Measuring Security

Understanding State Capacity in Oil-Producing States

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How do you measure security? Clearly, security is experiential, subject to perceptions and experience. However, this hardly lends itself to large-N comparisons between states. This paper seeks to model how people experience the state. More precisely, how people interact with the organs of the state that most people see and often deal with daily—state security actors.

Predicated on the notion that measuring security and safety is both a straightforward concept (e.g., number of crimes, budgets, staffing) but concurrently notoriously difficult to measure at the interpersonal level, this paper seeks to explore that space between numerical indices of security and personal anecdotes, ultimately seeking a more nuanced model for states subject to resource competition, particularly the oil-producing states of West Africa.

Though this paper was conceived without knowledge of the stir created by Francis Fukuyama's 2013 "What is Governance?," his overall conceptual framework animates this paper's general direction: how does one measure governance? More

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specifically, how can security and public safety institutions be measured to capture how citizens perceive their security vis-à-vis official actors? The usual determinants of state security, such as budgets, staffing and personnel, criminal cases opened and closed, and other tangible metrics may give a glance into the everyday reality, but clearly cannot capture the essence of the interpersonal experiences of many in the developing world, most acutely interactions with security actors. In its characteristic pithiness, *The Economist's Baobab blog* describes one such encounter with traffic police in Freetown, Sierra Leone:

> Motorbike-riding in the capital results in almost daily conflict with the notoriously corrupt traffic police, who attempt to solicit "fines" for a bizarre range of offenses. On one recent such occasion, two policemen on a motorbike forced Baobab to the side of the road. "You are plying the streets in your underwear," announced one, gravely. "You will have to come with us to the station; there will be a fine." Baobab considered this an unfair description of his attire —jeans, a sleeveless shirt, shoes, and a helmet—and told him as much; the men duly went on their way.[1]

With this not-altogether uncommon experience—in fact, the reality for most of the developing world—in mind, this paper extracts homicides—one universally-employed variable from the existing large-N studies—to study it (a bit) more closely, using Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire to test its validity. Moreover, resource competition is clearly linked to conflict, presented not just an existential threat to the state, to citizens as well, connecting individuals and the state.[2] Through a study of the state's performance in public safety and security, and governance writ large, this paper seeks to distill the main contributors to state capacity as they relate to energy.

Setting the Stage: Intrastate Conflicts[3]

The literature focusing on explanations for intrastate conflict spans the range of theoretical understandings. Stephen D. Krasner, for example, from a political economy perspective, argues the price volatility of key commodities could be a mechanism of social and political destabilization. He notes, "Economic dislocations caused by abrupt price increases can generate local or even national political discontent. . . The dissatisfaction caused by a decline of utility is usually greater than the satisfaction resulting from an unexpected improvement."[4] Rising food prices, due in large part to widespread drought in Russia, coupled with soaring energy costs at the time, likely catalyzed to become one of the drivers of the Arab Spring.[5] It appears likely growing economic inequalities, most tangibly popular inability to afford staples, coupled with repressive (albeit weak) governments, spurred the latent social forces to compel rebellion against the state.

Arguments supporting a state-weakness hypothesis where (relative) deprivation combines with an already-anemic state offer motive and opportunity for political-oriented violence, supported by evidence from numerous case studies.[6] Prompted by a relatively rich sample, the earliest studies looked at the most extreme example of collapsed states, This, however, reflecting the "stalled" transition that typifies the great majority of countries, has morphed into the contemporary focus on weak or fragile states, including those that exercise some powers associated with the state, but lack legitimacy.[7] The puzzle then seems to be why some states suffer from domestic tumult and violence, while others enjoy a modicum of internal peace.

There seems to be strong evidence that among the factors that promote societal peace, principal factors are the state's ability to resolve conflicts with a combination of good governance and the ability to provide public security. While all states face multiple pressures stemming from internal social dynamics and globalized economic and security factors, nonetheless a principal concern is the provision of public goods and infrastructure. Tying this into the provision of energy, states in the developing world are—theoretically—subject to energy shocks to a greater degree than states with more durable political systems. The fundamental argument, then, is that state capacity correlates directly with the ability for states to adapt to changing economic conditions. The stronger state then can withstand a related intrastate conflict. Therefore, as Figure 1 seeks to illustrate, does state capacity intervene to mitigate or increase the influence of energy resource on intrastate conflict?



Figure. Oil, conflict, and state security

Energy and Conflict. Akin to other globalized issues, increasingly energy and access to energy have become political and economic matters. Francis McGowan describes this arc:

> Energy rose from being a rather technical issue handled largely by the energy industries themselves and specialist civil servants to being one with serious dip-

> lomatic and geopolitical consequences which involved political leaders in debates about the strategic implications of how energy is produced, supplied and consumed. . . Given the centrality of energy to everyday life it is scarcely surprising that governments have been concerned to ensure that energy supplies are secure. . . It is clear that there is an important strategic dimension . . . giving rise to an understanding of energy as fundamentally a "securitized" issue.[8]

However, despite the varied research on political transitions, democratization and governance,[9] there is little extant literature on the relationship between energy shocks to governance in the developing world, and on state security capacity more specifically. The connection between insecurity and the liberalizing state are well established, though deeper, more refined understandings continue. James D. Fearon and David Laitin established many of the current intellectual foundations of the sources and effects of insecurity and the state. Arguing the principal factors that contribute to internal conflict are neither ethnic nor religious differences, nor even broader grievances, "but, rather, conditions that favor insurgency."[10] These are typically found in states with "financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments" that increase the feasibility and attractiveness of insurgency due to weak police capabilities.

More specifically, the state's security capacity is directly linked to income; low per capita income is strongly correlated with state policing capacity. Fearon and Laitin find a "U-shaped relationship between oil dependence and civil war onset, while high resource wealth per capita tends to be associated with less violence."[11] To supplement and enhance their qualitative assessment, Matthias Basedau and Jann Lay's qualitative comparisons of a smaller sample of oil-dependent exporters find oil-wealthy countries succeed in political stability through redistribution, a well-funded and presumably, effective security apparatus, external security guarantees, and capable state institutions.[12] Among the difficulties of gaining an understanding of the validity of state capacity, however, is understanding which variables provide the most energetic indicators.

State Capacity: Defining and Measuring

Ever seeking a binary conception of the world, practitioners and academics perceive state capacity essentially falling into two categories of public management. As Nick Manning notes, The first group is those who think that state capacity should be measured by what the state produces (its outputs and outcomes, like in health and education). Robert Rotberg and Craig Boardman fall here. The second group, where Fukuyama falls, argues that these measures are too difficult for a variety of reasons, and instead state capacity can best be measured by looking at how governments function, specifically bureaucratic procedures, capacity (in the sense of the ability to get

things done) and autonomy (in the sense of protection from political micromanagement).[13] Fukuyama's general argument rests on the idea there is an intrinsic relationship between procedures and outcomes, but that procedures ultimately trump outcomes as a measure of governance. For example, "outcome measures cannot be so easily divorced from procedural and normative measures."[14] By his reasoning, an authoritarian state may minimize everyday criminal activities, but at the cost of liberal governance. Most people "would accept a higher degree of crime in exchange for procedural protections of individual rights."[15]

In Jordan Holt and Manning's response to Fukuyama, they contend that in Fukuyma's estimation, while output and outcome measures seemingly cut through the conceptual uncertainty and simply ask what got done, in practice, they are likely to be very problematic for three reasons: (1) they can be affected by exogenous factors, making it difficult to isolate the contribution of public action; (2) measuring quality aspects is difficult; and (3) normative and procedural concerns (i.e., how the output or outcome was achieved) still matter, particularly in policy areas involving human and individual rights.[16]

The conclusion is outputs do not enjoy validity as a measurement of state capacity. Where, ultimately, does that leave one who desires to measure state capacity vis-à-vis state security? In practice, it is difficult to disaggregate procedures and outcomes, as security is inherently a personally-derived concept.

Measuring State Security

Though not specifically addressing national security and public safety writ large, Cullen S. Hendrix's work on civil conflict provides insight into the nexus between state capacity and security. He contends that in the literature on civil conflict and war, a rise in interest in state capacity coincides with a turn from the debate on motive (e.g., economic or societal factors) but toward the "political opportunity structure that affects potential rebels' decisions to fight," including Charles Tilly's work that "places state capacity at the center."[17]

In the national security context, which is most concerned with deterring existential threats to the state, both internal and external, Hendrix's discussion of the Weberian notion of the state enjoying the legitimate use of force, adds that, at least in terms of military capacity, "State capacity can be defined according to the state's ability to deter or repel challenges to its authority with force."[18] Moreover, as Douglas M. Gibler and Steven V. Miller contend, "the agents of the state build the capacity of the state and centralize power by creating military institutions, introducing instruments for controlling social activity…these are all supported by state-erected tax structures."[19]

As Peter Alexander Albrecht and Lars Buur note, "security provision and access to justice are widely considered to be essential services, fundamental building blocks in promoting good governance, and critical for the creation of a secure environment at both the local and national level."[20] With pressures placed on the state from resource competition, or more precisely, the pressure placed from the desire to gain access to resources, security organs might be among the best potential bellwethers to state capacity and state security. However, measuring the notion of security can be vexingly difficult. A recent Dutch conference introduced this challenge:

> Measuring security in fragile contexts is both politically laden and operationally challenging. At the core. . . is the reality that the measurement of security, just like its definition, its provision, and its oversight, is innately political. That is, it can be configured to serve particular interests and ambitions. So when discussing how to measure security, we begin with the question: To what end? Who is demanding this "evidence" of progress, and for what purpose do they intend to use the information gathered.[21]

Hendrix argues many in the field emphasize a state's repressive capacity, i.e., the military and the police, as the decisive factor in intrastate conflict. Larger security apparatuses (especially the military) are associated with a lower likelihood of conflict onset, increased likelihood of conflict termination, and shorter duration.[22] In the context of the state security—national security and public safety—the latter receives scant attention as a measure of the state's capacity to deal with intrastate conflicts. Perhaps a function of international efforts to promote military capacity over "low" policing activities in the wake of the globally-connected terrorism, the military has taken on the role of combatting internal violence, a role inconsistent with the theoretical best practices for the role of military and police forces. However, public safety remains a potent indicator of both security capacity as well as popular attitudes toward state legitimacy.

Public Safety/Rule of Law

The terms surrounding personal safety and security—public safety, rule-of-law, public order, personal security—all center on the central concept that providing for safety is a public good that may trump all others, both as a personal matter (of course) but as a prime goal of the state as well. Citizens demand an everyday existence where the threat of personal theft and injury or death is minimized, so much so that safety becomes a major indicator of state capacity. As Robert I. Rotberg and Rachel M. Gisselquist contend, "Countries with lower crime rates are supplying greater quantities and qualities of the safety segment of the political good of safety and security than those states where crime is rampant."[23] The animating concept is that public safety, as a distinct subset of a state's security, has a real relationship with the ability

resist internal and external pressures. The question, then, surrounds the data and approaches for measuring public safety. Among the range of variables, homicide rates stand out as best indicating a state's ability to provide public safety.[24]

Tapio Lappi-Seppälä and Martti Lehti argue, "Homicides have been a primary target for comparative and historical criminological studies since the beginnings of modern criminal statistics. . . in the nineteenth century. . . almost all homicides were recorded by the authorities, making them a suitable object of studies of crime, and especially of trends. . . the founders of modern criminology. . . had great interest in homicides."[25] Rotberg and Gisselquist base their public safety assessments on the level of violent crime, specifically the national homicide rate, derived from EIU for the Global Peace Index and United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operation of Criminal Justice Systems.[26] In perhaps the most influential of recent policy reports on the subject, the UN Office on Crime and Drugs notes the transcendent nature of homicide:

> Beyond resulting in the deaths of nearly half a million people in 2012, this form of violent crime has a broad impact on security—and the perception of security—across all societies. . . homicide and violence in countries emerging from conflict can become concurrent contributors to instability and insecurity. . . interventions must address not only the conflict itself but also surges in homicide resulting from organized crime and interpersonal violence, which can flourish in settings with weak rule of law.[27]

However imperfect a measure, homicides are at least accepted by practitioners and scholars as an indicator of state capacity. The true measure comes with homicide rates applied to context. Africa, with its range of states, allows for a deeper exploration within each national context.

Africa

African states, with shorter histories of independent governance, are clearly subject to all forms of pressures, including energy pressures. Not to lose this study's state-centered focus, it is relevant to note that Africa is arguably caught up in a modern version "Great Game," this time between China and the United States. Evidenced by US military interest in Africa (such as United States Africa Command), though the Obama administration—continuing policies from the Bush administration is primarily interested in reducing politically-motivated violence, there is, of course, a keen desire to maintain a stable flow of energy resources out of the region. As part of its strategy for the region, the Obama administration is keenly interested in promoting African states' intrinsic ability to resolve domestic issues. The Chinese note this US interest, increasingly devoting China's own considerable resources to the region.[28]

Africa might be described as typifying energy resource "honey pots," which might be a contributing element of intrastate aggression. Most contemporarily, the so-called Islamic State, demonstrates how resource capture can turn into revenue flows for insurgent groups. Locally, politically-oriented actors may attack energy infrastructure for a variety of reasons (typical of Michael Watts's "petro violence"). But African states are susceptible to violence to varying degrees. A tentative understanding is that oil does increase the risk for conflict, but that this relationship is "context dependent. . . African oil-producing countries face different levels of risks" depending on social and political factors.[29] Understanding how and why states are more or less resilient to pressure and coercion is central to this study. The African continent, including the Maghreb and Sahel in addition to the sub-Saharan countries, varies greatly in its experiences with developing liberal, accountable governance, as well as in wide country-to-country variations in exploitable energy resources. What is common among all African states, however, is that they have attracted international attention for both market potential and extractable wealth. Jonathan Holslag contends, "Despite changing interests, perceptions, and means, China is and will remain dependent on the good will and collaboration of other players to help safeguard its economic interests in Africa. . . In fact, it will be the main stakeholder in terms of maintaining peace, social stability, good governance, and equitable development in its partner countries."[30] Among the milieu of international and state-level factors that influence which states are more susceptible to pressure, disaggregating how and when certain factors privilege others can best be explained by case studies.

Case Selection and Study

Despite the range of African states that have or are increasingly their energy capacity, this study seeks to choose cases selected on the basis of displaying the particular set of characteristics deemed most important for an analysis of the impact of energy on political stability, with state capacity as the intervening variable. The cases are chosen based on those that display the following dynamic:

1) States that have significant energy resources and significant internal conflict; or
2) States that have an emerging or established energy resources and a degree of internal conflict in the past or present.

The guiding principle is that the oil extraction creates both a potential benefit and a risk to state capacity, with both resources to promote state institutions as well as the potential for threats to the state. Ideally, the cases would be able to address the more specific question of the impact, if any, oil has on state security institutions, and on the police more specifically.

Data challenges are obvious, doubly so because of the relatively closed dimension inherent in policing activities and the difficulties of a conflict or postconflict setting. One institution argues that "The unpredictable collection environment typical of most postconflict contexts requires practitioners to employ an element of creativity and comprehensive context awareness in designing ways to measure security progress."[31] Moreover, as Lappi-Seppälä and Lehti argue, "data for the African countries are limited. For most countries, figures are available for only one year (2008)" while noting further that, "All African countries report huge differences and generally very high rates, with a partial exception of northern (Islamic) Africa. The highest rates are in the 40–50 range (Zambia, Ivory Coast, and Swaziland). A majority of African countries have rates between 15 and 30."[32]

Following best practices of structured, focused comparison, after a brief introduction, each case first describes the current state of oil production, including contextual factors surrounding its extraction and institutional impact. Next, homicides and homicide rates establish a baseline for the subsequent study of national policing, including its structure and practice. An initial assessment completes each case. Based on the selection criteria described above, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire hold promise to describe the nexus between oil, conflict, and state capacity.

Nigeria Police Force: A Performance Assessment

As Africa's most populous country and a critical contributor to global oil markets, increasing instability in Nigeria is cause for great concern. While the security challenges confronting the state in recent years are diverse, there is little doubt that Nigeria's security forces have struggled to respond effectively and arguably have further alienated themselves from the Nigerian public, inviting greater chaos and erosion of the rule of law. This section examines the performance of Nigeria's National Police Force in confronting multifaceted threats: from piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, continuing unrest in the oil-rich Niger Delta, and, perhaps most devastatingly, growing tensions between the nation's Christian and Muslim populations that have been exacerbated by an ongoing, violent campaign to fight the Islamist group Boko Haram in the country's restive north.

Nigeria's constitution explicitly calls for the provision of national security as the centerpiece of state responsibility, stating that, "the security and welfare of the people (of Nigeria) shall be the primary purpose of government."[33] To examine the degree to which Nigeria's security apparatus is meeting this constitutional expectation, this case examines the level of threat Nigeria faces and the relationship between oil production and human insecurity. Finally, it will consider the structure of the nation's police force and its effectiveness in maintaining the rule of law in the face of multiple threats, with

particular attention afforded to its relationship with the Nigerian public and their perception of security forces.

Oil Production

As global oil prices fluctuate wildly (mostly recently steadily downward), and instability grows in many of the world's critical regions of production, examinations of the relationship between human security and the presence of hydrocarbon resources are perhaps more pertinent than ever. Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa, yet its ability to maintain production has been hampered in recent years by increasing security threats in its primary zone of production—the Niger Delta. Local forces in the region seeking a greater share of wealth from oil rents frequently attack oil infrastructure with devastating effects on aggregate production and Nigeria's relationship with the international oil companies it partners with for extraction. Nonetheless, oil remains the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, and its relationship with national security could become an even more pressing issue considering the recent massive drop in global oil prices.[34]

Despite these challenges, Nigeria continues to produce a great deal of oil. In 2013 (the most recent year with available data), Nigeria produced 2,371,510 barrels per day, a commanding portion of Africa's total of 9,958,000 barrels/day. The vast majority of this oil is refined and exported to global markets, as Nigerians only consumed 302,000 barrels/day in 2013. In 2012, the International Monetary Fund estimated that 96 percent of Nigeria's total export revenue was derived from oil and natural gas resources.[35] Hydrocarbon exports had a value of US $95,118,000 in 2014, clearly a massive revenue stream for a government struggling to provide material security to its population.[36] With this in mind, it is concerning to consider how the precipitous drop in global oil prices will affect the Nigerian state's ability to maintain the rule of law, especially since much internal conflict in the country's South is driven by local populations feeling they are not getting a fair share of wealth generated from oil revenues.

Social unrest driven by oil resources has been a major problem for Nigeria even when global oil markets favored producing nations, and these tensions will only be further strained as the value of the resources themselves declines, and populations become more desperate. As one recent report states: "unrest in the Niger Delta arises from the well-grounded conviction among the region's minority tribes that oil companies colluded with greedy Nigerian politicians over the decades to extract billions of dollars of oil for their own benefit at the expense of local habitat and the livelihoods it supported."[37] Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has also exploded since 2000, leading the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 2018 in October 2011, which urges states in the Gulf of Guinea to take effective action against piracy. Nigeria has

responded to these challenges by direct, coercive action against militant and criminal groups involved in the disruption of the country's oil industry, in conjunction with a program aimed at "buying off" insurgent groups. This project has been largely unsuccessful as it has failed to address the underlying causes of militancy in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea, and as the state's financial and military resources have been increasingly redeployed to the country's North where the state is engaged in a bitter battle with Boko Haram.[38]

Homicides

Although the security concerns confronting Nigeria range from property crimes to an outright insurgency, an accurate picture of the daily threat to Nigerians' lives is perhaps most easily obtained through observation of the nation's homicide rate. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Nigeria's homicide rate in 2010-2014 was 20 homicides per 100,000 people.[39] This rate is significantly higher than that of the African continent as a whole, where the homicide rate was 12.5 deaths per 100,000 in population. Considering that this number is almost precisely double the global homicide rate of 6.2 deaths per 100,000 people, it is clear that the prospect of falling victim to a homicide in Nigeria is particularly high compared to global norms—nearly four times.[40]

While these deaths are attributable to a large number of conflicts and crimes, it is clear that Nigeria's security services are failing to provide even a modicum of security to the nation's people. A closer examination of the structure and performance of the country's police force sheds further light on this issue.

Police

Although Nigeria is an extremely diverse state whose unity is predicated on the sharing of power between the largely Muslim North and the largely Christian South, the structure of law enforcement in the country does not reflect this diverse reality. Though Nigeria's federal government devolved substantial power to regional governments following independence from Britain in 1960, police services in the country remain centralized into a unitary force known as the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) following the integration of local forces in 1972. A direct holdover from the colonial police force tasked with protecting colonial interests via subjugation of indigenous communities; corruption, repression, and the excessive use of force have long been defining characteristics of the organization.[41]

Indeed, the NPF has been a direct contributor to Nigeria's soaring homicide rate, committing extrajudicial killings and using lethal and excessive force to apprehend suspects and control crowds of protestors. During the fight against Boko Ha-

ram, the NPF has acted in conjunction with the military to commit numerous summary executions, assaults, torture, and other abuses. The situation had deteriorated to such a degree that the joint task force assigned with degrading and destroying Boko Haram had to be disbanded in August 2013 in the face of excessive reports of abuse and violence at the hands of authorities.[42]

While these direct abuses have provided concrete evidence of the pernicious nature present in much of Nigerian policing, outright violence is not the only factor negatively affecting Nigerians' perception of their police force. As one recent report summarized harshly, "It is not an overstatement to say that corruption has destroyed the image and integrity of the Nigeria police in the eyes of the Nigerian people. In general, the behavior of the Nigerian police is far from good, and law enforcement in Nigeria can hardly be said to be positive because of the corruption embedded within the system."[43] The impression that police are not acting to protect and serve all of Nigeria's people is potent in such an ethnically and religiously divided society. Even when security personnel have the resources to effectively combat criminals—a notion that is far from given—they often use these resources to promote their personal interests or those of their ethnic kin, undermining the government's efforts to provide security to the population at large.[44]

Should Nigeria wish to benefit from its extensive material wealth, it must increase its capacity to promote human security and national cohesion. If the structural problems confronting the NPF—such as underfunding, poor training, and low morale —are not addressed, the security situation in the country is likely to continue to deteriorate. So long as the Nigerian public continues to distrust the authorities and perceive them as personally-interested actors rather than guarantors of societal well-being, ethnic strife, and the competition for national resources will continue to be the dominant narrative in Nigerian politics.

Côte d'Ivoire: The Potent Postauthoritarian/Postconflict Brew

This small West Africa coastal state, once among the most economically well-off country in the region, is only now—arguably—emerging from the conflict surrounding the 2010 elections, which were meant to seal the transition from the ancient regime and heal an otherwise fissiparous society. Côte d'Ivoire had built its economic foundation on the monoculture crop cocoa; through massive state intervention created the world's leading producer. That said, despite the obvious and well-founded concerns about overreliance on one commodity, other concerns, mainly societal, came to the fore. As Matthew I. Mitchell notes, undoubtedly state-led efforts to promote cocoa and coffee cultivation through promoting liberal immigration policies "helped to create a world-class agricultural export market."[45] But while this immigration strategy's economic success is clear, this success "came at a tremendous political cost

as the Ivoirian state failed to ground these sectors in a peaceful and sustainable socio-political environment."[46] It was within this tumultuous context that Côte d'Ivoire's dissolution developed.

Not to repeat existing excellent narratives of the conflict,[47] suffice to note that the 1999 coup against the successor to the one-party state of Félix Houphouët-Boigny and 2002's (failed) coup and rebellion revealed the contemporary fragility of the once-powerful regime. Emblematic of personal rule, the decades bordering the twentieth and twenty-first centuries left Côte d'Ivoire little recognizable legal-rational institutional structures. The 2010 presidential elections, meant to promote stability and reconciliation, conversely led to open combat between loyalists of Laurent Gbagbo (president since 2000) and President-elect Alasance Ouattara, recognized internationally as the legitimate-elected chief executive. Within this context and the concomitant security issues of a postconflict environment—demobilization and reintegration of combatants; security sector reform; reconciliation, among others—the Ivorian police have emerged as what most optimistically can be characterized as "developing."

Oil

Côte d'Ivoire is famously known worldwide for its success in cultivating crops for global consumption, oil, and gas reserves which place it firmly in the medium-capacity countries, though its production clearly has been affected by internal strife. The latest assessments from the US Energy Information Administration assesses total oil production in 2014 to be 37,650 barrels per day, down slightly from 38,560 barrels/day in 2013, placing Côte d'Ivoire 65th in global oil production. In fact, petroleum extraction had been decreasing since 2010, when it declined 21 percent from the previous year.[48] However, exploration and discoveries hold promise to raise Côte d'Ivoire capacity seven-fold in the coming years.

Côte d'Ivoire aspires to increase its share of public revenue dramatically, building on the international firms' increasing interest in Africa's west coast after Ghana's 2007 discovery of oil. Recent discoveries by French, American and British firms are raising the possibility of increasing domestic oil output to around 200,000 barrels per day in five years due in part to these recent discoveries and exploratory drilling. Moreover, Côte d'Ivoire has signed 14 new contracts since the end of the conflict.[49]

Oil production in Côte d'Ivoire remains inconsistent with international best practices for transparency. The UN's assessment is: management of oil industry revenues is still opaque. . . For example, the conclusion of the 2008 report of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative revealed important inconsistencies, demonstrating how payments made by the Ivorian oil company Société Nationale d'Opérations Pétrolières de la Côte d'Ivoire (PETROCI) to the State had not been

declared by the General Directorate of the Treasury and Public Accounts, an agency of the Ministry of Economy and Finance.[50] Moreover, the UN noted, "the Group confirmed from multiple credible sources that the contract and bidding process at PETROCI continues to be opaque and hence generates a high risk of diversion."[51]

Oil production, therefore, remains a relatively small portion of the Ivorian economy, though this is likely to change, even with oil trading at under $50/barrel in early 2015. Based on the ethnic violence sparked by cocoa cultivation, it is possible, and even likely, that as oil becomes increasingly lucrative, the odds of violence increasing are high.

Côte d'Ivoire Homicides

Côte d'Ivoire could reasonably be characterized as an unsettling personal safety environment for the average citizen. Short of the more globalized violence of just a few years past, a more profit-oriented (versus politicized) form of violence permeates much of the state, from the rural areas to the capital. Nonstate actors, however, are not the sole perpetrators as many official actors create the sense of universal threat to self. The State Department, in fact, characterizes Côte d'Ivoire as "critical" for crime, which includes "violent crime, carjackings, armed break-ins to private residences, hold-ups in the street, and theft from cars;" US Embassy personnel have not been immune.[52] Within this environment, homicides stand as interesting proxy for overall crime rates, though notoriously problem-rife to pin down.

Table 1. Homicide rates—Côte d'Ivoire

Source (Reporting Period)	Rate
WHO (2012)	13.6/100,000
Lappi-Seppälä and Lehti (2008)	56.9/100,000

Reported homicides vary widely, depending on the source (table 1). The World Health Organization, in conjunction with its public health reporting mandates, lists in 2012 homicides at 13.6 per 100,000 citizens, with a total reported homicides of 2,691. This figure is notable in that this is the only year—since 2001—reported in their dataset.[53] Interestingly, Lappi-Seppälä and

Lehti, the UN Office on Crime and Drugs as well as the State Department, cite 56.9 homicides/100,000 in their most recent reports, based on WHO data, those this figure seems to be lacking in WHO's reporting. In short, there is little evidence that homicide reporting enjoys universal acceptance.

Côte d'Ivoire Police

Superficially, Côte d'Ivoire security structure follows a standard template from international (arguably Western) models of force structure: a military, with land and sea forces, as well as a national police force tasked with civilian law enforcement and public safety. However, despite the overall "modern" structure of the Ivorian security apparatus, akin to many postconflict states organization belies the reality. Despite an absence of civil war, the country still struggles with developing an accountable and universally professionalized civilian police force.

The Limited Pace of Reforms

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration are challenging even in the most propitious environments, which Côte d'Ivoire clearly has not been in recent years. Wracked by corruption, internal criminal violence and societal discord, the Ivorian government and international actors have struggled to bring about substantive reforms.

One recent Human Rights Watch assessment notes the slow pace of security sector reform (SSR) as well as the disarming the estimated 74,000 former combatants from the recent conflicts.[54] Citing the UN, by June 2013, the Ivorian government disarmed and demobilized approximately 6,000 former combatants, though many former combatants remained as violent criminal actors or were protesting the slow progress of reintegration programs.[55] The former have presented a particular challenge for policing, particularly in rural areas. According to subsequent human rights reporting, "armed criminals operate in the north in virtual impunity, seemingly unafraid of security force intervention, arrest, or prosecution. As noted by a cocoa farmer who was robbed in an attack. . . 'They spent an hour doing the robbery—they took their time.' I heard one say, 'Today we are ready! Your forces should just come now!'"

Some of these concerns are as much a function of lack of access to resources as it is a reflection of the developing professionalism. The police lack the variety of materials associated with modern policing: communication equipment, weapons, and vehicles, which, all combined, severely constraint police ability to respond to criminal acts. Gendarme (modeled on the French paramilitary force of the same name) and civilian police stations outside of the capital have just one vehicle for all the stationed personnel. Some are forced to receive emergency duty calls on cell phones.[56]

Reflective of much of the current character of Ivorian policing (and, to be fair, much policing around the country) corruption is endemic. Security forces reportedly carry out arbitrary arrests and detentions, followed by cruel and inhumane detainee treatment.[57] Checkpoints established to combat criminals are sometimes used instead to extort money from travelers, with the government occasionally acting to re-

duce this particular form of extortion, including some arrests of responsible actors, though this tactic is still widespread.[58]

Côte d'Ivoire's current environment faces both the headwinds of postauthoritarianism and postconflict development while facing the potential to re-emerge as a model of governance and growth in West Africa. Without serious introspection coupled with a commitment to good governance—most centrally policing—Côte d'Ivoire's success can hardly be assured.

Analysis and Conclusions

As these two cases demonstrate, homicide rates can give some insights into policing capability as a proxy for state capacity. In both cases, above-average homicide rates correlated with perceived policing dysfunction, though their lack of well-founded data (telling in itself) sheds doubt on the efficacy of homicide data for more than the broadest of indicators. More specific conclusions indicate:

Weak Security Apparatus. Analyzing specifically for Nigeria, Robert-Okah and Wali's recent observations hold true not just for Nigeria, but Côte d'Ivoire as well. They hold that a weak security system "arises from inadequate equipment for the security arm. . . in addition to poor attitudinal disposition of security personnel. . . some personnel get influenced by ethnic, religious or communal sentiment." This results in citizens sabotaging government efforts by supporting and fueling insecurity, allowing criminals" to escape the long arm of the law."[59] The lack of materiel goes beyond weapons, encompassing a dearth of vehicles, fuel, information management, and communications equipment, among others.

Oil. There seems to be little connection, at this point, at least, between oil and state capacity. This study intended to isolate oil-producing countries based on their production levels—or their expected midterm production capacity. Côte d'Ivoire, as a low-to-medium producer of oil (though with great potential for growth) and Nigeria as Africa's largest producer, are chronically unable to connect their respective oil wealth to enhance internal security. The evidence does not support in either case oil as a nationwide variable that enhances the potential for violence, but in neither case does oil wealth lead to enhanced state capacity to deal with everyday violence or the more regional-specific internal identity-related violence.

Homicide *as an indicator of institutional capacity*. Neither case is universally what one might consider a failed state (recognizing that this term has seen a reduction in practice), but there is a clear and apparent weak institutional capability. In both cases the national homicide rates—well above the global average—indicated a gap in the institutional capacity of the police, which in turn is a barometer of nationwide institutional capacity. However, the problems with the data (most pronounced in Côte d'Ivoire) make drawing more specific inferences doubtful. In the case of Ni-

geria, "The foundations. . . are very shaky and have resulted in the deterioration of state governance and democratic accountability, thereby paralyzing existing set of constraints including the formal and legitimate rules. . . the state of insecurity in Nigeria is a function of government failure.[60] This "paradox of plenty," where in a very rich country has very poor people leads to the insecurity of lives and properties.[61]

Murphy's analysis on the interplay between oil production and state incapacity outside of those institutions that matter most to oil production plays out to a reasonable degree in both cases:

> The current international system that makes international recognition—not internal legitimacy or functionality—the key to state authority works to the benefit of dysfunctional oil producers in the developing world. Enclaves that are valuable to oil consumers—and to the domestic elites who facilitate and benefit from international legitimization—function well enough. They include oil and gas fields, export terminals, oil-related shipping, and offshore infrastructure around which defensive perimeters can be drawn.[62]

Significance for Regional Instability. The ultimate question surrounds a state's capacity to withstand internal pressures when combined with resource competition. In these two cases, both states experienced internal instability, though this instability was not a direct consequence of oil production, but rather was a symptom of greater social, political and economic dysfunctions. Police reforms may assist in mitigating some of the greater concerns surrounding crime and its prevention, but until macro-level issues, including economic growth and governance, these reforms will likely serve only as a temporary salve. Until these issues are ultimately addressed, perhaps with the commodity-derived incomes, regional instability emanating from and affected by Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire will likely continue.

Notes

1. "Corruption in Sierra Leone: Dodging the Traffic Police," *Economist*, 19 July 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2013/07/corruption-sierra-leone.

2. As noted in Douglas M. Gibler and Steven V. Miller. "External Territorial Threat, State Capacity, and Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 5, (September 2014): 634.

3. This and subsequent paragraphs in this section are revised and condensed from Andrew Price-Smith, Robin Dorff, and Joseph Derdzinski, "Energy and State Capacity: Implications for Instability and Conflict in East Asia and Africa," (working paper, 2015).

4. Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 40.

5. Sara Johnstone and Jeffrey Mazo, "Global Warming and the Arab Spring," *Survival* 53, no. 2 (April–May 2011): 11-17.

6. For example, see Fredrik Kahl, 2008, and Homer Dixon, 1999.

7. Though the direct comparison is rather crude, Freedom House's 2015 report that 54 percent of the world's 195 states are "partly free" or "not free," correlating with a lack of legitimacy founded in

liberal order and, to a lesser degree, a weakly functioning state. See Robert H. Dorff, "Responding to the Failed State: The Need for Strategy," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 10, no. 3, Winter 1999, 62–81.

8. Francis McGowan, "Putting Energy Insecurity into Historical Context: European Responses to the Energy Crises of the 1970s and 2000s," *Geopolitics* 16, no. 3 (5 August 2011): 487.

9. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–76.

10. Ibid., 75.

11. Matthias Basedau and Jann Lay, "Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 6 (November 2009): 757.

12. A majority of this paragraph originated from Price-Smith, Dorff, and Derdzinski, 8–9.

13. Nick Manning, "How Can We Measure State Capacity? Do You Start Upstream or Downstream?," *The World Bank* (blog), 23 June 2014, http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance.

14. Francis Fukuyama, "What Is Governance?" *Governance* 26, no. 3 (July 2013): 356.

15. Ibid.

16. Jordan Holt and Nick Manning, "Fukuyama Is Right about Measuring State Quality: Now What?" *Governance* 27, no. 4 (October 2014): 718.

17. Cullen S. Hendrix, "Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 3 (18 May 2010): 273.

18. Ibid., 274.

19. Gibler and Miller, "External Territorial Threat," 635.

20. Peter Albrecht and Lars Buur, "An Uneasy Marriage: Non-state Actors and Police Reform," *Policing and Society* 19, no. 4 (9 December 2009): 396–97.

21. From the 14 November 2014, "Measuring Security Progress: Politics, Challenges and Solutions" conference site, available at http://www.kpsrl.org/calendar/calendar-event/t/measuring-security-progress-politics-challenges-and solutions.

22. Hendrix, "Measuring State Capacity," 274.

23. Robert I. Rotberg and Rachel M. Gisselquist, *Strengthening African Governance: The Index of African Governance* (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 2009), 45.

24. As an indicator of more far-reaching approaches, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) takes a wider approach to public safety, including variables such political terror, social unrest, violent crime, and police services. Available at http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/interact/.

25. Tapio Lappi-Seppälä and Martti Lehti, "Cross-Comparative Perspectives on Global Homicide Trends" *Crime and Justice* (December 2014): np.

26. Rotberg and Gisselquist, "*Strengthening African Governance*," 46.

27. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Regional Homicide Profile: Africa," *UNODC Homicide Statistics 2013*, 2 February 2015, 5, http://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMI CIDE_BOOK_web.pdf.

28. For a broad discussion of Chinese security policies toward Africa, see, for example, Jonathan Holslag, "China's New Security Strategy for Africa," *Parameters*, Summer 2009, 23–37.

29. See Philippe Le Billon, "Oil and Armed Conflicts in Africa," *African Geographical Review* 29, no. 1, (June 2010): 63–90.

30. Holslag, "China's New Security," 36.

31. Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, "Measuring Security Progress: Politics, Challenges and Solutions," 20 November 2014, https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/measuring-security-progress-politics-challenges-and-solutions.

32. Lappi-Seppälä and Lehti, "Cross-Comparative Perspectives," np.

33. I. Robert-Okah and W. Wali, Insecurity in Nigeria: Implications for Sustainable National Development in Nigeria, *International Journal of Academic Research* Part B 6, no. 4 (July 2014): 242–250.

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35. US Energy Information Administration, "Nigeria-Country Analysis," np.

36. Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries, "Nigeria," 1 February 2015, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/.

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43. Matthias Olufemi Dada Ojo, "The Nigeria Police and the Search for Integrity in the Midst of Diverse Challenges: An Effective Police Management Approach," *International Journal of Political Science and Management* 16, no. 2 (June 2014): 87–100.

44. Okah and Wali, "Insecurity in Nigeria," 242-50.

45. Matthew I. Mitchell, "Migration, Citizenship and Autochthony: Strategies and Challenges for State-building in Côte d'Ivoire," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 30, no. 2 (April 2012): 274.

46. Ibid.

47. See, for example, Mike McGovern's 2011 narrative *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire* (University of Chicago Press).

48. Available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=iv. The UN noted that, "Production continued to decline in 2013, reaching 32,000 barrels per day." UN Security Council letter, 14 April 2014.

49. "Ivory Coast Aims to Boost Oil Output After Discoveries," *Reuters*, 3 January 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/oil-ivorycoast-idUSL5E9C33CZ20130103. More recent reporting demonstrates the rapid signing of multiple exploration contracts with many of the major international oil firms, including ExxonMobil in December 2014.

50. United Nations Security, letter, 14 April 2014.

51. Ibid.

52. US Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) "Cote D'Ivoire 2014 Crime and Safety Report," accessed 17 January 2017, https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17008.

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54. UN General Assembly, Resolution 2162, "Renewing Mandate of United Nations Operations in Cote d'Ivoire," 30 June 2014.

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58. Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), Human Rights Watch, *np.*
59. Robert-Okah and Wali, "Insecurity in Nigeria," 242–50.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Murphy, "Africa's Leaking Wound," 36–41.