, to the point that it receives real recognition by foreign countries; only at that point we can talk about a real ‘air diplomacy’: this is particularly evident in the United Arab Emirates, [and] Qatar who participated in operations in Libya.”21 The technologically advanced equipment of these partners, as well as the armored community, reinforces the importance of operational cooperation.

As these states further a more refined interoperability, developing a dynamic of multilateral cooperation for the future would also prove beneficial. At present, the Gulf states—inclined to cooperate in a more bilateral fashion—do not prefer this orientation. For the time being, they refrain from creating a trusting environment that would lead to collective action. For example, the Sultanate of Oman is very hostile to participation in coalition or multinational actions, including those at the heart of the CCASG, that would
combat piracy. Thus, one must strive to transmit to these countries a multi-
lateral culture—an essential requisite for coalition interoperability.

**Reinforcing France’s Influence in the Arab World**

Through various defense agreements in the Persian Gulf, France intends to
occupy a position of global power in a key region of the world. This ambi-
tion rests on its influence there and, beyond that, in the Arab world. Toward
that end, the base at Abu Dhabi can exert substantial leverage. Established
on 16 May 2009, it houses forces that can operate in the air, on land, and at
sea. For 50 years, France had not opened a new foreign military base, a fact
that made this one “a small geopolitical revolution,” according to Adm Edouard
Guillaud, chief of the French Defense Staff. First and foremost, this de-
fense base is the expression of an unambiguous engagement with our emirate
partners to guarantee their security by means of the presence and visibility
of French forces as well as the pre-positioning of permanent armed forces,
which would help keep enemies at bay. It also represents a strong indicator
of the determination and the capacity of France not only to react in order
to protect the UAE, in accordance with the defense agreement, but also to
protect French interests in the region by preserving the energy supply lines.
This military stronghold offers new projection capabilities for troops in the
region and secures two major naval routes between the Red Sea, protected
by the French base of Djibouti (3,000 troops) and the Arabian–Persian
Gulf outlet. France finds itself at the entrance points of a strategic location
in the Persian Gulf—namely, the Strait of Hormuz. In case of an Arab
conflict (whether involving the Americans or Israelis and Iran), the base,
situated 200 kilometers from the Iranian coast, will put France at the fore-
front of any regional battle. The hardening of political positions in the area
should not lead us to underestimate the occurrence of such a scenario. The
rivalry between US-supported oil monarchies and Iran, which wants to
emerge as a regional power, and the latter’s threat to block the strait pend-
ing an attack by Israel, put France at the heart of this sensitive territory.
More than ever, nuclearization of the region becomes a possibility since
Iran seemingly does not want to give up on nuclear weapons despite threats
from Israel. Moreover, a long-standing dispute exists between Iran and the
UAE about the three islands situated in the middle of the Strait of Hormuz. Under these conditions, we can also judge how the security clause—foreseen
in the agreement between France and the UAE—could become engaging. In this tinderbox, the Abu Dhabi base keeps tensions at arm’s length by discouraging all aggression that could force the region into a crisis whose consequences would become direr as they spread to surrounding countries.

In this sense, the French military believes in a strategy of strategic intimidation. That is, it “re[lies] on the threat of use or effective but limited use of capacities and conventional actions . . . to lead a potential or declared adversary to renounce the initiative, development or pursuit of an aggressive action, by influencing his decision with the fear of consequences to his organization.” This intimidation has no effect unless it is enforced by a strong political will backed by the means to deliver significant damage. Regular exercises that show efficient technique and operation will make the enemy aware of the effectiveness of such means, convincing him that the risk will far outweigh the benefits. The ability of the base at Abu Dhabi to strike quickly contributes to this strategic intimidation. Such a permanent display of our forces’ operational character adds to France’s external politics, particularly in the prevention of crises: “Our strategy of influence should rely on the existence of visible, quantifiable and recognized capacities, where engagement, potential or real, contributes to the politico-diplomatic maneuver at hand.”

France’s role in the quality of global power in the region rests also on surveillance of the existing nuclear-proliferation network. Its presence in the UAE allows France to keep an eye on attempts at such proliferation. This capacity again reinforces its role and influence in the security of the Middle East.

**Conclusion**

The Arab Spring validated the necessity of France’s investing in the Persian Gulf region to confirm its influence and contribute to stabilizing a place where a number of security issues have crystallized. The choices of French foreign politics in this zone have in fact been validated, but this binds France even more to this strategic, precarious location that has emerged from ongoing Arab revolutions. The latter make it imperative that France take advantage of the aura and the respect it has acquired in this part of the world and have a say in the security and solidity of its partners in the Maghreb, Far East, and Middle East.
Notes

1. According to the philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb, who developed the black swan theory, the realization of a certain number of unpredictable, highly improbable events would engender exceptional consequences. For example, one can consider the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 a black swan. See Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *Le Cygne noir: La puissance de l'imprévisible* [The black swan: The power of the unpredictable] (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2008).

2. Theorized by Prof. Joseph S. Nye Jr. in his work *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), soft power plays on the capacity of a country to influence the behavior of another in order to lead it to adopt the same point of view by means of ideological and cultural seduction without the use of force (hard power). The rift between hard and soft power is therefore superseded, and it is considered advantageous to combine the two concepts harmoniously to lead to a strategy considered “smart power”—the official American doctrine concerning foreign policy since 2009.

3. Created on 25 May 1981, the CCASG united the countries of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar.


5. The European Union, on the other hand, is not considered a viable partner to instill security in the Gulf states, mainly because it has credibility only in the political arena.


7. For parliamentary discussions related to this defense agreement, see report no. 3455 of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly concerning law project no. 3193, which authorized an agreement between the French government and the government of the UAE in terms of a defense cooperative.


10. The inflow of foreign exchange caused by the 1974 oil crisis and the need for Saudi Arabia to secure its sea lanes led the kingdom to diversify the modernization program of its armed forces. On 11 May 1980, Saudi Arabia and France concluded an agreement on naval cooperation whereby the French government would provide equipment to the Saudi navy. Similarly, on 9 October 1982 the two governments signed an agreement of cooperation and military assistance for the purpose of conducting joint exercises and training military personnel in Saudi Arabia.


12. At the end of the 1990s, the UAE diversified its arms suppliers and bought 80 F-16s from the United States. Saudi Arabia did the same by purchasing 72 Eurofighter Typhoons from Great Britain, thinking that Moscow would consolidate its military arsenal with Iran.

13. Some European nations—Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria—tried to take part in the “Persian Miracle.” Their influence, however, was secondary to that of the United States, Great Britain, and France.


15. For more on Qatar’s new diplomacy, see Jean-François Fiorina, “Géopolitique de Qatar: ‘Diplomatie du tapis volant’ ou réel appétit de puissance?” [Qatar’s geopolitical “flying carpet diplomacy” or real hunger for power?], *CLES*, no. 60 (22 March 2012), http://notes-geopolitiques.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/CLES60.pdf; Pascal Boniface, “Le Qatar pratique une diplomatie pragmatique” [Qatar practices a pragmatic diplomacy], *Challenges*, 16 February 2012; and Fatiha Dazi-Héni, “Désir de puissance: Le Qatar a-t-il les moyens de ses ambitions diplomatiques dans le monde arabe?” [Does Qatar have the means to carry out its diplomatic ambitions in the Arab world?], *Actualité de l’IFRI*, 21 July 2012.


18. Ibid., 42.

19. Ibid., 91.


23. On 30 November 1971, Iran’s Shah decided to invade three islands located in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran still occupies these islands, which are strategically located for economic reasons because of the development of hydrocarbons there.


25. Ibid., 9.