



Trilateral Strategic Initiative, Conflict Management in Africa, South Africa, Countering Convergence, Ebola Epidemic, and “Home Grown” Weapons

Air operations are increasingly executed by coalition forces. In “The Trilateral Strategic Initiative: A Primer for Developing Future Airpower Cooperation,” Col Peter Goldfein and Wing Cdr André Adamson present the concept of the Trilateral Strategic Initiative (TSI) and its objective of furthering trilateral cooperation. The authors argue that the TSI and its steering group are a compelling model for improving the coherence of international airpower. The initiative reflects the vision of the air force chiefs of the United States, France, and United Kingdom to increase trust and integration among their services and to advocate for airpower. In the absence of a bureaucratic framework, the TSI is steered by collaboration among the strategic thinking cells of each service’s air staff, which includes officers from all three nations. Together, they identify the means to improve interoperability. They also debate airpower concepts to feed the thinking of senior leaders and to spawn cooperation at operational levels. The article considers the historical and cultural convergences among the three air forces as well as countervailing tendencies that allow the initiative to fully realize its potential as an enabler of the trilateral development and employment of airpower. The authors also note the role of the initiative in informing debate within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Finally, they consider the applicability of this approach for broader cooperation, including its place in a joint context.

Dr. Nikolas Emmanuel’s article “Third-Party Incentive Strategies and Conflict Management in Africa” examines the use of an incentives approach in managing intrastate conflict in Africa because in many cases, risks and costs make applications of hard power alone unfeasible. Furthermore, simply ignoring episodes of civil conflict in the hope that they will “burn themselves out” does not appear to be a viable alternative. That said, both noncoercive and coercive incentive strategies exist and have been deployed by

third parties in a variety of conflict situations. Such incentives seek to manage conflict by encouraging political bargaining. The clear intention of this approach is to shift the behavior of targeted actors away from violence and towards more peaceful interaction. Indeed, such incentives offer a good deal of underexplored opportunities to help manage discord. This research has two primary objectives. First, it furthers the discussion of how external third parties can help manage conflicts. Second, it offers a typology of the available incentive strategies, classifying them along noncoercive and coercive lines. Thus, the article outlines the possibilities offered by an incentives approach, focusing on examples drawn from recent African cases.

Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has enjoyed unequalled political and economic standing in Africa. In “South Africa: Africa’s Reluctant and Conflicted Regional Power,” Prof. John F. Clark posits that the country’s record in regional diplomacy is quite mixed insofar as it has rarely employed coercive diplomacy to resolve local conflicts, preferring to use soft power to reinforce regional principles of interstate conduct. Only infrequently has South Africa used the threat of force to influence the domestic politics of other states or to resolve African interstate strife. He notes that it has generally failed to articulate a set of principles to guide either economic policy or international relations in a hegemonic fashion on the continent. This article, then, seeks to show that South Africa has acted more as a reluctant and conflicted regional power than a hegemon of any kind. Although the country is definitely a “regional power,” it is difficult to characterize its role at a continental level. After attempting a characterization of South Africa’s role, the author then inquires into the reasons for its ambiguous conduct on the African continent.

Mr. Dan Stigall’s article “Countering Convergence: ‘Central Authorities’ and the Global Network to Combat Transnational Crime and Terrorism” maintains that in a progressively unstable world order, there has never been a greater need for international cooperation in the fight against transnational crime and terrorism. The operations of nonstate armed groups, terrorists, and transnational criminal organizations are becoming global in scope. Moreover, as recent events have demonstrated, such groups are more lethal, disruptive, and destabilizing than ever before. Also apparent, however, is the fact that effective cooperation against such groups requires much development in what the parlance of international development calls “the justice sector.” Mr. Stigall argues that the international community must therefore devote more attention to the development of a central authority in critical regions such as the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel. Engines that give life to the international treaty framework must be built, serviced, and properly maintained. Otherwise, efforts to address transnational crime and terrorism through the framework of a rule of law will remain stymied.

In “Ebola Epidemic,” Prof. Yohannes Woldemariam and Mr. Lionel Di Giacomo address the effects of the 2014 outbreak in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia on those countries and on the international community. On 8 August, the World Health Organization declared the epidemic a “public health emergency of international concern.” By mid-September, nine months after the first case occurred, the numbers of reported cases and deaths were still growing from week to week despite multinational and multisectoral efforts to control the spread of infection. The epidemic has now become so large that the three most affected countries, mentioned above, face enormous challenges in implementing control measures at the scale required to stop transmission and to provide clinical care for all persons suffering with Ebola.

Dr. Aqab Malik provides an in-depth account of the indigenous manufacture of small arms and light weapons in the town of Darra Adam Khel and the wider Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. His study, “Darra Adam Khel: ‘Home Grown’ Weapons,” highlights factors such as the establishment of the infamous arms pipeline in Afghanistan; logistical issues related to the manufacture of firearms; the relationship between narcotics and arms; political problems; the buying and selling processes; methods involved in the procurement of weapons; the distribution and transportation of weapons, as well as the routes used; and the processes involved in the *Harwala* financial system for the exchange of payments in the black market arms trade. The article further aims to induce greater efforts to eradicate the menace of the widespread diffusion of small arms and light weapons from Pakistan. It does so by addressing concerted efforts in the consistent improvement of existing legislation and the inculcation of new legal tools that will assist in the reduction of the spread of these weapons in Pakistan as a result of the “Kalashnikov” culture that has taken root since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

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