Formulaic Leadership

Ahistorical, Anachronistic, and Wrong for the Air Force

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Every eight weeks, several hundred Air Force captains and some Department of Defense (DOD) civilians gather at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, for the five-week Squadron Officer School (SOS), a course that can be a defining moment in their careers. Some are sent off with some portentous words from well-meaning commanders, supervisors, and mentors that sound something like: "Now, Captain, remember that the Air Force puts a lot of value in superior performance in developmental education, and I don't have to tell you what being a distinguished graduate at SOS means for your career." The truth of such a statement is not lost on any officer, and understanding the meaning full well, those captains head off for Alabama for a leadership laboratory that is meant to challenge, inspire, motivate, mentor, and indeed, at the end, separate the wheat from the chaff.

In its current, abbreviated iteration (it was shortened from eight to five weeks in 2014), the SOS is a short course on Air Force heritage, history, and above all, leadership. In this, the SOS does a fine job given its temporal limitations (even the disaffected cannot escape the rebluing effect of Air Force professional military education [PME] for five weeks), and the Full-Range Leadership Model (FRLM) that forms the bedrock of much of the curriculum hits all the right touchstones of the human element of leadership. Similarly, the lectures that emphasize the hallmarks of history's greatest leaders, and the best of our airpower heritage, are without doubt the kind of curriculum that our future strategic thinkers need to get, and are characteristic of the courses offered by the Air Force.

However, the SOS stumbles in its devotion to metrics to determine success, and as I will argue, it is a problem that is not any fault of the SOS cadre, but rather one that is enmeshed in our fabric as a service. At the SOS, flights compete for top honors and earn points based on a number of team and individual events intended to offer objective metrics to select the best leaders from the best flights and identify some of the next generation of senior leaders. There is a disconnect, therefore, between what the SOS acknowledges through its academic curriculum as the right way to lead and the way it privileges the clever in selecting its best leaders, thereby

imprecisely highlighting the next generation of Air Force senior leaders, based on a dedication to numbers that, as we have done before, deceives us into thinking we are doing it correctly.

Thus, my primary contention is that the Air Force's understanding of what characterizes a leader, demonstrated by the way it privileges metrics to determine success and great leadership, is simply not supported by even a brief reading of history and its greatest leaders. The leaders I will highlight never resorted to a simple formula to determine success; rather, they understood that leadership requires that *people* be *led* and so, despite their shortcomings, became some of history's greatest. Furthermore, as I will argue, there are periods in our military history where simply associating a set of data points with leadership and victory has cost thousands, if not tens of thousands, of lives. Similarly, we err if we incentivize this variety of "leadership" in primary developmental education (PDE) by assigning yet another metric to determine future senior leadership potential. "Educating" captains as "future Air Force leaders" may be the first of the three-part SOS mission, but the education is in many ways a reinforcement of the mistaken notion that the best leaders are the ones who score the highest on tests, run the fastest or have the best stratifications. Leadership is an inherently *human* endeavor, and we go wildly astray to the point of risking the lives of our fellow service members to think that success in leadership can be distilled to mere figures.

Some might say, "He's just grumpy about not being a distinguished graduate (DG)." Hardly. I can't deny that I would have enjoyed the accolades, but I simply wasn't the guy, and those aren't my goals. Rather, my motivation is more on behalf of Chris, David, Matt, and many others—the great officers and leaders to whom flights at the SOS look and say, "That's who I would want as my wing commander," but who did not get a DG award they earned. I also realize this is likely to rile those SOS DGs who have benefitted from their distinction. I must emphasize that my goal is not to be inflammatory, but evocative, and to spark a conversation about how we view leadership as a service.

Currently, the SOS selects DGs, in part, by a calculation based on flight performance (11 percent), individual performance in team events (26 percent), academic events (21 percent), and peer (21 percent) and flight commander assessments (also 21 percent). The devil is in the details, however, for the DG allocation is not equally distributed among flights; the top-performing flights receive as many as three DGs while flights at the bottom get one or none. This first filter in the DG selection process consists of on-time written assignments (20 percent), physical challenges (29 percent), and team problem-solving events, or the "riddles" that I describe below (51 percent).[1]

This two-tier selection process that privileges mythical leadership situations in the ranking, therefore, means that outstanding leaders in poorly performing flights are not given the DG nod while top-performing flights get the preponderance of them with great shock that certain members received the distinction and an equal amount of shock that those officers would very possibly lead a squadron, group, or wing one day. Some will always "slip" through, but the way the current system rewards the cleverest flights by the weight assigned to these team riddles denies the great, *actual* leadership from outstanding officers in poorer performing flights.

Throughout my stay at the SOS, I kept asking myself, "What are we *really* learning here?" The academic curriculum has the right focus, but the leadership activities send conflicting messages about what leadership really is. As an example, flights compete in several "team leadership problems" (never mind the contradiction in terms), wherein they are given a riddle to solve in 15 minutes with no other input. Presumably, it is possible to solve these riddles in the allotted time, but almost comically, my flight never did, and accordingly was ranked near the bottom. Told that we weren't succeeding because we needed a better "process," a group, that otherwise got along and worked well together, walked away frustrated and were assumed to be a bunch of poor leaders for not having "team leadership" (whatever that is). Furthermore, it sent all the wrong messages relative to what the curriculum taught about decisive, strong, personal leadership. The takeaway for our future leaders, therefore, is that if a team just has a good "process," then it will be successful and earn all of the "points" in the real-world challenges they will face back in their units. There are a great many reasons to think otherwise.

The SOS actually comes tantalizingly close to the mark by emphasizing the most significant element of leadership—the human element. It makes a great deal of Bruce Avolio's FRLM, which emphasizes how leaders must realize that their people always require a different style of leadership for the organization to succeed, and significantly, there is no mention of figures or formulas to measure that success. Transactional leadership—a positive approach in which very specific standards are set and expected to be met—certainly has its place for achieving goals and meeting "a very broad range of performance outcomes," as Avolio asserts. Transformational leadership, however—the inspirational and intellectual stimulation a leader provokes in those he or she leads—creates breakthroughs, imbues the highest moral values in followers, and fully develops them as employees *and* people. Utilizing both kinds of leadership is pivotal, otherwise "leaders and those led would be limited in their ability to succeed."[2] Put another way, Avolio's list of transformational leaders includes Dwight Eisenhower, Mahatma Ghandi, Nelson Mandela, and Andrew Carnegie, notable for envisioning a better future, practicing empathy, self-sacrifice, developing independent followers, and not arbitrarily adhering to a formula or a process to measure success.

This, of course, contradicts the messages implicit in the SOS system of stratification and the overt messages conveyed by the flight commanders. The implicit *and* explicit message is that if a person could only devise the right kind of system or workable formula, he or she would have better success in most events. It is immediately obvious, of course, that to solve problems in a group in real life, one also has to do things that do not fit neatly into any kind of "process"—manage personality conflicts, massage egos, and incorporate all members of the team. These are the things that history's best leaders did so well. Furthermore, with the DG allocation biased toward flights that perform better on the team leadership problems and physical challenges, the top-performing flights are assumed to contain the better leaders when, in fact, they may just have a more fortuitous combination of riddle-solvers and runners. Because it is so entrenched in formal training that such metrics are the only way to determine success relative to one's peers, these metrics—not classic behaviors of great leaders—become the filter by which our next top leaders

are chosen. This is a part of our PME that begs to be changed in light of the lessons of history.

Doris Kearns Goodwin's comprehensive *Team of Rivals* captures the essence of transformational leadership in her characterization of Abraham Lincoln as a master of men. Indeed, to think that, like George Washington, he took the time to manage the petty squabbles of his cabinet members while also managing the nation's greatest existential crisis speaks volumes about his innate transformational leadership. As Goodwin says, his natural way with people enabled him

> to form friendships with men who had previously opposed him [as with Salmon Chase and William Seward, political "enemies" who Lincoln managed to bring into the cabinet based on their expertise rather than their conformism]; to repair injured feelings that, left untended, might have escalated into permanent hostility [as he did routinely in the early days of his presidency with Seward's very sensitive ego]; to assume responsibility for the failures of subordinates [as he did by taking the blame when conservatives cited Secretary of War Edwin Stanton for the failure of the Peninsula Campaign]; to share credit with ease [as he did routinely for his cabinet members and generals]; and to learn from mistakes [like he did after firing [George] McClellan and not hesitating to replace generals thereafter].[3]

Obviously, this was a transformational leader who saw victory, not through simple damage assessments or death tolls, but in relationships like the one with his unlikely best general, Ulysses S. Grant. Although Grant finished almost dead last in his class at West Point and failed at almost every civilian venture before the Civil War, Lincoln nevertheless gravitated toward him because, in the president's words, "he fights"—no small accolade in light of the heel-dragging McClellan who preceded him. Yet even with a track record of failure, Grant brought the mettle to the fight against Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and the steadfast endurance that kept his men fighting and dying in the tens of thousands on the Peninsula Campaign to bring the war to an end. Even in victory, Grant was magnanimous enough to take stock in both the strength of his enemy and his own shortcomings: he acknowledged his regret over launching the Battle of Cold Harbor, while at Appomattox Courthouse he joyously declared, "the Rebels are our countrymen again," offered generous terms to Lee, and was eager to resume his friendship with his old West Point comrade, James Longstreet.[4]

If these examples are ancient history to Air Force readers who think I'm being anachronistic in my old-timey examples, let us consider an instance from our airpower past: the Anglo–American combined bomber offensive (CBO) against Germany in World War II. There is no doubt that the destruction the Eighth Air Force and Royal Air Force exacted on Germany in that campaign was unprecedented, but the numbers the US Army Air Forces (AAF) touted in the *United States Strategic Bombing Survey* (USSBS) show too great a concern with battle damage assessment metrics as a measure of its effectiveness. On the first page of its summary report, the USSBS boasted of the 2.7 million tons of bombs dropped, more than 4 million sorties flown, the 3.6 million German homes destroyed, and 300,000 civilians killed as evidence of "the scars across the face of the enemy, the preface to the victory that followed." Yet these impressive figures and the conclusion that "Allied airpower was decisive in the war" mask the shortcomings throughout the report: in aircraft

production, ball bearing, and rubber production, and the USSBS admitted that German production *increased* or had no effect, despite the bombs and Allied lives lost.[5]

Worse still, the Royal Air Force, also a party to the destruction and without an axe to grind about an independent air force, reached a rather different conclusion, noting that the CBO "clearly failed" to break the morale of the civilian populace and noted the "remarkable increase" in armaments production.[6] I do not intend to impugn the great leadership that existed at all levels of the Eighth Air Force that inspired men to continue flying in the face of such great peril, but the AAF's analysis ignored those cases in favor of its metrics as a measure of success. One could go on with examples of airpower advocates using numbers to argue for effectiveness in World War I when they clearly weren't or the fantastic dogfights over the Yalu River in Korea that did nothing to break the stalemate that had set in by 1950, but it should be obvious that this is a problem that has been with us from the start.

The most egregious case of an overdependence on metrics to determine success arises from the Vietnam War in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration and in the DOD under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Well-known for his efficiency and a penchant for statistical analysis, McNamara quickly became the filter for the information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the president, displaying his supreme loyalty to his boss by knowingly modifying reports to make the administration look good. With the president's complicity, he created a hostile environment between them and their military advisors that had catastrophic consequences for the Vietnam War. Surrounded by the "whiz kids" who formed his inner circle of advisors, McNamara marginalized the JCS, their decades of experience distrusted, suspected, and dismissed when they proposed courses of action based on military expertise rather than the figures the secretary preferred. Still expected to offer the professional military stamp of approval for the administration's military decisions, the JCS sat helpless while McNamara and his civilian coterie set about devising war plans based on the best odds of success or public reception, including the much-derided plan of "graduated pressure." Once the fighting had broken out in earnest, moreover, a belief in favorable kill ratios became the yardstick of success. When division commanders began criticizing their troops for an 18 to 1 kill ratio as too low, we can see how widely the whiz kids had spread their influence in the military, and how poorly a metric can determine real success, something that was not lost on contemporary officers.[7]

Ironically, North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh also thought about kill ratios as a yardstick, except in his formulation, 10 to 1 meant victory for the Vietnamese. Writing while imprisoned in 1942, Ho Chi Minh wrote regarding the impending conflict with the French, "If we have to fight, we will fight. You will kill 10 of our men and we will kill one of yours, and in the end it will be you who tire of it." Already looking ahead to the end of World War II, the North Vietnamese president was predicting the armed conflict that became the eight-year First Indochina War after France had gotten back its colony at the end of WWII. Indeed, Ho Chi Minh's words proved to be prescient not once, but twice. At the end of the conflict with the French in 1954, casualty figures were closer to "only" four Vietnamese dead to one Frenchman, it was the French who quit their colony, and it is well known that in

1968 when the war was turning badly for the United States, it was nevertheless meeting McNamara's 10 to 1 target, and therefore was tallied in the winning column in the Pentagon and Oval Office. Of course, we now know that assessment was, at best, a delusion of the secretary of defense, or, at worst, a willful deception to give an insecure president the information he wanted.[8]

Finally, the current SOS model that is meant to identify the best of the current generation only exposes the fissures in the aging, sagging structure of the promotion and personnel system from previous generations that is plain for all to see, even outside of the military. A fabulous article in *The Atlantic* by Lt Gen David Barno, USA, retired, and Nora Bensahel highlights the anachronistic system in place today that may have worked fine in decades past, but is at risk of chasing off a trove of highly talented millennial officers across the DOD, a phenomenon they dub a "brain drain." Because of its arcane and outdated adherence to shoehorning every officer into a command track and forcing fast risers to keep pace with their more steady moving peers for the first decade of service, the personnel system continues to choose the eminently understandable path of choosing from the widest possible pool, but at the cost of some of the best up-and-coming officers who are seeking the opportunities they desire elsewhere, out of the military.[9] One of the common complaints that Barno and Bensahel uncovered in their survey of DOD officers was the lack of opportunities to attend civilian graduate schools to earn degrees that have wide application both in and out of the military. The current paths to master's degrees through the Air Command and Staff College or the check-the-box online school simply don't command the same clout on the open market (something millennials appear to think about more than their predecessors). It is just one example, but it represents the desperate need for change in the current PDE and intermediate developmental education (IDE) options.

Clearly, there is room for improvement. If we continue to privilege metrics-chasing above known leadership qualities and alienate strong natural leaders in the process of selecting our next generation of senior leaders, we will fail at ensuring the best leadership makes it to the top. This is not a revolutionary idea (various authors have floated similar ideas in *ASPJ* before)and it speaks to the desperate need to reform not only the selection process at PDE, but also the officer promotion process writ large.[10] I must reiterate that I am taking aim at the SOS, not because it is a *bad* program; rather, it is only that while some officers get culled off for senior leadership, everyone learns the ahistorical, anachronistic, and ultimately incorrect lesson that the top 10 percent have been chosen in large measure because they had a better process. As I have argued, we should know better, and do better. I therefore propose the following recommendations:

1. *Change the selection criteria for the next generation of Air Force senior leaders.*

   It is obvious why the Air Force wants some kind of distinguished graduate program to continue: it creates a pool of officers who, in the eyes of promotion boards, are primed for senior leadership. School-selected below-the-zone promotions, and the stratifications that result from an SOS DG box being checked, are all the signposts along a career path that lead to promotion to O-6 and beyond—

things that all begin at the SOS where captains compete for the first time against their peers across the Air Force.



Figure. Force development ribbon chart. (An Air Mobility Command-developed force development ribbon chart depicting an SOS DG as a first "gateway" to promotion to higher ranks. That it ends with "AAD (advanced academic degree)" for promotion to O-6 suggests that those with all "green" boxes will have better odds at that board and beyond. The more accolades in those boxes are, of course, better than fewer or none.)

It is no mystery—indeed, it is shared openly at the SOS—that DGs are the school selects, who in turn get below-the-zone promotion to O-5 and O-6 and become the "shiny pennies" that get the jobs that groom them for senior leadership. A perfect example is the force development ribbon chart (figure above) published by various

career fields that demonstrates all the "check boxes" along the path to higher and higher promotion, and the first box is naturally an SOS DG. My suggestion is not to eliminate the SOS DG program, but to change it in a way that better ensures our future leaders are those who embody the qualities of history's most successful leaders and the FRLM that the Air Force touts.

This suggestion is not as radical as it may seem; I am merely suggesting that the criteria used to select SOS DGs be changed to privilege peer evaluations over the weight assigned to the fictitious "leadership" problems and physical challenges. This is not a popularity contest; quite the contrary, four- to seven-year captains have led enough and experienced enough good and bad leaders to know a real leader when they have worked and lived with one. Furthermore, there is already a mechanism for this built into the SOS stratification system: the criteria flights use to nominate the "greatest contributor" are remarkably similar to what I have argued are historically verified features of superior leaders—an ability to engage in deep thought on challenging issues and solicit and engage the opinions of others to reach a carefully reasoned solution. In other words, the officers selected for this award have the right balance of interpersonal skills, emotional quotient, and assertiveness that history has shown to make a great leader. I propose that this become the greatest weight in a vastly more simplified SOS scoring system: each flight could select three of these officers, and the flight commanders would either validate or veto the nominations (the latter only with a strong reason seconded by the student squadron commander and create a pool from which the DGs would be selected).

The system is not purely subjective (and perhaps to indulge our service's penchant for numbers), about half of this pool of nominees would be filtered out to select the top 10 percent of SOS students using the metrics of graded individual performance on briefings, written assignments, and so forth. The final product, therefore, would be the "whole package" officer—one who is respected by his or her peers as a friend, confidante, and leader, who has outstanding written and oral communication skills, and can exercise the FRLM naturally and effectively like the Air Force wants its leaders to do.

2. *Create joint and civilian SOS alternatives that develop strategic thinkers earlier in an officer's career and will entice millennial officers who desire options in their career.*

   At a course that introduces strategic thinking to tomorrow's leaders, there is very little said about how the other services approach leadership. Furthermore, when the top graduates from this course go on to senior leadership, gaining a joint perspective earlier than the mid-to late-career IDE is of pivotal consequence for tomorrow's leaders. The reality is that more officers are interacting with other services earlier and earlier in their careers anyway, so for as much benefit as there is for captains to interact at a deeper level across career fields at the SOS, adding Army, Navy, and Marine O-3s would be a huge boon to developing better strategic thinkers earlier. This notion is not new, and has been argued in *Joint Force Quarterly* to incorporate joint curriculum into existing PME for DOD O-3s.[11] I propose to go a step further.

Integrating a handful of captains into applicable Army captains' career courses and portions of Marine Expeditionary Warfare School will also create better joint thinkers earlier in an officer's career, and those chosen for in-residence joint PDE will go on to diffuse the joint leadership lessons they learned at the other services' PME. Because it would be difficult, impractical, or impossible for these officers to compete for distinguished graduate in Army or Marine courses, the officers selected for this joint PDE should be standouts among their peers with the *potential* for command and senior leadership, and a joint PME credit should reflect this on the member's records. To ensure these participants still get the desired amount of "blue" in their PDE, SOS by correspondence should be a prerequisite.

Furthermore, there are a number of top universities like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Oxford that already offer one- to four-week summer courses for working professionals on history, leadership, management, and other professional development topics. I propose to allow officers to take the initiative on attending one of these programs as an alternative to SOS, similar to the way the Air Force grants equivalency credit for ACSC for various Air Force Institute of Technology and Education with Industry programs. A cost of $27 million will permit 1 in 10 company grade officers (CGO) to attend such schools.[12] At present, the Air Force spends north of $63 million on tuition assistance per year,[13] and for officers whose AAD completion is masked to the O-6 board, and who have ample opportunities through Air University to complete a free master's degree, tuition assistance for online degrees at for-profit universities is plainly unnecessary and could be an easy source of this funding. Tuition assistance for enlisted members should clearly continue, untouched.

Even if the whole $27 million simply gets added as a new line item, the additional 2.7 percent increase to the Air Force's training budget and a mere .06 percent to the Air Force's fiscal year 2017 budget would pay enormous dividends to the officer corps in just a few years.[14] Those CGOs would get the same kinds of leadership training at these civilian institutions, but with the added benefit of top officers (like the joint basic developmental education option, participation in this program should be predicated on future leadership potential) acting as the "face" of the Air Force to a civilian populace increasingly unfamiliar with its military.[15] Again, history serves as a guide, since there is a strong correlation between leadership ability in wartime and formal schooling in civilian, Army, and Navy schools. For example, flag officers like General Eisenhower, Fleet Adm Chester W. Nimitz, and Gen George Patton, and 74 percent of corps commanders in World War II spent at least 10 years in the 2 decades preceding 1941 in professional schools, including 200 graduates from the Harvard Business School.[16] Lt Gen H. R. McMaster comes to mind as a recent example. We could earn a similar return on investment by broadening our scope at the lowest level of officer PME.

This article ends with a lament and a hope. Like Barno and Bensahel's argument, the lament is that new, fresh ideas that have the potential to transform our services for the better often struggle to gain traction under the crushing weight of military bureaucracy. On the one hand, retaining the best and brightest and ensuring they get promoted to senior leadership is increasingly difficult under the current system for this generation and is situated to alienate and push out those we should want to promote the most. On the other hand, my hope is that the encouragement from our

senior leaders to innovate and improve is not simply talk; that someone, somewhere, will relax the bureaucratic stranglehold on change enough to improve our dearly loved Air Force and the DOD by changing the methods by which we choose our next generation of leaders. In the process, we will also raise the next generation of leaders at all levels to have a better understanding of the fundamentally human endeavor that leadership is, and how to think deeply on critical issues rather than bungling ahead with a pretty formula in hand, thinking it will offer success because, well, the numbers just add up. ✪

Notes

1. Squadron Officer School (SOS), *Student Evaluations and Guidebook* (Maxwell AFB, AL: SOS: Air University, 5 June 2015), 4–5.
2. Bruce Avolio, *Full Range Leadership Development*, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2011), 49.
3. Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 17.
4. Shelby Foote, *The Civil War: A Narrative, Red River to Appomattox* (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 951.
5. *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1987), 6.
6. Sebastian Cox, ed., *The Strategic Air War Against Germany, 1939–1945:* Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 79.
7. Gregory Daddis, "No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War," (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, 2009), 319–20.
8. My thoughts on Vietnam are shaped principally by Mark Philip Bradley's *Imagining America and Vietnam: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); and H. R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998).
9. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, "Can the Military Halt Its Brain Drain?" *The Atlantic*, 5 November 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/us-military-tries-halt-brain-drain/413965/.
10. Indeed, another thoughtful captain first sounded the generationally-minded caution about the SOS in 2001; see Alison Iverson, "Professional Military Education for Company Grade Officers: Targeting for 'Affect,' " May 2001, http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/airchronicles/apj/apj01/sum01/iversen.html.
11. Rhonda Keister, Robert Slanger, Matthew Bain, and David Pavlik, "Joint PME: Closing the Gap for Junior Officers," *Joint Force Quarterly* 74, July 2014, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-74/jfq-74_65-71_Keister-et-al.pdf.
12. Air Force Personnel Center, "Regular Officer Career Family Career Field Rank Gender as of January 2017," accessed 15 February 2017, http://www.afpc.af.mil/Air-Force-Demographics/. This document shows about 34,000 company grade officers, and tuition and travel costs are estimated at $8,000 per traveler.
13. Air Force Operation and Maintenance I, fiscal year (FY) 2017, 512–521, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY17/AFD-160205-032.pdf. Total enrollments in tuition assistance programs in FY 2017 is planned for 252,617, and $250 per "enrollment" puts the total at more than $63 million.
14. Air Force Financial Management and Comptroller, "FY16 Pocket Guide," http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY16/AFD-150202-046.pdf. Using FY 2016 figures, the Air Force's O&M budget of $47 billion and its training budget of $1 billion yields these figures from $27 million.
15. James Fallows, "The Tragedy of the American Military," *The Atlantic*, January–February 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/.
16. Edward Coffman, *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 280–87.

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