Enable and Enhance—That's It?

European Union Peace Building and the Enable and Enhance Initiative

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With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Germany's decision to militarily support Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq revealed the increased importance of the Enable and Enhance Initiative (E2I) as discussed by European Union (EU) member states. In addition to Berlin, policy makers in London and Paris, among others, also followed the rationale of taking responsibility in foreign affairs without being directly involved in military combat. However, as recent initiatives have shown (e.g., in Mali), the E2I approach comes with limitations. Based on recent EU peace-building initiatives in South Sudan and Mali, this article analyzes the challenges faced by any "getting fit initiative." In a brief literature review, it demonstrates the lack of scholarly attention towards the ambivalent scores that EU peace-building approaches have had in the past. The article then presents its analysis framework and introduces the cases of South Sudan and Mali, followed by an empirical analysis conducted on the basis of three categories: scope, design, and unintended effects. Finally, it addresses implications for future research and policy making.

Analysis Framework

This article broadly defines peace building as a range of activities to solidify peace and avoid a relapse into violent conflict.[1] For more than 20 years, peace-building actors such as the United Nations (UN) and/or bilateral donors have been dominated by a liberal peace framework.[2] Although early generation approaches were state- and power-centered (i.e., with a focus on security, territoriality, and the Westphalian state concept), since 1990 peace-building initiatives seek to attain security and institutional development based on externalized forms of intervention. For instance, international transitional administrations such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo

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have been heralded as role models for future interventions in places where local input was limited at best.[3]

Oliver Richmond, Annika Björkdahl, and Stefanie Kappler differentiate among three types of liberal peace building: conservative, orthodox, and emancipatory.[4] The conservative peace-building model is mainly associated with top-down approaches (i.e., coercive and intrusive). One achieves peace by external military force, not by negotiation. The cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia are mentioned in this regard.[5] The orthodox approach differs from the conservative model in that the emphasis is on conditionality to build functional state institutions for liberal-market-oriented states (i.e., partly top-down and cooperative). Establishing democratic institutions and reforming governance frameworks are prioritized. As such, consensual negotiations are mostly based at the elite level; however, local ownership remains limited. The cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo as well as East Timor are dealt with in this respect.[6] The conservative and orthodox approaches resemble the top-down perspective of most peace-building practices by donors, organizations, and institutions. However, after a controversial debate in recent years, critics of liberal peace building have tried to transcend the weakness of the prevalent top-down approaches.[7] The emancipatory approach favors a nonstate-led model shaped by private actors and social movements (i.e., bottom-up and noncoercive). Richmond, Björkdahl, and Kappler effectively summarize the critique and the need for emancipatory views on peace building:

> In many post-conflict environments different groups, often locally constituted, perceive liberal peacebuilding to be ethically bankrupt, subject to double standards, acultural, unconcerned with social welfare, and unfeeling and insensitive towards its subjects. It is tied to the state, to institutions, to the elites that control them, and not to the local context, to civil society or to deeper layers of society. Instead, liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict environments such as the one in Bosnia-Hercegovina has effectively begun to reinstate social and economic class systems, undermined democracy, caused downward social mobility, been built on force rather than consent, failed to recognize local cultural norms and traditions and created a virtual peace in its many theatres.[8]

At best, EU peace-building strategies match the orthodox approach. Given the EU's goal of reforming and transforming future member states, regional integration, harmonization, and standardization constitute the major means. In light of the EU's polycentric structure, however, there is no explicit peace-building strategy on the part of the union as a whole or the European Commission as the unitary actor in charge. However, a variety of elements across EU documents, policies, principles, and speeches includes both goals pursued (e.g., human rights and good governance) and the policy means applied in the process (e.g., trade and rule-of-law missions).[9] In sum, the different means pursue a liberal script of governance reform.

The first EU security strategy, drafted in 2003, called upon the member states to engage in a number of peace activities such as conflict prevention, crisis management, and postconflict rehabilitation. In 2009 the Lisbon Treaty specified the goals of "preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security."[10] Sandra Pogodda and her colleagues explain the unique character of the EU as a peacebuilding actor compared to other stakeholders:

> The EU's governance approach in conflict areas ranges from conflict resolution to society-appeasing strategies, while largely abstaining from the pursuit of a mediated, high-level settlement between political leaders or supporting a ceasefire through peacekeeping activities. By interacting with conflict parties at multiple levels—state, sub-state, private sector and civil society—and across a variety of policy areas—economic, social, political, cultural, environmental, infrastructural etc.—the EU's role in conflicts has been more pervasive and often indirect.[11]

The indirect approach of engagement is well reflected by the E2I. In December 2013, the European Council emphasized the importance of empowering global partners to take more responsibility for regional security. The E2I aims to strengthen crisis prevention through the provision of training, advice, and, if necessary, equipment.[12] The concept of capacity building—understood as the provision of advice, training, and equipment to strengthen partners' own capabilities—has been practiced by the UN for many years (e.g., in security sector reforms). Similarly, the EU has supported military and civilian capacity building through missions such as those in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[13] The major argument of the E2I is that police and military training adds little value if the requisite equipment is lacking. The first test cases the EU chose in 2014 to apply the E2I all turned out to be in Africa, starting with Mali and Somalia: "In Africa in particular, programmes that aim to build partners' crisis management and stabilization capacities have long been an integral part of the toolbox."[14]

Some studies have dealt with the lack of effectiveness of EU peace building.[15] Only little attention has been paid to negative spillover effects.[16] At this point, the analysis comes into play. Given the recent formal adoption of the E2I into official documents on the EU council level, only a few cases serve as an empirical basis for analysis. This article deals with EU engagements in armed conflicts in Mali (2012–ongoing) and South Sudan (2013–ongoing) (figs. 1 and 2).



Figure 1. Terrorist events in Mali and South Sudan, 2006–14. (Based on "Global Terrorism Database," National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, accessed 18 May 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.)



Figure 2. Rankings of Mali and South Sudan as fragile states, 2006–15. (Based on "Fragile States Index," Fund for Peace, accessed 18 May 2016, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015.)

Analysis

With the German government pushing forward, the E2I was integrated into the final declaration of the EU Summit in December 2013:

> The European Council emphasises the importance of supporting partner countries and regional organisations, through providing training, advice, equipment and resources where appropriate, so that they can increasingly prevent or manage crises by themselves. The European Council invites the Member States, the High Representative and the Commission to ensure the greatest possible coherence between the Union's and Member States' actions to this effect.[17]

Regardless of this formal acknowledgement, recent EU peace-building activities show that any E2I is bound to limitations. The following presents the major challenges on the basis of the cases of South Sudan and Mali.

Scope

Peace-building initiatives are usually criticized for constrained funding.[18] In South Sudan, the EU is the second-largest donor (after the United States). From 2010 to 2013, it has allocated €285 million in development funds, mostly targeting the agricultural sector, education, judiciary, and health infrastructure.[19] As of 2011, assistance to Sahel countries (i.e., Mali, Niger, and Mauritania) totaled more than €600 million. Compared to programs implemented in South Sudan, the focus in the Sahel was on governance reforms (i.e., decentralization, economic development of peripheral areas, etc.) or ad hoc humanitarian assistance to food crises.[20] Given other EU peace-building initiatives such as those in Kosovo (1.8 million people) where external assistance has been transferred since 1999, the question is to what extent the EU and its member states will remain committed to South Sudan (11.6 million) and Mali (14.5 million) in terms of financial volume as well as long-term engagement. Figure 3 illustrates the dimensions.



Figure 3. European Commission, technical and financial cooperation, 2007–15. (Based on "Technical and Financial Cooperation," European Commission, accessed 24 May 2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/eu_kosovo/tech_financial_cooperation/index_en.htm; "Fact Sheet: The EU and South Sudan," European Union External Action, 10 July 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140514_04_en.pdf; and "ECHO Factsheet: Mali Crisis," European Commission: Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, April 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/mali_en.pdf.)

Besides the ever-criticized underfunding of peace building and foreign aid initiatives, many external measures have been questioned with respect to the waste of

resources.[21] For instance, the May 2013 EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya was criticized for its rudimentary scope. In light of the local security vacuum in major parts of the country and state authorities existing largely on paper, doubts were cast on whether the border services training could ever be successful without first demobilizing militias and implementing security sector reforms.[22]

This waste of resources sheds light on a related scope issue: capacity-building initiatives are only seldom accompanied by robust mandates. In most cases, external agents fulfil technical functions and lack executive power. For instance, the European Union Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan (EUAVSEC) was established to support the strengthening of security at Juba International Airport: "EUAVSEC will train and mentor security services, provide advice and assistance on aviation security, as well as support the coordination of security activities related to aviation."[23] According to Head of Mission Lasse Christensen, airport security was improved (e.g., mobile airport perimeter control, screening of passengers and luggage, etc.). However, as EUAVSEC was reduced to a technical and advisory role only, no leverage could be made use of against the local warring factions that drove the escalation of violence in South Sudan.[24]

One can make a similar observation when analyzing the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM). According to the mandate, "The restoration of security and lasting peace . . . is a major issue for the stability of the Sahel region, and in the wider sense, for Africa and Europe."[25] As such, the task is to train and advise the military of Mali. EUTM personnel shall not be involved in combat operations and do not have an executive mandate.[26] The mandates of EUAVSEC and EUTM are limited to durations of no longer than 15 months. Given this brief time and scarce personnel resources, a relapse into state failure and escalation of violence is likely. Against this background, Claudia Major, Christian Mölling, and Judith Vorrath argue that external peace builders face a choice: "Either [they accept] that the outcome of many years of development and reform efforts is being called into question, along with confidence in the Federal Government; or attempts are made to avoid this scenario, if necessary by military means."[27] For instance, what if Mali's security forces are not fully operational by now and security sector reforms do not have a significant effect? Would EU member states guarantee stability in case previous peace-building initiatives failed? Again, EU involvement in Kosovo or the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan speaks volumes about the necessity of long-term and resourceful engagement—notwithstanding the controversy over the latter's peace-building record (table 1).[28]

Table 1. Peace-building/state-building missions

Mission	*Technical Staff*	*Military Staff*	*Duration*
EUAVSEC	64		Jun 2012–Oct 2014
EUTM		550	Oct 2012–Jan 2014
EULEX*	2,000		Feb 2008–ongoing
ISAF		130,000	Dec 2001–Dec 2014

Sources: "European Union Aviation Security Mission (EUAVSEC) in South Sudan," European Union External Action, February 2014, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/euavsec-south-sudan/pdf/factsheet_euavsec_south-sudan_en.pdf; "EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali)," European Union External Action, December 2015, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/pdf/factsheet_eutm_mali_en.pdf; "What Is EULEX?," European Union External Action, accessed 24 May 2016, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,16; and "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan (2001–2014) (Archived)," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1 September 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/de/natohq/topics_69366.htm.

*European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

The cost-intensive engagement in Afghanistan brings to mind two things: first, neighboring third states and regional organizations need to be integrated into peace-building initiatives (see below). Second, international coalitions increase the scope of engagement in terms of duration and resources. For instance, local security and political stability are more likely to be achieved in the case of EUTM when organizations such as the African Union can rely on long-term and substantial assistance by the EU and UN. Ownership on the ground depends on external resources.[29]

Design

Closely related to the importance of a broad coalition of local and external allies, the partnership concept determines the credibility of the E2I. Who is supposed to be a reliable partner state? What criteria must a state meet to be considered reliable "enough" for (military) training services and/or arms supplies? In the case of South Sudan, except for Kenya, neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda suffer from authoritarian rule and weak statehood (fig. 4). The Polity IV Project illustrates the autocratic legacies on which these countries have been built. For each year and country, a "polity score" is determined that ranges from -10 to 10, with -10 to -6 corresponding to autocracies, -5 to 5 corresponding to anocracies, and 6 to 10 to democracies.[30]



Figure 4. Authority trends, South Sudan neighborhood, 1970–2015. (From "The Polity Project," Center for Systemic Peace, accessed 19 May 2016, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.)

Against this background, external peace builders face a dilemma. On the one hand, regional partners are more likely to increase local legitimacy and ownership in the long run. On the other hand, the stakes are high that military goods and equipment are not under the control of responsible institutions. In the worst case, the transfer of knowledge and arms might even be used against the local opposition. Is regional stability the greater good then? For example, recent, controversial debates were held about military cooperation with Egypt under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi or the monarchs in Saudi Arabia.[31] As figure 5 shows, the case of Mali speaks differently to this perspective. Neighboring countries such as Algeria, Senegal, or Niger have been praised for political stability.[32]



Figure 5. Authority trends, Mali neighborhood, 1970–2015. (From "The Polity Project," Center for Systemic Peace, accessed 19 May 2016, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.)

On the operational level, EU peace-building initiatives face two major challenges. First, given the EU's polycentric (foreign) policy-making architecture, the need for consensus among the different institutions and member states constrains quick responses.[33] Second (closely related), the external agencies confront similar obstacles on the ground. Country office decisions have to be communicated back and forth via the headquarters. The same holds true for the different national ministries (e.g., state department, defense, economy, interior, etc.).[34] The negative effects caused by the lack of coordination, cooperation, and coherence among the different agents on local, national, and international levels (i.e., UN, NATO, World Bank, etc.) have been extensively discussed in the foreign aid literature.[35] Mutual understanding found at conferences in Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and Busan (2011) on the matter can similarly be applied to the peace-building realm.[36]

Despite the agreement among external stakeholders on the need for comprehensive peace-building approaches, a close look at the strategies reveals security-driven agendas. That is, in March 2011 the EU Council endorsed the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. Focusing on Mali, Niger, and Mauritania, the strategy's assistance to governance reform (i.e., decentralization, budget support, etc.) was meant to help "the states and legitimate non-state actors."[37] However, security concerns come first. These include arms proliferation, organized crime, terrorism, and the protection of EU interests and citizens. As of July 2014, adoption of the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP) did not come as surprise. According to 50 international experts, the EUCAP mandate is to give advice and training to support Nigerien authorities' efforts to strengthen their security capabilities. Although the mission has relatively few personnel, its goals resemble those of EUTM.[38] While EUCAP Sahel Niger supports the fight against organized crime and terrorism in Niger, EUTM contributes to restructuring of the Malian armed forces through training and advice. The critique against the dominance of security concerns feeds into the ever-discussed controversy over the international approach to peace building. A major review addresses external agents' policies for concentrating too much on "top-down approaches of institution-strengthening at (central-) state level, mainly involving government elites."[39] For instance, in the case of the mentioned Sahel strategy document, policy makers explicitly stressed the need to take the local context into consideration:

> In Mali, the setting up of the security and development poles in Northern Mali should muster strong political engagement of the central authorities while benefiting from a higher level of dialogue with the local civil society, in order to consolidate trust to avoid the deployment of security agencies in the North being interpreted by local and traditional leaders as undoing the engagements under the national pact.[40]

To some extent, EU peace-building initiatives in South Sudan followed bottom-up approaches. Brussels funded EU-based nongovernmental organizations to coop-

erate with local communities in cross-border dialogue activities in Sudan and South Sudan.[41] However, the scope of initiatives in South Sudan or Mali in terms of financial and personnel resources was and still is limited. Without a sufficient presence of EU representatives and staff in places such as Juba or Bamako, it is most likely that any intervention into the political process is primarily directed at elites: "In the end, the extension of state authority is a major goal of EU support for these countries, putting into question whether the EU has done enough to foster dialogue with 'legitimate non-state actors' as is . . . foreseen in the Strategy."[42]

Unintended Effects

In autumn 2013, Germany, Denmark, and Portugal circulated an off-the-record paper that addressed the need for the E2I in light of growing maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea.[43] As the problem was characterized earlier, training and arming security services do not guarantee the "right" use of the equipment and learned capacities. The same holds true for enabling regional partners such as Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, or Congo. In other words, neither the official E2I approach nor that paper addresses the need for control of military goods and trained capacities.[44] What if Western arms supplies eventually end up in the wrong hands? In particular, the case of Mali highlights the dilemma. To many external observers, the three-year-long armed conflict (2012–15) escalated in January 2012 because of the military professionalization of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. Tuareg-based, the movement fought a campaign against the Malian government for greater autonomy for northern Mali. Apparently, factions of the movement had fought in the Libyan civil war of 2011 and at some point seized military equipment that has been recently used in the struggle against the Malian government.[45] That military equipment did not entirely originate from former president Mu'ammar Gadhafi's arsenal. An unknown but significant quantity of military goods came from those arms supplies that were provided by Washington, London, and Paris via Qatar to the Libyan rebel forces.[46]

The bitter irony is twofold. First, the external military supplies enhanced the military capabilities of the anti-Gadhafi forces. However, after his fall, the different militias made use of these very weapons in the recent civil war.[47] Second, against the background of state erosion in Libya, the illegal arms transfer via Algeria, Niger, and Chad allowed for militarization of insurgent groups in Mali and elsewhere:

> There is a risk that if a government changes or is overthrown, well-trained forces and equipment can fall into the hands of actors who are opposed to the goals being pursued by . . . the EU in the context of security sector reform. In Mali in 2013, for example, soldiers trained by the US deserted to Islamist groups and then fought French troops deployed with Operation Serval. A very large number of weapons circulating on the black market in West Africa come from official stocks, having been sold illegally by the security forces.[48]

In light of the principal-agent dilemma, it is surprising that enabling local proxies remains a major strategy applied by governments in the West as well as the East. Before the following discussion of the implications for future research and policy making, table 2 summarizes the major critique against current EU peace-building missions.

Table 2. European Union peace-building critique

<table>
<tr><th>Scope</th><th>Design</th><th>Unintended Effects</th></tr>
<tr><td>Lack of resources and long- term engagement</td><td>Polycentric structure and operational incoherence on the local and international levels</td><td rowspan="5">Proxy myth: local and regional destabilization</td></tr>
<tr><td>Lack of executive power; no robust mandate</td><td>Top-down</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Waste of resources</td><td>Security first</td></tr>
<tr><td>Vague partner concept</td></tr>
</table>

Conclusion

The analysis of EU peace building in South Sudan and the Sahel has revealed a number of shortcomings. The *scope* of many initiatives is insufficient. Most of the missions are mandated for a short duration between 12 and 15 months. They are prolonged if deemed necessary and backed by the political willingness of major (external) stakeholders. The lack of long-term engagement comes with insufficient funding in terms of personnel and equipment. In accordance with the E2I approach, most missions lack executive power and are designed without a robust mandate. Local state authorities are to be supported via training and policy advice only; direct confrontations with warring parties are avoided entirely. On the one hand, the limited scope allows for local ownership. On the other hand, a relapse into violent conflict becomes more likely. Besides the absence of engagement in terms of funding and political willingness, the waste of resources by peace builders has been neglected in the literature. The case of EUBAM in Libya well illustrates the deficits. Apparently, EUBAM was never really capable of meeting the mandate in light of the security vacuum in major parts of the country. Doubts proved true that the border services training could not be successful without first demobilizing militias and implementing security sector reform.

Peace-building *design* deficits are closely related to the question of limited scope. Given its polycentric structure, the EU and its member states constantly face veto-player situations when it comes to decisions concerning the Common Security and Defense Policy. Quick responses to crisis situations abroad are thus unlikely. Making matters worse, on the operational level a variety of agents are involved in the peace-

building process. This multitude can constrain the effectiveness of missions. For example, peace-building headquarters in Brussels or capital cities need to coordinate with country offices, allied Western partners, international stakeholders (UN, NATO, African Union, etc.), as well as local state authorities. Frictions can also arise on a national level when different ministries (e.g., state department and ministry of economy) pursue varying interests in the intervened country. Regardless of operational aspects, peace-building missions still suffer from top-down approaches. Despite a controversial debate on (post)liberal peace building and the so-called local turn, peace building on the ground is still driven by interveners in the first place. Similarly, interventions are directed primarily at elites despite official strategy papers mentioning the need for the inclusion of local and traditional leaders in a comprehensive peace-building framework. The same holds true for the priority of security concerns over other sectors such as agriculture, education, health, or the judiciary. Yet another major critique is directed at the vague partnership concept of EU peace-building initiatives in general and the E2I approach in particular. No strategy in sight defines how to identify legitimate actors for cooperation on local ground—be they state authorities and/or neighboring governments.

The difficult assessment of (regional) partners' contribution sheds light on the risks of *unintended effects* of "enable and enhance" approaches. Basically, neither the E2I proposal nor any other strategy document has elaborated on the need for control over enabled actors on the ground. Given the principal-agent-dilemma considerations, "sending" countries such as Germany and France in Mali are not capable of guaranteeing how the training and (military) equipment eventually will be used.

In terms of the critique, it seems that EU peace building has failed and that reforms on the conceptual and operational levels are more necessary than ever. If so, what kind of measures can scholars of peace and conflict recommend? The categories of scope, design, and unintended effects provide a feasible basis in this regard. For instance, the critique against waste of resources is legitimate. The analysis of EUBAM in Libya shows that border training services would have been more successful if security sector reforms had been realized first. However, the argument is ambivalent since critics might stress that the post-Gadhafi security vacuum is probably going to take longer than expected. In that case, a limited peace-building mission might be better than no presence at all. Advocates of robust mandates also have to consider the different implications for sending nations. Besides the ever-valid budget argument, popular support of EUTM in Mali would probably be less if German and/or French soldiers were mandated to take part in armed combat. The likelihood of soldiers killed in action and/or civilian casualties would jeopardize single missions as well as general peace-building approaches in the West. The US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan speaks volumes to war-weary electorates.

Similar ambivalence is found in the critique against the design of peace-building missions. For instance, if senders' resources are limited in any way, then cooperating with prevalent elites seems a pragmatic choice. The same holds true for the priority of security reforms over other sectors. The case of post–Arab Spring Egypt under al-Sisi demonstrates the survival of the old system and donors' willingness to continue the relationship despite the increasingly authoritarian character of the regime in place. The case of Egypt well shows the dilemma. After President Mohamed Morsi's ousting in June 2013, calls by Western policy makers and scholars for sanctions and conditionality (e.g., cutting military cooperation) fell on deaf ears in Cairo as Saudi Arabia promised to compensate for any losses. With the rise of ISIS in Libya and terrorist attacks reaching Tunisia, by 2015 al-Sisi had been invited to talks at European capital cities such as Berlin and elsewhere. Al-Sisi's increased international legitimacy reflects why the E2I partnership concept is vaguely defined: the less rigid the profile, the more flexible the selection of partners by Western governments that have to make political decisions on an ad hoc basis. In a similar vein, the policy makers' perspective needs to be taken into account when questioning the "proxy myth" mentioned above. Despite ambivalent experiences with the mujahedin in Afghanistan in the 1980s and unbound militias in contemporary Libya, governments in the West and East keep making use of proxies, be they in northern Iraq (Kurdish Peshmerga), Mexico (self-defense militias), or Ukraine (Russian separatists). Again, the alternatives for EU peace-building architects are scarce. Our own soldiers will not be sent for the above-mentioned reasons, and a substantial EU drone program has not yet evolved.

Despite the legitimate criticism of EU peace building in general and E2I in particular, scholars likewise seem to have failed in recommending feasible policy options for improvement. Development studies seem to be ahead. The operational aspects of intervention, for example, have been extensively discussed under the rubric of harmonization, coordination, and alignment. In light of the ad hoc nature of crisis situations and Western peace builders' reactive (instead of curative) approach, proposals for operational reform offer a starting point for academic input in this regard. Identifying those specific bolts in the peace-building machine would make scholars' voices better heard than universal critiques and calls for fundamental change.

Notes

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