THE SECURITY LEXICON FROM WESTPHALIA TO THE PRESENT

A CAUTIONARY TALE

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A new and dangerous dynamic is at work around the world today. That new dynamic involves the migration of some of the monopoly of political power (i.e., the authoritative allocation of values in a society) from the traditional nation-state to unconventional actors such as the Islamic State (ISIS), transnational criminal organizations, Leninist-Maoist insurgents, tribal militias, private armies, enforcer gangs and other modern mercenaries. These actors conduct their own political-psychological type of war against various state and other non-state adversaries. These violent politicized non-state actors are being ignored; or, alternatively, are being considered too hard to deal with. That misunderstanding must inevitably result in an epochal transition from traditional Western nation-state systems and their liberal democratic values to something else dependent on the values—good, bad, or non-existent—of the winner.[1]

To help civilian and military leaders, policy-makers, opinion-makers, and anyone else who might have the responsibility for dealing with modern conflict come to grips analytically with the security dilemma and other realities of the 21st century political-psychological environment, this paper seeks to do three things. In Part One, we outline a bit of essential history that takes us from the Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648 to the present. In that context, we briefly consider a contemporary example of the traditional military-centric approach to national and international security that is still alive and well. That is, Chinese military activity in the South China Sea. In Part Two, we note that most of today's security issues can be characterized as conflicts in the "grey zone." They tend to be a mix of traditional and non-traditional conflicts that pose an ambiguous and blurred range of challenges for civilian and military decision and policy makers, and opinion-makers.[2] As a consequence, we examine an example of a new and broadened political-centric security issue that the international community has tended to ignore for over more than 40 years. That is, the security and political implications of the almost totally forgotten Western Sahara. In Part Three, we briefly discuss the problem of bridging the security lexicon from past to present, and the development of a new and broadened security approach to contemporary personal and collective security. In that context, it becomes clear that there is an acute need for small counties—not just the traditional major world powers—to develop ends, ways, and means strategies to deal with belligerent internal political actors, testy neighbors, and possible requirements to participate effectively in Chapter 6 and 7 actions sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council.[3]

The three parts of this paper also represent the reasoning process (i.e., dialectic) of the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. That dialectic has defined the post-Cold War globalizing security situation, and is also the basis for the developments in current International Law. That is, Thesis (Part One), Antitheses (Part Two), and Synthesis (Part Three).[4]

Part One--A Bit of Essential History:
The Traditional Concept of Conflict (The Thesis)

Several international relations/politics texts teach that the bloody international anarchy of 17th Century Europe generated a determination on the part of the controlling elites to devise an interstate system that would prevent anything like the Hundred Years War from happening again. The resultant negotiations promulgated the Peace or Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The major powers pledged to honor other nation-states' complete control over the territory and people affirmed to be theirs. That sovereignty was considered sacrosanct, and was defined as national security. Intervention by one nation-state into the domestic or foreign affairs (i.e., sovereignty) of another country—including interests abroad—was defined as aggression.[5] This would be a fundamental beginning part of the thesis in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's dialectic.

Traditional Aggression Further Defined. Aggression or defense against aggression was further defined as "protective" or "preventative." The notion of protective defense centered on the protection of territory, people, or specific interests abroad. Preventative defense focused on possible pre-emptive actions that would preclude a direct threat from a nation-state adversary. Again, protective and preventative defense against aggression was confined to defense against other nation-states. In any event and in the past, defenders and aggressors tended to claim to be acting in defense of sovereign security interests, and that their actions were appropriate in terms of "International Law." Both defenders and aggressors tended to rely on military-centric ways and means to "defend" their national security interests. Traditionally, in the anarchy of international politics, enforcement—if any—of the international law concepts of protective and preventative defense against aggression has tended to be undertaken only by the major powers of the day. They have done this using their own power unilaterally, or in concert and accordance with relevant protocols, agreements, accords, conventions, declarations, resolutions, and treaties. International organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and other international bodies, however, have no effective means of enforcing their statements of opinion.[6]

Thus, traditionally and effectively, appropriateness of nation-state actions—protective, preventative, and/or legal or illegal is determined by: 1) the winner of the resultant military action; and/or 2) diplomacy and public opinion as expressed in national and global media. As a consequence, in the past and into the present, security has been defined as military, economic, and/or diplomatic protection against or prevention of perceived aggression. Interestingly and importantly, from 1648 to the recent past, the Westphalian system has addressed the sovereignty of the nation-state only. Non-state actors and their unrestricted political-psychological ways and means of attaining their objectives have been ignored or wished away. The traditional security dilemma was "What is defense? What is aggression? What is protective action? What is legitimate preventative action? What is capability vs. intent?" Then, when unconventional non-state actors are added into the mix of actors playing in the global security arena, either as independent players or proxies for nation-states, there is a new and more complex security dilemma. The main problem in this context is that these questions generated by the Westphalian security dilemma have never been completely sorted out. It all really depends on who—after the fact—writes the history.[7]

One Contemporary Example of the Traditional Security Dilemma (The Thesis). An example of the fact that the past is still relevant today is that of China's actions in the South China Sea. China considers the development of a large, modern navy as "defensive." Given the interests and vulnerabilities of Japan and other countries in the region, those countries consider Chinese efforts to build a strong navy and establish protective bases in contested territories in the South China Sea to be offensive and potentially aggressive. As a result, China's decision to put surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island (in the Paracel Island Chain) is fueling regional and international tensions. These weapons would have a legitimate purpose in terms of enabling China to better defend its

naval bases on Hainan Island (273 miles away), but placing this and other Chinese weaponry in the area would also have the capability to control a vial international water-way and the passage of $5 trillion in annual trade.

The Paracel Islands have been under Chinese control for over 40 years, and Chinese military forces have been stationed there for almost that long. As a consequence, that country claims de *facto* sovereignty in those islands. Nevertheless, the Philippines challenged China's assertions of sovereignty in that region at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, Netherlands. And, not unexpectedly, China refused to participate in the case. When the court handed down its final opinion, the Chinese reaction was a foregone conclusion. The decision has been ignored. The problem is that this is one more blow to international legal practices that could help ensure the free flow of navigation in accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.[8]

This leads us to the base line reality of international politics. Hard evidence over time and throughout the world shows that security or lack thereof is dependent on the capability to defend against a state or non-state adversary who is attempting to compel one to accede to his will. This, importantly, is the classic definition of war.[9] And, importantly, definitions of "defense" and "aggression" work both ways. So, what is offensive? What is defensive? What is preventative or protective? The answer depends on one's interpretation of the issue on the basis of culture, values, external relationships, interests, and conception of the threat to national security. Over time, that answer depends on relative military, economic, diplomatic strength, and the will and skill to use those and other unconventional instruments of statecraft. That determines who will write the history. And that can be, indeed, a dilemma.

Part Two--Change and the Development of an Antithesis

In 1996, Boutros Boutros-Ghali described the most important dialectic at work in the post-Cold War world as globalization and fragmentation. He observed that globalization was creating a world that has become increasingly interconnected and a positive force for decolonization, good government, socio-economic development, human rights, and improving the environment. The Secretary General understood, too, that that dialectic was acting as a negative fragmenting force leading people everywhere to seek refuge in smaller more homogenous groups characterized by isolation, separatism, fanaticism, and proliferation of intra-state conflict. He also recognized that that kind of fragmentation can act as an important cause—related to poverty, social exclusion, and poor governance—of state failure.

Thus, the Secretary General introduced two new types of threats—in addition to traditional military-defensive aggression—into the global security arena. They are: 1) hegemonic/violent/belligerent non-state actors (e.g., insurgents, transnational criminal organizations, terrorists, private armies, militias, and gangs) that are taking on roles that were once reserved exclusively for traditional nation-states; and 2) indirect and implicit threats to stability and human well-being such as unmet political, economic, and social expectations. Accordingly, over a relatively short period of time, the concept of state and personal security became more than simple control of territory and people. Sovereignty (i.e., security) would also become the responsibility of the international community to protect and/or prevent peoples from egregious harm. Importantly, this broadened concept of security ultimately depends on eradicating the causes as well as the perpetrators of instability.[10]

Further Development of the Antithesis.

In response to the Secretary General's vision of contemporary reality, the United Nations (UN) outlined its Agenda for 2030. It provided 169 ambitious but "sustainable" development goals for

nation-state and international community action over the next several years. 17 specific goals were designated as priority efforts. All in all, Agenda 2030 would set the conditions for the elaboration of the principle of Protection and Prevention of peoples from harm perpetrated by governments, non-state actors, and/or root cause stressors. Additionally, the Organization of American States (OAS) Declaration on Security of 2003 supplemented the Agenda for 2030 with a list of threats to the global community that included everything the more traditional international law concept of the Responsibility to Protect and to Prevent might require—and more. In addition to traditional nation-state aggression, the new list of external and internal threats to security and stability noted corrupt governance, the global drug problem, trafficking in persons, attacks on cyber security, natural and man-made disasters, health risks, environmental degradation, and virtually all the ever-present root causes of instability.[11]

A New Security Dilemma

In these terms, the enemy is not necessarily a recognizable military force or the industrial and technical capability to undertake conventional war. At base, the enemy becomes any individual or organizational political actor that plans and implements the kind of violent or non-violent pressures that threaten another actor's well-being. The enemy may also be an inanimate "root cause" of instability. Security, then, becomes an all-inclusive circular process of interdependent relationships among: 1) personal and collective well-being of citizens; 2) political-economic-social development; 3) sustainable peace, liberal democracy, and effective responsible governance; and 4) back to personal and collective security again. This definition of security is nothing less than a redefinition of sovereignty. Sovereignty was, in the past, the unquestioned control of territory and the people in it. Sovereignty is now conditional. It is the responsibility to generate the security that enables political-economic-social development, and allows liberal democracy and a sustainable peace.[12] All this is not simply a moral-human concern.

Boutros-Boutros Ghali would remind us that the new international legal principle of Protection and Prevention of Harm, and the accompanying new definition of security, are intended to preclude a coerced transition of extant values of a given society to the unwelcome values of the winner. In turn, a forced transition of values poses an existential threat to national and international security.[13]

An Example of the Antithesis–the Western Sahara

The modern Western Sahara, previously known as the Spanish Sahara, Rio de Oro, and/or the Sahrawi Arab Republic (SADR), is a generally desert territory in north-west Africa located along the Atlantic coast between Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. It is sparsely populated, phosphate and iron ore rich, enjoys a profitable fishing industry, and is believed to hold significant oil deposits. Western Sahara is also the location of a nearly 50-year long dispute between Spain, France, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and the local Sahrawi people. The dispute centers on the issue of Moroccan political-military control of the area on one side of the proverbial coin, and the political independence of the Sahrawi population on the other.[14]

The Progression of Events from the Mid-1970s. In the summer and fall of 1975, several deciding events began to take place that have kept the region in a state of tension and turmoil for the past forty or more years.

First, Spain entered negotiations with Morocco and Mauritania that led to the tripartite Madrid Accords that would transfer parts of Spanish Sahara to both those countries. The Sahrawi people were not a party to those discussions. That led POLISARIO (i.e., the insurgent Sahrawi military organization) and SADR (i.e., the political organization intended to act as the sovereign representative of the Sahrawi people) to violently oppose the talks and resultant accords to violently oppose the talks and resultant accords.

Second, Morocco asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to offer its opinion regarding Moroccan claims to Spanish Sahara. On October 16, 1975, the court found that Spanish Sahara's historical ties to Morocco and Mauritania did not grant those countries the right to that territory. To add insult to Moroccan injury, the court also declared that the Sahrawi people, as the true owners of the land, held a right of self-determination. Thus, any solution to the issue of integration with or independence from any other country required the explicit approval of the Sahrawi people. Neither Morocco nor Mauritania accepted this decision.

Third, on November 6, 1975, King Hassan II addressed the people of Morocco over the radio and announced that he would organize and lead a "Green March" to "reclaim" the Western Sahara. That extremely innovative, well-planed, and well-executed effort mobilized 300,000-350,000 unarmed men, women, and children who would cross into Western Sahara to claim the territory as part of a "Greater Morocco." Spanish security forces were ordered NOT to resist the flood of unarmed civilians. The march continued for four days, by which time the marchers had pushed ten kilometers into the Spanish Sahara. At that point, King Hassan halted the march and allowed his "volunteers" to return to Morocco. On November 14, with the Moroccans back home and no one hurt, Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania signed the Accords that set out the terms for the transfer of power in the region from Spain to Morocco and Mauritania. The three countries were given joint control over the territory until 1976 when Spain would leave the Western Sahara entirely. At that point, Morocco would annex the northern two-thirds of Spanish Sahara and Mauritania would take control of the southern one-third of the former Spanish province.

Fourth, Algerian support to POLISARIO provided the resources that allowed that organization to concentrate on Mauritanian targets. Direct attacks on those targets resulted in a coup d'etat that brought a new Mauritanian government to power, the withdrawal of Mauritanian troops from Western Sahara, and recognition of SADR as the government in the former Spanish Sahara. The celebration of that POLISARIO victory, however, was short-lived. Almost immediately after the Mauritanian troops had left their one-third of the territory, Morocco annexed the area. Thus, POLISARIO and SADR were forced to cease acting as security and political institutions of a nation-state and went back to the role of proxy non-state insurgent actors—totally dependent on Algeria.

Fifth, Algerian support to POLISARIO precipitated the need for Morocco to build, defend, and maintain a costly 1,500 km berm (the Moroccan Wall) that separates the commercially profitable parts of Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara from the almost uninhabited and unproductive remainder of what used to be Spanish Sahara. Thus, POLISARIO controls the small generally unproductive area east of the Moroccan Wall, and Algeria houses the majority of the Sahrawi people.

Sixth, protests, demonstrations, parades, conferences, congresses, sporadic fighting, and a United Nations peacekeeping effort have continued off and on over the past several years. The UN authorized a mission (MINURSO) to make arrangements for a referendum, and to preclude a resumption of armed conflict in the area. That referendum has not taken place, but peace has been maintained. The sticking point, not surprisingly, is that Morocco insists that Moroccan citizens who have settled in Western Sahara since 1975—and who now make up a majority of the population–be allowed to vote in the referendum.

Seventh, in March 2016, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, visited Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria. On that occasion, he described Western Sahara as being "occupied." The reaction was virtually immediate and hostile. Morocco ordered the UN's MINURSO mission to close down and leave within 72 hours. The UN complied, but subsequently the Security Council asked Morocco to allow the reopening of the mission and resumption of the full MINURSO mandate. As of this writing, no one expects a quick or positive solution.[15]

Eighth, the stark reality is that: 1) Morocco exercises de facto sovereignty in Western Sahara, and enjoys the legitimacy that comes from the barrel of a gun; 2) as a consequence, Morocco is

firmly in control of Western Sahara, and shows no inclination to change its position there; 3) without serious support from major world powers, the UN has no way to enforce international court decisions or other forms of international law; and 4) if you are a teenager, one of the very few career paths available is that of an Islamic "fighter."[16]

Conclusions

This vignette provides a clear-cut example of the ultimate security threat. The threat is not instability or even state failure. What has taken place in the territory that was once called Spanish Sahara and/or Western Sahara is a humanitarian disaster that is the sum and substance of the aftermath of contemporary conflict and state failure.

In this "new" security environment, war is no longer an exclusive military-diplomatic undertaking conducted by traditional nation-states. The power to make war, the power to control war, and the power to destroy states and societies is now within the reach of virtually anyone or any organization with a "cause." Combatants are not necessarily military units. They tend to be groups of individuals that are not necessarily uniformed, not necessarily male but also female, and not necessarily adults but also children. Combatants may also be proxies for players that wish to maintain the international legal fiction of "plausible deniability." Traditional and nontraditional actors must, more often than not, deal with the absence of a credible government or political actor with which to negotiate, and the lack of a guarantee that any agreement between or among contending players will be honored. Nevertheless, war—declared or undeclared, or whatever "spin doctors" might call it—remains an act of coercion to compel an adversary to do one's will. In contemporary conflict there are only two rules: 1) traditional rules of war are not enforceable; and 2) only the foolish fight fair. Accordingly, war is not limited, it is unrestricted.[17]

Part Three--Bridging the Lexicon and Generating a Synthesis: Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Dialectic Continues Its Work

As a result of the gravity of the contemporary global security threat, we now see the international legal and security communities considering Ambassador Stephen Krasner's orienting principle of Responsible Sovereignty. This principle is a synthesis that responds to traditional state vs. state treats as well as threats generated by non-state and state perpetrators and exploiters of other international political actors' weaknesses, and the general global violence. As such, it is a synthesis of realpolitik and practical idealism. (See Figure 1).[18]

Ambassador Krasner's orienting principle of Responsible Sovereignty is also the theoretical basis for bridging the security lexicon, advocating rational policy change, and developing a

synthesis (i.e., a new thesis) that can deal effectively with the new broadened security dilemma. It begins with the definition of politics as "the authoritative allocation of values for a society."[19] Accordingly, politically relevant research, planning, execution, and power asset management refers to a separable dimension of human activity—legitimate governance. The state and its governance –or lack thereof—becomes the primary (i.e., dependent) variable and defining element in operationalizing the concept of contemporary security. It also makes the concept of legitimate governance intellectually manageable as well as analytically useful. Thus, the type of governance (legitimate or not—positive or negative) is the critical variable that determines stability or instability, development or stagnation, prosperity or poverty, and peace or conflict. Clearly, this is not a simple concept. The Ambassador cautions us that there may be no specific formula (i.e., model or recipe) that can be applied literally to any given situation. One must grasp the essence of the concept and apply it with judgment and reason.[20] In these terms, intervening powers must apply the principle with the understanding that they cannot bring about responsible sovereignty overnight, or with force alone. As a consequence, the earliest phases of an intervention must include a transition strategy—not an exit strategy. The intent is to take the time necessary to develop the legitimizing conditions necessary for economic reconstruction, political reconciliation, socio-economic development, and the professionalization and modernization of the state bureaucracy and security institutions. All this does not imply that the U.S. or any other power must be involved all over the world at all times. To the contrary, it means that it is time to seriously rethink the concept of security and the political/governmental organization necessary to effectively deal with it.[21]

Toward the Future

The Challenge and the Task. The basis for bridging the security lexicon and synthesizing rational policy change begins with the development of a "unified field theory" (i.e., a strategic concept; a paradigm; a blueprint for action; a theory of engagement) that would direct policy, strategy, and power asset management toward the achievement of a strategic geo-political policy objective. No coach in the National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), or the coach of an Olympic team would ever go into a season without a "philosophy" for his team. Neither would that coach go into any given game without a carefully thought-out and well-practiced "game plan" based on his philosophy. Given that in generating national security, "War is a matter of vital importance…the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin…"[22] it follows that small as well as large powers should develop a "unified field theory" to guide contemporary national security policy, planning, and implementation.

The primary task, then, would be to create integrating political organizational mechanisms to achieve a whole-of-government unity of effort. Once the appropriate organizational mechanisms are in place, shared goals and objectives, a broad understanding of what must be done or not done or changed, and a common understanding of possibilities and constraints will generate an overarching campaign plan—based on the "unified field theory." That campaign plan in turn becomes the basis for developing subordinate operational-level and supporting tactical plans that will make direct contributions to the achievement of the desired geo-political end-state. Thus, the roles and missions of the various national and international civilian and military elements evolve deliberately, rather than in response to ad hoc "mission creep."[23]

Conclusions

This challenge and task are nothing new, and not even close to radical. They are only the logical extensions of basic security and strategy, and national and international asset management. By accepting this challenge and associated task, the United States, the West, and perhaps others in

the global community can help replace conflict with cooperation, harvest the hope, and fulfill the promise that a new multidimensional responsible sovereignty security paradigm offers.

A Final Cautionary Note

Even though every internal conflict is situation specific, it is not completely unique. Throughout the universe of intra-national and international conflict cases, there are analytical commonalities. The evidence clearly indicates that once personal and collective security and the rule of law are firmly established, legitimate governance ultimately defeats a violent international political actor, or proxy, by removing the motives that created that adversary in the first place.

In The Rebel, Albert Camus discusses the nationalistic, destructive, and revolutionary activities of hegemonic state and non-state actors. He admonishes us to understand that: "He who dedicates himself to the destruction of the old in order to build something new [and possibly better] dedicates himself to nothing and, in his turn, is nothing. But, he who dedicates himself to the dignity of mankind, dedicates himself to the earth and reaps from it the harvest that sows its seed and sustains the world again and again."[24] ❏

Notes

1. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, "Cartel Evolution: Potentials and Consequences," *Transnational Organized Crime,* Summer 1998, pp. 55-78; John Rapley, "The New Middle Ages," *Foreign Affairs,* May/June 2006, pp. 93-103; John Sullivan, "Maras Morphing: Revisiting Third Generation Gangs, *Global Crime*, August-November, 2009, pp. 493-494; "War's Human Cost," *UNHCR Global Trends*, 2015, New York: UNHCR, 2016; and Robert J. Bunker and Pamela Ligouri Bunker, "The Modern State in Epochal Transition: The Significance of Irregular Warfare," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol 27, No. 2, 2016.

2. Max G. Manwaring, ed., *Grey Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder,* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.

3. As in the case of direct UN action against the M-23 militias in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and action against gangs in Haiti, mandates based on Chapters 6 and 7 of the UN Charter authorized significant deadly force against the designated aggressor.

4. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York: United Nations, 1992; and "Global Leadership after the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996, pp. 86-98.

5. As an example of this discussion, see: Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security,* 5th Ed., Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 3-46; Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989, pp. 7-8; Lars Schoultz, *6.National Security*, pp. 24-25 and 143-330; and Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, *National Security and American Society,* Lawrence, KS; University Press of Kansas, 1973, p. 47.

6. Ibid. Also see: Seyom Brown, *New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics,* New York: Harper Collins, 1995; Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*, New York: Penguin Press, 2005; Charles Kegly, Jr. and Eugene Wittkoph, *World Politics*, 6th Ed, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997; William J. Olson, "International Organized Crime," *Fletcher Forum*, Summer/Fall, 1997, pp. 65-80; and Mohammed Ahyoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies,* Minneapolis, MS: University of Minnesota Press, 1997; 121-146. Also see: Note #4, above.

7. Ibid.

8. For some good discussions of this issue, see: "Whose splendid isolation?" *The Economist*, June 6, 2015, p. 34; "Who's afraid of America?" *The Economist*, June 13, 2015, pp. 57-60; Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, "With a Post Overseas, China Retools Its Military," *New York Times* November 27, 2015; World Briefing, "US Proposes a Naval Coalition," *New York Times*, November 27, 2015, p. A6; and Michael Forsyth, "Chinese Planes Begin Patrols Over Disputed Area of Sea," *New York Time*s, July 19, 2016, p. A9.

9. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Orig. pub. 1832. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 80-81; 89; 596.

10. See: Note #4, above.

11. See: www.unglobal compact.org; *Millennium Report: Responsibility to Protect*, New York: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, August 15, 2001; and www. Oas.org/en/sms /doc /DECLARATION%SECURITY%AMERICAS.

12. Francis M. Deng, et al., *Sovereignty as Responsibility*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996, p. 33; Lee Feinsein and Ann-Marie Slaughter, "A Duty to Prevent," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2004, pp. 136-150; and Amitai Ezioni, "Responsibility as Sovereignty," *Orbis*, Winter 2006.

13. Ibid. Also see: Note # 4, above.

14. Janos Besayno, *Western Sahara*, Budapest, Hungary, 2009. (Janos Besayno is a Hungarian Army officer who served with the United Nations peacekeeping effort in Western Sahara in the early 2000s—MINURSO).

Also see: Jose Ramon Diego Aguirre*, Historia del Sahara Espanol*, Madrid: Kaydida, 1987; Henry Kamen, *Empire: How Spain became a World Power, 1492-1763*, New York: Harper Collins, 2003; Hugh Thomas, *Rivers of Gold: The Rise of the Spanish Empire 1490-1522*, London: Weidesfeld & Nocholson, 2004; Stig Forster, et.al., *Bismark, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989; Tony Hodges, *The Roots of a Desert War*, New York: Lawrence & Hill, 1983; and Gustavo de Aristegui, *La Yihad en Espana*, Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2005.

15. Janos Besayo, 2009, and Rick Gladstone, "Morocco Asks that U.N. Close Western Sahara Military Office," *New York Times*, March 22, 2016, p. A-8.

16. Ibid.

17. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999; and General (UK) Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.

18. Stephen D. Krasner, "An Orienting Principle for Foreign Policy," *Policy Review*, No. 163, Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution, Sanford University, October 1, 2010. Also see: David Easton, *The Political System*, 1963; Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environment Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," *International Security*, Fall 1991, pp. 114-115; Amatai Etzione, "Changing the Rules," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2011, p. 173; and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Restoring American Leadership through Smart Power," Global Strategic Assessment, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2009, pp. 474-476.

19. David Easton, *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*, New York: 1963, pp. 99; 128-129.

20. Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, "Addressing State Failure," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2005. This encompasses what B.H. Liddell Hart, drawing from Sun Tzu, calls the indirect approach to conflict. "The perfection of strategy would be, therefore, to produce a decision without any serious fighting…Thus, those skilled in war subdue he enemy without [major] battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted [military] operations." See: B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, New York: Signet, 1967, p. 324; and Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 79.

21. Ibid.

22. Sun Tzu, 1963, p. 63.

23. Author interview with General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, August 7, 1997, Boston, MA. The Complete interview is included in the Spring 1998 Special Issue of *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, No. 1, p. 9.

24. Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, New York: Vintage Books, 1956, p. 302.

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