CONCEPTS FOR AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP

Richard I. Lester, PhD
Executive Editor

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Preface

Compelling and creative leadership is one of the most critical demands of our time. Our Air Force is made up of people, doctrine, organizations, weapons, and equipment. It is leadership, however, that brings these elements together and makes them work effectively. Leaders make things happen. They make it easier for people to adapt to change, accept risk and uncertainty, and help others reach their full potential. This fifth edition of *Concepts for Air Force Leadership* reemphasizes the Air Force's commitment to inspired leadership, especially the kind of leadership needed in the military community during these times of unprecedented change occurring in our Air Force. Our objective in this edition is to examine the latest thinking about the art of leadership to achieve a better understanding of the process and to improve leadership effectiveness. This has been accomplished by creating a better understanding of the purpose, direction, and motivation involved in leading people in a pluralistic Air Force. Good leaders develop through a never-ending process of self-study, education, training, and experience. This text provides a guide for what you should be, know, and do to lead people. Our approach is more analytical than descriptive; it is not prescriptive because leadership is still more of an art than a science. And like any other art, it cannot be developed to perfection nor applied as a scientific formula.

We express deep appreciation to the authors and their publishers for their generosity in permitting us to reprint their articles and particularly to those who prepared articles especially for the 2008 edition.

We are also indebted to a number of faculty and staff members who offered many worthwhile comments and suggestions. A special note of thanks goes to Col James Galloway, commander, Ira C. Eaker College for Professional Development; and Dewey I. Johnson, PhD, who, more than 30 years ago, was the contributing editor of the precursor to this book.

Richard I. Lester, PhD
Dean of Academic Affairs
Ira C. Eaker College for
Professional Development

With Pride in the Past and Faith in the Future



Introduction to the Fifth Edition

The preface to the first edition of this book, published in 1983, affirmed that for too long we had tended to highlight leaders as managers and had downplayed the development of true leaders. The purpose of the first edition was to correct that misplaced focus and to enhance the understanding of the true leadership process. The second edition was published in 1990 in response to an increasing demand for its use as a supplementary text. It was designed to enhance the development of leaders and the concept of leadership in the US Air Force. The goal of the third edition in 1996 was to continue to examine the latest thinking about the art of leadership to achieve a better understanding of the leadership process and to improve leadership effectiveness. The fourth edition in 2001 updated and modified the previous publications. It emphasizes practical leadership and mentoring. It devoted more attention to servant leadership, the company grade officer, and peacekeeping experiences. The fifth edition considers the importance of strategic leadership, international issues, resource management for commanders, and the link between history and leadership. The fifth edition is founded on the principle that leadership is the art of influencing and directing people to successfully accomplish the mission during a period of major transformation, war, and unexpected deployments. This is the key concept upon which Air Force leadership is based. Using this definition for a more structured understanding of the leadership process, the text considers leadership in three dimensions. The first dimension examines leadership in the context of professionalism, and although the professional dimension is examined first in the text, professionalism is the connecting link between the organizational and interpersonal dimensions; it brings *mission* and *people* together. Professionalism is defined, described, and discussed as it is understood and practiced by the military profession. The second dimension deals with organizations as the arena in which professional military and civilian leaders function and is *mission-oriented.* The third dimension addresses interpersonal leadership skills that are directly connected to the art of influencing the behavior of people and is therefore *people-oriented.* The articles in this dimension identify leader responsibilities and skills required to influence people to achieve organizational objectives. The fourth division of the text, titled "Perspectives," provides a broad, high-level overview of leadership and is multidimensional, examining the concepts explained in the first three dimensions.

Selected readings included in the text present a wide range of views from a variety of sources in both the military and civilian communities. In almost every instance, the readings appear in their original form to preserve the integrity of the author's views and to ensure evaluation in the proper context.

Professional Dimension

The objective of this dimension is to consider what it means to be a professional in the armed forces and to understand the importance of the application of leadership in practicing our profession.

Within the profession of arms we are a very diverse group. Traditionally we have considered membership of the total force to include all active duty officer and enlisted personnel, guard, and reserve members. Today, in addition, we can no longer overlook the crucial contributions from civilian members, dependents, and retirees. It is within this expanded conception of the profession of arms that we intend to explore the seemingly elusive concept of what a professional is and what it means to be a professional in the armed forces. In the process, we shall attempt to communicate the importance of leadership in practicing this honored profession.

Our approach to understanding and applying leadership from this vantage point is to analyze the critical elements that make up the expanded operational definition of the military profession. The military profession is one of organized and disciplined violence to safeguard our national security interest and to protect the innocent. It practices a high level of responsible, ethical behavior by killing as few people as possible while fighting for just causes sanctioned by lawful authority, and it incorporates its multifaceted functions into a single integrated professional total force.

Accordingly, we have broken down this dimension of the book into three sections. The first group of articles deals with traditional military expertise and the need for leadership; the second, with responsibility, ethics, values, and the Code of Conduct; and the third, with quality and the total force.



Section 1

Expertise and the Need for Leadership

Professional Dimension



Lorenz on Leadership

Maj Gen Stephen R. Lorenz

In 1987 I was commander of the 93rd Air Refueling Squadron at Castle AFB in Merced, California. Late one night, I sat down and wrote out a list of leadership principles. There was nothing magical about them—they were simply useful precepts I had learned over the years. Today, especially after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, our leaders need to reflect on the principles that guide them. I do not seek to instill mine on the readers of this journal. Rather, I only ask that Air Force leaders reflect on what their principles are, regardless of whether or not they have written them down. That said, I offer the following for consideration.

Balancing Shortfalls

Shortfalls occur in our professional and personal lives. We never seem to have enough time, money, or manpower. The essence of this "scarcity principle" lies in accepting the reality of limited resources and becoming adept at obtaining superior results in less-than-ideal situations. Equally important, once people acknowledge the scarcity of resources, then they need not bemoan the situation any longer. In other words, they should "deal with it." Leaders must carry out the mission with the resources they have. They have to make it happen! This is part of being a military commander and leader. Commanders never go to war with all the resources they think they need—they balance their shortfalls to accomplish the mission.

Keeping Our Eyes on the Ball

In order to prevail, leaders must always keep in mind what they want to accomplish, regardless of the task, and not become distracted. They must articulate the mission to their people. During my tenure as director of the Air Force budget, I didn't consider the budget the mission so much as I considered it a means for our service to defend the United States through the exploitation of air and space. In the Air Force, this means that leaders must connect actions and troops to the mission and never lose sight of this important relationship.

Leaders can assure their people's well-being (a major ingredient of mission accomplishment) by knowing how they feel and how they are doing. They should look them in the eye and ask how they are. Eyes don't lie. They reflect happiness, sadness, or stress. To get an honest answer, one should ask at least three times, and do so more emphatically each time: "How are you doing?" The first response is always, "Fine." The second, "I'm okay." Finally, when they realize that their leader is truly interested, they respond honestly. By the way, the only difference between a younger person and someone my age is the amount of scar tissue. Because I have lived longer than most of my military colleagues on active duty and therefore have more scar tissue, I can probably disguise my feelings more effectively. But the eyes are the true indicator. Again, leaders must never lose sight of the primary objective: to focus on the mission and take care of their people.

Those Who Do Their Homework Win

The equation for this principle is simple: knowledge = power. Take, for example, the battle for scarce resources. The person who has the most compelling story, backed by the strongest data, gets the most resources. We have seen this principle, which applies universally to all other undertakings, demonstrated repeatedly throughout history—especially military history!

The Toughest Word to Say in the English Language

According to an old adage, the most difficult word to say in English is no. But I have a contrarian's view. Saying no finishes the situation; saying yes, however, carries with it additional tasks, commitments, and responsibilities. For instance, when I agree to speak to a group, I have taken a more difficult path than I would have by declining. If I say no to a request for funding an initiative, my job is finished. If I say yes, then I must take on the task of finding resources. Leaders should also consider the effects of a response on working relationships. If a leader responds affirmatively 95 percent of the time, his or her people will readily accept the fact that the leader has carefully considered their request before responding negatively. I never say no until I research the issue and look into all of the alternatives. To this day, it still amazes me that most of the time I can say yes if I do a little work and make a personal commitment.

New Ideas Need Time and Nurturing to Grow and Bear Fruit

In order to overcome some of the challenges we face today, we need people to think and act out of the box. Furthermore, we must have the patience and faith to stay the course. Things do not happen overnight. People have to work very hard to make things happen. They must sell their ideas and do their homework without concern for who gets the credit.

Reprinted with permission from the *Air and Space Power Journal* (Summer 2005), 5–9.

This principle is very important to remember as new generations of Airmen enter the Air Force to help fight the global war on terrorism.

Leaders Should Not Lose Their Temper—Unless They Plan To

To navigate the necessary course of action and ensure mission accomplishment, a leader must be willing to use more than one approach. Earlier in my career, I saw my boss—a mild-mannered, consummately professional four-star general—storm into a meeting and angrily bark out criticisms to his senior staff. When we left the room, he looked at me, winked, and calmly said that sometimes a person has to put across a different face in order for people to take him or her seriously. My boss had planned the whole incident. He had not lost his temper at all—he did it for effect. If leaders cannot control themselves, how can they control others? They must have self-discipline. They should never, ever lose their temper—unless they plan to.

All Decisions Should Pass the Sunshine Test

Because leaders must make difficult decisions every day, it's important for people in the trenches to know that the process is fair and above reproach. Toward that end, we must be as open and accessible as possible and always act as if our decisions were public knowledge—as if they appeared in the newspaper, for example. If leaders are forthright about why they made a decision, their people might disagree, but they will understand the underlying logic and continue to trust them. As Air Force leaders, we need only look to our service's core values—integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do—to arrive at solid decisions that gain the public trust and instill faith in our processes.

Ego: Both a Facilitator and a Detriment

A unit's success depends upon its members keeping their egos in check. We cannot afford to let them run amuck. We need confident, capable people who work together to enhance the organization rather than individuals who pursue their own selfish agendas. As my father taught me, leaders need people with ambition—not ambitious people.

Early in my career, I applied for a development program—the predecessor of the current Air Force Intern Program. I had confidence that I would be accepted, so not seeing my name on the list came as a shock. To make matters worse, another officer in my squadron did make the cut. Inwardly, I withdrew from the organization and walked around several days feeling hurt and angry. Eventually, though, I realized that the Air Force only owed me the opportunity to compete. On the day the board met, my records did not meet its standards. Whose fault was that? Mine—no one else's. I put the issue behind me and embraced my squadron mate. This experience taught me the negative effect of allowing my ego to dominate my actions—specifically, my failure to realize that the Air Force had not promised to select me for the program. It did, however, guarantee me equitable consideration and fair competition. I should have expected nothing else. An Air Force person should compete only with himself or herself, striving for improvement every day!

Work the Boss's Boss's Problems

This principle goes one step beyond the adage "work your boss's problems." Most people make a decision through a soda straw, but if they would rise up two levels above themselves, they could open the aperture of that straw and get a strategic view of the decision. Taking a "god's eye" view—looking through the eyes of their boss's boss—allows them to make a much better decision. That is, leaders must become deeply committed to the organization and make their boss's challenges their own. If they can achieve this type of commitment—regardless of who the boss is or which political party controls the government—the only thing that matters is enhancing mission accomplishment by making the best decisions possible and doing the right thing under the circumstances.

Self-Confidence and Motivation: Keys to Any Great Endeavor

We can attribute most successful endeavors to persevering and putting forth maximum effort. Whenever I speak about leadership, I always begin with a quotation from Sir Winston Churchill: "To every man, there comes in his lifetime that special moment when he is figuratively tapped on the shoulder and offered that chance to do a very special thing, unique to him and fitted to his talents. What a tragedy if that moment finds him unprepared or unqualified for that which would be his finest hour." I am particularly attracted to this statement because of the great things Churchill accomplished, even though he faced failure and defeat many times. Regardless of the difficulty or hardship, he remained committed and motivated. He never gave up. Churchill's words represent a call to action that has helped me overcome such challenges as surviving engineering courses as a cadet as well as serving as a wing commander, commandant of cadets at the Air Force Academy, and budget director for the Air Force despite having no prior experience in budgetary matters. Although I lacked in-depth knowledge of budgets and finance, perseverance got me through, as always. I never gave up. My best advice? Never give up. Never, ever give up!

Apply Overwhelming Combat Power to the Point That Will Have the Most Effect

I have a simple organizational method that has served me well for many years. I like to approach issues, goals, and tasks "big to small, top to bottom, or left to right." That is, I believe that one must be able to see the entire forest before working on individual trees. We must understand the big-picture issues before delving into smaller details. From a broad point of view, I find it helpful to pursue goals by progressing from the short term, through the midterm, to the long term. Leaders should make sure their subordinates have not only the "overall road map" they need for direction but also the resources to plan and complete tasks.

One of my favorite and most beneficial experiences involved an aircraft-sanitation worker at McGuire AFB, New Jersey. During a customer-focus class that I taught in an effort to counter what I perceived as lackadaisical attitudes prevalent in the organization, I noticed a lady in the audience whose body language was so agitated that she was figuratively screaming at me. I stopped the class and asked her what was wrong. Jeanie said she was frustrated because no one would help her with a work problem. I told her that if she explained the situation to me, I would try to help.

According to Jeanie, the sanitation truck that she operated was designed for servicing a KC-10, which sits high off the ground. Normally, she hooked the truck's waste-removal hose to the aircraft, flipped a switch, and gravity pulled the contents into her vehicle. At that time, however, McGuire also had the C-141, which sits only three feet off the ground. Consequently, when she attempted the same procedure on the C-141, the hose bent because it was not fully extended, as with the KC-10, and became clogged with waste. She then had to disconnect the hose, lift it over her head, and shake it to clear the obstruction—clearly an unpleasant task that she had to repeat multiple times if the aircraft's lavatory were completely full. Although such a problem might seem trivial, on a large aircraft that makes extended flights, the lavatory is a mission-essential piece of equipment. Armed with the knowledge of Jeanie's problem, I organized a team to solve it—and the members did so by engineering and installing a 3.2-horsepower engine that proved more than capable of overcoming the clearance problem.

But the greatest accomplishment in this case was neither the technical solution nor the vastly improved sanitation procedure but the effect the process had on Jeanie. It revived and energized her. Thereafter, each time I saw Jeanie she proudly displayed her truck, which she had polished and shined so highly that it would likely meet a hospital's sanitation standards.

This story drives home the point that leaders must look for both verbal and nonverbal messages from the people in their organization. If they can reach the person who operates the sanitation truck, then they can reach anyone.

Study the Profession and Read—Especially Biographies

During our Air Force careers, we have many opportunities to add to our education and knowledge. America's future depends upon our maximizing and complementing these occasions with our own regimen of reading and development. As a lifetime student of leadership, I have an insatiable appetite for learning and regularly read two or three books at a time. I have dedicated myself to learning from other people's experiences so that I do not waste time trying to reinvent the wheel. Studying and learning how other leaders overcame adversity will build confidence in one's own ability to make tough decisions. I have found my study of Gen Colin Powell and Gen Henry "Hap" Arnold especially rewarding.

Take Your Job (Not Yourself) Seriously

To drive home the important concepts when I discuss leadership, I include comical—sometimes outrageous—videos and pictures to accompany each principle. Audiences seem both surprised and refreshed to see a general officer use David-Letterman-style "top-10 lists" and irreverent videos ranging from Homer Simpson to bizarre advertisements as part of a serious presentation. However, I see these methods as the ideal way of delivering my message. Leaders must realize that because they communicate with a diverse, cross-generational population, they need to speak in terms their audience will understand. A leader must create a common, shared vision that everyone can comprehend and accept. I like to try to communicate my vision by talking about an experience or using an analogy that everyone can relate to, understand, and remember. It is critical that leaders deliver their message in easily grasped terminology. They should employ a type of universal device akin to the "Romulan translator" depicted in the Star Trek television series. The medium used by the communicator can take the form of an analogy, a video, or a story. However, the critical point is that the communicator package and deliver the message in a format that the varied groups we lead today will understand.

Today's leaders were born primarily during the last half of the twentieth century. They could have been born 100 years earlier or 100 years from now. By accident of birth, most, but not all American leaders, were born in the United States. They could have been born in another country like Iraq or Cambodia, but most of today's leaders were born in America. The United States, whether it wants to be or not, is the world's greatest power, and air and space power is now the permanent instrument of that power. Every one of the current leaders in our military at some time made a conscious decision to become a defender, not a defended. Balancing this all together, we see that our leaders have a heavy burden leading others in the global war on terrorism. Every day they get up in the morning to lead, and they have to give it their very best—not their second best. Visiting the wounded soldiers, sailors, marines, and Airmen in our hospitals makes us realize that leaders owe their people the very best. They cannot afford to have a bad day! They must know who they are and how they lead; they must have their own list of leadership principles.

As I said before, the most important point about these 13 personal leadership principles that I have laid out is to encourage leaders to define their own principles. In this article, I have sought to motivate and aid our service's leaders in identifying and clarifying their positions—not in memorizing mine. In order for a leader's set of principles to be effective, they should be based on a foundation—such as the ideals embodied in the Air Force's core values—and they must reflect who that leader is! It is never too early or never too late to write down a set of personal leadership principles. Future leaders in today's Air Force should start now—they will never regret it, and it will make them better leaders for our nation.

The Military Oath of Office

Col Orwyn Sampson

I (FULL NAME)

All that signifies my individuality. A personal reference to no one else, which implies that I accept full responsibility for my actions.

HAVING BEEN APPOINTED

An historical event signifying the accomplishment of some requisite evaluation and/or training. An act conferred by a ruling authority.

A CADET (2Lt/Regular Officer/Permanent Professor . . .)

A position of esteem, respect, privilege, and reward that carries with it professional responsibility.

IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

A branch of our nation's military that has a unique role to play in military operations and defense of American values and interests.

DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR

An oath to be taken seriously. One to which I offer my full allegiance.

THAT I WILL

An active call. One that demands my energy, my time, and if necessary, my life.

SUPPORT AND DEFEND

A directed call. My activity is to be both offensive and defensive.

THE CONSTITUTION

Not the parchment, but the principles—the ideal of liberty for all men and women.

OF THE UNITED STATES

It isn't just anybody's idea. It is ours! Tried by fire and found to be genuine, lasting, and valuable.

AGAINST ALL ENEMIES

There is inherent risk involved in my work. It is a call to arms and a call to sacrifice. The stakes are high. It is life we are supporting and defending and it is life that it may cost—whether supremely or on a moment-by-moment routine basis.

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC

No matter the foe we are ready, even if he arises among us.

THAT I WILL BEAR TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE TO THE SAME

My complete loyalty—my heart—is tied up in this commitment.

Reprinted from *USAF Academy Journal of Professional Military Ethics* 2, no. 1 (September 1981): 33–35.

THAT I TAKE THIS OBLIGATION FREELY

An active decision on my part, delegated to no other, mine alone to make. Weighing the costs, in liberty I choose.

WITHOUT ANY MENTAL RESERVATIONS OR PURPOSE OF EVASION

My pledge is not ill-advised, half-hearted, or deceptive.

AND THAT I WILL WELL AND FAITHFULLY DISCHARGE

A commitment to excellence.

THE DUTIES OF THE OFFICE UPON WHICH I AM ABOUT TO ENTER

All the duties, not just the pleasant or rewarding ones, remembering that the value of true service comes not in the job you get but the job you do.

SO HELP ME GOD

My allegiance can go no higher.

The Airman's Creed

I am an American Airman.
I am a Warrior.
I have answered my Nation's call.

I am an American Airman.
My mission is to Fly, Fight, and Win.
I am faithful to a Proud Heritage,
A Tradition of Honor,
And a Legacy of Valor.

I am an American Airman.
Guardian of Freedom and Justice,
My Nation's Sword and Shield,
Its Sentry and Avenger.
I defend my Country with my Life.

I am an American Airman.
Wingman, Leader, Warrior.
I will never leave an Airman behind,
I will never falter,
And I will not fail.

Leadership: Objective and Moral Courage

Col Allan W. Howey

Leadership is mostly in the eye of the beholder. Subordinates almost always know a good leader when they see one. During my years in the United States Air Force, I've been most impressed with leaders who "keep their eyes on the prize" (i.e., the "principle of the objective") and have the moral courage to do so. It's not as easy as it sounds.

In the annals of military history, the American Civil War offers many examples of leaders who wouldn't allow distractions to divert them from their ultimate goal. President Abraham Lincoln, America's greatest wartime leader, was one such person. Throughout the war he was beset with opponents who tried to distract him from his efforts to preserve the Union. Although commander in chief, he often had to overcome the petty resistance of even his military subordinates.

In the early years of the war, President Lincoln greatly suffered the indignities of the general in charge of the Union army, Maj Gen George B. McClellan. McClellan felt himself far superior to his commander in chief, whom he called an "idiot" behind the president's back. The general frequently refused to share his operational plans with Lincoln and openly snubbed the president. One evening Lincoln and Secretary of State William Seward walked to McClellan's home, which was only a short distance from the White House. Informed by the general's servant that McClellan was at the wedding of one of his officers, the two Union leaders decided to wait in the parlor for the general's return. When McClellan arrived by the back door some time later, his servant told him of his high-ranking guests. In a remarkable act of discourtesy, the general in chief told his servant that he was tired and went on to bed! Lincoln took the insubordination calmly and returned to the Executive Mansion.[1]

Why did Lincoln tolerate such crass disrespect? He was willing to endure McClellan's abuse, because he knew that the general was an outstanding organizer and was helping the Union cause. The Union needed McClellan's talents, whatever his faults! Only later, when Lincoln realized that the outstanding organizer wouldn't send his outstanding organization into battle did he relieve McClellan from command. Regardless of McClellan's insulting behavior, Lincoln kept his eyes on the ultimate objective—saving the Union. It took a great deal of moral courage.

In the area of moral courage, the Civil War battle of Gettysburg presents many fine examples, but one little-known episode stands out. After the 1970s novel, *Killer Angels*, and the 1990s movie, *Gettysburg*, many Americans came to know the name of Col Joshua Chamberlain. The heroic stand of his 20th Maine Infantry regiment on the southern slope of a hill called "Little Round Top" kept the Army of the Potomac from being outflanked by Confederate Gen Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Chamberlain's physical and moral courage are unquestioned, but another fine example of moral courage—that of Col Strong Vincent—is often neglected.

Colonel Vincent commanded a brigade of four infantry regiments of which Chamberlain's 20th Maine was a part. On 2 July 1863 Vincent's division commander ordered his brigade to reinforce a threatened part of the Union battle line in a place now known simply as the "Wheatfield." Nearly in place, Vincent flagged down a mounted courier who was desperately searching for troops to defend the hill that Vincent's brigade had marched past just a few minutes before. The hill was unoccupied by Federal soldiers, and its seizure was threatened by advancing Confederates. Vincent instantly realized that the hill, Little Round Top, was the key to the Union defensive line. If the Confederates occupied it, they would turn the Federal left flank and be astride the nearest Union escape routes. The Northern Army would either be trapped or forced to withdraw in a direction that would uncover Washington and Baltimore.

Without waiting for his chain of command to issue the necessary orders, Vincent immediately shifted his brigade to Little Round Top as fast as it could move. He positioned his four regiments, including Chamberlain's 20th Maine, on the southern slope of the crucial eminence. They arrived in the nick of time. Within minutes, Confederate infantry appeared at the base of the hill, determined to take it. Vincent's lone brigade fought desperately and fended off multiple enemy assaults before eventually being reinforced. Chamberlain's well-known fight was heroic, but it was only part of a larger whole instigated by Vincent who risked court-martial for not following his original orders. Vincent's moral courage—knowing what had to be done and taking the initiative to do it despite the risk—saved the Union army. It also cost Vincent his life. He was mortally wounded on the bloody incline and died five days later.[2]

In more recent years, I served with an officer, Col John A. Warden III, who also focused on the objective and had the moral courage to stay the course whatever the personal cost. Warden, the Billy Mitchell of the modern era, together with his "Checkmate" staff, developed the air campaign concept that eventually won the Gulf War. Convinced that a strategic air campaign using conventional weapons could achieve victory against Iraq, Warden faced a fractured Air Force hierarchy. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) was primarily re-

This article was prepared especially for AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership.*

sponsible for strategic air warfare, but to SAC, "strategic" essentially meant nuclear. The other Air Force warfighting command, Tactical Air Command (TAC), focused nearly exclusively on supporting the US Army on the battlefield by winning air superiority, interdicting enemy supply lines, and providing close air support to the ground troops. No one except Warden and his staff seemed to think in terms of a *war-winning* air campaign that employed *nonnuclear* weapons.

Colonel Warden faced opposition at every turn. TAC, in particular, rejected his ideas, and the organization charged with fighting the air war in the Persian Gulf, Central Command Air Force (CENTAF), agreed with TAC's line of reasoning. The CENTAF commander, when first presented with Warden's plan, threw it across the room in disgust! To make matters even worse, Warden's superior in the Pentagon fought the colonel's theories with a vengeance. More than once Warden felt his career was over and even gathered boxes in his office in which to pack up and remove his personal effects.

Warden refused to allow "insignificant" distractions, such as career suicide, to keep him from the goal of winning the Gulf War through airpower. He did not fight for his own glorification, he fought to save Coalition ground troops, whose lives would end in violent combat if the air campaign failed. With the moral courage of his convictions, Warden refused to give up, and he fought to preserve his ideas with the civilian leaders of the Air Force and Department of Defense and those military leaders who were sympathetic. Many ground soldiers are alive today because he had the guts to stay the course.[3]

Military history—both distant and recent—is rich with examples of superior leadership. All good leaders, through personality, training, or both, develop many different techniques to inspire those whom they lead. What they all have in common is a commitment to the objective, the "big picture," and the moral courage to follow it to the ends of the earth whatever the cost.

Notes

1. An excellent narrative of this episode may be found in David H. Donald, *Lincoln* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 317–20. The original eyewitness account, written by Lincoln aide John Hay, may be found in Tyler Dennett, ed., *Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of John Hay* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1939), 34–35.

2. For a full summary of the struggle for Little Round Top and Col Strong Vincent's central role in its defense, read Harry W. Pfanz, *Gettysburg, The Second Day* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 201–40. See also Oliver W. Norton, *The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top* (New York: Neal Publishing Co., 1913), 253–75. Norton, Vincent's brigade bugler and standard-bearer, was never far from the colonel's side and witnessed all the events cited. His eyewitness account of Vincent's intercepting the courier and taking responsibility for moving his brigade to Little Round Top is found on page 264.

3. I observed some of these events after I joined the Checkmate staff in September 1990. Two studies published by Air University Press chronicle the opposition to Colonel Warden's air campaign planning concepts—Edward C. Mann III, Col, USAF, *Thunder and Lightening: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995) and Richard C. Reynolds, Col, USAF, *Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign Against Iraq* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995). For an eyewitness account of the CENTAF commander, then: Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, throwing Warden's briefing slide across the room, see Reynolds, page 91.

The Officer Corps and Profession

Col Brian J. Collins

Much has changed in the 50 years since Samuel Huntington wrote *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. The prospect of a large standing army in peacetime is no longer viewed as an aberration but as the normal state of affairs. Furthermore, this force is no longer conscript-based, but totally professional; soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are all volunteers, adequately paid, and many serve full careers through retirement. Despite the shift away from a manpower system based on civilian-soldiers serving short enlistments, the officer corps is not viewed as a threat to society. In fact, the military is frequently listed as one of the most trustworthy institutions in the country. Although this is the product of the officer corps' and society's acceptance of Huntington's argument, his model remains trapped in time; it does not allow for adaptation of the officer corps as the world changes. In addition, Huntington's model does not account for service differences and interservice rivalry since it treats the Services as monolithic. It also does not explain why the Air Force added the concept of fighting in cyberspace to its mission statement in December 2005. It is important to have a working model of profession for the officer corps because neither society nor the officer corps is enamored with the implications of the alternatives. Modern states monopolize organized violence and delegate this function to restricted groups. Since these groups perform a vital function and must remain obedient to the state, using bureaucratic politics or business models to explain or normalize their behavior runs the risk of indicating that bureaucratic or business grounds might be sufficient justification to alter this subordination to the state and/or society. The professional perspective, on the other hand, reinforces the contractual nature between the profession and society. Furthermore, studies of the military based on bureaucratic perspectives meet with minimal acceptance in military circles. For example, Air Force officers do not see themselves as bureaucrats engaged in daily struggles to gain a bit more political power or resources here, while defending against Army or Navy encroachments there. Although some higher-level staff jobs certainly deal with Congress, the Department of Defense bureaucracy, and contentious issues of interservice rivalry, the focus of officership is *war*: preparing for war, conducting war, and making life and death decisions under battle conditions. The officer corps sees itself as a profession, not a bureaucracy. It is a calling. Officers do not join the military for personal gain or to amass political power, and their tenures in senior leadership positions are too short to enable them to wield any power that they might gain. Instead, many would say that officers are part of the traditional profession of arms, whose members have taken on the obligation of defending the nation. That profession develops new fields of expertise to maintain its relevancy in the face of the changing character and nature of warfare, and the officer corps' composition changes as its expertise changes. The primary motivations for these changes are the responsibilities inherent in the profession's contract with society. The general public perceives itself to have a stake in the officer corps' composition, and this is more than an abstract or passing interest. A failure of the officer corps to defend the state would have major repercussions. Consequently, major adjustments in professional expertise require society's acceptance in the form of an award of jurisdiction over a specific competency to one or more professions.

We begin with the traditional works on concepts of profession within the military—Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* and Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier*—to establish the foundation of military officership as a profession. We then turn to Andrew Abbott's *The System of Professions*, paying particular attention to his major concept that professions are dynamic, competitive, and evolving in a world of changing jurisdictions. The resulting descriptive model of profession provides a new perspective for studying the evolution, or transformation, within the individual service officer corps, interservice competition, as well as changing concepts of war and combatants.

Samuel Huntington

The Soldier and the State is the classic beginning for discussions on the issue of profession and the post–World War II military. Huntington's book was first published in 1957, 10 years into the history of the independent Air Force. It would not be a stretch to say that all officers are familiar with Huntington's definition of a profession involving expertise, responsibility, and corporateness, and that the military's expertise is the management of violence. The division of profession into three points appears almost tailor-made to match traditional military briefing techniques used at places such as the service academies and in the various levels of professional military education. No American military officer would disagree with Huntington's statement that "the modern officer corps is a professional body, and the modern military officer is a professional man."[1]

Huntington's three points provide a good structural basis for the descriptive model on officership as a profession. *Expertise* is the profession's peculiar knowledge and skill. It is what the profession knows, teaches, and thinks that it can do. *Responsibility* captures both a sense of higher calling in the

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rather nebulous ideal of defending the nation by forfeiting one's life if necessary as well as an agreement of sorts to provide that service if called upon. It is why the profession does what it does. *Corporateness* concerns who makes up the profession and how the member and profession as a whole are regulated. Finally, although Huntington treats each point in isolation and in the seemingly static early Cold War situation, there must be significant interplay between the three concepts. Modifying one surely affects the others.

For example, society might say that it wants the military not only to manage violence abroad but also to provide a disaster relief profession. Doing so would entail a renegotiation of the existing contract of social responsibility, a broadening of military expertise, and potentially a modification of its personnel and procedures to accommodate the new area of expertise. Consequently, as figure 1 shows, the simple and static Huntington three-bullet briefing slide transforms into a more complex picture. Expertise, responsibility, and corporateness are all parts of the same thing—the profession—and the demands of each interact with the others within the profession. The arrows symbolize this interaction. We now take this adaptation of Huntington forward to see what insights a study of Janowitz might add.



Figure 1. Huntington as the basis of the descriptive model

Morris Janowitz

In *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, Janowitz analyzes social and political changes in the US Army's and the Department of the Navy's highest-ranking career officers over roughly the first half of the twentieth century. He also includes Air Force officers as a group of interest, but a large part of that service's history is still entwined with the Army during the period of his study. Janowitz uses the concept of profession as a tool to analyze changes in the US military officer corps. He does not provide a three-bullet-point definition of profession and, in fact, treats it more as a way to categorize officers as a specific group of interest. Janowitz focuses on the changing social makeup of the officer corps, specifically its evolution from a homogenous, somewhat aloof and pseudo-aristocratic social group to a diverse collection that is more representative of American society. In fact, the Air Force leads the other services in terms of the transition to this officer corps.

Janowitz is primarily concerned with what he sees as clear implications for civil-military relations in this evolution, and he makes several points that are relevant to the model. First, he presents two officer archetypes that exemplify the divide he sees growing in the officer corps. In addition, he works through several supporting hypotheses with examples that often illustrate large differences between the individual services' officer corps. In the end, it is clear that Janowitz's overarching premise is that the change in the social and political makeup of military officers is changing the nature of the profession. The profession is not static, but in flux.

The essence of Janowitz's argument is manifest in his characterization of officers as one of three types: the heroic leader, who embodies "traditionalism and glory"; the military manager, who is "concerned with scientific and rational conduct of war"; and the military technologist, or technical specialist.[2] However Janowitz also writes that the "military technologist is not a scientist, or for that matter an engineer; basically he is a military manager, with a fund of technical knowledge and a quality for dramatizing the need for technological progress."[3] This means that Janowitz actually only has two archetypes—the heroic leader and the military manager.

Janowitz admits that his distinction between heroic leaders and military managers is harder to discern in the Air Force than in the other services since the new technology of the airplane can arguably be placed under both categories. On the one hand, at least in the first half of the twentieth century, only a heroic type would dare take wing in a flimsy flying machine, facing death by accident as much as by enemy action. On the other hand, embracing the airplane as a technological innovation that brings new efficiencies to industrial-age warfare is clearly managerial by Janowitz's description. As far as flying airplanes, Janowitz casts his lot under heroic leadership. He then asserts that the Air Force has the highest concentrations of heroic leaders in the general officer ranks. Furthermore, without explanation, he states that this heroic style is most apparent in bombers, which also has the highest prestige in that Service. Air Force military managers are more associated with tactical air forces and air transport, both of which are heavily involved in joint operations.[4]

Janowitz's main emphasis in 1960 was that the military manager was on the ascendancy, and the heroic leader was fast disappearing. The Air Force bomber pilot was a last bastion of the heroic leader, but he, too, was no doubt destined to transition to civilian style management techniques. This article borrows Janowitz's idea of the competition between the two prototypes but modifies the archetypes slightly. Today, the case can be made that the archetypical heroic leader lives on in the form of the combat pilot.

However, the Air Force heroic warrior archetype is not particularly authoritarian, aristocratic, or against technology. He is also not automatically a "leader." He is, however, tradition-bound in the sense that he would stand by the axiom, "The job of the Air Force is to fly and fight, and don't you forget it!" He has a sense of responsibility to the nation, but this ethos is flavored by his perceptions of the Air Force officer corps' expertise and sense of corporateness. To him, the Air Force officer's expertise is the delivery of weapons from manned aircraft. This formulation already shows a separation from the Air Force's initial basis of independence, strategic bombing, and an acceptance of technological innovation on the part of the heroic warrior. In addition, he naturally sees the composition of the Air Force officer corps as paralleling the expertise. He expects pilots to predominate in both quantity and quality in terms of manning senior, key, and combat-critical positions.

Janowitz contrasted the heroic warrior with the military manager. However, this study uses the terms *visionary* and *warrior* instead of *manager* for a variety of reasons. First of all, within the military profession, *manager* has negative connotations. Whereas officers *lead* people, a storekeeper *manages* his inventory, the organizational man *manages* various undifferentiated projects, and a bureaucrat *manages* a robotic bureaucracy. Second, because the Air Force simultaneously uses two different but overlapping systems for organization and leadership/management, the terms *leader*, *manager*, *command*, and command and control can quickly become hopelessly confused. Finally, in the Air Force, *vision*, as evidenced by both pilots and other officers, is the counter to the heroic traditionalist, although both were critical to the Air Force's independence.

By the time the Air Force became independent in 1947, its primary justification—independent, massed, and heroic strategic bombing raids—was already a piece of history, or at best a practice whose days were plainly numbered in the face of atomic bombs, long-range ballistic missiles, radar, and other technologies and innovations. As Janowitz noted: "Despite the ascendance of air power, the typical Air Force colonel or general had the least consistent self-image. Air Force traditions are not powerful enough to offset the realization that, in the not too distant future, heroic fighters and military managers will be outnumbered by military engineers. Air Force officers were fully aware, but reluctant to admit, that more of a 'leadership' role would reside in the Army and in the Navy."[5]

Janowitz's prophecy has not come to pass. Military engineers do not exist as a separate archetype in the Air Force. They are subsumed into the prevailing heroic warrior and visionary warrior archetypes. The focus of the officer corps remains war, not airplanes and technology, and the contentious issues are how that war should be conducted and by what types of people. Consequently, the officer corps was not shunted off into a technical track that could only support military courses of action determined by more broadly minded Army and naval officers.

It is important to note that the archetypes are just that. They are representations of particular characteristics and points of view, used as tools to clarify different positions in the analysis of the changing nature of the Air Force officer corps. Pilots are probably more likely to take on the mantel of the heroic warrior archetype, but it is not meant as exclusive of other career fields, nor is it meant to be all-inclusive of every pilot. Pilots, as well as officers in other career fields, also fall under the visionary warrior rubric. In reality, many officers probably exhibit characteristics of both archetypes at times. For this study, however, the heroic and visionary archetypes struggle to define just who is in the Air Force officership profession (corporateness) and what work (expertise) exactly encompasses the profession's self-concept; this forms the basis of claims for jurisdictional competence.

Consequently, the descriptive model now looks similar to figure 2. The newly added outer ring depicts the two archetypes of *heroic warrior* and *visionary warrior*, broken out into each of Huntington's pillars. The arrows in the outer ring indicate the tension between the heroic warrior and visionary warrior archetypes in the areas of expertise and corporateness. Expertise tends to be dominated by the visionary archetype, as illustrated by the long-standing involvement with a variety of missile types, the growing influence of command and control systems in the profession, the recent introduction of unmanned combat aircraft, and the addition of cyberspace to the mission statement. Technology has a large impact on expertise. The concept of corporateness is most heavily dominated by the heroic archetype since a range of things—from uniforms and pilot wings, to education, promotions, and discussions as to whether non-pilots are really members of the profession or are fit to command—fall in this bailiwick. Responsibility is depicted as equal between the archetypes since both see the obligation in similar terms; there is no struggle over the pillar of responsibility.



Figure 2. Janowitz-type modifications added to the descriptive model

Andrew Abbott

Andrew Abbott, in *The System of Professions*, changes the focus of the study of professions from the analysis of organizational structures of existing professions to an analysis of the work that the professions actually do. This shift leads to different perspectives on how professions are created, exist, evolve, and sometimes decline. Through the examination of professions' work, it quickly becomes evident that many professions are actually doing similar things. In fact, they are often competing with each other in a particular line of work. In Abbott's terms, they are contending for *jurisdiction*.

Society does not come up with the labels and then create professions to handle them. As knowledge, technology, and culture change, professions develop or move to cover the emerging voids. Voids may also develop when a profession moves to cover a new jurisdiction and either leaves its old jurisdiction or is no longer in a position to control it.[6] Professions may also create the perception that there is a void. There is obviously a strong similarity to business marketing concepts. In any case, professions play a role in the labeling process, which in turn affects which profession gets to handle the problem. This is a key part of Abbott's concept of jurisdiction:

> But to perform skilled acts and justify them cognitively is not yet to hold jurisdiction. In claiming jurisdiction, a profession asks society to recognize its cognitive structure through exclusive rights; jurisdiction has not only a culture, but also a social structure. These claimed rights may include absolute monopoly of practices and of public payments, rights of self-discipline and of unconstrained employment, control of professional training, of recruitment, and of licensing, to mention only a few. . . . The claims also depend on the profession's own desires; not all professions aim for domination of practice in all their juristictions.[7]

This simple example indicates that the competition can become quite complex because definitions of the work itself, the jurisdiction, and who or what actually forms the profession itself are in flux. In addition, professions may arrive at compromises and share jurisdiction, as occurs between psychiatrists and psychologists.

Although Abbott does not delve at any length into the military as a profession, his work provides a catalyst for further exploration of the military profession. Although he sometimes treats the military in toto as a profession, he does imply at points that each service is an individual profession. Abbott opens the possibility of acknowledging that the equipment, training, and doctrine differ greatly from service to service, which results in different perspectives on war and how to wage it. Each service has its own sense of corporateness, with uniforms, traditions, promotions, education systems, bases, and so forth. Although there is a joint DOD umbrella over all the services, it does make sense to use Abbott's work on competition between professions to explore differences between the services. After all, they are in competition for funding, recruits, status, and perspectives on how best to defend the nation. The Services have specific competencies or missions, which are essentially jurisdictions that they try to monopolize. Consequently, the model herein treats the Air Force officer corps as a profession in its own right.

Abbott uses "the very loose definition that professions are exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases."[8] The term *abstract knowledge* mirrors Huntington's concept of professional knowledge. The skill required of a professional is more than a simple physical ability or a routinized process. It involves thinking and applying the professional knowledge to new situations. A surgeon requires some hand-eye coordination, but what makes medicine a profession is the ability to use medical knowledge and skills in reaching a diagnosis and treating the patient and modifying the diagnosis or treatment if needed. As the use of computer-assisted lasers and robotics increases, the doctor's knowledge and skill are still recognized as what merits professional status. Therefore, in Huntington's terms, Abbott includes *corporateness* and *expertise* in his definition, but he completely excludes ideas of social responsibility. He ignores responsibility because by making the work his emphasis, occupations such as the auto mechanic and the medical doctor turn out to be quite similar at a certain level of abstraction in terms of diagnosing, inferring, and treating a problem.

Most people would reject the comparison's implication that mechanics are a profession with the same status as medical doctors. They would quickly run through a structure similar to Huntington's and point out that mechanics lack a broad-based education, have a minimal sense of corporateness, and no social responsibility. The counters are that a doctor's broad-based education does not contribute to most diagnoses and that the medical corporateness has been used to create the illusion of social responsibility in the doctor's case. The doctor has professional status partly because traditional professions are associated with higher socioeconomic levels of society. As Abbott and many others who study professions point out, there is a darker version of profession. That is, it can be argued that, first, professions actually define social needs that match their services; second, the leadership of a professional organization can dominate the membership instead of relying on a collegial organizational style; and, third, professions essentially create economic monopolies over specific services that tend to be beyond state or market controls.

Abbott points out that the concept of professions can become twisted in the workplace. If a professional is incompetent, or there is too much professional work in an organization, the organizational imperative may require a nonprofessional to pick up the slack. Workplace assimilation occurs when nonprofessionals pick up an abridged version of the profession's knowledge system through on-the-job experience or training. The military offers numerous examples, especially with the overlap of senior noncommissioned officers and junior officers. In fact, the case can be made that noncommissioned officers are part of the profession.

Finally, Abbott points out that professions often set high barriers to entry, requiring extensive education and exams, for example. This tends to keep the profession small in terms of members but higher in terms of quality standards. In addition, it keeps the profession monopolistic. However, such a profession runs into problems when demand for its work cannot be met; it may then lose its jurisdiction. In such a profession, however, the only ways to increase output are to lower the entry standards or let subordinate professions grow to take up the slack. However, Abbott cautions that this has only been successful in the medical arena. Elsewhere, the profession does not adapt or cannot quickly modify its requirements, so other professions or formerly subordinate professions jump into the void and win jurisdiction.[9]

The Army Air Corps' heavy reliance on the Aviation Cadet Program is arguably a successful case of lowering entry standards to increase output, and the Air Force's eventual independence from the Army could be portrayed as a case of a subordinate profession growing to take up the slack. In addition, the historically increasing percentages of non-pilot Air Force officers and general officers can be portrayed as the changing of Air Force officer corps entry standards in order to meet increased demand for its professional work.

In the end, Abbott's concept unveils jurisdictional struggles between professions and is a useful addition to the model. The completed descriptive model is shown in figure 3. The large arrow indicates the struggle between the Air Force officer corps and outside groups for jurisdiction in areas in which the officer corps believes it has or wants to have expertise or jurisdiction. In areas that the officer corps believes it has expertise but no jurisdiction, it is seeking jurisdiction or attempting to create public awareness that a new jurisdiction has been created that it should fill. If the officer corps already has jurisdiction in an area, it must defend that claim against competitors. For simplicity, the diagram does not show the outside groups, but they would be represented as other spheres in a three-dimensional space. As soap bubbles, as the professions compete, the personnel and missions at the peripheries may become entwined, and the dominant profession may totally absorb the other. Conversely, as was the case with the Air Force officer corps, a bubble might develop within an existing profession's bubble, and then pop off, forming its own bubble. It is also possible for the bubbles to remain intact and share a jurisdiction or for a new profession's bubble to seemingly pop out of nowhere—that is, to come from a nonprofession, with personnel and expertise to fill a new jurisdiction.



Figure 3. Completed descriptive model, incorporating Abbott

Why Does It Matter?

The Air Force's officer corps, like each of the service officer corps, considers itself a special breed within the military profession. In the Air Force case, the culture is that of Airmen and airpower, which is believed to be beyond the capacities of mere earthbound mortals to understand or to participate in. This dichotomy is not based in a sense of bureaucratic politics but on a conviction that the Air Force officer corps' visionary sense of its particular expertise is the best way to win wars and defend the nation. The Air Force officer corps has had difficulty articulating this point of view because it is trapped to an extent in the conception that the military profession is a single, static, multi-service entity. This model eliminates that problem and yields interesting perspectives.

On a broader scale, this model of profession explains the transformation of the Air Force officer corps, its expertise, and potentially its jurisdiction. As new technologies emerged and world events unfolded, the Air Force's missions and officer corps began to change. The concept of airpower began to shift from an airplane-centric view as it absorbed tertiary supporting areas. New technologies for aircraft and weapons meant fewer aircraft were needed to accomplish more tasks. Aircraft and weapons technology also began to shift the locus of decision making out of the cockpit. As quality began to substitute for quantity, it became more important to have centralized control over these fewer aircraft. In addition, targeting and planning required more intelligence support. Furthermore, the growth of command and control systems led to the need to counter enemy command and control.

Matters such as the use of space for communications, navigation, and the reconnaissance, electronic warfare, information, and cyber warfare, that were initially developed to manage, lead, assist, or protect aircraft performing airpower missions, began to eclipse aircraft in importance. The term *airpower* was contorted in all sorts of ways and no longer fits. The Air Force officer is still very much about flying and airpower, but that s no longer its primary focus. Over time, it has developed command and control (C2); communications systems; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in order to support and manage the organization's application of violence, while simultaneously opening the door to further visionary forms of warfare, such as cyber and information warfare and effects-based operations. Communications systems, C2, ISR, and visionary forms of warfare were born out of airpower but break out of the currently medium-defined box of jurisdictions and go beyond airpower and incorporate space, the electronic ether, counter–command and control, and cyber and information warfare—hence the Air Force's incorporation of cyberspace in its mission statement in December 2005.

Transformation in technology also led to a transformation of the officer corps. As technology reduced the required workforce and shifted the locus of decision-making authority to higher, more centralized levels, it became clear that the old way of doing business was fast coming to a close and that new career paths would be needed for the new decision makers. Consequently, the Air Force has instituted a new officer career development plan. However, pilots remain overrepresented in the general officer ranks because of past structural factors that stem largely from strategies that the officer corps employed in its struggle to establish itself as a new profession, independent of the Army officer corps. In fact, this has masked the dramatic changes in the Air Force officer corps' expertise, composition, and jurisdiction. In the meantime, the Air Force officer corps reassures society that the profession is continuing to meet its obligation to defend the Nation with airpower, while simultaneously seeking a grant of monopolistic jurisdiction over C2, communications systems, ISR, and visionary forms of warfare, as in cyberspace. Communications systems, C2, and ISR are important because they form the backbone of all Air Force operations today—nothing can be done without them—and visionary forms of warfare are important because they may replace manned flying operations tomorrow.

Notes

1. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1985), 7.
2. Ibid., 21.
3. Ibid., 164.
4. Ibid., 161.
5. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1971), 228.
6. Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 3.
7. Ibid., 59.
8. Ibid., 8.
9. Ibid., 84.

The Professional Soldier and the Warrior Spirit

Lt Col Donald R. Baucom

The balance among the three archetypes of the professional soldier in the United States—the heroic leader, the manager- and the technologist—has shifted relentlessly to the latter two. The shift has been prodded with the advent of the all-volunteer force. It is the consequence as well of a progressive civilianization of the US defense establishment—manifest both in the replacement of military men with civilians and the displacement of military men from their traditional roles. Finally, it reflects an enthrallment with technology that seems to be aiming at the complete mechanization of warfare. If we are to have the military establishment needed to fend against an ever more dangerous global environment, we must urgently rediscover the focus of the military professional and find ways to restore the warrior-leader to the position of honor traditionally accorded him.

According to Morris Janowitz, the officer corps is composed of heroic leaders, military managers, and military technologists. The heroic leader represents the warrior tradition of military service; he is the embodiment of the "martial spirit and the theme of personal valor." While the heroic leader generally sees military service as a way of life, this is not the case with the military manager, who tends to be concerned mainly with the practical, concrete aspects of warfare, such as how to mobilize a nation's resources for war. The military technologist's outlook is very similar to that of the military manager. Indeed, he is neither a practicing scientist nor a practicing engineer, but rather "a military manager, with a fund of technical knowledge and a quality for dramatizing the need for technological progress." Examples of each type of officer in the US tradition are Curtis LeMay, the heroic leader; George Marshall, the military manager; and Hyman Rickover, the military technologist.[1]

A Shifting Balance in the Military

The story of the American military profession during the first half of this century has been one of struggle between the military managers and the heroic leaders for control of the military establishment.[2] But in the nuclear age, the rising importance of technology and the changing role of the military transmute the military establishment into a "constabulary force," in which the struggle between manager and leader tends to be resolved by a fusion of the two types into a single, hybrid role model.[3]

To be successful, Janowitz maintained, this modern military establishment must be controlled by military managers, but its top leadership must include a "leaven of heroic leaders" whose primary responsibility is to keep alive the fighter spirit that must permeate military organizations. This warrior spirit, in the words of Janowitz, "is not easily defined; it is based on a psychological motive, which drives a man to seek success in combat, regardless of his personal safety."[4]

The dominant military managers share responsibility with the heroic leaders for sustaining the fighting spirit. The military managers, Janowitz wrote, must ensure that the military profession projects a martial image and must help the heroic leaders instill the warrior spirit in the next generation of young officers. As the most influential members of the military profession, the military manager also must see to it that the proper balance is maintained among military managers, military technologists, and heroic leaders, for an effective military establishment requires the dedicated services of all three types of officers.[5]

Janowitz, obviously, is dealing here with clear, black-and-white distinctions that are rarely found in the real world. Yet, his analysis has value, for before we can reasonably discuss the shades of gray that comprise the middle ground, we must define the ends of the spectrum with which we are dealing. Once defined, the extremes become vantage points from which to evaluate current trends affecting the American military profession.

Viewing the US military profession today from the perspectives offered by the Janowitzan model of the officer corps, we can conclude that it seems to be losing the essential balance among the three types of officers that must be maintained under the overall guidance of the dominant military manager. The balance is being disrupted by several factors that are eroding the respect traditionally accorded the heroic leader within the military profession; with his decline comes a deterioration of the warrior spirit he embodies. These factors are the all-volunteer force, a civilianization of American military institutions and activities, an overemphasis on management, and an enthrallment by technology.

The Impact of the All-Volunteer Force

In keeping with the tradition of American civil-military relations, the all-volunteer force (AVF) isolates Americans from the standing military establishment they have distrusted since seventeenth-century English immigrants to the colonies brought with them a fear of Oliver Cromwell's New Model Army. Under the AVF concept, no one is forced to serve in the military: marketplace incentives are used to attract enough volunteers to sustain the military at the prescribed strength. While the AVF has isolated American society from the mili-

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tary, it has exposed many of the military's essential institutions to the eroding influences of our commerce-oriented, individualistic society.

To draw sufficient numbers of recruits to the AVF, the military adopted an advertising campaign that portrays the military as an attractive way of life. Advertisements that scarcely hint of the hardships of military life stress good times, adventure, travel, job training, job experience, pay, and fringe benefits. As one TV commentator noted during an evening network news program: "The Army does what everyone who has something to sell does. It advertises, and it's difficult to tell whether it's maneuver time or Miller time."[6]

The AVF recruiting campaign leads young people entering the military to expect conditions that correspond to civilian life. Recruits consider themselves party to a contract binding the military to give them the jobs, the training and the civilian-like lifestyle they believe they were promised by recruiters and advertisements.[7] All too often, military life does not live up to their expectations. Two things result: a high percentage of enlistees do not complete their first enlistment, and military establishments are forced to change in an effort to meet recruit expectations.

In their effort to keep recruits content, the armed forces have civilianized much of military life. The Army abandoned the early morning rite of reveille and began selling beer in mess halls and living quarters. Soldiers and airmen who still live on military bases seldom reside in open-bay barracks, and frequently in motel-like quarters with two or three people per room. A substantial portion of the new enlisted force is married and resides off base. These latter changes tend to undermine the camaraderie that is an important bonding element among combat-ready soldiers.[8]

In addition to undermining the concept of military service as a way of life focused on preparation for war, the AVF brings with it social problems that drain the energies of officers. Associated with the increased reliance on women under the AVF concept is the necessity for officers to deal with such matters as sexual harassment, pregnancy, joint spouse assignments, and women assigned to jobs for which they may have insufficient physical attributes. Furthermore, there are the inescapable social problems associated with male recruits who come all too often from the lower socioeconomic strata of American society and tend to be poorly educated, have low mental qualifications, and are at times alienated from the society they are expected to defend.

Having been forced to recruit like a business and therefore attracting people motivated by marketplace incentives, the military naturally drifts toward the management practices used by private industry. For example, flex time, job enrichment, participatory decision-making processes, and coworker standards are some of the management concepts that enjoy at least some degree of support or use within the US Air Force.[9]

Hints that these problems and practices are detracting from the effective functioning of military organizations can be found here and there in our professional literature.[10] In a "can do" organization, such as the military that stresses getting the job done regardless of obstacles, hints are likely to be the proverbial tip of the iceberg. How serious must a situation be for a commander of a ship to declare his vessel unfit for sea duty?

In the all-volunteer force environment, then, officers must devote more time and effort to coping with the AVF, and less time to the study of their profession and to the preparation of their units for war.[11]

An officer who views his tasks primarily in terms of management and the motivation of industrial workers is not likely to be as frustrated by an atmosphere in which self-satisfaction as opposed to service is stressed, for modern management theory focuses on people who are motivated primarily by personal gain. But what of the heroic leader? Will he not feel alienated, perhaps betrayed, in an environment where service, sacrifice, and a sense of duty are no longer emphasized? Will he not see efforts to cope with the AVF, and the AVF itself, as obstacles that hinder his efforts to make his unit combat ready?[12]

Civilianization of the Defense Establishment

Having discussed the trend toward civilianization of the military way of life under the influence of the AVF, we now turn to a second form of civilianization in which civilians replace or displace military personnel.

Today, the US Defense Department employs about one civilian for every two military personnel in the regular armed forces.[13] This widespread use of civilians turns the Department of Defense (DOD) into an organization that attempts to achieve its purposes using two distinct groups of people with widely divergent value systems.

Generally, DOD civilians are governed by marketplace considerations. They are paid by the hour and must be paid overtime for work beyond the eight-hour day or forty-hour week. Many civilians are unionized, which means that at least some of their work conditions are defined in union contracts monitored by union stewards. On the other hand, military personnel are supposed to be governed by the military ethic, which places service to their organization above personal gain. There are no limits on the duty hours of service members, and they are paid a flat salary, regardless of the hours they work. There are no military unions.

Unusual situations develop when these two groups are cast together in the same organization. At times a civilian and a uniformed service member will be working side-by-side, doing the same task but receiving different pay. Overtime tasks frequently must fall to the military member, since funding ceilings often preclude paying the extra money for civilian overtime. There is also the interesting situation in which civilians, who have more relaxed standards for dress and appearance, are responsible for enforcing military standards on uniformed personnel who work for them.

Under conditions such as these, it is difficult to preserve a concept of military service as a way of life based on a sense of duty and a spirit of personal sacrifice for the good of the mission. Military personnel are in constant contact with civilians who work "eight-to-five" days with no disruption to their weekends. What do military men feel when they have to work on weekends? What thoughts pass through the minds of voting soldiers and airmen who are subject to relatively strict military discipline when they note that civilians can have a union steward present when they are "counseled" for substandard performance? Do enlisted men accept the idea that compensatory time is a fair exchange for overtime work that civilian coworkers do not have to perform? How does one who considers himself a combat leader feel in an organization that is one-third civilian? How does he keep such a situation from eroding the military ethic that is central to his concept of military service?

While some civilians are physically taking the place of military men, others have been displacing military men in strategy-making and in the defense decision-making process.

Invasion of Academics and Systems Analysis

This civilianization trend is largely the consequence of changes set in motion by World War II. Prior to 1945, military affairs were of little interest to civilian scholars and intellectuals. However, the advent of nuclear weapons to warfare and America's status as the only nation capable of opposing the expansionist drive of the Soviet Union, both hallmarks of the post-World War II era, inspired unprecedented interest in national security affairs in the civilian academic community. "Social scientists, economists, natural scientists, and mathematicians all began to apply their special expertise to the relevant dimensions of national security."[14]

Civilians moving into the area of strategy-making met little resistance from professional military men. Most senior officers in the postwar period were heirs of a tradition that discourages men in uniform from taking an active part in the politics of formulating national policy; they thus tended to shy away from strategy-making and to concentrate on the execution of policies handed down from civilian superiors.[15]

While academicians were beginning to monopolize the development of strategy—all the more so via the postwar proliferation of "think tanks" vying for government funds—systems analysts were winning important, if not dominant, roles in the DOD decision-making process. Systems analysis got its start in military affairs during World War II and steadily increased in importance, becoming a basic decision-making tool during the McNamara years, when the number of systems analysts employed at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level increased fifteenfold.[16]

In the decision-making process, systems analysis can be used as an alternative to experience, which makes it especially valuable in such realms as nuclear war and the development of radically new technologies where experience may be lacking. To be sure, systems analysis is useful also as a complementary tool of analysis in matters such as conventional warfare, where experience is available and is largely the possession of the heroic leader.

Certainly combat experience and systems analysis are not mutually exclusive factors in the decision-making process. Yet, as has been posited by retired Lt Gen Daniel Graham, USA—himself a veteran of the high-level decision-making process—systems analysis, combined with management training, has become a primary path to the top for officers. General Graham has remarked that the key to promotion for senior officers is the ability to "shepherd a weapons program through the Defense bureaucracy, get it into the budget, and defend it before the Bureau of Budget and the Congress. Such ability, he wrote, "involves considerable skill in applying cost-effectiveness and systems analysis techniques."[17]

The overall impact of these two forms of civilianization—the replacement of military men with civilians and the displacement of military men from their traditional roles in strategy formulation and defense decision making—has been to undermine the authority and standing of the heroic leader. His judgment based upon combat experience is subject to challenge by systems analysts. His warrior ethos is eroded by constant interaction with civilians who permeate the defense establishment. The warrior ethos is being supplanted by the ethos of management.

Leadership and Management: Differences in Values

Is leadership distinct from management? Members of the military profession have been arguing this issue, in one form or another, for years. The title of a 1975 article by Gen Lucius D. Clay tells us that "Management Is Not Command."[18] On the other hand, a 1979 Air Force publication informs us that efforts to distinguish among management, leadership, and command are "usually a waste of time": management is a generic term that also subsumes command and leadership.[19] Yet, the journal, *Military Review* considered the matter of leadership sufficiently important to devote its entire July 1980 edition to the subject, and in the lead article Gen Edward C. Meyer, then Army chief of staff, stated: "Leadership and management are neither synonymous nor interchangeable."[20]

What is the basic issue here that could provoke such divergent views? Could it be that the military managers who run our armed forces have failed to maintain the vital martial image of the military and the crucial balance among military technologists, heroic leaders, and military managers? Could it be that those who see themselves as heroic leaders are responding to a perceived overextension of the influence of management?

It seems clear that there has been a substantial increase in the emphasis on management in the armed forces since World War II. The McNamara years stand like a watershed in this respect. During the period from 1961 to 1969, military and business structures became almost identical, especially at the upper organizational levels. In the case of the Army, one book states that it "moved ever closer to the modern business corporation in concept, tone, language, and style."[21]

The siren voices of management have resounded in the Air Force as well. The traditional inspection by the Inspector General has now become a "Management Evaluation Inspection." Terms such as *battle management, battle manager, levels of management, resource management, weapons inventory, weapons systems, and management by objective* proliferate throughout the Air Force. Such management functions as budgeting and productivity improvement are pushed down to the lowest operational level—the traditional domain of the heroic leader—where they compete for the commander's time and energy, often at the cost of essential and time-honored command functions.

Quite frequently, when these matters are discussed, those who would distinguish between management and leadership are told that the issue is merely one of semantics, that there is no substantive difference between the terms. What this conveys is that the various schools of management have co-opted into their language paradigm the terms traditionally used to describe command and leadership, making it linguistically impossible to distinguish between leadership and management. Thus, a good manager is defined as being also a good leader, and a good leader is required to be a good manager.

In fact, the linguistics difficulties may be the key to the underlying issue that fuels the debate. Words not only denote things and processes; they also carry connotations to which we all respond in one way or another. Furthermore, our words are indications of thought patterns that affect the way we perceive situations and the way we act in response to these situations. As psychologist Julian Janes has written: "Let no one think these are just word changes. Word changes are concept changes, and concept changes are behavioral changes."[22]

Let us explore for one moment the different connotations of the two major words in the debate: lead and manage. To lead has clear connotations of influencing behavior by example, by being out front, by going before: to "lead the way, to go in advance of others . . . to be at the head of, command, direct." It is the old idea of the officer who is out in front of his men, literally in the case of the bomb group commander leading his group in its first attack on the enemy's home industrial base. In exercising leadership, the commander must at times compel his followers to undertake actions that may not be in their own best interest.

On the other hand, there are aspects of management that have clear connotations of manipulation, administration, and supervision. The manager convinces people that they should do what the manager desires because it is in their best interest: the desired behavior may lead to rewards such as advancement, increased pay, higher status, and so forth.[23] The difference is validated by the mental images derived from these connotations: while one can easily visualize a person managing a large organization from some remote central point, it is more difficult to picture that person leading this group from a remote location, for leadership implies proximity and visibility to those being led.

Surely, then, some distinction is at work between the general concepts of management and leadership. The two are both value-laden and have the power to evoke different emotions, different spirits. As the words of the various management schools and concepts come to permeate the military milieu and replace the more traditional terms associated with leadership and command, the temper of the military profession changes. The heroic leader like Patton looks at a difficult situation fraught with unknowns, such as the invasion of North Africa, and says: "Wars are only won by risking the impossible.[24] The military manager examines his Lanchestrian equations, determines that the odds are strongly against him, and does not take the risk.

Unfortunately, the transition in the outlook of the US military profession seems well advanced—a fact which substantially explains the increasing criticism heaped upon the profession. Steven Canby's words are typical: "The study of war has all but atrophied in the United States. The best minds in the US military have become managerial and technical experts; but they have not studied their own professional discipline."[25]

Another indication of this shift in the balance between military managers and heroic leaders is a significant trend in the military awards and decorations policy. When this writer was commissioned in 1962, medals for heroism dominated the medals worn by our nation's military men. Six awards recognized battlefield heroism and combat service. There were only four decorations for meritorious service or achievement. While no new award has been added in recognition of combat feats, six new medals for outstanding achievements or service are now available to military personnel. There are now ten medals that one can earn for peacetime managerial-type accomplishments.

Unquestionably, our leaders were pursuing a worthy goal when they sought to provide more recognition for important peacetime achievements. Unfortunately, these new decorations have the unforeseen and undesirable effect of lowering the visibility and distinction of the heroic leader. If present trends continue, at some time in the future we may find that our most decorated military men never have seen combat.

Technology and the Heroic Leader

A major factor in the ascent of the military manager has been the steady increase in the importance of technology in warfare. Generally, it is the military manager who keeps the military abreast of technological changes. He tends to be less tradition-bound than the heroic leader and therefore more receptive to innovation.[26]

America is a technologically oriented society. We have a long tradition of substituting machines for people in our production efforts. Moreover, our nation is deeply imbued with Western humanism, which emphasizes the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human life. The increasing importance of technology in wars of the twentieth century, and the relatively low American casualty rates of World War I and World War II, could scarcely escape our notice.

In keeping with our national character, the general belief has taken root that machines should be substituted wherever possible for people on the battlefield, ensuring us of victory with minimum loss of human life. We tend to lose sight of the well-trained men of courage who must operate the machines in the hectic environment of battle.[27]

Although we still vaguely remember that generalship is the key to getting men and machines to the right place at the right time, we seem bent on replacing generals with computer programs and data banks. Thus, the real thrust of computerized command and control developments seems to be the complete mechanization of warfare. Men are to be reduced largely to drones that convey the instructions of one machine, the computer, to another set of drones operating other machines that fight the battles. Fighting men and their heroic leaders become largely superfluous in this approach to war.

The impact of this view of war obviously is to raise the stature of military technologists and military managers who are responsible for developing, procuring, and sustaining the wonder weapons of war. The importance of warriors and heroic leaders, as we have noted, is diminished.[28] "Operating a console in an air-conditioned electronic listening post becomes equivalent to facing a T72 tank with a handheld missile."[29]

There is a second and even more beguiling way in which modern technology has tended to undermine the heroic leader's status in today's military establishment. The advent of nuclear weapons has made it appear to many that war is outmoded and that military establishments exist only to deter war. As Bernard Brodie wrote some three decades ago: "Thus far, the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose."[30]

This "deterrence mentality" has led to a schism in the officer corps. A substantial number of officers, perhaps even a majority, believe that "peace is our profession"—that the military does exist only to deter war. This attitude contrasts sharply with the view of the heroic leader who continues to maintain that the military profession focuses on combat: in peace the soldier prepares for war, and in war he marches toward the sound of the guns.[31]

While deterrence mentality calls into question the heroic leader's central place in our profession's social structure, the importance of the technology upon which deterrence is based raises the status and authority of the military technologist and the military manager. Nuclear deterrence is directly related to a given weapons complex, the so-called Triad of land-based, airborne and sea-based nuclear systems. Obviously, for those who see deterrence as the primary mission of the military, the scientists, technicians, and managers who ensure the continuing readiness of the deterrence force overshadow in importance the heroic leader who spends his time preparing his unit for what will be required should deterrence fail. When peace is your profession, those who would prepare for war appear outmoded and perhaps even dangerous.[32]

Protecting an Endangered Species

As a consequence of the post-World War II developments that we have discussed, the balance among military managers, military technologists, and heroic leaders has been badly shaken. As these developments erode the status of the heroic leader and his warrior spirit, the function of the officer comes increasingly to be viewed in terms of management and technical activities.[33]

Sensing that it is losing its vocation which has traditionally centered on the heroic leader who is the master of the art and science of war, the military profession has sought to preserve its martial image by proclaiming the existence of the "fusion role model" predicted by Janowitz. As the Air Force personnel plan for 1975 put it: "The military professional is typically viewed in three roles—as a leader, manager, and technologist—in optimal balance, providing for the well-being of our nation's defense posture."[34]

But the fusion role model is not working. Its elements evoke behavioral patterns that are too disparate to be mastered effectively by the vast majority of officers. It is not the fusion role model but the realities of military service in the 1980s that are shaping the attitudes and actions of today's generation of young officers.

Only about 15 percent of all members of the Department of Defense are engaged in uniquely military functions today.[35] What advantage is there in belonging to such a minority when there are clear indications that success comes to the technical specialist and the manager who can effectively handle top-level staff responsibilities?[36] Already within the Air Force there are indications that support functions have more prestige among junior officers than line functions.[37] And a "senior Pentagon aide" has proclaimed publicly: "The era is over of flamboyant combat heroes rising to the top of the military. The military is no longer going to win the budget game through image and authority. The brass are going to win it by knowing their stuff and knowing how to present it."[38] It appears that the heroic leader is becoming an endangered species.

Given that the balance among military managers, military technologists and heroic leaders is vital to an effective military establishment, and recognizing that the balance has been undermined by post-World War II developments in the US military profession, what actions might we consider to correct current trends?

Recruiting Pressures of the All-Volunteer Force

The nation seems unlikely to return to a draft in the near future. Therefore, we must find ways to reduce recruiting pressures that undermine our ability to focus on war-fighting attitudes and skills. Could these pressures be eliminated by establishing a civilian organization similar to the Selective Service System and charging it with the responsibility for recruiting? Such an organization would return local involvement to the process of procuring defense personnel and would take the armed services out of an activity marked by scandals and litigation that have tarnished the military's image in the post-Vietnam era, a delicate time in American civil-military relations.

Socialization of the Officer Corps

Can we do more to socialize the young men and women whom we bring into the officer corps? Are the curricula of our service academies appropriate, or have they become so inclusive of various academic disciplines that they have lost their focus on the profession of arms? Are cadets and midshipmen now more concerned with majoring in a marketable academic discipline than with preparing themselves for a lifetime of service in the profession of arms?[39] Is Officer Training School long enough and does it include enough indoctrination into the customs, courtesies, and traditions of the military profession? Do we demand enough of our ROTC training programs? Are senior officers devoting enough of their energies to "bringing along" the next generation of officers?

Language of the Profession

Should we not be more careful about the way in which we talk and think about the military profession? Why should we abandon perfectly good traditional terms like Inspector General Inspection just because replacement terms sound more modern and up-to-date? The use of military phrases and words like Gen Bennie L. Davis's "officership"[40] could end the military's dependence on management terminology to describe the officer's duties and activities.

At least one effect of the wide use of management language has been a breakdown of the distinction between the military profession and civilian occupations. Using traditional military terms in describing military functions should help restore a sense of the military as a unique and special profession. Tradition can be overdone, but properly used it provides continuity with a rich past and a guide in an uncertain future.

The Prestige of Combat Decorations

Can we find some way to restore the prestige of combat decorations? Would it be possible to withdraw the more recently established defense awards for meritorious service and achievement and replace them with decorations like the Distinguished Service Medal and the Legion of Merit? Could we separate the combat-related decorations and their peacetime counterparts on uniforms, for example, over the left and right breastpocket, respectively? Failing this, could we perhaps increase the precedence of awards for combat service so that the top four awards for valor (Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, and Distinguished Flying Cross) would outrank all noncombat awards except perhaps the Distinguished Service Medal?

A New Approach to Civilianization

In an effort to restore and nurture a sense of uniqueness and service in uniformed members of the defense establishment, can we find some organizational pattern that separates DOD civilians and the military? One scheme that might be considered is a gradual civilianization of organizations that contain fewer military personnel than civilians. Conversely, in those organizations where the uniformed service members are in the majority, civilians would be replaced gradually by military personnel as the former retire and transfer. This process would have the effect of making civilian supervisors responsible for function accomplishment through a civilian work force and leave officers and NCOs with responsibility for purely military units. It would reduce friction between the military way and the civilian way, each of which is valid and appropriate within its own context.[41]

Revival of the Line and Staff Categories

Can we find a way to revitalize the traditional distinction between line and staff officers? Perhaps we could include in the line-officer category all aircrew members and those who serve in the combat branches and are likely to be involved in combat or close combat support. Staff officers would be the remaining officers, with the exception of chaplains, veterinarians, physicians, dentists, and legal personnel, who would comprise a special third category.

Once the line and staff distinction is redrawn, various measures would be used to make service in the line more attractive and prestigious. Among the measures that might be considered are providing distinctive accoutrements for uniforms, granting special survivor benefits for line officers who die in the line of duty, and awarding one and one-half years promotion list service time for each year in a line position after the first five years of line service. Furthermore, only those who had served the first 20 years of commissioned service in the line would be eligible for 20-year retirement. Finally, a selection process might be devised that would limit the number of staff officers permitted to transfer into line service. The idea of all of this is to make the line something of an elite corps; it would be difficult to enter and easy to leave.[42]

There are hopeful signs on the horizon. Here are two such signs: For some time now, efforts have been underway to reform the curricula of the professional military education schools at Maxwell Air Force Base. More emphasis is being placed on the art and science of war, especially at the Air War College. This effort is making headway and is receiving considerable support from the top Air Force leadership. In the US Army, there continues to be a spirited dialogue over the importance of heroic leaders and the things the Army should do to nurture them.

But the hour is late, and Mars is a cruel and impatient master. If we are to have the military establishment that we need to cope with an ever more treacherous global environment, we must rediscover the focus of the military profession and restore the heroic leader to the position of honor we have traditionally accorded him.

Notes

1. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1971), 21, 35, 164.
2. Ibid., 21. A similar picture of the American military profession in the nineteenth century is presented in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Random House, 1957). See specifically 193, 195, 200–203, 211–21, 226–37, 255–56.
3. Janowitz, op. cit., 72, 161, 426.
4. Ibid., 32.
5. Ibid., 21, 33–36, 168, 224–25.
6. Morely Safer, CBS Evening News, 20 March 1981.
7. J. L. Reed, *The Beard Study. An Analysis and Evaluation of the United States Army* in US Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Status of the All-Volunteer Armed Force, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed Services,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, 135–36. For a view of the contractual nature of the new Air Force recruit's relations with the military, see Anthony Lynn Batezel. "Getting What Your Recruiter Promised," *Air Force Magazine,* June 1978, 76–78.
8. James Fallows, "The Civilianization of the Army," *The Atlantic Monthly,* April 1981, 98. For information on other changes in the Army, see William L. Hauser, *America's Army in Crisis: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 133–39.
9. Information on these concepts can be found in "Co-worker Standards: Some New Findings—LMDC," *TIG Brief* 4, 1981, 4; Ed Gates, "USAF's Growing Grievance System," *Air Force Magazine,* January 1979, 50–59; Denis D. Umstot and William E. Rosenbach, "From Theory to Action: Implementing Job Enrichment in the Air Force," *Air University Review,* March–April

1980, 75; and Laurie A. Broeding, "Industrial Democracy and the Future Management of the United States Armed Forces." *Air University Review,* September–October 1977, 42–52.

10. Gates, op. cit., 59; Zeb B. Bradford and Frederic J. Brown, "Implications of the Modern Battlefield," *Military Review,* July 1977, 8; and Fielding Arty (nom de plume), "It's Just Not Fun Anymore," *Army,* April 1981, 13, 16.

11. The Marines are our most combat-oriented service, yet Bill Lind tells us in his recent book on maneuver warfare that Marine battalions at Camp Pendleton spend only about 30 days a year in the field. William S. Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 46.

12. For two pieces that illustrate this contrast in attitude, see Arty, op. cit., and Gerald Raubach, "Engineers' Exodus," *Air Force Magazine,* July 1978, 9.

13. Lawrence J. Korb, "Civilians in Defense the Resource and the Challenge," *Defense Management Journal,* Third Quarter, 1983, 5.

14. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, The Wars of the United States,* ed. Louis Morton (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), 405–6.

15. David MacIssac, "Military Education in the United States," work in progress. See also Bernard Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," *International Security,* Spring 1978, 67, where we read: "Virtually all the basic ideas and philosophies about nuclear weapons and their use have been generated by civilians working quite independently of the military."

16. Ralph Sanders, *The Politics of Defense Analysis* (New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., Inc., l973), 7–8.

17. Daniel Graham, "The Decline of US Strategic Thought," *Air Force Magazine,* August 1977, 27–28; For a similar view, see James Fallows, "America's High-Tech Weaponry," *The Atlantic Monthly,* May 1981, 31. For a discussion of the conflict between experience and systems analysis, see Sanders, op. cit., 15, 157–59.

18. "Management Is Not Command," *Air Force Magazine,* September 1975, 63.

19. US Air Force Air War College, *Managing the Air Force: A Reference Text for Department of Executive Management Studies,* 1979–1980 edition, viii. It is interesting to note that this line of thinking has been softened somewhat in the 1980–1981 (second) edition, which notes that leadership is so important to the Air Force that it is treated in a separate book, *Officership.* See page ix of the second edition. In a welcome step Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 35-49, *Air Force Leadership,* 1 September 1985, clearly distinguishes between leadership and management.

20. "Leadership: A Return to Basics," *Military Review,* July 1980, 6.

21. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 19–22.

22. *The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bi-Camerall Mind* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), 292.

23. Janowitz, op. cit., 8, comments on the rise of persuasive management as opposed to traditional, authoritarian leadership.

24. Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers: 1940–1945,* vol. II, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974), 84.

25. "General Purpose Forces," *International Security Review,* Fall 1980, 319. For similar views, see Jeffrey Record, "Is Our Military Incompetent?" *Newsweek,* 22 December 1980, 9; and Edward N. Luttwak, "The Decline of American Military Leadership," *Parameters* X, no. 4, 82–88. See also Richard A. Gabriel, *Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985).

26. Janowitz, op. cit., chapter 2. See especially 22.

27. S. L. A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1947), 23. Here Marshall noted that already in 1947 Americans were forgetting the importance of the men who operated the weapons of World War II. For a fuller development of the argument being presented here, see Donald R. Baucom, "Technological War: Reality and the American Myth" in *Air University Review,* September/October 1981, 56–66.

28. This is the thrust of the comments of General Graham which I presented above. To this point also are the observations of James Fallows, op. cit., 31, that the services are becoming procurement oriented: the path to the key positions of authority in the military is through procurement management. That support functions are beginning to have higher prestige than line functions in the Air Force is indicated by Frank R. Wood, "Air Force Junior Officers: Changing Prestige and Civilianization," *Armed Forces and Society* VI, no. 3 (Spring 1980): 483–506.

29. Lee Olson, "Air Force Goal: Motivate People," *Denver Post,* 1 July 1977, 20, quotes an Air Force general as stating that his technicians are "on the front line and they fight back as hard as they can."

30. Bernard Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," in *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order,* ed. Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1946), 76.

31. Here I ascribe to Janowitz's heroic leader an attitude Huntington assigns to the line officer. See Huntington, op. cit., 254–56.

32. Fred Reed, "Military Minds," *Signal,* January 1980, 69. Reed criticized what he referred to as the military mind, considering Patton and LeMay as examples of this mythological mind-set. He said: "The Pattons and LeMays are occasionally useful, always dangerous, and a good case for civilian control of the military." Edward N. Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 198, tells us that officers with a strong interest in military arts are considered eccentric.

33. Reed, op. cit., remarks: "Especially in the Air Force and Navy, officers tend to be engineers." Information of master's degrees in the Air Force as of March 1980 reveals that Air Force officers are far more likely to be managers than engineers. At the time, the Air Force was showing 12,492 master's degrees in administrative management and military science and only 3,410 master's degrees in engineering. For a discussion of officer as military manager, see "The Price of Power," *Time,* 29 October 1979, 29. See also Morton Kondracke, "Defense without Mirrors," *The New Republic,* 24 January 1981, 12.

34. USAF Personnel Plan, 5 September 1975, vol. 1, 1-1.

35. Charles C. Moskos Jr., "The All-Volunteer Force," *Wilson Quarterly,* Spring 1979, 137.

36. Luttwak, "Decline of American Military Leadership," op. cit., 85–86.

37. See note 28.

38. "Price of Power," op. cit., 29.

39. For some comments on change at US service academies, see Cathy Downes, "Educating for the Profession of the Arms: USMA West Point and RMA Sandhurst," *RUSI Journal,* 4 December 1981, 33–39, and John P. Lovell, *Neither Athens Nor Sparta? The American Service Academies in Transition* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979).

40. "Officership: A Profound Commitment," *Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders,* January 1981, 24–29.

41. For similar suggestions pertaining to the Army, see Hauser, op. cit., chapter 12.

42. Ibid.

Generalship

Barbara W. Tuchman

On 3 April 1972, Mrs Barbara W. Tuchman spoke at the US Army War College as part of the evening lecture program. In her remarks she made some very astute observations on the qualities and characteristics required of high military leaders. She extended her remarks by explaining her views on the role and influence of the military in our society. Her thoughtful observations served to broaden the horizons of all who heard her by exposing them to a clearly expressed point of view which varies from that held by many military officers.

My subject tonight was suggested by your commandant with no accompanying explanation: just the word "Generalship," unadorned. No doubt he could safely assume that the subject in itself would automatically interest this audience in the same way that motherhood would interest an audience of pregnant ladies. I do not know whether General Davis thought the subject would be appropriate for me because I am the biographer of a general who vividly illustrated certain qualities of generalship, both in their presence and their absence, or whether he had something of larger scope in mind.

In any event, as I considered the subject I became intrigued for several reasons: because it is important, because it is elusive, and because it is undergoing, I think, as a result of developments of the past 25 years, a radical transformation which may make irrelevant much of what we now know about it. I will come to that aspect later.

I should begin by saying that I have no greater qualification in this matter than if you had asked Tennyson to lecture on generalship because he wrote "The Charge of the Light Brigade." I did not write the biography of Stilwell in his capacity as soldier, but rather in his capacity as a focal figure and extraordinarily apt representative of the American relation to China. I did not write *The Guns of August* as a study of how war plans go wrong—at least I did not know I was doing that until it was all over. I am not primarily a military historian, and to the degree that I am one at all, it is more or less by accident. However, since life is only fun when you attempt something a little beyond your reach, I will proceed with the assignment.

The Importance of Generalship

In Colonel Heinl's *Dictionary of Military Quotations,* the subject headings "Generals" and "Generalship" together take up more space than any other entry. If the closely related headings "Command" and "Leadership" are added, the subject as a whole takes up twice as many pages as any other. Why is it so important? The answer is, I suppose, because the qualities that enter into the exercise of generalship in action have the power, in a very condensed period of time, to determine the life or death of thousands, and sometimes the fate of nations. The general's qualities become, then, of absorbing interest not only to the military but to citizens at large, and it is obviously vital to the state to determine what the qualities are, to locate them in the candidates for generalship, and to ensure that the possessors and the positions meet.

I have also seen it said that senior command in battle is the only total human activity because it requires equal exercise of the physical, intellectual, and moral faculties at the same time. I tried to take this dictum apart (being by nature, or perhaps by profession, given to challenging all generalizations) and to think of rivals for the claim, but in fact no others will do. Generalship in combat does uniquely possess that distinction.

Qualities Generalship Requires

The qualities it requires divide themselves into two categories as I see it: those of character, that is, personal leadership, and those of professional capacity. When it comes to command in the field, the first category is probably more important than the second, although it is useless, of course, if separated from the second, and vice versa. The most brilliant master of tactics cannot win a battle if, like General Boulanger, he has the soul of a subaltern. Neither can the most magnetic and dashing soldier carry the day if, like General Custer, he is a nincompoop in deployment.

Courage, according to the Marchale de Saxe, is the first of all qualities. "Without it," he says undeniably, "the others are of little value since they cannot be used." I think courage is too simple a word. The concept must include both physical and moral courage, for there are some people who have the former without the latter, and that is not enough for generalship. Indeed, physical courage must also be joined by intelligence, for as a Chinese proverb puts it, "A general who is courageous and stupid is a calamity." Physical, combined with moral, courage makes the possessor resolute, and I would take issue with de Saxe and say that the primary quality is resolution. That is what enables a man to prevail—over circumstances, over subordinates, over allies, and eventually over the enemy. It is the determination to win through, whether in the worst circumstance merely to survive or in a

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limited situation to complete the mission, but whatever the circumstance, to prevail. It is this will to prevail, I think, that is the sine qua non of military action. If a man has it, he will also have, or he will summon from somewhere, the courage to support it. But he could be brave as a lion and still fail if he lacks the necessary will.

Will was what Stilwell had, the absolute, unbreakable, unbendable determination to fulfill the mission no matter what the obstacles, the antagonists, or the frustrations. When the road that he fought to cut through Burma at last reached China, after his recall, a message from his successor recognized that the first convoy to make the overland passage—though Stilwell wasn't there to see it—was the product of "your indomitable will."

Sensible men will say that will must be schooled by judgment lest it lead to greater investment of effort or greater sacrifice than the object is worth, or to the blind persistence in an objective whose very difficulties suggest it was a mistake from the start. That is true enough: good judgment is certainly one among the essentials of generalship, perhaps the most essential, according to the naval historian Raymond O'Connor. He quotes C. P. Snow's definition of judgment as "the ability to think of many matters at once, in their interdependence, their related importance, and their consequences." Judgment may not always be that rational, but more intuitive, based on a feel of the situation combined with experience.

Sometimes judgment will counsel boldness, as when Admiral Nimitz, against the advice of every admiral and general in his command, insisted on assaulting Kwajalein, site of the Japanese headquarters at the very heart of the Marshall archipelago, although this meant leaving the enemy-held outer islands on the American line of communications. In the event, American planes were able to keep the outer islands pounded down while Kwajalein proved relatively undefended because the Japanese, thinking along the same lines as Nimitz's subordinates, had convinced themselves the Americans would not attempt to assault it.

More often than not, however, judgment counsels "Cannot" while will says "Can." In extremity the great results are gained when will overrides judgment. Will alone carried Washington through the winter of Valley Forge, that nadir of misery and neglect, and only his extraordinary will kept the freezing, half-starved, shoeless army, unpaid and unprovisioned by the Continental Congress, from deserting. Judgment would have said, "Go home." I suppose it was will that dragged Hannibal over the Alps although judgment might have asked what would happen after he gained his goal, just as judgment might have advised Stilwell that his mission—the mobilizing of an effective Chinese army under the regime of Chiang Kai-shek—was unachievable. Hannibal too failed in his objective: he never took Rome, but he has been called the greatest soldier of all time.

Sometimes the situation calls for will that simply says, "I will not be beaten"—and here too, in extremity, it must override judgment. After the awful debacle of four battles lost one after the other on the French frontiers in August 1914, and with the French Army streaming back in chaotic retreat and the enemy invading, judgment might have raised the question whether France was not beaten. That never occurred to the commander in chief, General Joffre, who possessed in unsurpassed degree a quality of great importance for generals—he was unflappable. Steadiness of temperament in a general is an asset at any time and the crown of steadiness is the calm that can be maintained amid disaster. It may be that Joffre's immunity to panic was lack of imagination, or he may have suffered all the time from what Stilwell called "that sinking feeling," and concealed it. We do not know because he kept no diary. Whatever the source of his imperturbability, France was fortunate to have it in the right man at the right time. Certainly it was Gallieni who saw and seized the opportunity to retrieve disaster, and Foch and Franchet d'Espery who supplied the élan to carry it through, but it was Joffre's ponderous, pink-cheeked, immovable assurance that held the army in being. Without him there might have been no army to make a stand at the Marne.

High on the list of a general's essentials is what I call the "Do this" factor. It is taken from the statement which Shakespeare put in the mouth of Mark Anthony: "When Caesar says, 'Do this,' it is performed." This quality of command rests not only on the general's knowledge of tactics and terrain and resources and enemy deployment in a specific situation, but on the degree of faith that his subordinates have in his knowledge. "When Stilwell told you what to do in Burma," said an officer, "you had confidence that was the right thing to do. That is what a soldier wants to know." If officers and men believe a general knows what he is talking about and that what he orders is the right thing to do in the circumstances, they will do it, because most people are relieved to find a superior on whose judgment they can rest. That indeed is the difference between most people and generals.

I come now to the second category; that is, professional ability. This encompasses the capacity to decide the objective, to plan, to organize, to direct, to draw on experience, and to deploy all the knowledge and techniques in which the professional has been trained. For me to go further into this aspect and enter on a discussion of the professional principles of generalship does not, I think, make much sense; first, because if you do not know more about them than I do, you oughtn't to be here, and second, because it seems to me very difficult to select absolutes. The principles depend to a great extent on time, place, and history, and the nature of the belligerents. I will only say that the bridge that joins the two categories—that connects personal leadership to professional ability—is intelligence, which is the quality de Saxe put second on his list after courage.

The kind of intelligence varies, I suppose, according to occupation: in a doctor it must be sympathetic; in a lawyer it is invariably pessimistic; in a historian it should be accurate, investigative, and synthesizing. In a military man, according to de Saxe's fine phrase, it should be "strong and fertile in devices." I like that; it is a requirement which you can tell has been drawn from a soldier's experience. It closely fits, I think, the most nearly perfect, or at any rate the least-snafued, professional performance of our time—that of the Israelis in the Six-Day War of 1967.

In that microcosm, caught for us within the visible limits of six days, the qualities of resolution and nerve, the "Do this" factor, the deployment of expert skills, and a governing intelligence "strong and fertile in devices," all meshed and functioned together like the oiled parts of an engine. I need not go into the circumstances that made this happen, of which the chief one perhaps was that no retreat or defeat was possible—either would have meant annihilation in that sliver of a country the size of the state of Massachusetts. The Israelis' concept of generalship, however, does contain principles that can apply beyond their borders. To anticipate is one. "To be a general is to lead," as the commander of the Jerusalem district put it to me, "and to lead one must be ahead, ahead, too, of what occurs." A general, he said, must be skeptical, critical, flexible, and finally obstinate—obstinate in the execution of his mission.

This quality, which I have already mentioned in connection with Stilwell, seemed to be the requirement which the Israelis most emphasized in an officer. Youth in generals was another. There are no active Israeli generals over the age of 46, and the General Staff is on an average probably the youngest in the world. This is deliberate policy reflecting the military leaders' tense consciousness that on them may depend at any moment their nation's actual existence, in a sense not true of a country like ours which is spread over a continent and walled by two oceans. In Israel they cannot afford to maintain generalship at less than a peak of alertness, never satisfied, constantly improving.

The principle I found stressed above all others, although more on the planning level than in the field, was knowledge of the enemy—of his capabilities, his training, his psychology—as complete and precise as prolonged study, familiarity, and every means of intelligence-gathering could make it. In this realm the Israelis have the advantage of knowing in advance the identity of the enemy: he lives next door. Yet it seems to me that Americans could learn from this lesson.

If we paid more attention to the nature, motivation, and capabilities, especially in Asia, of the opponent whom we undertake so confidently to smash—not to mention of the allies whom we support—we would not have made such a mess, such an *unexpected* mess, in Vietnam. We would not have found ourselves, to our confusion and dismay, investing more and more unavailing effort against a continually baffling capacity for resistance, and not only resistance but initiative. In the arrogance of our size, wealth, and superior technology, we tend to overlook the need to examine what may be different sources of strength in others. If in 1917 Edith Cavell could say, "Patriotism is not enough," we now need another voice of wisdom to tell us, "Technology is not enough." War is not one big engineering project. There are *people* on the other side—with strengths and will that we never bothered to measure. As a result of that omission we have been drawn into a greater, and certainly more ruinous, belligerent action than we intended. To fight without understanding the opponent ultimately serves neither the repute of the military nor the repute of the nation.

Generalship in Terms of the Present

Having brought myself down to the present with a rush, I would like to examine generalship from here on in terms of the present. I know that military subjects are generally studied and taught by examples from the past, and I could go on with an agreeable talk about the qualities of the Great Captains with suitable maxims from Napoléon, and references to General Grant, and anecdotes about how King George, when told that General Wolfe was mad, replied, "I wish he would bite some other of my generals"—all of which you already know. Besides, it might well be an exercise in the obsolete, for with the change in war that has occurred since midtwentieth century, there must necessarily follow a change in generalship.

The concept of total war that came in with our century—the Terrible Twentieth, Churchill called it—has already, I think, had its day. It has been backed off the stage by the advent of the total weapon, nuclear explosion, with its uncritical capacity for overkill. Since, regardless of the first strike, there is enough nuclear power around to be mutually devastating to both sides, it becomes the weapon that can't be used, thus creating a new situation. If war, as we have all been taught, is the pursuit of policy by means of force, we are now faced by the fact that there can be no policy or political object which can be secured with benefit by opening a nuclear war that wrecks all parties. Consequently limited wars with limited objectives must henceforth be the only resort when policy requires support by military means. Upon investigation I find that this was perceived by some alert minds almost as soon as it happened; by former Ambassador George Kennan for one, who wrote in 1954, when everyone else was bemused by the Bomb, that nuclear weapons had not enlarged the scope of war but exactly the opposite, that "the day of total wars has passed, and that from now on limited military operations are the only ones that could conceivably serve any coherent purpose."

The significance of this development for the military man is profound. It means that he will be used more for political or ideological ends than he was in the past, at least in the American past. The effect is bound to be disturbing because, as the British general, Sir John Winthrop Hackett, recently said in a talk to our Air Force Academy, "Limited wars for political ends are far more likely to be productive of moral strains . . . than the great wars of the past." The United States, it is hardly necessary to remark, is already suffering from the truth of that principle.

The change has been taking place over the past 20 years, while we lived through it without really noticing—at least I as a civilian didn't notice. One needs to step outside a phenomenon in order to see its shape and one needs perspective to be able to look back and say, "*There* was the turning point." As you can now see, Korea was our first political war. The train of events since then indicates that the role of the military is coming to be, as exhibited by the Russians in Egypt and ourselves in Southeast Asia, one of intervention in underdeveloped countries on a so-called advisory or assistance level with the object of molding the affairs of the client country to suit the adviser's purpose. The role has already developed its task force and training program in the Military Assistance

Officers Program at Fort Bragg. According to its formulation, the task is to "assist foreign countries with internal security problems"—a nice euphemism for counterinsurgency—"and perform functions having sociopolitical impact on military operations."

In short, the mission of the military in this sociopolitical era is counterrevolution, otherwise the thwarting of communism, or if euphemism is preferred, nation-building, Vietnamizing, or perhaps Pakistanizing or Africanizing some willing or unwilling client. This is quite a change from defense of the continental United States, which the founders intended should be our only military function.

Implications of Change

What does the change imply for generalship? "Has the Army seen the last of its great combat leaders of senior rank?" I quote that question from the recent book *Military Men* by Ward Just, correspondent of *The Washington Post.* Will there still be scope for those qualities of personal leadership that once made the difference? In the past it was the man who counted: Clive who conquered India with 1,100 men; Cortez who took Mexico with fewer; Charles Martel who turned back the Moslems at Tours; Nelson who turned back Napoléon at Trafalgar (and incidentally evaluated one source of his prowess when he said, "If there were more Lady Hamiltons there would be more Nelsons." Though that might be thought to please the Women's Lib people who are down on me already, I am afraid it won't, because from their point of view it's the wrong kind of influence. Anyway, that factor too may vanish, for I doubt if love or amorous triumph will play much role in inspiring generals to greater feats on the advisory or Vietnamizing level).

Above all, among the men of character who as individuals made a historic difference, there was Washington. When, on his white horse he plunged into the midst of panicked men and with the "terrific eloquence of unprintable scorn" stopped the retreat from Monmouth, he evoked from Lafayette the tribute, "Never have I seen so superb a man."

Is he needed in the new army of today whose most desired postgraduate course, after this one, it has been said, is a term at the Harvard Business School? To fill today's needs the general must be part diplomat, part personnel manager, part weapons analyst, part sales and purchasing agent. Already Gen Creighton Abrams has been described by a reporter as *two* generals: one a "hell-for-leather, jut-jawed battlefield commander and the other a subtle and infinitely patient diplomat." For his successors the second role is likely soon to outweigh the first.

Out of that total human activity—physical, intellectual, and moral—how much will be left for the general to do? Given chemical detectors and people-sniffers, defoliators and biological weapons, infrared radar, and electronic communication by satellite, not to mention, as once conceived by Mr McNamara, an invisible electric fence to keep out the enemy, the scope for decision making in the field must inevitably be reduced. Artillery and even infantry fire, I understand, will be targeted by computers, extending from pocket-sized models in the soldier's pack all the way to the console at headquarters. This is supposed to raise the dazzling prospect of eliminating human evil by teaching the machine. The realization of either of those prospects, I can guarantee you as a historian, has about the same degree of probability as the return of the dinosaur.

The change that could be the most momentous would be a change in the relation of the military to the state. This is sensitive territory with potential for trouble, and I am entering here into an area of speculation which you may find refutable, and certainly arguable.

Traditionally the American Army has been, and consciously has considered itself, the neutral instrument of state policy. It exists to carry out the orders of the government. In order to do so without hesitation or question, the officer corps has maintained, on the whole, a habit of nonpartisanship, at least skin deep, whatever individual ideological passions may rumble beneath the surface. When it is ordered into action, the Army does not ask "Why?" or "What for?" In the past that has been a fundamental presumption. But can it last when the military find themselves being sent to fight for purposes so speculative or so blurred that they cannot support a legal state of war? You may say that it is a matter of semantics, but semantics make a good test. As a writer I can tell you that trouble in writing clearly invariably reflects troubled thinking, usually an incomplete grasp of the facts or of their meaning.

One wonders what proportion of officers in Southeast Asia today get through a tour of duty without asking themselves "Why?" or "What for?" As they make their sociopolitical rounds in the future, will that number uncomfortably grow? That is why the defunct principle that a nation should go to war only in self-defense or for vital and immediate national interest was a sound one. The nation that abides by it will have a better case with its own citizens and certainly with history. No one could misunderstand Pearl Harbor or have difficulty explaining or defining the need for a response. War which spends lives is too serious a business to do without definition. It *requires* definition—and declaration. No citizen, I believe, whether military or civilian, should be required to stake his life for what some uncertain men in Washington think is a good idea in gamesmanship or deterrence or containment or whatever is the governing idea of the moment.

If the military is to be used for political ends, can it continue to be the innocent automaton? Will the time come when this position is abandoned, and the Army or members of it will question and judge the purpose of what they are called upon to do? Not that they will necessarily be out of sympathy with government policy. Generally speaking, American policy since the onset of the cold war has been the containment of communism with which, one may presume, the Army agrees. What about Russia vis-á-vis Pakistan where we skirted the consequences of folly by a hair? What about the Middle East? Suppose we decide that unless we rescue Syria from Russian influence, Iraq will fall? Or suppose we transpose that principle to South America? You can play dominoes on any continent. What happens if we blunder again into a war on the wrong side of history?

That is not the military's fault, the military will reply. It is a civilian decision. The military arm remains under civilian control. Did not Truman fire MacArthur?

It is true that in America the military has never seriously challenged civilian rule, but in late years it hardly needs to. With a third of the national budget absorbed by military spending, with the cost of producing nuclear and other modern weapons having evidently no limits, with 22,000 defense contractors and 100,000 subcontractors operating in the United States, with defense plants or installations located in 363 out of 435 congressional districts, the interlocking of military-industrial interests grips the economy and pervades every agency of government.

The new budget of $83.4 billion for defense represents five times the amount allotted to education and nearly 40 times the amount for control of pollution (our government having failed to notice that pollution by now is a graver threat to us than the Russians). It costs an annual average of about $10,000 to maintain each man in uniform compared to a national expenditure of $1,172.86 for each person in the United States; in other words, the man in uniform absorbs 10 times as much. The Pentagon, where lies the pulse of all this energy and activity, spends annually $140,000,000 on public relations *alone*, nearly twice as much as the entire budget of the National Endowment for Arts and Humanities. When military-connected interests penetrate government to that extent, the government becomes more or less the prisoner of the Pentagon.

In this situation, the location of ultimate responsibility for policy-making is no longer clearly discernible. What *is* clear is that while the military exerts that much influence in government, it cannot at the same time retain the stance of innocence.

It used to be that any difficulty of assignment could be taken care of under the sheltering umbrella of Duty, Honor, Country. As long as you had a *casus belli* like the *Maine* or the Alamo you could get through any dubious expedition without agony. The West Point formula may no longer suffice. Country is clear enough, but what is Duty in a wrong war? What is Honor when fighting is reduced to "wasting" the living space—not to mention the lives—of a people that never did us any harm? The simple West Point answer is that Duty and Honor consist in carrying out the orders of the government. That is what the Nazis said in their defense, and we tried them for war crimes nevertheless. We undercut our own claim at Nuremberg and Tokyo.

When fighting reaches the classic formula recently voiced by a soldier in the act of setting fire to a hamlet in Vietnam, "We must destroy it in order to save it," one must go further than duty and honor and ask, "Where is common sense?" I am aware that common sense does not figure in the West Point motto; nevertheless, soldiers are no less subject to Descartes' law, "I think, therefore I am," than other mortals. Thinking will keep breaking in. That is the penalty of abandoning the purity of self-defense as *casus belli.* When a soldier starts thinking, according to the good soldier Schweik, "he is no longer a soldier but a lousy civilian." I do not know if it will come to that, but it serves to bring in the civilian point of view.

Does civilian society really want the Army to start thinking for itself? Does this not raise all sorts of dread potentials for right-wing coups or left-wing mutinies? While the military normally tends to the right, there *have* been other cases: Cromwell's New Model Army overturned the King; the naval mutiny at Kronstadt and desertions from the front brought on the Russian Revolution. Already we have a dangerously undisciplined enlisted force in Vietnam, which admittedly does not come so much from thinking as from general disgust. While this development is not political, from what one can tell, it is certainly not healthy.

Final Problem

A final problem is the question of the military's cherished separateness from civilian society. America has never encouraged the evolution of a military caste, yet a certain sense of a special calling has developed, as it is bound to do among men who have chosen a profession involving risk of life. That choice sets them apart, gives them a sense of mission, unites them in a feeling of belonging to a special band. They *want* to feel separate, I believe; they want the distinction that compensates to some extent for the risk of the profession, just as the glitter and pomp and brilliant uniforms and social prestige compensated the armies of Europe. Yet if the military man must now begin to ask himself the same questions and face the same moral decisions as the civilian, can his separateness long endure?

Conclusion

I know that I have wandered far from my assignment, but I raise these questions because it seems to me that generalship will have to cope with them from now on. The trouble with this talk, as I imagine will now have become visible, is that I have none of the answers. That will take another breed of thinker. I can only say that it has always been a challenge to be a general; his role, like that of the citizen, is growing no easier.

The Leadership-Integrity Link

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman

The supreme quality for a leader is unquestionably integrity.

—Dwight D. Eisenhower

As I met with the Air Force community in the first months of my tenure as chief of staff, I was struck by how many times issues related to leadership and integrity popped up. Without a doubt, the Air Force, from the flight line to the Pentagon, is led by some of the most capable, committed, and caring individuals that I have ever seen. Of the many challenges they face each day, the challenge I consider the most critical to mission success is setting the standard for integrity within their organizations.

Few will dispute that we have experienced significant change over the past several years. We won the Cold War; we've downsized and reorganized the Air Force; and we are engaged in an unprecedented number of operations worldwide. Our society has also changed and not always for the better. But one thing will never change: men and women of the Air Force must have impeccable integrity. This is especially true of Air Force leaders to whom the men and women of the Air Force look for guidance. Integrity and leadership are inextricably linked. Without integrity, leadership theories are just that—theories. Integrity is the cement that binds organizations together, the cornerstone of mission accomplishment.

Tracing the Leadership-Integrity Link

A friend of mine named Bill Cohen once wrote, "Leadership is the art of influencing others to their maximum performance to accomplish any task, objective, or project."[1] This compelling definition applies to leaders of all types of organizations, including Air Force units. While Bill described leadership as an art, my own experience has shown me it is an art that can be learned. I have also found that the main difference between units that perform at their maximum potential and those that fail is usually their leadership. Of course, it is rare that you find a unit that has all good or all bad leaders and followers. Just like organizations in other professions, there is usually a mix of talent. But the point I want to stress is that a *single individual* in a position of leadership can make the difference between a unit's success or failure.

Leadership is about motivating people to perform and accomplish the unit's mission. Working towards this common goal builds unit cohesion, trust, and a sense of self-esteem. A good leader fosters these qualities. But a failure of integrity poisons the outfit, destroys trust between people, and breaks down unit cohesion. While leadership qualities are diverse, integrity is simply a yes-or-no question. You either have it or you don't. For that reason, leaders must always display the highest standards of integrity.

Characteristics of Integrity

In my experience, I have found that leaders with integrity are sincere and consistent, have substance and character, and are good finishers.

Sincerity

Sincerity is behavior that is unfeigned and presents no false appearance. Leaders with integrity are sincere—their actions match their words. There is an anecdote about Gen Wilbur Creech that illustrates this point. When he was commander of the Tactical Air Command in the early 1980s, General Creech made it a habit to get out and meet his people where they worked and lived. On one trip, General Creech was inspecting a supply warehouse when he noticed a sergeant sitting in a chair patched with electrical tape and propped up by a brick.

When asked why he didn't get a better chair, the sergeant explained there were no new ones available for supply sergeants. General Creech said he would take care of the problem. Following the inspection, General Creech instructed his aide to fly back to Langley [Air Force Base, Virginia] with the old chair and give it to the general in charge of logistics. General Creech told the general that the broken chair was his until he resolved his supply problem, and he sent the general's chair to the supply sergeant.[2] General Creech made a habit of matching his words and actions. That's what made him a person of integrity and a great leader. The more a leader's behavior matches his or her words, the more loyal people will become, both to the leader *and* the organization.

Consistency

A single example of integrity makes an impression, but a leader's behavior must be consistent if he or she is to successfully shape an organization. In fact, integrity is an imperative since a single breach of integrity can leave a permanent scar. Leaders must also be consistent in their enforcement of disciplinary standards. A commander who uses discriminators

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such as rank or friendship to determine a response to a breach of discipline has a serious integrity problem. Nothing destroys morale quite as effectively as "throwing the book" at a junior officer for a serious infraction while allowing a senior officer to retire in lieu of punishment for similar behavior. Leaders must practice what they preach and apply standards even-handedly. It is essential for discipline, for morale, and for mission accomplishment.

Substance

To be a leader, you must have more than the *image* of integrity—you must also have substance. President Abraham Lincoln once told a story about a farmer who had a tall, majestic-looking tree growing next to his house. One morning he saw a squirrel run up the side of the tree and disappear into a hole. Curious, the farmer looked into the hole and discovered that the tree he had always admired for its apparent grandeur was hollow inside and in danger of falling on his home during a strong storm.[3] Like that tree, leaders who have the appearance of substance but lack internal integrity won't have the strength to make it through the tough times. In the military, commanders with a veneer of integrity cannot build organizations capable of withstanding the unique challenges of military life, much less the trials of combat.

Being a Good Finisher

Finally, leaders show their integrity by performing all tasks to the maximum extent of their ability, despite the relative importance of the task or who gets the credit. Air Force Space Command chaplain Ben Perez uses the analogy of a team that continues to play their hearts out in a game they are obviously losing to illustrate the determination professionals with integrity will consistently display. Perhaps no organization exhibited greater devotion to duty than the 17th Pursuit Squadron in the Philippines at the start of World War II. Despite heavy Japanese air attacks, pilots took off daily on solo armed reconnaissance missions and occasionally even attacked enemy shipping. Although their missions were nearly suicidal, the men of the 17th flew combat sorties until Bataan fell in May 1942. The 17th Pursuit Squadron was a team led by men with the integrity to stay the course long past the hoopla and glory. That's the kind of devotion to duty, the kind of integrity that all Air Force leaders should strive to build.

Building Integrity

I believe you build a lifestyle of integrity one step at a time. Individual acts of integrity lead to a habit of integrity, and individual habits add up to a way of life. Simplistic? Perhaps so, but I've never found a more effective way of developing personal integrity than by applying it to everything you do, every day of your life—no matter how small or seemingly inconsequential the matter at hand. And since organizations tend to take on the personality of their leadership, building integrity must start at the top. Dishonest acts are like cancers that eat at the moral fiber of organizations, especially if the acts are explicitly or implicitly condoned by leaders.

Breaches of integrity can occur for a number of reasons, such as the fear of failure, embarrassment, arrogance, or just plain laziness. Good leaders admit mistakes and take responsibility for their actions. Perhaps one of the most famous examples of this is Gen Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. When it became clear after Pickett's charge that his army had suffered a disastrous defeat, Lee openly told his men, "All this has been my fault. It is I who have lost the fight. . . ."[4] On hearing this, Lee's men shouted it was they who had failed Lee and pleaded that he allow them to attack the enemy again. When leaders show that they have the character and integrity to admit they are wrong, amazing things tend to happen—people will trust them and will follow them anywhere.

The Challenge

Of the many challenges Air Force leaders face today, building integrity is the most important. Admittedly, this is not an easy task, especially in today's permissive society. But we are committed to building a quality Air Force, and this requires quality leadership. *Without integrity, leadership cannot flourish and our mission will suffer.* The Air Force standard is to exhibit integrity in everything we do. It should permeate our lifestyle. Anything less is unacceptable to the people you lead, the Air Force, and the American people.

Notes

1. William A. Cohen, *The Art of the Leader* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1990), 3.
2. Tom Peters and Nancy Austin, *A Passion for Excellence* (New York: Random House, 1985), 48.
3. Donald T. Phillips, *Lincoln on Leadership* (New York: Warner Books, 1992), 55–56.
4. Burke Davis, *Gray Fox*: *Robert E. Lee and the Civil War* (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 1988), 245–46.

Courageous Leadership

CMSAF Gerald R. Murray

Military service, perhaps more than any other profession, necessitates bold and courageous leadership. Few other professions require an immediate pledge of one's life for the greater cause. Unlike most organizations in the corporate world, we don't hire people for our leadership positions—we develop them from within. We take young men and women right out of high school or college and provide them with the right training, education and experience, and cultivate them into military leaders. In peacetime or war, the developed and diversified capabilities, talents, and inspiration of those serving in leadership positions ultimately contribute to our overall success as America's Airmen.

The mission of our expeditionary Air Force demands a cadre of experienced, and fully committed leaders at all levels—tactical, operational, and strategic. For our enlisted force this encompasses focused leadership with technical and specialty knowledge. We must have those who can articulate the technical aspect of a particular specialty field, while leading fellow Airmen in performing the vital day-to-day operations of our Air Force mission. Consistently, military leaders must transcend their occupations. They must realize that developing effective leaders at all levels is a deliberate and meticulous process. To take technically skilled Airmen and mold them into competent leaders and managers requires targeted professional military education, technical and on-the-job training, robust exposure to diversified assignments, and ongoing mentoring. The result is leadership with the knowledge, skill, and experience to take Airmen from the base to the battlefield.

To begin the process of enlisted force development we recruit young people with enthusiasm, energy, and the capability to develop technological expertise. We are fortunate to have some of our nation's best and brightest volunteering to be Airmen. Their initial focus must be on meeting the requirements of a military profession. This means not only achieving technical proficiency, but also learning how to be highly productive members of our Air Force. They must be good followers, as this is the primary tenet of being a good leader. As Airmen continue to prepare for increased responsibilities, we owe each of them every opportunity to grow as a person and as a military leader.

The next developmental stage establishes the "backbone" of our force—the noncommissioned officers (NCO). These are our front-line supervisors who ensure their team members work together as a cohesive unit to accomplish the mission. We depend on NCOs to mold our Airmen and give them the necessary tools and training. The NCOs' face-to-face leadership, direct training, clear instruction, and setting the right example ensure the strength of our force is in tact. It's vital that NCOs understand the strengths and weaknesses of each person under their charge to fully develop the individual. Focused leadership at the NCO level, coupled with the right discipline and care for our Airmen, is critical.

The final stage of leadership is developed throughout the senior noncommissioned officer (SNCO) ranks. SNCOs have been fine tuned by their experiences, guidance, and nurturing they received throughout their careers. They've performed Air Force missions thousands of times, making the technical aspect of their position second nature. Now we expect them to focus their abilities towards nurturing NCOs and Airmen, while continuing to grow in knowledge and leadership capability. The SNCOs' ultimate responsibility is to accomplish the organization's mission through the skillful use of valuable resources. They leverage personnel, equipment, and processes to get the job done. We must also not overlook the responsibility our SNCOs share in mentoring young officers, helping them grow into future senior leaders. Together they chart a course for an even greater Air Force.

As we look ahead, we know we can't truly accomplish our professional development objectives with constrained and old ways of thinking. A constantly changing environment requires us to be attuned to fresh ideas and to accept new ways of doing routine tasks. One of the greatest strengths in our Air Force and Airmen is the ability to adapt to new missions, new technologies, and an ever-changing world landscape. The leadership challenge is to remove obstacles that hinder them from being the most efficient and effective force possible. It is the leader's responsibility to ensure each task or process is performed in the most streamlined manner. Exceptional leaders never settle for just "getting by" or "status quo." The environment we are in today requires us to look at duties and responsibilities in a new way, with a different focus. We need each and every one of our people operating at their maximum effectiveness to meet and exceed the demands placed on our force today and tomorrow.

We have been at war for more than 15 years. With our joint and coalition partners, Operation Iraqi Freedom proved once again that our Air Force can deliver airpower quickly and decisively whenever and wherever our president directs. The experiences gained in combat environments cannot be duplicated in the classroom. We must adjust our training and curriculum to capitalize on our lessons learned to provide the most realistic scenarios possible. Today's battles are fought and won by a great joint team; tomorrow's

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battles will leverage our interdependence even more. Our professional development must include more joint education, training, and experience allowing us to be ready to fight alongside our Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard counterparts. We need to improve our integration and knowledge of our allies and coalition forces. From a leadership perspective we must ensure our Airmen never deploy without being absolutely qualified for the mission. Their knowledge of those they fight, and more importantly those they fight with, is critical to our success.

In addition to training, educating, and directing Airmen, leaders must also be their strongest advocates. The importance of leadership involvement in our Airmen's lives cannot be overstated. The leaders I respected most throughout my career were those who knew my name instead of, "Hey Airman." Those who took the time to know my wife and children, where we were from, my hobbies, and certainly my goals, made an even bigger impression. They took a vested interest in me by communicating and demonstrating I was a valued member of the team. The best leaders find creative ways to bring everyone together, on the job and off. We are a family among ourselves in the Air Force and each member plays a vital role.

As a final thought, always remember the leadership basics—nothing replaces consistent face-to-face interaction with our fellow Airmen. They depend on us to give them the knowledge, direction, and motivation needed to win America's wars. We must lead by example and set the bar high; our Airmen will follow and even exceed our expectations. Winning wars requires us to always be at peak performance. We must take our role as leaders as seriously as we take our current fight in the global war on terror. America depends on our fortitude. Let us never forget the ideals our nation stands for, or those who sacrificed their lives in the name of freedom. As a tribute to those who served and led us to where we are today, we owe our nation and Airmen nothing short of phenomenal leadership.

The Pillars of Generalship

Maj John M. Vermillion

A review of the spate of literature on the operational level of war published within the past two or three years suggests that the Army (at least those officers writing on the subject) is finally agreeing on how the term should be defined. Working definitions of the concept generally argue that the operational level of war encompasses the movement, support, and sequential employment of large military forces in the conduct of military campaigns to accomplish goals directed by theater strategy.[1]

Just as the Army has been able to perceive more clearly what warfare at the operational level entails, so also has it observed that the requirements of leadership at that level differ in some important respects from leadership at the tactical level. Indeed, the term *operational art* implies that the commander at this echelon requires special talents. To identify these special requirements should be a matter of high concern not only to those who aspire to command at the operational level, but also to all field-grade officers who might be staff officers at operational-level headquarters.

If it is advisable, then, to learn about the unique demands of leadership at the operational level, where does one look for instruction? The ideal circumstance is to serve with a latter-day Clausewitzian genius personally and directly. Commanders with transcendent intellectual and creative powers are rare, however, so to have a chance to observe a genius personally is nearly impossible. A second way, open to all, is through study of the sequence and tendencies of past events and the key personalities who drove them. The present essay rests mainly on this method. As a matter of plain fact, though, most US Army officers do not read military history with a critical eye. The majority of officers look for a third way.

The Army has tried to provide just such a third way. In Field Manual (FM) 22-999, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, Army leaders have provided guidance for leadership and command at the large-unit level in the context of AirLand Battle as described in FM 100-5, *Operations*. Even the most biting critics must applaud the hard work and serious study that obviously underpin the new manual. Nonetheless, the work suffers badly precisely because of its sheer exhaustiveness. Every significant utterance on leadership seems to have found its way into the manual. It is full of lists, generally in threes. For example, the reader learns that senior leaders teach, train, and coach; that they must possess certain attributes, perspectives, and imperatives; and that they ought to possess three groups of skills—conceptual, competency, and communications. Subdivisions of major headings also commonly occur in threes, as in three types of attributes—standard bearer (read "example"), developer, and integrator.

By the time one finishes wading through endless alliterative lists of traits desirable in the operational-level commander, he has had drawn for him a commander with the piety of Saint Paul, the intellect of Albert Einstein, and the courage of Joan of Arc. In short, FM 22-999 lacks focus and selective sense of what is fundamentally important. To say everything is to say nothing. The purpose of this essay is to draw sharper distinctions between the junior and senior levels of leadership and to offer a considered opinion about what characteristics seem to be most essential to those commanders whom, in AirLand Battle, we associate with the operational level of war.

On the Corporate Nature of Leadership

A false idea, namely that discussions about leadership need take into account the leader only, has spread throughout the Army and slowly influenced at least a generation of soldiers. The word *leadership* implies that a relationship exists between the leader and something else. The "something else," of course, is followers. By followers, however, I am not speaking of the subordinate commanders or the men in ranks. Entire books have been written on how various generals have inspired their troops to success in war. Rather, in the present context, I am speaking of those followers who comprise the general's staff—that immediate circle of assistants who act to translate the commander's operational will into battlefield reality. Little first-class work has been done to appraise the dynamics of leader-staff interaction. It is time to examine the evidence regarding leadership in this sense and then to hold the findings up to the bright light of common sense.

The exercise of generalship today carries with it tremendous difficulties. A division today is expected to cover a frontage comparable to that assigned to a corps in World War II. As the numbers and varieties of machines and weapons have multiplied, so also have logistical requirements. The higher the echelon of command, the more the general has to be responsible for, yet the less direct control he has over subordinate forces. With the advent of night-vision equipment and vehicles with longer ranges of operations, combat operations can proceed unremittingly. Command functions continue into a process that is progressive and continuous. While a commander is exercising military command, he is responsible

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without respite for the effective and vigorous prosecution of the operations that will achieve his objectives and contribute to the execution of the overall mission. Obviously, no single man, unaided, can do this properly. He must have, as we have seen, a close circle of functional assistants.

But such a requirement is by no means new. From the middle of the last century, the tasks of the general in command have been too numerous and too complex for any one man to manage effectively, and the general staff system thus gradually emerged. Helmuth von Moltke saw that the Industrial Revolution had let loose the powers to mobilize, equip, and direct enormous armies, and that this development demanded the creation of a complex and highly professional staff. In fact, "The General Staff was essentially intended to form a collective substitute for genius, which no army can count on producing at need."[2] The Army need not aim so high as to produce geniuses, but [to produce] generals solidly grounded in the fundamentals of the profession. With a wise selection of subordinates, the "average" general can have a successful command. On the other hand, history demonstrates conclusively that some of its most acclaimed generals have failed when stripped of their right-hand men.

Superior generals surround themselves with staff officers who complement them by covering their blind spots. Consider the case of Napoléon Bonaparte, widely acknowledged to be the most esteemed soldier who ever led troops into battle. Some histories depict Marshal Berthier, the emperor's chief of staff, as nothing more than an exalted clerk. Napoléon from time to time spoke publicly about Berthier in such pejorative language, but this probably was a consequence of the emperor's personal insecurity. Napoléon needed a chief of staff who would endure the waspish sting of his burning intellect, and, yes, even occasional humiliation. The fact is, though, that Berthier's responsibilities were heavy, to such a degree that he often worked 20-hour days. He personally controlled the division of labor on Napoléon's staff, all finances, and all appointments. Most important, he supervised the issue of all of Napoléon's orders regarding troop movements, operations, and artillery and engineer employment.[3]

Napoléon was an operational-level planner nonpareil. Nonetheless, he needed someone with Berthier's energy, dedication, and retentive capacity to translate broad instructions into polished orders fit to be delivered to the corps commanders. Berthier had an exceptional talent for drafting clear, concise orders. As David Chandler notes, "Bonaparte owed much of his early success to the administrative talents of Berthier."[4]

Only at the end, in 1815, did Berthier's worth to his emperor become clear. On 1 June 1815, during the Waterloo campaign, Berthier reportedly committed suicide, possibly because of his inability to tolerate any longer the rebukes of his commander. Napoléon thereupon was forced to substitute Soult, an able corps commander. Almost immediately, "Soult was to be responsible for perpetuating several mistakes and misunderstandings in the written orders he issued, and these, taken together, account for a great deal of Napoléon's ultimate difficulties."[5] At Waterloo, Napoléon is said to have cried out, "If only Berthier was here, then my orders would have been carried out."[6]

In analyzing the dynamics of the Napoléon-Berthier relationship, it seems fair to suggest that Berthier was not flashingly quick. He was a man of deeply intelligent judgment rather than of brilliance. He was capable of making Napoléon's desire, if not vision, his own, of knowing how the emperor wanted things to appear, then of being tough and stubborn enough to make them turn out that way. He would dutifully execute every directive concerning an operation, but without adding a single idea of his own, or perhaps without comprehending the subtleties of the emperor's thoughts. Now, ponder how suitably Berthier met Napoléon's requirements. Napoléon was a commander so knowledgeable and so quick to focus his knowledge that even his apparently spontaneous reactions often emerged as intricate and fully developed ideas. That capacity can paralyze a staff. The interesting work of creation was done for them, and tedium does not stir the imagination. It is likely that many minds sharper than Berthier's, not just Soult's, would have failed precisely because the temptation to bring their fertile imaginations to bear would have been irresistible.

During the 1807–1814 reorganization of the Prussian Army, Gen Gerhard von Scharnhorst ordered reforms, many effects of which are still evident today. A regulation issued by Scharnhorst in 1810 was perhaps the most influential. He made the chief of staff a full partner in command decisions. By 1813 all Prussian commanding generals had chiefs of staff with whom they were expected to form effective partnerships. One of the most famous and effective of these teams was that of Gerhard von Blücher and his chief, Count Neithardt von Gneisenau. They were effective because they complemented each other perfectly. Whereas Blücher was a "brave, charismatic, but impatient man," Gneisenau was his polar opposite: cool, methodical, yet courageous and determined.[7] Gordon Craig here elaborates on the inspired collaboration of Blücher and Gneisenau: Blücher, who recognized his own shortcomings and the genius of his chief of staff, relied implicitly on Gneisenau's judgment; and he was not wholly joking when—while receiving an honorary degree at Oxford after the war—he remarked: "If I am to become a doctor, you must at least make Gneisenau an apothecary, for we two belong always together."[8]

In contrast to Napoléon and Berthier, in this case the chief developed the plans and the commander executed them. The Gneisenau-Blücher model of teamwork remains the supreme example of its kind for the German army.

Montgomery, Patton, and Rommel

Soon after World War II, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery was asked to enumerate his requirements for a good general. He listed nine items. The first was "Have a good chief of staff."[9] And so he did, throughout the war. In his own work, *The Path to Leadership,* Montgomery referred to a good chief of staff as a "pearl of very great price."[10]

As did the other generals mentioned thus far, Montgomery chose the men who worked for him. He insisted upon his right to install soldiers of his own choosing in all key positions. Shortly after Dunkirk, Montgomery described his plan to get the 3d Division on its feet. He called together his staff and the senior officers in every unit in the division and announced who was to take command in each case. He personally and unilaterally, without waiting for War Office approval, appointed all commanders down to battalion. In Nigel Hamilton's words, Montgomery's

> essential drive was to get the "right man for the right job". . . . [This was,] together with his unique ability to abstract the essentials of any problem, the touchstone of his genius as a commander. The conduct of battle had borne out how dependent a commander is on his subordinate officers."[11]

Montgomery tried to hold on to the same staff as he progressed in rank through the war; in this endeavor he was reasonably successful. The mainstay of most general staffs, but of Montgomery's in particular, was the chief of staff. The field marshal was fortunate to have had Maj Gen Francis de Guingand serve him in this capacity for the better part of the war. De Guingand's comments about his old boss are intriguing in that they explode the usual public image of Montgomery. According to de Guingand, Montgomery naturally tended to be rash and impetuous, not deliberate and wholly rational. The main business of his chief of staff was not to carry out detailed staff work or to make decisions in the absence of the commander, but to "keep Bernard's two great virtues [will and discipline] in tandem."[12] When the War Office thrust an unwanted chief on Montgomery, the invariable result for the command was mediocrity or failure.

Instructively, the single greatest failure with which Montgomery is associated, the Dieppe raid, occurred during a period of flux in his staff. In March 1942 during his tenure as commander, South-East Army, his chief of staff, Brigadier John Sinclair, was transferred over Montgomery's opposition. The commander then turned to the War Office with a personal request for "Simbo" Simpson to replace Sinclair. London refused him not only in this request, but also in his bid for two other staff officers on whom he had depended heavily in earlier assignments. At this time he was denied the strong steadying influence of a de Guingand, and the predictable outcome was a too-quick acceptance of an ill-conceived plan. It seems highly likely that had de Guingand been present, he would have checked Montgomery's essential rashness: "There was . . . a fatal vacuum at this critical moment; and Bernard, as the one soldier—apart from Brooke—who possessed the undisputed prestige and authority to scrap the project, tragically agreed to undertake the raid."[13]

The qualities and talents necessary to be a good staff officer are far different from those necessary to be a good commander. Gen George Patton's career as well as any underscores this point. In the truest sense, Patton was a "general" officer. He abhorred involvement with details; indeed, few great commanders come to mind who felt otherwise. Patton was temperamentally unsuited to the role of staff officer. In his staff assignments he received poor efficiency reports for his performance.[14] The point is that at the operational level, no matter how brilliant the commander, the most glittering conception will go awry if it is not undergirded by the grinding hard work of his staff, which must churn out empirically correct movement tables, time-distance calculations, and logistical data.

Patton demanded that he be permitted to select his staff. Although this mode of operation did not conform to the methods of the US Army replacement system, Patton, for whatever reason, got away with making these decisions himself. When he arrived in England to assume command of Third Army, he shocked the staff then in place by announcing that he was moving them out to make room for his own men. All those he brought on had served with him in North Africa and Sicily; most had backgrounds in Patton's 2d Armored Division. The man who held Patton's staff together, Brig Gen Hugh Gaffey, has been termed "a staff officer of genius."[15] Gaffey held the post as Patton's chief of staff until the early autumn of 1944, when Patton sent him down to command 4th Armored Division, and eventually a corps. Gaffey's replacement was Brig Gen Hobart Gay, a longtime cavalry associate of Patton. According to historian Hubert Essame, "Both were equally competent in the exercise of their intricate craft, . . . both were in the mind of their master."[16]

As one would expect, Patton had an excellent relationship with the staff, making it a personal policy never to interfere with them on matters of minor detail. Like many outstanding German commanders, but unlike some of his American counterparts, Patton promoted an open and frank dialogue between his staff and himself. They did not hesitate to disagree with him.

What was best for Third Army came first. George Patton did not play hunches. He had the wisdom to rely on his staff for sound advice, and they consistently gave it to him. His assistant chief of staff (intelligence) (G-2), Col Oscar Koch, for example, was felt by many to have the most penetrating mind in the US Army in the intelligence field. Koch always had available for Patton the best, most accurate intelligence estimates to be found at any level of command. Patton's famous 90-degree turn from the Saar bridgehead to the Ardennes has received countless well-deserved accolades in history texts, but seldom are we reminded that at bottom the action was made possible by a dutiful staff officer. It was Koch who persuaded his commander before the fact that planning should commence at once to deal with the situation which would arise if the Germans staged an attack in the Ardennes area.[17] Patton was served equally well by other members of the staff. His primary logistician, Col Walter J. Muller, was known throughout the European Theater as "the best quartermaster since Moses."[18]

As for Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's success in North Africa, David Irving suggests six reasons. Of these, one pertained to his good equipment, two to Rommel's individual talents, and three took note of the high-quality personnel who worked for him.[19] Like Patton and Montgomery, Rommel "appropriated" his *Panzer* army staff. Without question, this was one of the most remarkably competent staffs assembled in modern times. Siegfried Westphal, later a general officer in command, was the operations officer and a man for whom Rommel had the highest professional respect. F. W. von Mellenthin, destined to wear two stars before the war's end, ran the intelligence section. More than anyone else, Alfred Gause, Rommel's chief of staff, was "in the mind" of the commander. He could anticipate with near-perfect accuracy what Rommel needed and when he needed it. Gause stayed on as Rommel's chief from early 1941 until April 1944, at which time Rommel's wife, as a result of a petty domestic dispute with Gause and his wife, prevailed upon her husband to release Gause. Rommel selected Hans Speidel to succeed Gause. Observe that in this instance, too, the commander chose a man whose temperament, intellect, and personality were nearly opposite his own. The highly literate, sophisticated Speidel was "a useful complement to Rommel's own one-track mind."[20]

Operational leadership is a corporate endeavor, not individual, and it requires full complementarity between the commander and his staff. Sadly, as obvious as this point may appear, it is ignored with frightening regularity by those charged with preparing the US Army's official pronouncements on the subject of leadership.

The Concerns of War

Getting right down to the basics, what are the essential things that the operational-level commander must cause to happen if he is to be successful in war? They are two in number. First, information must be communicated from the commander to his instrument of war, that is, his troops and weapons. Second, physical force must be applied against the enemy by these instruments of war in a manner calculated to produce the desired result. Let us discuss these two concerns in order.

Before a general can begin to communicate the wherewithal to win victories, he must prepare himself for the task. One of the most difficult parts of such preparation, especially in combat, is to find time to think problems through fully in order to make sound decisions and to plan future operations. Montgomery termed these respites "oases of thought." He believed fervently that the senior combat leader "must allow a certain amount of time [each day] for quiet thought and reflection."[21] He habitually went to bed at 2130, even amid tough battles. Patton, as well as Montgomery, made time to reflect and think ahead. Each lived apart from his main headquarters in the company of a small group of officers and noncommissioned officers. Each let his chief of staff handle the details, and never allowed himself to do so.[22]

Noting that he had seen too many of his peers collapse under the stresses of high command, Sir William Slim insisted that he "have ample leisure in which to think, and unbroken sleep."[23] His permanent order was not to be disturbed unless there arose a crisis no one else could handle. As with any other aspect of combat, commanders must train in peacetime to do well what war will demand. Gen Douglas MacArthur and Gen George Marshall gave this personal training their devout attention. While superintendent at West Point, MacArthur often worked in his quarter's study until 1200 or 1300 instead of going to his office, where he might be distracted. Years later, in the Philippines, he had a standing daily appointment at a Manila movie house for a 2100 showing. He did not care what was playing; he fell asleep as quickly as he sat down. He found moviegoing a convenient way to unburden himself, to undergo a daily psychic housecleaning.

Similarly, during his World War II years as Army chief of staff, General Marshall usually left his office by 1500 each day and rarely made any important decisions after that hour. Fully aware that his decisions could make the difference between life and death for large numbers of field combatants, he strove to be as mentally and emotionally prepared as possible to make good decisions. In short, periods of rigorously protected solitude are enormously important to the general in command. If the mind is the key to victory, the general must tend and exercise his mind with a view to its health just as he would his body. This recommendation is not often heard in the US Army.

Combat orders express the commander's desires. History and common sense demonstrate that clarity, conciseness, and rapidity of dissemination are the measures of a good order. At the operational level the general must possess the power, derived from clarity of expression only, to knife through thick layers of command to be understood. Superior commanders at the operational level almost universally have been guided by a concern and talent for clear literary exposition. This does not mean that they must be able to facilely toss off arcane knowledge, but merely that they appreciate the strength of words carefully and economically employed. Even when the commander leaves it to principal staff assistants to actually write out the order, as Napoléon did with Berthier, he still must assure that such orders are prepared in clear, simple language. Commanders who communicate well orally and in writing are likely to have developed this ability over long years of wide reading. Indeed, we may take as axiomatic the proposition that great leaders are great readers.

Conciseness and rapidity of dissemination go hand in hand. More often than not, the unit that acts first wins. This means that time and the saving of it should be at the core of the orders-generating process. Failure in timely issuance of orders is a cardinal error. Fortunately, the leader may avoid this error by following the principle that all orders must be as brief and simple as possible.

Many World War II commanders issued oral orders exclusively. Gen Heinz Gaedcke, a combat commander with considerable experience on the Russian front, followed the practice of most German generals in giving oral orders. In his opinion, "To actually operate using formal written orders would have been far too slow. Going through the staff mill, correcting, rewriting, and reproducing in order to put out a written order would have meant we would have been too late with every attack we ever attempted."[24] General Gaedcke added that while serving in the postwar German army, he pulled out of the archives some of his orders from the first Russian campaign. He remarked on this occasion that the new generation of officers probably would find inconceivable the running of a field army with such a small staff and on the basis of such simple, brief instructions: "It was a most peculiar feeling to see the orders, all very simple, that I had written in pencil so that the rain wouldn't smear them—and each had the radio operator's stamp to confirm that they had been transmitted."[25]

The Sixth Army commander, Gen Hermann Balck, whom General Gaedcke served for a time as chief of staff, declared that he could present a five-minute oral order which would last a good commander eight days.[26] Asked after the war about his technique for giving orders, General Balck replied: "Even my largest and most important operations orders were [oral]. After all, there wasn't any need for written orders. As division commander, I forbade the use of written orders within my division."[27]

The clever commander will discover many ways to reduce the time it takes to communicate direct, unambiguous instructions to his subordinates. Working toward this goal should be a main objective of the operational-echelon commander.

Ironically, one of the toughest tests facing the commander is deciding when *not* to communicate, that is, in deciding when to control and when not to. If successful fighting units of the twentieth century have proved anything, it is that operations must be decentralized to the lowest level possible. Because the operational commander can not do everything himself (in fact, he rarely will control combat units directly), he must delegate extensively. Commanders might profit from the example of Gen Ulysses S. Grant, who pledged never to do himself that which someone else could do as well or better. He "trusted subordinates thoroughly, giving only general directions, not hampering them with petty instructions."[28] Sir William Slim spoke for a legion of successful senior commanders when he summarized the compelling case for decentralization:

> Commanders at all levels had to act more on their own; they were given greater latitude to work out their own plans to achieve what they knew was the Army commander's intention. In time they developed to a marked degree the flexibility of mind and a firmness of decision that enabled them to act swiftly to take advantage of sudden information or changing circumstances without reference to their superiors. . . . This acting without orders, in anticipation of orders, or without waiting for approval, yet always within the overall intention, must become second nature . . . and must go down to the smallest units.[29]

By decentralizing control to low tactical echelons, the operational commander implicitly places heavier weight on his overall intent and lighter weight on detailed orders, thus speeding up the processes of information flow and decision making. The benefits of decentralization are easy to identify. Nonetheless, many in the US Army remain uncomfortable with the practice of issuing mission orders and allowing subordinates broad decision authority within the context of the commander's intent. Among many explanations for this uneasiness, a significant one involves the poor fit of decentralized control with present leadership doctrine. By spotlighting the commander, by exalting his image to the neglect of the follower, the Army subtly and unwittingly has engendered the erroneous notion that the wheel of command will turn only on the strength of the commander.

The final facet of the communication function with which the operational-level commander must be ready to cope is uncertainty, ambiguity, or "noise" (Clausewitz's "friction"). It is astonishing that anyone can perform well as a general in wartime command. Crucial decisions have to be made under "conditions of enormous stress, when *actual* noise, fatigue, lack of sleep, poor food, and grinding responsibility add their quotas to the ever-present threat of total annihilation."[30] Even during the Iranian rescue mission, when some of these conditions did not exist, the sources of friction were plentiful and potent. The Holloway panel investigating the failure of the mission concluded that "the basic weakness displayed by [the joint task force commander's] staff" was that his "planners were not sufficiently sensitive to those 'areas of great uncertainty' that might have had a shattering impact on the rescue mission."[31] The goal is to be like Grant, "for whom confusion had no terror."[32]

Gen Archibald Wavell claimed that the first essential of a general is robustness, which he defined as "the ability to stand the shocks of war."[33] The general, Wavell wrote, will constantly be at the mercy of unreliable information, uncertain factors, and unexpected strains. In order to cope in this environment, then, "all material of war, including the general, must have a certain solidity, a high margin over the normal breaking strain."[34] He can develop this toughness only by spending most of his peacetime training in the art and science of war craft. One cannot expect to play a rough game without getting dirty. The Germans played many rough and dirty games during the interwar years, and as a result were generally better prepared than the Allies. In any event, the friction of war, producing a surfeit of "noise" and a welter of incomplete, erroneous, or conflicting data, stresses to the uttermost a commander's ability to keep his thoughts focused and his communications selective and germane.

Delivering Force on the Objective

After communications, the next fundamental concern in war fighting involves bringing armed force effectively to bear upon the enemy. Force will be applied most effectively if the operational-level commander ascertains, preferably before hostilities begin, the condition he wants to obtain at the end of the conflict. Only if he understands the end he seeks will he be able to prepare a clear statement of intent. No coherent campaign is possible without a lucid vision of how it should conclude. Evidence suggests that planners sometimes do not tend to this crucial first decision.

Students in the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth [Kansas] recently participated in an eight-day Southwest Asia war game. The pertinent part of the scenario portrayed a takeover by anti-American rebel forces of several key cities in Iran, mostly in the southern part of the country. The rebels threatened to seize the Persian Gulf ports, and thereby shut down oil cargo out of the Persian Gulf. Twenty-three Soviet divisions from three *fronts* entered Iran in support of the rebels. In response to the threat to its national interests as expressed by the Carter Doctrine, the United States deployed a joint task force to assist the loyalist Iranian forces. Ground forces consisted of roughly five and one-half Army divisions under the control of a field army headquarters plus one Marine amphibious force.

SAMS students decided early in the planning that their mission, to "defeat" rebel and Soviet forces in Iran and to facilitate the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf, needed clarification. What was the defeat criterion? Restore Iran's national borders? Destroy all Soviet and rebel forces within the borders of Iran? Or should they emphasize the second part of the mission statement, to facilitate the West's and Japan's access to Persian Gulf oil? Answers to such questions make a mighty difference. In the absence of a national command authorities (NCA)-player cell, the students judged that NCA intent was to optimize chances for the uninterrupted flow of oil, consistent with means. With this understanding, they concentrated on securing the vital Gulf ports of Chah Bahar, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. The ground commander (in this exercise, the notional US Ninth Army commander) determined that he would attempt to drive out, or prevent from entering, any enemy forces in an area centered on Bandar Abbas and circumscribed by an arc running roughly through Shiraz, Kerman, and Bam, some 250 miles away. This decision made sense in four important respects. First, in the ground commander's opinion, the US force was too small to fight much-superior enemy forces across the vast entirety of Iran itself. Second, with almost no infrastructure from which to establish supply operations, to move farther than 250 miles inland would have been logistically unsupportable. Third, this course of action permitted friendly forces to exploit the excellent defensible terrain of the Zagros Mountains. Fourth, a secure enclave would be available from which to launch attacks to the northwest should the NCA subsequently decide upon a more ambitious and aggressive course.

The SAMS students' decision is not offered as an approved solution. It did not even provide for securing the Iranian oil fields, at least not initially. Rather, it is used to illustrate the importance of establishing the ends of the campaign. Shortly after the SAMS exercise, the students visited each of the operational-level headquarters actually assigned a comparable mission. Ominously, when questioned about the ends they hoped to achieve, four headquarters responded with four different answers. The reason for their differences was that they had never gotten together to agree on ends before allocating means and drawing up plans.

After he decides the end he seeks, the next question the commander must confront is "How do I sequence the actions of the command to produce the desired conclusion to the conflict?" The short answer is that he must think through a series of battles and major operations that will constitute the campaign. He must weigh probabilities and risks and the challenges of battle management. This is anticipation. Good intelligence analyses will help him immensely, as will an in-depth knowledge of the enemy and his psychological predispositions. Despite the imponderables, he must fashion his thoughts into a convincing, coherent outline for a campaign plan. He presents the outline, representing his vision of how the campaign is to unfold, to the staff for refinement.

Although the commander need not be perfectly prescient, it helps immeasurably if his vision matches reality with reasonable fidelity. Planning at the operational level is tougher than at the tactical level because there is a narrower margin for error. The commander had better make the right decisions most of the time and on the big issues because once large formations are set in motion, it is nearly impossible to cause them to halt or change directions quickly. As Col Wallace Franz has written: "Operational (large) units, once set in motion, do not conform readily to later modifications. There must be the fullest realization that any adaptation of means cannot be immediate and instantaneous."[35]

Like a member of a football kickoff team, the forces being employed at the operational level must move downfield at top speed with controlled fury. While charging hard, and under the threat of being knocked off his feet from multiple directions, each player must be capable of moving rapidly out of his assigned lane of responsibility if conditions change radically; for example, if the returner has run past him and is going toward the other side of the field. To carry the analogy a step further, if all has gone well for the kickoff team, they will have disrupted the opposition's timing by clogging all 11 potential running lanes. When this situation develops, the opposition's set play collapses and the runner must freelance. If my team is much smaller than the opponent's, I have to rely on quickness, rapid thinking, hit-and-run tactics, and deceptive moves (all of which together define AirLand Battle doctrine's "agility") to give me the advantage I want.

But all the agility in the world will not be sufficient to guarantee victory. In the real world, it is not unusual for the commander's ideal operational end to exceed his actual operational resources. And it is in recognizing this disconnect that the commander's art must be most acute.

The eighteenth-century English neoclassicists believed that the antithetical forces of reason and passion struggled for possession of a man's personality. On the actual battlefield the same struggle constantly is being enacted in the mind of the commander. Commanders are sorely tempted to allow emotion to cloud good judgment in decision making. The art lies in realizing when and to what extent to let emotions intervene, to sense when it is proper to discard reason and turn to passion, to let the heart rule the head. Stated differently, the internal conflict is between will and judgment. The force of will usually counsels "can" to the commander while judgment may signal a "cannot."

Nearly every treatise on generalship speaks of the tremendous importance of the will to prevail. The truth of this observation is obvious. The flip side of tenacity, though, is obstinacy. More serious lapses of generalship may have occurred because of a failure to distinguish between tenacity and obstinacy than for any other reason. The general must ever be conscious of the true limitations and capabilities of his forces. As S. L. A. Marshall rightly claims:

> The will does not operate in a vacuum. It cannot be imposed successfully if it runs counter to reason. Things are not done in war primarily because a man wills it; they are done because they are do-able. The limits for the commander in battle are defined by the general circumstances. What he asks of his men must be consistent with the possibilities of the situation.[36]

The way a general understands what his forces can or cannot do is through what Sir John Hackett terms *the principle of total engagement.* By this he means that the general somehow completely fuses his own identity with the corporate whole of his men. He reaches this state by being a participant in combat, not merely a prompter. In discussing the 1915

Turkish siege of British forces in Kut, India, Norman Dixon furnishes an example of a general who was a prompter and no more. The British commander, Major General Townshend, stayed apart from his soldiers. He had no sense of the true condition of his four weak brigades. As a consequence, his reports lied regarding casualties, food supplies, medical aid, and estimates of Turkish strength.[37] In all, some 43,000 British soldiers needlessly became casualties because their commander lost all physical and emotional contact with his fighting troops. Only when the commander achieves a total moral fusion with his troops will he be able to sense whether they are being asked to do the impossible.

Leadership in War: Summing Up

Doctrine on leadership ought to talk about leadership in war. This is not the case with present manuals. Field Manuals 22-100 and 22-999 speak mostly about personal attributes desirable in a leader. The problem with so much emphasis on personal qualities is that even if the key ones could be identified, a leader probably cannot adhere to them all at the same time or all the time. Let us also recall that those commonly acclaimed as "great" leaders are not necessarily good men. It is possible to be morally blemished and still be a highly effective combat commander.

There is no simple set of rules by which to establish the pillars of generalship. One rule in any set, though, is that the good general must be adept at the art of choosing competent and compatible subordinates, especially his chief of staff. The Army can modify its personnel system to permit senior commanders to select their own staffs. Surely the devising of such a system is within man's ingenuity. This is a *must-do* requirement if the Army is serious about developing war craft as something distinct from witchcraft. Every superior combat commander in modern times has relied on the brilliant staff work of men he has handpicked to assist him. Surely there is a lesson in this observation. Chief executive officers of all large corporations choose their own principal subordinates. No university president in his right mind would attempt to assign the nine assistants to the head football coach, nor for that matter, would any head coach worth his salt accept such a proposition. The quality of the great majority of today's Army officers is superb. The issue, then, is not so much whether competent officers will surround the senior commander, but whether he will have officers around him who best complement him. Under the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, commanders in chief (CINC) of unified and specified commands will have veto authority over officers nominated for assignment to their staffs. This is a step in the right direction.

Having selected an able staff, the commanding general in combat must then look to his communicating. He should pay special attention to carving out of his schedule time to think; to issuing simple, unambiguous orders; to decentralizing control to the lowest levels possible; and to developing a tolerance for the uncertain and the unexpected. With respect to the delivery of force, the operational-level commander must furnish a clear-sighted vision of the conditions he wants to obtain at the conclusion of the campaign. Based upon an accurate understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the forces he commands, he must conjure a sequence of actions that will bring to fruition the desired outcome. Finally, the commander must be able to discern with certain knowledge the fine distinctions between tenacity and obstinacy.

In the final analysis, US Army operational-level leadership doctrine must step away from preachments on the Boy Scout virtues writ large, and toward the genuine requirements of wartime command. It must also abandon the idea that the general should and can master all the skills practiced by those subordinate to him; that time has long since passed. Instead, he should spend his precious time preparing to make the kinds of decisions war will require him to make, thereby strengthening the pillars of his generalship against the day they must bear the awful weight of war.

Notes

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Concepts for Leadership

Gen T. Michael Moseley

Leadership is all about our Airmen. It's about helping them get where they need to go. It's about getting them to all believe in the same goal. It's about helping them reach their potential. It's about setting them up to succeed.

Now this focus on people may take some people aback. They will rightly ask, "What about getting the mission done? How do you balance that against the needs of your people?" As an Air Component Commander during a war I know all about getting the mission done. Frankly though, in my experience, I've rarely had to make the choice between one or the other. Why is that? Because, your people will make the choice themselves—they know the mission, and with the right leadership they will go to the ends of the earth to get it done.

How do you set the right attitudes so that people make the mission happen? I believe the key is humility. If you are focused on your people, they'll know it . . . it will permeate everything they do. If you are focused on yourself, they'll know it even faster. Leadership is about them. It is about accomplishing the mission. And as long as those two are your focus, then your people will never fail you.

When someone does something less than smart, how do you react? Scream and holler? Ignore it? I don't believe most people wake up in the morning and wonder to themselves, "Wow, how can I really screw things up today?" Most often performance failures have two root causes: The person either lacks the training to get the job done correctly, or I wasn't clear in what I wanted. Sure there are times when someone just doesn't make the standard, but those are very rare. After all, good judgment often comes from making bad decisions. And teaching our fellow Airmen good judgment is one of our most important duties.

Our Air Force is the most powerful, most lethal in the world because of our Airmen. It is your responsibility to make sure they reach their full potential. Then stand back and watch the mission happen better than you'd ever imagined. Good luck.

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Officer Professionalism

Anthony C. Cain, PhD

Officers are first and foremost professional leaders. As such, they do not merely pursue a career or occupation, nor are they simply managers. Military professionalism requires leadership, commanding forces in battle, and very often extreme risk and personal sacrifice. Professionalism entails more than earning a salary or performing designated tasks. In the landmark book, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel P. Huntington described three attributes that separate professionals from nonprofessionals: expertise, corporateness, and responsibility.

Expertise. Military professionals exercise a unique expertise involving the employment of violence on behalf of the states they serve. Military professionals voluntarily offer their lives in service to their countries; they dedicate their careers to serve and if necessary, they risk the ultimate sacrifice through capture or death in battle.

Professional Airmen further specify their expertise in this arena by concentrating on skills in air, space, and cyberspace warfare. As they progress through their careers they shift the focus of their unique expertise from employing weapon systems to leading war-fighting organizations, to organizing, training, and equipping the forces that other Airmen will carry into battle. Technical skills, however, are only one part of the special expertise that military professionals exhibit.

Airmen must continually acquire knowledge and expertise throughout their careers as they serve in positions of increasing complexity and responsibility. They study the history and the doctrine of their profession; they contribute to that body of knowledge by developing doctrine and by adding to the written record of the profession, and they transmit the heritage, values, and culture of their profession to succeeding generations.

Corporateness. Corporateness involves identifying with the institution—Airmen are part of the larger American society, but they are also separate from that society because of their shared experiences as a part of the profession. Airmen express a sense of corporateness through the daily exercise of their Core Values—*Integrity First, Service Before Self,* and *Excellence in All We Do*.

Officers transmit, monitor, and enforce these values as they lead their subordinates to accomplish assigned missions. As professionals adopt the institution's values as their own, they enrich those values with meaning by contributing to the ongoing professional dialog.

Building this sense of corporateness begins in subtle ways as Airmen gather to discuss better ways of performing their missions. Doctrine emerges from these sessions as a body of knowledge that represents the distillation of the best way to employ air, space, and cyberspace power. Professional journals and public discussion and debate provide other forums for professional Airmen to enhance their profession.

Responsibility. Officers give and follow orders that ensure mission success. The professional characteristic of responsibility appears explicitly in the concept of chain of command. From the time they receive their commission, officers have a responsibility to act; they also have the authority of their office. The weight of responsibility requires professional officers to discipline themselves, to set the example for their fellow officers and subordinates, and to mete out discipline when situations warrant.

Airmen have a responsibility to the civil society which they serve to present the most innovative and sensible options for employing their particular expertise to accomplish national goals. This relationship to the larger society also contains an inherent responsibility to know when to act in an advisory capacity and when to step back from the decision-making process to execute the directives of the legal civil authorities. This responsibility to separate the advisory role from the decision-making role is one of the most critical characteristics of the professional officer corps.

The Oath of Office. The characteristics of expertise, corporateness, and responsibility come together in the officer's oath.

> I ____ do solemnly swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter; so help me God.

The Air Force officer corps includes individuals coming from distinctly different commissioning programs ranging from as little as two weeks to as much as four years. Officers serve in functionally and operationally diverse career fields requiring varying amounts of initial skills training to become mission ready. Despite these fundamental differences, officers as a part of the Air Force culture, serve a common cause as a part of the same Air Force team. It is these very differences and commonalities that call for systematic approach to how officers develop through training, experience, and education.

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Section 2

Responsibility, Ethics, Values, and the Code of Conduct

Professional Dimension



Reflections on Core Values

Gen Michael E. Ryan

The first discussions I recall about core values were in the late 1980s. It certainly wasn't the first time we talked about values—we've been focused on character and values as long as I can remember—but the effort to specifically define and institutionalize Air Force core values gained momentum about 10 years ago.

The first shot at defining core values highlighted six of them: Courage, Patriotism, Integrity, Competence, Tenacity, and Service. Each represented an important aspect of serving in the Air Force. And we began teaching those values in basic military training, in our commissioning programs, in professional military education, and across the Air Force.

Over time we discovered that the six values we'd initially defined didn't hang together very well. Each had validity in itself, but they were difficult to bring together in any meaningful way. Not surprising. It would be rare to hit the bull's-eye on the first shot with an endeavor like this. So in the mid-1990s, we synthesized the six core values into three: *Integrity First*, *Service Before Self*, *Excellence in All We Do*. For our Air Force, these core values have become a constant we can depend on in a changing world.

Core values help those who join us understand right from the outset what's expected of them. Equally important, they provide all of us, from airman to four-star general, with a touchstone—a guide in our own conscience—to remind us of what we expect from ourselves. We have wonderful people in the Air Force. But we aren't perfect. Frequent reflection on the core values helps each of us refocus on the person we want to be and the example we want to set.

These values weren't invented in some seminar—they're rooted in our heritage and in our experience. They reflect the best of ourselves—our highest common denominator. They're worth thinking about and talking about—because thinking about them and talking about them will help us live them.

Integrity First

Integrity First—the foundation of trust. And trust is the unbreakable bond that unifies the force. Trust enables everything that we do—trust that when a job is signed off, it's complete and it's right. Trust that when a wingman says he's got you covered, you're covered. It's trust that allows each of us to concentrate our energy on doing our job, knowing those around us are doing theirs. It's trust that makes us effective. And it's integrity that underpins trust.

In simple terms, *Integrity First* means doing the right thing—even when it's uncomfortable, even when it's hard. A few years ago, a group of Medal of Honor recipients gathered at Air War College to speak to the class. They shared their experiences. Each experience was very different. But these heroes had one thing in common—a firm commitment to the importance of doing the right thing.

Now-retired Col Joe Jackson faced up to doing the right thing in 1968 when the call came for a volunteer to rescue three Americans who had inadvertently been left behind when an airstrip was overrun by nearly 6,000 North Vietnamese regulars. He was overhead at 9,000 feet in an unarmed transport and knew that landing on that strip to pick up the three was extraordinarily hazardous. But, he said, "I was obsessed with doing the right thing, even though it took all the courage I had to dive into that hostile enemy fire along the airstrip."[1] We applaud the skill that allowed Colonel Jackson to pull off this difficult mission. But even more, we applaud his determination to do what was right, despite the very real risk to his own life.

This is more than just an example of heroism. It's an example of the importance of trust. The trust that they would not be abandoned allowed these three men to focus on doing their jobs instead of worrying about saving themselves. And their focus on doing their jobs allowed hundreds of others to be safely evacuated from the airstrip.

There are thousands of less dramatic examples that take place around us at our bases every day. Air Force people—from maintenance-arming crews to finance professionals—skip the shortcuts and do the right thing, even when it isn't easy. And in doing so, they build the trust that makes us effective.

Service Before Self

Service Before Self—the essence of our commitment to the nation. It is this mutual commitment that binds the warfighting team. The commitment is founded in the oaths that we take, and is exemplified in large and small ways around us every day.

Airman John Levitow offered a dramatic example of selflessness as, despite wounds, he threw himself on a burning flare in the back of an airplane full of munitions. Capt Lance Sijan's unbreakable determination to resist enemy torture and keep faith with his country during his time as a POW was an equally heroic example.

But examples of *Service Before Self* are not limited to Medal of Honor recipients. There are powerful examples at every base, every day. Not long ago, the area around Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, was submerged in a

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devastating flood. Airmen were forced to evacuate like everyone else. But instead of worrying about themselves and their homes that were under water, they put their families in shelters and went to work. Helicopter pilots may have had to borrow flight suits and boots, but they flew almost 50 medical evacuations of threatened citizens in one weekend alone. Base firefighters drove through five-foot waters to get to the center of town and spend nine hours fighting a major fire. And, with city water shut down due to contamination, civil engineers found a way not only to generate and pump over a million gallons a day to meet base needs, they also pumped a million gallons a day back to the city to meet their needs.

Airmen who serve selflessly inspire mutual support from everyone they touch. And that mutual support makes us a more effective team.

Excellence in All We Do

Excellence in All We Do—a commitment to high standards in serving our country. The application of modern aerospace power is an extraordinarily complex endeavor. It requires the seamless integration of hundreds, and often thousands, of airmen. And each must perform to high standards for the mission to succeed. As last year's Operation Allied Force demonstrated, our airmen do that routinely and do it superbly.

This commitment to high standards is contagious. Each year we recognize 12 outstanding airmen for their passion for excellence. Their contributions inspire us all. They represent a broad cross-section of career fields—from recruiting to fire fighting, and from security to space and missile maintenance. But every one of them has one thing in common—excellence.

While the 12 outstanding airmen are emblems of excellence, they'd be the first to tell you that they didn't succeed alone. Their accomplishments are a result of their own commitment, combined with the skill and dedication of those around them.

That commitment to excellence is more than desirable; in the profession of arms, it's essential. Lives depend on the fact that we maintain high standards—high standards in the way we do our jobs, high standards in the way we take care of our equipment, high standards in the way we take care of our facilities—high standards across the board. Those high standards put meaning to the phrase: "America's Air Force . . . No One Comes Close."

The Challenge

The challenge for each of us is not just to understand our Air Force core values. It is to live them. Not in some phony "holier than thou" way—people see through that—but in a conscious choice to do our best each day, to live up to *Integrity First*, *Service Before Self*, and *Excellence in All We Do*. And as we do, we'll build on the trust that makes us a great team, a great family—a great Air Force.

Notes

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Authentic Leadership

Chaplain (Col) Howard D. Stendahl

Though it eludes easy description or definition, there is perhaps no ingredient of the profession of arms more essential to the success of any unit or mission than *leadership.* From basic military training or military academies through the highest levels of professional military education (PME), it is the topic about which more lectures are presented and books written than perhaps any other. Leadership defies definition and resists manipulation. After more than 30 years of public ministry, more than 20 years of that in the active duty Air Force Chaplain Service, it is the opinion of this author that leadership is, at heart, too personal, too demanding to be described or solved by any "how-to" essay.

I contend that leadership, whether military, religious, political, or in nearly any human experience, must flow *authentically* from a person whose life, beliefs, and behavior are *integrated* rather than compartmentalized. This *integrity* becomes the very seedbed from which *authentic leadership* grows.

One often hears that great leaders are "born, not made." Unreflective persons often suffer thereby under the burden of a supposed gift, perhaps inflicting suffering on those whom they may lead if they fail to realize that any gift soon deteriorates into a knack, an instinct, or an aptitude if it is not deliberately developed. Leadership suffers when leaders of any organization or community fail to deliberately attend and focus their energies on their "gift," which may be to others only a "position."

Over the years most people will have known those described as "gifted." Perhaps it was an artist or musician, yet these are likely people who have paid the high price of artistry, suffering through the loneliness and tedium of hard work in developing their gift. Any person can occupy a position in an organization. Leaders, however, are those who have developed and continue to cultivate an integration of their life, beliefs, and personhood (public and private), as well as their professional competencies (for example flying a jet, leading a religious congregation or the clinical competencies of health care professions) in such a way as embody authentic leadership as a model for others to emulate. There is no substitute in the military profession for this integration, this integrity. To lead others in the practice of a profession with deadly serious consequence requires this above all else.

The Authentic Leader as Person

"What is the new commander like?" All military members have served in organizations experiencing a change of command. As the guidon is passed, those who serve will ask the above question, inquiring after what kind of a person now leads them. CMSgt Robert D. Gaylor, retired, the fifth Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, reflected that people will remember four things about us after we have retired: (1) what one looked like, (2) what one does, (3) what one says, and (4) how one says it.[1] These are ingredients of personhood, describing our presentation of ourselves to a group. One cannot completely control one's physical appearance, beyond good grooming and physical conditioning, but one clearly controls one's behavior and speech. Are our personal and private lives, our highest beliefs (such as religious convictions and faith) integrated into our speech and behaviors? An individual can control these, and it dictates how one is perceived by others, and how one is remembered.

Followers want to assess the leader as person *first.* Following a change of command one may hear "the commander seems to be intense" or "nervous" or perhaps "harsh," or "doesn't look you in the eye." That is, military members tend to assume professional competencies (airmanship, clinical competencies, etc.), but they look to their commanders, irrespective of any specialty, as personal *leaders*. They are justified in this expectation. There can be no real power in leadership if the pilot, the physician, or the engineer is a phony, or "running scared." Authentic leadership derives from a person who has integrated their fidelities of spirituality, family life, professional competence, and personal behaviors in such a way as to stand the "scrutinous" light of day. Obviously, authentic personhood alone does not create a great leader; the military abounds in authentic persons. Authenticity however is the very foundation upon which leadership must be built.

Authentic leaders communicate their integrity with their entire lives. It was disheartening to American citizens to learn about a former president, now resigned from office and deceased, whose private conversations were typified by great vulgarity and mean-spirited intentions toward political rivals and even supporters. This *disintegrated* leadership style collapsed in the end as it was founded on a shifting foundation and could not withstand deep scrutiny.

Great leaders communicate their integrity not with lives of utter perfection but with their lives integrated around values or faith which transcend mere power or control. This requires skill in communication, such as how to read and interpret for those they lead the intentions of those over them in authority. This can be for good or ill; as history is also replete with those whose transcending values may have been well-integrated in their lives but characterized as harmful or evil (Germany's Third Reich was indeed well-led and organized!).

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Authentic, integrated leaders learn how to read the human situation or group they lead and engender devotion to the mission or task by model of their own example. Followers will inevitably abandon or undercut a leader whose commitment is revealed to be rooted in mere self-interest or power.

While serving at United States European Command a number of years ago, a Marine Corps brigadier general shared that leadership is like parenting. He said that "you gotta love your troops." By example of his own childhood, growing up in a very modest home, he and his brother never knew they were poor, even though they had only one bike to share, and only one baseball glove between them. "We never went hungry, we had good boundaries with consequences for our behaviors, and we never doubted that mother and father loved us and each other. Often this was 'tough love.' Our family was prepared to face anything together."[2]

This model of "love" and leadership surprised hearers, coming from such a seasoned combat Marine, but it exemplified the model of integration and authenticity. For a parent, the safety and well-being of the family is more important than mere self. Examples abound of parents "giving themselves up" for their children. So also for the military unit, the authentic leader puts the mission and people ahead of self. When the unit sees leadership that cares so deeply about the mission and those who execute it, more than their own well-being or self, the unit will surely follow.

At this point one must distinguish also between what is "authoritarian" and "authoritative" in authentic leading. To continue the image of family, merely authoritarian parents demand compliance based exclusively on threat or power. This seems inevitably to elicit rebellion and resistance rather than compliance. On the other hand, when experience teaches a child that there is safety and well-being in parental authority; that a parent really does "care" or "love" the child, the resulting trust is evidence of "authoritative" leading.

Authentic, authoritative leadership creates this atmosphere of trust. All who have served in the military have had occasions when they have not necessarily agreed with a leader's decision. Those leaders who have demonstrated authenticity and gained the trust of their followers are vastly more likely to have accumulated the leadership capital to carry a unit through a difficult or less popular mission to accomplishment. Bear in mind that military members tend to assume professional competence in an authentic leader. Add to that knowledge and skill an integrated, authoritative reputation earned over time and one has a recipe for success.

It will always be important for the authentic leader to exercise great caution in the use of the word "I" or "my." I was uncomfortable years ago when attending a Status of Discipline briefing at a Tactical Air Command base when specific cases were discussed among squadron commanders. Repeatedly they would refer to individuals as "mine" or "that one belongs to me." Literally "owning" another human being or implying it in patterns of speech may run contrary to authoritative leadership. Vastly more winsome in developing individual performance is the first person plural, "us" our "our." A commander may order a mission to be flown, but it will be accomplished by a unit. The commander is a special person seat *apart* to lead. Be careful in setting oneself literally or figuratively *above* others, or even worse, "owning" others. It can lead to a precipitous fall.

Authentic Leadership and Its Message

Leadership in military life often consists in getting people to do things they would ordinarily not be inclined to do. It is not ordinary to leave one's home and family, depart for a distant, often harsh environment, then take up arms against unknown persons at the risk of one's own life. The message of authentic military leadership is found in fidelity, faithfulness to a task or mission that is in the interest of our nation's survival, the success of which will be realized by those dear to us and the nation as a whole—hopefully the entire world.

My supervisor at a joint assignment, a senior naval chaplain, shared a story about two bricklayers who were asked the same question: "What are you doing?" One replied, "I'm laying bricks." The other replied, "I'm building a cathedral." Authentic leadership translates roles and task listings into faithful execution of something vastly greater than mere individual contributions, carrying out the intent of those whom we must trust to lead. The genuine affirmation of every person's role in a unit, expressed without a patronizing manner or condescension, creates a climate of "ownership" and productivity which respects contributions from all ranks and specialties. It is essential that all persons understand and buy into "the message" or "the mission." It requires authentic leadership, characterized by the leader's devotion to that message, integrated into his or her life, to create such a climate for synergy in a unit.

The profession of arms is changing dramatically, with increased digitization of the battlespace, cyberwarfare, and other historically unprecedented categories of thought and operations. There is something unchanging, however, in military life and leadership that those of us in uniform share with generations before us. It is my contention that the demands of authentic leadership and communicating "the message" transcend technical novelty.

During Operation Desert Storm, I was assigned with an F-16 unit which participated in the earliest and most devastating attacks on Iraq. One of our pilots painted his face like an American Indian warrior prior to each of his missions. Initially, I was amused at this seeming affectation, but he was deadly serious. He truly saw himself as an heir to an American warrior legacy, as piloting his F-16 would require no less a warrior spirit than an American Indian warrior on horseback, riding into hostile fire.

Shannon E. French, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, reflects this reality in her work *Code of the Warrior* ". . . , most warriors feel themselves a part of an even longer line, a line of men and women from diverse cultures throughout history who are deserving of the label "warrior." This is a legacy that spans not just centuries but millennia.[3]

The authentic leader realizes that he or she is by no means the first of his or her kind, but in fact a co-heir of that warrior legacy. In this tradition, authentic leadership usually sees itself as a sharer of "the message" or "the mission" and not its author. Indeed, the greatest leaders in the field of conflict are the faithful ones who have received the message, the "intent" of those over them in authority, and let it work through them. It is their life and example, heretofore exemplified to the warriors, demonstrated in garrison, in public and in private that will inspire others to carry on the faithful warrior ethos in the heat of conflict.

This can be a challenge if one assumes command in the midst of war, without the benefit of having had the opportunity to personally exemplify authentic leadership prior to actual combat operations. This is exactly what happened to our wing in Desert Storm. Our truly authentic leader and wing commander pinned on brigadier general and was reassigned to Washington DC only days before the air war began. The new commander was totally unknown to the squadrons he would lead, following one whom the warriors revered as truly integrated and very authentic. The new commander's personality and appearance were different, and there was skepticism. When operations began however, the new commander placed himself in the lead for one of the most dangerous daylight raids over Baghdad, Iraq, facing the most formidable air defenses himself. He courageously led his team and thereby demonstrated his professional competence, but more importantly, made it clear to all that he brought the same "message" and fidelity to mission as his predecessor. His courageous leadership of this and subsequent high-risk missions became, in retrospect, his *de facto* change of command ceremony, when the guidon authentically passed finally to him in the eyes of those who saw this new commander carrying on as the one before him.

The authentic leader realizes that the privilege of command carries with it the heavy burden of history, that generations before ours provide examples of how leaders of integrity have practiced the profession honorably. Leaders themselves, in a sense, become the message to those who would follow, as they must integrate in their own lives the beliefs, values, and message of not only the historic profession of arms, but also the contemporary mission, if they expect their units to follow.

Authentic Leadership and Spirituality

The Republic in which we live is in no way theocratic. According to the First Amendment to the Constitution, there can be no "establishment" of religion, nor can Congress or other authority "inhibit the free exercise" of the same. Indeed, military chaplains enjoy a place in the armed forces of the United States to guarantee to the maximum extent possible (given military duties and requirements) this free exercise for all military members and their families. What then is the role of "spirituality" in leadership, especially in the military community? Should there be any role?

To begin, the term "spirituality" eludes easy definition. Years ago the great systematic theologian Paul Tillich wrote a modest but influential work entitled *The Dynamics of Faith*. Tillich defined for a generation of theologians that faith is one's "ultimate concern." Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned.[4] Whatever stands in one's life above all other concerns, that which claims "ultimacy" for any individual may be suitably defined as one's "faith." For some, their ultimate concern may only be in accumulation of money, wealth, or power. For others, it is faith beyond the measurable or empirical, what many would call "spiritual" beliefs, in that they are what one writer of the Christian scriptures called ". . .the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen" (Hebrews 11:1).[5] Christians may state their ultimate concern as belief in God as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, and hope for an eternal life to come. For the faithful Jew, it may be a belief in God and faithful adherence to the Torah and interpretive writings and traditions of the faith. For the Muslim, there is great emphasis upon faith in God and submission to the Divine will, with hope for the life to come in Paradise.

There are great varieties of faith and "spirituality" among those who serve in our military services, as well as many who serve very effectively without any specific religious beliefs. It is essential for authentic leaders to know very well what their own ultimate concern in life is, where their faith lies, and communicate that effectively in the conduct of their lives. It is the *integration* of belief and life that is abundantly evident to those who follow. This integrity is the essential "message" of leadership. As noted above, no person does this perfectly, but the constant striving to integrate one's ultimate concern (spirituality) and leadership in the profession of arms speaks definitively to followers.

There have been many effective leaders in organizations who have no expressed religious faith. I do contend however, that there must be a larger concern, even an "ultimate" concern espoused by a leader, which serves as a guide or inspiration integrating their life, values, and conduct. This is not the same as "relativism," which defines all beliefs as essentially moral equivalents. For me as a Christian clergyman, faith in God is my ultimate concern, that which informs and motivates my behavior above all else. I believe that God created, redeems, and sustains me from day-to-day. That informs how I live in relation to my family, work and friendships, and of course my ministry in the Air Force. People will observe and evaluate me as a leader based on how my ultimate concern is integrated into all aspects of my life. If I am the most eloquent preacher, yet grasp at every selfish opportunity, even to the point of lying, stealing, or cheating, or present even the appearance of impropriety, my leadership is *disintegrated* as a result, thus inauthentic and in the end, ineffective.

The same holds true for leaders of all specialties. One must know one's "ultimate concern," as well as that of those one leads. What motivates a person as a leader above all else? To whom or to what does one feel "accountable," either temporally or eternally? The integration of that "ultimacy" builds the foundation for the authentic leader. Sensitivity and respect for the ultimate concerns, spirituality, or faith of those whom one leads is key to eliciting from them their best performance, not to mention it is a respect specifically stated in our Constitution.

Finally, it can be argued that one's ultimate concern comes to expression at different levels in one's life. It is imperative that one know one's highest level of concern, as it will be the primary fidelity. For the faithful of traditional religious life such as mine self, fidelity to God must be the first measure of all my behavior, as that is an *eternal* fidelity, initiated in my tradition at baptism, yet with everlasting consequence according to my faith. Second, I have several *life-long* fidelities, such as the promise of marital faithfulness, or commitment as a father to my sons. Thirdly, I have *temporal* fidelities, such as my military service while in uniform. Though it is third, it is no less a commitment of life, as military service may indeed require the sacrifice even of one's physical life. This prioritization of fidelities has proven the surest guide for many in integrating life, belief, and behavior, leading to authenticity as a person, and when called to do so, lead others.

Notes

1. CMSgt of the Air Force Sam Parrish, quoted by Col Howard Short, commander, College for Professional Development, Maxwell AFB, AL in a speech to Basic Chaplain Course 05B on 15 August 2005 at the Air Force Chaplain Service Institute, Maxwell AFB, AL.
2. Brig Gen Joseph Weber, USMC, speech at the European Theater Control Center, February 1999.
3. Shannon E. French, *Code of the Warrior* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 16.
4. Paul Tillich, *The Dynamics of Faith* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1957), 4.
5. *The New Oxford Annotated Bible* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 326NT.

Hobson's Choice: Responsibility and Accountability

Along with responsibility, as this famous editorial of 14 May 1952 points out, must go accountability. Without accountability, having to answer for what one has or has not done, either good or bad, one has no responsibilities. If an officer has no responsibilities for which he or she will be held accountable, followers will find it difficult, if not impossible, to place their confidence and trust in that leader.

One night past some thirty thousand tons of ships went hurtling at each other through the darkness. When they had met, two thousand tons of ship and a hundred and seventy-six men lay at the bottom of the sea in a far-off place.

Now comes the cruel business of accountability. Those who were there, those who are left from those who were there, must answer how it happened and whose was the error that made it happen.

It is a cruel business because it was no wish of destruction that killed this ship and its hundred and seventy-six men; the accountability lies with good men who erred in judgment under stress so great that it is almost its own excuse. Cruel because no matter how deep the probe, it cannot change the dead, because it cannot probe deeper than remorse.

And it seems more cruel still, because all around us in other places we see the plea accepted that what is done is done beyond discussion, and that for good men in their human errors there should be afterwards no accountability.

We are told it is all to no avail to review so late the courses that led to the crash of Pearl Harbor; to debate the courses set at Yalta and Potsdam; to inquire how it is that one war won leaves us only with wreckage and with two worlds still hurtling at each other through the darkness. To inquire into these things, now, we are reminded, will not change the dead in Schofield Barracks or on Heartbreak Ridge, nor will it change the dying that will come after the wrong courses.

We are told, too, how slanderous it is to probe into the doings of a captain now dead who cannot answer for himself, to hold him responsible for what he did when he was old and tired and when he did what he did under terrible stresses and from the best of intentions. How futile to talk of what is past when the pressing question is how to keep from sinking.

Everywhere else we are told how inhuman it is to submit men to the ordeal of answering for themselves; to haul before committees and badger them with questions as to where they were and what they were doing while the ship of state careened from one course to another.

This probing into the sea seems more merciless because almost everywhere else we have abandoned accountability.

What is done is done and why torture men with asking them afterwards, why?

Whom do we hold answerable for the sufferance of dishonesty in government, for the reckless waste of public monies, for the incompetence that wrecks the currency. We can bring to bar the dishonest men, yes. But we are told men should no longer be held accountable for what they do as well as for what they intend. To err is not only human; it absolves responsibility.

Everywhere, that is, except on the sea. On the sea there is a tradition older even than the traditions of the country itself and wiser in its age than this new custom. It is the tradition that with responsibility goes authority and with them goes accountability.

This accountability is not for the intention but for the dead. The captain of a ship, like the captain of a state, is given honor and privileges and trust beyond other men. But let him set the wrong course, let him touch ground, let him bring disaster to his ship or to his men, and he must answer for what he has done. No matter what, he cannot escape.

No one knows yet what happened on the sea after that crash in the night. But nine men left the bridge of the sinking ship and went into the darkness. Eight men came back to tell what happened there. The ninth, whatever happened, will not answer now because he has already answered for his accountability.

It is cruel, this accountability of good and well-intentioned men.

But the choice is that, or an end to responsibility and, finally, as the cruel sea has taught, an end to the confidence and trust in the men who lead, for men will not long trust leaders who feel themselves beyond accountability for what they do.

And when men lose confidence and trust in those who lead, order disintegrates into chaos and purposeful ships into incontrollable derelicts.

The enormous burden of this responsibility and accountability for the lives and careers of other men and often, the outcome of great issues, is the genesis of the liberality which distinguishes the orders to officers commanding ships of the United States Navy.

Military OR Ethics

Dr. James H. Toner

The title of this article is deliberately "cute" or misleading because it suggests exactly what I wish to argue against. I oppose the idea that there is *either* the "military" (by which I mean the profession of arms, the military services, or combat operations) *or* "ethics" (by which I mean morality, concern for righteousness, or principles of goodness). That division between what is military and what is moral is properly referred to as a false dichotomy; that is, we are arbitrarily and unfairly separating what must not be torn asunder.

Having taught military ethics for 12 years at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, I have never had to make the case to my students there that military ethics is necessary, possible, or ordinarily makes plain good sense. That simple fact—that senior officers almost without exception buy into the reality (not just the ideal) of military ethics—is a great compliment to them and their services. It is also something that the severest critics of the United States military too frequently (and willfully?) overlook. Let me say that another way. I do not have to go on an academic campaign with war college students to persuade them that they can be airmen (or soldiers) *and* moral men and women. About that, they already agree—and that is no small matter.

So the title is not meant to argue that airmen must be *either* militarily competent *or* personally decent. From experience and from personal conviction, senior officers whom I have taught for more than a decade know, accept, and teach this to their subordinates by their own words and works. What I do suggest is that military ethics is based upon two letters, *O* and *R*. A sense of ethics compels me to admit that I will sneak in *P* and *D* also, risking alphabetical overkill, but I intend thereby only to make some precepts of moral ethics clearer and perhaps more memorable. If there is one principal thesis in what is to follow, it is this: Military ethics is about *our* learning what is good and true and then having the courage to do and be what and who we ought to. For military ethics is not about *his* or *her* successes or failures; it is not about *their* virtues or vices. Military ethics is about *our* heritage and history, and it is about *our* responsibility to be men and women of character.

The Three Os

Military ethics is rooted in three Os: owing, ordering, and oughting. (OK, so I am fudging a little on the third one!) About a decade ago, the movie *Saving Private Ryan* appeared. In it, Capt John Miller of the US Army leads a patrol during World War II to save Private Ryan, all of whose brothers have already been killed. Miller and his soldiers, dying in the effort, do manage to save Ryan. Miller has given Ryan "life," and the dying captain wants young Ryan to make his life count and instructs him to "earn this . . . earn it." Many years later, an aging Ryan returns to France to visit the military cemetery where his captain is buried. He "tells" the captain that not a day goes by that he doesn't think of the sacrifice of Miller and his men so that he could live. He turns to his wife, plaintively asking whether he has, in fact, kept the faith. Has he "earned it"? Has he lived up to the charge given him so many years earlier by his dying captain?

Military ethics based upon "me-ism" or "egotism" cannot function. Military ethics is about knowing whom and what we owe. Like Private Ryan and then Mr. Ryan, airmen must understand that they owe a debt of gratitude to their country, families, services, chain of command, and comrades. That is exactly what is meant by "service before self" (in the Air Force), "selfless service" (in the Army), or "commitment" (in the Navy and Marine Corps). Military ethics cannot properly exist without the concept of owing. If we know why we owe what we do, we are able to recognize the obligation, responsibility, and duty which give rise to moral thinking and ethical reasoning. If I think I owe nothing to anyone, then I am a moral psychopath unable to distinguish the basis of honor, which is an understanding of my moral indebtedness to those who have given me life and learning.[1] Indeed, without a sense of owing, I am little more than a self-indulgent child, of whom we say, quite properly, that "he has no sense of responsibility."

Neither can military ethics properly exist without the concept of ordering. By *ordering*, I do not mean telling subordinates what to do. I refer, instead, to moral structuring and ethical priorities. In the movie *A Few Good Men*, a Marine lance corporal tells his lawyers that the "code" is based upon "unit, corps, God, country." He has it, of course, all wrong. In fact, many illegal activities or stupid mistakes in the military services are the result of leaders' failures to order wisely and well.

In the meantime, let us suppose that our Marine lance corporal attended Officer Candidate School and has now risen to the rank of, say, lieutenant colonel. He is about to appear before a congressional committee to testify about a weapons system which still has a kink or two—but one which the Marine Corps may really want. Is it all right for him to withhold crucial information about that weapons system from the

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committee that might terminate it? Or even to lie to them about it? Of course it is—if we put "corps" ahead of "country." Please: I am not saying that the Marine Corps should or would agree to the colonel's deception or lies. But if the colonel's sense of ordering were that anything the corps wants the corps should have because the USMC is more important than the country, we are looking at potential ethical disgrace and disaster. By the way, just to be clear, I have never known a senior Marine Corps officer who thinks that way.

Before getting to the third O, let me suggest that the way to think about the Os is in the context of three Ps: principle (truth-telling and honor) first; purpose (mission accomplishment and duty) second; and people (countrymen, airmen, and soldiers) third. We know that military ethics demands that we look out for more than ourselves. An ancient military leadership principle, after all, is "know your troops and look out for their welfare"; but there is much more to it than just that. If military leaders put their people first, then the armed services would be little more than morale, welfare, and recreation operations. The point, though, is that the proper ordering, in my view, is God, Country, Corps (or Air Force), unit.[2] A great deal of ink has been spilled over the question of "purple" officers. I am not trying to argue the case here for or against "jointness," but I am only saying that every leader ought to be able to see on his BDUs that before the name of his or her service come two letters—US. That makes my point.

As I mentioned, the third O stands for oughting, by which I mean an understanding of what airmen or soldiers should do or ought to do. The three Rs which follow are the guidelines to oughting, but the key for military ethics is this: What airmen do may not be the same thing as what they ought to do. Sound simple? Yes, but it isn't, for military hierarchies sensibly insist upon obedience to orders and upon prompt, total discipline. Ethics, however, demurs, insisting upon conditional and contextual obedience to orders, which ought to be obeyed if lawful. So there is often, but not always, tension between the demands of military authority (or command) and the demands of ethical judgment (or conscience). So we have here not just what is (which is might and power or the man-made or positive law) but also what ought to be (which is right or ethics or the natural or moral law).[3] Some things we cannot deny knowing, for anyone of normal mental and moral development must understand certain things (such as knowing that the slaughter of the innocent is wrong).

> *It is a defense to any offense that the accused was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused knew the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful.*
>
> —Manual for Courts-Martial, Rule 916

One does not have to become embroiled in theology or philosophy here, for an AF pamphlet titled International Law—The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, states the matter plainly: "The fact that an act was committed pursuant to military orders is an acceptable defense only if the accused did not know or could not reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered was unlawful. Members of the armed forces are bound to obey only lawful orders."[4]

In simple English, then, there can be no proper military ethics without a sense, not merely of what we have been ordered to do, but also of what we ought to do. I said that military ethics is necessary, but I did not say that it is simple.

The Three Rs

So what guidance can we give airmen as they sort out owing, ordering, and oughting? This is where the three Rs come in—not reading, 'riting, and 'rithmetic, but rules, results, and realities. Unless there were rules, we would have to say that we know little or nothing about ethics. (In fact, there are some scholars who—in my view, mistakenly—would say exactly that.) Rules are minicourses in, or compressions of, ethical guidance. Much of what is, or passes for, ethical education amounts to our teaching rules, which are shorthand moral prescriptions, to our children, our students, or our cadets. The scholarship, jurisprudence, and wisdom of the ages become the theory of just war, which, in turn, becomes the law of war, which, in turn, becomes rules of engagement.

Oughting tells us that some things we must know; correlatively, some things we cannot not know.[5] But let's understand too that we cannot invent clear rules that govern every circumstance. That is not to say that such moral guidance doesn't exist—consider, for example, the ancient rule that we should treat others as we wish to be treated—but the more ground it covers, the "thinner" it must become. Even the Golden Rule, which depends upon good reason, fails if the one doing the thinking is deranged or sadistic. Rules are therefore very important, but we cannot create military ethics on the basis only of rules, however valid or virtuous they may be, for they are not a moral "logic tree" or an ethical calculator.[6]

Over the years of teaching military ethics, I have found that many, if not most, senior officers lean toward utilitarianism. What matters is the outcome, the bottom line, and the consequence—thus the second R of results. Ethics instruction frequently amounts to little more, really, than this: Choose the greater (or greatest) good.[7] That is a seductive instruction for military professionals who are and—up to a point—should be concerned with results. (Intelligence, in particular, is driven by a bottom-line concern.) The difficulty with this approach to ethics, of course, is that it ignores a rule: The ends do not justify the means. Although this rule can be debated, I think most of us will agree that even good ends can't justify all means or any means. Would you want as a friend—let alone as a senior commander—someone whose view of ethics is that the only thing that matters is getting a good officer performance report, or passing the inspection, or even winning the battle at any cost, regardless of the price, suffering, or deaths involved? Cadet codes of honor, for example, rightly teach that lying, stealing, and cheating are wrong—which is to say that certain means (cheating) are wrong even though the end in sight (passing a test) may be good in itself. Many choices in military ethics are defective precisely because airmen or soldiers forget or ignore the idea that, almost without exception, the end does not and cannot justify the means.

What is good for us is not just to choose freely but freely to choose what is good.

—Professor Alfonso Gomez-Lobo
Morality and the Human Goods

But did you notice the weasel words "almost without exception"? Here we meet our third R—realities. Lying is wrong. But would you lie to a Nazi if you owned a house in Warsaw in 1939 and he knocked on your door, asking if you had seen two fugitive Jews (whom you were hiding in your basement)? Of course you would, for you recognize the importance of the situation, circumstances, or realities.[8] Some would say that rules are inadequate and that we cannot predict outcomes; therefore, all we have with which to make ethical judgments are the exigencies of the moment. This is known as "situation ethics," a moral view I strongly deny—and one I am not trying to defend here. Circumstances condition our choices, I think, but they do not and should not determine such choices. We do know some things (rules), and we often can reasonably predict outcomes (results); but, of course, we do take into consideration present realities. The Nazi knocking on my door in 1939 is not entitled to the truth, and I will lie to him, knowing that a literal-minded devotion to the idea here of the rule "do not lie" will result in the reality of a gross miscarriage of justice—the likely murder of those two Jewish people. Prudential judgment—not situation ethics, utilitarianism, or even rule-based thinking—informs my conscience here, and I choose to save the Jews by lying.

This is a case of what I have elsewhere called "dueling duties."[9] In the case of lying to the Nazi, I know I owe loyalty to the security of the Jews before I owe loyalty to telling truth to a Nazi who doesn't deserve it, and I order my priorities in that manner, deciding what I ought to do by reasoned moral judgment. I have two duties—one to save the Jews and the other to tell the truth. The rule of truth telling finds exception or exemption in this instantiation. But that does not release me, in the future, from the moral obligation of telling the truth.

If we know whom and what we owe; if we know how our loyalties should be ordered; and if we know what we ought to be and ought to do—then we must still marshal the courage to be a lady or a gentleman true to our formed consciences. I do not think of the late Frank Sinatra as a great philosopher, but his line from the song "Strangers in the Night"—"dobedobedo"—makes profound ethical sense. For we become what we do and we do what we become (fig. 1). So we fashion for ourselves either a virtuous or a vicious square.

Every time we act, we become what we have done. In a sense, I become what I do, and then I do what I have become. Sensible people do not want to think of themselves as liars even though they may have lied at one time or another. If we think that, by telling a lie, we are becoming liars (not just committing an act), we are much more unlikely to do what we should not do, lest we become what we do not want to be. In this process of moral reasoning, we are, in effect, thinking about owing, ordering, and oughting.



Figure 1. Act—Become—Act—Become

The Three Ds

The three Os work in conjunction with the three Ds: We must try to discern the truth; at appropriate times, we declare the truth, as we have discerned it; and then we do what we have discerned and declared (fig. 2).

Figure 2. Three Ds

Consider the name we give to someone who says (declares) one thing but does something different: hypocrite. Although the three Rs are useful, the best ethical reference I know is a man or woman of noble character. Such people—not paid "ethics industry" consultants or newspaper ethics columnists—should be your moral touchstone, a point Aristotle made 2,300 years ago (and without a Web site, a speaking fee, or a regular column in a periodical or newspaper!).

Persons of strong character are the ultimate resource for any military organization, and they are by definition persons of integrity—individuals whose actions are consistent with their beliefs.

—Col Anthony E. Hartle, USA
Moral Issues in Military Decision Making

The three Ds tell us that we have a moral charge to educate ourselves as best we can in light of the truth, to speak up for truth, and then to act in truth. One more D actually comes into play here, for this is a process of moral decision, a word that the dictionary tells us means "the idea of coming to a conclusion after some question, talk, or thinking over." In fact, the word decide comes to us from the Latin meaning to "cut off," for we cut ourselves off from alternatives that we reject as unworthy of what we should do or of who we are.

We "cut ourselves off" from deception and distortion, from prejudice and self-promotion, from lies and lunacies, and we seek truth. For we cannot act as we should or be what we ought to unless we are grounded in what is true. Today's world, however, increasingly tells us that "truth is just a name we give to our opinions." As the scholar Felipe Fernandez-Armesto has put it, "Doubt is the truth of our times—the socially constructed, culturally engineered formula which arises from our own historical context—just as, according to relativism, the truth of every group is fashioned by its needs."[10] If that is correct (one can't say "true"!), then it is only a matter of time until the profession of arms itself becomes "self referencing"—that is, the military becomes its own final authority and ultimate standard, "fashioned by its needs," and then there will be no sense of right and wrong, of honor and shame, which transcends the military ethic and by which the deeds of the armed forces can be morally judged. In the Platonic dialogue the Apology, Socrates tells us that "the life which is unexamined is not worth living."[11] That assumes, of course, that there are standards and authorities against which one ought to measure his or her life. Without such authorities, one has only the impetus of one's ego as a moral criterion. By the same token, if the armed services have no ultimate standards by which to judge their actions and orders, we court moral and military disaster.

> *If we do not confront the soft relativism that is now disguised as virtue, we will find ourselves morally and intellectually disarmed.*
>
> —William Bennett
> *The Death of Outrage*

In Anton Myrer's novel Once an Eagle, the hero—a military officer named Sam Damon—instructs his son in "virtue ethics": "If it comes to a choice between being a good soldier and a good human being, try to be a good human being."[12] Military ethics is about each airman's being a good human being, because an Air Force of competence and character is made up of thousands of "good human beings"—people for whom truth and integrity are not "social constructs" but the very threads of the fabric of their lives. Such airmen know, as Gen John D. Ryan, Air Force chief of staff, put it on 1 November 1972, that "any order to compromise integrity is not a lawful order."[13]

What's It All About, Alfie? A Summary

What's It All About, Alfie? is a movie and the title of a Dionne Warwick song, a line from which is—"Is it just for the moment we live?" In the movie (and song) the question put to Alfie is asked and answered in a way rather unusual for the entertainment industry. I ordinarily refrain, however, from singing Sinatra and Warwick songs when I speak about ethics! Let me put a gloss on the answer given to Alfie.

We have tried to look at military ethics in terms of two—well, all right, three—letters: The Os tell us to think hard about whom we owe, to order those debts properly, and to ought ourselves accordingly—to have a "sure sense of should." We live at a time and in a society which increasingly tells us that there are no standards and no authorities to help us develop our three Os. We are told, instead, to regard as our ultimate standard the image we see every morning in our bathroom mirror. Not only is that morally mistaken, but it is also militarily ruinous, for any armed service which is based upon or rooted in its members' self-love is doomed to failure and disgrace.

So we can highlight two negative adages: Be leery of loyalty and be suspicious of sincerity. A loyalty only to self or only to gang or group (or even, by extension, only to service) is dangerous. Loyalty must flow from an ordered sense of ultimate obligation: God, country, corps or Air Force, unit (or principle-purpose-people). And, be suspicious of sincerity because the wolf of evil can easily vest itself in the sheep's clothing of sincerity, and good intentions must answer the test question of the ends or purposes served by those intentions. So we discern truth diligently; we declare our convictions, saying what we will do; and then we consistently do what we say (or discernment-declaration-deed).

Two positive adages also suggest themselves. First, will wisdom. Ethics—to include military ethics—is not about prejudice; nor opinion; nor information; nor knowledge; nor even "processed knowledge," which we call "intelligence." Ethics—and all philosophy—are about wisdom, which may be defined as—well, what? How you define that word will determine your idea of owing, ordering, and oughting. But wisdom can be willed; it can be sought after; it can be pursued. And good men and women do desire it, seek after it, and pursue it. First, they will wisdom. Not for nothing, after all, does the biblical book of Wisdom tell us that "those who despise wisdom and instruction are miserable. Their hope is vain, their labors are unprofitable, and their works are useless."[14]

Second, good people value virtue, knowing the logic of the ancient proverb that "virtue exalts a nation, but sin is a people's disgrace."[15] Everyone has values, but not everyone has virtue, which is a habitual desire to do what ought to be done and thus to become what one should be (taking us back to dobedobedo!). The four classical, or cardinal, or natural, virtues were wisdom or prudence, justice or truthfulness, moral and physical courage, and self-control or temperance. By understanding the three Rs (rules to live by, a thoughtful attention to probable consequences or results, and situational awareness or realities), one forms the habit of detached moral analysis, of circumspect ethical reasoning, and of virtuous deeds. In a word, this is character.[16] Character is merely virtue in action.

Character, for example, is the commitment shown by Private Ryan, who properly perceived a debt he had to Captain Miller and the squad which saved him in World War II; he properly ordered his life as a result, reflecting often upon the example set for him; and he acted in the light of that reflection, as he should have. Truly, the good life led by "Private Ryan"—fulfilling and ennobling as it was for him and his family—was the result of his being able to see things in perspective. My dictionary defines perspective as "a view of things or facts in which they are in the right relation." So, Alfie, I think that is what it's all about! That, in essence, is also what military ethics is all about: Defending the national interest and protecting the innocent with the discrimination and proportionality which flow from seeing things or facts "in which they are in the right relation." And what, exactly, is "right relation"? Here is an Air Force illustration.

A number of years ago at the Air War College, the commandant opened the year with some customary announcements and with the charge to the new students that they were to question and criticize all year long; for that was the reason they had been chosen to read and to study and to think for a year at a senior service institution. The general then added an admonition which I have never forgotten. He told the (mostly) US Air Force students to challenge the speakers, and the readings, and the presented doctrines to their hearts' content, provided that the Air Force officers, in their criticisms, never blamed an ambiguous them, instead of us (i.e., including the students themselves). For it is our Air Force, he said, and not theirs; it is about us, and not about them. That is "right relation."

Military ethics, therefore, is not about them; it is about you—and about your knowing what is true, and doing what is right, and being the man or woman who leads the kind of life you would lead if, every day, you remembered that someone named Captain Miller had saved you from death many years before. And what do we think of all those who served the nation and who wore the uniform before us? Did they not give us a republic, if we can keep it? Did they not tell us about our government "of the people, by the people, for the people"? Did they not tell us to ensure "the survival and the success of liberty"? And did they, in effect, not tell us to "earn [all] this"? Or has our history come to this, that they are dead and forgotten, while we are alive and forgetting? Can it be that the beginning of military ethics is to remember?

Notes

1. Plato has Socrates make this point in the *Crito*, 360 b.c. A translation by Benjamin Jowett can be found on-line, Internet, 18 March 2003, available from http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/crito. html.
2. Compare Acts 5:29: "We must obey God before men."
3. The concept of the natural or moral law can be found, for example, in Rom. 2:14–15; Ezek. 11:19, 36:26; and Jer. 31:33.
4. Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM) 110-31, *International Law—The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations*, 19 November 1976, 15-6.
5. I am indebted to J. Budziszewski for this insight. See J. Budziszewski, *The Revenge of Conscience* (Dallas, Tex.: Spence Publishing Co., 1999), xvi. See also Peter Kreeft, *How to Win the Culture War: A Christian Battle Plan for a Society in Crisis* (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 2002).
6. Rule-based thinking is deontological ethics, associated with Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).
7. Outcome-based thinking is teleological or utilitarian ethics, associated with Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and with John Stuart Mill (1806–1873).
8. Sometimes termed *situation ethics* and associated with Joseph Fletcher (1905–1991).
9. James H. Toner, *Morals under the Gun: The Cardinal Virtues, Military Ethics and American Society* (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 82–85.
10. Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, *Truth: A History and a Guide for the Perplexed* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 204, 206. Fernandez-Armesto is simply saying that many today hold that truth is what we call our opinions; he does not agree with that view.
11. Plato, *Apology*, 360 b.c. A translation by Benjamin Jowett can be found on-line, Internet, 18 March 2003, available from http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html.
12. Anton Myrer, *Once an Eagle* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968).
13. Quoted in Malham M. Wakin, ed., *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 180.
14. Wisd. of Sol. 3:11, New Revised Standard Version. Wisdom, a book of the Old Testament is grouped with other writings referred to as either Deuteroncanonical or Apocryphal; it was included in the original King James Bible of 1611 but is often not included in today's protestant Bibles.
15. Prov., 14:34, New American Bible.
16. I highly recommend James Davison Hunter, *The Death of Character: Moral Education in an Age without Good or Evil* (New York: Basic Books, 2000). I know that a number of ethical consultants, institutes, seminars, and one-day or weekend workshops promise miracle cures for businesses and others willing to pay great chunks of money for these services. There is no royal road to character, however, and it is certainly not developed by "ethics gurus" who are modern sophists and shills for the new national ethics industry. The best ethics consultant I know died nearly 2,000 years ago, and other great ones died more than 2,000 years ago. Their books (e.g., Aristotle's *Ethics*) are available in any good bookstore, and these thinkers do not charge exorbitant speaking and consulting fees!

Ethics, Leadership, and Character

Brig Gen Malham M. Wakin

A leader is best
When people barely know that he exists,
Not so good when people obey and acclaim him,
Worst when they despise him.
'Fail to honor people,
They fail to honor you,'
But of a good leader, who talks tilde,
When his work is done, his aim fulfilled,
They will all say, 'We did this ourselves.'

—Lao Tzu, sixth century B.C.; Verse 17 of the Tao Teh Ching

It is possible to infer much more from this verse in the *Tao Teh Ching* concerning ethics and leadership than its author could have intended so many centuries ago. Lao Tzu saw human leadership at its best when it imitated the most harmonious ways of nature flowing smoothly like a natural stream, without harshness or aggressive struggle, and marked always by a gentleness that naturally pulled subordinates to their tasks. This is a view totally inimical to that of the leader as an egoistic order-giver who forces compliance from subordinates by threats and claims sole credit for any positive results of their efforts. With some trepidation, I would like to reflect on these two extreme characterizations of superior-subordinate relationships, pursuing a fundamental notion first suggested to me in a paper delivered by William May and developing the ethical implications of adopting one mode of leadership rather than another.[1] Following these reflections, I hope to be able to establish the critical importance of ethical considerations to military leadership in the light of the unique function of the military profession.

Social Contract or Polity

In the many criticisms of military leadership which have been published in recent years, much attention has been given to the image of a ruthless, ambitious careerist, intent upon furthering his or own interests in his or her climb up the hierarchical ladder in spite of or even because of the high personal cost he or she may extract from contemporaries, subordinates, or the actual military mission itself.[2] This is one of the anecdotal statements made by an Army major who was interviewed during the Army War College's research for their *Study on Military Professionalism*: "My superior was a competent, professional, knowledgeable military officer who led by fear, would double-cross anyone to obtain a star, drank too much and lived openly by no moral code. He is now a Brigadier General!"[3] But the "careerists" are not a peculiar military phenomena; they are to be found in many of our professions. And it is not as though ethical considerations are irrelevant for these professional climbers—they have an ethic, but as Max Lerner puts it, "It is the wrong one." Lerner refers to this ethic in contemporary business parlance as the "bottom line" ethic. "For a politician, the ethic is to get power and hold on to it; for a lawyer, it is to win his case and get his fee . . . for a corporate executive, the ethic is to win out in the lethally competitive struggle for profits, markets, stock values. The bottom line is what counts, whatever the means used. It is the cancer of the professions."[4]

How does one find oneself caught up in this bottom-line ethic, not only without sensitivity for the means employed but often with the seeming conviction that promotion (the symbol of success) is evidence of virtue? The means employed "worked"; can there still be ethical questions to ask? Promotion itself provides vindication for the means employed. One possible explanation of the "ethic" is that it is an understandable extended outcome of a certain position on the nature of man, advocated in its most primitive form by Thomas Hobbes.

Hobbes is used as one of the classic representatives of egoism in most textbooks of moral philosophy. His view of man in the *Leviathan* begins with the assumption that all men are equal in the state of nature; that is, as they appear in the world considered apart from any formal social or political structure. In the primal condition, every man has an equal right to everything and moral terms have no meaning. There can be no right or wrong if every person has a right to everything; the fundamental rule of behavior involves personal survival by the use of one's own devices. This natural condition of man is chaotic, savage, and marked by violence. Indeed Hobbes tells us that "during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that con-

This paper is a 2006 revision and update of a 1981 paper by Brig Gen Mal Wakin, USAF, Retired. The original paper was entitled "The Ethics of Leadership II" and was published in several anthologies during the 1980s and 1990s.

dition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man." Life for man in such conditions is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (*Leviathan*: chap. 13). But man is also endowed with reason which ultimately leads him to conclude that if he is to survive, he must seek peace with other men. He must give up his right to harm other men if he can persuade them to do likewise and enter into an agreement, a social contract with them. However, the mere fact of the existence of an agreement does not change human nature. It is still the case that "of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some *good to himself*" (*Leviathan*: chap. 14). So to guarantee that men will abide by their agreements, tremendous powers must be granted to government (the real leviathan) so that men will live up to their social contract out of fear of punishment. For the first time, moral terms have meaning once the agreement is made: Living up to the contract is "justice"; breaking it is injustice. All laws passed by the agreed-upon government become moral obligations: morality itself rests on the agreement—it is man-made and not found either in nature or in accordance with nature. Moral rules are legislated.

This brief elaboration of Hobbes's account of the nature of man and the origins of government through a social contract is relevant to any analysis of military leadership. The Hobbesian view of man is held by several commentators on the military profession to be essential to the military ethic.[5] This view might also be at the root of the moral comfortableness of the careerist mentioned previously. If self-interest is the primary focus of human action, or if, more to the point, it *ought* to be, then one may feel morally justified if hierarchical ambitions are realized even at high cost to others. Here, we may reflect on William May's suggestion that social contract theories "tracing the origin of the state to a supreme evil" (namely, man's predatory nature) give rise to adversary relationships on every side. May made specific reference to John Locke's version of the social contract theory rather than to that of Hobbes, perhaps because Locke is viewed as having more direct influence on the framers of the American Constitution. Locke, of course, did not share Hobbes's extreme egoistic view of man although he placed great stress on innate human rights, especially the right to private property. For both Hobbes and Locke, however, it seems accurate to conclude that governments are essentially founded in negative fashion to provide security to the individual from the threat posed by other men.

If one stops for a moment to place the Hobbesian contractual view into the context of the military profession, it is easy to develop the least attractive picture of military leadership. Orders can be seen as *justified* because the military leader gives them (he or she is authorized by contract to do so), not because they make sense or are appropriate to the task addressed. A legitimate answer to the query "Why?" on this analysis would always be, "Because the general said so." Further, if Hobbes's version of psychological egoism were correct, one could hardly expect to find any examples of self-sacrifice or subordination of the good of the self to the good of the unit, service, or nation. And yet, if we analyze the critical and essential functions that are uniquely military (more on this later), we see immediately that self-sacrifice rather than self-interest is an essential ingredient in both of military leadership and of military service in general. Self-interest theories of ethics and the view of human nature in which they are grounded are simply not appropriate for the military profession (nor indeed for any of the professions focused on service to the greater society).

In one sense, at least, the military profession is more akin to the classical Greek notion of polity than to the communities of the social contract theorists. The fundamental mission of the military under a constitutional government must be associated with the common good, the good of the community it serves. When the military or any branch of the military places its own interests ahead of the nation's overall interest, we soon see elements of the militarism that Alfred Vagts, General Hackett, and others have adequately described. Militarism is, as it were, careerism writ large, and both are grounded in the ethics of self-interest. In reflecting on Aristotle's position that man's natural habitat is the society of other men and that human development seems intended by nature to take place in the social context, Hackett suggests that a properly functioning military may be an ideal societal form.

> Living in a group demands some subordination of the self to the interests of the group. The military contract demands the total and almost unconditional subordination of the interests of the individual if the interests of the group should require it. This can lead to the surrender of life itself. It not infrequently does. Thus in an important respect the military would appear to be one of the more advanced forms of social institution.[8]

The Aristotelian notion of man as *zoon politicus* is worth some attention if only to contrast with the view of Hobbes mentioned earlier. Aristotle, and the classical Greeks generally, would not grant Hobbes's view that man's nature is totally egoistic, requiring political arrangements and constraining moral rules to be artificially imposed. The family and the state are in fact viewed as natural to man who works out his development in the context of these organizations: They are not essentially contrived to hold back man's selfish egoism but rather provide the context and education for each person's growth and contribution to the polis. In this view, political structures are intended to educate individuals for their contributive roles in human societies. Based on the fundamental and unique role of reason in the life of man, the Greek view seeks rational harmony within the individual and in the state; peace and not war would better describe the "natural" state of man. Balance, moderation, development of the intellect—these are the ethical aims appropriate to man and required to be fostered by the state. An ethic based on self-interest, cost-benefit, or the bottom line must be totally uncongenial to this perspective of the role of man in society.

It may be necessary to distinguish between self-interest viewed as "selfishness" and self-interest viewed as "self-development." We attribute selfishness to those who seek their own advantage without regard to the consequences of their actions for others or in spite of causing harm to others. To develop one's talents can be viewed as self-interested action, but it need not be selfish. Certainly, some self-interested actions can be morally right and justifiably encouraged (developing one's mind or skills which will be employed for the benefit of all). It is the extreme egoistic sense of self-interested action (selfishness) which gives rise to Hobbesian views of the need for a governmental leviathan. It is also selfishness which characterizes the careerist and his or her organizational counterpart, militarism.

The root notion of service to the polity seems more accurate and appropriate for understanding the military profession than does the root notion of social contract. William May suggested the possibility that social contract theories remove individuals from active participation in the governing process. "Government is not what one does but what one purchases with taxes." Citizens may, in this view, be active at the founding and dissolution of the state but passive in between. One can easily venture a parallel suggestion when the military function is also viewed as a contractual relationship with the society; "Defense is not what one does but what one purchases with taxes." Thus the average citizen, especially when not under immediate threat of attack, may not feel any obligation to provide anything other than financial support to the military profession; his or her role is passive. Even when the nation is under immediate attack, if the military function is viewed as contractual only, the nonmilitary citizen remains passive and expects the military professional to protect his or her client (society) against external enemies.

May suggested that the extended application of the social contract thesis to the profession in general produces "adversarial" relationships; society as the client of the professions and faced with the threat of the negative (pain, lawsuits, crime, aggression, and the like) is involved only in the formation and dissolution of the relationship which has the professional protecting the client against threats. Analogies in medicine and law are obvious, but perhaps the critical notion to be learned from May is that when governments or professions are dominated by negative motives (formed to suppress evil) rather than positive motives (formed to promote the general good), adversarial relationships are almost certain to be promoted. It is easy to agree with his concern that when professional authority is invoked by fear, it will be difficult to limit and will ultimately generate resentment against the professionals.

Jacques Barzun observed that for the past decade, the professions have been under fire because the competence and ethical standards displayed by many practitioners in medicine, law, education, and other professions have been exposed and found wanting.

> The message for the professions today is that their one hope of survival with anything like their present freedom is the recovery of mental and moral force. No profession can live and flourish on just one of the two. For its "practical purpose" it requires the best knowledge and its effective use. But since that purpose is to transfer the good of that knowledge from the possessor to another person, the moral element necessarily comes into play. *Moral* here does not mean merely honest it refers to the nature of any encounter between two human beings.[9]

Like the professions for which Barzun has expressed concern, the military profession has also been "under siege" and needs to reexamine, if not to recover, its "mental and moral force." These reflections contrasting the egoistic foundations of social contract theories with classical Greek notions of man may lead us to fruitful judgments concerning the ethical dimensions of military leadership.

Ethical Implications

The military leader who views his or her oath of office as merely a contractual arrangement with his government sets the stage for a style of leadership critically different from the leader who views that oath as his or her pledge to contribute to the common good of his or her society. For the former, "duty, honor, country" is a slogan adopted temporarily until the contract is completed; for the latter, "duty, honor, country" is a way of life adopted for the good of all and accepted as a moral commitment not subject to contractual negotiations.

If one adopts the contractual view, it is relatively easy to attempt to divorce the military function from moral considerations. War is a dirty business, and the task facing this military leader is to develop armies and weapons systems which can efficiently destroy potential enemies; the body count is the bottom line. This conception is analogous to the adoption of the contractual view in the teaching profession, which envisions the role of the teacher as transmitter of value-free objective knowledge, packaged and distributed; grade-point average is the bottom line. Neither approach accepts responsibility for forming the character of the people being led (to war or to knowledge), and hence there is no predicting the uses to which their weapons or knowledge may be directed. But leadership is not a value-free enterprise; approaches which ignore the critical ethical dimensions of leadership must always be viewed as unsatisfactory. This latter assertion assumes, of course, that the role of the professions, and especially the military profession, is best viewed as more nearly approximating the Aristotelian than the Hobbesian idea.

In the American context, a leadership committed to the development of character can be on precarious ground. In our pluralistic society, there will always be the question, what kind of character, what virtues can be legitimately taught and inculcated? It seems clear, however, that an ethic for any of the public professions based on a total laissez faire, egoistic, and self-interested view of man will not do. Professions which do not exercise constraints over their members' standards of competence and over the costs of professional services invite governmental controls. Professions whose members lose sight of their service function in society and allow the values of the marketplace to become dominant invite unionization. Precarious ground or not, concern for virtue among professionals is critical if the professions are going to survive with anything at all like their past and current status. The medical, legal, and military functions continue to be critical to society, but that is not to be confused with continuing preeminence of the associated professionals.

> What every professional should bear in mind is the distinction between a profession and a function. The function may well be eternal; but the profession, which is the cluster of practices and relationships arising from the function at a given time and place, can be destroyed—or can destroy itself—very rapidly.[10]

The function of the military profession (its mission) is relatively well fixed; and it is a noble one whether it is characterized as the management of violence (Huntington), the containment of violence (Hackett), or as constabulary (Janowitz). The latter two characterizations are similar and seem most accurate for the US military profession currently. They do not presume so wide a gulf between war and peace as has been the American predilection prior to the end of World War II, nor do they avoid the essential moral concern that total war, with its potential for the destruction of all humanity, has become an irrational option. Already one sees that the military leader cannot afford the luxury, if luxury is what it is, of viewing his or her function in some sort of "scientific" or objective value-freeway. The uses of military force always involve moral considerations; the decision to go to war is a moral decision; and the judgments on the employment of means are always more than merely military judgments. At least since President Lincoln's acceptance of Lieber's "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field" in 1863, the public position of the United States has been that all is not fair in war. This position has been reaffirmed many times through the Hague and Geneva Conventions; in the Army pamphlet, *The Law of Land Warfare*; and through our participation in war crimes tribunals at Nüremberg and Tokyo after World War II. Military leaders are charged with the responsibility of observing the moral positions developed through this tradition, and with educating all members of the profession with regard to the provisions of these "laws of war."

The "military" virtues are virtues in any human society, pluralistic or not; but they are called military virtues because of their essential connection to the specific military function. The end (military mission) is essentially fixed—the choice of means to bring about that end often involves moral considerations and always requires a display of certain virtues in effecting those means. In some professions the most obvious specific virtues are easy to identify; in medicine and law, for example, client confidentiality receives unanimous, clear, dominant, and obvious emphasis. The military virtues are no less obvious: *subordination of the good of the self to the good of the nation and military unit, courage, obedience, loyalty, integrity*. I have argued elsewhere that integrity is the foundation virtue for military leaders if they wish to successfully develop loyalty and obedience in their subordinates.[11] But the critical thing to notice here is that these virtues are obvious because of their functional necessity; success in battle is impossible without them; preparation for battle requires their inculcation. Please note that these moral virtues are not merely "nice to have," they are functional imperatives in the military profession. Notice also that if the list is a correct one and self-subordination is as crucial as I believe it to be to the military function, then a contractual view of one's role in the profession generated from the Hobbesian view of man cannot adequately serve as the ethical foundation for military leadership.

Superior-Subordinate Relationships

Given the enormous authority over the lives of subordinates that the hierarchical military structure provides to its leaders, what are the moral demands on those to whom subordinates are required to be loyal and obedient? Again the fundamental position on the nature of human relationships is extremely relevant. If the relationship between superior and subordinate is viewed as merely contractual, then each association takes on the dimensions of a transaction.[12] The subordinate expects that the superior will respond to his or her needs; the superior expects that subordinates will "do their job" in response to his commands. Each has contracted to act in specified fashion. The more Aristotelian view of leadership would have the leader accept responsibility for transforming subordinates with an eye to inculcating the virtues mentioned earlier. The transactional leader places emphasis on objective performance; the transformational leader adds to performance an emphasis on education. The transactional leader is less likely to accept responsibility when his or her mission fails; in those cases he or she can easily place the blame on subordinates who did not "fulfill their contract." The transformational leader resembles more the "good leader" depicted by Lao Tzu in the quotation appearing at the beginning of this article. The contrast between these two approaches seems authentic when placed in practical context as in the following comments made by officers participating in the Army War College's study of professionalism:

> [There is] fear in the subordinate of relief and a bad Officer Effectiveness Report if he admits that his unit is less than perfect or he is presenting a point his superior doesn't want to hear. . . . The subordinate must have the integrity to "tell it like it is" in spite of fear for his career, etc., while the superior owes it to his subordinate to help him as much as possible as opposed to the attitude of "you get it squared away or I'll get someone who will" over a one-time deficiency. Across the board the Officer Corps is lacking in their responsibilities of looking out for the welfare of subordinates. Everyone is afraid to make a mistake with someone always looking over his shoulder. They are afraid that if they delegate authority to subordinates . . . they themselves will suffer. . . . Subordinates are not being properly developed and there is a general feeling among junior officers that seniors are untouchable, unapproachable, unreasonable, and constantly looking for mistakes. . . . A commander who takes a genuine interest in the welfare and training of his subordinates is getting rarer.[13]

It is easy to see from these comments made by officers of different ranks that their perceptions of actual leadership practice in 1970 was that it was transactional (in our terms) when it ought to have been transformational. Is it going too far to attribute many of the moral lapses in the military profession in the United States in recent years to the contractual (transactional) relationship? One of the ethical scandals accompanying the all-volunteer army conception in the middle and late 1970s was the occurrence of recruiting irregularities. Several newspaper articles reported on congressional investigations which revealed that fictitious names were placed on computers to meet recruiting quotas; police records were altered so that those possessing them could be fraudulently enlisted; test scores were altered so that others could be qualified for enlistment. The enlistment quota was viewed by many as a contract, a "bottom line"; and the resulting pressures were seen by some recruiters as reason enough to cheat and lie. Similar pressures, sometimes generated by unrealistic goals or demands for perfection, are frequently adduced as reasons for false reporting of AWOL rates, false readiness reports, cheating on training examinations, false aircraft in-commission reports, and falsification of a host of other quantitative indicators which we have institutionalized and used to evaluate the effectiveness of our leaders at all levels.

Common sense suggests that the bottom-line ethic most easily accompanies institutionalized overemphasis on quantitative measurements of leadership. “When we can’t measure the things that are important, we ascribe importance to the things we can measure” (attributed, perhaps erroneously, to Milton). Along with the emphasis on quantitative measurements comes often the requirement to report 100 percent of the quantity measured. Misinterpretation of a “zero-defects” program can lead and has led subordinates to believe that a single mistake or any performance that produces a “bottom line” that is less than 100 percent can lead to career disaster. Professor Philip Flammer suggested that the institutional pressures generated by exaggerated emphasis on “zero-defects” led to bad superior-subordinate relationships, even to the point of compromised integrity:

> [The Zero Defects System], interpreted literally, as some image-conscious and ambitious commanders were inclined to do, automatically moved from the realm of the plausible and desirable to the impossible and impractical. In many instances, the program evolved into a “Zero Error Mentality,” that is, the commander felt that his command had to be error free. . . . Yet outlawing risk precludes initiative, which is a basic requisite for modem [modern] combat effectiveness. In the end, many errors were made and consequently covered up, for the zero error mentality is automatically wedded to the grotesque philosophy that it is worse to report a mistake than it is to make one.[14]

The transformational leader sets the moral tone for his subordinates by the example of integrity he provides in both his official duties and in his private life. Honesty cannot be instilled by contract—but it may be enhanced by education about its importance to mission accomplishment and by example. Courage cannot be instilled by contractual arrangement, nor should it be expected if the basic mission orientation is merely contractual. It seems clear that selfishness is more generated than sublimated by any contractual/transactional grounding of the military ethic. Army chief of staff General Edward C. Meyer seemed to be summarizing this point of view when he commented recently: “The obligation of service and commitment inherent in the military ethic imposes burdens not customary in the larger society where obligations are normally contractual in nature and limited in degree of personal sacrifice expected. For the solider, the obligation is complete: to death if necessary.”[15]

Is Professional Competence a Moral Obligation?

It is not immoral under normal circumstances to fail a course in school. If a military person is incapable of learning to deal appropriately with a sophisticated weapons system, that is not immoral. But the leader who knowingly assigns the incapable to equipment they cannot operate is not merely foolish; where the stakes are so high in terms of the survival of his society, loss of human life, and use of national treasure, it seems clear he has entered the moral realm. With respect to the development of tactics, weaponry, long-range strategy, and the conditions for employing those weapons systems which pose serious threats to noncombatants, the military leader’s competence is a crucial issue. Literally, he has a moral obligation to be competent in these areas. There are analogies in other professions. Judges are morally obliged to research and understand legal precedent relevant to cases over which they have jurisdiction. Incompetence on the judge’s part can lead to injustice; and, of course, justice is a very important moral value. Surgeons are morally obliged to develop an understanding of the human organs on which they operate, and they are obliged to study and understand surgical techniques before deciding to employ them. In these areas it seems clear that the obligation to be competent is not merely prudent; where justice and human life are at stake, and where authority to act has been bestowed, the obligation to be competent must be viewed as a moral one. Often in the military context, the authority of the military leader to act is nearly absolute and the stakes at issue are crucial to society. The strength of the moral obligation must be commensurate with that responsibility.

Within the context of the professional ethic, it appears the line between incompetence and immorality is a very thin line, perhaps most obviously so in the military profession. It is obvious that an incompetent physician may, in a lifetime of practicing bad medicine, harm many of his patients, perhaps even cause some deaths. It is also disheartening to contemplate the damage that an incompetent junior high school teacher may do to developing young minds. But the incompetent military leader may bring about needless loss of life and indeed, at the extreme, may have at his fingertips, the ability to destroy humanity as we know it. Given this critical uniqueness of the role of military leaders, no nation can afford to have them be intellectually incompetent or morally insensitive. Further, it seems clear that military leaders must extend this concern for competence to all levels of the military hierarchy. It is also quite clear that neither competence nor moral sensitivity is acquired by mere contract; military leadership in these areas must proceed by example and by education. Transformational leadership holds far more promise than transactional leadership where competence and character are at issue.

Perhaps we may lay at the door of advancing technology some of the explanation for our need to connect moral concerns with military leadership in a fashion that was unnecessary for professionals of the past. When there was some possibility that the majority of persons wearing uniforms were likely to confront an enemy in direct combat, the primacy of courage was so obvious as not to require commentary. When unit survival in battle depended on each soldier’s fulfilling his assigned task, the need for subordination of self to the common good, conceptions of loyalty and obedience were all so clearly seen as fundamental and functionally imperative that example and encouragement were adequate to guarantee their inculcation. But in the modern US military services, there is great need to call attention to the ultimate purpose of the military profession because technological specialization has brought about a state of affairs that places the majority of uniform wearers in specialized roles remote from anything resembling battle engagements in past wars. Even those in direct control of our most devastating weapons systems will never confront their enemies face-to-face; indeed, their knowledge of the target of their weapons is frequently restricted to location and numbers.

As early as 1960, Professor Janowitz was pointing out that the tasks of military leadership had become segmented into at least three identifiable characterizations: the direct combat roles of the heroic leader, the organizational and administrative functions of the military manager, and the specialized skills of the military technologist.[16] The traditional military virtues and moral considerations are most easily associated with the heroic leader because he or she most directly employs the instruments of violence and places himself or herself and his or her men at risk. The moral consequences of incompetence in that role are easiest to discern. Not so with the leader whose essential contribution to the profession is the management of large contracts, or developmental programs, or large numbers of people engaged in support functions. He or she may see himself in a role analogous to that of a manager in a large business firm or industrial complex and may use analogous measures of successful operation: productivity, cost-effectiveness, bottom-line numbers. In this environment it is remarkably easy to lose sight of the ultimate function of the military profession. What kinds of measurements are the relevant ones to determine if the profession is best prepared to defend our way of life? Productivity is important only if the "product" is contributing to the success of the military function. In a psychological warfare campaign, for example, does the number of sorties flown and the number of leaflets dropped (easily measured and easily increased) provide a measure of the success of the psychological operation?

The military technologist may be the furthest removed from the direct military function. He or she may spend an entire career in military laboratories, contributing to basic research in optical physics, laser development, analysis of radiation effects, development of computer software, and so on. He or she may be outnumbered by the civilian researchers participating in the same projects, working the same hours, and differing only in the circumstances of pay and work uniform. How much more like the civilian specialist his or her daily life appears to be than like the traditional military leader whose principal concerns might have been the inculcation in his or her subordinates of unity, loyalty, obedience, and the other military virtues. The officer-researcher's status in the military profession seems more to resemble that of the military doctor than that of the traditional heroic leader. The military doctor may identify more closely with the medical profession than with the military profession. But both the military technologist and the military doctor may be called upon to place themselves at risk by carrying out their specialized functions in combat zones, while their civilian colleagues are not bound by the same unlimited liability. The danger of diminishing effectiveness of the military profession seems directly proportional to the growing identification of military specialists (technologists or managers) with their specialty at the cost of less identification with the profession of arms.

It is important to notice that often the rewards of daily effort are connected immediately with one's specialized activity and only mediately with the ultimate military function. This is not often true in other professions. The medical doctor who saves a life by timely surgery or relieves pain by curing an illness sees himself or herself fulfilling his or her function directly and daily. The Air Force major who solves a critical data systems problem leading to more efficient usage of the comptroller's computers gets the immediate fulfillment of the data systems analyst but may have to extrapolate remarkably well to perceive herself as contributing to the ultimate military mission. The moral dimensions of competence in this environment are easily overlooked, perhaps replaced entirely by prudential considerations. Duty, honor, country; responsibility for the lives of one's subordinates; victory on the battlefield—all seem remote from the many specialized tasks performed in the extremely complex, technologically oriented, modem military structure.

As the distinction between certain military and civilian "jobs" becomes narrower, the relationship between leader and led may have a tendency to become even more contractual and less transformational. It is not sheer coincidence that the standard terminology for civilian assistance to the military has included the phrase "defense contractor." With the word "contract" comes the emphasis on the values of the marketplace, concern for working hours, pay scales, and perhaps even collective bargaining. Charles Moskos has highlighted perceivable dangers to military effectiveness and legitimacy should the military institution see its traditional professional values replaced by the self-interested values of the contractors who work so closely with the military."[17]

"Good" Leaders versus Merely Effective Leaders

Reflection on the many very excellent studies of leadership available today reveals a number of astute and useful ways to develop effective leadership styles and traits. Little attention is paid, however, in our leadership manuals, to the *moral* dimension of leadership which I believe is a requirement in a democracy. *Effective* leaders may well have mastered the technique of persuading and motivating their followers to accomplish the leader's goals. But the nature of those goals has moral relevance. Adolf Hitler was a very effective, persuasive, and motivating leader. But in the final analysis he led his followers to accomplish some very evil atrocities. The difference between a merely effective leader and a "good" leader lies in the moral dimension. Good leaders will have all the skills and competence of effective leadership, but in addition will always have a moral purpose. That moral purpose will have something to do with the good of their followers, and in the military case, with the good of the country they serve as well. The actions of the good leader will be constrained by the moral rules. Good military leaders understand the need to develop in themselves and in their subordinates those qualities of moral character, those military moral virtues, essential to properly accomplish the military mission. Those essential moral virtues (already mentioned) include integrity, loyalty, obedience, courage, and selflessness. Good leaders, as distinguished from merely effective leaders, will be characterized by both their competence and their character.

I think General Matthew Ridgway got it just right in the following reflection on his experience in World War II.

During a critical phase of the Battle of the Bulge, when I commanded the 18th Airborne Corps, another corps commander just the fight next to me remarked: 'I'm glad to have you on my flank. It's character that counts.' I had long known him and I knew what he meant. I replied: "That goes for me too." There was no amplification. None was necessary. Each knew the other would stick however great the pressure: would extend help before it was asked, if he could; and would tell the truth, seek no self-glory, and everlastingly keep his word. Such feeling breeds confidence and success.[18]

Conclusions

The nature of modem defense policy and the composition of the US defense organization have placed strains on the professional military ethic. Complexity, however much it may conceal the functional importance of the ethical-military virtues, is not an excuse for failure to understand the crucial role these virtues must play. With complicated command, control, and communications networks comes an even more critical need for integrity in reporting. Command decisions are more centralized but depend entirely on honest inputs. There is still need for the heroic leader, but his or her role must be complemented by the military manager and the military technologist. It is not inconceivable that our most able military professionals will have to demonstrate characteristics of all these roles, sometimes all at the same time.

In an era when miscalculation can lead to tragic consequences for humanity, technological competence takes on an added and crucial moral dimension. If, under the umbrella of a nuclear deterrent posture, future military engagements must be carried out with the intention of containing violence at the lowest possible level, military leaders will have to be totally aware of the political uses of the military instrument. In the context of limited engagements for specific political aims, courageous action and the subordination of self to mission accomplishment become more difficult for the military professional (especially for those immersed in the ethos of "total victory"), but even more important than ever before. Integrity, obedience, loyalty—these qualities take on even more significance in the modem military as it becomes more difficult for military leaders to inculcate them in their people. The military function retains its noble and necessary role of protection of a way of life; the military profession in the United States will be equal to the task of carrying out that function only in proportion to its ability to attract and retain leaders who understand the ethical dimensions of professional competence and who themselves exemplify the highest intellectual and moral qualities.

Notes

1. In July 1980, William May (currently at the Kennedy Center for the Study of Ethics, Georgetown University) read a paper on "Adversarialism in America" at Vassar College as part of a workshop on professional ethics sponsored by the Hastings Center. His paper has caused me to reevaluate formerly held views of social-contract theories, but Professor May should not be held responsible for any distortions of his insights at my hands.
2. These two views are not proposed as the *only* approaches to citizen-state relationships or to leadership-follower relationships. I deal only with these two in this article because (a) it seems likely that social-contract theory approaches are most common, and (b) I think they easily lead to harmful practices and should be supplanted by an approach based on the classical conception of the polity.
3. US Army War College, *Study on Military Professionalism* (Carlisle Barracks, PA; US Army War College, 1970), 11-1-i.
4. Max Lemer, "The Shame of the Professions," *Saturday Review* 3, 1975, II.
5. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (New York: Random House, 1957), chap. 3.
6. Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York: Macmillan, 1959).
7. Lt Gen Sir John W. Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London: Times Publishing, 1962).
8. Hackett, *The Profession of Arms*, 45.
9. Jacques Barzun, "The Professions under Siege," *Harper's* 257 (1541), 1978, 68.
10. Ibid., 63.
11. "The Ethics of Leadership II."
12. The terms "transactional leadership" and "transformational leadership" are borrowed from William May (note 1), who in turn credits their usage to James McGregor Bums.
13. *Study on Military Professionalism*, 14–16.
14. Philip M. Hammer, "Conflicting Loyalties and the American Military Ethic," *American Behavioral Scientist* (May/June 1976), 597.
15. Gen Edward C. Meyer. "Professional Ethics Is Key to Well-Led, Trained Army," *Army* 30 (1980), 14.
16. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), chap. 2.
17. Charles C. Moskos Jr., "From Institution to Occupation," *Armed Forces and Society*, 4 (1977), 41–50.
18. Matthew B. Ridgway, "Leadership," in *Military Leadership in Pursuit of Excellence*, edited by Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 23.

The Code of Conduct

Robert K. Ruhl

Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces of the United States

Article 1: I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

Article II: I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

Article III: If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

Article IV: If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with all my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any actions which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

*Article V: When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

Article VI: I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

**By Executive Order signed on November 3, 1977, President Carter amended the original statement in the Code which read, "bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth."*

In the dark battlefield of men's souls, the lonely war of conscience rages on, unabated by time and place.

The very intensity of the shadowy struggle did come to light for a brief time two years ago but, sadly, the public record of the haunted, released last fall, has gone all but unnoticed.

For them—mostly former prisoners of war (POW) in Southeast Asia, those who had endured the unspeakable—the war has nothing to do with winning and losing in combat. Rather, it was—and is—the interminable hell of measuring themselves against the deceptively simple tenets inherent in the six articles that make up the fighting man's creed, the Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces of the United States.

Some had lived gallantly to uphold the Code, many with a rigid tenacity born of a dogma-like understanding of its precepts. Some have died doing the same. A very few have failed those same precepts miserably and suffered the outcast's dishonor.

But all, the more than 800 who returned from North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, the People's Republic of China, and the repatriated crewmen of the ill-fated USS *Pueblo,* had given the enemy more information than they had wanted to or at one time thought possible.

It was for them and for those in the future who might find themselves in the desperation of captivity that the Defense Review Committee for the Code of Conduct first met in Washington, D.C., in May 1976 to consider changing the Code.

The assigned duty of the committee was to relate the experiences of those once captive to the high standards of the Code, the aim being to help the services "produce a better prepared, better disciplined, better informed, and better guided fighting man."

The result, after seven months of discussion, meditation, and interviews with some 50 former prisoners and experts in several fields, was as deceptively unpretentious as the Code itself.

In Article V, the most controversial of the six, one word was changed and one was deleted; a broad guideline was produced for future Code training, and three sections of the Manual for Courts-Martial were amended to give the senior ranking officer or noncommissioned officer in captivity legal authority over all US servicemen.

Last November 3, President Carter approved the committee's recommendations by signing two executive orders and thereby tacitly answered the sad-wise question of Shukhov, the prototype prisoner of Communist tyranny in Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich:* "How can you expect a man who is warm to understand a man is who cold?"

For the committee, as well as any could, had understood both the man who is warm and the man who is cold.

In the words of Committee Chairman Dr. John F. Ahearne, a former Air Force officer who was then the acting assistant

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secretary of defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and now an assistant to the secretary of the Department of Energy, by changing Article V "we tried to make it clear that a human being can be pushed beyond human tolerance."

In that context, the committee of 11, composed of seven active duty or retired military members, including recently retired Air Force Medal of Honor recipient Col George E. (Bud) Day (see "All Day's Tomorrows," *Airman,* November 1976) and three other former prisoners, broadened the whole of the Code to encompass compassion.

No longer would the American POW feel he was *"bound* to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth" to a captor—the Big Four statement that had tormented prisoners in Southeast Asia because of the services' differing interpretations of the two words.

Future POWs would be *required* to give the same information to comply with the 1949 Geneva Convention but the deletion of the word *only* would allow captives a flexibility of response and action that would help them maintain their self-respect after being pushed "beyond the limits of human tolerance."

Coerced past those limits, they will be able, with the full sanction of their country and their service, to "bounce back" with dignity and try again and again to resist giving important information to their captors or cooperating with them.

The word changes were also a reaffirmation of the intent, never properly promulgated, of the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War that first formulated the Code in 1955 as a direct response to the public outcry over the well-publicized germ warfare "confessions" and turncoat actions that tainted the return of POWs from Korea.

But it was not to assuage guilt feelings, both real and imagined, that Article V was changed. No, it was a sober recognition of the plight of POWs under the grinding heel of Communist captors. It was the recognition by civilized men of brutality meted out often for brutality's sake.

"There is no man who will not break under Communist interrogation," Army Lt Col Floyd J. Thompson, who spent nine years in prison, the longest of any US serviceman in Indochina, told the committee. "They have complete control over your environment to make life a living hell for the sake of obtaining a very simple statement to the effect that I'm well treated and these are nice folks and why don't we go home and leave them alone."

It was this use of American POWs in Korea for political and propaganda purposes—the first time this had ever befallen American servicemen in our nation's history—that led to the establishment of the Code.

By signing Executive Order 10631 in 1955, President Eisenhower directed that "each member of the Armed Forces liable to capture shall be provided with specific training and instruction designed to better equip him to counter and withstand all enemy efforts against him, and shall be fully instructed as to the behavior and obligations expected of him during combat and captivity."

That the establishment of the Code, the only one like it in the world, was an overreaction to biased press reports and speeches at home concerning the alleged misconduct of large numbers of POWs in Korea wasn't clear until the late 1960s when a definitive study, contracted for by the Air Force, concluded, that, in fact, American POWs had done as well as their predecessors in past wars.

"Had the Department of Defense waited for the Air Force study, I don't think we would have a Code of Conduct today," explained Claude L. Watkins, an Air Force Intelligence operations specialist and former World War II POW who is a highly regarded expert with 28 years of experience in all phases of survival, evasion, escape, and resistance while in captivity.

A graying man of medium build who speaks with disarming casualness while all the time driving home facts with mallet force, Watkins served the review committee as an observer, consultant, advisor on Code training, and finally as executive secretary before closing the doors on committee business in the Pentagon last January.

Years earlier he had set up the program to debrief returning Air Force POWs from Southeast Asia, a portion of which was adopted by all the services.

The theme of those who were writing and lecturing about the Korean War POWs was that "Americans were all screwed up; they couldn't do anything right, and that they were putty in the hands of the Communists," according to Watkins, a member of the Air Force's 7602d Air Intelligence Group, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

"We heard about brainwashing, dissension, the 'confessions,' but the truth is that the Chinese went all out to politically indoctrinate Americans, who were mostly lower ranking Army troops, and failed miserably. They quit trying a year before the POWs came home. As you recall, just 21 prisoners decided to stay in Communist hands, and there were more than 7,000 prisoners, 223 of whom were Air Force members.

"Considering that our troops hadn't been trained to combat the pressures that no other American had ever been subjected to before," he continued, "they did very well."

Code or not—and Watkins noted that many in Vietnamese prisons "wouldn't have made it without the Code—training is the key element to survival under Communist captivity. But training, or lack of it, has been the Code's dilemma from its inception.

Although the framers of the Code had intended that any confusion over the precise meaning of the words and state merits would be clarified in training, those intentions were thwarted by lack of monitoring and training guidance.

In the years following the establishment of the Code, the services took differing positions. The Air Force, for the most part, taught methods of "ruses and stratagems" that encompassed bounce-back techniques, which the service believed to be the intention of the Code's founders. The other services generally took a hard-line stance embodied in the refrain, "Big Four and nothing more."

From the start the Air Force was concerned with training aircrews for hazardous missions. As then-chief of staff, Gen Curtis E. LeMay, contended in 1963, the Air Force had a higher percentage of officers vulnerable to capture and with a considerable amount of technical education and expertise that made them particularly attractive targets for enemy interrogators. The Air Force POW was also very likely to be subjected to exploitation for propaganda purposes.

The Army and Marines felt the Big Four was more appropriate for training large numbers of combat troops, and the Navy determined that its members most vulnerable to capture—carrier pilots—would be flying short fighter missions and their chances of becoming prisoners for long periods were remote.

But the harsh tales of brutality and deprivation told by the early returnees from Southeast Asia in the late 1960s caused the Army, Navy, and Marines to reassess their approach to Code training.

The capture of the USS *Pueblo* in March of 1968 was an added factor. A House subcommittee that studied the circumstances recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) consider training that would better equip servicemen to deal with captivity.

Speaking before the Defense Review Committee in 1976, the now-retired *Pueblo* commander, Mark Lloyd Bucher, said he felt he was in violation of the Code from the start because he went beyond the Big Four and gave it cover story. He explained he had signed a "confession" that his ship had entered North Korean territorial waters because the enemy threatened to kill his men, starting with the youngest.

With all the services in harmony after 1968 over the necessity of extending Code training, they determined that a thorough study of the Code should be made but that such a study and any definitive training guidance that resulted would be deferred while Americans were still in Communist prisons.

Today DOD, including representatives from all the services, is working to develop future Code of Conduct training doctrine.

Where does the Air Force stand with respect to training in the Code? What should the Air Force be doing? These are questions Lt Col Stevenson E. (Steve) Bowes is asking himself and others. In his assignment with the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Colonel Bowes chairs the Air Staff committee that monitors the entire scope of Air Force involvement in survival, evasion, resistance, and escape—SERE—activities.

"If we are going to tell an individual that his country has established standards that he's expected to live up to," Colonel Bowes said, "then I think it's incumbent upon institutions that represent his country to him, primarily his service, to examine themselves and see to it they're helping him as much as possible before he becomes its prisoner, while he's in prison, and afterwards."

The review committee in 1976 recommended the designation of the Air Force as the executive agent to train future Code instructors for all services. DOD is presently considering that recommendation and is looking at the form and content of training.

The committee proposed different levels of training that take into account a military member's combat specialty and his risk of being captured.

Depending on the type of conflict, aircrews, various special forces groups, members of long-range reconnaissance patrols, and others, may receive more intense training than the normal infantryman. But the problem of putting teeth into the amended training directive boils down to policy and resources, according to Bowes.

"We're talking about who—for example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or others—is going to have their hand on the policy throttle," he explained. "Who will determine what Code training is going to encompass, what the substance of that training will be, and how the results will be measured?"

There are, of course, resource implications for all the services. The Army, for instance, doesn't have survival schools akin to those of the Air Force. The Army approaches Code training, according to Colonel Bowes, as an element of unit training.

And those working out the training concepts also realize the differing maturity levels, intellectual acuity, age, years of service, and others, that come into play.

"The guy who punches out of a plane over enemy territory has a different problem than the infantryman who is about to be captured in a group," noted the former chief of an interrogation team in Southeast Asia.

"For the infantryman about to be captured with his unit and near his own lines, training probably ought to stress that fighting his way back obviates a lot of concern about surviving, evading, resisting, or escaping. But think about the pilot who might go down in the Ural Mountains. Telling him to fight his way back to friendly hands takes some examination. Shooting his way out must run counter to both his own and his nation's interests.

The word among pilots who came back from Southeast Asia was, "I didn't think it was incumbent on me to start an Asian ground war in the middle of North Vietnam. Better that I evade rather than fight."

Future Code training must also take into account the various theaters where war is possible and the money spent on a proportionately small number of servicemen who become prisoners.

As one ex-POW told the committee, "6 1/2 million served in Vietnam; 56,000 died; about 1,500 went down over North Vietnam; 546 came home. How much time and money do you spend on so small a percentage as the prisoners represent?"

The quality of training, then, becomes a most important consideration. Claude Watkins feels "the ultimate goal is a school for high-risk personnel. It should have the best qualified instructors from all the services, use the best training aids and materials, and employ the most realistic training."

The Intelligence specialist, who probably knows more former POWs than any other man alive, noted that he never heard one say he gave only Big Four information. He feels strongly that there should be heavy emphasis on "taking all you can take, giving the least amount of information you can, and then bouncing back."

He also thinks the high-risk serviceman should understand the probable chain of events after he's captured—the trauma, disorientation, the abuse, interrogation methods, the techniques of political exploitation—and acquire rudimentary skills in primitive medicine and a knowledge of how to establish covert communications.

"You've also got to know the enemy doesn't want to starve you to death," he said. "The food may be unappetizing, but eat every damned bit of it. Mainly, though, just hang in there, man, and be faithful to each other and support each other."

Surprisingly, many POWs, while still in prison, thought the Code was legally binding rather than a set of standards to be followed. But the testimony of most former POWs and experts before the committee was overwhelmingly in favor of letting the Code stand as it was intended. As in the past, the Uniform Code of Military Justice will form the basis for any legal prosecution.

Like the others working on training doctrine, Colonel Bowes fully recognizes the difficulty in trying to train military members in a code of conduct with inherent open-ended strictures. But, he noted, "Americans tend to be a two-valued people. If you don't win, then you're a loser. That may or may not be true. We are fond of saying close only counts in horseshoes, but there are more horseshoes in life than we often recognize."

He also said he thought the Code has been "looked at by a lot of guys in such a way that it becomes a source of guilt.

Take a guy who jumps out of his damaged airplane. "Geez, I've lost my airplane," he says. "Now I've got to evade."

After six hours a little old lady with a pitchfork nabs him. He feels he's got two failures now—he's lost his airplane and he's been captured. He's psychologically disoriented, a lot's playing on his mind, and the people who have him have less than a wholly constructive intention concerning his welfare and his uses to them.

Now he's in a resistance situation and thinking about the Big Four, "Can I ask that guy if I can go to the 'head' or get medical attention?" he asks. If he does, he thinks he's failed again.

Later he says to himself, "I tried not to, but they worked on me, manipulated my wounds, beat me, put me in ropes, did to me what they wanted, and I screamed, and I cried, and I soiled myself. I have absolutely debased myself, I have failed again."

It's that kind of thinking, Colonel Bowes said, "that we've got to turn around. We've got to point out in training that if you really tried, if you've made your best effort, then you must not let your own perspective of failure turn you into your own worst enemy. Maybe the POW has to approach the situation like a recovered alcoholic. One step, one day at a time. No promissory notes for tomorrow."

The seriousness with which he views Code of Conduct training is apparent in Bowes's approach to the subject. "Two philosophical precepts say a lot to me about Code training. The first is, 'There's only one way to learn to play the flute, and that's by playing it.' But you may play it badly." Code training is fundamental combat training. It prepares the fighting man to be just that, and it must be done well. We have a wealth of material—history, actual experiences, various studies, and analyses—on which to build. We need to be very sensitive about what we use and how we use it in our efforts to sustain and improve Code of Conduct training.

And, secondly, "You shouldn't expect a more precise answer than the subject matter of the question will allow." In Code training we're not counting two and two and we're not counting beans. We're dealing with what goes on in a guy's mind and whether we can help him stay in control of himself under what I think are probably the most difficult situations he or any man may ever have to face.

The Defense Review Committee for the Code of Conduct understands the same intangibles.

"We spent more than half our time wrestling with the changes in Article V, Chairman Ahearne said. "We came to the understanding that once you give this amount of information, you don't just fall into damnation. There is no precipice. It's not just a black-and-white, all-or-nothing situation. You resist, you do the best you can, and then you bounce back."

With it all, then, there does seem to be a dawning of understanding, one that may yet drive the dark from the battlefield of many men's souls and lead others in the future to higher, surer ground.

The man who is warm does, after all, understand the man who is cold.

Military Ethics: Some Lessons Learned from Manuel Davenport

Dr. J. Carl Ficarrotta

Starting and fighting wars is a morally hazardous business. The philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe describes the peril well: in starting wars, our common foibles have too often led nations to "wrongly think themselves to be in the right."[1] The deadly serious work of fighting wars presents to the military professional in combat even more pitfalls: "Human pride, malice and cruelty are so usual that it is true to say that wars have been mostly mere wickedness on both sides. . . . The probability is that warfare is injustice, that a life of military service is a bad life."[2] We might disagree with Anscombe's estimations of the probability that we will fail, but certainly no other context presents so many opportunities for the worst kinds of immorality. In the face of this danger, some people have actually embraced war as a moral catastrophe, allowing without condemnation any use or abuse of power in international relations and any method of fighting in the prosecution of war. Fortunately, many more of us rightly set our faces against this kind of moral nihilism with respect to war.

With the opposition to nihilism and its radical permissiveness should come yet another worry: that we will do a poor job of formulating our moral judgments (and the accompanying, well-intentioned attempts to remedy or prevent problems). We must not proceed naively, too quickly, or from the "outside" without an appreciation for the real nature of the moral difficulties found in statecraft and the prosecution of warfare. Numbers of thinkers have avoided these risks, become wise and informed specialists in the morality of war, and made many helpful contributions to coping with the thorny problems posed in military ethics. Manuel Davenport was one of those thinkers. Indeed, we can understand in retrospect that he was part of an elite group of military ethicists who have done this vital work truly well.[3] The thoughtfulness, moral conviction, and discipline he brought to the enterprise of doing and teaching military ethics provide us with a great example. We should reflect on that example and see what lessons it can teach us in the present.

Lessons on How to Teach Military Ethics

The places where Davenport taught military ethics allowed his work as a teacher to have maximal reach and impact. Texas A&M University's Aggie Corps of Cadets normally has as many as 2,000 members, making it one of the largest groups of uniformed students in the country.[4] During his long tenure at A&M (starting in 1967), Davenport taught a course in military ethics that touched many of the cadets from this rich source of officers. Moreover, he twice served as a distinguished visiting professor at the Air Force Academy, where he taught military ethics to hundreds more future officers. Here is the first lesson to learn: at the very least, we must place courses in military ethics close to all of our commissioning sources.

On many occasions, I observed Davenport engage these undergraduates, who would soon become our leaders; he was always at their level—engaging, memorable, kind, and funny. Yet at the same time, he remained rigorous and intellectually demanding. In time his teaching provided a widespread, positive influence on how many of us throughout the armed services think about moral problems—influence planted one student at a time. So here is another lesson we should learn in reflecting on Davenport's teaching: we cannot teach military ethics properly by using only posters, pamphlets, or short motivational speeches. Reasonable concerns for efficiency and leveraging our resources must not trump what is essential to the educational process. Individual engagement, one student at a time and over long periods, is a vital part of the job.

Davenport did more than teach many college-aged students on their way to becoming junior officers. He also taught a number of teachers who then went on to educate many, many more undergraduates. The faculty of the Air Force Academy, like the one at West Point, is staffed in large part (indeed, for many years before the 1990s, almost exclusively) by military officers. Some military professors have long-term relationships with the academy, hold doctorates, and have years of teaching experience. Significantly more members of the military faculty, however, are very junior officers recruited from various career fields to serve a single tour of duty—three or four years—as instructors in lower-level introductory courses. They must hold a master's degree in the subject they hope to teach. If no qualified officers who hold the advanced degree are available, then the academy sponsors those with the right credentials for 12- to 18-month fellowships. That is, when necessary, the institution will "grow" its own junior instructors.

As one might expect, very few military officers already hold master's degrees in philosophy, so the lion's share of them must receive training in graduate schools before coming to work. However, not that many universities can or will accommodate the needs of the services on this count. Short timetables, students who need remedial work, students not able to pursue the doctoral degree, and other complications make it difficult for philosophy departments to admit these officers. But Davenport never said no. Always willing to take

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academy-bound officers under his wing, he got them through solid master's programs when others might not have. Through his training of these instructors, he of course touched the moral education of thousands of future military officers at both the Air Force Academy and West Point. Here we find yet another lesson: we must not neglect the institutional structures and programs that provide a pipeline of officers with the requisite expertise for teaching military ethics. Such structures and programs (for example, Air Force–sponsored civilian education, the release of officers from their career fields for these "nonstandard" tours and career paths, military billets on the academy staff, etc.) serve as critical nodes in our larger, systematic effort to produce Air Force officers with strong moral character and sure moral-reasoning skills.

During his yearlong visits to the academy, Davenport served as an important advisor to several department heads and mentored many junior faculty members. On his first visit, he became a confidant to Malham Wakin, a colonel at the time (Wakin called Davenport his "senior consultant"). During his second visit, Col Charles Myers felt much the same way. For younger faculty, Davenport led reading groups, offered advice on publishing, and gave of his time freely and generously, both in the office and in the coffee shop, always ready to help with something puzzling, whether personal or professional. The academy's philosophy department is unquestionably stronger as a result of the two years he spent there. Other visitors have had similar beneficial influences. Sharing the expertise of senior scholars in this way provides another important precedent for us to follow: we should find ways to replicate this sort of in-residence arrangement at all levels of ethics education in the Air Force. We cannot replace Davenport, but we *can* hope to benefit from the synergistic and sustained stimulation that a visiting expert can bring to a faculty.

Davenport's influence spread from more places than just Texas A&M and the Air Force Academy. In the early 1980s, a group of military officers formed an organization that would allow them to present papers on problems in military ethics at a regularly held symposium—the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE, now known as the International Symposium for Military Ethics). When the group sought out Davenport to participate, he agreed immediately, serving on the JSCOPE board as its civilian representative, presenting many ground-breaking papers at the conference, and arranging to have Texas A&M host the conference before it found a permanent home in Washington, DC. Year after year in this organization, he facilitated the thinking not only of undergraduates and their teachers, but also of seasoned professionals still struggling with the same problems—people *now in the military*, who will make so many of the hugely important decisions in fighting our nation's wars. So here we find yet another lesson to learn: we should continue to support ongoing ethics forums for military professionals to share ideas and consult with a diverse group of experts. Overall, we should look to Davenport's teaching as a model for what is possible and find ways to keep that kind of flame burning (with undergraduates, their teachers, and working professionals).

What He Taught: The Doctrines

Besides learning from Davenport's example as a great teacher with a wide influence, we obviously cannot neglect to survey *what* he taught. His writing on military ethics reveals helpful contributions in two broad areas. In the first, he articulated and defended some specific doctrines—extensions of or twists on several classic principles in military ethics. In the second, he showed us a method or an approach that we should never fail to appreciate and emulate.

The doctrines he taught ran the gamut of problems in military ethics: moral questions about when to go to war, how we may fight, professional loyalty and competence, and what sorts of people (morally speaking) military professionals should be. He worked broadly inside the just war framework, familiar to any student of military ethics.[5] Here I highlight only a few of the most important and influential ideas that he developed and promulgated—ideas unique or unusual in the literature on these topics.

To begin, Davenport consistently warned us of the dangers of military power and the absolute necessity they create for certain loyalties in people who make up the military. The dangers fall into two general categories. First, if given too much power, the military typically does not relinquish it; hence, the military's influence grows beyond what is fitting, and its function moves from protection toward tyranny. So loyalty to the client state becomes crucially important. The military is and should be characterized by fellowship and a fierce loyalty to the service, yet "duty to client [that is, the client state] must take priority over duty to profession, and in this nation [the United States] we recognize this by the principle of civilian control of the military."[6]

Connected to this notion was Davenport's firm defense of a venerable just war principle: that only legitimate and competent authority—removed from the military itself—should make the decision to go to war. Militaries throughout history have been tempted to think they knew better than the citizens they served, with bad results. In most cases, when members of the military "decide who the enemies of their society are and engage on their own in actions aimed at the destruction of such perceived enemies, the stability of their society is endangered rather than preserved."[7] Moreover, in Davenport's view, we should remove the decision to go to war even from people responsible for the day-to-day tasks of direct rule. Rather, the authority for making war should rest with those responsible for appointing and deposing rulers—in the United States, the people or their representatives. History has shown and reason confirms that "those who directly rule are more difficult to depose if they possess the power to make war."[8] We must keep the dogs of war on a tight leash.

The second danger of military power manifests itself in the conduct of war. Davenport had grave concerns over soldiers in the midst of fighting made "drunk with power." Even if these soldiers recognize that the client state and the rules of morality grant their power to do violence, they may be "tempted to exercise the power . . . without restriction and plead that this was necessary in order to serve the best interests" of their clients.[9] However, military professionals must "distinguish between [their] clients and humanity" and cannot justify destructive actions toward enemy civilians simply because such actions might promote their own interests or even those of fellow citizens back home. The paramount duty of the military professional is "to promote the safety and welfare of *humanity* and this duty, [even] according to military law, takes precedence over duties to clients, who as his fellow citizens are but a particular portion of the human race" (emphasis in original).[10] So discrimination between the innocent civilian and the combatant is one of the military professional's most pressing responsibilities. Temptations to the contrary notwithstanding, this responsibility takes precedence over our other personal or state interests.

This same lexical ordering of values led Davenport to some interesting views on what constituted just cause for warfare. His views were more encompassing than those of people who advocate only for national interests and self-defense: "In an ideal world all violations of human rights should be punished, but in the actual world we may not be able to do this. Our failure to do so, however, should not prevent us from appreciating that our attempts to establish international justice can and should lead to increased moral awareness and an improvement in the actual rules of war. Improvement in the quality of life for all humans is more important than serving our selfish, national interests."[11]

Davenport also had strong views on the kinds of people we need in the military and stumped for the personal qualities he considered indispensable for military service. Elaborating on some ideas of Wakin, Albert Schweitzer, and others, he pointed especially to moral integrity and expert technical competence. He called for courage (both physical and moral), a sense of calling, and a wholeness of person—and made these strong moral demands even in the military professional's private life. For example, Davenport set his face against toleration of adultery for the military officer, even when it remains private: "A person whose continued existence depends upon deceiving himself and others cannot be trusted to execute assigned duties or to provide truthful reports which are subjectively unpleasant or harmful. Such a person . . . cannot be a military professional worthy of respect."[12]

He endorsed these special and demanding military virtues because they are necessary for military functioning. Now this functional approach is a fairly standard way of understanding the justification of military virtues. All along, however, Davenport noticed that these virtues must promote not only military excellence, but also (and at the same time) a rich notion of the good life for anyone, in or out of the military. After all, what counts as a moral military should not be conceived in isolation from the rest of the moral life—in fact, a moral military will be moral *precisely because* it properly preserves a number of important human goods. Virtues for the military professional and those for a good human life as a whole must go hand in hand and blend into a seamless consistency. So Davenport's ultimate groundings for all these demands on military character (that is, military excellence *and* the overarching idea of a good human life) exclude the possibility of judging a Nazi a virtuous fighter simply because, on a certain level, he was a good soldier.

In another theme that runs through Davenport's work, he proposed that the bureaucratic and abstract nature of the military structure creates a number of problems, especially for the military character. In the first place, the structure of the military tends to aggravate its remoteness and isolation from the rest of society. This in turn creates a tendency not to respond adequately when unethical demands are made of the services. As a case in point, he thought that the military frequently finds its true needs unhealthily subordinated to purely selfish political concerns. He also believed that other features of the military structure create problems as well: an all-volunteer force does not adequately represent all walks of life, the military does not effectively recruit enough especially competent people, and the bureaucracy motivates a kind of careerism among officers that focuses merely on promotion rather than real excellence. But Davenport judged that the basically bureaucratic and abstract structure of any large military remains the only one it can have and still perform its function. Hence, "the military organization must [when necessary] change its personnel and its responses to the social environment so that within the existing structure there is a greater commitment to the military objective."[13] Again, he underscored the need for certain virtues or character traits—*certain kinds of people*—in the military. These, then, are some of the unique doctrines that Davenport taught.

What He Taught: The Method

Understanding the *method* by which Davenport developed and taught these doctrines (a method I discerned, for the most part, by his example) proves by far the more difficult lesson to learn; nevertheless, it is one we sorely need in the practice of military ethics. In sum, he was masterfully subtle—always evenhanded and never succumbing to the temptations of oversimplification or dogmatism. He said very clearly that we "should not rush headlong" to our judgments, warning against the "danger and allure . . . of moral shortcuts" and insisting that we engage in "constant questioning of the actual rules of war rather than inflexible adherence to [simplistic] moral absolutes."[14]

Indeed, Davenport resisted all forms of formulaic thinking about military ethics, showing us instead a kind of moral wisdom that grows out of a real humility before this difficult subject matter. In contrast to the deceptive simplicity and clarity of his writing, he had a profound appreciation of moral complexity. At the foundation of Davenport's thinking, we find the avoidance of one-dimensional theoretical commitments not true to the nature of moral experience. He frequently appealed to utilitarian arguments but was not simply a utilitarian; he spoke of moral duties but was not at base a Kantian; and he occasionally appealed to biblical principles or theologically informed philosophers but gave them no privileged place in his thinking.[15] In the same vein, he realized that moral theories are often not fine grained enough to help in the balancing of competing values but that, in addition, sensitive moral judgment and experience are crucial. Moreover, when approaching a concrete moral issue, he sought the facts—all of them—despite knowing the difficulty of discerning which facts have moral relevance. He also understood that knowing the everyday moral rules does not at once guarantee that we will know which ones properly fit with the situations at hand—or how. And he saw that sometimes a problem involves a lack of moral motivation or a failure to *possess* the virtues (rather than a failure to understand them). I could list more of his cautions. The important point is that Davenport knew that no simple algorithm guarantees a correct moral judgment, which is as much an art as it is a science. In all but the easiest cases, there is no simple way to proceed.

Davenport's understanding of moral judgment is reminiscent of something the philosopher Jay Rosenberg once said about philosophy in general: learning to do good philosophy is something that cannot be reduced to a simple set of rules. Sometimes we must first see how it is done—like learning to dance by watching someone else and then joining in.[16] In the same spirit, let us look at how Davenport handled some tough cases of applied moral reasoning by examining some instances of his method in action.

Take, for example, Davenport's analysis of a dilemma faced by Gen Laurence Kuter, who participated in planning the firebombing of Dresden during World War II. When Kuter's papers and some other previously classified documents became available in the 1990s, Davenport studied the memos associated with the general's decision to participate. He considered the targeting of this largely civilian population center with incendiaries immoral, amounting to a form of terrorism. Apparently, even Kuter believed something similar and held to the idea that "terrorism, including area bombing, was always wrong."[17] So we might think that if Kuter held these views yet still planned the raid, he must have been a weak and compromising sort—the kind Davenport so often claimed was out of place in the military.

But he refused to engage in such a characterization of Kuter. Why? He noted that Kuter tried mightily to dissuade his superiors from carrying out the raid, but he failed: "What seems evident is that he thought he had gained as much moral ground as he could hold, [and] that to push further might jeopardize his future moral credibility."[18] That said, how did Davenport think the moral person should respond in these terrible circumstances?

> To answer this question we would have to consider, as Kuter did, which course of action would contribute most significantly to winning the war and saving the peace: obedience after making one's moral objections known or a refusal on moral grounds to continue to participate in the war. General Kuter clearly believed that he could contribute more to both the moral awareness of his superiors and eventual victory by retaining his military office than by resigning it and becoming a public critic of those who had been his superiors. . . . He leaves us, as he left himself, constrained to preserve his integrity and serve his nation in the face of moral uncertainty. To acknowledge one's finitude and fallibility and yet take a stand according to one's best insights takes a high degree of moral courage. It is much easier to act as a moral coward and refuse to take a moral position out of fear of being mistaken or unpopular, and it is easier still to act on the arrogant and foolhardy assumption that one knows what is best for all humans in all times. The morally brave person fears the harms that come from failing to act and fears the harms that come from blind adherence to absolutes.[19]

Thus, compromising one's principles without objection or second thought is cowardly and easy (easy at least in the moment). In fact, a refusal to compromise on moral principle is almost without exception the courageous, difficult, and proper course—for example, when no doubt exists about the immorality or illegality of an order, integrity demands nothing less than firm disobedience. Davenport, however, admitted the existence, on very rare occasion, of fearsome circumstances filled with terrible pressures and conflicting duties in which a simple and high-minded refusal might *also* be the relatively easy, yet improper, course. Was Kuter really sure about the immorality of the raid? If the general resigned after vigorously making his objections known, who would replace him? Would the next such raid prove easier without Kuter in place? Without him, what are the chances of stopping another one? Would anyone challenge the moral consciences of his superiors? Would the details of the planning take any steps to mitigate the immorality he perceived? With all these questions open, the right course is not obvious. Michael Walzer notices a similar difficulty in such rare cases when we must do something, even though we judge it wrong, as part of an overall concern for doing the right thing: "We say of such people that they have dirty hands. . . . [Those] with dirty hands, though it may be the case that they had acted well and done what their office required, must nonetheless bear a burden of responsibility and guilt."[20] Whether or not we agree with Davenport (about the general idea or whether it was properly invoked in Kuter's case), his suggestion should give us pause before coming to the conclusion that Kuter plainly erred in compromising. Davenport showed us that a moral judgment often involves more than first meets the mind's eye.

Another case illustrates much the same point. During the 1970s, Davenport, along with Wakin and J. Glenn Gray, was part of the Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference. In the early months of that decade, the conference decided to put forward a public position paper, bearing the name of the conference, condemning the Vietnam War in clear terms. At the time, doing so would have been easy and (in those academic circles) uncontroversial. Wakin, at the time a colonel in the Air Force, asked the conference not to speak with one voice. If it proceeded as planned, he and other military philosophers in the group would have to withdraw. Davenport stood with the military officers even though he believed the war immoral, all things considered. Although others appeared not to understand, he understood the webs of loyalty in which the military officers found themselves. He respected their position and refused to take a simplistic view, even when it appeared on the surface to be the moral "high ground."

Davenport's reaction to problems of false reporting in the military provides yet another example of his careful reasoning. In the 1980s, beginning in Vietnam and continuing for over a decade, the military discovered a rash of false reporting—about battlefield events, maintenance, readiness, and a host of other things, big and small. Hysteria about the moral fabric of the military had started to spread among commentators. Yet Davenport would not jump on that bandwagon. He had previously done research on the killing of Japanese admiral Isoroku Yamamoto at the end of World War II. Who shot him? The pilots on the mission did not agree, but Davenport did not assume, as many do, that some or all of them were simply lying. In a fine case study, he uncovered how stress and expectations, personal values, and myriad other factors affect perception: "Given the stress produced by combat situations and multiplied by the increasing complexity of weapons and communications systems and in view of the fact that such stress can accentuate the normal tendency to respond to stimuli according to subjective values, what is remarkable is not that there are so many false reports concerning military operations but that, relative to the number possible, there are so few."[21] Ever the fair-minded and clear-headed analyst, he refused to join a frenzy that had no grounding—and he tried to dissuade us from doing so.

Davenport also weighed in on the controversial issues of gays in the military and women serving in combat roles, taking moderate positions at odds with both conservative and radical views on these problems. In defending those stances, he insisted on a careful examination of the actual consequences of proposed policies for the services and our nation. Before excluding women from combat on the basis of alleged bad consequences, we must first do the empirical work by *showing* the difficulty of integrating them or demonstrating that their presence would affect readiness. (Although Davenport had doubts about the existence of such evidence, he patiently awaited the verdict of actual experience.) Before excluding gays from service for similar reasons, we must first do the empirical work by *showing* that their behavior will seriously impair our ability to accomplish the military mission. Davenport simply did not abide a priori arguments or quick solutions rooted in preconceptions, authority, or ideology.

Conclusion

All of us, both in the military and out, have benefited greatly from what Davenport did—and the wise, careful way he did it. To my mind, he set the bar high in the practice and teaching of military ethics, and we must strive to meet that standard. Present and future generations of leaders and fighters need thorough exposure to the moral problems embedded in what they do. They need thorough education in the philosophical skill and practical wisdom they will need to negotiate these problems. To satisfy these needs, we must (1) persuade first-rate scholars and teachers, in and out of the military, to continue working in military ethics, (2) encourage them to do their work in places (such as academies, war colleges, and conferences for military professionals) where they will have an impact on the military at all levels, and (3) set up and maintain the kinds of institutional policies, practices, and support (such as teacher education, assignment priorities, in-residence visitor arrangements, travel funding, etc.) that will make all this possible.

Notes

1. G. E. M. Anscombe, "War and Murder," in *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, 2d ed., ed. Malham M. Wakin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 286.
2. Ibid.
3. Two others come to mind in the context of thinking about Davenport: J. Glenn Gray and Malham Wakin. I mention them because it is worth noting that in the early years of Davenport's career, while still teaching in Colorado, he cemented personal and professional friendships with these two. Their influences undoubtedly contributed to setting him on his way.
4. "About the Corps," Texas A&M University Corps of Cadets, http://www.aggiecorps.org/home/about.
5. For readers not familiar with just war thinking, many fine summaries of this general approach are available, which I will not attempt to re-create or summarize here. Among many others, see James Turner Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981); Paul Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly?* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1961); Nicholas G. Fotion, *Military Ethics: Looking toward the Future* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990); or Martin L. Cook, *The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004).
6. Manuel Davenport, *The Fellowship of Violence: Readings for Military Ethics* [a complete collection of his work on military ethics] (Acton, MA: Copley Publishing Group, 2000), 4.
7. Ibid., 79.
8. Ibid., 80.
9. Ibid., 5.
10. Ibid., 2–3.
11. Ibid., 181.
12. Ibid., 171.
13. Ibid., 29.
14. Ibid., 144, 181.
15. According to utilitarian thinking about the nature of morality, looking only to the *consequences* of actions, evaluated in terms of the greatest good for the greatest number, is morality's foundational principle. German philosopher Immanuel Kant assigns a similar foundational role to certain primitive duties—but those *not* determined by mere consequences.
16. Jay F. Rosenberg, *The Practice of Philosophy: A Handbook for Beginners*, 2d ed. (Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984), vii.
17. Davenport, *Fellowship of Violence*, 116. For a contrasting characterization of the raid, consult Frederick Taylor, *Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004) (reviewed by Maj Paul G. Niesen, *Air and Space Power Journal* 19, no. 3 [Fall 2005]: 122–24).
18. Davenport, *Fellowship of Violence*, 119.
19. Ibid., 120.
20. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 3d ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 323. See also his "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 2, no. 1 (Autumn 1972): 160–80.
21. Davenport, *Fellowship of Violence*, 64.

The Military in the Service of the State

Sir John Winthrop Hackett

This paper by Lt Gen Sir John Winthrop Hackett was delivered as the Harmon Memorial Lecture at the United States Air Force Academy in October 1970. Hackett pursues the theme here that the relationship between the military and the state in the twentieth century must be analyzed in terms of the nature of war and peace in this century. He suggests that previous American conceptions of the nature of war and the role of the military in the state were anti-Clausewitzian, but the structure of war from the Korean conflict on has required a different view. He points up the various consequences that ensued in World War II as a result of differing philosophies regarding war and politics. He maintains that the world situation today is such that total war must not be allowed to occur but that limited wars will continue to occur; war and peace will once more coexist. He reflects on the controversy between MacArthur and [Harry S] Truman, reaffirming the principle of civilian control of the military and making a number of astute observations about the proper placement of loyalty. He describes the ethical strains that military professionals must encounter and offers important reflections on the role that moral qualities play in the very function of the military.—MMW

I am much honored by the invitation to address this distinguished gathering tonight, and my wife and I are deeply indebted to our hosts for their hospitality and for the opportunity to visit this beautiful and remarkable place. My topic tonight is one upon which much has already been said. It might reasonably be asked whether anything omitted from the distinguished writings of men like Samuel Huntington, Hanson Baldwin, Spanier, Clark, Legere, Coles, Ralston, Higgins, to name only a few, as well of course as those very distinguished men, Theodore Ropp and Forrest C. Pogue, and my own good friend and countryman Michael Howard, who have also enjoyed your hospitality on similar occasions—whether anything omitted by them has sufficient importance to justify a transatlantic journey to say it. But times and perspectives change. It is perhaps worthwhile to ask, from a point in time now well advanced in a century that has seen swifter change in human affairs than any since the world began, what the relationship between the military and the state looks like today, what changes have taken place in it in our time, and what factors are at work leading to further change. To try to be exhaustive would be to succeed only in exhausting patience. I propose therefore only to outline a basic position and suggest broadly how it has developed up to our time, to point to some of the factors bearing in a novel way upon the relationship between the military and the state in the second half of our century and to ask what their effect might be, and finally to consider some ethical aspects of the relationship.

Until man is a great deal better than he is, or is ever likely to be, the requirement will persist for a capability which permits the ordered application of force at the instance of a properly constituted authority. The very existence of any society depends in the last resort upon its capacity to defend itself by force.

"Covenants without swords are but words," said Thomas Hobbes 300 years ago. This is no less true today. Government thus requires an effective military instrument bound to the service of the state in a firm obligation.

The obligation was at one time uniquely personal. Later it developed into an obligation to a person as the recognized head of a human group—a tribe, a clan, a sect, or a nation. The group develops in structure, acquires associations and attributes (including territoriality) in a process occurring in different ways at different times in different places. The polis emerges in ancient Greece. King John is found in medieval England describing himself on his seal, the first of English kings to do so, as *Rex Angliae,* King of England, and no longer *Rex Anglorum,* King of the English. The state is born. In western Europe statehood had by the midthirteenth century largely replaced the concept of an all-embracing Christendom as the basic political structure. Military service continued, however, to be rendered as an obligation to a person, to the single ruler, or to the monarch, and the personal link has persisted in one form or another right up to today.

As we leave the Middle Ages behind, the military profession emerges, clearly distinguished from other institutions. Continuous service, regular pay, uniforms, segregation in barracks, the revival and improvement of ancient military formations such as the Roman Legion, the development of tactics, the introduction of better materials and techniques and of firearms, more attention to logistics—these and other developments had by the early eighteenth century regularized this calling; the nineteenth century professionalized it. From the late nineteenth century onwards, armed force was available to the governments of all advanced states through the medium of military institutions everywhere broadly similar in structure and essentially manned—and wholly managed—by professionals. The soldier and the statesman were by now no longer interchangeable; the subordination of military to

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civil was, in theory everywhere and in your country and mine in fact as well, complete.

The Napoléonic experience led not only to the complete professionalization of the military calling; by reducing to a system the basic concept of the French revolutionary armies, it opened up the era of the nation-in-arms and thus of total war. In the eighteenth century, wars were conducted by a relatively small sample of the nation's manpower applying a relatively small proportion of the nation's wealth. The nineteenth century led to the situation in which the totality of a nation's resources in men and materials was applied to the conflicts that similarly mobilized all other belligerents. In the eighteenth century, war and peace could to some extent coexist. England and France were at war when the writer Sterne received his passport to travel in France from the French ambassador in London himself with the words, "A man who laughs is never dangerous."[1] Odd vestiges of the coexistence of war and peace persisted even into the nineteenth century: George Washington's investment account was handled by Barings of London throughout the Revolutionary War; and Russia, 70 years later, helped to finance the Crimean war against France, Turkey, and Britain by means of loans raised in London. But by quite early in the twentieth century, war and peace had come to be mutually exclusive concepts and could coexist no longer.

A century and a half after Napoléon we seem to have reverted in some respects to the position evident before him. Total war is now unacceptable, total peace is apparently unobtainable. The world lives in a state between the two: war and peace again now coexist.

With the military institution professionalized, regularized, and seen to be subordinate to the civil power, what was its sphere of operation and to what or whom was it ultimately responsible? Clausewitz declared that war was the continuance of policy by other means. Military action in war must always be governed by political requirements.

But some who have accepted that the state is master have not always accepted that the statesmen are the masters, or have done so with extreme reluctance. "I can't tell you how disgusted I am becoming with those wretched politicians," said Gen George McClellan in October 1861[2]—a sentiment that has possibly been echoed more than once since then. On at least one important occasion in recent years, hostility and distrust have erupted into something near open insubordination.

The principles formulated by Clausewitz have not been accepted as binding at all times everywhere. In Germany in World War I, the army under the control of Hindenburg and Ludendorff became "a state within the state claiming the right to define what was or was not to the national interest."[3] The supreme command reserved to itself the right of defining Germany's war aims.

The history of the United States in our time has also afforded instances of tendencies to operate in a sense opposed to the concepts set out by Clausewitz. The case of General MacArthur is important here and I shall return to it later. But in quite another respect the approach of the United States to military/civil relationships up to the middle of our century could be described as anti-Clausewitzian.

Let us look at the spring of the year 1945 as events drove swiftly on to military defeat of Germany. In spite of agreement between the Allies on postwar areas of occupation, "It was well understood by everyone," as Winston Churchill wrote, "that Berlin, Prague, and Vienna could be taken by whoever got there first."[4] The supreme allied commander, writes Forrest C. Pogue, "halted his troops short of Berlin and Prague for military reasons only." As General Eisenhower himself said of this time, "Military plans, I believed, should be devised with the single aim of speeding victory."[5]

General Eisenhower recognized that Berlin was the political heart of Germany. General Bradley, however, in opposing the British plan for an all-out offensive directed on the capital, described Berlin as no more than "a prestige objective," though he frankly conceded later that "as soldiers we looked naively on the British inclination to complicate the war with political foresight and nonmilitary objectives."[6]

Here lies the crucial difference between two philosophies. The one holds that war *replaces* politics and must be conducted by purely military criteria towards purely military ends. When war has been ended by the enemy's military defeat, political action can once more take over from the military. The other maintains that war *continues* policy and is conducted *only* to a political end, that in grand strategy purely military criteria and objectives do not exist, and that military action must at all times be governed by political considerations arising out of clearly defined war aims. Under the first concept the only war aim is to win the war and to do this as quickly as possible. Under the second the prime aim in war is to win the peace. A policy of unconditional surrender is not a war aim at all, but the acknowledgment of the lack of one.

There were, of course, towards the end of World War II problems of national sensitivity within the alliance which complicated issues. It would be wrong now to oversimplify them. Nevertheless, whereas Churchill asked at the time whether the capture of Berlin by the Russians would not "lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties for the future,"[7] the US Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that such "psychological and political advantages as would result from the possible capture of Berlin ahead of the Russians should not override the imperative military consideration, which in our opinion is the destruction and dismemberment of the German armed forces." There is no evidence whatsoever that General Eisenhower at any time put American national interests above those of the British. There is plenty of evidence that he acknowledged the complete priority in importance of the general political interest over the military. "I am the first to admit," he said, "that a war is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military considerations in this theater I would cheerfully readjust my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an operation."[8] The Combined Chiefs gave him no other instructions on this critically important point than to make his own dispositions. The new president of the United States, Harry S Truman, cabled Churchill on

21 April 1945 that "the tactical deployment of American troops is a military one."[9]

On 2 May 1945, with the Allied troops still halted according to their orders from SHAEF [Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces] on or about the Elbe, the Russians completed the capture of Berlin. On 12 May, with the Allies halted on orders from the same source to the north and west of Prague, the Russians entered Prague too. I do not think I need dwell now on the consequences of these events or their effect upon the history of our own time. Let me only add a warning against oversimplification. The record stands as quoted. The Yalta agreement, however, is also on the record and it is not easy to see how the Allies could have stayed in Berlin and Prague even if they had got there first. The decisions which led to the course of events I have outlined here were in general wholly consistent with the US attitudes up to the midtwentieth century. The national ethic was not greatly in favor of the application of armed force to a political end. It is true that the United States had been involved in limited wars (like the Spanish-American and that of 1812–14 with Britain) and in wars against the Indians which could scarcely be justified on grounds either of absolute morality or of national survival. But the nation has in general been reluctant to fight except where there was clear and compelling danger of national overthrow or a violation of the moral code the nation followed—a violation so grave and flagrant as to demand correction. It has then suspended normal peacetime procedures wherever the military imperative demanded, thrown its whole weight into the crushing of opposing armed force as speedily as possible and, this accomplished, returned with relief to its own way of life.

From this concept there developed a division of responsibility of which a classic exposition is quoted by Morton from an Army War College statement of September 1915. "The work of the statesman and the soldier are therefore coordinate. Where the first leaves off the other takes hold."[10]

The middle years of our century, however, have seen changes that have profoundly affected the relations of military and civil and have set up a new situation. Of developments in military practice, the introduction of weapons of mass destruction is the most obvious, but it is not the only one. Improved and new techniques and materials abound and have been applied not only in all aspects of weaponry but over the whole range of tools for war. Developments in metals, ceramics, plastics; new sources of energy; new forms of propulsion; new techniques in the electric and electronic fields; laser beams and infrared; the startling developments in solid-state physics which have revolutionized communications and control systems—these are only a few examples chosen at random from a list any military professional could almost indefinitely extend. What has been happening in space needs no emphasis, nor does the dramatic rise in powers of surveillance. The flow of information from all sources has vastly increased and the application of automatic processes to its handling has opened a new dimension.

There are other developments than those in the hardware departments. International alignments have changed. The Unites States has replaced Britain in important traditional roles; Russia has been reborn; China has emerged as a major power. The third world has grown up out of disintegrating colonial empires—British, French, Belgian, Dutch—and stresses have developed in the international community no less than at home as the rich are seen to get richer much more quickly than the poor do. International relations have grown more complex with the demise of bipolarity. The Russians have moved further from strict Marxism at home and have developed a striking potential for armed action at a distance abroad. The failure hitherto of yet another attempt to establish a world community of nations in the United Nations has been accompanied by a growing impatience worldwide with warfare as a means of settling social problems, while there has been no decline at all in the resort to warfare. There has been a surge of interest everywhere in the study of defense problems, an interest which springs, in my view, from a basic realization that what is at stake is nothing less than human survival. There has been much striving towards international agreement to take account of the new situation, and some of it not unpromising—the Test Ban Treaty, for instance, and SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty]. The American relationship with Europe has changed and is changing further. These are only some of the more important developments in the field of external relations.

Here in the United States you have seen an increase in centralized authority and a closer scrutiny of the decision-making process in relation to national security. The risks of the nuclear age and the complexity of international issues have resulted in a day-to-day involvement of the executive in external affairs, with all their military implications, far greater than in the past. The reason for this, as well as for the development of defense analysis into a considerable industry, lies in the imperatives of nuclear weapon power. Armed forces cannot now be brought into being more or less at leisure after the crisis breaks, as was formerly possible for America beyond the oceans, and for Britain, protected by her navy, when Britain could afford to be content to lose every battle but the last. For in general and unrestricted war the last battle is now the first, and we know that it cannot be won. Thus it is vital not to let the war take place at all, and deterrence becomes the major element in defense. But deterrence demands an apparatus sufficient in size and performance, always up to date, always at a high state of readiness, but never used and never even fully tested. It is therefore quite inevitable that the military agency will be closely and continuously monitored by its civil masters.

From all these and other developments, the civil/military relationship now finds itself in a new frame of reference. I select two important elements in this new environment for further comment.

First of all, there is the enormous rise in the cost of warlike material since World War II and the huge increase in the burden on national resource, in money, materials, and skilled manpower, which preparation for war demands. President Eisenhower spoke of the growing significance of a military/industrial complex. General MacArthur among others drew attention to the ruinous cost of preparation for war, as distinct from the cost of its conduct. The demands of the military upon national resource, in times when a world war is *not* being fought, can be so great that the whole orientation of national policy, not only abroad but at home as well, can be determined by them. The danger of the formal supersession of civil authority by the military can today in our two democracies be dismissed as negligible. National resource, however, whatever its size, is limited. Money spent on space exploration cannot be spent on slum clearance. Money spent on the containment of pollution cannot be used for an antiballistic missile system. Even if the usurpation of civil government by the military is no longer to be feared, the orientation of policies, particularly at home, which might be forced upon the state by demands upon material resource, money, and skilled industrial, technical, and other manpower could place the military in a position of dominance scarcely less decisive in this event than formal usurpation of powers of government.

In a pamphlet published in Britain this month, J. K. Galbraith speaks of the growth of a huge bureaucratic organization of defense contractors and politicians acting with service advice. It began to grow, to use Galbraith's arresting phrase, before poverty was put on the national agenda. The danger that the military, through the demands upon resource of the military/industrial complex, would exercise too powerful an influence over the state was never high in postwar Britain. Professor Galbraith suggested to me last week in England that the British tradition of civil supremacy was probably too powerful to allow it. There are other, simpler reasons. The world wars which greatly enriched the United States greatly impoverished the United Kingdom. Britain was made very sharply aware at the end of World War II that drastic reduction in national resource demanded a drastic review of spending priorities. Over the postwar years Britain has asserted and confirmed priorities in which social spending went ahead of expenditure on defense. In the past few years, for the first time ever, less has been spent in Britain on defense, for example, than on education.

In the United States, where resource was so much greater, the realization came later that resource, however great, was not unlimited. Hard priorities have had to be drawn and as this disagreeable task was faced, perhaps a little reluctantly, the demands of some other claimants on national resources have had to be heard.

My own view is that the danger of unbalancing the relationship between military and state through inordinate demand upon national resource was never great in Britain; and now in the United States, as national priorities come under review, it is on the decline. There is, however, an aspect of civil/military relations to which we are not yet, I think, wholly accommodated.

Of crucial importance in this relationship between armed forces and the state is atomic weapon power. It is a commonplace now that total war is no longer a rational act of policy. George Kennan saw this earlier than most when he wrote in 1954, "People have been accustomed to saying that the day of limited war is over. I would submit that the truth is exactly the opposite: that the day of total wars has passed, and that from now on limited military operations are the only ones that could conceivably serve any coherent purpose."[11] The implications of this situation have not been fully accepted everywhere. The concept of the nation-in-arms is no longer viable in major powers and we have to think of national security in other terms. But in what terms?

The introduction of atomic weapons has thrown new light upon a hallowed principle of Clausewitz's. "As war . . .," he wrote, "is dominated by the political object, the order of that object determines the measure of the sacrifice by which it is to be purchased. As soon, therefore, as the expenditure in force becomes so great that the political object is no longer equal in value this object must be given up, and peace will be the result."[12]

Into an equation that Clausewitz saw in relative terms, atomic weapons have now introduced an absolute. Can *any* political object be secured by the opening of a nuclear war which devastates both sides? Hence, of course, the whole language of brinksmanship in a situation in which one object—survival—has come to be common to all parties. In the context of general war we have here a completely new situation.

In the closing stages of World War II President Roosevelt showed much reluctance to impose a policy upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His successor, President Harry S Truman, was disinclined at a critical time in 1945, as we have seen, to instruct General Eisenhower to act in Europe on any other than purely military considerations. It was only five years later that this same presidential successor found himself roughly compelled to accept the logic of the new order and act in a diametrically opposite sense.

"The Korean War," says Samuel Huntington, "was the first war in American history (except for the Indian struggles) which was not a crusade."[13] I cannot quite accept this, but it certainly was for the United States a war of unusual aspect. It was a war conducted according to the main concept supported by Clausewitz and not at all according to the practice of Ludendorff. That is to say, the object from the beginning was clearly defined in political terms, and limited. There were variations from time to time in the war aim. After MacArthur's brilliantly successful amphibious operation at Inchon, the aim shifted from the simple reestablishment of the status quo in South Korea to the effecting of a permanent change in the whole Korean Peninsula. The chance was seen to reunite this at a time when China was thought to be too preoccupied with the danger from the old enemy Russia to be inclined to intervene by force of arms. But China did intervene and the administration reverted to its former aim, whose achievement would, in their view, run small risk of furnishing the USSR with excuse and opportunity for the opening of World War III before Europe was strong enough to resist.

General MacArthur could not accept this position in terms either of the limitation of means or of the restriction of ends. He challenged the administration on both counts. In criticizing the administration's desire to prevent the war from spreading, he declared that this seemed to him to introduce a new concept into military operations. He called it the "concept of appeasement, the concept that when you use force you can limit that force."[14]

"Once war is forced upon us," he told Congress, "there is no alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end."[15] He was not consistent here. He did not, in fact, advocate the use of every available means against China. He was strongly against the use of US ground forces in any strength on the mainland, for example, and advocated in preference air bombardment and sea blockade with the possibility of enlarging Nationalist forces on the mainland out of Formosa. He did not, in my view, either convincingly or even with total conviction argue against the acceptance of limitations on hostilities. What he did insist on was that the limitations accepted should be those of his, the military commander's, choice and not those settled upon by his political superiors. But given the acceptance of limitation in principle, the identification of those areas in which specific limitations must be accepted is a clear matter of policy. Is that for soldiers to determine? MacArthur challenged the administration on this issue and appealed to the legislature and the American people over the administration's head. He lost. Perhaps he underestimated the character of the president and the degree to which experience had helped him to develop since the spring of 1945. Perhaps he overestimated the support that he could expect in the Joint Chiefs. The position taken by the Joint Chiefs, however, supported that of the president. It conveyed quite clearly that the instrumental nature of the military, as an agency in the service of the state, was not going to be forgotten. In the seven years between 1945 and 1952 there probably lies a watershed in civil/military relations in the United States which future historians will see as of prime importance.

But another question arises, and this too was raised by the case of MacArthur, as it arose in the matter of the Curragh incident in Ireland in 1914 and with General de Gaulle in 1940. Where or by what is the allegiance of the military professional engaged? Personal service to an absolute monarch is unequivocal. But in a constitutional monarchy, or a republic, precisely where does the loyalty of the fighting man lie?

In Ireland just before the outbreak of World War I, there was a distinct possibility that opponents of the British government's policy for the introduction of home rule in Ireland would take up arms to assert their right to remain united with England under the crown. But if the British army were ordered to coerce the Ulster Unionists, would it obey? Doubts upon this score were widespread and they steadily increased. As it turned out, there was no mutiny, though the Curragh incident has sometimes been erroneously described as such. The officers in a cavalry brigade standing by on the Curragh ready to move into the north of Ireland all followed their brigade commander's example in offering their resignations from the service. The Curragh episode, all the same, formed an unusually dramatic element in an intrusion by the military into politics which seriously weakened the British government of the day and forced a change in its policy. As a successful manipulation of government by the military on a political issue, it has had no parallel in Britain in modern times. But it also raised the question of where personal allegiance lay and raised it more sharply than at any time since 1641, when the hard choice between allegiance to the king and adherence to Parliament, in the days of Thomas Hobbes, split the country in the English Civil War.

Essentially the same question was raised by MacArthur, for he challenged the administration on the fundamentals of policy—upon political ends, that is—as well as upon choice of military means. He also claimed that he was not bound, even as a serving officer, by a duty to the executive if he perceived a duty to the state with which his duty to the administration conflicted. His words to the Massachusetts legislature are worth quoting: "I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept, that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of the Government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous."[16]

There is here a deep and serious fallacy. I do not refer to the possible violation of the president's constitutional position as commander in chief. I have more in mind a principle basic to the whole concept of parliamentary democracy as it is applied, with differences in detail but in essential identity of intention, in our two countries. It is that the will of the people is sovereign and no refusal to accept its expression through the institutions specifically established by it—whether in the determination of policies or in the interpretation of the constitution—can be legitimate. MacArthur's insistence upon his right as an individual to determine for himself the legitimacy of the executive's position, no less than his claim of the right as a military commander to modify national policies, can never be seen in any other way than as completely out of order. It is ironic that MacArthur, who himself might perhaps have been brought to trial for insubordination, should at one time have sat in judgment on another general officer for that very offense. General [Billy] Mitchell, though possibly wide open to charges of impropriety in the methods he used, was challenging the correctness of the administration's policy decisions. MacArthur's act was the far graver one of challenging his orders in war, and of appealing to the legislature and people over the commander in chief's head.

It is worthy of note that in the wave of criticism of General MacArthur from non-American sources, some of it violent at times, General de Gaulle in France was almost alone among those of comparable importance who raised his voice in MacArthur's defense. De Gaulle himself, of course, had been there too. He had declined to accept the wholly legitimate capitulation to a national enemy in war of a properly constituted French government. This is something for which France will always remain deeply in his debt. There is no doubt, however, of the correctness of the position taken by officers of the so-called Vichy French Forces after the fall of France. We fought them in Syria on account of it. The Troupes français du Levant had orders to defend French possessions in mandated territories against all comers and this they did.

I was wounded for the first time in the last war in that campaign commanding a small force in an untidy little battle, which we won, on the Damascus road. After the armistice in Syria and the Lebanon, I was walking around Beirut with my arm in plaster when I met a French officer who was another cavalryman and a contemporary whom I had known before the war as a friend. He had the other arm in plaster and, I discovered, had been in this little battle as the commander on the Vichy French side. We dined together in the St. Georges Hotel while he explained to me with impeccable logic how professionally incompetent the command had been on our side. The fact that we had won was at best irrelevant and at worst aesthetically repugnant. But I do not recall that in the whole of our discussion either of us doubted the correctness of his action in fighting against the Allies and his old friends.

There is sometimes a purely military justification for disobedience. Britain's greatest sailor, Lord Nelson, exploited it. After Jutland, Admiral Lord Fisher said of Admiral Jellicoe that he had all Nelson's qualities but one: he had not learned to disobey. What I describe as military justification rests in the opinion of the officer on the spot that he can best meet the military requirement of his superiors if he acts in some way other than that prescribed by them. This is a matter of professional judgment, and of courage, for failure can prejudice a career. It is not a matter of morals. But there are also circumstances in which men or women find themselves under a moral compulsion to refrain from doing what is lawfully ordered of them. If they are under sufficiently powerful moral pressure and are strong enough and courageous enough to face the predictable consequences of their action, they will then sometimes disobey. This, I know, is terribly difficult ground. "My country right or wrong" is not an easy principle to reconcile with an absolute morality, even if we accept a Hegelian view that the state represents the highest consummation of human society. Early in World War I a brave English nurse called Edith Cavell, who had said that "patriotism is not enough," was shot by her country's enemies for relieving human suffering where she found it, among people held by the enemy to be *francs tireurs* or partisans. Nurse Edith Cavell's statue stands in London off Trafalgar Square, around the corner from the National Gallery, and it is worth a look in passing. It bears the inscription I have quoted: "Patriotism is not enough."

In the half century since that time doubt has grown further, not only of the ultimate moral authority of the nation-state but also of its permanence as a social structure. The nation-state could at some time in the future develop into something else. States have before now been united into bigger groupings, and supranational entities are not impossible.

I do not see the nation-state disappearing for a long time yet, but already we have much experience of international political structures under which groups of national military forces are employed. The United States in the last third of a century, it has been said, has learned more about the operation of coalitions than ever before. Conflicts of loyalty are always possible where forces are assigned to an allied command. I have been a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commander in Europe, and as such I had on my staff an officer of another nation who was engaged in the contingency planning of tactical nuclear targets. This was less of an academic exercise for this particular officer than it might have been, say, for an American or even for a Briton, for the targets were not only in Europe but in this officer's own country and in parts of it he had known from boyhood. It was made known to me that this officer was showing signs of strain and I had him moved to other work, for the military servant of a nation-state can even now be put under moral strain in situations where conflicts of loyalties arise. The tendency towards international structures will almost certainly increase and the incidence of such situations is unlikely to grow less.

Let me draw together these thoughts upon the moral, as distinguished from the professional, aspect of obedience. The fighting man is bound to obedience to the interest of the state he serves. If he accepts this, as MacArthur certainly did, he can still, rightly or wrongly, question, like MacArthur, the authority of men constitutionally appointed to identify and interpret the state's interest. He could even, like de Gaulle, flatly refuse to obey these men. Those who consider General MacArthur open to a charge of insubordination may consider that General de Gaulle was probably open to a charge of no less than treason. Neither is constitutionally permissible. A case in moral justification might just possibly be made for both, though such a case is always stronger when the results of the act are seen to be in the outcome beneficial. "Treason doth never prosper," wrote Sir John Harrington in the days of Queen Elizabeth the First. "What's the reason? For if it prosper none dare call it treason." In the event, de Gaulle became in the fullness of time president of the French Republic. It was poor Pètain who was put on trial.

Finally there is disobedience on grounds of conscience to an order, lawfully given, whose execution might or might not harm the state but which the recipient flatly declines, for reasons he finds compelling, to carry out. This will be done by the doer at his peril; and the risk, which can be very great, must be accepted with open eyes.

Another possible cause of strain upon the military is divergence in the ethical pattern of the parent society from that of its armed forces. Samuel Huntington, in the book *The Soldier and the State,* which will always occupy a high place in the literature on this topic, spoke in the late 1950s of tendencies in the United States towards a new and more conservative environment, more sympathetic to military institutions. He suggested that this "might result in the widespread acceptance by Americans of values more like those of the military ethic."[17] The course of events since Huntington wrote this, in 1956, throws some doubt on the soundness of any prediction along these lines. The qualities demanded in military service, which include self-restraint in the acceptance of an ordered life, do not seem to be held in growing esteem everywhere among young people today. In consequence, where a nation is involved in a war which cannot be described as one of immediate national survival and whose aims, however admirable they may be, are not universally supported at home and perhaps not even fully understood there, strains can be acutely felt. Limited wars for political ends are far more likely to produce moral strains of the sort I have suggested here than the great wars of the past.

The wars of tomorrow will almost certainly be limited wars, fought for limited ends. The nation-in-arms has vanished; the general war is no longer a rational concept. But the nation-state will persist for a time yet and the application of force to its political ends will persist with it. These ends, however, will be limited and the means limited too—not by choice of the military but by choice of their employers, the constitutionally established civil agencies of the state. These employers will also be watching most carefully the level of military demand being made on national resource. If this level rises so high as to prejudice enterprises higher in the national scale of priorities than preparation for war, it will be resisted. There are signs that the very high priority given to the demands of the military on national resource in the United States in the third quarter of the twentieth century will not persist in the fourth.

Ladies and gentlemen, in addressing myself to the topic chosen for this memorial address, "The Military in the Service of the State," I have selected only a few aspects of a big and complex theme. Let me end with something like a *confessio fidei*—a confession of faith. I am myself the product of 35 years' military service—a person who, with strong inclinations toward the academic, nonetheless became a professional soldier. Looking back now in later life from a university, I can find nothing but satisfaction over the choice I made all those years ago as a student—a satisfaction tinged with surprise at the good sense I seem to have shown as a very young man in making it. Knowing what I do now, given the chance all over again, I should do exactly the same. For the military life, whether for sailor, soldier, or airman, is a good life. The human qualities it demands include fortitude, integrity, self-restraint, personal loyalty to other persons, and the surrender of the advantage of the individual to the common good. None of us can claim a total command of all these qualities. The military man sees round him others of his own kind also seeking to develop them, and perhaps doing it more successfully than he has done himself. This is good company. Anyone can spend his life in it with satisfaction.

In my own case, as a fighting man, I found that invitations after World War II to leave the service and move into business, for example, were unattractive, even in a time when anyone who has had what they called on our side "a good war" was being demoted and, of course, paid less. A pressing invitation into politics was also comparatively easy to resist. The possibility of going back to Oxford to teach medieval history was more tempting. But I am glad that I stayed where I was, in the profession of arms, and I cannot believe I could have found a better or more rewarding life anywhere outside it.

Another thought arises here. The danger of excessive influence within the state to which I have been referring does not spring from incompetence, cynicism, or malice in the military, but in large part from the reverse. What is best for his service will always be sought by the serving officer, and if he believes that in seeking the best for his service he is rendering the best service he can to his country, it is easy to see why. He may have to be restrained. He can scarcely be blamed.

The military profession is unique in one very important respect. It depends upon qualities such as those I have mentioned not only for its attractiveness but for its very efficiency. Such qualities as these make any group of men in which they are found an agreeable and attractive one in which to function. The military group, however, depends in very high degree upon these qualities for its functional efficiency.

A man can be selfish, cowardly, disloyal, false, fleeting, perjured, and morally corrupt in a wide variety of other ways and still be outstandingly good in pursuits in which other imperatives bear than those upon the fighting man. He can be a superb creative artist, for example, or a scientist in the very top flight, and still be a very bad man. What a bad man cannot be is a good sailor or soldier, or airman. Military institutions thus form a repository of moral resource that should always be a source of strength within the state.

I have reflected tonight upon the relationship between civil and military in the light of past history, present positions, and possible future developments and have offered in conclusion my own conviction that the major service of the military institution to the community of men it serves may well lie neither within the political sphere nor the functional. It could easily lie within the moral. The military institution is a mirror of its parent society, reflecting strengths and weaknesses. It can also be a well from which to draw refreshment for a body politic in need of it.

It is in the conviction that the highest service of the military to the state may well lie in the moral sphere, and the awareness that almost everything of importance in this respect can still be said, that I bring to an end what I have to offer here tonight in the Harmon Memorial Lecture for the year 1970.

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Leadership: A Hallmark of Military Life

Michael W. Wynne

A hallmark of military life is leadership—we navigate by leadership. In the civilian world there is often a struggle to parse the difference between management on one hand, and leadership on the other. Leadership often remains a mystery.

In all walks of life, people usually recognize leadership when they see it, although not all know its source. But leadership is not a mystery in the military life. Leadership springs from living as an example and from integrity, service, sacrifice, and devotion to those in one's charge.

Leaders beget leaders; it is the lifeblood of our Air Force. Gen Curtis LeMay in particular was a leader with a message that resonates today, as the Air Force transforms by means of Air Force Smart Operations 21: "My personal philosophy is that the best outfits are those wherein a procedure is developed whereby every man who has an idea on a particular subject may bring it forward at the time of the discussion, without the slightest criticism or hesitation."

General LeMay was on target. The best leaders remove barriers to communication and performance. The leaders of our Air Force—the commanders and supervisors at all levels—in fact have the authority to remove barriers, perceived or real, that may prevent their Airmen from mission accomplishment. This is the essence of leadership under Air Force Smart Operations 21: Remove barriers and encourage education, ideas, and innovation.

How do leaders find these barriers? The answer can be found in the Air Force Core Values. Everything a leader does must be cemented in the foundation of these Values, while consistently instilling an accountable Airmen ethic.

Integrity First. Service Before Self. Excellence in All We Do. These Values must be internalized by all Airmen, and are especially critical to those we entrust with leadership. They are the pathway to achieving the Air Force mission.

Integrity First starts with a commitment to honesty. It goes on to include courage, both physical and moral, and respect, both for yourself and others. Thomas Jefferson described it best when he described our moral muscles, saying we build and strengthen our character through the daily exercise of words, actions, and decisions.

Leaders must possess the moral courage to confront unacceptable behavior, and remove the barriers created by discrimination or harassment. As an expeditionary force, we find ourselves deployed to foreign countries with increased responsibilities in new mission areas with each Airman acting as an ambassador to strengthen the relationships with individual partner countries.

Also, providing sovereign options reflects the fact that our Air Force mission has grown to cover the spectrum of operations from humanitarian relief to base defense. This mission demands that effective leaders must not only set the standards, but also hold others accountable. The failure to do so could affect our relationships with coalition partners and allies, degrading our efforts.

By confronting a "bad apple" who harasses others, a leader is not only removing a barrier to performance but is also upholding an accountable Airmen ethic and gaining the respect of those he leads.

In fact, instilling an accountable Airmen ethic is crucial in this information age of warfare. Due to advances in technology and communications, we can fly farther and shoot from greater distances than ever before, engendering a type of trust surpassed by no other. We are net-centric and must be able to trust the data stream and protect the data stream from Cyber attack. We must trust that the data that we're about to transmit is accurate; trust that our training will enable us to execute the mission correctly; and trust in the equipment we employ. In short, if we cannot trust, we cannot fight. *Integrity* must be *first*.

Service Before Self begins with duty. It also means that, as we fly and fight in war and peace, going above and beyond the call of duty is not the exception—it is the rule—in the United States Air Force.

Every Airman is an expeditionary Airman, whom the Joint Team counts on every day to be trained and battle ready. We must deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its global interests. This often requires self-sacrifice.

Our Airmen embrace this Core Value not only in warfare, but in humanitarian relief. Whether it is the relief we provide to those devastated by the catastrophic South Pacific tsunami or the tragic Pakistani earthquake, the heroic efforts of our Men and Women in Blue exemplify *Service Before Self*. Many Airmen showed their commitment to service right here in the United States, during the immediate rescue and recovery operations from Hurricane Katrina.

In all cases, our leaders did not allow barriers—such as post-deployment reconstitution—to stop their Airmen from going beyond the call of duty. Some of our critical search and rescue Airmen had just returned from Operation Iraqi Freedom when their leaders removed that barrier so their Airmen could rescue Americans from rooftops in New Orleans.

Another example of such *Service Before Self* is the remarkable number of Air Force Reservists and Air National

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Guardsmen who volunteer for deployments. While other services regularly mobilize entire units for rotations, we are able to meet our requirements almost exclusively via volunteers. Why? Because Air Force leadership removed obstacles, allowing motivated volunteers to immediately contribute to the fight. Instead of our Guard and Reserve Forces facing barriers to become part of the fight, Air Force leaders integrated them into their units creating seamless Total Force teams.

In all of these examples, stellar Air Force leadership enabled such unparalleled accomplishments. By removing barriers to mission accomplishment, our leaders inspire their Airmen to display their commitment to *Service Before Self*.

Excellence in All We Do reminds us that a task worth doing is a task worth doing right. Mediocrity can cost lives and endanger our very nation. Thankfully, I spend little time worrying about the operational excellence of our Airmen. Like the heroes who have gone before us—giants like Mitchell, Doolittle, Spaatz, Davis, LeMay, and Schriever—we stand on the shoulders of amazing Airmen who conquered incredible odds.

On top of operational excellence, our Airmen must also pursue personal excellence through continued education. Leaders must remove the barriers that prevent our Airmen from taking continued education classes, and encourage them to see education as a lifelong project. Simple decisions will have far-reaching results. Leaders must take a holistic view and focus on training the whole individual, moving beyond their current jobs or skill sets. The goal is to create knowledge-enabled Airmen; stretching their Airmen's minds through further education is a key step for leaders.

But *Excellence in All We Do* continues beyond operational and personal excellence to include organizational excellence. Organizational excellence starts with leaders removing the barriers of favoritism and engendering an inclusive environment where every voice is given equal weight. Fostering this mutual respect ensures all Airmen are valued as important individuals. Likewise, mutual respect also applies to our coalition partners and the diverse cultures we work with as part of the Joint Team.

Once people realize their opinions are respected, they will amaze you with their ingenuity. *This is the heart of Air Force Smart Operations 21—leaders removing barriers so new ideas can be heard.*

Our Nation continues to call on our Air Force to perform missions that cover the entire spectrum of operations, from humanitarian relief to major combat operations. By taking our cue from General LeMay and removing barriers to performance, our leaders can ensure operational excellence, personal excellence, and organizational excellence will flourish.

As our mission areas grow, it is imperative that we continue to develop our leaders using the core values as our beacon. I have no higher priority as your secretary than reinforcing the bedrock of ***Integrity, Service, and Excellence*** in each and every one of our Airmen. And through Air Force Smart Operations 21, our leaders must keep removing barriers so knowledge-enabled Airmen can innovate while still maintaining an accountable Airmen ethic.

Our citizens expect nothing less as we provide for the Common Defense.

Dynamic Subordinancy

William J. Crockett

Our organizations are filled with subordinates, but few of us get much basic survival training for that role, not to mention training on how we might make those roles dynamic, synergistic, and satisfying. But we spend a lot of time helping people to learn how to be effective leaders and in learning how to fulfill their leadership roles. I believe that it's important for our organizations to start giving some attention to the development of the concept and role of followership, because leadership is but one strand in the complex web of human relationships that holds our organizations together.

Traditionally we have accepted the assumption that it's primarily the boss's job and responsibility to cause the work group to function well—and to take care of the people needs of subordinates so that the group is turned on and productive. Bosses have borne the chief responsibility in the past for the vitality of their relationships with their subordinates, and for the quantity and quality of their work.

But the successful and effective boss/subordinate relationship not only demands some things of bosses, it also demands some things of followers as well. Therefore, subordinates can and should be more than passive robots to be manipulated and used by bosses. They have the responsibility—as well as the opportunity—for making the situation a good one, a win/win for themselves as well as for the boss.

Another very pragmatic reason for our wishing to achieve excellence in followership is that we often get rewarded or punished as a result of our "followership" effectiveness. Our success in effectively filling our subordinancy roles is the key to our here-and-now security as well as to our future promotion and success. People get fired because they are ineffective subordinates. From this standpoint alone, the vitality and worth of the relationship are more important to the subordinate than they are to the boss—because it is the subordinate who has the most at stake!

There are three overlapping areas or ways for looking at our followership role and for mapping strategies for making that role more fulfilling to us, as well as more effective.

The first of these areas is the job itself. This includes how well we understand its mission and its accountabilities as well as its opportunities and the skills and attitudes this requires of us.

The second way of looking at our jobs is in terms of our relationships and, most especially, our relationship with our bosses.

The third area for review is our own feelings about our jobs, our bosses, and ourselves. Just our trust level and what can we do to improve it?

This article deals with each of these three areas and helps us to think through where we stand in each. It helps us to find the means of taking charge of our work lives rather than passively accepting what comes our way.

Finally, it also helps us to formulate an action plan for doing something about each of these three areas, for it is only by taking action that we can start to become more dynamic in our followership.

The Job Itself

Being a subordinate is very much like being a steward; that is, assuming the responsibility for the well-being of something that belongs to another. Like the biblical story of the good and bad stewards (Matthew 25:14–30), the stewardship role is not fulfilled when it is just passively done. The good steward is dynamic and risk-taking in attending to the work that he has been given to do.

However, in order for us to be dynamic and risk-taking in our jobs, we must work through some things for ourselves and then with our bosses. To risk blindly is the action of a foolish person, and it courts ruin as well as success. The dynamism I am talking about is that which has a high chance of ending with success for the subordinate as well as for the boss—a win/win situation for both.

In order for us to be genuinely dynamic, we must have a strong launchpad of basic understanding about the job and our boss on which to base our actions. There are three ingredients that make up this basic launchpad. These are as follows.

Know What the Job Is

In a survey, a group of top-level business people failed to agree upon the exact acts of subordinancy that would ensure the success of their subordinates. But they did agree upon the point that the subordinate must know precisely what it is that his or her boss expects! Doing a number of things well will not suffice if the boss doesn't care about those things. Therefore, no amount of effort in these areas will make the subordinate succeed if he or she fails to perform well in the one or two things that the boss holds dear.

Another area of potential misunderstanding around the job comes from ambiguity about the job itself. The more ambiguity there is in a job, the greater the danger in terms of the subordinate's not delivering what the boss really expects. The initiation of discussions with the boss about expectations for the tasks and responsibilities of the job is one of the first and most important responsibilities (and opportunities) of a subordinate.

It is absolutely essential that the critical success factors of the task, such as the boss's expectations, be known and understood by the subordinate. It is far too easy to overlook them in the first place, or to push them out of focus due to the multiplicity of nonessential tasks and loadings that the job (the subordinate) has acquired. It is the subordinate who has the best opportunity to know these loadings because he or she has the firsthand data. Therefore, it is the subordinate's responsibility to initiate discussions with the boss to surface expectations about the job: its accountabilities, its goals, its content, its priorities, its methodology, its standards, and so on. Boss/subordinate discussions around the context and meanings of the subordinate's job, when they are initiated by the subordinate's genuine concern for the boss and his or her best interest rather than from the subordinate's dissatisfaction, can be a dynamic and exhilarating experience for a subordinate. If subordinates will take the pains to be objective in documenting their cases, and if they will present them in a genuine concern for the boss, then the subsequent discussion can be free from emotion, tension, and acrimony.

One important piece of self-research we can do is to develop data about the job:

a. The accountabilities . . . what end results am I accountable for?

b. The critical accountabilities . . . the ones that have the most leverage if accomplished and those that have the most risk if not accomplished.

c. The ways I now spend my time and how that relates to *a* and *b* above.

Know How to Do the Job

The value that the boss places upon a subordinate is in relationship to how well the subordinate enhances the effectiveness of the boss's domain—how well the job is done. The shortsighted subordinate will conceive it to be the boss's responsibility to discover deficiencies, for training, to promote, to look after his or her career, and to help in the subordinate's success. And, of course, bosses do have some of these responsibilities.

One unyielding requirement for us if we are to be successful subordinates is that we can objectively look at ourselves and our skills in relation to the skills that the job requires. If we can do this and can see our own deficiencies, then we can, through training and development, acquire the needed skills. This aggressive self-examination of our needs and our taking charge of our own self-improvement is another way dynamic subordinates distinguish themselves from their more passive colleagues.

Dynamic subordinates don't wait. They soon take on that responsibility for their own professional development. They don't own their territory, for their boss can fire them at will. But the one thing that every subordinate does own, and which no one can take away, is their expertise—their professionalism. This is the most personal, most valuable, and most absolute territory a person can have. No one can hold a capable person back. Their professionalism and talents will become known, will be needed, and will be requested—if not by their boss, then by others.

The wise subordinate is the learning, developing, experience-seeking person who becomes independent because he or she is a professional! The wise subordinate never uses the maddening excuse, "That isn't my job," but will seize upon every opportunity for learning something new and having a new experience.

Do the Job

The end product that a boss expects from a subordinate is a job well done—whatever it is that "well done" means to the boss. A subordinate succeeds, gets rewarded, and receives accolades and promotions based mostly upon successful fulfillment of his or her here-and-now duties.

Do the job! That's what the boss expects and that's what we are receiving our pay as subordinates to do. That's what will lead us to success and future.

It is said that there are three requirements for successful followership, that is, for getting the job done. These are

- know **what** the job is,
- know **how** to do the job, and
- **do** the job.

Knowing what the job is and having the required skills to do it with will not get the job done if the person is not motivated to do it with zest. One of the most powerful drags to productivity in America is lack of motivation.

To become demotivated is the emotional result of all that we see happening to us in the workplace. When we are demotivated, we don't care whether or not we do the job, or whether we do it well or badly. Or maybe are so turned off and angry that our hidden objective is to really punish the organization and our boss! If we are in this frame of mind, then we have but two logical choices:

a. to pull ourselves out of this pit and rekindle our positive drive, or

b. to leave.

For the inevitable consequence of our staying in this negative frame of mind is sooner or later to be fired.

One play of dynamic action that I can suggest for us if we are in this state is to make an objective (it's hard to be objective now) analysis of our entire situation; for example,

a. search for and identify all of the negative emotional producers;

b. search for and identify the positive emotional producers (there will surely be some of these);

c. carefully analyze and examine the impact of each of these negatives and positives upon us;

d. think through ways that we can unhook ourselves from our participation in the negative producers;

e. think of ways that we can create other positive producers and enhance those that now exist; and

f. make a plan of action.

This whole analysis ideally should be shared with a trusted friend who will tell us honestly what his or her reactions are and not just what we would like to hear.

Another potential reason for our demotivation may be our feeling that we have been given little or no freedom by our boss to get our job done. Freedom of action in getting our job done has these components:

a. free to determine the substance (the what);

b. free to determine the timing of when things will be done (the when);

c. free to determine how the job will be done (the how);

d. free to determine who will be responsible for doing the job (the who); and

e. free to determine the cost of doing it (the cost).

Sometimes bosses just don't give their subordinates enough freedom to enable them to feel worthwhile, trusted, and turned on.

We can analyze each of our major accountabilities on the preceding five dimensions to get an objective evaluation of our freedom. If our analysis demonstrates to us that we aren't being given enough freedom around an accountability, or on one or more of the above dimensions, we then have objective data to take to our boss for discussion. If this is the case, we need to carefully devise an action plan of how we will confront the boss as well as what we plan to confront him or her with.

The possibility exists that we subordinates can badly misread the realities about us, and thereby we may have actively created our own demotivation out of nothing more than our own misperceptions. If this is the case, we'll need a personal action plan. On the other hand, of course, the possibility also exists that our analysis and our subsequent discussions with our boss only serve to confirm our worst fears and suspicions that the situation is a lost cause! If this is the case, then it will require a different kind of an action plan from us—a plan to leave!

One of the key dimensions to dynamic subordinancy is the psychological willingness and the professional capability of the subordinate to be independent of the boss and the job whenever I, the subordinate, want the end to come. When I find myself depressed and demotivated and I have done all that I could to change the conditions causing this, then it's time to think about leaving. When it becomes apparent to me that I can't respect my boss, don't approve of my boss, can't trust my boss, again it's time to think about leaving. When I find myself wanting to punish my boss, and am moved to bad-mouth and belittle my boss, then it's far past time for me to move on. To stay under such conditions is to prostitute myself for money with little sense of commitment and loyalty. To stay is to lose my self-respect as a human being. To stay is to eventually fail.

Perhaps our willingness to leave a situation whenever it no longer meets our needs, fulfills our values, turns us on, or challenges our expertise is the most important single measure for ensuring that we remain dynamic as a subordinate. This is the key to our own freedom and to our self-esteem.

Boss-Subordinate Relationships

Everyone knows that there is a lot more involved in a job than just getting the job done, no matter how well we do it from a substantive point of view. One critical factor for success in any job is the quality of the relationship we have been able to create with our boss.

This relationship, like all relationships, is a mutual responsibility to develop and nourish. But since it has so much significance for the future growth and success of the subordinate, we must go to extra lengths to try to cause the relationship to become a good one. Some of the things we can do are listed below.

Challenge

We must obey the legal demands of our boss, but in doing so, we do not have to lose our self-esteem nor take on the hangdog pose of the servant. We can become the trusted adviser to whom the boss comes to get the straight dope. No one, not even our boss, can be completely infallible. Humans at all levels will make mistakes occasionally. Most managers are thinly spread over wide stretches of important and diverse activities. As a result, they can be caught in trivial errors that take on more importance than they have in real substance. Wise subordinates will be alert to ways that they can rescue their boss from mistakes of commission and omission.

Most good bosses don't like subservience and don't trust yes-people. Most bosses want subordinates who will challenge their ideas, differ with their decisions, give them data, put forward new ideas for doing things, and who will care to be uniquely themselves. But to get away with this kind of behavior requires that the subordinate come from a base of absolute trust and not from competitive counterdependency. To gain this preferred role, a subordinate must have

- demonstrated absolute personal respect and loyalty to the boss in other situations;
- gained the boss's admiration and respect for his or her professionalism, for the accuracy of his or her data, for the timeliness of his or her reports, and for his or her emotional maturity;
- never publicly played win/lose games at the boss's expense; and
- gotten the boss's job done to the boss's expectations when the decision was finally made.

The role of loyal opposition or devil's advocate is an important one for all subordinates to learn—if they can also learn to use it from a solid base of trust. They must learn, when practicing it, to come across as caring rather than punishing, collaborative rather than competitive, probing rather than judging.

The way this is done—how it is done—is often far more important than what the substance is.

Inform

Closely associated with the concept of subordinancy is the irksome chore of accounting for our activities. Like obedience, most of us stopped accounting to anyone when we left home. And now that we are at work, we must once more account to someone—our hierarchic superiors.

The reason for this accountability to the boss is that no subordinate, no matter if his or her title is dishwasher or president, has final accountability. We are not the full owner of the territory that we occupy. We may feel like an entrepreneur, act like the king, and be a saint. But in the final analysis, we are but a steward in the "master's vineyard. "

Through the process of delegation, each subordinate is given a job to do by the boss. Some bosses tell their subordinates little, and others tell them much—how, when, who, where, why, how much, how often, how deep, how wide, and so on. But in the end, every subordinate must account to the leader for his or her stewardship of what was done with the thing the boss assigned. It is the subordinate's duty to give and the boss's right to request this accounting.

It is the boss's territory. It is the boss's right to know. The boss must be told because he or she is also a subordinate to another boss who is also looking for that same accountability. And so it works, forever upward! The effective subordinate will fully and cheerfully perform this function of accountability. This, in reality, gives the subordinate a chance to put the boss at ease and create the first stirrings of trust.

A subordinate who, for whatever reason, elects *not* to account to the boss fully and honestly, can't win. Such actions on the part of the subordinate as withholding information, diverting data, giving half-truths, forgetting, falsely telling, and so on—whatever the excuse or rationale—are examples of no-win, nonprofessional subordinancy. The system doesn't condone such subordinate behavior no matter what kind of boss a subordinate may have or what the private rationale may be.

The dynamic subordinate will not only fully and cheerfully perform this function of accountability, but will initiate it! The subordinate's challenge is to be able to account to the boss about the job honestly and factually and still retain the feeling of personal freedom and dignity.

Invite Him or Her In

All of us have a feeling of personal territory. My desk, my car, my coat, my home, my job, and so on, are mine and are important to me. They are my territory and no one had better encroach uninvited into my domain.

All of us seem to possess and exercise this "territorial imperative," this personal ownership of the things that are mine, including my job.

There is one area, however, where a person cannot exercise such dominion with impunity—the job that the boss has delegated. It is still the boss's territory because the boss still has accountability upward for the success of the job. The subordinate has been given only a temporary lease. The subordinate is the steward for the boss and is working to fulfill the job in the best way possible on behalf of the boss.

Some bosses, of course, for whatever reasons, will sometimes elect to respect the subordinate's area and not intrude unasked into this domain. Other bosses make no bones about their right to tell the subordinate exactly how the boss wants the job to be done. Leaving out the psychological, motivational, and productive consequences of such dominant boss behavior, there seems to be little question of the boss's right to do just that. The reason for this rests upon the rule of accountability—the person who is accountable has the right! And since the subordinate's boss is accountable upward, it is his or her right to have full access to the subordinate's area of responsibility.

So the dynamic subordinates will open wide the gates of their job to the boss. They will invite him or her in to visit frequently. They will proudly show him or her the situation, explain the improvements, ask for help on problems, and seek the boss's ideas for change.

The subordinate who can share his or her area of responsibility with the boss with unlimited and uninhibited trust, in turn, makes the boss his or her advocate—partner—and gains additional trust and freedom as a result. It's the win/win way to go! The challenge to the subordinate is in fulfilling his or her stewardship responsibilities to the boss without falling into the trap of claiming ownership of the territory that the subordinate has so skillfully created and built.

Ask for Feedback

The job that a person does is always emotionally loaded by the subordinate's perceived behavior of the boss—and most importantly, the subordinate's interpretation of the meaning of that behavior. Whatever the boss does or does not do in the course of a relationship, day after day, has implied (and sometimes overt) meaning for the subordinate about the boss's intentions and attitude.

For example, if the boss may seem to withhold important data that the subordinate believes is needed in order to do a job properly, if the boss doesn't invite him or her to the meetings that he or she thinks are important, if the boss looks at him or her in certain ways, if the boss appears at unusual times, and on and on, the subordinate may wonder why. In such cases, the subordinate supplies the reasons and the motives for the boss's behavior—and in many cases, those reasons and motives, in the mind of the subordinate, may portray the boss's dissatisfaction.

This is the start of distrust, suspicion, disloyalty, and outright animosity on the part of the subordinate. Over time these emotions can build to the point of causing the relationship to end.

The sad thing in our human relationship is that very often the subordinate's perception of the boss and the situation is entirely incorrect. And in such instances subordinates again have the responsibility to act, because it is they who have the data; that is, their perception of the boss's behavior and their inferences of the meanings of that behavior. So, it is the subordinate who has the burden of taking the matter up with the boss.

In such cases, the wise subordinate will choose the time and place carefully. He or she will also take the responsibility for the feelings held and the way to express them to the boss. For example, don't start out by saying, "You do so-and-so," but rather "I feel so-and-so." Usually the boss will ask "why," and then the subordinate can describe his or her perceptions of the behavior and his or her inferences of the meaning (impact) of that behavior. This can be the beginning of a very fruitful building process that may become ongoing.

This kind of dynamic behavior on the part of a subordinate will do much to keep the boss/subordinate relationship vital and unspoiled by the pollution of unfounded suspicion.

Help Give Feedback

The boss, also being human, will play the same game of perceptions and implied meaning that the subordinate plays.

The wise subordinate will be aware of two important facts:

- That the boss does indeed look at the subordinate's behavior and wonder at the implied meanings it may hold.
- That the boss may not have the guts to openly and directly confront the subordinate about the things that the subordinate does that the boss doesn't like. It may be the boss's tendency to "store up" resentments and irritations over little things without telling subordinates. And if this is so, this holds grave danger for the subordinate. The subordinate may be blissfully unaware of the deep resentment and irritation that some part of his or her behavior is stirring in the boss. The danger is that one little thing the subordinate may inadvertently do may wipe out the boss's perception of all the good things the subordinate has been doing. And in fact, these irritations may (can) result in the subordinate's dismissal. The explosion of a boss's pent-up emotions can be dangerous to all subordinates.

The dynamic subordinate will take the initiative to probe with the boss for these hidden reservoirs of resentment. One of the best ways of doing this is for the subordinate to get the boss's confidence; that is, tell the boss of his or her hopes for success and ask the boss for help—for coaching—for ideas—and for advice.

This may ease the situation so that the boss can feel free to express his or her feelings. And once this general base of expectations has been laid, then the subordinate should take the initiative to discuss the results of any major activity that he or she has fulfilled as to what went right, what went wrong, how the boss felt, and so on. The process becomes critique—not criticism.

Only the most constricted boss can fail to respond to the sincere searching of a subordinate for positive and helpful critique.

Share Your Needs

Subordinates also have needs, and wise bosses, realizing this, will attempt to understand and fulfill those needs. But for whatever reasons, some bosses won't do this or are unable to start the process.

Dynamic subordinates will not elect to feel hurt when they find that the boss is not very aware of their needs. They won't sulk in their corner. They won't, first off, try to find another job. Instead, they will stop waiting to be chosen and will start letting the boss know what it is that they want. In reality, there is no way for another human being to actually know our needs unless and until we ourselves make them known. Oftentimes our needs do make sense to others, do fit in with higher goals and objectives, and can indeed be met. But it's the subordinate's responsibility to take the risk of making them known. That's part of being dynamic.

Build Trust

The only relationship that is tenable for a subordinate to have is a constant, surging flow of two-way trust. Without such trust nothing works well and the relationship is flat, unexciting, and suspicious. There can be no real professionalism without trust.

Building trust is a mutual activity and is the responsibility of both the boss and the subordinate. But the subordinate must work at it harder, take the first initiative, and avoid the depletion of trust caused by ineffective behavior, because the subordinate has so much to lose if the boss's trust is lost. When the boss loses trust, the subordinate has lost all.

Trust is built in tiny increments of positive behavior around the things that have already been mentioned: obedience with grace, accounting with absolute honesty, exercising unselfish stewardship, initiating access, and challenging and confronting. It is built by day-by-day evidence that the subordinate puts the boss's interest first; does not upstage the boss; does not let the boss look bad; saves the boss from mistakes; rescues the boss from errors; and makes the boss believe that he or she is truly happy in second place. But getting the here-and-now job done on time—fully up to its standards and fully meeting the expectation that the boss has for it—is the single most powerful producer of trust. If a subordinate will do these things, one day his or her bank will overflow with trust!

Responsibility for Ourselves

Perhaps the greatest challenge for all of us is the opportunity we have for managing ourselves in ways that enable us to be proactive in our jobs and in our critical relationships. In my own experience, it has been neither an easy task nor a quick one. But surely it is one that is worthy of our consideration and hopefully, of our effort.

Self-management is taking charge of both our emotions and our behavior so that we are not just reactive robots to every emotion stimulus that becomes activated within us. Since our emotions are, potentially, powerful motivators of our behavior, then we need to learn a system that puts us in charge. But the fact that I may choose self-management as an option and the actual act of fulfilling that choice (that is, making self-management an actuality in my life) are miles apart!

There follow some ideas on how we can make a start toward self-management:

Acquire Self-Awareness

Our first challenge is to be aware of our own behavior and the feelings it may trigger in others. Do we behave in ways that arouse feelings of anger, hatred, frustration, fear, insecurity, and distrust in others toward us? To the extent that we generate these feelings in others by our own behavior and since feelings generally cause (motivate) dysfunctional or inappropriate behavior—then we are sometimes a direct catalyst of such behavior in others. Thus, in this sense our behavior is ineffective.

Since we each "own" our feelings and are responsible for our ways of reacting, we cannot blame others for our reactions. And when we hit someone's hot button (either deliberately or by accident), we are participating in and contributing to their inappropriate behavior, whatever it is. Therefore, our challenge is to become aware of the impact of our own behavior and to behave in such ways that we do not set in motion destructive and inappropriate chains of behavior in others—and most especially our bosses.

One important aspect of self-awareness is to examine our habit patterns of dress, of facial expression, of body language, and of speech. Have we fallen into the trap of "you knowing" the end of every sentence? Do we interrupt? Do we listen? Are we cynical? Self-awareness requires eternal vigilance of ourselves by ourselves and, if possible, a trusted friend to ensure that we are indeed fully positive.

Managing Our Feelings and Our Behavior

Managing the Way I Behave. One way we can cope with our feelings is through a process of self-disciplined control of our behavior. This requires that we remind ourselves that we are responsible for our own behavior and can shape it in a variety of ways. We can each develop a range of ways of behaving to different persons, in different situations, and for different results. This is to say that sometimes one deals with a b-----d as a b-----d deserves!

However, it is well to remind ourselves that certain roles call for certain behavior (and control). Thus, parents have an obligation for restraint toward their children, or a boss needs to consider what responsibilities are for the well-being of his or her subordinates who have been entrusted to him or her by the organization, and subordinates must consider the boss's need for respect and loyalty. This kind of self-restraint is not a denial of feeling; it is an optional kind of behavior that we have selected for that person in that situation. Emotionally responsive behavior is not the only choice I have for coping with the way I feel. It's just one way, and all too often it's not the best way!

I believe that it's worth my effort to manage my behavior for two reasons. First, because it does save us from many a behavioral blunder. Our perceptions aren't always accurate enough in sensing the true feelings or motives of others, despite their overt behavior, for us to risk basing all of our behavior upon them. We cannot assume that we always make the correct evaluation of their intentions and interests toward us. And second, when we do succeed, it is a great psychic reward to us because of the increased self-esteem that flows to us from a successful encounter with ourselves. We can be responsible for our own behavior!

Managing the Way I Feel. My second option of self-management is harder even than the first. This is to embrace the concept that my emotions are also my own to deal with in just the same way as my behavior.

I know and accept the fact that no one can make me "feel love," "feel happy," and so on, unless I, too, am a willing party to that process with another person. This does not mean a denial of the feeling once it is in being, but it does mean that I don't need to have the feeling in the first place unless I lay the feeling upon myself.

For example, someone does something which I interpret in a way that means to me that I have been snubbed. The frequent "human" emotional response to that would be either anger or hurt or maybe some of both. (In my case, I probably would feel both.) A common rejoinder is that the other person made me feel these ways, and the behavioral response might be to get even in some way or other—to punish the person either by overt act or by withdrawal.

But my feelings (emotions) are not necessarily an automatic reaction to the behavior of another, unless I myself let them be (maybe even want them to be!). It's like turning on a lightbulb. There is power in the line, but the bulb won't shine unless I turn it on. There is behavior (power) in the system (the way the person acted), but my emotions (the lightbulb) needn't be (won't be) activated—turned on—unless I want them to be.

I like this view, and have experimented with it enough myself to know that it is viable—though it is not easy, and I fail about as much as I succeed.

Our Response to Personally Hurtful Behavior. If I do what others demand of me just because my boss, my subordinates, or others get angry—swear, pout, threaten, and abuse me—then I have become a participant to their process. I am partially responsible for what they are doing to me. Their behavior is effective for them because it does achieve their objectives with me!

The most telling (best) response to the personally hurtful behavior of anyone is to deny that person the achievement of his or her objective when he or she uses hurtful and inappropriate behavior toward us. (Workers in business and industry all over America are, in reality, doing this by their uncaring attitude about the job.) We all learn from our experience, and if our behavior doesn't get the results that we want, then we will change it pretty quickly!

Our Responsibility to Confront

We subordinates are enmeshed in a web of intricate and conflicting human relationships. We often feel that we are the pawns of powerful forces that use us, direct us, and sometimes discard us at will. Perhaps the thing that is the most important for us to learn, to accept, and to practice is to assume full responsibility for ourselves, for our professional growth, and for our behavior. This means that we must learn to attain a high degree of self-management. This means that we do not delude ourselves as to what we wish for any situation, and that we know what we want to have happen for ourselves as well as for our bosses. This means that we keep ourselves close to the realities of our relationship and not let ourselves be carried away by our emotional fantasies.

Finally, this means that we have the internal personal security to take whatever risks there may be for ensuring that all facets of our jobs and relationships are indeed dynamic. Perhaps the greater risk is not risking. The status quo may be the ultimate indignity.

Thus, our own self-discipline, self-management, and professionalism become the underlying forces that fuel our dynamic subordinancy. We are indeed responsible for ourselves and for our own behavior. To me, this means that if I honestly have done all of the foregoing, then I take the risk of telling the boss my perceptions of the situation—my degree of psychological pain, and my solutions for challenging the situation. If the boss, for whatever reason, can't change either his or her own behavior or the situation, then I can exercise my final and ultimate freedom—leave! I owe it to me to do exactly this—not as a threat and not in anger, but for my own long-run self-esteem.

Edgar Friedenberg has said, "All weakness corrupts, and impotence corrupts absolutely." The traditional state of subordinancy is powerlessness and dependency. But as we make people dependent, we increase their capacity to hate. As we make people powerless, we promote their capacity to violence.

The thing we must learn as bosses is how we can grant people freedom despite all of the demands that the work situation puts upon us.

The challenge we have as subordinates is to secure for ourselves an enhanced self-image, a sense of potency, and a feeling of significance without resorting to the ultimate power—violence! If all of us don't learn how to achieve this for ourselves and learn how to teach others to achieve it for themselves, then our organizations are in for a continuing era of violence—not because people are bad, but because they hurt so much around the deprived condition of their human needs.

The Responsibility of Leadership in Command

Gen John Michael Loh

When we select our commanders, we expect them to create a vision and motivate and inspire their people toward that vision. We also expect our commanders to face squarely any situations that may undermine unit effectiveness and cohesion. We expect our commanders to be more than the head of a unit; we expect them to be leaders and to be accountable for mission performance. Those who recognize the interdependence of leadership and command are the most effective commanders, can best translate intentions into reality, and sustain momentum. Therefore, we must select for command those who will, with resolve and persistence, meet all the responsibilities—both pleasant and unpleasant— inherent in command.

Command is a sacred trust. We surround the change of command with dignity and ceremony deliberately to dramatize the sacred meaning of military command. A commander is not just the person in the top block of the unit's organizational chart. A new commander becomes a different person than he or she was prior to accepting command.

Commanders are awarded a special trust and confidence to fulfill their units' missions and care for their people with leadership, discipline, justice, fairness, and compassion, in peace and war. Therefore, we must select them with utmost scrutiny and care, and for the right reasons.

Commanders must foster a strong sense of duty and service. They must create a vision, and motivate and instill pride in team performance. When the going gets tough, they must rise above the strife and lead. The essence of command and leadership is to create a climate throughout the unit that inspires all to achieve extraordinary goals and levels of performance at all times and under all conditions, especially in the stress of combat.

So, when a commander violates this special trust and confidence by looking the other way and tolerating breaches of discipline, it is a matter of great concern and demands his or her deep introspection.

When one member of a unit flaunts discipline and directives to the detriment of safety and mission accomplishment, the commander's obligation and loyalty must be to the rest of the members of the unit, those who are loyal, dedicated, and working hard to deliver and support the unit's mission every day. Protecting the few at the expense of the many is to misplace loyalty and is a serious breach of the responsibility of command. Our people deserve commanders who understand the difference.

Honest mistakes in the execution of our demanding missions, even when they result in injury or loss of equipment, can be, and frequently are, tolerated. We learn from these mistakes and put in place safeguards to prevent recurrence. We must apply common sense and sound judgment here. We train and trust our people to perform in a stressful, difficult, and sometimes hostile environment. We are obliged to provide them the same trust and loyalty that will allow them to make split-second decisions and carry out their missions with a feeling of security and confidence even when honest, explainable mistakes occur. When honest mistakes occur, we must stand by our commanders and their people.

But a crime is different from a mistake. The distinction lies in the culpability of careless or negligent acts or the degree of premeditation and willful disregard for directives, regulations, and sound judgment.

A good leader realizes the difference between mistakes and crimes and, in the case of the latter, displays the moral courage to protect the loyal many at the expense of the disloyal few. Our people deserve such leadership from all our commanders, all the time.

What follows are a few of my time-honored principles of solid leadership. As they apply to those in command positions, they are not only relevant, they yearn for reinforcement today.

- Commanders must be role models, leading by example as well as by authority and influence.
- Commanders must be open and accessible, but not "one of the gang."
- Commanders must promote a positive vision and culture within the unit, and not look the other way to avoid having to face a difficult problem.
- Commanders must distinguish between mistakes and crimes, and deal with them differently.
- Commanders must apply discipline fairly and consistently across the board without regard for friendship, rank, or other discriminators.
- Commanders must avoid favoritism, nepotism, and cronyism in all their forms.
- Commanders must understand trust and loyalty to the entire unit, and not misplace them.
- And finally, commanders must understand when to administer discipline and compassion, and not get the two mixed up.

Fortunately, in our Air Force we are enriched with a plentiful supply of commanders at all levels who understand these principles, and are applying them conscientiously and scrupulously at home and when deployed around the world. They are real leaders in every sense of the word, and their people

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hold them in high esteem, would follow them anywhere, and risk their lives for them. I see these commanders every day throughout Air Combat Command and our Air Force. We must never let the actions of a few overshadow our commanders' leadership, accountability, and devotion to duty. Our commanders understand their responsibilities. They are accountable. They deserve our trust and support, and they have both in full measure.

The Ten Rules of Good Followership

Col Phillip S. Meilinger

I have often come across articles written by great leaders—generals, politicians, businessmen—that list the properties and attributes of good leadership. These lists are usually similar, noting the importance of intelligence, physical and moral courage, stamina, compassion, and so on. These characteristics are not only fairly general, but also seem to fall into the "great leaders are born, not made, category," with the implication that if a person is not born with these charismatic qualities that make great leaders, it would be exceedingly difficult to acquire or develop them. How does one develop a sense of bravery, for example? How does one develop intelligence? Moreover, the entire subject of leadership principles always strikes me as a bit grandiose, because the authors are indeed great men or women who have performed great deeds. Although they provide useful advice for those very few who will someday command thousands of troops in battle or direct the operations of great organizations, what about the rest of us?

It occurs to me that there is a subject more relevant to the men and women of all ranks who populate our Air Force: how does one become a good follower? This is a responsibility no less important than that of leadership—in fact it enables good leadership—yet it is often ignored. Moreover, it is likely that all of us will be followers more often than we will be leaders. For my part, I have had 23 years of experience in taking orders, implementing policy guidance, and serving as an intermediate supervisor. Here are my Ten Rules of Good Followership gleaned from those years.

1. *Don't blame your boss for an unpopular decision or policy; your job is to support, not undermine.* It is insidiously easy to blame an unpopular policy or decision on your superior: "I know this is a dumb idea and a pain for everyone, but that's what the boss wants, sorry." This *may* garner some affection from your subordinates (although even the lowest one-striper is wise enough to eventually see through such ploys), but it is certainly showing disloyalty to your superior. Unquestionably, the desire for popularity is strong, but it must be guarded against because of the unpleasant effects it can have on unit cohesion. One colleague with whom I served several years ago would indulge in periodic gripe sessions with his subordinates at which time he would routinely criticize the commander and his decisions in front of the youngest troops. When asked why he was undermining the boss, he would reply sanctimoniously that his integrity would not allow him to lie; he thought the policies were idiotic, and he had a duty to tell his people how he felt. He said he was exercising "good leadership" by telling the truth as he saw it. Rubbish. Leadership is not a commodity to be bought at the price of followership. If a subordinate asks you whether or not you agree with a particular decision, your response should be that it is an irrelevant question; the boss has decided, and we will now carry out his orders. That's what good subordinates are expected to do. Loyalty must travel both up and down the chain of command.

2. *Fight with your boss if necessary; but do it in private, avoid embarrassing situations, and never reveal to others what was discussed.* Chronologically this rule should come before the first, but I felt the first principle so important it deserved priority. Before the decision is made, however, you will generally have the opportunity to express your opinion to the boss. Speak honestly and frankly. Don't be a "yes-man." There is always a tendency to tell the boss what you think he or she wants to hear; resist the temptation. In fact, if you have strong reservations about an issue under discussion, you have an obligation to express them. Fight for your people and your organization; don't roll over on principles or on any issue that you believe will be detrimental to accomplishment of the unit's mission. As a rule of thumb, you should be willing to revisit an issue three times: don't give up after the first discussion or even the second if you are in earnest. (I'm obviously not considering here decisions that are either illegal or immoral; there are other avenues to resolve those issues.) At the same time, however, remember to do this in private. A weekly staff meeting is usually not the time to challenge the boss. Human nature will take over; your stance may be seen as a threat, and the boss will dig in his heels. At the same time, however, if you are able to sway a decision or deflect a policy, it will be natural to boast to your troops: "The boss wanted to institute a new policy that you wouldn't have liked, but I was able to talk him or her out of it." Once again, you may have just won points for yourself, but you have done so at the expense of your superior.

3. *Make the decision, then run it past the boss; use your initiative.* No one likes to work for a micromanager. We all believe we are smart enough and mature enough to get the job done without someone hovering around and providing detailed guidance. There is another side to that coin, however. One reason commanders tend to become micromanagers is because they see their subordinates standing by and waiting for specific instructions. They then feel obliged to provide it. You can short-circuit this debilitating spiral by simply showing initiative, accomplishing the task, and then briefing the boss on what you did. Very few people actually like to be bombarded with problems that require them to de-

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vise solutions. Even the most "hands-on" supervisors would generally prefer that someone present them with a workable plan and ask for their ratification. Help out the boss and take a load off his or her mind. A word of warning here, however: you may have to know your boss fairly well before you begin showing *too* much initiative. There is at times a fine line between seizing the moment to get something done and becoming a loose cannon. You don't want to gain a reputation for the latter. In sum, always try to provide answers and not questions. As trust and understanding develop between you and the boss, begin acting on those answers once you've arrived at them; then tell him or her what you've done. A sense of initiative is something I always look for in a subordinate, but, as the next rule notes, it is often in short supply.

4. *Accept responsibility whenever it is offered.* When I was in basic training an instructor gave me what he thought was sage and sane advice: don't volunteer for anything. It took me several years to realize his suggestion was worthless. Neither the military nor any other top-flight organization can work effectively or continue to grow and evolve unless it is composed of risk takers willing to assume responsibility. This will often be difficult, because people do not wish to fail or embarrass themselves. Most of us have a certain amount of self-doubt, combined with a healthy dose of humility, that often causes us to hold back when a challenge is offered. Will we measure up? I used to worry about feeling unworthy whenever given a new task. Then I read the memoirs of former Air Force chief of staff and war hero Gen Curtis LeMay. His comment that he had never been given a job that he felt qualified to handle put my mind at rest. Nonetheless, the fear of failure is real and must be overcome. When working in the Pentagon during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990, we scrambled to devise a suitable response to Saddam Hussein's aggression. In those hectic days I often saw leadership and responsibility lying on a table, waiting to be picked up by anyone who wanted it. I was amazed at how few people were willing to walk over and grasp it. The reasons given were plausible: "It's not my job," "That's above my pay grade," or "I'm not an expert in that area," but these were rationalizations, not reasons. Their call to glory came, but they weren't listening. Be a risk taker, accept responsibility, volunteer.

5. *Tell the truth and don't quibble; your boss will be giving advice up the chain of command based on what you said.* Mighty oaks from little acorns grow. The same could be said for major miscalculations that have been based on minor indiscretions. Another unfortunate human reaction is to hide or cover up mistakes before they are discovered. When asked if you accomplished a certain task, wrote a point paper, made a phone call, reserved a conference room—and you haven't done so—the temptation will be great to respond in the affirmative, curse softly, and hurriedly do what you had forgotten about earlier. Such instances of deceit are minor and not likely to cause misfortune, but it is not hard to imagine how similar white lies can easily become magnified. For example, imagine the result of telling your commander the aircraft is ready, when in fact it is not—it's *almost* ready—and the Klaxon goes off! In an organization as large and multilayered as the Air Force, each level must scrupulously adhere to the exact truth. If each supervisor exaggerates his unit's achievements or capabilities even a little, the combined error of the message will be enormous by the time it reaches the chief. We have all seen examples of this phenomenon, but the most publicized recently are those regarding procurement programs for new weapons systems in which wishful thinking and sloppy reporting allowed things to get out of control. Because those at all levels bent the truth or told the boss what he or she wanted to hear, great harm was done to the nation and the military's reputation.

6. *Do your homework; give your boss all the information needed to make a decision; anticipate possible questions.* Being a good staffer is harder than it looks. When the boss gives you a problem to solve, it is essential that you become an expert on the subject before you attempt to propose a course of action. Read up on the issue, talk to the offices that will be affected by the decision, talk to your friends and coworkers to gain insights; do your homework. Most importantly, think through the implications of the problem, what it would mean and to whom—not just now but down the road as well. Anticipate the type of questions that will be asked by your boss and prepare suggested answers. Be creative here, asking the second- and third-level questions, not merely the obvious ones. Remember too, if your boss will be making this proposal to his or her boss, you must prepare him or her properly so as to avoid his or her being embarrassed (and guess who will pay for that!). You might find it surprising how often your supervisor will rely on you to actually make policy. When arriving for a tour at the Pentagon, I was told my task would be "to lead the generals." Few flag-rank officers have the time to study closely all of the dozens of issues they are confronted with each day. As a consequence, they will expect you to become the subject-matter expert and propose the appropriate course of action. More often than not, they will listen to your recommendation and simply state: "Make it so, Number One." Be careful what you wish for because you may get it. And that leads me to rule seven.

7. *When making a recommendation, remember who will probably have to implement it. This means you must know your own limitations and weaknesses as well as your strengths.* Since you have just finished studying a problem in some depth and are about to make a recommendation you want the boss to ratify, it's probably wise at this point to remember that you will likely be tasked to implement your own suggestion. After all, who better to carry out a policy than the person who just became an expert on it? In other words, don't propose a solution that is impracticable. It's one thing to recommend a course of action that is designed for an ideal world, but it is quite another to suggest something that is doable under the present circumstances and constraints. This certainly is not to imply that you should always look for easy fixes or latch on to the lowest common denominator. Yet, there is a calculus you must make that will reveal whether the ideal solution is worth the effort, or if a 90 percent solution might be more efficient. Be prepared to brief the perfect answer, but note how much extra it will cost. At the same time, bearing in mind your own role in this process, you must have a clear understanding of your weaknesses as well as your strengths.

Some people are originators, while others are organizers; some are drivers, while others are facilitators; and some work better in groups, while others perform more successfully alone. Know who you are; try to put yourself in positions that maximize your strengths while masking your limitations. This will make you a more successful subordinate.

8. *Keep your boss informed of what's going on in the unit; people will be reluctant to tell him or her their problems and successes. You should do it for them, and assume someone else will tell the boss about yours.* One of the things you will notice as you advance in rank and responsibility is that people will be less inclined to talk to you. As a result, most of what you hear regarding what's going on in the unit will be heavily filtered. Staying informed on the true state of affairs is a constant but essential challenge. To really stay in touch, a boss needs subordinates who routinely drop a note or mention while passing in the hall that so-and-so had a baby, or lost a mother, or had a daughter who won a scholarship, or was complimented by an aircrew as the best crew chief on base, and so on. Most of us feel a bit queasy about blowing our own horn to the boss: if something important happens in our life or career we are embarrassed to tell anyone for fear it will sound self-serving; and similarly, we hesitate to mention our troubles because it will sound like we're complaining. Humility is an attractive virtue. That's when we need to take care of each other: tell the boss about your coworkers, and assume they will reciprocate for you. This type of mutual support will help build esprit and cohesion within the unit. At the same time, however, remember that the boss needs to know *everything* that is going on, the bad as well as the good. If there are problems in the unit, don't let the boss be the last one to know. Most difficulties can be short-circuited and solved early-on—if the boss knows about them. Keep him or her informed.

9. *If you see a problem, fix it. Don't worry about who would have gotten the blame or who now gets the praise.* Gen George C. Marshall, the Army chief of staff during World War II, once made the comment that there was no limit to the amount of good that people could accomplish, as long as they didn't care who received the credit. Although this rule might look similar to my earlier calls for initiative and accepting responsibility, my point here is to stress selflessness. When you see something has gone wrong or is about to go wrong, fix it. Too often when we notice a bad situation developing, we shake our heads and mumble, "It's not my problem." It is our problem. Don't get wrapped around the axle wondering if you are directly affected by the problem, or if you stand to benefit from its solution. We all serve for the greater good so every time difficulties are straightened out, the service, our unit, and ourselves are better off. As you can no doubt tell by now, I'm an optimist who truly believes that good deeds will eventually be rewarded. The military really is an equal opportunity society that recognizes and responds to merit. It's not necessary to have the attitude of one big-league baseball player of whom it was said: "He'd give you the shirt off his back; then call a press conference to announce it to the world." The essence of military life is teamwork. Do your job quietly, confidently, and professionally, and trust that your colleagues will do likewise. But if you come across a problem, just go ahead and take care of it. We're all in this together.

10. *Put in more than an honest day's work, but don't ever forget the needs of your family. If they are unhappy, you will be too, and your job performance will suffer accordingly.* Americans believe in hard work. It is a matter of great pride for us that we have a strong work ethic and are among the most productive societies in the world. The military is certainly no exception. It has always been an honor for me to be associated with military men and women of all ranks and services because I'm constantly amazed at how hardworking, conscientious, and dedicated they are. That's a high standard to maintain and that is why I exhort all of you to give *more* than an honest day's labor—you have a habit of doing so in any event. But be careful that you don't become a "workaholic" and let your job become your life. Certainly, there will be times in war, in crisis situations, or during inspection visits when you will have to double your efforts and work overtime for days or even weeks on end. Don't make a habit of that, and don't let your subordinates make a habit of it either. There was a popular tee shirt a few years back that stated: "If mama ain't happy, ain't nobody happy." That's the way it was in my house growing up, and indeed still is. In addition, if things are miserable at home, you will probably bring those troubles to the office. Your family is married to the service every bit as much as you are; they too must pick up and move, change jobs and schools, leave friends behind, and start over. That periodic turmoil exacts a price from them; make sure you pay your family back for all they've done for you and your career. Remember, families are forever.

So these are my Ten Rules of Good Followership. All of us are subordinate to someone, and learning how to serve our boss well is an important responsibility. If we can master this task, and master it well, then we will, in turn, be better leaders when that challenge confronts us. We'll be ready. After all, even the greatest of military leaders must start at the bottom. We must learn to follow before we can lead. I hope you find these thoughts useful in your own journey to the stars.

A Critique of the Air Force's Core Values

Dr. Christopher Hugh Toner

As most readers well know, the Air Force's core values consist of "integrity first," "service before self," and "excellence in all we do." Integrity deals largely with character (honesty, courage, and responsibility), service with commitment (duty, respect, and loyalty), and excellence with striving toward perfection (on personal, team, and operational levels). The *United States Air Force Core Values* booklet, January 1997, speaks of a strategy for infusing the core values into Air Force culture—a strategy involving training and education, leadership in the operational Air Force, discussions among Airmen at various levels, and so forth.[1] Years later we can say that in many ways the strategy has succeeded. Every Airman knows the core values, and in my experience (as a former officer in a sister service and a current instructor at Air Command and Staff College), most do not regard them as a management fad but genuinely respect them. Commanders relate that a key factor in deciding whether to rehabilitate or separate a troubled troop involves determining his or her commitment to the core values.

Although I could list many other indicators of the health of the program, I will single out one notable shortfall: the fact that most Airmen do not know what I call the elements of each core value (see table). To most of them, integrity means honesty, service means duty, and excellence means sure competence in mission accomplishment. But as Col Charles Myers points out in an influential article, the Nazis could profess such values if that is all they mean, thus reducing the core values to a mantra that any military professional could chant—the bad as well as the good. The presence of such elements as justice and respect for others as persons gives the core values substance and separates them from the "virtues of the SS-man."[2] Of course it is the task of leaders to overcome this shortfall, and sound doctrine seems already in place to support them: the *United States Air Force Core Values* booklet and Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, February 2004.

I argue, however, that the way doctrine is currently written may present certain obstacles to its own propagation. Air Force leaders as well as the Airmen they lead and mentor will in general find it much easier to "own" doctrine when it possesses internal coherence; clear, logical flow; and an evident, convincing rationale. In some respects, current doctrine fails these tests.

Lack of Coherence between the Air Force's Formulations of the Core Values

The core values have been with us in more or less their current form for a number of years now and, as is proper, have roots in the historical experience of the Air Force and the American military. Since 1997 they have circulated (and continue to circulate) in a stand-alone format—the core-values booklet. In 2004 the Air Force incorporated them into leadership doctrine as one of the "Leadership Components" (along with competencies and actions) in the first chapter of AFDD 1-1.[3] This is good since a doctrine document is more authoritative than other forms of publication, but it does raise questions about the relationship between the two formulations. Although they are quite close in most respects, a side-by-side comparison reveals some inconsistencies (see table). Boldfaced elements in the table appear in the booklet but not in the doctrine document, and the reverse applies to italicized elements. Underlining indicates relabeled elements that are essentially the same in both formulations.

Two ways of removing the inconsistency suggest themselves. First, we might suppose that AFDD 1-1's formulation simply supersedes the booklet's. But AFDD 1-1 does not state this explicitly, as is usually the case when one publication supersedes another.[4] Nor would this be wise since the booklet contains (in sections 2–4) valuable supplementary materials—such as the core-values strategy mentioned at the outset—not contained in the doctrine document. Second, we might hold that the inconsistencies are merely apparent—the changes merely verbal. This may well be in some cases (e.g., the differently worded elements under "service" and "excellence," underlined in the table). Other changes, however, seem more substantive: AFDD 1-1 has added "honor" and "loyalty," and "duty" is a richer notion than "rule following." In these cases, the later formulation expands and probably improves upon the earlier. But if we look closely at "operational excellence," we can note an important subtraction: in the booklet, under "excellence of external operations," we find a requirement to fight in obedience to the laws of war—a requirement not stated under "operational excellence" in AFDD 1-1. I am not claiming that AFDD 1-1 has backed away from a commitment to the laws of war—simply that fighting in accordance with those laws is no longer explicitly linked to operational

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Table. Two formulations of the Air Force's core values

Core Values Booklet			*AFDD 1-1*		
Integrity	Service	Excellence	Integrity	Service	Excellence
Courage	Rule following	Product/service	Courage	*Duty*	Personal
Honesty	Respect for others	Personal	Honesty	Respect for others	Organizational
Responsibility	Discipline and self-control: anger, appetites, religious toleration	Community: mutual respect, benefit of doubt	Responsibility	Self-Discipline	Resource
Accountability	Faith in the system	Resource: material, human	Accountability	Self-Control	Operational
Justice		Operations: internal, external	Justice	Appropriate actions or desires	
Openness			Openness	Tolerance	
Self-Respect			Self-Respect	*Loyalty*	
Humility			Humility		
			Honor		

excellence. This is regrettable; at the least, it represents a substantive change in the formulation of the core values.

I conclude that real inconsistency exists between the two formulations and, therefore, that the Air Force's current teaching on the core values lacks, to some degree, the internal coherence mentioned above.[5] To some extent, then, core-values doctrine needs some rewriting. But as I now argue, one can raise questions about logical flow and rationale as well—problems that may point to a need for further changes.

The Problem of Logical Flow in the Arrangement of Elements

The core-values booklet tells us (in section 2, "Why These Core Values?") that the values and their elements are the "price of admission" to the Air Force.[6] Both documents make clear that their justification is functional: we need Airmen to be trustworthy, to put the service and its mission before their personal goals and desires, and to commit themselves to a high degree of competence. Functional justifications for most, if not all, of the elements of the core values are also fairly straightforward. Military service clearly requires elements such as courage, honesty, accountability, respect, duty, and so forth. Here the authors of the documents wisely follow in the tradition of such military theorists as Gen Sir John Hackett. Someone with a background in the Army or Marine Corps might champion other ways of articulating the values, and anyone might wish some further element explicitly included under one or another value, but there is no real objection here. The core-values booklet explains that

> it is impossible for three or six or nine Core Values to capture the richness that is at the heart of the profession of arms. The values are road signs inviting us to consider key features of the requirements of professional service, but they cannot hope to point to or pick out everything. By examining integrity, service, and excellence, we also eventually discover the importance of duty, honor, country, dedication, fidelity, competence, and a host of other professional requirements and attributes.[7]

As "road signs," the core values and their elements stress moral and professional features of military service that, in the historical experience of the Air Force, have proven particularly important. The list of values and elements, compiled by authors well versed in Air Force tradition, remains open to development in the light of further experience and reflection. On the whole, this seems exactly the right approach for doctrine writers to take. Nevertheless, we might ask, given the list, whether the elements are suitably arranged under the values—whether they flow logically. Concerning this matter, I raise some objections.

People often consider integrity synonymous with honesty, but in fact it means something more like wholeness or integration—a fact acknowledged by the two formulations of the core values, AFDD 1-1 describing integrity in terms of "the ability to hold together and properly regulate all of the elements of one's personality."[8] Consistent with this recognition, both documents insist that integrity involves self-control, the core-values booklet speaking explicitly of controlling impulses and appetites. One wonders, then, why the booklet locates the element of discipline and self-control under the value of service and why AFDD 1-1, although breaking this one element into three (self-discipline, self-control, and appropriate actions or desires), follows suit.[9] Here we seem to have a problem—not with the elements themselves but with their logical flow in relation to the values they fall under. Based on its doctrinal definition, self-control should fall under integrity.[10]

Under the general heading of logical flow, a few other questions need answers (here I will just ask them). We seem to have more elements than strictly required. It is not clear, for example, why AFDD 1-1 breaks up the booklet's element of discipline and self-control into self-discipline, self-control, and appropriate actions or desires, mentioned above.[11] The same holds true for the elements of responsibility and accountability, located in both documents under integrity. Although the location is appropriate, why should they constitute two separate elements since neither document (both use very similar language) makes obvious the difference between them?[12] Both documents insist that Airmen "internalize" the core values, a process facilitated by ease of memorization and grasp of the logical flow—and therefore impeded by unnecessary multiplication of the elements.

Finally, one finds no obvious rhyme or reason to the elements' order of presentation under each value. For example, honesty and openness, listed under integrity, seem clearly related. Why then are they separated by three other elements (responsibility, accountability, and justice) rather than listed one after the other (as are responsibility and accountability)? Under service, why is respect for others followed by self-discipline and its allied elements and only then by tolerance, which is clearly related to respect? Duty and loyalty seem importantly related, but they are listed at the opposite ends of the spectrum of elements under service.[13] Rather than illuminating the nature or structure of each core value, the lists of elements under each give the appearance of a grab bag of moral traits—a problem easily fixed by some cutting and pasting.

The Problem of the Rationale of the Core Values

Lastly, I wish to address the rationale or justification of the core values. In discussing doctrine (teaching), we can distinguish among the "what," the lessons taught, and the "why"—the rational process through which the lessons are formulated and justified. Doctrine documents, for good reason, tend to focus on the teaching of the "what," but they typically also tend to give us at least a glimpse of the "why"—of the rationale behind the teaching. Good reasons exist for this as well: understanding the "why" facilitates accepting and internalizing the "what."

Both documents on the core values give us the same glimpse of the rationale. The core-values booklet speaks of their "functional importance," and the doctrine document maintains that "success hinges on the incorporation of these values."[14] That is, these are our values because we have found that they work. This is fine as far as it goes, but I want to suggest that going a little further could help Airmen understand how the core values are grounded in the nature of their profession, which could then help them internalize the values.

As mentioned above, Colonel Myers has sought to ground the core values on the basic aspects of morality (character, actions, and consequences), but the question of how ultimately to ground values is controverted, and it can be dangerous to do philosophy in public.[15] So one can understand that doctrine writers would shy away from seeking to justify the core values officially in terms of abstract moral theorizing (whether that of Myers or someone else). Bracketing such deep theoretical issues, however, one can offer a rationale for the core values that is deeper than a pragmatic appeal to "what works," while still avoiding the controversies of moral theory.

This rationale takes as its starting point the nature of professionalism. Famously, Samuel Huntington argues that the distinguishing mark of a profession is that its practitioners display expertise ("specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor"), responsibility ("the essential and general character of his service and his monopoly of his skill impose upon the professional man the responsibility to perform the service when required by society"), and corporateness. ("The members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. This collective sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence, the common bond of work, and the sharing of a unique social responsibility.")[16] In the case of the military profession, the relevant expertise is "the management of violence," together with all that entails (such as training and organizing the force as well as planning and directing its operations). The military has the responsibility of providing security for its "client"—the state and its government. In discussing the corporateness of the military, Huntington focuses on its bureaucratic character—its formal, hierarchical structure—and what sets it apart from civilian culture. He also mentions informal aspects of military corporateness, such as associations, journals, and customs.[17]

From these characteristics we can move to the appropriateness of the core values; before doing so, however, we must clarify that Huntington's conception of a profession is neither idiosyncratic nor, in essence, controversial. In his discussion of the professional status of the military, Brig Gen Anthony E. Hartle, USA, retired, begins with Huntington, whom he acknowledges as "a classic voice on the sociology of professions."[18] He goes on to consider alternative definitions that stress elements not emphasized by Huntington. Although Hartle wishes to show that the military qualifies as a profession on any plausible conception of what constitutes a profession, we can extract another lesson as well: the differences between Huntington's and other influential conceptions of professionalism tend to be relatively minor matters of emphasis. For example, General Hartle mentions such criteria as having a systematic theory of professional practice and a distinct culture.[19] These could be acknowledged by Huntington and captured under his notions of expertise and corporateness, respectively. One need not insist that Huntington's definition of *profession* is superior to all others. Rather, it is enough to see the plausibility of his definition and to know that any alternative put forward will need at least to cover the ground that Huntington covers—differences will tend to be matters of emphasis. In relying on his definition in what follows, therefore, I believe I am on solid ground.

With these three characteristics in hand, we can develop a fairly straightforward rationale for the core values. Arguably each characteristic of the profession may require all of these values, and I will pick up on this line of thought shortly. First

I will argue that each characteristic of professionalism calls for one of the Air Force's core values in a certain way, thereby clarifying the particular appropriateness of these values to the military profession.[20] Perhaps the most obvious correspondence lies between expertise and excellence in all we do. We saw that expertise in "the management of violence" entails attendant expertise in training, equipping, and organizing the force—and in planning and directing its operations.[21] This clearly will require commitment to excellence (personal, organizational, resource, and operational).

Next, responsibility calls for service before self. In order to discharge their responsibility to society, professionals will require the "age-old military virtue of selfless dedication to duty" that AFDD 1-1 speaks of under the heading "Service before Self."[22] General Hackett reminds us that the military serves its society under conditions of "unlimited liability," in that service members may well have to risk or lay down their lives—a point explicitly noted in the doctrine document's discussion of service.[23] Further, given that the military serves its society (i.e., operates under civilian control), the elements of duty and loyalty, as extending beyond the military itself to the duly constituted political authorities, are also clearly essential to the military's discharging its social responsibility. As AFDD 1-1 notes with respect to loyalty, "American military professionals demonstrate allegiance to the Constitution and loyalty to the military chain of command and to the President and Secretary of Defense."[24]

Lastly, the corporateness essential to professionalism requires integrity. The corporateness required by military service covers more ground than Huntington's description of it lets on. The rigors of service, especially in combat, require Airmen to put their lives into the hands of other Airmen—often individuals they do not personally know. This in turn requires a high degree of mutual trust. AFDD 1-1 describes integrity as the "moral compass" that serves as "the basis for the *trust* imperative in today's Air Force" (emphasis added).[25] As Air Force chief of staff, Gen Michael Ryan wrote that integrity is "the foundation of trust"—"the unbreakable bond that unifies the force" and enables Airmen to focus on their jobs, knowing that others are doing likewise.[26] As Huntington says, corporateness does involve the "organic unity" of the profession: in the military, this unity must take the form of a force cemented by "the unbreakable bond" of trust whose foundation is integrity.

I suggested above that each professional characteristic may well require all three core values, and I would now like to show how this is indeed the case. While each of the core values "takes the lead" with respect to one or another professional characteristic, all need the support of the other two in meeting the requirements of the characteristic at stake. Let us take expertise first. We have seen how excellence in all we do acts as the lead value for this characteristic, but this commitment to excellence will demand support from elements of integrity (such as responsibility and courage) and service (such as duty and self-discipline). Organizational excellence especially will further require integrity (as the foundation of trust) and additional elements of service such as loyalty, tolerance, and respect for others, precisely because of the team mentality and, indeed, the corporateness (as discussed above in terms of mutual trust) it requires.

We can make similar points with respect to the other two characteristics. Service, for example, although the lead value with respect to the professional characteristic of responsibility, must have support from integrity and excellence. As we saw, the doctrine document speaks of service's centrally involving the "age-old military virtue of selfless dedication to duty." Airmen will not be able to maintain this sort of dedication without drawing upon several of the character traits under integrity: courage to accept risks in the performance of duty, a sense of responsibility, and honesty in dealing with superiors up to and including representatives of the state (here, think of the Lavelle affair in Vietnam or scandals in the acquisition world).[27] Further, one needs a commitment to excellence to develop the character traits already mentioned (personal excellence) and to perform well the service that society requires (organizational and operational excellence).

Finally, we have seen that the lead value for corporateness is integrity, perceived as the foundation of the mutual trust that unifies the force. But if integrity takes the lead here, it will require support from elements of the other core values, such as loyalty and operational excellence (clearly, we cannot trust a disloyal or incompetent person). A commitment to organizational excellence will also be relevant. (Here again we see how interconnected and mutually supporting the core values and their elements are, for as discussed above, organizational excellence in turn calls upon a number of elements of service and, indeed, upon integrity.)

This, then, is the rationale for the core values that goes deeper than the quick, functional justification asserted in current Air Force teaching, yet it does not risk the controversy involved in the attempt to penetrate the murky depths of abstract moral theory to reach a rock-bottom justification (the question of the ultimate "origin of the Values" that the core-values booklet shies away from).[28] Surely we should not expect doctrine to include a fully worked-up theory of the role of core values in professionalism (of course here I have offered only an indication of how this would go), but it could conceivably include the basic or primary correspondence of characteristics to values, thus facilitating Airmen's understanding of the importance of the Air Force's core values to the service's professionalism.[29]

Beyond the Core Values

Yet, this way of grounding the core values still depends upon the nature and function of the Air Force profession and thus may raise in some minds the specter of relativism: are there really no universal moral standards on which to base our professional ethic? (Are we not "one nation, under God"?)[30] Is there really one morality for one profession and another for another? I myself believe no such thing. However, in some roles certain virtues and, indeed, certain aspects of certain virtues come more into the foreground and therefore more to the notice of reflective practitioners when the time comes to formulate doctrine—including core values—for a given role or profession. All of us need, among other things, to acquire and exercise the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, courage, and temperance. Still, justice (roughly definable as the stable disposition of giving to each his or her due) will take somewhat different forms in, say, a mother, drill sergeant, squadron commander, and priest (think about how each might deal with a person under his or her care who has "gone wrong" in some way). The same will hold for the other virtues. That is why different professions will formulate different ethical codes or sets of core values—especially when their formulations deal in the road signs mentioned in the core-values booklet.

Some have argued that the military should explain "the moral framework within which military activities take place" in terms of the cardinal virtues instead of core values.[31] I have considerable sympathy with this view in principle. It is worth noting, however, that these four virtues *are* taught as elements of the values.[32] Further, the core values have a history of some years now (and an even longer history if we recognize that their framers did not create them from scratch but drew on American military tradition in formulating them). Given that integrity, service, and excellence have become substantially embedded in the culture of the Air Force, we should not too hastily set them aside for another set of values or virtues, especially if the core values already embrace this other set to some significant degree. Perhaps, in any event, the question of which virtues are "cardinal"—pivotal to living a good human life—goes beyond the purview of Air Force doctrine. Perhaps too the same might be said with respect to the debate between moral relativists and universalists. All of this, in any event, lies beyond the scope of this article.

Yet, we should note that a full understanding of the core values and their place in the military profession cannot altogether escape deeper questions about the "origin of the Values." The core values may "work," and military professionalism may need them; still, Airmen must face the question of whether they can fully internalize them—that is to say, harmonize them with their deepest convictions about how they should live. If they cannot, they should seek another vocation. Or if enough patriotic Americans could not (I mention this only as a theoretical possibility), then the military ethic as formulated in doctrine should be reconsidered.

The American people, too, must consider the role of the military profession in the life of the nation and in so doing must obviously appeal to moral principles more basic than the core values (the laws of nature and of nature's God and certain truths held to be self-evident, for example). For a society cannot endorse a profession that violates its basic moral convictions. Thus, while torture, perfidy, terror bombing, and other forms of indiscriminate or disproportionate warfare might contribute to fighting effectively (taking this in a morally neutral sense of battlefield effectiveness), they remain inconsistent with American values and concern for universal human rights. *Therefore*, the Air Force core values rightly contain elements that rule out such practices (obedience to laws of war under "excellence" in the core-values booklet and in both formulations, "justice" under "integrity," and the injunction to respect the worth and dignity of all humans as part of "respect for others" under "service"). Such practices, although consistent with the hypothetical function of (merely) fighting effectively, are inconsistent with the United States Air Force's *actual* function of serving militarily the moral ends of the American Republic in accordance with its Constitution.[33] This is a good thing, for it helps make unmistakable the real difference between the core values and the "virtues of the SS-man." Again, doctrine writers might reasonably declare that abstract theoretical concerns about the basis and validity of human-rights claims lie well beyond their purview. But it may well be worth stressing that the American military's function—which grounds the core values—itself has moral content, namely serving, honoring, and promoting American values, treaty obligations, and so forth.

In closing, let me make a final remark about the purpose of this article. The argument moves from some technical (at times nitpicking) criticisms about the consistency between the two existing formulations of the core values, through some formal concerns about the logical flow among values and their elements, to some quite broad and suggestive concerns about their rationale. Through all of this, the article presents a critique of doctrine for which, as a whole, I have a high regard. I offer these comments in a collegial spirit, and if the article opens a dialogue among readers, it will have well served my purpose in writing it.

Notes

1. *United States Air Force Core Values* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1 January 1997), http://www.usafa.af.mil/core-value/cv-mastr.html. I use the term *Airman* as Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1 uses it: "Any US Air Force member (officer or enlisted; active, reserve, or guard; and Department of the Air Force civilians) who supports and defends the US Constitution and serves our country." AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 18 February 2004, 2, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd1-1.pdf. What of contractors? I think it would be wonderful if they would embrace and live by the core values (although holding them accountable might prove difficult), but applying *Airmen* to them would overstretch the term.

2. Col Charles R. Myers, "The Core Values: Framing and Resolving Ethical Issues for the Air Force," *Airpower Journal* 11, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 40, 52n7, http://www.air power.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/spr97/myers.pdf. Myers, of course, goes on to respond to this and other questions about the appropriateness of the core values.

3. AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 3.

4. Mr. Robert Christensen of the Air Force Doctrine Center pointed out to me that because the core-values booklet was an unofficial publication (not a numbered doctrine document, instruction, or pamphlet), it did not need to be superseded (in fact, in a sense, could not be superseded). Nevertheless, the booklet has a certain amount of customary authority due to its circulation over time and its use in education and training (it clearly had *some* sort of authoritative sanction, official or otherwise). Clearing up the conflict between the two documents, then, would be a useful service, whether done in a revision of the doctrine document, a policy letter, or some other appropriate format.

5. We might even suggest that one finds no unified Air Force understanding of the core values that gets beneath the bumper-sticker level down to the elements. One would think that a doctrine document would codify such an understanding, but two further points seem to underline how this is not the case. First, in his *Letter to Airmen* dated 13 February 2006 (http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/secaf.asp?id =217), Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne discusses the core values in a way that seems to place loyalty under integrity and honor under excellence (contra both documents discussed here). Second, the history of the core values presented at the January 2006 USAF Strategic Planning Workshop on Core Values made *no mention of AFDD 1-1*, let alone of the doctrine document's reformulation of the elements of the values.

6. *United States Air Force Core Values*.

7. Ibid.

8. AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 4.

9. *United States Air Force Core Values*; and AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 6.

10. In the core-values booklet, we can identify a possible explanation of this apparent discrepancy. There the elements of service are portrayed as "behaviors" (whereas the elements under integrity are portrayed as "moral traits"). *United States Air Force Core Values*. Presumably *behavior* displaying a lack of self-control (excessive shows of anger, inappropriate sexual overtures, etc.) is inconsistent with putting service before self, while the *moral trait* of self-control is part of integrity. Such a reading receives additional support from Colonel Myers's interpretation of the core values, according to which the values correspond to the elements of moral theory: integrity to character, service to action, excellence to consequences. Myers, "Core Values." But this sort of response is not available for AFDD 1-1, which explicitly treats the elements under service before self as "moral attributes." AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 5–7. Taken in this way, the element of self-control clearly belongs under integrity, given the doctrine document's own definitions. Its inclusion (along with self-discipline and appropriate actions or desires) under integrity would greatly improve the logical flow of the formulation. Finally, let me note that an early draft of a revision of AFDD 1-1 that I have seen incorporates some of the changes I suggest.

11. The descriptions of the first two both speak of controlling anger, the description of self-discipline explicitly enjoins self-control, and the description of self-control explicitly rules out "inappropriate actions or desires." Perhaps self-discipline is intended to focus more on self-improvement while self-control focuses more on refraining from negative actions (one could read the text this way). Further, the language of the description of appropriate actions or desires focuses more explicitly on refraining from substance abuse or unprofessional relationships (such as fraternization). All of this content is fine, but given the very substantial overlap, it is just not clear why three separate elements are required.

12. *United States Air Force Core Values*; and AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 5. Of course, it is easy to put plausible constructions upon them that distinguish them. One favored by me and many of my colleagues and students maintains that one *accepts* responsibility for one's own performance while one *holds* others accountable (and accepts being held accountable by others). If plausible, such a reading is not mandated by the documents, and there is certainly nothing unnatural about speaking of *accepting accountability* and *holding others responsible*. Both terms, of course, are prevalent in military culture, and it is understandable that doctrine writers would want to retain them. If so, however, and if they are to be listed as separate elements under integrity, then a clearer distinction between them would help Airmen grasp the structure of the core values.

13. *United States Air Force Core Values*; and AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 5–7.

14. *United States Air Force Core Values*; and AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 4.

15. Likewise for moral theology: the core-values booklet is sensitive to this, begging off any deep explanation of the "origin of the Values" and insisting that they are independent of "Chapel programs." *United States Air Force Core Values*.

16. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957). The quotations appear on pages 8, 9, and 10, respectively.

17. Ibid., 11–18. I should note that he is quite restrictive about who counts as a military professional, essentially limiting membership to "line," "rated," or "combat arms" officers. Most of us today will be more inclusive, but we can be so without rejecting other aspects of Huntington's conception of military professionalism.

18. Anthony E. Hartle, *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*, 2d ed., rev. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 11.

19. See ibid., 22, and chap. 2 as a whole.

20. In saying this I intend no slight toward the core values of the other services. One could pick out similar correspondences for honor, courage, and commitment or for duty, honor, country (traditional if not official core Army values). The value is the important thing—not the label.

21. We might prefer to come up with a more pleasant formulation, such as "the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem." See Gen Sir John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London: Times Publishing Company, 1963), 3.

22. AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 5.

23. Hackett, *Profession of Arms*, 63; and AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 5.

24. AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 7.

25. Ibid., 4.

26. Gen Michael E. Ryan, "Reflections on the Core Values," in AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership*, ed. Richard I. Lester and A. Glenn Morton (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2001), 53, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au-24/ryan.pdf.

27. This case of dishonest reporting resulted in, among other things, a policy letter from Gen John Ryan, chief of staff at that time, on the absolute centrality of integrity to military service. I suspect that this letter influenced later work on the core values. For a brief account of the affair and a reference to General Ryan's letter, see James H. Toner, *Morals under the Gun: The Cardinal Virtues, Military Ethics, and American Society* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 91–93.

28. *United States Air Force Core Values*.

29. One might ask whether this rationale proves too much. Does it not imply that *every* profession should adapt core values of integrity, service, and excellence? In a way, perhaps it does. Members of every profession will need to honor and embody values along these lines if they wish to maintain a cohesive corporateness, discharge their responsibility to society, and maintain and continually enhance their expertise. But nothing in this rationale implies that every profession will or should conceptualize these values in the same way or use the same labels. The legal profession, for example, surely requires integrity, but the kind of courage lawyers need—the nature and line of accountability, the particular requirements of honesty and openness, and so forth—will differ. Even within other military services, different missions and traditions will fully justify different formulations of core values—both in terms of the "letter" (the names and ordering of the values and their elements) and to a lesser degree the "spirit" or substance of the ethic (the sort of character and behavior required by practitioners of that branch of the military profession).

30. One may debate the meaning of such a phrase in such a context, but it seems *at the least* to imply that we are answerable to some moral standard well above and beyond our own narrow interests.

31. AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 4. Toner, for example, argues this in *Morals under the Gun*.

32. They are not labeled "cardinal virtues," but integrity includes justice and courage, and service includes temperance (self-control and appropriate actions or desires) and, most tenuously, prudence (the elements of rule following and duty speak of the importance of exercising good judgment in the performance of duty). Although we may debate whether they receive enough emphasis, at least they are there.

33. Here I wish to bracket thorny questions about whether there are *ever* times when it might be permissible to engage in practices of torture, terror bombing, or the like (say in a ticking-time-bomb scenario or a situation like that faced by Great Britain in late 1940)—my point is just that the core values correctly prohibit them (at least) in all but truly extreme circumstances. Anthony Hartle's *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making* takes up such questions and further provides an extended treatment of the relation among the three main influences on the American military ethic: the exigencies of the profession, the values of American society, and the laws of war. He argues (see especially the discussion of social differentiation in chap. 8) not only that American values and the laws of war serve as "boundary conditions" on the military ethic, but also that they have to a considerable extent penetrated the texture of that ethic, which is thus not merely functional. The case of the Air Force's teaching on respect for others is a partial confirmation of Hartle's thesis, as is the inclusion of obeying the laws of war under operational excellence (in the core-values booklet).

Section 3

Mentoring, Diversity, Professionalism, and the Total Force

Professional Dimension



Reality Leadership

Prof. John Charles Kunich
Dr. Richard I. Lester

There is such a difference between the way we really live and the way we ought to live that the man who neglects the real to study the ideal will learn how to accomplish his ruin, not his salvation.

—Machiavelli, *The Prince*

Leadership means different things to different people in different contexts, which accounts for the baffling spectrum of theories, models, and methods, all jockeying for the leadership vanguard. Every serious student of the subject has a personal opinion about leadership, even if he or she has not (yet) offered us a written record of it. But leadership is neither mystical nor mysterious, at least in the abstract, where theorists remain unencumbered with the messy chores of implementation and execution. That's why people have written so much about it—everyone wants a quick solution, and it's not hard to write some ideas that make sense on paper and that even sound rather scientific. But after we peel away all the layers of wrapping paper and wade through the packaging popcorn, leadership involves nothing more than making a difference, creating positive change, moving people to get things done, and getting rid of everything else that does not contribute to the mission. This means reinforcing core values, articulating a clear and powerful vision, and then setting people free to develop better ways and better ideas. Yes, most of the clichés are true: leadership entails trusting and giving authority back where it belongs—to the human beings who actually perform the great bulk of what we call work. Trust is the glue that holds organizations together, and empowerment is the fruit of trust. True—and far easier to say than to do.[1]

Leadership by cliché will not work unless personal strength, character, skills, and performance lie behind the phalanx of platitudes. The sad truth is that it is never easy to be a leader—to cope with the myriad intractable challenges that come bundled with the territory. If it were easy, many more people would do it. We do not learn most of the useful leadership lessons from reading. As much as we might crave the swift, effortless, and low-impact fix from books and articles, that passive and painless process rarely can substitute for little things like ability, talent, upbringing, diligence, creativity, opportunity, personality, experience, courage, vision, drive, values, perseverance, and luck. If only we could squeeze the essence of those sweet secrets into words on a page and enable readers instantly to make up for decades of error, wasted time, poor habits, inaction, bad advice, ill fortune, and laziness! Maybe if we could conceive a catchy and sophisticated-sounding new name to disguise our refried old bromides—perhaps Eight Omega Leadership or the One-Second Ruler—it would suddenly become a panacea for our power outage. Alas, *instant leadership* remains only a fantasy, even in this age of perpetual gratification, high-speed Internet, and no-fault living. No extreme makeover of the superficial trappings of musty, rusty, and medieval management methods will trick reality for us. The virtual reality of the self-help cult is a poor understudy for no-kidding reality, as numberless frustrated managers discover to their dismay when they fail to wring miracles out of all those gleaming formulas. A wise person understands that leadership success is a process and not an event.

Assuming a leadership role in the real world today guarantees us a mixed bag—more accurately a perverse piñata, loaded with both good and bad surprises as our reward for all that effort to crack open the shell of success. Along with the obvious satisfaction and benefits come tough pressures and responsibilities. Leaders are expected to inspire lethargic people to do their best, handle problem personnel and bad attitudes with ease, make difficult or unpopular decisions before breakfast, maintain high credibility, fend off cutthroat competition from all over the planet, explain senior management's inexplicable positions to staff members, and keep cool in the face of contentious disagreement and unfair criticism.[2] No wonder leaders would like a little help. Based on our experience, we will pass along some lessons we have learned about specific strategies, techniques, and ideas to help leaders live with the challenges unique to their role. These tips will probably not work overnight magic, morphing someone from Homer Simpson into Alexander the Great as he or she sleeps. Anyone looking for that type of happy-news leadership liposuction can put this article down now. Remember, this is reality leadership—not something in the fantasy section.

What Leaders Really Do

The best leaders do not start out with the question "What's best for me?" Rather, they ask, "What can and should I do to make a positive difference?" These leaders constantly ask themselves and their followers, "What are the organization's mission and goals? Do they need to be modified? What sur-

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prises might lie ahead that we need to anticipate? What constitutes winning performance in this fluid environment?" In these challenging times, leaders prepare organizations for change and help them adjust as they struggle through it. Leaders never fake it, and there are no shortcuts they can take, as they first learn all they can about the situation, including resources and obstacles, trends and unmet needs, as well as hidden potential and ossified misconceptions. Still, the all-knowing person does not make the best leader—the all-understanding one does. Now more than in the past, a leader cannot often act like a dictator/tyrant. The leader's people have human needs, and in the modern era, in many quarters, they are accustomed to being treated with dignity, respect, and maybe even kid gloves.

People today need to know—demand to know—that the leader cares and will do his or her utmost to help them get the job done. An old-school General Patton wannabe who tries to shove a "my way or the highway" leadership model past the gritted teeth of today's personnel will soon find himself discredited. Flexibility, sensitivity to individual circumstances, and a determination to empathize are more suited to the twenty-first-century workplace than the old leadership-through-intimidation paradigm. Just as people cannot lead from behind, they cannot lead solely by applying their soles to their workers' behinds—not anymore, at least. And that is a hard lesson. Techniques that might have worked a few decades or centuries or millennia before are not guaranteed to work as well next week. They probably require serious adjustment before we can graft them onto a contemporary leadership style. After all, leadership is not arithmetic or Newtonian physics—closer analogues are chaos math and the quantum-mechanics world of the uncertainty principle. It is all about people, and people are ever-changing. The leader who does not know that, or who does not want to know that, is apt to find no one following his or her lead. Why not? Did not it work for Attila the Hun?[3]

The tried-and-true (and trite) old tricks often don't work on the new dogs in this year's workplace. The reason for that lies at the center of what reality leaders really do—and really need to do—to succeed now. People currently entering the workforce are different from the entry-level employees of even a couple of decades ago in ways that present a leader with a jumbled grab bag of adversities and advantages. They may have shorter attention spans, less acquaintance with strict standards, and lower experience with long, arduous tasks. Today's young employees—even those with college diplomas and advanced degrees—may lack some basic skills and background knowledge once taken for granted. As our educational system has transformed—with much less emphasis on fact learning, rote memorization, and what used to be the fundamentals of reading, writing, mathematics, spelling, grammar, logic, and other disciplines—our graduates require much more critical thinking, remedial education, and training before they can perform at an acceptable level in many jobs. The leader has to provide that education and training. A progressive intellectual environment becomes possible only when critical thinking serves as the foundation of education. Why? Because when students learn to think through the core competencies they are learning, they are in a better position to apply this learning to their lives and daily work. In a world characterized by constant change and increasing complexity, people need critical thinking for economic, social, political, military, and educational survival.

Young graduates today have far more technological sophistication than the previous generation of new employees and usually can teach their leaders a thing or 60 about computer-aided research, software, hardware, and a host of powerful, modern tools. They can handle all manner of telecommunication and high-speed computerized methods with a facility that will astound many old-timer leaders who climb on a chair if someone mentions a mouse in the office. The wise leader is humble enough to use this digital edge to the fullest, even while filling in the young associates on some basic writing and sociocultural fundamentals.

Teacher-leaders cannot safely assume anything about new recruits in terms of knowledge, skill, or attitude—only that they are human and will surprise them in ways that range from delightful to dreadful. If entry-level employees (or even senior ones) appear to have a work-ethic deficit or seem disrespectful or ill mannered, no contemporary Attila can change all that by merely barking a few orders. People have a deep-seated and ineradicable need to achieve and succeed, but a modern leader must find the right way to access that latent potential within each individual, and this often entails considerable teaching and back-to-basics skill training in the workplace. Screams, threats, and periodic exclamations of "You're fired" or "You just don't fit in" will not compensate for decades of acculturation and educational priorities that are a bit (or a lot) off track from what the leader wants from his or her people. Teaching and learning remain central to what today's leaders really do, and that continues throughout the life cycle of their relationship with their people. (That is why we touch on the concept of perpetual learning later in this article.) If a person ignores either teaching or learning for long, the leader's office will soon house someone new who better "fits in" the twenty-first-century boss's chair.

Healing an Achilles' Heel

Primarily, leaders fail or fall short of their potential because they have an undiscovered and/or unhealed Achilles' heel—a weakness serious enough to negate all of the many positive attributes they may be blessed with. It follows that perhaps one of the most important actions a leader can take is to find and rectify whatever hidden flaw threatens his or her future. This is unpleasant, painful, and arduous work; thus, most people never do it. No off-the-shelf text on liposuction leadership can swiftly suck out our latent and long-festering vulnerability while we recline and rest. Unless we face our flaws, we gamble that one day they will face us—at a moment when a single, unaddressed issue jeopardizes everything we have achieved, and one big "Oh, no" upends a career overflowing with "Attaboys."

The metaphor of an Achilles' heel is potent because legendary Achilles himself was a demigod and the greatest warrior who ever lived, virtually a one-man army capable of winning wars with his unmatched abilities for whatever side he favored. He could slay the enemy's premier hero, even Hector of Troy, and conquer the mightiest of obstacles. Yet his famous heel was ever present throughout his astonishing string of marvelous triumphs, and at the climax of his crowning victory over Troy, it allowed a far inferior enemy to kill him. If a lowly heel can fell the ultimate military genius at the pinnacle of his power, all leaders would do well to check carefully for whatever vulnerability threatens their own success.

That does not mean that such self-inspection is fun or easy. No one, from Achilles on down, likes to confront his or her own imperfections—especially ones deep and deadly enough to provoke utter failure. Sometimes we have no awareness of our own worst weaknesses, at least on a conscious level, simply because it is far more comfortable to avoid them and pretend that all is fine than to wrestle with such pernicious internal perils. Moreover, some character defects manifest themselves only when a particular, specific combination of unusual circumstances coalesces, which might not happen more than once or twice in a lifetime—if at all. Staring long and closely at ourselves in a starkly lit mirror to identify those often well-concealed weaknesses can be challenging and repugnant work. It involves methodical analysis of often horrible memories of incidents in which things went very wrong. When and why did this happen? Has it recurred? Could it recur?

All of us could also effortlessly critique many leaders—great and not-so-great, ancient and modern—and catalogue the flaw or cluster of flaws that undermined them. From Julius Caesar, Hannibal, and Alexander the Great to Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, it is so easy for us to play Name That Heel that one wonders why these prominent individuals did not do it themselves and proactively root out all those inimical defects. How could they not see their glaring blind spots? Why would such successful and eminently experienced leaders make colossal blunders—even make them repeatedly—when the consequences seem so obvious and predictable to us in our retrospection recliners? We can help ourselves to a few cheap laughs at the Big Boys' expense. But then, when it is our turn to literally help ourselves by putting our own character under the microscope, the game jumps suddenly to a much more challenging and decidedly less festive level.

Completely eliminating our greatest weakness may prove impossible, given that it likely formed through many years of experience. At a minimum, however, we ought to identify and then stay away from those specific temptations, situations, preconditions, and circumstances that have proved their potential to breach that weakness and thereby cause our downfall. By gaining cognizance of the existence and nature of our Achilles' heel, we acquire the opportunity to be alert to whatever warning signals tip off the approach of our special combination of dangerous conditions and therefore exercise extra caution to guard against giving in to our weakness. In *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, Oscar Wilde famously but erroneously declared, "The only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it," but actually the best remedy is to understand the temptation and what causes it, strive constantly to remain removed from those causes, stay vigilant for early signs of trouble, and then use all our strength to resist surrender.[4] Doing nothing along these lines makes it far more probable that one day people will gossip about our own stunning failure and shake their heads that we could throw our once-promising careers away on something so blatantly foolish and so entirely obvious (to others) that we should never have gotten caught up in it. Finding and healing our Achilles' heel (or heels) can be one of the greatest favors we ever do for ourselves, our people, and our organization.

Service, Not Self

As young children, we tended to believe that being a leader is an unqualified blessing, amounting to getting our own way all the time and calling all the shots. That might be a fair description of a despotic dictator who rules with an iron fist tightly clenched around a bundle of fear and force. Such tyrants live and die by violence and threats, and their methods have no place in a modern free society—even though some megalomaniacs might imagine themselves as divine-right royalty within their little domains. Paradoxically, in our contemporary, self-centered, Me Century culture, where narcissism and self-esteem are paramount, the best leaders put service to others before service to themselves. To lead people who put themselves first, we would do well to check our own egos at the door and focus on what is best for our people, organization, and culture.

This concept of servant leadership is as old as humanity, but we are fated to relearn it every generation. It feels backwards, as if the leader must put aside the perquisites and privileges of the crown to stay on top—almost abdicating the throne to keep it. But authentic leadership does not involve serving ourselves, and self-aggrandizement remains foreign to the true leader, whose proper aim is to move people to do what is best for the greater good—not what is best for the leader's petty and narrow personal interests. Only by regarding the broader interests of others—employees, colleagues, customers, and society—can leaders prevail in a world where people routinely expect to be first. Of course, over time a leader will strive to impart some measure of other-regarding selflessness to his or her employees as well and move the entire organization into a service mode—but this plan unavoidably begins with the leader's own attitude.[5]

Humility, a modest sense of one's own importance, is basic to reality leadership. For people weaned on a formula of high self-esteem, humility and self-sacrifice would appear oxymoronic—a concept blatantly at odds with itself. But that is precisely why it is so crucial to productive leadership. It is not easy, and it is not obvious—but it is effective. Only by turning outside our constricted, selfish miniworld and looking at what is best for others can we serve them and, ultimately, succeed in our own right. A dictator might demand that his serfs put up a huge statue of him in the city square, but one day that monument to megalomania will be torn down, maybe by those same serfs. The only lasting memorials to leaders are those earned through assiduous devotion to something greater than themselves—and greater than any one person.

That splendid brand of selfless leadership differs greatly from the "best friend" or babysitter leadership you might think appropriate for workers coddled, pampered, and cushioned with an inflated sense of self-esteem since conception.

It does no one any favors to dumb down the organization's expected performance level or to numb down our alertness for failure to meet those expectations. Reality leadership demands recognizing the truth about ourselves as well as our coworkers, competitors, customers, and culture—and then insisting on a cooperative and coordinated approach to making that truth work for our organization. No one can do this with sloppy work, lowered standards, tolerance for intolerable attitudes, or excuses for inexcusable behavior. People will eventually respond positively and appropriately to a selfless leader who settles for nothing less than best efforts and high-quality production from everyone—from the leader to the most inexperienced newcomer.

Pampered, grown, and nanny-cosseted self-esteem junkies will probably bristle initially when someone suggests (for maybe the first time in their lives) that their performance is less than above average. However, once it becomes clear that everyone, including the leader, must adhere to a no-excuse, no-kidding production, they too will usually adapt and even take pride in at last meeting and exceeding exacting standards. After all, self-esteem becomes only selfish steam unless real substance lies behind it and we ultimately see undeserved praise as saccharine for the soul. As generations of recruits have learned the hard way from surviving a grueling boot-camp ordeal, they can realize great value by reaching deep within to overcome the steepest challenges of their lives. Furthermore, the genuine sense of pride and camaraderie that comes with such a personal and organizational triumph far outshines any false pride that well-meaning but overly lenient caregivers so easily hand out. Those rewards and accolades we earn are infinitely more satisfying than those given us, precisely because we had to toil, think, struggle, and do more than was comfortable to obtain them. In that sense, the gift of high standards and high expectations for one and all is one of the greatest and truest gifts any reality leader can convey.

Mentoring for Leader Development

One can make a strong argument that leaders are neither born nor passively made; rather, they are developed and develop themselves through education, training, and a special set of experiences. Mentoring offers a good place to begin. It is largely a teaching process, beginning with parental nurturing of children and continuing through the life cycle of organizational and personal interrelationships. A key principle here is that mentoring is both an obligation and a privilege of leadership. It is something we give people. In mentoring, reality leaders provide followers with the guidance they need to make intelligent and informed decisions. Through mentoring, the senior imparts wisdom and experience-derived know-how to the junior. This process includes passing on and discussing principles, traditions, shared values, qualities, and lessons learned. Mentoring provides a framework to bring about a cultural change in the way the organization views the professional development of competent people. In most organizations today, people must take an uphill and bumpy ride on the road to the top—they simply cannot float there, nor will anyone carry them. Mentoring involves guiding and coaching—helping people move in the right direction. Clearly, mentoring is a vital way to help us reach our desired destination.

Perhaps the most powerful method by which we can shape the professional development of our employees, mentoring has become a buzzword, often carelessly shot into the air along with a dust cloud of other jargon from the unofficial, unwritten dictionary of those who consider themselves on the cutting edge of modern leadership and management. Real mentoring, properly understood, is much more than just another clipping from last week's "Dilbert" cartoon. It can and should be adjusted to fit the idiosyncratic needs and situations of both parties to the mentoring partnership, as elastic and malleable as human beings themselves. The antithesis of the old-school, one-size-fits-all, cookie-cutter mentality, mentoring—because of its capacity to conform to individual circumstances—is ideally suited to today's partnering environment. Thus, it is literally a time machine that allows us to have a profound influence many years beyond today's hubbub and humdrum and allows us to make a significant difference in the lives of our people.

A mentor—a trusted advisor, teacher, counselor, friend, and parent, usually older and more senior in the organization than the person being helped—is present when someone needs assistance in an ongoing process, not just a one-shot, square-filling formality. Because of the widely recognized value of mentoring, many organizations have made it routine, turning it into a meaningless exercise in mandatory window dressing—just one more pro forma ritual to perform and check off on some to-do list. With all the blood drained out of it, mentoring becomes just as ineffective as any other quick-fix leadership "secret" copied mindlessly from some leadership-for-losers book. Throughout our society, authentic mentoring can apply to all leaders and supervisors responsible for getting their work done through other people—but it takes much more than a perfunctory patch. As mentors who take the time to do it right, our greatest validation may come one day when we witness our former protégés—the individuals assisted by mentors—in turn undergo metamorphosis and emerge as mentors themselves.

The modeling of proper behavior, an indispensable ingredient of good mentoring, occurs when the leader demonstrates for the protégé exactly what he or she expects. It is an ongoing exercise in "do as I do," follow-the-leader game theory, but we play this never-ending game for keeps. We have seen too many examples of leaders who consider themselves exempt from the rules—even the laws—that apply to everyone. Corruption, scandal, and ruin on both an individual and institutional level metastasize from the leader's attitude of special privilege. The leader who tries to conceal personal dishonesty, immorality, or lawlessness behind a mask of faux integrity can only mentor people into becoming similar frauds because such rottenness will inevitably be exposed, having permeated the organization at every level. The true mentor must prove that "do as I say" and "do as I do" are utterly indistinguishable, without regard for time, place, or circumstance. It may not always be personally convenient or expedient for the mentor-leader to be and do everything he or she asks of the workers, but it is a nonnegotiable prerequisite of genuine leadership excellence.

As mentors, the fact that we can matter, even if for only one protégé, may be one of the most rewarding events a leader experiences. Neither dramatic nor flashy, this outcome may remain invisible to everyone but the protégé, but to that person it has profound significance. This is not the kind of marquee-magic, big-bang leadership legerdemain many people yearn for—just the kind that really does work a quiet, personal form of magic an inch at a time.[6]

Perpetual Learning

Good leaders understand that organizations cannot grow unless people grow, including the leader and everyone else. Professional development or perpetual learning involves becoming capable of doing something we could not do before. It requires growing and developing more capacity and self-confidence in ourselves and in our people. Now more than ever, leaders must ensure that professional development remains a constant activity, as we mentioned in our section about what leaders really do. We do not go to school once in a lifetime and then put education aside forever; we stay in school all of our lives.

Developing people—really developing them, with all the individually tailored effort that entails—is fundamental to how the organization views itself and how it is viewed by leaders, customers, competitors, and colleagues alike. The organization reifies its capabilities through perpetual learning, enhancing every person from the inside out, and working the same internal alchemy on the overarching team structure. Only by holding the "learning constant" foremost in their vision can reality leaders have a chance of keeping their people fully capable of fulfilling an ever-shifting mission under steadily unsteady circumstances. Given the complexity of life in the world today, no one doubts that continuous learning and adaptation are directly related to and absolutely essential for overall, long-term success.[7]

Leadership and Implementing Change

Do not read the following joke if you have already heard it more than 43 times. How many psychiatrists does it take to change a light bulb? The answer is simple. Only one, but it is very expensive, takes a long time, and the light bulb must want to change. However, unlike changing the legendary light bulb, implementing real change does not necessarily take a long time. It can happen very quickly at some times, while at other times it crawls with imperceptible, glacier-like slowness. This is true of all types of evolution, whether good or bad. A major function of leaders calls for maximizing the former and minimizing the latter. Positive change—the kind that we cause proactively rather than the kind that falls on top of us by default—requires the right strategy. We need a system, including a workable and institutionally internalized process, to bring about the good-news change and identify/dodge the car-crash kind. Without an effective leader engineering useful change, change will inevitably find us even as we sit still, and we will usually not welcome that variety of accidental alteration.[8]

This age of instability can be an uncomfortable time for people who long for things to remain as they are—familiar, well understood, and routine. Since continual change is a given, a leader must resolve to put change to work, squeeze a harness around it, and ride it toward the right horizon. We best predict the future by inventing it, but we cannot do that by mechanically applying any formula from a self-help book, and no do-it-yourself kits exist for this. No matter what neologisms we create to describe our methods and irrespective of how many charts and four-part process lists we concoct to conjure the illusion of quantifiable precision, we still glimpse the future, if at all, through a glass, darkly. But we can look at what we need now and two years from now, and then set purposefully about making it happen. If we devote significant amounts of time on a regular basis to meeting with our people at all levels to brainstorm ideas for dealing with the years to come, we will find ready confirmation of our suspicion that we do not know all the answers and do not have a monopoly on all the good questions. We will also find that action works like a powerful medicine to relieve feelings of fear, helplessness, anger, and uncertainty because we become no longer just passive passengers on a runaway train, but engineers with influence over our journey. Instead of changing with the times, we must make a habit of changing just a little ahead of the times and doing what we can to nudge change in the optimal direction; in the process, we will enhance our living with a constructive purpose.[9]

Conclusion

In summary, we reflect on John W. Gardner, who wrote as thoughtfully as anyone on the complexities of leadership. His words almost constitute a leadership creed: "We need to believe in ourselves and our future but not to believe that life is easy. Life is painful and rain falls on the just. Leaders must help us see failure and frustration not as a reason to doubt ourselves but a reason to strengthen resolve. . . . Don't pray for the day when we finally solve our problems. Pray that we have the freedom to continue working on the problems the future will never cease to throw at us."[10]

Perhaps the synthesis and summation of everything we can do to become ethics-based reality leaders call for using our freedom to the fullest and setting our hearts on doing all we can to develop a group of individuals into a cohesive and purposeful problem-crunching team.[11] This will necessarily entail all of the activities we have covered in this article: comprehending the concepts of leadership, conducting genuine mentoring and teaching, healing our Achilles' heels, practicing perpetual learning, and inventing our own future at all levels. If we become, at our core, members of that team with no interests out of harmony with what is best for the team and the organization it serves, many of the fancy theoretical notions about leadership will take care of themselves—or we and our teammates will take care of them ourselves. Reality leadership may not fit into any academic textbook's equations or inspire any novelist to rhapsodize us into fictional immortality, but it delivers because it embraces the totality of real things and events that leaders come to grips with on a daily basis.

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Civilian Personnel: An Experience in Transformation

Roger M. Blanchard

The Air Force of today bears little resemblance to that of just 10 or 15 years ago. The end of the cold war brought about a peace dividend of manpower reductions in both the military and civilian ranks which brought about the desired savings. Many different personnel management tools were used to effect this reduction: buy outs, reengineering, restructuring of processes, regionalized personnel servicing, contracting out, and reductions-in-force. The move away from the cold war mind-set also brought a requirement for developing new Air Force leaders who had the broader skill sets and perspectives needed to operate effectively in an environment which included Air Force commitments around the globe. To support this expansion, the Air Force transitioned from a fight-in-place force, ready for large-scale conflicts, to a mobile (and deployable) force that can operate simultaneously in multiple locations. This movement to the "expeditionary" air and space force allows us to meet our responsibilities while providing predictability in the demands placed on our personnel. In addition, the events of 11 September 2001 changed the face of our national defense strategy and placed increased requirements on our expeditionary forces. More now than at any time in our nation's history, the nature of our enemy requires our forces to be poised around the world, ready to meet any threat.

The increased flexibility afforded by the expeditionary model impacts not only the doctrine, tactics, and hardware of the Air Force, but also the people who bring it all together to create battlefield effects. While great strides have been made in recent years, the work to fully adapt to the new model continues. The ongoing need to better define and develop our workforce to meet the needs of an expeditionary Air Force drives a mandate to reshape our force with the right skills, and to improve the quality of service provided to the Total Force—Active Duty, Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian Airmen—from anywhere around the world, at any time. Our efforts to operationalize civilian Force Development (FD), transform our Total Force through the Personnel Services Delivery model (PSD), and implement the Department of Defense's (DOD) National Security Personnel System (NSPS) provide our answers to these stressing demands now placed on our personnel and manpower assets.

The entire way we use and develop our civilian force has undergone an evolution. Given the current strains on resources and our need to deploy effective combat and support forces wordwide, the Air Force has been forced to make full use of all our people. On the civilian side, this means utilizing civilians in new roles and leadership positions previously performed by our military members. For the first time, we are building succession plans with the Total Force in mind. Senior civilians are entering roles of increasing importance, assuming responsibilities that have historically been filled with officers, as we strive for optimum utilization with the Total Force. Essential to making this transition has been our efforts at civilian FD, where we view leadership development as an investment in our people, rather than an operational cost. Our efforts now include a development continuum with connected experiences, training, and educational opportunities that link development of our civilians from the tactical-entry level to our strategic senior-leader levels. Our civilian development is also being integrated into a Total Force approach, with more and more of our military and civilian processes becoming synched and unified. The heart of our Total FD efforts is the involvement of our functional communities through the Development Team (DT) structure. In the civilian world, we have had similar functional involvement for years through our career programs. Now, however; our DT structures have begun to formalize our mentoring and guidance roles and we are beginning to manage civilian career fields as a whole. Senior functional members who comprise the DTs look to a unified set of Air Force requirements and competencies, and ensure individuals as well as the community as a whole are being developed to meet those requirements. The result is a focused development effort where we use programs providing education, training, and experiences to satisfy our FD requirements. The end goal is a well-defined requirement for our members, along with a connected set of available opportunities that form a development-road map utilized by our DTs and members to create superior civilian leaders.

To build this road map our civilian FD efforts have added new programs and processes as well as incorporated existing ones. Existing programs stem from the career program construct that existed for officer- equivalent-level employees at the operational level for many years. Programs here include career-broadening and developmental-education opportunities that expose our civilians to a wider set of skills and experiences, centrally funded training and permanent change of station, as well as intern recruiting through the PALACE ACQUIRE program. As part of this, we also continue to participate in the DOD's Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP) approach to developing a cadre of senior career civilian leaders. We actively participate in DLAMP and have constructed our development programs to take advantage of the opportunities offered by DLAMP. New pro-

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grams to identify and select civilians for important leadership positions are also being established. AFSLMO (Air Force Senior Leader Management Office) has launched the GS-15 Leadership Development (LD) program for strategic level employees, and we are expanding this program to the operational level at the GS-13 and 14 levels. In an effort to parallel our military efforts and posture us for Total Force integration, the LD program is paralleling our military squadron commander and command screening board processes to create corporate programs for selecting and validating civilian leaders prepared to occupy key leadership positions. These efforts provide essential leadership experience and credibility for our civilians that facilitate utilization in roles previously reserved for military members. Tactical-level development programs are being launched as well to acculturate our civilians and provide a common baseline understanding of our Air Force. Basic-level leadership training is being developed to provide training for tactical-level employees and also provide an avenue to identify and develop emerging leaders at those levels. These emerging leaders combine with our existing PALACE ACQUIRE intern recruiting efforts to form the basis of our force-renewal efforts and create the seed corn for developing future senior leaders within each career field. Even more important, we are working to connect and link all of these opportunities and experiences together to form our development continuum. This is our road map where everyone understands the requirements and opportunities for leadership development.

Civilian personnelists serving in the Air Force have undergone particularly radical changes since the transition to the expeditionary force model. In 1990 the Air Force had a full civilian personnel administration presence at each base. Subsequently, the National Performance Review and National Partnership Council highlighted areas in public administration where we needed to reengineer business processes. Civilian personnel administration was one of the career fields identified. We had to prioritize where we placed our resources—both dollars and people. As a result, business process improvement was introduced as one means of achieving the efficiencies needed to absorb this prioritization and reduce manpower levels. Technological change has enabled this reengineering. Today, we have a much smaller presence at each base, as the majority of Civilian Personnel services and backroom operations that were conducted at base level have been centralized at the Air Force Personnel Center to maximize efficiencies gained from standardized and automated processes. The personnel specialists that remain at each base now primarily focus on resolving issues that require direct customer contact. Efforts to promote effective interaction with customers using Web-based tools and expert systems, such as implementation of the Benefits and Entitlements System Team (BEST) call center and Web site, the Personnel Automated Records Information System (PARIS), and the Civilian Employment call center, have been successful in improving personnel service efficiency and access. These interactive voice response (IVR) and Web services were developed and established under PALACE Compass, the Air Force plan for regionalizing and improving civilian personnel servicing.

The critical next step for improving our ability to shape and manage our workforce will be to extend some of the civilian force progress to the Total Force, and to concurrently transform and integrate the processes, organizations, and technology by which we deliver personnel support and services to the Total Force. PSD Transformation, which consists of the planning and design of a new Air Force delivery model that will support the vast majority of customer transactions in a centralized/shared service organization, is currently under way. This new organization will use integrated technology, automation, centralization, and streamlined business processes to improve operational efficiency, effectiveness, and customer satisfaction; improve accuracy and availability of information; and enable the most effective use of resources to support war-fighting operations and stressed career fields. This comprehensive effort will include a fundamental change in the role of personnel specialists who will shift their primary focus from conducting routine transactions to providing more strategic and advisory services. The new centralized organization will also provide a knowledge repository that will put key expertise and guidance within easy reach of every commander, leader, and Airmen, facilitating the Air Force Personnel and Manpower mission of delivering the right people, in the right place, at the right time. This multiple-year effort will apply a multiphased approach, with each phase building on those that preceded it.

Our PSD Transformation-service delivery model will blur the distinction between historically stovepiped military and civilian personnel management organizations by collocating and merging similar processes, thereby providing first-level customer services to the Total Force by a cadre of integrated military and civilian personnel and manpower specialists. This transformation will add to the mobility and flexibility that enables our expeditionary Air Force to function effectively; reflect the value we place in our people by improving the quality of personnel service delivery to Airmen and their families; and allow additional cost savings to be reaped as duplicate structures are reduced or eliminated outright in support of the President's Management Agenda and the secretary of defense's charge to shift resources "from bureaucracy to battlefield."

While the Air Force will continue to exploit opportunities for centralization and online self-service, we are starting to look at the next great step forward. In the near future, we will begin integrating systems of record with other services by participating in the adoption of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS), and the creation of a single point of entry to a "one-stop shop" for all personnel and pay services for all Airmen—Active, Reserve, Air National Guard. We have taken a significant step in this direction with the establishment of a "1-800" number and a comprehensive case-management system to facilitate the resolution of personnel/pay issues for Air Force members.

As the Air Force undergoes these changes, the largest change in civilian personnel in the last quarter century is also being implemented with the DOD's introduction of NSPS. NSPS is an ambitious reshaping of the old rules governing civilian-employee management. It changes how employees are recruited, developed, deployed, and retained. It builds on a new performance management system that values performance, rewards contribution, and promotes excellence. It represents a major paradigm shift to focus on performance and requires that supervisors manage with innovation to achieve tangible results, and that civilian employees adapt rapidly to new missions, new technology, and new tactics.

NSPS challenges civilian and military managers and supervisors, as well as employees, to work smarter and more creatively and to accept responsibility for the success of each organizational undertaking. The result of the challenge is a partnership focused on solving problems, producing results, and advancing the mission; it is civilian employees working with uniformed personnel as members of an agile, high-performing defense force.

In concert with our Air Force FD and PSD efforts, NSPS helps to provide the flexibility and responsiveness needed of our HR systems in today's environment. When executed properly, the combination of FD, PSD, and NSPS will create a human resource (HR) system capable of responding to any world situation.

Notwithstanding these improvements in organizational alignment and strategic management, there remain several obstacles we must overcome to meet our civilian HR management challenges. While the aforementioned changes produce a leaner, more efficient Air Force personnel structure, they also create turbulence in our workforce. As high-performance organizations have come to realize, human resources are the most critical assets. The placement of quality people as the foundation of the Air Force Strategic Plan underlines the importance we place on obtaining, developing, and retaining a quality workforce. The recent and planned advances in our approach to personnel management posture us to take Air Force human capital planning to the next level as we work to ensure that the concerns of our people are continually addressed. Each service member and employee must be assured that leadership is concerned not only about the mission, but also about the welfare of its most important asset—the people who make the USAF the finest air and space force in the world.

Air Force Personnel plays a critical role in meeting the Air Force mission. We are eager to fulfill our responsibility as a key component of the Air Force of the twenty-first century. Air Force people are at the heart of operational readiness, and Civilian Personnel has never been a greater factor in meeting the national security strategy.

The Air National Guard Yesterday and Today: The Citizen-Soldier

Lt Gen Craig R. McKinley

Citizen-soldiers have played a central role in America's defense since the first English colonists settled in North America in the early seventeenth century. Throughout most of our history, the American people have relied upon the militia and National Guard as well as volunteers to provide the vast bulk of their military manpower in wartime. Prior to the Cold War, large standing forces in peacetime were considered unnecessary, overly expensive, and a potential threat to our liberties.

Only in major crises like the Civil War, World War I, and World War II, did the nation tolerate the establishment of large standing forces. For all of its shortcomings in training and discipline, this system was considered cost-effective, strategically sound, consistent with our cultural values, and supportive of democratic institutions. With this basic philosophy of military institutions, the English colonists gained a foothold on the Atlantic coast, fought off the attacks of hostile Indians and European powers, won the nation's independence, acquired a vast continental domain, survived a great Civil War, and ended slavery while becoming an increasingly affluent and liberal society.

Citizen-soldiers also aided their states in coping with natural disasters and civil unrest. This dual mission—both state and federal—has served as a source of great pride among Guardsmen for generations and has helped maintain the highest retention statistics among the American armed forces. This close relationship between the Guard and the states has also helped knit the fabric of the US military as one of the most trusted institutions in the federal government. The Air National Guard (ANG) proudly supports the militia heritage of the citizen Airman.

Guard Aviation's Early Years

In the twentieth century, the relative importance of the citizen-soldier declined. The evolution of technology and the emergence of the United States as a great world power drove a shift of emphasis to the standing forces of the professional military. But, until the Vietnam War, the bulk of our manpower was not composed of professional soldiers. Draftees and volunteers filled the gap in times of need. The twentieth century also saw the addition of the Federal Reserve forces to fill the needs of trained soldiers in times of crisis.

Although the ANG was not established as a separate reserve component until 18 September 1947 when the Air Force was created, National Guard aviators have played significant roles in all of America's wars and most of its major contingencies since the First World War era. On 2 August 1908 the Army formally accepted the world's first military airplane from the Wright brothers. Meanwhile, a group of enthusiasts had organized an "aeronautical corps" at the 7th Regiment Armory in New York City to learn ballooning. They were members of the 1st Company Signal Corps, New York National Guard. Ballooning experiments were also considered an important military aviation undertaking in support of infantry units.

In 1910 members of the 1st Company Signal Corps raised $500 to finance their first aircraft. The investment disappeared when the plane crashed on takeoff during maneuvers that same year. In 1911 the Curtiss Aeroplane Company loaned the unit an aircraft and a pilot named Beckwith Havens. Later, Havens joined the unit as a private and was recognized as the National Guard's first aviator. In August 1912 he flew with the Army in joint maneuvers.

There were many efforts to form Guard aero units in various states by guardsmen, civilian flyers, and businessmen who were interested in promoting the general development of American aviation. On 1 November 1915, Capt Raynal Cawthorne Bolling, a prominent New York City attorney, organized the Guard's first genuine aviation unit. The Aviation Detachment, 1st Battalion, Signal Corps, of the New York National Guard, trained at Mineola Field on Long Island, New York. The unit rented, and then purchased, its own aircraft with funds donated by the Aero Club of America and other contributors. This unit is recognized as the Air National Guard's oldest unit, and its lineage is still carried by the 102d Rescue Squadron, New York Air National Guard.

Subsequently, the organization was redesignated the 1st Aero Company and was "provisionally recognized" on 22 June 1916. The unit was called into federal service and mobilized on 13 July 1916 during the border crisis with Mexico. Captain Bolling's unit was joined by the 2d Aero Company of Buffalo, New York, and 12 Guard officers from other states. However, instead of seeing active service in the southwest, they remained at Mineola Field training and were released from federal service on 2 November 1916.

The three months' training at Mineola Field was not satisfying for the fledgling National Guard aviators. Little was accomplished by the group, and they received scant support from the War Department. Captain Bolling saw the main problems as difficulty of obtaining funds for spare parts and the inability to recruit expert mechanics into the National Guard. Instead, his unit had to rely entirely on paid civilians to maintain its aircraft. He was

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convinced that military aviation could only be developed under the auspices of the regular Army.

World War I

Captain Bolling's sentiments were shared by the Army, and this early experience convinced the War Department not to activate Guard aviation units when Pres. Woodrow Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war in April 1917. Although no Guard air units were mobilized in World War I, a significant number of guardsmen volunteered as part of the initial pool for the Army to draw aviators. Approximately 100 Guardsmen had either qualified as pilots or were in training to become military aviators. Convinced that they could make valuable contributions in the air, these patriots had to leave the Guard and enter the Signal Corps Reserve in order to fly in the war.

Some Guardsmen, including then Colonel Bolling and Maj Reuben Fleet of Washington State, occupied senior Air Service positions and played prominent roles in air operations in France. Lt Col Philip A. Carroll, an attorney, had learned to fly with Bolling in 1915 at Mineola Field. Colonel Carroll helped form the 1st Aero Reserve Squadron and shipped overseas as the unit's commander. Once in France, he eventually became chief of the Training Section of the Army's Air Service. Maj John M. Satterfield, whose 2d Aero Company had also trained at Mineola Field, was a prominent banker and businessman from Buffalo, New York. During World War I, he served on Gen John J. Pershing's staff in France, and his principle duties were to buy aircraft and develop airfields for the Army Air Corps. Maj Reed Chambers, a Tennessee guardsman, flew with Eddie Rickenbacker on the first US Army combat air mission of the war.

At least four guardsmen became aces during World War I. Moreover, 2d Lt Erwin R. Bleckley of Kansas was awarded posthumously the Congressional Medal of Honor for his heroism as an aerial observer.

Interwar Years

Guard aviation struggled to establish its value to state governors and the Army in the years between World War I and World War II. In the interwar period, Guard observation units were usually the products of grassroots efforts to form them by former World War I flyers and civic boosters in various communities. Guard aviation was also closely linked to commercial aviation. In 1918 Maj Reuben Fleet began the nation's first airmail service. The National Guard aviation program soon captured the public imagination by demonstrating how flight could deliver a useful service to both the military and civilian communities. In 1927 the Mississippi River flooded, devastating an area the size of New England, while killing an estimated 1,000 people and leaving another 700,000 homeless. To help deal with the emergency, the governor of Arkansas called up his 154th Observation Squadron and its JN-4 aircraft. Its aviators delivered food and medical supplies to isolated communities while scouting levees for broken or weakened areas. This was the earliest recorded use of a Guard aviation unit to help state and local authorities deal with natural disasters, a practice that has continued to the present day. Charles Lindbergh joined the Missouri National Guard as a pilot, motivated by a sense of service and a love of flight. He was a Guard aviator when he became the first pilot to fly solo across the Atlantic in 1927. For his accomplishment, Lindbergh was awarded the Medal of Honor. In 1934 the Guard provided planes, mechanics, and aircraft to the Air Corps to assist it in temporarily flying the airmail for Pres. Franklin Roosevelt.

World War II

Guard aviation took on an even more serious challenge with the outbreak of the war in Europe. Although its equipment was obsolete, its pilots and maintenance personnel were outstanding. During World War II, approximately 4,800 experienced National Guard aviation personnel in its 29 observation squadrons were mobilized. Most Guard units were stripped of many key personnel and reequipped with more modern aircraft. Some of the early deploying squadrons maintained a degree of unit integrity and cohesion. But most lost their character and identity as Guard organizations. Guard aviators, usually serving as individuals who had been stripped from their prewar units, fought in every combat theater and flew virtually every type of operational mission conducted by the Army Air Forces (AAF). The most significant wartime contribution of National Guard aviators was to train and lead the large numbers of volunteer Airmen who had entered the AAF during the war. That role was epitomized by Lt Col Addison Baker, a guardsman from Ohio, who commanded the 93d Heavy Bombardment Group's daring raid on Ploesti, Rumania. Colonel Baker's heroic leadership once again led to the posthumous award of the Medal of Honor. Maj Donald Strait, a prewar enlisted member of Pennsylvania's 119th Observation Squadron, was officially credited 13.5 kills of German aircraft during the war.

Despite the heroic success of Guard aviation personnel during World War II, many senior officers in the AAF remained skeptical of the usefulness of Guard aviation units in postwar defense plans. Gen Henry "Hap" Arnold was a vocal opponent of Guard aviation. He believed the guard could not perform missions in modern aircraft because they lacked the time to train and took too long to mobilize. He was proved wrong in the coming years.

The Cold War Begins

On 18 September 1947 the Air National Guard was born as an independent reserve component of the Air Force. Initially, servicemen returning from overseas met in civilian clothes to form units and pursue their love of flight. These units trained with outdated equipment and were poorly funded. But the experienced aviators and maintainers retained from the war allowed them to continue to expand the Guard's mission capabilities. However, the development of the Air Guard into an effective military organization was slowed by poor planning, inadequate funding, obsolescent weapons systems, and squabbles between the Air Force and the Air National Guard (ANG) over who was actually in charge of the ANG when its units weren't called into federal service. One senior Air Force general referred to the ANG during this period as "flyable storage."

The Korean War

The Air Guard mobilized 45,000 airmen in 66 of its flying squadrons—over 80 percent of its total force—in support of the war. Nearly 25 percent of those mobilized were in aircraft control and warning squadrons. However, the call-up exposed the weaknesses of all US military reserve programs, including the ANG. It took three to six months for some Air Guard units to become combat-ready. Some never did.

Eventually, the ANG made a substantial contribution to the war effort and the Air Force's global buildup. Although initially unprepared and ill-equipped for combat, air guardsmen had flown 39,530 sorties and had destroyed 39 enemy aircraft by the end of the war. Four air guardsmen became aces, and 101 were either killed or declared missing in action. Because of the lack of initial preparation for combat, senior ANG and Air Force leaders became seriously committed to building the ANG into an effective reserve component force. The Guard began to receive modern equipment and funding to shape it as an effective fighting force.

Developing an Operational Reserve

In addition to preparing for a possible world war with the Soviet Union and its allies, the Air Guard began to build itself during the mid-1950s into what has been called an "operational reserve" force in recent years. In 1953 it conducted a successful experiment to augment the Air Defense Command's runway alert program. The following year, that experiment was placed on a permanent basis when 17 Guard fighter squadrons began standing alert. It was the first time in history that reserve units began assisting the Air Force in peacetime in performing a major combat mission on a volunteer basis. During the following several years, the ANG added special operations, aeromedical airlift, air refueling, and strategic airlift operations to its portfolio despite Air Force sentiments that the Guard couldn't handle large aircraft and should stick with fighters. Very early on, air guardsmen began flying real operational sorties as volunteers, not just training flights or waiting for a major mobilization to do battle with the Soviets, in those new mission areas.

Air guardsmen continued to play a major part in supporting America's national interests overseas at the outset of the Cold War. In April 1961 80 air guardsmen, serving as civilian volunteers, trained exiled Cubans to fly old B-26 bombers and transports during the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. The Guardsmen volunteered for combat missions after the exiles lost two B-26s on D-day.

In August 1961, Pres. John F. Kennedy ordered 148,000 guardsmen and reservists to active duty in response to the Soviet blockade of Berlin. Twenty-one ANG tactical fighter squadrons, four tactical reconnaissance squadrons, six air transport squadrons, and a tactical control group were mobilized for the Berlin Crisis. Once again, deficiencies in range for the Guard's fighter aircraft and lack of spare parts for maintenance caused United States European Command to question the value of the Guard's participation. Operation Stair Step was needed to "island hop" more than 200 Air Guard fighters to Europe. Beginning in the late 1950s, selected ANG fighter squadrons began training to deliver tactical nuclear weapons, and some of its fighter interceptor units were equipped with nuclear-tipped air defense missiles.

Vietnam and the Total Force

On 2 January 1968 Pres. Lyndon Johnson ordered the mobilization of 9,343 ANG personnel in response to the North Korean seizure of the American spy ship, the USS *Pueblo*. Within 36 hours, approximately 95 percent of the Air Guardsmen had reported to their units. Eight tactical fighter groups, three tactical reconnaissance groups, and three wing headquarters were mobilized. Four fighter squadrons were deployed to Vietnam. The 355th Tactical Fighter Wing in Vietnam was officially an Air Force unit, but 85 percent of its members were guardsmen. An additional 1,333 air guardsmen mobilized on 13 May 1968 in response to the Communist's Tet offensive in Vietnam. The Air Guard flew approximately 30,000 sorties and 50,000 combat hours in Southeast Asia.

The bitter end of the war in Vietnam, the mistrust in government institutions it generated, and the economic realities of maintaining a large active duty force called for a new defense strategy. In the wake of the Vietnam War, the Department of Defense (DOD) adopted a Total Force policy in 1973. The Total Force policy was designed to hold down costs as well as strengthen ties between the military and American society by providing greater reliance on the National Guard and Air Force Reserve. The concepts behind the Total Force were developed and sold in the Pentagon by Dr. Theodore Marrs, a former guardsman and Air Force reservist. Marrs, a senior aid to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, based his ideas largely on his service in the Air Reserve Components (ARC). The strong political alliance forged between the regular and reserve forces helped the DOD achieve its highest approval rating from the American people in decades, and the unprecedented peacetime defense spending of the Reagan administration helped modernize the Guard to the highest readiness levels in its history up to that point.

The war in Vietnam stretched the Air Force's ability to maintain its commitments in Europe. As a result, the ANG assumed aerial-refueling responsibilities for Air Force and NATO fighters in Europe. Jet engines were added to ANG KC-97 tankers so they could safely refuel modern Air Force fighter aircraft on training missions over Europe. As one unit would complete its service, another would arrive and continue operations. From 1967 to 1977, Operation Creek Party—sustained primarily with volunteers on a rotational basis—flew 6,512 accident-free sorties, completing 47,207 hookups, and off-loading 137,398,620 pounds of fuel. More significantly, the operation demonstrated that the Air Guard could sustain significant operational rotations overseas in support of the Air Force without resorting to a politically sensitive mobilization by the president or Congress. This rotational philosophy, using a volunteer force, remains virtually unchanged today. The success of Operation Creek Party contributed to the development of the Total Force policy to better integrate active duty and reserve component forces.

As the drawdown of active duty forces continued after the Vietnam War, some significant missions began to transition to the Air National Guard. Air Guard KC-135 air refueling tankers began participating in the Strategic Air Command's nuclear alert force in 1976. The ANG became the primary airlifters for US SOUTHCOM in 1977. In 1978, rotating ANG fighter squadrons assumed responsibility for the air defense of the Panama Canal Zone and providing close air support for Army ground forces stationed there. During that decade, two ANG units in New York and California transitioned to the air rescue mission and began their distinguished history of saving many lives in peace and war. Like the other missions mentioned here, rescue was a full-time responsibility not a "weekend warrior" operation. Air National Guard civil engineering squadrons built roads and schools in Central America. In 1983 the 193d Special Operations Group, Pennsylvania ANG, flew propaganda missions in its EC-130Es over Grenada, aiding in the evacuation of American citizens in Operation Urgent Fury. In 1988 the 109th Tactical Airlift Group, New York ANG, began Operation Deep Freeze, flying supplies to Antarctica in support of scientists from the National Science Foundation.

Operation Just Cause, to expel Manuel Noriega, the dictator of Panama, and to install a democratically elected president, was a success in part due to the efforts of the ANG. In the 1990s air guardsmen manned radar stations and flew fighter aircraft in Latin America to monitor and report suspected drug-running aircraft.

The First Persian Gulf Crisis

The Persian Gulf Crisis saw 12,404 air guardsmen mobilized to federal service. Of that number, 5,240 deployed to Southwest Asia while another 6,264 served in the continental United States, and 900 were assigned to Europe and other overseas locations. Unlike previous mobilizations, the Air Guard required no additional training or new equipment. Air Guard fighters participated in the air campaign from the first day. Additionally, it was the first time in the Air Guard's history that the majority of those called up were not members of combat flying units—or any type of flying unit—they were instead members of support units.

Air Guard F-16s flew 3,645 missions and dropped 3,500 tons of ordinance without losing a single aircraft to enemy fire. Air Guard Special Operations EC-130s flew approximately 2,000 missions lasting some 8,000 hours. And the Guard's aerial tankers pumped over 250 million pounds of fuel into more than 18,000 aircraft. Guard airlifters flew over 40,000 hours, transporting 55,000 people and 115,000 tons of cargo.

The Post-Cold War Era

Driven by the Cold War's end and the drawdown of the active force, the Air Force relied increasingly on the ANG to accomplish its global roles in American defense strategy. The ANG flying and support units participated in volunteer rotations to maintain the no-fly zones over Iraq, provided humanitarian assistance in Somalia and Rwanda, and supported peacekeeping forces in the Balkans and Haiti. Its airlift and tanker forces continued to participate in the Air Force's global mobility operations on a daily basis. The Air Guard established its first space unit in 1995. In 1997 the ANG assumed responsibility for manning First Air Force, which maintained the air defenses of the continental United States against air-breathing threats. During Operation Allied Force in 1999 our guardsmen answered the call once again. Pres. Bill Clinton authorized the recall of 4,870 air guardsmen for the Kosovo Operation. The Presidential Selective Recall brought 3,266 personnel to the fight—87 units responded. An additional 300 personnel volunteered who were not part of the total tasking, and another 250 guardsmen were mobilized at stateside locations. Air Guard KC-135s logged 10,300 flying hours and flew 1,640 sorties to offload 50 million pounds of fuel to more than 5,100 receivers. And our A-10s logged 3,073 hours and flew 558 sorties, delivering over 14,000 rounds of munitions.

9/11 and Beyond

America's post–Cold War sense of invulnerability as the world's only remaining superpower evaporated on 11 September 2001 when members of the al-Qaeda terrorist network struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, killing some 3,000 human beings. Responding to the outrage, Pres. George W. Bush declared a "Global War on Terror." Air Guardsmen played a critical role in the immediate US response to those attacks and the long-term, worldwide military actions against those aggressors and their supporters. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, guardsmen improvised a greatly strengthened continental air-defense system on the fly and bore the main burden of sustaining it under the auspices of Operation Noble Eagle without sacrificing their critical role in the Air Force's Air and Space Expeditionary Force. For example, by 29 March 2003 the ANG had flown 72 percent of Noble Eagle's fighter sorties and 52 percent of its tanker sorties, while its fighter, tanker, airlift, special operations, combat search and rescue, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and combat-support units played critical roles in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Air guardsmen flew 294,414 sorties accumulating 738,126 flight hours for Noble Eagle, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, additional AEF requirements, and other taskings between 11 September 2001 and 31 December 2006.

While fighting a continuing war against terrorists and their sponsors, air guardsmen have also grappled in recent years with the challenges associated with transforming their organization to meet the Air Force's critical expeditionary warfighting requirements, growing homeland defense responsibilities, and the needs of the governors to assist the states and local communities in dealing with natural disasters, civil unrest, and the scourge of illegal drugs. The process has been likened to performing major modifications on a sophisticated warplane while flying a combat mission. In partnership with the active force, air guardsmen have established innovative organizations like the "blended" 116th Air Control Wing in Georgia and the Air Force's 30th Airlift Squadron, an active associate unit that now helps the Wyoming Air Guard's 150th Airlift Wing operate and maintain the latter's C-130s. At Langley AFB, Virginia, members of the Virginia Air Guard's 192d Fighter Wing are preparing to become an associate organization of the 1st Fighter Wing and share responsibility for flying and maintaining its brand new F-22A Raptors. While pursuing these and other promising changes in its flying unit community, the Air Guard has worked hard to gain a larger role in emerging mission areas, especially those associated with Space as well as Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), and Information Warfare operations. Because of the multiple challenges posed by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, the Air Force's Total Force Initiative, the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, and recent defense budget drills, we needed to "close the deal" on transformation and are implementing a far-reaching plan to "reset" the Air Guard with the help of our TAGs and the Air Force.

Our state missions and the necessity to work more closely on them and homeland defense jointly with our Army Guard counterparts have become increasingly high priorities in recent years. Air guardsmen play key roles in our various Joint Force State National Guard Headquarters across the country and in the NGB's Joint Staff, which were all established during 2003. The growing emphasis on National Guard jointness was dramatically displayed during the summer of 2005 when several hurricanes ravaged the Gulf Coast region of the United States. From 30 August 2005 through 29 November 2005, Air Guard volunteers serving primarily in Title 32 *US Code* status under the authority of various Emergency Management Assistance Compacts between the states flew 4,132 airlift sorties in relief efforts for hurricanes Katrina and Rita, carried 34,639 passengers and 11,496 tons of cargo, evacuated 2,046 patients from the region while rescuing 23,604 endangered people and moving them to local safe havens. In June 2006 under Operation Jump Start, the first of some 6,000 Army and Air Guard volunteers began deploying to the US border with Mexico at the request of President Bush to help stem the flow of illegal migrants into this country.

A Challenging Future

The Air Guard is no longer viewed as a wartime-only mobilization force. The ANG has gone from being seldom called to first called. Today, air guardsmen actively participate in virtually every expeditionary Air Force mission overseas while helping to provide a strengthened defense of our homeland and meeting the needs of state and local officials. Modernization remains a huge challenge, but we are working closely with the Air Force to assure that our guardsmen actively participate in state-of-the-art, highly capable new weapons systems, including the F-22A, the F-35, Predators, C-17s, C-130Js, space systems, and the planned Joint Cargo Aircraft. We are pursuing new missions, including Space, ISR, and Information Warfare while developing new organizational formats for our units. The challenge is to accommodate these challenging transitions while maintaining the militia culture, community roots, and state roles of our Air Guard units and promoting greater diversity in our force. All of this must be accomplished while the Air Guard continues to play a critical role in America's global campaign against terrorists, which promises to continue into the indefinite future.

Learning Leadership

Ursula G. Lohmann, PhD

Successful leadership and adaptation feed on the opportunity to learn. Good leaders never slack off learning, they make it conscious, and they take every opportunity to apply it. They even write about and publish their learning experiences. Go to any popular bookstore and check out the management, leadership, and business sections. Of roughly 500 different titles, approximately two-thirds of them will represent significant learning by a leader.

What Is a Leader?

I lean toward Kevin Cashman's perspective. A leader adds something to the organization and is authentic in behavior and contribution. Cashman advises leaders that to be effective, they must first be effective with themselves.[1] To be effective with themselves, leaders must first know themselves. This is "authenticity" or the integration of the link between what the leader says and does. Finally, leaders must create something of value. They must add to the organization. That is, others in the organization must perceive the leader to have a clear purpose and direction. To find clear purpose and direction, Cashman recommends a process of observation. "The things that you regard as important surround you every day. Open your eyes and observe how you spend your time. Study and observe the people whom you admire."[2]

In Robert Rosen's *Leading People*, the leader is someone who constantly questions assumptions about self and the business, and who continually seeks new perspectives to increase the organization's capacity. Leaders also continually learn from others—both healthy and unhealthy people—and they integrate that learning into their thinking and relationships. Further, they enable others to learn.[3] Both Cashman and Rosen strongly link the leader's development to everything the leader has been exposed to; that is, leaders develop well before they achieve the hierarchical designation of *leader*. Leader is or ought to be synonymous with *learner.*

Warren Bennis echoes this sentiment in *On Becoming a Leader*. He analyzed the leadership learning basics employed by a variety of recognized, successful leaders and found four lessons applicable to the learning leader. One, you are your own best teacher. Two, accept responsibility for what you do and what you learn. Blame no one else. Three, you can learn anything you want to learn, and four, true understanding comes from reflecting on your experience.[4]

How Do Leaders Learn Most Effectively?

Effective learning links more to where it brings us than to the time or effort it has taken us to learn. Effective learning catalyzes a discharge of pure mental energy. Traditional linear learning processes do not help us understand the pure energy gained from learning. Traditional learning processes do not account for the learner's "high," achieved with the shift of perspective. Take this example: the head of an organization asks, "What can I do to motivate my people?" He or she receives as a response, "Seems to me, your people were motivated when they came to you. They wanted a job, didn't they? *What have you done in the meantime to mess that up*?"[5] With this last question, the leader learns much more than would be provided by a simple, structured review of listening and thinking skills. With one response, the leader learned to shift his or her entire perspective. The line, "What have you done to mess that up?" in effect becomes a guiding stimulus to learning. This stimulus helps the leader recall the value of examining situations through different prisms and applying what's learned—a stimulus to continued self-directed learning.

Malcolm Knowles's conceptualization of andragogy or learning for adults is more effective than is traditional linear learning processes in examining learning for leaders. Andragogy assumes that mature learners are much more self-directed than are children. This self-directed learning includes collaboration and support among learners, resource people, and peers,[6] but the responsibility for learning lies squarely with the learner. Research based on Knowles's work supports the idea that self-directed learners select from nonlinear (also known as limited available) alternatives in their current environment. In short, they take their learning as opportunities present themselves. As they mature, they also *make* their learning opportunities. Mature leaders learn in the ambiguous, nonlinear, and challenging twenty-first century where they must integrate people, technology, and speed into their own and supporting organizational outcomes. They would certainly appear to profit greatly from the exercise of self-directed learning. Such learning is highly consistent with the Cashman, Rosen, and Bennis leader lessons described in the last section.

Another perspective on self-directed learning comes from the American psychotherapist, Carl Rogers (1902–1987). A founder of humanistic psychology, he developed client-centered therapy and personal encounter groups in which the client directs the focus and pace of each session. He was one of the first to simplify psychological concepts and did so to return to ordinary people some sovereignty over their own experience. In effect, his work concentrates on the "simple" process of mutual understanding.[7] Carl Rogers's personal reflections on learning demonstrate one man's comprehension and acceptance of the idea that he is interested only in learn-

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ing things that matter, or that have some significant influence on his own behavior.[8] His experience as a teacher left him largely with the sense that the outcomes of teaching were either hurtful or unimportant. He observed his students taking away more from his *example* than from his teaching.

Rogers's inferences about learning as a self-directed activity effectively reframed teaching in a way that gives central importance to the learner. What Rogers learned also effectively frames the learning role of leaders. Rogers elicits self-discovery in others by modeling the process and by refusing to become defensive about it when criticized. He speaks his views, emphasizing their "merely personal" nature. At the same time he invites and elicits the reaction of others. He seeks to be thought provoking but always to be reflective. He defined his own growth as a leader of educators in terms of learning things that matter or that had a significant influence on his own behavior. Ken Blanchard's 1997 book, *Managing by Values,* describes these same behaviors as part of the development experience of his protagonist.[9] Reflection and learning from experience undergird the examples of the book, as they do in all Blanchard's "One-Minute Manager" publications. Finally, Bellingham and Cohen in their book, *Leadership Myths and Realities*, debunk the idea that leaders develop people.[10] They say the reality is that good leaders create an environment that nurtures personal development in others. The leader creates the environment in which others can learn using the same self-directed and reflective methods so powerful for a leader.

Top-level leaders tend to work "high-ground" problems often based in research and theory. Employees see these as largely unimportant problems. Much more critical to them are the "low-ground" problems that confuse and confound them daily and appear to defy solution. Top-level leaders without reflective, self-directed learning abilities may be tempted "to provide the solution to the problem." These leaders miss the point that truly effective learning is self-directed and reflective. They do not provide the example for employees to follow that would allow them to make connections between their daily problems and the higher-ground problems faced by leaders. In short, they don't allow their employees to become leaders and learners in their own right. Self-directed learning uses groups, personal relationships, and support of all kinds. Often, it launches the learner upon a fascinating yet perhaps frightening process, one in which the learner tries to understand an ever-changing reality. Meg Wheatley, in *Leadership and the New Science*, states that "Solutions, as quantum reality teaches, are a temporary event, specific to a context, developed through the relationship of persons and circumstances."[11] But in organizations an ever-changing reality is that for which organizations require leadership from all levels—and if leadership from all levels, then learnership at all levels.

It would be intuitively ridiculous to suppose that a self-directed learner learns only once. Indeed Peter Senge's work on the subject of learning organizations and their resulting improved bottom line says very clearly that learning is as continual as improvement in organizations.[12] Continual improvement, the battle cry of the twenty-first century, helps organizations adapt and grow in a rapidly changing world. In order for organizations to evolve, the leader must liberate the talents and spirits of his employees to gain capacity to grow. Capacity to grow, however, will only increase if the relationships and environment set by the leader allow people to learn, develop, and contribute. To sustain growth, people must be willing to renew themselves at all times—prompted by the behavior of the leader.

Studies on adult self-directed learning have found that adult learners follow numerous paths and varieties of strategies to learn on their own. In effect, they become opportunistic learners. Self-directed learners, although frequently learning in a collaborative environment such as their professions, careers, or organizations, have also been found to "represent a qualitative evolvement of a person's sense of cognitive definition and developmental readiness for ambiguous and nondefined actions."[13] Military environments speak often of readiness linked to the soldier, to equipment, to strategy. Seminal to readiness in these areas is the readiness of leaders at all levels to continue to learn. We talk about leaders leading leaders. We also need to actively participate as learners learning from leaders as learners.

Another interesting finding from studies on self-directed learning includes the three elements that characterize the autonomous or self-directed learner: independence, the ability to make choices, and the capacity to articulate the norms and limits of an activity. At large, the literature on leadership and leader development agrees that these characteristics factor heavily in the making of a good leader. Stephen Brookfield, well known in the field of critical-thinking research, found self-directed learning to be equated with the exhibition of critical reflection—another skill we value highly in leaders and learners.[14]

Self-directed learners, too, have been found more frequently to participate in collaborative activities such as teamwork, shared resources, and peer networks. To become an executive with the Federal Senior Executive Service (SES), leaders must demonstrate their abilities to work collaboratively, to lead people, influence the outcomes for their organizations, manage the resources, and lead change. Under the category of leading change, one significant component is continual learning. To enter the SES requires demonstrated attention to continual learning.

The arguments of educators notwithstanding, companies find the leader's role as a self-directed learner to be healthy for the bottom line—whether you measure it in profit-margin dollars or in mission accomplishment. Robert Slater's book, *Jack Welch and the GE Way,* relies heavily on examples of learning, learning made conscious, and learning applied.[15] In it, Jack Welch recommends "passionate lunacy" on the issue of quality, a topic that requires continuous learning by leaders at all levels. He came to the passionate lunacy perspective by assuming that he could attack the issue of quality by improving speed, increasing productivity, and getting employees and customers more involved in the company—the measures of success. What he got was a fast and agile company producing items that did not achieve quality goals. That realization launched the "passionate lunacy" that in turn launched the highly regarded quality movement at GE.

Conscious Learning

To review so far, leaders must be learners. The best learners use the environment around them to learn, and the best are self-directed and reflective learners. Such individuals learn consciously, applying the kaleidoscope of memories, prejudices, hopes, habits, and emotions that constantly expand and enrich our lives. These do not aggregate as so many building blocks. Much like the actual sophisticated and intricate network of integrated cells and brain structure that comprise our ability to act consciously, we synthesize areas of learning to generate new meaning within a context.[16] Conscious learning often generates new business. For instance, the 24-hour day isn't news to the military, but to the economy at large it's a tremendous change. To the business leaders living in it, it's a challenge in managing time, sleep, and the business needs of the organization. It's even given rise to new services, such as a car-starting service for night-shift employees in St. Cloud, Minnesota, who encounter frozen car batteries when leaving work.[17] These new services demonstrate the benefits of conscious learning—finding and filling an unfilled need to make a profit!

Every learner recognizes intuitively the experiences of learning. Often these experiences link back to emotions and prejudices. To be most effective, learning must also be conscious—that is, you must know what you have learned. To do that, Rogers found it necessary to drop his own defensiveness and to try to understand the experience the way it seems or feels to another person—also a requirement of critical thinking. If we have consciously learned, we have an attitude supportive of learning and reflect critically upon our prejudices, hopes, habits, and emotions. Conscious learning, of course, assumes the freedom to learn as well as the ability to navigate between the external and the internal worlds.

Carl Gustav Jung always insisted that psychoanalysis was a branch of education. Consider these words in light of organizations and traditional leader versus employee roles—roles that we recognize to be deadly to organizational health! *Education is the self-learning process; training is what others make you do.* Taken into another context, leadership is a self-learning process; employeeship is what others make you do. The job titles people give themselves are good indicators that they actively engage in the self-learning process. These include Princess of Persuasion (aka director of sales and marketing); Chief Lizard Wrangler (aka associate general council/manager); and Manager of Mischief (aka manager of marketing and communications).

J. Kermit Campbell, president and chief executive officer of Herman Miller, Inc., which has a worldwide reputation for modern furniture design and was featured in Max DuPrees's *Leadership Is an Art*, applied several of his own learnings to help employees grow. One, help employees get over being afraid of the new freedom to contribute—for example, go out and meet each one. Two, demonstrate that you don't have all the answers and are willing to join with employees in taking risks—for example, accept and share your imperfections; and, finally, nurture employees—for example, Campbell uses management coaches to help employees facilitate their projects. He says the inability to admit weakness or ignorance gets in the way of taking risks and growing on the job. Campbell calls this liberating the human spirit. Not all stories of learning have happy endings and learning doesn't guarantee success. In 1995 Campbell resigned from his position. The company's profitability had been down, causing Campbell to cut key executives. This was too much for the midwest company that had never experienced such changes. Says Campbell of this experience, "Maybe next time I will be less patient with those in management who were uncooperative or incapable of making changes fast enough."[18] Even in this setback, Campbell reflects on what he can learn from the situation.

In effect, we should be allowing our employees to take the opportunities to educate themselves. This implies that they have the freedom to think both reflectively and critically. For instance, a recent benchmarking study of highly successful, nationally known business schools showed clearly that success in placement of graduates linked strongly to a school and workplace partnership.[19] The students were required to work real problems within the environment of the organization and they received a grade for their efforts. This is an example of the interdependent learning that adults favor. No wonder this method is gaining in popularity. It allows adult learners free range to practice thinking skills, especially critical thinking, while getting credit for learning.

Learning Applied

Learners must recognize and practice critical thinking. Much more than logical analysis, critical thinking involves calling into question many of our underlying assumptions, habitual ways of thinking and acting, and being ready to act differently on the basis of what we've learned. Critical thinking is evident every time employees (who think of themselves as leaders!) challenge the effectiveness of a certain process or technique and every time managers readily jettison outmoded organization designs or norms. Critical thinking is not criticizing. Critical thinking is a core activity of self-directed learning, assuming openness, innovation, and a future of possibilities. In Rogers's terms, critical thinking gives central importance to the learner. Above all, critical thinking is a conscious process. The outcomes of both critical thinking and learning ought to be a change in the assumptions of yourself and the world (in other words, perspective) and a corresponding change in behavior and relationships—both consciously derived.

We trace our English language roots of the word *learn* back to Gothic and Saxon times where words expressed learning in these concepts: to become awake, to become whole, to become unbound, to become full, to trace out. The word *lead* traces its roots back to Icelandic, Swedish, German, and Italian languages. The concepts expressed were a process: to pass or move along, to glide along, to undergo, endure, suffer, and to accompany or go on the way with.[20] The leader recognizes the experiential nature of these words as part of the leader's learning process. The leader also recognizes the personal responsibility inherent in these concepts.

Leaders as learners increasingly are becoming more critical to organizations as the workplace becomes flatter and more dependent on every available bit of knowledge capital. A substantial key to success is knowing your people, your business, and yourself, and learning from and working with the complexities revealed. If learning is an art, then leading while learning is performance art. The legitimacy of both learning and leading rests more on accomplishing desired outcomes than the "correct" method of getting there. To accommodate the ever-changing realities of organizational life, leaders must be learners—exceptional leaders who are also exceptional learners give their organizations the edge in today's ultra-competitive environment.

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Leading/Valuing Diversity

Sandra A. McGruder

A major concern of the Air Force, as well as corporate America, is how to deal with the changing demographics of the American workforce. Based on the article titled, "New and Improved Workplace Diversity Initiatives for the Bottom Line," written by Dr. Samuel Betances and Dr. Laura M. Torres Souder, of Souder, Betances and Associates, Inc., the future is screaming at us with new demographic trends that announce a new world reality in which to do business. The changing face of America requires a positive response. Part of that response is the implementation of diversity initiatives in the workplace. For real organizational change to occur, three conditions must be met: (1) there must be dissatisfaction with the way things are; (2) there must be a vision of where the organization wants to go and a process by which to get there; and (3) insightful, visionary leaders who will embrace the challenge of change while seeking a more prosperous and profitable future.

One Air Force solution to the shifting patterns and potential problems caused by changing demographics in the American workforce is for the total force to receive instruction in understanding diversity. Now that we have downsized and rightsized the Air Force, it is imperative that we recruit, train, educate, and retain the best and brightest individuals that America has to offer.

The rapidly changing global environment in which we live and work and the challenge brought about by the realities of the future workforce are important issues for profit and nonprofit entities alike. If America is to remain competitive in the future, it is critical that we understand how to manage a diverse workforce to assist us in meeting the challenges of accelerating change and exploding technological advances. The overall impact of changing workforce demographics is that each organization, if it is to prosper, must be prepared to deal with diverse cultural values brought to the workplace. Managers must create a hospitable climate that reduces dysfunctional tensions by promoting respect and productive teamwork. With this in mind the following four tools are presented for leading/valuing diversity:

1. The first tool essential to lead/value diversity is to form a common ground or shared set of assumptions within which we communicate. In most work situations, you will have people of different ages, race, sex, religions, personalities, and so on; however, the organization normally has a vision, goals, rules, and regulations that govern what it does based on the mission. When we don't establish a common ground for communication, we have mass confusion with everyone going in different directions.

2. After forming a common ground, we must expel stereotypes. "Younger employees are wet behind the ears, know nothing, have no respect or loyalty, lack experience, therefore have no credibility and can't be trusted with much responsibility. Older employees are less motivated to work hard, they are nothing but deadwood, resistant to change, can't learn new methods/technology, they reach a plateau after 40, should be fired after 50, and are 'fire proof.'" These are examples of age stereotypes from *Workforce America! Managing Employee Diversity as a Vital Resource* by Marilyn Loden and Judy B. Rosener. In order to manage diversity, we must increase awareness and expel stereotypes. Stereotypes ignore differences among the individuals in a group; therefore, there is no room in the workplace for stereotypes.

3. Next, we must acknowledge differences. People are different and there is no way to make them fit into a single mold; nor is there any reason to. In order to effectively manage a diverse workforce, we must acknowledge differences. (We may have differences of opinion about individuals such as Rush Limbaugh and Louis Farrakhan, but we should accept the fact that we share different views, and respect our right to have them.) We should focus more on the things we have in common.

4. Finally, we should use everyone's experience and background as a resource. Diversity of experience and background ensures diverse ways of looking at problems. Effective managing of all human resources can result in higher productivity, survival in a world of competition, improved performance, more creativity, more innovations, and reduced turnover and absenteeism. Giving emphasis to diversity without threatening our unity is the proper way we, in fact, strengthen the ties that bind us together. Communication, sensitivity, mutual respect, and common trust are the primary ingredients of social cohesiveness in a democratic society.

Diversity should not be used interchangeably or synonymously with equal employment opportunity (EEO)) or affirmative action (AA). EEO/AA is the law based on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII. This body of law provides a clear-cut set of guidelines that all organizations and employers must comply with regarding objective hiring, promotion, and treatment practices. The goal of diversity is about shaping new systems, not about demeaning groups who have benefited from past imbalances. The reason is simple: diversity is a good management tool. There is nothing to be gained by poisoning relationships. The goal of leading/valuing diversity is to heal, to build, to shape new nonracist, nonsexist, nondiscriminatory systems.

This article was prepared especially for AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership*.

In summary, managing a changing mosaic workforce requires more flexibility and more understanding than does managing a more homogeneous workforce. We have to learn the W. Edwards Deming quality principles and how to empower our employees. We have to encourage their ideas and suggestions. We must reward outstanding performance and support the professional and personal needs of others. We are faced with a variety of management challenges based on the life experiences and socioeconomic factors of workforce members. We can be a more effective Air Force if we keep these differences in mind when we develop both short-term and long-range strategic plans. We must be cognizant that what works to motivate or reward employees of one group does not necessarily work for other groups. Organizations that understand these flexibilities and design programs to meet the needs of all their workers, as well as those of potential employees, will have a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining the highest quality workers. We want to make the Air Force an organization where the best qualified want to work. We should promote and recognize diversity as a key component of mission success. The future will bring only more diversity and with it will come the additional need to build an Air Force culture of sustained mutual respect and understanding.

Organizational Dimension

The objective of the organizational dimension is to develop knowledge of theories, skills, techniques, and strategies needed to accomplish the mission. The organizational structure used in the Air Force is like most large and diversified organizations. It consists of an administrative and functional structure organized to perform a mission. The organizational dimension of *Concepts for Air Force Leadership* emphasizes getting the job done in the most practical yet effective way possible. In other words, the emphasis is primarily on achieving the mission or outcomes.

The Organizational Dimension falls into three sections. The readings appearing in the first section illustrate organizational leadership, executive-level strategy, and the characteristics of leaders within an organization. The relationship of leadership principles and the nature of organizations are also addressed.

The second section explores the symbiotic relationship of leadership and management while illustrating a host of useful skills and techniques, including innovation. Military organizations have significantly contributed to the development of the leadership/management interface. For example, much of the management literature reflects military concepts of control, organization, chain of command, line and staff relationships, professional development, and planning. Therefore, management is an essential component of the military leader's exercise of leadership, and by necessity, interjects the rigors of that science into the art of leadership. Since an effective leader must also be a manager, this section in addition deals with bureaucracy and structure together in the modern not-for-profit organization.

The third section provides examples of the actual practice of leadership. Insights and leadership profiles are considered to provide information and commentary on leadership in action within the context of the organizations leaders serve.



Section 4

Organizational Leadership

Organizational Dimension



A Proven Process to Fix "Broke" Organizations

Peter A. Land

Truism: We are all flawed. Organizations are made up of flawed people. Therefore, all organizations are flawed. However, the slang term "*broken*" refers to organizations with sufficient problems, distractions, and confusion, which result in more failures than successes, more people looking for another job than looking for better ways to "wow" the customer, and more conflict than teamwork. We have all seen or experienced broken organizations.

During my 24 years as an Air Force officer, plus the past 23 years as an international management consultant, I have learned many valuable lessons (some the hard way) to get ailing organizations focused, functioning, and successful. The following process has produced positive results in for-profit and nonprofit businesses: military units, volunteer associations, churches, schools, even Little League sports and the Cub Scouts. The purpose of this article is to share this proven process with you.

Background

In order for an organization to be successful, the leaders must ensure that the following four major performance factors are in place. Conversely, if any one of these key factors has not been established, failure is inevitable and the organization will be broken.

1. All the required skills must be in place for personnel to perform their tasks properly. Education, in its purest form, is the transfer of concepts and principles. The output of education is knowledge. We demonstrate our knowledge by discussing the concepts and principles intelligently and by passing examinations. Education usually takes place in a classroom setting.

Training, on the other hand, is the transfer of skills, which provides the ability to actually perform. I learned the profound difference between education and training (knowledge and ability) when I was in Air Force pilot training during the late 1950s. Half of each workday we spent in a classroom learning aerodynamics, meteorology, engineering, and so forth. We routinely had to pass tests to ensure that we understood the concepts and principles. However, the other half of the day, we were strapped into single-engine jet planes, where we developed such skills as safely landing the aircraft. Surprisingly, we had a few people in our class who made As on every test but failed to graduate as Air Force pilots because they never mastered the skill of landing a plane. They were bright, hard-working people, but they are not pilots today because they did not have the requisite skills. Key point—performance tends to be skill-based, not knowledge-based. In truth, the people who look to you for leadership really do not care what you know about the leadership concepts, principles, or models. The deeper question is "When you sit down across the table next week, do good things happen as a direct result of your leadership skills?"

I am sure you have found, as I have, people who have considerable knowledge but lack the discreet skill sets needed to actually do the job. Always train against the deficit or defect; all good training should begin with a needs assessment to identify the gaps or deficits. We cannot afford to spend time and money teaching people skills they already possess. Nor should we spend scarce training dollars to teach people skills they do not need. Focus training on the skills needed, not those already in place.

2. After a person is adequately trained, he or she must be motivated to perform. Motivation results from consequences. Positive tangible consequences include pay, benefits, bonuses, and so forth. Positive intangible consequences are those feelings of pride and high self-esteem that are the result of praise, pats-on-the-back, awards, and so forth; the list is long. Negative tangible consequences are letters of reprimand, poor performance appraisals, and termination notices. Negative intangible consequences result when one is embarrassed by being criticized or by making a mistake.

Imagine that everyone has in their head a "mental balance scale." On one side of the scale, people place the value they give to their organization with their skills, knowledge, and talents—they value their contributions to the organization. On the opposite side of the scale, they place all the consequences (positive, negative, tangible, and intangible) they receive *from* the organization. As long as that value equation is in a state of balance or equilibrium, people are willing and motivated to continue to contribute. However, if this scale shifts into an unbalanced relationship ("I am putting a lot more into this organization than I am getting from the organization")—motivation, willingness, enthusiasm, commitment all go "south" with the speed of light. When this imbalance of consequences occurs in the minds of our people, there are two inevitable results. They leave the organization (the best, most talented people leave first); we call this phenomenon "hemorrhaging your talent." And if employees do not leave—they stay, sadly because they *cannot* leave. Often the people you would rather have leave, must stay for financial reasons, becoming "bottom-feeders." They become experts at what is *not* their job: they come to work late, reluctantly and go home early, enthusiastically. In such organizations, the parking lot is an unsafe place

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to be at quitting time! Bottom-feeders have a culture of mediocrity which creates "broken" organizations.

As we reflect on the first two factors, training and motivation, we understand the truism: You cannot motivate an untrained person! The following *exaggerated* example defines the enormous difference between training and motivation. For over 40 years, I have been an active pilot, with over 12,000 flying hours. My next-door neighbor, Mike, is a very intelligent and successful president of his construction company. He has told me many times that he has always wanted to learn to pilot a plane, but has just never had the opportunity. Fact: he is smart but untrained as a pilot. Let's see if I can motivate him to perform (fly my plane today solo) by providing overwhelming positive and negative consequences. "Mike, if you fly my plane today solo, I will give you $10 million cash" (highly motivational positive consequence). "However, if you fail to do so, I will put you in jail for the rest of your life (negative consequences for nonperformance). Will he perform [fly]? Of course not! Regardless of the motivational consequences, no performance occurs, because Mike is untrained. While this is an outrageous example, I have seen companies lose customers and good employees shortly after implementing the cost-cutting policy of trimming the training budget to bare bones, purchasing cheap (poor) training, and adding a few dollars to the incentive program and commission structure. The customer fires the "broken" organization because the employees are untrained to perform to the demands or expectations of the customer. The only way to create skills (ability) is through effective training—there is no other way.

Truism: Good training is inherently motivational. When people experience excellent training, they internalize (own) the valued skills, and they use and develop those skills, resulting in high performance. The high performance builds self-esteem, reduces stress, and "wows" the customer, who then buys your products and services. Some of the most valued, positive, intangible consequences, which are highly motivational, are the feelings of accomplishment, pride, and enhanced self-worth, plus the attendant praise and affirmation. Despite rumors to the contrary, good training is inherently motivational, but motivational consequences will never create skills.

3. Once people are well-trained and highly motivated, they must have all the resources necessary to accomplish their tasks. Resources include equipment, tools, time—the massive array of things we need and use in applying our skills. Failure to provide resources results in a work stoppage known as task interference. People involved in purchasing and maintenance are responsible for preventing task interference problems.

From a manager's perspective, their resources are trained, motivated people. If an employee is sufficiently unmotivated and calls in sick when not, or reports to work but is untrained to accomplish the job, then the boss has task interference, because the boss lacks trained, motivated employees. Task interference, whether it is due to broken equipment or broken employees, is one of the major causes of broken organizations.

4. The fourth puzzle piece in completing the performance picture is timely and appropriate feedback, both positive and corrective. In developing people Dr. Ken Blanchard strongly believed in the power of feedback to motivate and inspire people.

The most important point to remember about these four ingredients of successful performance (ability, willingness, resources, and feedback) is the fact that *all* are required for success. If any one factor is absent, the entire performance shuts down—don't train, nothing happens; train but don't motivate, nothing happens; train, motivate, but fail to provide resources, nothing happens. Finally, train, motivate, and provide resources but keep your people in the dark without timely feedback, and performance will shut down. Leaders must take action to ensure that all four components are in place in order to fix broken organizations.

The Proven Process

The following steps, when followed precisely, tend to resolve each of the four performance factors by developing skills, stimulating creativity, and enhancing teamwork, communication, and trust.

1. Everyone, from the chairman of the board to the janitor, must know the MISSION of the organization. If you were to ask anyone in the organization "What is our mission?" you should get identical replies. Don't ask for *your* mission; it's *our* mission. The "your" idea keeps people focused too low in the organization; they often think you are asking for their job description. This focus tends to draw attention to the differences in jobs, titles, perks, and so forth. In contrast, the "our" mission question tends to expand the thinking to concepts employees collectively share—our mission. If people think our mission, the answer should be the same from every person, every time.

The Steelcase Corporation manufactures some of the finest office furniture in the world. I am told if you were to ask any employee at any level "What is our mission?" the response would be the same, "We deliver quality products, on time, period." If you were to further ask "What do you personally do to accomplish our mission at Steelcase?" the answers would be as varied as the number of different job descriptions. But every job, every effort at every level, exists for one over arching purpose—"to deliver quality products on time, period."

While we have all seen the verbose and complex mission statements in reception rooms, those formal etchings should be captured in succinct, no-nonsense statements that everyone can own and internalize. The mission is part of the organization's DNA.

2. After everyone owns the organization's mission, the next question the leader asks is "What are the measures of merit, the metrics we use to keep score of how well we are accomplishing our mission?" The metrics run the gamut from dollars, to souls saved, to bad guys captured, to points on a scoreboard—the list is lengthy.

3. The third question may require some research: "Where are we today with respect to these metrics? Where were we one, two, or three years ago?" This forces a look at the history of the organization, requiring subtle facilitation skills. For example, you might say "The trends reveal that we are a learning organization in that the mistakes we make are usu-

ally temporary, but the lessons they teach us are permanent. Let's set a goal for next year, since we expect to be smarter and better than this year."

4. In facilitating the goal-setting process, you accomplish more by asking instead of telling. For the purpose of this article I will not identify a specific topic to demonstrate the classic goal-setting process. The organization will have little difficulty selecting those particular issues of greatest values—profit, cost reduction, accident prevention, percent of customer retention, games won, cases solved—the list is limitless. What follows is a process for setting meaningful goals irrespective of the organization's mission. Goals must be:

S - Specific, not vague or general.

M - Measurable–using the agreed upon metrics.

A - Achievable with stretch. If the goal does not challenge everyone and get them up on "mental tiptoes," you will never tap their resources of energy and creativity. And if it's not challenging, there is no real sense of pride in achieving it.

R - Realistic. The goals must be in the realm of the possible—with stretch. If a goal is perceived to be completely unattainable, it becomes a reverse motivator; people won't even try! People will not passionately pursue assured failure. They are less demoralized by failure if they know "We could have done it, but we really didn't try!" So, there is a fine balance between a stimulating challenge (stretch) and a guaranteed failure. Work to find that critical balance.

T - Trackable over time. Establish milestones throughout the life of the goal to measure progress. For example, if the goal is to be completed in 12 months, define quarterly milestones. Note the goal-setting acronym: S M A R T.

The best format for drafting goals is: To (verb) (single result) (specifications) (by date) (limitations or constraints). For example: to reduce customer complaints by 40 percent by 1 November 2006 without spending more than $10,000. Don't use fluffy verbs like *to try* or *to attempt*. Be sure the verbs are solid like, "to produce, to build, to create, to achieve." In his leadership style, Abraham Lincoln believed that unless goals were properly set they would not be fully developed.

Despite how professionally a goal is written, nothing good happens until an action plan is created, with a specific sequence of tasks to be achieved, resources to be allocated, and individuals or departments to be held accountable. The action plans are the legs upon which goals stand. All of these steps are completed by the leader asking questions—not telling. For example, "Now that we have a meaningful goal prepared, what steps are required?

On a flip chart write "What action steps are required?" Write the number 1 on the chart and turn to the group and say nothing. Soon someone will offer an action step. Write that input beside number 1, then write number 2 and ask "What else?" Continue the brainstorming process; flood the charts with ideas. Proper sequences and organization will follow.

Once the goals and action plans have been created through the process of facilitation, the group tends to sense ownership; the goals and action plans become theirs. Now we get to the business of accomplishing the first milestones of the action plan. In most cases when a goal and action plan are well designed by the people who must accomplish them, and the skills, motivation, resources and feedback factors are in place, formerly "Broken" organizations began to move in a positive, productive, and healthy direction.

Successfully reaching the first milestone is a crucial event. Since the group might be learning new skills, I suggest the first target be a bit conservative, not embarrassingly low, but low enough to be reasonably assured the group will "win." Upon achieving the first "victory," the leader's role becomes critically important. Gather together everyone who participated in reaching the milestone: buy coffee and doughnuts to celebrate. Imagine everyone is gathered on a "platform of success." Then, the leader assumes an all-important coaching role. Experience tells me the following process is very powerful; I encourage you to adhere to it precisely.

Get a flip chart and marker. Write on the chart "What did [we or you] do *well* while achieving this first milestone." (If you, the leader, were actively involved in the work, you can appropriately ask "What did *we* do well?" If you were not personally involved, you should ask "What did *you* (the group) do well?" Write the number 1 on the chart, turn to the group, and keep your mouth shut. If you, the leader, answer the question, the group will not. Live with the awkward silence. Soon, someone will say "We had a problem with. . ." We tend to focus on the negative (bad news). Say "Let's don't discuss that just yet. What did the group do *well*?" Drive them to the positive. Invariably, someone will mention some positive aspects of the work. Thank him or her, write the input on the chart, and then write number 2. Turn to the group and say "What else?" Resist the temptation to contribute your thoughts—they come later.

Someone will offer another positive comment. Write that at number 2. Write number 3 and again ask "What else?" Before long you will have several flip charts full of "good news" the group has shared. After the group appears to have shared all the positive inputs, then and only then, do you, the leader, offer your input. Post the charts around the room. Self-esteem is high; the group is beginning to bond as a team.

On the next flip chart, write these words: "If [we or you] could accomplish this task again, what would [we or you] do *differently*, if anything?" The phrasing is important; this is a less threatening way to deal with errors/mistakes/defects which are negatively loaded terms that tend to create defensiveness.

Write number 1 on the chart, face the group and say *nothing*. There may be moments of nervous silence. Eventually, a risk-taker will offer a suggestion for a minor improvement which represents a test for the leader. If the leader shows disapproval or disdain for that person or the input, sadly the meeting is over; no one else will speak. On the other hand, if the leader thanks the contributor for his or her input, writes it beside number 1, and then writes number 2, turns and asks "What else?"—good things begin to happen. Soon, someone else will offer more serious input. Thank him or her and write this input at number 2. Write number 3, and ask "What else?" If you handle the key process with sensitivity, the real issues will soon emerge. These "true confessions" represent the major problems that need to be identified and worked.

After everyone else has contributed to the "what-would-we-do-differently" list, then you, the leader, offer your ideas, while at the same time being supportive of the team's suggestions. Post the charts on the wall.

On the next flip chart write "What have [we or you] *learned* about our operation?" Write number 1, and continue asking "What else?" The lessons learned will shock you. The group is learning both from the good and bad news, problems are worked, and the team continues to bond. After the coaching session, adjust the strategy to incorporate the lessons learned and attack the second milestone.

At the second milestone, have another coffee, doughnut or coaching session. Adjust the strategy as needed and continue to move forward with the action plan. I can assure you that the aforementioned process will produce laudable results.

Here is the most important step and the most difficult to accomplish—the leader takes no credit, none, for the successes, but personally accepts the blame for mistakes, defects, and flaws. If leaders have their egos firmly under control, they will be able to do this. When they do, loyalty, passion, creativity, and organizational excellence will follow. Sadly some insecure leaders simply must feed their egos or justify their pay to their board of directors. They very skillfully skim off the lion's share of the credit for themselves, while spreading the blame for problems to subordinates. One inevitable result of this strategy is that loyalty, commitment, and excellence wither. These organizations will soon be added to the scrap heap of "broken" organizations.

Great leaders bring out the best in others. They are passionate about the mission and find joy in developing skills and motivating others. Great leaders infect the culture with a selflessness that inspires others to do likewise. Truly, great leaders simply execute the fundamentals perfectly—elevate the mission, provide the skills and resources, facilitate the goal-setting of the action planning process, then coach to trap the lessons learned. Finally, they share the praise and personally accept accountability for the mistakes. There are no "bottom-feeders" in outstanding organizations, only high performers who come to work early, enthusiastically and go home late, reluctantly. I have a personal bias that everyone wants to win. Teams of high performers accomplish their missions with excellence and have fun doing it—they win!

Organization Theory for Leaders

Dr. Frank R. Hunsicker

Organization theory is more than just an academic pursuit, it is a primary requisite for good leadership. This article helps meet that requirement by viewing organizations as a part of a broader, total environment and provides insight into how organizations interact with specific sectors of their environment. It concludes with an analysis of the role of top leadership organizations.

In this century society has become a society of organizations.[1] The growth of civilization is really a study of the ability of people to organize in a meaningful way. Major contributors to military history such as Alexander the Great, Napoléon, and Clausewitz recognized and capitalized on the importance of organizations. The leader of today, even more than in the past, must have a basic understanding of the factors affecting organizations.

What are organizations? What are their traits, and how do they function? These are fundamental questions for those who study organizations. They are also vital questions for those who call themselves leaders, for leaders exist only in relation to some sort of organization. Since leaders are charged to organize, direct, and control the elements of an organization, they should certainly understand that which they are charged to lead. Understanding organizations is more than just an academic pursuit, it is a primary requisite for good leadership. This article helps meet that requirement.[2]

To understand something of organizations one must approach the subject in a logical fashion. Therefore, this article first looks at organizations as a part of broader, total environment. Next, it reviews how organizations interact with specific sectors within this external environment; and last, it catalogues the basic internal traits of organizations as a basis for examining the role of the leader. Although the theory presented herein relates to both corporate and military organizations, it specifically isolates those unique aspects which differentiate them.

To begin, however, one must first define an organization, and this brief composite serves as an excellent introduction: "An organization is essentially a separate and distinct group of people (and resources) that have been brought together for a common purpose or objective. Furthermore, the interaction of its members is consciously coordinated toward accomplishing a common objective." For example, the United States Air Force is a separate and distinct organizational entity. It has a common objective of providing defense for the country and its resources. The employment of pilots, mechanics, ground crews, and aircraft have all been coordinated toward that objective. A similar description could be made about tactical wings and squadrons and, with slight changes in terminology, we could discuss IBM or US Steel.

An Organization and Its Environment

Although the foregoing definition stated that organizations were essentially separate, distinct entities, it did not say that organizations are autonomous and completely independent of their environment. Indeed they are not. Dr. William B. Wolf, in his article "Reflections on the Theory of Management," observes that "the organization cannot be isolated from the broader society of which it is a part.[3] Philip Selznick states that "an organization is adaptive—adapting to influence upon it from an external environment,"[4] and Chester I. Barnard, writing in *The Functions of the Executive,* notes that "the very survival of an organization depends on a proper environment equilibrium."[5]

Figure 1 is a graphic example of this delicate balance. Note that the arrows depict a continual interchange between the organization and its environment. For example, if the organization is a business firm, it must advertise and sell its product to customers who are in the broader environment. If the firm cannot sell its product, it will not survive. Therefore, a business firm draws its very sustenance from the environment, and if it cannot, it ceases to be a viable organization. Similarly, a military organization must satisfy the political environment from which it draws the budget which is imperative to its resource base.

This environmental interchange is continuous. A firm sends its product out to customers, and the customers return revenues to the firm when they buy its product. Employees are hired from the environment, and federal laws impose certain constraints on how the firm can treat them. In fact, this relationship is so complex and so critical it is well to note various sectors of the environment with which this interaction takes place.

For our discussion, the environment will be limited to five primary sectors: economic, cultural, political, competitive, and technological. Others could be added such as international, local communities, and other organizations. To interact with these primary sectors means an organization must function within a complex of structures and conditions. To demonstrate this interchange, consider how a commercial firm interacts with the various sectors of its environment. Later, this same analysis will be made with military organizations.

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

Figure 1. An Organization and Its Environment

While a business firm generally interacts with all of the primary sectors, its main emphasis is on making a profit. Since it is essentially an economic organization, its executives carefully define a particular segment of the economic environment they want to exploit; analyze market demands of the cultural sector for a particular product; and initiate organizational policies to encourage that market to buy their product. If people buy their product and if sales are good, revenue is returned to the firm and the interchange continues. If the product is not bought, sales suffer and the firm must somehow adjust. For example, American automobile manufacturers are currently adjusting to a changing demand in the economic environment by manufacturing smaller cars. But the economic sector is not a business firm's only concern—there are others.

The cultural sector of the environment also affects business firms, because it determines the basic attitudes of employees toward work and their service or product. Our society has historically been characterized by a strong work ethic, one which research suggests, is undergoing a period of change. This changing of cultural values may cause firms to pursue new methods of worker motivation and to reconsider the very nature of work itself.

A commercial organization also interacts with the political sector of its environment. For example, government at any level may either pressure organizations to change their practices or pass laws to control them, and the corporate entity exists only by the consent of society. The growing concern for consumer protection is an example of the political sector's effect on business. Also, hiring practices are regulated by the political sector. The law now states that job seekers cannot be rejected because of age, race, or sex.

The technological situation in the environment is also important. In the United States, a business firm can count on a larger number of technologically advanced subcontractors and specialists to help with organizational problems. In this sense, the technological environment is usually a positive factor. However, when technological and competitive sectors of the environment combine, there can be problems. As an example, in 1961 a firm by the name of American Photocopy confidently announced that it and two other companies had the copying machine market "sewed up" with their new wet-copying machine. Unfortunately, they were not aware of technological abilities of a small firm called Xerox. Competition always exists, and technology is often used to exploit that competition.

In summary, a business firm is by no means an island unto itself. It is constantly interacting with the various sectors of its environment, and as the environment changes, so must the firm if it expects to remain a viable institution. Of all sectors of the environment, however, the economic sector has the most profound effect on business organizations. Take away the revenue an organization receives from its environment and it will cease to exist.

But what about military organizations? Are they unique, or do they have a great deal in common with the basic model of a business firm?

In the broadest sense, government agencies and commercial firms are similar because neither are autonomous structures. Nor does this point require elaborate proof. The largest of our governmental agencies, the Department of Defense (DOD), is very much aware of just how important a senator and his or her colleagues are to its continued well-being. If you are still doubtful, read the annual appropriations hearings to put those doubts to rest. Indeed, to expand this example, all government agencies (federal, state, or local) must run the environmental gauntlet of political and economic appropriations.

Thus, military agencies do interact with their environments, and much said of business firms also applies to them. There are, however, some basic differences. A military agency is much more involved with the political sector than a business firm. In the final analysis, both types of organizations must rely on the favorable response of individual citizens, but the business firm secures its support essentially from the marketplace, while the military agency is more dependent upon making its appeal through the political process.

The economic sector also influences military agencies, for like business firms, they must also deal with problems of inflation. In addition, both must draw funds from the economic environment. While a business firm receives its funds directly from sales and revenue, a military service receives its funds through the appropriations process. In either case, the amount received is very much predicated on conditions within the economic and political sectors.

A military agency's interaction with the cultural and technological sectors is roughly the same as for business organizations. There is, however, a distinct difference in the competitive sector of the environment. Military agencies do not typically compete with other agencies in the marketplace. Still, there are exceptions to even that rule. The United States Air Force and Navy have certainly been competing to see which will provide the major follow-on strategic weapons for the future. The Air Force wants the stealth bomber, and the Navy is advocating the Trident. Further, DOD has to compete for national priorities with Medicare and Social Security.

Therefore, business firms and military agencies do have much in common but they also have some unique differences. Both facets are best summarized by the following points:

1. Organizations, both military and commercial, relate to their environments and are dependent on them.
2. Both types of organizations are influenced by five primary sectors of the broader environment (economic, cultural, political, competitive, and technological).
3. There are some distinct differences between the two types of organizations, especially the ways they relate to the economic, political, and competitive sectors of the environment.
4. Although military and commercial organizations do differ, their similarities outweigh the differences. Furthermore, the differences seem to be more procedural and technical, than fundamental.

Before leaving this discussion of organizations and their environment, one concept should be reemphasized: an organization is dependent upon its environment, and as the environment changes, so must the organization if it expects to remain fully functional. While many organizations exist in a peaceful and supportive environment, it is not always the case. In order to achieve and maintain relative harmony with its environment, an organization must recognize and react to the realities of that environment. If the organization is a closed system that either disregards, does not understand, or rejects the information coming from its environment, it is doubtful that it will make a reasonable adjustment. If, on the other hand, the organization is receptive to feedback and capable of adapting, it will probably continue as a viable institution. Based on this concept, there is little or no difference between governmental and commercial organizations.

The singular most important change in recent years affecting organization is the growing interdependence of organizations and their environments. In the old Wild West movies, Fort Apache could lock its gates to the world around it. The military organizations of today have many more responsibilities to the external environment. The nature of our complex world suggests that *no organization can be an island.*

The Internal Traits of an Organization

All organizations have certain internal characteristics or traits in common. While not all authorities agree as to just what these common traits are or how they should be labeled, four are frequently identified: objectives, structure, processes, and behavior.[6] Examination of any organization reveals evidence of these common traits. The following is a detailed examination of these common internal characteristics of organizations.

Objectives

By definition, objectives are supposed to be the focus of organizational effort; that is, goals an organization's components strive to reach. As such, they play a central role in coordinating effort. Further, the broad objectives of the larger organization are broken down into lesser supporting objectives for subordinate organizations. This is often referred to as the cascade effect whereby lower levels of organization are fitted into the larger whole. DOD has the broad mission or objective of providing efficient national defense. The Air Force, Army, and Navy each have mission statements, which support it, as do their subordinate organizations down to the smallest unit in the remotest location.

Some things about objectives are not widely understood. First, and most important, statements of organizational objectives should deal with how an organization relates to its external environment. An organization is dependent on its environment, and if it cannot maintain a harmonious relationship with that environment, it ceases to be a viable institution. Since the very existence of an organization depends on maintaining this relationship, organizations should have a basic statement of what they must do to assure harmony. For a government agency, such as the DOD, its broad mission statement indicates—what it must do if it expects to receive appropriations. For example, during the 1950s Americans were frightened by the Soviet Union. They told DOD to counter the threat at any reasonable cost, and that became the objective of DOD. During the late 1960s and 1970s, the threat seemed to subside and as cultural and political assumptions changed, a much lower military profile was suggested. In the 1980s, the assumptions changed again and cultural, political, and economic forces suggested changing mission for the military forces.

The important thing to note in this example is that a major change in the demands of the people (environment) prompted a change in objectives. The previous harmony had been disrupted, and a new internal direction (objectives) was called for if harmony was to be reestablished.

In a commercial firm the broad objective is determined in a little different manner, but as with the military agency, the objective of the company implies a desired harmony with the environment. For example, the objective might be to show a 10-percent return on investment after taxes. That objective statement implies a corollary: the company will not get 10-percent return on investment within a limited market spectrum unless it satisfactorily meets the needs of its customers. In other words, the company must adapt its product and price to conditions in the environment.

In discussing the concept of objectives, two other considerations should be introduced. First, objectives can and do change. If environmental requirements change significantly, the objective probably should change—and the quicker the better. Second, an organization's objectives are not necessarily subscribed to by its members. Merely formalizing the objectives of an organization does not mean management and employees are always working toward those objectives. This consideration is most relevant in today's society where commitment is critical to an organization's success. A leader is challenged to understand the organization's objectives, communicate them to the unit's members, and work for their commitment.

In summary, an organization and its environment are directly related. The objectives should not only define requirements for a harmonious relationship, they should serve as a guide to internal behavior as well.

Structure

With all the "wiring diagrams" (organization charts) one sees in government and business, it is not necessary to spend time justifying the fact that most organizations are structured into prearranged organizational patterns. What does appear necessary, however, is a brief review of some of the causative and dysfunctional aspects of structure.

Structure evolves out of size and technology. As an organization grows and incorporates new and complex activities, the job becomes too much for one person. Another employee is hired and the task is divided into two parts. One person specializes in and carries out part of the job, the other specializes in the remaining tasks, and so it goes. The larger an organization is and the more activities it entails, the more specialized and structured it becomes. Thus, specialization and structure are the natural outgrowths of increasing size and complexity and one encounters them in all large organizations.

Unfortunately, there are some difficulties associated with structure, and inflexibility is one of them. Once a structure is established, it is hard to change, and inflexibility can deter an organization in its attempt to adapt to environmental changes.

Another problem is that parochialism tends to set in and cause dysfunctional conflict. Members of squadron A tend to think the whole organization operates to support them regardless of the needs of squadron B. Maintenance and supply argue over who is responsible for an aircraft being out of commission. Each specialized area tends to emphasize its interest and forget the objectives of the larger organization.

The structure of an organization should fit its objectives. A Strategic Air Command wing and a Military Airlift Command wing have different structures because their objectives are different. Leaders are challenged to cope with the fit of structure and objectives in their organizations.

Processes Including Organizations and Structure

Neither serves to describe the activity within an organization. Organizations are marked by patterns of ongoing activities, and in any organization, there are numerous and different processes going on simultaneously. While the physical processes are the most obvious (for example, a production line in a manufacturing plant), organizations have other less obvious processes under way.

Understanding informal and formal communication processes in organizations is a major challenge to leaders. Information is critical to the organization's decision process and the effective leader must know how both the formal and informal communication flow.

Decision-making processes in organizations are often quite formalized whether they are budget or equipment purchase decisions. Military organizations have developed programmed decision processes in regulations and directives designed to achieve the best use of resources. Successful leaders know these processes, how much discretionary authority they have, and when to exercise it.

These processes constitute a major characteristic of all organizations, and understanding an organization entails understanding its processes. An organization is not just a structure as portrayed by the wiring diagram. An organization is also a complex of interrelated processes, and it is through knowledge of the processes that the formal activity of an organization is understood.

Behavior

By understanding an organization's objectives, structure, and formal processes, you will have a basic idea of what that organization is like. Nevertheless, the picture is not complete until you consider the really dynamic aspect of organizations: people and their behavior. Within most organizations there are large numbers of people performing a variety of tasks, and these individuals exert a pervasive influence on that organization. You must consider your place in the overall scheme of things to truly understand your organization.

The first point is that people in organizations are neither good nor bad—they are both. They are necessary and valuable in that they operate the machines, carry out the processes, make up the reports, and do the work. So in that sense, they are organizationally good and of considerable value.

Unfortunately, they can also be organizationally *bad.* They can steal funds, do shoddy work, demand time off, build empires, set norms that limit output, and submit false reports.

The important concept here is not that they are "good" or "bad," but that they are both! Their productive efforts are valuable and functional for the organization and their bad behavior is dysfunctional. Both functional and dysfunctional behavior are parts of organizational reality. To understand an organization, therefore, you must be aware of some of the behavioral patterns within the organization and how they affect functions of the organization. This is often referred to as the microaspects of an organization.

Another crucial point about organizational behavior is that employees are essentially self-serving. They generate behavior not necessarily to meet organizational objectives, but rather to gratify their personal goals and needs. Psychologist Carl Rogers states that people act to maintain and enhance their self-concepts.[7] Abraham H. Maslow asserts that behavior has its origins in the needs of the individuals.[8] Fredrick I. Herzberg suggests that employees are motivated only when the conditions of work satisfy their needs and when they are relatively insulated from personal dissatisfiers.[9] Current *expectancy theory* suggests people perform tasks for rewards of promotion, pay or some other benefit, and the strength of their relationships and feelings.[10]

The intent here is not to put forth some cynical concept of people, for most people are certainly capable of benevolent acts. Nevertheless, people are blessed or cursed with personal needs and drives to which they are essentially compelled to respond. This response pattern is part of the reality of organizational behavior, and it dictates many of the leader's motivational practices.

It is important to note that people pursue their needs as individuals, and as members of small, unofficial groups. These groups are an important part of the organizational matrix. These unofficial groups (the informal organization) are social mechanisms used by employees to exert internal pressures on organizations.

Individuals often behave differently when they become a part of a group. Their behavior is affected by association, unity, group standards, values, and group goals. Behavioral patterns of the group can be functional or dysfunctional. Group efforts can often cause organizations to exceed operational goals. Conversely, they can cause production to fall short of reasonable organizational goals. Leaders should develop a thorough understanding of the dynamics of group behavior and master the skills required for coping with its positive and negative influences.

In summary, organizations have common internal traits such as objectives, structure, processes, and behavior. Furthermore, these traits are not separate and distinct; they are overlapping, interdependent factors in the broader organizational system. All affect organizational behavior, and all provide the astute manager with a fundamental basis for examining and understanding organizations.

The Role of Top Leadership

The role of top leadership is often hard to distinguish in situations of dynamic internal forces and the abiding problem of adjusting to continual change in the external environment. Top leaders must clarify their positions in relation to the organization's internal needs for planning, coordinating, and directing with its external needs for coping with environmental forces.

As viewed in figure 2, the role of top level leaders becomes that of a harmonizer and balancer. Those who attempt to know must consider, balance, and integrate the internal factors and forces with those outside the organization. To illustrate this point, let us see what happens when a top leader disregards either of these responsibilities.

First, consider the case of military leaders who concentrate efforts on the external factors of the organization. The bulk of their efforts are directed toward public image. They concentrate on environmental interface while neglecting the internal situation. To the public, their organizations appear sound and efficient. The ultimate test of all military organizations, however, is the ability of their internal systems to efficiently defend the country. Neglect of internal factors prejudices that possibility.

Externally oriented leaders typically assume short-range views and may well be successful in the immediate future. Nevertheless, leaders must do more than merely make good impressions: they must also come to grips with the more dif-



Figure 2. The Leader's Role

ficult long-term problems of internal soundness. Military units that purposely or inadvertently appoint leaders for short tenures are likely to foster this type of leadership.

At the other end of the spectrum are leaders who concentrate on internal characteristics of the organization and ignore external forces. They believe an efficient organization will automatically be recognized for its merit. This is also a deficient point of view. Henry Ford concentrated on the internal process of manufacturing to build a tremendous organization. His purported attitude that the public could have cars of any color as long as they were black is an indicator of the difference between Ford and General Motors. Alfred Sloan of General Motors recognized the need to balance internal and external factors and, as a result, overtook Ford's initial dominant position in the automobile industry.[11]

This discussion and examples show that top level leaders are more than just internal functionaries or external public relations representatives. Effective leaders at this level have several responsibilities. First, they must know and consider the factors and forces of the environment. Second, they must know, consider, and be able to influence their organizations' internal factors and forces. Third, they must be able to reasonably balance, integrate, and harmonize the two while leading their organizations toward productive goals.[12] How well leaders perform this third and final responsibility depends, to some measure, on how well they understand the basic tenets of organization theory.

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Executive Strategy Issues for Very Large Organizations

William E. Turcotte

This note draws attention to some of the special problems of directing and/or influencing outcomes in very large organizations. *Large* resists precise definition, but for present purposes, imagine a multifunctional organization with at least five hierarchical levels and a very complex external environment from which resources and directions flow. In such an organization, the range of top management responsibilities allows only infrequent, though often intense, interactions with most subordinates. Opportunities for personal direction and role-centered leadership patterns are limited. Range and complexity of organizational issues make it difficult for executives to master the details involved. They must instead develop skill in abstracting the essence, implication, and key ideas from complex issues. Executives frequently find themselves drawn into situations for which past experience provides limited guidance. Often, their agenda is dominated by external events, reducing time to deal with internal matters in an orderly way. They find it difficult to "get their arms" around the organization and its key players. Subordinates meanwhile are clamoring for executive time and feel frustrated when the decision process slows, lacks established pattern, and leaves important policy or coordinative matters in suspense. Executive time for setting internal priorities and effort integration is compressed and subordinates can easily evolve conflicting views of policy and priorities especially when major resource allocations are at stake.

Strategies successful in smaller, better-defined organizations that center on high levels of personal interaction and control may have limitations in larger, less well-defined organizations. At this point, please reflect on and form an opinion as to:

1. What constitutes a large and complex national security organization?
2. How does commanding, directing, and influencing practices for these organizations differ, if at all, from smaller, well-structured organizations such as a squadron, frigate, or a battalion?
3. What are the elements of a framework or points of view to achieve a balanced personal strategy for directing a large organization, or some major component within that organization?

Integrating Large Organizations Elements of a Framework

While each of us will have our own ideas, some elements of an executive framework include:

1. scanning the external environment for early warnings, impacts, opportunities, and points of required influence,
2. aligning internal core competencies and priorities with external requirements, and
3. devising substrategies for
   a. the implications, constraints, and emerging requirements of organizational structure,
   b. ordering decision-making patterns, structure, and implementation,
   c. delegating and feedback,
   d. planning and control,
   e. projecting behavioral processes to include
      (1) managerial style
      (2) motivational/incentive climate
      (3) leadership
      (4) power and influence
      (5) group and committee dynamics, and
      (6) conflict identification and address,
   f. adapting to organizational and change processes, and
   g. managing time—yours and that of your subordinates.

Scanning the External Environment

No matter what the size of an organization, its leadership must direct careful attention to its external environment. That environment will be the source of directions, problems, evaluations, and priorities, and will dictate changes. Indeed, it is not unusual for the top individual in an organization to spend much, if not most, of his time interacting with this environment in search of resources, directions, defensive support, offensive opportunities, and sometimes just reading the tea leaves or groping for significant rumors. No diagrams of key players or influence centers are provided to new executives. Categorizing the external environment is very difficult, but some important components include the following.

Mission/Task Issues. Most organizations are never static. Missions and tasks are changed, and new projects can gather momentum long before the responsible command learns of their existence. Bases are closed, functions consolidated, squadrons reassigned, reserve responsibilities modified, et cetera. For many reasons, this information is not always widely shared, even though it takes some time to formulate decisional alternatives. But once organizational change is decided, implementation proceeds at a furious pace. An alert executive through regular interaction with external points of contact, can pick up the threads of discussion early and be-

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gin, subtly if necessary, preparing the organization for externally directed changes.

Mission or tasks are also the basis for evaluation of performance. In an era of very scarce resources, a constant problem is setting priorities to ignore as well as stress certain activities. Understanding seniors' views of priorities is obviously important to aligning internal emphasis. One would assume that this is simply the result of regular and open discussion between commanders and subordinates (it should be). On the contrary, obtaining information on shifting priorities frequently requires deft and constant interaction.

Economic Issues. Economic issues range from the size of next year's Department of Defense budget to adequacy of your organization's budget and ceiling points. The executive who learns pressure points of external influence centers may not always prevail in the resource pursuit, but he will be able to ascertain impending actions, and through wise interaction, be able to guide in various degrees outcomes important to his organization. Large organizations do not always allocate resources in totally open or even very precise ways. Those responsible for final decisions in this area may be unaware of the specific impact of decisions altering activity or resource flow. Feedback from subordinate organizations is essential, sometimes must be aggressively pushed, and must come from leaders in the affected components. It is not always pleasant for some top managers to involve themselves in the maze of resource allocation, but frequently only they have the perception and status to explain the intent of decisions and to subsequently influence outcomes. The resource struggle is not one of simply interpersonal influence. It is also one of ascertaining, as early as possible, upper level information gaps regarding your programs and providing necessary data, persuasion, and advice to make needed changes in resource flow.

Political Issues. Political issues grow in importance as one nears the top of an organization. Moreover, it is very difficult to separate fully the economic external environment from the political one. The political external environment may involve interaction with Congress, with their key staff, or it may involve interaction with state and municipal influence centers and with a wide assortment of interest groups. The latter might include the Navy League, trade associations, labor associations, advisory groups, environmental authorities, and employee groups, to name but a few.

Technological Issues. In-depth knowledge of technology may not be essential for executives unless the organization is specifically responsible for initiating technical activities or is primarily involved in technical matters. Even in situations where technical expertise is not required, a passing familiarity with relevant technical matters may yield dividends. If the unit is required to utilize complex equipment or processes, it is psychologically advantageous, both within the organization and in dealing with those outside of it, for leaders to be conversant with the basic technical framework involved. Effective response to technological change demands that its potential effects at least be understood. What, for example, upper level technical initiation will impact on your organization and require special support equipment, special skills, special training and what are the relevant budget/training lead times for adaptation? Where does one interact to learn this information in time to plan rather than react?

Cultural/Value Issues. Both the external and the internal environments are importantly influenced by cultural patterns. Geographical areas in the United States have their own cultural and value orientation, and these impact on organizations situated there. Working hours, level of effort, religious observance, dress, and discipline acceptance all can be influenced by regional culture/values. The problem grows significantly when one's organization is located in another country and national officials and workers are important to successful performance. How should a base commander in Oman or in Rota, Spain, interpret required actions in the context of local culture and values? How can major gaps and gaffes be avoided? What bearing does local culture and values have on motivational systems? In other cultures, concepts of employment security, emphasis on seniority, on group loyalty, intergroup competition, and group decision making are very different than those in the United States.

Government Regulations/Compliance. The government not only makes laws, but it is generally expected to be the model in enforcing these laws. The external arena is influenced by environmental laws, equal opportunity laws, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) laws, military justice constraints, labor laws, conflict-of-interest laws, small business set-asides, relations with contractor laws, and so on. The larger the organization, the greater the potential impact of laws and the greater the need for upper management to be ready to incorporate the requirements of past and pending legislation and regulations.

Aligning Internal Core Competencies and Priorities with External Requirements

Imperatives for command/top management action also come from within the organization. Strategy for directing an organization should include the establishment of sensors to determine internal pressures and support for plans or adaptive action. The list of internal issues is quite long, but among the more important are (a) recognition of the organization's core competencies and weaknesses; (b) perceived (real or imagined) inequities in internal resource allocation; (c) difficulties encountered by top management in identifying who or what suborganizations are the principal contributors to the work effort; (d) the levels of morale; (e) powerful informal groups; (f) major present and future changes in workload or workload distribution; (g) past and present patterns of resource allocation; (h) key billet backup and replacements; (i) required information flow; (j) required decision making processes; (k) present and expected shortages in special skills; (l) areas where major shortfalls in performance exist (real or perceived); (m) areas of interpersonal or interorganizational conflict; (n) the 20 or so percent of activity that accounts for 80 percent of the organizational payoff; (o) plans (if any) and the planning horizon; (p) major players' role definition; and (q) the organizational climate. While these areas of concern exist in most organizations, the flow of information in large organizations may for upper executives obscure, rather than highlight these and related issues.

The Implications, Constraints, and Emerging Requirements of Organizational Structure

Organizational structure is intended to subdivide and fix responsibilities. Structure also constrains interactions. Structure is but a guide to intended roles. Individuals, through ability and ambition, often exceed the confines of structure. Others shrink into the structure, narrowly defining their roles and responsibilities. The top executive's major questions related to organizational structure are: Can information flow according to my preference? Are there important ambiguities? Can I easily fix the responsibility for new tasks? Does the organization represent a dynamic capacity for handling multi-faceted tasks or does it represent past, not present and future, requirements? Are the right people positioned in the right place or should the organization be modified to give access and added responsibilities to the best subordinates? Does the organization have clear points of access and identification to the external environment? Does the design integrate what must be integrated and separate out that which should be independent? This very incomplete list is but a guide to the leader's analysis of the adaptability of his or her organizational structure to the external environment and its suitability to the internal assignment of responsibility.

Ordering Decision-making Patterns, Structure, and Implementation

It is always important for the top leader to have a clear understanding of his/her personal decision-making process and its capacity to generate an organizational climate supportive of the flow of required and honest decisional information. Most of us perceive ourselves to be quite solid in this area. But, as our organization grows, our perception of decision making may be viewed quite differently in the organizational trenches. Moreover, our loyal subordinates may not be faithful to our intent or, through overzealousness, may be less than accurate in interpreting our preferences and priorities to the lower organization.

Our decision analysis course offers one guide to decision-making that you may find helpful. Others, of course, exist. What is certain though is that as the size of the organization increases, so will the uncertainty involved in most top-level decisions. Once decisions are made, a clear process for transmitting information and tracking implementation is required. Memory will not suffice.

Substrategy for Delegating and Feedback

Size involves delegation and delegation suggests organized feedback. Feedback can be at the option of the individual/organization receiving an assignment or feedback can be triggered by some random or orderly process established by the delegating official. In smaller organizations, feedback may be triggered by the memory of the delegator, by a schedule, or by an assistant. In larger organizations, more formal and complex methods are required. These methods generally fit the description of a planning and control system.

Substrategy for Planning and Control

Planning and control are intertwined. The need varies considerably according to the size and complexity of the organization. In smaller and more structured units the top manager can often do much of the required planning and controlling rather informally by memory and on the back of an envelope. Indeed, in some smaller organizations, procedures, patterns, and external direction can reduce internal activities to compliance routines. However, as the organization reaches a certain size, as its activities become more unstructured, and as freedom for interpretation of emphasis increases, more formal planning and control systems are required.

Planning requires development of activities and assignment of responsibilities to achieve selected objectives. It requires some sort of priority system; a search to identify opportunities and to find ways to deal with anticipated problems; organized systems for accumulating and displaying information; some sort of system to forecast future conditions; and it requires at least a brief description of how goals are to be achieved.

Control traces progress toward the achievement of ongoing or single event goals. Control involves procedures to describe desired action, milestones against which success can be determined, and reports to both judge and accumulate comparative data. More than any other aspects of the managerial process, control depends on accurate and timely information and a well-designed feedback loop. Control stimulates progress because it underlines accountability. Control also motivates interorganizational cooperation and highlights situations when conflict blocks progress between interdependent units.

Planning and control, taken together, involve structure and process. The structure represents the desired means for seeking and maintaining progress. Process is largely a function of the behavioral aspects of planning and control. Process insights are important for reducing the dysfunctional behavior and threat characteristics of any control system. The number of variations is large in designing a planning and control system, but concepts of planning and control are central to the top manager's operating strategy. Planning and control translates leadership into purposeful and coordinated behavior. Without such a system, the senior executive risks being driven by sequential attention to inputs (the in-basket or crises management strategy). Moreover, without a planning and control system, the executive may be surprised (or never know) how few of his intended initiatives are implemented. Top decision makers enjoy making policy but are frequently less interested in tracking the implementation of policies or desired emphasis.

Substrategies for Projecting Behavioral Processes

Behavioral strategies must also be explicitly employed in guiding the activities of large, complex organizations. While there are many components of this portion of the overall strategy, some important ones are as follows:

Managerial Style. All executives operate within a particular philosophical framework (though they may not know it exists or are quite mistaken in its description). Philosophy, if it is as consistent in application as it is in perception, matches what is said with what actually occurs in practice. When concepts of philosophy are communicated properly, both the manager and the managed will be in a much better position to understand the behavior that is mutually expected. A proper philosophy assumes, as well, a capacity to communicate and to be the recipient of open communication. It sets the organizational work culture. Without a guiding philosophy, an executive's actions, real or perceived, are bound to be somewhat random and will not provide any consistent framework for subordinate interpretation. In order to be effective an executive's philosophy must be communicated to the entire organization and must be capable of being understood by the entire organization. This requires walking a thin line between giving subordinates excessive direction and allowing appropriate freedom of action.

Motivation/Incentive Climate. Motivation and incentive formulation are but one part of the behavioral process and an even smaller part, however important, of a broader framework of an executive strategy. While all ascribe to the importance of motivation and many understand its concepts, few are able to put into practice this knowledge when they are directing large, complex organizations. *Much of our image of motivational strategies comes from small, largely one or several member, group interactions. In such a setting, our own qualities and characteristics are thought to motivate.* In very large organizations the problem is more difficult as we must somehow find ways to convey incentives and create an effective motivational climate down through many organizational layers where the bulk of our subordinates are rarely in direct contact with us. In such an environment, we are being interpreted by our middle-level subordinates. Hopefully, this interpretation is not different from what we seek to project. It is also true that one cannot meet all the motivational needs of the many members in very large organizations. Rather, the search is for central rewards perceived to be important by either the majority or by those who most influence the majority.

Sometimes this substrategy is importantly linked to our capacity for generating incentives for desired directions of action, for accurately defining roles of individuals and linking their goals to our own and for placing decisional authority at the appropriate levels of expertise. Such organizational processes involve the wise use of responsibility centers, and the allocation of resources in ways that stimulate and reward those who bear the main burdens of achieving organizational goals.

Leadership. Like motivation, our concept of leadership is often discerned from past, successful, smaller group experiences. These have often been situations wherein our direct involvement was seen, served as a role model, and was interpreted directly and favorably by influenced subordinates. Perhaps an identical approach will serve well in very large organizations; perhaps it will be inappropriate.

Apart from an understanding of leadership concepts, there is the difficult matter of communicating a chosen style down into the trenches of a large organization. The "Great Speech" will not do it, nor will the well-intentioned (or not so well-intentioned) actions of subordinates do it. Moreover, the further one gets away from the "Great Leader," the less individuals tend to be influenced by posturing and the more they are influenced by an understanding of the rationale influencing decisions, especially resource allocation decisions, affecting them. Individuals also draw important assumptions about leadership from their real or perceived involvement in the decisions that impact on them. The more they observe unexplained impacts on themselves, the more likely they are to interpret the organizational climate as impersonal, despite what the content of the change of command speech implies.

Power and Influence. Formal authority is a quick and useful way to influence. Authority also has considerable limits in large organizations when one is highly dependent on others who can contribute or withhold their creativity and full support. For influence to be consistently effective, executives must possess and deploy many power sources, only one of which is authority. These sources and the tactics for them are treated in another part of the course.

Group and Committee Dynamics. The executive requires a conceptual knowledge of group dynamics. His or her day will be spent interacting with internal and external groups. Groups can be the source of resistance and antagonism, or they can creatively supplement the formal motivational and control systems by reinforcing quality and quantity performance standards. The top manager's insight into these processes, and his or her strategies for group utilization and direction will importantly influence the posture and utility of groups. Setting a climate for open discussion and listening, far more than talking, are not necessarily easy for the activist, take-charge person. The complexity of upper level issues inevitably lead to wide-ranging and conflicting suggestions requiring considerable synthesis skill. For this reason, a large organization demands the formation of issue based executive teams functioning with the senior executive to manage inherent complexities.

Conflict Identification. For high-level leaders, daily life is largely centered on dealing with conflict. This is normal, since what cannot be resolved moves inexorably toward the top, and what nears the organizational apex represents very difficult conflicts. When it gets to the level of top executives, generally speaking, someone will lose and someone will gain—either in resources, status, or in ego. Conflict is many faceted and can be categorized as person-to-person, and group-to-group. Sources of conflicts may stem from task interdependencies, task dependencies, inconsistent performance and reward criteria, and difficulties regarding the sharing of common resources (air support, strategic lift, ADP, and so on).

Executive responses require accurate diagnosis of the cause, not the symptoms, of conflict and then the application of such strategies as restructuring, confrontation, smoothing, forcing, compromise, and bargaining. The executive also recognizes that conflict is neither good nor bad in itself. Indeed, there are situations in complacent organizations when the executive's strategy will entail the initiation of conflict.

Substrategies for Organizational Adaptation and Change Processes

Successful military executives require a practical underpinning in change processes. Forces for change may involve modification in tasks and goals, technology, people, and structure. Forces resisting change will stem from the difficulties of the change itself to the process or method by which the change is to be undertaken. Change strategies involve (a) a technology strategy that centers on change in work flows, methods, materials, and information systems; (b) organizational structure strategies for internal changes seeking realignment of jobs and responsibilities; (c) task strategies focusing on specific job activities aimed generally at productivity improvement; and (d) people strategies that are directed toward improving communications and relations among individuals and groups to achieve increased organizational effectiveness. How accurately executives diagnose the problems and how accurately they recognize the need and direction for change will itself affect the change process as will the use of a mixture of the strategies just outlined.

Substrategies for Time Management—Yours and That of Your Subordinates

Not many top managers have an explicit awareness of the way in which their time is consumed. They are carried along by a stream of almost random events over which they believe they have little control. Ceremonial events, questions from the external environment, conflict resolution, personnel problems, telephone calls, visitors, meetings, and the like regularly exhaust both the day and the top executive. Indeed, constructive work is done after and before the normal working day and on weekends. Top managers who do not manage their time create even greater time management problems for subordinates who spend considerable time waiting for the boss. Frequently while they are waiting, others are waiting to see them. The consequence is waiting rooms filled with important people and substantial losses of lead time. Executives, using secretarial assistance, must carefully audit, prioritize, and control their time. Similarly, they need to observe appointments and other actions that will stimulate their subordinates to preserve time.

Summary

Directing the affairs of large, complex organizations requires a balanced and integrated point of view. One must resist the natural tendency to focus most on those areas one knows best from past experiences. This is a common fault of many senior executives. Acting on predispositions built from past successes, they sometimes conceive strategies ill suited to the organizational needs of the present.

To guide, rather than react, one needs a comprehensive view or framework which includes a good insight into: the external environment of the organization; the internal environment; the managerial processes of organizing, decision making, planning, and control; the behavioral processes of managerial style, motivation, leadership, group dynamics, conflict management; and concepts of change processes. Moreover, one must have a good understanding of the tendency for large organizations to filter out some of the top individual's intentions on the way down and to filter out unpleasant, but essential, information on the way up. One of the sadder sights in large organizations is that of top brass busying themselves at ceremonial tasks and random organizational events, while the organization, like an iceberg, moves along inexorably on a path set by momentum and internal preference, rather than in the direction the "Great Leader" intends. In such organizations even well-intentioned leaders can become isolated from the affairs of their organization, while simultaneously believing that they are very much on "top of things." Market forces have a way of abruptly changing this attitude in profit-making organizations. Unfortunately, in nonprofit organizations it takes a massive amount of information to alter misperceptions of high effectiveness. Strategy is, if anything, more important in not-for-profit organizations than in profit-making organizations. See figure 1 for an analytical approach to diagnosing the needs of an organization.



Figure 1. An Analytical Approach for Diagnosing an Organization and Framing Priorities

What Makes a Top Executive?

Morgan W. McCall Jr., PhD
Michael M. Lombardo, EdD

Senior executive: At one time, Jim was the leading, perhaps the only, candidate for chief executive officer. And then he ran into something he'd never faced before—an unprofitable operation. He seemed to go on a downward spiral after that, becoming more remote each day, unable to work with key subordinates.

Interviewer: Why do you think he derailed?

Senior executive: Some of it was bad luck, because the business was going down when he inherited it. Some of it was surrounding himself with specialists, who inevitably wear the blinders of their particular field. And some of it was that he had never learned to delegate. He had no idea of how to lead by listening.

The case of Jim is by no means unusual. Many executives of formidable talent rise to very high levels, yet are denied the ultimate positions. The quick explanations for what might be called their derailment are the ever-popular Peter Principle—they rose past their level of competence—or, more darkly, they possessed some fatal flaw.

The grain of truth in these explanations masks the actual complexity of the process. So we learned from a study that we recently did here at the Center for Creative Leadership, a nonprofit research and educational institution in Greensboro, North Carolina, formed to improve the practice of management.

When we compared 21 derailed executives—successful people who were expected to go even higher in the organization but who reached a plateau late in their careers, were fired, or were forced to retire early—with 20 "arrivers"—those who made it all the way to the top—we found the two groups astonishingly alike. Every one of the 41 executives possessed remarkable strengths, and everyone was flawed by one or more significant weaknesses.

Insensitivity to others was cited as a reason for derailment more often than any other flaw. But it was never the only reason. Most often, it was a combination of personal qualities and external circumstances that put an end to an executive's rise. Some of the executives found themselves in a changed situation, in which strengths that had served them well earlier in their careers became liabilities that threw them off track. Others found that weaknesses they'd had all along, once outweighed by assets, became crucial defects in a new situation requiring particular skills to resolve some particular problem.

Our goal was to find out what makes an effective executive, and our original plan was to concentrate on arrivers. But we soon realized that, paradoxically, we could learn a lot about effectiveness by taking a close look at executives who had failed to live up to their apparent potential.

We and our associate, Ann Morrison, worked with several Fortune-500 corporations to identify "savvy insiders"—people who had seen many top executives come and go and who were intimately familiar with their careers. In each corporation one of us interviewed several insiders, usually a few of the top 10 executives and a few senior "human resources professionals," people who help to decide who moves up. We asked them to tell both a success story and a story of derailment.

Fatal Flaws

Asked to say what had sealed the fate of the men (they were all men) who fell short of ultimate success, our sources named 65 factors, which we boiled down to 10 categories:

1. Insensitive to others: abrasive, intimidating, bullying style
2. Cold, aloof, arrogant
3. Betrayal of trust
4. Overly ambitious: thinking of next job, playing politics
5. Specific performance problems with the business
6. Overmanaging: unable to delegate or build a team
7. Unable to staff effectively
8. Unable to think strategically
9. Unable to adapt to boss with different style
10. Overdependent on advocate or mentor

No executive had all the flaws cited; indeed, only two were found in the average derailed executive.

As we have noted, the most frequent cause for derailment was insensitivity to other people. "He wouldn't negotiate; there was no room for countervailing views. He could follow a bull through a china shop and still break the china," one senior executive said of a derailed colleague.

Under stress, some of the derailed managers became abrasive and intimidating. One walked into a subordinate's office, interrupting a meeting, and said, "I need to see you."

Reprinted by permission from *Psychology Today*, February 1983.

When the subordinate tried to explain that he was occupied, his boss snarled, "I don't give a g-----n. I said I wanted to see you now."

Others were so brilliant that they became arrogant, intimidating others with their knowledge. Common remarks were: "He made others feel stupid" or "He wouldn't give you the time of day unless you were brilliant too."

In an incredibly complex and confusing job, being able to trust others absolutely is a necessity. Some executives committed what is perhaps management's only unforgivable sin: They betrayed a trust. This rarely had anything to do with honesty, which was a given in almost all cases. Rather, it was a one-upping of others, or a failure to follow through on promises that wrecked havoc in terms of organizational efficiency. One executive didn't implement a decision as he had promised to do, causing conflicts between the marketing and the production divisions that reverberated downward through four levels of frustrated subordinates.

Others, like Cassius, were overly ambitious. They seemed to be always thinking of their next job, they bruised people in their haste, and they spent too much time trying to please upper management. This sometimes led to staying with a single advocate or mentor too long. When the mentor fell from favor, so did they. Even if the mentor remained in power, people questioned the executive's ability to make independent judgments. Could he stand alone? One executive had worked for the same boss for the better part of 15 years, following him from one assignment to another. Then top management changed, and the boss no longer fit in with the plans of the new regime. The executive, having no reputation of his own, was viewed as a clone of his boss and was passed over as well.

A series of performance problems sometimes emerged. Managers failed to meet profit goals, got lazy, or demonstrated that they couldn't handle certain kinds of jobs (usually new ventures or jobs requiring great powers of persuasion). More important in such cases, managers showed that they couldn't change; they failed to admit their problems, covered them up, or tried to blame them on others. One executive flouted senior management by failing to work with a man specifically sent in to fix a profit problem.

After a certain point in their careers, managers must cease to do the work themselves, and must become executives who see that it is done. But some of the men we studied never made this transition, never learning to delegate or to build a team beneath them. Although overmanaging is irritating at any level, it can be fatal at the executive level. When executives meddle, they are meddling not with low-level subordinates but with other executives, most of whom know much more about their particular area of expertise than their boss ever will. One external-affairs executive who knew little about government regulation tried to direct an expert with 30 years' experience. The expert balked, and the executive lost a battle that should never have begun.

Others got along with their staff, but simply picked the wrong people. Sometimes they staffed in their own image, choosing, for instance, an engineer like themselves when a person with marketing experience would have been better suited for the task at hand. Or sometimes they simply picked people who later bombed.

Inability to think strategically—to take a broad, long-term view—was masked by attention to detail and a miring in technical problems, as some executives simply couldn't go from being doers to being planners. Another common failure appeared as a conflict of style with a new boss. One manager who couldn't change from a go-getter to a thinker/planner eventually ran afoul of a slower-paced, more reflective boss. Although the successful managers sometimes had similar problems, they didn't get into wars over them, and rarely let the issues get personal. Derailed managers exhibited a host of unproductive responses—got peevish, tried to shout the boss down, or just sulked.

In summary, we concluded that executives derail for four basic reasons, all connected to the fact that situations change as one ascends the organizational hierarchy:

1. *Strengths become weaknesses.* Loyalty becomes overdependence, narrowness, or cronyism. Ambition is eventually viewed as politicking and destroys an executive's support base.

2. *Deficiencies eventually matter.* If talented enough, a person can get by with insensitivity at lower levels, but not at higher ones, where subordinates and peers are powerful and probably brilliant also. Those who are charming but not brilliant find that the job gets too big and problems too complex to get by on interpersonal skills.

3. *Success goes to their heads.* After being told how good they are for so long, some executives simply lose their humility and become cold and arrogant. Once this happens, their information sources begin to dry up and people no longer wish to work with them.

4. *Events conspire.* A few of the derailed apparently did little wrong. They were done in politically, or by economic upheavals. Essentially, they just weren't lucky.

While conducting the interviews, we heard few stories about water-walkers. In fact, the executive who came closest to fitting that category, the one "natural leader," derailed precisely because everyone assumed that he could do absolutely anything. At higher levels of management, he became lost in detail, concentrated too much on his subordinates, and seemed to lack the intellectual ability to deal with complex issues. Still, no one helped him; it was assumed that he would succeed regardless.

In short, both the arrivers and those who derailed had plenty of warts, although these generally became apparent only late in the men's careers. The events that exposed the flaws were seldom cataclysmic. More often, the flaws themselves had a cumulative impact. As one executive put it, "Careers last such a long time. Leave a trail of mistakes and you eventually find yourself encircled by your past."

In general, the flaws of both the arrivers and the derailed executives showed up when one of five things happened to them: (1) They lost a boss who had covered, or compensated for, their weaknesses. (2) They entered a job for which they were not prepared, either because it entailed much greater responsibility or because it required the executives to perform functions that were new to them. Usually, the difficulties were compounded by the fact that the executives went to work for a new boss whose style was very different from that of his newly promoted subordinate. (3) They left behind a trail of little problems or bruised people, either because they handled them poorly or moved through so quickly that they failed to handle them at all. (4) They moved up during an organizational shake-up and weren't scrutinized until the shakedown period. (5) They entered the executive suite, where getting along with others is critical.

One or more of these events happened to most of the executives, so the event itself was telling only in that its impact began to separate the two groups. How one person dealt with his flaws under stress went a long way toward explaining why some men arrived and some jumped the tracks just short of town. A bit of dialogue from one interview underscores this point:

Senior executive: Successful people do not like to admit that they make big mistakes, but they make whoppers nevertheless. I've never known a CEO [chief executive officer] who didn't make at least one big one and lots of little ones, but it never hurt them.

Interviewer: Why?

Senior executive: Because they know how to handle adversity.

Part of handling adversity lies in knowing what *not* to do. As we learned, lots of different management behavioral patterns were acceptable to others. The key was in knowing which ones colleagues and superiors would find intolerable.

As we said at the beginning, both groups were amazingly similar: incredibly bright, identified as promising early in their careers, outstanding in their track records, ambitious, willing to sacrifice—and imperfect. A closer look does reveal some differences, however, and at the levels of excellence characteristic of executives, even a small difference is more than sufficient to create winners and losers.

The Arrivers and the Derailed Compared

In the first place, derailed executives had a series of successes, but usually in similar kinds of situations. They had turned two businesses around, or managed progressively larger jobs in the same function. By contrast, the arrivers had more diversity in their successes—they had turned a business around *and* successfully moved from line to staff and back, or started a new business from scratch *and* completed a special assignment with distinction. They built plants in the wilderness and the Amazonian jungle, salvaged disastrous operations, and resolved all-out wars between corporate divisions without bloodshed. One even built a town.

Derailed managers were often described as moody or volatile under pressure. One could control his temper with top management he sought to impress, but was openly jealous of peers he saw as competitors. His too-frequent angry outbursts eroded the cooperation necessary for success, as peers began to wonder whether he was trying to do them in. In contrast, the arrivers were calm, confident, and predictable. People knew how they would react and could plan their own actions accordingly.

Although neither group made many mistakes, all of the arrivers handled theirs with poise and grace. Almost uniformly, they admitted the mistake, forewarned others so they wouldn't be blind-sided by it, then set about analyzing and fixing it. Also telling were two things the arrivers didn't do: They didn't blame others, and once they had handled the situation, they didn't dwell on it.

Moreover, derailed executives tended to react to failure by going on the defensive, trying to keep it under wraps while they fixed it, or, once the problem was visible, blaming it on someone else.

Although both groups were good at going after problems, arrivers were particularly single-minded. This "What's the problem?" mentality spared them three of the common flaws of the derailed: They were too busy worrying about their present job to appear overly eager for their next position; they demanded excellence from their people in problem solving; and they developed many contacts, saving themselves from the sole-mentor syndrome. In fact, almost no successful manager reported having a single mentor.

Last, the arrivers, perhaps due to the diversity of their backgrounds, had the ability to get along with all types of people. They either possessed or developed the skills required to be outspoken without offending people. They were not seen as charming-but-political or direct-but-tactless, but as direct-and-diplomatic. One arriver disagreed strongly with a business strategy favored by his boss. He presented his objections candidly and gave the reasons for his concerns as well as the alternative he preferred. But when the decision went against him, he put his energy behind making the decision work. When his boss turned out to be wrong, the arriver didn't gloat about it; he let the situation speak for itself without further embarrassing his boss.

One of the senior executives we interviewed made a simple but not simplistic distinction between the two groups. Only two things, he said, differentiated the successful from the derailed: total integrity, and understanding other people.

Integrity seems to have a special meaning to executives. The word does not refer to simple honesty, but embodies a consistency and predictability built over time that says, "I will do exactly what I say I will do when I say I will do it. If I change my mind, I will tell you well in advance so you will not be harmed by my actions." Such a statement is partly a matter of ethics, but, even more, a question of vital practicality. This kind of integrity seems to be the core element in keeping a large, amorphous organization from collapsing in its own confusion.

Ability—or inability—to understand other people's perspectives was the most glaring difference between the arrivers and the derailed. Only 25 percent of the derailed were described as having a special ability with people; among arrivers, the figure was 75 percent.

Interestingly, two of the arrivers were cold and asinine when younger, but somehow completely changed their style. "I have no idea how he did it," one executive said. "It was as if he went to bed one night and woke up a different person." In general, a certain awareness of self and willingness to change characterized the arrivers. That same flexibility, of course, is also what is needed to get along with all types of people.

A final word—a lesson, perhaps to be drawn from our findings. Over the years, "experts" have generated long lists of critical skills in an attempt to define the complete manager. In retrospect it seems obvious that no one, the talented executive included, can possess all of those skills. As we came to realize, executives, like the rest of us, are a patchwork of strengths *and* weaknesses. The reasons that some executives ultimately derailed and others made it all the way up the ladder confirm what we all know but have hesitated to admit: There is no one best way to succeed (or even to fail). The foolproof, step-by-step formula is not just elusive, it is, as Kierkegaard said of truth, like searching a pitch-dark room for a black cat that isn't there.

Two Executives: A Study in Contrasts

THE TWO CASE HISTORIES THAT FOLLOW ARE TOLD IN THE WORDS OF CORPORATE EXECUTIVES WHO KNEW THEM WELL.

ONE WHO ARRIVED

The Man

"He was an intelligent guy with a delightful twinkle in his eye. He could laugh at himself during the toughest of situations."

Notable Strengths

"He was a superb negotiator. He could somehow come out of a labor dispute or a dispute among managers with an agreement everyone could live with. I think he did this by getting all around a problem so it didn't get blown. People knew far in advance if something might go wrong."

Flaws

"He was too easy on subordinates and peers at times. Line people wondered whether he was tough enough and sometimes, why he spent so much time worrying about people."

Career

"He was thrown into special assignments—negotiations, dealing with the press, fix-it projects. He always found a way to move things off dead center."

And Ended Up . . .

Senior Vice President

ONE WHO DERAILED

The Man

"He got results, but was awfully insensitive about it. Although he could be charming when he wanted to be, he was mostly knees and elbows."

Notable Strengths

"He was a superb engineer who came straight up the operations ladder. He had the rare capability of analyzing problems to death, then reconfiguring the pieces into something new."

Flaws

"When developing something, he gave subordinates more help than they needed, but once a system was set up, he forgot to mind the store. When things went awry, he usually acted like a bully or stonewalled it, once hiring a difficult employee and turning him over to a subordinate. 'It's your problem now,' he told him."

Career

"He rocketed upward through engineering/operations jobs. Once he got high enough, his deficiencies caught up with him. He couldn't handle either the scope of his job or the complexity of new ventures."

And Ended Up . . .

"Passed over, and it's too bad. He was a talented guy and not a bad manager, either. I suppose that his overmanaging, abrasive style never allowed his colleagues to develop and never allowed him to learn from them."

Lines of Excellence: Executing a Balanced Organizational Vision

Maj Raymond M. Powell

Congratulations! You've been selected to lead 1st Widget Maintenance, the unit command for which you've waited your whole career. You polish off your favorite leadership ideas—a grab bag of techniques you've assembled over the years of leading, following, and observing. You've learned that you're supposed to supply your troops with a philosophy, so you've filled your change-of-command ceremony with lofty proverbs and visionary axioms. You hit the ground running, emphasizing "mission first, people always" and eagerly pushing four or five of your favorite tools of the trade, refined over 15 years' experience in the widget business. You will be involved but not overbearing, comprehensive yet focused, inspirational but not cheesy. Most of all, you will emphasize your core belief—that the business of 1st Widget Maintenance is to support the war fighter!

That was then; this is two hours later—after your secretary has assigned you your first stack of paperwork to review and sign. Halfway through the pile, the first sergeant arrives to report that one of your junior troops has been detained following a domestic dispute. As he's recounting the sordid details, the phone rings. The installation commander just drove by one of your buildings whose yard doesn't meet the standards of his "Combat Cleanup" program. Naturally, you drop everything to restore his inner harmony. Support the war fighter—but first rake the leaves.

You spend the rest of the day and half the evening fighting fires and getting yourself caught up on paperwork. By week's end, you've spent a surprising amount of precious time and energy managing the aftershock of back-to-back security violations and meeting with opinionated spouses, while your loyal subjects have already begun poking holes in the pet projects you introduced on day one. By month's end, you've got the whole unit working 12-hour days to prepare for a visit from the Widget Inspection Agency, and a legion of objections and naysayers have wrestled most of your magnificent plans to earth. Grand Vision, meet Stark Reality.

Ground Rules and Pitfalls

Fortunately, reality need not be so bleak, and you need not find your leadership agenda engulfed by the tyranny of the urgent. You can still cultivate a high-performing unit if you accept a few basic ground rules:

- If you've never studied the art and science of organizational management, start immediately. Successful leaders attain results through competent management of people, processes, money, time, information, and other resources in pursuit of organizational goals. Although it may be fashionable to say, "I'm a leader, not a manager," in truth you cannot lead at the organizational level without exercising sound management skills.
- Your capacity to introduce your own breakthrough improvements and dazzling new ideas is insignificant compared to the potential locked up in your people. Rather than serve as the wellspring of all brilliance, set the conditions for success by encouraging and channeling a culture of excellence.
- Your troops must thoroughly understand both *how* and *why* your unit does what it does. Technical or managerial incompetence is an obvious dereliction, but failure to grasp the unit's fundamental purpose leads to self-absorption and preoccupation with procedural detail.
- A host of mundane nonnegotiables will compete vigorously for your most precious commodity—time. You'll find it easy to neglect crucial responsibilities such as combat readiness and long-range planning when late paperwork is the crisis of the day, the sewer backs up, or the commanding general's e-mail doesn't work. Effective management can reduce but not eliminate the extent to which these events intrude upon your schedule.

A clear unit vision exerts its power during conflict between urgent and important matters by enabling your people to execute your priorities while you're tied up in meetings and attending to crises. In fact, when Gen James Jones, former commandant of the Marine Corps, set out his "Ten Principles for Marine Leaders," vision led the list: "Have a vision—Develop a strong sense of where you want to go. . . . Invest time in articulating the vision."[1] Unfortunately, most young leaders prove unable to follow through on this basic principle, frankly because it's harder than it looks.

Part of the problem is that our doctrine and training deceptively represent the envisioning process as simple, intuitive, and discrete. You yourself may have been led to believe that inspired vision will naturally spring from your fertile mind and that once you develop and broadcast it, you can move on to more substantive matters while your newly enlightened troops dutifully move out. This is pure fantasy. Executing an organizational vision requires a long-term commitment to get it right and then see it through.

Your first temptation along that path will involve simply *neglecting* the development or execution of a vision, allowing the tyranny of the urgent to crowd it off your plate. Perhaps

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even more insidious, however, you might allow *divergence* to set in by repeatedly broadcasting a particular vision despite your obvious preoccupation with other, incongruent, priorities. The former says, "I don't have time for vision," while the latter simply screams, "Hypocrite!" A third common culprit, *diffusion*, intrudes when your vision becomes either too vague or disjointed to be functional. It may look good on PowerPoint, but it doesn't translate easily into a guide to action. Finally, myopia sets in when leaders become so preoccupied with their overly narrow, rigid vision that they can't recognize external realities, threats, or opportunities.

So what characterizes a vision that actually survives first contact with reality to become an organization's guiding force? To begin with the obvious, a well-constructed vision should center on fulfilling your unit's mission and should clearly reflect your boss's priorities. It should instill a forward-looking mind-set that positions your unit to move confidently and aggressively toward bold objectives. Above all, it must be *executable* along four balanced imperatives or *lines of excellence*: modernize, operationalize, professionalize, and standardize (MOPS).

Lines of Excellence: Basis for a Balanced and Executable Vision

Before I develop the MOPS model, let me first explain what I mean by *lines of excellence* and how this framework is foundational to executing your unit's vision successfully. In recent years, it has become fashionable for senior military commanders to frame objectives within the "logical lines of operation" construct, by which they synchronize myriad disparate tasks to achieve a desired end state.[2] By capturing the complexity of large-scale operations, logical lines of operation compel subordinates to recognize the full spectrum of activities required to realize comprehensive mission success. They provide staffs a flexible framework from which to tailor plans to meet these objectives. Simply put, *logical lines impose balance* when fixation on urgent, obvious, or familiar problems is most tempting.

In Iraq, for example, Task Force Baghdad developed five lines of operation for its stability and support efforts: combat operations, training and employment of security forces, essential services, promotion of government, and economic pluralism. This approach recognizes that killing bad guys, extending sewer lines, and building government institutions all play an indispensable role in forging a secure and democratic nation. According to the task force's Maj Gen Peter Chiarelli and Maj Patrick Michaelis, to neglect one in favor of another would have represented a dangerously "lopsided approach."[3]

You face essentially the same challenge, and by adapting this model into a steady-state, unit-level guiding force, you can harness its balanced and practical approach to infuse a *culture of excellence* throughout a *skilled, motivated, and aggressive* workforce. This is less a matter of uttering flowery prose than of consistently expressing unit values and objectives in terms that the troops can get behind. The four meaningful, memorable, and forward-leaning lines of excellence represented by MOPS are designed to serve as the executable arm of your organizational vision (see fig 1.).



Figure 1. The MOPS framework provides a balanced approach for achieving organizational vision.

Modernize: Improve, Upgrade, Expand, Innovate

During his presentation of the Navy's budget for 2006 to Congress, Secretary of the Navy Gordon England stressed his department's commitment to a culture of "continuous *improvement* in both our effectiveness and our efficiency" (emphasis added).[4] The modernize track represents this imperative to get every member of your unit dialed into "making it better" every day. Great ideas are far more likely to bubble up from below than they are to emit from the inspired head shed, but moving those ideas from concept to action can prove extremely challenging, particularly in hierarchical organizations. Junior personnel frequently believe, with some justification, that no one takes their ideas seriously. It's up to you to break this inertia and cynicism by seeking, promoting, and celebrating progressive thinking. Up and down the chain of command, you want your folks chomping at the bit to effect improvements in combat capability, mission effectiveness, responsiveness, efficiency, and service.

One of the most productive techniques for generating improvements in operational military practice—the after-action review—entails "a professional discussion of an event, focused on performance standards, that enables soldiers to discover for themselves what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve on weaknesses."[5] Aviators recognize this concept as the postflight debrief—a critical deconstruction of each mission to capture and leverage lessons learned. By following up major operations, exercises, and other significant events with focused after-action reviews, you send your people a clear message that you demand honest, constructive criticism and that you don't tolerate comfortable inertia.

Further evidence of achieving a modernizing culture occurs when your requirements begin to grow far beyond your budget because your people always bombard you with ways they want to *upgrade* or *expand* current capabilities. Of course, I'm not advocating mindless spending. In fact, although it may seem counterintuitive, waste will more likely result when you're ineffective at identifying opportunities and requirements. After all, if you can afford everything on your list, you have no need to prioritize. Moreover, as Air Force colonel James Kolling points out, " 'Unfunding' something that's always been seen as a must-pay . . . in order to invest in a new idea or initiative is a powerful indicator of priority and willingness to support innovation."[6]

This is an important point because developing an *innovative* military culture seems to run contrary to the military predisposition toward standardization. Indeed, a natural tension exists between the two—standards are imperative but not immutable. Much conventional wisdom just begs to be rewritten by an aggressively modernizing organization. Push that envelope by encouraging your troops to break the mold of how it's always been done. Challenge the wise elders to actively elicit creative new solutions from their younger troops. When their ideas seem infeasible, tell them, "I'm not sure we can get there from here, but I like the way you're thinking. What do you propose?"

Operationalize: Mission Focused, Combat Ready, Rapidly Deployable, Aggressively Aware

It may seem obvious to say that your people need to be *mission focused*—that is, to know the overarching purpose of your unit and comprehend the cost of mission failure. But such an understanding can prove strikingly elusive due to another natural tension: procedural integrity versus flexibility. You clearly need your checklists and rule sets lest every routine action become an improvisation, but dull allegiance to these tools can easily undermine your operational edge. If you deny your customers the use of critical capabilities for the sake of obsolete or overly rigid regulations, you have done the enemy's job for him.

Because formal rules and procedures generally lag a step behind the state of the art, they are constantly challenged by mission changes and technological advances. The United States has recently seen this dynamic play out on the evening news, as our lawmakers have struggled over whether mechanisms established to generate intelligence and protect civil liberties need to adapt to new twenty-first-century threats. Since both the security environment and technology have changed drastically in recent years, procedures that once seemed reasonable now strike many people as archaic. In the same way, your troops need to know that there is a time to go by the book and a time to reinterpret, edit, or even rewrite the book.

Military leaders must address still another tension point, one involving the balance between those mundane nonnegotiables and the need to stay *combat ready* and *rapidly deployable* in support of exercises and real-world operations. This is not an either/or equation—you must be able to perform both daily and contingency missions with equal proficiency. Unfortunately, the nature of business at the home station dictates that your people will naturally become fixated upon relentless peacetime requirements while unit readiness ebbs away. Your most basic leadership responsibilities include honing the operational sword by keeping checklists current, servicing deployable equipment, rehearsing and reviewing contingency procedures, and readying troops to move out on minimal notice.

Such readiness implies that your troops routinely demonstrate *aggressive awareness*, one of the most difficult operational mind-sets to enforce in a garrison. Gen John Jumper, former Air Force chief of staff, publicly lamented a pervasive "help-desk mentality," under which many staffers waited to be called rather than proactively identifying and resolving the war fighter's most important issues.[7] Such passivity is the enemy of operational effectiveness. Infuse your troops with the aggressiveness to get out from behind the desk and discover looming problems before they blossom into crises.

Professionalize: Clean and Orderly, Customer Friendly, Total Team, Recognized Excellence

The professionalized track begins with a simple motto: "disorder spells disaster." You might be tempted to take the attitude that a messy work area reflects "real work," but it's generally more symptomatic of a cancerous carelessness. Foster a squared-away ethic in your organization by enforcing *clean* *and orderly* equipment and facilities. Gen Bill Creech, legendary commander of Tactical Air Command from 1978 to 1984, launched his "Look" campaigns at a time when he believed that pride in the command's units, people, and work ethic had waned. Though many personnel chafed at the time, by insisting on high standards of professional appearance, Creech eventually earned wide admiration as a key architect of today's world-class combat Air Force.[8]

Of course true professionalism lies far deeper than external appearances. Your troops need to be *customer friendly*—routinely accessible, courteous, helpful, and knowledgeable. All members should also recognize the importance of the unit's *total team*, whether they serve as suppliers, partners, or community and family members. Such a unitwide commitment not only remains vital to mission accomplishment but also prevents ordinary problems from festering into calamities that eat up your personal time and energy. If you find yourself constantly dragged into your subordinates' food fights or mediating unexpected disturbances, it may indicate that your people haven't internalized this mind-set.

As your unit begins to achieve its goals, sustain the momentum through a policy of *recognized excellence.* Seize every opportunity to further educate and train your people. Reward and celebrate success, and provide incentives to your achievers through encouragement as well as enhanced opportunities for advancement. Build a robust recognition program to send the message that your people represent the elite, not because they were selected as such but because they have chosen to be. Furthermore, when you faithfully reward your high performers, you clearly communicate the message that they don't need to be careerists. They can focus on their mission and troops because they believe that you're committed to taking care of them.

Standardize: Compliant, Safe, Secure, Repeatable, Measurable

From the day we entered military service, we learned to consider some things as basic: *comply* with rules governing critical procedures, assure that the *safety* of troops remains of paramount importance, and *secure* valuable materials as well as classified information against loss or compromise. Indeed, you'll earn a fast trip to the leaders' graveyard by failing to take care of "musts" such as administration, meticulous accountability of financial resources and equipment, technical and operational training, and dozens of others specific to your specialty or unit.

Unfortunately, these habits fall into disrepair as time erodes memories of what can happen when procedural discipline crumbles. Each of these basic functions has the potential to become the elephant in your unit's living room, as you find that yesterday's top priority gets overshadowed today when your unit has a major safety infraction, a repeat security violation, or chronically late paperwork. Only by systematically knowing, monitoring, and enforcing basic compliance issues will you keep them in perspective.

Chronic problems reflect bad underlying processes, so assure the *repeatability* and *measurability* of your unit's recurring procedures. Your commitment to responsiveness, flexibility, and innovation doesn't set aside your unit's need to gain efficiencies, address deficiencies, reduce common errors, and simplify task training. You'll find that Management 101 offers a careful system of automating, checklisting, and evaluating repeatable processes against realistic standards—an indispensable guard against the kind of chaos that can unravel the most well-intentioned leader.

Note that young leaders make one of the most elementary management errors by treating multiple, related errors as individual problems rather than a systemic weakness. Identify these defects by encouraging each work center to lay down accurate, meaningful metrics and then conduct trend and deficiency analyses of their most critical processes. Select the most important of these, making them part of your own balanced scorecard of unit performance.[9] Don't lull yourself to sleep with misleading metrics that consistently show outstanding performance. Instead, constantly refine your scorecard to assure its accuracy and its ability to get to the heart of your priorities.

Modernize, Operationalize, Professionalize, and Standardize in Action

Whereas the logical lines of an operation model generally don't seem very useful below brigade level, the lines-of-excellence framework described above appears especially practical for company- to field-grade-equivalent levels of leadership.[10] It offers a convenient starting place for new leaders who need an off-the-shelf means of focusing unit efforts. The MOPS tracks themselves are fairly generic and tailorable to a variety of unit and mission types. Perhaps most importantly, their simplicity allows young leaders to grasp and apply them easily.

An especially powerful template for setting goals, MOPS induces subordinates to define their objectives via a balanced and forward-looking model. Having participated in goal-setting exercises throughout my career, I've observed a vast qualitative and quantitative difference in the product people generate when they have a clear outline of what the leader expects as opposed to a vague edict to "send me your goals." Give your folks your vision, and tell them you want to see how they plan to modernize, operationalize, professionalize, and standardize over the next 18 months. (Including the subtitles for each track will generate a complete range of ideas.) You'll be amazed at what they come up with!

After establishing your initial goals, however, you must actively monitor and encourage your people's progress lest their good intentions pave the road to mediocrity. Require them to set target-completion dates and intermediate milestones for each objective. Don't settle for distant targets that invite procrastination, but be generous when renegotiating milestones so as not to discourage aggressive goal setting. Keep a living list of these goals, reviewing and updating it consistently to maintain its integrity.

Whatever you do, make sure you celebrate every success. Hard-working people become cynical about suggestion-box improvements, believing that a defensive or preoccupied leadership will smother or discount their ideas. Under the MOPS construct, however, ideas are not optional—they're fundamental because it assumes that, regardless of past or current success, a culture of excellence doesn't stand still. Conscientiously implemented and dependably encouraged, MOPS can expand a trickle of ideas into a torrent.

While leading the 1st Fighter Wing, Air Force colonel Steve Goldfein expressed a commander's raison d'être this way: "In the end, commanders do only two things—provide the vision and set the environment."[11] These are not simple, discrete tasks. They represent enduring charges that require your utmost devotion and careful implementation. Constructing the vision is up to you, but by providing a balanced and executable vision framework, the MOPS lines of excellence can help you set the environment for a culture of excellence—skilled, motivated, and aggressive.

Notes

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Organizational and Leadership Principles for Senior Leaders

Gen W. L. Creech

It is an honor to be asked to contribute my thoughts on Leadership and Organization—garnered over 371/2 years of service in the US Air Force—to this important publication. You, the reader, will have the opportunity to help mold and shape our Air Force into an evermore productive and dynamic organization; and an appreciation of the absolutely critical role that leadership plays in that development is essential. I have also included my views on organizational principles because leadership—at all levels—can flourish only if it is not strangled by misguided organizational concepts and approaches that leave little or no room for true leadership, creativity, and innovation at the lower levels where the organization either thrives or flounders. This article is drawn from the transcript of a speech that I was privileged to deliver extempore to a large leadership and management symposium sponsored by the Air University a few years ago. I consider the themes as timely and relevant now as they were then, and the spontaneity of those remarks are preferred to the dry dissertation of a written treatise. Throughout my interesting career in the US Air Force I always believed that I could make a difference. You can too. Perhaps these thoughts will help you as you go about that task.

A good way to begin is with the recognition that we manage and lead very well indeed in the United States Air Force. In that regard, during my incarnation as the commander of an AFSC product division (ESD) I had a great deal of interface with people in American industry, I went into their plants. I got to see them at work because they were building our products. I saw good and bad companies. I saw creativity and dedication. I also saw on occasion poor and insensitive management. So I can say without any equivocation that we manage every bit as well as the norm in US industry, and in overall management and leadership terms we do even better. So we have nothing to apologize for. On the other hand, there is considerable improvement that we can bring about. In my judgment the improvement potential falls into two main areas: leadership and the changes in organization that will allow such leadership to flourish. As we look to the future I believe we must base our changes and our concepts on a new appreciation for the nature of human beings. And we must develop far greater understanding of the central—indeed critical—role played by leadership. We also must appreciate far more than we do today how fundamentally our organizational approaches influence the proper functioning of leadership; specifically how some approaches facilitate it and others stifle it.

I will have some more words on organization later. Let me simply say at this point that any organization, whatever its nature or orientation, must help create focus and commitment on the part of its members. Throughout my career I both practiced and preached the concept that a successful organization must be based on core values and core principles that are in harmony with the essential nature of human beings. In my own case, I always thought of any organization that I led as being best served by an organizational model based on "five Ps": people - purpose - pride - professionalism - product. All are important, and all work together synergistically. Fail to pay sufficient attention to any of the five, and the model fails and the organization flounders. Let's look at each a bit more closely.

The idea that it all begins and ends with people requires little elaboration. And yet, I have seen case after case of appalling insensitivity to that fundamental truth in all walks of life, public and private. This is the building block for a successful organization: One should always consider the people *first,* treat them well, and place paramount importance on their welfare, morale, and the opportunity to grow and excel.

But it is not enough to have the right people instilled with the right attitude; one must also instill a strong sense of commitment and direction, a strong sense of purpose. Thus, purpose is a key ingredient for a successful organization, and it must be cultivated and nurtured. That sounds self-evident, but far too many managers pay scant attention to it—taking it, by and large, for granted. It has many dimensions, and you have to work very hard at it. First of all, there is a variety of purposes at work when you're dealing with people. To begin with, there's the purpose of the organization—the mission, if



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you will. But there are also the purposes of all the people within it. Those purposes run a wide gamut—such as the need and desire to care for their families, to have a challenging job, to be treated fairly and objectively, to have a degree of authority and responsibility, to get adequate compensation and recognition, and a host of others. Excellent leaders understand there is a variety of purposes at work, and they try to meld a common purpose in two essential ways. One, to get the people to transcend their individual purposes as their primary focus and to get into harmony with the fundamental purpose of the organization to fully support its objectives. And second, excellent leaders are sensitive to those individual purposes and both acknowledge and address them in ways that build unit esprit and individual motivation. By so doing, excellent leaders keep that array of purposes convergent on the mission to be accomplished. And they recognize that bad things happen to an organization where the purposes are divergent and in disharmony. That's what focus is all about, and it must be created—it just doesn't happen on its own.

Next, you must have pride working for you. All of the great outfits that I have seen had tremendous pride. The people in them had pride, and the commanders understood that they had to appeal to that pride by having things to feel proud about. I call pride the fuel of human accomplishment. After all, why pay that extra price to do something especially well unless you can feel good about it, and feel good about your unit as well? Again, you can't feel real pride unless you have something to feel proud about. It can become contagious. But it is also contagious if there is little to feel proud about. The opposite of pride is shame, and its companion piece is apathy. Shame: "Boy, this base is rundown. The facilities are rotten." "Wow, no one pays attention to upkeep here." Good people are turned off by that. I believed deeply that all the bases and facilities in the Tactical Air Command (TAC) should be the best that we could make them. They were painted, they were clean, the facilities were well-kept and the good housekeeping was obvious. We opened self-help stores throughout the command so that people could fix up their own surroundings. It cost some money, but the cost was trivial in comparison to what it bought us. Why did we do it? To engender pride. To convey a pervasive sense of excellence so that our people would feel good about themselves—and perform accordingly. Quality begets quality. Excellent leaders provide a climate that produces pride. They make it happen. It is a critically important element in forging a top-notch outfit.

We all know what professionalism means. And we recognize it when we see it—even when we see it in the October Revolution parade in Moscow. They drive in impeccably straight lines and the vehicles took good. You don't see oil streaks or paint flaking off on the starting grid at Indianapolis for the "500." You get a feeling of professionalism. But we all know that professionalism is far broader than that. It also covers our norms of behavior, and our commitment to excellence. Excellent leaders facilitate professionalism. More than that, they insist on it. There must be standards to measure against, and they must be high standards. It is only on TV that a "Black Sheep" squadron can somehow convey that being unkempt, untidy, and undisciplined equals excellence in performance. That's pure nonsense. In all my years of watching organizations in the field I have never seen that combination. Outfits with lousy standards are invariably lousy outfits. High standards alone do not ensure a great outfit, but excellent leaders understand that they make up one of the absolutely vital building blocks.

The fifth "P" is product. Good organizations find ways to put their product into clear focus, and also find ways to measure that product—to measure success or failure. That's what we were up to in TAC when I devised the monthly "sortie rate" as an important measurement tool, and put it on scoreboards at the main gates and in base newspapers. That's how we helped create focus and objective assessment in the critically important area of providing training for combat. And that's how we increased the sortie rate each TAC fighter was flying by 80 percent during my six and one-half years as TAC commander. A fundamental part of the entire process, of course, was recognition and reward (and you can't tell the winners without a scoreboard). Every leader should work hard at crystallizing the product(s) of his organization, and to keep them in clear focus for all. He or she should measure objectively so as to mitigate the rampant self-delusion that is an inescapable part of human subjectivity. A few important goals. Ways to measure against those goals. After years of experience, I am convinced of the following: When performance is measured, it improves. (It improves by the mere fact that it is being measured.) Second, when performance is measured and compared (to goals, history, like units), performance improves still more. And when performance is measured, compared, and significant improvement is *recognized and rewarded,* then productivity really takes off. It won't happen unless the leaders make it happen—by being attuned to the dynamics of human nature and by providing the tools and incentives that create focus and mobilize motivation.

That's the model. The "five Ps." All are needed. If you can get them all going strongly at the same time you will have happy, involved, motivated people and a great organization that's a winner in all that it does. Ignore any of the five and you won't. It's that simple.

(Note: During the six and one-half years I was privileged to command TAC, the aircraft sortie productivity increased by a well-documented 80 percent; the safety record improved by 275 percent—reflecting qualitative as well as quantitative improvement and achieved concomitantly with a vast increase in training realism/risk—and our retention soared from a historic low to an all-time high, reflecting improved satisfaction and motivation. Greatly improved mission capable rates of TAC's aircraft represented the equivalent of a $12 billion savings, and the combat capability in wartime sortie terms more than doubled. These accomplishments were carried out with no more people, spare parts inventories that were actually lower for most of this period than when we started, and several years of anemic defense spending. This record was achieved by the people of TAC, not by me. I am convinced however that it could not have happened without the following: (1) The leaders of TAC paid attention to the "Five Ps"; (2) we reorganized extensively to get away from the ruinous centralization and consolidation notions of the past, and a new bottoms-up approach—as represented by COMO, COSO and like initiatives—created leaders at all levels who took the ball and ran with it; (3) we created focus and we empowered, measured, rewarded, and recognized; and (4) we took care of the people. It works. It's not mysterious.)

Given its critical importance, a few thoughts are now in order on my view of the true meaning of leadership. The individual who runs an activity or function must be totally responsible for that activity, and how the people in it should feel and act. That's the key word, *responsibility.* Responsibility to make it better. Not just to be a "storekeeper," but to make it better! And it must be better not merely in intuitive ways and your subjective appraisal, but in visible, measurable ways. Measurable ways so that everyone in the organization will agree: Yes, we're better—and getting better all the time. And to do that leaders must make it happen. That does not mean the leader is a one-man band. Quite the reverse. Leaders must delegate freely and fully, and foster great participation and initiative at *all* levels. The leader cannot be a "happen back" kind of manager, who waits for things to happen and then "happens back" at them. The leader must be proactive, dynamic, informed, involved. During my years at senior levels, in important jobs in PACAF, USAFE, AFSC, Air Staff, and TAC, whenever I saw a good organization—a good wing, a good jet engine shop, a good finance section, a good civil engineering squadron and the like—I always knew what was going on in that organization. An excellent leader was involved and was making it happen, and was making it better.

What characteristics and qualities do leaders—male or female—exemplify in creating such an organization? They know what's going on. They have that sense of total responsibility. They set high standards. They lead by example and set the tone. Above all they do not countenance *selective enforcement* of standards. I know of no more ruinous path for commanders than selective enforcement of rules and standards. Because the commander, the leader, the manager, is the role model. If commanders selectively enforce standards, then they are merely teaching selective enforcement to their subordinates. Then they surely will make their own selection process—and different selections at that! Once you start down that road, you're a dead duck. Take my word for it. I've seen it again and again. Excellent leaders have very high standards, and they enforce them without fear or favor.

Also excellent leaders stand for absolute integrity, absolute honesty. They preach the concept of honesty and openness in the organization. That appears self-evident. However, as an example, many people find it difficult to *want* the IG to come for a look-see. If you're honest and open about your command, you welcome the IG in your unit. (During my career I not only welcomed IG visits—I *solicited* them.) You want it to be better and you have nothing to hide. Remember that it works both ways. They can tell you how great you are as easily as how poor you are. Whether you're great or not is up to you. If you're not, you should want to know it. If you are, and the IG confirms it, then it creates even more pride within your unit. Excellent leaders practice integrity in thought, word, and deed. And they insist upon integrity, honesty, and openness on the part of their subordinates. They also see themselves as responsible for the unit's discipline. A military organization absolutely depends on discipline and loyalty. (For that matter, any organization in any walk of life depends upon disciplined execution to get its job done.) Fair, reasoned discipline—but discipline nonetheless. When leaders go off the rails in this area, in my experience it is usually because they confuse leniency with leadership. Or they confuse their personal goals with the organization's goals. What's a personal goal almost everybody shares? To be liked. Almost everyone wants to be liked. But excellent leaders don't confuse their personal agenda with the needs of the organization. And they realize—and preach—that discipline and human relations are mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive. Unfortunately some of our younger officers and NCOs have trouble grasping that reality. This is a nation of laws. Good intentions reinforce those laws, not replace them. No one has a right to do wrong. A mistake is not a crime. A crime is not a mistake. Make sure your subordinates understand that you will be tolerant of well-intentioned mistakes but absolutely intolerant of deliberate flaunting of rules and laws. Excellent leaders are firm but fair—and their people know it.

Excellent leaders also instill loyalty. They are loyal up as well as loyal down. They are fiercely loyal down—and they are also fiercely loyal up. You cannot expect loyalty unless you practice it. I have heard a few commanders and managers in talking to their people make unfortunate statements about the ability, insight, or character of certain supervisors up the chain of command. All they are doing is indulging in a public display of disloyalty. There is a way of handling the sometimes challenging relationships with higher authority without invoking disdain and disloyalty. Another important concept that I believe in very deeply is that you have to be loyal to the right principles—and to the right people. One must be very careful about his or her loyalties! Let me give you a case in point. Let's take an organization where perhaps five percent or less of the people in the organization are pushing the rules and flaunting the standards on dress, bearing, and behavior. Often a naive commander will say: "Well, I know they're not in compliance, but I kind of hate to hassle the troops. I feel loyal to them." That's *not* being loyal to the troops! Most of the people are doing it right. They have pride in the organization and themselves. Those are the troops you need to be loyal to. So if you really have a sense of loyalty, be loyal to the right people and the right principles. Get the miscreants in line. That doesn't discourage your good people; it encourages them. Often in such cases the commander is being loyal to no one but himself and he sacrifices the unit's well-being to be liked. Loyalty is an issue of many dimensions. The leaders with the right stuff see their obligation to be loyal to the right principles and the right people. Talk about it to your subordinates. It's a critical concept. But it must be applied properly, not abused on the altar of self-aggrandizement.

Excellent leaders fill the leadership vacuums. Again, that doesn't mean they are the whole show or one-man bands. But if leadership vacuums develop because of the shortcomings of major subordinates, excellent leaders fill them by providing more guidance, direction, and oversight. They never forget their overall responsibility for the health, welfare and productivity of their organizations. But excellent leaders do not view such heightened involvement as viable for the long term. Either the subordinates improve through guidance so that they can shoulder their responsibilities properly, or they have to go. In considering that decision, don't forget loyalty to the right people—not necessarily to "good ole Joe." Also, your pattern of oversight and guidance needs to be heavily influenced by the strengths and weaknesses of your subordinates. Some simply need full authority and pats on the back. Some need more supervision than that. I was privileged to command two fighter wings. My oversight pattern was different in the two because the challenges were somewhat different and there were different subordinates involved with their own strengths and weaknesses. I'm confident I would have had six variations if I had commanded six wings. The point is, don't get in a rut. Don't change your principles or values. However, you cannot duck responsibility for your unit's failures based on incompetence among your subordinates. That won't wash. Don't micromanage. Do get the job done.

An excellent leader *does not* rule through terror. In TAC I initiated a week-long leadership symposium for all new and prospective wing commanders. (TAC has 32 full-sized wings and numerous other equivalents.) I spent a *lot* of time at those symposiums personally, because I believe it is a fundamental obligation of a leader to be a teacher also, and to pass along what works as well as what needs to get done. During those meetings I made it clear that there were four leadership "pass/fail" items that if violated would be cause for immediate dismissal as a commander. The first: Any kind of personal integrity violation. Covering up something or fabricating facts. Second: Ruling through fear. You know the type. The terror of the valley—the fellow that terrorizes everyone and prizes intimidation as a motivational force. At one time that was a very accepted management style, largely emanating from the armed services of World War II and earlier. A fierce temperament was nearly *de rigueur* in some circles. That's nonsense. We don't need or want that in our present Air Force and should not tolerate it. The third pass/fail item was somewhat related to the terror approach: temper tantrums. Public display of raw emotion. One can and must speak out unambiguously at times, but that can be done without losing one's temper. My theory on this item was that if commanders cannot control themselves there was no reason why I should want them in control of others. The fourth and final item was serious abuse of office: misuse of government resources for personal gain, sexual indiscretions, and the like. Those were the four that called for immediate dismissal: Dishonesty. Rule through terror. Lack of emotional control. Abuse of office. They are very important because they highlight the qualities we simply *should not accept* of people in positions of leadership, trust, and responsibility. Now none of that means that an excellent leader is not aggressive and positive and dynamic. It does mean that our leaders should be individuals of high principles and good character. And they must have courage.

Shortly after World War II, Gen George Marshall was asked to single out the most important ingredient of a good leader. Was it knowledge? Insight? Experience? Compassion? He thought for a moment and said

". . . it's courage because all else depends on that . . . ." He wasn't talking about the kind of courage it takes to attack a pillbox or a AAA site. Fortunately there is no big shortage of that kind of courage. He was talking instead about courage in interpersonal relationships. The courage to tell it like it is. The courage to admit you're wrong. The courage to change your mind. The courage to discipline subordinates who need it. The courage to stick to your principles. The courage to change what needs changing. The courage to put the organization's needs above your own. Excellent leaders exemplify courage. They don't fear failure. They don't expect perfection, but they don't tolerate obvious incompetence. They don't mind admitting their imperfections. Above all, they have the courage to *want responsibility so* that they can make things better. They have the courage to share fully the plaudits, and accept fully any blame that falls on the unit. They have the courage to avoid the "look good" syndrome. In short, they have real courage, and from that courage flows confidence and conviction.

Excellent leaders communicate, communicate, and communicate. When I talk of communication, I'm talking two-way communication. They make themselves accessible so that they can hear the views from the troops. In fact, they work very hard to establish feedback loops. They freely delegate authority and responsibility. They trust their subordinates. If the subordinates individually prove themselves unworthy of that trust, leaders act on specific cases and not with collective condemnation. They stay well informed. And no one should confuse being well informed with micromanagement. Those are two different things. Micromanagement occurs when you can't resist the temptation to intrude, to tell anyone and everyone how to do things. That's counterproductive. But being well informed is critical—so you can praise as well as condemn; so you can shape and mold; so that you're operating on facts as well as opinions. And to be well informed means that you must do your homework. So excellent leaders work hard at getting informed and staying informed. Not lost in minutiae . . . but also not guilty of an aloof, uninformed, "olympian" approach that produces dumb decisions and psuedo-leadership. Look out for the leader who "wings it"—who refuses to do the necessary homework. Prize the leader who is involved and informed, and be that way yourself.

There is a sports analogy here, and one shouldn't carry it too far. When you look at the sports dynasties—teams with a sustained winning tradition—you will find coaches who were true leaders. Men of high principle who had a deep understanding of the workings of human nature. Vince Lombardi with the Green Bay Packers. John Wooden at UCLA. Red Auerbach with the Boston Celtics. Bear Bryant at Alabama. Disciplinarians? You bet. Fair? You bet. Very human. *Uncompromising* on standards. Committed to the basics. (John Wooden said at UCLA they did nothing fancy. They had one offense and one defense. And they won 10 national championships in 12 years by superb execution.) They stressed fundamentals. They stressed core values and core principles. All were great teachers and great communicators. Loyal to their players, but also loyal to their own principles. They instilled a common purpose, and inspired commitment. The principles of leadership are the same whatever the field of endeavor.

How do we build those kinds of leaders? Leaders who are both caring and selfless? Gen Dwight Eisenhower was asked during World War II, "What do you look for in a senior leader before promoting him to bigger responsibilities?" And he answered: "Selflessness. If he's selfless then you know he's working for the right purposes in the organization." We can build such leaders by looking for courage and selflessness. We can build such leaders by the major commanders and Air Force leaders of today being the teachers of the leaders of tomorrow. We can build such leaders by prizing the right values and the right qualities. It is my conviction that each generation is brighter and better than the one preceding it. That does not mean, however, that we totally rewrite the script with each new generation. Change is a way of life in the modem world, and change we must. However, that change must be oriented to the values that count, and the principles that work.

We are doing a far better job of creating leaders, and a leadership mentality, at all levels. We still are encumbered by organizational approaches that stifle and stymie that leadership. People cannot exercise authority unless it is given to them. In that regard, it is my absolute conviction that we must break away much more fully from the Air Force's past enchantment with centralization, consolidation, and other dehumanized organizational concepts. We need more empowerment down through the system. We need to value and measure the outputs, not try to micromanage the inputs. We need to integrate authority and responsibility, not separate them. We need to get back to accountability which is only feasible when you give people real authority.

I would like to close this article by sharing with you the "organizational principles" that I authored during my tenure as commander of Tactical Air Command. They are based on years of observation of what works, and what doesn't work. They served me well throughout my career. I believe they will be of use to you. Good luck and Godspeed as you shape the Air Force of tomorrow.

Organizational Principles

1. **Have a set of overarching principles and philosophies. Have an overall theme and purpose.**
   - Ensure they are well understood.
   - Stress integrity and commitment.
2. **Use goals throughout.**
   - Make them straightforward, understandable, and meaningful.
   - Make it important to achieve them. Reward and praise success.
3. **Measure productivity/efficiency at several levels.**
   - Devise adequate analytical tools—but don't strangle in paper.
   - Compare to: (1) history, (2) goals, (3) like organizations.
   - Don't use availability of microinformation to micromanage.
   - Look for trends, failure nodes, areas for improvement.
   - Orient to the product. Keep in clear focus for all.
4. **Create leaders at many levels, not just a few.**
   - Provide wide autonomy and flexibility to achieve goals while preserving overall coherence and overarching principles.
   - Get the leaders where the action is.
   - Streamline staff procedures. Staff supports the line, not vice versa.
5. **Integrate authority and responsibility—not separate them. Know the difference.**
   - Create a sense of responsibility throughout.
   - Recognize that few accept responsibility without accompanying authority. Create ownership.
   - Invest principal authority in horizontal mission/product leaders—not in vertical functional "czars."
   - In "matrixing" establish clear lines of authority—tied to the product. Make it clear who is in charge.
   - Link authority to accountability.
6. **Set up internal competition and comparison where feasible.**
   - Reward success. Provide incentives and motivators.
   - Praise the winners.
   - Address failure in balance with the circumstances.
7. **Create a climate of pride.**
   - Quality treatment begets quality performance.
   - Never forget the organization begins and ends, sinks or swims with its people. Treat them well and consider them first.
   - Instill individual dignity. Provide challenge and opportunity.
   - Invest in people, facilities, upkeep. Payback is enormous.
8. **Create a climate of professionalism.**
   - Insist on high standards. Don't settle for less.
   - Provide the supporting mechanisms and aids.
   - You reap what you sow. Invest accordingly.
   - Spirit and enthusiasm are the critical measures.
9. **Educate, educate, educate.**
   - Make it specific. Establish feedback on results.
   - The organization is as strong as its weakest links.
10. **Communicate, communicate, communicate.**
    - Create the mechanisms. Up/down, down/up—and laterally.
    - Make it clear and concise. Work to eliminate ambiguity and misinformation.
    - Don't depend on strictly hierarchical communication. Augment it. On key issues, communicate several layers deep.
11. **Create organizational discipline and loyalty.**
    - Without stifling initiative. Reward it.
12. **Provide everyone a stake in the outcome.**
    - And "humanize" wherever possible—make each job meaningful.
13. **Make it better.**
    - In measurable, identifiable ways. Instill that philosophy.
    - Work to create a sense of individual and organizational worth. Foster team identification.
    - A proud, confident, and optimistic organizational "chemistry" is the key to success—leaders must create it.
    - Provide the climate and impetus for evolutionary organizational change. Instill a philosophy of creative adoption and adaption. Stay out in front of problems, changing circumstances—and the competition.
14. **Make it happen.**
    - Active, vigorous leadership throughout is the magic ingredient.
    - Be informed, involved. Provide the dynamic spark.
    - Work the details—the whole is the sum of the parts.
15. **Make it last.**
    - Codify, educate, and perpetuate.

Section 5

Leadership and Management Interface

Organizational Dimension



Leadership and Power Base Development: Using Power Effectively to Manage Diversity and Job-Related Interdependence in Complex Organizations

Dr. Barton J. Michelson

Mention the word *power* and what comes to mind? Power is evil, corrupt, self-serving, manipulative, hurtful, and possibly "America's last dirty word."[1] These words speak to the dark side of power. There is, however, a positive face to addressing power acquisition, power-base development, and power use. The purpose of this article is to consider power as a positive force that is continually used to achieve organizational, group, and individual goals. When power is used in an ethical and purposeful way, there is nothing evil about it.

This paper posits that leadership is the exercise of power; and, therefore, leaders must develop appropriate organizational power bases to use effectively their power to influence others. A power-base development model is constructed to show various deployments of power. This model establishes an interactive link between a leader's power base and alternative influence strategies that produce positive power dynamics. The significance of this proposed model is that it accentuates the leadership role in developing positive organizational and interpersonal relationships that are predicated on the employment of certain known power bases in an organization. The power dynamics described in this model apply to all organizations regardless of size, goal, mission, technology, and so forth.

The structure of the model is fashioned from a review of recognized and accepted literature on power theory, power-base formation, leadership, and organizational dynamics. The works of John Kotter, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, David A. Whetton, and Kim S. Cameron were invaluable in constructing an expanded model that displays both the dependent and interdependent relationships considered critical to power acquisition, power transformations, power dynamics, and organization effectiveness. The model's design will permit the reader to examine both positive and negative power outcomes and provide an accelerated dramatization of known power relationships in complex organizations.

Leadership and Power

Power obviously is a pervasive reality in the life process of all modern-day organizations. Leaders regularly acquire and use power to accomplish specific work goals and to strengthen their own positions vis-à-vis the reading of general or organizational goals. It is possible to see every interaction and every social relationship in an organization as involving an exercise of power.[2] Thus, in the context of this paper, the word *leadership* will be used to mean "the process of using power to obtain interpersonal influence."[3] The question then arises, why must leaders achieve success at influencing the behavior of other people at work? Because, as Harry Truman succinctly stated, "Leadership is the ability to get men to do what they don't want to do and like it."[4] In short, the core problem for leaders in any organization involves getting others to do what is required to accomplish the organization's goals.[5] There are a number of other reasons to explain why leaders pursue power and view it as an important part of their work. In a general sense, power acquisition and power use can have an impact on career progress, on job performance, on organizational effectiveness, and on the lives of numerous people.[6] More specifically, the nature of work in today's complex organizations requires that we become more enlightened with respect to issues of leadership, power, and influence. John Kotter, writing in *Power and Influence Beyond Formal Authority,* states: "We can make rigid bureaucracies more flexible, innovative, and adaptive. We can even make the world of work more exciting and personally satisfying for most people."[7] Kotter believes that in today's complex organizations, the concept of using formal power (that is, legitimate authority) as a sole source of influencing behavior to make organizations more competitive, responsive, and responsible is outmoded.[8]

Leaders today work in socially intricate organizations where they need the assistance not only of subordinates but also of peers, superiors, and external parties to accomplish their goals. Accomplishing goals that positively impact the organization requires effective leadership linked to strong power bases and workable influence strategies. Building a strong power base and developing effective influence strategies to produce power dynamics is an important leadership challenge.

The Leadership Challenge

The social milieu of large and complex organizations can be characterized as highly diverse, highly interdependent, and rich in opportunities to generate power dynamics. The

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first characteristic, diversity, pertains to differences among organization members with respect to goals, values, outcomes, assumptions, and perceptions. Interdependence relates to the situation in which multiple actors have power over each other due to job-related interdependence. In the literature, for instance, Kotter summarizes the logic of how high levels of diversity and interdependence set the stage for power acquisition, power base development, and the use of influence to create power dynamics. He writes

> . . . when a high degree of interdependence exists in the workplace, unilateral action is rarely possible. For all decisions of any significance, many people will be in a position to retard, block, or sabotage action because they have some power over the situation.[9]

He concludes by indicating:

> The greater the diversity, and the greater the interdependence the more differences of power there will be. Because of the interdependence, people will not be able to resolve these differences either by edict or by walking away. As a result, high levels of diversity and interdependence in the workplace are quite naturally linked to conflicting opinions about action and thereby influence attempts to resolve that conflict.[10]

Thus, the leadership challenge becomes one of making diversity and interdependence work for organizational success. Whether the organization is private or public not-for-profit, the challenge is similar.

Managing Diversity, Interdependence, and Power Dynamics

The nature of the leadership challenge, therefore, is clear. High diversity and high job-related interdependence often produce conflict. Leaders cannot simply ignore the conflict; they must attempt to influence factors to resolve it. Managing conflict when its roots are buried deeply in complex diversity and job-related interdependence requires a sense of power and influence strategies that can only be skillfully developed. Once developed, one can produce effective and responsible power dynamics. The power that leaders need to produce these dynamics comes from numerous sources and multiple bases. Building such a power base is not easy. It takes time, energy, and management.

Exactly how do effective leaders build a strong power base? How do effective leaders transform power into influence? What specific steps do effective leaders take to avoid abuses of influence? How do effective leaders sustain and maintain power over time?

Power Acquisition

The foundation of a strong power base starts with a leader's individual power. As figure 1 indicates, leaders derive power from both position and personal sources.

Position Power

Five key factors have the ability to foster power in a leadership position. Centrality, criticality, flexibility, visibility,



Figure 1. Leadership: The Exercise of Power

and relevance stimulate power acquisition by horizontal expansion or maneuvering. The power potential is based on lateral relationships between positions and organization activities. Each factor is described in table 1.

Table 1

Factors Increasing Position Power

Factor	*Description*
Centrality	Relationship between positions in a communication network
Criticality	Relationship between tasks performed in a work flow process
Flexibility	Amount of discretion vested in a position
Visibility	Degree to which task performance is seen by influentials in the organization
Relevance	Relationship between a task and organizational priorities

Acquiring or increasing leader position power happens when the key factors are used in the following manner:[11]

Centrality/Criticality. You secure a more central role in the work flow, influence the flow of information through you, structure elements of your job responsibilities in a unique way, expand your communication network both intra- and interorganizationally and maintain your office near the main traffic flow.

Flexibility. You enrich your job by eliminating routine activities, increasing task variety, generating novel ideas, initiating innovative projects, getting involved at the outset of the decision-making process, and avoiding standardized performance criteria for job success.

Visibility. You increase the number of interactions you have with senior people, making important oral presentations, participating on problem-solving teams, publicizing accomplishments in the right places, and taking advantage of opportunities to enhance personal name recognition.

Relevance. You have the opportunity to acquire or develop internal or external boundary-spanning roles. Boundary-spanning roles are defined as providing services and information to other work units, monitoring and assessing activities intra- and interorganizationally. Other areas that increase relevance relate to getting involved in decision making pertaining to priority goal setting and assuming a socialization role for new work-unit members.

Personal Power

Three personal attributes are associated with building personal power: knowledge/information, personal attraction, and effort.[12] These are the characteristics you bring to the organization.

Knowledge and Information. Leader power can be increased through expertise acquired by possession of special knowledge and information. Access to key people and data sources also enhances power potential.

Personal Attraction. Agreeable behavior, pleasant personality characteristics, and attractive personal appearance are referents that attract people to a leader.

Effort. A leader's capacity to demonstrate a high level of effort can be parlayed into increased expertise and personal attraction. Working hard on priority assignments may enhance visibility with superiors and set in motion other dynamics associated with position power.

Transforming Power

Position power and personal power are the building blocks upon which a leader has the potential to use power. The first stage of our model leader power represents power at rest; the second stage transforms power into influence to achieve desired results. Influence involves securing the consent of others to assist, collaborate, and work with you in achieving an objective.[13] Influence also entails any act or potential activity that affects the behavior of another person, group, or set of organizational entities.[14] Transforming power into successful influence requires the development of an influence strategy that minimizes resistance, resentment, and potential abuse.

A leader must maintain perspective in terms of targeting power to achieve successful influence. Possessing a potentially strong power base to use power is worth little unless you are able to secure compliance, effort, and commitment from others.

Developing Strategies of Influence

There are numerous ways of exercising influence. Several studies suggest that influence strategies can be classified into three broad categories: retribution, reciprocity, and reason (table 2).[15] David Kipnis and others have developed several general strategies of leader influence.[16] They list the most to least popular strategies found in their three-nation study of managerial influence styles as shown in table 3. Another researcher, Gary A. Yuki, lists 11 forms of influence and a summary of leader and target-person requirements for each strategy.[17] Table 4 identifies the different forms of influence.

The research on influence strategies indicates that each approach listed in the classifications has advantages and limitations. Effective leaders generally use combinations of various strategies for different purposes and under different conditions. The challenge of complex organization diversity and job-related interdependence requires a leader to select the proper influence strategy to produce positive power dynamics. Leaders should avoid the pitfall of overreliance on and overuse of a particular influence strategy. Excessive use of an influence strategy could lead to abuses of influence that may provoke resistance leading to diminished leader influence over time. It is important to maintain a balanced perception between the leader's power and the target persons to be influenced. You do not want to place the target persons in the position of perceived helplessness or feeling abused, exploited, or manipulated against their will. Leaders should create power dynamics to secure the commitments necessary to achieve important organizational goals and objectives. Unbridled use of power and influence generally produce negative power dynamics that are self-defeating for all concerned. Positive power dynamics shown in figures 2 and 3 contribute to managing diversity and opportunities to cope with job-related interdependence.[18]

Positive Power Dynamics

The proper selection and use of an influence strategy transforms leader influence into behavioral dynamics that produce inventive thinking, creative problem solving, and the development of new prototypes, products, and services. Positive power dynamics enhances organization competitiveness, increases organization adaptability and responsiveness, and ultimately increases synergy under organization conditions of high diversity and job-related interdependence. Later, increases in organization synergy permit an organization to improve performance levels related to goal attainment and mission accomplishment. Thus, leader power and influence produce the dynamics that optimize results that in turn generate the greatest good for the greatest number of people.

Negative Power Dynamics

Figures 2 and 3 also indicate that leader influence can produce negative behavioral dynamics. This model confirms that power abuse is a reality in complex organizations of high diversity and job-related interdependence. Oftentimes leader influence simply fails or is used for personal self-

Table 2
Influence Strategies

Category	*Indirect Approach*	*Direct Approach*
Rely on fear of retribution	Intimidation (demand)	Coercion (threaten)
Involve norms of reciprocity	Ingratiation (obligation)	Bargaining (exchange)
Use persuasive arguments based on reason	Appeal to personal values (apply general principles)	Present facts (stress, immediate need) reason

Source: David A. Whetten and Kim S. Cameron, *Developing Managerial Skills* (Glenview, Ill. Scott Foresman, 1984), 267.

Table 3
Most-to-Least Popular Strategies Used in All Countries

	When Managers Influenced Superiors	*When Managers Influenced Subordinates*
Most Popular to Least Popular	Reason Coalition Friendliness Bargaining Assertiveness Higher Authority	Reason Assertiveness Friendliness Evaluation Bargaining High Authority Sanction

Source: David Kipnis et al., "Patterns of Managerial Influence: Shotgun Managers, Tacticians, and Bystanders," *Organizational Dynamics* 12, no. 3 (New York: American Management Association, 1984), 62.

Table 4
Different Forms of Influence

Form of Influence	*Agent Requirements*	*Target Person Requirements*
1. Legitimate Request	Legitimate Justification	Relevant Values
2. Instrumental Compliance	Control over Rewards; Credibility of Promise	Relevant Needs, Openness to Manipulation
3. Coercion	Control over Punishments; Credibility of Threat	Fear, Openness to Intimidation
4. Rational Persuasion	Insight; Technical Expertise; Credibility	Relevant Values and Need
5. Rational Faith	Technical Expertise; Credibility	Low Expertise, Relevant Need; Trust of Agent
6. Inspirational Appeal	Insight into Values and Beliefs; Persuasive Ability	Relevant Values and Beliefs
7. Indoctrination	Control of Social Situation; Relevant Skills	Alienation, Relevant Needs
8. Information Distortion	Credibility as Information Source	Use of Information for Impression Formation and Decision Making
9. Situational Engineering	Control of Relevant Aspects of Situation	Willingness to Accept Situation
10. Personal Identification	Attractiveness, Charisma	Admiration of Agent
11. Decision Identification	Willingness to Allow Participation; Relevant Skills	Desire to Participate; Goals Consistent with Agent Goals

Source: Gary A. Yuki, *Leadership in Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1981), 11.

aggrandizement. This kind of failure of leader power can lead to prolonged power struggles and intraorganizational/interorganizational warfare. Protracted power struggles, bureaucratic infighting, and parochial politics then produce myopic organization outcomes that increase inefficiency, elevate human/nonhuman costs, produce diminished innovative capabilities, and increase vertical and horizontal conflicts that culminate with entropy and the probable and eventual deterioration of the social fabric of the organization.[19]

Organization Effectiveness

The picture of organizational life depicted in our model of leader power and influence suggests a complex social environment of confrontation, struggle, manipulation, hostility, and battle. It also projects a fundamental reality found in contemporary complex organizations. The nature of work, work processes, goal setting, and decision making is grounded in high diversity and job-related interdependence. The achievement of organization effectiveness that then produces excellence is almost impossible without leader excellence. Excellence in leadership can be attributed to how effectively a leader acquires and exercises power to produce positive power dynamics that in turn impacts the organization over the long run. The social milieu described in figure 4 creates exciting challenges to the leader, who must constantly exercise power to produce organization excellence. The leader in this environment recognizes that excellence requires much more than technical competence. It demands a different context for managing social reality; and it necessitates power skills that can mobilize diverse people who are linked together through interdependence and a common need to pull together for



Figure 2. Leadership: The Exercise of Power



Figure 3. Leadership: The Exercise of Power

meaningful purposes despite the many multiple countervailing forces working against that synergy.

In conclusion, the presentation of this model suggests that if leaders are to cope and prosper under the conditions of high diversity and job-related interdependence, it is essential that they develop effective power bases and influence strategies to make social complexity work for them. Success translates into stronger power bases with greater opportunities to lead through the exercise of power. Power misuse and abuse consistently lead to heightened and unproductive diversity and strain job-related interdependence that results in counterproductive power struggles. The end result of negative power dynamics is a general diminished power-base opportunity and specifically leader ineffectiveness.

Notes

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5. Ibid., 301.
6. John P. Kotter, *Power in Management* (New York: AMACOM, 1979), 1.
7. John P. Kotter, *Power and Influence Beyond Formal Authority* (New York: Free Press, 1985), 3.
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11. David A. Whetten and Kim S. Cameron, *Developing Management Skills* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman, 1984), 259.
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13. Cohen et al., 311.
14. Ibid., 310.
15. Whetten and Cameron, 267.
16. David Kipnis et al., "Patterns of Managerial Influence: Shotgun Managers, Tacticians, and Bystanders," *Organizational Dynamics,* Winter 1984, 62.
17. Gary A. Yuki, *Leadership in Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1981), 11.
18. Kotter, *Power and Influence,* 36.
19. Ibid., 20–21.



Sources: Adapted from David A. Whetten and Kim S. Cameron, *Developing Managerial Skills* (Glenview, Ill.; Scott Foresman, 1984), 278; and John P. Kotter, *Power and Influence Beyond Formal Authority* (New York: Free Press, 1985), 36.

Figure 4. Leadership: The Exercise of Power

Structuring Project Teams and Building Cohesiveness

J. Davidson Frame, PhD

Every autumn a certain sports madness overcomes Americans on Sunday afternoons. Week after week, millions of Americans sit in front of their television sets for three or four hours, cheering their favorite football teams, booing the opposing teams, vilifying referees for unfair calls, flicking off their sets when it is obvious that the home team is bound for defeat. For half an hour before the contest, sports commentators examine the players, coaches, and possible game plans in excruciating detail. For half an hour following the contest, they perform postmortems, trying to determine the whys and wherefores of success and defeat. Frequently someone comments that the winning team made a good team effort, while the losing team could not seem to bring things together.

Teams are the basic work unit of sports competition. Similarly, they are the basic work unit of projects. Because of the central role that teams play in projects, it is worthwhile spending some time examining them, to gain a better understanding of what they are, and to determine how they contribute to project success and failure. With this knowledge, we can then structure project teams to maximize the likelihood that our projects will be carried out effectively.

Characteristics of Project Teams

A team is a collection of individuals who work together to attain a goal. In order to work together, their individual efforts must be coordinated. In sports, coordination is directed by an all-powerful coach and coaching staff. It is achieved through hours of drills and practice sessions. In projects, we have a fundamentally different perspective on teams, since project managers are rarely all-powerful and the unique and transitory nature of projects does not make them amenable to repetitive drills.

This last point has interesting implications. In sports teams, a large amount of effort is directed at developing team spirit, which requires team members to have a clear image of what the team is and to identify strongly with it. The presence of team spirit may give a team the competitive edge that allows it to win over equally competent teams lacking team spirit. With project teams, however, team members are often borrowed and may have only the briefest exposure to the project effort. They work on a piece of the project, and when they are done they move on to other projects. Because of this, they may not recognize that they are part of a team. Without such recognition, they are incapable of developing team spirit, or what I earlier referred to as project commitment. Of course, from the perspective of the project manager, there is a team, whether or not the team members recognize this. The project manager is aware of project goals and knows how the pieces fit together. To the extent that project workers do not realize they are part of a team, however, the project manager's work is more difficult. Clearly, one important task of project managers is the development of some sense of team identification among their staff.

Project teams have structure—that is, there are established rules governing the relationships of team members with each other, with the project manager, with the client, and with the product being developed. How the team is structured will have a strong bearing on a project's prospects for success. A well-structured team can enhance the probability of project success, while a poorly structured team will surely lead to trouble. Good team structure is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for success; poor team structure is a formula for failure.

One question naturally arises: how can we structure the project team in such a way that it will facilitate the effective management of projects? The answer: structure the team to enhance team efficiency.

Team Efficiency

In engineering, the concept of efficiency is straightforward. It is defined as the ratio of output to input. If a device consumes 100 energy units of coal (input) and produces 60 equivalent energy units of electricity (output), we say the device is operating at a level of 60 percent efficiency. With projects, we are unable to measure team input and output precisely, so our treatment of team efficiency is necessarily rough. For purposes of discussion, let us loosely define team efficiency as the fraction of *potential* team performance that is *actually achieved.* Thus, if our team is accomplishing only a small portion of what it could accomplish under ideal circumstances, we say that team efficiency is low. If it is achieving as much as is physically possible, we say that team efficiency is high. Our concern here is not with how to measure team efficiency precisely but with how to achieve it. How can we structure project teams to enhance team efficiency?

To answer this question it is useful to understand better why systems are inefficient. Mechanical engineers know that two common and interrelated sources of inefficiency in machinery are machine design and friction. If a machine is poorly designed, it will be inefficient. Poor design often means

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that the machine is not configured in such a way as to minimize the effects of friction. But even a well-designed machine can operate at less than peak efficiency if, through poor maintenance (for example, improper lubrication), it is subject to the effects of friction.

Team efficiency can be viewed analogously. We can say that a project team can be inefficient because its basic design assures inefficiency, and/or because organizational friction keeps it from operating as smoothly as it could. Major structural sources of team inefficiency in projects are matrix- based frictions, poor communication, and poor integration of the efforts of team members. The inefficiencies in each of these cases are interrelated and are rooted in both design inadequacies and organizational friction.

Matrix-Based Frictions

Projects that are heavily dependent on temporarily borrowed staff—that is, projects employing the matrix approach—often have built-in inefficiencies. One important cause of inefficiency in a matrix-structured project is lack of staff continuity. Let's say that Arthur is assigned as a computer programmer/analyst to a project to revamp a hospital's accounts receivable system. He works actively on the project during the early design phase. When the preliminary design is done, he returns to the data processing department, where he is promptly assigned to an office automation project. Two weeks later, top management signs off on the preliminary design and releases funds for a detailed design phase. Since Arthur is working on another project, Linda is assigned as the computer programmer/analyst to the accounts receivable project. Because this is new material for her, she spends her first week simply reviewing overall project requirements, as well as Arthur's specific contributions. Only after this review period is she ready to work actively on the detailed design phase. When this phase is completed, she returns to the data processing department, where she is immediately assigned to a new project. During the implementation phase of the accounts receivable project, still another programmer/analyst is employed. And so on.

It is clear that in this kind of situation, which arises commonly in projects, organizational friction is high, with staff spending substantial time simply reviewing what others before them have done. Couple this with the lack of project commitment characteristics of high-turnover jobs, and it is evident that team efficiency will be low.

Another important matrix-based source of friction is the project manager's lack of direct control over project staff and material resources. Without direct control, it takes more effort and time to acquire needed human and material resources. Project politics may enter the picture, so that acquisition of even a simple piece of equipment may trigger a contorted Rube Goldberg chain of events.

Poor Communication

Information is the lifeblood of projects, and communicating this information effectively to the relevant parties is vital to project success. When communication breaks down, the project is in serious trouble.

There are various kinds of communication-based friction that contribute to team efficiency. Three will be examined here: communication that becomes an end rather than a means, communication channels that suffer from information arteriosclerosis, and garbled messages that lead to work being done improperly.

Communication as an End Rather than a Means. As projects become increasingly bureaucratized, proportionately more and more effort is expended on transmitting information and coordinating tasks. On large projects, as much effort may be directed toward communication and coordination as toward carrying out the required tasks. As is illustrated in figure 1, the number of communication channels can grow quadratically as projects become larger. When a project team consists of two members, there is only one communication channel to maintain. When it consists of three members, there are three channels; four members, six channels; five members, ten channels. In general, if the team is comprised of n members, there are potentially $n(n-1)/2$ channels to be maintained. Thus, even a modest team of 20 members has a possible 190 communication channels associated with it! Of course, on most projects not everyone has a need to communicate with everyone else. Nonetheless, the potential exists to overwhelm projects with communication requirements. When an inordinate amount of time is spent sending and receiving messages, team efficiency is bound to decline.

Information Arteriosclerosis. Arteriosclerosis is a condition in which arteries become so clogged that blood can barely trickle through them. Information arteriosclerosis occurs when communication channels are so clogged that important information has difficulty making its way through them. The clogging is largely a consequence of requirements that information be processed in a bureaucratically sanctioned fashion. Thus, an important piece of information sent



The larger the team, the more communication channels to maintain. In general, n people require $n(n-1)/2$ communication channels.

Figure 1. Communication Channels

from team member A to team member B may have to pass through five hands before B receives it. Clogging may also be caused by large amounts of useless information floating through channels and blocking the flow of important messages. Here great effort must be expended to separate useful information from chaff.

The principal consequence of information arteriosclerosis is that information flows are retarded, contributing to inefficiencies in the team effort.

Garbled Messages. We are all familiar with the parlor game in which 10 or 15 people sit in a line or a circle while someone whispers a message in the ear of the first person, who whispers it in the ear of his or her neighbor, who passes the message to the next individual, and so on. Typically, by the time the message is passed on to the last person, it has undergone some modification.

I still clearly recall a personal experience with message modification. Many years ago, when I was a freshman in college, the college president invited me and two dozen other freshmen to his house for a get-acquainted tea. Upon entering his house, I encountered a reception line of three school officials (the admissions director, the assistant dean, and the dean), and at the end of the line stood President Lowry. I introduced myself to the first person, saying "Hello, I'm David Frame from Donelson House [my dormitory]." After greeting me, he turned to the woman standing beside him and said, "Professor Jones [or whatever her name was] I want to introduce you to Mr. David Frame from Donelson House." "So nice to meet you," she said. "Are you related to Jim Frame from Schenectady?" I told her I was not, and after a few more seconds of pleasantries she passed me on to the next official in line, introducing me as Jim Frame from Donelson House. This official chatted with me for a moment and then introduced me to President Lowry as Jim Donelson. Over the next four years, whenever I encountered Dr. Lowry on campus he would smile and say, "How do you do, Mr. Donelson?"

This experience illustrates something that frequently occurs in organizations: messages get garbled. The consequences of garbled messages range from neutral to disastrous. In projects, garbled instructions may lead staff to carry out their tasks incorrectly. If their work has to be redone (assuming the mistake is caught), or if their efforts cause spin-off problems with other tasks, team efficiency drops.

My discussion of communication has focused on communication within the project team. It should be noted, however, that communication between the project team and the user of the product emerging from the project is also very important. In particular, if the users' needs are improperly conveyed to the team, the team may produce a deliverable that is rejected and requires rework. This is a very important issue.

Poor Integration

As mentioned earlier, one of the basic traits of projects is that they are systems: they are comprised of many interrelated pieces. For the system to work, somehow the pieces have to be brought together and fitted into their proper places. This process of bringing things together is called systems integration.

Systems integration is an important function of project managers. They must integrate the pieces of their projects, bringing everything together so that both the project and its product work properly. If integration is not carried out properly, tremendous inefficiencies will be introduced into the project.

Consider, for example, an editor who is compiling a handbook on gardening. The handbook will contain twenty-five chapters, each written by a recognized expert. If the editor does not carefully spell out what she expects of each of the authors—if she does not take steps to integrate the pieces into a whole—she will have a hodgepodge of chapters turned in to her. Some will be long, some short. Some will be narrated in a very folksy manner; others will be rigidly academic in tone. Some will be filled with footnotes; others will lack any references to related material. Many will repeat material covered in other chapters.

Ultimately, if the editor wants a work that hangs together nicely, she will either have to return the chapter manuscripts to the authors, with instructions on how to revise them so that they dovetail with each other, or she and her staff will have to spend enormous amounts of time editing and rewriting the submitted material. In any event, a poor initial effort at integrating the separate chapters into a cohesive book will cause burdens of a rework and will yield low levels of team efficiency on the project.

This matter of integration is especially crucial in software development projects. In developing complex software, programmers typically work separately on different pieces of the system. Major problems often arise when attempts are later made to integrate the pieces into a whole. What happens, using the jargon of systems analysis, is that "bugs arise at the interfaces." Simply put, while the pieces may be internally consistent and bug-free, they don't quite fit together, leading the system to malfunction. A great deal of time and effort must be dedicated to trying to get the pieces to fit together. More time is usually spent testing and debugging the system to ensure integration than writing lines of computer code.

To the extent that project managers are effective systems integrators, they dramatically increase the efficiency of their project teams.

Structuring Teams

Because we want to structure project teams in such a way that the structure enhances team efficiency, we clearly want to avoid structures that encourage the organizational and design frictions just discussed. Thus, a desirable project team structure is one that copes with staff turnover and lack of direct project manager control over resources, enhances effective communication among project team members, and facilitates the integration of the many pieces of the project.

There is no one structure that fits the bill for all projects. A structure that is ideal for one project may fail dismally with another. Various things must be taken into account in configuring a team structure. What is the size of the project? Can staff be permanently assigned to it, or will there be high levels of staff turnover? What is the technical nature of the project? What is the corporate culture like? What are the psychological characteristics of the team members and other relevant project actors?

To illustrate team structure considerations concretely, we will examine the consequences of structuring a hypothetical project in four different ways. The project is a common one faced by professional consultants—to write a technical report on some topic of interest to a client.

Isomorphic Team Structure

The adjective isomorphic comes from the Greek *iso,* which means equal or same, and *morph,* which means form or shape. Two things are isomorphic when they share the same structural appearance.

If we configure a project team so that it closely reflects the physical structure of the deliverable—the thing that is being produced—the team and the deliverable are isomorphic in respect to each other. In figure 2, I illustrate an isomorphic team configuration for our project to write a technical report for a client. Figure 2, part A shows what the report will look like, a simple document with five chapters. Figure 2, part B shows how the team can be configured to match the structure of the deliverable. The project manager corresponds to the fully integrated report, while each of five team members corresponds to one of the report's five chapters.

With a project structured this way, there is always a real risk that the pieces (the chapters in our example) will not fit together nicely, since each is being developed independently. Clearly, then, a major function of project managers is to serve as integrators. They must interact closely and continually with their staff to make sure that staff members produce pieces that will fit in the final product. In our specific example, the project manager should focus on maintaining a consistent writing style among his or her workers, avoiding duplication in the material being covered in the different chapters, and linking together the material through cross-references between the chapters. One way he or she can accomplish this integration is to hold weekly staff meetings at which team members briefly describe their efforts and compare notes.

There are several advantages to the isomorphic approach. For one thing, it is organizationally simple. Team structure simply follows the structure of the deliverable. Each team member is responsible for developing one or more pieces of the deliverable. If progress on one chapter of the report begins to lag seriously, the project manager immediately knows whom to talk to in order to find out what the problem is.



Figure 2. Isomorphic Team Structure

Second, if the different modules of the system are independent, the isomorphic approach allows parallel implementation of tasks, which may considerably shorten the amount of time it takes to carry out the project. Thus, in our technical report example, if the chapters are independent of each other, all five chapters can be written simultaneously.

Third, this approach is well suited to projects where new staff members are getting their first exposure to a project management environment. Its simplicity eases novices into their new jobs, rather than overwhelming them with complexity. Furthermore, the project manager can take on the role of mentor to the new staff, watching over them closely and providing them with important guidance on how projects are carried out in the organization.

In general, the isomorphic approach can be highly effective in dealing with projects on which the different pieces that make up the deliverable are relatively independent of each other. In such cases, problems of systems integration are much smaller than in projects in which the pieces are inextricably tied together.

Specialty Team Structure

The specialty approach to structuring teams is illustrated in figure 3. With the specialty approach, team members may be asked to apply their special expertise across a wide array of tasks. In this case, the project workers' orientation is toward their specialty rather than toward a specific deliverable.

With a specialty structure, coordination of staff efforts becomes complex, since staff work is distributed across many tasks. Typically, project staff focus on a small piece of the deliverable without an appreciation of how that piece fits into the larger system. Their clear-cut responsibility toward a given deliverable disappears. Responsibility is now more diffuse, and it may be difficult to diagnose the cause of the problem if something goes wrong.

Because the specialty approach fractionates work along functional lines, project managers must pay particular attention to keeping track of the diverse piecemeal efforts and making sure that they will ultimately fit together. Problems with integration are greater here than with the isomorphic approach. Not only do we want to integrate the different chapters so that they fit together, but we must also focus on integrating the work of different people within each chapter. Similarly, the need to maintain good communication is greater, particularly in view of the fact that staff are likely to be wearing specialty blinders and therefore be unaware of and possibly uninterested in the big picture.

One advantage of the specialty approach is that it capitalizes on staff expertise and specialization of labor. The people doing the project work are not amateurs; they should know what they're doing. Another advantage of this approach is that it fits in nicely with a matrix system. Staff can be borrowed from functional departments and assigned work on different tasks. When they have finished their work, they can return to their functional departments for reassignment to



Figure 3. Specialty Team Structure

other projects. Of course, as I mentioned earlier, various sources of team friction that arise in matrix approaches reduce team efficiency. However, matrix management is a fact of life for many project workers. Project managers who work in any organization that employs matrix management should give serious attention to structuring project teams according to the specialties of the team members.

Egoless Team Structure

Back in the early 1970s, Gerald Weinberg noted in *The Psychology of Computer Programming* that a major cause of problems in computer programming projects is the ego of computer programmers. They are often more interested in developing tour-de-force programs than in doing what is necessary to come up with a well-integrated product. Too often they are not good team players. In order to deal with this common problem, Weinberg suggested that project teams should be structured to minimize the ill effects of egos. When we look at the product of an egoless team, the results of a truly collaborative effort, it should be difficult to determine who produced what portion of the product.

The structure of a three-person egoless team is shown in figure 4. Note that there is no obvious leader on the egoless team. Decisions are achieved through consensus, and project tasks often reflect the input of all the team members. For example, in our technical report case, Martha may write a draft of the first chapter and then turn it over to George, who edits and reworks it. After all the chapters are done, Miriam may do a final editing of the report to make sure that it is well integrated. To the extent that team members collaborate jointly like this, problems of ego will be minimized.

The egoless team structure encourages high levels of interactivity and communication among project members. They are continually in touch with each other and make decisions through consensus. If communication is good, and if team members are working together toward a common goal, problems of systems integration should be low.

I have heard many scathing criticisms of the egoless team approach by those who have tried to implement it in their organizations. One of the most common is that "the egoless team doesn't work, because *people have egos.*" Project workers—especially those with great talent—possess pride of authorship. They want to make their unique contributions, to stand out from the crowd, and they strongly resist attempts to downplay their egos. Another criticism focuses on the lack of leadership of egoless teams. "Without strong leadership, there is a tendency for egoless teams to drift," comments one project manager who worked in a company that espoused the egoless approach to team structure.

To those who declare that egoless teams go against human nature (and I often hear this comment), I point out that in Asian cultures, with their stress on harmony and consensus, egoless teams are more the rule than the exception. The Western concept of leadership, based on individualism, is alien to the East. Consider the Japanese dictum that states "The nail that stands up is hammered down."

My feeling is that egoless teams can work effectively in Western cultures in certain situations. First, team size must be relatively small, since with larger teams communication channels proliferate, leading to bureaucracy and its attendant



Figure 4. Egoless Team Structure

inefficiencies. Furthermore, with large teams it becomes difficult to achieve a meaningful consensus.

Second, egoless teams require continuity in team membership. They are very much like a sports team in this respect. On television recently, there was a story about a college basketball team that had four starting players who were brothers. "I spend most of my time trying to get team members used to playing with each other," said the coach. "The brothers have been playing together a whole lifetime. They're remarkable." As with sports teams, team efficiency on egoless teams is highly dependent on the team members' knowing each other's operating styles, technical capabilities, weaknesses, and so on. This knowledge can develop only if staff work together continually. You cannot have egoless teams functioning effectively as a matrix.

Third, egoless teams may function well on ill-defined state-of-the-art projects for which the final deliverable is at first only vaguely conceived. Basic research projects typically have these characteristics. A synergistic team (one on which the effectiveness of the combined team is greater than the effectiveness of the individual team members) may be able to pool the talents of the team members and come up with creative solutions that the team members could not achieve if working alone.

Finally, egoless teams may be effective on projects where highly creative team members resist the imposition of strong leadership, which goes against their grain and which, they feel, restricts creativity.

Surgical Team Structure

Frederick P. Brooks, in his classic work on managing software projects, *The Mythical Man-Month* (1975), promotes use of an approach he calls the surgical team. (In software project management, this approach, developed originally by Harlan Mills of IBM, is called the chief programmer team concept.) Brooks asks us to consider how a surgical team functions. At the heart of the team is the surgeon, who actually performs the surgery on the patient. The surgeon is surrounded by assistants—an anesthesiologist, nurses, interns—who provide him or her with all manner of assistance. In the final analysis, however, it is the surgeon who actually carries out the surgical procedure. He or she calls the shots. The primary function of the assistants is to help the surgeon carry out his task most effectively, with *the surgeon defining effectiveness.*

One fundamental objective of the surgical approach in medicine is to allow the surgeon to pursue his work freely, unencumbered by administrative and technical obligations. The surgeon's task is to perform surgery. Billing of the patient can be handled by administrative staff, anesthesia can be administered by an anesthesiologist, surgical tools can be maintained by the nursing staff, examination of removed tissue can be carried out by a pathologist, and so on. Similarly, in project management one individual is given total responsibility for carrying out the main body of project work while being shielded from administrative paper pushing.

The surgical approach to team structure stands in diametrical opposition to the egoless approach. With the surgical approach, all attention focuses on a single individual and his or her abilities. With the egoless approach, it is the overall group effort that counts.

Figure 5 shows how the surgical approach can be applied to our project to write a technical report. A chief writer stands at the heart of the undertaking. This individual will write the whole technical report. She has been chosen for this position because she writes quickly and clearly and understands the technical content of the study. She is buffered from administrative concerns by an administrative staff member who keeps track of hours devoted to the project, progress reports, and the like. She is relieved of editorial burdens by an editorial staff member, who at the end of each day reads her writing, corrects misspellings and grammatical errors, spots and removes minor factual inconsistencies, and so on. In addition, she is provided with technical backup, individuals who are specialists on the material covered in the technical report. If at any point she needs detailed information on a particular topic, she will confer with the appropriate specialist to obtain this information.

At her side is her special assistant, an alter ego who is also a good writer, though perhaps with less experience. The special assistant plays numerous roles. For example, he may serve as an intermediary between the chief writer and the specialists. His most significant role, however, is to keep fully abreast of what the chief writer has done and to take over the project if necessary. The special assistant is an insurance policy against what in project management is called the *Mack truck syndrome,* which gets its name from the question, "What hap-



Figure 5. Surgical Team Approach

pens to the project if on the way to work the project manager gets hit by a Mack truck?"

A major advantage of the surgical team approach is that it tackles head-on the issue of systems integration. Since project output flows from the mind of a single individual, the pieces being produced are likely to fit together nicely. Stylistic and factual inconsistencies and duplication of effort will be minimized. The final product will be well integrated.

Another advantage is that the surgical approach can be readily adapted to matrix organizations. This can be seen in Figure 13, which shows that functional specialists serve as a central information pool that can be used by a number of projects.

One disadvantage of the surgical approach is that it requires a superlatively capable individual to play the role of surgeon. If such an individual is not available, the resulting product may be mediocre.

Another disadvantage is that the surgical team may end up with three bosses. The surgeon is clearly a boss, but principally in regard to technical matters. The administrative chief is a boss, in the sense that he or she is in charge of maintaining and controlling budgets, schedules, and material resource allocations. Finally, the special assistant may assume responsibility for coordinating and controlling the technical personnel who serve as project specialists. If these three individuals do not communicate with each other clearly and frequently, or if they hold differing perceptions of project goals, team efficiency will be low.

The surgical team approach is most effective on design projects, computer coding projects, and projects—such as our technical report project—that entail large amounts of writing. Brooks claims that it is also an effective approach on very large projects where each project module is given a surgical team structure. When used in this way, according to Brooks, this approach combines small-project efficiency and consistency with large-project scope.

This discussion of four approaches to structuring a project team is not meant to be exhaustive. Many other approaches can be undertaken. Rather, it is illustrative. It shows that for a single project to write a technical report, team structure has a dramatic impact on the way in which a project is carried out. It also shows that there is no one perfect structure for managing projects. An approach that addresses the issue of systems integration (the surgical team) may lead to confusion as to who is in charge. An approach that fosters intense and open communication among team members (the egoless team) may suffer from lack of leadership. An approach that is conceptually simple and straightforward (the isomorphic team) may yield systems integration problems. And an approach that dovetails nicely in a matrix environment (the specialist team) may have associated with it all the problems that can come with matrix management.

Creating Team Identification

The focus of the discussion up until now has been on the mechanical aspects of putting a team together. Beyond mechanics, there is the question of creating a sense of team cohesion among the team members. The problem is that people working on projects are typically on loan and have little opportunity or motivation to develop a commitment toward the projects. It is clearly in the interest of project managers to stimulate a sense of project identity among workers attached to their projects.

There are many ways in which they can do this. What sometimes pulls a team together is the personality and special management style of the project manager, or his or her expertise. Charismatic managers or those with a legendary reputation for technical prowess easily catch the attention of their staff, who recognize that they are privileged to work with these managers.

Those of us lacking exceptional charismatic or technical prowess must work hard at developing a sense of project identity among project staff. Among the steps that can be taken to do this, three are almost universally useful: use staff meetings effectively, employ quality circles, and employ task forces.

Use Staff Meetings Effectively

Staff meetings are the bane of many information-age workers. They are often perceived as time killers, intrusions that interrupt the flow of productive work. Staff meetings often deserve the poor reputation they have: frequently bosses simply mount their soapboxes and spout opinions on the state of the world to a captive audience. This is too bad, since these meetings, when carried out effectively, serve two important functions. One obvious function is to convey information to and among staff members. It is at staff meetings that new policy directions are conveyed to workers and that staff have the opportunity to coordinate their efforts with each other.

A more important function of these meetings, from the perspective of team building, is to provide staff with a sense of team identity. The staff meeting is a physical embodiment of the team. Project staff who otherwise work alone or drift into and out of a particular project see that there is substance to the team and that they are part of a larger unit. If the meetings are pleasant experiences and well run, staff will develop a sense that the project itself is being carried out effectively.

Project managers should take staff meetings seriously, not treat them in an offhand manner. A large share of the image that team members have of the competence and management ability of their project managers will be garnered at these meetings. If the meetings are boring and disorganized, it is natural to assume that the project manager is likewise boring and disorganized. If the meetings are fast-moving and open, and if they signal a willingness to act upon the views of all project workers, the foundation has been laid for developing team cohesion on the project.

Employ Quality Circles

Quality circles are regular gatherings of small groups of workers to discuss ways of improving work performance. A typical group is comprised of ten or fewer people who meet regularly for one or two hours once a month. In these meetings, they identify problems they encounter in their work, offer solutions to these problems, and review the effectiveness of past attempts to improve work performance.

The basic rationale for having quality circles is twofold. First, those actually doing the work are in a good position to see how the work can be done even better. Second, by involving workers in decision making, management enhances worker commitment to doing a good job. In projects, quality circles serve an important additional function: they are good instruments for enhancing team identification. When quality circles are used on projects, team members who would normally have little or no contact with each other get to sit down together and work jointly to improve project performance. Like the oarsmen in a shell, they may develop a feeling that team performance will be strengthened if they all pull together.

Project managers who want to employ quality circles on their projects will have to take the initiative in setting them up since it is unlikely that project staff who come from different parts of the organization and are working only temporarily on the project will spontaneously organize themselves into such circles. Project managers should also demonstrate a willingness to meet frequently with the groups and to follow their recommendations when appropriate.

Employ Task Forces

Task forces serve much the same team-building function as quality circles. However, whereas quality circles meet regularly and deal with across-the-board issues, task forces focus on a specific problem and meet as often as necessary to resolve the problem. One profitable use of task forces is for needs/requirements definition on a project. In the development of a hardware or software system, for example, system designers, analysts, implementers, and testers can get together in a task force with end-users to define and articulate end-user needs and system requirements. Not only will this approach lead to a superior statement of needs and requirements, but it will also contribute to a stronger sense of team identity among project workers who would otherwise not interact with each other.

What is appealing about these three suggestions for creating team identification on projects is that they are relatively easy to implement and, if carried out properly, will produce results. They are only the tip of the iceberg, however; many other approaches can be employed as well. For example, on larger, more structured projects, awards can be offered for exemplary performance, competitions can be established to motivate different groups to perform better than their colleagues, and after-work social activities can be organized for members of the project team. The important thing here is recognition that most project situations do not automatically create a sense of team identification among project workers. Project managers must consciously strive to create this sense if they want to run projects peopled by highly motivated and effective workers who care whether the project is carried out in the best manner possible.

Conclusion

Projects are carried out through teams, but these teams are typically fragmented and poorly defined, owing to the exigencies of matrix management. An important function of project managers is to consciously create a team structure where no discernible structure exists. This is not trivial, since there are countless ways teams can be organized. One prime consideration in structuring a team should be to select a structure that enhances team efficiency.

It is not enough simply to select an appropriate team structure, however. Team members must be encouraged to identify with the team, to develop team spirit, and to do what is necessary to make the project succeed. The problem is that team members are usually on temporary loan to the project and have little stake in whether it succeeds or fails. Project managers must create a sense of identity in an environment that does little to encourage cohesiveness. They must make stakeholders out of their staff. They can do this through a number of ways, including the skillful use of staff meetings and the employment of quality circles and task forces.

Innovation and the Military Mind

Air Vice-Marshal R. A. Mason

At a recent seminar in a reputable British university, a young sociology lecturer—fresh from the process of regurgitating other people's hypotheses but already irrecoverably enmeshed in his own—made a disdainful reference to "the military mind." He asserted that the military mind is characterized by conventional thinking, lack of imagination, unwillingness to challenge accepted doctrine, excessive caution, professional pessimism, narrowness of outlook, and subservience to the views of higher authority. In the vigorous debate that followed his remarks, not surprisingly his preconceived ideas were challenged not only by some intelligent members of his faculty but also by several representatives of various armed services. However, just as Descartes observed that "bad ideas can stimulate the good," in this case, the assertions prompted the reflection that even if the military mind was no more tenable a concept than the academic mind, the industrial mind, or the commercial mind, there are nevertheless, in the modern military environment, factors that can induce such characteristics. Indeed, many of these factors and their effects are not only justifiable but essential to the effectiveness of a fighting force. They should be recognized and their implications understood. If mental characteristics among military members should ever coalesce to the extent that the young lecturer's allegation came to be sustainable, the military service concerned would be in serious trouble.

Even the most cursory survey of military history illustrates the critical importance of technological and tactical innovation. The stirrup, the longbow, barbed wire, the tank, blitzkrieg, radar, electronic countermeasures, AWACS, helicopter assault, and the astonishing aggregate of British innovation displayed during the Falklands War are random examples. Sometimes the vision of the innovators has outrun the capability of technology: the early submariners, the early aircraft carrier advocates, the first air power theorists, the proponents of surface-to-air missiles, and, just possibly, those enthusiasts who unreservedly espouse the cause of enhanced technology as the panacea for today's Western strategic dilemmas might be so categorized. Yet without such visionaries and without innovation, a nation's way of war becomes predictable; and predictable means vulnerable.

It is fashionable to criticize the Soviet armed forces for the weaknesses listed by the young lecturer, and certainly there is ample tactical evidence to support this contention. But before considering whether the Western superiority implicit in the criticism is justified, one should remember this true scenario:

- A Russian four-star admiral disparaged the value of the aircraft carrier;
- Within twelve months, a Russian two-star admiral publicly challenged his commander in chief;
- and the four-star retracted, while the two-star was promoted, as was another junior two-star who equally publicly questioned the judgment of his newly promoted superior.

When did we last see a British or American four-star officer's military judgment being publicly questioned by his subordinates, let alone see these subordinates subsequently being promoted?

One does not have to look to the Soviet armed forces to identify the factors militating against military innovation. In organized Western armed services, conformity, reliability, and teamwork have long been essential ingredients of esprit and confidence within the unit. Mutual dependence normally requires coordinated, predictable behavior from colleagues, whether in an infantry platoon or in a four-ship formation. The demands of teamwork tend to inhibit independent action. Above the level of the fighting unit, further restrictions apply. In conventional warfare, it is highly unlikely that the firepower or any other contribution of a single unit will be sufficient to achieve tactical success. The foundations of a commander's assumptions in combat are certain knowledge of the disposition of his forces and confidence that they will react as they have been trained and ordered to do. Modern warfare, and especially air warfare, is fought by an aggregate of interdependent units: a timely matching of men, aircraft, weapons, communications, and logistic support to achieve concentration of appropriate force at the desired point of operational significance. Does innovation threaten such coordination?

Arguably, the time for innovation is at the planning stage, which is shrouded in secrecy to achieve surprise and confound a predictable defense. But there are several complementary factors, particularly relevant to modern air war, which inhibit innovation even then. The gestation period for the entry into service of modern aircraft and weapons considerably exceeds that of previous eras. Progression of such systems from concept, through development, to production, and, finally, operation will usually span several years. These materiel acquisitions may be accompanied by tactical manuals that explain their associated operational procedures. Moreover, there are strong and legitimate influences driving toward standardiza-

Adapted from *Air University Review,* January–February 1986.

tion of equipment that is increasingly expensive and complex. Yet simultaneously, many of today's military prognosticators predict that conflicts employing sophisticated weapon systems will be short wars, without the extended periods for mobilization and reinforcement that have characterized wars traditionally and offering little opportunity for tactical or technological revision or reequipment once the fighting starts. It would take a very persuasive innovator to change the direction of a weapon procurement program at the eleventh hour on military grounds alone in the face of heavily committed commercial, industrial, and political opposition. Indeed, one could argue that corporate commitment to a major weapon procurement program could inhibit innovative responsiveness to changing circumstances. Procurement inertia itself can be buttressed by legitimate military caution in the face of putative advantages from an unproven alternative.

In any event, whether in concepts, procurement, planning, training, or operations, the innovator has many problems to face. To start with, such are the day-to-day pressures on the modern service member that the individual has little time either for reflection—the essential prerequisite for innovation—or even the time to develop the habits of reflection. If an innovation does come to mind and the service member proposes it as a change, the individual is then challenging the accepted wisdom, which, presumably, is either apparently working successfully or has catastrophically failed. In the latter case, the time for innovation may be long gone. The former situation offers greater promise. However, in our military hierarchies, the accumulation of experience and wisdom is associated with increasing seniority. Weight of opinion is usually accredited according to rank. One superior's appreciated innovator can be another superior's pain in the neck. Generally it takes a big person to accept that his or her subordinate's questioning of the status quo or earlier decisions is well founded, unless perhaps the former can be persuaded that the new ideas are in fact his or her own. The restless mind can make for an uncomfortable subordinate. Paradoxically, the more powerful, competent, and confident the general, the more difficult it becomes to convince him that he may not be omniscient: it is the general who must be prepared to fight with what he has available and who therefore is the most conscious of the costs in training time, of the possible reduction in readiness or fighting effectiveness, or the gamble involved in changing current proven operational practices under the threat of imminent enemy attack. It is not melodramatic to remember that the general carries the responsibilities of not only the lives of his own men but possibly the fate of nations in his hands. It is scarcely surprising that he tends to approach innovation with caution.

Indeed, when one reflects on all the factors militating against innovation in modem military affairs, it is astonishing that tactical and technical innovations ever take place at all. But they must, for many reasons. "War is the province of uncertainty," observed Clausewitz. How much more so in an age when aircraft are expected to reach across oceans and continents, when command and control is increasingly important in the exercise of coordinated but widely distributed force, and when electronic warfare and other sources of friction can blind, paralyze, disrupt, or delay the plan that has been adopted. When planning, organization, coordination, and communication fail, leaders must rely on their own resourcefulness, ingenuity, flexibility, initiative, and common sense.

"When all else fails," advised Helmuth von Moltke, "march to the sound of the guns." A highly trained service member will respond instinctively in those circumstances that demand a swift, instinctive response. But the unexpected may call for more than a precondition or well-rehearsed response; even the use of initiative may be inadequate. Conditioned response contributes to conformity, and conformity certainly strengthens unit dependability, which is essential to the success of any coordinated tactics or strategy. Yet absolute conformity strangles individuality of thought, and the utterly dependable can easily become the readily predictable. A doctrine may have been observed, if not always practiced, for several years with complete confidence. But the onset of doctrinal thrombosis must be prevented by timely diagnosis and treatment, preferably before the patient endures combat conditions. Conformity will not encourage such diagnostic analysis. However, neither will placing the patient in the hands of a group of doctrinal theorists far removed from the operational theater. Any military innovation is of little value unless it can be made to work.

If innovation is essential to the successful pursuit of modern air warfare and if by definition it is a risky business with many justifiable and some not so justifiable factors inhibiting it, what can be done to encourage it in a military environment with minimum risk to existing effectiveness?

It is probable (and no doubt could be tested by case histories) that powers of innovation are associated with independence of thought, individuality, imagination, and initiative. However, few, if any, armed services recruit with the slogan "Join our service branch and become an innovator!" Conversely, if young people are naturally inclined toward invention or philosophical reflection, they are unlikely to make military service their first career choice. Nevertheless, Western armed forces, particularly air forces, set out to recruit for their officer cadres young men and women who have strong character, above-average intelligence, and potential for initiative and leadership. The services recognize their need for a reservoir of talent that they can develop and draw on, as needed, in the future. But there is an immediate danger that instead of being encouraged to flow, the springs of creative young people will dry up long before they can contribute to the reservoir.

The first obstacle lies in the nature of traditional basic military training, "Learn to follow before you learn to lead" is a well-proven precept that should not be discarded. Is it sufficient? Good training will produce enlisted personnel and officers who will respond instinctively to anticipated, recognizable circumstances in a manner circumscribed by their training. How can an officer be trained to recognize and to be prepared for the unexpected? Further, how can an officer be taught to engineer the unexpected or to innovate? Any suggestion that rookie officers be taught powers of innovation at the expense of military training would be justifiably derided. At the other extreme, it seems unrealistic to expect an officer on achieving senior rank to undertake a postgraduate course at a war college, war-gaming center, or national defense university and make a sudden transition from responder to innovator.

The resolution of the dilemma probably lies in a much maligned word: *education.* It seems to a foreign observer that the great strength of the United States military academies lies in their striving to produce officers who are not only highly trained but who have been taught how to think. If there is a difference between training and education, it is that education should instill the mental flexibility to look beyond today's possibilities, to anticipate and perhaps even to help shape tomorrow's. Inevitably, there are the seeds of tension when conformity and questioning are being taught side by side. It should come as no surprise that military education can occasionally give rise to uneasiness within the military as a whole. There are many apparently incompatible objectives: discipline and individuality, conformity and initiative, responding and innovating, determination and flexibility, imagination and objectivity, fire and dispassion. However, fighting and thinking should not be incompatible, but complementary. A forthright British general observed eighty years ago that "any military service which tries to separate its fighters from its thinkers is likely to finish up with cowards doing the thinking and the fools doing the fighting." Education from the very outset of an officer's career should teach the officer not only to recognize the apparent incompatibilities but to accept them as the anomalies of the chosen profession. The officer is then less likely to be confused by the seemingly conflicting demands that he or she will encounter. Hopefully, we will have selected young men and women with the intellect and strength of character to master the challenges and contradictions confronting them. No doubt we shall lose those who lack either sufficient strength or flexibility—but better sooner rather than later when their responsibilities, and possibly the conflicting demands placed on them, have grown immeasurably greater.

Thereafter, when young officers go to their first units, they learn that there is a time for thought and a time for action, a time for conformity and a time for independence, a time for consolidation and a time for innovation. Whatever else military education should do, it should instill in them the good judgment to ascertain which time is appropriate for which activity. Even then, these youngsters will not be able to apply that judgment confidently without the tutelage of good leadership. In this context, the good leader is the one who has sufficient self-confidence to encourage subordinates to think about their own immediate environment and to seek improvements, revisions, or modifications that will enhance unit capability. The leader will identify those individuals who seem to have the capacity to discharge their regular tasks with the utmost effectiveness and still have the time and inclination to think constructively about what they are doing. He or she will have the patience to identify and bridle the brashness of youth and will have the wisdom to instruct subordinates in the ways of persuasion without provocation. In short, the good leader will be encouraging both activity and habits of thought and will be sensible enough to recognize that industrious, innovative officers will reflect the high quality of his or her leadership, not undermine authority. And—perhaps most important of all—the good leader will take the necessary steps to ensure that powers of innovation and practical imagination gain the attention of appointers and superiors so that any particular talent can be nurtured and given a wider canvass for its expression.

Subsequently, in this ideal air force or other service branch, such officers who attend staff and war colleges will be surprised by an environment in which there is not just a "recommended staff solution" but also credit given for coming up with an alternative. Some, though probably not all, will be officers who could make the staff solution work in an exemplary fashion if that was called for or, alternatively, harness their formidable powers of leadership and organization to "sell" an innovative solution which they themselves had devised. In every walk of life, such men and women are scarce and very valuable.

In a military service, someone has to become the intellectual master of the ever-expanding, increasingly complex technology; someone has to analyze, synthesize, plan, and recommend; someone has to identify and coolly interpret hostile capabilities; someone has to have the foresight, imagination, and courage to suggest solutions to problems that may be ten years away or more; someone has to address the ambitious bureaucrat, the single-minded politician, and the instant academic strategic analyst from the institution, confronting, discussing, arguing, and holding the corner. Clausewitz was very precise in defining the qualities which he sought in a general officer to meet the uncertainties of war; they are equally applicable for any military leader in peacetime.

> A strong mind which can maintain its serenity under the most powerful excitement . . . strength of character . . . discernment clear and deep . . . energy, firmness, staunchness. . . . Here then, above all a fine and penetrating mind is called for, to search out the truth by the tact of its judgment.

That must be the military mind. Its fostering is not the responsibility of academies and colleges only but of commanders everywhere. Independence of thought, imagination, ingenuity, and initiative are not substitutes for discipline, teamwork, conformity, tenacity of purpose, and loyalty but are military virtues complementary to them. All must be encouraged—from each individual, according to his or her talents. Therein lies the source of successful military innovation. Should anyone doubt whether the possible outcomes are really worth all the hassle, whether the idea is indeed worth the pursuit, perhaps the words of General Henry "Hap" Arnold in November 1945 should be recalled: National safety would be engendered by an air force whose doctrines and techniques are tied solely to the equipment and processes of the moment. Present equipment is but a step in progress, and any air force which does not keep its doctrines ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude the nation into a false sense of security. Timely and well-considered innovation is the practical manifestation of that vision to ensure the continued harmony of equipment and doctrine without prejudice to today's operational effectiveness.

The Military as a Bureaucracy: The Super Activity Trap

Dr. George S. Odiorne

The year 1976 was the bicentennial of a book as well as of a nation. In 1776, Adam Smith wrote his *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,* which became the handbook and theoretical guide to an industrial society. For a long time, Smith's work was viewed as the "handbook of capitalism," but in many ways, it was more because it described the basis for industrialization, particularly the development of the bureaucratic organization that made so much of the industrial society possible. The description of the division of labor in the opening chapter of *The Wealth of Nations* is one of the major underpinnings of current organizational theory.

Division of Labor

Smith stated that "the greatest improvement in the productive powers of labor, and the greatest art of the skill, dexterity, and judgment which is anywhere directed or applied seems to have been the effects of the division of labor."[1] Although his most frequently cited example was the pin factory where the division of labor could enhance productivity by a thousandfold, he was explicit in suggesting that the division of labor would have its effect in the general business of society, not just in manufacturing. "In every art," he suggested, "there is a proportionable increase in the productive powers of labor which can be attributed to the division of labor." Not only does it improve skill and dexterity; it also saves time and makes possible the application of machines and technology. Furthermore, it does not limit such gains to physical things but even includes machine makers and philosophers .[2]

Division of labor creates a host of highly desired effects and some unintended effects. The desired effect is that it substantially increases the yield from the same amount of resources. Efficiency and effectiveness are the aims and, indeed, demonstrable results. The new specialization of people, the ease of training new entrants into the organization, the possibility of reasonable personnel replacements, and uniformity of quality and quantity of output are demonstrable results of the division of labor.

This form of organization has been identified as a bureaucracy. In its simplest form, a bureaucracy is a group of people working together; one of them holds authority, and the others occupy subordinate positions. Each person handles a different and specialized segment of the divided labor of the group.

The Nature of Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy calls for persons to do different work within the same organizational group. This demands both specialized training and widespread ignorance on the part of each job incumbent; that is, in-depth knowledge of his own work and in-depth ignorance of what most of the other people do. To make the system work, the superior must have *authority,* the power to remove or to issue sanctions on the people below him in rank. The system tends toward authoritarianism and autocratic methods of management, however deftly they may be disguised.

There is a pressure in the bureaucracy to select persons with similar modes of communication, and this tends to make bureaucracies, among other things, ethnocentric. The nature of communication seems to imply behavior that produces an exchange of meaning. Thus, except at the very lowest levels of the organization, life becomes hospitable only to persons with similar social and cultural modes of behaving. This is not necessarily conscious snobbism nor racism in purpose, but it has that effect in practice.

The bureaucracy produces leaders whose most heartfelt assumptions resemble the assumptions of Douglas McGregor's Theory X.[3] Such leaders assume that the average subordinate must be treated as though he dislikes work, avoids it when he can, and, at heart, is probably lazy and, perhaps, a bit dishonest. Thus, he must be directed, coerced, intimidated, or controlled if the organization expects to achieve its purposes. These assumptions, in turn, comprise a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the people behave according to the expectations that the organization holds for them.

Control through system, supervision, and training produces instrumental persons whose major qualities and attributes are contained within their occupations. Such persons disappear into their job descriptions each day and, even in their personal lives, become instrumental. Their recreation and life-style adapt to the bureaucratic mode. As the division of labor piles up on itself, the numerous bureaucratic levels increase the significance of the organization and create occupational phobias in trivial work.

Some Questionable Side Effects

The promised efficiency of bureaucracy has indeed been realized. It has permeated American society, including the

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military. Even in 1977, much of the military culture reflects times when conflict was tribal, when the individual soldier or officer owned his own weapon, and when the army was a means for the landed aristocracy to maintain its political position against possible peasant rebellions. Today, however, the military is mainly bureaucratic.

The bureaucratization has had the same unintended side effects in the military as in other bureaucracies, including corporations, universities, and government bureaus. The following four major effects have apparently intensified in recent years.

1. *Angry clients.* They are angry against the powerlessness they feel and the depersonalized character with which they are treated in their contacts with bureaucratic organizations. It has become politically profitable to kick the military.

2. *Apathy.* Among its members, including the middle ranks, listlessness, demoralization, and indifference, the shrugging of the organization's shoulders to its purposes and its results, the attitude of "go away, you do your thing and I'll do mine," and the "I don't give a damn" attitude are apparently natural products of bureaucratic organizations. This apathy is often reflected in the organization's contacts with its clientele, and this angers the clients even more. In a business, this means bored clerks producing furious customers, and so on; in the military, it riles civilians and angers lower-ranking people seeking help, information, or action.

3. *Alienation.* The turning away from the organization and its goals, the shirking of responsibility, the avoidance of concern over the consequences of failure to do one's job, and a general retreat from the entire culture—all these can be bureaucratic effects.

A counterculture is often a product of some or all of the three major side effects of the bureaucratic form, particularly among the young, the educated, the successful, and children of the middle class. Communes, drugs, and long hair are natural evidences of the counterculture. This is a paradox. Society organizes for efficiency and, in the process, dehumanizes and depersonalizes organizations; this in turn produces counterforces that diminish efficiency.

4. *The absurd.* As an underlying condition of life, the absurd becomes normal in a bureaucracy. *Catch 22* is a preeminent model of a believable overstatement of the military bureaucracy in one moment of time. For Yossarian, starting out in a rubber raft paddling for Sweden from an island in the Mediterranean seemed not only logical but also the only sensible alternative in the light of events described in the book. For most people, however, a sense of humor, a keen skill for the devious, or a vast apathy will suffice. Only a few actually make concrete moves in rebellion, and the moves usually take the form of malicious obedience.

Changes in the Language and Operation of Bureaucracy

Today, the traditional language of bureaucracies has been supplanted by a new language based on the systems approach and goal displacement.

1. The systems approach, with its simple and completely plausible explanation of everything, joins Hegel's dialectic and other ultimate explanations with numerous applications.

2. It takes disparate parts and their relationships and views them as an integrated whole.

3. It requires three elements: input, activity, and output, with some feedback to tie the first to the third.

4. It is organismic rather than mechanistic in logical presumption, which is suitable for clarifying that which has already been clarified.

Of the numerous kinds of "systems" that could fall within the general systems theory, the cybernetic or feedback system is usually identified as the most typical. The economics of the organization is one application of this type of system. Figure 1 depicts the elements of a cybernetic system.[4]

INPUTS	ACTIVITY	OUTPUT Value Added
Resources	Work	Goals
Factors of Production	Procedures	Objectives
Capital	Efforts	Results
Labor	Means	Ends
Materials		

Figure 1. Schematic of a Cybernetic System: The Most Commonly Used of the Systems Approaches Feedback

Inputs are the resources committed to an idea to make it a tangible, going concern. They include capital (fixed, working, cash, receivables, inventories), labor, and materials. *Activities* are the designing, making, selling, keeping books, engineering, bargaining, and other things that *add value,* presumably, to the inputs. *Outputs* are the goods and services, hardware, and software that come out of the system. These outputs are more valuable than all of the inputs used in their making; thus, a *value added* can be computed.

The value added *is* the profit, the need that is filled, the *purpose for committing the input,* and *the activity carried out.* There are two customary methods of disposing of this surplus value: input back into the system or distribution to beneficiaries of the system as dividends, learning, satisfactions, benefits, needs met, and the like. Although this minicourse in the systems approach is somewhat instructive as a map, it is also a diagram of traps for managers and other people who are part of the system.

The easy trap for one involved in a system is to become emotionally overattached to one element of what must be a three-element system.

1. Some people become obsessed with *input* and spend their time in preventing expenditures (for example, the man who disapproves your expense account).

2. Others become *output* fanatics and bearishly resist considering whether the inputs and resources are adequate or whether the activities are possible (the desk pounder and the "I demand results not alibis" type).

3. Far more prevalent, however, is the activity-obsessed person. He is competent, professional, often dedicated, but he has lost sight of the inputs used up or even the results sought.

Thus, in system terms, management is a system that begins by defining outputs and then applies these output statements as criteria to judge the quality of activity (behavior) and to govern the release and effectiveness of the inputs.[5]

Even the most noble, exciting, and important objective is forgotten as people engage in the activity initiated to achieve the objective. What begins as a momentary lapse becomes a habit, then a procedure, and, finally, a religion. Meanwhile, this activity consumes inputs related only to activity and not to output.

The consequences, however, are not limited to material input losses, which are real; they also affect human beings. The organization that locks fanatically into the input-activity loop produces a new dimension of bureaucrat. The superior is often hostile, exacting, judgmental, and primitive; the subordinates become professionally irresponsible. He becomes so enamored of his profession that he resists the very idea of making commitments to output of either a tangible or an intangible character. "Give me resources continually, but don't ask me to commit in return to a specific output."

The only recourse of the providers of inputs is to reduce or eliminate inputs and observe the losses that might occur. This is almost certainly a painful way to learn, but it is a prevalent approach, in part, because mature persons are sometimes unwilling to behave in a responsible and committed fashion. Bosses fail to define their goals, to provide help in achieving them, to leave people alone while they work, to inform them of their progress through self-control systems, and to regard them according to their accomplishments.

Strategic Effects of the Activity Trap

The military organization today is composed mainly of people who are not engaged in primary combat operational units or occupations. Approximately 15 percent of the army are foot soldiers, tankers, or members of other combat occupations, and a lower percentage of airmen are engaged in flying or other combat operations. Most persons in the military are mechanics, systems people, computer programmers, and other noncombatants. If the people counted as involved with the military included Department of Defense civilians and the employees of mainly military contractors, the ratio of combat to noncombat personnel would shrink even further. This condition is perfectly understandable in the sense that the military is a highly technological business, but it allows the phenomenon of the Activity Trap to become even more pervasive and, perhaps, deadly.

The Activity Trap raises the costs of the simplest operation by complicating it, and it makes the complicator more respected and revered than the simplifier. The Naval Air Rework Facility, a marvel of sophistication, has one defect—it cannot take in an airplane, repair it, and return it to its squadron or carrier on time to save its soul. When this happens, the answer is to add more systems people to improve upon the defective systems that previously caused the backlog.

Furthermore, this approach raises military spending to multibillion dollar levels that have an inflationary impact on the economy. Inflation then becomes the basis for justifying ever-increasing expenditures. This inflationary cycle of deficit spending and government expenditure feeds on itself.

The growth that sophisticated systems are approaching requires more highly educated and sophisticated people to man them. Such people have immense capacities to resist traditional military discipline. In time, it becomes impossible for the command structure to command its own organization by the methods that it knows best.

Towns, cities, states, and even regions become wholly dependent on the flow of military funds into their economies. They know the risks and addictive effects of seeking more funds, but they resort endlessly to such tactics as protecting unnecessary military bases, make-work projects funded through defense budgets, and similar quasi-welfare programs. Similarly, many industrial concerns build their organizations around defense contracts and then, to preserve their identity and existence, resort to political and other methods that make little or no contribution to military goals. As a result, the Activity Trap becomes tightly bound in place by money.

These well-known and familiar tactics produce a sense of inevitability and powerlessness among command officials and civilian leaders, who learn to narcotize themselves against the situation. Old-fashioned military autocracies and commands continue their activities in areas that are unimportant, and they are totally impotent to deal with important strategic questions.

Although the Activity Trap apparently weakens military effectiveness and fails to achieve missions, it has an equally dangerous side effect on people: they *shrink* personally and professionally. Almost any superior and one of his subordinates can serve as an example of the shrinking process. One can ask the employee to write down the specific work objectives expected by his boss during the next quarter. One can also ask the boss: "What results would you like to see that man produce next quarter?" The average manager and subordinate will not agree on work objectives, but they will be reasonably close on activities to be conducted. Essentially, the differences in answer will cause the subordinate to shrink in his potential. Research shows that on regular, ongoing responsibilities, the average boss and subordinate caught in the Activity Trap will fail to agree on expected outputs at a level of 25 percent. If they fail to agree on regular responsibilities, they will disagree at a level of 50 percent on the subordinate's major problems. The worst gap is the failure of boss and subordinate to agree on methods of improving the subordinate's job. On this count, they will fail to agree at a level of 90 percent.[6]

As a result, nothing really changes in the way things are done. The environment changes, expectations change, and employee values change. But methods remain static, and outdated employee activities cripple the organization.

The organization drains its people of their zap, and it becomes an employer of pygmies. The pygmies resemble real people, wear neckties and uniforms, drive cars, and pay taxes, but they are performance midgets. They nod their heads when the boss chastises them, but they know that they have been cheated. They are stabbed daily as unwitting antagonists in duels. Trees fall on them, and *then* somebody yells "timber." And what is their defensive recourse? They keep *active!*

They redouble their energy when they have lost sight of their goals. They may be chastised or even fired for doing something "wrong" when they do not know what is "right" in the first place. They run a race without knowing the length of the track. They wonder if it is time to sprint for the wire, but they cannot guess when to sprint because the race may be a 100-yard dash or the Boston Marathon.

The effect is cumulative. Since the employees do not know the ordinary objectives of their jobs, they are hit for failures that result from not knowing the requirements for success. The prospect of failure produces a reluctance to discover problems, for the problems may be attributed to their shortcomings. Suggesting something new in such an environment is risky; continuing the old activity insures survival. In other words, appearing busy is safer than being productive. This tendency toward activity is not inevitable if top people try to circumvent it. The law of gravity is always with us, but some people build bridges.

The Antidotes for a Military Activity Trap

Two different movements could possibly overcome the worst effects of the lamentable Activity Trap. Legislative supervision and the scrutiny of public interest groups independent of the military for funding support have become increasingly popular pressures. These groups include the press and other media that consider the military beyond popular control. The results of this movement are self-evident.

On the other hand, the military has proved in the past that it is capable of self-reform. The following examples show how a new thrust in the administration of the military could possibly overcome Activity Trap management styles:

1. more demanding attention by top management to mission, purposes, and strategies and their use in evaluating subordinate missions and strategies;
2. a major shift in emphasis from *adding* resources to *movement* of resources from goals of less contribution to goals of higher contribution;
3. focus of inspectors general on audits against objectives rather than audits against some of the more traditional inspection modes; and
4. major efforts to obtain commitments to objectives at all levels of organization, with accountability of responsible people to explicit commitments.

Any further attempt to define the nature of self-reform in the military must come from within the military, but the idea of self-reform is important. Obviously, there are people who serve that function now, all too often to their own peril. Increased emphasis on self-reform of military management is not inevitable. It is always possible that reform could begin outside the military establishment, and such reform could have many unfortunate effects on the organization and the nation.

Notes

1. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
2. Ibid.
3. Douglas McGregor, *The Human Side of Enterprise* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).
4. Norbert Weiner, *The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society,* 2d ed. rev. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954).
5. George S. Odiorne, *Management and the Activity Trap* (New York: Harper and Row,1974).
6. Ibid.

Section 6

Practical Leadership

Organizational Dimension



Leadership

Air Vice-Marshal J. R. Walker

Most of the Air Power articles in Air Clues *deal with our equipment and the doctrine and tactics for their use; some—like last month's—explain why we need Armed Forces at all. But the key to making it all work is "man." And if a body of men is to be effective, it needs leaders. What qualities should we, in the Royal Air Force, look for in our air marshals? We all, doubtless, have our own views on that. In this month's article Air Vice-Marshal J. R. Walker CBE AFC FBIM RAF outlines his. His article is based on a talk he gave at the Royal United Services Institute in October 1984, and on our pages is published for the first time.*

D Def S.

When considering leadership in the context of an air force, it is important to acknowledge that there are differences between the three Services and that these differences are highlighted in particular by those who make war in "light blue." From these differences stem the nature of a force, its style and character, and thereby the opportunities and constraints presented to its leadership.

In highlighting some of these differences I am not suggesting that any one force is better served than the other. On the contrary, my thesis is that the differences are there for good purposes, and that the reason we wear uniforms of varying hues is that in the past those differences have been recognised.

In both the other two Services, admirals and generals lead their men, both officers and other ranks, into shot and shell. Admirals have gone down with their ships and generals have fallen in battle. Air marshals should not be so afflicted. Not through any lack of courage, verve or élan, but—if air power is to be used correctly—the air marshal's place is well behind the lines, exploiting the flexibility of air power. He will accomplish this by means of face-to-face contact with a relatively small staff; and his ability to influence and motivate the distant fighting troops by his presence and inspiration will be far less than his Naval and Army counterparts. Leadership in an Air Force calls for a different approach. An air marshal must do his leadership primarily before battle, whereas the admiral and the general have more opportunity to do so during battle.

The admiral with his hand on the tiller of a ship leaves limited scope for the ship's company to dispute the direction they collectively travel; desertion at sea can be a cold, wet and friendless business. On the other hand, the general has the advantage that his medium allows him to apply his own expertise to the battlefield more directly than that of the average air marshal. The fundamentals of armoured warfare, for example, have changed but little from those the general would have known as a junior subaltern. Artillery *principles,* again, have scarcely changed since World War I. The air marshal, however, has to contend with what has been, and is continuing to be, a very fast pace of technological change—not only affecting the way his force makes war, but bringing changes of doctrine and philosophy in its wake.

It is very easy—in a force so dominated by fast moving technology—to become outdated; and we seem to have arranged our peacetime affairs in such a manner that the time it takes to keep fully abreast of developments in technology is not always readily available to our senior officers. Yet if the time is not made available, there is the risk of a technological gulf between leader and led, which can lower the credibility of the former and destroy the confidence of the latter. The more "high-tech" the business (and that increasingly applies to all Services), and the more that "high tech" dominates doctrine and tactics, the greater the effort required to bridge the gulf. There is no better way of bridging that gulf than for senior officers to fly regularly with their squadrons. Time, cost, and the consequence of even small errors in technique make this too expensive to contemplate to captaincy standard, but much is achieved with participation far short of this. A renowned air marshal of the past put the advantages well; "Senior officers should fly high performance aircraft," he said, "because it is good for promotion, and the survivors are worth having."

Another, and very fundamental, difference between the Air Force and the other two Services is the way we fight our battle; generally an Air Force engages the enemy with a very small proportion of its force—the majority of whom are young aircrew officers. Furthermore, the nature of air operations is *aggressive.* And Air Force takes its war deep into the enemy hinterland, and often the young officer has to take on the might of the enemy unaided. We should not be misled by so-called *defensive* operations in this regard. When a fighter pilot gets airborne on his mission, he is actively seeking combat; he is picking the fight, he is taking the initiative. Maritime patrol must not be mistaken for meandering surveillance; the aim is to search for, to attack, and to sink those who would contest the issue.

This small group of aircrew must be selected from the outset with those warrior traits in mind, but then they must be nurtured to ensure that they do their duty enthusiastically on the day. That is no mean task. For example, we emerge, hopefully, from a period when some progressive schools have abandoned individual sports to avoid the development of competitive spirit amongst their pupils. Yet the air commander must look for those who will willingly fly with odds 2.4 to 1 against them. The task placing the leader in these circumstances is not at all straightforward. This is particu-

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larly so for the air marshal who does not steer the ship's company into the enemy broadside or lead the division "over the top." Rather, he says *go on*—not *come on.* Again, I stress, this is not cowardice on his part, but simply the way airpower works. Indeed, one can argue that a different, and no less demanding, form of leadership is required if those intelligent young aircrew members are going to continue to *go on* without the personal face-to-face motivation of their senior leaders. The air marshal has to do his leadership, inspiration, and motivation before the battle starts. It will be far too late to do anything about matters once combat is engaged.

So far I have concentrated on the aircrew side of the equation, but it is the other side—that of the ground crew—that has seen the greatest change in the demand on RAF leadership. For the majority of its short history the RAF has been able to assume, with some justification, that its bases were relatively immune from attack—situated as they were normally to the rear of the action. Three things have changed that situation. First is that we field smaller numbers of aircraft than in the past—of greatly improved performance, but nonetheless smaller total numbers on fewer bases. Second is that the potential enemy's "reach" or "range" has increased while ours, stemming largely from the Defence Reviews of the sixties, has decreased. Our "accessibility" has thereby increased. Third, the impact that airpower can have on the conduct of warfare in its own, or in either of the other two mediums, is so overwhelming that it cannot be ignored. Its very effectiveness has made it a high value target, and the business of offensive counter air operations has become a necessary feature of battle planning. Our ground crew enter the frontline war because the enemy brings the front line to them. And so our technicians have to be turned into technician/soldiers for they have to be able to defend their base as a whole and their workplace in particular, whilst at the same time servicing our complex equipment under conditions of dispersal, hardening, and in the cumbersome (but most necessary) nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) equipment.

But the requirements of both these specialisations—air and ground—are quite *different,* the training is utterly so, as are the qualities required of the leader in these two activities. And so, not only do we now look for the aggressive warrior class to take our war to the enemy, but we now need the same from those leaders operating and securing our bases.

As a Service we have come a long way towards turning our ground crew into passable soldiers, but we still have a long way to go; in the matter of physical fitness, we still have a lot to learn from our Army colleagues, and we must make more of the leadership qualities of our SNCOs than our technically orientated background has demanded in the past. Of great import is the need to rationalise our command of men at the lower commissioned levels. In the late fifties most airmen on stations were to be found under the command of General Duties (or flying branch) officers. This branch, which provides the senior leadership of the Royal Air Force, thereby provided the opportunity for leadership training and practice throughout the junior and formative years of its officers—an experience which held many in good stead later when commanding squadrons, stations, and groups.

In the early sixties it was decided by the newly popular *"managementosi"* that, because our airmen were technicians spending the majority of their time spanner-bending, it was only right and proper that they should come under the command of junior engineering officers. It also coincided with the ill-conceived move towards centralisation of servicing, which, thankfully, we have all but emerged from, closely followed recently by the US Air Force. This latter event has recently given rise to articles in the aviation press extolling the virtues of the new-found organisation.

Yet any airman or operator worth his salt has known all along that the *"managementosi"* were wrong. They were wrong because they tried to apply mathematical management to a field where both the inanimate and the human being interfaced and—finding that they had no *factor* for "esprit de corps," no *binary code* for "loyalty," no *figure* for "corporate spirit," and no *constant* for "pride"—they ignored them. Had they been leaders rather than managers, they would have known that men like belonging to units sized to permit them to identify—small enough to know their fellows, to trust them, and to have responsibility towards them. We should not, as a new Service, try to reinvent wheels; the Army has shown us through a long history what men will do for their regiment; we need to move towards this system.

Before a leader can lead he must know something about who he is leading. Ever conscious of his great achievements, man sometimes forgets his origins. He is descended from an aggressive flesh-eating ape, a hunter who still reverts to the chase but now only for sport, and one of a very small band of God's creatures who kills for enjoyment. He is averse to the unexpected and the unknown, he fears failure largely because it affects his image and thereby his acceptability amongst his fellows; he has been found vulnerable to the sights and sounds of battle and he has very finite reserves of energy; and he can become mentally and physically exhausted disappointingly quickly. While the military commander may be irked by these human frailties—General Patton's views on shell shock in World War II spring to mind—it is an unwise, and probably unsuccessful leader who ignores them.

These inbuilt human factors have been further reinforced or modified by the effects of modern society, and we should assume performance in the future which parallels that of the past only with real care. Things have changed over the years, and—from a military viewpoint—not all for the better.

First, we are dealing with a better-educated man who has been taught to question. He will ask why, and the leader must be able to answer him. That process needs to be completed before the battle starts, and there must be far more talking throughout the rank strata than was ever necessary before. Then *materialism* has to be recognised, with all its pulls and divisiveness. Welfare states and a more caring society produce a *softer* product; there is nothing particularly wrong with that per se, but our heroes will be up against a man from a much harder society—a man who makes a good soldier, as the testimony of World War II German generals shows. One answer to this is hard training, and the Falklands conflict showed how this can pay handsome dividends. But our all-volunteer forces are drawn from society as a whole and the standards of *Sparta* within cannot contrast too starkly to those of *Sodom and Gomorrah* outside if we are to attract and retain our men.

Religion is no longer a great cohesive force. While one must miss its contribution to any conflict against an anti-Christ foe, a military man might prefer the good clean fight over politics, greed, or territory rather than the almost invariably dirty war over Gods. Patriotism ebbs and flows, and because of this cannot be taken for granted. The pessimist will say that it is ebbing; I suspect that it might be flowing again in this country. It certainly seems to be in the United States where the attitude between post-Vietnam and post-Los Angeles Olympics has been transformed.

Of most concern perhaps are the political divisions. The nation seems to be increasingly polarised politically, and while the Falklands showed us at our cohesive best, it is difficult to forget Suez. How would the nation—and therefore our Servicemen—cope with Suez-like political differences now? We must never forget that we are a citizen military force drawn from all shades of opinion—not an elitist tribe.

With these pervasive factors in mind, we must not forget the impact that technology can have in magnifying human frailties. The most important by far is the ability to fight by night.

Darkness has been said to be the soldier's friend; and one can see why, when it allowed him a respite from the battle—time to eat, wash, and perform his bodily functions, on a voluntary instead of involuntary basis. Above all, night permitted sleep. Now, with the advent of terrain-following radar, unmanned systems impervious to light conditions (such as thermal imagers and night vision devices), and while facing an enemy whose doctrine demands constant pressure, where will the time be found to sleep? Yet without it, man's performance very rapidly deteriorates. This is a field where the medical profession has a major role to play—not only to do the obvious, that is to keep people awake, but also to put them to sleep when the opportunity arises. The thought that men will voluntarily fall asleep halfway through World War III is incredible; they will have to be put to sleep if they are to have proper rest. Meanwhile, we need to do much more work, experimentally, on sleep deprivation, and certainly far more exercising over extended periods. To return to Patton—he insisted that during training his troops went for a 24-hour period without sleep each week.

It is not only the led who need consideration here. The leader can be just as badly affected. Albert Speer, for example, suggests that the subjugation by Hitler of the German generals might be laid in part to their state of permanent fatigue brought about largely by the Führer's unusual work routine. Stories are told of Churchill, working to the early hours as a matter of course, being irritated when more mortal underlings were to be found abed. The physical pressures of great responsibility can be insidious and very damaging. The numbers of commanders who fell to this cause in war may be more numerous than are usually admitted (for the administrative posting can be used mercifully). But at a level where it is difficult to hide, there are enough names to impress; Rommel and Guderian, for example, both suffered from ill health. And is suicide a related thing? If so, what of Jeschonnek, Udet, Von Kluge?

I should not give the impression that it is only an affliction of the Teuton. The record of illness of US presidents shows that during this century 6 out of 10 suffered some form of incapacitating illness. To the leader the message should be clear. Be as economical with your men's physical resources as you must be with your own, and guard both as carefully as material, munitions, or fuel. Above all, practice in peace—on yourself and your men. *Industriousness* is too often equated, falsely, to *efficiency* in a peacetime force; yet if it becomes a habit it could be, in war, a self-inflicted wound.

But what of the pitfalls of leadership? Perhaps the greatest is peace. Dr. Schact put it well when he wrote that the military must be the most self-sacrificing and self-effacing of professions, because its whole effort is directed to preventing the exercise of the professional skill acquired. The lack of combat-tested officers in positions of high command speaks volumes for the wisdom and effectiveness of the nation's foreign policy over the years, but such a deficiency results in the military entering any new conflict with just one more unknown.

The peacetime system can be weakening. A career-motivated staff can mean both *professionalism* and *integrity* (if we are lucky), but—if we are not—it can mean the reign of the *yes-man,* a danger to the commander far more pointed than any hostile bullet. How well General Monash put it, when he told his staff: "I don't care a damn for your loyal service when you think I'm right; when I really want it is when you think I'm wrong."

It is too easy to suffer cognitive dissonance and to refuse to believe what is unpalatable or to refuse to change preconceived ideas or opinions, notwithstanding new facts or evidence. It can happen at the highest levels and for an amazingly long period; it is very deep rooted. Despite overwhelming evidence of what was afoot, Stalin is reported to have warned against "causing a border incident" when Operation Barbarossa was launched by Hitler. And did the Israelis not *want* to believe their intelligence reports prior to Yom Kippur? And what of our own slow appreciation of the German threat in the thirties? Leaders at all levels, high or low, should at least remain aware of human vulnerabilities in this regard.

Then there is the change of *pace.* In peace we are accustomed to take time over our decisions. Scarce resources are at stake, and quite properly we should take all possible steps to safeguard taxpayers' money and to weigh our decisions with great care. But a high intensity and dynamic war, as the next one could be, will allow no time for extensive consultation, for committees, or studies, or for the full practice of bureaucracy. *Paralysis-by-analysis* could be a terminal condition. Decisions will have to be wrung from leaders without the reassurance of such props; decisions will have to be based on *their* knowledge and perception, not that of others. It is a situation for which leaders need to prepare themselves mentally, intellectually and psychologically.

Complex subjects demanding rapid decisions can be both soul- and body-destroying to the unprepared. But this is nothing new; Samuel Johnson put it eloquently when, to obtain his answer, he asked of his correspondent: "Answer 'Yea' or 'Nay,' Sir; if your barbarous tongue permits of so subtle a distinction."

Avoiding the obvious pitfalls will not make a leader. But what will? Are they born or made? Is it some innate skill, or an art form? Or can it be taught, developed and schooled? Probably a little of everything is needed; but however much one ponders on leadership, there is always that elusive quality which it is difficult, if not impossible, to pin down—that quality which makes a man follow one leader because he wants to, another merely out of duty, and another—as the phrase has it—out of pure curiosity. Enough books have touched upon leadership, and of course a profusion of people claim to have the secrets—mostly different secrets. Perhaps it simply boils down to personal perception. So what do I look for in my leader?

Above all, he must be professionally competent. He must know his business, and at some time in his career he must have demonstrated that he is as good at it as I am—and preferably a great deal better. I want a leader who, to paraphrase Bonar Law, does not have to "hasten after me." The modern fighting man will not willingly follow a fool—nor should the system require him to do so.

Then I look for someone who is a "people" man—a man who is thrifty with his men's toil in peace, and with their skins in war. Those who talk of the "manpower resource," or that phrase (which should be banned in any unit worth its salt) "man management"—then let them manage the inanimate to their hearts content, but let them keep away from people. This is not to say that "people" leaders are cuddlesome softies; a commander's primary responsibility to his men is to ensure that, by hard and realistic preparation, they have the maximum chance of winning—and thereby living through—any conflict.

I demand of my leader a wholehearted belief in the cause, whatever that may be at the time—for without it he cannot show the enthusiasm for the grand purpose which has to be in the infectious fever of a top-class unit.

Finally, in a mercifully short list, I want a *winner.* Field Marshal Slim said that a "Commander has failed in his duty if he has not won victory—for that is his duty. He has no other comparable to it." And, of course, he is right. It does not matter whether it is the inter-squadron skittles, a tactical evaluation or World War Three, we are not in the business of coming second. And if any team continues to come second, then one day the captain will run out on the pitch by himself. *A good loser is a consistent loser.*

How do you find these leaders? What is that indeterminable factor, the intangible, the unknown which makes one man a *manager* and the other a *leader?* I believe T. E. Lawrence's comments on tactics can be applied equally to the matter of leadership. And how well he put it when he said that: "Nine-tenths of tactics are certain and taught in books, but the irrational tenth is like the Kingfisher flashing across the pool, and *that* is the test of generals."

Practical Leadership

Gen Thomas C. Richards

It's difficult to talk about leadership in a short period of time and even more difficult to discuss briefly the differences between leadership and management. Volumes have been written on both subjects, so I will not attempt to draw a distinction between the two in the short time I have.

The Air Force is a diverse organization composed of flyers and nonflyers, military and civilians, each with major leadership and management responsibilities. Should leading a squadron in combat and managing a weapons acquisition program be compared? Most would agree the answer is *no*—there are too many differences. However, many people would agree that it takes some ability with both if one is to be successful. Rather than take on both subjects, I will narrow my scope to explore leadership in the military context, drawing from my experiences in two wars and over 30 years in the military.

I believe some people are born leaders with inherent ability to command; others can be taught to varying degrees. We can remember when we were children the informal leader who emerged to take charge of the playground. On a school football team, the quarterback was designated to call the plays, but when the going was tough, the informal leaders, the guys who sparked the team all year, through the heat of the late summer practice, on the cold and wet autumn afternoons, were the ones who gave the team the courage and determination needed to make the big play—to win the game. Some people are lucky enough to be born with that kind of leadership ability. Others, through training and experience, rise to the challenge when the pressure is on.

Leadership is a vital part of today's Air Force; therefore, we cannot depend on born leaders—we must build them through formal training and progressive levels of responsibility. This training begins early in both the enlisted and officer forces. For enlisted personnel, training starts in the leadership schools that prepare our young airmen for noncommissioned officer (NCO) rank. As they progress, NCO attend our various major-command NCO academies, finally culminating at the Senior NCO Academy at Gunter Air Force Base, Alabama. This process entails a significant financial investment—an investment so important that the leadership of the Air Force has never failed to support it.

We make the same kinds of investment in training leaders in our officer corps. For officers, the process begins when they are US Air Force Academy, ROTC, or Officer Training School cadets. At the academy, a large part of the curriculum is directed at nurturing and cultivating leadership qualities over a four-year period. Officer skills are then refined and honed through organizational assignments, formal follow-on training and education at our Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, and a host of other schools.

The Air Force has another important procedure to identify and train leaders; you might call it the filter process. As officers move up through the ranks and gain experience, they are part of an overall system that identifies only the best for promotion, based on demonstrated skills and potential to lead at the next higher level. As leaders, we should continually evaluate our people, looking for individuals with special leadership skills, and then we should ensure that person is placed in positions of increased responsibility. Both our formal and informal programs to identify and nurture leaders are important to the future of the Air Force.

There are many qualities good leaders must possess. But there is an overarching principle, an attribute if you will, that all good leaders must possess: integrity. Without integrity, you cannot be a good officer or an effective NCO. Your leadership will be flawed to the point of impotence at best, destructiveness at worst. Therefore, integrity, a collection of moral and ethical standards, must guide your every decision. If you do not have integrity you are a facade, a "tinkling bell and a clanging cymbal" as the Apostle Paul put it; or, as Shakespeare's Macbeth so aptly states, you will become "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Integrity is an absolute essential for leadership.

During one of his speeches at Air University, Gen Robert T. Herres identified five guides for leadership. Let me borrow from those guidelines as I provide some additional commentary to accompany them from my own study and experiences.

Effective leadership requires the ability to communicate. An effective leader must define concepts, making the subordinates understand why the mission is important and how their actions fit into that mission. If your people do not understand their mission, your command will soon be like a ship without a rudder, floundering helplessly in troubled seas. Like a ship's captain, you have to communicate two ways: down to the crew and up to the admiral.

There is more to communicating than just giving orders. The commander who thinks it is sufficient merely to issue orders and then wait for the job to get done will fail as a leader. But that does not mean that good leaders constantly look over their people's shoulders. It does mean that leaders must develop a system for assessing the effectiveness of communication within the organization. Some call it "feedback."

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Every leader must create two-way communications: understanding and acceptance.

Even today with all the experience I've gained, I am constantly amazed at how my words, my intentions, and my orders are misinterpreted. I make it a point to talk to people at the bottom of the chain, trying to determine if they understand what my policies are on given issues. When you don't have good feedback, your intentions and orders get misinterpreted and changed as they flow down through the chain of command and out through the various organizations. When a leader makes a policy statement to the staff or issues an order verbally, it may be interpreted by each individual in a different way. It is then passed along, with another person's interpretation added to what you said. Before long, through lack of understanding, diffusion, and additional interpretations, an absolutely bizarre policy may emerge. This is something one has to guard against at all times. The larger the organization or command, the more potential there is for this to happen. Communicative skills play a most important role in leadership. Good leaders who realize that will keep in touch with their organizations to make sure that what they say is completely understood.

The second principle is to fix responsibility. The ability to fix responsibility is almost as essential as integrity in making an effective leader. Why do you have to fix responsibility? Your people have to know what you expect of them. There can be no question in their minds about what the commander expects. Again, this is a two-way street. As commander, you have to be absolutely certain your word is understood among your subordinates, and you must understand what your commander expects of you. Your responsibility is to understand the mission of your organization as your boss sees it and to fix responsibility throughout your command so that your people will understand exactly what is expected of them. When they fail to perform to the level you have defined, you, as the commander and the leader, can discuss their shortcomings in terms they can understand. The leader is the one to set the example. If one seeks authority but dodges responsibility, one is not a leader. Worse, a leader becomes an imposter, someone sitting in a seat of authority where he or she does not belong. The world is full of people who want authority but who are not willing to accept the responsibility that goes with it. Wearing the rank alone does not make you a leader.

When a leader fixes responsibility, it is important that tasks are properly and appropriately assigned. Do not give the same task to different people. The larger the organization, the more specific one has to be. It is not a good idea to toss something out and say, "Okay troops, let's go do it." If it is a fun thing that has to be done, all your people step all over each other doing it. If it's difficult, they will stand back, waiting for someone else to take the initiative. Be specific by making the right people responsible.

As leader, you are responsible for who is doing what and how he or she is doing it. You have to know so you can reward those who do a good job. If you reward the wrong people for doing a good job, you offend those who have actually performed the assignment, and, furthermore, you have lost a measure of credibility. If you have failed to define responsibility within your organization, you run the risk of not knowing who is doing what. Just remember, most people want to do things correctly. If they are properly led and given credit when credit is due, they will work well. The organization will prosper, and you will accomplish your mission.

The next guideline is to be consistent. The kindest thing you can do for your people is to be consistent in your dealings with them. We live in a world of change. In the military, new regulations are written and issued each year. There are policy changes that attempt to keep pace with the turbulent world in which we live. A good leader brings consistency to an organization. People appreciate consistency because they like to know what is going to happen and how the commander is going to react to certain situations. It is very difficult to work for someone who is consistently inconsistent. Too much unpredictability keeps people nervous. You can't praise and promote people on one day and then destroy them on the next. Being tough does not keep one from being a good leader. Some great football coaches have been very tough and demanding, but they were great because they were consistent, predictable, and their teams knew what the coach expected. Insisting on or demanding that high standards be met is not being too tough on your organization—it's how you do it that's important.

The next guideline is to learn from mistakes. Learning from our mistakes is the essence of experience. You can also learn from the mistakes of others, your friends, your commander, and your subordinates. We all make mistakes, and there are lessons in each of them. When you make a mistake, recognize it as such. Admit it to others and, most important, admit it to yourself. Then ask the difficult questions about how the mistake happened. Did I have enough information? Did I ask enough questions? Abraham Lincoln said, "I have no respect for the man who is not smarter today than he was yesterday." Perhaps the most difficult thing we have to do with ourselves is to dig deep into our own shortcomings and ask ourselves why we fail or make mistakes. This is especially true for people who continue to make the same mistake over and over.

After you have discovered the mistake, you will want to rectify the situation. Make sure that when you do so, you are correcting the appropriate problem. Too many of us cure symptoms rather than correct the cause. All too often, I read replies to IG reports that indicate organizations are working at correcting only symptoms rather than solving the problems involved. Those organizations are not going to flourish. Their commanders have failed to work the right thing, and they are destined to have the same problem surface again later.

The last guideline I offer is, be yourself. We should emulate the characteristics we admire in great leaders but must realize we cannot be those leaders. I am not a Patton or an Eisenhower, a Grant or a Lee. Neither are you. We can learn from these great leaders by reading history and studying their biographies, but we cannot become them. You can borrow tips from them by studying what they did and how they did it and trying to mold their good qualities into your own style, but you must be yourself. If you try to be anything other than yourself, you will be tagged as a phony or a buffoon. Be yourself—an honest person of integrity—and be straight with your people.

These guidelines can help you become an effective leader. If you are an effective leader, you will find great satisfaction in doing most of the things leaders do: patting people on the back, watching them grow into effective leaders, sharing in the pride of an organization that is accomplishing its mission, and quite possibly reaping the personal reward of increased responsibility through recognition from above. That's what is rewarding in leadership. Like most things in life, "it's not all fun." There is an important part of leadership responsibility that is distinctly unpleasant but absolutely essential: holding people accountable for their mistakes and taking appropriate action. It's tough, and it is unpleasant. But if a military commander cannot do these unpleasant things, then he or she is no leader.

As a leader, you have to take responsibility for the harsh realities of command. When a subordinate does something that requires punishment, you must do what is required. You have to meet your responsibility as a commander for two reasons. First, you, as the commander, set the example for the rest of the organization. Your integrity demands that you keep your organization honest. If you do not lie, cheat, or steal, then your organization must know that lying, cheating, or stealing will not be tolerated in your organization. Second, there is a deterrent effect in punishment. If you punish the troublemakers, others will think twice before crossing over that line between what is acceptable and legal and what is not. If you cannot handle this tough part of leadership, the organization will sense it, and you will lose credibility. Furthermore, the troublemakers will multiply, and your organization, including the 95 percent who are decent folks, will suffer.

In summary, leading successfully is the most rewarding challenge one can experience. There is no better way to do it than to lead by example. The virtues of a good leader will be an example for others to emulate. Someday, a 100 years from now, maybe some future general will be admonishing junior officers to study Patton, MacArthur, and *you* as examples of good leadership. I sincerely hope so.

Leadership and High Technology

Brig Gen Stuart R. Boyd

In August of 1940, just a few months after the German army had swept through France and introduced the world to the power of a mechanized advance, the US Army began large-scale training maneuvers in Louisiana. In the face of the success of the German blitzkrieg, you might have expected to see our forces searching out new ways to counter the threat of tank and technology. Such was not the case. As the forces gathered, a serious logistics problem soon developed. There were not enough horses to go around. As we approached the dawn of the Second World War, we still clung to the thrill of the cavalry charge. Technology was not yet an integral part of our military force. Gen George S. Patton, a staunch advocate of the horse cavalry, wrote in 1926, "It is the cold glitter in the attacker's eye, not the point of the questing bayonet, that breaks the line. It is the fierce determination of the drive to close with the enemy, not the mechanical perfection of the tank, that conquers the trench. It is the cataclysmic ecstasy of conflict in the flier, not the perfection of his machine gun that drops the enemy in flaming ruin."

History is full of examples of reluctance to adjust to change, especially changes associated with the introduction of new technologies. The French at the Battle of Crécy spent the flower of their knighthood against the power of the English longbow. Millions fell before the machine gun in World War I. Even Henry Ford, "Father of the Model T," was reluctant to introduce colors other than black or the six-cylinder engine. Change is a key factor in effective leadership. New technology, however, has a greater impact than simply the process of change that occurs inside an organization.

The importance of "high tech" to today's decision maker has never been greater. Significant portions of our defense dollar are spent on research and development, although some argue that such expenditures remain inadequate to meet the challenge. Weapon systems grow more complicated and expensive at an ever-accelerating rate. Today's F-6C has more than 10 times the computer capacity of the lunar landing module that carried man to the surface of the moon only a short 15 years ago. As new technologies evolve, we need to decide how we, as military leaders, are to interact with this technical explosion. That is the purpose of this paper, to explore some ideas concerning the relationship between leadership and technology. Let's start with a definition of technology.

In the broadest sense, *technology* refers to any enhancement of human ability to move faster, shout louder, hit harder, see sharper, calculate faster, or whatever. Technology and weaponry have always been intimately connected. I believe it was George Bernard Shaw who pointed out that man's genius is best observed, not in his housing or clothing, but in his weapons. Weapons have always been needed to ensure our security and, in some cases, our survival. Maintenance of security is a responsibility that is assigned to the military—thus, military leaders will always have to deal with the technology that is embodied in the new weapons that they are provided.

The essential elements of military leadership do not change. There are many definitions, but this one by Gen E. M. Flanagan Jr., writing in *Army* (April 1988), seems to capture most of the critical elements: "Leadership in the Army, simply stated, is the ability to get a unit to accomplish a given mission efficiently (of time, resources, casualties) and willingly, or at least cooperatively." Although the essential elements of military leadership never change, technology, an essential instrument of mission success, is in constant flux. The challenge for the military leader is to recognize and use whatever technology is available; to dominate that technology, not to be dominated by it.

The problem is not technology per se; it is the adaptive process of the leader to technology that is the issue. We have had to adapt to the longbow, the tank, the airplane, and now the challenges and opportunities of outer space. Your role as a military leader is to integrate the technologies of today into the accomplishment of your mission—be it peace or war. At the same time, you must be ready to work with the rapidly evolving technologies of the future.

Let us now focus on some of the characteristics of high technology. We frequently concentrate on the wonderful things to be gained by new technologies. However, the introduction of new developments also causes problems. In this regard, this portion of the paper could be aptly titled, "potholes on the road to the successful integration of leadership and technology."

1. Just load the data and the computer will give you the answer. Many of you will recall the movie *War Games*. In this movie a bright young teenager hacks his way into a mythical computer system housed at NORAD and almost starts World War III. The final scenes are filmed in the command post where a number of senior officers are staring at the electronically generated battle, helpless to deal with the runaway computer that is bent on "winning the game." Though the fiction of the situation is absurd, the idea of an electronic system isolated from any human intervention is real. When dealing with high technology there can be a tendency to become isolated from the reality of the situation. I recently saw an advertisement for a computer to be used to assist the ground plan-

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ner in the NATO environment. The advertisement emphasized the idea that the maximum use of symbols was a strong selling point since it allowed the decision maker to "avoid the need for person-to-person communication in a difficult multilingual environment." High tech can be impersonal.

2. With a computer you get all the information you want—immediately. In the classic military battles speed was often critical. The speed of the fastest horse decided many engagements. Now we have systems that instantly provide the logistic planner the location and status of every part of the F-16 or B-1. Technology can provide real-time information—regardless of the accuracy of the data loaded. Traditional methods of staffing, though sometimes bureaucratic and frustrating, provided time to check data before they went to the decision maker. With the introduction of applications of expert systems using artificial intelligence, we will see this tendency to rely on the computer increase. A computer can provide lots of incorrect information very rapidly.

3. It must be correct, it's computed to the 10th decimal place. High technology provides an impression of precision. Who can argue with the reams of computer printouts being generated by high-speed laser printer from a mainframe computer supported by banks of tape drives? When I attended Squadron Officer School we had to complete a staff study. The format included sections that identified assumptions as well as data sources. This permitted the logic of the decision process to be clarified for the reader. Such an approach, however, is not available when using many of our current technologies. We now rely on software, developed by someone else, for which we couldn't read the code even if it were available. How many people, even if they are comfortable with computers, spend time "studying" the documentation? The precision of a computer answer may lure you into a false sense of security. I can recall struggling with a french curve trying to find a "fit" for some very scattered data points. Since the rules said the raw data had to be plotted, the world would know how I arrived at my conclusions. In today's world, the computer does all of that for you and draws a nice, smooth, multicolored graph—all at the speed of light.

4. I really don't understand these new technologies and techniques, but I don't want to look stupid. High tech can be intimidating. Because it is complex and mysterious, the senior decision maker is faced with a new set of problems. As previously mentioned, the process can be difficult to understand. The people who do understand the process are probably not on the senior staff since the education needed to work with these new technologies is more available to junior personnel. How will you integrate tools such as marginal analysis, effectiveness ratios, or a weighted decision matrix into your decision process? Can you integrate these tools if you do not really understand them? If you look at the history of the eastern front in World War II, there is not a computer programmer in the world who could have given the German army more than three months. The German forces were outnumbered, outgunned, and undersupplied. However, despite their eventual defeat, they conducted a brilliant campaign lasting almost three years. Training and discipline held out for a long period of time against far superior odds.

5. Since technology continues to improve, if you can wait till tomorrow I can promise you a "better" answer. A significant portion of my career has been involved in research and development. One thing I have seen time and time again is the engineer who can always make it just a little better. In peacetime, it is this allure of making "it" more combat effective, even with tight schedules and limited funding that has been the downfall of many programs. In wartime, it can be the "promise" of turning around an impossible tactical situation with "this new miracle weapon to be delivered tomorrow." Tomorrow's leaders must understand the risks associated with searching for the optimum solution.

6. If you want more information, the computer can turn out products as long as you want to ask for them. Tomorrow's leaders will have at their fingertips everything they could possibly want to know about the status of their unit. This information will not be reserved for just the unit commander. Every level of command can look into what is happening at a particular location or in a particular situation. Every dollar expended, every takeoff aborted—everything can be reviewed and questioned. George Orwell's book, *1984,* introduced "big brother," who can look into every aspect of our lives. The technology is now available to make *1984* a reality. A military commander no longer has to leave the office to determine how things are going in the tire shop or whether bombing scores are getting better or worse. As a commander, what will you do when you call up a computer screen that shows nobody ate liver at the dining hall last evening! How are the leaders of tomorrow going to use the vast amount of information they will have at their fingertips? How do you, as a leader, operate in an environment of "total information"?

In wartime, the problems can become even more complex. Numerous sensors feeding back to a central data bank can provide a myriad of information to the commander. Even the pilot can become saturated with dozens of inputs requiring rapid decisions. The wartime implications of total information are even more challenging than those of peacetime.

7. Instant communication is here today. During several recent military operations, technology provided the capability to communicate with forces actually engaged in combat. Was this more effective than the earlier methods of indirect, delayed communications? One of the reasons for the German defeat at Stalingrad is attributed to the attempts by Hitler to direct the battle from the bunker in Berlin. The role of future communications is critical. The capability to direct an F-16 squadron halfway round the world is real. Modern communications systems allow us to make a decision immediately. Sometimes an "instant" decision may not be wise—the situation may change or the weather worsen. Rapid communications can pressure a leader into furnishing "an answer" even if such an answer could and should wait.

8. Technology is a tool—but it cannot consider everything—especially such intangibles as discipline, motivation, and so forth. This last pothole can be the most dangerous. Some of the best military decisions have been based on what a leader "felt" was the best course of action. For all the controversy surrounding General MacArthur, the Inchon landing was a masterpiece of military strategy. Almost everyone

said it should not be done. The bay was too shallow, the tides too high—everyone, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), had a reason it would fail. In the past, leadership was developed in field exercises where the smell of dust and sweat was part of the learning experience. Leaders learned to "feel" the right way to go and how to best motivate their troops depending on the situation. Today, we are moving more and more to the world of computer war gaming. After you make your "decision" the computer will make the calculations and tell you whether you are an "effective" leader or not. In such computerized training, how does tomorrow's leader learn to develop "gut sense" that has led to many of the great decisions of the past?

At this point, you may be wondering how you can get down the road at all since it is so full of potholes. Let me offer a few suggestions to avoid some of the deeper ones.

1. Develop a concept of *inner tennis.* One of the current sports fads is to focus on a key element of an activity in a "mind-over-matter" mode. You "picture" yourself as a great skier or a par golfer. In tennis, you discipline yourself to always keep your eye on the ball. In the case of being able to function effectively in the world of high technology, the same technique can be used. Keep your eye on the objective. Don't drive off the road because of the potholes. Not matter how seductive the technology, don't lose sight of your organizational goals. Practice inner tennis.

2. Use a "technology telescope." A telescope allows you to search ahead and better define where you are headed. It makes things clearer. Today's technology can be used to provide tools not available five years ago. Find out what tools can be used and integrate them into your organization. Depending on the uniqueness of your organization, one set of tools will not work for everyone.

3. Understand what technology can and can't do for you. Technology changes rapidly. You are not going to be able to keep up unless you make an effort. The importance of education to both you and your unit will continue to grow. My education focused on slide rules and vacuum tubes. Without periodic updates you cannot expect to be capable of making prudent decisions. Technology comes loaded with all sorts of seductive charms. If you don't take the time to understand the underlying principles, you just might fall in love with the slick allure of all those high-tech bells and whistles.

4. Technology is a micromanager's dream—don't get caught in the trap. These new technologies provide an opportunity to drive a staff crazy with dozens of questions, all developed by paging through your computer screens, and all delivered by electronic mail. Centralized management and information saturation can result in an organizational self-destruct. Tomorrow's leaders must discipline themselves to stay out of this mode. They must also establish an environment that does not force their staffs to operate in this mode.

Technology will tend to drive you away from your people. Don't forget the basic adage: the effective leader spends at least 25 percent of his/her time "out with the troops." The need to discipline yourself to be in the organization is more difficult in an information-rich, rapid-communications world. The military histories of tomorrow are not going to focus on who wrote the most vivid electronic message. Your most critical resource is people. You must gain their confidence, stimulate their productivity, and reward their accomplishments. The only way this can be done is to get out from behind your computer terminal.

Where then do you fit into this environment of technology? More importantly, what are you going to do to better adapt your leadership strengths and weaknesses to the changes ahead? As a leader, you will be expected to understand and shape the technologies you are using to meet mission requirements. No matter what kind of organization you are with—from fighter squadron to system program office—there are tools here that can improve productivity and develop a happier, harder working unit.

This paper has discussed a number of potential problem areas associated with high tech. The list is longer. You and your staff could spend some valuable time exploring this area and deciding how you will avoid some of the potholes.

I have also shared a few ideas on things that will make the process easier and more effective. Keep in mind that we are currently experiencing major funding reductions. The old days of "doing more with less" are gone. The new days of "working smarter" are here. I challenge you to get on board; high tech can save you—or sink you.

Principles of Servant Leadership

Ken Blanchard

In Robert Greenleaf's book, *Servant Leadership*, he talks about two types of leaders, strong *natural leaders* and strong *natural servants*. Strong natural leaders are those who try to take control, making decisions and giving the orders, in any situation they find themselves. They have a strong need to be in charge.

Strong natural servants, on the other hand, assume the leadership role only if they see it as a way they can serve the organization. You would think that natural leaders would employ a directive autocratic style, while natural servants would use the more supportive participate styles. This assumption falls short because it confuses style with character. Strong natural servants are willing to use whatever leadership style—directive, supporting, or some kind of combination—that best serves the needs of those they lead.

The problem with a lot of leaders today is that they feel the need to micromanage people. Law after law is passed down with the notion that the decisions being made will dramatically improve the lives of their constituents, without really understanding those needs. Politically correct decision making has been more about which sides of the political line our leaders stand on—not what they believe is truly best for the American people.

Servant leadership asserts the belief that the sheep do not exist for the sake of the shepherd, but rather the shepherd exists for the sake of the sheep. This doesn't mean, however, that the natural servant polls their sheep on what pasture they will eat from next, what water hole they might drink from down the road, or what direction they will use to get back home—servant leadership is not about pleasing everybody. It's not about a popularity contest. It's about making sure the mission is accomplished.

The reality concerning leadership is that sometimes you are going to have to make tough decisions. You are not going to be able to say yes to everybody. But all of the decisions you make as a leader need to be made in view of what is best for the people you are leading.

Servant leadership gives the power back to the people. It sounds cliché, but the simple truths that founded this nation—*Of the People, By the People, and For the People*—must remain true if our nation is to survive long enough to see ourselves through another century.

Though character is the foundation of servant leadership, today's leaders need to be flexible and fearless enough to use the appropriate leadership style for the appropriate situation in order to assure that the needs of their people are met. We cannot afford to sit back and allow the same old political styles of leadership to drive our nation and its organizations into extinction. We must raise up servant leaders in our communities to ensure a meaningful life is freely pursued and lived by all of us.

This article was prepared especially for AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership*.

Learning about Leadership

Lt Col Jim Lauria, EdD

Calling upon my 35 years of experience as a military commissioned and noncommissioned officer, police patrol officer, chief of police, and as a trainer and consultant to the private sector, I have had the honor of analyzing hundreds of issues that leaders are confronted with on a daily basis. I have distilled these issues into three basic competencies that could help leaders become effective. The three competencies are as follows:

1. Playing three distinct roles daily and sometimes hourly.
   - The roles are leader, manager, and follower.
   - Leaders must know what role they should be in.
   - They must have a "mental model" of what success looks like in that role.
   - They must know the sequence and order of when to be in which role.
2. Dealing with the constant inconsistencies within the organization.
   - A misapplication of your role may block your view to resolving an inconsistency.
   - Leaders must learn to get out of their own way sometimes.
3. Knowing where the "point of the sword" (where the work is being accomplished) is.
   - Leaders must understand that the role they are in will affect where the point of the sword should be placed.
   - They must know what it takes to keep the sword sharp so that it does exactly, not more or less, but exactly what it is supposed to do.

These three competencies will help leaders only if they have built a foundation of integrity, courage, commitment, and passion because without these characteristics in the leader's foundation, not much will help them become more effective, efficient, or successful.

I have been lucky enough to experience the full spectrum of leadership from the era of authoritative leadership, through the situational phase, to where we find ourselves today—in partnerships where collaboration and cooperation have become increasingly necessary. To make partnerships successful, leaders must clearly understand and be comfortable with the roles they must play as leaders, managers, and followers.

The leaders must understand both the logical as well as the emotional elements of the enterprise and help to merge the heads and the hearts of the people, while tempering their leadership with practicality and reason. They must respect themselves and others and engage in collaborative relationships based on trust and integrity while playing whatever role necessary to exert power toward achieving the mutual goals of the organization and the people.

From the many definitions of leadership, management, and followership, I have chosen to use the following ones: leaders do the right things; managers influence the followers to do those right things efficiently; and followers do the work of the organization. Adams and Fenwick write that leadership is an interactive process that relies upon the leaders, managers, and followers to come together in common pursuit of the organization's goals.[1] Leaders must understand that to be successful they must assume and be comfortable in each of these roles at any given time throughout the day. It is for this reason that they must know what role to be in, when they should be in it, and the characteristics of each role.

An example of this concept is that in the leader role you set direction, envision the future, and decide where the organization should be in the next few years. Followers need help from you and need for you to be in your management role, helping them do their job more efficiently or removing some type of barrier for them. If you find yourself in a leadership role, giving the follower the vision of the organization or setting direction will not help. Even assuming a follower role will not help the follower get the job done now and will hurt the organization over the long haul.

Another scenario would be that the follower is doing fine and you decide to come into the situation in a manager role, or worse, a micromanager role. When the follower is doing fine, the leader or follower role works very well. Often followers find an opportunity to display leadership and management skills. If the opportunity arises and those skills are overshadowed by leadership or micromanagement roles, their growth and motivation will be tremendously inhibited, and may cause some attitude problems.

Not knowing the role or assuming a role out of sequence and order can be disastrous to relationships and will assuredly inhibit performance. Leaders must learn the characteristics of each role and practice until they become second nature. If a leader is uncomfortable being in a specific role, it will become obvious and will be seen as phony or condescending. The leader's integrity and honesty will compensate for only a few mistakes in the area of a misapplication of the roles.

The complex web of human relationships, coupled with the rules and regulations of the organization and driven by

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the organization's need to be successful, creates a number of inconsistencies or paradoxes. Most problems caused by these inconsistencies don't have concrete solutions, so leaders must develop the capacity to understand them, develop the ability to function effectively, and entertain opposing ideas, all from the perspective of the roles of leader, manager, or follower.

Here are a few of the inconsistencies that have caused the greatest stress and discomfort in my career as well as in the careers of others:

- having to make a correct decision without complete information
- developing followers' abilities to perform and succeed as individuals while cooperating and working in teams toward achievement of organizational goals
- coping with sometime brutal business realities while preserving human values and dignity
- being totally aware of what is going on without micromanaging and looking over people's shoulders
- balancing dedication to work with responsibilities to the family
- caring for people and firing people; sometime they are one and the same
- creating rapport with people without seeming to play favorites
- creating a sense of urgency without creating undue anxiety and stress
- embracing risk-taking and rewarding effort while avoiding mistakes that could cripple the enterprise

By acknowledging that there will be inconsistencies in the organization, by knowing the organization, and by having rapport with people, leaders may be better able to anticipate where the inconsistencies will surface. If they can identify where they may surface, they can collaborate with the workforce or the unions to try to deal with them in the most effective and efficient way.

I used the "point of the sword" metaphor because in my mind the point is where the work is being accomplished. Where the work is being accomplished is the place to put as much of the resources as possible. Using that example, leaders must understand what role needs to be played and what work needs to be accomplished. As an example, if the profits are low, the point of the sword would be inserted in such a way as to enhance the profits. In this situation, the leadership role would be the most appropriate because there may be some critical decisions to be made in a hurry.

Another example may be the situation in which the organization is growing, sales are flourishing, and getting the products out the door to the customers is the critical success factor. The point of the sword would be the first-line supervisors, as they are directly in contact with the workforce. At this point, they become the thin line between success and failure and every ounce of organizational energy should be placed there.

Leaders must understand the needs of the organization and the role they must be playing to expertly drive the point of the sword into the situation to effect the desired outcome. Keep in mind, the sword can work only if it is kept sharp and it is used correctly and expertly. A dull instrument used improperly will cause more damage than if there were no intervention at all.

These three competencies come about through continual learning, maintaining situational awareness, taking care of ourselves physically and mentally, being committed to the enterprise, and having a driving passion to succeed.

Notes

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Profile of a Leader: The Wallenberg Effect

Lt Col, John C. Kunich
Dr. Richard I. Lester

Executive Summary

This is a study of the leadership principles employed by Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat who went to Budapest in 1944 to intervene on behalf of Hungary's 700,000 Jews, who were being deported by the Nazis to extermination camps. This extended case narrative profiles the extraordinary accomplishments of a truly unique leader. The leadership implications addressed herein are timely, because the study of leadership is beginning to overcome decades of intellectual neglect.

Wallenberg is credited with having saved close to 100,000 lives. On 5 October 1981, the president and Congress recognized Wallenberg's contribution to humanity when they named him only the second person ever to be awarded honorary United States citizenship; the other is Winston Churchill. By joint resolution, the United States Congress also designated on 5 October 1989 as Raoul Wallenberg Day. In addition, the street in front of the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., has been renamed Raoul Wallenberg Plaza.

Leadership is movement in a resistant medium. Leadership is also the capacity to translate intentions into reality and sustain them. Leaders take charge and make things happen. They create a new reality for the purpose they serve. This case study is intended to demonstrate how Wallenberg exercised leadership and how he refused to be indifferent, complacent, or ignorant of the suffering of others. Wallenberg emerges from a sordid chapter in human history as a courageous and compassionate leader—a symbol of the best mankind has to offer.

The Wallenberg Effect

During the waning months of World War II, the Allies were desperate for ways to stop Hitler's slaughter of innocent civilians in Eastern Europe. Even as the prospects for an Axis military victory dimmed, the Nazis grew more determined to complete the "final solution." Death camps operated at maximum capacity in a feverish effort to rid Europe of Jews and other target groups. Until a complete military triumph could be secured, the Allies were powerless to halt the genocide raging on behind enemy lines. Therefore, a volunteer was sought—someone who could go where Allied tanks and aircraft could not, and disrupt the insidious Nazi death machine.

No one could have been a less obvious choice for this mission than Raoul Wallenberg. Wallenberg was 32 years old in 1944, a wealthy upper-class Swede from a prominent, well-respected family. Sweden's neutrality in the war was only one in a long series of ready-made excuses life had handed young Wallenberg, had he wanted to use them to refuse the rescue mission. He was not Jewish; he was rich; he was well-connected politically; he was in line to take the helm of the vast Wallenberg financial empire; and he had everything to lose and nothing to gain by accepting this challenge.

Wallenberg was recommended for this endeavor by Koloman Lauer, a business partner who was involved with the new War Refugee Board. Lauer felt that Raoul possessed the proper combination of dedication, skill, and courage—despite his youth and inexperience—and that his famous family name would afford him some protection. Wallenberg proved eager to serve, but he boldly demanded and was granted a great deal of latitude in the methods he would use.

When he learned that Adolf Eichmann was transporting roughly 10,000–12,000 Hungarian Jews to the gas chambers each day, Wallenberg hastily prepared to travel to Budapest. His "cover" was that of a diplomat, with the official title of first secretary of the Swedish legation. He conceived a plan whereby false Swedish passports (*Schutzpasse*) would be created and used to give potential victims safe passage out of Nazi-controlled territory. In conjunction with this, a series of safe houses would be established within Hungary in the guise of official Swedish legation buildings under diplomatic protection. With this scheme still forming in his mind, "Swedish diplomat" Wallenberg entered Hungary at the request of the United States War Refugee Board and his own government on 6 July 1944, with a mission of saving as many of Hungary's Jews as possible from Nazi liquidation.

He designed the fake passports himself. They were masterpieces of the type of formal, official-appearing pomp that was so impressive to the Nazis. Wallenberg, though young, had traveled and studied extensively abroad, both in the United States (where he attended the University of Michigan as a student of architecture) and in Europe, and he knew how to deal with people and get things done. He worked hard at understanding enemies as well as allies, to know what motivated them, what they admired, what they feared, and what they respected. He correctly concluded that the Nazis and Hungarian Fascists (Arrow Cross) with whom he would be dealing responded best to absolute authority and official sta-

Reprinted with permission from *The Journal of Leadership Studies*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1994): 94–107. Excerpt from *USA Today*, Thursday, 21 March 1991.

tus. He used this principle in fashioning his passports as well as in his personal encounters with the enemy.

Wallenberg began with 40 important contacts in Budapest, and quickly cultivated others who were willing to help. It is estimated that under Wallenberg's leadership, he and his associates distributed Swedish passports to 20,000 of Budapest's Jews and protected 13,000 more in safe houses that he rented and which flew the Swedish flag. However, Eichmann continued to pursue his own mission with fanatical zealous devotion, and the death camps roared around the clock. Trains packed with people, crammed 80 to a cattle car, with nothing but a little water and a bucket for waste, constantly made the four-day journey from Budapest to Auschwitz and back again. The Hungarian countryside was already devoid of Jews, and the situation in the last remaining urban enclaves was critical. And so Wallenberg himself plunged into the midst of the struggle.

Sandor Ardai was sent by the Jewish underground to drive for Wallenberg. Ardai later told of one occasion when Wallenberg intercepted a trainload of Jews about to leave for Auschwitz. Wallenberg swept past the SS officer, who ordered him to depart. In Ardai's words,

> Then he climbed up on the roof of the train and began handing in protective passes through the doors which were not yet sealed. He ignored orders from the Germans for him to get down, then the Arrow Cross men began shooting and shouting at him to go away. He ignored them and calmly continued handing out passports to the hands that were reaching out for them. I believe the Arrow Cross men deliberately aimed over his head, as not one shot hit him, which would have been impossible otherwise. I think this is what they did because they were so impressed by his courage. After Wallenberg had handed over the last of the passports, he ordered all those who had one to leave the train and walk to a caravan of cars parked nearby, all marked in Swedish colors. I don't remember exactly how many, but he saved dozens off that train, and the Germans and Arrow Cross were so dumbfounded they let him get away with it![1]

As the war situation deteriorated for the Germans, Eichmann diverted trains from the death camp routes for more direct use in supplying troops. But all this meant for his victims was that they now had to walk to their destruction. In November 1944, Eichmann ordered the 125-mile-death-marches, and the raw elements soon combined with deprivation of food and sleep to turn the roadside from Budapest to the camps into one massive graveyard. Wallenberg made frequent visits to the stopping areas to do what he could. In one instance, Wallenberg announced his arrival with all the authority he could muster, and then,

> 'You there!' The Swede pointed to an astonished man, waiting for his turn to be handed over to the executioner. 'Give me your Swedish passport and get in that line,' he barked. 'And you, get behind him. I know I issued you a passport.' Wallenberg continued, moving fast, talking loud, hoping the authority in his voice would somewhat rub off on these defeated people. . . . The Jews finally caught on. They started groping in pockets for bits of identification. A driver's license or birth certificate seemed to do the trick. The Swede was grabbing them so fast, the Nazis, who couldn't read Hungarian anyway, didn't seem to be checking. Faster, Wallenberg's eyes urged them, faster, before the game is up. In minutes he had several hundred people in his convoy. International Red Cross trucks, there at Wallenberg's behest, arrived and the Jews clambered on. . . . Wallenberg jumped into his own car. He leaned out of the car window and whispered, 'I am sorry,' to the people he was leaving behind. 'I am trying to take the youngest ones first,' he explained. 'I want to save a nation.'[2]

This type of action worked many times. Wallenberg and his aides would encounter a death march, and, while Raoul shouted orders for all those with Swedish protective passports to raise their hands, his assistants ran up and down the prisoners' ranks, telling them to raise their hands whether or not they had a document. Wallenberg "then claimed custody of all who had raised their hands and such was his bearing that none of the Hungarian guards opposed him. The extraordinary thing was the absolutely convincing power of his behavior," according to Joni Moser.[3]

Wallenberg indirectly helped many who never even saw his face, because as his deeds were talked about, they inspired hope, courage, and action in many people who otherwise felt powerless to escape destruction. He became a symbol of good in a part of the world dominated by evil, and a reminder of the hidden strengths within each human spirit.

Tommy Lapid was 13 years old in 1944 when he was one of 900 people crowded 15 or 20 to a room in one of the Swedish safe houses. His account illustrates not only vintage Wallenberg tactics, but also how Wallenberg epitomized hope and righteousness, and how his influence extended throughout the land as a beacon to those engulfed in the darkness of despair.

> One morning, a group of these Hungarian Fascists came into the house and said all the able-bodied women must go with them. We knew what this meant. My mother kissed me and I cried and she cried. We knew we were parting forever and she left me there, an orphan to all intents and purposes. Then, two or three hours later, to my amazement, my mother returned with the other women. It seemed like a mirage, a miracle. My mother was there—she was alive and she was hugging me and kissing me, and she said one word: 'Wallenberg.' I knew who she meant because Wallenberg was a legend among the Jews. In the complete and total hell in which we lived, there was a savior-angel somewhere, moving around. After she had composed herself, my mother told me that they were being taken to the river when a car arrived and out stepped Wallenberg—and they knew immediately who it was, because there was only one such person in the world. He went up to the Arrow Cross leader and protested that the women were under his protection. They argued with him, but he must have had incredible charisma, some great personal authority, because there was absolutely nothing behind him, nothing to back him up. He stood out there in the street, probably feeling the loneliest man in the world, trying to pretend there was something behind him. They could have shot him there and then in the street and nobody would have known about it. Instead, they relented and let the women go.[4]

Virtually alone in the middle of enemy territory, outnumbered and outgunned beyond belief, Wallenberg worked miracles on a daily basis. His weapons were courage, self-confidence, ingenuity, understanding of his adversaries, and ability to inspire others to achieve the goals he set. His leadership was always in evidence. The Nazis and Arrow Cross did not know how to deal with such a man. Here was someone thickly cloaked in apparent authority, but utterly devoid of actual political or military power. Here was a man who was everything they wished they could be in terms of personal strength of character, but for the fact that he was their polar opposite in purpose.

It is impossible to calculate precisely how many people Raoul Wallenberg directly or indirectly saved from certain death. Some estimate the number saved as close to 100,000, and countless more may have survived, in part, because of the hope and determination they derived from his leadership and example.[5] Additionally, he inspired other neutral embassies and the International Red Cross office in Budapest to join in his efforts to protect the Jews. But the desperate days just prior to the Soviet occupation of Budapest presented Wallenberg with his greatest challenge and most astonishing triumph.

Eichmann planned to finish the extermination of the remaining 100,000 Budapest Jews in one enormous massacre; if there was no time to ship them to the death camps, then he would let their own neighborhoods become their slaughterhouses. To cheat the Allies out of at least part of their victory, he would order some 500 SS men and a large number of Arrow Cross to ring the ghetto and murder the Jews right there. Wallenberg learned of this plot through his network of contacts and tried to intimidate some lower-ranking authorities into backing down, but with the Soviets on their doorsteps, many ceased to care what happened to them. His only hope, and the only hope for the 100,000 surviving Jews, was the overall commander of the SS troops, Gen August Schmidthuber.

Wallenberg sent a message to Schmidthuber that, if the massacre took place, he would ensure Schmidthuber was held personally responsible and would see him hanged as a war criminal. The bluff worked. The slaughter was called off, and the city fell out of Nazi hands soon thereafter when the Soviet troops rolled in. Thus, tens of thousands were saved in this one incident alone.

But while peace came to Europe, Wallenberg's fate took a very different path. He vanished, and the whole truth of what happened to him has not been revealed even to this day [*Editor's note*: See addendum to this case]. From various sources, though, the following seems to have occurred.

The Soviets took Wallenberg into custody when they occupied Budapest, probably because they suspected him of being an anti-Soviet spy. For a decade, they denied any involvement in Wallenberg's disappearance. Then they admitted having incarcerated him, but claimed he died in prison of a heart attack in 1947, when he would have been 35 years old. Since then, however, many people who have served time in Soviet prisons have reported seeing Wallenberg, conversing with him, or communicating with him through tap codes. Others have heard of him and his presence in the prisons but had no direct contact. The Soviets have denied the accuracy of all of these reports and have never deviated from their official position. But in 1989, Soviet officials met with members of Wallenberg's family and turned over some of his personal effects. Reportedly, a genuine investigation was launched in an effort to determine the truth. Whether the years and the prisons will ever yield up their secrets remains to be seen.

In Israel there is today a grove of trees, planted by the Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority, or *Yad Vashem.* Known as the *Avenue of the Righteous,* each tree memorializes a "righteous Gentile," someone who risked his or her life to help Jews during the holocaust. The trees stand in silent testament to those who, in the words of a former speaker of Israel's parliament, "saved not only the Jews but the honor of Man."[6]

Along with Raoul Wallenberg's tree, there is a medal. His medal bears the language of the Talmud and summarizes his mission in the words, "Whoever saves a single soul, it is as if he had saved the whole world."

The chairman of *Yad Vashem,* Gideon Hausner, who also prosecuted Adolf Eichmann, summarized his feelings for Raoul Wallenberg in this way:

> Here is a man who had the choice of remaining in secure, neutral Sweden when Nazism was ruling Europe. Instead, he left this haven and went to what was then one of the most perilous places in Europe, Hungary. And for what? To save Jews. He won his battle, and I feel that in this age when there is so little to believe in—so very little on which our young people can pin their hopes and ideals—he is a person to show to the world, which knows so little about him. That is why I believe the story of Raoul Wallenberg should be told and his figure, in all its true proportions, projected into human minds.[7]

There is much we all can learn from Raoul Wallenberg's life. Young and old alike need heroes, role models, people to remind us of the immensity of human potential for good in the midst of evil. The United States Congress recognized this when it made Wallenberg only the second person ever to be awarded honorary United States citizenship; the other is Winston Churchill. On that occasion, one television news commentator spoke for millions when he said, "It is human beings such as Raoul Wallenberg who make life worth living."

Leaders at every level can make use of Wallenberg's life and example to enhance their ability to inspire, to motivate, and to succeed. Leadership is difficult to define, but "you know it when you see it." Looking at Wallenberg's heroic work in Hungary, one sees leadership in action. We will now more closely examine his leadership style. There are several elements of what we shall call the *Wallenberg Effect,* which can be adapted and incorporated into each leader's own personal style and situation.

Knowledge

Wallenberg's success was largely based upon knowledge—of his enemies, of resources available to both sides, of the limits as to what was permissible, and of himself. This information enables a leader to understand each situation within a context that will allow a reasoned course of action. This is why knowing the facts and the substantive details surrounding issues has always been and always will be an integral part of a leader's decision-making and problem-solving ability.

The traditional types of information gathered, such as planned actions, location, movement, numerical strength, type and condition of circumstances, and availability of material resources are obviously important. But Wallenberg proved the utility of subtler information as well. Because he understood the way his enemies thought and felt, because he comprehended what motivated them, he knew which buttons to push in each individual situation. He knew the great deference to authority and the fear of those in positions of power that were part of the Nazi and Arrow Cross mentality. This enabled him to bluff them with his false passports and with his air of officialdom so as to achieve excellent, seemingly impossible results. Wallenberg had a commanding presence, which is a hallmark of the effective leader, but that presence was fortified with a knowledge of how he would be perceived by his adversaries.

He also understood the rules of the game he was playing, as they applied to him, his associates, and their opponents. In effect, Wallenberg was very much a situational leader. He was able to adapt his behavior to meet the demands of the unique circumstances that confronted him. This is why he demanded and obtained authority from the Allies to use deception, bribery, and threats, and to invoke Swedish immunity as needed. He was in an environment where such tactics were the rule rather than the exception; they worked for others, and he knew he could make them work for him. As a leader, Wallenberg was out front, not hiding behind a desk or behind bureaucratic inertia. He showed initiative. He responded to an obvious need with imagination and creativity. He understood what was involved and he fully accepted the consequences.

Finally, he knew himself. He had a grasp of his talents and weaknesses and how they fit in with those of his opponents. Thus, what he could not possibly have accomplished through military force or physical violence, he did through bravado, intimidation, and illusion. Any other tactics would have met with crushing defeat. This is not to imply that leaders should always behave in this manner. It simply suggests that these strategies employed by Wallenberg were essential to fulfill his objective under the most extraordinary of conditions, and that they were chosen with full comprehension of the alternatives and their consequences.

In essence, the Wallenberg Effect suggests that becoming a mature leader means first becoming yourself, learning who you are and what you stand for. Implicit in this notion is the theory of self-discovery, getting in touch with oneself. Wallenberg teaches us that to grow as a leader involves reflecting on oneself, putting values in perspective, thinking about the task to be accomplished, and influencing others to get the job done. Wallenberg's work in Hungary is a testimony that leaders are foot soldiers who battle for the ideals in which they believe, and that leadership has far less to do with using other people than with serving other people. Plato said that "man is a being in search of meaning." In essence, servanthood is the key to successful leadership, which in turn can result in meaningful accomplishments. Raoul Wallenberg found himself and the meaning of his life by losing it in the service of others.

The process of learning about oneself and others, on an in-depth level, requires hard work. It is not something that can be gained solely from book study. It evolves best through personal introspection, human interaction and feedback, and through life experiences, observations, and analysis. It involves large quantities of common sense and realistic perspective. But its yield is high; it pays big dividends to those leaders who spend the time and make the extra effort to go beneath the surface, to discover what makes a person tick, because life and its activities are all part of the human experience. At bottom, it is all a matter of people, and the leader who understands people is prepared to win.

Objective

Every leader must have a clear, specific objective in mind at all times, a destination towards which all actions are directed. When the leader says, "forward march," everyone must know where forward is. If the leader lacks a sense of direction, then the followers will wind up some distance from the goal, like explorers without a compass or a guiding star.

Closely related to objective is vision, which implies having an acute sense of the possible. All effective leaders possess this capacity; they are able to focus sharply on what is to be done, seeing the objective as if through a powerful telescope.

Wallenberg exemplifies the principle that a clearly defined objective is absolutely essential as the focal point of our energies. His work in Hungary suggests that effective leadership is not neutral nor sterile, but deeply emotional, and that leaders must hold a sense of mission, a deeply felt belief in the worth of their objective. Nothing less has the necessary power to motivate leaders or followers to stretch the limits of their abilities. Total commitment comes only from total conviction that the goal is significant and right.

This ethical sense of mission grows out of a lifetime of value-building study and experience. However, the Wallenberg experience teaches us that much can be done in a short amount of time to impart principles upon which a given objective is based. All leaders should study the great foundational works of their nation to learn of the struggles of prior generations, ponder them, make them part of their being, determine how they apply to the situation at hand, and then transmit key principles to followers. History and philosophy form the underpinnings of the way of life for which people live and die. If values are thought to be only relative, if there is no right and wrong, if one system of government is morally equivalent to all others, then there is nothing worth sacrificing for. The leader will be limited to appeals to local pride and self-interest in attempting to inspire excellence. The result will often be halfhearted effort—and failure.

Ingenuity

Where only unquestioning obedience is valued, and where only strict adherence to rigid procedures is allowed, inflexibility and predictability are the consequences. But to succeed as a leader, or even to survive in a constantly changing and dangerous environment, creativity and adaptability are essential. This is where leaders must apply their foundational knowledge to the objective at hand and develop solutions, even in situations where there is no textbook answer.

Wallenberg knew that he had virtually no tangible resources and few allies. He also knew the type of people who stood in his path. And so, out of scraps of paper and a surplus of courage and personal character, he intimidated and defeated seemingly invincible enemies, time and again. Nazi numerical superiority and force of arms were powerless when confronted with a man who knew their own game better than they did and who could think faster than they could.

Throughout his entire experience in Hungary, in all that he did, Wallenberg had the daring to accept himself as a bundle of possibilities, and he boldly undertook the game of making the most of his best. Wallenberg instructs us that the leader is not a superman, but simply a fully functioning human being. Successful leaders are aware of their possibilities. Erich Fromm said that the pity in life today is that most of us die before we are fully born. Leaders such as Wallenberg are not merely observers of life, but active participants. They take the calculated risks required in exercising leadership and experimenting with the untried. It is surprising (and most aspiring leaders do not realize it) but much failure comes from people literally standing in their own way, preventing their own progress. Wallenberg never blocked his own path; rather, he created new paths where others saw only impenetrable walls. And in the process he was able to motivate others to do the same. He was a dispenser of hope in an environment filled with hopelessness and despair.

History is replete with instances where small, militarily weaker forces triumphed on the strength of superior strategy and tactics. Ingenuity makes surprise possible and allows quick adaptation and reaction to an adversary's actions. Without flexibility, humans are reduced to automatons, programmed only for failure.

Ingenuity requires information as its fuel. The established objective and the available tools and procedures provide the raw material for any leadership action. But much can be accomplished when leaders react beyond traditional methods and use the status quo as a floor rather than a ceiling. Leaders must be evaluated on the basis of what they achieve. Results are what count, not formulaic adherence to precedent. Wallenberg was an achiever; he was results-oriented. We, like him, can "do more with less" when we think creatively and are not confined to what has already been done. Military leaders are often criticized for preparing to fight the previous war. The best leaders think of all the possible ways in which available resources might be used or modified to achieve the objective, as well as how the opposition might do the same. Who would have thought, for example, that silicon, common sand, would be the basis for the phenomenon of microcomputer chips and would revolutionize modern society? To see each problem from multiple perspectives is to multiply the possible solutions and open the door for victories that would be inconceivable under "conventional wisdom."

Confidence

Leaders create an environment in which ideas can flourish and see the light of day. To do this, leaders must be self-confident and have faith in themselves and others. People in leadership positions need a solid sense of self. It serves them well in times of turmoil, which inevitably await those who aspire to lead. The way people feel about themselves affects virtually every aspect of their lives. Self-esteem, which emerges from a sense of confidence, thus becomes the key to success or failure. In effect, leaders such as Wallenberg defy the law of averages and win because they expect success from themselves.

An indispensable ingredient of Wallenberg's success was an almost tangible self-confidence. He radiated certainty, composure, and authority, and this breathed life into his otherwise foolhardy actions. He compelled his enemies to accept as valid passports things such as library cards, laundry tickets, and even nothing at all . . . and he did it by infusing all of his actions with the sheer power of his personality. Through his aura of conviction he also inspired people who, in many cases, had already resigned themselves to execution to join in his actions and save themselves and others.

Some would argue that the elusive quality we call *charisma* is a gift with which some people are blessed from birth. But even if this is true, everyone can cultivate a positive attitude and an air of self-confidence within the bounds of his or her own personality.

This unique aspect of leadership tends to develop as a natural consequence from the qualities previously discussed. As leaders learn about themselves and their opposition, they identify their respective strengths and weaknesses and compose a creative strategy for bringing their own greatest assets to bear against their opponents' most vulnerable areas. Wallenberg understood, as did Napoléon, that "strategy is a simple art, it is just a matter of execution." When leaders act from a position of advantage, they feel confident that they will prevail . . . and this confidence will be perceived by friends and foes alike.

Further, the leaders' actions will be focused on a purpose that the leaders believe to be right. This sense of the righteousness of the cause will also strengthen resolve. Conversely, where the leaders do not believe in the virtue of their actions, they will lack commitment and will be hindered by self-doubt. Such uncertainty will be apparent to others, undermining the confidence of the followers and encouraging their opponents. It will contribute to eventual defeat and failure.

Wallenberg teaches us that it is important for each leader to become convinced of the worthiness of the mission, on some deeply felt level. Even when the immediate objective seems questionable, the leader must find justification in some indisputable value, such as support of the nation's honor. Then, that conviction must fortify all of the leader's actions. Wallenberg is a clear example that when a leader exudes a quiet confidence, surety, and decisiveness, followers will be inspired and opposition will be weakened. Leaders have been described as "strong," "powerful," "magnetic," and "charismatic." But whatever else they may be, they certainly are self-confident, and from this confidence, leaders are able to mobilize and inspire individuals and groups to make their own personal dreams and objectives come true.

Courage

When a sense of mission becomes powerful enough to motivate people to action, even in the face of personal danger or certain death, that is courage. To be courageous one need not be fearless; it is natural and good to be afraid when confronted with real risks. But so long as that fear does not paralyze, there is courage at work.

Wallenberg knew he was entering a lion's den when he accepted his mission to Hungary. Innumerable times he ignored armed soldiers and even flying bullets to continue his rescue operations. He had the audacity to threaten high-ranking Nazi officers, who had proved their willingness to murder innocent civilians, let alone troublesome opponents, under conditions where they easily could have killed him. Although in constant fear for his life, he pressed on, risking and ultimately sacrificing himself for his mission.

Can courage be learned? It can, in the sense that the development of deep devotion to a cause galvanizes a person to act on behalf of that cause. This type of fundamental belief in the value of the mission is essential to the cultivation of courage.

If self-interest were the most important motivator, then self-sacrifice would be out of the question. Only a profound conviction that there is a good greater than self can spark a person to risk everything for others. Self-sacrifice, and the courage to take that chance, are the antithesis of "me-generation" philosophy. When the lives or liberties of others are valued more highly than one's own life, then true courage can provide the fuel for remarkable accomplishments.

Wallenberg's life can help others form a series of constellations by which they can successfully chart their own contributions to humanity. A key element of what we call the Wallenberg Effect is this idea: Do not give in to life nor its challenges. Dig in! Accept responsibility and in the process make a difference.

To some people, life is like the weather; it just happens to them. But to those who display the Wallenberg Effect (heroic leadership under adverse conditions), life is a great journey in human accomplishment. Wallenberg, like the trees of the Avenue of the Righteous, stands tall in the annals of man's "humanity" to man.

Few leaders will ever have the opportunity to help as many people as did Raoul Wallenberg. Still, each victory is immeasurably precious for those whose futures are spared. They, their children, their grandchildren, their entire posterity, and all whose lives will be touched by them, owe their existence to that one heartbeat of time when a person took action, despite the dangers. Although conditions may differ, the lessons for leadership that the Wallenberg Effect demonstrates should be valuable for all who aspire to more effective leadership. With patient application, it can be transferred and applied to everyday leadership problems, whether on the level of nations or individuals. As Wallenberg's medal testifies, "Whoever saves a single soul, it is as if he had saved the whole world."

Discussion Questions and Ideas

What do you think motivated Wallenberg, a wealthy, young, non-Jewish civilian citizen of neutral Sweden, to risk his life for the endangered Hungarian Jews? What motivates you in the duties you perform? Why are you in the occupation you now pursue?

What enabled Wallenberg to inspire, in those he helped, a belief in the possibility of success and a willingness to try, in the face of hopelessness and resignation to defeat? Have you ever known leaders who could cause positive transpormations in the attitude of the people under their care? How did they accomplish this? What effect have you had on the attitude of the people you lead? Why?

How could Wallenberg, who had no weapons and little if any official status or power in Nazi-occupied Hungary, induce his Nazi and Arrow Cross enemies, including their highest ranking officers, to do his bidding? Have you ever faced a situation in which you had to "do more with less" and tackle a problem with seemingly inadequate resources? What did you do? What were the results?

Was it morally wrong for Wallenberg to use deception, threats, and bribery in furtherance of his mission? Compare and contrast his situation with examples from your experience in which you were tempted to "bend the rules."

Consider the following two sentences. Which comes closer to your own personal view? Why? For what, if anything, would you be willing to risk your life? Why?

"Nothing is worth dying for."
"If nothing is worth dying for, nothing is worth living for."

How would you define the word "hero?" What qualities or feats constitute heroism? Have you known anyone you consider to be a hero? To what extent is heroism important to your life and career?

Can leadership be taught? How do you identify potential leaders? What sets leaders apart from other members of an organization?

How can you incorporate the Wallenberg Effect into your work?

How would you rate Wallenberg as a leader? Why?

Notes

1. J. Bierman, *Righteous Gentile* (New York: Viking Press, 1981), 91.
2. K. Marton, *Wallenberg* (New York: Random House, 1982), 110–11.
3. Bierman, 90.
4. Ibid., 88–89.
5. House, *Human Rights in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,* 96th Congress, 1980.
6. Bierman, viii.
7. Ibid., viii–ix.

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ADDENDUM

Excerpt from *USA Today,* Thursday, 21 March 1991

WALLENBERG CASE: The Soviet Union handed Sweden 70 hitherto secret documents on the case of missing Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. Wallenberg, who saved thousands of Hungarian Jews from Nazi death camps, disappeared after Soviet troops entered Budapest in the last days of World War II. Swedish radio and the documents reportedly confirm a Soviet claim that Wallenberg died of a heart attack in a Moscow prison in 1947.

Thirteen Traits of Effective Leaders

Col Henry W. "Kodak" Horton

Everyone in the Air Force should be a leader! Everyone has a role in accomplishing the mission, and everyone directly impacts the effectiveness of his or her organization. Additionally, all officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians, whether they supervise people or not, are being watched—their words and deeds set the standards others will follow, and they impact individual and organization effectiveness, morale, good order, and discipline.

In my over 28 years in the Air Force, I've been around some great and some not-so-great leaders. After analyzing what it was that made me want to follow some of them to the ends of the earth and go in the opposite direction from others, I identified 13 common traits in the great ones.

These traits are not a prescription for being promoted to general, CMSgt, or a Senior Executive Service-level civilian. They *are* a prescription for improving individual and organization effectiveness, morale, good order, and discipline. By accomplishing these things, they also improve organization and ensure Air Force mission accomplishment.

The 13 traits are listed below.

1. RESPECT–Leaders treat all human beings with respect and dignity, in all situations. Whether speaking with a GS-3 secretary on the telephone, telling an officer he or she is being recommended for court-martial, or thanking someone for a job done well, a leader follows three basic rules: "Praise in public and criticize in private," "Treat others as you wish to be treated," and "Don't lose your temper."

2. EMPOWERMENT–This is a 1990s buzzword, but the concept has been around since the beginning of time. Think of empowerment like this: Leaders give everyone who works for them a piece of rope. The people they want on their team seek out the organization's problems and find out what the boss is concerned with. These people then make a lasso out of their ropes and attack the problems, ultimately eliminating them. At this point, the successful leader gives them a longer piece of rope so they can attack bigger problems. Conversely, the people who have their own agendas will make their ropes into nooses and hang themselves. The effective leader gives these people a shorter rope, or none at all.

The opposite of empowerment is micromanagement. Micromanagers stifle effectiveness, learning, creativity, and growth, and thus, mission accomplishment.

3. ACCOUNTABILITY–This is another '90s buzzword. When I was a lieutenant, this trait was called "acceptance of responsibility." Leaders are accountable for their actions and for the actions of their personnel 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Effective leaders never make excuses; they take the blame when things go wrong, and direct the praise to those who did the work when things go right.

When something goes wrong, leaders take corrective action by attacking the root problem, not just the symptom. However, leaders know the difference between accountability and blame. Things can go wrong even if everything is done right, and in that case no one is blamed for what happened.

4. LISTENING–Leaders listen to all ideas and take the time to explain why a new one can or cannot be adopted. This behavior on the part of the leader keeps people coming back with other ideas, and sooner or later one will be exceptional.

Leaders are receptive to bad news, and never "shoot the messenger." This policy ensures that the lines of communication are kept open and that leaders will continue to receive the initial report of bad news from peers or subordinates rather than from their bosses. Shooting the messenger virtually assures that the only notification of bad news will come from the boss, and that's not conducive to a leader's longevity. Additionally, real leaders view the problems brought to them as opportunities to excel.

5. SINCERITY–Leaders have a deep concern for people. A leader's words and deeds always convey sincerity. When a leader asks people how their weekend was, or what's going on in their duty section, he or she wants an honest answer. If a problem is raised in the conversation, a leader will always do more research to see what the magnitude of the problem is and determine whether he or she can help alleviate it.

6. REWARD–A leader guarantees that top performers are rewarded. Rewards take many forms, including a handshake and sincere "thank you," appropriate performance reports and decorations, and nominations for Air Force-level awards.

7. DISCIPLINE–This is an area where many "wanna be" leaders fail because they try to be nice to everyone. People who can't or won't meet the standards *must* be appropriately disciplined. Proper discipline punishes people for their incorrect behavior, attempts to rehabilitate them, sends a message to everyone else "what the time is for the crime/mistake" is, motivates the people who are meeting standards to continue their performance, and reinforces the established standards of conduct. Appropriately disciplining people is critical to

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high morale, good order, and discipline; great leaders know this and act accordingly.

8. MISSION–Leaders understand that military organizations have one reason for existence—to accomplish the mission. They never forget that Air Force personnel are required to make many sacrifices, including giving up their lives for their country if necessary. While keeping the primary focus on mission accomplishment, leaders ensure that their people are taken care of.

9. CREDIT–A leader lives by the credo, "It's amazing what you can get done when you don't care who gets the credit." Leaders are never involved in anything to garner honor and glory for themselves. Any credit they receive is attributed to those who did the work.

10. COMMUNICATION–Leaders regularly communicate both the mission and their vision to keep everyone focused. While they sometimes use the written word to do this, a true leader is usually visible and communicates face-to-face more than in writing. Leaders ensure that people are informed about what's happening in the organization, wing, MAJCOM, and the Air Force. Real leaders function as "rumor control monitors" too, separating fiction from fact for the troops. Leaders also take the time to mentor people junior in rank to them. They understand they must "grow" their replacement so they explain their decision-making thought process, provide career counseling, and give meaningful feedback. Additionally, leaders share their experiences and the lessons learned from them.

11. ATTITUDE–Some smart person once said, "Life is 10 percent what happens to you and 90 percent how you react." Leaders are eternal optimists with positive attitudes, and they will always find and focus on the opportunities in every problem. They know that one needs to learn from the past, but must always look to the future. Effective leaders know that "attitudes are contagious" and that people around them will "catch" their attitude—and a real leader's attitude is worth catching.

12. INTEGRITY–Integrity is like virginity and, once lost, cannot be recovered. Leaders live, eat, and breathe integrity and our other Air Force core values—Service before Self and Excellence in All We Do. Leaders know that if something is worth doing, it must be done to the best of their ability. When one's oath is to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic," doing something just well isn't good enough.

Leaders are not "Service-before-Self" zealots. They understand the sacrifices team members are required to make, and control the things they can control. For example, when SrA Smith, who is a cop manning the main gate, gets a call that his wife is sick at work and can't drive, a true leader finds a replacement for SrA Smith immediately so he can take care of his spouse.

13. COURAGE–While the 12 previous traits are not rocket science, they are difficult to embody all the time. It takes courage to be a leader. Not just charge-the-enemy-machine-gun courage a warrior-leader needs, but the moral courage to always do the proper thing regardless of the consequences; real leaders have this courage.

To summarize, I use the following "crutch" to remember these traits:

REAL is a word, and where I'm from, you can add "S" to anything and it remains a word.

Respect
Empowerment
Accountability
Listening
Sincerity

Run DMC, a musical group.

Reward
Discipline
Mission
Credit

California Integrated Circuits (CAIC).

Communication
Attitude
Integrity
Courage

Great leaders exhibit these traits (REALS, RDMC, and CAIC) day in and day out. The more officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians who become effective leaders, the better off our Air Force and nation will be since more personnel will improve individual and organization effectiveness, morale, good order, and discipline. Improving these critical areas will result in a higher level of organization and Air Force mission accomplishment—whose bottom line is airpower.

A "Success" Pathway

Col Michael E. Outten

Think about savoring a mouth-watering chocolate bar. Now imagine the nougat, surrounded by peanuts and creamy caramel, topped off by a thick layer of rich chocolate, being consumed by your senses! Each day, millions of people satisfy their craving for chocolate by wolfing down one, maybe more, of these treats. The desire for a chocolate fix can be so overwhelming that individuals will persist until the craving is satisfied. In a similar vein, desire can be transferred to a different venue; a person's craving for success. Oftentimes, individuals observe how certain people soar through a career while others seem to muddle through each day. Some leaders appear to always be in the right place at the right time—they always seem prepared—they handle adversity well, and no matter the challenge, appear to come out on top. Luck, timing, skill, and many other factors play an important role in that success. However, three individual traits are prominent. The manner by which people apply desire, talent, and perseverance in daily activities dramatically impacts their success.

Desire occurs when one has a longing or craving for something. Desire is an inner commitment that comes from a person's heart. Desire is the overwhelming catalyst for success and enables a person to look at the future with optimism. Desire often develops into a can-do attitude that allows individuals to carefully navigate minefields and unforeseen obstacles. The amazing thing about a can-do attitude is that it becomes contagious in the workplace. Success on a small project leads to triumphs on larger efforts. A can-do attitude encourages teamwork and a competitiveness that borders on inspiration. The result is increased productivity for an organization and individual success that contributes toward achieving long-term career goals.

Desire also equips individuals with skills to more readily adapt to change. One often-cited cliché about life is "not to sleep too long because when you wake, the world will be somehow different. At the crossroads of change stand 10,000 guardians of the past. Obviously, one must change with the circumstances to succeed; but to add value to the process is the key to desire."[1] Individuals with desire want to add value to their work and their community. People want to be contributors. People want to be valuable members of the team. Individuals want to belong to a group. These desires foster that "I can do anything" attitude and a persistence to stay the course and succeed in the long term.

Strong leaders possess desire and have an inherent commitment to influence people, processes and outcomes.[2] In short, they love what they're doing! A recent TV show was paying tribute to Donald Trump and his lifetime achievements as a real estate mogul. The interviewer asked Mr. Trump how he was able to accomplish so much. The answer was immediate and forthright. Mr. Trump said "you've got to love what you're doing". This love spurs an individual to set in motion a commitment to attain goals. This desire, initiated by love, also spurs a drive for excellence that inspires individuals to go the extra mile, to go beyond normal expectations, and to achieve goals. Peers and bosses recognize excellence which, in turn, helps pave the way for future success. Excelling at tasks enables people to have the courage to take smart risks which can lead to success.

Desire is necessary for achieving any long-term career goal. Success cannot, however, be measured solely on this trait. For example, many teens desire to be professional athletes. Most of these budding stars fail because desire alone cannot make one a standout athlete. Desire must be coupled with talent. And so it is with most of life's pursuits. A strong desire, coupled with talent, can inspire one to succeed.

Talent is linked to aptitude and is acquired through experience. People are not really born with ability. Talent comes from the mind and is developed through hard work and determination. Life is a journey and people add to their "success" toolbox with skills they have acquired over time. Some people learn quickly, others take more time. However, the common thread is that successful people do learn and apply learned skills to tasks that accomplish goals.

Knowledge is the foundation on which talent is built. People are bombarded with information and constantly sift data to store in their brains for future recall. People depend on knowledge to learn and grow; personally and professionally. Knowledge is gained through education. For most individuals, education is procured during high school and college resulting in a hard earned degree. A college degree opens doors otherwise closed because employers are seeking individuals with a solid knowledge base to add value to a corporation's business practice.

However, education does not stop at the doorstep of one's job. Employers constantly send individuals to training classes to sharpen knowledge skills. The bottom-line is to absorb enough knowledge to accomplish assigned tasks better than anyone else. Dig into the regulations; ask questions; talk to peers, supervisors, and customers. Stay current on changing technologies and policies. Knowledge, if applied correctly, translates into power and becomes a catalyst for achieving success. Samuel McClure stated "unless a man is given more

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than he can possibly do, he will never do all he can."[3] The challenge, then, is to create an internal mindset to never stop the quest for learning.

Competence is on a similar plane as knowledge. Jack Nicklaus, arguably the best golfer of all time, said "I don't think talent is as important as the work and the dedication necessary to become competent . . . a lot of guys out there are more talented than I am, and through the years we've passed them by many times."[4] What did he mean by this statement? The secret lies in the terms dedication and commitment. Dedication means providing the effort required to achieve success. Commitment means practicing learned skills until the talent becomes second nature and almost a seamless part of the person. Senior leaders are often observed making challenging tasks look so easy and employees wonder how they did it. It is an art. "The art of talent lies in making difficult things simple, not simple things difficult."[5] Competence is a learned trait, something that must be constantly worked. "Competence is something one must strive for, one must work at . . . sometimes joyfully, always persistently and perceptively, realizing where one's strengths and weaknesses lie."[6] The challenge is to practice what is learned. Practice! Practice! Practice! Practice and hard work will make a difference building competence levels.

Being knowledgeable and competent are fantastic! Success, however, also depends on one's talent to communicate effectively. Those individuals that can clearly articulate ideas in verbal and written forms have a decided advantage over peers who struggle. Most people have a reluctance to stand up in front of other individuals and present a briefing or express ideas. Long-term success, however, is dependent on that ability. When a speaker stands to present ideas, that person's leadership role is enhanced. As a matter of fact, just being the center of attention makes an individual appear more courageous than those not willing to take the risk. The key is to prepare for that moment in the limelight and practice presenting the ideas clearly. Those individuals that deliver a clear, concise, effective message have a decided advantage over members in the audience. Similarly, writing is extremely important. People that can outline a way forward, express well thought concepts, and clearly articulate a vision will steadily climb the success ladder. A good writer can sift through mountains of information, get to the heart of an issue, and deliver viable options to a decision maker. Time becomes a handicap the more senior in rank one becomes and, therefore, writing becomes a tool to translate means to ends. The writer must quickly get to the point, provide a way ahead, and offer options to get there.

Desire and talent are success pillars. However, success can still be elusive without perseverance. Perseverance is synonymous with persistence. Pres. Herbert Hoover once wrote:

> Nothing in the world can take the place of persistence
> *Talent will not*,
>
> Nothing is more common than unsuccessful people with talent
> *Genius will not*,
>
> Unrewarded genius is almost a proverb
> *Education will not*,
>
> The world is full of educated derelicts
> The slogan 'Press on'
> has solved and always will solve
> the problems of the human race.[7]

The basis of persistence is will-power and represents the soul of one's existence. Will-power and desire, when properly combined, make a dynamite combination. The following examples illustrate this point. Leonardo Da Vinci took 10 years to paint the last supper. One painting required 10 years to complete! But he never quit. Theodor Seuss Geisel, better known as Dr. Seuss, became famous for his children books. Dr. Seuss' first children's book, *The Cat in the Hat*, was rejected by 23 publishers; but he persisted. Then there was this little girl from Tennessee who was born to poverty, obesity, a broken home, and abuse. Now, Oprah is one of the most recognizable celebrities in the entire world.[8] These people had an intense desire to succeed; to accomplish goals they established. These now famous personalities did not allow obstacles and people to stop them. They endured hardships, had many critics, and could have packed their bags many times and said adios. But these particular individuals developed thick skins and persisted until success was achieved.

As one can imagine, a most salient factor in achieving success is to stay the course. **Never quit**. Winston Churchill said, "Never give in. Never give in. Never give in. In all things large or small, great or petty; never, never, never, give in." Churchill knew what he was talking about It took him three years to get through the sixth grade because of challenges learning English. But Churchill never gave in.[9]

The world is made up of dreamers and doers. Dreamers oftentimes have brilliant ideas but a lukewarm desire to succeed and tend to break when the going gets tough. Doers do not necessarily have the greatest ideas; however, they combine a never give-up attitude with an intense desire to excel and somehow get to the finish line. They are winners. Find a way to be a winner; make a difference, excel, and persevere.

Tenacity, courage, and hope are strong perseverance attributes. Tenacity is the bulldog in a person that says don't quit. Courage is the ability to face one's fears and somehow find the strength to endure. George Patton said, "Courage is fear holding on a minute longer."[10] It takes courage to persevere. Hope is the ability to see ahead about how things could be; not the way they are. Hope provides an individual the inner strength to endure. Emily Dickinson once said, "Hope is a thing with feathers that perches on the soul and sings a tune without words and never stops at all."[11] What a powerful message! Persistence and desire, coupled together, make an unbeatable combination for success.

Similar to the craving for a chocolate bar, a person must desire success. Individuals, properly armed with education can achieve great things. Success, large or small, is directly correlated to the amount of passion, hard work, and persistence individuals pour into the goal they wish to achieve. If one pours their heart, mind, and soul into achieving specific goals, then it will happen. The pathway is clear. Be a doer, make a difference, and never quit.

Notes

1. Richard Lester has notes as of 4 Feb 2004.
2. Dr. Wes Roberts, *Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun* (Warren Books, Inc., 1985), 18.
3. Lester notes.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. President Hoover, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum, West Branch, IA.
8. Carmen Mariano, "Reach For The Stars," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 70, no. 24 (1 October 2004): 763.
9. Ibid., 763.
10. Lester notes.
11. Mariano, 763.

Interpersonal Dimension

The objective of this dimension is to help leaders develop the knowledge and skills to influence people to accomplish the mission. Leaders need to develop multiple skills—none more important than interpersonal—to be successful in today's Air Force. A commonly used definition of *interpersonal* is "being, related to, and involving relations between persons." The interpersonal process, as presented in this dimension, addresses the communicator, the message, the medium, the receiver, and feedback. The Interpersonal Dimension, then, is people-oriented, rather than mission-oriented like the Organizational Dimension. The effective leader must be able to work with people and influence them to accomplish the mission. Effective leaders depend on their ability to understand and apply the concepts, principles, practices, attitudes, and skills of "human-to-human" interaction addressed in this dimension.

The articles in this dimension focus on four aspects of interpersonal relations. The first section addresses leadership theories and styles. As a leader, you need a basic understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of different leadership styles available and the impact they have on followers. Additionally, a self-analysis exercise is provided to help you identify your leadership style.

The second section focuses on understanding how to motivate people and how to use this knowledge to build cohesive and productive teams. The leader understands and meets the expectations and needs of team members. Principles and the unique relationship between the officer and NCO are analyzed.

The third section focuses on another significant aspect of interpersonal relations—communication. The authors of these articles believe that communication is an essential leadership skill. The articles discuss common problems in the communication process and methods to improve communication.

The last section relates to creating an environment that fosters constructive feedback, creativity, and doing the right thing. The leader sets the tone for everything that is done and should create an environment of honest feedback and dissent within the limits of military standards of discipline and obedience. This section also addresses the need to nurture creativity and to develop people capable of thinking independently, using their own initiative.



Section 7

Leadership Theories and Styles

Interpersonal Dimension



Thinking and Learning about Leadership

Thomas E. Cronin, PhD

Introduction

Leadership is one of the most widely talked about subjects and at the same time one of the most elusive and puzzling. Americans often yearn for great, transcending leadership for their communities, companies, the military, unions, universities, sports teams, and for the nation. However, we have an almost love-hate ambivalence about power wielders. And we especially dislike anyone who tries to boss us around. Yes, we admire the Washingtons and Churchills, but Hitler and Al Capone were leaders too—and that points up a fundamental problem. Leadership can be exercised in the service of noble, liberating, enriching ends, but it can also serve to manipulate, mislead and repress.

"One of the most universal cravings of our time," writes James MacGregor Burns, "is a hunger for compelling and creative leadership" But exactly what is creative leadership? A *Wall Street Journal* cartoon had two men talking about leadership. Finally, one turned to the other in exasperation and said: "Yes, we need leadership, but we also need someone to tell us what to do." That is to say, leadership for most people most of the time is a rather hazy, distant and even confusing abstraction. Hence, thinking about or defining leadership is a kind of intellectual leadership challenge in itself.

What follows are some thoughts about leadership and education for leadership. These thoughts and ideas are highly personal and hardly scientific. As I shall suggest below, almost anything that can be said about leadership can be contradicted with counter examples. Moreover, the whole subject is riddled with paradoxes. My ideas here are the product of my studies of political leadership and my own participation in politics from the town meeting level to the White House staff. Some of my ideas come from helping to advise universities and foundations and the Houston-based American Leadership Forum on how best to go about encouraging leadership development. Finally, my thoughts have also been influenced in a variety of ways by numerous conversations with five especially insightful writers on leadership—Warren Bennis, James MacGregor Burns, David Campbell, Harlan Cleveland, and John W. Gardner.

Teaching Leadership

Can we teach people to become leaders? Can we teach leadership? People are divided on these questions. It was once widely held that "leaders are born and not made," but that view is less widely held today. We also used to hear about "natural leaders" but nowadays most leaders have learned their leadership ability rather than inherited it. Still there is much mystery to the whole matter. In any event, many people think colleges and universities should steer clear of the whole subject. What follows is a set of reasons why our institutions of higher learning generally are "bashful about teaching leadership." These reasons may overstate the case, but they are the objections that serious people often raise.

First, many people still believe that leaders are born and not made. Or that leadership is somehow almost accidental or at least that most leaders emerge from circumstances and normally do not create them. In any event, it is usually added, most people, most of the time, are not now and never will be leaders.

Second, American cultural values hold that leadership is an elitist and thus anti-American phenomenon. Plato and Machiavelli and other grand theorists might urge upon their contemporaries the need for selecting out and training a select few for top leadership roles. But this runs against the American grain. We like to think that anyone can become a top leader here. Hence, no special training should be given to some special select few.

Third, is the complaint that leadership training would more than likely be preoccupied with skills, techniques, and the *means of* getting things done. But leadership for what? Leadership in service of what ends? A focus on *means* divorced from *ends* makes people—especially intellectuals— ill at ease. They hardly want to be in the business of training future Joe McCarthys or Hitlers or Idi Amins.

Fourth, leadership study strikes many as an explicitly vocational topic. It's a practical and applied matter—better learned in summer jobs, in internships, or on the playing fields. You learn it on the job. You learn it from gaining experience, from making mistakes and learning from them. And you should learn it from mentors.

Fifth, leadership often involves an element of manipulation or deviousness, if not outright ruthlessness. Some consider it as virtually the same as learning about jungle-fighting or acquiring "the killer instinct." It's just not "clean" enough a subject matter for many people to embrace. Plus, "leaders" like Stalin and Hitler gave "leadership" a bad name. If they were leaders, then spare us their clones or imitators.

Sixth, leadership in the most robust sense of the term is such an ecumenical and intellectually so all-encompassing a subject that it frightens not only the timid but even the most well-educated of persons. To teach leadership is an act of arrogance. That is, it is to suggest one understands far more than even a well-educated person can understand—history,

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ethics, philosophy, classics, politics, biography, psychology, management, sociology, law, etc. . . . and to be steeped deeply as well in the "real world."

Seventh, colleges and universities are increasingly organized in highly specialized divisions and departments all geared to train specialists. While the mission of the college may be to educate "the educated person" and society's future leaders, in fact the incentive system is geared to training specialists. Society today rewards the expert or the super specialist—the data processors, the pilots, the financial whiz, the heart surgeon, the special team punt returners, and so on. Leaders, however, have to learn to become generalists and usually have to do so well after they have left our colleges, graduate schools and professional schools.

Eighth, leadership strikes many people (and with some justification) as an elusive, hazy, and almost mysterious commodity. Now you see it, now you don't. So much of leadership is intangible, you can't possibly define all the parts. A person may be an outstanding leader here, but fail there. Trait theory has been thoroughly debunked. In fact, leadership is highly situational and contextual. A special chemistry develops between leaders and followers and it is usually context specific. Followers often do more to determine the leadership they will get than can any leader. Hence, why not teach people to be substantively bright and well-read and let things just take their natural course.

Ninth, virtually anything that can be said about leadership can be denied or disproven. Leadership studies, to the extent they exist, are unscientific. Countless paradoxes and contradictions litter every manuscript on leadership. Thus, we yearn for leadership, but yearn equally to be free and left alone. We admire risk taking, entrepreneurial leadership but we roundly criticize excessive risk taking as bullheadedness or plain stupid. We want leaders who are highly self-confident and who are perhaps incurably optimistic—yet we also dislike hubris and often yearn for at least a little self-doubt (e.g., Creon in *Antigone)*. Leaders have to be almost single-minded in their drive and commitment, but too much of that makes a person rigid, driven and unacceptable. We want leaders to be good listeners and represent their constituents, yet in the words of Walter Lippmann, effective leadership often consists of giving the people not what they want but what they will learn to want. How in the world, then, can you be rigorous and precise in teaching leadership?

Tenth, leadership at its best comes close to creativity. And how do you teach creativity? We are increasingly made aware of the fact that much of creative thinking calls upon unconscious thinking, dreaming, and even fantasy. Some fascinating work is being done on intuition and the nonrational—but it is hardly a topic with which traditional disciplines in traditional colleges are comfortable.

Leaders themselves often complain that the incentives for leadership are not as great as the disincentives. Many people shy away from leadership responsibilities saying it "just isn't worth it." A survey of some 1,700 business, government, and professional leaders revealed a number of striking reasons for this question. See table 1.

Relationships

A few other initial observations need to be made about leadership. Chief among these is that the study of leadership needs inevitably to be linked or merged with the study of followership. We cannot really study leaders in isolation from followers, constituents, or group members. The leader is very much a product of the group, and very much shaped by its aspirations, values, and human resources. The more we learn about leadership, the more the leader-follower linkage is understood and reaffirmed. A leader has to resonate with followers. Part of being an effective leader is having excellent ideas, or a clear sense of direction, a sense of mission. But such ideas or vision are useless unless the would-be leader can communicate them and get them accepted by followers. A two-way engagement or two-way interaction is constantly going on. When it ceases, leaders become lost, out of touch, imperial, or worse.

The question of leaders linked with followers raises the question of the transferability of leadership. Can an effective leader in one situation transfer this capacity, this skill, this style—to another setting? The record is mixed indeed. Certain persons have been effective in diverse settings. George Washington and Dwight Eisenhower come to mind. Jack Kemp and Bill Bradley, two well-known and respected members of Congress, were previously successful professional athletes.

Scores of business leaders have been effective in the public sector and vice versa. Scores of military leaders have become effective in business or politics. Some in both. However, there are countless examples of those who have not met with success when they have tried to transfer their leadership abilities from one setting to a distinctively different setting. Sometimes this failure arises because the new group's goals or needs are so different from the previous organization. Sometimes it is because the leadership needs are different. Thus, the leadership needs of a military officer leading a platoon up a hill in battle may well be very different from the leadership requirements of someone asked to change sexist attitudes and practices in a large corporation or racist and ethnic hatred in an inner city. The leadership required of a candidate for office is often markedly different from that required of a campaign manager. Leadership required in founding a company may be exceedingly different from that required in the company's second generation.

Another confusing aspect about leadership is that leadership and management are often talked about as if they were the same. While it is true that an effective manager is often an effective leader and leadership requires, among other things, many of the skills of an effective manager, there are differences. Leaders are the people who infuse vision into an organization or a society. At their best, they are preoccupied with values and the longer range needs and aspirations of their followers. Managers are concerned with doing things the right way. Leaders are more concerned with identifying and then getting themselves and their organizations focused on doing the right thing. John Quincy Adams, Herbert Hoover, and Jimmy Carter were often good, sometimes excellent managers. Before coming to the White House, they were all recognized for being effective achievers. As businessmen, diplomats,

Table 1

What Leaders Say Are the Obstacles to Leadership in America (Percentage)

	Very Important	*Somewhat Important*	*Not Important*
The system does not favor the most capable individuals	54	35	11
Our educational system does not provide people with leadership skills	48	37	15
American voters look for the wrong qualities in leaders	46	44	10
Leaders are not fully appreciated	23	49	28
Leaders are not given enough financial compensation	21	48	31
The pressures of leadership positions are too great	18	51	31
Leadership roles demand too much time	17	45	38
Potential leaders are deterred by fears of lack of privacy	16	43	41
The responsibilities of leadership roles appear too great	14	44	42
The times make effective leadership impossible	10	39	51

Source: The Connecticut Mutual Life Report on American Values in the '80s (Hartford, Conn., 1981), 188.

governors or cabinet members, they excelled. As presidential leaders, they were found wanting. None was invited back for a second term. While none was considered an outright failure, each seemed to fail in providing the vision needed for the times. They were unable to lift the public's spirit and get the nation moving in new, more desirable directions.

As this brief digression suggests, being a leader is not the same thing as being holder of a high office. An effective leader is someone concerned with far more than the mechanics of office. While a good manager is concerned, and justifiably so, with efficiency, with keeping things going, with the routines and standard operating procedures, and with reaffirming ongoing systems, the creative leader acts as an inventor, risk taker and generalist entrepreneur—ever asking or searching for what is right, where are we headed and keenly sensing new directions, new possibilities and welcoming change. We need all the talented managers we can get, but we also need creative leaders. Ironically, too, an effective leader is not very effective for long unless he or she can recruit managers to help them make things work over the long run.

Characteristics

One of the most important things to be said about leadership is that it is commonly very dispersed throughout a society. Our leadership needs vary enormously. Many of the great breakthroughs occur because of people well in advance of their time who are willing to agitate for change and suggest fresh new approaches that are, as yet, unacceptable to majority opinion. Many of the leadership needs of a nation are met by persons who do not hold high office and who often don't look or even act as leaders. Which brings us to the question of defining leadership. Agreement on a definition is difficult to achieve. But for the purposes at hand, leaders are people who perceive what is needed and what is right and know how to mobilize people and resources to accomplish mutual goals.

Leaders are individuals who can help create options and opportunities—who can help clarify problems and choices, who can build morale and coalitions, who can inspire others and provide a vision of the possibilities and promise of a better organization, or a better community. Leaders have those indispensable qualities of contagious self-confidence, unwarranted optimism and incurable idealism that allow them to attract and mobilize others to undertake demanding tasks these people never dreamed they could undertake. In short, leaders empower and help liberate others. They enhance the possibilities for freedom—both for people and organizations. They engage with followers in such a way so that many of the followers become leaders in their own right.

As implied above, many of the significant breakthroughs in both the public and private sectors of this nation have been made by people who saw all the complexities ahead of them, but so believed in themselves and their purposes that they refused to be overwhelmed and paralyzed by doubts. They were wiling to invent new rules and gamble on the future.

Good leaders, almost always, have been get-it-all- together, broken-field runners. They have been generalists. Tomorrow's leaders will very likely have begun life as trained specialists. Our society particularly rewards the specialist. John W. Gardner puts it well:

> All too often, on the long road up, young leaders become "servants of what is rather than shapers of what might be." In the long process of learning how the system works, they are rewarded for playing within the intricate structure of existing rules. By the time they reach the top, they are very likely to be trained prisoners of' the structure. This is not all bad; every vital system re-affirms itself. But no system can stay vital for long unless some of its leaders remain sufficiently independent to help it to change and grow.

Only as creative generalists can these would-be leaders cope with the multiple highly organized groups—subsystems within the larger system—each fighting for special treatment, each armed with their own narrow definition of the public interest, often to the point of paralyzing *any* significant action.

Overcoming fears, especially fears of stepping beyond the boundaries of one's tribe, is a special need for the leader. A leader's task, as a renewer of organizational goals and aspirations, is to illuminate goals, to help reperceive one's own and one's organization's resources and strengths, to speak to people on what's only dimly in their minds. The effective creative leader is one who can give voice and form so that people say, "Ah, yes—that's what I too have been feeling."

Note, too, however, that leaders are always aware of and at least partly shaped by the higher wants and aspirations and common purposes of their followers and constituents. Leaders consult and listen just as they educate and attempt to renew the goals of an organization. They know how "to squint with their ears." Civic leaders often emerge as we are able to agree upon goals. One analyst has suggested that it is no good for us to just go looking for leaders. We must first rediscover our own goals and values. If we are to have the leaders we need, we will first have to agree upon priorities. In one sense, if we wish to have leaders to follow, we will often have to show them the way.

In looking for leadership and in organizational affiliations—people are looking for *significance, competence, affirmation,* and *fairness.* To join an organization, an individual has to give up some aspect of his or her uniqueness, some part of their soul. Thus, there is a price in affiliating and in following. The leader serves as a strength and an attraction in the organization—but psychologically there is also a *repulsion* to the leader—in part because of the dependence on the leader. John Steinbeck said of American presidents that the people believe that "they were ours and we exercise the right to destroy them." Effective leaders must know how to absorb these hostilities, however latent they may be.

The leader also must be ever sensitive to the distinction between *power* and *authority.* Power is the strength or raw force to exercise control or coerce someone to do something, while authority is power that is *accepted* as legitimate by subordinates. The whole question of leadership raises countless issues about participation and the acceptance of power in superior-subordinate relationships. How much participation or involvement is needed, is desirable? What is the impact of participation on effectiveness? How best for the leader to earn moral and social acceptance for his or her authority? America generally prizes participation in all kinds of organizations, especially civic and political life. Yet, we must realize too that a part of us yearns for charismatic leadership. Ironically, savior figures and charismatic leaders often, indeed almost always, create distance and not participation.

One of the most difficult tasks for those who would measure and evaluate leadership is the task of trying to look at the elements that make up leadership. One way to look at these elements is to suggest that a leader has various *skills,* also has or exercises a distinctive *style* and, still more elusive, has various *qualities* that may be pronounced. By skill, I mean the capacity to do something well. Something that is learnable and can be improved, such as speaking or negotiating or planning. Most leaders need to have *technical skills* (such as writing well); *human relations skills,* the capacity to supervise, inspire, build coalitions and so on, and also what might be called *conceptual skills*—the capacity to play with ideas, shrewdly seek advice and forge grand strategy. Skills can be examined. Skills can be taught. And skills plainly make up an important part of leadership capability. Skills alone, however, cannot guarantee leadership success.

A person's leadership style may also be critical to effectiveness. Style refers to how a person relates to people, to tasks and to challenges. A person's style is usually a very personal and distinctive feature of his or her personality and character. A style may be democratic or autocratic, centralized or decentralized, empathetic or detached, extroverted or introverted, assertive or passive, engaged or remote. This hardly exhausts the diverse possibilities—but is meant to be suggestive. Different styles may work equally well in different situations. However, there is often a proper fit between the needs of an organization and the needed leadership style. A fair amount of research has been done in this area—but, much more remains to be learned.

A person's *behavioral style* refers to one's way of relating to other people—to peers, subordinates, rivals, bosses, advisers, the press. A person's *psychological style* refers to one's way of handling stress, tensions, challenges to the ego, internal conflicts. Considerable work needs to be done in these areas—particularly if we arc to learn how best to prepare people for shaping their leadership styles to diverse leadership situations and needs. But it is a challenge worth accepting.

James MacGregor Burns, in his book on *Leadership,* offers us yet one additional distinction worth thinking about. Ultimately, Burns says, there are two overriding kinds of social and political leadership: *transactional* and *transformational leadership.* The transactional leader engages in an exchange, usually for self-interest and with short-term interests in mind. It is, in essence, a bargain situation: "I'll vote for your bill if you vote for mine." Or "You do me a favor and I will shortly return it." Most pragmatic officeholders practice transactional leadership most of the time. It is commonly a practical necessity. It is the general way people do business and get their jobs done—and stay in office. The transforming or transcending leader is the person who, as briefly noted earlier, so engages with followers as to bring them to a heightened political and social consciousness and activity, and in the process converts many of those followers into leaders in their own right. The transforming leader, with a focus on the higher aspirations and longer range, is also a teacher, mentor and educator—pointing out the possibilities and the hopes and the often only dimly understood dreams of a people and getting them to undertake the preparation and the job needed to attain these goals.

Of course, not everyone can be a leader. And rarely can any one leader provide an organization's entire range of leadership needs. Upon closer inspection, most firms and most societies have all kinds of leaders and these diverse leaders, in turn, are usually highly dependent for their success on the leadership performed by other leaders. Some leaders are excellent at creating or inventing new structures. Others are great task leaders—helping to energize groups at problem solving. Others are excellent social (or affective) leaders, helping to build morale and renew the spirit of an organization or a people. These leaders are often indispensable in providing what might be called the human glue that holds groups together.

Further, the most lasting and pervasive leadership of all is often intangible and noninstitutional. It is the leadership fostered by ideas embodied in social, political or artistic movements, in books, in documents, in speeches, and in the memory of great lives greatly lived. Intellectual or idea leadership at its best is provided by those—often not in high political or corporate office—who can clarify values and the implications of such values for policy. The point here is that leadership is not only dispersed and diverse, but interdependent. Leaders need leaders as much as followers need leaders. This may sound confusing but it is part of the truth about the leadership puzzle.

Leadership Qualities

In the second half of this essay, I will raise in a more general way, some of the qualities I believe are central to leadership. Everyone has his or her own lists of leadership qualities. I will not be able to discuss all of mine, but permit me to offer my list and then describe a few of the more important ones in a bit more detail.

Leadership Qualities—A Tentative List

- Self-knowledge/self-confidence.
- Vision, ability to infuse important, transcending values into an enterprise.
- Intelligence, wisdom, judgment. Learning/renewal.
- Worldmindedness/a sense of history and breadth.
- Coalition building/social architecture.
- Morale-building/motivation.
- Stamina, energy, tenacity, courage, enthusiasm.
- Character, integrity/intellectual honesty.
- Risk-taking/entrepreneurship.
- An ability to communicate, persuade/listen.
- Understanding the nature of power and authority.
- An ability to concentrate on achieving goals and results.
- A sense of humor, perspective, flexibility.

Leadership consists of a spiral upwards, a spiral of self-improvement, self-knowledge and seizing and creating opportunities so that a person can make things happen that would not otherwise have occurred. Just as there can be a spiral upwards, there can be a spiral downwards—characterized by failure, depression, self-defeat, self-doubt, and paralyzing fatalism.

If asked to point to key qualities of successful leadership, I would suggest these:

Leaders Are People Who Know Who They Are and Know Where They Are Going

"What a man thinks about himself," Thoreau wrote, "that is what determines, or rather indicates his fate." One of the most paralyzing of mental illnesses is wrong perception of self. This leads to poor choosing and poor choosing leads to a fouled-up life. In one sense, the trouble with many people is not what they don't know, it is what they do know, but it is misinformed or misinformation.

Leaders must be self-reliant individuals with great tenacity and stamina. The world is moved by people who are enthusiastic. Optimism and high motivations count for a lot. They can lift organizations. Most people are forever waiting around for somebody to light a fire under them. They are people who have not learned the valuable lesson that ultimately you are the one who is responsible for you. You don't blame others. You don't blame circumstances. You simply take charge and help move the enterprise forward.

I am sure many of you have been puzzled, as I have been, about why so many talented friends of ours have leveled off earlier than needs to be the case. What is it that prevents people from becoming the best they could be? Often it is a lack of education, a physical handicap or a disease such as alcoholism. Very often, however, it is because people have not been able to gain control over their lives. Various things nibble away at their capacity for self-realization or what Abraham Maslow called self-actualization. Family problems, inadequate financial planning, and poor health or mental health problems are key factors that damage self-esteem. Plainly, it is difficult to handle life, not to mention leadership responsibilities, if persons feel they do not control their own lives. This emotional feeling of helplessness inevitably leads people to believe they aren't capable, they can't do the job. It also inhibits risk-taking and just about all the qualities associated with creativity and leadership.

Picture a scale from, at one end, an attitude of "I don't control anything and I feel like the bird in a badminton game"—to the other end of the scale where there is an attitude of "I'm in charge." Either extreme may be pathological, but plainly the higher up, relatively, toward the "I'm in charge" end of the scale, the more one is able to handle the challenges of transforming or creative leadership.

Thus, the single biggest factor is motivating or liberating would-be leaders in their attitude toward themselves and toward their responsibilities to others.

Leaders also have to understand the situations they find themselves in. As observed in *Alice in Wonderland,* before we decide where we are going, we first have to decide where we are right now. After this comes commitment to something larger and longer term than just our own egos. People can achieve meaning in their lives only when they can give as well as take from their society. Failure to set priorities and develop significant personal purposes undermines nearly any capacity for leadership. "When a man does not know what harbor he is making for, no wind is the right wind."

Setting Priorities and Mobilizing Energies

Too many people become overwhelmed with trivia, with constant close encounters of a third rate. Leaders have always to focus on the higher aspirations and needs of their followers. Leadership divorced from important transcending purpose becomes manipulation, deception and, in the extreme, is not leadership at all, but repression and tyranny.

The effective modem leader has to be able to live in an age of uncertainty. Priorities have to be set and decisions have to be made even though all the information is not in—this will surely be even more true in the future than it has been in the past. The information revolution has tremendously enlarged both the opportunities and the frustrations for leaders. Knowing what you don't know becomes as important as knowing what you do know. A willingness to experiment and explore possible strategies even in the face of uncertainty may become a more pronounced characteristic of the creative leader.

The creative priority setter learns both to encourage and to question his or her intuitive tendencies. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., said that "to have doubted one's own first principles is the mark of a civilized man" and so it continues to be. The ability to look at things differently, and reach out for more and better advice is crucial. The ability to admit error and learn from mistakes is also vitally important. Leaders need to have considerable self-confidence, but they also must have a dose of self-doubt. Leaders must learn how to communicate the need for advice and help, how to become a creative listener, how to empathize, and understand. In Sophocles's compelling play, *Antigone,* the tragic hero, King Creon, hears his son's advice but imprudently rejects it or perhaps does not even hear it. But it, Haemon's, is advice any leader should take into account:

> Let not your first thought be your only thought. Think if there cannot be some other way. Surely, to think your own the only wisdom, and yours the only word, the only will, betrays a shallow spirit, an empty heart. It is no weakness for the wisest man to learn when he is wrong, know when to yield. . . .
>
> So, father, pause and put aside your anger. I think, for what my young opinion's worth, that good as it is to have infallible wisdom, since this is rarely found, the next best thing is to be willing to listen to wise advice.

Leaders need to be able to discover their own strengths and the strengths of those with whom they work. They have to learn how to share and to delegate. They have to be able to make people believe they are important, that they are or can be winners. People yearn to think that what they are doing is something useful, something important. The transforming or creative leader knows how to nourish conviction and morale within an organization.

Good leaders know how to serve as morale-builders and renewers of purpose, able to get people to rededicate themselves to long-cherished but sometimes dimly understood values. Motivation is sometimes as much as 40 to 50 percent of the leadership enterprise. You can do very little alone with just faith and determination, yet you can do next to nothing without them. Organizations of all kinds need constantly to rediscover or renew their faith, direction, and sense of purpose.

Leaders Have to Provide the Risk-Taking, Entrepreneurial Imagination for Their Organizations and Communities

Leaders are able to see things in a different and fresh context. Warren Bennis suggests that creative leadership requires the capacity to recontextualize a situation. Willis Hannon suggests a leader is one who reperceives situations and challenges and comes up with new approaches, insights and solutions.

A third grade class begins and the teacher says: "Class, take out your pencils and paper and draw a picture of anything you can think of." Students begin to draw—balls, trees, automobiles, and so forth. Teacher asks Sally, in the second row: "What are you drawing?" Sally says, "I'm drawing a picture of God." Teacher says: "But no one has ever seen God, we don't know what he looks like." An undaunted Sally responds: "Well, they sure will when I get through!"

This little story illustrates the sometimes irrational self-confidence and "failure is impossible" factor that motivates the galvanizing leader. The founding revolutionaries in America, Susan Anthony, Martin Luther King Jr., Saul Alinsky, and countless others had the vision of a better and newer society and they, in effect, said, "They'll know a better or more just society when we get through."

Mark Twain once said, "A man is viewed as a crackpot until his idea succeeds." We need a hospitable environment for the dissenter and the creative individual. We need to avoid killing the spark of individuality that allows creativity to flourish. We kill it with rules, red tape, procedures, standard operating restrictions and countless admonitions "not to rock the boat."

Creativity is the ability to recombine things. To see a radio here and a clock there and put them together. Hence, the clock radio. Open-mindedness is crucial. Too many organizations are organized with structures to solve problems that no longer exist. Vested interest grows up in every human institution. People all too often become prisoners of their procedures.

Psychologist David Campbell points out that history records a long list of innovations that come from outside the "expert" organization. (See also John Jewkes, *The Sources of Invention.*) The automobile was not invented by the transportation experts of that era, the railroaders. The airplane was not invented by automobile experts. Polaroid film was not invented by Kodak. Handheld pocket calculators were not invented by IBM, digital watches were not invented by watchmakers. Apple computers and herbal tea are yet two more examples. The list is endless and the moral is vivid.

Leaders get organizations interested in what they are going to become, not what they have been. Creative leadership requires also not being afraid to fail. An essential aspect of creative leadership is curiosity. The best way to have inventive ideas is to have lots of ideas, and to have an organization that welcomes fresh ideas—whatever their merit. As any scientist knows, the art of research requires countless experimentation and failure before you get the results you want, or sometimes the unexpected result that constitutes the true breakthrough.

Leaders recognize the utility of dreaming, fantasy and unconscious thinking. One advocate of creative thinking writes,

> Production of dramatically new ideas by a process of purely conscious calculation rarely seems to occur. Unconscious thinking, thinking which you are unaware of, is a major contribution to the production of new ideas. . . .

Leaders Need to Have a Sense of Humor and a Sense of Proportion

Leaders take their work seriously, but do not take themselves too seriously. Humor relieves strain and enables people to relax and see things in a slightly different or fresh light. Effective leaders usually can tell a joke, take a joke, or tell a good story. They also usually know the art of telling parables. Lincoln, FDR, and JFK come quickly to mind, while Hoover, Nixon, and Carter were humorless men. Adlai Stevenson put it this way, "If I couldn't laugh, I couldn't live—especially in politics."

In this same light, leaders need to be able to share the credit. Leadership sometimes consists of emphasizing the dignity of others and of keeping one's own sense of importance from becoming inflated. Dwight Eisenhower had a slogan he tried to live by which went as follows: "There's no telling how much one can accomplish so long as one doesn't need to get all the credit for it."

Thus, leaders need to have a sense of proportion and a sense of detachment. They must avoid being workaholics and recognize that they will have to be followers in most of the enterprises of life and leaders only a small fraction of the time. Emerson put it well when he tried to answer the question, "What is success?"

> To laugh often and love much, to win the respect of intelligent persons and the affection of children to appreciate beauty; to find the best in others; to give one's self; to leave the world a lot better whether by a healthy child, a garden patch, or a redeemed social condition: to have played and laughed with enthusiasm and sung with exaltation, to know even one life has breathed easier because you have lived—this is to have succeeded.

Humor, proportion and also compassion. A person able to understand emotions and passion and at least on occasion to express one's self with passion and conviction. Enthusiasm, hope, vitality and energy are crucial to radiating confidence.

Leaders Have to Be Skilled Mediators and Negotiators, but They Also Have to Be Able to Stir Things Up and Encourage Healthy and Desired Conflict

An old Peanuts cartoon has a dejected Charlie Brown coming off a softball field as the game concludes. In exasperation he whines, "How can we lose when we are so sincere?" Sincerity or purity of heart are not enough to succeed in challenging leadership jobs.

The strength of leaders often lies in their tenacity, in knowing how to deal with competing factions, knowing when to compromise, when to amplify conflict, and when to move an organization or a community away from paralyzing divisiveness and toward a vision of the common good.

Most citizens avoid conflict and find conflicts of any kind painful. The truly effective leader welcomes several kinds of conflict and views conflict as an opportunity for change or revitalization.

Stirring things up is often a prerequisite for social and economic breakthrough. Women's rights, black rights, consumer protection, tax reform movements and even our election campaigns are occasions for division and conflict. They are a reality the leader has to learn to accept, understand and turn to his advantage. Harry Truman said,

> A President who's any damn good at all makes enemies, makes a lot of enemies. I even made a few myself when I was in the White House, and I wouldn't be without them.

George Bernard Shaw and others have put it only slightly differently. Reasonable people, they observe, adjust themselves to reality and cope with what they find. Unreasonable people dream dreams of a different and better world and try to adapt the world to themselves. This discontent or unreasonableness is often the first step in the progress of a person as well as for a community or nation.

But be aware that "stirrer uppers" and conflict-amplifiers are often threatening in any organization or society. In the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. This may well be, as the proverb has it. But in the kingdom of the one-eyed person, the two-eyed person is looked upon with considerable suspicion and may even be considered downright dangerous.

Thus, it takes courage and guts as well as imagination and stamina to be the two-eyed person in a one-eyed world. Harlan Cleveland points out that just about every leader has had the experience of being in an office surrounded by experts. The sum of the meeting will be, "Let's do nothing cautiously." The leader is the one who has to say, "Let's take the first step." He or she is the functional equivalent of the first bird off the telephone wire, or what Texans call the "bell cow." The experts always have an excuse. They are like the losing tennis player whose motto is: "It's not whether you win or lose, it's how you place the blame."

An Effective Leader Must Have Integrity

This had been suggested earlier in several implicit ways, but it is perhaps the most central of leadership qualities. A leader must be able to see people in all of their relationships, in the wholeness of their lives and not just as a means to getting a job done, as a means for enhanced productivity.

Some may call it character, others would call it authenticity, compassion, or empathy. Whatever we call it, character and integrity are much easier kept than recovered. People can see through a phony. People can readily tell whether a person has respect for others. Respect and responsibility generally migrate to those who are fair, compassionate and care about values, beliefs, and feelings of others. Persons who cannot rise above their prejudices usually fail. A person who permits a shell to be built up around his heart will not long be able to exercise creative leadership. Michael Maccoby captures this concern.

> The exercise of the heart is that of experiencing, thinking critically, willing, and acting, so as to overcome egocentrism and to share passion with other people . . . and to respond to their needs with the help one can give. . . . It requires discipline, learning to concentrate, to think critically, and to communicate. The goal, a developed heart, implies integrity, a spiritual center, a sense of "I" not motivated by greed or fear, but by love of life. adventure and fellow feelings.

A leader's integrity requires also that he or she not be captured by peer pressures, protocol, mindless traditions or conventional rules. The truly effective leader is able to see above and beyond normal constraints and discern proper and desirable ends. The leader also possesses a sense of history and a concern for posterity. This ability, an exceptional capacity to disregard external pressures, is the ability that separates leaders from followers.

The Leader Has to Have Brains and Breadth

In the future, even more so than in the past, only the really bright individuals will be leaders. Harlan Cleveland highlights this quality well when he writes:

> It used to be that a leader was a two-fisted businessman who chopped up the jobs that needed to be done, then left everyone alone and roared at them if they didn't work right. . . .
>
> Loud commands worked if one person knew all things, but because of the way we now make decisions, through committees, a person charging around with a loud voice is just in the way.

Today's leaders must widen their perspectives and lengthen the focal point of their thinking. Leaders today have to learn how to thread or weave together disparate parts and move beyond analytical to integrative thinking. This will require well-read, well-traveled persons who can rise above their specialties and their professions. It will require as well persons who are not afraid of politics, but who rather view the art of politics as the art of bringing about the difficult and the desirable.

American Leadership

The creative political leader must work in a tension-filled world between unity and dissent, majority rule and minority rights and countless other contradictions. Tocqueville said of us, "These Americans yearn for leadership, but they also want to be left alone and free." The political leader is always trying to reconcile this and other paradoxes—but the important point is to be able to live with the paradoxes and dilemmas. And beyond this, the political leader must also be able to create, and preserve, a sense of community and shared heritage, the civic bond that ties us—disparate and feisty, rugged individualists together.

Effective leaders of today and tomorrow also know how to vary their styles of leadership depending on the maturity of their subordinates. They involve their peers and their subordinates in their responsibility networks. They must be good educators and good communicators. They also have to have that spark of emotion or passion that can excite others to join them in the enterprise.

Most effective leaders will also be effective communicators: good writers, good speakers, and good conversationalists. A few noted scientists may get by with mumbling, but they are the exception. For so much of leadership consists nowadays in persuading and informing that someone who cannot communicate well, cannot succeed. To paraphrase George Orwell, "If people cannot communicate well, they cannot think well, and if they cannot think well, others will do their thinking for them."

America is especially good at training experts, specialists and managers. We have plenty of these specialist leaders, but they are almost always one-segment leaders. We are in special need of educating multisegment leaders—persons who have a global perspective and understand that the once tidy lines between domestic and international, and public and private are irretrievably blurred. Indispensable to a leader is a sense of breadth, the intellectual capacity to handle complex mental tasks, to see relationships between apparently unrelated objects, to see patterns in incomplete information, to draw accurate conclusions from inchoate data.

Vision is the ability to see all sides of an issue and to eliminate biases. Vision and breadth of knowledge put one in a strategic position—preventing the leader from falling into the traps that shortsightedness, mindless parochialism often set for people.

None of these qualities can guarantee creative leadership, but they can, when encouraged, provide a greater likelihood of it. We need all the leadership we can get—in and out of government. The vitality of nongovernmental America lies in our ability to educate and nourish more citizen-leaders. Those of us who expect to reap the blessings of freedom and liberty must undergo the fatigues of supporting it and provide the leadership to sustain it.

Learning about Leadership

Permit me to return again to the question of whether leadership can be learned, and possibly taught. My own belief is that students cannot usually be taught to be leaders. But students, and anyone else for that matter, can profitably be exposed to leadership, discussions of leadership skills and styles, and leadership strategies and theories. Individuals can learn in their own minds the strengths as well as limitations of leadership. People can learn about the paradoxes and contradictions and ironies of leadership, which however puzzling, are central to appreciating the diversity and the dilemmas of problem solving and getting organizations and nations to function.

Learning about leadership means recognizing bad leadership as well as good. Learning about leadership means understanding the critical linkage of ends and means. Learning about leadership also involves the study of the special chemistry that develops between leaders and followers, not only the chemistry that existed between Americans and Lincoln, but also between Mao and the Chinese peasants, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, between Martin Luther King Jr., and civil rights activists, between Jean Mormet and those who dreamed of a European Economic Community.

Students can learn to discern and define situations and contexts within which leadership has flourished. Students can learn about the fallibility of the trait theory. Students can learn about the contextual problems of leadership, of why and when leadership is sometimes transferable, and sometimes not. Students can learn about the crucial role that advisors and supporters play in the leadership equation. Students can also learn about countless problem-solving strategies and theories, and participate in role-playing exercises that sharpen their own skills in such undertakings.

Students of leadership can learn widely from reading biographies about both the best and the worst leaders. Plutarch's *Lives* would be a good place to start. Much can be learned from mentors and from intern-participant observing. Much can also be learned about leadership by getting away from one's own culture and examining how leaders in other circumstances go about the task of motivating and mobilizing others. Countless learning opportunities exist that can sharpen a student's skills as a speaker, debater, negotiator, problem clarifier and planner. Such skills should not be minimized. Nor should anyone underestimate the importance of history, economics, logic, and a series of related substantive fields that help provide the breadth and the perspective indispensable to societal leadership.

Above all, students of leadership can make an appointment with themselves and begin to appreciate their own strengths and deficiencies. Personal mastery is important. So too is the ability to use one's intuition, and to enrich one's creative impulses. John Gardner suggests, "It's what you learn after you know it all that really counts." Would-be leaders learn to manage their time more wisely. Would-be leaders learn that self-pity and resentment are like toxic substances. Would-be leaders learn the old truth that most people are not for you or against you but rather preoccupied with themselves. Would-be leaders learn to break out of their comfortable imprisonments; they learn to cast aside dull routines and habits that enslave most of us. Would-be leaders learn how to become truly sharing and caring people—in their families, their professions and in their communities. And would-be leaders constantly learn too that they have more to give than they have ever given, no matter how much they have given.

Let me conclude by paraphrasing from John Adams:

> We must study politics [and leadership] and war [and peace] that our sons [and daughters] have the liberty to study mathematics and philosophy, geography, natural history and naval architecture, navigation, commerce, and agriculture, in order to give their children a right to study painting, poetry, music, architecture, statuary, tapestry, and porcelain.

Leadership Style and Managerial Effectiveness: An Exercise in Self-Analysis

Dr. Joseph C. Latona

Most managers are continuously involved in evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of their subordinates, machinery, methods, and capital. Rarely, however, do they evaluate the key ingredient for the success of their organization—themselves!

Little attention has been given in management literature to the importance to managers, at all levels, to evaluate themselves periodically—to determine how well they are leading. Equally important, they must determine if they are communicating effectively, if they are recognizing and rewarding exceptional performance, and how effective are their decisions and the decision-making procedures they use.

Behavior and Leadership

The performance or productivity of individuals and groups in an organization is dependent upon (or a function of) such individual and group behavior patterns as job involvement, commitment, cooperation, communication, trust, and confidence. Thus:

Performance = f (Individual and Group Behavior)

Behavior patterns depend to a great degree on, or are a function also of, how the leader leads—whether he represents his work group, encourages participation in work-related decision making, urges teamwork and cooperation, uses rewards and counseling to motivate. Therefore:

Individual and Group Behavior = f (Leadership Style)

How can you as a manager determine your leadership style, evaluate individual and group behavior patterns, and pinpoint areas in both where changes should be made?

Self-Analysis

Dr. A. J. Melcher, in his book *Structure and Process of Organizations* (Prentice-Hall, 1976), defines eight critical dimensions of leadership. These eight provide a means for you to evaluate yourself in this area as well as have your performance in this area evaluated by subordinates and superiors.

Let's look at each of the eight dimensions described below. After reading the brief description of each, circle the number on the continuum that best describes your leadership style.

Representation: Upward versus Downward

The representation process is defined in terms of the leader/manager acting as a spokesman and a buffer for his subordinates to higher management and/or acting as a spokesman and a buffer of higher management and other groups to his subordinates. Note where you as a leader lie on the continuum below.

Representation Continuum

Upward								*Downward*
Represents the subordinate work group								Represents higher management and other groups
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Interaction: Lateral versus Vertical

At the "1" end of the continuum, the leader/manager would encourage peer interaction but discourage his subordinates from developing close relations with him. At the "9" end, the leader/manager would encourage close relations with his subordinates but discourage close peer relations.

Interaction Continuum

Lateral								*Vertical*
Supports peer interaction								Supports superior/ subordinate interaction
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Standards: Low versus High

Performance standards such as time, cost, quality, and quantity may be specified at relatively low levels to high levels. At the "1" end of the continuum, the standards would be low and easily met. The leader/manager might allow individuals or the groups under his supervision to establish their own standards and monitor their performance. When the leader/manager establishes the standards, he would use previous levels of average or normal production.

At the "9" end of the continuum, the leader/manager would establish standards 25 to 100 percent above historical levels. And as these standards were met, higher standards would be established.

Standards Continuum

Low								*High*
Standards are low and easily met								Standards are high, difficult to attain, and revised upward
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Goal Emphasis: Group versus Individual

The leader/manager may emphasize group or individual goals in discussions with superiors, other managers, and subordinates of other groups. Where group goals are emphasized (at the "1" end of the continuum), encouragement is given to the individual to contribute to the group. His performance is evaluated in these terms. Suboptimization at the individual or group level is discouraged if it adversely affects others.

At the "9" end of the continuum, individual goals are emphasized. Individual performance is evaluated and rewarded. Individual accomplishment is highlighted; competition is emphasized.

Goal-Emphasis Continuum

Group								*Individual*
Group goals are emphasized								Individual goals are emphasized
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Participation: Extensive versus Restrictive

In arriving at a decision, the leader/manager may seek participation from those likely to be affected by the decision or make the decision on his own. Note where you as a leader lie on this continuum.

Participation Continuum

Extensive								*Restrictive*
All decisions are arrived at through participation of those affected								All decisions are made by the leader/manager with a minimum of participation by those affected
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Direction: Laissez-Faire to Close

The approach to providing direction may vary from no supervision (laissez-faire) to close supervision. The middle ground would be providing general direction.

On the "1" end, the leader/manager outlines the job to be done and leaves it to the individual or the group to decide how to do it. In the middle of the continuum—general direction—the leader/manager outlines the job to be done and gives general instructions. A leader/manager at the "9" end of the continuum—close direction—would issue detailed instructions on what to do and how to do it.

Direction Continuum

Laissez-faire				*General Direction*				*Close Direction*
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Rule Enforcement: Deviation versus Adherence

Leaders/managers vary in their attitude toward the observation of rules, policies, and procedures that are established by higher management. A leader/manager may emphasize goal attainment and permit or even encourage deviation from the rules and other prescriptions when they don't contribute to goal containment. On the other hand, he may emphasize the rules and adherence to policy regardless of whether the rules and policy contribute to goal attainment.

Rule Enforcement Continuum

Deviation								*Adherence*
Allows broad deviation from rules and other prescriptions and policy								Emphasized rules as ends
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Motivation: Rewards versus Sanctions

There are different ways in which performance may be motivated using rewards and sanctions. On the one hand, there may be a primary emphasis on the use of rewards and counseling to motivate. Then, again, there may be heavy emphasis upon applying sanctions when performance is not up to expectations.

At the "1" end, the leader/manager would primarily rely upon rewarding good performance, training, and counseling to orient and motivate subordinates and others. He would use information on performance factors such as cost, quality, and quantity, or complaints to direct attention to problem areas. His approach would be to discuss the way in which the problem could be solved and to set goals toward which the group would work.

The leader/manager at the "9" end of the continuum would use sanctions primarily to achieve performance goals. Data on performance trends would be used as the basis for firing, transferring, demoting, taking away privileges, and so forth. As performance failed to measure up to standards, the sanctions would be applied. The employee would be expected to assume much greater responsibility for doing the job—without training, counseling, or suggestions from the boss. When the leader/manager discussed his evaluation of the work of subordinates or others, he would particularly note the negative dimensions. His general posture would be that a satisfactory level of performance was expected in all areas where performance was below standard. The leader/ manager would tend to discipline publicly, making it clear to all around the nature of his dissatisfactions and the sanctions that were being applied.

Motivation Continuum

Rewards	*Sanctions*
Emphasis on use of rewards and counseling to motivate	Emphasis on use of sanctions to motivate

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Now that we've analyzed your leadership style, let's look at the individual and group behavior patterns of those who report to you. The following are questions that focus on individual and group patterns that are influenced to a great extent by leadership style. Circle the number on each of the continua that best describes in your opinion the behavior pattern of your subordinates.

Analysis of Individual Behavior

Individual worker behavior entails the commitment of self and one's energy to meeting work standards and unit goals.

Job Involvement

To what extent are employees involved in their jobs—try to do the jobs thoroughly and take pride in their work?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY OFTEN ALMOST ALWAYS

Commitment to Meeting Standards

To what extent do your employees try to meet or exceed established work standards? (Do they try to meet or exceed the standards of their job and do a full day's work?)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY OFTEN ALMOST ALWAYS

Work-Goal Commitment

To what extent are your employees willing to change the work pace, work breaks, and schedules as work pressure increases? Do they generally make adjustments without supervisory pressure and cooperate willingly when asked?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY OFTEN ALMOST ALWAYS

Intragroup Behavior: Lateral Relations within Groups

Analysis of relations within the group involves assessment of patterns of cooperation, trust and confidence at all levels, and the sharing of job information.

Confidence and Trust

To what extent do members of your section or unit have confidence and trust in each other and seem to confide in one another about job- and nonjob-related subjects?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY OFTEN ALMOST ALWAYS

Cooperation Patterns

In your department, to what extent is there cooperation among coworkers? Is assistance regularly given without being asked and in a generally spontaneous manner?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY OFTEN ALMOST ALWAYS

Trust and Confidence—Downward

To what extent does the leader/manager (you) have trust and confidence in subordinates? Is there confidence between you and your subordinates concerning job- and nonjob-related subjects?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY OFTEN ALMOST ALWAYS

Trust and Confidence—Upward

To what extent do subordinates have trust and confidence in you? Is there confidence between your subordinates and you concerning job- and nonjob-related subjects?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY OFTEN ALMOST ALWAYS

Job Information

When a subordinate initiates discussion concerning job problems, do you respond with genuine concern?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY OFTEN ALMOST ALWAYS

Intergroup Behavior: Lateral Relations among Groups

Lateral relations among groups involve interactions assessed on the basis of confidence and willingness of groups to assist each other.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY OFTEN ALMOST ALWAYS

Confidence and Trust

Do units or sections seem to confide in each other concerning job- and nonjob-related subjects?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY OFTEN ALMOST ALWAYS

Cooperation and Teamwork

Is spontaneous and ready assistance given regularly without being asked?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

RARELY SOMETIMES USUALLY OFTEN ALMOST ALWAYS

Finally, rate the productivity (output or performance) of your subordinates on the following continuum.

Productivity Continuum

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

POOR BELOW AVERAGE AVERAGE GOOD SUPERIOR

You have now described the performance of your group in terms of your perception of their behavior patterns and your leadership style.

There is no right or wrong answer. It is up to you to determine whether your leadership style is having the best effect possible on work performance. If you think it may not, try this. Look again at the eight leadership dimensions and determine how your subordinates would rank you. Then look at the behavior questionnaire and answer the questions but this time as you feel your subordinates would evaluate their own behavior. If there are discrepancies, they may be in areas that require changes in your leadership style.

The Courage of Sam Bird

B. T. Collins

I didn't learn about leadership and the strength of character it requires from an Ivy League graduate course. I learned by watching one tall captain with proud bearing and penetrating eyes.

I met Capt Samuel R. Bird on a dusty road near An Khe, South Vietnam, one hot July day in 1966. I was an artillery forward observer with Bravo Company, 2d/12th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, and I looked it. I was filthy, sweaty, and jaded by war, and I thought, *Oh, brother, get a load of this.* Dressed in crisply starched fatigues, Captain Bird was what we called "squared away"—ramrod straight, eyes on the horizon. H—, you could still see the shine on his boot tips beneath the road dust.

After graduation from Officer Candidate School, I had sought adventure by volunteering for Vietnam. But by that hot and dangerous July, I was overdosed on "adventure," keenly interested in survival, and very fond of large rocks and deep holes. Bird was my fourth company commander, and my expectations were somewhat cynical when he called all his officers and sergeants together.

"I understand this company has been in Vietnam almost a year and has never had a party," he said.

Now, we officers and sergeants had our little clubs to which we repaired. So we stole bewildered looks at one another, cleared our throats, and wondered what this wiry newcomer was talking about.

"The men are going to have a party," he announced, "and they're not going to pay for it. Do I make myself clear?"

A party for the "grunts" was the first order of business! Sam Bird had indeed made himself clear. We all chipped in to get food and beer for about 160 men. The troops were surprised almost to the point of suspicion—who, after all, had ever done anything for them? But that little beer and bull session was exactly what those war-weary men needed. Its effect on morale was profound. I began to watch our new captain more closely.

Bird and I were the same age, 26, but eons apart in everything else. He was from the sunny heartland of Kansas, I from the suburbs of New York City. He prayed every day and was close to his God. My faith had evaporated somewhere this side of altar boy. I was a college dropout who had wandered into the Army with the words "discipline problem" close on my heels. He had graduated from The Citadel, South Carolina's proud old military school.

If ever a man looked like a leader, it was Sam Bird. He was tall and lean, with penetrating blue eyes. But the tedium and terror of a combat zone take far sterner qualities than mere appearance.

Not One Step Further

Our outfit was helicoptered to a mountain outpost one day for the thankless task of preparing a position for others to occupy. We dug trenches, filled sandbags, and strung wire under blistering sun. It was hard work, and Sam was everywhere, pitching in with the men. A colonel who was supposed to oversee the operation remained at a shelter, doing paperwork. Sam looked at what his troops had accomplished, then, red-faced, strode over to the colonel's sanctuary. We couldn't hear what he was saying to his superior, but we had the unmistakable sense that Sam was uncoiling a bit. The colonel suddenly found time to inspect the fortifications and thank the men for a job well done.

Another day, this time on the front lines after weeks of awful chow, we were given something called "coffee cake" that had the look and texture of asphalt paving. Furious, Sam got on the radiophone to headquarters. He reached the colonel and said, "Sir, you and the supply officer need to come out here and taste the food, because this rifle company is not taking one step further." *Not a good way to move up in the Army,* I thought. But the colonel came out, and the food improved from that moment. Such incidents were not lost on the men of Bravo Company.

During the monsoon season we had to occupy a landing zone. The torrential, wind-driven rains had been falling for weeks. Like everyone else, I sat under my poncho in a stupor, wondering how much of the wetness was rainwater and how much was sweat. Nobody cared that the position was becoming flooded. We had all just crawled inside ourselves. Suddenly I saw Sam, "Mr. Spit and Polish," with nothing on but his olive-drab undershorts and his boots. He was digging a drainage ditch down the center of the camp. He didn't say anything, just dug away, mud spattering his chest, steam rising from his back and shoulders. Slowly and sheepishly we emerged from under our ponchos, and shovels in hand, we began helping "the old man" get the ditch dug. We got the camp tolerably dried out, and with that one simple act, transformed our morale.

Sam deeply loved the US Army, its history and traditions. Few of the men knew it, but he had been in charge of a special honors unit of the Old Guard, which serves at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery and participates in the Army's most solemn ceremonies. He was the kind of guy whose eyes would mist during the singing of the national anthem.

Sam figured patriotism was just a natural part of being an American. But he knew that morale was a function not so much of inspiration as good boots, dry socks, extra ammo, and hot meals.

Dug His Own

Sam's philosophy was to put his troops first. On that foundation he built respect a brick at a time. His men ate first; he ate last. Instead of merely learning their names, he made it a point to know the men. A lot of the soldiers were high-school dropouts and would-be tough guys just a few years younger than himself. Some were scared, and a few were still in partial shock at being in a shooting war. Sam patiently worked on their pride and self-confidence. Yet there was never any doubt who was in charge. I had been around enough to know what a delicate accomplishment that was.

Half in wonder, an officer once told me, "Sam can dress a man down till his ears burn, and the next minute that same guy is eager to follow him into hell." But he never chewed out a man in front of his subordinates.

Sam wouldn't ask his men to do anything he wasn't willing to do himself. He dug his own foxholes. He never gave lectures on appearance, but even at godforsaken outposts in the Central Highlands, he would set aside a few ounces of water from his canteen to shave. His uniform, even if it was jungle fatigues, would be as clean and neat as he could make it. Soon all of Bravo Company had a reputation for looking sharp.

One sultry and miserable day on a dirt road at the base camp, Sam gathered the men together and began talking about how tough the infantryman's job is, how proud he was of them, and how they should always look out for each other. He took out a bunch of combat infantryman's badges, signifying that a soldier has paid his dues under fire, and he presented one to each of the men. There wasn't a soldier there who would have traded that moment on the road for some parade-ground ceremony.

That was the way Sam Bird taught me leadership. He packed a lot of lessons into the six months we served together. Put the troops first. Know that morale often depends on small things. Respect every person's dignity. Always be ready to fight for your people. Lead by example. Reward performance. But Sam had another lesson to teach, one that would take long and painful years, a lesson in courage.

Enemy Fire

I left Bravo Company in December 1966 to return to the States for a month before joining a Special Forces unit. Being a big, tough paratrooper, I didn't tell Sam what his example had meant to me. But I made a point of visiting his parents and sister in Wichita, Kansas, just before Christmas to tell them how much he'd affected my life, and how his troops would walk off a cliff for him. His family was relieved when I told them that his tour of combat was almost over and he'd be moving to a safe job in the rear.

Two months later, in a thatched hut in the Mekong Delta, I got a letter from Sam's sister, saying that he had conned his commanding officer into letting him stay an extra month with his beloved Bravo Company. On his last day, 27 January 1967—his 27th birthday—the men had secretly planned a party, even arranging to have a cake flown in. They were going to "pay back the old man." But orders came down for Bravo to lead an airborne assault on a North Vietnamese regimental headquarters.

Sam's helicopter was about to touch down at the attack point when it was ripped by enemy fire. Slugs shattered his left ankle and right leg. Another struck the left side of his head, carrying off almost a quarter of his skull. His executive officer, Lt Dean Parker, scooped Sam's brains back into the gaping wound.

Reading the letter, I felt as if I'd been kicked in the stomach. I began querying every hospital in Vietnam to find out if Sam was still alive. But in June, before I could discover his fate, I was in a firefight in an enemy-controlled zone. I had thrown four grenades. The fifth one exploded in my hand. I lost an arm and a leg.

Nearly a year later, in March 1968, I finally caught up with Sam. I was just getting the hang of walking with an artificial leg when I visited him at the Veterans Administration (VA) Medical Center in Memphis, Tennessee. Seeing him, I had to fight back the tears. The wiry, smiling soldier's soldier was blind in the left eye and partially so in the right. Surgeons had removed metal shards and damaged tissue from deep within his brain, and he had been left with a marked depression on the left side of his head. The circles under his eyes told of sleepless hours and great pain.

The old clear voice of command was slower now, labored, and with an odd, high pitch. I saw his brow knit as he looked through his one good eye, trying to remember. He recognized me, but believed I had served with him in Korea, his first tour of duty.

Slowly, Sam rebuilt his ability to converse. But while he could recall things from long ago, he couldn't remember what he had eaten for breakfast. Headaches came on him like terrible firestorms. There was pain, too, in his legs. He had only partial use of one arm, with which he'd raise himself in front of the mirror to brush his teeth and shave.

He had the support of a wonderful family, and once he was home in Wichita, his sister brought his old school sweetheart, Annette Blazier, to see him. A courtship began, and in 1972 they married.

They built a house like Sam had dreamed of—red brick, with a flagpole out front. He had developed the habit of addressing God as "Sir" and spoke to him often. He never asked to be healed. At every table grace, he thanked God for sending him Annette and for "making it possible for me to live at home in a free country."

Every Waking Moment

In 1976, Sam and Annette traveled to The Citadel for his 15th class reunion. World War I hero Gen Mark Clark, the school's president emeritus, asked about his wounds and said, “On behalf of your country, I want to thank you for all you did.”

With pride, Sam answered, “Sir, it was the least I could do.”

Later Annette chided him gently for understating the case. After all, he had sacrificed his health and career in Vietnam. Sam gave her an incredulous look. “I had friends who didn’t come back,” he said. “I’m enjoying the freedoms they died for.”

I visited Sam in Wichita and phoned him regularly. You would not have guessed that he lived with pain every day. Once, speaking of me to his sister, he said, “I should never complain about the pain in my leg, because B. T. doesn’t have a leg.” I’d seen a lot of men with lesser wounds reduced to anger and self-pity. Never a hint of that passed Sam’s lips, though I knew that, every waking moment, he was fighting to live.

On 18 October 1984, after 17 years, Sam’s body couldn’t take any more. When we received the news of his death, a number of us from Bravo Company flew to Wichita, where Sam was to be buried with his forebears.

The day before the burial, his old exec, Dean Parker, and I went to the funeral home to make sure everything was in order. As Dean straightened the brass on Sam’s uniform, I held my captain’s hand and looked into his face, a face no longer filled with pain. I thought about how unashamed Sam always was to express his love for his country, how sunny and unaffected he was in his devotion to his men. I ached that I had never told him what a fine soldier and man he was. But in my deep sadness I felt a glow of pride for having served with him, and for having learned the lessons of leadership that would serve me all my life. That is why I am telling you about Samuel R. Bird and these things that happened so long ago.

Chances are, you have seen Sam Bird. He was the tall officer in charge of the casket detail at the funeral of President John F. Kennedy. Historian William Manchester described him as “a lean, sinewy Kansan, the kind of American youth whom Congressmen dutifully praise each Fourth of July and whose existence many, grown jaded by years on the Hill, secretly doubt.”

There can be no doubt about Sam—who he was, how he lived, and how he led. We buried him that fall afternoon, as they say, “with honors.” But as I walked from that grave, I knew I was the honored one, for having known him.

A Situational Leadership Model for Military Leaders

Col Donald E. Waddell III

Leadership remains the most baffling of arts . . . as long as we do not know exactly what makes men get up out of a hole in the ground and go forward in the face of death at a word from another man, then leadership will remain one of the highest and most elusive of qualities. It will remain an art.

—James L. Stokesbury

The art of leadership Stokesbury alludes to is a subject studied more seriously in military schools than in civilian institutions. Given the life-and-death nature of our business and the importance of the military to a nation's survival, this should surprise no one. What is surprising, however, is that most Air Force professional military education (PME) schools rely almost exclusively on the civilian-oriented Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard's situational leadership model to help teach military leadership and management.

While the Hersey and Blanchard model is useful, it has some significant limitations. Specifically, the model does a good job of highlighting the appropriate leadership style based on the "maturity" or "development level" of the followers but does not adequately address other military considerations such as the level at which leadership is exercised; different styles that may be required because of the demands of combat; staff versus operational leadership; or the differing styles appropriate to service, joint, or combined leadership. The purpose of this article is to suggest another leadership model that is helpful in modeling leadership situations unique to the military. Even though this model is used in the Air War College (AWC) curriculum, it has numerous applications and is particularly appropriate for midcareer officers faced with transitioning from unit level to leadership positions involving more people and more complex missions.

Evolution of Leadership Theory

As a backdrop, we should first review the evolution of leadership theory in this century. Almost all leadership theory is based on the relative importance assigned to the leader versus the follower in mission accomplishment. Those who believe that leaders are sufficiently enlightened or *heroic*[1] (to use Morris Janowitz's term) cite examples of bold, "larger than life" leaders such as Napoléon, Alexander the Great, and Frederick the Great, and favor the authoritarian model of leadership. Those who have greater confidence in the follower's maturity, capability, and insights favor the democratic model.

Our perspective of leadership with regard to the respective roles played by the leader and follower has changed dramatically in this century. In the nineteenth century, the industrial revolution had pulled many Americans out of rural areas into the city, where industry was producing unprecedented wealth at the expense of the worker. Working conditions were appalling and management ruled tyrannically, enjoying enormous power to hire, fire, and generally dictate working conditions for the worker. We began the twentieth century focused almost exclusively on a leader-dominant theory of leadership that assumed a low opinion of the follower's motivation, maturity, and abilities. In the early part of the twentieth century, child labor laws and unions helped improve working conditions of America's workers but also exacerbated the divisive relationship between management and labor—leader and follower. The military, long a bastion for authoritarian leaders, also maintained a predominately authoritarian leadership style.

At the turn of the century, however, social scientists began to be interested in the worker as a means to improve production. In *Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources,* Hersey and Blanchard do an excellent job of tracing the evolution of leadership theory during the twentieth century. Their "Continuum of Leader Behavior"[2] diagram (fig. 1), adapted for use in this article, illustrates how all leadership theory is based on the relative emphasis placed on either the follower or the leader.

Hersey and Blanchard describe how leadership theory has evolved beginning with Frederick Winslow Taylor whose scientific management movement in the early 1900s sought to improve production by increasing worker productivity through time and motion studies. In their book, Hersey and Blanchard observe that

> the function of the leader under scientific management or classical theory was obviously to set up and enforce performance criteria to meet organizational goals. The main focus of a leader was on the needs of the organization and not on the needs of the individual.[3]

Elton Mayo shifted the emphasis to the human relations movement in the 1920s. This movement sought to examine employee needs and motivation to increase output. Mayo's best known work was the Hawthorne experiment conducted at the Western Electric Company. In this study, lighting conditions were varied to observe the effect on productivity. Surprisingly, worker productivity was less sensitive to changing

This article was prepared especially for AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership*.



Source: Adapted from Tannenbaum and Warren Schmidt's model. Paul Hershey and Kenneth Blanchard, *Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982), 92.

Figure 1. Continuum of Leader Behavior

lighting conditions than it was to the perception on the behalf of employees that management was interested in studying their behavior. Hersey and Blanchard observed

> The function of the leader under human relations theory was to facilitate cooperative goal attainment among followers while providing opportunities for their personal growth and development. The main focus, contrary to scientific management theory, was on individual needs and not on the needs of organization. In essence, then, the scientific management movement emphasized concern for task (output), while the human relations movement stressed a concern for relationships (people). The recognition of these two concerns has characterized the writings on leadership ever since the conflict between the scientific management and the human relations schools of thought became apparent.[4]

The depression and World War II resulted in a gap in organizational leadership scholarship; but just after World War II and into the 1960s, others began to seriously examine the leader-follower interaction. The Ohio State, University of Michigan, and University of Iowa studies all addressed the leader's role in balancing the competing demands of mission (task orientation) and employee (relationship behavior). Each study developed new terms to describe its particular orientation, but the fundamental issue in each case was the relative authority given to the employee or the follower.

One of the more recent studies, Douglas McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y, provides a useful framework for analyzing a leader's attitude concerning his or her followers. Theory X leaders assume followers are not sufficiently mature or motivated to be allowed much autonomy. Theory Y, in contrast, assumes just the opposite.

Figure 2 depicts a composite of these theories as they relate to leader-dominant and follower-dominant leadership styles and situations. Note the generalized chronology beginning at 1900 and ending at 1990. This illustrates how leadership theory has evolved since the turn of the century to the point where, in contrast to the predominately authoritarian style in 1900, our leadership style today is substantially follower-dominant as witnessed by the development of total quality management (TQM) within the Department of Defense (DOD).



Figure 2. Leader-Dominant and Follower-Dominant Styles and Chronology

Hersey and Blanchard, concluding that no one theory of leadership is wholly correct, developed the situational leadership model. This model holds that the leadership style used depends primarily on the maturity of the follower. They depicted their model with the diagram shown in figure 3.[5]



Source: Adapted from Hersey and Blanchard, *Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources,* 169.

Figure 3. Hersey and Blanchard's Situational Leadership Model

In sum, the substance of these studies and theories reflects a gradual evolution from an authoritarian leadership style based on a Theory X orientation to a democratic orientation that seeks to motivate the employee to feel he or she is a contributing part of the organization. That evolution has culminated recently with the development of TQM and a Quality Air Force (QAF) that seeks to further empower the employee. According to the total quality philosophy, "the challenge of our leaders is to invert the organizational pyramid and change the role of the leader or manager to a more supportive and empowering one."[6] Compared to the decidedly autocratic model of the US military in the past, the TQ approach to leadership is just about as follower-oriented as a system can be. Gen John M. Loh, Air Combat Command (ACC) commander and QAF advocate, articulated just how far we have come since the turn of the century when he said of the QAF environment, "No one in my organization is more important than anyone else."[7]

The Air War College Model

The AWC model is designed to describe situational leadership in a military context, although it can be applied to a variety of other circumstances. We can begin to build this model with a review of the definition of leadership. According to Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 35-49, *Air Force Leadership,* "Leadership is the art of influencing and directing people (followers) to accomplish the mission."[8] I would add, "to accomplish the mission in a particular *situation* or environment." In *Management of Organizational Behavior,* Hersey and Blanchard suggested that the above modification to the Air Force definition might be appropriate. They noted that "there is no best leadership style or stimulus. Any leadership style can be effective or ineffective depending on the response that style gets in a particular situation." They concluded that "empirical studies tend to show that there is no normative (best) style of leadership. Effective leaders adapt their leader behavior to meet the needs of their followers and *the particular environment* (emphasis added)."[9]

In his introduction to *The Mask of Command,* John Keegan alluded to a similar thought when speaking of "the particularity of leadership" or the necessity for studying and understanding leadership "in context."[10] The following model stresses the components of leadership identified in the AFP 35-49 definition (leader, follower, mission) as they are influenced by the situation or context in which leadership is exercised. Thus, the AWC model looks like this:

A few observations can be made about the components of the model and the relationship of these components. First, note that the arrow from followers to mission is unidirectional. That suggests that it is the followers, not the leader, who actual do the work and accomplish the mission. While the leader may get his or her "hands dirty" occasionally, the followers do the work. It is also the followers who provide feedback to the leader on their progress in accomplishing the mission. For that reason, among others, communication between leader and follower needs to be free-flowing, unencumbered as much as possible by administrative obstacles and psychological barriers.

The bidirectional arrow between leader and followers makes this point (fig. 5). Communication between the leader and the followers must be in the form of a dialogue, not a monologue. Many scholars have suggested that *the* critical factor in determining the effectiveness of this relationship is communication. "Congress can make a general," Gen Omar Bradley once observed, "but only communication can make him a commander."[11] As John Kline noted,

> The importance of effective communication by leaders is demonstrated daily in all organizations. Indeed, since 1938 when Chester Barnard concluded that communication was the main task of managers and executives, emphasis has been placed on improving communications in organizations. . . . Not only is communication down the chain of command important, subordinates need to keep each other and their supervisors informed. In other words, to be effective, communication channels need to be open down, up, and throughout the organization.[12]

That's why the arrow between the leader and the followers points both ways.



Figure 4. The AWC Leadership Model



Figure 5. Situational Component of the AWC Leadership Model

As outlined in the previous discussion, a major consideration in the understanding of leadership is the relationship between the leader and follower. The other major variable component (given that the mission remains a fixed component for a specific situation) is the situation, the environment, or the context in which leadership is exercised. This is where I think the AWC leadership model is most useful since it helps us understand how the dynamics of the leadership relationship change as the situation changes. For this reason, the "situation" component of the AWC model includes all the other components under its bracket. The various situations we will examine are

1. The *levels* at which leadership is exercised.
2. *Peacetime* leadership as compared to *wartime* operations.

3. Staff leadership as opposed to leadership of *operational* units.

4. A comparison of service, *joint* and *combined* leadership.

Levels of Leadership

Figure 6 reveals a number of relevant observations about how the leadership equation varies as the level of leadership rises from the tactical to the operational level and above. Look first at the column under "mission." The mission is very specific at the tactical level but becomes broader at the higher levels of leadership. For instance, junior officers operate primarily at the tactical level. Their missions are specific: bomb a target, seize and hold terrain, provide support for a specific operation, and so forth.



Figure 6. Levels of Leadership

On the other hand, higher levels of leadership have broader missions. An excellent example of broader mission tasking at the operational level was the Operation Overlord directive given Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower by the Combined Chiefs of Staff: "You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed Forces."[13] The model helps us see that as the leadership situation changes from tactical to operational and higher, mission tasking should become less specific.

The model allows us to visualize changes in the interaction between the leader and the followers as levels of leadership change. As the leader rises above the tactical level, the number of people for whom the leader is responsible increases. Consequently, the interaction with the "troops" becomes less and less direct. For instance, the relatively small number of people in a squadron allows the flight commander and even the squadron commander frequent and direct interaction with his or her people. To discuss an issue, the leader need only use the intercom or walk down the hall to talk to the person who will actually do the work.

However, as an officer becomes a group or wing commander or above, he or she inevitably becomes insulated, and communication is now less direct and more through intermediaries. Most successful leaders have attempted to reduce the effect of this isolating phenomenon by visiting their troops in the field as often as possible. Robert E. Lee was able to maintain extraordinary rapport with his troops even while serving as an operational commander. Likewise, Gen Omar Bradley and Gen George Patton made their presence felt among the soldiers they led. Even the aloof Napoléon went out of his way to be visible to his followers by presenting awards and visiting the troops in the field. The same principle practiced by these senior leaders applies to lower levels as well. The most effective leaders today are highly visible.

On the other hand, leaders who, as they rise above the lower and more direct leadership levels, attempt to maintain the same interaction with their followers and the same control over mission accomplishment are called micromanagers. "Micromanagementitis" may be the most pernicious disease common to leaders above the tactical level.

Instead of micromanaging, the leader needs to become an expert at what I would call "climate control." The effective senior leader controls the climate of the organization by ensuring that his or her vision, values, and vitality permeate the organization. This is achieved by defining the leader's vision for the organization, packaging it so everyone can understand it, and then communicating that message repeatedly through a variety of means. The concept of climate control includes delegating work and empowering subordinates to accomplish the mission.

As illustrated in figure 6, the changes in mission and followers associated with the rise above the tactical level force certain changes upon the leader as well. The leader at the tactical level is primarily a technician, a practitioner, who actually participates in an operation. For instance, at the tactical level a flight commander or squadron commander flies an aircraft, a submarine officer directs the navigation and employment of his weapons system, and a battalion commander leads his men into combat. As leadership is exercised at the higher levels, the technician becomes a generalist who is less concerned about operations at the tactical level and more concerned about the broader application of military power at the strategic levels.

So What?

What does all this mean to the military leader? On the basis of the discussion above, we can make five generalizations about leadership at the tactical level and above.

1. Your leadership style should probably change as you move from company grade to field grade and above. We can see this by examining the Hersey and Blanchard situational leadership model shown in figure 3. It is safe to say that the dominate leadership style for midcareer officers is a combination of "telling," "selling," or "participating" depending on the maturity of the followers. It is also correct to note that the leadership styles of selling and telling are less common today due to the empowering effects of QAF. As we include our youngest airmen in process action teams (PAT) and solicit their input in production and operations decisions, the S1 and S2 leadership styles will become more or less limited to basic training and other highly structured, routine tasks.

As you rise to higher leadership positions, the "maturity of your followers" (bottom horizontal line) will increase. The increased maturity of followers is associated with lower task behavior. That is, above the unit level you are less involved in "tasking" people to do things and depend on them to get the job done with less supervision.

As task behavior decreases there is an associated decrease in the senior leader's interaction (or "relationship behavior") with followers. According to Hersey and Blanchard all this means that your leadership style should evolve from "participating" (the style most common at the unit level) to "delegating" (the style leaders above the squadron should adopt).[14]

2. Because of the greater number of followers who work for leaders above the tactical level, he or she will have less direct contact with the majority of them. For instance, the officer in charge (OIC) of a maintenance squadron has 50 to 100 people working for him or her. These subordinates have frequent, direct contact with the leader. As a result, it is relatively easy to communicate values, goals, and guidance. On the other hand, as the midcareer officer today becomes the senior leader of tomorrow, the greater number of subordinates will make frequent, direct contact difficult and eventually impossible. As a consequence, a significant senior leader responsibility is to create the appropriate operational and ethical atmosphere where everyone knows what's expected of them—"climate control."

3. Leadership above the unit level must become less hands on, less technical. The leader must remain firmly in touch with the mission the unit performs, but he or she is now more of a generalist who leaves the details of the operation in the hands of those most familiar with the day-to-day operations.

4. As the individual rises above the unit level, the leader is removed farther from where the organization's activity takes place, and he or she is more out of touch with what is actually going on. Consequently, decisions made above the tactical level are frequently made with less than 100 percent of the information. In his book *Taking Charge*, Gen Perry Smith refers to this as the "60 percent rule," which means a leader makes a decision when 60 percent of the relevant information is available.[15] This is often a difficult step for the rising leader to take because it involves risk. It is, in many respects, a step of faith, but a step that must be taken because the consequence of not taking that step is inefficiency at best, paralysis at worst.

5. Above the tactical level, vision becomes more essential. Vision is essentially the ability to see into the future. According to Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus:

> To choose a direction, a leader must first have developed a mental image of a possible and desirable future state of the organization. This image, which we call vision, may be as vague as a dream or as precise as a goal or a mission statement. The critical point is that a vision articulates a view of a realistic, credible, alternative future for the organization, a condition that is better in some ways than what now exists. A vision is a target that beckons.[16]

The midcareer leader's vision is near term. At one extreme, a senior captain or major in combat may be required to focus 100 percent of his or her attention on the next mission. Under normal circumstances, the outer limits of the vision of a leader at the unit level probably don't extend much beyond the fiscal year. As leaders rise above the tactical level, however, the time frame for which they must plan increases considerably. In his article, "Building Strategic Leadership for the 21st Century," Maj Roderick R. Magee notes that

> one of the primary responsibilities of the strategic leader is to look ahead 10 to 20 years and determine what the Army will be required to do and thus how it must be structured to satisfy national objectives. There is universal agreement that vision is a key factor for organizational success and survival. Of course, it is the strategic leader who is responsible for establishing the vision.[17]

Creating a long-range, strategic vision for the organization requires the leaders to deal with issues that are more complex, conceptual, and abstract than the tactical concerns of a unit commander. In this respect, leadership is a more intellectual activity. Clausewitz expressed a similar thought when he said, "Every level of leadership of command has its own intellectual standard."[18] Major Magee refers to the Jacques and Jacob Stratified Systems Theory (SST) to make this point. He notes,

> One basis of their model (SST) is that cognitive complexity increases hierarchically as you go up the organization and that the leader's cognitive complexity must match what is required by the organizational level. According to SST, cognitive complexity can be thought of in terms of "differentiation and integration." The complexity associated with the organizational level, or organizational strata, is based on the time span of the role the leader is in.[19]

The Situation: Peace or War?

The foregoing discussion was concerned primarily with helping leaders understand how the leadership equation changes as the leader moves from tactical leadership to higher levels. The model can also be used to examine other leadership situations. For instance, we can use the model depicted in figure 7 to observe how the wartime environment affects the dynamics of leadership. As a general rule, the wartime mission is more critical and the result of failure takes on potentially tragic consequences. For this reason, the arrow under the "mission" column is substantially larger than the other arrows. A unit that fails to meet its peacetime tasking may bust an operational readiness inspection (ORI) or get a commander fired. On the other hand, Desert One, Gallipoli, Gen J. E. B. Stuart's absence at Gettysburg, and the Allied disaster at Kasserine Pass are examples of the tragic consequences of not accomplishing a wartime mission.

In time of war, the mental state of followers takes on greater significance since fear complicates his or her ability to perform. Leaders must take this factor into consideration when transitioning from peace to war. To compensate for fear and the greater importance of mission accomplishment, leaders may understandably become more authoritarian. The movie *Twelve O'Clock High* studied at various PME schools illustrates this point. As you will recall, General Savage assumed command of a World War II bomber group whose aircrews were suffering from low morale due to combat losses. To turn the situation around, the new commander adopted a very authoritarian leadership style. The renewed emphasis on strict discipline and the resulting antagonism toward the demanding boss led to improved mission accomplishment and ultimately higher morale.

Lest we infer too much from the above example, I would suggest that an authoritarian style is not an automatic response to a combat environment. Under normal circum-



Figure 7. The Situation: Peace or War?

stances, a leader's style won't change simply because the bullets are flying. It depends on the situation and the leader.

Looking again at the model, we can make some observations about the interaction between leader and follower in a combat environment. During peacetime operations, this interaction is complex and difficult. During war, this interaction is even more difficult since it is exacerbated by the fog and friction of war. Clausewitz's familiar observation is relevant:

> If one has never personally experienced war, one cannot understand in what the difficulties constantly mentioned really consist, nor why a commander should need any brilliance and exceptional ability. . . . Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.[20]

A final war-versus-peace related issue should be addressed at this point. As we transition to a more follower-oriented, "empowering" leadership model in peace such as TQM, there are potential pitfalls for us when engaged in combat operations. The fundamental purpose of basic training over the years has been to break down the individual's civilian mindset that is naturally resistant to following potentially life-threatening battlefield orders. In place of the civilian mindset, we substitute military discipline during basic training, a reflexive obedience to an authoritarian leadership style. The intent of QAF is just the opposite. It seeks to transfer power from the leader to subordinates, to solicit ideas and insights from followers in a very friendly, benign environment. How will the thoroughly indoctrinated and empowered QAF follower respond if the unit's leadership takes on a more autocratic style during combat? This is an issue which future leaders, particularly at the unit level, need to address.

Joint and Combined Leadership

Another variation in the leadership equation that will become increasingly important in today's environment involves the composition of friendly forces. A single-service operation is relatively easy to coordinate since like-minded individuals are involved in accomplishing the mission. Their interaction is facilitated by a common lexicon and a common orientation to their particular way of fighting. Once we include members of another service, however, additional considerations and sensitivities need to be addressed (fig. 8). Differences in service doctrine and operational methods not only frustrate working together but can have a deleterious, even fatal, effect on operations. As an example, you might consider the difficulties that arose due to doctrinal disagreements between Army ground and air commanders in North Africa during World War II.

In addition, interservice rivalries have complicated and will continue to complicate mission accomplishment. The competition among Gen Douglas MacArthur and Adm Ernest J. King and Adm Chester W. Nimitz in the World War II Pacific theater led to a less than optimum coordination of operations. On the other hand, Army general Omar Bradley and Air Force general Elwood R. Quesada worked well together.

The situation becomes even more complex when allies are involved. In addition to doctrinal and service differences, cultural and historical differences compound efforts to coordinate combined operations. In his *Airpower Journal* article "Staff Experience and Leadership Development," Gen John Shaud noted that "the likelihood of your participation in a joint coalition staff in this post-cold-war world has increased by an order of magnitude."[21] He served as chief of staff for the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) until recently and from that experience made the following observation:

> On the coalition staff, as is the case with any new leadership position . . . my primary mission was to coordinate the activities of the staff. . . . In addition to what you might normally expect that to entail, I found that I also had to be a negotiator, diplomat, taskmaster, and cheerleader. I learned also that on the SHAPE staff (as well as on most coalition staffs), some of the most important factors to be considered were appreciating inherent differences in culture and language and possessing a solid sense of history. [22]

The Axis alliance in World War II provides an example of the liabilities of coalition warfare. Germany found itself dragged into a North African campaign and into combat in Greece by its Italian allies who failed to perform effectively according to German generals Albert Kesselring and Erwin Rommel.[23] On the other hand, Eisenhower's collegial, accommodating leadership style was a key to the success of Operation Overlord. It is doubtful that a Patton-type leadership style would have been successful.



Figure 8. Joint and Combined Leadership

Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf's sensitivity to Arab culture acquired as a child growing up in Iran was an important factor in forging the coalition during the Persian Gulf War. "Storm'n Norman" may be the consummate practitioner of adaptive, situational coalition leadership in the recent past. In *Crusade* Rick Atkinson describes Schwarzkopf as a tyrant, a bellowing autocrat who was abusive to US members of the coalition. At the same time, he was diplomatic and accommodating to most allies. One has to wonder if this was not precisely the leadership style that was necessary to keep the coalition together. As Atkinson observed,

> In a curious way, Schwarzkopf's temper also helped quell interservice squabbles by unifying natural rivals beneath a common fear. Moreover, he prudently spared the allies his wrath. Here he showed himself most competent at that for which he was presumed least prepared by training and constitution: the muster and master of a huge coalition drawn from three dozen nations.[24]

Staff versus Operational Leadership

A final leadership situation we can examine is the difference between the staff and operations environment—a key issue for midcareer officers moving above unit level for the first time. As illustrated in figure 9, leaders in operational units are probably more effective if they conform to the heroic leader style while a staff leader's style is more appropriately bureaucratic and participative. The interaction between leader and followers is primarily verbal and informal in an operational environment but becomes more formal and written in the staff. Likewise, the followers are more sophisticated in the staff environment and the mission more in the arena of policy and plans. In the Air Force, the farther you get away from the flight line, the greater becomes the leader's challenge to keep followers focused on flying and fighting and to promote institutional, as opposed to occupational, values.

James Stokesbury called leadership the most baffling of arts, and those of us in the military would certainly agree. At the same time, our PME curricula are designed to make the art of leadership less baffling for the military practitioner. The AWC situational leadership model described above is, I think, a useful framework to assess leaders and their leadership in context. In a rapidly changing world, this view of leadership can also help you adapt your leadership style to the situation as you find yourself in more senior leadership positions. In light of unprecedented technological developments, rapidly changing world events, and compressed cycles of social change, the need for adaptive, flexible, empowering leadership has never been greater.



Figure 9. Staff versus Operational Leadership

Notes

1. In his article "The User of Leadership Theory" (*Michigan Business Review,* January 1973), James Owen defines bureaucratic leadership style in terms we can all understand. Heroic or charismatic leadership is more difficult to pin down. In his book *Leadership*, James MacGregor Burns noted that charismatic leadership may mean "an emotional bond between leader and led; popular assumption that a leader is powerful, omniscient, and virtuous, imputation of enormous supernatural power to leaders (or secular or both); and simply popular support for a leader that verges on love." The sense in which I use heroic or charismatic leadership implies a leadership style that reflects a strong personality that inspires and energizes followers to accomplish extraordinary feats. In this sense, it is very similar to Morris Janowitz's definition in *The Professional Soldier,* which calls the heroic leader a perpetuation of the warrior type, the mounted officer who embodies the martial spirit and the theme of personal valor.
2. Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard, *Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982), 86.
3. Ibid., 85.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 152. Depending on which edition of their book you have, you may see different terms used to describe the Hersey and Blanchard model. Nevertheless, the meanings are essentially the same.
6. *The Quality Approach*, published by the Air Force Quality Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala., II-7.
7. Gen Mike Loh, address at the National Quality Month Kick-off, Hampton Roads Quality Council, Hampton, Va., Holiday Inn, 1 October 1992.
8. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 35-49, *Air Force Leadership,* 1985, 2.
9. Hersey and Blanchard, 102.
10. Ibid., 103.
11. John Keegan, *The Mask of Command* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1987), 1–4.
12. Omar Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1951), 474.
13. John Kline, "Communications for the Leader," in AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership,* Richard I. Lester and A. Glenn Morton, eds. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1990), 261.
14. Hersey and Blanchard, 236–37.
15. Perry M. Smith, *Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986), 108.
16. Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, *Leaders: The Strategies for Taking Charge* (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), 89.
17. Maj Roderick R. Magee, "Building Strategic Leadership for the 21st Century," *Military Review,* February 1993, 39.
18. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 111.
19. Magee, 37.
20. Clausewitz, 119.
21. Gen John Shaud, USAF, Retired, "The Staff Experience and Leadership Development," *Airpower Journal* 7, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 9.
22. Ibid.
23. Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen, *World War II: America at War* (New York: Random House, 1991), 537.
24. Rick Atkinson, "Desert Storm's Angry Caesar," *Washington Post National Weekly,* 4–10 October 1993.

"Heterogenius" Engineering and Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS): Leadership, Logic, and Acquisition Requirements

Col Steve Chiabotti

Acquisition is all about leadership. The difference between success and failure in bringing on a new technology or weapon system most often boils down to the finesse and grit of the people leading the program. This may be surprising to those who believe in some form of technological determinism. Karl Marx may have told us that the hand mill gave us the feudal lord and the steam engine the industrial capitalist. And he may have been correct within the narrow historical context he chronicled, but who gave us the hand mill and steam engine? It certainly was not the feudal lord and the capitalist. While the origins of the hand mill are obscured somewhat by the darkness of the age, we know quite a bit about the origins of the steam engine. John Newcomen and James Watt were men of vision and will. They had the vision to understand the potential of power in the condensation of steam to water and the will to overcome dissociative forces in constructing their engines. The light of genius and the power of will pervade the writings of the leading philosopher on things military, Carl von Clausewitz. It's somewhat ironic that we should mention him in the context of technological transformation, since he wrote from a period when military endeavor was remarkably devoid of technical change. Nonetheless, the Clausewitzian formula for military leadership and genius combines nicely with the sociology of modern technical transformation to provide insights for those leading acquisitions. John Law, in describing Portuguese attempts to master navigation along the African coast in the 15th century, coins the term "heterogeneous engineering." His thinking was that prototypes take many forms of modern systemic frameworks, where an agency is afforded people, technical artifacts, and natural forces. In Law's parlance, every technical system faces associative and dissociative forces. The heterogeneous engineer takes advantage of associative forces to overcome dissociative ones in bringing a system to closure, or stable form.[1]

Dissociative forces resonate in many ways with the Clausewitzian concept of friction. "War is like a machine operating under great friction. Everything in war is simple, but war makes even the simplest things very difficult."[2] In the Clausewitzian paradigm of leadership, friction is overcome by the "iron will of the commander." Interesting that he writes on one hand of genius—the ability to see all in a single "blink"—and yet on the other of iron will—the need to rescue genius from friction.[3] The dichotomy is, I believe, seemingly deliberate. Just as he defines the culminating point of the offensive in terms of the ability to conduct a successful defense against counterattack, Clausewitz illuminates the need for military leaders to combine the fanciful flights of genius with the dogged determination to see things through the inevitable problems that arise. Good advice for raconteurs of military technology.

Before we get on to illustrations, it might be good to ask just who leads military technical transformation? Is it the program manager or the chief of staff? I would maintain neither, although both play important roles. The real leadership for acquisition occurs somewhere in between—in the plans shop of the command buying the system. The reasons for this are manifold. First, the command formulates the requirements for the new system. These require an acute awareness of what is needed and when the market can deliver, as well as how it might be maintained and operated at minimum danger to human life. Second, the using command must advocate the funds to procure the system and operate it over its life cycle. Third, following operational test and evaluation, the using command takes ownership of the system, usually for decades, occasionally for nearly a century. Hence, the heterogeneous systems engineer at major command level must balance operational requirements and ""desirements"" with what the market will deliver for funds available. Moreover, she must advocate the funds, first within the Air Force, then DOD, and finally the four subcommittees of Congress that deal with military allocations. While we may have program element managers (PEM) in the Air Force secretary's office, they rely on cogent argument from the major command and potential user to make their case in what is often a very complicated context. While context subsumes and engulfs all, it may be good to remember that genius manages context.

Consider systems requirements a picture with four quadrants. In one sits the operators. They want to fly higher, faster, and further than the laws of nature will allow—and be invisible, not burn fuel, or make any noise while doing it. In another quadrant sit the safety people—former operators who recognize the violence of gravity and try to protect those who routinely cheat it. They want redundant systems, multiple engines, ejection seats that work inverted and underground—well; you get that corner of the picture. In another quadrant sit the maintainers and logisticians. Even though they believe aircraft exist only to be repaired and inspected, they want the kind that never need repaired or inspected—or as seldom as possible. They require easy accessibility to system components, single-point refueling, onboard oxygen-generation systems, and the like. Their rationale is brutal and honest: parts

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and labor drive life-cycle costs. Unreasonable maintenance man-hours per flying hour have spelled the demise of many operationally "sweet" systems.

Finally, we come to the quadrant where the market meets the money. How much are we willing to pay for these operational, safety, and logistic capabilities? Which are easily delivered by the complement of manufacturers in the world system, and which require developmental work? At which points are we willing to trade performance, logistic, and safety capabilities for the economies in cost and schedule that inhere in off-the-shelf components? These crucial decisions must be made by planners in the requirements shop of the major command buying and using the system. Their decisions are passed on to the requirements division of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in the Pentagon and are eventually validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council on the Joint Staff. Nonetheless, the leadership and decision-making, may I say make a compelling argument for the system, comes from the major commands intending to use it. Nay, it comes from the heterogeneous engineer in the middle of the picture who understands the concerns and capabilities of all four quadrants and negotiates trade-offs. This kind of maneuvering rivals the battlefield in its demand for both visionary genius and the iron will to overcome friction; hence, the title of this piece.

Allow me to illustrate by example in the procurement of a relatively modest aircraft—a primary trainer to replace the T-37. Here, both failure and success emphasize the importance of "heterogenius" engineering.

Since the late 1950s the Air Force used the T-37 Cessna as its flying classroom. The aircraft was designed specifically to train pilots for the modern jet force that was clearly emerging at the time. It had two relatively modest-in-power jet engines, a large clamshell canopy, and side-by-side seating with dual controls—stick, rudder, and throttles—for the instructor and student. Several thousand Air Force pilots—and many from allied countries (including Iran) gained their air sense in the T-37.

By the mid-1980s, however, the aircraft began to exhibit some deficiencies, particularly when compared to the state of the art in trainers of this variety. Wing and tail structures showed signs of fatigue from the countless spins, aerobatic maneuvers, and hard landings. The engines required 23 seconds to accelerate from idle to full power. They also emitted a hideous 105-decibel whine at 5,000 cycles when idle power, violating most of the noise emission standards projected for commercial airports by the turn of the century. The ejection seats required a healthy amount of altitude and airspeed to return a pilot safely to ground—so much so that the aircraft was out of its ejection envelope in the traffic pattern, where nearly half of the flying occurred. The air-conditioning system did not function well below 20,000 feet, where the temperature is usually about 10 degrees Fahrenheit. In fact, in the traffic pattern at now-closed Williams AFB, Phoenix, Arizona, the temperature in the cockpit could reach 160 degrees. Also, the T-37 cockpit was not pressurized, making the typical training sortie more dramatic in pressure gradients than that experienced by pilots in altitude-chamber training. Finally, the instrument gauges formed a somewhat antiquated hodgepodge that was difficult to read and even harder to replace when components failed.

The Air Force responded to these shortcomings by requesting a new trainer in the early 1980s. The T-46 was a developmental program, meaning the Air Force set requirements that couldn't be met by an aircraft currently in manufacture. The design specification for the T-46 reflected many features of the T-37 it was to replace. It had two jet turbo-fan engines (with a separate development contract for the TF-109 engines), side-by-side seating, and ejection seats—this time with "zero-zero" capability, meaning if the aircraft caught on fire during start-up in the chocks, both pilots could safely eject there, as well as just about anywhere else in the flight envelope. Some of the T-46 requirements demonstrated a fractious competition between various communities comprising the requirements picture. The twin engines and zero-zero ejection seats were clearly supported by the safety community—as well as a curious requirement for the engines to endure three successive throttle movements from idle to full power while the aircraft was in a spin. This drove engine intakes to a size that a small person could stand in. The safety community was also adamant that the aircraft employ the Aces II ejection seat—a rather large seat for an otherwise small airplane. These requirements conflicted somewhat with a desire from the operational community for the airplane to achieve 400 knots in level flight. The large intakes, and nearly-square plane form presented by the cockpit, along with the limited power of the engines, made this feat equivalent to getting your sports utility vehicle up to 150 miles per hour on the interstate. If it were going to happen all, you'd better be going down a big hill.

Unable to meet its performance specifications, behind schedule, and over cost, the T-46 Program was cancelled by the secretary of the Air Force in 1987. While there was plenty of blame to go around, one cause was a failure of leadership to compromise on competing requirements. Air Training Command (ATC) responded by ordering a structural life-extension program for the T-37 that would ensure the venerable *Tweet* would last until another aircraft could be procured. At the same time, ATC established a requirements directorate under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans whose principal task was to establish a master plan for replacing training aircraft and realistic and attainable requirements for the planes themselves. As part of the master plan, the T-37 would be replaced by the Primary Aircraft Training System (PATS), named after Pat Flannigan, a mercurial colonel in the requirements shop of ATC. The T-37 replacement was to be nondevelopmental. This approach would enable shorter lead times and an ambitious acquisition schedule—"level-funded" at $400 million per year at the suggestion of Congress.[4]

Before we visit the key requirements that form the constructive basis for this airplane, it might be wise to revisit the strategic landscape or context of the acquisition. The aircraft was to be commercial off-the-shelf, meaning exotic requirements in need of research and development simply wouldn't fly (pun intended). Second, the mood of Congress was such that joint programs had a much better chance of receiving funding than those of single-service persuasion. Third, the Air Force had already forestalled an initiative from Congress for it to replace its T-38 advanced trainer with a variant of the Navy's T-45 (picture a T-45 Goshawk). Consequently, by 1991, planners at ATC had entered talks with the Navy training people in Corpus Christi, Texas, and Pensacola, Florida, and firmly welded a "J" onto the front end of their PATS. As the deputy for Plans, Brig Gen Walt Kross, said to his requirements shop, "From this point forward, we will cloak ourselves in the mantle of 'jointness'."

Joint acquisitions are like weddings between large families with distinct ethnicities and, should we say, a "history" of relations. While the Air Force and Navy have on occasion used the same aircraft, they've demonstrated little aptitude in buying things together. In fact, competition between the two services has probably yielded more than cooperation. Nonetheless, an examination of the two services' primary flying training systems revealed few substantive differences. Although the Navy liked to fly around the traffic pattern with the landing gear extended at all times, they did not practice carrier landings or engage arresting gear in the primary phase. Junior and young field-grade officers from both services agreed that the same aircraft could probably be used to replace the Navy's T-34C and the Air Force's T-37, and the generals and admirals went along with the notion. So the wedding was on. Now for the guest list, which is akin to determining the exact requirements or performance specifications for the aircraft.

Key requirements form the basis for any acquisition and particularly for a training aircraft. The first involves the need for speed—how fast must the aircraft go? The T-37 tops out at about 250 knots, the T-34C at about 180. Remember the Air Force had asked for 400 knots from the T-46. Pundits might suggest that need was driven by a disdain for propeller-driven aircraft. Even high-performance turboprops (jet engines with propellers, like the T-34C) top out around 350 knots. Well over 90 percent of Air Force pilots fly jets without propellers. Seventy percent of Navy aviators, on the other hand, fly something with a blade, whether it is spinning in front of the aircraft or above it, in the case of a helicopter. In other words, all things considered, the Navy would prefer to train in cheap and efficient turboprops, while the Air Force would not. The question then became: would the Air Force insist on a speed that would exclude turboprops from the competition—say 400 knots, or relent to a figure on the high end of turbo-prop performance—say 300 knots?

In early 1989 ex-Navy fighter pilot Tony Nargi brought a team of Swiss engineers and pilots with an aircraft called the PC-9 to Randolph, AFB, Texas, to answer that question. Over 30 instructor pilots current in both the T-37 and T-38 flew the turboprop aircraft and evaluated its potential to replace the T-37 in the training system. They concluded that although the "step" from the PC-9 to the T-38 would be different than that from the T-37, it was manageable and could be "trained." They were impressed with the performance of the slick turboprop, which was faster than the T-37 and could literally fly circles around it. As seasoned T-38 instructor Phil Budenbender remarked after his PC -9 sortie, "There's gonna have to be rules!" The aircraft also had a "glass" instrument panel replete with multifunctional liquid crystal display (LCD) gauges and an efficient cooling system. It posed problems, however, to traditionalists. Not only was there a prop, but only one engine pushing it. The seating arrangement was tandem, with the backseat elevated considerably over the front, so that the rear-seat pilot could see only the helmet of the pilot in front—ostensibly the student. Finally, the aircraft, like most turboprops, was not pressurized. When queried about pressurizing the aircraft, the Swiss engineers in tow suggested some difficulty and made the noise feared by programmers the world over—cha-ching. But one thing was clear; the PC-9 had made a strong case for the turboprop as a contender in the Air Force system and influenced the decision for minimum acceptable top airspeed of 300 knots. The case for a turboprop like the PC-9 was perhaps even stronger in the joint arena—providing the aircraft could meet other specified requirements.

The next issue to address had to do with the seating arrangement. The Air Force had trained side-by-side for the past 30 years, while the Navy went at it in tandem. Proponents of the side-by-side arrangement argued for nonverbal communication, like squeezing off the student's oxygen hose for attention. More importantly, they argued for the ability of the instructor to see just what the student was looking at and when—probably the most important variables in piloting an aircraft. But this capability came at a heavy price. The side-by-side configuration limited performance by increasing drag, without the concomitant increase in lift created by the stepped-tandem canopy. The visibility of each pilot was limited by the head of the other—a complicating factor in maneuvers, such as turning rejoins during the formation phase. For example, few T-37 instructors would consider rejoining a solo student from a two-ship formation to the left side of the aircraft where the ongoing success of a maneuver that ends just short of collision was left exclusively to the judgment of two relatively inexperienced students. Turns are more difficult to execute in a side-by-side aircraft. Left turns look different than right turns, and the same is true for traffic patterns. Hence, all must be practiced at the expense of other training.

In general, most pilots would agree that tandem aircraft are easier to fly because both pilots are sitting along the center line, or longitudinal access, and can more readily sense and identify changes in pitch and bank. The tandem aircraft also fosters a greater sense of independence and removes the flight instructor from the student's cross check. Thus, the essential transition to solo is more easily accomplished. Ejection from side-by side aircraft using rocket-assisted seats can be a little sporty for the crew member that gets out second. In fact, aside from nurturing proper habits of eye movement in the early phases of flying, the only other type of mission that favors side-by-side aircraft is low-level navigation, where instruction moves from map to ground and back again through several iterations. Here the ability to point out features on the map aids comprehension. It's not surprising then that most commercially available training aircraft of this genre are tandem. In fact, at the time of the JPATS acquisition, tandem contenders outnumbered side-by-side variants by nearly four to one.

At a meeting in the summer of 1991, Air Force senior leaders pondered the seating-arrangement requirement. By then the acquisition of the new screening aircraft, which was to precede the JPATS in the training system, was in full swing. ATC planners urged the generals to consider dictating a side-by-side requirement for the screener, where several promising candidates had emerged, and a tandem requirement for the primary trainer to replace the T-37, where again the market was strong. Such a posture would accomplish much. Proper habits of eye movement would be established in the first 25 hours of flying in the new screener. The tandem configuration in the JPATS would enhance both safety and performance, ease the training burden, play into the strength of the market, and perhaps curry favor with the Navy.

Such a posture—side-by-side in the screener and tandem in the primary trainer—would eliminate some candidates deemed undesirable from both acquisitions. In the winter of 1988 two Chilean pilots had brought the *Enaer Pillan* to Randolph AFB. The Pillan was a tandem design and acquitted itself very well as potential replacement for the T-41 screener. Inquiries through legislative liaison channels revealed, however, that there was little interest from the State Department in doing business with the Chilean government. A side-by-side requirement would then solve a sticky problem in what had been a successful military-to-military exchange. Similarly, in the field of contenders for the JPATS there existed two side-by-side contenders. The Finns offered the *Valmet Redigo*, a side-by-side-seating turboprop that used a rocket-extraction system instead of ejection seats for emergency egress. The film of a rocket-extracting a dummy from the airplane looked more like a hanging and scared the ATC viewers attending a *Valmet* pitch. Across the North Sea, the Belgians offered a side-by-side trainer powered by the engine developed for the T-46. The *Squalus*, however, had only one of the engines, instead of the two deemed necessary to get the T-46 up to altitude and speed. The ATC crew that flew the airplane in Belgium named it the "Squalid" but quipped that it might be just ugly and slow enough for the Navy to like it.

For a host of reasons that embraced performance, safety, training effectiveness, aesthetics, and politics—both international and interservice—the Air Force's new primary trainer was to feature a tandem cockpit configuration. While this appeared to slant the acquisition toward turboprops like the *Pilatus* PC-9 or *Embraer Tucano*, the Air Force had to take a "vanilla" posture on the kind and number of engines for that airplane to compete.

The issue of engines, number and type, represents a busy intersection of safety, operational, logistic, and economic factors. Most safety advocates prefer more engines to mitigate the effects of losing one. Most operators like the additional power, particularly if it can be placed close to the center line. Two is better than one, four better than two, eight better than four. In a trainer or small airplane, the choice is generally between two and one. In its two present trainers, the T-37 and T-38, the Air Force had opted for two-engine aircraft. It did the same in the failed T-46 acquisition. The Navy appeared to believe less strongly, with many of its trainers sporting only one engine. Other factors persuaded the argument toward the single-engine solution. Modern diagnostic techniques—analyzing engine oil samples, for example—had greatly improved the art of predicting engine failure. Zero-zero ejection seats minimized the danger of engine failure during takeoff, landing, and low-altitude maneuvers. Moreover, engines tend to be the most expensive component of the aircraft system. Although twin-engine aircraft tend to experience lower attrition, they seldom do so at a rate to offset the cost of an additional engine for each aircraft that does not crash. Additional engines also add to the life-cycle cost of the system, since they must be maintained at regular intervals. So, in the end, the number of engines boiled down to an economic argument. If someone wanted to offer an airplane with more than one engine they would have to do so at price that would compete with the single-engine bidders—difficult, but not impossible, and very easy to measure.

Now the "kind" of engine solicited is a more subjective problem. Three variants exist: turbojet, turbofan, and turboprop. Turboprops present the demanding physics of rotational mechanics to the pilot in just about every maneuver with torque, yaw, corkscrewing, and slipstream effects. Jets are just easier to fly, but they tend to be stubborn and slippery—harder to speed up and slow down. Turbojets tend to have better performance at high speeds and higher fuel consumption than turbofans. Turboprops tend to be very efficient in the range of airspeed between 50 and 300 knots. Fuel consumption will give you an idea of efficiencies. On a one-hour contact sortie flying typical primary training maneuvers, the *Aermacchi* MB-339 turbojet burned 180 gallons (gal) of JP-4 (about the same as the T-37), the *Sia Marchetti* S-211 turbofan burned 130 gals, and the PC-9 turboprop 65 gals. These figures represent averages over 20 sorties. In other words, if the Air Force was willing to countenance the "unjetlike" characteristics of the turboprops, and sacrifice about 50 knots from its top-end airspeed, it could achieve a 50–75 percent reduction in fuel costs. At the time, JP-4 (essentially kerosene with a few additives) cost about a dollar a gallon. Since then, as you might expect, the price has nearly tripled.

Hence, economics also influenced the decision on which types of engines were allowed to compete, but we should not discount the strong performance of the PC-9 turboprop in demonstration flights. Eventually, type of engine, like number of engines, became a vanilla requirement. Neither the Air Force nor its acquisition partner, the Navy, specified a type or number of engines in their joint requirements layout. As Maj Gen Larry Henry, the deputy for Plans, ATC, was fond of saying, "We don't care what moves the air over the wings—just so it moves." Such a posture favored again the turboprops, whose fuel consumption would lead to low life-cycle costs and whose estimated acquisition costs tended to be about $1 million less per copy than the turbofans and turbojets. But the latter also tended to carry cockpit pressurization, while the turboprops did not. So would the Air Force and Navy force bidders to offer a pressurized aircraft? By 1992 this became a high-stakes issue.

The original joint statement of need for the aircraft required cockpit pressurization of the standard military variety.[5] The rationale was quite strong. Pilots of the unpressurized

T-37 experienced an average of 150 pressure-related physiological incidents each year. This figure represented roughly 50 percent of the Air Force total, even though the T-37 executed less than 7 percent of the aggregate flying-hour program. It made little sense for the primary trainer to be the most physiologically demanding aircraft in the inventory. Proponents of pressurization also argued about the distraction caused by ear-blocks and sinus problems that were never severe enough to be reported, but nonetheless impeded learning.

On the other hand, was it fair to ask companies like Pilatus and Ennaer to pressurize aircraft "out-of-pocket" in a nondevelopmental acquisition? The Swiss did not think so. They and their on-shore pairing partner Beech-Raytheon put a lot of pressure on Gen Merrill "Tony" A. McPeak, Air Force chief of staff, to buy their aircraft as was—in other words to relax the requirement for pressurization to a "desirement." McPeak was so inclined and put a lot of pressure on Lt Gen Joseph W. Ashy, ATC commander. But, clinging to their data, his requirements shop under Larry Henry held firm. Ashy had signed the statement of need with a "Yeah, we really need this!" in the margin next to the pressurization requirement and nearly decapitated his two-star deputy for requirements when confronted with that evidence. Things settled down when McPeak visited Randolph AFB later that year and flew a T-37 for the first time in over 20 years. After his staff instructor pilot took him through two spins and a series of aerobatic maneuvers and landed, he stepped away from the airplane, took off his helmet, and started slapping the heel of his palm above his right ear. "Damn it, Joe, we need a pressurized airplane."

And there were pressurized turbojets and turbofans that met the other requirements. So the table was leveled. The inherently cheaper, fuel-sipping turboprops would have to pressurize to play. The increase in weight would drive an increase in power and the increase in power, an increase in fuel. The more powerful engine would require a larger tail surface to counteract the additional torque and slipstream effects generated, and the fuselage would need to be lengthened to create a longer moment arm for the tail. The airplane is a tightly wound system, and the physics of rotational mechanics are unrelenting. In the end, pressurization required Beech engineers to completely redesign the PC-9. The airplane they offered looked almost the same but was 95 percent different from the original.

To this point we've focused almost exclusively on the airplanes. But what of the people being trained? Specifically, what size of person should the aircraft accommodate—particularly when the aircraft is the gateway for nearly all military fixed-wing pilots? This evokes the science of anthropometry—literally the measurement of people. Consider the "pear-shaped" size demographic of the American population. The bulge at the top represents what is commonly referred to as the "Bubba factor." Weight training, growth formula, and the premium football and basketball put-on size have contributed to this distortion. The larger bulge at the bottom of the pear represents the influx of more diminutive people in recent years such as Asians, Hispanics, and females.

Airplanes, on the other hand are designed around men—typically a five foot 10 inch, 170–pound white male. African American males, for example, tend to have longer legs and shorter torsos than whites. Females tend to be shorter. Now, we're all pretty good at distorting our bodies to reach things when we need to. But there are limits when one is strapped to an ejection seat with a five-point tie-down lap belt, sitting against a forty-pound parachute, sucking oxygen through a rubber hose and mask, and generally impersonating a large insect about to fly away. Feet must be able to reach the rudder pedals, which double as brakes—they usually adjust by crank. Hands must reach the control stick, landing gear handle, flap lever, radios, instrument knobs, and the like. But most importantly, within parameters of adjusting the seat up and down, the pilot must be able to fit under the canopy and see above the dashboard. So the most critical anthropometric measurement is sitting height. If you sit under 34 inches, no matter how good your eyes may be, you cannot see over the dash of a T-37. If you sit over 40 inches, you cannot close the canopy in the back seat of the T-38. Other than Fisher DeBerry, football coach at the Air Force Academy, the over-40 crowd has few advocates. But did you know that over 50 percent of female college graduates sit under 34 inches? In other words, while the 1990 Air Force standard of 34–40 inches in sitting height accommodated the 5th to 95th percentile male, it accommodated less than 50 percent of the potential female pilot candidates. Surprisingly, each half inch below 34 captured nearly 15 percent more of the female population. By the time you got to 32 inches, you achieved parity with the male demographic of 5th to 95th percentile.

In the early 1990s none of the potential contenders could accommodate this anthropometric profile. Unlike pressurization, where some had it and some didn't, this requirement couldn't be thrown in the face of the have-nots. The acquisition was nondevelopmental, meaning the government could not force a developmental effort without compensation. In fact, accommodating sitting heights below the current standard couldn't be stated as a requirement without pushing the issue all the way to the secretary of defense. After all, who else could legally and politically define this discriminator for America's cohort of military pilots? The solution was an elegant compromise, bordering on genius. The requirement was to remain the same, with 34 to 40 inches of sitting height defining the limits. But air framers were offered incentives in source selection for going below 34 inches. It was interesting, but not surprising, to see the Navy champion this approach in the wake of the Tailhook scandal. Incidentally, the winning aircraft could accommodate down to 31.58 inches in sitting height. And that aircraft was the PC-9 variant offered by Beech-Raytheon, with a pressurized cockpit and a prop spinning at a constant rate of 2000 revolutions per minute.

Anthropometry is perhaps the most socially constructed of all requirements in the acquisition and required the most ""heterogenius"" engineering. While social factors and politics played a strong role in the JPATS acquisition, performance, cost, and safety had at least as much influence; and these fall more on the instrumental side of the ledger. One would be hard-pressed, however, to argue for determinism.

Neither the acquisition itself, nor the requirements that defined the aircraft eventually selected were inevitable. The failed T-46 development and the structural life-extension programs for the trainers of the time provided a set of initial constraints. The joint mood of the Congress also had an effect in shaping requirements in that the Air Force and Navy were forced to compromise. One need only compare the Air Force lay down for the T-46—twin-engine, side-by-side, turbofan—with the tandem, single-engine, turboprop PC-9 to appreciate how far the junior service drifted in its predilections. Similarly, the Navy stepped up in both class and cost by transitioning from the T-34C. The PC-9 had twice the power, ejection seats, pressurization, anti-G system, and a host of other upgrades not present in the T-34 Turbo Mentor.

People and relationships were perhaps as important as technology in determining outcomes. The liaison of young Navy and Air Force officers and their general agreement on the principles of primary flying training played a large role in determining requirements. Walt Kross's disposition for joint acquisition, as well as Joe Ashy's relationship to Tony McPeak, also played key roles along the way.

One overarching generalization: requirements represent the trade space for competing systems. Proper formulation of requirements stems from an explicit understanding of operating constraints and desired outcomes. This is true whether one is buying a house, a power-generation system, or an airplane. While the choices between two-story and ranch, gas and electric, or tandem and side-by-side appear both stark and arbitrary, they are much influenced by "local" conditions. The proximity of the T-3 acquisition to JPATS had a large influence on the tandem requirement, while the recent Tailhook scandal drove the Navy's posture on anthropometry for the new airplane.

Compromise in these instances usually engenders progress. While I've made much of the Air Force's willingness to consider a tandem turboprop, we must also applaud the Navy for considering the four-turbine–driven aircraft that appeared at source selection. In following through on the JPATS acquisition, the Air Force and Navy now have a joint primary aircraft training system that shares aircraft, locations, and personnel. While some in the Air Force may wonder why on earth the retrograde motion to prop-driven aircraft, few would argue that the new turboprop is not an improvement to the venerable T-37. Similarly, while the new airplane may be more than the Navy wanted or needed for a primary trainer, I think naval aviators will suffer the inconvenience gladly.

Of primary importance is the leadership and foresight displayed in the ATC plans directorate in specifying requirements that embodied workable compromises among the operational, safety, logistic, and market communities of a several-billion-dollar acquisition. The requirements for the JPATS, or T-6, represent both the genius of exceptional staff officers and the iron will of leaders determined to see their work to completion.

Notes

1. John Law, "Heterogeneous Engineering," in *The Social Construction of Technological Systems* Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pich, eds. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 120.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 100–112, 119–21.

3. Ibid.

4. *1989 Department of Defense Trainer Aircraft Master Plan*, HQ Air Training Command, Randolph AFB, TX, 1989, 11–12.

5. Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) Joint Statement of Need (JSON), Randolph AFB, TX, 1991, 3.

Critical Thinking for the Military Professional

Col W. Michael Guillot

Any complex activity, if it is to be carried on with any degree of virtuosity, calls for appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament. . . . Genius consists in a harmonious combination of elements, in which one or the other ability may predominate, but none may be in conflict with the rest.

—Carl Von Clausewitz
On War

In a previous article on strategic leadership I described the strategic environment as volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA). Additionally, that writing introduced the concept of strategic competency.[1] This article will discuss the most important essential skill for strategic leaders: critical thinking.

It is hard to imagine a strategic leader today who does not think critically or at least uses the concept in making decisions. Critical thinking helps the strategic leader master the challenges of the strategic environment. It helps one understand how to bring stability to a volatile world. Critical thinking leads to more certainty and confidence in an uncertain future. This skill helps simplify complex scenarios and brings clarity to the ambiguous lens. Critical thinking is the kind of mental attitude required for success in the strategic environment. In essence, critical thinking is about learning how to think and how to judge and improve the quality of thinking—yours and others.

Lest you feel you are already a great critical thinker, consider this: In a recent study supported by the Kellogg Foundation, only 4 percent of the US organizational population was considered highly competent in strategic thinking.[2] When it comes to thinking itself, there are still a number of myths to contend with. For instance, "Thinking is natural and you don't have to think twice about it to do it well—thinking skills and intelligence are synonymous—they aren't! Bright people just know how to think well together—they don't."[3]

The grand master of military strategy and leadership, Carl Von Clausewitz, thoroughly embraced the value of critical thinking in his writings concerning military genius. Clausewitz advised, "What we must do is to survey all those gifts of mind and temperament that in combination bear on military activity."[4] Also consider the challenge presented to all the military departments by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld when he called for leaders who were proactive, more like venture capitalists, and deal with uncertainty—those unknown unknowns.[5] Critical thinking is required to address this kind of challenge.

To understand the concept of critical thinking, first one must try to define it—what it is and what it is not. Next, the prospective critical thinker must study the topic to develop critical-thinking skills. This paper will present a very useful construct or model for learning how to think critically and how to use critical thinking. Finally, we will consider the challenge of engaging noncritical-thinking societies.

What is Critical Thinking?

Average intelligence may recognize the truth occasionally, and exceptional courage may now and then retrieve a blunder; but usually intellectual inadequacy will be shown up by indifferent achievement.

—Carl Von Clausewitz
On War

There is only one thing harder than learning to think critically—trying to define the concept in a comprehensive way. To arrive at a comprehensive definition, one must consider the origins of critical thinking, some misconceptions about critical thinking, and some of the attributes of critical thinking.

We can trace the origins of critical thinking back to the early Greek philosophers. The word itself comes from two Greek words: *Kriticos*, meaning discerning judgment, and *kriterion*, meaning standard.[6] Among the philosophers most closely associated with critical thinking was Socrates who strived to find meaning and truth through serious questioning. In his day, Socrates embodied the ideas of *kriticos* and *kriterion*, two ideas we will consider later when we address a modern construct for critical thinking. He developed the art of Socratic questioning to reach a more profound logic, understanding, and reflective thought.[7] In essence Socrates' method was the quest for reason and wisdom. Many years after Socrates, Clausewitz too tried to define critical thinking. As mentioned earlier, Clausewitz called his brand of critical thinking "Genius." In his definition, Clausewitz stated, "Genius consists in a harmonious combination of elements, in which one or the other ability may predominate, but none may be in conflict with the rest."[8] He further defines critical thinking as "strength of mind" and as ". . . the ability to keep one's head at times of exceptional stress and violent emotion."[9] While we have no evidence Clausewitz studied Socrates, there seems to be little doubt Clausewitz understood critical thinking and helped solidify the importance of critical thinking to strategic leaders.

Even with the clear writings of Socrates and Clausewitz, there are still misconceptions about what constitutes critical thinking. Many people often use the term "critical thinking"

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without understanding the concept, the meaning, or how to apply it. Others progress to a stage sociologist Dr. Richard Paul calls *activated ignorance* that is, taking into the mind and actively using information that is false though mistakenly thinking it is true.[10] Another misconception involves the term *critical thinking* itself. Critical thinking is not being a critic or a cynic. Being a critic or cynic is not critical thinking at all, but many times this is the common practice. Some people even confuse critical thinking with having a critical spirit. This does not mean being negative or hypercritical of everything or every issue.[11]

Exploring the attributes of a critical thinker will help lead to a common definition. Critical thinking can be termed robust thinking because it involves many different attributes. Most importantly, critical thinking is a state of mind whose goal is better thinking. The attribute is being repetitively cognizant of one's thought process. The term *meta-cognition* has been used to describe this state of being—essentially "thinking about thinking."[12] The mark of a good critical thinker then is the ability to continually monitor thought patterns for emotional, analytic, and psychological biases. Another critical-thinking attribute is a questioning or inquisitive attitude. Critical thinkers always ask questions to learn more and arrive at greater depths of understanding. Critical thinkers appreciate and are not threatened by contradictory information that does not match what is already understood and accepted. Additionally they are comfortable working with ideas and thinking of things in different ways. Finally, critical thinkers like to hold their thinking to high standards of objectivity. Taken together, these attributes give critical thinking its robust qualities. Although defining critical thinking is still difficult, Dr. Paul, the foremost scholar of critical thinking uses the following definition:

> *Critical Thinking: (1) Disciplined, self-directed thinking that exemplifies the perfections of thinking appropriate to a specific mode or domain of thinking; (2) thinking that displays mastery of intellectual skills and abilities; (3) the art of thinking about one's thinking while thinking, to make one's thinking better: more clear, more accurate, or more defensible; (4) thinking that is fully aware of and continually guards against the natural human tendency to self-deceive and rationalize to selfishly get what it wants.*[13]

A more concise definition of critical thinking is: the ability to logically assess the quality of one's thinking and the thinking of others to consistently arrive at greater understanding and achieve wise judgments. There are many other definitions of critical thinking and most are very similar. The key is to recognize that regardless of the definition, critical thinking abilities can be individually developed.

Developing Critical Thinking

One of the most effective ways to develop this strategic-leader skill is by studying the parts of critical thinking—specifically, certain elements and standards. As one can imagine, there are a number of authors who write about critical thinking, including Peter Facione and the late John Boyd. Each presents very compelling explanations and insights into critical thinking. However, Dr. Paul developed a certain comprehensive model for learning critical thinking. The Paul model presents an integrative approach to critical thinking that allows for easier mastery of this essential strategic-leader skill. In essence, the Paul model is easier to study, easier to practice and easier to teach. As a future critical thinker, you will have to commit to each of the above actions to reach the level of what Paul terms *Master Thinker*.[14] The Paul model can be presented as two complimentary parts: elements of reasoning and intellectual standards (see fig. 1). Before moving to a more detailed explanation of this model, a word of caution. Sometimes models tend to discourage certain individuals from learning particular subjects. If this is the case for you, consider this model strictly as a way to learn a new style of thinking. It is not intended as a linear or sequential process. The model is simply a depiction of how critical thinkers relate thinking abilities to the real world and arrive at reasoned, wise judgments. Using both parts of the model, elements and standards, helps create the mind-matter relationship that is the basis of critical thought.



Figure 1. Elements of Reasoning. (Used with permission of the Foundation for Critical Thinking)

> *Only those general principles and attitudes that result from clear and deep understanding can provide a comprehensive guide to action.*
>
> —Carl Von Clausewitz
> *On War*

The Elements of Reasoning

In the Paul model there are eight elements of reasoning: purpose, question, information, concept, inference, assumption, point of view, and implications. While we will cover each element in this same sequence, please note the elements are arranged in a circular pattern to emphasize their non-linear, complimentary nature. We will return to this mutually supportive arrangement later in the discussion. What follows is an explanation of each element and the standards.

Purpose

Critical thinkers want to assess the purpose of their thinking and their actions. For instance, a critical thinker might ask, is my purpose in line with my goals, values, desires, and needs? Many times the noncritical thinker will delude or deceive him or herself about the true purpose of a thought or action. For instance, one may say they want the tough job at the Pentagon because it is exciting and challenging. However, the true purpose may be accepting a position with greater long-term promotion potential. The critical thinker looks deeper for the essential motive or purpose in each situation, attempting to eliminate false purposes. Many examples of false purpose can be found in the media. For example, article titles often obscure the true purpose or intent of the text. Of course, deliberate false purposes can also have an effect during war, especially when used as part of an information operations campaign. In the months heading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the stories concerning the US Army's 4th Division had a much greater purpose than showing morale. As Gen Tommy Franks indicated, one entire front of the war was devoted to deception—in essence deliberate false purposes.[15] The key to understanding purpose is being aware of ones self-deception tendency and cognizant of planned deception operations.

Question

Without a doubt, questioning is the most important element of critical thinking. One can look at critical questioning in three ways: the need to continually use critical questions, the interrelationships of critical questions, and the need to ask and answer critical questions at the right time.[16] The critical thinker must seek to identify the primary issue, problem, or question at stake. In essence this is defining the problem. Although this sounds easy enough, things become difficult as scenario's change and events occur which change the central issue. The astute critical thinker will continually evaluate whether he or she is trying to answer the right question or solve the right problem. Paul categorizes questions into three types: questions of fact, questions of preference, and questions of judgment.[17] For strategic leaders, questions of judgment become the difficult challenges requiring the best in critical thinking. Whereas questions of fact have one right answer and questions of preference have many answers, questions of judgment require reasoning skills. Using probing questions leads to the deeper understanding required by the complex national security environment. Some examples of questions of judgment with respect to our current conflict might include: what is the best way to fight terrorism, or how can we protect American civil liberties and maintain security? Another timely question of judgment concerns Iraq: How can the United States convince Iraqi clerics to support our goals?

Information

In our society there is generally no shortage of information, and most often this becomes a problem. Former Harvard professor Francis Aguilar estimates that 70 percent of the information strategists' use comes from outside their organization and 50 percent is from informal channels.[18] The critical thinker must determine what information is most important and judge the quality of information. One must consider the biases and filters between incoming information and mental comprehension. Additionally, a critical thinker must see how all the information fits together and what linkages exist between the information and the entire organization. This is a systems thinking approach.[19] Again Paul writes about three ways the mind takes in information: inert information, activated ignorance, and activated knowledge.[20] Inert information is useless—nothing more than clutter in the mind. Activated ignorance is dangerous—using false information as truth. Activated knowledge is powerful—truthful information that leads to greater understanding and wise decision-making. Critical thinkers are generally skeptical of information and as such rely very heavily on the intellectual standards to help evaluate data to create information that leads to knowledge. We will discuss the relationship to standards later but one final point on information deserves attention—a dearth of information. Strategic leaders during wartime conditions often feel as though there is not enough actionable information and this can lead to strategic indecision. Author Gary Klein calls this paralysis "doubt that threatens to block action." He further states that decision makers often believe a decision can be improved by collecting more information. But, in many instances this delay results in lost opportunities.[21] Military strategist John Boyd considered "rapidity" one of his four parts of strategic thinking. Boyd believed effective organizations avoided getting bogged down in information. They make decisions with the information available at the time.[22] In cases like this, critical thinking is even more important to ensure reasoned, sound judgments.

Concepts

The most powerful element of critical thinking is concepts. A concept is an idea or object that makes some other idea or thing comprehensible.[23] It would be impossible to understand the world without using and understanding concepts. Consider this simple example: the concept of time makes the idea of a watch or calendar possible. We have all read about people who were great conceptual thinkers, people like George Kinnen and Albert Einstein. These men had the ability to think in different dimensions—using known ideas in a different way. One might say conceptual thinking is the seed of "outside the box" thinking. Boyd described this kind of thinking in his concept of "variety."[24] Conceptual thinkers are able to change focus and shift their thinking to see things differently. They remain open to new information and new ideas. These new ideas spring from using multiple concepts.

The problem with noncritical thinkers is that they are unable to change their concepts. Uncritical thinkers get stuck using the same concepts or use incorrect concepts to interpret the world. They enter a conceptual trap! If one is trapped in a single set of concepts, one can think of things in only one way. Many times the trap is constructed by a person's education, upbringing, and belief system. Of course, the result at the strategic level can be strategic surprise or strategic disaster. The United States witnessed an example of this conceptual thinking on 11 September 2001. On that day the concept of "a missile" or "bomb" changed and so did our idea of how to protect against such a conceptual shift. Beforehand we were stuck in the conceptual trap that hijacked aircraft are used as hostages for ransom rather than weapons. The attack also demonstrated the power of conceptual traps. Central Intelligence Agency director George Tenet said, "none of the warnings indicated terrorists would fly aircraft into buildings—this concept was anathema to our thinking."[25] Even though intelligence activities over a several-year period suggested terrorists were interested in pilot training, commercial aircraft, and attacks, these small pieces of information individually could not change our conceptual thinking. Conceptual traps require overwhelming, explicit information to dismantle or strong critical thinking skills to overcome.

The master critical thinker forces his or mind to think of different ways of employing or integrating the same things or ideas. Strong critical thinkers are strong conceptual thinkers who exhibit the mental agility required to rapidly and comfortably change domains of thinking to critically evaluate and analyze their world.

[Interpretation] Inference

An inference is the conscious thought process that draws a conclusion based on the interpretation of assumptions. As the elements go, inferences can be good or bad, true or false, logical or illogical. The key to understanding inferences (conclusions) is evaluating the underlying assumptions and applying good judgment in arriving at the correct conclusion. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 2004 in Spain, many leaders drew conclusions (inferences) which were false. In this case the incorrect inference was the separatist group *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*, or Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA), was responsible for the carnage. Hence we have the saying "jumping to conclusions," and critical thinkers resist this urge. First they carefully evaluate and interpret the available information, then assess the validity of the underlying assumptions. This kind of deliberate analysis and evaluation leads to a more reasoned, informed, conclusion.

Assumption[s]

Just as it would be impossible to understand the world without concepts, it would be paralyzing to live without assumptions. An assumption can be either an explicit conscious statement of belief or more likely a subconscious belief taken for granted. Authors Neil Brown and Stuart Keeley divide assumptions into two categories: value-based and descriptive.[26] Value-based assumptions are based on how one believes the world should be—the concept of "ought." Descriptive assumptions are more explicit and describe the world as it actually is. Many times this contrast in assumptions creates conflict for the critical thinker—a conflict that will be addressed more thoroughly later. We have all used conscious assumptions to help drive planning when there is a dearth of factual information. This is a perfectly logical and reasonable approach to thinking. However, the assumptions we make with our subconscious mind are not always thought out or evaluated for validity. Using the Spanish example from before, the underlying assumption was all terrorism in Spain is cause by ETA. One can easily see how faulty, subconscious assumptions lead to inaccurate conclusions. Another example of this was the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City. Again we see the same impact of faulty assumptions—that terrorism in America is caused by Arabs or Muslims. A similar faulty assumption initially occurred with several anthrax scares in the Washington, DC, area in October 2001. Critical thinkers become keenly aware of their assumptions. Not that we question all the simple assumptions that help us make it through the day, but those assumptions tied to inferences (conclusions) with large implications need careful thought. The master critical thinker attempts to bring the subconscious thoughts and assumptions into a conscious level of understanding so these assumptions can be questioned, analyzed, evaluated, and either validated, rejected, or updated.

Point[s] of View

Fresh opinions never cease to batter at one's convictions.

—Carl Von Clausewitz
On War

Being able to see things from another point of view is an essential part of critical thinking closely related to conceptual thinking. The master critical thinker looks at situations from multiple points of view and different domains of thinking. For instance, critical thinkers may look at terrorism from a security domain, a political domain, a legal domain, or a combination of the three. The ability to enter other points of view or consider a situation from another domain can be very insightful. Critical thinkers first recognize their own points of view, then acknowledge other points of view and note the contrast. Strategist Boyd would consider this kind of thinking as "variety" and "harmony" in that effective organizations invite rather than fear different points of view.[27] Critical thinking organizations operate without letting their points of view distort or exclusively dominate the thought processes. Consultant Peter Linkow calls this kind of strategic thinking "valuating."[28] Linkow suggests expert valuators conduct a stakeholder analysis to become sensitive to the interests of others. In essence, this approach requires the critical thinker to deliberately enter another point of view. It will not be easy to initially enter another point of view—it takes extreme mental flexibility and intellectual discipline to eliminate one's biases against doing so. Critical thinkers do not see opposing points of view as a threat, but rather another belief to be understood and perhaps even adopted. It is worth mentioning that accepting different points of view does not necessarily lead to capricious decision-making. On the contrary, Clausewitz argues just the opposite. He reminds us that new opinions will constantly batter one's convictions and character.[29] But, the critical thinker will not become obstinate as a result. One becomes obstinate, Clausewitz reminds us, ". . . as soon as. . .[he or she]. . .resists another point of view not from superior insight or attachment to some higher principle, but because he or she objects instinctively."[30] Exploring different points of view will help a critical thinker, especially in strategic leadership situations, understand the environment and clarify ambiguity.

Implications [and Consequences]

Implications are what we expect to happen before a decision. Consequences are what actually happen after the decision.[31] Critical thinkers always consider the implications of their beliefs, opinions, and actions. In fact according to Paul, master thinkers should think about implications in three ways: possible, probable, and inevitable. When thinking about implications, first consider all the reasonable possibilities. In essence this includes everything from the best case to the worse case. At this point one has developed the total expected implication set. It follows that if this set is comprehensive, it will include the consequences of an action. Next, the critical thinker should consider which implications are most probable in a scenario. Finally, identify any implications that are inevitable, given the situation. This kind of future analysis is more than simple guessing. It forces one's thinking to focus on ends. From here the critical thinker can easily compare possible implications and probable implications with expectations of what will solve the problem or address the issue at hand. The critical thinker's expectations become the fourth part of implications: what is a "required" implication, given the current problem or scenario.

Relationship of the Elements

By now you may have the opinion the Paul model of critical thinking is a rather linear way of thinking. However, the elements are more complicated than a linear model. For instance, each element of reasoning is linked simultaneously with the other elements. Consider these examples. As new information becomes available to the decision maker, assumptions and inferences may change. Changes in information will generate new questions, impact points of view, or require new concepts. If we change our assumptions, inferences-conclusions will be affected. Questioning permeates the entire model in that one must use questions to illuminate each of the other elements. For instance, the critical thinker must ask: what is my real purpose, what is the key issue, what is the most relevant information, what are the correct concepts in this case, are my assumptions valid, have I drawn the correct inferences, what points of view matter, and what are my desired implications? While this kind of circular thinking is being conducted, one must ultimately come back to both purpose and implications. The interrelationships between the elements of critical thinking meld into a dynamic system of thought—not a sequential, linear checklist approach. This kind of thinking requires a certain flexibility of the mind and is what this author terms "robust thinking." Just as in robust decision-making, robust thinking constantly updates one's thought process by scanning for new information, checking for personal biases, maintaining conceptual flexibility, and sustaining open mindedness.

Intellectual Standards

The elements of reasoning form a framework for critical thinking. Intellectual standards act as a set of principles that help gauge or measure the quality of one's thinking. Paul lists nine intellectual standards critical thinkers use to help raise the quality of thought. These standards include: clarity, accuracy, precision, relevance, breadth, depth, logic, significance, and fairness.[32] Critical thinkers apply the standards to each of the elements of reasoning to create a more reasoned, valid pattern of thinking. As one might expect, some standards are more applicable to certain elements than others with one exception. Paul maintains that clarity is a gateway standard.[33] Each of the elements must be clearly understood for critical thinking to occur. Essentially this is the "meeting of the minds" before serious thinking begins. Clarity does not provide comprehension but it makes comprehension possible. The critical thinker must ensure each element is clearly understood before further thought can proceed with the expectation of reasonable progress or useable results. Once an element is clearly understood, one can apply the remaining standards to achieve a robust level of thinking. The best way to apply these standards to a particular element is by asking a question related to the standard.[34] For instance, the critical thinker may ask of a particular element, is this accurate? Truthful? How can one verify this? Using the precision standard helps critical thinkers refine information. One question could be, is this precise enough for decision- making? Could this information be more exact? Relevance helps distill the complexity of critical thinking by helping focus one's thinking on the parts of a scenario that relate to the question or decision at hand. As mentioned earlier, normally decision makers are overwhelmed by information, assumptions, points of view, and implications. Being able to ask "How is this relevant" is a step toward simplifying decisionmaking. The breadth and depth standard are the two most closely related. Taken together they are complimentary—either something is too narrow or too shallow. The key is to recognize a certain robust harmony between these two standards; for instance, critical thinkers are looking for breadth in point of view, concepts, and implications. At the same time, one needs depth in information, concepts, assumptions, and questions. In essence these standards lead to the question, do I have a wide enough view (scan) with sufficient detail on the second-and third order effects? When considering logic as a standard, the simple test is: does this make sense? Another question may apply: does this opinion track with the available proof? Here the inquisitive, skeptical mind is an asset to critical thought. Logic requires one to reflect and reconsider any conditional statement or information. The significance standard, like relevance, seeks to highlight not only what applies to the situation but also what is most important. Significance will help the critical thinker prioritize information, point of view, concepts, and implications. In a sense, significance could be thought of as the first step toward planning effects-based operations. Finally, critical thinkers need to consider the issue of fairness. This standard appears the most controversial of the group. Many of you are thinking, who determines what is fair and how does one determine what fair is? Both are good questions without a short answer when explaining the standard of fairness. In fact, when asking a panel of experts studying critical thinking to evaluate the issue of critical thinking and ethics, the majority concluded that critical thinking is totally unrelated to political correctness, morality, or values.[35] In practice we see this when very skilled professionals use critical thinking to mislead or exploit others. The issue with this kind of "weak" critical thinking is how easily personal biases and ego creep into the thought processes. Suffice it to say, fairness has as much to do with personal bias and personal motives as ethical decision-making. The thought behind fairness as a standard relates to an individuals propensity for self-deception. So, when gauging the fairness of a decision, the critical thinker must ask, do my selfish interests distort this thinking, or is my decision fair to all concerned? The fairness standard seeks to prevent egocentric thinking. As one's ego enters the thought process, critical thinking becomes poisoned with ulterior motives, resulting in suboptimized decisions. The ego determines the purpose, and the central question selectively chooses information using only familiar concepts and unquestioned assumptions leading to misdirected conclusions, while considering limited points of view resulting in unwarranted implications. If clarity is the gateway standard, fairness is the "gut check" standard for eliminating egocentric bias.

Come Let Us Reason Together.

—Isaiah 19:1

Critical Thinking: You versus the Situation

Now that we have covered the basics of critical thinking this section will concentrate on putting this knowledge into perspective by offering a way to use critical thinking. Imagine being able to use critical thinking skills in two dimensions: the inner and the outer. In keeping with our abbreviated definition of critical thinking, remember that critical thinking is useful for monitoring the quality of your thinking, the inner dimension, and the quality of other's thinking, the outer dimension. Using the following compendium of questions, one can learn how to use both dimensions.

When considering critical thinking to guide the inner dimension of your own thinking, ask yourself some of the following questions: What have I said is the purpose of my thinking? What questions do I have about this situation? What do I believe to be the key question or issue needing my decision? What information do I know to be true? What kinds of information do I have too much of? Too little of? What concepts am I using right now? What conclusions have I already drawn? What assumptions underlie these conclusions? Do I need to make any assumptions in this situation? What is my point of view? What other points of view are represented? What implications would I expect see as a result of my critical thinking? What is my desired end state? Does all this seem fair and selfless? Have I checked my reasoning against some intellectual standard?

Now consider the critical thinking required to guide the outer dimension of your thinking. Seek answers to the following questions: What is my true purpose in this situation? Why am I really thinking about this? What questions should I be asking? What questions are required that I have not asked? What questions are forbidden to ask? What information do I really need to know? What information is missing that I would like to know? What other concepts could apply to this situation? What concepts should I be using that would change my thinking? What other conclusions could be drawn from the information available? Are others assumptions available for consideration? What assumptions would radically change my conclusions? Whose point of view is missing from the scenario? From what point of view am I approaching this situation? Are there other domains or points of view that I could or should accept? What are the possible implications from this robust thinking? Which implications are most probable? What implications are inevitable, based on this thinking? How do these implications meet or exceed my desired end state? How would I gauge the thinking of others in this thought partnership? Have I applied the standards of thought to this reasoning?

One can see through this short exercise in questioning, how learning critical thinking skills is possible. The key, as with any new skill begins with study. This article should be the first issue in your study of critical thinking. There are many more available as mentioned in the notes. Future critical thinkers must also practice the new skill so critical thinking becomes second nature as your default thinking pattern. The more you practice thinking using the elements and standards, the quicker your thinking will improve. Initially this practice will be difficult, especially as one challenges the mind to think in new ways, remain flexible, open to change, and confront one's ego. Over time, critical thinking will so dominate the thought process you will begin to recognize uncritical thinking in others. At this point, the practicing critical thinker must attempt to challenge the thinking of others by explaining the concepts of critical thinking in a practical way. Being able to coherently explain, illustrate, or elaborate why certain reasoning is faulty is synonymous with teaching critical thinking. The master critical thinker teaches by demonstrating critical thinking in action.

Engaging Noncritical Thinkers

Even though much has been written about critical thinking, many questions require further study especially on how to engage noncritical thinking societies. Specifically this challenge includes relating to noncritical thinking societies, reasoning with noncritical thinking societies, and changing noncritical thinking societies.

To understand noncritical thinking societies, one must appreciate the value of a liberal education. Here the term does not have a negative connotation but rather means being liberated from the control of others thinking. In his book *Critical Thinking*, Richard Paul captures the essence of this phrase by including small outtakes titled "Think for Yourself." What an appropriate way to describe a liberal education. In those societies controlled by warlords, despots, and dictators, a liberal education is not universally allowed or even available to the general population. As a result, the population easily becomes harnessed to weak thinking, unquestioning obedience, and radicalism. This kind of thinking manifests itself through suicide bombers, fidayeen attacks, child soldiers, and fanatical clerics.

Another challenge of relating to noncritical thinking societies is that without the ability to think for themselves, these "think-less" societies become sensitized to basic human decency. Peter Facione in his article "Critical Thinking," describes the process as refining humane sensibilities that lead to a critical appraisal of what is good and bad in human nature.[36] The lack of humane sensibilities leads to acts of barbarism like those in Rwanda and recently the gruesome killing of contractors in Iraq.[37] Additionally, noncritical thinking societies reject different points of view to the extent they become as Clausewitz mentioned, obstinate. Examples of this include the Islamic idea of apostasy where one who has known the faith and subsequently rejects it is marked for death.[38] Another issue that Facione points out is how easily noncritical thinking societies are exploited both politically and economically.[39] The impact of not understanding the international economic system, legal system, or social system is that these societies lag further behind the rest of the world, live meager lives without hope, leading to even less critical thinking. Bernard Lewis, author of *The Crisis of Islam*, relates this downward spiral to the concept of frustration felt by many revolutionary Islamists.[40] Facione believes that in time the judicial and economic systems of such a society will collapse.[41]

As you can see, there are many challenges in trying to relate to noncritical-thinking societies. But, since interaction between different societies is inevitable, how does a critical thinking society reason with a noncritical thinking society?

The question of reasoning with noncritical thinking societies boils down to two issues: what the society respects and patience in reasoning. These issues bear on the idea of establishing democracy in noncritical thinking societies. In many noncritical thinking societies, the only thing they respect is power—not culture. Noncritical thinking societies understand violence, not reason. Again we can turn to Clausewitz to shed light on this point when he posited, "in any primitive warlike race, the warrior spirit is far more common than among civilized people."[42] Perhaps the noncritical thinking societies produce more violence-prone cultures but according to Clausewitz, they rarely if ever produce a great commander or military genius because this requires the ability to think critically. At best critical thinking will have limited short-term success dealing with noncritical thinking societies. Without changes, ultimately reasoning with these societies will fail. As Bernard Lewis points out, some of these societies will seek short-term accommodation before turning to violent approaches.[43] Author Roger Scruton writes in his book *The West and the Rest* that the view from many of these societies questions the entire Western tradition of reasoning. They equate reasoning as a means to reinforce Western values and as a result to accept one is to accept the other.[44] One might ask, without the ability to reason with noncritical thinking societies is it possible to create democracy? Facione posits ". . . in such a society, one that does not liberate its citizens by teaching them to think critically for themselves, it would be madness to advocate democratic forms of government."[45] Democracy is hard even under the best of circumstances and while there may be setbacks, one can begin the process in noncritical thinking societies, but this kind of embryonic democracy will require extreme protection, advice, and perhaps a rescue mission or two. Since the quality of any democracy is equal to the quality of the democrats, in a noncritical thinking society the quality of the democracy may be low for quite a while, but a change to "thinking freedom" is essential to nurturing the beginnings of critical thinking.

How can a critical thinking society help bring about the changes required in noncritical thinking societies? As discussed earlier, critical thinking can be taught with varying degrees of success within any society. So, one approach should infiltrate the education systems of the subject society. This could be accomplished by direct intervention, with critical thinking teachers, or training for current teachers. Another effective idea is to immediately increase access to books and materials on critical thinking and reasoning skills. In many cases these kinds of works would be the first such editions translated into some languages. Next, telecommunications can be a tremendous "brain multiplier" if used to provide truthful, unbiased information to the targeted society. What would happen if a certain young democratic nation suddenly inherited one million satellite dishes each with pre-programmed information channels? Certainly the conceptual thinking required here is not to think about noncritical thinking societies as rejecting Western reasoning but rather to think of them as an educational challenge. Although the deep creativity necessary to solve this monumental problem is the subject for a subsequent article, the above ideas are readily apparent.

Epilogue

This article's intent is to explain the concept of critical thinking by first defining it and then reviewing what is considered one of the better models of critical thinking. One may argue whether one model is better than the next, but in this case the elements of reasoning and intellectual standards presented represent the essence of how to think critically. Taken in their entirety, a short collection of questions can lead one to the kind of robust thinking required in today's strategic environment. Today's critical thinkers face the challenge of creating the critical thinkers of tomorrow—many in foreign lands who have never known or accepted the power of critical thinking. Robust thinkers must answer the question, how do we accelerate the process of change in a society of critical thinkers over nihilistic decision-making? We are living in the era of "wars of the haves versus the have-nots" and now more than ever critical thinking seems to be a big part of what is missing from the societies we are trying to democratize. Becoming a critical thinker is an admiral goal, requiring a committed effort to learn the concepts, practice the elements, and teach the ways. It is critical for military professionals to develop this essential strategic-leader skill. Clausewitz recognized the value of critical thinking for strategic leaders when he wrote, "the human mind is far from uniform. If we then ask what sort of mind is likeliest to display the qualities of military genius, experience and observation will tell us that it is the inquiring rather than the creative mind, the comprehensive rather than the specialized approach, the calm rather than the excitable head to which in war we would choose to entrust the fate of our brothers and children, and the safety and honor of our country."[46]

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Down from the Mountaintop, or Demythologizing "Leadership"

Robert C. Burgee

Every manager would like leadership to emanate from the work group. Without the creativity, initiative, and risk taking implicit in leadership coming from members of the team, the manager is forced to make decisions as if all ideas for work improvement and problem-solving reside at the top of the hierarchy. Of course, we know better. Personnel at any level, and with varying amounts of experience, can contribute significant leadership in the development and execution of plans. However, in defining leadership we consistently confuse leadership behavior with the position of the nominal leader (e.g., the manager, chief, boss, etc.). This relegates subordinates to positions of support, "followership," and other roles lacking important influence over the destiny of the team.

Any reader of the literature today will notice that discussions of leadership focus with predictable regularity on the personalities of key political figures, chiefs of large businesses, or high-ranking military commanders. The effect of this concentration of interest suggests that leadership is a function of position and that the middle manager, technician, or staff specialist either must eschew the taking of leadership positions on issues they confront or must operate in an arena strictly limited by their title and authority. By focusing the discussion of leadership on individuals who hold top-level positions, at least two distinct perils arise: (1) The view that leadership is defined by position. This leads, in turn, to the assumptions that if I am not in a leadership position, I cannot assert leadership traits or those who are in leadership positions must be leaders or they wouldn't be where they are. (2) The view that leadership is comprised of a special, unique collection of traits is enduring in the individual (once you have it, you never lose it) and is heroic in nature—that is, the leader masters great difficulties, solves problems of great moment, and does it all with a just and compassionate hand.

In our work with organizations in both the private and public sectors, we consistently find that discussions of leadership quickly become discussions of the person who is hierarchically on top of the organization or team. Leadership is vested exclusively in the "leader" (i.e., the boss). Supervisors and managers, when asked in a group, "How many of you see yourselves as leaders?" will respond with few raised hands and with furtive looks around the room. It connotes bragging to call yourself a leader, especially among your peers, which again suggests that leadership comprises a unique set of traits, and to claim these traits for yourself would be arrogant. It also ties leadership to the accrual of the power and control that accompanies top-level positions. If we are to promote the exercise of leadership among *all* the players on the team it is essential to separate the process of leadership from the title of leader.

There are many ways leadership is expressed apart from the world of institutional power and visibility. Examples of quiet, unspectacular leadership exist off the job when "average" employees carry significant leadership responsibilities in their local community's civic, school, religious, or charitable organizations. Many examples exist on the job in middle- and low-echelon positions. So it is important to expand the "lens" through which we view leadership behaviors, for if we don't move away from narrowly focused, heroic models of leadership, we risk confining our discussions of the subject to such esoterics as "vision," "inspiration," and "charisma," and limiting its exercise to those who hold positions of power and control.

Leadership Perspective

One common view of leadership is that the leader (manager) figuratively stands apart from individuals, groups, tasks, and situations. When a problem is perceived or when help is requested, the leader steps in and takes the appropriate action to resolve the issue and then moves on to other leadership duties. Richard Pascale and Anthony Athos in their book, *The Art of Japanese Management,* describe the archetypal example of this view of leadership when they discuss Harold Geneen's tenure at ITT.

At ITT Geneen was the arbiter of what would work and what wouldn't, who was right and who was wrong, and channeled virtually all information and decisions through his office. This form of managing is highly centralized and leader-dependent. It is also the most common perception managers have of themselves as leaders and of those who are above them in the hierarchy. The confusion of "leader," as a position (e.g., chief of staff, president, chairman, manager) with "leadership" as a process or function is common and creates the problems that are apparent when we separate the person or the leader from the situation with which he or she is confronted.

A different and realistic perspective on leadership makes the leader *part of* the situation. The assumption operating here is that persons exercising leadership behaviors do not step into problem-solving situations with "clean hands." They are, by their prior actions and their style, part of the problem (or situation). In some circumstances, they may be

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the problem. This is not to suggest that individuals should be concerned at every turn with their approval rating by others or should strive for consensus on every issue to avoid unpopularity. It does suggest that leaders who are not aware of their own style, of the impact they have on others, and of what they contribute to ineffectiveness and confusion in the workplace, lack a powerful tool for personal growth and surely frustrate their peers and subordinates.

Personal Style as a Leadership Tool

One important rationale for exploring the personal style of managers is to help them determine what effect their style has on the situations in which they find themselves. For example, suppose a crime has been committed, and a detective (leader) is called in to find the criminal. This assumes that the detective comes in from the outside, innocent of any complicity in the event. However, the leader (manager) does not take on problems within his or her responsibility free of "complicity," but participates in, and is part of the problem. This poses the question, what if the detective is the criminal?

What if, because of personal style, managers unwittingly "train" others to perform in ways that produce poor results? Without awareness of their style and the effects they have on others, managers are, in effect, "flying blind." If they solicit and receive feedback from others, they can reduce the blind spots: In effect they can create an instrument panel to help them read the effects of their style on others. From this information the leaders can decide what changes in behavior they want to initiate.

Not only are managers often part of the problem, it is very difficult for them to know what part of the problem they constitute. We are all self-referencing. That is, we all use our own values, attitudes, and perceptions as guides for our behavior and give to situations the response we believe—in our own self-referencing logic—is appropriate. It is no accident that managers often assemble around them people of similar bent. This makes it very difficult for the manager to get candid feedback, since anyone who would give it is part of the same dynamic.

Another important rationale for examining style is to assist the team, and especially the manager, to utilize *all* the resources on the team. Different styles bring different points of view and talents to the problem-solving process; and without a ground of acceptance and support, the energy and resourcefulness of these differences become quiet or misdirected. This requires a posture by the manager that encourages diversity. Managers must be partners with their team members, and true partnership can come about only with the genuine communication of trust in others' motives and a respect for others' intelligence and commitment. This communication is impossible if managers buy into the idea that, as titular leaders, they are also the front of leadership in their groups.

Since 1973 we have been researching the dynamics of teamwork and leadership through the use of a personal style model designed to describe personal style and to illuminate the strengths and limitations of certain given style tendencies in problem-solving and decision-making situations. The model, called Stylemetrics, uses a descriptive checklist of terms, which, when completed by the participant and by his or her "audience" (five persons selected to complete the same checklist), provides comparative profiles of personal style. A critical part of the process is the *descriptive* nature of the resulting profiles. There are no preferred styles and no styles better than others. There are, however, strengths and limitations to any style position.

If we hold the assumption that leadership is the province of the person in power (the manager) or is comprised of a special, unique collection of traits, then the *style* of the manager becomes the model for leadership. Models are fine.

We all need models for behavior and for developing attitudes and ethical positions. But models can become "the way things are done" and can create imitative behavior. We see this happen when work teams take on the dress, haircut, and mannerisms of the boss. This modeling becomes more pernicious when it takes the form of significant personal style shifts.

The profiling of a manager and his or her work team gives all participants a base from which to analyze their relationships with others on the team, including the manager, and to adopt productive strategies for increasing personal effectiveness in negotiating with others on the team.

In the hands of managers the profile becomes a potent coaching and career development instrument, allowing them to place themselves in the dynamic of the team without taking undue responsibility for failures and also without avoiding responsibility for those failures in which they play a major role. If, as argued earlier, the manager is *part of* the problem, the profile process gives him or her a tool for determining what part to play and what to do to ameliorate his or her negative contributions.

The objective examination of style also serves to dampen the effects of bias, a condition that is natural to all of us and which is especially harmful when present in the manager. Since we all tend to be self-referencing in our judgments of others, it follows that we tend to view those who are like us in a more favorable light than those who are different. Such tendencies are a major cause of prejudice and carry over in the workplace in how we interpret the behavior of others in comparison with how we would behave in the situation. If the manager can come to understand that there is no one best style that denotes leadership and that leadership is not the province of the visionary or the charismatic, then movement toward true partnership and teamwork can be realized. This understanding by the manager that leadership is truly egalitarian accomplishes two important ends: It frees the follower from the notion that leadership is reserved for those with leader titles; and, equally critical, it frees managers from the notion that they must be smarter, quicker, better informed, and more decisive than anyone on their team. They realize that they do not have to sit at the head of the table and carve the roast at every meal.

The very term *leadership* implies a collaboration of some sort. One does not lead unless at least one other person is there to respond to the leader's initiative. In modern organizations this collaboration takes place in a complex web of interrelated work teams, with participation and accountability dispersed widely across formal organizational boundaries. How do we speak to the "typical" manager, secretary, or technician if the only models for leadership are the heroic, and sometimes self-aggrandizing figures who stand atop the hierarchical pyramid? We need more commonplace examples of leadership to inspire and encourage leadership behavior from among those who toil in the trenches. We need to examine and illustrate the behaviors of leadership as partnership, teamwork, mentoring, support, and shared responsibility if we are to tap the enormous potential of initiative, creativity, and energy from among the middle and lower echelons of organizations. We need to demythologize leadership behavior and to bring it back to the level where it can be understood and exercised by any of us.

The Four Competencies of Leadership

Warren Bennis

Warren Bennis interviewed 90 outstanding leaders and their subordinates, with the intention of learning what makes real leaders (as opposed to effective managers) tick. After five years of research and thought, he identified four competencies common to all 90 leaders, and they're presented here, in Training & Development Journal's fortieth anniversary series of articles by major figures in human resource development.

For nearly five years I have been researching a book on leadership. During this period, I have traveled around the country spending time with 90 of the most effective, successful leaders in the nation; 60 from corporations and 30 from the public sector.

My goal was to find these leaders' common traits, a task that has required much more probing than I expected. For a while, I sensed much more diversity than commonality among them. The group comprises both left-brain and right-brain thinkers; some who dress for success and some who don't; well-spoken, articulate leaders and laconic, inarticulate ones; some John Wayne types and some who are definitely the opposite. Interestingly, the group includes only a few stereotypically charismatic leaders.

Despite the diversity, which is profound and must not be underestimated, I identified certain areas of competence shared by all 90. Before presenting those findings, though, it is important to place this study in context, to review the mood and events in the United States just before and during the research.

Decline and Malaise

When I left the University of Cincinnati late in 1977, our country was experiencing what President Carter called *despair* or *malaise.* From 1960 to 1980, our institutions' credibility had eroded steadily. In an article about that period entitled "Where Have All the Leaders Gone," I described how difficult the times were for leaders, including university presidents like myself.

I argued that, because of the complexity of the times, leaders felt impotent. The assassinations of several national leaders, the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, the Iranian hostage crisis and other events led to a loss of trust in our institutions and leadership.

I came across a quotation in a letter Abigail Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1790: "These are the hard times in which a genius would wish to live." If, as she believed, great necessities summon great leaders, I wanted to get to know the leaders brought forth by the current malaise. In a time when bumper stickers appeared reading "Impeach Someone," I resolved to seek out leaders who were effective under these adverse conditions.

At the same time that America suffered from this leadership gap, it was suffering from a productivity gap. Consider these trends:

- In the 1960s the average gross national product (GNP) growth was 4.1 percent; in the 1970s, it was 2.9 percent; in 1982, it was negative.
- The US standard of living, the world's highest in 1972, now ranks fifth.
- In 1960 when the economies of Europe and Japan had been rebuilt, the US accounted for 25 percent of the industrial nations' manufacturing exports and supplied 98 percent of its domestic markets. Now, the US has less than a 20 percent share of the world market, and that share is declining.
- In 1960 US automobiles had a 96 percent market share; today we have about 71 percent. The same holds true for consumer electronics; in 1960 it was 94.4 percent, in 1980 only 49 percent. And that was before Sony introduced the Walkman!

In addition to leadership and productivity gaps, a subtler "commitment gap" existed, that is, a reluctance to commit to one's work or employer.

The Public Agenda's recent survey of working Americans shows the following statistics. Less than one out of four jobholders (23 percent) says he or she currently works at full potential. Nearly half say they do not put much effort into their jobs above what is required. The overwhelming majority, 75 percent, say they could be significantly more effective on their job than they are now. And nearly 6 in 10 working Americans believe that "most people do not work as hard as they used to."

A number of observers have pointed out the considerable gap between the number of hours people are paid to work and the number of hours they spend on productive labor. Evidence developed recently by the University of Michigan indicates the gap may be widening. They found the difference between paid hours and actual working hours grew 10 percent between 1970 and 1980.

This increasing commitment gap leads to the central question: How can we empower the work force and reap the harvest of human effort?

If I have learned anything from my research, it is this: The factor that empowers the work force and ultimately deter-

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mines which organizations succeed or fail is the leadership of those organizations. When strategies, processes, or cultures change, the key to improvement remains leadership.

The Sample: 90 Leaders

For my study, I wanted 90 effective leaders with proven track records. The final group contains 60 corporate executives, most, but not all, from Fortune 500 companies, and 30 from the public sector. My goal was to find people with leadership ability, in contrast to just "good managers"—true leaders who affect the culture, who are the social architects of their organizations and who create and maintain values.

Leaders are people who do the right thing; managers are people who do things right. Both roles are crucial, and they differ profoundly. I often observe people in top positions doing the wrong thing well.

Given my definition, one of the key problems facing American organizations (and probably those in much of the industrialized world) is that they are underled and overmanaged. They do not pay enough attention to doing the right thing, while they pay too much attention to doing things right. Part of the fault lies with our schools of management; we teach people how to be good technicians and good staff people, but we don't train people for leadership.

The group of 60 corporate leaders was not especially different from any profile of top leadership in America. The median age was 56. Most were white males, with six black men and six women in the group. The only surprising finding was that all the chief executive officers (CEOs) not only were married to their first spouse but also seemed enthusiastic about the institution of marriage. Examples of the CEOs are Bill Kieschnick, chairman and CEO of Arco, and the late Ray Kroc of McDonald's restaurant.

Public sector leaders included Harold Williams, who then chaired the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): Neil Armstrong, a genuine all-American hero who happened to be at the University of Cincinnati; three elected officials; two orchestra conductors; and two winning athletics coaches. I wanted conductors and coaches because I mistakenly believed they were the last leaders with complete control over their constituents.

After several years of observation and conversation, I have defined our competencies evident to some extent in every member of the group. They are

- management of attention;
- management of meaning;
- management of trust; and
- management of self.

Management of Attention

One of the traits most apparent in these leaders is their ability to draw others to them, not because they have a vision, a dream, a set of intentions, an agenda, a frame of reference. They communicate an extraordinary focus of commitment, which attracts people to them. One of these leaders was described as making people want to join in with him; he enrolls them in his vision.

Leaders, then, manage attention through a compelling vision that brings others to a place they have not been before. I came to this understanding, in a roundabout way, as this anecdote illustrates.

One of the people I most wanted to interview was one of the few I couldn't seem to reach. He refused to answer my letters or phone calls. I even tried getting in touch with the members of his board. He is Leon Fleischer, a well-known child prodigy who grew up to become a prominent pianist, conductor, and musicologist. What I did not know about him was that he had lost the use of his right hand and no longer performed.

When I called him originally to recruit him for the University of Cincinnati faculty, he declined and told me he was working with orthopedic specialists to regain the use of his hand. He did visit the campus, and I was impressed with his commitment to staying in Baltimore, near the medical institution where he received therapy.

Fleischer was the only person who kept turning me down for an interview, and finally I gave up. A couple of summers later I was in Aspen, Colorado, while Fleischer was conducting the Aspen Music Festival. I tried to reach him again, even leaving a note on his dressing room door, but I got no answer.

One day in downtown Aspen, I saw two perspiring young cellists carrying their instruments and offered them a ride to the music tent. They hopped in the back of my jeep, and, as we rode, I questioned them about Fleischer.

"I'll tell you why he is so great," said one. " He doesn't waste our time."

Fleischer finally agreed not only to be interviewed but to let me watch him rehearse and conduct music classes. I linked the way I saw him work with that simple sentence, "He doesn't waste our time." Every moment Fleischer was before the orchestra, he knew exactly what sound he wanted. He didn't waste time because his intentions were always evident. What united him with the other musicians was their concern with intention and outcome.

When I reflected on my own experience, it struck me that when I was most effective, it was because I knew what I wanted. When I was ineffective, it was because I was unclear about it.

So, the first leadership competency is the management of attention through a set of intentions or a vision, not in a mystical or religious sense, but in the sense of outcome, goal, or direction.

Management of Meaning

To make dreams apparent to others, and to align people with them, leaders must communicate their vision. Communication and alignment work together.

Consider, for example, the contrasting styles of Presidents Reagan and Carter. Ronald Reagan is called "the great communicator"; one of his speech writers said Reagan can read the phone book and make it interesting. The reason is that Reagan uses metaphors with which people can identify.

In his first budget message, for example, Reagan described a trillion dollars by comparing it to piling up dollar bills beside the Empire State Building. Reagan, to use one of Alexander Haig's coinages, "tangibilitated" the idea. Leaders make ideas tangible and real to others, so they can support them. For no matter how marvelous the vision, the effective leader must use a metaphor, a word or a model to make that vision clear to others.

In contrast, President Carter was boring. Carter was one of our best informed presidents; he had more facts at his fingertips than almost any other president. But he never made the meaning come through the facts.

I interviewed an assistant secretary of commerce appointed by Carter, who told me that after four years in his administration, she still did not know what Jimmy Carter stood for. She said that working for him was like looking through the wrong side of a tapestry; the scene was blurry and indistinct.

The leader's goal is not mere explanation or clarification but the creation of meaning. My favorite baseball joke is exemplary: In the ninth inning of a key playoff game, with a three and two count on the batter, the umpire hesitates a split second in calling the pitch. The batter whirls around angrily and says, "Well, what was it?" The umpire barks back, "It ain't *nothing* until *I* call it!"

The more far-flung and complex the organization, the more critical is this ability. Effective leaders can communicate through several organizational layers, across great distances even through the jamming signals of special interest groups and opponents.

When I was a university president, a group of administrators would hatch what we knew was a great idea. Then we would do the right thing: delegate, delegate, delegate. But when the product or policy finally appeared, it scarcely resembled our original idea.

The process occurred so often that I gave it a name: the Pinocchio Effect. (I am sure Geppetto had no idea how Pinocchio would look when he finished carving him.) The Pinocchio Effect leaves us surprised. Because of inadequate communication, results rarely resemble our expectations.

We read and hear so much about information that we tend to overlook the importance of meaning. Actually, the more bombarded a society or organization, the more deluged with images, the greater its thirst for meaning. Leaders integrate facts, concepts, and anecdotes into meaning for the public.

Not all the leaders in my group are word masters. They get people to understand and support their goals in a variety of ways.

The ability to manage attention and meaning comes from the whole person. It is not enough to use the right buzzword or cute technique, or to hire a public relations person to write speeches.

Consider, instead, Frank Dale, publisher of the Los Angeles newspaper, the *Herald Examiner.* Dale's charge was to cut into the market share of his morning competitor, *The L.A. Times.* When he first joined the newspaper a few years ago, he created a campaign with posters picturing the *Herald Examiner* behind and slightly above the the *Times.* The whole campaign was based on this potent message of how the *Herald Examiner* would overtake the *Times.*

I interviewed Dale at his office, and when he sat down at his desk and fashioned around him a safety belt like those on airplanes, I couldn't suppress a smile. He did this to remind everybody else of the risks the newspaper entailed. His whole person contributed to the message.

No one is more cynical than a newspaper reporter. You can imagine the reactions that traveled the halls of the *Herald* building. At the same time, nobody forgot what Frank Dale was trying to communicate. And that is the management of meaning.

Management of Trust

Trust is essential to all organizations. The main determinant of trust is reliability, what I call constancy. When I talked to the board members or staffs of these leaders, I heard certain phrases again and again: "She is all of a piece." "Whether you like it or not, you always know where he is coming from, what he stands for."

When John Paul II visited this country, he gave a press conference. One reporter asked how the Pope could account for allocating funds to build a swimming pool at the papal summer palace. He responded quickly: "I like to swim. Next question." He did not rationalize about medical reasons or claim he got the money from a special source.

A recent study showed people would much rather follow individuals they can count on, even when they disagree with their viewpoint, than people they agree with but who shift positions frequently. I cannot emphasize enough the significance of constancy and focus.

Margaret Thatcher's reelection in Great Britain is another excellent example. When she won office in 1979, observers predicted she quickly would revert to defunct Labor Party policies. She did not. In fact, not long ago a London Times article appeared headlined (parodying Christopher Fry's play) The Lady's Not for Returning. She has not turned; she has been constant, focused and all of a piece.

Management of Self

The fourth leadership competency is management of self, knowing one's skills and deploying them effectively. Management of self is critical; without it, leaders and managers can do more harm than good. Like incompetent doctors, incompetent managers can make life worse, make people sicker and less vital. (The term *iatrogenic,* by the way, refers to illness *caused* by doctors and hospitals.) Some managers give themselves heart attacks and nervous breakdowns; still worse, many are "carriers," causing their employees to be ill.

Leaders know themselves; they know their strengths and nurture them. They also have a faculty I think of as the Wallenda Factor.

The Flying Wallendas are perhaps the world's greatest family of aerialists and tightrope walkers. I was fascinated when, in the early 1970s, 71-year-old Karl Wallenda said that for him living is walking the tightrope, and everything else is waiting. I was struck with his capacity for concentration on the intention, the task, the decision.

I was even more intrigued when, several months later, Wallenda fell to his death while walking a tightrope between two high-rise buildings in San Juan. Without a safety net, Wallenda fell, still clutching the balancing pole he warned his family never to drop lest it hurt somebody below.

Later, Wallenda's wife said that before her husband fell, for the first time since she had known him he was concentrating on falling, instead of on walking the tightrope. He personally supervised the attachment of the guide wires, which he never had done before.

Like Wallenda before his fall, the leaders in my group seemed unacquainted with the concept of failure. What you might call a failure, they referred to as a mistake. I began collecting synonyms for the word *failure* mentioned in the interviews, and I found more than 20: mistake, error, start, bloop, flop, loss, miss, foul-up, stumble, botch, bungle . . . but not failure.

One CEO told me that if she had a knack for leadership, it was the capacity to make as many mistakes as she could as could as soon as possible, and thus get them out of the way. Another said that a mistake is simply "another way of doing things." These leaders learn from and use something that doesn't go well; it is not a failure but simply the next step.

When I asked Harold Williams, president of the Getty Foundation, to name the experience that most shaped him as a leader, he said it was being passed over for the presidency of Norton Simon. When it happened, he was furious and demanded reasons, most of which he considered idiotic. Finally, a friend told him that some of the reasons were valid and he should change. He did, and about a year and a half later became president.

Or consider coach Ray Meyer of DePaul University, whose team finally lost at home after winning 29 straight home games. I called him to ask how he felt. He said, "Great. Now we can start to concentrate on winning, *not* on losing."

Consider Broadway producer Harold Prince, who calls a press conference the morning after his show opens, before reading the reviews, to announce his next play. Or Susan B. Anthony, who said, "Failure is impossible." Or Fletcher Byrum, who, after 22 years as president of Coopers, was asked about his hardest decision. He replied that he did not know what a hard decision was; that he never worried, that he accepted the possibility of being wrong. Byrum said that worry was an obstacle to clear thinking.

The Wallenda Factor is an approach to life; it goes beyond leadership and power in organizations. These leaders all have it.

Empowerment: The Effects of Leadership

Leadership can be felt throughout an organization. It gives pace and energy to the work and empowers the work force. Empowerment is the collective effect of leadership. In organizations with effective leaders, empowerment is most evident in four themes:

- *People feel significant.* Everyone feels that he or she makes a difference to the success of the organization. The difference may be small—prompt delivery of potato chips to a mom-and-pop grocery store or developing a tiny but essential part for an airplane. But where they are empowered, people feel that what they do has meaning and significance.
- *Learning and competence matter.* Leaders value learning and mastery, and so do people who work for leaders. Leaders make it clear that there is no failure, only mistakes that give us feedback and tell us what to do next.
- *People are part of a community.* Where there is leadership, there is a team, a family, a unity. Even people who do not especially like each other feel the sense of community. When Neil Armstrong talks about the Apollo explorations, he describes how a team carried out an almost unimaginably complex set of interdependent tasks. Until there were women astronauts, the men referred to this feeling as "brotherhood." I suggest they rename it "family."
- *Work is exciting.* Where there are leaders, work is stimulating, challenging, fascinating, and fun. An essential ingredient in organizational leadership is pulling rather than pushing people toward a goal. A "pull" style of influence attracts and energizes people to enroll in an exciting vision of the future. It motivates through identification, rather than through rewards and punishments. Leaders articulate and embody the ideals toward which the organization strives.

People cannot be expected to enroll in just any exciting vision. Some visions and concepts have more staying power and are rooted more deeply in our human needs than others. I believe the lack of two such concepts in modern organizational life is largely responsible for the alienation and lack of meaning so many experience in their work.

One of these is the concept of quality. Modern industrial society has been oriented to quantity, providing more goods and services for everyone. Quantity is measured in money; we are still a money-oriented society. Quality often is not measured at all, but is appreciated intuitively. Our response to quality is a feeling. Feelings of quality are connected intimately with our experience of meaning, beauty, and values.

Closely linked to the concept of quality is that of dedication, even love, of our work. This dedication is evoked by quality and is the force that energizes high-performing systems. When we love our work, we need not be managed by hopes of reward or fears of punishment. We can create systems that facilitate our work, rather than being preoccupied with checks and controls of people who want to beat or exploit the system.

And that is what the human resources profession should care most about.

Posttrauma Support from a Leadership Perspective: Swedish Peacekeeping Experiences

Gerry Larsson

Introduction

Military personnel in most industrial countries are nowadays being asked to be prepared for a wide variety of missions encompassing peace-support operations as well as traditional war fighting. Sweden has been one of the most frequently employed nations in United Nations (UN) operations and may therefore claim long experience of different UN commitments. The purpose of this study is to summarize, from a leadership perspective, Swedish experience of posttrauma support during peacekeeping missions.

Stressors for Peacekeepers

In a recent study of Swedish peacekeeping forces in former Yugoslavia, several classes of stressors were identified.[1] The service environment, the media, and the private social network were labeled *external influencing factors.* A typical comment regarding the service environment was given by a soldier: "Be mentally prepared for uninterrupted frustration because of the parties' irrational behavior." Frustrations related to the recruitment principles of the forces, mismatches between preservice training and actual demands during missions, and leadership deficiencies were grouped together under the heading *internal peacekeeping force factors.* The interaction between these external and internal factors caused an accumulated stress reaction over time in many soldiers. Reactions to acute, traumatic events should be understood against this background.

Common traumatic events for Swedish peacekeepers taking part in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's so-called implementation force (IFOR) in Bosnia were threats with weapons, firing very close, being taken prisoner or hostage, seeing wounded and maimed people, and being involved in serious accidents—driving onto mines, for instance. Commanders and soldiers who had faced these kinds of highly stressful situations were offered various types of posttrauma support as described in this section.

Various Types of Posttrauma Support

Psychological debriefings following traumatic events have a long history in military settings.[2] In the last decade, they have also become quite common in civilian contexts. Debriefings have been used after major disasters but also following minor traumatic events faced by, for instance, firefighters, hospital staff, police officers, and social workers.[3] A common outcome is that most participants perceive debriefings positively. For example, in a follow-up of approximately 1,000 psychological debriefings in Sweden, Larsson and Österdahl reported a mean rating of 4.5 on a scale ranging from 1 (of no value) to 5 (very valuable).[4]

Some critics have argued that there is a lack of systematic knowledge about how a debriefing functions and whether it makes an impact on persons who have experienced stressful or traumatic events. On a general level, it has been noted that concepts need to be clarified, potential favorable mechanisms need to be analyzed, and short- and long-term effects need to be studied further.[5]

Psychological Debriefings

In order to differentiate debriefings from other kinds of psychological support, the following definitions will be used:

- Peer support = A friend helps you by sitting down and talking to you in connection with the event;
- A ventilation session = Your ordinary group leader gathers your group on the same day the event occurred and leads you through what happened while you are being given opportunities to express your feelings; and
- A group debriefing session led by an external counselor with the aim of providing an opportunity to work through the event with regard to facts, thoughts, and emotions is conducted 1–3 days after the event. The external counselor has a behavioral sciences academic education (e.g., psychologist) plus a shorter period of special training (usually around one week) on how to lead debriefings.[6]

Effectiveness of Posttrauma Support

Recently two studies on posttrauma support for Swedish peacekeepers were completed. One was prospective and focused on an evaluation of different forms of support on postservice mental health.7 The other study was qualitative and sought to develop a theoretical understanding of conditions and mechanisms affecting experiences of the quality of debriefing sessions.8 Key points from these two studies are summarized in the following discussion.

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The Study Design

The sample consisted of the Swedish battalion that was part of IFOR in Bosnia from March to October 1996. Assessments of personality characteristics and mental health were done before and after service as shown in figure 1.

The response rate was 84 percent on the preservice assessment (T1 in figure 2) and 92 percent on the postservice assessment (T2). Complete responses on both measurement occasions were obtained from 510 individuals (70.4 percent response rate).

Occurrence of traumatic events was reported by 181 soldiers. Among these individuals, four kinds of support were noted after the event. One subgroup (n = 56) did not get any support at all. A second subgroup (n = 29) received peer support only. A third subgroup (n = 60) received peer support plus a ventilation session. A final subgroup (n = 36) received peer support plus a ventilation session plus a debriefing session.

Results of the Study. The four groups receiving different kinds of support following a traumatic event did not differ significantly from each other in any preservice measurement. The postservice assessment showed that peer support followed by a ventilation session had a positive effect on postservice mental health. This, however, did not apply to the individual with the worst preservice mental health. The value of debriefing sessions could not be evaluated due to insufficient data. The study also showed that poor mental health after service was more related to preservice mental health than to trauma exposure and posttrauma support. Conclusions from the study are presented from a leadership perspective in the final section.

Effectiveness of Psychological Debriefings

A study designed by Glaser and Strauss was administered to determine whether psychological debriefings are helpful in dealing with posttraumatic stress and, if so, to learn how they accomplish this desired outcome.

The Study Design

The qualitative study was conducted in accordance with the grounded theory tradition.[9] The study participants were selected from the Stockholm fire brigade and the Swedish armored UN battalions serving in Bosnia from the fall of 1993 up to and including the fall of 1996. Both organizations were selected because they are known to have extensive experience of emotional debriefings following traumatic events. Ten persons recommended by their colleagues for their ability to communicate their experiences were selected within each of the two organizations. Data were collected by interviews consisting of open-ended questions and individually adapted follow-up questions. The interviews were recorded and tran-



Figure 1. Prospective Design of a Study of Swedish Peacekeeping Soldiers

scribed verbatim. They were consecutively analyzed according to the constant comparative method.[10]

Results of the Study. The quality of emotional debriefings is formed by the dynamic interplay between group and debriefing leader characteristics. The key group and debriefing leader quality is security. Individual group member resourcefulness and vulnerability, as well as degree of knowledge and support from the management of the organization, also affect the outcome. A presentation of the model is given in figure 2.



Figure 2. Conditions Affecting Experiences of Psychological Debriefings

Dynamic Interplay between Groups and Leaders

A number of possible mixtures of leader/group types was analyzed to attempt to find which combination would produce the best results. Descriptions and findings are presented below.

Secure Leader/Secure Group

These are the optimal conditions for a high-quality debriefing session. Both the leader and the group members enter the session with reciprocal respect and with a belief that the session will help the group and the individual members.

Secure Leader/Insecure Group

A group may be insecure during a debriefing session for a number of reasons. Typical sources of group insecurity mentioned in the interviews included earlier conflicts in the group, group members who do not know each other but just happened to work together during the stressful event, a strong sense of guilt due to mistakes made during the episode, and lack of experience of emotional debriefings.

Facing an insecure group puts high demands on the debriefing leader, since he or she determines the quality of the debriefing. Personality characteristics (see below) and an ability to handle group dynamic processes appear to be more important than debriefing technical skills.

Insecure Leader/Secure Group

A debriefing leader may be perceived by the group members as insecure for various reasons. Common causes mentioned in the interviews were basic personality characteristics (see below), poor leadership traits, lack of experience of group processes and group dynamics, and lack of knowledge and skills related to stress management and debriefing.

The quality of this kind of debriefing session is determined by the group. A possible outcome is that the dialogue remains at a superficial level. If this is the case, group members will ascribe little value to the session. Another possibility is that the leadership is usurped by one of the group members. In these cases, the quality of the session will depend on the competence of the new informal leader.

Insecure Leader/Insecure Group

If the debriefing leader lacks the ability to handle the situation and the group lacks the security to take over the responsibility for the session, the necessary conditions for a meaningful debriefing are missing. Debriefings held under this kind of circumstance are likely to be characterized by mutual resistance or indifference.

Ideal Characteristics of Secure Groups and Leaders

Following is a description of the main components of a secure debriefing leader in charge of a secure group. Such a combination would be ideal because it would produce the best results in alleviating posttraumatic stress.

Characteristics of a Secure Debriefing Leader

As security on the part of the debriefing leader is central in the model, it is important to present the main components of this core category. The qualitative analysis suggests three necessary components. One of these could be labeled *basic personality characteristics*. Codes underpinning this category include calmness, flexibility, stress tolerance, and self-awareness. The latter includes an awareness of one's limitations.

A second category was called *basic knowledge*. The codes which add up to this category are a basic academic training in the behavioral sciences, knowledge of group dynamic processes, knowledge of crisis reactions, and an ability to identify persons with more complicated reactions so they can be referred to more qualified helpers. The debriefing leader also needs a thorough knowledge of debriefing methodology as well as of the working conditions of the affected group.

The third category could be called *emotional leadership*. Indicators brought together under this heading are having a good empathic ability and an ability to sense the needs of the individual group members as well as the group atmosphere. When practicing this type of leadership, one must show an honest interest in the group members and make them feel that the purpose of the debriefing session is to help them. Courage is another indicator; to have the fortitude to confront strong emotions. The leader should also have a sense for how much space he or she should occupy as the leader. This implies a balancing act in which you are close to other people's emotions, while at the same time having access to but control over your own.

Characteristics of a Secure Group

Security in the group which is about to go through a debriefing session constitutes the second core category in the proposed model. However, this category was covered less intensively in the interviews. A typical expression was that "It is important with mutual faith and good comradeship in the group and these things are built up over a long period of time." In addition to a strong cohesion, tolerance was mentioned. It was emphasized that high-quality debriefings are characterized by an open climate where each individual can be himself or herself; nothing is right or wrong.

In a secure group, different members can also act as models for each other; for instance, when telling about difficult things, showing feelings, or demonstrating how to go on. In a secure group reactions are normalized as the participants' understanding of their reactions, as well as those of the others, increases. This was expressed in terms like "I'm not alone" and "It felt good to hear what the others were thinking."

Additional Core Components of Debriefings

Another precondition for high-quality debriefings is knowledge and support from the management of the organization. This category was derived from interview indicators such as "Our management supports annual education in this area" and "Thanks to the support of the senior management we constantly have one debriefing leader on duty."

The category titled *individual group member characteristics* is designed to cover basic psychological conditions of each group member. These aspects were not focused in the interviews. However, recurrent remarks dealt with individual differences in resourcefulness and vulnerability.

Lessons Learned from a Leadership Perspective

The favorable results of ventilation sessions led by the ordinary platoon commanders (or similar leaders) shown in the prospective study are promising from a practical point of view.[11] All officers had received a fairly structured training on how to lead a ventilation session before leaving for Bosnia. The results indicate that this kind of training is valuable although the multivariate analysis showed that no effects were found when looking at the subgroup with the worst preservice mental health. The results may also indicate that the lowest level of command plays an important role for the mental health of troops in a stressful context. This would be consistent with, for instance, findings from Israel.[12]

The desired leader characteristics identified in the qualitative study, have parallels to those commonly found in counseling, nursing care, and psychotherapy evaluations.[13] It has repeatedly been reported that successful caregivers, counselors, and therapists are perceived as secure, warm, and approachable. They also have a good capacity for tolerating anxiety in themselves as well as in their patients.[14] The desired debriefing leader also resembles so-called transformational leaders as described by Avolio and Bass.[15] If our model is valid, it means that the selection of debriefing leaders becomes crucial. This conclusion rests on a somewhat pessimistic outlook on the possibilities of developing skillful debriefing leaders through training alone. A secure inner base and a good empathic ability probably take a long time to develop.

The emphasis on the security and atmosphere in the debriefed group also carries a pessimistic touch. Mutual trust, comradeship, and respect in a working group commonly take some time to develop. The same can probably be said about the third key component of the model, namely the resourcefulness and vulnerability of the individual debriefing participant.

All key aspects of our model focus on conditions affecting the quality of debriefings rather than on more technical aspects such as how to move from one phase to another. This is not to say that the technical aspects are not important. The remarks on pessimism should not be overstated, but indicate that one should not expect too much from debriefings alone. This kind of psychological support should be considered as only one component in a broad array of stress management aspects.[16]

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Duty, Honor, Country

Gen Douglas MacArthur

No human being could fail to be deeply moved by such a tribute as this [Thayer Award]. Coming from a profession I have served so long and a people I have loved so well, it fills me with an emotion I cannot express. But this award is not intended primarily to honor a personality, but to symbolize a great moral code—a code of conduct and chivalry of those who guard this beloved land of culture and ancient descent. For all hours and for all time, it is an expression of the ethics of the American soldier. That I should be integrated in this way with so noble an ideal arouses a sense of pride, and yet of humility, which will be with me always.

Duty, honor, country: Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be. They are your rallying point to build courage when courage seems to fail, to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith, to create hope when hope becomes forlorn.

Unhappily, I possess neither that eloquence of diction, that poetry of imagination, nor that brilliance of metaphor to tell you all that they mean.

The unbelievers will say they are but words, but a slogan, but a flamboyant phrase. Every pedant, every demagogue, every cynic, every hypocrite, every troublemaker, and, I am sorry to say, some others of an entirely different character, will try to downgrade them even to the extent of mockery and ridicule.

But these are some of the things they do. They build your basic character. They mold you for your future roles as the custodians of the nation's defense. They make you strong enough to know when you are weak, and brave enough to face yourself when you are afraid.

What the Words Teach

They teach you to be proud and unbending in honest but humble failure and gentle in success; not to substitute words for actions, not to seek the path of comfort, but to face the stress and spur of difficulty and challenge; to learn to stand up in the storm, but to have compassion on those who fail; to master yourself before you seek to master others; to have a heart that is clean, a goal that is high; to learn to laugh yet never forget how to weep; to reach into the future, yet never neglect the past; to be serious, yet never to take yourself too seriously; to be modest so that you will remember the simplicity of true greatness, the open mind of true wisdom, the meekness of true strength.

They give you a temperate will, a quality of the imagination, a vigor of the emotions, a freshness of the deep springs of life, a temperamental predominance of courage over timidity, of an appetite for adventure over love of ease.

They create in your heart the sense of wonder, the unfailing hope of what next, and the joy and inspiration of life. They teach you in this way to be an officer and a gentleman.

And what sort of soldiers are those you are to lead? Are they reliable? Are they brave? Are they capable of victory?

Their story is known to all of you. It is the story of the American man-at-arms. My estimate of him was formed on the battlefield many, many years ago, and has never changed. I regarded him then, as I regard him now, as one of the world's noblest figures; not only as one of the finest military characters, but also as one of the most stainless.

His name and fame are the birthright of every American citizen. In his youth and strength, his love and loyalty, he gave all that mortality can give. He needs no eulogy from me or any other man. He has written his own history and written it in red on his enemy's breast.

But when I think of his patience in adversity, of his courage under fire and of his modesty in victory, I am filled with an emotion of admiration I cannot put into words. He belongs to history as furnishing one of the greatest examples of successful patriotism. He belongs to posterity as the instructor of future generations in the principles of liberty and freedom. He belongs to the present, to us, by his virtues and by his achievements.

Witness to Fortitude

In twenty campaigns, on a hundred battlefields, around a thousand camp fires, I have witnessed that enduring fortitude, that patriotic self-abnegation, and that invincible determination which have carved his stature in the hearts of his people.

From one end of the world to the other, he has drained deep the chalice of courage. As I listened to those songs [of the glee club], in memory's eye I could see those staggering columns of the first World War, bending under soggy packs on many a weary march, from dripping dusk to drizzling dawn, slogging ankle deep through the mire of shellpocked roads; to form grimly for the mud, chilled by the wind and rain, driving home to their objective, and for many, to the judgment seat of God.

I do not know the dignity of their birth, but I do know the glory of their death. They died, unquestioning, uncomplaining, with faith in their hearts, and on their lips the hope that we would go on to victory.

Always for them: duty, honor, country. Always their blood, and sweat, and tears, as we sought the way and the light and the truth. And twenty years after, on the other side of the globe, again the filth of murky foxholes, the stench of ghostly trenches, the slime of dripping dugouts, those boiling suns of relentless heat, those torrential rains of devastating storms, the loneliness and utter desolation of jungle trails, the bitterness of long separation from those they loved and cherished, the deadly pestilence of tropical disease, and the horror of stricken areas of war.

Swift and Sure Attack

Their resolute and determined defense, their swift and sure attack, their indomitable purpose, their complete and decisive victory—always victory, always through the bloody haze of their last reverberating shot, the vision of gaunt, ghastly men, reverently following your password of duty, honor, country.

The code which those words perpetuate embraces the highest moral law and will stand the test of any ethics or philosophies ever promulgated for the uplift of mankind. Its requirements are for the things that are right and its restraints are from the things that are wrong. The soldier, above all other men, is required to practice the greatest act of religious training—sacrifice. In battle, and in the face of danger and death, he discloses those divine attributes which his Maker gave when He created man in His own image. No physical courage and no greater strength can take the place of the divine help which alone can sustain him. However hard the incidents of war may be, the soldier who is called upon to offer and to give his life for his country is the noblest development of mankind.

You now face a new world, a world of change. The thrust into outer space of the satellite, spheres, and missiles marks a beginning of another epoch in the long story of mankind. In the five or more billions of years the scientists tell us it has taken to form the earth, in the three or more billion years of development of the human race, there has never been a more abrupt or staggering evolution.

We deal now, not with things of this world alone, but illimitable distances and as yet unfathomed mysteries of the universe. We are reaching out for a new and boundless frontier. We speak in strange terms of harnessing nuclear energy, of making winds and tides work for us, of creating unheard of synthetic materials to supplement or even replace our old standard basics; to purify sea water for our drink; of mining ocean floors for new fields of wealth and food; of disease preventatives to expand life into the hundreds of years; of controlling the weather for a more equitable distribution of heat and cold, of rain and shine; of spaceships to the moon; of the primary target in war, no longer limited to the armed forces of an enemy, but instead to include his civil populations; of ultimate conflict between a united human race and the sinister forces of some other galaxy; of such dreams and fantasies as to make life most exciting of all times.

And through all this welter of change and development your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable. It is to win our wars. Everything else in your professional career is but corollary to this vital dedication. All other public purposes, other public projects, all other public needs, great or small, will find others for their accomplishment; but you are the ones who are trained to fight.

The Profession of Arms

Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that, if you lose, the nation will be destroyed, that the very obsession of your public service must be duty, honor, country.

Others will debate the controversial issues, national and international, which divide men's minds. But serene, calm, aloof, you stand as the nation's war guardian, as its lifeguard from the raging tides of international conflict, as its gladiator in the arena of battle. For a century and a half you have defended, guarded, and protected its hallowed traditions of liberty and freedom, of right and justice.

Let civilian voices argue the merits or demerits of our processes of government: Whether our strength is being sapped by deficit financing indulged in too long, by federal paternalism grown too mighty, by power groups grown too arrogant, by politics grown too corrupt, by crime grown too rampant, by morals grown too low, by taxes grown too high, by extremists grown too violent; whether our personal liberties are as thorough and complete as they should be.

These great national problems are not for your professional participation or military solution. Your guidepost stands out like a tenfold beacon in the night: duty, honor, country.

You are the leaven which binds together the entire fabric of our national system of defense. From your ranks come the great captains who hold the nation's destiny in their hands the moment the war tocsin sounds.

The long, gray line has never failed us. Were you to do so, a million ghosts in olive drab, in brown khaki, in blue and gray, would rise from their white crosses, thundering those magic words: duty, honor, country.

Prays for Peace

This does not mean that you are warmongers. On the contrary, the soldier above all other people prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war. But always in our ears ring the ominous words of Plato, that wisest of all philosophers: "Only the dead have seen the end of the war."

The shadows are lengthening for me. The twilight is here. My days of old have vanished—tone and tint. They have gone glimmering through the dreams of things that were. Their memory is one of wondrous beauty, watered by tears and coaxed and caressed by the smiles of yesterday. I listen vainly but with thirsty ear, for the witching melody of faint bugles blowing reveille, of far drums beating the long roll.

In my dreams I hear again the crash of guns, the rattle of musketry, the strange, mournful mutter of the battlefield. But in the evening of my memory always I come back to West Point. Always there echoes and reechoes: duty, honor, country.

Today marks my final roll call with you. But I want you to know that when I cross the river, my last conscious thoughts will be of the corps, and the corps, and the corps.

I bid you farewell.

"SIJAN! My Name Is Lance Peter Sijan!"

Lt Col Fred A. Meurer

The colonel, recalling the tragic events of almost nine years earlier, had been talking for more than an hour about the heroic ordeal of Capt Lance Sijan, his cellmate in North Vietnam. Reaching the point in his chronology when Captain Sijan, calling out helplessly for his father, was taken away by his captors to die, Col Bob Craner's voice broke ever so slightly and tears glistened in his eyes. He agreed to a break in the interview.

"Okay, Mom, you can come back in now!"

The voice, coming from a tape recorder that day in early November 1967, gave immense pleasure to Mr. and Mrs. Sylvester Sijan (pronounced sigh-john), just as it had so many times for more than 25 years. It was especially meaningful now, coming from Da Nang AB, Vietnam. Capt Lance Sijan had done his Christmas shopping early and, separated by half a world, was having some mischievous fun with his family.

Sitting in the living room of the comfortable two-story house in Milwaukee this past January, Mrs. Jane Sijan tenderly related the tale of her son's tape. Across the street, snow was crusted on the park that gently slopes into Lake Michigan. Flames danced in the fireplace as Sylvester Sijan busily prepared to show movies of Lance's graduation from the Air Force Academy in 1965.

Everywhere was memorabilia of Lance and his brother, Marc, younger by five years, and his sister, Janine, 13 years Lance's junior. An oil painting bathed in soft neon light on one wall showed Lance in his academy uniform, smiling out into the room.

Along the staircase hung dozens of photos of the Sijans, their children, relatives, and friends. Football pictures of Lance and Marc abounded, for football is a tradition with the Sijans. Lance's Bay View High School team won the city championship in 1959, the first time Bay View had turned the trick since 1936, when Lance's father played on the team.

Family heirlooms, souvenirs from faraway places, and trophies dominated mantels and shelves. The most significant showpiece, however, was enshrined in a glass case. Resplendent with its accompanying baby-blue ribbon dotted with tiny white stars was Capt Lance Sijan's Medal of Honor.

It had been awarded posthumously.

Jane Sijan—attractive and darkhaired, her Irish heritage smiling through—continued her story of the tape from Vietnam.

> Lance made us individually leave the room as he described the presents he had gotten for us. He'd say, "Mom, leave the room," and then he'd tell everybody what he had for me. Then he'd yell for me to come back in, and he'd send someone else out.

Those Christmas presents were not opened that year, nor for several years thereafter. On 9 November 1967 Capt Lance Sijan was shot down over North Vietnam. For years no one at home knew his fate. The box of Christmas presents was added to his personal effects, and not until his body was returned to Milwaukee some seven years later did his family sort through his belongings.

On 4 March 1976 President Gerald R. Ford awarded the Medal of Honor to Captain Siijan for his "extraordinary heroism and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty at the cost of his life. . . ."

R&R in Bangkok, Thailand, had been nostalgic for Lance Sijan. He told his family in a tape from the country once known as Siam that his drama teacher at Bay View High—where Sijan had been president of the Student Government Association and received the Gold Medal Award for outstanding leadership, achievement, and service—would have been impressed.

As a sophomore, according to his mother, Lance had competed against seniors for the lead singing role in the production of "The King and I," whose setting was Siam. Competition raged for six weeks, consuming Lance's energy and concern.

"One day," said Mrs. Sijan, "he walked in and said, 'I'd like to speak to the Queen Mother.' " I knew he had the part.

There were 21 children in the cast and Sijan needed one special little princess. He and Marc had always doted over their sister, Janine, even to the point of arguing who would feed her, as an infant, in the middle of the night. Lance asked Janine, then not quite four years old, to be his daughter in the play.

Occasionally, the family listens to a recording of the play, Lance's rich voice sing-talking the role of the Siamese king that Yul Brynner made famous.

Sijan flew his first post-R&R mission on 9 November l967 in the backseat of an F-4 piloted by Col John W. Armstrong, commander of the 366th Tactical Fighter Squadron. On a bombing pass over North Vietnam near Laos, their aircraft

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was hit and exploded. Colonel Armstrong was never heard from again. Captain Sijan, plummeting to the ground after a low-level bailout, suffered a skull fracture, a mangled right hand with three fingers bent backwards to the wrist, and a compound fracture of his left leg, the bone protruding through the lacerated skin.

The ordeal of Lance Sijan—big, strong, tough, handsome, a football player at the Air Force Academy, remembered as a fierce competitor by those who knew him—had begun.

He would live in the North Vietnamese jungle with no food and little water for some 45 days. Virtually immobilized, he would propel himself backwards on his elbows and buttocks toward what he hoped was freedom. He was alone. He would be joined later with two other Americans, and in short, fading in-and-out periods of consciousness and lucidity, would tell them his story.

Now, however, there was hope for Sijan. Aircraft circled and darted overhead, part of a gigantic search and rescue effort launched to recover him and Colonel Armstrong. Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service histories state that 108 aircraft participated the first two days, and 14 more on the third when no additional contact was made with Sijan, known to those above as "AWOL 1."

Contact had been made earlier, and the answer to the authenticating question, "Who is the greatest football team in the world?" came easily from the Wisconsin native. "The Green Bay Packers," Sijan replied. In continuing voice contacts, "the survivor was talking louder and faster," the history notes. "AWOL did not know what happened to the frontseater."

The rescue force, meanwhile, was taking "ground fire from all directions" and was "worried about all the [friendly] fire hitting the survivor." Finally, Jolly Green 15, an HH-3E helicopter, picked up a transmission from the ground: "I see you, I see you. Stay where you are, I'm coming to you!"

For 33 minutes, Jolly Green Giant 15 hovered over the jungle, eyes aboard searching the dense foliage below for movement. Bullets began piercing the fuselage, a few at first then more and more. Getting no more voice contact from the ground and under a withering hail of fire, Jolly Green 15 finally left the area.

Rescue efforts the next day and electronic surveillance in the days that followed turned up no more contacts, and the search for "AWOL" was called off.

One A-1E aircraft was shot down in the effort—the pilot was rescued—and several helicopters crewmen were wounded.

"If AWOL," the report said, "only had some kind of signaling device—mirror, flare, etc.—pick-up would have been successful. The rescue of this survivor was not in the hands of man."

Much later, a battered Sijan was to ask his American cellmates, "What did I do wrong? Why didn't I get picked up?" He told them he had lost his survival kit.

On that November day, except for enemy forces all around, Sijan was alone again. Although desperately in need of food, water, and medical attention, he somehow evaded the enemy and capture as he painfully, day by day, dragged himself along the ground—toward, he hoped, freedom.

But it was not to be.

Former Capt Guy Gruters, who was to be one of Sijan's cellmates later, told *Airman:*

> He said he'd go for two or three days and nights—as long as he possibly could—and then he'd be exhausted and sleep. As soon as he'd wake up he'd start again, always traveling east. You're talking 45 days now without food, and it was a max effort!

Col Bob Craner, the older cellmate in Hanoi, picked up the story:

"When he couldn't drag himself anymore and said, 'This is the end,' he saw he was on a dirt road. He lay there for a day, maybe, until a truck came along and they picked him up."

Incredibly, after a month and a half of clawing, clutching, dragging, and hurting, Sijan was found three miles from where he had initially parachuted into the jungle.

Horribly emaciated and with the flesh on his buttocks worn to his hipbones, Lance Sijan still had some fight left.

"He said they took him to a place where they laid him on a mat and gave him some food." Craner related, "he said he waited until he felt he was getting a little stronger. When there was just one guard there, Sijan beckoned him over. When the guy bent over to see what was the matter, Sijan told me, 'I just let him have it. Wham!'"

With the guard unconscious from a well-placed karate chop from a wakened left arm and hand, Sijan pulled himself back into the jungle. "He thought he was making it," Craner said, "but they found him after a couple of hours."

Once again Sijan had been robbed of precious freedom. Once again he was down, but—as other North Vietnamese were to learn—by no means out.

Sijan's obsession with freedom had manifested itself much earlier, and rather uniquely, at the Air Force Academy. His arts instructor, Col Carlin J. Kielcheski, remembers Sijan well.

"He had the crusty cadence of a football player, yet he was very sensitive. I was particularly interested in those guys who broke the image of the typical artist."

Colonel Kielcheski still has the "Humanities 499" paper Sijan submitted with his two-foot wooden sculpture of a female dancer. Sijan wrote:

> I feel that the female figure is one of nature's purest forms. I want this statue to represent the quest for freedom by the lack of any restraining devices or objects. The theme of my sculpture is just that—a quest for freedom, an escape from the complexities of the world around us.

Colonel Kielcheski chuckled, "Here was this bruiser of a football player coming up with these delicate kinds of things. He was not content to do what the other cadets did. He was very persistent and not satisfied with doing just any kind of job. He wanted to do it right and showed real tenacity to stick to a problem."

Others remember other aspects of Sijan's character. His roommate for three years, Mike Smith of Denver, said Sijan was "probably the toughest guy mentally I've ever met."

Sijan was a substitute end on the football team, Smith said. Football, he thought, hindered Sijan's academics, and his concern over grades conversely affected his performance and chances for stardom on the gridiron.

> He had a lot of things going and tried to keep them all going. He came in from football practice dead tired. He'd sleep for an hour or two after dinner and then study until 1 or 2 in the morning. He knew he had to give up a lot to play football, but he had the determination to do it.

Sijan did give up football his senior year. But one thing he did not sacrifice for studies was the company of young women.

"They found him very attractive, and he had no trouble getting dates," said Smith. "He was a big, handsome guy with a good sense of humor."

Maj Joe Kolek, who roomed with Sijan one semester, agreed. In fact, he said, "it was pretty neat now and then to get Lance's castoffs. "

Smith recalls that he and Sijan talked sometimes about the Code of Conduct, which was to test Sijan's character so severely fewer than three years later.

"We found nothing wrong with the Code. We accepted the responsibility of action honorable to our country. It was strictly an extension of Lance's personality. When he accepted something, he accepted it. He did nothing halfway."

"It seemed," Smith said, "that there was always a reservoir of strength he got from his family."

Sylvester Sijan, whose character and physique bear a striking resemblance to a middle-aged Jack Dempsey, owns the Barrel Head Grille in Milwaukee. Built into an inside wall is a mock four-foot-round beer barrel top, a splendid woodwork fashioned by the elder Sijan from an oak table. A wooden shingle on the polished oak bears the engraved inscription, "Tradition."

Sijan's forefathers immigrated from Serbia, a separate country prior to World War I that later became part of Yugoslavia.

"Serbians have been noted for their heroic actions in circumstances where they were outnumbered," Mr. Sijan said. "They were vicious fighters on a one-to-one or a one-to-fifty basis, so they have a history of instinct and drive."

He thinks a mixture of that tradition, his son's love for his home and his competitive spirit spurred him through the odyssey in Vietnam.

"What made Lance do what he did? One thing, for sure. He always wanted to come home, no matter where he was. He was going to come home whether it was in pieces or as a hero."

> A person never knows how competitive he really is until he comes up against the ultimate situation. He could have been less courageous; he could have retreated into the ranks of the North Vietnamese and said, "Here I am, take care of me." But he chose to go the other way. He probably never doubted that somehow, somewhere he'd get out.

Lance Sijan had wondered about his ultimate fate even before leaving for Vietnam, according to Mike Smith. In the Air Force at the time and stationed at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, Smith enjoyed a visit from Sijan who was on leave prior to going overseas.

I sensed a foreboding in him and he and I dealt with the issue of not coming back," Smith said. "I remember it distinctly because I talked with my wife about our conversation. I felt he had a premonition that he might not return."

Mrs. Jane Sijan, too, sensed something. In Milwaukee prior to leaving, Lance asked her to sew two extra pockets into his flight suit, and he took great pains coating matches with wax.

"One night he was sitting on his bed," she recalled. "He was sewing razor blades into his undershirts so he would have them if he was ever shot down."

Sijan had been on the ground for 41 days when Col Bob Craner and Capt Guy Gruters took off from Phu Cat AB in their F-100 on 20 December 1967. Col Craner is now in Germany and Gruters is out of the service and living in Tampa.

Pinpointing targets in North Vietnam from the *Misty* forward air control jet fighter, they were hit by ground fire and ejected. Both were captured and brought to a holding point in Vinh, where they were thrust into bamboo cells and chained.

Reaching back into his memory, crowded with recollections of more than five years as a prisoner of war, Craner told the story:

> As best as I can recall, it was New Year's Day of 1968 when they brought this guy in at night. The Rodent came into the guy's cell next to mine and began his interrogation. It was clearly audible.
>
> He was on this guy for military information, and the responses I heard indicated he was in very, very bad shape. His voice was very weak. It sounded to me as though he wasn't going to make it.
>
> The Rodent would say, "Your arm, your arm, it is very bad. I am going to twist it unless you tell me." The guy would say, "I'm not going to tell you; it's against the code." Then he would start screaming. The Rodent was obviously twisting his mangled arm.
>
> The whole affair went on for an hour and a half, over and over again, and the guy just wouldn't give in. He'd say, "Wait till I get better, you S.O.B., you're really going to get it." He was giving the Rodent all kinds of lip but no information.
>
> "The Rodent kept laying into him. Finally I heard this guy rasp, "Sijan! My name is Lance Peter Sijan!" That's all he told him.

Guy Gruters, also an Air Force Academy graduate but a year senior to Sijan, was in a cell down the hall and did not know the identity of the third captive. He does recall that "the guy was apparently always trying to push his way out of the bamboo cell, and they'd beat him with a stick to get him back. We could hear the cracks."

After several days, when the North Vietnamese were ready to transport the Americans to Hanoi, Gruters and Craner were taken to Sijan's cell to help him to the truck.

"When I got a look at the poor devil, I retched," said Craner. "He was so thin and every bone in his body was visible. Maybe 20 percent of his body wasn't open sores or open flesh. Both hipbones were exposed where the flesh had been worn away."

Gruters recalled that "he looked like a little guy. But then when we picked him up, I remember commenting to Bob, 'This is one big sonofagun.' "

While they were moving him, Craner related, "Sijan looked up and said, 'You're Guy Gruters, aren't you?' Gruters asked him how he knew, and Sijan replied, 'We were at the Academy together. Don't you know me? I'm Lance Sijan.' Guy went into shock. He said, 'My God, Lance, that's not you!' "

"I have never had my heart broken like that," said Gruters, who remembered Sijan as a 220-pound football player at the academy. "He had no muscle left and looked so helpless."

Craner said Sijan never gave up on the idea of escape in all the days they were together. "In fact, that was one of the first things he mentioned when we first went into his cell at Vinh: 'How the hell are we going to get out of here? Have you guys figured out how we're going to take care of these people? Do you think we can steal one of their guns?'"

"He had to struggle to get each word out," Craner said. "It was very, very intense on his part that the only direction he was planning was escape. That's all that was on his mind. Even later, he kept dwelling on the fact that he'd made it once and he was going to make it again."

Craner remembers the Rodent coming up to them and, in a mocking voice, he paraphrased the Rodent's message:

"Sijan a very difficult man. He struck a guard and injured him. He ran away from us. You must not let him do that anymore."

"I never questioned the fact that Lance would make it," said Gruters. "Now that he had help, I thought he'd come back. He had passed his low."

The grueling truck ride to Hanoi took several days. Sijan—"in and out of consciousness, lucid for 15 seconds sometimes and sometimes an hour, but garbled and incoherent a lot," according to Craner—told the story of his 45-day ordeal in the jungle while the trio was kept under a canvas cover during the day.

The truck ride over rough roads at night, with the Americans constantly bouncing 18 inches up and down in the back was torture itself. Craner and Gruters took turns struggling to keep an unsecured 55-gallon drum of gasoline from smashing them while the other cradled Sijan between his legs and cushioned his head against the stomach.

"I thought he had died at one point in the trip" said Craner. "I looked at Guy and said, 'He's dead.' Guy started massaging his face and neck trying to bring him around. Nothing.

I sat there holding him for about two hours, and when he just came around. I said, 'Okay, buddy, my hat's off to you.'"

Finally reaching Hanoi, the three were put into a cell in "Little Vegas." Craner described the conditions:

> It was dank, with open air, and there was a pool of water on the worn cement floor. It was the first time I suffered from the cold. I was chilled to the bone, always shivering and shaking. Guy and I started getting respiratory problems right away, and I couldn't imagine what it was doing to Lance. That, I think, accounts ultimately for the fact that he didn't make it.

"Lance was always as little of a hindrance to us as he could be," said Gruters. "He could have asked for help any one of a hundred thousand times, but he never asked for a damned thing! There was no way Bob and I could feel sorry for ourselves."

Craner said a Vietnamese medic gave Sijan shots of yellow fluid, which he thought were antibiotics. The medic did nothing for Sijan's open sores and wounds, and when he looked at Sijan's mangled hand, "he just shook his head."

The medic later inserted an intravenous tube into Sijan's arm, but Sijan, fascinated with it in his subconscious haze, pulled it out several times. Thus, Craner and Gruters took turns staying awake with him at night.

"One night," Craner said, "a guard opened the little the door and looked in, and there was Lance beckoning to the guard. It was the same motion he told me he had made to the guy in the jungle, and I could just see what was going through the back reaches of his mind: 'If I can that guy close enough . . . .'"

Craner remembers that Sijan once asked them to help him exercise so he could build up his strength for another escape attempt. "We got him propped up on his cot and waved his arms around a few times, and that satisfied him. Then he was exhausted. "

At another point, Sijan became lucid enough to ask Craner, "How about going out and getting me a burger and french fries?"

But Sijan's injuries and now the respiratory problems sapped his strength. "First he could only whisper a word, and then it got down to blinking out letters with his eyes," said Gruters. "Finally he couldn't do that anymore, even a yes or no."

With tears glistening, Bob Craner remembered when it all came to an end. They had been in Hanoi about eight days.

> One night Lance started making strangling sounds, and we got him to sit up. Then, for the first time since we'd been together, his voice came through loud and clear. He said, "Oh my God, it's over," and then he started yelling for his father. He'd shout, "Dad, Dad where are you? Come here, I need you!"
>
> I knew he was sinking fast. I started beating on the walls, trying to call the guards, hoping they'd take him to a hospital. They came in and took him out. As best as I could figure it was 21 January.

"He had never asked for his dad before," said Gruters, and that was the first time he'd talked in four or five days. It was the first time I saw him display any emotion. It was absolutely his last strength. It was the last time we saw him."

A few days later, Craner met the camp commander in the courtyard while returning from a bathhouse and asked him where Sijan was.

"Sijan spend too long in the jungle," came the reply. "Sijan die."

Guy Gruters talked some more about Sijan:

"He was a tremendously strong, tough, physical human being. I *never* heard Lance complain. If you had an army of Sijans, you'd have an incredible fighting force."

Said Craner:

> Lance never talked about pain. He'd yell out in pain sometimes, but he'd never dwell on it, like, "Damn, that hurts."

> Lance was so full of drive whenever he was lucid. There was never any question of, "I hurt so much that I'd rather be dead." It was always positive for him, pointed mainly toward escape but always toward the future.

Craner recommended Sijan for the Medal of Honor. Why?

> He survived a terrible ordeal, and he survived with the intent, sometime in the future, of picking up the fight. Finally he just succumbed.
>
> There is no way you can instill that kind of performance in an individual. I don't know how many we're turning out like Lance Sijan, but I can't believe there are very many.

In Milwaukee, Sylvester Sijan started to bring up the point, and then he hesitated. He finally did, though, and then he talked about it unabashedly.

> I remember one day in January, about the same time that year, driving down the expressway. I was feeling despondent, and I began screaming as loud as I could, things like, "Lance, where are you?" I may have murmured such things to myself before, but I never yelled as loud as I did that day.

He wonders if maybe—just maybe—it may have been at time Lance was calling for him in Hanoi.

"The realization that Lance's final thoughts were what they were makes me feel most humble, most penitent, and yet somehow profoundly honored," he said.

Mr. Sijan still wears a POW bracelet with Lance's name on it. "I just can't take it off," he said, adding that "not too many people realize its significance anymore."

Though Lance was declared missing in action, and though one package they sent to him in Hanoi came back stamped "deceased"—"which jarred me terribly," Mrs. Sijan said—the family never gave up hope.

I'm such an optimist," said Jane Sijan. "I even watched all the prisoners get off the planes on television [in 1973] hoping there had been some mistake."

Lance's body, along with the headstone used to mark his grave in North Vietnam, was returned to the United States in 1974 for interment in Milwaukee (23 other bodies were returned to the US at the same time). At a memorial service in Bay View High School, the family announced the Capt Lance Peter Sijan Memorial Scholarship Fund.

It is a $500 scholarship presented yearly to a graduate male student best exemplifying Lance's example of the American boy," said Mrs. Sijan. "It will be a lifetime effort on our behalf and will be carried on by our children."

Lance Sijan, US Air Force Academy class of 1965, would be 35 years old now. He is the first academy graduate to be awarded the Medal of Honor. A dormitory at the academy was recently named Sijan Hall in his honor.

"The man represented something," Sylvester Sijan said of his son. "The old cliché that he was a hero and represented guts and determination is true. That's what he really represented. How much of that was really Lance? What he is, what he did, the facts are there."

We'll never adjust to it," Sijan said. "People say, 'It's been a long time ago and you should be okay now,' but it stays with you and well it should."

Lance was always such a pleasure; he was an ideal son, but then all our children are a joy and blessing to us," said Jane Sijan. "It still hurts to talk about it, but I have certainly accepted it. I'm a very patient woman, and I wait for the day our family will all be together again, that's all."

On 4 March 1976 three other former prisoners of war, all living, also received Medals of Honor from President Ford. One of them was Air Force Col George E. "Bud" Day ("All Day's Tomorrows," *Airman,* November 1976). Col Day recently wrote to *Airman:*

> Lance was the epitome of dedication, right to death! When people ask about what kind of kids we should start with, the answer is straight, honest kids like him. They will not all stay that way—but by God, that's the minimum to start with.

You Can Drag a Horse to Water but You Can't Make It Drink Unless It Is Thirsty

Bruce J. Avolio
Bernard M. Bass

Executive Summary

This paper reviews preliminary results of a field study that examined the impact of a leadership development program on pre- and post-ratings of the multifactor leadership questionnaire. Emphasis in the training program was placed on developing transformational leadership. Results indicated that there were some positive effects of the training program on increasing ratings of transformational leadership.

Introduction

"You can drag a horse to water, but you can't make it drink." The adage may explain why the effects of many programs to train participants to be more effective leaders evaporate once participants are back on the job. We believe that for training to produce lasting changes in attitude or behavior, participants must be ready, willing, and able to change. They must understand the whys and wherefores of the training, must be cognizant of their own needs to change, and must want to make the change. Along these lines, Posner and Kouzes recently stated, "The belief that leadership can't be learned is a far more powerful deterrent to development than is the nature of leadership itself."[1] Equally important, the change must also be supported by the readiness of the organization for the change advocated by the program.[2]

This paper focuses on the particular importance of electing to make a change in a particular aspect of one's leadership style, and planning for the change following a training workshop intervention. In this regard, we operationalized "readiness," based on the participants' completing and implementing a detailed leadership developmental plan of action for changing their leadership styles following a three-day training program. We believe that intentions to implement are required to have a successful training effort. Indeed, Gollwitzer found that 62 percent of participants completed a past due difficult task if they had formed a specific plan to do so. Conversely, only 22 percent complied with their goal if they had not developed a plan.[3]

Many past leadership programs have taught lessons that had some practical value for participants. The Grid posited one best way to lead across different situations: showing an integrated concern for production and people.[4] Situational Leadership argued for aligning one's leadership to the demands of each of four designated situations.[5] Leader Match assumed task-oriented leaders performed better in one type of structure, while relations-oriented leadership style was better for other situations.[6] Here, we assume a broader array of possible leadership styles can be developed through training, resulting in efforts to improve some but not necessarily all components of leadership, including charismatic or idealized leadership.[7]

An Increasing Importance Assigned to Leadership Development

Over the last decade, advocates in the movement for total quality and reengineering have repeatedly emphasized the need to develop leadership to facilitate the changes associated with these organizational interventions. The opportunity for leadership training to have a "real" and positive impact in parallel with these efforts has never been greater. As depicted in the Malcolm Baldrige criteria, leadership represents the "driver" in the overall change process. One then must ask the question, "What type of leadership framework will contribute most positively to the changeover processes that many organizations are currently undergoing these days?

Our contention is that the leadership framework must include a broader range of styles and leadership behaviors than the transactional exchanges emphasized in the Grid, Situational Leadership, or Leader Match. Attention also is needed to styles of transformational leadership.[8] By adding transformational leadership, Cascio argues that individuals will have a broader range of styles from which they can contribute to development most needed in organizations today, to survive

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in the complex rapidly changing, social, political and economic environments.[9]

A Closer View of a "Full Range" of Leadership Styles

Social science has long recognized that leadership went beyond a simple exchange relationship between leaders and their followers.[10] Nonetheless, most leadership training has focused on leadership as a transaction, where goals were clarified, agreements were made, and contingent reinforcement was provided to followers for carrying out their assignments. These kinds of transactions were constructive when they provided a clear delineation of the paths and the goals of those led.[11] Less effective leadership also used contingent correction, threats and discipline, when followers failed to meet standards and agreed-upon expectations.

Since 1983 transformational leadership training has been completed by participants from industry, educational administration, health care, and government agencies in the United States and abroad. The present paper reviews preliminary findings from one evaluation project showing modest pre-post training effects on the job.

Transformational Leadership: The Upper End of a Range of Leadership Styles

Transformational leaders motivate others (followers, colleagues, clients, and supervisors) to do more than they originally intended and often even more than they thought possible. They set challenging expectations and typically motivate and enable others to achieve higher levels of performance.[12]

Transformational leaders earn credits with others by considering others' needs over their own personal needs. Their behaviors, values, and principles are consistent with their espoused beliefs. They can be counted on to do what's right, demonstrating high standards of ethical and moral conduct. Impressions are managed for the good of the organization and its members, not for the purpose of deceit and/or subterfuge. The "pseudo-transformational" leader may create the impression of doing some of the "right things," but actually fail to do so when it conflicts with his or her personal interests.

Transformational Leadership Components

Prior research by Bass identified four components of transformational leadership.[13] Leadership is *idealistically influential* (II) when followers have confidence and faith in the leader. They seek to identify with the leaders and emulate them. Such leaders set high moral and ethical standards. The leadership is *inspirationally motivating* (IM), in that it furnishes followers with challenges, persuasion, meaning, and understanding for shared actions and objectives. The leadership is *intellectually stimulating* (IS) in that it enhances followers, innovation, and creativity, and expands their use of abilities to take on a broader range of problems and opportunities. Such leadership questions basic assumptions and helps people to abandon outdated strategies of operating. Finally, transformational leadership is *individually considerate* (IC), providing followers with support, mentoring, and coaching, while demonstrating an understanding and acceptance of individual differences among the followers. Altogether, transformational leadership is predicted to develop exemplary followers who trust their leaders, who anticipate a more optimistic future, who are willing to question their leaders, and who focus on continuous improvement and development in themselves, as well as their colleagues.[14]

Each of the components comprising transformational leadership is measured in the current study by Bass and Avolio's Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ Form 5).[15] We see each of the four I's of transformational leadership as relevant to corporals as well as generals, to teachers as well as superintendents, and to productions workers as well as CEOs (see Bass & Avolio, *Improving Organizational Effectiveness through Transformational Leadership,* 1994, for a more detailed discussion of transformational leadership). All four I's are contained within House's and Conger and Kanungo's single complex term, *charisma.*[16]

Transactional Leadership: The Lower End of a Full Range of Leadership Styles

Transactional leadership occurs when the leader practices *contingent reward leadership* (CR), and specifies goals and rewards, or corrects colleagues depending on the adequacy of their performance. Transactional leadership depends on behavior/performance being linked with recognition or rewards, or with active or passive corrective discipline where performance falls below some acceptable standard.

When leadership effectiveness is measured by the objective performance of those led, according to two separate meta-analyses, contingent reward (CR) leadership has been found to be effective, although not as effective as the transformational components, in motivating others to achieve a higher level of development and performance.[17] With this constructive exchange, the leader assigns or negotiates agreements on what needs to be done and may link rewards and commendations in return for the followers' achievements.

Corrective transactions are generally less effective than the constructive ones described above. However, even these corrective styles are appropriate in situations which require active and corrective oversight, such as where threat of accidents or disasters are ever-present, or where careful accounting and auditing are mandated in financial transactions. The corrective transaction may be *active managing-by-exception* (MBE-A) or *passive managing-by-expectation* (MBE-P). In MBE-A, the leader arranges to actively monitor deviances from standards, mistakes, and errors in follower's assignments and to take corrective action as necessary where deviations are expected or actually occur. MBE-P implies waiting passively for deviations, mistakes, and errors to occur and then taking corrective action. Passive MBE is likely to be less effective than active MBE. The passive MBE attitude is characterized by "If it ain't broke, don't fix it," and is typically inadequate for most organizations where there is a proactive focus on continuous quality improvement.

Nontransactional or laissez-faire leadership. The "full range" of leadership includes the possibilities of the absence or avoidance of leadership, the *laissez-faire* (LF) style. It is mostly ineffective according to prior research. As contrasted with transactional leadership, laissez-faire represents a non-transactional leadership style. Yet it must be distinguished from delegation and empowerment of colleagues. The laissez-faire leader shows he or she doesn't care about what happens and fails to follow up when delegation and empowerment processes are implemented.

Objective of Training

The purpose of our training effort was to enhance the trainee's use of the leadership styles at the upper end of the full range. We expected to bring about increases in the frequency of displaying the four components of transformational leadership, and decreases in the corrective and laissez-faire leadership styles. Stated another way, the objective of the training was to increase the frequency of use of transformational leadership relative to transactional and nontransactional leadership since over a broad array of situations, transformational leadership has a more positive impact on collegial motivation and performance.

In the current investigation we hypothesized that through training we could enhance the frequency of participants' exhibiting transformational leadership, while also decreasing the use of less effective styles, for example, management by exception. These results were expected if the components to be changed were identified in advance, selected for further development, and planned by the trainee for pursuit over time. The willingness of participants to establish a plan of action for improving their leadership style was used as an indirect means of assessing participants' readiness to make a change in their leadership style. Preliminary evidence to support these expectations has been provided by Barling, Weber, and Kelloway.[18] They reported an increase in several MLQ transformational scales following feedback sessions on how to interpret and use the feedback from the MLQ, comparing an experimental group that received MLQ feedback versus a control/comparison group.

Full Range Leadership Development Program

The program ordinarily requires three basic workshop days and two to three advanced workshop days with on average, a three-month interval between the two workshops. Follow-up activities are planned between the basic and advanced training, which may continue over one or more years following the completion of the advanced training workshop. At the outset, we felt that extending the program over time and through follow-up activities would be a better way to accommodate the different degrees of participants' readiness to change their own profile of leadership. This strategy also provided opportunities for participants to make adjustments throughout the duration of the training intervention while they practiced new styles and orientations towards leading others. By design, the program gave opportunities for improving participants' approaches to influencing others by practicing new styles, behaviors and orientations.

Program Processes and Components

The core program focused on education as well as skill-based training. The philosophy of leadership involved in being transformational, transactional, and nontransactional were presented early on, and discussed in terms of how the styles related to participants' implicit theories and models of leadership. The program was intended to broaden participants' implicit theories and perspectives within a broader range of leadership styles, methods and practices.

The program contained simulations and exercises, with a heavy emphasis on action learning that dealt with issues, dilemmas, and problems faced back home by participants. We stressed there were numerous ways to be transformational, transactional, and nontransactional. Emphasis was placed on establishing how participants saw themselves as leaders as well as how they were perceived by participants in the basic workshop and their colleagues at home.

After receiving computerized feedback from the MLQ Form 5 ratings from themselves and their colleagues in their work organizations, trainees were asked to identify the components in their profile they wanted to develop further. For their individual leadership development plan, they were asked to write personal goals and activities for improvement, which they then discussed in small groups. They also considered the support and constraints in the organization that would help or hinder such changes in their leadership styles. A typical plan involved proposing to be more individually considerate by becoming a more active listener, and learning to be more attentive to the needs of one's colleagues. The plan also included how progress was to be measured, who would provide support for the change, and so forth.

The program proceeded from (1) increasing awareness of one's leadership model with which participants came to the program based on prior life experiences, (2) learning about alternative strategies to improve their impact on others, and (3) adapting, adopting, and internalizing some new ways of thinking and behaving through the use of reflective learning, skill building exercises, individuals plans for change based on feedback, and an articulation of the desired future context and culture participants hoped to create in their units over time. Participants were also encouraged to consider which behaviors and/or styles they needed to either eliminate or reduce to be a more effective leader.

Program Schedule

The total program assessed here had 13 modules, eight in the basic and five in the advanced workshops, respectively. The interval of three months between the basic and advanced programs provided opportunities for participants to practice for planned changes, to collect and receive data on their profile, and to modify plans before returning for the advanced workshop.

The program modules progressed from an internal individualistic focus to an organizational one, ending with each participant creating a vision of a desired future state for his or her respective unit. Considerable emphasis was placed in the workshop on coaching participants on how they could increase or reduce the frequency of styles with a plan for leadership development to be implemented and revised over time.

Personal Feedback

After learning in the basic workshop about the behaviors present in the components of a full range model of leadership, participants received the results of the MLQ survey obtained from themselves and their colleagues. Results were presented at the scale level as well as on an item-by-item basis (10 items per component). Thus, the feedback provided in relative terms how often participants were exhibiting each of the styles along a full range of leadership based on self and others' ratings about them.

Facilitators explained the meaning of the results to participants in groups and for some participants in one-to-one sessions. Comparisons were drawn: how the participants' scores compared to the general norms for other participants inside and outside of their organization and how participants' self-ratings compared with MLQ ratings by their colleagues. Participants then were asked to identify specific factors and behaviors they regarded as strengths or weaknesses in their profiles, which were discussed with facilitators as well as with other participants in the workshop.

Since each MLQ item did not necessarily identify all of the actions or behaviors that resulted in the ratings, participants identified events or experiences to aid in their interpretation of the ratings. They were asked general questions such as, "What other factors may have contributed to the profile of ratings which were obtained?"

A detailed *Leadership Planning Guide* was provided to help participants proceed systematically through the process of developing an individualized plan for improving one's leadership style. The plan guided participants in how to use their awareness of a range of leadership components measured by the MLQ in developing their full leadership potential. Participants developed personal ideas for self-improvement and specific goals and objectives to be achieved for enhancing the effectiveness of their leadership potential. They were coached in this process by facilitators. Priorities and the methods to be used to achieve the objectives and the ways to assess progress were set. Participants used each other in small groups to test their ideas for change. They counseled each other on the components of their respective plans.

Attention in the leadership development plan was placed on building the target leader's ability to function as a more active transactional and transformational leader. For instance, those initially high in laissez-faire leadership and passive managing-by-exception, could consider how much and in what way they could reduce such styles of behavior.

Participants were told that to be effective, their developmental plans should be periodically revised. The plan should become a "living" document for participants. Once developed, the plan was revised at least twice over the course of three days in the basic workshop, and then again at least twice in the advanced workshop.

Before the basic workshop ended, the plan was revised based on the organizational and personal obstacles that needed to be taken into account. The emphasis placed on obstacles or barriers to effective leadership development was intended to provide a realistic picture of both constraints and opportunities in the participant's home organization.

Example of a Leadership Development Plan

Among the components of transformational leadership, proposals most likely to be included in the plan were to increase one's individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation, and inspirational motivation. The focus on individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation, and inspirational motivation fit with appreciating that one's self-development is consistent with increasing one's emphasis on developing others to their full potential. The skills and insights regarding self-improvement mentioned are many of the same skills and insights important to helping others to develop, be more motivated, and innovative at work.

A secondary goal that derived from this effort was to set an example for colleagues and to provide a role model of a leader who was willing to work at improving his or her own performance before asking others to do the same. Development was viewed in terms of how it could improve the individual as well as in terms of its contribution to colleagues and to the organization.[19]

Practice Period

During the several months that followed the basic workshop, participants pursued their personal development goals and plans.

Advanced Workshop

The advanced workshop began with participants reporting on the successes and failures of their attempts to change and the extent further revisions might be needed in their plans. Common experiences and implementation problems were discussed in small groups, and processed in the larger workshop group. Those who did not try to implement their plans usually indicated they did not have the full support of their supervisors and that they themselves were not ready to work on their leadership potential. The next series of modules dealt with ways of becoming more intellectually stimulating to individuals and groups using real "back home" problems. These modules built on work that had already been done on individualized consideration in the basic workshop. Participants then discussed the extent to which their "back home" organizational culture was transactional and transformational and ways they could make changes in it through transformational leadership. In the culture-change module, particular emphasis was placed on developing the inspirational leadership needed to change one's organizational unit to a more transformational culture. The advanced workshop ended with participants envisioning their organization and work setting in two to five years with emphasis on aligning the interests of the organization, its other members, and themselves. Here, participants practiced inspirational strategies to create more desirable future scenarios for their organization. Stressed also was the articulation of espoused beliefs and values that are associated with idealized influence. Work on these last modules became part of the participants extended individualized leadership plan.

Follow-up Activities

Specific evaluations following the advanced workshop after six months included assessing progress on the implementation of the leadership development plans, as well as readministering the MLQ.

In sum, a periodic reinforcement schedule was implemented after receiving feedback from the MLQ and learning about the possibilities for improvement. Individual development plans were established, redefined, and reinforced by colleagues in training as well as back on the job over an extended period of time. In the next section, we examine preliminary effects of the training process with respect to changes in leadership style.

Evaluation

Available for study were the results from 66 out of 489 participants who after being preassessed with the MLQ Form 5 by their followers "back home" had completed the Full Range Leadership Development Program. Then these 66 participants attended a half-day follow-up session to discuss the impact of the training program. The follow-up for 42 participants was within a year after the end of their advanced workshop; for 11, within two years; and for 13 after more than two years. Six months to two years later, after the participants' training was completed, post-assessed MLQ scores were obtained from their followers.

The 66 follow-up session attendees were a self-selected sample from the original participants. However, they were similar in terms of gender (45 percent versus 44 percent), age (43.8 years versus 44.3 years) and the same level of graduate education (62.4 percent versus 69.3 percent).

Specify of Gains Depending on Proposed Plans

The plan for improvement allowed for each participant to try to make changes on four factors. The 66 participants proposed to try to improve themselves on a total of 76. When we examined the 76 proposals, as shown in table 1, eight of the plans proposed increasing one's idealized influence, 18 proposed increasing inspirational motivation, 19 proposed increasing intellectual stimulation, 22 proposed increasing individualized consideration, and eight proposed increasing contingent reward leadership. None proposed increasing management-by-exception or laissez-faire leadership.

Significant gains appeared for idealized influence and intellectual stimulation as shown in table 1 if the factor had been included as a goal in the participant's Leadership Development Plan as originally designed and revised in the basic and advanced training programs. Comparing the means pre- and post-, idealized influence rose from a mean of 3.10 to a mean of 3.26 among those participants for whom increasing idealized influence was *a stated goal of the Leadership Development Plan.* For those for whom idealized influence was not a stated goal, it remained relatively unchanged at 3.Q2 before and 3.03 at the follow-up evaluation. Similar effects appeared for intellectual stimulation, which showed a gain of +.25 ($p<.02$) if planned, and +.04 ($p<.25$) if not planned. Inspirational motivation rose whether planned (+.10) or unplanned (+.12); however these effects were not significant. If planned, contingent reward rose (+.07). If unplanned, it fell (–.07), but these results also were not significant. In all, we concluded that planning made some difference in whether improvement on a factor could be observed over time.

Motivation and Constraints on Efforts to Change

A plurality of the 66 participants in the follow-up meeting stated that implementation of their Leadership Development

Table 1

Changes in MLQ-Follower Ratings According to Whether the Change Was Proposed in the 66 Participants' Personal Leadership Development Plans

Factor Score	Proposed in Plans				Not Proposed in Plans				Total Sample of Participants		
MLQ Transformational	N	Pre	Post	Change	N	Pre	Post	Change	Pre	Post	Change
Idealized Influence	8	3.10	3.26	+.16*	68	3.02	3.03	+.01	3.03	3.06	+.03
Inspirational Motivation	18	2.69	2.76	+.10	58	2.74	2.86	+.12	2.73	2.83	+.10
Intellectual Stimulation	19	2.62	2.87	+.25*	57	2.72	2.76	+.04	2.70	2.79	+.09
Individualized Consideration	22	2.75	2.84	+.07	54	2.96	2.99	+.03	2.90	2.95	+.05
MLQ Transactional											
Contingent Reward	8	2.31	2.37	+.06		2.41	2.34	–.07	2.40	2.45	+.05
Management-by-Exception							Not in plans		1.88	1.87	–.01
MLQ Laissez-Faire							Not in plans		1.08	1.00	–.08

Statistically significant Changes at $p<.05$

Plans was aided by their own motivation (38 percent), by their colleagues (34 percent), by knowledge obtained (13 percent) and through feedback (12 percent). Lack of self-discipline (22 percent) and time pressures (25 percent) were mentioned as the factors most inhibiting to the implementation of the leadership development plans.

Conclusions and Implications

Generally speaking, follow-up resurvey of participants indicated that improvements in leadership such as increases in idealized influence and intellectual stimulation appeared to depend on whether the trainees became aware of the need for improvement and created a plan to do so. Where the personal development plans did not include a goal for improving transformational leadership, little change was recorded from six months to two years after the training effort. Most participants showed at least some improvements in one or more components, although the components differed among trainees, and the changes were not large. It is possible that participants in some circumstances might have wanted to increase a component such as individualized consideration, but felt constrained from doing so by their organizational culture, supervisor, associates, and/or their tasks.

Some indirect support for our conclusions that benefits of the effort depended on the needs and goals set by the individual participants appeared in an evaluation study of another leadership development program reported by McCauley and Hughes-James.[20] McCauley and Hughes-James reviewed the results of a six-day training program for 38 public school superintendents who attended the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL). This program was built around feedback of personality assessments and coworkers' perceptions of their skills and abilities. As with the current leadership development efforts reported here, individual goals were set and projects to improve the organization were designed by participants. McCauley and Hughes-James reported that keeping journals promoted self-analysis and reflection among participants. Impact of the superintendent's leadership program appeared to depend on the emergence of self-awareness that gave rise to reflective thinking on better strategies for leading their respective school systems. Most likely to benefit from CCL's leadership development program were those who were more highly motivated, who experienced a greater need to resolve conflicts in their lives, and who were supported in their learning efforts.

In the McCauley and James study, those already experienced and at top levels of administration were less reflective, received less feedback from their coworkers, and were less affected by the training effort. The authors concluded that awareness, developmental readiness, and reflective learning were considered critical components for obtaining a positive training impact with participants.

The current results provided here can only be seen as preliminary. Although trends for improvements in components of transformational leadership were in the predicted direction, the small shifts involved small numbers of participants. And, there are other plausible alternative explanations which might be entertained. For example, trainees may have informed followers about their plans, and followers responded accordingly by increasing their ratings of the target leader at the second administration of the survey. Since we have no experimental control group to compare our findings against, we can not rule out these alternatives interpretations. Nevertheless, these preliminary results call attention to the impact on leadership training programs of the readiness and willingness of participants to engage in their own leadership development. The results are consistent with the idea that management development involves in a direct sense, self development,[21] that self-planning may be implemented more effectively than plans devised by others, and that for goal fulfillment, goal setting should be accompanied by mapping out in advance how the goal will be fulfilled.[22] We believe that implementation intentions are important in the training process and its effects over time.

Implications for Human Resource Development

Three further implications can be drawn from this article: (1) attention needs to be focused on a broader or fuller range of leadership development at all levels of organizations; (2) training efforts and their evaluation should be conducted with greater controls over alternative interpretations of program impact; and (3) the evidence reported here provides some preliminary support that if the goals in development plans are focused and measurable, and if the context to which leadership is to be exercised is considered in the planning process and its implementation, then training may positively affect leadership development. Preparing the context and providing facilitation for trainees are possibly two critical roles that human resource practitioners can play in improving the impact of leadership training efforts in their organizations.

In our opinion, leadership training must place greater emphasis on including not only a focus on developing leadership styles and behaviors, but also on the surrounding conditions in which the behavior is to be embedded. By considering the context, its constraints and opportunities in the training program, we are more likely to provide a realistic picture of the trainee's challenges and opportunities following the training program. Indeed, we would argue that both the organizational setting as well as the participant himself or herself must be readied for change for the training program, to have the intended impact on development.

We would suggest that much costly training is likely wasted where assessment, counseling, preparation of trainees, and individualized planning is inadequate. Revenue spent on providing prospective trainees with opportunities to make realistic decisions and plans about what it is they need and want to achieve may save a dollar's worth of time spent fruitlessly in training. Finally, we are advocating that leadership training will be more successful to the extent that follow-up interventions are built up front into the planning process. More attention to such follow-up activities may have also boosted the training effect observed in the current study.

In sum, preliminary evidence provided here suggests that training at the upper end of the leadership style continuum is possible. Results here are preliminary in that the field evaluation in this report did not include untrained control groups, participants were not randomly selected, and the impact of training on ratings was at best, modest. Nonetheless, the results suggest that training in transformational leadership should include trainee involvement in the development of plans, opportunities for practice, attention to context and adequate follow-up.

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Guidelines for Leadership

Gen Robert T. Herres

Students of leadership and management techniques certainly do not suffer from a lack of source materials. Libraries are filled with volumes on the "how to" of these subjects. Many of the world's most successful men and women have written at great length about their experiences, philosophies, and methods of getting to the top of their professions. Others, as students rather than practitioners, have taken a more analytical approach by studying organizational behavior. We are literally inundated with rules, systems, and checklists—you can "search for excellence" or be a "one-minute manager"; terms such as *right-brain thinking, zero-based budgeting,* and *management by exception* grow abundantly in the almost magical garden of leadership literature.

The biographical approach to leadership is useful to a degree; however, I've found that circumstances and personalities are rarely aligned closely enough to make a useless exercise of even wondering what Hannibal, Washington, or whomever would have done. On the other hand, while the cookbook approaches are appealing to the eye, the real world seems bent on providing a cup of sugar too little or a cup of salt too much at any particular decision point. Total reliance on either approach tends to give a false sense of comfort and is likely to fail miserably when the ingredients or circumstances don't match up. There is no panacea for the problem.

Leadership is not something you can learn and then go execute; rather it is something to be lived and wrestled with everyday. It's sort of like flying. You can learn to fly, earn your wings, but what you've really accomplished is merely to demonstrate proficiency in the principles of flight. From then on, every time you take off, you must re-earn those wings as you adapt your knowledge and skills to the situations that the machine, the elements, and the enemy present. So too, leadership is a constant learning experience that is wholly individualized and very much a problem of adapting one's attributes (and accounting for one's weaknesses) to the situations encountered.

Leadership is clearly an art rather than a science; indeed, an elusive art form. Because it is so elusive, I think it is best discussed in conceptual terms. In so doing, the essence comes out, "causing others to participate productively and positively contribute to the achievement of a set of goals too big for individual accomplishment, or too tough for spontaneous or accidental accomplishment." In other words, getting others to do things collectively that they could not or would not be able to do on their own. Just as there are many definitions, there are also many theories and ideas about how to pursue and perfect this elusive art form. And because it is an art rather than a science, there are really no set rules that will work for everyone, every time. When called upon to list what he thought to be the essential character traits of the general officers of the Continental Army, George Washington named the following: character, professional ability, integrity, prudence, and loyalty. I think our first commander in chief had the right idea. Rather than provide rules, he provided broad concepts that had to be lived rather than memorized for later recitation. Concepts which are necessarily strengthened by constant use because the higher you go on any organizational ladder, the more issues and the murkier the ethical waters. The true leader must have the vision to see beyond the here and now and the strength of character to stay the course. Over the years I have tried to abide by a few conceptual guidelines with one overarching principle that enriches each, and that holds them all together. That principle is integrity; without it, the six guidelines discussed in the following paragraphs, or any others, would be cosmetic.

The nature of the military profession is so entwined with the very existence of our nation that military leaders must maintain a high standard of conduct; higher, I believe, than in any other profession. Integrity is the most important characteristic that any leader can ever have and this is even more critical in a military leader. It has more to do with whether you are going to be effective as a leader than any other factor. People instinctively respect others with integrity. Our protection of this standard is the key to the respect and confidence of the public at large; after all, our military is designed not only to be of service to the nation, but must be fully responsive to its people. I believe that Sir John Hackett summed it up best in his book, *The Military in the Service of the State:*

> A man can be selfish, cowardly, disloyal, false, fleeting, perjured, and normally corrupt in a wide variety of other ways, and still be outstandingly good in pursuits in which other imperatives bear than those upon the fighting man. He can be a superb artist for example, or a scientist in the very top flight and still be a bad man. What the bad man cannot be is a good sailor, or soldier, or airman.[1]

Understanding the absolute criticality of the overarching principle of integrity, we can move on to the six guidelines: communicate, fix responsibility, be loyal both ways, be consistent, learn from mistakes, and be yourself. Let me discuss each one in some detail.

First, communicate. You must learn how to get concepts and ideas across—accurately—to others; both subordinates and supervisors. Workers deal with hardware, tools, and equipment; leaders deal with people, concepts, and ideas. Communicating those concepts and ideas to your people is much harder than most of us realize. Telling people what they need to know is one thing; getting across the idea they

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need to understand is likely to be a much higher order of achievement. The business of leadership is the transmission of ideas, and that is difficult. Most of our professional military education includes a number of written assignments for this reason. Leaders must be able to reduce good ideas to the precision of the written word. I hasten to add, however, that many effective leaders are not particularly articulate, yet still are able to get their ideas across by example or similarly subtle techniques. Nevertheless, unambiguous, clear instructions are critical to the successful execution of any project—both up and down the chain of command.

I believe that the best way to improve this ability is to read a lot. Don't get seduced by the tube. Get a lot of your news and opinions from reading and don't be afraid to read viewpoints that may be out of the mainstream or that may go against the grain. It is a common mistake to read only the journals that tell us what we want to believe. Read the magazines that publish things that are critical, even unfairly critical of ideas that you may hold dear. Try to understand their editorial viewpoints and formulate your rebuttal point for point. Read the works of great leaders of the past to see how they expressed their ideas. Great leaders have always been great communicators—George S. Patton; Douglas MacArthur; Winston Churchill; and Abraham Lincoln, the great communicator of all time.

The second guideline is to fix responsibility not only among your subordinates but also for yourself. Understand exactly what your responsibility is, and be sure you and your boss have a common understanding. If you seek authority but dodge responsibility (and many do) you are a nonleader; worse than that, you are an imposter. There must be no confusion about what the task is and what results are expected. From this it should be clear that fixing responsibility is dependent on the previous principle, communication.

Avoid assigning the same tasks to more than one person without putting someone in charge. There must be no confusion about who will have to answer if the result is failure; likewise, this ensures that the deserving are rewarded for success. Committees are not, and cannot be responsible because individual accountability is shared. Fixing responsibility means ensuring that the "what" and the "who" are clearly communicated. People like to get credit when they do a good job, and they know if one of their fellow workers is not doing a good job. You can't put credit with the right person unless it's clear who's responsible for what. Similarly, you want your boss to know that you know what he or she expects of you. Communications and fixing responsibility are direct contributors to the concept of two-way loyalty, which is my third guideline.

Loyalty, that is fundamental as a leadership characteristic, goes in two directions. You must be loyal to your people and to your boss. If you have built your relationships with both based on integrity, there will be no conflicts between your loyalties. You will take on many roles in the eyes of your subordinates; the one that you cannot abdicate is that of leader. In taking care of your subordinates, you must ensure that you don't confuse yourself or your people by replacing loyalty with doting paternalism. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel is often quoted as having said that the best form of welfare for the troops is tough training. Be loyal to your people by ensuring that they understand what you want and by rewarding them for success. Your integrity will let you know when you should shield them from the fallout of your mistakes.

Remember, you've got to be loyal to your boss as well. Your boss's job and mission are your responsibility. You should know what his or her job description is and you should know what piece of that job description is yours. Everybody who works for the same boss has a piece of his or her job description. Civil War Gen George B. McClellan was certainly adept at organizing, equipping, and training his men. The dramatic turn- around of the Union forces' state of morale and readiness after First Bull Run (Manassas) gives ample evidence of these talents. However, it was never clear that he was devoted to solving his commander in chief's problems, and eventually President Lincoln removed him from command because of this. An old boss who was a real leader, Gen William McBride, once said, "You should always work your boss's problems, not your own. That's part of selflessness. Don't expect him to work your problems. You work his. You think about him. Think about his responsibilities. Think about what he is trying to do. Not only what he told you to do, but think hard about what he really wants to do. Work his problems . . . if you will be selfless, you will fit that category of bright leadership of tomorrow." You can't have loyalty until you understand what is expected of you and what you expect of other people.

The fourth guideline is be consistent. The kindest thing you can do for your people is to be consistent. They want to know what to expect from you and what you expect from them. The first three guidelines are natural building blocks to achieving this understanding. Among these expectations or standards may be the use of technical data or operational procedures, compliance with regulations, standards for personal appearance, or treatment of poor performance. Be sure that variations are well understood. Troops who don't know what to expect of their "leader" and have difficulty knowing how he or she will react, are not likely to be happy with their situation. We live in a dynamic world. Policies and ground rules that people become accustomed to are like a moving train. Making sense that seems consistent out of it all as a high-level leadership changes, with the whims and fancies of the policymakers ricocheting all through the system, is always difficult. We live in a very dynamic environment; the good leader must weave a strong thread of consistency through the fabric of it all.

The fifth guideline is to learn from mistakes. This guideline is very important. It's what experience is all about. Abraham Lincoln said he had no respect for the man who was not smarter today than he was yesterday. The only way to be smarter today is to study yesterday; treat every unsuccessful event as if you must unlock it. Not to fix blame, but to fix the problem and learn ways to prevent others like it before they happen. Don't go through an operation, incident, or any event without learning something. Learn from other people's mistakes, learn from your own; analyze your mistakes and don't be afraid to look at yourself in the mirror and think about them. Don't ever pass up an opportunity to learn from a mistake, even one you didn't make. I've been to a lot of staff meetings under some hard masters, and I've heard a lot of people get wire-brushed hard. I've seen too many people in those circumstances tune it all out, simply grateful not to be in the "hot seat." I never turned those tune-out valves. I said to myself, that could be me if I don't pay attention to what I'm doing. What is it that person did wrong and how do I prevent that from happening to me or to my organization?

I think that kind of thing has helped me more in my career than anything else. I've been fascinated by the business of government, the business of democracy and how it works, and I've always tried to soak up as much as I could in every learning environment in every learning environment in which I was situated. Don't stop learning when you leave formal schools; the best school is usually the "School of Hard Knocks." And it's not only your hard knocks, it can be somebody else's hard knocks. Learn from mistakes. Some people repeat one year of experience 20 times. Others are enriched by 20 years of experience. Never let mistakes go to waste; they cost too much.

My sixth and last guideline is be yourself. Here is where the principle of integrity is most pervasive. If integrity is truly deeply ingrained in your character, then this guideline will probably take care of itself. Learn from others—from the great lessons and leaders of history—learn to apply the principles that made great leaders what they were, but don't imitate their style. There are characteristics of others that you can adapt to your own style and there are things you can learn from the way others operate and behave, but never imitate anyone. Make whatever it is you do to be a good leader fit you. You have to do what's comfortable for you. So be yourself. In a letter to his son on the day the Allies landed at Normandy Beach, George S. Patton wrote, "People who are not themselves are nobody." If you're trying to be somebody else, you're kind of losing something of your own fundamental self and with that, your integrity.

So, there they are—my six guidelines: communicate with others; fix responsibility; be loyal both ways; be consistent; learn from mistakes; and be yourself. Above all, remember that integrity is the essential ingredient that binds them all together.

Notes

1. Gen Sir John Hackett, "The Military in the Service of the State," Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, no. 13 (Colorado Springs, Colo.: US Air Force Academy, 1971).

Leadership as a Function of Experience

Gen Bryce Poe II

During my years of active service I read military history and biographies extensively with a view of learning more about what made a successful commander, what were the secrets of leadership. I still do, for the subject is both fascinating and rewarding, whether Napoléon's words on the "Coup d'oeil militaire . . . inborn in great generals" or the most recent text of Royal Air Force action in the Falklands.

During the same time, however, I was privileged to be a commander at every rank but second lieutenant and brigadier. I learned that the lessons of history, while invaluable in many ways, left many relatively mundane and commonplace problems unanswered.

Closer attention to the classical military writings indicated that such was not always the case. We read Sun Tzu Wu for advice every bit as useful today as when written in 500 B.C.—"Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt;" or quote him to the Congress, "rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable." To find these comments, however, we must turn through many pages of practical advice on not trying to cross rivers "flecked with foam" or to mark "rising of birds in flight" as a sign of an ambush. Jomini's *Art of War* not only gives good counsel on such diverse major subjects as tactics, strategy, logistics, and relations with the civil government but also advice on coping with daily activities such as how to track "Temporary Duty" detachments, manage transportation, organize repair shops, and the like.

I sometimes feel that we are a bit embarrassed to equate "leadership" with the routine, the matter of course, the customary. This is a pity, since it is by a commander's performance in such matters that he is most often judged by both superiors and subordinates. More important, such actions often form the baseline for the training, planning, and execution necessary for success in mission-critical activity.

Without taking anything at all from the many writings on the overall subject of leadership, it might be useful to spend a few pages on a potpourri of the practical, often almost mechanical, things that a commander can do—or refrain from doing—to make his organization more efficient, actually more lethal, in the accomplishment of the mission.

The first thing he can do is expose himself and his people to the experience, the wisdom, available. It might come from the written record just mentioned or from the expletive deleted comments of a frustrated crew chief, but solutions to most problems are readily at hand. Most things have been tried before—you can learn why they worked or did not work. That they failed before may not be reason for not trying again, but you can do so from a position of knowledge.

Unlike many around the world, our society is reluctant to accept the advice of elders. That is our loss. When commander, Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), I was fortunate to have Generals Ira C. Eaker and William F. McKee as advisors at my commanders' conferences. Just before one such meeting a young colonel said, "It is certainly thoughtful of you to ask those two gentlemen to sit in—I know life must be sort of dull for them and that they appreciate it." I said, "See me later and let me know what you think." After the meeting he came in, wide-eyed, and said, "They really had some good advice!"

Of course they did—our problems with the budget, with support of allies, with combat readiness, were all examined by two experts on the basis of experience from the *Question Mark* to Yalta, from dealings with dozens of presidents, prime ministers, secretaries, and congressional committee chairmen to lessons learned as successful commanders, authors, and businessmen.

It is just as foolish to ignore the immensely valuable fund of information from juniors, either in age or rank. Bacon said, "You cannot do things that have never been done except in ways that have been never tried." The young, the inexperienced, often approach a problem without the preconceived notions or bias that restrict real examination of alternatives. As for rank—whether Roman centurion, frontier calvary colonel, or modern day wing commander—what successful senior officer has not asked for and relied on the advice of the key noncommissioned officers (NCO) of his organization on a daily basis.

Our allies provide another rich lore of practical experience. Some have had to substitute technology, tactical skill, training innovations, for numbers and have much to offer in that way. Others, in particular those with smaller forces, have had to "make do" in ways that are particularly attractive to us as we deal with budget cuts. Finally, each is the real expert in its part of the world.

I spent many years overseas, and never served with another air force that I didn't learn a great deal to my profit in later years—runway snow removal in Norway; tool control from the Danes to reduce foreign object damage (FOD); target designation in the jungle in Malaysia; air base defenses from the Royal Air Force (RAF); fighter quick-turn at Luftwaffe stations; and so forth. From some friends, like those in Indonesia and Egypt, I not only learned to do some things but how not to treat your allies, as they told me of their difficulties in working with the Soviet airmen that preceded me.

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So remember that good advice is where you find it, and you find it almost anywhere you look. The same goes for example.

Of course in both cases there is another side to consider and be wary of. You will find some outfits replete with people who will—with every good intention—lead you down the garden path. Ensuring justice, in everything from signing charge sheets to preparing duty rosters, requires that you analyze very carefully any advice you receive.

In Europe we had what I considered a reasonable rule about what happened to those guilty of driving while intoxicated (DWI). It was that you didn't drive on station for the following year. For some time it seemed to me that every officer that was caught DWI had a house full of kids and a wife who couldn't drive—furthermore, it was made clear that we couldn't go to war without him behind the wheel of his auto. My response. "Give him his license back at DEFCON 5," as considered heartless—but demonstrated to all ranks that justice had to be prompt, predictable, and evenhanded.

I very much admired one of our commanders who, found to be DWI after a minor accident, raised rather than lowered his credibility. He asked no favors but instead bought a moped (which required no license) and used it instead of his staff car, an action not lost on his subordinates.

When a medical officer was caught using and selling controlled substances, three separate delegations with impressive credentials came overseas to try and talk us out of taking courts-martial action. When we asked why this man should not be held to the same standards as a young airman—really much higher because of his responsibilities—the answer was, "But he has so much greater potential!" For all we knew, the young airman in trouble could be a potential Edison or Einstein. Of course we stood fast.

Then there is the individual—with an example prominent in the news these days—found in nearly every organization who says, "I know what you want done, just don't ask me too many questions and I'll take care of it." When I was a young officer that was a way of life; each outfit had its scrounger, its experts in "moonlight requisitions," or its specialist in taking some recalcitrant out behind the barracks and explaining the facts of life. No more. If you hear that—or even sense it—say, "Sit down and tell me exactly what you intend to do." You will not only save yourself a lot of trouble but may actually preserve the career of a good man, since many such people really are basically smart, loyal, and energetic.

I mentioned justice as regards such mundane things as duty rosters. You will never be considered a leader by your people, especially the more junior ones, if you allow abuse in such matters. It requires some perception and close attention on your part. For example, a wing in Spain had a continuous alert commitment in Turkey. When we began to have maintenance and support problems there we found that the TDY burden was being carried by two- and three-stripers. For the most part, senior NCOs would go on one or two TDY tours and then, all the souvenirs bought and sightseeing done, would opt out for the rest of their three-year tour. Accordingly, some young airmen were spending almost two years TDY at a remote base during the same three-year period. It was unfair; it was also hurting readiness.

And it was often the most conscientious NCO, one who took more than his own share of TDY, who did his friends the favor when it came time to pick who was to go.

Often such problems arise from the perception as to what is "fair" rather than what is important to the mission. I remember the wing in West Germany that was close to failing an operational readiness inspection (ORI) because aircraft were down for hydraulic problems due to a shortage of hydraulic specialists. I found two such specialists on duty as security police augmentees at the same time that some administrative people had so little to do they were playing cards. The problem? It was considered "fair" that each organization contribute X percent of their people to be augmentees, instead of leaving critical flightline skills along and empyting some essentially peacetime offices.

Perception can be a real problem in other ways. You need to recognize it as often every bit as serious to a commander as reality. The example comes to mind of the commander who assured the visiting inspector general (IG) that the rumor that a particular minority group had grievances was just that, a rumor. He had a briefing that showed their promotion rate as above average, ethnic tradition and tastes were being attended to, had had an "open door" for complainants, and "they really have no problems." The IG replied, "Yes, but they burned your X$#@& mess hall down!" To the group concerned the problems were real indeed.

That commander's problem is shared by many, by all those who never get out of the office. For example, what does "open door" mean to the two-striper? It means explaining to his section chief why he needs time off, getting a haircut, shining his shoes and his brass, seeing a first sergeant who he hopes had forgotten him, all en route to a session with a squadron commander he has never met and doubts he can trust. That commander should have learned the two-striper's problem when visiting his section on the job.

Get out of your office and through the various parts of the headquarters, and especially "show the flag" on the line, in the shops, wherever your people are—*and on all the shifts and in all the remote places where they work!* Yours will never be a home-station, eight-to-five job. Most people want to have a look at the new commander, even better, hear what he has to say—even a few words.

As you make your rounds, note how you are received—professionally, courteously, lackadaisically, perhaps not at all, ignored. Remember that other visitors to your outfit, not to omit such as the IG, General Accounting Office (GAO), or higher headquarters, may get the same reception. Some of the most talented people you have will find it almost impossible to talk to visitors, especially those who are high ranking. One system that helped me as a wing commander was to train the top two or three people in each shop or office to greet visitors with their name and five items. "My name is _______; I am the ___________ of the shop; we have ________ people authorized and _______ assigned. We rebuild ______ per week; if you will follow me I will show you around." Once he gets through this he will usually decide that he can talk to the visitor without turning into a pumpkin and do alright from then on. It all worked very well except for "if you will follow me." They always seem to stand aside for the senior, who of course has no idea where to go.

It is especially important to get out at night and visit TDY posts. During a two-year period I spent over 250 days TDY, mostly "kicking over toolboxes" at night. While I asked the questions that concerned me, about quality, use of tech data, safety, security, and other issues; what were the questions they asked me? Why: "sour milk in the commissary, no bench stock, my wife turned away from hospital emergency, no pay, batteries only last one or two flights . . . ." "Have you told anyone else about this?" "Yes sir, I've been talking about it for a long time." Of course he has, he's been talking about it to his friends on the night shift and they all wonder why the commander lets this sort of thing go on.

Remember, most flightline and shop supervision is on hand from 0800 to 1700, most maintenance work is done from 1500 to midnight or beyond. Get out there at night unannounced, and you'll see all manner of amazing things—what you won't see is all that many stripes and bars and leaves. And whatever you fix won't stay fixed! I remember telling a wing commander, "Only in avionics have you proper, around the clock, supervision." I went back a month later and all was up tight, but two months after that I had to tell him again, "Only in avionics do you have proper, around the clock, supervision."

The idea is that, "I have 20 years in and it's only right that I can run the bowling league (be a scoutmaster, umpire at little league, play poker, square dance. . .) in the evenings." Not so, if the people and mission are active at night, so must be supervision. The only way in the world for a commander to check that is to go out and look, personally and often!

The mission is top priority to you as a commander, but you must remember that is not true for everyone. So long as they do the job I find no fault with that but you must remember it. Remember, for example, that families are rightfully the first concern of your married people, and that those family members are subject to many more problems and give a lot more than their counterparts in civilian life. Recognize that and recognize them—a rose to a man's wife when you mark his promotion or decoration may seen a little thing, but it shows you know her important contribution to his success.

As you move around and see and meet people remember the way things work. It used to really irritate me when we'd come across some slovenly or discourteous individual and the commander who was with me would put on a little show: "Name, rank, serial number, report to my office at . . .!" What he should have done is noted the name on the name tag and asked just one question: "Who do you work for?" That supervisor has, by commission or example "authorized" that man to look and act that way—or perhaps he has not even seen him to know if the culprit is on TDY or the night shift. Who then deserves the commander's attention?

To make your trips out into the organization effective, you need to do some study and learn some basic procedures. No one expects you to know things in detail, but it keeps them on their toes when your knowledge is obviously not superficial. Some interesting exchanges come to mind: "Chief, why isn't this lightall grounded?" "It is sir, right there." "That's a start, chief, but unless I'm wrong you need three and that's only one." "I thought you folks in the engine shop were helping me save money?" "We sure work at it, sir." "Then why does this daily document register show that you bought these items this morning and turned them in for no credit this afternoon?" And, "I thought that other than the gun any munitions load operation required a nonworking crew chief?" I worked hard at this, trying to get some specific skills in a few key areas, but still felt I never got my "snow factor" under about 50 percent. If you **don't** work at it you'll never have any idea as to what is really going on.

And there are some other advantages to working at it. If you check an item in some detail once, the word will quickly get around and you can go on to other things, at least for a little while.

Take a look at how your subordinate commanders operate. If they seem to be tied to their offices, you may need to use some mechanical device to get them out where they can learn what is going on. At a time when we had serious supply problems, all the way from aircraft support to discipline, we found most wing commanders never visited supply facilities or barracks. Soon after we decreed a monthly "window on the wing supply" briefing, **given at the supply squadron**, all sorts of good things began to happen.

The wing commanders involved had fallen into a typical trap, that of working on what they were good at and liked to do instead of what they should do. Flying operations are the mission every part of the wing supports, but when the commander, who has capable full colonels as vice commander, Deputy Commander for Operation (DCO), and ADCO, plus handpicked field grade officers as flying squadron commander, stan eval, instructor pilots (IP) etc., spends all his time on monitoring weather aborts and cross-country planning while he has a captain in a lieutenant colonel's job as commander of a support squadron that is in trouble, he needs to have his priorities reexamined.

Always work to make certain that unit pride does not discriminate—that it applies to the entire unit. "I may be a clerk but I'm a clerk in the . . . Tac Fighter Squadron." My first command was an overseas additional duty command of a rehabilitation unit for delinquents—everything from absence without leave to thieves and thugs. We worked hard and looked surprisingly good as we went about our drill and other training. Years later, halfway around the world, I met one of my trainees who proudly told his wife, "I used to be in the captain's outfit in Japan." If it would work for that unit it should work anywhere.

Get your historian into the act. History convinces more people than does philosophy. Your unit may have helped Pershing chase Villa, been to Schweinfurt, fought on the Yalu or over Route Pack Six. Time passes quickly and youngsters can't know these things unless they are told.

If you talk to people they will talk to you. A commander is busy, burdened, and understandably not prone to suffer fools. Nevertheless, he *must* do so. Let's say you're asked the most stupid question on record and sarcastically respond.

That man may be stupid but he lives and works with people. You can easily forecast a scenario where someone tells him: "Jim's pushing drugs and using my shop locker to store them and says he'll cut me up if I do anything about it." "Well, whatever you do, don't go to the old man—I had a real problem and he chewed me up and threw me out!"

The way perception comes about doesn't always even require a word. The commander who lets a racist or sexist joke or slur made in his presence go unchallenged has lost his credibility. You needn't shoot the culprit, or make a big thing of it, just words like "I don't find that in any way funny," will make your point quite clear and that word will get around. You may not be able to change how people think, but you are then on the road to change how they act, which in that circumstance is exactly your job.

Don't jump to conclusions when judging people or organizations. Take time to learn what is really going on—sometimes that isn't easy.

I remember the case of a security police squadron with persistent rumors of racial discrimination by some officers and NCOs in the award of Article 15s. An investigating officer conducted an agonizingly detailed study of records and interviewed everyone concerned. His determination was that all was fair since those punished all agreed they had done what they were disciplined for. We sent him back to ask how many of what kind of people had committed the same infractions and learned that if you were black you read about it and if you were not you were told not to do it again!

In another case a snap decision was made by a general officer to summarily fire a very senior base commander. He was responding to poor information given him by visitors who mistook the blunt and rather impolitic manner of the man for racial prejudice. It turned out that he was one of the strongest supporters of the equal opportunity program. Several thousand people assembled to object to the firing and I went in and interviewed many. Comments included: "He had me for Thanksgiving dinner in his home, how many black airmen were in your home that day, general?" and, from an old friend and chief master sergeant, "Those @#$% came in here and fired the best friend the black man has." Of course, by that time we had to deal with not just rumor and gossip but newspaper headlines. Five minutes on the telephone with the wing commander, to ask the question: "What in the world did colonel X say today and what kind of a man is he?" would have saved all manner of grief for all concerned, including the commander in chief (CINC) who had personally to get involved.

The old order "I want that man off the base by sundown" is foolish in the extreme. You may find it necessary to relieve someone on very short notice but don't overcommunicate until you know what is going on.

The most difficult task you'll have in evaluating people will not be the bad ones but the good ones. When I was a junior officer we had quite a few really bad actors, lazy, disinterested, undisciplined, and they had skills to match—little in the way of education, technical know-how, air or ground abilities. Today things are almost too good. In later years my toughest job was to sit on selection boards. The typical scene was where—with say 2,000 people to look at—two or three popped out the top with extraordinary achievements and perhaps a dozen more fell out the bottom with records that made you wonder why we still kept them. You were left with more than 1,900 any of whom could have served well at the higher rank, done well at the school, or whatever.

Much thought has been given to a new officer effectiveness report (OER) system—I hope it helps. The old system suffered from several problems but it was hard to criticize when you had no better idea. Whatever the system, I offer two thoughts. First, because most OERs are written on the activity of the last three months of the reporting year, the most significant accomplishments could well be forgotten. It takes some digging to prepare a proper evaluation. Second, most people write too much—perhaps the best endorsement I ever saw read: "This major is the best ops officer I have, and I have some crackerjack lieutenants doing the same job."

While we're at it, it's not only with OERs that we write too much. It's a way of life. One time I saw an order for a missile launch that covered 150 pages. One annex of 20 pages dealt with public affairs—"If the missile fails to launch we say . . . ; if it explodes in sight we say . . . ; if it destructs downrange we say . . . ; if it hits the target we say . . . ." Of course the missile didn't accommodate and did something unforecast. I couldn't help but compare this with Sherman's march from Atlanta to the sea and then north, moving a modern army of 68,000 men through the heart of an enemy country for six months by means of a three-page order that never changed. He also had a nine-man staff, but perhaps we had best skip that.

The first time you meet with a new staff you are really on trial. That meeting should be carefully prepared and limited in time. No more than half an hour that may have taken you several hours to prepare. The main points should be clear and what is important to you and, in particular, your priorities should be emphasized.

Incidentally, those first meetings with your staff can give you some useful clues. You have, for example, worked hard to prepare and as you talk you see that only two or three people are taking notes. You can be certain that, within a few days, each of the others will demonstrate, by omission or commission, that they have not remembered what you said.

This is a common failing; few people seem to understand that "the weakest ink is stronger than the strongest memory." You need to get them in the habit of writing things down, tell them to, give them a pencil if they haven't one. And how did I learn this—my first military boss was a World War I veteran master sergeant. When I reported in to him he gave me a dime and said: "Poe, go over and buy one of them little pocket notebooks, cause I never intend to tell you nuthin' twict!"

We not only write too much when we don't need to and not at all when we should, we really write very poorly. It may be that as we gain technical excellence we lose the ability to tell people what we want and need. Worse yet, there is a cadre of staff officers who have great skill in writing with so much jargon and gobbledegook that they can never be pinned down, never committed. That is as unconscionable as it is common. We are in the wrong business to be obtuse, oblique, vague, or undecisive. If Lee had written a little more clearly to Longstreet, he might not have had three such bad days at Gettysburg.

Insist that what you sign be as brief and to the point as possible and crystal clear. At one time I became so frustrated that I began announcing a "secret word" at staff meetings, words I never wanted to see again (utilize, penultimate, author [as a verb], macro, synergism, and all the rest). Some time later one of my brigadiers wryly remarked that since he left the Pentagon and joined me he had lost half his vocabulary and no one in his old office could understand his letters.

You don't have to put up with that nonsense. If you won't sign it they will learn to write properly.

Nothing is more frustrating than to learn that something you have been told is not true. However, that does not always call for the conclusion you have been lied to. The US Air Force is made up for the most part of honest, conscientious people. They are also usually very hard working and busy. At Tan Son Nhut, with the 50,000-plus landings and takeoffs per month, we felt it prudent that each squadron commander visit wheel watch at the end of the runway at least once a month just to keep in mind the scale of the problem. When I asked if everyone had done that, all said, "Yes." When I checked the book at runway control most had not. They thought they had but had been so busy that 10 weeks instead of four had passed since their last visit. No one lied, they just needed to be jacked up for not doing as told.

Often you have to introduce people in your own organization. I can remember asking a commander why he had not dispersed his aircraft even though I saw stacks of pierced steel planking (PSP) on hand. He advised that it was used material and had arrived without the steel rods needed to assemble it. I took him to his machine shop, showed a rod to the shop chief and asked if he could make them. His reply, "Faster than you can pick them up off the floor."

It is always a problem to get people to use the talent in a unit. Standard evaluation and quality control are excellent examples, as in the case of an avionics shop that got a fine score during an inspection and decided to go for "Best in the Command." They cleared the place, reworked the floor, walls, repainted equipment, put everything back, and waited with great pride for the next IG inspection. "Unsatisfactory!" Grounds had been painted over and safety boards and warning signs not reposted. Heartbreaking, but easily avoided by a call to quality control (QC) saying, "We've finished our rehab, how about coming over and giving us a shakedown?"

Some commanders are prone to strong and public display of irritation or temper. Though there are all too many circumstances that may tempt you, and all of us have probably been guilty, I would suggest that the only time to display temper is when it is essentially theater—carefully planned and thought out. I once saw an example in a multinational headquarters, where the commander and his vice carefully orchestrated his "exploding" and staking out of a staff meeting, followed by his vice saying, "Don't be too hard on . . ., these problems of delayed national approval of our actions to meet the new threat are really getting to him."

This time it worked, but it's not easy and when temper and sarcasm become standard you are in real trouble. I can remember, during the Cuban missile crisis, two major generals arguing about the direction just given them—"He said . . . ." "I know he said that but he must have meant. . . ." I felt like shouting, "please go back in and find out," but they had been so often abused and ridiculed that they never even considered volunteering for more of the same. The commander had put himself in a dreadful position.

When otherwise capable people suddenly have problems you may need to look into it yourself. This is particularly true if their supervisors are technicians or specialists rather than commanders. I was asked to sign an Article 15 for a major who had been a top performer but had recently often been late to work. "Just sign here, general." I refused until I had talked to him—a process I highly recommend whenever possible. I asked what he had to say and he said, "Nothing, it's all true." I said, "Do you have a drinking problem?" and it all came out—wife left him, elderly parents uncared for in the states, couldn't pass the bar in the lobby of his billet. We confirmed his problems, helped with them legally and got him into a program that successfully dried him out. He went on to be one of our best support squadron commanders. The problem was not only his but that of the two full colonels up the chain who did not have the wit to work the problem other than superficially, didn't know to ask the first logical question when someone changes so radically.

There is another side to that. Remember that you are in a business with no second place winners, no silver or bronze medals. If you have done what is reasonably possible to salvage someone and he does not, or cannot, respond, then he has to go. It can be done discreetly, with compassion, but must be done. We can no longer carry such people, and that includes friends, classmates, relatives, war buddies, or any other category of personal association. And do it yourself, don't pass the buck to someone else to be your hatchet man.

This business of the necessity for a leader's being accessible is not confined to squadron level. If anything it becomes ever more difficult as you move up the ladder. People know how busy you are, the long hours you work, the problems distractions cause, and they loyally try to protect you. They often do you no favor. Some of the most loyal and also the most guilty are the carefully selected colonels and executive secretaries in your outer office. They can insulate you so thoroughly that you can't do your job, and worse yet they are so good at it you don't know it's happening.

One way to reduce the possibilities of this is rarely, if ever, to move key staff people with you on changes of assignment. Unless you are establishing an entirely new organization, this instantly results in a "them and us" perception on both sides, one of the worst things for a new commander. Talk to your predecessor about the staff, make changes if you like but from within if at all possible. Later, if you have a special problem that needs solving by bringing in someone with known ability, that's fine, but to arrive with an entourage will usually hurt much more than it helps.

This brings to mind the subject of general officers' aides. If there is an undeserved poor perception, it is the one that many otherwise bright people have of aides. The job is critically important, and I used to search Air Force-wide for the right person. I then tried, however, to keep them in the job little more than a year. There are several reasons for this—first, don't tar him with the title of "horse holder." Also, the job is unique in its opportunity to learn, and that opportunity should be offered to as many young officers of high potential as possible.

You will be tested at each new station and by each new staff or command. People will deliberately try to determine how firm or easy you will be, how fair or unfair, how distant or remote. Don't ever forget, "first impressions" are very real for commanders, and while bad ones are hard—almost impossible—to erase, good ones are, in contrast, very fragile and easily destroyed.

Don't forget your subordinates who are tenants with other commands. Often they have extremely sensitive and important missions that are not very high on the landlord's priority list. One technique is to require a monthly letter report directly from your commander to you. Then he can go in and say, "I really have to have that security fencing and lighting brought back up to standard before the 10th, when I send my monthly letter to the old man. If I report it still out, he'll be right out here and neither of us needs that!" Seemed to work nearly every time.

Decision making is almost continuous. It can range from the instantaneous reaction to "break left!" in your headset to the acceptance of a plan that has taken weeks to prepare. It is often difficult, but a simple, old-time procedure, called the Five Paragraph Field Order, helps address almost any circumstance.

- Paragraph 1—**Statement of the Problem.** (When someone is wrestling with a decision, ask him to state the problem. This is often eye opening.)
- Paragraph 2—**Assumptions.** (Most point papers mix assumptions and facts too readily.)
- Paragraph 3—**Facts Bearing on the Problem.** (Look carefully to be certain that you are not given the facts bearing only on one side of the problem, that favoring the author's desired conclusions.)
- Paragraph 4—**Conclusions.**
- Paragraph 5—**Recommendations.** (Do they track with the conclusions?)

This is a mechanical device, found in Army manuals for over a hundred years, that still is very useful.

It is also useful when you have one of those seniors who gives you a problem to solve, together with the conclusions and recommendations he desires. You work the problem, and then are able to go in and say: "If this is the problem, and these are the correct assumptions, then these facts that I have collected do not support what was anticipated. Rather, these are the conclusions and recommendations that result."

Some decisions need to be made in an instant, most do not. This is particularly true when something completely unforeseen occurs, and people come running in waving their arms and insisting on immediate action by you, the commander. A typical example is the aircraft stuck in the mud off the side of the runway. If alternates are available to recover other aircraft and alert reactions are not impaired, you have all the time in the world to get that plane out. All too often, panic reigns and what is initially only an incident turns into a major accident when the wrong people with the wrong equipment tear the gear off in the process.

You not only have an accident, but the knowledgeable officers and NCOs wonder how well you would handle a *real* crisis—such as an enemy attack!

At a time like that, you should know your priorities. While a wing commander overseas giving a tour to the USAF chief of staff, I had a call on my car radio that one of my RF-4Cs was inbound with a serious emergency. I suppose the "cool" reaction might have been to reply, "OK, take care of it and let me know." My priorities were clear, and my reaction was, "General Ryan, I'm afraid I have to leave you here, my vice commander will continue the tour." The chief had his priorities too; he said, "How about my coming along, I'll stay out of the way." We both observed a happy ending.

Remember that the more senior you are, the less people are inclined to forgive you for errors or discrepancies. It has been said that a colonel's amusing eccentricity is a general officer's major character defect.

This is becoming more true every day as the media and entertainment industry portray military leaders—officer and NCO—as buffoons, martinets, cowards, zealots, or any of many other uncomplimentary types. There are no longer honest errors, only conspiracies, and anyone in a position of responsibility is automatically marked as irresponsible.

I wouldn't lose any sleep over all this, but neither would I give them any ammunition to use against us. Write as if for the front page of the *Washington Post;* speak as though it will be broadcast on the 7 A.M. television news.

The modern counterparts of "feed the horses, then the men, and last of all the officers" are very much in order. As we have moved to the larger, more sophisticated, less personal military organizations, much of this attitude has been lost. For too many, rank is confused with "perks" and privilege. Leadership requires a visible demonstration that you do not consider yourself a privileged character.

Even when you work at that, you will find people think you have privileges you do not have. Again, don't spend time worrying about it but don't feed the fire with thoughtless actions. Ostentatious use of staff cars (sometimes actually in violation of public law, such as most domicile to duty travel), fancy offices with plush carpets, elaborate official social activities and the like do not inspire confidence in juniors, seniors, or the taxpayers. There is no reason not to be comfortable, neat, clean, and attractive, but excess is too often apparent.

And this can impact the mission. I remember one occasion when "innovative" partitioning of funding to keep under the legal ceiling had been used to build a facility in which to meet visiting contractors. This was discovered in the height of our desperate effort to keep the B-1 bomber in the budget and did nothing to help our fiscal credibility. I was furious, and when I complained was given the excuse that "we can't use those old shabby rooms to have discussions with contractors, you should see where we work at their installations." The answer of course was that it would probably do both our people and the contractors good to work in the midst of evidence that we were saving our money to increase readiness.

An overly simple but intriguing motto for the commander might be, "If it doesn't contribute to putting the bombs down or the missiles up, don't do it!"

Remember that **credit to your subordinates is credit to you.** The small benefit gained by claiming recognition for something someone else does—or blaming a subordinate for an error that was your responsibility—is greatly outweighed by the justifiable loss of confidence and respect by your people. Those kinds of actions will not only always become known, they will be embellished and become larger than life. Such behavior seems endemic in some staffs. It is bad enough there, but intolerable in the field. As a commander, you must be alert to this, not do it yourself and not allow it in others.

The opposite, giving the junior the chance to brief his project, lead his project team, take the public bows, pays dividends over and over. It also results in much better prepared and presented material.

This should be remembered as paperwork moves up the line. If each level above the action officer picks at it and rewrites, you often get a product that is so watered down and compromised it is worthless. One system that worked for me was insisting that the action officer's original come to my desk. Intermediate levels could make any comments they desired, preferably marginally, and then if it were to go out of the command we'd retype it after my changes. This has great advantages. The action officer, once trained to give it only a "lick and a promise" because "the old so-and-so is going to rewrite it anyway so be my guest" now is really precise about what he does, and a great deal of typing and retyping and paper-passing time is saved.

You should stand up to seniors on behalf of subordinates when it is right and reasonable to do so. Remember, however, that is a different thing from bad-mouthing those seniors to your subordinates to make points with them. That not only does not work, it is contemptible.

Take a careful look at the impact of the bureaucracy on your ability to do the wartime mission. Although the best of all is to do things in peace exactly as you would in war, you may not have that option. Examine all critical operations in that light. Aircraft shelters are being modified and are fenced to accommodate the contractor and Corps of Engineers—at what defense readiness condition (DEFCON) do you bulldoze that fence and how do you provide access, PSP or…? Safety requires that you fix certain major aircraft problems before you fly—but why let an aircraft sit on the ground in war when you can fly it and perform some missions? Technical data requires procedures that can be shortcut. You must not do that in peacetime because every aircraft is a piece of national treasure, but it might provide additional sorties in war—put your best people on it and see what the options are.

Even for peacetime operations the system needs continuous review. Most regulations are the result of a single incident, CYA written. A careless airman discharges an M-16 and no sentry is allowed to chamber a round—incredible in this day of terrorist threat. Take a look at every restriction on the handling of small arms and base defense weapons. Spetsnaz teams are for real. Challenge the unreal restrictions. Think of what you should have that you do not—mines, night vision devices, and other equipment.

The same applies to all that is critical to combat operations: fuel, spares, munitions, power, communications, shops, ground support equipment, runway, rations, you name it. Identify the assets, set your priorities, determine what needs change for wartime operations, see what portion of that can be changed now and change it, set up the rest for automatic change at DEFCON…! Develop the means to do the latter and check it out. Use ORIs, TAC Evals, inspections, exercises, and day-to-day observations to classify not only procedures but people.

Think war, sort of like I used to think survival when I had a rough engine in that Stearman biplane I started in. "If it quits now I'll go there, if it quits now I'll go over there, and so forth . . . ." Know what you intend to do with that facility, that procedure, that man, if the balloon goes up.

You might also review what you're supposed to do in wartime and ask some questions about that. At one time the only plan that had as its primary mission the destruction of enemy forces was that of the Navy in the Pacific—all the rest had to do with something on the order of changing his mind. When the time comes you do as you are told, but in the meantime you have the obligation to present the problem as you see it.

That's about it, and in closing I'll leave you with two thoughts. First, a question that is nearly always asked of me when I speak at the Air University. "Why don't more generals quit [in protest]?" Two answers. One, by a tough old commander who replied, "I think I can limit the damage better than anyone else I see around here." Another in my own experience. When, the same day, the administration both cut the budget for war reserve spares to 15 percent of the validated requirement and offered honorable discharges to those who ran away to Canada during SEA, I decided I had to go. Fortunately, Gen Ira Eaker came to dinner that night. He put his finger in a glass of water, pulled it out, and said, "Bryce, it will make just about that much difference—and they'll replace you with someone who agrees that 10 percent is enough for the war reserve. Stay in and fight it." It was good advice, I took it and we did improve the situation. There may well be circumstances where you cannot stay, but carefully study whether or not your leaving will make things better or worse.

The other thing is, when totally frustrated I used to recall that I never really wanted to do anything else and—for all the faults—ours was the only government for which I would be a professional soldier.

Leadership That Inspires Excellence

Brig Gen Steve Ritchie

We fight wars with machinery, but we win wars with people.

—Gen George S. Patton

It was one of the most carefully planned missions of the Linebacker campaign. For days, with the help of the latest special intelligence-gathering techniques, we studied the routes, orbit points, formations, and tactics of the enemy. We selected 10 May 1972 to put to the test what we had learned. At 0500 hours, the 432d Tactical Fighter/Reconnaissance Wing briefing took place as it did every day, seven days a week. We then broke for individual flight briefings to review each detail of what was likely to occur during the next few hours as we prepared to launch for various destinations over North Vietnam.

I was number three, or deputy flight leader, of Oyster Flight. Oyster was the ingress flight led by Maj Bob Lodge, a friend, a fellow 1964 graduate of the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and one of my former students in the Air Force "Top Gun" school at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada.

Our McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantoms were the first four aircraft to penetrate North Vietnamese airspace, paving the way for the strike force to follow. Our mission was to intercept and defeat enemy fighters that would attempt to prevent our strike Phantoms from dropping their highly accurate laser-guided bombs.

After a brief delay for foul weather in the target area, the mission was a "go." Following tanker rendezvous shortly after takeoff to top off our fuel tanks, Oyster Flight dropped to treetop level and proceeded inbound low enough to be under enemy radar surveillance. We employed radio silence procedures to reduce the chances of being detected. Reaching our planned orbit point some 25 to 30 miles west of Hanoi, we stayed below 300 feet as planned and continued radio silence. Using the latest, highly classified, high-technology equipment—available in only a few of our best airplanes—we electronically spotted a flight of four MiG-21s in orbit northwest of Hanoi. Intelligence had predicted this situation, and our plan was to wait until the MiGs departed their holding pattern to attack our strike force as it approached from the southwest. We would then "pop up" to meet the Soviet-built fighters head-on.

Our orbit was then below the effective altitude for surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and heavier antiaircraft artillery (AAA), so small arms fire and light AAA were the only nuisance as we waited.

Right on schedule, the MiG-21s departed orbit, and we rolled out on a northerly heading, pointing our radar sensors skyward to achieve full system radar lock-ons at 15 miles. Our adrenaline surged as the battle developed at a closing rate of more than 1,200 miles per hour. Visual engagement was only moments away. The computer for our Sparrow radar missiles flashed that we were in range, and, as briefed, our first two jets (Oyster One with Bob Lodge and Roger Locher and Oyster Two piloted by John Markle and Steve Eaves) fired head-on at seven miles.

Within seconds, fireballs and smoke trails filled the air, and debris was falling all around us. Two MiG-21s had been destroyed. Lodge and I, in Oyster One and Three, immediately turned our fighters as hard as possible to achieve rear-quarter positions on the remaining two MiGs. I locked on to the third MiG using the autoacquisition switch on the left throttle and fired two Sparrows at a range of 6,000 feet. The second missile exploded under the fuselage of the North Vietnamese fighter, and the pilot bailed out as his craft burst into flames at 15,000 feet above sea level.

Meanwhile Lodge and Locher were positioning for a shot at MiG number four. What a great day it was going to be—a perfectly planned, perfectly executed mission, resulting in four American victories. But it was too good to be true. As Oyster One, piloted by a crew with over 400 combat missions (a crew largely regarded as the best in Southeast Asia), was about to claim its second MiG of the day, an unanticipated obstacle appeared. A flight of four MiG-19s stormed in from above and behind.

"Oyster One—Break!—Break!" we screamed, "MiG-19s at six o'clock—Oyster One, Oyster One—Break! MiG-19s firing! "

But Lodge and Locher, concentrating on the MiG-21, missed our frantic calls, and 30-millimeter rounds from the MiG-19s peppered the wings and fuselage of the American fighter. Within seconds, the Phantom II burst into flames and rolled.

"Bail out! Bail out!" I yelled. "Bail out!"

At 7,000 feet, upside down and on fire, the Phantom was out of control. What began as a triumph was ending in tragedy. Two of America's finest young officers, and two very close friends, were going down in flames, and Oyster Two, Three, and Four were being chased out by the remaining MiG-21 and the MiG-19s. It was not supposed to end that way.

This article was prepared especially for AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership.*

Throughout the following week, we returned to the area and called on the radio, hoping that Lodge and Locher, who carried survival radios with extra batteries, had somehow managed to bail out—hoping that our calls would be returned by one, or even both. But our calls went unanswered. We finally resigned ourselves to the probability that they had been killed or captured (though their names never appeared on the list released by the North Vietnamese of those taken prisoner on or after 10 May), and we were ready to give up.

Then, 22 days later, on 1 June, our strike force was in the vicinity of Yen Bai Airfield, some 70 miles northwest of Hanoi. Momentary silence filled the air, then came a piercing call: "Any US aircraft—this is Oyster-Zero-One- Bravo—over."

We don't have an Oyster call sign today, I thought, but my backseater, Chuck DeBellevue, shouted, "My God, that's Roger Locher!" We answered, and Roger said, "Hey guys, I've been down here a long time. Any chance of picking me up?"

"You bet—you bet there is!"

Back at Udorn Royal Thai Air Base we quickly planned and launched a rescue mission. It was one of the deepest, most difficult, and dangerous rescues ever attempted. There were numerous SAM sites and more than adequate AAA around Yen Bai, one of North Vietnam's most important airfields. And of all places, Roger Locher was only five miles off the south end of the runway. The ground fire was so intense the rescue effort had to be aborted, and Udorn was quiet that night. We knew Roger was alive. We knew that he had valiantly evaded the enemy for over three weeks. And now we could not get him out. We had failed, and what was worse, the North Vietnamese had been alerted. They knew Roger was in their jungle, and now they knew where to find him.

Back at Udorn we were frustrated and discouraged. The next morning, Gen John Vogt, the four-star commander of Air Forces in Vietnam/Thailand, in an uncommon act of courageous leadership, canceled the entire strike mission to Hanoi and dedicated over 100 aircraft to the rescue of Roger Locher. Capt Ron Smith, as Sandy One, was the low-altitude, on-scene commander; and a 27-year-old captain named Dale Stovall commanded Jolly 30, the lead chopper that snatched Locher from the jungle as the enemy closed in.

In a brilliant display of total commitment and unparalleled excellence, a bitter defeat became a sweet, sweet victory. On that morning, the training, teamwork, discipline, and the dedication of hundreds of Americans and allies resulted in the successful return of Capt Roger Locher to friendly territory. During Locher's debriefing it was learned that, unfortunately, Bob Lodge did not make it out of the airplane. His remains were returned to the United States by the North Vietnamese government some years later.

On learning the good news, General Vogt flew from Saigon to Udorn in time to be the first among hundreds of us to welcome Roger back as he stepped off the rescue helicopter after 23 days in the jungles of North Vietnam. It was an experience as moving as it was magnificent.

The flight surgeons rushed Locher off to the hospital but later agreed that he could come to the officers' club that night at 1900 hours for 30 minutes. The word spread and the club was packed. On time, washed, shaven, fed, and in his "party suit," Roger walked through the front door to applause that went on for 20 minutes. Hands were shaken. Tears were shed. The camaraderie and love that bound us together in time of war had come together that morning. Enormous resources and many lives had been risked.

Vince Lombardi used to tell his players, "Unless you believe in yourself and put everything you have into your pursuits—your mind, your body, your total dedication—what is life worth? The quality of life is in direct proportion to your commitment to excellence, no matter what your field of endeavor.'' The commitment to excellence, the total dedication, and the belief that we could succeed are what enabled us to rescue Roger Locher. And these are the same essential elements, the intrinsic ingredients, the keys that go into the success of anything we do in life.

Retired Air Force general Jim Mullins wrote that "we must not shrink from the pursuit of excellence and quality, because our very survival depends on it." Adm Hyman Rickover, speaking on this subject, said, "Survival for America requires the revival of excellence. Internal mediocrity can destroy us just as surely as anything external."

The laws of success that govern our society—that keep America strong—are the same laws that care for and nurture our families, our businesses, and our spiritual and intellectual endeavors. If we are going to be the best that we can be, if we are going to realize our most profound dreams, we must be willing to be different in our quest for excellence, because it is a moving target that requires constant sight adjustment. Conformity and satisfaction with mediocrity kill the conscience and "deaden the soul of man."

The spirit of the fighter pilot embodied in the "Top Gun" theme—and so important to the rescue of Roger Locher—is a spirit that is in no way limited to fighter pilots. It is a state of mind, a dedication to superior performance, achievement of a mission, excellence in a cause. Nothing less is acceptable if you want to do your very best, and if you want to be all that you can be.

We have to make a choice. We can be meaningful, productive, creative, positive contributors to our professions or vocations; or we can just go along for the ride, remain average, and be content to stagnate.

The first group of people is filled with creative discontent—they are people who want more out of life than the standard offering and are not afraid to raise the standards of excellence and to work for it harder. The second group is filled with people who figured out early on that they could get by—hack the program—by doing less than their best, satisfied with "good enough." What both groups have in common is the total freedom to choose. Born in the ghetto, or on Nob Hill, it makes no difference. Abraham Lincoln showed us that presidents can come from log cabins. The power of the mind is increased and finds its own reward when it is engaged and acted upon.

Leo Rosten wrote, "I cannot believe that the purpose of life is merely to be happy. I think the purpose of life is to be useful, to be responsible, to be honorable, to be compassionate. It is, above all, to matter, to count, to stand for something, to have it make some difference that you lived at all." If we are going to make a difference, we are going to have to be different, and that is not easy. We have to decide if we have what it takes—as individuals, as flights, squadrons, wings, companies, schools, and organizations—to stand tall, to be counted, to be proud, to achieve, to be better than our competition.

If we become big through the success of our efforts, that's okay—it's the way it should be. We deserve to be big if we produce better products at better prices, provide better services, and are devoted to the pursuit of excellence. And despite the critics of the 1960s and the lingering voices that remain, there is nothing wrong with being big. Big joined Small in building America, and as long as Big remains socially conscious, Big will help provide for America's future. Big in this regard is really a badge of excellence.

Having had the good fortune to be involved in a wide variety of activities, civilian, military, and government—I am convinced that in most endeavors excellence cannot prevail without the right kind of leadership and inspiration. As General Patton said, "We win wars with people." General Patton won battles with people because he inspired them to win and led them to victory. A mediocre leader with the same people would have been less successful in battle, and a bad leader would have been defeated. I believe that people can and will reach for the stars when motivated by inspired leadership.

I have been more than fortunate to have worked for people like Carl Miller, Gordon Blood, Jerry O'Malley, Charlie Gabriel, and Jack Vessey. Today Carl Miller is the national administrator of the Civil Air Patrol; Gordon Blood was commander of the USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center; Jerry O'Malley was commander of the Tactical Air Command before his tragic and untimely death in an aircraft accident; Charlie Gabriel was chief of staff of the Air Force; and Jack Vessey rose from an enlisted man to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top military position in the world.

Why were these men so successful? Because they understood people. They knew exactly what Patton was talking about. War is won with people, and the ability to inspire in others a desire for excellence and passion for achievement is the key to successful leadership. Personally, I would have died for any one of these men—these great leaders. And I was not alone. My colleagues would have died for them, too, and some of them did.

Again the question is why? The answer is because we admired them. We respected them. We were devoted to them. We loved them. Never, ever, would we have done anything to disappoint them. Our loyalty was absolute, and what is more, that loyalty cut both ways. We knew how much they depended on us to help them achieve their missions. We knew that they genuinely cared about our needs, our hopes, and our dreams. We knew that we could count on them for support, for help when the chips were down, because they understood the real meaning of both leadership and followership.

Unfortunately, so many people in leadership and management positions, in all walks of life and particularly in the military, try to rule through a warped principle I call *negative discipline.* Followers of this principle believe motivation is sparked by threat, fear, and intimidation. This principle is engaged by little minds that dare not stretch themselves through love, loyalty, caring, support, and encouragement. Negative discipline never has worked, and it never will. Under the shadow of negative discipline, people react rather than proact. They run for shelter and hide from progress rather than stick their necks out and march forward. This is the antithesis of leadership excellence and quality.

On the other hand, great leaders know the tremendous power of positive discipline, that which inspires and instills a desire to achieve, to win, to be the best one can be. Positive discipline does require sacrifice, but sacrifice is the willing result as subordinates, inspired by their leader, self-impose the highest standards in their professional lives.

Bill Danforth, the founder of Ralston Purina, always challenged the people in his company to "stand tall, to think tall, to smile tall, and to live tall." It is this understanding of what motivates people toward positive behavior that makes the difference between a great organization and a mediocre—or failing—organization.

J. W. Marriott, founder of one of the finest and most successful hotel companies in the world, had a very simple philosophy: "We take care of our people, and they take care of our guests."

These two men echo the philosophy of George Patton, Carl Miller, Gordon Blood, Jerry O'Malley, Charlie Gabriel, Jack Vessey, Vince Lombardi, and all great leaders who know how to inspire people to achieve and excel. These people hold the key to the power of inspired attitude—the attitude that is so great it has literally raised nations—the attitude that is so simple it can be mastered by children. And what is it? Simply put, it is incentive and reward, good examples, mutual respect, shared beliefs, symbiotic loyalty, and bottom-line values. Separately these components are powerful enough, but collectively they work miracles.

The greatest miracle of all is that they are infectious. There is no other feeling as great as the feeling of accomplishment, of doing something worthwhile, of being productive, of turning defeat into victory.

In the score for "Vagabond King," Rudolph Friml wrote, "Give me some men, stout-hearted men, and I'll soon give you ten thousand more." John Vogt gave the inspired order to rescue Roger Locher to "a few stout-hearted leaders," and soon there were hundreds who took leadership into their own hands, accomplished the mission, and rejoiced in its success.

At the opening of the Atlanta Marriott Marquis, widely regarded as one of the great architectural and engineering achievements in the world, the designer, John Portman Jr., noted that each speaker on the program had been preceded by a musical selection. He supposed that the "Impossible Dream," which was played as he came forward to speak, was an appropriate choice because he had always been told: "You can't do this. You can't do that. There's no way. It's never been done. It won't work." He said,

> I guess the good Lord made me dumb enough not to believe in the possibility of failure, and dumb enough not to think in negative terms, and dumb enough to believe that it takes noble thoughts to produce noble deeds—yes, dumb enough to have faith, and believe that it can be done. We believe in what we do, and we seek excellence in every-

thing we do. This hotel is about people, life-style, and hopefully it is a contribution to a feeling of human enhancement and well-being. This hotel is not elitist. It recognizes all people and their innate desires. It hopefully appeals to all of us, from the chairman of the board of the largest corporation to the most humble among us—for we are all part of the human family. This, I hope, responds to my desire of bringing people together in harmony and happiness.

Great leaders can make us feel like the author who wrote, "I love you not only for what you are, but for what I am when I am with you." They not only set marvelous examples for us to follow if we should want to, they inspire us to want to and to set our own examples of excellence for others to follow. Strong leadership inspires strong leadership.

A Leadership Perspective

Gen Duane H. Cassidy

As the Air Force prepares for the complex challenges of the twenty-first century, our success depends on the strength of our leadership. There is absolutely no substitute for leadership in our business and therefore the development of future leaders is a vital task. My 34 years of service have convinced me that there are no experts on the subject of leadership, but I *have* observed several characteristics that seem to be common to successful leaders. Those characteristics are integrity, selflessness, and energy—let me share my thoughts on them with you.

The bedrock of successful leadership has always been integrity—both in the personal and the professional sides of life. Former Air Force chief of staff Gen David C. Jones said,

> Integrity is certainly not a unique military attribute, but stakes are higher in our business than in almost any other. We must be right, we must be competent, we must admit our mistakes and correct them when they do occur, and above all we must never permit either the fact or image of duplicity to taint our honor. The watchword must be, as always, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

The reason this is true is that Air Force leaders must accomplish their missions through Air Force people—and our people excel when they trust their leaders. That trust is a fragile commodity and is built upon the confidence that the leader is acting in the best interest of the followers—that he or she will serve the group without sacrificing the rights of the individual. Therefore, a leader must not only set high standards, but must, by commitment and example, live up to the same standards. If you set the right example, you won't need to worry about the rules, or as former Army chief of staff Gen W. C. Westmoreland stated, "Inevitably in the turmoil of times, every soldier will be confronted by situations which test his character. On these occasions, he must stand on his principles; for these are the crucial episodes that determine the worth of a man."

In addition to integrity, leaders must be selfless. Simply stated, this means putting your own personal desires second to a higher cause or to other people. We must be selfless because we are in a life and death business—our success guarantees freedom for all Americans—our failure is unconscionable. Selflessness creates the group atmosphere, the team spirit we need to make a military organization capable of limitless activity—rather than one that waits for someone else to get the job done.

Leaders must realize that there are other things more important than their own comfort, their own self-aggrandizement, or their own self-satisfaction. Those things are not important, but rather the importance lies with the people and the mission—leading others to incredible heights or watching them accomplish a difficult mission through teamwork. Granted, the idea of selflessness is not particularly new—nor is it complex—it's just the opposite of selfishness. Selfless leaders think about how to make the unit, the Air Force, or the country a better place. They put their effort into the larger problems—doing things for other people, showing others more concern than for their own careers.

Truthfully, I have found that this selflessness—this concern for other people—consumes much of your time. You can spend a lot of time sitting and listening to someone else's problems, and that is time that will be taken away from your own personal life. But, that sacrifice can also be a great investment and bring rich dividends. Actually, everything you are, you owe to the Air Force anyway, so it is okay to give some of that back.

Selflessness also means you're not so egocentric that you're unwilling to ask for help. My point here is that you can get help from places you just don't realize. One of the most important lessons I learned in my life did not come from the leadership courses I took, nor from all of the four-star generals I worked for, but it came from a chief master sergeant at McChord, the first sergeant of the squadron I commanded as a lieutenant colonel. I had been in command for a short time and had been trying to learn all the names, attending all the parties, and trying to get to know "my" squadron.

One day he walked into my office, shut the door behind him, cleared his throat and said simply, "This squadron needs a commander, not a buddy," and then quietly left. That experience showed me that you learn about leadership from everybody, and all the time. From your peers, from the NCOs, from your boss, and you'll continue to learn all the time. Sometimes that involved listening, not talking, like when your boss calls to talk. Through the years I have observed lots of people who have passed up perfectly good opportunities to keep their mouths shut.

Another trademark of successful leaders is energy. Leadership is hard work! Motivating others, developing plans and executing them, focusing resources and taking care of your people takes a significant level of effort. Examples that come immediately to mind are all leaders who exhibited unbounded amounts of energy. They had an ability to keep going—to do more than everyone else. People like Curtis LeMay, Grace Hopper, Charlie Gabriel, Larry Welch, and Bob Hope. Every successful person has been able to produce at the right time. These leaders are not workaholics; in fact, some are a little lazy. But they know how to get the most out of themselves at

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the right time. It's a matter of time management. It's a matter of energy management. Successful leaders don't keep pushing themselves at maximum velocity—they save themselves for the big pushes. It is also important to use your energy for your own job. There will always be plenty of work to do. When you move up to a higher position, quit doing what you did before—if you are doing someone else's job, who will do yours?

Finally, the leaders of tomorrow's Air Force must remember the difference between leadership and the mirror image that we have named management. British Field Marshal Lord Slim penned the following words on the realities of that difference. He said,

> There is a difference between leadership and management. The leader and the men who follow him represent one of the oldest, most natural and most effective of all human relationships. The manager and those he manages are a later product with neither so romantic nor so inspiring a history. Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of personality and vision. Its practice is an art. Management is of the mind, more a matter of accurate calculations, statistics, methods, timetables, and routine. Its practice is a science. Managers are necessary. Leaders are essential.

All I have observed throughout my career affirms those words—"Managers are necessary; Leaders are *essential.*" Management is cold and calculating, but leadership goes much deeper—it comes from your heart.

On Leadership

Gen Omar N. Bradley

Military men are expected above all else to be leaders. What they do may well dignify the past, explain today, and secure—for all of us—tomorrow.

I would like to touch upon a few factors that will underscore the value of good leadership. Leadership is an intangible. No weapon, no impersonal piece of machinery ever designed can take its place.

This is the age of the computer, and if you know how to program the machine you can get quick and accurate answers. But how can you include leadership—and morale, which is affected by leadership—into your programming? Let us never forget the great importance of leadership; and while we use computers to obtain certain kinds of answers, let us not try to fight a whole war or even a single battle without giving proper consideration to the element of leadership.

Another element to be considered is the Man to be led, with whose morale we are concerned. I am constantly reminded of this point by a cartoon which hangs over my desk at home depicting an infantryman with his rifle across his knees as he sits behind a parapet. Above him is the list of the newest weapons science has devised, and the soldier behind the parapet is saying: "But still they haven't found a substitute for ME."

In selecting a company in which to invest our savings, we often give primary consideration to the company with good leadership. In similar manner, a military unit is often judged by its leadership. Good leadership is essential to organized action where any group is involved. The one who commands—be he a military officer or captain of industry—must project power, an energizing power which marshals and integrates the best efforts of his followers by supplying that certain something for which they look to him, whether guidance, support, encouragement, example, or even new ideas and imagination.

The test of a leader lies in the reaction and response of his followers. He should not have to impose authority. Bossiness in itself never made a leader. He must make his influence felt by example and the instillment of confidence in his followers. Remember, a good leader is one who causes or inspires others, staff or subordinate commanders, to do the job. His worth as a leader is measured by the achievements of the led. This is the ultimate test of his effectiveness.

While it takes a good staff officer to initiate an effective plan, it requires a leader to ensure that the plan is properly executed. That is why the work of collecting information, studying it, drawing a plan, and making a decision is only a small part of the total endeavor; seeing that plan through is the major part. During World War I, while inspecting a certain area, Gen John J. Pershing found a project that was not going well, even though the second lieutenant in charge seemed to have a pretty good plan. General Pershing asked the lieutenant how much pay he received. On hearing the lieutenant's reply of "$141.67 per month, Sir," General Pershing said: "Just remember that you get $1.67 per month for making your plan and issuing the order, and $140.00 for seeing that it is carried out."

Similarly, I can recall a former vice president of an industrial company with which I am familiar. He would formulate some good plans but never followed up to see that his plans got the expected results. I knew he had served in World War II; out of curiosity, I looked into the nature of his service and found that his entire period of service was as a staff officer. He had never had the advantage of a command job; thus his training was incomplete. Maybe if he had remained in the service longer, we could have developed his leadership qualities as well—and this man would still be with the company.

Certainly in these days, however, problems are complex and good staff work plays a large part in resolving them. I have known commanders who were not too smart, but who were very knowledgeable about personnel and knew enough to select the very best for their staffs. No leader knows it all (though you sometimes find one who seems to think he does). A leader should encourage the members of his staff to speak up if they think the commander is wrong. He should invite constructive criticism. It is a grave error for the leader to surround himself with "Yes" men.

Gen George C. Marshall was a strong exponent of the principle of having his subordinates speak up. When he first became Chief of Staff of the Army, the secretariat of that office consisted of three officers, including myself, who presented orally to General Marshall the staff papers coming from the divisions of the General Staff. We presented the contents of the staff studies in abbreviated form, citing the highlights of the problem involved, the possible courses of action considered, and the action recommended.

At the end of his first week as chief of staff, General Marshall called us into his office and opened the discussion by saying: "I am disappointed in all of you." When we inquired if we might ask why, he said: "You haven't disagreed with a single staff recommendation all week." We told him it so hap-

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pened that we were in full agreement with every paper that had been presented, and that we would add our frank comments to any proposal we considered dubious. The very next day, we briefed a paper as written and then pointed out some factors which, in our opinion, made the recommended action questionable. General Marshall responded: "Now that is what I want. Unless I hear all the arguments concerning an action, I am not sure whether I have made the right decision or not."

Thus, if an officer happens to be detailed to a staff, he should try to avoid being a "Yes" man. I would recommend to all commanders that they inform the members of their staffs that anyone who does not disagree once in a while with what is about to be done is of limited value and should probably be shifted to some other place where he might occasionally have an idea.

Of course, I am thinking about the decision-making process. After a decision is made, everyone must be behind it 100 percent. I thought the British were admirable in this respect during World War II. No matter how much discussion there had been on a subject, as soon as a decision was made you never heard any doubts expressed. You would have the impression that no one involved in making the decision had ever entertained a contrary point of view.

I don't want to overemphasize leadership of senior officers; my interest extends to leaders of all ranks. An essential qualification of a good leader is the ability to recognize, select, and train junior leaders. During World War II in the Pacific, Col Red Reeder was on a trip for General Marshall. One of his assignments was to inquire into junior leadership. In a book entitled *Born at Reveille,* Colonel Reeder records an account of his conversation with Col Bryant Moore on Guadalcanal:

> "Colonel Moore," I said, "tell me something about leadership." I had hit a sensitive spot. He forged ahead. "Leadership! The greatest problem here *is* the leaders, and you have to find some way to weed out the weak ones. It's tough to do this when you're in combat. The platoon leaders who cannot command, who cannot foresee things, and who cannot act on the spur of the moment in an emergency are a distinct detriment.
>
> 'It is hot here, as you can see. Men struggle; they get heat exhaustion. They come out vomiting and throwing away equipment. The leaders must be leaders and they must be alert to establish straggler lines and stop this thing.
>
> The men have been taught to take salt tablets, but the leaders don't see to this. Result, heat exhaustion.
>
> The good leaders seem to get killed; the poor leaders get the men killed. The big problem is leadership and getting the shoulder straps on the right people.' "
>
> Sixty-millimeter Japanese mortar shells fell about thirty yards away and attacked a number of coconut trees. I lost interest in taking dictation and the colonel stopped talking. When the salvo was over and things were quiet again, Bryant Moore said, "Where was I? You saw that patrol. I tell you this, not one man in 50 can lead a patrol in this jungle. If you can find out who the good patrol leaders are before you hit the combat zone, you have found out something.
>
> 'I have had to get rid of about twenty-five officers because they just weren't leaders. I had to make the battalion commander weed out the poor junior leaders! This process is continuous.' "

What, then, are the distinguishing qualities of a leader? There are many essential characteristics, but I will mention a few that come to mind as perhaps the most important. First, he must know his job without necessarily being a specialist in every phase of it. A few years ago it was suggested that all engineering subjects be eliminated from the required studies at West Point. I objected. For example, bridge building is a specialty for engineers; yet, I think every senior officer should have some idea of what is involved. When we reached the Rhine in World War II, it was not necessary that I know how to build a bridge, but it was very helpful that I knew what was involved so that I could see that the bridge engineers received sufficient time and proper logistical backup.

Specialization figures in almost every problem faced today by the military leader or the business manager. This person must get deeply enough into his problem to be able to understand it and manage it intelligently, without going so far as to become a specialist himself in every phase of the problem. One doesn't have to be a tank expert in order to use a tank unit effectively.

Thomas J. Watson of IBM once said that genius in an executive is the ability to deal successfully with matters he does not understand. This leads to another principle of leadership which I have often found neglected, both in the military and in business. While one need not be a specialist in all phases of his job, he should have a proportionate degree of interest in every aspect of it—and those concerned, the subordinates, should be aware of the leader's interest.

Thus, leaders must get around and show interest in what their subordinates are doing, even if they don't know much about the techniques of their subordinate's work. And, when they are making these visits, they should try to pass out praise when due, as well as corrections or criticism.

We all get enough criticism and we learn to take it. Even Sir Winston Churchill, despite his matchless accomplishments, found occasion to say: "I have benefited enormously from criticism and at no point did I suffer from any perceptible lack thereof." But let us remember that praise also has a role to play. Napoléon was probably the most successful exponent of this principle through his use of a quarter inch of ribbon to improve morale and get results.

We tend to speak up about our subordinates' performance only when things go wrong. This is such a well-recognized fact that a "complaint department" is an essential part of many business firms. To my knowledge, no comparable department exists anywhere to handle praise for a job well done. Praise, incidentally, need not be extravagant.

Both mental and physical energy are essential to successful leadership. How many really good leaders have there been who were lazy or weak, or who couldn't stand the strain? Sherman was a good example of a leader with outstanding mental and physical energy. During the advance from Chattanooga to Atlanta, he often went for days with only two or three hours of sleep per night and was constantly in the saddle reconnoitering. He often knew the dispositions and terrain so well that he could maneuver the enemy out of position without a serious fight and with minimum losses.

Conversely, a sick commander is of limited value. It is not fair to the troops under him to have a leader who is not functioning at 100 percent. I had to relieve several senior commanders during World War II because of illness. It is often pointed out that Napoléon didn't lose a major battle until Waterloo, where he was a sick man.

A leader should possess human understanding and consideration for others. Men are not robots and should not be treated as such. I do not by any means suggest coddling. But men are intelligent, complicated beings who will respond favorably to human understanding and consideration. By these means their leader will get maximum effort from each of them. He will also get loyalty—and, in this connection, it is well to remember that loyalty goes down as well as up. The sincere leader will go to bat for his subordinates when such action is needed.

A good leader must sometimes be stubborn. Here, I am reminded of the West Point cadet prayer. A leader must be able to "choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong." Armed with the courage of his convictions, he must often fight to defend them. When he has come to a decision after thorough analysis—and when he is sure he is right—he must stick to it even to the point of stubbornness. Grant furnishes a good illustration of this trait. He never knew when he was supposed to be licked. A less stubborn man might have lost at Shiloh.

During the Richmond campaign, after being up all night making his reconnaissance and formulating and issuing orders, Grant lay down under a tree and fell asleep. Some time later, a courier rode up and informed the general that disaster had hit his right flank and that his troops at that end of line were in full retreat. General Grant sat up, shook his head to clear the cobwebs, and said: "It can't be so," went back to sleep—and it wasn't so.

Of course, in commending stout adherence to one's chosen course of action I do not mean to imply that there is just one solution to a problem. Usually there is one solution, but any good plan, boldly executed, is better than indecision. There is usually more than one way to obtain results.

Actually, what I have referred to as Grant's stubbornness might better be called confidence. Leaders must have confidence in themselves, their units, their subordinate commanders and in their plans. Just before the invasion of Normandy in 1944, a story went around in some of the amphibious assault units that they would suffer 100 percent casualties—that none of them would come back. I found it necessary to visit these units and talk to all ranks. I told them that we would, naturally, suffer casualties, but that our losses would for certain be manageable and that with air and naval support we would succeed. After our landing, a correspondent told me that on his way across the channel in one of the leading LSTs he had noticed a sergeant reading a novel. Struck by the seeming lack of concern of the sergeant, he asked: "Aren't you worried? How could you be reading at a time like this?" The sergeant replied: "No, I am not worried. General Bradley said everything would go all right, so why should I worry?"

I might relate another incident involving confidence. I had to relieve a senior commander because I learned that his men had lost confidence in him. This meant, of course, that we could not expect maximum performance by that division. After being relieved, the officer came back through my quarters and showed me a file of statements given him at his request, I am sure, by the burgermeisters of all towns his division had passed through. After seeing the letters, I told the officer that if I had ever had any doubts as whether to relieve him, those doubts were now removed. His letters proved beyond question that he had lost confidence in himself, so it was no wonder the men had lost confidence in him.

A leader must also possess imagination. Whether with regard to an administrative decision or one made in combat, the leader must be able to look ahead: what will be the next step—and the one after that? Imagination is the quality that enables him to anticipate the train of consequences that follow from his contemplated courses of action. He must minimize error and be prepared for likely contingencies.

While there are other qualities which contribute to effective leadership, I will mention just one more—but it is a vital one—Character. This word has many meanings. I am applying it in a broad sense to describe a person who has high ideals, who stands by them, and who can be trusted absolutely. Such a person will be respected by all those with whom he is associated. And such a person will readily be recognized by his associates for what he is.

It has been said that a man's character is the reality of himself. Once having been maturely formed, I don't think a man's character ever changes. I remember a long time ago when someone told me that if a mountain was reported to have moved, I could believe or disbelieve it as I wished, but if anyone told me that a man had changed his character, I should not believe it.

All leaders must possess those positive qualities which I have been discussing, and the great leaders are those who possess one or more of them to an outstanding degree. Some leaders just miss being great because they are weak in one or more of these areas. There is still another ingredient in this formula for a great leader that I have left out, and that is LUCK. He must have the right opportunity. Then, of course, when opportunity knocks, he must be able to rise and open the door.

Some may ask: "Why do you talk about the desirable traits of leadership?" They maintain that you either have leadership or you don't—that leaders are born, not made. I suppose some are born with a certain amount of leadership. Frequently, we see children who seem inclined to take charge and direct their playmates. The other youngsters follow these directions without protest. But I am convinced nevertheless leadership can be developed and improved by study and training.

There is no better way to develop a person's leadership than to give him a job involving responsibility and let him work it out. We should try to avoid telling him how to do it. That principle, for example, is the basis of our whole system of combat orders. We tell the subordinate unit commander that we want him to do and leave the details to him. I think this system is largely responsible for the many fine leaders in our services today. We are constantly training and developing younger officers and teaching them to accept responsibility.

However, don't discount experience. Someone may remind you that Napoléon led armies before he was 30, and that Alexander the Great died at the age of 33. Napoléon, as he grew older, commanded even larger armies. Alexander might have been even greater had he lived longer and gained more experience. In this respect, I especially like Gen Bolivar Buckner's theory that "Judgment comes from experience and experience comes from bad judgment." Thus, all other factors being equal, the leader with experience will have a considerable advantage over the leader who lacks it.

Military Leadership: What Is It? Can It Be Taught?

Gen Maxwell D. Taylor

Upon being ordered to West Point as superintendent in 1945, I duly reported for instructions to the Army chief of staff, Dwight D. Eisenhower. To my surprise he limited his comments to two points, the importance which he attached to the honor system and his strong feeling that the academy should include in its curriculum a formal course designed to teach cadets the principles of military leadership. In his view, this had never been adequately undertaken in the past despite the fact that the preparation for military leadership was a prime objective of West Point education.

Armed with this mandate from General Eisenhower, upon taking over my duties I promptly initiated an elementary course in the psychology of leadership as a first step and thereafter watched the development of the course with keen personal interest. As events turned out, it marked for me the beginning of a quest for the ultimate sources of leadership and a satisfactory answer to the questions posed by this article—What is leadership? Can it be taught?

Having agreed to summarize my tentative conclusions on these points, I must begin by stating my understanding of what is meant by military leadership. I take it to mean the gift enjoyed by a limited number of commanders who have been able to derive a maximum measure of military effectiveness from themselves, their associates, and all other resources placed at their disposition. If this is indeed leadership, how is it produced? What are the talents and attributes of the men who possess it?

Assisted by historical studies of individual cases and by personal contacts with proven leaders, a student of this subject can assemble a list of attributes apparently shared by many eminent leaders and in due course arrange them according to some system of classification. My own efforts have led to an arrangement in four categories under the headings of professional competence, intellectual capacity, strength of character, and inspirational qualities.

In the case of the first category it is fairly easy to agree upon the attributes which one ordinarily associates with professional competence. One expects a military leader to demonstrate in his daily performance a thorough knowledge of his own job and further an ability to train his subordinates in their duties and thereafter to supervise and evaluate their work. His competence may be further confirmed by evidence of good judgment in choosing key assistants in command and staff functions—proof that he knows a good man when he sees one.

Also he may be expected to give importance to maintaining physical fitness. Because of the strenuous demands of military life, a competent officer should regard his career as an arduous endurance race for which he must remain constantly in training. To do so, in early life he should acquire habits of moderation in eating, drinking, working, and playing—activities any one of which if carried to excess may impair his effectiveness as a leader. Napoléon might have won at Waterloo had he been physically fit to ride a horse on the day of the battle. Alexander might have found new worlds to conquer had he been less successful in finding wine and dissolute companionship in early life.

But an ideal leader must have qualities beyond those of a competent professional. If he is to rise above subaltern grades, he must acquire a disciplined and orderly mind—one as accustomed to thinking hard as his body is inured to working hard. His intellectual interests should be as broad as the scope of the national interests for which his profession undertakes to provide security. In 1962, President Kennedy made this point in an address to the West Point graduating class in which he stressed that its members must prepare themselves for dealing with problems outside the military field—diplomatic, political, and economic matters to include a knowledge of the foreign policies of other nations. In his view the ideal leader was more than a military specialist—he was a man of wide horizons capable of perceiving the military role in a setting of integrated national power derived from many sources.

If asked to identify certain intellectual gifts particularly appropriate to the tasks of such a leader, I would underscore the importance of clarity and facility in oral and written expression. A career officer is constantly engaged in attending school, teaching school, training men and units, explaining military issues to superiors and setting forth to them the relative merits of alternative decisions and courses of action. In all such tasks he must be able to speak and write lucidly and persuasively, carefully avoiding any professional jargon which may becloud his thoughts and obscure his meaning. As chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I found that I spent an inordinate amount of time acting as a high school English teacher, simplifying and purifying the language of important staff papers to make them readily comprehensible to civilian leaders. While military communicators need not aspire to a high literary quality in their style, they must be clear and concise if

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they are to avoid misunderstandings which may prove fatal to the outcome of matters of great moment.

Similarly, as a speechmaker, a commander need not rise to Churchillian heights of eloquence, but he must be able to speak easily and effectively to his men, explaining to them the why of their tasks and spurring them to action at critical moments. Napoléon was famous for his ability to rouse his men, a skill never better demonstrated than in his proclamation in 1796 to the ragged Army of Italy awaiting to invade Lombardy. Although regarded by some historians as a regrettable invitation to plunder the "rich provinces and opulent towns" of the enemy, it gave the French soldiers an élan which carried them to six victories in a fortnight and launched their commander on his career of conquest.

The task of identifying subordinate qualities becomes much greater in the case of our third category, which embraces the traits of character encountered in successful leaders. Historically, those traits have generally included virtues such as reliability, courage, dedication to mission, determination, and self-discipline. Napoléon stated it more briefly: "The chief virtues of a soldier are constancy and discipline," but he was thinking of soldiers in the ranks, not those in high command. The latter must above all have the ability to exercise command in such a way as to gain and retain the respect and confidence of their men—not merely by virtue of their professional competence and intellectual gifts but also from evidence of strength of character. Men going into danger want a leader they can count upon, one who though demanding much of them will bring them back alive and victorious. They will readily accept a stern commander if it is apparent that he views his rank as an obligation to them, not as a personal privilege and honor. Once such bonds of mutual respect and confidence unite a leader and his men, they become a mighty force capable of the deeds of such famous fighting units as Caesar's Tenth Legion, Napoléon's Old Guard, and Jackson's Stonewall Brigade.

Such thoughts led me to a consideration of the final category—the inspirational qualities of a leader who can incite his men to unusual acts of valor. Many of the qualities previously discussed—competence, physical fitness, intellectual power, strength of character—contribute to the image of an inspiring leader but they are not sufficient in themselves. There are many able officers who are competent, intelligent, and reliable, yet remain dull, unimaginative, and uninspiring—incapable of stirring a pulse, raising a cheer, or moving a soldier toward the enemy. Something else must be added to produce a "critical mass"—some spark which will release enthusiasm and even fervor in quite ordinary men and thereby obtain from them extraordinary results.

What constitutes this spark? Is it innate as it appears in some cases or may it be acquired by effort on the part of some while remaining unattainable by others? Is it definable or merely perceptible? A distinguished justice of the Supreme Court, the author of a widely discussed opinion on obscenity, was asked by a friend to define it. "I can't define it," he replied, "but I sure know it when I see it." Perhaps this aspect of leadership is of the same order.

Regardless of the elusiveness of the quality, one can readily identify its presence in an officer who has it. In the first place he is likely to give the external impression of a leader—he looks, acts, and obviously feels a leader. Gen Phil Sheridan on his stone horse in Sheridan Circle conveys that impression even today as he seems to bow to admirers aligning the square. General Patton has always looked the beau sabreur in his shining boots, pearlhandled revolvers, and glittering helmet—trappings worn deliberately to call attention to a leader in the same way and for the same purpose that Henry of Navarre wore his white plume "into the ranks of war" at the battle of Ivry.

A sure indicator of the charisma of a leader is the effect of his presence on his troops. General Lee needed only to ride by a column on Traveler to arouse both the cheers of his men and their concern for his safety. Gros's painting of the young Bonaparte carrying the tricolor across the fireswept bridge at Arcola exemplifies the intrepid leader exposing himself to animate troops. Wellington, who could hardly be accused of Bonapartist bias, said that Napoléon's presence on the field was worth 40,000 troops to the French. The Iron Duke, himself a stern, no-nonsense commander who described his recruits from England as "the scum of the earth," succeeded by some mysterious gift in converting this scum into the veterans who manned the squares at Waterloo, turned back the Old Guard, and toppled the emperor. The unique spark which glowed in the personality of such leaders, even if undefinable, was no less real in presence and effect.

Before closing this survey of leadership, we might seek further clues to its nature in the qualities of a few well-known American leaders of World War II. Let us take, for example, the cases of General Marshall, the wartime Army chief of staff; General MacArthur, the commander of a theater of operations in the Pacific; General Bradley, an Army group commander in Europe; and General Patton, our most famous armor commander. I have chosen them because of their acknowledged eminence, their differing levels of responsibility, and their surprising contrasts in personality, habits, and methods.

As to professional competence, they were all thoroughly equipped for their wartime assignments but as the result of differing circumstances. By virtue of his unusually rapid promotion in and after World War I, MacArthur spent little time in the junior grades and had unusual opportunities to prepare for his subsequent wartime role by peacetime service as Army chief of staff and later as field marshal of the Philippine Army. Whereas he never had to learn the soldier's trade at each level in a laborious ascent to high command, the other three waited long years before reaching general rank, a delay which allowed ample time to ground themselves in the tactics and techniques of their arms of the service. Marshall, by his many years between wars spent at Fort Benning, had the added opportunity of becoming acquainted with many of the ablest officers of the infantry, a valuable asset, when, as chief of staff, he became responsible for choosing and assigning the senior generals of an expanding Army.

In the intelletual field, MacArthur was always notable for the breadth of his interests and the brilliance with which he gave expression to his thoughts. Marshall was often referred to as a man with "a steel-trap mind"—he impressed not by brilliance but by the logic and clarity of his thinking. Bradley had the manner of a schoolmaster—in fact, he had taught school prior to entering West Point and later, as a major, instructed cadets in mathematics at the academy.

Patton, deliberately I suspect, fostered the impression of a flamboyant, hard-riding cavalryman, the antithesis of a scholar. On the latter point, the West Point faculty, by their low academic rating of Cadet Patton upon graduation, appeared to agree. But, Patton was deeply read in military history and was in fact a profound student of the profession of arms and the art of war. In Africa and Europe, he never missed the opportunity to pause at a nearby battlefield of the past before moving on to do battle on a field which would later bear his name.

The task becomes more difficult when we seek to appraise the character and inspirational power of such men. I would award the palm for strong character to Marshall—he has always typified to me utter integrity and moral fearlessness After a hard decision, he had a way of folding his arms and saying: "Well, let the chips fall where they may." Bradley stood out by his calm judgment, his quiet, business- like manner and his evident concern for his troops. In the course of the battle for he Normandy beachhead, I was amazed to receive the unsolicited help of a combat command of the 2d Armored Division. General Bradley, the Army commander, had noted German tanks moving into my division sector and had hurried armor to reinforce our lightly armed airborne troops.

While Patton was known as a rough-tongued, arbitrary commander quick to wrath, during my service in his Third Army in the Battle of the Bulge, I could never have asked for a more considerate commander. Anything the division needed at Bastogne he provided—if he had it. It is just possible that some of this consideration stemmed from the fact that he never caught me in the division command post during his recurrent visits to the front. His antipathy for commanders who allowed themselves to become tied to their headquarters was well known—and, I might add, well justified.

There is much to learn from both Patton and Bradley if only because of the dissimilarities in their appearance, personality, and methods of command. When caught in the limelight of world attention, Patton was no shrinking violet—indeed he rarely operated out of range of a friendly photographer. Bradley was modest to a fault and quick to pass the credit to his subordinates.

On the evening of 7 March 1945 Generals Ridgway, Gavin, and I were guests at dinner of General Eisenhower at his headquarters near Reims. In the course of the evening, the general was called to the telephone in an adjacent room to receive a message from General Bradley whose advance had been halted by the barrier of the Rhine. Shortly we heard an excited whoop from Ike who rushed back beaming: "What do you know! Brad has just seized an unguarded bridge at Remagen and he's apologizing to me because he says it isn't a very good one!"

A sharper study in contrast was the difference in the way in which Patton and Bradley took leave of their senior commanders on the eve of two important operations, the invasion of Sicily on 10 July 1943 and the Normandy landing, 6 June 1944. I happened to be present at both.

A few days before the opening of the Sicilian campaign, Patton assembled his general officers in Mostaganem, Morocco, for a final discussion of plans. It was an all-day session with Patton taking little part until the very end. Then he took the floor and regaled us with a moving account of the gallant performance of green American troops in the North African operations in the spring. It was clear that he wanted to remind us generals going into our first combat that there is nothing wrong with our troops—and thereby warn us that if anything went awry it would clearly be the fault of the generals. He closed with a menacing wave of his swagger stick and an ominous farewell: "The meeting's over. On your way and I never want to see you bastards again until you're ashore with your outfits in Sicily."

It was far different at First Army headquarters in Bristol, England, when General Bradley took leave of his corps and division commanders shortly before D-day. Bradley personally conducted the meeting and personally cross-examined each senior commander regarding his plans and his readiness for unexpected contingencies. When my turn came, I faced the Army commander, pointer in hand, before a map of my division sector and proceeded to recite my plans, feeling once more a cadet hoping for a passing mark from the instructor.

When the day was over, Brad, like Patton in Africa, felt the need to say something to inspire his commanders as they embarked on the greatest military operation of recorded history.

But Brad was no speaker and he sensed it at this critical moment. So he simply folded his hands behind his back, his eyes got a little moist, he gulped, and said quietly, "Good luck, men."

Which way was the better, Patton's or Brad's? All I can say is that we did our best for both.

In this discussion, I have been obliged to neglect my old West Point superintendent, Douglas MacAthur, for lack of pertinent data. The fact is I never saw MacArthur from the morning of 13 June 1922 when he gave me my diploma until the fall of 1955, when I called on him in New York at the Waldorf Towers to pay him my respects as the new Army Chief of Staff. I rang his doorbell with some trepidation, as I suspected that, in his view, I was one of the Marshall-Eisenhower clique which had derogated the importance of the Pacifc theatre where he had fought and won the war. But when the door opened, there was MacArthur in person, arms outstretched, to give me a warm embrace and a hearty welcome—"Max, it's good to see you again!" Whereupon the new Chief of Staff became another fascinated victim of the famous MacArthur charm which few escaped—with the possible exception of President Truman.

After this rambling effort to explain and illustrate what seems to be the nature of successful military leadership, I am still left with a question to be answered. Can leadership in the case used here be taught or is it a talent which eludes the methods of the schoolmaster and the scholar? In large measure, I would rally to the view which General Sherman expressed on this subject: "I have read of men born as generals peculiarly endowed by nature but have never seen one." As he had obviously known able generals on both sides of the Civil War, one must conclude that he believed that they had learned or had somehow acquired their gifts through means other than heredity.

Among our four categories of leader attributes, there is little doubt that professional competence and a trained intellect can be developed by standard educational methods. Professional competence has long been the primary objective of the military school system maintained by the armed forces, the overall success of which has never been challenged. A sound mind in a sound body has been an accepted goal of the educative process since antiquity. Hence, there seems no reason to doubt that the leadership qualities of our first two categories are susceptible to being taught and learned.

The possibility of teaching character is somewhat more doubtful. However, religious teachers, prophets, and sages of all times have undertaken to teach moral principles by precept, example, parable, and fable. Parents have used the rod to reinforce precept in enforcing on their children a decent respect for the behavioral code of contemporary society. The fact that, by such means, many men have acquired habits of virtuous conduct which they have pursued over much of their lives at least in many cases provides ample ground to believe that the attributes associated with high moral character can be successfully taught or learned.

I must admit, however, that the acquisition of inspirational qualities through teaching techniques is far more uncertain. To some extent, such attributes can probably be acquired through studies of historical and contemporary examples but unfortunately there is no corpus of literature or base of scientific data available to help the researcher in this relatively unexplored field. Students of war and of the military profession have conducted few if any thoughtful investigations seeking to identify the sources of the inspirational qualities of certain leaders. It may be argued that the aspiring young leader may obtain academic instruction in certain arts and techniques which appear related to this quality—such subjects as public speaking, debating and histrionics, the latter suggested by the dramatic skills demonstrated by a Patton or a MacArthur. Also studies in sociology and mass psychology may provide clues to the means available to a leader to influence the reactions of his followers.

But such approaches though useful are insufficient to plumb this secret of leader magnetism. In the end, the greatest promise for the researcher probably lies in close association with successful practitioners of this black art and an opportunity to observe their styles, methods, and tricks of the trade. He might even explore the ground for President Lincoln's feeling that the quality of General Grant's whiskey had something to do with his quality as a general. All leads must be pursued tenaciously if we are ever to reach a solution to this fascinating riddle—what makes the inspiring leader?

A Single-Hearted Desire

Gen Armistead L. Long

When the Confederate capital was transferred from Montgomery [Alabama] to Richmond [Virginia], the Virginia forces, of which he was commander in chief, were incorporated in the Confederate army. He then lost his independent command. While the transfer was yet in contemplation, the Confederate authorities were anxious to know whether an apparent lowering of his rank would offend or make him less zealous in the service of the Confederacy. When Mr [Alexander H.] Stephens, the Confederate vice president, mentioned the matter to him, he promptly said, "Mr. Stephens, I am willing to serve anywhere where I can be useful."

It was in perfect accord with his character that he was no stickler for rank or position. In the early part of the war, the positions held by him were not such as to attract public attention; the duties assigned to him, while very important, were not of a showy kind. Others were winning distinction in the field and rising into prominence, while he was in the background. No great laurels could be won in the mountains of West Virginia or in strengthening the coast defences of South Carolina and Georgia. In the estimation of the general public, his reputation was suffering; it was said that his former distinction had been too easily won. During this time he uttered no word of complaint, and gave no intimation that he felt himself in any way wronged or overlooked. One might wonder whether this sweetness of spirit, this calmness, this cheerful content, did not spring from a consciousness of power and assured belief that he had only to bide his time; but a close acquaintance with workings of his mind convinced me that it was rather from a single-hearted desire to be useful, and the conviction that the best way to be useful was to work contentedly and to the best of his ability in the place assigned him.

He looked at everything as unrelated to himself, and only as it affected the cause he was serving.

Leadership

Dr. Douglas Freeman

When I was a lad, I had the great pleasure, the infinite honor, of seeing some of the great men of the War Between the States. Strange as it seems, I can remember Jubal Early. What a somber (I almost said a sinister) figure he was as he walked around town, chewing tobacco fiercely, and leaning on a long staff. As soon as we little lads would see him we would run away because it was thoroughly understood among all of us lads of about five years old or thereabouts that General Early ate a little boy for breakfast every day.

I remember John B. Gordon; I remember Fitzhugh Lee; I remember James Longstreet. I knew well a number of the younger staff officers of General Lee and General Jackson. I knew personally and talked often with three of General Lee's staff officers, one of them his assistant adjutant general, and of course I knew the leaders of the Spanish War, of the First World War, and of the Second World War. Many of these men of the Second World War I taught at the War College. And, it was amusing beyond expression to go to headquarters immediately after hostilities, to go to General Eisenhower's headquarters, or to General Clark's headquarters, or to General MacArthur's headquarters and see some of these men I had known as majors at the War College, stand up and say, "My God, am I going to have my historical photograph taken now?" So those are the circumstances that make me feel, as it were, that I am the Rip Van Winkle of the armed services.

But no man can go through this long stretch of years and have the honor of seeing these great men without having an admiration for them, an admiration for the service and a reverence for the leadership that these men exemplify. I have seen a new chapter of it during the last year because I have been studying George Washington after he came to the command of the American Army in June 1775. Nothing that he had ever done before showed the qualities that he then displayed. I don't think anybody who studied Washington as he was in 1759 is prepared for what Washington was in 1775. I think strangely enough, that out of his civilian training, out of all the difficulties he had to endure, there developed the patience, the maturity of judgment, the essential sanity that were the hallmark of the remarkable ability of that man.

You know, we look at Washington usually through the silly pages of Parson Weems or as we see him in the portraits of Gilbert Stuart. I think either approach is wrong. Washington wasn't the stupid prig that he is made out to be by Weems, nor was he the embalmed celebrity that he appears to be in Gilbert Stuart's portraits. Of course, many portraits of Gilbert Stuart are pretty good works of art of the type and of the age (he made a good living in portraits of George Washington), but personally, except for the one at the Boston Art Museum, I'd like to see all the Gilbert Stuarts of Washington destroyed. I wish they were all burned up because they give such a false impression of the man.

The Peale portraits of him, even the Trumbull portraits, have so much more of the vitality that was Washington—the sanity, the judgment, the humanity that was his. You who are older used to see George Washington presented to you in front of the East Portico of the Capitol. Washington, being a modest man, I think would have been very much embarrassed if he had seen how nearly naked he was presented in that statue of him in front of the Capitol where he sits in a Roman toga which would suit Washington weather in July and no other weather in the world. And he sits there with his hand outstretched as if saying, as Lorado Taft used to put it, "My body lies over at Mount Vernon—my clothes in the Pension Office."

He exemplified leadership which is not anything like as complicated as some of the psychologists would make it out to be. Psychology is going to be a great subject one of these days. Now it's just in its infancy, and when we try to apply it in the abstract to problems of leadership, we usually make monkeys of ourselves; we don't get very far. Leadership is fundamentally common sense and mankind. Maybe I'm going to oversimplify it for you this afternoon, because I'm going to say that it consists fundamentally of three things and three only. If a man meets these three conditions he is going to be a leader; if he fails to meet them he may be on the roster as the head of a command, but he will never be at the head of that command when it marches down the pages of history—never!

First, know your stuff. Know your stuff, just that. If you are an aviator, know it. And know something else besides. We are entirely too much disposed in the American armed services now to have men who begin their professional career on too narrow a foundation and they go up and up and up, and the higher they go the thinner their knowledge is. We have to have specialists but very few of them can afford to be primarily the leaders of men. Our advanced specialists, they must be men who know something about leadership but they are primarily laboratory men—research men. The leader must have a broad foundation if he is going to keep his position. Know—know your own branch, know the related arms of the service; you can't know too much if you are going to be a successful leader. And know the yesterdays. I have always said, and said many times here at the War College through the years, "Don't rely on us military historical writers too much. We don't know but so much. We can't fight wars." But after all don't ignore the yesterdays of war in your study of today and of tomorrow.

I always thought that one of the finest things that ever was said about MacArthur was that when he had a period in

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which he was relieved of active administrative duties and was, for three months, able to do as he pleased, he took those three months and caught up on everything that he could read in order to bring his knowledge of today into line with the yesterdays of war. The same thing is true of Marshall. Marshall is one of the most avid readers of military history that I know. The same thing is true of Nimitz. Of course, Nimitz sometimes made bad choices of his reading. He said to me one time for example, “Ah, Doctor, you never will know how grateful I am to you,” and he mentioned one of my books that he had read at Guam while he was in command there. I said, “How is that, Admiral?” “Well,” he replied, “every night after I had finished my duties I would go to bed and turn on the light and I would read for about half an hour of some of General Lee’s problems in dealing with his subordinates. Then, I would go peacefully to sleep, because I would reason then that General Lee’s problems of command were infinitely greater than mine were, and that I had a far easier time with my subordinates than he had with his.” I said, “Admiral, you never were more mistaken in your life; you had ‘cuckoos’ and some ‘prima donnas’ with you and I’ll not argue with you about that, but what put you to sleep was not peace of mind—it was my style.”

Know your stuff—know your specialty, know the background of military history. Know it so that when the man comes to you and says, “What do I do in these circumstances, with this weapon, with this gun?” you can tell him, and if you don’t know and want to be a leader, then for Heaven’s sake tell him honestly, “I don’t know.” A man very seldom loses the respect of his men if he says he doesn’t know something when he can demonstrate that he knows something else, but look out for that man who tries to bluff about his knowledge.

I was dealing one time with a very tough audience and I happened during the course of my remarks to say something about Iwo Jima. I didn’t think I was doing so hot myself. I wasn’t getting on so well, but when we came around to the question period, some man way back in the audience said, “Doctor, you have been talking about Iwo Jima; would you mind discoursing for a minute on what you think of the tactics of small landing parties as they were employed at Iwo?” I said, “I don’t know a thing in God’s world about it.” I saw my audience was very much relieved from that minute. If you don’t know, say so and try to find out.

Know your stuff. Now that means a lot in the way of the utilization of your time. And, it means a lot in the way of utilization of a Navy wife or an Army wife. You boys think have a hard life to lead. You don’t have any tougher life than the life of a Navy wife. And both the Navy husband and the Navy wife need to learn all they can, when they can. I’d like to give you a little motto on that question. I gave it to one of my historical secretaries. She happens to be the one who came up with me this morning. She said it was the must useful thing I’d ever told her. It came from Oliver Wendell Holmes, a justice of the Supreme Court of United States, who should have been chief justice. Holmes would get a boy from Harvard Law School every year and that boy would have one year as Holmes’s law clerk, a magnificent training, out of which in their generations have come some of the best lawyers in public service in America. And one of the favorite things that he would tell these boys was, “Young man, make the most of the scraps of time.” Now believe me, if you want to know your stuff and know it better than the other man, you’ve got to spend more time on it, and if you are going to spend more time on it, you’ve got to make the most of the scraps of time. The difference between mediocrity and distinction in many a professional career is the organization of your time. Do you organize it, do you make the most of the scraps of time? Bless my soul, I don’t suppose that the admiral with his dignity and justice and regard for all the amenities says “no” to you about playing bridge, but there is many a man would have three more stripes on his sleeve if he gave to study the time that he gives to bridge. Don’t say that you have to have the recreation. You have to have enough recreation, but diversification of work is the surest recreation of the mind. You don’t have to go and forget the whole world. You have to work different brain centers and that is all you need to do. If you do it you get the recreation and out of the recreation you will get the training. Write it down, my young seamen, my young mariners (I love the word “mariner”)—write it down. Make the most of the scraps of time.

If we have another war, which Almighty God forbid, and I know not one single leader in the armed services who does not say Amen to that—if we have another war it is going to be a highly technical war, but the older principles of leadership will stand. Number one will remain—know your stuff.

I have not a record of a single American soldier, a single American admiral who, when all was said and done, was not proficient in the knowledge of his specialty. Don’t think the time spent at schools is lost either. Professional training for war is a categorical imperative of efficiency. In history, I believe I knew General Lee’s brigadier, major, and lieutenant generals pretty well. I think I have written about most of them, however poorly. Of all that company there were only two who became distinguished division commanders who had not had professional training.

This idea of the inspiration of the soldier is nonsense. The idea that out of the great body of our people, you are going to get soldiers of high eminence—there is absolutely nothing to it. If you require professional training to save the lives of men in peace, and you call the man who does it a physician—are you not likewise called upon to have professional training for war in order to save the lives of men in war? And that man you call an admiral or you call him a general. Professional training is worthwhile. The best money that ever was spent on the Navy of this country has been the money that was spent here at Newport. I don’t believe any man can contradict that.

Know your stuff—and be a man. That is number two. Be a man. We have had some leaders in American history who may not have been all they ought to have been in their regard for some of the amenities of life, but I never knew a great American seaman, I never knew a great American soldier, or read about one, who was not fundamentally a man. And that means a man of character; it means a man of industry; it means a man of fair play. We were talking at the house of the president of this college a little while ago about the matter of courage. And the admiral said to me, “Doctor, have you ever found in history any process by which you can tell whether a man is going to show courage in action?" I said, "No, you never can; I don't believe you ever will. If we do, it will be thousands of years hence and by that time, please God, we may have sense enough not to fight wars." But this is a fact—the type of courage that keeps a man from turning his back on his adversaries and running away is one thing. That is not so uncommon. But the type of courage that is shown by a leader who will take his part of the load in all circumstances—that's a much rarer type of courage.

What is the coward? Who is the coward in the high rank? He is not apt to be a physical craven but he is a man who sometimes tries to pass onto the other fellow the more difficult job and won't do his own. You take that great captain of the state from which I have the honor of coming. You can see beautiful stories of the physical courage of Gen Robert E. Lee. I never go to Washington from Richmond on Highway No. 1 that I don't see the house where he was standing one day on the porch, with a glass of buttermilk between the table and his mouth, when a round shot came within four feet of him and shattered the lintel of the door. You can see the place there today, and it was said that no man observed a quiver when the glass went to his mouth. I have read the story of how he conducted himself on that bloody field of Spotsylvania Courthouse. That is fine, but if you want to see what courage is, what the real test of the man is, you read Lee's farewell to Jackson on 2 May 1863. When Jackson, called upon to make the great turning movement there at Chancellorsville, was asked by General Lee, "What troops do you propose to make this movement with?" Jackson said, "My whole corps, sir." Lee then had about 50,000 men. Jackson wanted to take 28,000 of them, put in motion around the flank and leave Lee 22,000 men with which to face the Federals while Jackson was out of action and making that movement around the flank. Lee could have said, "Why those are impossible figures. Take fourteen thousand men, and leave me enough at least with which to defend this line against these seventy-five thousand Federals here in the wilderness." Not so. Lee knew what concentration of force meant; Lee knew the doctrine of superiority of force at the point of contact. Lee had the courage to take his chance in order that his comrade might have superiority of force for difficult offensive operations. In that, gentlemen—and it is repeated gloriously a hundred times in American history—in that you see what I mean by the word courage. What I mean by the words: be a man.

Aye. Be a man who is disciplined in spirit. Be a man who is observant. How many fine persons there are who go through this world. Never forget and, as God gives me might, I shall never fail on a lecture to mention Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox—Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox and his observation of a string over the shoulder of the Federals in that same battle of Chancellorsville. Remember Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox? What a name. Cadmus had his orders, "You move when the Federals do. You've got one little brigade here; you are holding Banks Ford and when they move, you move." Cadmus went out the next morning early. (Every good seaman ought to be out early. People talk about what you ought do for the redemption of the American people. American people need nothing in this world more than they need to get up earlier and go to bed earlier.) Cadmus Marcellus got up earlier than most men, and he went out and looked, which a great many people never do, and over Banks Ford he saw that Federal sentinel walking his post, another and another down the line, in plain view. Well is there is nothing uncommon about a sentinel walking his post, is there? But Marcellus wasn't content with that; Marcellus took his glasses and he looked at that sentinel who have been thinking about anything under the sun other his military duties; and Marcellus observed that over the sentinel's shoulder there was a string, and behind that sentinel's left hip as he looked at the end of the string was his haversack. And Marcellus looked at the next sentinel and he had on his haversack and the next and the next and Marcellus said to himself, "Those birds are getting ready to move because if they were simply in camp they wouldn't have on their haversacks and their haversacks wouldn't be full. They have got their rations on them because they are getting ready to move." He ordered his artillery hitched, got his infantry in position and within 15 minutes after those Federals started their withdrawal, Marcellus was in the road and he hadn't gone three miles before he had the great opportunity of his career to stop a Federal offensive.

Observation! Be a man, not a blind man. Might as well go down in the engine room and stay there if you are not going to look and see.

Last of all, the third point. Look after your men. Look after your men. What a simple thing you are saying, Rip Van Winkle! Here, you have three-fourths of the brass and nine-tenths of the brains of the American Navy before you and you are saying that leadership is three things and you have listed those things so simply. Know your stuff—be a man—and look after your men. We came a long way to hear you, Rip Van Winkle, and is that all you have to say? Yes! That is all, because that is the sum observation of my travels. Look after your men.

I mention to you the fact that, as a youth, I saw those gray columns moving up the street and I heard the clatter of cavalry 40 years after. I saw those men who had thrust through the wilderness, those men who had stood at Second Manassas, and those who had climbed the hill at Gettysburg and had their red banners with them until 22 of those flags were there on one acre in the Federal position. I saw them; I knew many of them, and often I asked them, "Tell me, that great man who is our southern demagogue, this Lee, what was there about him that made you reverence him? What was there in him that made you tell us that next to the love of God and His Son, there had to be reverence for him?" An incredibly simple answer, my friends, they gave me. "Oh," they said, over and over again, "he looked after his men! We knew that when he demanded anything of us, it was because he had to. And when he said, 'Men, you must take that height,' we took it, because we knew that was the cheapest thing to do." He looked after his men. So did the lieutenants—some of the men to you unknown. Did you ever hear of the name of John R. Cooke? Some of you did; just a brigadier general in the Confederate Army. I remember him well, an old man running a grocery store, an unprosperous grocery store. He had in his head the most beautiful bullet hole you ever saw in your life. He must have been hardheaded—it never cracked his skull. One day when he was in his thirties he was commanding two little regiments at Sharpsburg. On his left early in the morning something had happened. Something had gone wrong even with Stonewall Jackson, and the flank had been swept back. The Federals were at the Dunker Church, and Hood's great Texans, the Grenadier Guard of the Confederacy, were panting in the woods. The tide swept around to the center of that segmented battlefield. There an impression was made, not too deep. Cooke stood there, a little salient—two regiments; and against his fire, with the supporting artillery around the Dunker Church, a Federal corps broke itself in vain. During the fight Longstreet sent word to him and asked him if he wanted help, and I am told that of all the classic cussing that as been heard in the American Army—and the American Army sometimes casts reflections on its adversary's ancestry back six or eight generations—there never had been heard such words as those that Cooke sent back. "Give him help! Not until every man he had was pursuing through hell the last Yankee in front of him!" Or words to that effect. I said to myself, "What is in that man? What made that Twenty-seventh North Carolina regiment that way? This Third Arkansas—Arkansas is a good state, good fighters. They have some mighty long-winded politicians among them, but what made that Third Arkansas regiment do that? And I took the pains to go back and I found that from the time that Cooke had taken over that regiment (he had been a captain in the regular army before the war) he had done everything he could to tell those men, "I am going to demand the maximum of you and I am going to do the maximum for you." He held them to the highest standards and he did for them everything that a man could to protect them from casualties.

Look after your men—it means many things; it means many things that you don't think about. It means mail facilities; it means food. General Lee, no matter how much impoverished his commissariat was, never failed to increase his men's rations after they had won a fight. Hot food is one of the greatest builders of morale in the history of war. Looking after your men means looking after their clothes. I was telling one of the officers today how much how much emphasis George Washington laid on the cleanliness of person. That great builder of morale, that same Lee, when he got his men out of a dirty campaign always tried to put them by a stream where they could wash. And the most valiant men were the men who, if they needed it, got the new uniforms. Look after your men and your men will look after you. I don't believe there has ever been an exception to that dictum.

I said one day to MacArthur, "You know, I think when I come to write the history of your campaign, there from the Solomons northward, one of the things I am going to find most difficult to understand is how you did so much with so little." Well he lighted his corncob pipe for the 453d time that afternoon, and made the 17th oration that he had delivered to me that day, and he said many things that were absolutely true and sound. And we talked about his casualties, about how few there were in terms of what was done. I said, "Difficult as it was, you looked after your men." And I quoted him some of the things I told you. He said "Well, if there was economy of life, it is something for which"—and he dropped all his theatrical manner—"something for which I will be grateful to the end of my days." He said, "When I thought about the number who were killed, nothing could console me except the thought that maybe by God's grace and hard effort we had saved some that might otherwise have been slain." He is a tall man; he got up and walked the floor as he sometimes did when he spoke, but believe me he grew taller and taller in my eyes as he spoke those words.

Gentlemen, have I oversimplified this case? I think sometimes we overcomplicate it. I think sometimes we take these books on psychology, we take all the arts of salesmanship and we try to apply them to the armed services in a manner that is too elaborate. I don't believe I'm oversimplifying when I say to you, know your stuff, be a man, look after your men.

Remember, you may in God's mercy have had your day of battle. You who were there in the Arctic night—you who flew across the hump—you who went from South America to Africa—you who fought those submarines up and down our coast—you who went out from Pearl Harbor never knowing whether that submarine would come back again or whether your burial place ever would be known to men—you who were in the supply service—you who were in the battlefield—you who had the immortal honor of serving with Spruance, with Kinkaid, with Halsey—you may have had your day, you may live until over it all comes the glamour of the years and you may tell the tale so often that you'll hardly be able to distinguish the fabric from the embroidery. Such things happen. On the other hand your challenge may lie ahead—the era of atomic warfare may bring us problems vaster than anybody ever faced before.

I covet but one thing for you and that is, if you come to the final day which must for America always be the day of victory, I covet for you nothing more than that in the day of victory you can say with a clear conscience what was said by the vanquished as he rode back through those thin gray ranks across the red hills of Appomattox one day in April 1865. The men knew that something had happened because he had been in the midst of the Federal lines. They broke ranks, they thronged the road, they gathered around him, they put up their hands. "General!" they said, "General! Are we surrendered? General! Give us another chance, we'll fight them now." He said, "No, my men. I've done for you the best that I knew how to do." Your nation demands of you no less than that; your conscience should ask no more than that you do your best.

The Challenge of Leadership

Brig Gen Robin Olds

Gentlemen, I am happy you asked me to participate in this "Frontiers of Leadership" program for a number of reasons. Although I do not possess advanced degrees, as many of you do, I feel that I have some relevant experience in this area. In our service they don't give you degrees for your ability to exercise the intangibles of leadership; they give you ribbons.

There are a wide variety of leadership positions in our Air Force—positions of command, positions of staff, as well as very responsible positions such as agency, or staff head; I am referring to jobs that do not carry with them the authority to say, "So-and-so is appointed commander of X, Y, or Z outfit; so-and-so, relieved." And for as many different positions as there are in our Air Force that call for somebody to be the "honcho," there are so many different people who vary widely on an emotional, physical, educational, and experience basis who fill those jobs. So getting the right man-job match is extremely difficult, and I agree with Fiedler[1] that you can't really compare kumquats and oranges. The proof of the pudding is whether the man gets the job done, not really in how he does it. This is certainly true from the military point of view.

I think our Air Force has come a tremendously long way in the past 25 years. On the question of leadership and command, the officers left over from World War II either proved themselves or got out of the service. I think we have matured as a service. I think the people that we have following along today are better men than were their predecessors, en masse.

I've been privileged to go to the Air University, to talk to the Air War College, the Air Command and Staff School, and the Squadron Officer School. Naturally, in talking to these different schools within the Air University, you pitch your talk at a slightly different level to each student body. But the difference is slight as they are all interested in and engaged in the same leadership problems. They are all part of the same organization; and by and large, they have a pretty good feel for what is going on. I found the younger officers full of questions, and darn good ones. The older men were a little more set in their ways, not quite as curious, more resigned to what is happening to them, and more assured in the direction they want to go. I must say, many seemed pretty well aware of how far they can go, which in itself is a very interesting observation. I wondered why; but I am certainly not going to stand before this group and make an analysis because I haven't come up with a good answer, certainly not an answer that wouldn't be challenged immediately by you. So what I would like to do this morning is to talk a little about some of the theories of leadership as I see them as a practicing leader.

My qualifications for standing before you today are possibly the result of pure luck. Although I really don't believe that, it establishes a nice degree of humility. I became a leader the easy way. I was one of the 40 young men that went over with a squadron in 1944 and joined the Eighth Air Force in fighters. I was one of the original 40 that joined the squadron; and by the time we were completing our first tour, there were only eight of us left. That made it pretty easy for me because in those days the personnel people had the lovely habit of promoting you, if you were qualified, into any vacancy that might arise. I went from assistant flight commander to squadron commander in something like eight months. That also meant that I went from first lieutenant to major too. Now you can call that luck if you like, but there was something that made me survive. There was also something that made me qualified to be chosen to command that squadron. That is the thing I can't put into words, although I shall try a little later on.

Frankly, I was very grateful that the war ended when it did; otherwise the orders that had already been cut promoting me to lieutenant colonel might have been issued. Even at the tender age of 22, I had the good sense to realize that this was perfectly and absolutely ridiculous. So I went home knowing that I could do a job as a combat squadron commander; and believe me, it wasn't all just flying. I was responsible for a little more than I am responsible for today, namely mess, discipline, transportation, maintenance, personnel, and so on. In those days the squadron commander had it all. He even had his own communications section.

That may give you pause for thought, gentlemen; but it is quite true. As a 22-year-old major I had more authority than I do today as a 47-year-old brigadier general—more direct authority. If a man goofed, zap! You took away a stripe or two. On the other hand, if he performed well and you had a vacancy, you promoted him. Fiedler covered this in different words in his article. He called it authoritarian—he didn't use the word dictatorship, but he almost said it—which, to him, typifies the military in a combat situation.

To get to the meat of the thing this morning, I want to say that I disagree partially with Fiedler. I think the words that he has used here are just jim-dandy, fine; however, he sets up the situation and then proves his theory—and it just ain't that way! You can't take a high LPC (score on the

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Least-Preferred Co-worker scale) and a low LPC and say this is it! The one score means the individual is an authoritarian; and the other means that he is a democratic sort of laissez-faire, free-rein type of leader. I would flunk the test. I feel that Fiedler has established a situation which is all black on the one hand and all white on the other. I would suggest that when he is here, you people challenge him to study the Air Force leader. He focuses on two clusters of behavior and attitudes. One is labeled autocratic, authoritarian, task-oriented; and the other is labeled democratic, permissive, and group-oriented. He says the first type is frequently advocated in conventional supervisory and military systems. Of course, he qualifies it when he says "frequently." He doesn't say "always." I realize this, but I suggest to you that it just isn't that simple. For instance, he talks about leadership behavior and leadership style. The former is how the leader engages in directing others—or specific acts, that is, how much consideration he gives his subordinates, what praise, what kicks. This is leadership behavior, and the style seems to be "Why he does what he does." In other words, what is his basic motivation—to step on others? Is he task-oriented or group-oriented? It is more complex than that. It just isn't that simple. In my estimation, gentlemen, a good leader combines all of these—and more!

Fiedler goes on to say that the high LPC is relationship-oriented, has close personal relationships with members of the group. A low LPC on this test is task-oriented. He will step on anybody, and he gets his kicks out of getting the job done successfully. I don't quarrel with the words, but it is shallow—because a good leader combines the two. You've got to relate to your people. You get your satisfaction from the knowledge of having successfully performed the task assigned to you with the resources given but in order to do it successfully, you must relate to people.

Fiedler seems to say in no uncertain terms that experiments comparing the performance of both types of leader have shown that each is successful in some situations and not in others. I don't quarrel with that. No one has been able to show that one kind of leader is superior or more effective. But when he gets down to the point that leaders are not born and that anyone can become a leader—if he learns which types of situations are favorable to his personal leadership style and chooses to exert leadership in these situations—I can't buy that. Again, this is putting forth a situation and then working around it to prove that it is true. In the first instance, I don't quarrel that leaders are not born. I would like to say that perhaps they are lucky, that they've got something. They do have something; they've had the finger put on them. Because how many men have the opportunity to take advantage of situations favorable to their personal leadership style? Well, perhaps it's the guy whose daddy owns 52 percent of the stock in the company. He's got time to go to school and learn how to be a leader in that situation, but God help him if the company merges with another one. He's out.

Look at the people in the Air Force. Look at yourselves, gentlemen. What are you asked to do? You are asked to lead in peacetime, and you are asked to lead in wartime. You are asked to lead in the Pentagon; you are asked to lead on an airdrome; you are asked to lead on the mountain that has a radar station on it. In short, you are asked to lead in every conceivable type of situation except the one in which you have absolute authority, because you don't have it in the Air Force.

I have journeyed too far afield and into too many things that I know little about. I merely wanted to say these things to you to give you my reactions to a very well-written article and one that gave me pause for a lot of thought.

Another thing in your outline that caught my imagination was your attempt to teach the cadets an understanding of formal versus informal authority. I envy you every moment of the classroom time you spend with cadets discussing subjects like this because they are fascinating. Formal versus informal authority—that is really the greatest trick of the century nowadays—to fulfill a command position and to understand the limits of your formal authority and the horizons of your informal authority.

I mentioned a few moments ago that as a 22-year-old major I had more direct authority than I have today as a brigadier general, and that is true by any standard of measurement. Formal authority has been stripped from today's commanders. You must perform and command within the confines of a shelf full of regulations, a room full of manuals, and a warehouse full of technical orders. And this is to say nothing of the ever-present and ever-watchful eye of the inspector general, staff judge advocate, and the local director of personnel. You just do not possess the degree of formal authority oftentimes essential to the performance of your mission.

For instance, what are the inherent responsibilities of command or leadership? It used to be that first you fed your horse, then you fed your men, and then you looked out for yourself. These are pretty good words really. Translated into today's vernacular it means that given a mission, given the resources, and the facilities, a leader must first concern himself with the training, the welfare, the care (blankets, beds, building, beans), and the morale and the discipline of his troops. If they lack in any of three aspects, you cannot perform the mission. You can continue to launch attacks on Hill 307 as long as you've got two men left. You can't launch the first attack with a full platoon if your men aren't properly trained, disciplined, and of good spirits, and properly led. So this is the first inherent responsibility of a leader.

Does this call for an authoritarian or a democratic, free-rein type? I'm not sure the question is even a relevant one because it doesn't matter who has the job or what his leadership style is, he still has these responsibilities. How does he react to them? How does he react when he finds that his lack of formal authority—which, believe me, is absolutely essential in securing the right reaction from his troops—works horribly against him? He relies heavily on informal authority.

For instance, how does he deal with discipline problems? You cannot properly, quickly, and with complete impartiality discipline a recalcitrant. I've always tried to tell any subordinate commander I ever had working for me that you don't punish the culprit for his own good; you punish him for the good of the command. The men in your unit, collectively and individually, demand justice. Anyone who gets away with something, believe me, is a chink in your armor, is a chink in your authority, is a chink in your image.

It used to be that a commander could put a man in the pokey for a week, even the officer of the day could do that. He can't do that anymore. Now it takes the approval of a major force commander. In the meantime this guy and his acts have wrought a pernicious influence on the good of the command.

Now I didn't mean to rant and rave about our lack of formal authority, but I am saying that what it does is place supreme emphasis on informal authority. By informal authority, I don't mean circumventing regulations, or the Uniform Code of Military Justice. But you do have to play your game; you have to exercise your leadership; and you have to command in a very different way. I want to make it very clear right here and now that I am not saying this lack of formal authority is bad. As a matter of fact, I think it is rather good because it has, in our service, tended to eliminate the absolute autocrat, the guy who has no qualifications other than the insignia on his shoulders, the man who does not fit any definition of a leader. It has made people use their wits and their ingenuity, and I think it has brought to the surface (please, I am not speaking personally) the very best in our Air Force officers because it is a challenge to command with these difficulties placed in your way.

Now what is informal authority? Well, for one thing, informal authority is the word that goes around the base. Usually the commander is surprised at the authoritative value placed upon as simple a thing as his name spoken by someone else. Now that may not be his given name or his surname. It could be the "old bastard," or the "old man," or the "chief," or the "boss," or whatever you choose to call him; but there is a very definite aura of authority associated with the commander's name.

You will find, for example, the technical sergeant who is the chief warehouseman will exhort his workers to greater efforts in stocking, binning and recording, and keeping the place policed up by using your name. He'll say, "The old man is coming around tomorrow; now get with it." Boy, zap, zap, zap, everybody gets with it. The same thing with getting a mission off. The bird isn't ready; and according to normal procedures that are all laid down in stacks of books telling you how to do it, it would take two days to get that aircraft back in commission. So the supervisor says to the Indians, "Men, we need this bird for tomorrow night's mission. The old man just told me so, and I think he is going to fly it himself." And zap, zap, zap, it's ready; and off it goes!

Now we could go on for a long time talking about this informal authority. Believe me, it is an all-pervasive force within a command. How many times here at the Academy have you heard "The superintendent said . . . ."? How many times have you questioned that statement? Who said he said? Did you hear him? Nope. You may never find the source. It could be Dick Davis.* He knows what the superintendent thinks. He doesn't say, "He said." He says, "The superintendent sort of likes it this way." By the time it floats down here and over to your shop, "The superintendent said." Right? It's true.

Now I don't want to preach at you; all I'm doing is recognizing the fact that informal authority does exist. And it is very, very important! But as a corollary, it is absolutely essential that the man who is in a position of command understand informal authority. It can be horribly abused by ambitious staff officers and subordinates. It can get you into trouble faster than anything I know. It also places the requirement upon you to recognize that this is happening and to be prepared to take advantage of it. Recall the warehousemen who really had the place in beautiful shape; they were proud of it. You know it's because of *you* they did it. They did not do it because they like to put little boxes on shelves and write a lot of numbers on a card that goes into a machine. They did it for you. So, by golly, you had better make sure you go around there and look at it and find a little bit wrong with it if you possibly can and just praise the hell out of them. And do this as a regular practice everywhere in your command—everywhere.

Of course, you realize I am talking about something as simple as a military command. Last year I was asked to talk to a businessmen's executive club meeting at Scottsdale, Arizona. I was very flattered to address this group of gentlemen. The night before I read very carefully the brochures and the autobiographies of each of the men in attendance. They made no bones about it. There was a pecking order, and the worth of each of the industries or companies was right there in black and white. One man would have a company worth $25 million. There was another one there worth $500 million, which I thought was pretty interesting. So I sat down that evening and tried to figure out the worth, the intrinsic value, of a fighter wing. The more I pondered, the more things I thought of on that base for which I had really been responsible. When I stood up to give them my talk, I informed them of what the firm I had just run was worth; and I gave them the round figure number. They laughed when I reported my executive salary. That set the stage for my thirty-minute speech.

I would like to try to get down to the specifics of leadership instead of generalizing. I am just going to say what I feel, and you can tear it apart. Instead of talking to you about the principles of leadership or the techniques, or theory, I want to tell you a little about the practice. Even this is a very difficult subject.

Your effectiveness in a position of command is determined by you, plus your mission, your situation, where you are, the status of the unit that you take over, and the circumstances that prevail. Remember, it's you plus these factors. You must adapt yourself, even your personality, to suit what's needed from you or of you as a commander. Having assessed this hurdle, maybe intuitively, maybe objectively, the next thing you had better do is find out all you can about your people, individually and in work groups or task groups. How is their morale? How effective are they? Do they work well together? Have you got any problem areas? Remember that it is your personality and even your reputation that they are now going to look at very closely. In order to accomplish the mission, as

*Deputy chief of staff for personnel, USAF Academy.

a boss you've got to have a lot of guts, or courage, or faith—anything you want to call it; it all equates to the same thing.

You have to have the courage of your convictions. You have to have the courage, the faith, and the guts to delegate authority. You have to have the courage and the fortitude to punish, when punishing is necessary—and you had better understand exactly when it is necessary and act swiftly. You have to have the good sense to praise when praise is due. You have to have the guts to exercise authority that frankly may not even exist; but if you act like it does, you exercise it. You have to have the courage to allow your subordinates a lot of swinging room because when you assign that responsibility, you have to delegate some authority. Unless you make that subordinate *feel* responsible for the job that he is doing and give him the authority to do it, the job may not get done. He is going to make mistakes; he might get your neck in a sling, so to speak. But you, in my estimation, are next to nothing as a leader if you don't give your people a job and say, "O.K., now go do it. Here is what you need to do it with—here are the people, the facilities, and the resources."

By the same token, you have to supervise, you have to manage, you have to watch. Don't stand on their toes. That's a terrible mistake, because you might just as well do it yourself. Believe me, if any one man thinks he is as smart as a whole collection of people, he is out of his mind.

I want to explain one of the techniques I have used in taking over a flying outfit because I could get away with it (I don't pretend that I measure up to what I am about to say, but some of you in the audience may not know the difference). In Thailand I had never been in combat in an F-4. So I just told the truth—gathered them all in and said, "O.K., I'm new. I haven't the vaguest idea what's going on here; and I expect you men to teach me, every one of you. That goes for the supply officer, the electronics officer, the communications officer, the engineering officer, materiel guys, club officer, special services, every one of you. You are going to teach me, and I'll fly 'green 16'* until I know as much about your job as you do. And when I know as much about your job as you do, look out because then I start getting nasty, terribly arrogant, and superior. I may even tell you how to do your job, so just stay ahead of me. Make sure you know more about it than I do."

Then you follow up. You had better, by golly, go around and have each guy tell you what he does and why and what his purpose is; and then ask him, "How do you fit into the whole?" The special services man probably never thought about it that way, or the club officer, or the motor pool maintenance officer, or the dispatcher in base operations. What you are doing is starting to mold them and weld them together. Each one feels that there is not a wheel that rolls down the runway that isn't his direct interest and something that he contributed to directly. Boy, if you can get those troops to feeling that way, you've got them. And it isn't difficult really, providing the circumstances are right.

What are some of the qualities that a leader should have? Mind you, I am speaking from a very limited background so my remarks are oriented a little bit more toward operations than they are toward other aspects of our services. By failing to cover the whole broad spectrum, I'm not ignoring anybody; I just plead ignorance.

What qualities must a leader have? I think he must have bearing (these are all written down; I didn't think of them), courage, decisiveness, dependability. You know all of these things: enthusiasm, initiative, judgment, integrity, a sense of justice, knowledge, loyalty, tact, unselfishness. You know them because they're right out of the dictionary, right out of the manual. You better have a whole lot of all of these and a tremendous amount of some of them. Any failings that you have as a personality, a human being, in any one of these qualities, you better cover up with a plethora of capability in the others.

Some men think that to be a good leader you have to be popular. This is so fallacious that it is absolutely unbelievable. Any man who thinks this way is doing the Air Force and himself a disservice. You are not running a popularity contest. You are there to command a unit, to perform a mission. It takes every man in the unit to perform that mission, including you as a catalytic agent. After you have taken care of your equipment and your facilities, *then* know your mission. Whatever the situation demands, you better make sure that you maintain good order and discipline through whatever talents you have. You train those men, equip them, house them, feed them, motivate and lead them. You must instill discipline, the right kind of discipline, and a high sense of duty and personal and individual responsibility. Willing obedience, not obedience through fear, stems from spirit, pride, and morale. If you do these things, I'll guarantee that you'll perform your mission well.

Each man in your unit, I said earlier, must feel that his job is necessary. I submit to you that a leader, whether he be in industry, in the Air Force, or in any other place, must make sure that everyone knows exactly where he fits and that he is necessary to the output of the whole. Sometimes your actions in this respect will be grossly misunderstood and misrepresented. Let me give you an example.

At my base in SEA I made it a rule that any man who was lucky and shot down a MiG would come back down that runway and do a roll on his return. This wasn't fighter pilot bravura as some people thought. I didn't make the rule for the benefit of the pilot. I didn't want to satisfy a childish inclination for showing off, a "Hey, look at me." I did it for every airman on that base, because I wanted to make sure each airman felt that that victory was his. It reached the point where, after a good mission, almost every airman on that base came down to greet the returning aircraft because he wanted to, because he was part and parcel of that mission and felt it in his heart.

I would like to talk a little bit about loyalty. This is a very difficult trait of leadership for some. When I speak of loyalty, I mean loyalty first to something that is almost passé in many circles today, loyalty to country, the symbolism of your flag, the meaning of your oath of commission to protect and defend the Constitution, not the president, nor the secretary of defense, nor even the chief of staff—the Constitution. That's your oath. That's where your loyalty lies. It's loyalty to your

*Last aircraft in the formation.

country, to everything it stands for, everything it is today and everything it better be in the future. That is what you are fighting for—working for. You've got to believe in everything that is good and hate everything that is bad. Of course, you make that choice yourself. You can't go wrong, far wrong, by listening to the chaplain a little bit and the dictates of your own conscience, your own upbringing, and your own heritage.

You must give loyalty to those above you—that means loyalty also to the men on the staff in the headquarters just above you. I don't mean a kind of deliberate, calculating, "What's in it for me" type of loyalty to those hard-working staff types, I mean *full* loyalty. Get to know them as people and work with them, not against them. If you don't, you have made one of the biggest mistakes you can make in your career. Sure they are all idiots, but so are you. They are hard-pressed, dedicated, wonderful guys, working under a situation of stress that you, the commander, sometimes can't even appreciate.

In one outfit over in SEA, loyalty was purely internal. This was fostered by the commander and his staff. The men of that wing were told they were the best, the bravest, and the smartest. Everyone else was wrong; they were always right. No one else could do the job as well as they. This was common knowledge in the whole unit. Didn't they tell themselves constantly that this was so? Therefore, it had to be right. They owed loyalty to no one but themselves. Such mass ego-pumping is not uncommon, but it is always dangerous in any organization and almost invariably leads to serious trouble. In this instance, the unit hushed up a monumental goof, to the ultimate embarrassment and international discredit of our government, and all because of a warped sense of loyalty.

One other subject I would like to discuss with you just briefly is the process of taking over another unit on any level. A few minutes ago I talked about the popularity business, and then I trailed off on another subject. I would like to return to it.

The first thing a new commander must do—the new officer boss or whatever—is to get the attention of his people. He can do it in a lot of different ways. First, he must assure job output—mission accomplishment, mission capability, or whatever you want to call it. If he is not sure that the unit he has taken over can handle this task and is fully capable, then he should shore it up. This is the attention-getting step. By doing this, he is going to earn respect or hatred, depending upon his personality and methods. He may be thoroughly hated, but he could care less about that. As long as he is fair and has the other traits of judgment, unselfishness, and so on that we discussed earlier, this will earn him respect; and out of respect, gentlemen, will come loyalty. He may still be disliked, but I doubt it. He's got that loyalty. Once he's got loyalty, it's a "piece of cake." He has obedience that is willing and spirited. He has to hold them down now, not kick them. He has built good morale and high spirit, and everybody absorbs that "can do" attitude.

Popularity is the last attribute a leader should ever seek. It is the least important; and if improperly placed on the priority list, it can certainly be the most damaging. All of you know that you have to be consistent. You have to praise when praise is needed and correct when corrections are called for.

A leader also has other responsibilities, and these are to his subordinate leaders. A good leader ensures that the people to whom he passes authority and responsibility properly fulfill their roles in turn. He works with them to be sure they are properly oriented toward their mission and job, that they are fully aware of all the facilities and means available for accomplishing that mission, and that they receive the assistance they need to do the job.

You have to demand of your officers, for instance, adherence to standards. If you see an officer walking down the street and an airman does not salute that officer and the officer doesn't do anything about it, I suggest you walk up to that officer and say, "What the hell's the matter with you? Didn't you see that airman fail to salute you? Why didn't you do something about it?" If he answers, "Well, I don't know," then you had better get rid of him, because he is not on your "ball team." He let that airman down, and he let him down badly in a military organization. I suggest the same thing is true in a corporate setup where men fail to say good morning or fail to follow the normal courtesies of human relationships.

What I'm saying here, gentlemen, is that you can't let your subordinates, the officers, and NCOs give up their own sense of responsibility in their positions of leadership. They can't pass the buck up to you. You've got to keep that "buck" well spread. In spite of the fact that there is a dearth of formal authority backing the movement of each of your subordinates in the chain of command, you've got plenty of informal authority.

I suggest also that a leader must be a leader whatever his job may be, and this is where I perhaps quarrel a little bit with Fiedler. He makes it too easy—it's too much this way or too much that way. Each of us knows in the military we have a wide variety of jobs, and any one of them may fall our lot. If we rip our knickers in any one of them, we are never going any further in the Air Force. So the great challenge to the military man is to be a "jack of all trades" and good in everything. Our system is designed to make allowances for the fact that we do have this variety of jobs. How, I don't know. I'm not sure it was even thought out, but it is built in. The system makes allowances. This can be illustrated in an assignment to the Pentagon.

When you report to the Pentagon, you are given time to learn your job. You go through the three stages. First, you are a "polyp," then you are a "raging bull," and finally you become an "elder statesman." Nobody expects any thing out of you in the "polyp" stage—not even where the nearest men's room is located. Leaders in the Pentagon know that it takes time to learn the ropes; and when you get to the "raging bull" stage, they make allowances for that also, in most cases. I know this system motivated me. I moved from the basement to the joint staff. When you are an "elder statesman," you've really got it made; and you can count on having three or four tours there during your career.

What are the things that you the leader must try to be? I suggest that a good leader must be his own severest critic. You know it if you are leading well. You know it if you are doing a good job. But if you ever think that "you've got it made," if you ever think that everything you are doing is just absolutely apple pie and ice cream, then it's time for you to move on.

If you are doing the job well, don't be afraid of the ideas of your subordinates, or be afraid to admit it when it is perfectly obvious that you've made a mistake. Admit it any way you like. You don't have to admit it openly, but let them know that you know you goofed. With their help you can pull yourself out of it. I guess what I'm trying to say is that you've got to be authoritarian, and yet you've got to be democratic. You've got to use people, but you've got to be human. You've got to know your job, which means you've got to know your subordinates' jobs to the best of your ability. If you know their jobs, they'll be more interested in them.

Finally, I think you must be psychologically prepared to fail along the way and to get "hung," because in the final analysis that's what the leader is for. He's the scapegoat because he's responsible. When you take on that position of command and walk grandly onto the base and see your name and title plastered on a sign out in front of headquarters, get down on your knees and ask for a little guidance and a little help because you're going to need it. I guarantee those of you who take over that squadron, that air base group, or that wing—or any job where a piece of paper says you are the commander—I guarantee that within the first month your accident rate is going to go up. It never fails to happen. I guarantee that your incident rate and your disciplinary rate are going up too. I guarantee that some clod is going to run a truck over the commanding general's staff car, or some idiot is going to prang one of your airplanes. I guarantee it! So you better be prepared. You had better know these things are going to happen and be prepared the day you arrive. I know; I've had all of these experiences.

I pity the man who takes over a squadron or a wing that has an unblemished accident record stretching back for three and one-half years. I wouldn't want a job like that for anything in this world. In the first place, there is no such thing. There were some things going on in that wing that were wrong. There must have been some slightly shady reporting—some little cover-up. The systems that were in effect because of the forceful personality of the outgoing leader are going to fall apart when he leaves. So in you come, thinking how wonderful it is that you finally are going to command your own wing. The first thing you know you are going like this (down) because the airplanes are falling out of the sky, and all sorts of other things are happening.

I can't close without something being said about the rewards that come from being a commander. The greatest reward you can have is when you have severely disciplined a young fellow (you're a 29-year-old lieutenant colonel, commanding a little base), and this guy is a bad apple. O boy, is he a bad apple; and you very severely disciplined him. You are way out in the boonies, so your methods of discipline are a little bit different when the inspector general is not sitting there looking at you. When his enlistment is up and this young man is about to leave, he storms his way into your office and stands there with tears in his eyes and thanks you for what you did for him. He's going home now, and he's going to be a far better man for the four years he has just spent in the service. Gentlemen, that's when you get a lump in your throat and you realize what leadership is all about.

You taxi out on a mission for which you have been preparing for a couple of weeks, and you note the overtime work of the guys that have already been working ten hours a day for seven days a week. One bird is sick—but the airman is determined it's going to go. He doesn't know where or why or when, but it's going to go. He's out there for something like damn near forty hours without sleep working on that airplane of his. So when you taxi out, he's lying on that hot concrete under the blazing noonday sun with his head on a wooden wheel chock, out, dead to the world, absolute exhaustion; but his bird has gone. And his bird knocked down a MiG-21 that day too. That's a reward of leadership, gentlemen.

You see all the heartache, all the responsibility, and all the frustrations have not been in vain. You see that everything falls right into place, and you are a happy man. You have all the rewards and all the success that you could possibly ask for as a leader.

The moment comes when you have to depart a job. The situation is charged with emotion because you are a pretty emotional type, as much as you didn't want the guys to know it. They give you a parade, and the airmen come running across the ramp just to shake your hand, to say goodbye. And, buddy boy, if you don't have to go to the men's room at the club when the guys carry you in on their shoulders and hide from them for 15 minutes or so, you aren't human. Those are the rewards of leadership.

Notes

1. Fred Fiedler, "Style or Circumstance—The Leadership Enigma," *Psychology Today,* March 1969.

Section 8

Understanding People's Needs

Interpersonal **Dimension**



A Winning Combination: Leadership and Teamwork

Col Ian R. Cartwright

In any future war, commanders at practically every level are going to find it extremely difficult to impress their personality on events once their troops are in contact with the enemy. Operations are expected to be highly mobile and fought by small, self-contained combat teams with weapons which can produce a firepower and shock effect hitherto unknown. These operations will demand excellent command communications in order to achieve the mobility and flexibility necessary to beat a numerically superior enemy. Yet any communications system must be vulnerable if not to enemy electronic warfare then to electromagnetic radiation following a nuclear attack.

If a formation commander cannot control his subordinate tactical units by radio, he will have to depend on the initiative, determination and leadership of his subordinate commanders to follow his prepared contingency plan and act within his overall directive for the operation. Formation commanders will have to impress their personality and their ideas beforehand and then, during the battle, demonstrate complete trust in the ability of their battalion and company commanders to win. At battalion and company level, the leadership and professional qualities of a commander will be more severely tested than ever before as he maneuvers his command to bring to bear his maximum combat power against the opposition at a time of his choosing.

In 1945 Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery described leadership as "the will to dominate and the confidence to inspire." If commanders are to be successful in the future, they will have to dominate and inspire their subordinates in peacetime because there will be precious little scope for it during the crucial initial stages of the war. A commander is only going to be able to dominate subordinates by impressing on them his personality and views beforehand. Whereas, "inspire" could be understood to suggest developing a relationship of mutual trust and self-confidence which would be expected in any successful team, be it in war, in business or sports.

In fact, military success is so dependent on teamwork that a good battalion or company can be compared to a successful sports team. The coaches and training staff have little real influence once the game starts. Their main input is in the preparation for the game. They will have studied the opposition in great detail and, knowing their own weaknesses and strengths and the personalities involved, will have planned their strategy to win the game. They will have developed their tactics to counter the opposition moves. And they will have trained the team, subunits of the team and individual players in their respective roles until they are well drilled in exactly what is required.

However, the difference between a good team and an outstanding one is "flair"—stereotyped play can be predicted and will be beaten. The good trainer must allow scope for individual flair within his overall plan, but he must remember that a team of stars can always be beaten by excellent teamwork. The coach will have selected those individuals for key positions who have the necessary skill to execute his plan and who have the intelligence to understand exactly what he wants to achieve and how they fit into his overall plan.

A good military commander must, therefore, do the same. He must decide exactly what his purpose is; he must know his enemy in detail; he must know the ground he is to fight over; and, then, knowing the capabilities and limitations of his command, he must plan his operation. He can then dominate his command with his personality when he outlines his plan and ensures that every subunit and individual knows what he expects of them. But, if he is to succeed, he must remember that if his plan is too rigid, it will almost certainly bog down—he must allow scope for the individual flair and initiative of his subordinates. What, then, makes a good planner into a successful commander and leader? Inspiration!

A commander who lacks self-confidence in his own abilities will never inspire the trust and respect of his subordinates. Nobody can be expected to follow a leader he does not trust unless he is motivated by fear or curiosity—both very temporary expedients. To develop that special trust, a commander must win the loyalty of his subordinates. Their loyalty will follow very naturally if the commander offers his undivided loyalty to them in the first place.

At company level and below, the commander may find it easier to lead— to impress his will and to inspire—because he will always be in much closer personal contact with his soldiers. As would a captain of a sports team, he will be on the field with them. He will have to prove his competence to be a member of the team and that he has that little extra required of a leader.

If we are to prepare ourselves to win the next war, I suggest we approach it exactly as if we are preparing for a major sports competition. I recommend that, whenever it is feasible, a commander must be able to select his immediate subordinates (and staff officers). He must select them knowing they possess the experience and the potential to understand ex-

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actly what they are required to do and have the ability to do it. He should, however, remember that it will always be prudent to keep some incumbent team leaders. If he changes a complete level of command, it will take time for him and his new team to establish a relationship with those below them.

The commander must develop a special relationship with his subordinates so that mutual trust and confidence can be achieved. He will need to coach and train them, but he must expect mistakes. If the same mistake is repeated too many times, it suggests that the player does not have the intelligence or skill to appreciate the problem, and he should then be offered up for transfer. But it will be beholden on the commander to ensure his views and instructions are clearly understood, or mutual confidence will not develop; he will not be dominating his subordinates. A commander (and his staff) must be able to produce clear and concise verbal and written instructions. A commander must train himself and his staff to do this.

Particularly at company level and below, the commander should he a "player" as well as captain. He must prove his professional individual skills while proving he has that little extra demanded of the captain. Unless he can prove his professionalism, he will not win the necessary respect. But, in the heat of battle, survival may play a more decisive part than leadership; an individual soldier may be more motivated to fight for himself and those he identifies as his immediate team.

In peacetime, we must make certain that every soldier feels he belongs to a team. Constant moving will make him feel an individual, whereas if he identifies himself with a team or group, he will be more effective. This team spirit can be developed at work and at play—competition fosters interest and a team spirit. It should be introduced at all levels of command. Team games can be used to foster team spirit and an esprit de corps and also to promote fitness. Unfortunately, too many times, only "the gladiators" are catered for.

If games are to be used to best effect, they must be organized so that everyone is involved. For example, in a battalion, if an inter-platoon competition is organized, ideally it should be on a league basis and include several games to be played simultaneously. The competitions could include volleyball, basketball and orienteering. This way, every man in the platoon will be involved.

Another way to foster team spirit is to encourage junior commanders to take their command away on an independent mission, for which they must plan and make all arrangements. This mission could be to a training area or an adventurous training expedition. If the commander is inexperienced, it will be essential that his plan is checked out by a senior officer; otherwise, a disastrous plan could have quite the reverse effect.

However, no really successful team was built overnight. In every professional sports competition, the outstanding team has been carefully built up over a long period. The players are encouraged to feel they have joined a family. They work hard together; they become friends; and they learn to trust each other and their bosses. Then, they go out and beat the opposition.

I know quoting Montgomery is not very acceptable in the US Army. However, in this case, I have deliberately used his words to develop a theme. I believe we could lose the next war if we rely too much on management and place too much reliance on technology. Soldiers win wars—not as individuals, but as a team.

Leadership Principles for the Successful Company Grade Officer

Capt Hardy J. Sellers III

As an Air Force officer, you will be in the company grades for more than half of a 20-year career. The leadership you develop as a company grade officer is analogous to the foundation of a building. The size and strength of a foundation will determine how large a structure you can build. To support a large structure, the foundation must be solid and reinforced. You must have this foundation in order to handle the responsibilities of being a leader in the Air Force.

The art of leadership is really a composite of 10 common-sense principles. Your relationship to these principles is comparable to your relationship to the law of gravity; you do not have to like them, understand them, or believe they exist; you just have to suffer the consequences if you violate them. Let's take a look at these principles that will help you create a strong foundation for your future success.

Leaders Have a Positive Attitude

Your attitude determines your altitude. While this catchy phrase applies to flying, it also applies to life. Some of you might feel that ability or aptitude is the key to success, but it's not your aptitude or ability that determines your success; it's your attitude. Attitude is "knowledge charged" and it can be either positive or negative. While a positive attitude will allow you to soar with the eagles, a negative attitude will ultimately cause you to crash and burn. As a leader, you determine the attitude for your entire organization. Remember, no one wants to follow someone who is drowning. Be positive. You have a responsibility to look for the good, the silver lining, in all situations. Successful people look at potentially negative situations as opportunities to learn. A positive attitude can turn any negative situation into a positive one, giving your troops hope and encouragement. Henry Ford said, "If you think you can or you think you cannot, you're right." It's your choice; you actually choose your destiny. Do not be the person who, while telling the boss it cannot be done, gets interrupted by someone doing it. People are drawn to those with a positive attitude for leadership. Likewise, they are drawn to those with a negative attitude when they want sympathy. Your boss, peers, and subordinates will know more about you from your attitude than from your background or experience. As a leader, you must have a positive attitude. Never forget success is 98 percent attitude, 2 percent knowledge, and another 50 percent hard work.

Leaders Have Goals

A goal starts out as a dream. Woodrow Wilson once said, "We grow great by dreams. All big men are dreamers. Before anything great is ever achieved, it is born in the mind of a dreamer." Whether you are talking about a cure for AIDS, a new supersonic engine, or setting the world record for the high jump, these are examples of someone with a dream. Add a date to that dream and now you have a goal. All leaders are goal-oriented. They have a vision as to where they want to end up and a timetable to get there. Do they always reach their goal? Of course not, but a goal has an interesting characteristic. It has a magnetic effect, pulling dreamers along the path of self-improvement even if they never reach their destination. To decide upon your goals, you start out with a dream. How do you get a dream? You surround yourself with dreamers!

You quit hanging around the naysayers, and find some achievers. Read books written by and about those who excelled in life and you will find they were all dreamers. Once you have a dream, protect it as if it were the most important thing in your life, because it is. Best-selling author Napoleon Hill said, "Whatever your mind can conceive and believe, it can achieve." Those who have a dream will lead those who don't. Thoreau said, "Dreams are the touchstones of our character." So if you want to be a leader, make sure you have a dream. Success is not an accident; it is a planned event.

Leaders Discipline Themselves

Self-discipline is vital for success. First you find your dream, next you turn it into a goal. Now all you have to do is roll up your sleeves and get to work achieving that goal. In order to succeed at anything you have to motivate yourself to push toward your dream. It is not your boss's job, your spouse's task, or the government's responsibility to keep you motivated. As an officer, it is imperative to have self-discipline. This means holding yourself to a higher standard, staying in shape even if you don't like to work out, and watching how you look in uniform (fork-to-mouth discipline), just to name a few. We have a tendency to judge others by their actions, but ourselves by our intentions. This will not work for a leader. We must be our own best example. What you do speaks so loudly others can't hear what you are saying. Success is an inside job.

This article was prepared especially for AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership.*

Leaders Encourage Teamwork

"Teamwork makes the dream work." As a leader, it is your job to encourage teamwork in your organization. TEAM stands for Together Everyone Accomplishes More, and it is part attitude and part structure. The attitude and structure must start with the leader. The entire organization must understand that it is a team, equal in importance and responsibility. The structure of the organization must allow different groups to work together, share resources, and most importantly, share the credit. Just as children learn from their parents, both good and bad, your organization will learn from you. If you don't consider your own organization as part of the bigger team, willing to pitch in for the overall good, don't be surprised when that same attitude becomes apparent within your organization. A rising tide raises all the ships. Teamwork is contagious! Make sure you are infected. True success in the Air Force is not a solo event.

Leaders Are Enthusiastic

Enthusiasm attracts people to you. John Wesley, the founder of the Methodist church, said, "Catch on fire with enthusiasm and people will come for miles to watch you burn." The enthusiasm of a group is determined by the enthusiasm of the leader. Be enthusiastic as a leader. You cannot light a fire with a wet match! If you want to know why there isn't any excitement in your organization, look in the mirror. You not only have to be enthusiastic, but you must look enthusiastic and speak enthusiastically. According to Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nothing great was ever achieved without enthusiasm." Success is something to be enthusiastic about!

Leaders Go the Extra Mile

The difference between ordinary and extraordinary is just a little "extra." If you want to stand out, if you want to be a leader, you don't have to work twice as hard, just give 110 percent. There is very little traffic along that "extra mile." H. Jackson Brown, author of the New York Times best-sellers, *Life's Little Instruction Books,* said, "A racehorse that consistently runs just a second faster than another horse is worth millions of dollars more. Be willing to give that extra effort that separates the winner from the one in second place." Leaders don't look at the minimums; how little do I have to do or how early can I leave work? They look at maximums. My advice: don't wait for the next job or more important tasking. Whatever you lay your hand to, give it all you've got. When the master retailer, J.C. Penney, was asked the key to success, he said, "Work half days, and it doesn't matter if it is the first half or the second half." Be prepared to work hard. Success is found along the extra mile.

Leaders Learn from Failure

Failure is not the enemy of success; it is the teacher of success. We learn more from our defeats than from our victories. However, this will only happen when we view our setbacks with this attitude. Henry Ford said, "Failure is only the opportunity to begin again more intelligently." You must look at these defeats, setbacks, and potholes on the road to success as what they really are—opportunities to learn. Once you can do this, you're on the road to success, realizing that failure is only a detour. No one wants to follow a leader who has never failed; such a leader can't relate. Lloyd Jones said, "The man who tries to do something and fails is infinitely better than he who tries to do nothing and succeeds." Hockey great Wayne Gretzky said it another way, "You miss 100 percent of the shots you never take." Failure is not the worst thing in the world—the very worst is not to try. The fortress of success is built with blocks of failure.

Leaders Have a Mentor

A smart person learns from his own mistakes; a wise person learns from the mistakes of others. You must learn from the mistakes of others; you can't possibly live long enough to make them all yourself. Do you want to be first through a minefield or do you want to follow someone who has made it through? A mentor is someone who has navigated a minefield and thereby knows where to step and where not to step. He or she has made both good and bad decisions; you can learn from both. You start with the energy and excitement; they give you direction and focus. Finding a mentor is crucial. You must find someone who has gone where you want to go, whether in career, family, or anything else, and then ask for his or her guidance. There are many successful people who are willing to share their knowledge and experience. It is quite an honor to think someone wants to follow in your footsteps. Ask questions, seek counsel regularly, and take advice. Success is easiest learned from the lives of successful people.

Leaders Understand the Law of Sowing and Reaping

You learned from parents, church, and the playground while you were growing up that what goes around comes around. So once you decide what it is you really want, learn to sow those seeds. If you want respect, then learn to sow the seeds of respect for others. If you want people to give 100 percent, then you must give 100 percent. Just as a farmer will never plant corn seed and get beans, you will never sow dishonesty and reap honesty. Too many times people hoard what it is they want, only to slowly lose it. Never eat your seeds. You must be willing to give away what it is you truly want. An organization gives back what it sees the leader giving. This can be time, commitment, and loyalty, or it can be laziness, sloppiness, and back stabbing. As the leader, you decide. What is it that you really want? Now, go give it away. To reap success, you must sow success.

Leaders Go on Faith

The Bible defines faith as "the confident assurance that what we hope for is going to happen." As a leader you must follow the above principles with the faith that they will bring about the desired results: better organization, improved morale, increased productivity, and/or a promotion leading to more responsibility. You cannot dig up the seeds you have just planted to see if they are growing. Realize that all you can control is your attitude and your action; the rest is out of your hands. Faith allows you to do that. Elmer Towns, cofounder of Liberty University said, “All great leaders have one common spiritual gift—faith.” Faith also allows you to see what can be before it occurs: the potential of a subordinate, a smooth-running organization, or a completed project. With a vision produced by faith, you can inspire those around you. People like to follow those who know where they are going. Faith is that confidence. Success is in the mind before it is in the world.

Conclusion

There is no skill involved, education required, or training needed to put the above principles into practice. It’s just a decision backed up with action. A decision to have a positive attitude instead of a negative one, to have your own dreams as opposed to working for someone else’s dream, to encourage teamwork instead of individualism, and to be willing to go the extra mile and not say “that’s not my responsibility.” You must decide to discipline yourself or you will be at the mercy of someone who will. Learn from your failures but do not let them keep you from trying, and always be enthusiastic. Never let outside events, other people, or lack of will power dampen your enthusiasm! Decide to find a mentor; do not just “hope” you figure everything out yourself. Decide to give of your time, talents, and resources; you will reap what you sow. And finally, decide to step out on faith. Trust in these principles—a small decision that will change your career, your personal and professional relationships, and ultimately your life. From these you can build your foundation for success. Godspeed on your journey.

Section 9

Communication

Interpersonal Dimension



Effective Writing: A New Millennium—An Old Challenge

Col Samuel E. Riddlebarger

As the twenty-first century begins, accelerating change is the most notable characteristic of civilization. Technology and society are evolving exponentially and interactively. The world, the nation, and the Air Force must cope with the new and the altered. Yet one challenge facing today's United States Air Force (USAF) leaders has not changed fundamentally—the overwhelming necessity of communicating effectively.

If you hope to succeed in the increasingly complex Air Force and American society, you must learn to travel the information superhighway. But to keep up with—not to mention pass—the traffic on that electronic avenue to advancement, you need the proper skills as well as the right equipment.

In a word (six, actually), you must be able to communicate. It will not be enough to know how to operate the machinery; you will have to know how to get the most out of it. To communicate effectively, one must think, organize, compose, create, speak, and write. Especially write. And good writing is a product of vocabulary, spelling, grammar, erudition, literacy, and other scholarly skills.

You may have the latest umpteen-megabyte Silicon Valley wonder device at your fingertips, but if you can't drive that marvel, you are going to stay in the slow lane. It's not enough to be facile in pulling material from the computer; you also must be adept at putting worthwhile thought *into* the machine.

Bosses want people who can create as well as operate. There are plenty of experts who can store and retrieve stuff. But where does all that stuff come from? And how good is it? Consider the *quality* of much of that verbiage flashing onto the screen. Much of it is pitiful: unnecessary, redundant, shallow, open to misunderstanding, and poorly composed. Bad spelling, capitalization, punctuation, grammar, sentence structure, and organization are common and reduce effectiveness. Sometimes unsupported assertions and outright claptrap undermine the material's credibility. Often there is too much emphasis on speed at the expense of worth. We need more *meaningful* information, not reams of crude, uncoordinated data. Sure, machines that spell, perform some grammatical corrections, translate voice into typescript, and search out relevant data can enhance speed, accuracy, and comprehensiveness; but those marvelous contraptions don't create the end product—you do.

So, can you? Technology is making available amazing tools and systems to enhance written communications, but without the ability to use words, you will not get the job done.

In recent years, much of the guidance on better writing in the Air Force has articulated a common theme: make it simple; avoid big words; keep sentences short; write the way you speak; be informal; write for your audience; use everyday language.

Baloney! (Is that sufficiently short and simple?) Get the fire ready; I'm a heretic. If the nation and the Air Force want better writers, I believe they need a smarter approach. The current game plan is taking us in the wrong direction, and the computer era is accelerating our slide down that dangerous decline.

Our society is losing the keys to advancing civilization: progressive reading and writing skills. Now, if you're not interested in what I have to say on this subject, stop here and read something else. No one reads anything unless he wants to (pleasure, curiosity) or needs to (profession, trade, business, personal welfare), a point I'll return to later.

After pushing a pencil for the Air Force since the mid-1950s from squadron swamps to Pentagon peaks, I've seen plenty of briefings and brochures on how to write more effectively (I have a full file drawer of them). Much of that guidance stressed simplified writing. And some of that advice came from ivory-tower types with little "combat writing" experience. My scar tissue says it ain't necessarily so; simpler is not always better. What you put into your paperwork and what you feed the computer need to be good.

Why must we write down? What's wrong with writing *up?* If, as some say, grade-level literacy is declining, why should we keep retreating instead of fighting to gain ground? As we continue to downgrade vocabulary, punctuation, spelling, grammar, formality, preciseness, style, and other aspects of good writing, we can look forward to communicating with grunts and sign language, while computers talk to one another.

Consider America's "eyesight" as the dawn of the Information Age breaks into full day. In 1986 a federal Department of Education official said, "We are creating a new nation of illiterates."[1] In an article titled "The Illiteracy Blight," *Publishers Weekly* called the situation a national crisis.[2] Another observer claimed that nearly 60 million Americans could not read or write adequately.[3] Have we stopped or even slowed the erosion? I don't think so. Studies and surveys continue to report that, although measurement standards and exact percentages can be argued, literacy levels in the United States are poor. "One-fifth of the population is functionally illiterate," says *Futurist* magazine in an October 1999 article, "The Demise of Writing," by Geoffrey E. Meredith, who pre-

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dicts that within 100 years "few people will want to read at all, and fewer still will know how to write."[4] "Well into the computer age, we discover that as a nation we are more communicative than ever but less articulate," says Stanley J. Solomon in *Modern Age*.[5] Assessing the impact of computers on literacy, Solomon concludes that "the further we distance ourselves from a tradition of fine writing, the more we place in jeopardy even commonplace business writing, losing not only the sense of nuance but even lucidity itself."[6] Why this ominous trend away from effective writing? Experience and logic tell me that we are emphasizing the wrong things. Why must writing be aimed at the fourth-grade level or the sixth or at whatever arbitrary benchmark? Why set ceilings? Why use the computer as an excuse for poor prose? Why promulgate "fog count" guidance that stultifies the writer's efforts to precisely express himself? (The Air Force says, "Aim High," but don't try that with a pencil in your hand.)

Let's get serious. If we want good writing, we will have to strive for it the old-fashioned way—by working for it. To handle third-millennium hardware, advanced aerospace concepts, and twenty-first-century societal development, we need commensurate writing skills, capabilities that are not acquired overnight.

By now some of you think I'm pushing the pedant's view: big words, fancy sentences, and copious ostentatious obfuscation. Wrong! I'm calling for a return to freedom and progress in writing. I believe in using the *right* word, not necessarily the shortest or longest. The most accurate term usually is the best. If the word has three letters and best represents what you want to say, use it! But if a bigger word more precisely or more persuasively communicates your thought, use *it!* Using the shorter word just because it's shorter is losing sight of your writing objective. Complicated subject matter is not going to become simple by being addressed by a bunch of one-syllable words—it's only going to get screwed up and thus will not be adequately or properly understood by the reader.

A good writer also needs a synonym now and then to avoid excessive repetition. Using *divers* in lieu of *various*, for example, may help hold the reader's attention (even if he thinks you left the *e* off at the end). A healthy vocabulary represents power, communicative power. Just as a great painter blends a variety of colors and strokes to create a meaningful image, the writer armed with a wide array of words and phrases can convey messages that move his or her reader. Our language is full of evocative words, and we ought to use them!

Furthermore, a more precise word can save time by taking the place of a phrase or sentence, thereby making the communication both sharper and shorter. If I write "anorak" instead of "a heavy jacket of a bulky material, with a hood," haven't I saved words? As to the argument that a reader may not understand the word *anorak*, let him look it up! Better writing is a two-way street. Readers have responsibilities too. Why are we so quick to blame the writer when a reader doesn't know a word's meaning? *Anorak* is used in a novel by an author who has sold millions of books.[7] Or how about the eminent news magazine that wasn't afraid to use the term *morganatic* to describe the marriage of Wallis Simpson to the Duke of Windsor?[8]

Just as short, simple words aren't always best, staccato sentences aren't always going to get the job right. Sentences may need to have more than three or four words. *I* don't like to read something written with short, choppy words and sentences; it often resembles a telegram or a computer printout, with the loss in subtle human communication characteristic of such transmission modes. Complex objects and thoughts frequently require complex words and sentences. Why should that surprise or discomfit us?

Society and the Air Force are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Do we really think that complicated equipment and systems can be managed with rudimentary language skills? If USAF members can't read and write adequately, how can they handle F-15s and advanced logistics systems? And legal documents concerned with subtle points of law are written the way they are because they must be as precise and unequivocal as possible, not because lawyers and jurists are playing games.

The long and the short of the writing function ought to be articulated as follows: use the right words and sentences—even if they are long rather than short.

The chiefs, colonels, and generals know that. When the hucksters tell you to straighten out the senior folks and get them to always write at the fourth-grade level, just remember that the general got to be a general while writing the way he or she does. As a veteran of high-level ghostwriting, I have learned that senior officials have reasons for wanting paperwork written their way; and if you don't give it to them that way, someone else will.

Put succinctly, if you think you are going to remodel sensitive, important, or complicated paperwork into McGuffey Reader language, good luck! Writing is usually hard work, and you're not going to become proficient or successful by taking shortcuts.

We are advised also to write for the audience (despite increasing illiteracy?). Well, as I've already asserted, readers need to hold up their end too. There are only two reasons why you ever read anything: interest and need. In neither case must the writer compromise his meaning because of possible deficiencies in potential readers. The writer's *primary* allegiance should be to his subject, not his audience! (How's that for heresy?) If the author is preparing a nursery rhyme, common words are consistent and appropriate. If the topic is the metaphysical connotations of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra,* grab your reference books.

My experience says that good writing requires a definite degree of loyalty to the subject. As for the reader, if she picks up something to peruse for pleasure, she's on her own. I like to read Will Durant, and the reality that I sometimes have to consult a dictionary or an encyclopedia is no deterrent. Mr. Durant was true to his themes, subjects, and objectives; he didn't compromise to accommodate a Virginia mountain boy's limited vocabulary. The point is that it's *my* choice to read Durant, so it's *my obligation* to know or learn the inherent language.

Likewise, if the material is pertinent to one's job or personal life, the reader ought to know the appropriate terms and concepts. When I had to deal with the sometimes abstract and convoluted intricacies of a theater war plan, I had to understand the terms and rationales outlined, even when those key elements were expressed in less than pedestrian words and phrases.

We may have our thinking backward when we insist the writer is wrong because the reader doesn't understand. Before you light the fagots at my feet, let me say that I'm not advocating overwriting. I'm suggesting that we shouldn't underwrite either. Furthermore, I do not deny that some Air Force writing needs to be simplified, only that all of it can or should be.

To cite an example of overemphasis in this regard, a few years ago an Air Force writing manual (a good one, for the most part) criticized the following sentence: "Request this office be notified when your activity's supply of paper clips falls below the 30-day level." The manual suggested that "Let us know when you need more paper clips" would have been better.[9]

I don't agree, for several reasons. First, the original sentence was close enough (see Tip 2 in the attached guide). Rewriting a memo concerning paper clips is wasting time. There wasn't that much wrong with the original version. (Don't call *me* a pedant if you are the kind of nitpicker who would revise a reasonably comprehensible statement regarding a trivial matter.)

Second, the revision doesn't pass the stupidity test (see Tip 1). Do we actually believe that folks won't ask for more paper clips when they need them unless we send them such a memo? When I was a pilot, I didn't need a flight order cautioning me to land when I needed more fuel. The manual's revised memo is rhetorical, a waste of time, because it only states what the reader already knows.

The third problem with the rewrite is the most serious and goes to the heart of my theme in this essay. The revision significantly *changed* the message, making the communication less precise and therefore less informative (see Tip 4). Who defines "need" in the second version? Sergeant Bilko may order a two-year supply of paper clips, just to be safe or for trading, even though he has enough on hand to last six months. The point is that the original version said something, contained specific, useful information (it apparently established a 30-day policy on paper-clip inventory) and therefore was arguably worth preparing. By trying to be simple and informal, the revision lost sight of the message to be conveyed.

Another so-called good-writing pointer that disturbs me is the suggestion that we should write the way we speak. I don't enjoy conversations laced with "you know," "like, man," "uh," and "I mean," so I certainly don't want to read such drivel. Granted, language is an evolving body that adds new cells (words, phrases) and sheds old ones, but slang can be carried too far. Serious communication, especially writing, must retain a minimum level of formality to remain effective.

If many of us were to write the same way we speak, the written word would constitute a new Tower of Babel. These two modes of communication, speaking and writing, are distinctly different.

The spoken word immediately disappears and is subject to misinterpretation. Even when recorded, statements can be misunderstood. Speakers use mannerisms, tone, body language, inflection, and other techniques like dramatic hesitation to help convey the message; and visual recording still requires the viewer-listener to correctly assess these nuances. I supervised a USAF project that obtained tape-recorded interviews of individuals who served in the Southeast Asia conflict, and those tapes had to be transcribed into typescript (including every "uh," "you know," and "I mean") before they could be used for official purposes.

Since they can't be seen or heard in the literal sense, writers function in a more sterile environment. But the written word typically reflects more careful study and analysis, more reasoned thought and judgment, and more organized resultant form; thus it can be better absorbed, understood, and evaluated; it also puts down a footprint and lasts. (Important in this regard, computer print such as E-mail resembles speech more than writing, in that it tends to be extemporaneous and informal. In essence, computer communications use technology to make conversation synonymous with writing.)

All in all, speakers can be especially emotional and moving, while writers can be particularly logical and efficacious. Nevertheless, as the eighteenth-century French naturalist Buffon observed, "Those who write as they speak, however well they speak, write badly."[10]

Having criticized certain guidance on better writing, I've risked appending some suggestions of my own for improving Air Force pencil whipping.

Good writing, I am convinced, has three fundamental characteristics: substance (important information, serious statements, relevant material—worth); clarity (organized, sequential, appropriate words and sentences, using precise and meaningful terms—communication); and force (style, originality, format—impact). And you will not acquire these writing skills by reducing your printed prose to the "see-Jane-run" level.

As for winning the paper (or computer overload) wars in the twenty-first-century Air Force, the following "Heretic's Guide" provides some brief tips (learned the hard way!) that I've used and added to over many years of blue-suit writing and teaching. These hints may help you. Try them; you'll like them and reap substantial rewards. And concentrate on the *subject* when you write.

We need better writers in the Air Force, not better data retrievers. And we need readers who are more erudite, not writers who are less literate. Perhaps books will go the way of the buggy, something seen only in a museum. I hope not. If savoring a mystery novel by the fire becomes as archaic as churning butter, life will have lost something for me.

Meanwhile, remember, the mission of the Air Force is to "Fly and Write!"

THE HERETIC'S GUIDE TO BETTER AIR FORCE WRITING

1. Is this paper necessary?
   - Does it pass the "stupidity test"?
   - Don't contribute to the "paper mill" or data overload.
   - Pick up the telephone or walk down the hall.
   - Avoid CYA files. (Most MRs are sissy.)
2. Use the "close enough" rule.
   - All paperwork is not equal.
   - If it's routine, don't sweat grammar, spelling, punctuation, neatness—and longhand may be okay.
   - Speed may be more important than perfection.
3. Clocks, chiefs, and colonels won't wait.
   - Don't waste time arguing about the suspense.
   - Forget the old cliché "Do you want it right, or do you want it on time?" (The boss wants both.)
   - Avoid overcoordination. (Don't ask for opinions you don't need.)
   - Late can mean useless.
4. Audiences don't come first.
   - Readers have responsibilities too.
   - Concentrate on the subject.
   - Say what you mean.
   - "KISS" with care. (Cavemen were not good writers either.)
   - Use the *right* words (even if they aren't the smallest ones).
5. Get to the point.
   - Make the first sentence count.
   - You aren't writing a murder mystery.
   - But don't forget the "beef."
6. Longhand shouldn't be shorthand.
   - Scribblers never win.
   - Reasonable penmanship saves everybody's time.
   - Learn to write legibly, especially if you work in the medical field.
7. Get a dictionary and use it.
   - It's the writer's best friend.
   - Don't guess; look it up.
   - That spell-check function won't always save you.
   - Search for synonyms.
   - Experience the sweet spell of success.
8. Proofread or perish.
   - Double-checking isn't sissy.
   - A tight paper builds credibility.
   - Don't develop good prose and then submit trash. (To win the race, you must take the last step.)
   - Don't blame the typist or the computer; if it's your paper, it is your responsibility. Learn to spell "assumption."
   - Murphy was an optimist.
9. Don't get too cute.
   - Be judicious with abbreviations, acronyms, parochial words and phrases, and jargon.
   - Don't change nouns into verbs.
   - Be cautious with humor, sarcasm, subtlety, alliteration, and their cousins.
   - Slang can be lazy writing.
   - If uncertain, decide in favor of formality.
10. Clean up the common, telltale mistakes.
    - Who, which, that—use the right one (if you have to use the word at all).
    - Principal/principle, affect/effect, complement/ compliment, farther/further, credible/creditable, ordinance/ordnance, capital/capitol, inter/intra, discreet/ discrete, lay/lie, imply/infer, continually/ continuously, blond/blonde—learn the difference.
    - Promiscuous pronouns will get you in trouble.
    - Misplaced modifiers confuse the reader.
11. Build and use a reference file.
    - Recognized dictionary.
    - Synonym-finder or thesaurus.
    - Grammar guide.
    - World almanac.
    - *Tongue and Quill* (AFH 33-337).
    - One-sheet writing aids (punctuation, capitalization, numbers, possessives, and so on).
12. Keep learning; keep trying.
    - Writing is the most important skill in getting ahead.
    - You build walls and literacy brick by brick and word by word.
    - Develop a positive attitude, a striving to be better.
    - Bring passion, integrity, and skill to your writing.
    - Read!
    - Write!

MORE ON THE HERETIC'S GUIDE

Tip l. Don't create paper or data that isn't needed or to tell people things they already know or to cover your behind. Maybe a phone call will suffice. And most memos for record just clutter files.

Tip 2. Treat paperwork according to its importance. A statement for the base commander to promulgate on Memorial

Day should be worded precisely and typed impeccably. On the other hand, a note to the boss reminding her that today is her husband's birthday doesn't have to be Shakespearean in composition or prepared on flawless letterhead; it's the basic message that matters here, not the nuances or appearance. Save time for important writing by not dawdling over routine stuff.

Tip 3. Respect suspenses. Sometimes they're not reasonable, but don't waste half your time arguing about the deadline. The boss usually (not always) has a valid reason for the short fuse (maybe someone else didn't produce). If you must complain, do so *after* you get the job done. If the wing commander needs the paper in two hours and you don't come through, you may never get another chance. And don't try to get everybody to agree with your words unless you have to; remember, coordination often means only to alert certain offices, not necessarily to get their concurrence.

Tip 4. Consider and respect your subject, your objective. Don't become so engulfed in "Write for your audience," "Check your fog count," and "The paper is no good if the reader doesn't understand it" that you forget what you're trying to accomplish. Good writers get good by making their prose (words, sentences, style, length) fit their subject. Don't ignore your audience, but think about your topic and goal. Use the proper word! Those who read for pleasure are on their own; and those who read for professional or personal reasons have an obligation to learn the pertinent terms. The clichéd admonition, "Keep it simple, stupid," known as the "KISS" rule, if overworked can produce documents so generalized and simplified that they are more stupid than simple.

Tip 5. Don't beat around the bush. Tell readers quickly what your paper is all about. Don't make them read it all to find out. The first sentence should be short, simple (but accurate), meaningful, and in the active voice. The body of the document can then etch with more detail, rationale, background, and precision—because you must provide the "beef," the necessary support. Don't go overboard on length, but don't underwrite either; you can *underwhelm* readers as well as overwhelm them. In short, consider the possibility that only the first sentence will capture the reader's full attention (it may determine whether he reads further), but make the *entire* paper worth reading.

Tip 6. Take the time to write legibly! Handwriting is atrophying in these days of the computer keyboard, but it hasn't disappeared or become less important. The medical profession continues to learn that unreadable scribbling is deadly and costly. And the chicken scratching that Air Force secretaries and horseholders have to ponder over is disgraceful. You are a worthless writer and a sorry supervisor if your penmanship is poor.

Tip 7. Let a dictionary help you. You will be a better writer if, as you compose, you verify meaning, check spelling, and seek synonyms (to provide variety). You are not in a spelling bee; it's fair to look up the word. The computer has not made the dictionary obsolete. That spell-right crutch will not keep you from stumbling. Will the machine know whether you meant "bare" or "bear" (I couldn't "bare" those revelations versus I couldn't "bear" those revelations); whether the sheep "was" crossing the runway (one woolly) or the sheep "were" crossing the runway (several woollies), or whether you simply used the wrong word (even if you spelled that word correctly)? If you ensure that you've used the proper word and spelled it right, you've saved time and avoided possible grief. (Did you use "principal" when you meant "principle"? No one will know if you checked it to be sure, but everybody will know you didn't if you mess up the usage and the secretary doesn't catch your carelessness.) And don't risk alienating the reader by being too lazy to consider a synonym for a word you use over and over. Bottom line: vocabulary is like a savings account; as you add words you build compound interest and, oh, what you can buy with that interest!

Tip 8. Read what you sign or prepare! And read it carefully. The refusal to proofread is an inexcusable problem in the Air Force and society (just watch television, read a current novel, or surf the Internet—the typographical mistakes, distorted grammar, and crude composition are disheartening). The boss isn't going to blame the typist or the computer if there's a glitch in your paper. If the document is important (remembering Tip 2), don't weaken the impact of careful composition with careless proofreading; if the words are spelled wrong or put together poorly, the reader may conclude that your thinking and message are just as error-filled. On the other hand, if the manuscript reflects meticulous preparation, the credibility and reputation of the writer are enhanced.

Tip 9. Use the right words, but eschew shorthand. Humor and other informal approaches, jargon, acronyms, abbreviations, verbs formed from nouns (or, worse, from abbreviations), parochial slang, and such artifices are effective communication shortcuts in some situations (mostly oral), but don't get carried away. Wit is wonderful when it works. Nonetheless, cute may be perceived as cavalier. Unless you're writing a comedy script, be careful with irony, facetiousness, satire, and other avenues along the light side, especially in this age of heightened sensitivities. You may think you were clever; your reader may not. Clarity is the goal, not a short, snappy message that misses the mark. And the reader's responsibility to know pertinent terms can be abused: "I PC-Sed from that Sierra-Hotel homesteader base because I got a flesh-peddler in my six and had to E-and-E a seven-day opt so I could ice a fogey that put me into a better sleepy-hollow situation." Don't go there!

Tip 10. Don't continue to make the typical mistakes that brand the poor writer. Pick one problem or weak area each week (or even one a month) and take the time to learn the correct usage. You will enjoy the increased respect your writing will receive. Those who know when to use "affect" instead of "effect," or that "consensus" is proper (not "concensus" or "consensus of opinion") will get more opportunities to use—and benefit from—their writing skills. Learn to differentiate between words often incorrectly used interchangeably (is your writing style "classic" or "classical"?). And keep your modifiers and pronouns under control. "Pilot praised as instructor crash-lands new fighter." (Say again?) "Sam's dad died when he was 28." (Who died?) Yes, there may be certain rules of grammar that apply in convoluted cases ("Either Sam or the Shea sisters were behind that trick," but "Either the Shea sisters or Sam was behind that trick."), but will the reader know those more obscure rules? When you correctly use "lay" and "lie" (even if you don't care to learn the difference between a transitive and an intransitive verb), discerning readers (like your commander) are impressed. Sure, you may need an hour or more to clearly grasp one of these examples, but, once learned, consider the time (and the rewards) you will save over your career. If you can handle confidently just the terms listed here in Tip 10, most of your writing competitors will disappear from your rearview mirror.

Tip 11. I've had a file like this since the 1950s, and I've used it *a lot.* Keep the dictionary current (I buy a new one every few years). A good world almanac is a gold mine of useful data; get a new one each year. The Air Force Handbook (AFH) 33-337, *Tongue and Quill,* is a fine guide in preparing Air Force paperwork. The writing guides provide quick answers for everyday questions. If you develop the habit of using these references, you will spit-shine your writing.

Tip 12. Never stop trying to be a better writer. If you do, don't expect promotion. Writing is the one skill indispensable to advancement; ignore it at your peril. The ability to do Immelmanns with a pencil will get you a lot more than the ability to do them with an airplane (and I've done both!). Writing skills can be acquired through practice; conviction and honesty come from within and will show in your prose. And the more you read, the better you will write. All in all, the effective writer is the individual who realizes that there is always more to learn—and goes for it!

Notes

1. Robert Barnes, "Losing the War of Letters," *Time,* 5 May 1986, 68.
2. "The Illiteracy Blight," *Publishers Weekly,* 24 May 1985, 27.
3. Jonathan Kozol, "Dehumanizing the Humanities: Scholars and Adult Illiteracy," *Education Digest,* December 1985, 6.
4. Geoffrey E. Meredith, "The Demise of Writing," *Futurist,* October 1999, 28–29.
5. Stanley J. Solomon, "Artless Writing in the Age of E-mail," *Modern Age,* Summer 1998, 322–23.
6. Ibid., 319.
7. Lawrence Sanders, *The Fourth Deadly Sin* (New York: Berkley Publishing Group, July 1986), 33.
8. "The Woman Who Cost a Kingdom," *Time,* 5 May 1986, 39.
9. John C. Smith and Maj John R. Grellman Jr., *Plain English, Please!* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1982), 43.
10. Georges Louis Leclerc de Buffon, quoted in *The Age of Voltaire,* by Will and Ariel Durant (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), 574.

Effective Communication: "If Anything Can Go Wrong, It Will"

Lt Col William S. Pine
Lt William R. Bauman

One of Murphy's best-known laws suggests, "If anything can go wrong, it will." Given such a grim prognosis, the Air Force needs leaders who can communicate effectively with their people, helping guide them by the many pitfalls that can stand as obstacles to the goal. Thus, it makes sense that we understand how communication and leadership interact to get the mission accomplished.

Not everyone is a leader, and those who hold leadership positions are not necessarily effective in their roles. Likewise, all organizations communicate, but perhaps not efficiently. As future leaders, it is important to examine our own communication abilities. Granted, communication is a complex process, one that requires some basic understanding. However, we must always work toward improvement—always asking, "could we do it better?"

The Air Force anticipates, rather than reacts to, Murphy's Law and potential communication problems by offering a variety of educational programs. For example, all four levels of Professional Military Education offer communication instruction, with special remedial programs available. The USAF Academy's Executive Writing Course receives acclaim throughout the Air Force as well as in civilian organizations. At the base level, commanders recommend their personnel complete the USAF Effective Writing Course. Thus, the Air Force expenditure of resources underscores the importance placed on this vital area.

Almost everyone knows about Mr. Murphy and his laws, but you may not be familiar with his Finnish counterpart, Osmo Wiio.

Wiio devoted years to the study of organizational communication and set forth four laws which Gerald M. Goldhaber shares with his readers in *Organizational Communication.* It is here that Murphy and Wiio might help us in a unique way by alerting us to the pitfalls associated with the communication process.

Law 1. Communication usually fails—except by chance. It appears that we don't do a very good job of communicating—with sometimes devastating results. Our newspapers tell of increasing divorce rates, the alienation of youth from parents, and general mistrust between the American people and their elected officials. On an international basis, there is continued political instability, rising inflation rates, and the ever-present impact of increasing oil prices. While not a panacea for these problems, effective communication could lead to improved understanding between people and a better interpersonal or group relationship. As Murphy said, "Nothing is as easy as it looks." Law 1 has four corollaries:

1.1 If communication can fail, it will.

Like dropping a piece of buttered toast on the carpet, Murphy's research indicates that the chances of the buttered side landing face-down are directly proportionate to the cost of the carpet! It seems that just when we need communication to be exact and understood, it falls short of its mark. The cause could be our indifferent attitude toward the communication process, the subject, or our faulty perception of the intended receiver.

1.2 If communication cannot fail, it, nevertheless, usually does fail.

There is always the potential for misinterpretation, misperception, typographical errors, or other barriers to effective communication. No matter how we might try, our efforts will not always succeed. Maybe the situation is similar to that of the general's aide who, believing the routine morning arrival of the staff car had indeed occurred, stated as such to the general without first checking. When the general stepped to the curbside and, found no car, the aide began explaining how he had assumed everything would be in order. The general responded, "If you assume the car is here, then get in!" The initial communication process had failed, the aide blundered, but the general's communication was very clear.

1.3 If communication seems to succeed in the way which was intended, it must be in a way which was not intended.

The familiar saying goes like this: "I know that you believe you understand what you think I said, but I am not sure you realize that what you heard is not what I meant." Sometimes, we don't understand the directions given us, but don't want to appear "dumb" in front of the boss or our peers. Too often people accept a task and quickly set off to get the job done, while not really knowing what it was they were supposed to do. That's probably what happened to the pilot who radioed, "I'm lost, but I'm making record time."

1.4 If you are satisfied that your communication is bound to succeed, it is then bound to fail.

Your best chance of beating this one is to be clear in your own mind concerning what you want to say. Careful planning should be a part of your communication event. Remember,

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too, to know your audience. Your choice of words, emotional appeals, and even your personal appearance communicate, or can blur your attempt to communicate, so you can't overprepare. Murphy warns, however, that "It is impossible to make anything foolproof because fools are so ingenious." Give it a try though. You might get lucky!

Law 2. If a message can be understood in different ways, it will be understood in just that way which does the most harm. Another Murphyism: "Left to themselves, things tend to go from bad to worse." There are so many reasons communication can fail, it just makes sense to work that much harder to be sure that all we can control is working for us. That takes time and effort. Remember: "A shortcut is sometimes the longest distance between two points."

Law 3. There is always somebody who knows better than you what you meant by your message. Too often we are guilty of anticipating what someone is about to say and immediately engaging our thought process in our reply. Trouble is, we stop listening to what the person actually does say, sometimes resulting in confusion, misinformation, and misunderstanding. We do not know what other people will say before they say it, because we are not them!

Law 4. The more communication there is, the more difficult it is for communication to succeed. Beware of information overload. Be more selective in your communication and realize that more is not always better. An anonymous cabinet member of President Warren G. Harding's administration purportedly said, "When he stands up to speak, battalions of words march from his mouth and scour the countryside in search of an idea; and when they find one, they promptly trample it to death." Remember that too much information can be as ineffective as too little information. A good rule to practice is, "keep it simple."

You might begin to think that effective communication is almost an unattainable goal. No matter how much we try, it probably won't be enough. Of course we can't anticipate all the potential barriers to effective communication. However, to be effective leaders, we must work hard to master the skills involved in this complex process. You'll find that the extra effort you put into communication will be worth the time and effort! As Murphy said, "Everything takes longer than you think."

Leaders Communicating Effectively

John A. Kline, PhD

The value of leaders communicating effectively is demonstrated daily in all organizations. Indeed, since 1938 when Chester Barnard concluded that communication was the main task of managers and executives, leaders have emphasized improving communication in organizations.[1]

Years later a study by Dr. Dan B. Curtis and others supported what previous studies by other researchers had found: Effective communication skills are tantamount to the success of an organization.[2] Results of that nationwide survey and later ones led Curtis to conclude that chief executives and other senior leaders place the highest value on effective interpersonal communication because they know that productivity depends on effective communication.[3]

Commanders and supervisors must communicate effectively. Air Force military and civilian members must be informed. But not only is communication down the chain of command important, subordinates need to keep each other and their leaders informed. In other words, to be effective, communication channels need to be open down, up, and throughout the organization.

Effective communication is especially important to Air Force leaders. In a study of over 500 leaders from a variety of Air Force organizations, Dr. Richard I. Lester found that ineffective communication was rated as the number one concern.[4]

The primary responsibility for communication in any organization rests with those in leadership positions, since subordinates take cues on how to communicate from those above them. What, then, can we as leaders do to improve communication in our organizations?

Establish the Working Climate

The first step in improving communication is to provide a good working climate. Nearly four decades ago a leading authority on communication and leadership, W. Charles Redding, said, "A member of any organization is, in large measure, the kind of communicator that the organization compels him to be."[5] This fact is no less true today. And one of the most compelling factors influencing communication is the organizational climate imposed by the leaders. Three basic climates might be labeled (1) dehumanized climate, (2) overhumanized climate, and (3) situational climate.

The Dehumanized Climate

For years, many organizations were founded on the model of a master-slave relationship. Certainly, the military has not been exempt from this kind of thinking. The work of Frederick W. Taylor in the early part of the twentieth century is often associated with the dehumanized climate.[6] Taylor has been credited with suggesting a leadership philosophy that neglects human relations in the workplace.

The basic assumptions of the dehumanized climate are that subordinates are lazy, won't take responsibility, lack desire to achieve significant results, demonstrate inability to direct their own behavior, show indifference to organizational needs, prefer to be led by others, and avoid making decisions whenever possible. Leaders communicate their belief in such assumptions by withholding information (since confidential information is not safe with subordinates), telling subordinates not only what to do but how to do it, doing all the upward and lateral communication themselves (if the subordinate's idea is good, the leaders handle it themselves; if they think it is bad, they crush it), and talking individually with subordinates (seldom in groups) to keep each person competing for their favor.

This communication behavior of leaders, in turn, affects the communication behavior of subordinates. Since information is not shared, subordinates become very ingenious at ferreting out secrets. And a secret is of no status unless it can be shared. This is how leaks occur. Because leaders also show lack of confidence by telling subordinates how to do the work, subordinates fulfill the lack of confidence by not readily assuming new tasks. Considering that leaders attempt to handle all upward and lateral communication, subordinates learn little about other parts of the organization, and, therefore, prove their assumed indifference to organization needs. Since leaders of this type either kill ideas or send good ones forward themselves, subordinates are not motivated to present new ideas. When leaders do not communicate with subordinates in groups, subordinates form informal alliances to spread information.

Overhumanized Climate

The overhumanized climate is at the other end of the continuum. Instead of dehumanization, there is undue preoccupation with human relationships. Though the dehumanized climate can be traced to the work of Taylor, the overhumanized climate has its roots in the famous Hawthorne studies, which highlighted the importance of social relationships to production.

The basic assumptions of the overhumanized approach are that human relations are more important than organizational objectives, conflicts and tensions should be reduced at

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all costs, motivation of subordinates should be almost totally intrinsic and self-directed, and participative decision making is always superior to decisions made by one or a few. Leaders communicate their belief in this approach by emphasizing individual needs more than organizational ones.

In some instances these assumptions will produce positive and productive results, but there is a high frequency of undesirable responses. Subordinates often respond to the overhumanized climate in ways not in the best interest of the organization. The consistent concern for needs and welfare of individuals further emphasizes that these are more important than organizational goals and may eventually lead to the destruction of the organization. Since absence of conflict is emphasized, attempts are often made to create the appearance of harmony and warm interpersonal relationships, even when tensions and conflicts are present. Therefore, instead of manifesting themselves through conflict at the workplace, tensions and emotions are often relieved with husbands, wives, families, and friends—ultimately more damaging to individuals than conflict at work. Undue emphasis on intrinsic motivation suggests that something is wrong with individuals who are motivated by external factors, such as raises or promotions. Belief in decision making exclusively by the group causes subordinates to be dissatisfied with directives from those above them.

Situational Climate

The situational climate might be viewed as somewhere between the dehumanized and overhumanized climates. More correctly, however, this approach contends that organizational goals and individual goals need not be at odds with one another. Certainly one of the best-known advocates of this view was Douglas McGregor.[7] McGregor called for an "appropriate" approach, based on an assessment of individual and organizational needs. By definition, the situational approach suggests that an "appropriate" climate be established for each situation. When necessary to use a strict uncompromising discipline, it is used. When necessary to structure work experience to enhance a person's self-development, it is done.

There are three assumptions basic to establishing a situational climate. First, a flexible climate that can adapt to the complex and changing nature of individual and organizational needs is superior to a fixed climate. Second, individuals are not naturally passive or resistant to organizational needs or reluctant to assume responsibility. Third, since individuals are not basically lazy, work can be structured to bring individual and organizational goals in line with one another.

The leader who communicates willingness to establish a situational climate—one that fits individuals and situations—can expect certain responses from subordinates. First, subordinates' feelings of self-worth and respect for others will likely increase. This increase will most likely lead to improved communication. It may also bring expressions of disagreement that can then be dealt with. Second, perception of similarity between personal and organizational goals should promote increased productivity, which, in turn, may increase the amount of intrinsic motivation and a greater sense of responsibility by subordinates. Third, subordinates will probably bring other work behaviors in line with organizational objectives. Establishment of the appropriate organizational climate promotes effective communication. In addition, there are positive steps a leader can take to improve communication in the organization.

Ways to Improve Communication

Often leaders shy away from simple lists of suggestions and guidelines. Yet by following basic suggestions we can become better leaders and enhance communication. Here, then, are practical suggestions for effective communication.

Encourage Feedback

Subordinates discover quickly what leaders want and supply that information to them. But subordinates are unlikely to provide negative feedback or communicate bad news to those above them since they fear that, much like ancient messengers delivering bad news, they will be punished. The familiar story of "The Emperor's New Clothes" illustrates unwillingness of subordinates to communicate honestly to superiors.

What then can you do to help accurate feedback reach you?

1. *Tell subordinates you want feedback.* Encourage them to give you both good and bad news. Welcome disagreement on issues. Then, make certain you positively reinforce rather than punish them for such information.
2. *Identify areas in which you want feedback.* Do not encourage indiscriminate feedback consisting of idle talk or personal gripes about others in the organization. Do communicate your desire for feedback on issues and areas that can help the organization.
3. *Use silence to promote feedback.* Listen, and encourage feedback rather than taking issue with comments raised by subordinates.
4. *Watch for nonverbal cues.* Most persons do not control nonverbal responses as well as verbal ones. The person who says, "I am so happy to meet you" as he draws away from the other person, probably communicates more by actions than by words.
5. *Consider scheduling feedback sessions.* Since it is easier to prevent illness than to treat it, set aside time for feedback. A planned feedback session will usually get more response than an impulsive, "How are things going?"
6. *Use statements to encourage feedback.* Statements such as "Tell me more about it," or "That's interesting," or questions that cannot be answered yes or no will help you find out what is going on in your organization. Start your questions with what, why, when, where, and how in order to encourage feedback.

Listen Effectively

To receive feedback leaders must listen. Listening is the neglected communication skill. All leaders have had instruction in reading, writing, and speaking. But few have had any formal instruction in listening. This lack of instruction is especially interesting in light of research showing that people spend seven out of every 10 minutes awake in some form of communication—10 percent writing, 15 percent reading, 30 percent talking, and 45 percent listening. Here are some things you can do to improve your listening.[8]

1. *Prepare to listen.* Effective listening requires physical and mental preparation. Put aside papers, books, and other materials that may distract you. Have the secretary hold your calls or have callers leave a message on voice mail. Avoid unnecessary interruptions. Be ready to catch the speaker's opening remarks. The rest of the message often builds on the opening statement.
2. *Listen for ideas, not just for facts.* Concentration exclusively on the facts often causes leaders to miss main ideas. Facts may be interesting in their own right, but the reason facts are given is usually to develop a generalization from them.
3. *Keep an open mind.* Often the subject or the delivery of the speaker may seem boring or uninteresting. Certain subjects or individuals may cause the listeners to become judgmental, hear only certain parts of the message, or just hear what they want to hear. Effective listening requires an open mind.
4. *Capitalize on the speed differential.* Thought operates several times faster than the normal rate of speech. In other words, listeners listen faster than speakers speak. Do not fall into the trap of daydreaming or trying to think about something else while listening. Use this time differential to summarize and internalize the message.
5. *Put yourself in the speaker's place.* Understand the speaker's perspective. What do you know about the speaker's knowledge, background, and grasp of the subject? What do speakers mean by the words and nonverbal communication they use?

Reduce Communication Misunderstanding

Although there are many barriers to effective understanding, four of them arise directly from misunderstanding the message. Knowing these barriers can help you reduce problems of communication.

1. *Barrier #1:* Misinterpretation of the meanings of words. There are two basic problems here.

a. *Same words mean different things to different people*. This problem is common wherever two or more people attempt to communicate. You may tell a colleague that the temperature in the office is quite comfortable. For you, 75 degrees is comfortable. For her, comfortable means 68 degrees. The same word can mean different things to different people. A friend tells you he will be over in five minutes. To him, five minutes means "soon"—perhaps any time in the next half hour. On the other hand, you attach a literal meaning. Five minutes means five minutes—300 seconds.

b. *Different words mean the same thing*. Many things are called by more than one name. Soft drink, soda, and pop all mean the same thing. The name used depends on who is doing the talking. Both this barrier and the first one can be overcome by realizing the following fact: Meanings are not in words, meanings are in people. Leaders communicate more effectively when they consider the message in relation to its source and its recipients.

2. *Barrier #2:* Misinterpretation of actions. Eye contact, gestures, facial expression are all action factors. When someone walks quickly out of the room during a meeting or taps a pencil on the table during a conversation leaders may conclude that the person is in a hurry or is bored. These conclusions may or may not be correct. If others twitch or seem unsure while speaking, we may conclude that they are nervous when, in fact, they may not be.
3. *Barrier #3:* Misinterpretation of nonaction symbols. The clothes you wear, the automobile you drive, the objects in your office all communicate things about you. In addition, your respect for time and space needs of others affects how you interpret their messages. For example, if a subordinate is to see you at noon, but arrives fifteen minutes late, his tardiness may affect how you interpret what he says to you.
4. *Barrier #4:* Misinterpretation of the voice. The quality, intelligibility, and variety of the voice all affect understanding. Quality refers to the overall impression the voice makes on others. Listeners often infer from the voice whether the speaker is happy, sad, fearful, or confident. Intelligibility or understandability depends on such things as articulation, pronunciation, and grammatical correctness. Variety is the spice of speaking. Rate, volume, force, pitch, and emphasis are all factors of variety that influence understanding.[9]

Communication with Key Personnel

It probably goes without saying that you should communicate one-on-one with your key persons often. Certain guidelines apply to establishment and maintenance of effective communication with key subordinates:

1. Show genuine interest and concern with facial expression, head nods, gestures, and bodily posture which reflect openness and positive reinforcement.
2. Put the other person at ease by appearing relaxed and breaking down barriers with friendliness.
3. Be natural, because genuineness and sincerity are foundations for effective communication.
4. Do not assume a superior manner or pretend to be what you're not.
5. Adapt to the conversation as it develops with spontaneous comments rather than plowing ahead with "prepared" comments or arguments.
6. Respect the other person's point of view.
7. Seek to understand what the other person really means and not necessarily what is said.
8. Reduce your own defensiveness.
9. Do not dominate the conversation to the point that you shut the other person out.
10. Listen attentively by concerning yourself with what the other person is saying instead of planning what you are going to say.

Promote Consensus

One of the biggest problems leaders face is getting a group to reach consensus. There are many times, of course, when you must make an independent decision and stick to it. But generally, policy decisions are hammered out in the give-and-take of small-group discussions. Problem solving is certainly a goal of decision-making groups at all levels, but often consensus or agreement is just as important. If a decision is reached without consensus, morale and unit satisfaction both may suffer. With genuine consensus, a unit tends to support and implement the new policy willingly.

The following five suggestions for reaching consensus are based on a longer list formulated after much research and careful analysis of decision-making groups.[10]

1. *Clarify the discussion.* Make sure that the group's activity is understandable, orderly, and focused on one issue at a time. Consensus comes more easily if factors are weighed individually and systematically. Encourage each person to stick to the subject, to avoid side discussions, and to clarify the issues with questions.

2. *Use process statements.* Process statements deal with what is happening in the group. While process statements may relate to the content, they primarily stimulate and facilitate discussion: "What you've said seems to make sense. How do the rest of you feel?" or "So far, we seem to agree on the first two points. Let's move on to the third," or "Have we heard from Joe yet?" or "This is really a productive discussion." When both the leader and group members use process statements effectively, agreement will come more readily and satisfaction will be increased.

3. *Seek different views.* All persons should be encouraged to present their views and provide information and evidence to support their views. Expression of a wide range of opinions and views allows a great opportunity for learning to take place. At the same time, participation by all persons will allow them to have their voices heard and will increase their satisfaction with the discussion and conclusions reached.

4. *Remain open to different views*. This suggestion is clearly the corollary to the preceding guideline. We have all known people who seek the views of others with no intent to be influenced by them: "Don't confuse me with the facts; my mind is made up." When others present irrefutable facts and figures, or even a good idea that you may not have thought of before, don't be afraid to alter your position or admit that you may have been wrong. Good leaders often learn from their subordinates. Also, leaders can serve as models for the behavior of others in the matter of not being overopinionated. Studies have shown that low or moderately opinionated leaders are held in higher esteem by others than highly opinionated ones.

5. *Use group pronouns.* Studies show that less cohesive groups—groups that are less successful in reaching consensus—tend to use more self-referent words, such as *I, me, my,* and *mine*. Groups that reach consensus and are more cohesive, on the other hand, are more apt to use group referent words such as *we, our,* and *us*. As a leader, talk about the group. Talk about what *we* hope to accomplish and how *we* can work together to achieve *our* objectives. Do not emphasize what *I* want done or what is best for *my* interests. Stress that while all persons should be concerned with their own unit or division, they should also be interested in the needs of others in the group.

Conclusion

Effective leaders recognize the importance of good communication. Communication problems can cause bottlenecks in the organization. But before you blame subordinates for bottlenecks, stop and examine a bottle. Notice where the neck is. It is not at the bottom.

Responsible leaders communicate effectively. They work hard to prevent bottlenecks and keep channels open up, down, and throughout the organization by (1) establishing an appropriate working climate and adjusting their communication behavior to fit the situation, and (2) practicing techniques to improve communication in their organization.

Notes

1. Chester Barnard, *The Function of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938).
2. Dan B. Curtis, Jerry L. Winsor, and Ron Stephens, *The Ideal Entry-Level and Management Profile* (Central Missouri State University Research, 1985–1986), 21–25.
3. Dr. Dan B. Curtis, interviewed by author, 16 February 1995.
4. Richard I. Lester, PhD, "Top Ten Management Concerns," in *Management of Organizational Behavior,* 7th ed., Paul Hersey, Kenneth Blanchard, and Dewey Johnson (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 8.
5. W. Charles Redding and George A. Sanborn, *Business and Industrial Communication: A Source Book* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 29.
6. Frederick W. Taylor, *Principles of Scientific Management* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1911).
7. Douglas McGregor, *The Human Side of Enterprise* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960).
8. For a more comprehensive treatment of listening, see John A. Kline, *Listening Effectively* (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, 1996).
9. See John A. Kline, *Speaking Effectively* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1989).
10. For a more complete discussion, see John A. Kline, "Consensus in Small Groups: Deriving Suggestions from Research," in *Small Group Communication: A Reader*, ed. Robert S. Cathcart and Larry A. Samovar, 4th ed. (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Publishers, 1984).

Symbolic Leadership

Dr. Jim Vickrey

Excellent leaders communicate, communicate, and communicate.

—Gen W. L. Creech
Commander, Tactical Air Command, 1978–84

The test of a leader lies in the reaction and response of his followers. His worth as a leader is measured by the achievements of the led . . . the ultimate test of his effectiveness.

—Gen Omar N. Bradley

Present and potential leaders are frequently admonished to "communicate." In an essay on "Guidelines for Leadership," for example, Gen Robert T. Herres, then vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, listed *communicate* as the first of six guidelines he posited for would-be leaders.[1] Air Force Pamphlet 35-49, *Air Force Leadership,* provides leaders with 10 "ways of increasing . . . personal and position power," the fifth one of which is *communicate:* "Unless a leader can communicate a vision or purpose, followers cannot be empowered to act."[2] Such counsel is not limited to military sources. In their book on leadership for the American Management Association, for example, J. W. McLean and William Weitzel propose six leadership skills, the second one being *communications*.[3] They list it only second and in the middle of their text, despite their assertion that "success in putting into practical use the principles and techniques of leadership . . . described in this book will be directly dependent upon [the] ability to communicate."[4] Is communication merely a "skill," important to be sure, but just part of one of the numerous "guidelines" offered today to leaders and would-be leaders in most writings on leadership? No.

Communication is not one of the skills—or tools—of leadership; it is the very process by which leadership itself is exercised, without which neither leaders nor leadership would exist.[5] That should be apparent from even a cursory examination of typical definitions of the terms. *Communication* is most often defined today by professionals in the field as *symbolic interaction*—that is, the sending and receiving of messages in the form of verbal and nonverbal symbols[6] to generate meaning.[7] Michael Z. Hackman and Craig E. Johnson put it this way: "Communication is based on the transfer of symbols. This transfer allows for the creation of meaning within individuals."[8] *Leadership* is most typically defined today by professionals who study it as *noncoercive influence*—that is, the exercise of interpersonal influence in a given situation, directed toward the attainment of goals or objectives.[9] Robert Hogan and others note that "leadership involves persuading other people to pursue a common goal that is important for the welfare of the group. . . . Leadership [,indeed,] is persuasion."[10] How does one seek to persuade—to influence—others? Without resorting to coercion or, say, extrasensory perception, there is but one way to do so: symbolic interaction—that is, communication.[11] Accordingly, communication is the process by which leadership is exercised and *not* merely a tool of erstwhile leaders or something leaders do or do not have at their disposal, such as their IQs, heights, personalities, or skills with word-processing equipment.

Viewing leadership *as* communication and perceiving the currency of its realm to be symbolic interaction have important ramifications for leaders and those people they seek to lead. A few of these ramifications are noted and briefly discussed below. They are considered in the context of oral communication because most leaders expend most of their leadership currency listening and talking (and in that order).[12]

- *Leaders cannot not communicate.* Just as delaying or refusing to make a decision *is* a decision, so is *not* communicating with another who expects to be communicated with an act of communication. Thus it is that virtually everything leaders say or do that becomes known to others is communication.[13] For every symbol—verbal or nonverbal—stimulates meaning in people who encounter it.
- *Leaders communicate in four contexts.* All human communication occurs in one or more of four overlapping contexts:
  1. *Personal (intrapersonal,* which is tantamount to thinking, for symbolic interaction with one's self *is* thinking; and *interpersonal,* which is symbolic interaction with one or a few who don't comprise a group).
  2. *Group* (symbolic interaction with three to 12 persons—a small group—which is typical of most leadership groups. A large group consists of more than a dozen or so).
  3. *Organizational* (symbolic interaction within one or more networks, formal and informal, of persons in a relatively structured, ongoing entity with a purpose).

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4. *Public* (symbolic interaction in nonmediated, "live" settings featuring a "speaker" and an "audience," and in mediated settings such as those characteristic of "mass media of communication").

Each of these contexts places different demands on leaders and the led, and few leaders are unusually successful in each. That is so in part because the response of listeners to symbols varies with the context—that is, the "same message" sent in each one will not produce exactly the same responses in listeners. Wise leaders seek to maximize the number of opportunities to function in the contexts in which they are most successful.

- *Leaders are affected by the conditions inherent in the use of symbols.* Conditions inherent in the use of symbols include the following:

1. *Symbols are arbitrary.* No necessary relationship exists between a symbol—say, the word *quality*—and its supposed meaning: that for which the word stands. That fact is especially the case of such other abstractions as "leadership" and "communication." To communicate with another person, therefore, all affected users of symbols must associate in their minds something similar, regardless of one's insistence that his/her own association is the "right" one. Besides, no "right" association exists—only appropriate or agreed-upon associations.
2. *Symbols are ambiguous.* By their very nature, symbols have more than one meaning. As Roger M. D'Aprix has observed, the average adult in the United States uses about 2,000 words from day to day. The 500 *most frequently used* words have a total of 14,000 dictionary definitions![14] Such commonly shared, so-called objective, *denotative* meanings of verbal symbols—which are *de*scribed, not *pre*scribed, in dictionaries—are but one of four types of meanings relevant to making sense of a given set of symbols. The other three types of meaning of symbols are (a) *connotative,* the more personalized, so-called subjective meaning; (b) *contextual,* the meaning derived purely from the context in which symbols are used; and (c) *relational,* the meaning generated about the presumed relationship between the users of symbols—a critical but perhaps underappreciated aspect of communication, particularly in the military. A useful way to remember these four aspects of meaning is to think of the meaning of a communication as having two components: *reportorial* or *content* (denotative- and connotative-based meaning) and *relational* (context- and relationship-based meaning).

   If the meaning of any given verbal or nonverbal symbol has such multiplicity, it is apparent that it and the symbol are not the same. As Hackman and Johnson observe, "Communication is based on the transfer of symbols"—*not meaning*. This transfer allows for the creation of meaning within individuals; indeed, it requires that meaning be created there.[15] This is why communication—the generation of meaning via symbolic interaction—is a collaborative process. Because it is, *anticipation* of meaning and *attribution* of intention may overpower the actual exchange of messages in a communication situation, creating an otherwise inexplicable "failure to communicate."
3. *Symbols are alterative.* Symbols, verbal and nonverbal, can create and alter reality. Merely by labeling someone or something, a leader can affect the way others react to either. That is the basis of the well-known Pygmalion Effect (the powerful effect of the expectations of others on one's performance) and the Galatea Effect (the similar effect of self-expectations on performance).[16] It is also the foundation of the analysis in most modern leadership texts of the transforming power of "visionary" and "empowering" communication of organizational leaders. As Hackman and Johnson write, "Viewing organizations [themselves] as the product of symbol using [,as many modern writers do,] suggests that organizational leaders play an important role in the creation of organizational meaning or culture. In particular, the organizational leader is actively involved in 'symbolic leadership' by using symbols to determine the direction of the organization."[17] In the case of the US Air Force, many of the most important symbols are givens, but not all of them are—a fact that gives leaders opportunities to select many of their own.

Thus, leadership has been called a "language game," because what leaders do is "manage meaning," as described by L. R. Pondy:

> The effectiveness of a leader lies in his ability to make activity meaningful for those in his role set—not to change behavior but to give others a sense of understanding what they are doing and especially to articulate it so they can communicate about the meaning of their behavior. . . . If in addition the leader can put it into words, then the meaning of what the group is doing becomes a social fact. . . . This dual capacity . . . to make sense of things and to put them into language meaningful to large numbers of people gives the person who has it enormous leverage.[18]

- *Leaders must rely upon symbols to cause change in organizations.* The "leadership challenges" confronting contemporary leaders are numerous and at times numbing. James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner's book on the subject provides the following fivefold list of "leadership behavior that [based on empirical research,] emerges when people are accomplishing extraordinary things in organizations." These behaviors, they write, account for more than 70 percent of the behavior and strategies in executive respondents' personal "best case" studies and interviews:

1. *Challenging the process* by
   a. searching for opportunities and
   b. experimenting and taking risks.
2. *Inspiring a shared vision* by
   a. envisioning the future and
   b. enlisting others.
3. *Enabling others to act* by
   a. fostering collaboration and
   b. strengthening others.
4. *Modeling the way* by
   a. setting the example and
   b. planning small wins.
5. *Encouraging the heart* by
   a. recognizing contributions and
   b. celebrating accomplishments.[19]

This list is not much different from other enumerated challenges to leaders, especially to people who desire to be "transformational leaders," as James McGregor Burns calls those who embody these behaviors.[20] To engage in such behaviors (or even to order others to act in specified ways) is to become a symbolic leader, for one can engage in none of these behaviors without resort to the process of communication. The most successful—that is, the most effective, efficient, and ethical—leaders in and out of the military intuitively understand or learn that *communication and leadership are thus inextricably intertwined.* Nevertheless, they still may forget that fact, particularly when they find themselves in totally new (to them) communication contexts. For example, this author has seen on more than one occasion during the past three decades the difficulty with which a retired, decorated military officer of high rank and demonstrated leadership skills makes a transition to academe, where some symbol-meaning associations differ markedly from those in the military context.

Most "leadership failures" are not "failures to communicate," as the warden in the motion picture *Cool Hand Luke* says to Paul Newman's character. Leaders cannot fail to communicate for the same reason that communicators generally cannot not communicate: Whatever they do or do not do in a given context *is* communication. It is thus the failure of leaders to communicate successfully (i.e., ethically, efficiently, and/or effectively) that results in "leadership failure"—not their "failure to communicate."

Why do leaders fail to communicate successfully and thus fail to that extent in the exercise of leadership? They fail to learn, or they forget the symbolic nature of communication. It hardly matters what aspect of leaders' responsibilities one examines: It will be dependent upon or otherwise related to communication—symbolic interaction. Whether one is concerned with what J. Kevin Barge refers to as the "five basic functions that lead to effective decision making" by leaders[21] or with the six "resources" that G. B. Graen and T. A. Scandura say leaders have access to in their "exchanges" with followers for "performance,"[22] the perceptive and ultimately successful leader is perforce required to focus on symbolic interaction. Yet, too many of the latest additions to the estimated 10,000 published works on leadership continue to treat communication as something leaders merely engage in (or not) at their peril rather than something inherent in the nature of leadership itself.[23] There is a difference in the perspectives, and the difference can explain why some leaders are more successful than others and why the responses of some leaders' followers are different from those of other seemingly similar followers.

Notes

1. Gen Robert T. Herres, "Guidelines for Leadership," in AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership,* ed. Richard I. Lester and A. Glenn Morton (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1990), 390.

2. Cited in Dewey E. Johnson, "Leadership: Some Thoughts after Twenty Years," in AU-24, 353.

3. J. W. McLean and William Weitzel, *Leadership: Magic, Myth or Method* (New York: Amacon, 1992), 138. Well-known management/leadership consultant Warren Bennis does much the same thing in his essay on "The 4 Competencies of Leadership," in AU-24, 347–51. He posits the competencies of "management of attention," "meaning," "trust," and "self," describing the "management of meaning" as communication of vision—this, despite the fact that communication is required to manage attention, trust, and self as well. The latter, for example, he defines as "knowing one's skills and *deploying them effectively,*" 350 (emphasis added).

4. McLean and Weitzel, 138. See also, for example, Genevieve Capowski, "Anatomy of a Leader: Where Are the Leaders of Tomorrow?" *Management Review,* March 1994, 16.

5. That is why several recent textbooks are based on the assumption that "leadership is best understood from a communication standpoint." Michael Z. Hackman and Craig E. Johnson, *Leadership: A Communication Perspective* (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, Inc., 1991), 6. (The author uses this text in his group discussion and leadership class.) Note also J. Kevin Barge's statement that "leadership is best explained by communication skills," in his *Leadership: Communication Skills for Organizations and Groups* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), vi.

6. Technically, communication is said to involve the sending and receiving of signals, signs, and symbols, which are different—albeit related. For present purposes, that distinction is being ignored. Note that a symbol is anything that stands for or represents something other than itself, and a *verbal* symbol refers to *words*—oral or written; a nonverbal symbol refers to every other kind—from eye contact, facial expression, gestures, posture, and tone of voice (in cases of oral communication) to form and formatting, "style," and type size (in cases of written communication).

7. See the definition of *meaning,* below.

8. Hackman and Johnson, 6. Note that only *symbols* are transferred. Meaning is not, for it cannot be: it can be generated only *within* persons.

9. In his recent essay on "Leadership for a Quality Organization," Richard I. Lester writes, "Leadership is the art of influencing people to accomplish an organization's purpose." *The Journal of Leadership Studies* 2 (1995): 6.

10. Robert Hogan, Gordon J. Curphy, and Joyce Hogan, "What We Know about Leadership," *American Psychologist* 49 (June 1994): 493. This summary analysis is highly recommended.

11. Other writers have made the connection explicit: "Leadership *is* a social interaction" (emphasis added). Roger Ayman, "Leadership Perception . . . ," in Martin M. Chemers and Roger Ayman, *Leadership Theory and Research* (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1993), 140. Similarly, Jay A. Conger writes, "If we think of leadership as essentially a process of influencing others, then language becomes a key means of social influence." *The Charismatic Leader: Behind the Mystique of Exceptional Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989), 70.

One should note in passing that some scholars in the field of speech communication use the term *symbolic interaction* to refer to communication generally and *symbolic inducement* to conscious attempts to communicate persuasively.

12. A variety of studies has documented the fact, each of which reveals that college students and/or adults generally spend most of their "waking time" in these communicative activities: listening (45–55 percent), speaking (16–30 percent), reading (13–17 percent), and writing (8–14 percent). See Joseph A. DeVito, *Human Communication,* 6th ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 78.

13. A useful reminder of just how complicated this aspect of communication can become—regardless of intentions—may be found in the humorous essay of Lt Col William S. Pine and Lt William R. Bauman, "Effective Communication: 'If Anything Can Go Wrong, It Will,' " in AU-24, 269–70.

14. Cited in McLean and Weitzel, 139.

15. Hackman and Johnson, 6. Actually, to be accurate, meaning is *jointly* created by the parties to any act of communication, which makes communication a truly *collaborative* activity.

16. Ibid., 159–66.

17. Ibid., 147.

18. L. R. Pondy, "Leadership Is a Language Game," in *Leadership: Where Else Can We Go?* ed. M. W. McCall Jr., and M. M. Lombardo (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1978), 94–95.

19. James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, *The Leadership Challenge: How to Get Extraordinary Things Done in Organizations* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987), 310.

20. James McGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

21. Barge, 21. The functions are said to be (1) establish a set of operating procedures, (2) analyze problems, (3) generate solutions, (4) evaluate solutions, and (5) determine methods for implementing solutions. A much more useful framework for decision making, developed by the au-

thor while he was studying at the Harvard Business School, is available by writing him c/o the Department of Speech and Theatre, Troy State University, Troy AL 36082.

22. G. B. Graen and T. A. Scandura, “Toward a Psychology of Dyadic Organizing,” in *Research in Organizational Behavior IX,* ed. B. Shaw and L. L. Cummings (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1987), 175–208. They identify the “resources” as (1) influence in decision making, (2) information, (3) valued task assignments, (4) latitude to perform tasks, (5) support, and (6) attention (concern for the other’s professional development).

23. Robert E. Kelley, *The Power of Followership: How to Create Leaders People Want to Follow and Followers Who Lead Themselves* (New York: Doubleday Currency, 1992), 17.

Ethical Communication and the Air Force Leader

Col Eric A. Ash

Just as Air Force members are now actively exercising to be "fit to win," so does the business of leadership also need regular exercise of a different kind in order to maintain its effectiveness. It must consistently exercise ethical communication. That means more than simply telling the truth. It involves methodology as much as message, or *how* to say what you say. This paper will focus on ethical communication in electronic methods, and ramifications for military leaders.

Without ethics in communication between Air Force members, effective leadership is in trouble. Fundamentally, communication is linked to core values and virtues because it is often the executive agent for them. Therefore, Air Force leaders must protect the ethics of communication. At the unit level, many leaders have witnessed the erosion of mission effectiveness due to communication chaos. But the issue involves more than a unit problem. It is paramount to the profession of arms.

The challenge of communication is nothing new in leadership, and new technologies are not diminishing that challenge. In some places secure, high-speed electronic communication is killing the chain of command. Broad connectivity through e-mail and the Internet provides incredible capabilities to communicate information rapidly to all reaches of an organization, while simultaneously providing great opportunity for dissemination of the wrong information, to the wrong people, at the wrong level of authority, at the wrong time. The issue is not technological; it is procedural.

For example, e-mail provides great benefits of speed, accuracy, and reach. Yet, it also confounds the commander who is trying to maintain good order and discipline. It is astounding that a system allowed a fourth-class (freshman year) cadet at the Air Force Academy in 2003 to send an electronic message directly to the chief of staff of the Air Force and also to the secretary of the Air Force! How much did that jump the chain of command? Yet, the incident was not an anomaly. It is not that unusual for Air Force troops or former military members to send e-mail messages to all levels of authority, including Congress, the chiefs of staff, and the service secretaries (with a courtesy copy to the United States president just for good measure).

There are a few checks in place that discourage such communication. Yet, electronic transmissions are received and replies are generated, sometimes right back to the original sender. The process sends mixed messages to the force, and Air Force leaders at all levels need to clarify the message. Fixing the "communichaos" syndrome is not a matter of regulation. It is part of leadership itself.

It is frustrating to a leader to have a well-planned communication process eclipsed by someone sending an e-mail to "all" that contains the same information the leader intended to discuss when, how, where, and with whom he or she intended to discuss it. Perhaps the single greatest danger of e-mail is its greatest asset: timeliness. In just a few seconds a leader can send off a message or a reply to a message that he or she quickly reconsiders—too late. One of the keys to effective leadership is the ability to control the communication urge to react spontaneously.[1]

Symphony conductor Guy Fraser Harrison had a great piece of advice that he called the "3-second rule." He said it takes three extra seconds to correct musicians nicely. In the symphony business, those three extra seconds can result in the difference between music and noise.

Military leaders are in a different business than making music, but the 3-second rule still applies. Whether getting faculty members to teach effectively at Air War College, urging Air Force Academy cadets to interact on a socially acceptable level, or ordering troops into action with M-16/A-2 rifles, people appreciate being addressed as people. Admittedly there are circumstances that demand an immediate "break right," when there is no time for pleasantries. Three seconds can be life or death. Yet, most of the time leaders can afford three extra seconds to think about a response prior to clicking "send." Learning this discipline is part of developing leadership character.

Leadership character is not just defined by visible actions, but by those actions undertaken when nobody is looking.[2] This is part of the dilemma of the Internet and e-mail. Everybody is looking! The profession of arms cannot afford to allow the proliferation of loosely controlled, rapid communication to erode military discipline to the point of having chaotic leadership. Just as weapons of mass destruction have needed solid, disciplined control systems in place, so must mass communication have such discipline in order for it not to become a weapon against us.

The Department of Defense is rightly concerned about threats to electronic communication systems that are growing by orders of magnitude on a daily basis, especially during the current war on terrorism. Yet, within the most secure firewall looms an equally dangerous threat of the military coming apart over undisciplined use of communication.

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It is a large claim to state that an innocent mistake on an e-mail address line can constitute a breach of ethics. Yet, a parallel argument is raised by retired Brig Gen Malham Wakin, when he notes the fine line between incompetence and immorality in the military. His argument, which is sound, claims that because the profession of arms can potentially involve catastrophic loss of life, there is no room for an innocent mistake due to incompetence.[3] In other words, the soldier is duty-bound *and* ethically bound to be competent.

There is a similar argument that members of the profession of arms are duty-bound and ethically bound to adhere to effective communication processes. Consider the air operations center (AOC), which in current vernacular is a weapon system. What exactly does that weapon do? It communicates. Out of the AOC come decisions that require an effective communication process.

The AOC director and joint forces air component commander must clearly establish communication rules of engagement, specifying how people are going to interact and share information. A simple example is that AOC personnel must know when the video teleconference is going to be scheduled each day, but there are also exceedingly more complex communication issues to be worked.

This is no different, fundamentally, than communication in any unit. People must know if leadership expects e-mail or some other medium to be used as the primary mode of communication. They need to know who is authorized to send messages to everyone in the unit and for what purpose. This relates to one of the fundamental truths of leadership: authority must match responsibility.

Just as a parent does not appreciate disrespectful communication from a child, a military commander does not appreciate orders from a subordinate. Yet, that very thing happens regularly with e-mail, due to people of higher rank and positions of authority accidentally ending up on address listings of forwarded messages.

As effective as e-mail is in communicating to large numbers of people simultaneously, it cannot be one-size-fits-all. Unfortunately, the Air Force has accommodated that limitation to its own detriment, and future Air Force leaders must regain the upper hand. The process begins not with replying to a message, but by stepping back from the electric box and walking across the hall to personally educate someone who needs guidance.

As mentioned previously, communication is a business. In that regard, many leaders have horror stories of well-intended communication investments that turned out to be stock market lemons. Take, for example, the leader who publicly praises a division of employees via e-mail, only to find out later that a different division really did all the work. In reality, it is a leadership challenge to communicate praise to anyone or any group of people in an organization without creating envy or resentment somewhere. Yet, the leader who emphasizes factual accuracy, the timing of announced praise, and the sensitivity of others is more likely to communicate effectively.

In this way, leaders must protect their praise, sort of like they protect their signatures.[4] Both are important elements of leadership communication and both apply to the electric box. Sending praise electronically may be very convenient, but it can also be received like a slap in the face. Similarly, electronic signatures are extremely convenient, but their use comes with a price. They are difficult to protect, and they can promote signature inflation. In essence, a quasi-signature is attached to every e-mail. A leader's word must be his or her bond, and a few e-mail mistakes can cause major damage to the reputation of a leader's word.

Leadership and communication integrity are not just individual issues, but involve institutions. A unit full of ethical individuals may not be an ethical unit, because some people who would never lie for themselves will lie for the organization.[5] There is an argument that organizational circumstances dictate different ethical standards, but a lie is a lie. Institutional integrity is just as important as individual integrity, and institutional communication must be as integrity-sound as individual e-mail.

Another potential problem with e-mail is its tyrannical effect on the recipient. It automatically puts the receiver on the defensive, as he or she is tacitly obligated to respond to, or at least acknowledge, receipt of messages. E-mail makes it impossible to not communicate—even if it is the wrong message. This can be a real problem when sent messages are not received, but senders assume they have been received. Such crossed transactions can lead to confusion and undeserved criticism.

The need to clarify electronic communication practices requires what some have called "computer citizenship," or knowing "enough about the social, political, environmental, and military implications of computer technology to make personal and social choices."[6] The military today recognizes computer citizenship with promotion. In fact, the military has an entire generation of digital leaders groomed on their electronic briefing prowess. But computer citizenship demands more than expertise. Again, it requires discipline.

Take, for example, the issue of security. People are generally very attuned to communications security (officially COMSEC) and are continuously reminded of the importance of maintaining security. Yet, in some respects communication security is gone. Although military members are quick to recognize officially labeled information that pertains to security regulations and "need to know," when it comes to daily information that is not classified there is a communication free-for-all. During the average enlisted promotion release, it is common practice for nearly every enlisted member in the organization to know the promotion list before the release date to commanders, which itself is a day prior to the official release date. Not only do our troops feel no guilt about this activity, but they take pride in violating the rules! It is not much different in officer ranks as well.

Promotion announcements are perhaps something not to be taken too seriously, but the larger issue of loose communication is doctrinal, relating to at least two of the fundamental principles of war: security and surprise. Where does the military draw the line if it continues to practice communication infractions as a cultural norm? How hard is it today for commanders to protect someone's privacy and reputation when there is an ongoing investigation or sensitive situation? Very hard! This is simply unacceptable for the world's greatest military service.

Leaders at all levels must assume dedicated responsibility to stop the spread of communication chaos and anarchy. This is not a technological issue; it is a cultural one. It cannot be fixed with a technological solution; it requires a leadership solution.

During the past few decades, communication technologies have changed dramatically, causing a profound cultural effect on the profession of arms. Successful leaders anticipate and adapt appropriately to changing circumstances.[7] They recognize potential gains versus risks and steer their organizations accordingly. The revolution in communication technologies is a sea of change that demands such careful attention. How well the military and its leaders adapt to this change will be fundamental to the future military culture and the military's success as a profession.

Notes

1. Ty J. Handy, "Presidents in Action," *The Presidency*, American Council on Education, Winter 2004, 38–9.
2. S. L. A. Marshall, *The Armed Forces Officer*, Armed Forces Information Service, Department of Defense, 1975, 14.
3. Malham M. Wakin, ed., *War, Morality and the Military Profession* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Inc., 1986), 211–15.
4. Perry M. Smith, *Taking Charge: Making the Right Choice*, New York: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1993, 129. Perry Smith notes that leaders must protect their signature.
5. Ibid., 128.
6. L. Siegel and J. Markoff, quoted in Vincent Mosco's, "Communication and Information Technology for War and Peace," in *Communication and Culture in War and Peace*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993, 68.
7. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 26. Cohen and Gooch argue for the importance of anticipation, learning and adaptation in combat, but their analytical approach applies nicely to leadership.

Section 10

Feedback and Creativity

Interpersonal Dimension



Feedback: A Unique Key to Leadership

Lt Col Henry A. Staley

We've been wringing our hands for the past decade over the decline of personal integrity and the slow slide of "professionalism" down the slope toward "occupationalism." Most of our precommissioning and PME institutions devote blocks of instruction to integrity, leadership, professionalism, officership, and the like. Periodic conferences and symposia bemoan the apparent "lack of professionalism" among the troops. Specific definitions are seldom forthcoming, but the emotionally soggy words *professionalism, leadership, integrity,* and *officership* make for good press. Merely mouthing the words seems to give some leaders the sense they are actually doing something constructive to mend the tattered fabric of our profession.

Written or spoken words rarely lead to significant *behavioral change* unless those communications are consistently supported with action. Our integrity, our professionalism, and our officership erode a little every time we see the leadership pull a fast one, act inconsistently, or fail to meet that seldom defined ideal. For me, that idea conjures up a definite mental picture. I see an officer who has the strength of character to be humble and the wisdom to be reasonably suspicious of gut reactions. I see someone who sincerely values the opinions of others and considers many alternative paths to the objective. Even when time limits full consideration of all paths, I see an officer who never stops trying to find them. I see an officer who's intellectually stimulated by open debate.

Above all, I see a person who's acutely aware of that almost mythical isolation from reality that slowly and insidiously overtakes a leader as he or she advances in rank. I'm critical of that isolation because it's one of the underlying causes of the perceived decline in integrity, officership, and professionalism. I formerly blamed staffs for isolating their decision makers, but the more I've studied and reflected on the matter, the more I'm convinced that the staffs are really powerless to correct the problem. They've become their own worst enemy.

I learned long ago never to criticize without offering alternatives for improvement. Therefore, I'll introduce my suggestion by mentioning a grassroots activity that occurs in thousands of situations throughout the Air Force every day. It plays an important role in all human relationships. It's called feedback. But the type of feedback *usually* provided by officers brings multiple injuries to our profession every hour of the day: it's death by a thousand cuts.

Allow me to set the stage upon which this hourly drama unfolds. Psychologists and sociologists tell us that we were drawn to military careers for a variety of complex reasons; three of them are our needs for order, conformity, and authority. (Some would substitute "a father figure" for authority.) Add to these needs a precommissioning regimen that stresses "yessir, yessir, no excuse, sir," and we tend to create a majority of officers who become emotionally frazzled at the mere suggestion of disagreeing with anyone in the authority chain. I won't belabor this truism since you've each witnessed your share of "yes men and women"—careerists, opportunists, and manipulators. You may be one of these types yourself. In fact, we're all members of that overwhelming brotherhood and sisterhood to some extent.

Is there something wrong here? Am I suggesting that we should overcome our basic natures? Should we resist those aspects of USAF training and education that reinforce the "yessir, yessir, three bags full" mentality? Yes! There *is* something wrong here and you can sense it. And, yes, I am suggesting we overcome the traditional approach. But, first, let's return to that hourly drama.

The staff assembles (collectively or individually) and, if fortunate, they are allowed to comment—to give their views on "Issue X." Being bright troops, they intuitively sniff out the atmosphere. "What's the boss really after here?" "Does he/she want to support Issue X?" Most of the staff members will slant their comments so that they agree with the perceived objectives of the decision maker (leader). There may be conventional recognition of opposing viewpoints, but it will most likely be written or spoken in less than emphatic fashion. Thus armed with the supportive wisdom of his or her staff, the decision maker rides off into the sunset toward another calamity, another success, or another nonproductive but expensive rearrangement of the status quo. On the other hand, a truly effective leader (here comes the bottom line) literally squeezes, begs, demands, and cajoles the staff to provide all the reasons Issue X may or may *not* be logical. Equal emphasis is given the position that runs *counter* to the decision maker's personal viewpoint.

A truly effective leader understands the basic character of the corps—the basic need to "yessir, yessir, three bags. . ." ad nauseam. And in understanding it, *overcomes it through personal action.* How many times have you heard these comments front a decision maker:

> Now (insert your name here), I know what you wrote on Issue X, but I think you're hedging. Tell me what you *really* think. Tell me which side of the log you'd roll off if the decision were yours. The Air Force is

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paying you to think and render judgments based on your expertise—it doesn't pay you to flatter me. Now let's have it without the honey.

You haven't heard a conversation like that very often, have you? A truly effective leader has the strength of character to realize that his or her intuitive judgment is usually a poor substitute for the collective wisdom of the staff. And, in those rare cases when intuitive judgment *is* best, listening to the viewpoints of the opposition will neither weaken a sound intuitive decision nor strengthen a poor one.

A truly effective leader's success will hinge in no small part on frequent and meaningful reward for honest feedback. This reward can be as informal as, "Thanks for that candid and provocative viewpoint," or as formal as specific comments in the OPR.

A truly effective leader realizes that fighting for feedback really *is* a fight—a personal battle. Staff members will resist it; their eyes will dart from right to left furtively looking for escape hatches and rat holes. After all, this is a new experience. It short-circuits all of their subservience training and career survival wisdom. They will sense ulterior motives on the part of the decision maker. An effective leader must struggle doggedly against these initial reactions. In other words, a true leader must *lead.*

There is obviously no grand design or complex conspiracy aimed at shielding leaders from bad news or contrary viewpoints, but the effect is almost the same. What I'm suggesting is really quite simple. It requires no great intellect, creative genius, or long string of classic leadership traits. It takes only a personal commitment to *demand* and *reward* honest feedback. And, unlike many of the complex leadership/followership issues we read about, the responsibility for effective or ineffective feedback rests squarely on the leader's shoulders.

Some people suggest that our precommissioning and PME systems should approach officership training and education from a more enlightened perspective—that we should, among other things, nurture a more questioning, creative, and assertive approach in our professional programs. Instead of preaching "yessir, yessir, three bags full . . ." we should be teaching "yessir, we can probably do what you ask, but the costs will be . . . ." Indeed, until a decision maker actually *decides,* the staff officer should be compelled by his or her professional integrity to render a thorough, no-punches-pulled assessment of every staff issue. Until that time comes (if ever), the key to opening the lock to honest feedback waits in the pocket of every leader. The truly effective leader will reach for it.

Military Dissent and Junior Officers

Maj William Timothy O'Connell

In the article, "Dynamic Subordinancy," William J. Crockett, a well-known consultant in human resources and personnel management, points out that "most bosses want subordinates who will challenge their ideas, differ with their decisions, give them data, put forward new ideas for doing things. . . ."[1] This article surveys dissent from the military perspective. It examines historical examples of dissent in the profession of arms by junior officers. Next, to better prepare you for developing this art, it outlines some successful techniques junior officers have used to advocate their ideas.

Dissent by Junior Officers

The acceptance of junior officer dissent in the American military since the turn of the century is well documented. In his study of the American performance in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, Gen S. L. A. Marshall concluded that an after-action meeting must be conducted after each exercise. This review must have all members of the unit present, rank must be put aside, and differences of opinion must be settled by the weight of the evidence rather than the person's position. He felt that by increasing the flow of information such meetings kept the soldiers informed of their mission, showed them where they fit in the big picture, and enabled them to develop better judgment under high-pressure situations.[2]

Today some of the best units in the Air Force still encourage junior officers to participate in these open and free discussions. The Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and Tactical Air Command (TAC) commanders steered the author of *Excellence in Tactical Fighter Squadrons* toward their best units during his research. There he found a common attitude that

> we, as a squadron, are only as good as our weakest link, so everyone works to make the squadron better. It's this kind of attitude that allows a second lieutenant to critique his flight commander, a major, during a debrief. In the excellent squadrons, this lieutenant's critique is welcome.[3]

Precautions against stifling the courage to present innovation and contrary judgment exist at the highest levels in the Air Force. Maj Gen William J. Mall, former director of Personnel Plans, warns that we may be developing a "one-mistake career mentality among our junior officers and NCOs [that] robs our people of the opportunity to test themselves, make mistakes, and learn valuable trial-and-error lessons."[4]

Currently, some assert that the Air Force's strict discipline in following checklists and tech orders in a high-tech environment gives the impression that discipline means blind obedience. However, this is not a valid conclusion. Despite the increase in technology, the Air Force continues to resist turning its mission over to robots. This resistance is based on the need for a human who can make the necessary deviations when circumstances change. Lieutenant Colonel Gallardo clarified the relationship between discipline and such deviations when he wrote

> What is needed (a trait for which Americans are famous) are trained, motivated people who can apply their experience in an orderly, prescribed manner and yet be able to deviate or apply a separate set of rules when the situation dictates. This professional, innovative spirit is also a form of discipline.[5]

This professional judgment is not limited to the cockpit. During a tour of duty as an Air Staff action officer, a captain received specific guidance on writing the arms control implication of Peacekeeper missile (MX) development. A conflict arose, however, when he realized that the guidance was not consistent with the terms of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreements. When he voiced his concern over following the guidance, his supervisor instructed him to write down his position. The captain's position paper was forwarded to the chief of staff and accepted contrary to the original guidance.[6] In his case, the Air Force senior leadership permitted a member, regardless of rank, to present a professional challenge to instructions.

These examples underscore the importance of developing sound, assertive judgment in our peacetime junior officers so they succeed in combat. Once war begins, the leadership of America stands behind this principle. During the My Lai trial, Lt William L. Calley Jr., defended his actions as following orders as he understood them, but the court reaffirmed the lessons from the Nuremberg Trials for American junior officers.[7]

From these examples three conclusions may be drawn. First, the military has encouraged dissent by junior officers when it improves effectiveness. Second, junior officers can enhance mission effectiveness when they appropriately challenge the status quo. And finally, junior officers are legally bound to present a challenge to instructions that violate the law. Thus, a junior officer must consider the development of professional and effective dissenting skills an important part of his or her development as a professional officer.

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Techniques

As you have seen, professional and well-presented dissent by junior officers is encouraged and, in some situations, legally required. But, the terms *professional* and *well-presented* can be intangibles in your work environment. They must be broken down into supporting techniques. These techniques fall into two broad categories: establishing preconditions and delivery.

Establishing Preconditions

You should establish some preconditions for success before actively expressing dissenting opinions. Even though these preconditions do not guarantee that your ideas will be accepted, they will almost certainly gain more open-minded consideration of them.

Trust. Probably the most important preconditions you must establish is your boss's trust in you. Without trust, your comments might easily be categorized as an unqualified complaint or careerist maneuvering. Trust does not just happen, however. As a subordinate, you must create and nurture it. There are a number of ways to do this.

Expertise. Master the job. Treat it with a sense of urgency. Become an expert and a point of reference on all aspects of the job. Then become familiar with others' jobs, especially those that affect your job, the boss, and the unit.

Image. Look and act the part of a trusted agent. Dress to project this role. Demonstrate that you realize you represent more than yourself by subjugating your personal preference to the unit standards. The person who follows only the "letter of the law" or who stretches the length of a break is sending a message to the unit, "I want to belong but not enough to sacrifice." The person who stays well within the intent of the rules is saying, "I am in 100 percent. You can count on me." If you are the boss, whose dissent would you trust as being in the best interest of the unit?

Also, ensure that your mannerisms project a professional image. Act like the mature, responsible person who comes up with productive, innovative ideas. Use clear word choice and purposeful nonverbal communication. Remember, part of selling your idea is to sell yourself.[8]

Association. The boss's perception of your associations impacts his or her receptiveness to your ideas. Your ideas typically start from the comments of your associates, or at least you get feedback from them on your idea. If your associates support the unit and have made helpful contributions to the unit's mission, your boss will probably be more receptive. On the other hand, if you associate with people with hidden agendas and self-interests or who lack a professional drive, the boss might suspect your dissent.

Goals. Your goals communicate a lot about you. If your goals are short-term or self-centered, the boss's trust in your inputs will carry far less weight than if they are long-term and team-oriented. Establish and communicate your goals early. You can communicate your goals via Air Force Form 90, Officer Career Objective Statement, or by simply giving your boss a written outline of them.

Loyalty. Keep the boss informed. Don't complain to others about his or her shortcomings or about problems in the unit. And never put him or her into an embarrassing situation.[9] If you don't have the guts to deal with the problems, don't go around the boss. If you catch your boss's errors, back him or her up like you would any other team member and never imply you scored points with your discovery.[10]

Dealing with your feedback. Your behavior sets an example for those up as well as down the chain of command. If you cannot deal in a mature manner with challenges directed toward your ideas, those above you are less likely to listen and act on your challenge.

Determine Importance. There are many issues that compel a junior officer to present a dissenting view, but it is the wise officer who can set priorities on these issues. In setting priorities, determine the relevance of the issue to the "big picture." Fighting an issue when it is very minor to the unit mission wastes time and patience. If you're not sure of the importance of an issue, check around or even ask your boss.

In determining priorities you need also to estimate how much of your energy it will take to present your case effectively. It is a mark of courage to throw yourself on the sword for a noble cause, but wasting time on every issue is an abuse of an Air Force resource—your time and your superior's.

Differentiate between Wrong and Different. Just because your idea is right does not mean another is wrong. To borrow from Dr. Rae Andre's idea, you may find that NORWAY applies.[11] That is, <u>N</u>o <u>O</u>ne <u>R</u>ight <u>WAY</u>. The existing way may also be right, in which case your dissent would be insubordinate resistance rather than courageous devotion. If confronted with this situation, follow the lead and set your idea aside for the future should circumstances change.

Know the Dissent Channel. There are a number of established and widely used channels for dissent in the Air Force. Become familiar with them so you can use the one most appropriate for your situation. Some programs to look at are the Suggestion Program's AF Form 1000, the MIP program, hazard and safety report, various base councils, and after-action reports. Also, look at Air Force Handbook (AFH) 37-137, *The Tongue and Quill,* for Air Force written and oral formats for advocating.

Timing. The saying "don't change horses in midstream" is vital to the discussion of military dissent. Before the plan is executed, dissent might be acceptable. But once the execution phase begins, changing the plan can cause more problems than it will solve. Therefore, it is your duty at the lieutenant and captain level to salute sharply and support the plan, unless, of course, it is unethical or illegal. Likewise, it is your responsibility to be proactive and make your inputs during the decision phase.

Know the Law. Naturally, you cannot determine if your instructions are illegal if you don't know the law. Unfortunately, you will not have the luxury of time to look up the law when you receive the typical illegal order. Now is the time to study the *Uniform Code of Military Justice* (UCMJ), laws of armed conflict, the *Code of Conduct*, regulations, and the national and international laws that impact your performance as an officer.

Delivery

When delivery of dissent is discussed, such words as *tact* and *professional* come to mind. The problem once again is that these are very general concepts. The following provides more specific techniques:

Control Your Emotions. Do not try to plead your case or demand action. Remain calm despite adversity, use emotional terms judiciously, anticipate rebuttals, and if possible, pick a comfortable time and place to present your position. You want your dissent to receive mature, unemotional consideration. If you present your challenge on an adult level (rather than the demanding-parent or pleading-child levels), your ideas have a better chance of receiving this desired consideration.[12]

Recognize Idiosyncrasies. Even the most professional environment has personal idiosyncrasies and organizational sacred cows. This isn't to say that you must stifle your dissent because of them, especially if they are the subject of your dissent. However, you must be sensitive to things like pride of authorship, unwritten rules, and personality conflicts. Concentrate your energy on one issue at a time by not drawing unnecessary opposition into the dialogue.

Use the Chain of Command. Work your dissent within the chain—always. As a junior officer, you do not have the credentials to go outside the chain. Furthermore, in the military, the chain of command is the most effective means of solving a problem, even when it *is* the problem. Work with your immediate boss first. If that does not solve the problem, discuss with your boss any intention you have of going higher.

One other point before we move on. There is an increase in the number of senior officers who like to get out and talk to their people. Despite the convenience of these visits, continue to observe the chain of command in routing your dissent. You may use such an opportunity to speed up the process, but first coordinate your comments with your immediate supervisor.

Written Dissent. A written statement is often the best way to present your disagreement with the status quo. Written dissent has many advantages. Typically, a reader is less defensive than a listener. Also, the reader can pick the time and place to read your dissent. This puts him or her at ease by preventing an unnecessary confrontation. Written dissent is also private. The reader can read it free of pressure to react immediately and is free to reconsider an initial negative reaction before rendering a final judgment. Furthermore, when you write your dissent you will usually present your most complete and organized thoughts.

The Air Force has a number of written instruments for presenting your dissent. *The Tongue and Quill* presents such instruments as the formal letter, talking paper, position paper, and bullet background paper. You will find both explanations and examples of each in that handbook.[13]

Support. Support your challenge. Find facts, quotes, models, or historical examples to support your ideas. Ensure that they are accurate, concrete, and credible. Then present them in support of a logical conclusion. Your ultimate goal is for the audience to adopt your idea as theirs.[14] Support will help you lead them there.

Provide a Solution. Whenever you challenge the status quo, present a solution.[15] The world is full of problems and messengers; the problem solver is the rarity. In a few cases, you might find that your superiors fault the status quo but support it because there is nothing better. Thus, your solution can be more important than your explanation of the problem. They need your innovative problem solving as well as your communication skills.[16]

Be Prepared for Rejection. If your challenge is rejected, you have two choices: continue your battle another way or quit. You can continue the battle by taking your dissent through other channels, changing your approach or audience, or developing a better solution. Quitting can be done by either following or getting out of the way. Before the assault on Inchon, Rear Admiral Doyle presented alternative ideas to Gen Douglas McArthur. When the general was unmoved, the admiral gave his total commitment to the attack.[17] Both the dissent and the obedience were professionalism in action. Likewise, had Lieutenant Calley challenged the order he thought he received and had his challenge failed, it would have been his duty to disobey the illegal orders and step aside when ordered to do so.

Closing Comments

On the surface, the concept of dissent in the military seems contrary to the profession's fundamental principles of discipline and obedience. But history has shown that dissent, when properly timed and presented, can complement discipline in accomplishing the mission. Furthermore, there are examples within the Air Force of support for innovative junior officers who challenge the status quo.

Like any other part of military leadership or followership, dissent is an art. The techniques you learn are only the skills. To develop the art properly, you must practice with daring the skills that best fit your personality and the situation. This requires both courage and bravery. It takes moral courage to risk a comfortable niche in the unit by advocating an unpopular idea. As one American officer wrote, "The bars, leaves, birds, and stars that mark an officer are not just to be worn, at times they must also be bet."[18] Due to the courage of many before you, the Air Force has stayed in the forefront of warfighting ability. Additionally, it takes physical bravery to comply with what Sir John Hackett called our profession's "unlimited liability clause"[19] or to risk your life following the very order you unsuccessfully challenged. Ultimately, your dissent will complement your professional discipline only when your underlying motivation is a selfless desire to do what is right for your country and not what is right for your ego or career.

Notes

1. Department of the Air Force, *Leadership in the Air Force,* Area 3, Bk. 2 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Headquarters AU/ACSC, January 1987), 7.

2. Capt Lynn W. Kaufman, USA, "Initiative in the US Soldier," *Military Review* 66 (November 1966): 46–54.

3. Capt Hugh A. Forde, USAF, *Excellence in Tactical Fighter Squadrons* (Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1985), 17.

4. Maj Gen William J. Mall, USAF, "One Mistake Career Mentality," *TIG Brief* 38 (2 May 1986): 2.

5. Lt Col Gallardo, USAF, "Leadership, Discipline, and the Flying Mission," *TIG Brief* 37 (18 March 1985): 18.

6. Michael C. McMullen, USAF, faculty instructor, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., interview with author, 15 January 1988.

7. Capt John D. Kuntz, USMC, "Are You Ready to Disobey?" *Marine Corps Gazette* 70 (October 1986): 39.

8. William P. Anthony, *Managing Your Boss* (New York: American Management Association Book Division, 1983), 96.

9. Department of the Air Force, *Leadership in the Air Force.*

10. Mall, 175.

11. Rae Andre et al., *The 59 Second Employee* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1984), 91.

12. T. A. Harris, *I'm OK—You're OK: A Practical Guide to Transactional Analysis* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 95; Maj Ralph R. Rohatsch Jr., USAF, "Air Force Communication: A Transactional Analysis Viewpoint," research study prepared at Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala. (1976), 30–31.

13. Air Force Handbook (AFH) 37-137, *The Tongue and Quill* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 31 August 1994).

14. Lt Gen Victor H. Krulak, USMC, "A Soldier's Dilemma," *Marine Corps Gazette* 70 (November 1986): 26.

15. Ibid., 27.

16. Anthony, 168–75.

17. Krulak, 27–28.

18. Kuntz, 39.

19. Sir John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1983), 23.

Reflections on Leadership for Would-Be Commanders

Dr. I. B. Holley

Highly successful leaders aren't born, they are made. And they start working to be leaders very early. The successful careers of such men as Gen George S. Patton or Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who became legends in their own time, are worth studying closely for what makes a leader. At West Point one can peruse the library of books General Patton collected and read over the course of a lifetime. Many contain his marginal annotations. One of these is of particular interest. Scrawled on the blank flyleaf in Patton's hand one finds under the heading "Qualities of a great general" a list of attributes he had inferred from reading Fieberger's *Elements of Strategy.* What makes this entry of significance for us is the date, 29 April 1909, *after* Patton's last class as a cadet at the US Military Academy and *before* he received his commission as a second lieutenant.[1] In short, the pattern is clear: early in his career Patton recognized that the road to command involves not only conscientious effort to study the experience of others but thoughtful reflection on the meaning of that experience.

Several years ago this writer was invited to give the dedicatory address on the occasion of General Patton's installation in the Hall of Fame at Fort Leavenworth. In casting about for ideas suitable for the occasion he recalled a most revealing bit of evidence in the published Patton papers. Like many another officer, Patton attended the Command and General Staff School (as it was then called), but unlike most, year after year, following his graduation, he wrote back to the school requesting the current map or tactical problems, the exercises set for the class. He didn't ask for the school solutions but worked them out for himself.[2] Here was a true professional, on his own initiative honing his tactical skills against the day when he would lead an army in battle.

Professional military education (PME) can be of substantial assistance to the resident student who applies himself or herself conscientiously. But PME courses are but fleeting opportunities in an extended military career. For those who seriously aspire to leadership, at all levels, self-study, self-discipline is perhaps an equally fitting term, and sustained reflection are essential.

The supply of readings on leadership is virtually endless. The professional journals frequently run such articles, some of them excellent, some trash. The aspiring leader will dip into this literature, reading critically and reflectively, accepting ideas that seem to have the ring of truth or seem to apply to the problems at hand. Sometimes, but not always, the thoughtful reader will want to make notes. The more thoughtful one is, the briefer the notes. What does one do with the notes? File them? Have you established a filing system? Is it simple and workable? Show me your filing system, and I'll tell you a good deal about the quality of your mind and your thinking processes. But even if you never again look at those notes after writing them down, all is not lost; the mere act of writing them tends to enhance their grooving in your memory. As the old saw had it, expression sharpens impression.

There are countless books on leadership; one of the best is *The Challenge of Command* by Col Roger Nye, a longtime member of the US Military Academy faculty.[3] This brief paperback, though written by an Army officer, can be used to great advantage by officers in all the services. It offers insights to troop leaders from the junior level all the way up to senior staff planners and decision makers concerned with strategy. Along the way it has suggestions on the moral dimensions of officership and the concept of duty. All the chapters are thought-provoking and all are graced with lists of suggested readings, enough to last a lifetime. Another, particularly appropriate for Air Force officers, is Maj Gen Perry M. Smith's *Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders,* reflections from General Smith's role as commandant of the National War College where he taught courses on leadership in large organizations.[4]

Of course, even the most thoughtful and sustained reading in the literature of leadership will, of and by itself, never make a successful leader. But it should help us acquire a clear conception of what is really involved in the practice of command at successive echelons. At the same time, such reading and reflection should help make us better followers than we would otherwise become. At every step along the way, whether as leader or follower, one sets the insights derived from reading against one's day-to-day experience. Was I wise or foolish in the way I handled that situation? Did I even try to apply the insights garnered from my readings, or did I act impulsively only to rue my action later?

Effective leaders learn from their mistakes. They are willing to suffer the pain of introspection; they ransack their memories for examples of how others have avoided such blunders. For a veritable mine of examples of the psychology of leadership one can scarcely do better than dip into Maj Gen Aubrey Newman's *What Are Generals Made Of?* which contains a wealth of insights derived from experience from newly minted second lieutenant to senior general.[5]

All of the foregoing is merely by way of introduction, reaffirming a notion that should be self-evident: Though formal professional education is useful, it can never substitute for a lifetime of self-directed, self-imposed, self-conducted, self-education. What follows is a suggested technique, a use-

This article was prepared especially for AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership.*

ful initial approach, an illustrative first step toward a better understanding of what leadership involves for those who aspire to command and are willing to invest time and thought to the process.

Good commanders are harder to find and to cultivate than good staff officers. Everything the Air Force can do to nurture latent talent for command should be done. This would be true even if the effort appears to benefit only that small fraction of the officer corps eventually selected for high command. Since instruction in the art of command is not limited in utility to those who will eventually wield significant authority, those who serve in staff positions must understand the nature of command as surely as those who exercise it.

The terms *staff* and *command* are shorthand symbols for decidedly intricate activities. It is undoubtedly true that the average officer is confident he or she knows the difference between the two. On the surface the distinction is obvious; it can be summed up in the old maritime adage, "pilot's advice, captain's orders." But it is precisely this obvious quality that appears to lie at the root of the problem. Ask yourself: Do I really grasp the fuller dimensions of these two terms, *staff* and *command,* that represent highly complex congeries of ideas and interrelationships?

If staff and command are key words for leaders at all echelons, then it is imperative to explore them exhaustively. Terms so frought with meaning defy simple definition. Nevertheless, by extracting the principal words from all the definitions one can assemble from browsing in the literature of leadership, it may be possible to illuminate the two functions usefully. Here is a suggested way of going about such an analysis for yourself.

Command involves *authority* to make *decisions* that are translated into orders to carry out an assigned *mission.* Implicit in this definition is the notion of responsibility. If command has been assigned a mission, then command is responsible to the higher authority making the assignment. By the same token there are implied *limitations* to the power or the authority of command. If one undertakes to explore the implications and ramifications of each of the italicized words, the outlines of a fruitful discussion begin to emerge suggestively.

For example, take the word *authority;* there are substantial legal implications to this term that officers need to know. Further, they must be familiar with the organizational structure of the Air Force to understand the flow of authority. But not all the authority a commander enjoys stems from legal sanctions. A substantial fraction is moral, stemming from the perceptions of a leader's power held by subordinates, perceptions that are shaped by such nonlegal considerations as a leader's presence, demeanor, personality, and other traits. The greater this perceived authority, the more willing a commander's superiors are to entrust him or her with still greater legal authority, so legal authority and moral authority interact.

Or again, take the word *responsibility.* One normally thinks of responsibility upward; commanders are responsible to their superiors. True, but in a sense no less real if less clearly defined by law, commanders are also accountable to their subordinates. They must reckon with their superiors' perception of their actions and live with the consequences good or bad.[6]

Every significant word in the various definitions of command should be identified, extracted, and explored for its larger implications. The two examples above are, of course, by no means exhaustive. They are offered only to indicate in suggestive fashion the direction such analysis might take. A similarly intensive treatment should be accorded the term *staff.*

Staff functions can be reduced to three: a staff *investigates, formulates,* and *facilitates.* Each of these roles lends itself to substantial elaboration. *Investigate* implies study, that is to say collect, record, assess, or evaluate all aspects of identifying, retrieving, storing, and processing information. *Formulates* implies conceptualizing, planning, projecting, devising alternative courses for the consideration of command. Also implicit in this function is the notion of initiating or originating concepts, proposals, or programs for command decision. Finally, *facilitates* implies informing, coordinating, supervising, monitoring all functions that close the feedback loop in the hierarchy from the upper levels of command to the subordinate levels of operations—the people who execute, implement, perform or carry out orders.

Just as the analysis of key nouns associated with "command" produced a number of suggestive leads for the development of a provocative discussion of leadership, so too a study of the action verbs associated with "staff" offers fruitful suggestions to the same end. The symbolic word *investigate,* for example, virtually dictates a whole series of lessons and exercises designed to train officers to perform this vital staff function with dispatch and precision. The same is obviously true of *formulate* and *facilitate.* This much must be evident. More subtle and more elusive is the implied interrelationships of these several subfunctions of staff work and the relation of staff to command.

Who, for example, initiates? The conventional conception envisions ideas or policies as stemming from command, flowing down to staff for processing, then, with the imprimatur of command in the form of an order continuing on down still further to the operating echelon. This may, indeed, be a pattern, but it is by no means the only pattern. Commanders may or may not initiate actions, concoct policies, or dream up programs. Whether they take such actions on their own initiative or rely upon a staff to feed such ideas up to them, the authority to act and the ultimate responsibility rests with them. A staff, at best, is an extension of the commander's person. It may originate and devise all significant policies and plans, it may actually initiate every significant action; but unless the commander adopts the proposals of the staff, those proposals remain just that and nothing more.

Clearly, well-trained staff officers will not only recognize the two different styles of command, but will appreciate the fact that the nature of the staff in which they function will vary, depending upon the style of command congenial to the leader. Both styles can be made to work, as numerous historical examples of each testify, but manifestly the most effective style is that in which commanders encourage staff initiatives. This kind of commander extends and enlarges the scope of his or her own creativity whereas, by contrast, commanders who limit their staffs to a largely reactive role restrict themselves to the range of their own resources and reduce the job satisfaction and thus the effectiveness of their staffs. Here there is no need to develop further the ramifications of the command-staff relationship; the foregoing should be sufficient to illustrate suggestively some of the several crucially important areas toward which a discussion of leadership might usefully be directed.

Notes

1. Col Roger H. Nye, "The Patton Library Comes to West Point," *12 Friends of the West Point Library Newsletter,* March 1989, 1.

2. Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972–1974), 2 vols.

3. Col Roger H. Nye, *The Challenge of Command* (Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1986).

4. Maj Gen Perry M. Smith, *Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986).

5. Maj Gen Aubrey S. Newman, *What Are Generals Made Of?* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1987). Most of the episodes in this book are reprinted from *Army* magazine where they originally appeared.

6. For an illuminating analysis of the meaning of authority and responsibility, see Lt Comdr B. C. Dean. "Authority: The Weakened Link," 97 USN Institute *Proceedings* (July 1971): 48–52.

Perspectives

This portion of *Concepts for Air Force Leadership* is entitled Perspectives because it provides an expansive, high-level overview—or perspective—of the entire book. It is multidimensional, addressing all of the concepts discussed in the first three dimensions. The objective of this portion is to consider leadership impressions within a broad conceptual context to enhance our understanding of the multidimensional aspects of leadership.

Leadership is the art of getting others to do something the leader is convinced should be done. Leaders make a difference and produce decisive results. Leaders have an unwavering integrity and a strong desire to stretch themselves and their people to the limits of individual and organizational capability.

Successful leadership is the pursuit of excellence within a values-based Air Force. Leadership can be learned by practice and study, just as the pilot learns to fly or the athlete learns to play baseball. We develop these attributes with professional military education, professional continuing education, self-study, and on-the-job experience. This is the central theme of this portion of *Concepts for Air Force Leadership*. It is left to the reader to supply the details as they pertain to specific leadership situations. The reader should relate the concepts discussed in the first three dimensions to available or emerging leadership theory in order to achieve a more in-depth and practical treatment of this complex, and sometimes misunderstood, yet important subject.

Specifically, this portion contains several articles on leadership impressions. Additional articles provide a broad overview of leadership in relation to "Duty, Honor, Country" with a perspective on related subjects. Finally, leaders discuss their views of leadership. In effect, all the articles attempt to reveal leadership as subjective and influenced by human variables.

This portion of the book emphasizes that leadership is more than managerial ability. It requires a capacity to influence followers to achieve a common goal and is accompanied by providing purpose, direction, and motivation. Leadership reaches deep emotions through presence, force of personality, integrity, service, and example. Leaders know their people, themselves, and their professions. Good leaders are good simplifiers, who cut through argument, debate, and self-doubt to provide solutions and the vision their subordinates and others can understand and support. Effective leaders have infectious optimism and the ability to convince followers they are winning when odds are against them. Above all, leadership implies a willingness for self-sacrifice to reach high, realistic group goals.



All readings in this portion reinforce the articles in the first three dimensions. They underscore the value of good leadership to meet the current and future needs of the Air Force.

Doctrine for Air Force Leaders

Maj Gen Allen G. Peck

Air Force doctrine represents our Service's historically proven best practices for how to organize, deploy, and employ Air Force forces in support of the missions of combatant commanders. Doctrine is inextricably interwoven with the concept of leadership and provides the foundation of leadership for Airmen. Volumes exist that expound on the elements of leadership and its inherent necessity in the military. What is often overlooked, however, is the connection between the concepts of leadership and doctrine.

Service doctrine exists at the basic, operational, and tactical levels of war, and when read and understood provide the bulwark of learning for leaders to perform their jobs. Doctrine codifies what we as a Service have learned over the years in actual practice and in war games, exercises, and simulations. Doctrine cannot stand alone; it requires judgment in its application. This is where the facets of leadership come into play. Through comprehension and judicious selection of the relevant parts of doctrine for a given situation, leaders can take full advantage of their knowledge, training, and experience to make critical mission-related decisions. Lack of understanding of the principles of war, the tenets of airpower, or the distinctive capabilities of our Air Force diminishes that ability to maximize decision-making capabilities. Great leaders understand and communicate not only what to do, but why they are doing it.

For Airmen, leadership is the art and science of motivating, influencing, and directing Airmen to understand and accomplish the Air Force mission.[1] Airmen must work to refine their leadership skills by developing a leadership style that capitalizes on their particular strengths; good leaders are adaptable, balancing their units' needs while remaining focused on mission success. Airmen are grown into the responsibilities of leadership through deliberate development, using education, training, and experience as the building blocks. This force development process is a deliberate series of challenging experiences that, combined with education and training opportunities, are directed at producing Airmen who possess the tactical expertise, operational competence, and strategic vision to lead and execute the full spectrum of Air Force missions both today and tomorrow.[2]

The tenets of airpower highlight the way the Air Force differs from other military forces in how we fight. Leaders must be grounded in these tenets to be able to fully execute the airpower elements of an operation. As an example, the key tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution allows commanders to provide coherence, guidance, and organization to a unit's efforts and still be able to focus their energies where needed to achieve success at the operational level of war. It simultaneously demonstrates the commander's willingness to entrust subordinates with the authority to execute their missions—essential if commanders are to achieve an effective span of control and foster initiative, situational responsiveness, and flexibility.

It is good judgment in using doctrine that makes a great leader out of a good one. Air Force Doctrine Document 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, addresses the concept to say, "In application, doctrine should be used with judgment. As a body of best practices, it should neither be dismissed out of hand through ignorance of its principles, nor should it be employed blindly without due regard for the mission and situation at hand."[3] Doctrine can be treated as a "commander's intent," providing guidance that should be followed, but not at the expense of the judgment that comes from education, training, and experience we as Airmen have gained over the course of our time in Service.

Clearly leadership and doctrine are tied closely together. The credibility one gains by knowing tactical level doctrine for his or her weapons system is self-evident. Operational level doctrine, however, is often overlooked as we move from one tactical level job to the next, but it is at the operational level where wars are won and lost. Doctrine is designed to ensure that our leaders have the knowledge and understanding necessary to fight and win across the entire spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian relief to total war. We need to read it, understand it, and debate it if we expect to successfully lead tomorrow's Air Force.

For additional information on doctrine, visit the AFDC website at https://www.doctrine.af.mil.

Notes

1. Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 12 March 2007 revision draft, 16.
2. Ibid., 30.
3. Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 12 March 2007 revision draft, 16.

This article was prepared especially for AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership*.

Anatomy of Leadership: Images and Reflections—The Pattern of Air Leadership

Gen Ira C. Eaker

Colonel Crabbe, Seminar Director, Gentlemen:

This opportunity to discuss with you this pattern of air leadership, with particular reference to the careers of Generals H. H. Arnold and Carl A. Spaatz, is welcomed and appreciated. I do believe there is a definite "pattern" of air leadership and I also believe it is best represented and illustrated by the careers of these two preeminent US air leaders, Arnold and Spaatz.

I have been an avid student of leadership, more particularly generalship, for 60 years since entering the military service in 1917. I served, in staff or command roles, each of the successive chiefs of the Army Air Corps: Patrick Fechet, Foulois, Westover, Arnold, and Spaatz from 1924 to 1947. I have known all the chiefs of staff of the Eighth US Air Force—Spaatz, Vandenberg, Twining, White, LeMay, McConnell, Ryan, Brown, and Jones and have observed closely the patterns of leadership displayed by these 14 able air leaders.

From this unforgettable experience, I shall make some observations for 30 minutes and then stand for any questions you may raise.

First, what are the differences between air generalship and Army and Navy leadership? Some of my views on this subject were revealed in discussions with Albert Speer, Hitler's weapons production minister, on 21 October 1976, from which I quote:

> Whereas armies and navies have clashed for centuries and nations have risen and fallen as a result, air power has never had similar use, experience, or influence.
>
> Although Lord Trenchard of Britain, General Douhet of Italy, and Gen William Mitchell of the United States had prophesied that strategic air power could exercise a decisive influence on warfare and the survival of nations, those theories had never been tested before World War II.
>
> Many theories of land and sea combat had been advanced and tried out in combat over the centuries. Great land and sea commanders, like Napoléon and Nelson, had led winning campaigns on land and sea. These battles, strategies, and tactics had been recorded, studied, and analyzed by war colleges of many nations. Strategic and tactical historians, like count Von Schliefen and Mahan, had written many volumes on the proper usage of land and sea forces.

Air power and its employment had never had any of that treatment. Why? Because the airplane was less than 50 years old. Flying machines as weapons had never been developed with the power and capacity to test the visions of Trenchard, Douhet, and Mitchell. For the first time ever, the US Eighth Air Force, operating out of Britain, and Britain's own Royal Air Force (RAF) were to be given the resources to test those theories of the use of strategic air power.

Gen H. H. Arnold, head of the Army Air Forces in the United States, was a dedicated Mitchell disciple. His instructions to General Spaatz and me were clear-cut, specific, unmistakable. We were to take the heavy bombers General Arnold would send us and demonstrate what air power could do. Could it, as he hoped and believed, exercise a decisive influence on warfare by destroying the weapons-making capacity of an industrial country like Germany?

General Spaatz was diverted from the test temporarily when he was ordered, in October 1942, to accompany General Eisenhower to Africa to start the campaign to defeat Rommel and seize North Africa. I moved up from 8th Bomber Command to be Eighth Air Force commander. Air Marshal Harris had been RAF bomber commander for six months. This responsibility for the vital test of airpower fell upon us the next two critical years.

We had no precedent, no textbooks, no heritage from former leaders of strategic airpower campaigns. We had to develop our operational techniques and test them by employment over Nazi-occupied Europe. We had also, by trial and error, to determine what changes needed to be made in our aircraft and their armament so that they could survive against the Luftwaffe, which had already been fighting more than two years.

So, during 1942 and 1943 this process continued, cooperatively, out of Britain—the RAF by night, the US Eighth Air Force by day.

Next, I shall review some of my personal recollections and experiences with Arnold and Spaatz, in keeping with my agreement for your program today.

When I first met Arnold in December 1918 at Rockwell Field, North Island, San Diego, California, he was a colonel, just returned from a brief tour of inspection overseas, in the closing days of World War I, and recently appointed commanding officer of Rockwell.

He was 32 years of age and the most handsome Army officer, with the possible exception of General Pershing, I had ever seen. He was six feet tall, erect, wore his uniform with pride and grace; his instant trademark was a quick, engaging smile, but he possessed a reserve and dignity of bearing which did not encourage familiarity.

During the next six months, our principal duty consisted of reducing our garrison from its wartime strength of 12,000 to its peacetime complement of 250 men. Rockwell had been the Advance Flying School for Pursuit and Aerial Gunnery

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Address at the Industrial War College, Washington, D.C., 14 April 1977.

in World War I, and it was in the process of being transformed into a supply and maintenance depot, its postwar status. I had an opportunity at Rockwell to observe two men who were to be in later years successively chief of Army aviation—the commanding officer, Hap Arnold, and his operations officer, Tooey Spaatz. I decided then that these two were going places, and this would be a good team to join. I know of only one better long-range career prediction than this, and Arnold was its author.

In 1911, while serving in the Philippines as a second lieutenant, Arnold returned from a mapping detail in the jungle and told Mrs. Arnold that he had met a first lieutenant who one day would be chief of staff of the Army. The admired lieutenant's name was George C. Marshall, the Army's great World War II leader who was made chief of staff 30 years after Arnold's prophetic prediction. The friendship and mutual respect and admiration formed then was to have profound consequences for the Army and for its Air Force in the climactic, dramatic events of later years.

In 1919 Arnold became air officer, Western Department, and was reduced to his permanent grade of major. While serving in this capacity he came up with ideas to keep the Army Air Corps before the public, keep its pilots busy, and promote the mission of military aviation. Among these efforts were the forest patrol, aerial refueling experiments, and the border patrol.

In 1923 he became chief of information in Washington under General Patrick, the chief of Air Corps. This almost culminated in disaster.

Arnold had long been a longtime admirer of the assistant chief, Gen Billy Mitchell. As chief of information, he helped Mitchell in his public relations campaign that resulted in the famous Mitchell court-martial of 1925. He and Spaatz were warned that if they testified for Mitchell, it might jeopardize their future careers. Both, despite this warning, became witnesses for the defense. A year later a news release highly complimentary of the Air Corps but disparaging the General Staff of the Army appeared surreptitiously. It was traced to Arnold by the Army inspector general. He had used a government typewriter and paper and was charged with misappropriating public property in a project inimical to the Army. The inspector general recommended Arnold's court-martial; but at General Patrick's intercession, instead he was relieved of duty on the Air Staff, banished from Washington, and assigned command of one air squadron at Fort Riley, Kansas, a cavalry post.

Turning adversity to advantage, an Arnold habit that became a trademark, he there developed new methods of cooperation between air and ground forces, new signaling devices and techniques. He also took the opportunity to form close friendships with officers who were to hold senior command and staff assignments in later years.

In 1933 Arnold was made commanding officer of March Field, Riverside, California. Here occurred a series of events that were to play significant roles in his career and in the Air Corps's future. As one of his squadron and later group commanders, I had the opportunity to observe this important period in Arnold's career development.

For example, there was his appreciation for public relations. Then came the Army airmail, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt canceled the civilian airmail contracts. Arnold was appointed commander of the Western region, with headquarters in Salt Lake City. Within three hours after receiving the telephone call from Washington assigning him to the task, he had outlined his organization, named his route commanders (I was given CAM Route 4, from San Diego to Los Angeles to Salt Lake City), selected his staff, and moved to his new headquarters in Salt Lake City. Incidentally, he authorized each of his commanders to commit the US government for thousands of dollars in hangar rentals and communications with only verbal authority. Partly because of more favorable weather, but due also to foresight and organization, his was the most successful segment of the Army airmail effort, sustaining fewer casualties, and with the highest rate of on-schedule delivery.

Another Roosevelt innovation was the Civilian Conservation Corps. Arnold was again designated Western region commander, administering 33 camps in the national forests, with his subordinates in command, and winning commendation for outstanding performance.

In 1935 when the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force was formed, Arnold was given command of its 1st Wing, as two of his groups at March Field comprised half of this experimental force. This brought him his first star. His wing of the GHQ Air Force participated in many maneuvers and worked out tactical formations and strategic doctrine, which, incidentally, were later validated against the Luftwaffe.

I remember, he often told a story he had picked up on a visit to England. It appears that two English poachers were arrested for killing the king's deer. They were brought before the lord of the manor. Before pronouncing the usual death sentence upon the hapless miscreants, he asked if either had anything to say. One of them stood mute, but the other said, "My lord, you have in the courtyard a donkey, a favorite with the children of the manor. I believe if I were given a reprieve for a year, I could teach that donkey to talk." The idea intrigued the lord, and the reprieve was granted for one year. As the two prisoners were being returned to the dungeon, the one who had remained silent said, "You fool, you know you can't teach a donkey to talk." Whereupon the reprieved prisoner replied, "Let me remind you that tomorrow you'll be dead, while I will be alive. Also, in a year many things can happen. The lord may die. The donkey may die. And besides, with so much at stake, with my life depending on it, I may just be able to teach that donkey to talk."

I didn't think that story very funny, either, the first few times I heard General Arnold tell it. Then, suddenly, I perceived its significance. It explained much about the Arnold compulsion and motivation.

One of the burdens he bore, considering the quality of the personnel he had surrounding him, was that he always faced the necessity of teaching donkeys to talk. Thereafter, I always had the uneasy feeling that I was one of the donkeys.

No one was ever in doubt for very long about Arnold's opinions or ideas. He always knew where to put the emphasis.

In 1936 General Arnold was selected by his friend, Gen Malin Craig, the chief of staff of the Army, to be the assistant chief of the Army Air Corps. He was back in Washington in triumph, just 10 years after he had been banished in disgrace!

He saw World War II on the horizon more clearly than any of us and worked all of us unsparingly to be ready, and to have Army aviation ready to play a significant role. He followed closely the Spanish civil war and watched with especial interest the latest weapons and tactics as that war unfolded between the German and Russian air forces. He selected air attachés with especial care and put them in sensitive spots in the European capitals. He arranged to have selected aircraft and engine manufacturers, like Dutch Kindelberger, visit England, France, and Germany to bring back the latest in aircraft and engine design.

I remember one experience of those years that was very typical. One day he called Colonel Spaatz and me into his office and said, "I am going to the White House to be with the President when he makes a national broadcast which will be very significant. Listen to it on my radio set." That was the speech in which President Roosevelt announced his plan to build 50,000 military planes that year.

When General Arnold returned, in high spirits, we said to him, "How could you let the President make such a preposterous statement? The whole aircraft industry in this country built less than two thousand planes last year, 50,000 next year is ridiculous." His response was, "If I had asked for 25,000, I would have gotten but 15,000. Now I have asked for 50,000 and if I don't get 25,000 you boys won't be here a year from now."

Of course, General Arnold got only 10,000 planes that year; and most of those went to France and Britain; but he built the factories and laid the foundation for the phenomenal expansion that followed and ultimately produced 50,000 planes per year, which was the way he planned it all along.

During the war years, I saw General Arnold only when he came, as he frequently did, to visit the war theater; but I corresponded with him constantly, answering his queries on our tactics, our losses, our target selection, and the results of our bombing. He summoned me from my Eighth Air Force headquarters in England to the Casablanca Conference when our daylight bombing seemed doomed. This strategy proved effective for Prime Minister Churchill, after our conference, withdrew his request to President Roosevelt that we join the RAF in night bombing. We were allowed to continue, the Luftwaffe was destroyed, making possible Eisenhower's channel crossing in June 1944, and the rest is history.

Arnold's leadership, drive, experience, and imagination were the primary factors in this unprecedented accomplishment. No other man could have done the job. The close relations he was able to establish with President Roosevelt; General Marshall; Mr. Hopkins; Mr. Robert A. Lovett, the assistant secretary of war for air; and finally, with the leaders in Congress, were decisive.

Through the force of his personality, he won full membership on the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff. This gave the Army Air Forces parity at all military and political conferences where the vital decisions were made—Quebec, Casablanca, Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam.

When I returned from overseas in May 1945 to become his deputy while he was in the hospital recovering from a severe heart attack, there was ample evidence of the frightful burden he had carried and of the influence he exercised on all major national decisions. Arnold, our Army Air Forces chief, was one of the eight or 10 most influential military leaders in Washington at the most dramatic period in our history.

Upon his retirement, Congress made him general of the Air Force; he had been for four years general of the Army. He has been the only airman to wear five stars. Hap Arnold was an authentic genius in military management and leadership. Selecting and inspiring subordinate Air Force commanders and principal staff officers was his forte. His eight years as chief of Air Corps and commanding general Army Air Forces was the most remarkable and significant period in military aviation history. There has not been, nor is there likely to be, his equal again.

Carl Andrew Spaatz, who was destined to be the last commanding general of the US Army Air Forces and the first chief of staff of the US Air Force, came from Pennsylvania. His grandfather had immigrated from Germany shortly after the Civil War. His father published a weekly newspaper in Boyerstown. The son, Carl, was his only assistant, typesetter, and apprentice printer.

The father was popular and influential in the Dutch community. In 1910 he announced for Congress as a Democrat against the incumbent, a Republican. But he withdrew after his opponent promised to appoint his son Carl to West Point.

Carl Spaatz entered the US Military Academy in 1910 and was promptly given the nickname "Tooey." (A redhead in each class was called "Tooey" in those days.) He graduated with the class of 1914. On the day of graduation he was walking off demerits, of which he had the maximum allowable, and had but 20 minutes to dress for his graduation parade. He was always, thereafter, a fast dresser. I used to marvel at how he could sleep until a quarter to eight and appear at Eisenhower's conferences in Algiers promptly at 8:00 A.M. freshly shaved and well-turned out, bright, and alert.

Upon graduation from the US Military Academy, he chose the infantry rather than the cavalry or field artillery because of his dislike of horses. His first station was with the 25th Infantry at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii. There he had the good fortune to meet the 17-year-old daughter of a cavalry colonel, Ruth Harrison, who became his wife three years later.

One day in 1915 Colonel Harrison said to his wife, "Mother, I see our daughter, Ruth, keeps company with that Lieutenant Spaatz. I want that to stop immediately. Today, he put in for aviation training and there is obviously no future in that."

The daughter was more prescient. The father retired as a colonel and the daughter's husband—with a major assist from her—became a four-star general.

Spaatz was accepted for aviation training, received his wings in 1916, and saw his first combat service with the 1st Aero Squadron chasing Villa with Pershing's Expeditionary Force in Mexico. Spaatz went to France in command of a squadron in 1917. He was soon placed in command in Issoudon, the largest US pursuit training base. In the last weeks of the war he escaped to a frontline squadron commanded by one of his former students, shot down three German planes, and won the Distinguished Service Cross.

His first station, postwar, was Rockwell Field, San Diego, California, where he was operations officer for the commanding officer, Col H. H. Arnold, and where I, the assistant adjutant first met him. Early in 1919 he flew an SE-5 British-built fighter in a transcontinental air race, making the best time across the continent in a single seater.

When Arnold became air officer of the Western Department in 1919, he took Spaatz with him. It was obvious then that Spaatz was his favorite assistant, a relation which was to continue for the next 30 years, eventful years for both of them and significant, too, for US military aviation.

Dr. Freeman wrote a well-known history of the Civil War called *Lee's Lieutenants.* Well, Arnold never had but one lieutenant, Carl Spaatz. In any crisis Spaatz was always at his side. In any war, when Arnold could not go, he sent Spaatz.

In the years between World Wars I and II, Spaatz always had command of fighter groups, of air bases, or senior positions on the air staff. During these years he was always on the boards that tested and selected each new series of fighter planes. About 1930 he was president of the Pursuit Evaluation Board, with Capt "Monk" Hunter, Captain Elmendorf (a field in Alaska now bears his name), and me. There were three experimental planes in the competition. I remember the week we spent in competitive test flights at Wright Field principally because of the report we rendered.

Serving as recorder, and well knowing Major Spaatz's reputation for brevity, I prepared a report one page in length. He thought it much too long and redundant. As he finally approved and signed the document, it read, "The Boeing P-12 won the fighter competition. It is a better plane; it more nearly meets the specifications. We recommend its early procurement." McNamara's whiz kids would have been hard put to spend two years analyzing that report, as they did with the F-111.

Brevity of reports and speech became his framework. He was a miser with words. If he had brought down the Ten Commandments from the Mount, there would have been but one, "Always do the right thing." He was fond of saying, "I never learned anything when I was talking."

When the Germans crossed the French border in the fall of 1939 to launch the blitzkrieg, Arnold sent Colonel Spaatz and Capt "Monk" Hunter as US observers with the RAF. During these critical days US Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy Sr., was sending back gloomy reports to Washington indicating that Britain was doomed and that Germany would launch an early and successful invasion. Spaatz learned of these reports and urgently cabled Arnold his own estimates, in defiance of the ambassador. He believed the RAF would stop the Luftwaffe bombers. He concluded, "Air superiority over the channel is essential to any invasion of Britain. The Germans, in my judgment, will never gain that requisite air superiority."

The Spaatz prophecy, accurate by a very narrow margin, impressed President Roosevelt favorably and endeared Spaatz to British leaders. He was thus a logical and certain choice to head our own air effort in Europe in World War II.

In June 1942 he arrived in England with the headquarters and Fighter Command of the US Eighth Air Force. I had preceded him in February with the headquarters of the 8th Bomber Command. When Eisenhower arrived in July to command all US forces in Britain, there was a reunion of old friends. Eisenhower, of the West Point class of 1915, had marched as a file closer behind Cadet Spaatz of the class of 1914. Their cadet friendship was probably enhanced by their common German origin.

In October 1942 when General Eisenhower went to Africa to launch the African invasion, Spaatz accompanied him to head the air effort. Early in that campaign Eisenhower called Spaatz to a fateful conference. He said, "Tooey, my morning report shows you have four hundred planes, while the British have two hundred and the French show one hundred. Rommel has only five hundred planes by today's intelligence estimate, yet every day he clobbers us. How come?"

Spaatz said,

> Ike, your figures are about right; when Rommel's planes hit me they outnumber me 5 to 4; when they hit the British they have the advantage, 5 to 3. The Germans have overwhelming superiority over the French, 5 to 1. Our tactics have been all wrong. The airplane is a poor defensive weapon. Airpower must always be used on the offensive. The first mission of the tactical Air Force is to win air superiority over the battlefield. Then only can it be diverted to secondary roles like observation, directing artillery fire, shooting up tanks, or defending headquarters.

Eisenhower said, "Tooey, I get the point. Hereafter, as long as I am in command, you have operational control of all the airplanes made available to me by our government or any allied nation."

The Luftwaffe never won another air battle in the North African campaign. The 800 Allied planes, all under Spaatz's control, took the offensive, destroyed the 500 German planes, and thereafter denied the resupply of the Afrika Korps by sea or air. Without gas, Rommel's tanks were halted. The Afrika Korps was finished.

Spaatz was always, thereafter, Eisenhower's principal air advisor, stationed at his headquarters and in daily contact. When Eisenhower returned to England, Spaatz accompanied him and assumed command of all US Strategic Air Forces in Europe. That job he held until final victory in Europe. He then transferred to the Pacific theater, where he was given the same role, coordinator of all the US Army Strategic Air Forces against Japan, engaged in burning down Tokyo and destroying the war-making potential of the warlords. This concluded abruptly when the two atomic bombs incinerated Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

When President Truman made the decision to drop the atomic bombs, he handed me a letter directing General Spaatz to accomplish that mission. Spaatz requested that he be authorized to advise General MacArthur, and he flew to Manila and briefed the supreme commander in the Pacific.

Spaatz was the only air commander present at both surrender ceremonies. He and Gen Beedle Smith represented Eisenhower at the Nazi surrender in Berlin. He was also aboard the battleship *Missouri* for the capitulation of the Japanese warlords.

When General Arnold—tired, worn, and ill—elected to retire in 1946, General Spaatz inevitably became his successor. His immediate primary tasks were to dismantle the world's most powerful air force, effect its reduction from 2.3

million men to 400,000 and from its operational strength of 90,000 planes to a peacetime inventory of less than 10,000.

He had also to plan the organization, composition, and status of the postwar Army Air Forces. A fundamental decision faced him. Should the Army Air Forces be content to remain in the Army or should we campaign for a separate service, coequal with the Army and Navy?

Navy aviators, faced with a similar problem, decided to stay in the Navy and eventually run it. They suggested that Army aviation should follow the same course.

General Spaatz, an advocate of coequal status for the Air Force since the days of Billy Mitchell, made a hard decision to "go for broke." He reasoned we would never have a better opportunity—with our war record, with the probable support of Generals Marshall and Eisenhower, and with powerful friends in Congress.

When General Spaatz presented the original plan to President Truman, the commander in chief said, "Tooey, I don't want two armed services, or three services, I want only one."

Armed with that guideline, the planners came up with a defense department and three coequal branches—Army, Navy, and Air Force. That compromise President Truman approved upon the decisive recommendation of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air Stuart Symington. It was submitted to Congress and resulted in the National Defense Act of 1947.

General Spaatz's success as a military leader and manager was due primarily to his possession of two indispensable qualities, to an extraordinary degree. He possessed absolute integrity. He never vacillated, trimmed, or hedged where principle was involved. Many times when it seemed certain it would jeopardize his career, he took the unpopular course, often contrary to his military superiors, because he believed it was right; and he would not compromise.

The other quality that he possessed, which accounted for his phenomenal success, was wisdom. He was always wise beyond his years. He was one of the most perceptive, quick-witted men I ever knew. Common sense dictated all his decisions and motivated his conduct.

Spaatz was the wisest defense leader I ever knew, the only general who never made a major mistake.

I will conclude with this brief analysis of the "pattern of air leadership" as I perceive it from my knowledge of the careers of Arnold, Spaatz, and the other 12 chiefs I have been privileged to observe.

All of them possessed great courage, physical and moral—the one certain, common characteristic of all successful military leaders.

All of them believed and advocated that airpower (aerospace power) had come to join armies and navies as a third essential, to complete the military triad.

All believed and advocated that it must be cooperative with armies and navies and always subject to overall civilian control—responsive to the acts of Congress and the orders of the commander in chief.

All believed and advocated that airpower had two vital constituent elements, manpower and weapons. The provision of adequate manpower always came first. But weapons and equipment were vital, too, and these must be continually modernized by current programs of research and development.

All believed and advocated that air power should be operated according to sound principles of strategy and tactics.

The key to these principles must always be that a war-fighting, war-winning capability is the only true measure of a valid war-deterrent, peacekeeping posture.

Now I would like to close, as I began, by suggesting (from my 60 years of observing military leadership) that the characteristics and capacities which pattern air leadership are almost identical with those that make successful leaders on land and at sea. For example, I believe that Gen George Patton and Adm Arleigh Burke could have been great air leaders, had fickle fate or a kind providence given them that opportunity.

A General's Perspective: Leadership in the Cold War

Gen Russell E. Dougherty

The US Air Force, from which I retired in 1977, is celebrating its 50th Anniversary this year—having been legislated into existence in the summer of 1947, with our first secretary, Stuart Symington, sworn in on 18 September 1947. The 45-year period in our history that we call the Cold War can be overlaid almost exactly with the first 45 years of the US Air Force, since its birth in 1947.

Unlike the USAF, however, the beginning of the Cold War cannot be established with precision—its beginning is a subjective date, a date that will vary with an individual's perception of post–World War II events. Not only is the beginning of the Cold War subjective, but its end is also subject to individual interpretation of the events following the breach of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and into the early 1990s. We have our own views on this, of course, but 45 years is a good layman's consensus of the Cold War's duration.

Historian Adam Ulam argued that Joseph Stalin, flush with the post-World War II survival of his nation and his own role could not long withstand the logic of his position as the ruler of a totalitarian society and as the supreme head of a movement that seeks security through constant expansion.

Then Dean Rusk, as secretary of state maintained that, in keeping with Ulam's assessment of Stalin's imperative for expansion, the United States had some responsibility for launching the Cold War, because we probably exposed Stalin to intolerable temptation through our own weakness. Just after V-J Day we demobilized almost completely, and almost overnight. We in the State Department were being told by officers on the Joint Staff that we did not have one division in the Army, nor one group in the Air Force, that could be considered ready for combat.

One could take a few specific exceptions to these dismal post–war assessments by the Joint Staff as reported by Secretary Dean Rusk—but my observations were that, in the main, they were just about right. That was the situation in the 1946–47 period. We were not focused on any external threat—we were basking in the complete victories in Europe and the Far East, concerned with garrison and occupation duties. There was no compelling reason to maintain combat-readiness, nothing dared challenge us. We felt no impulse of fear—we were asleep.

By and large we were totally preoccupied with getting back to peacetime pursuits—getting rid of mountains of wartime prestockage in bases and depots throughout the world—with rolling up and closing unneeded installations—with building a relatively small regular military establishment for our future needs, whatever they were. President Truman had explicitly laid out a plan for the creation of relatively large Reserve and National Guard forces, and the services were screening the wartime augmentees in an attempt to identify and build a relatively small, young cadre of qualified officers for integration into the depleted ranks of regular Air Force, Army, and Naval officers.

We had no imperialistic ambitions. Though left in a position where we could have done so, we had no desire to expand, to dominate other regions, to seize and rule other parts of the world. While we reluctantly accepted our obligation to occupy and stabilize certain areas in the Pacific and Europe for a short period—we had absolutely no intention of becoming the "world's policeman."

This was the early Cold War period; but, as a relatively young captain, I had no real feel for it. I had only the prevailing and popular notion, shared by all of my youthful colleagues, that we could never really be confident of cooperation with the Soviets. I was completely occupied with crew duties, base legal officer's "legal work," and caring for my family in remote, ill-equipped habitats. I had no knowledge of the extent of Soviet encroachment into Central Europe and its post–war domination of non-Soviet Europeans. Like my contemporaries, I had no illusions concerning productive international cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies but I had an inadequate understanding of what this meant for our future peace and security—and I was not alone in my ignorance!

Not until I read and studied former United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri—and the commentary surrounding it in the nation's press—did it hit home to me that there were serious complications to our uneasy relationships with the Soviets. Then came the reports of what we later came to know as George Kennan's famous "long telegram" from Moscow—and the policy of "containment" that it spawned. My personal international naiveté, and that of many of my contemporaries in the regular officer ranks of the services, was rapidly disappearing. The Air Force initiated serious studies of the Soviet Union for us to pursue; then, of more practical importance, the Soviets, themselves, closed ground access to the jointly occupied city of Berlin—and the necessity for the Berlin airlift was upon us. Though I was in the Pacific at the time, all of our airlift squadrons were involved and our people impacted. My introduction to the vicissitudes of the Cold War was under way—to continue and intensify for some 40 years.

This presentation given at the University of North Texas and adapted for AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership*.

Now, let me move ahead some 12 years into the Cold War period. In the fall of 1959 as a colonel coming out of one of Strategic Air Command's (SAC) operational air forces, I became a resident student in the National War College at Fort McNair, Washington, DC. My classmates and I—all Army, Air Force, Marine colonels, and Navy captains—ranged in age from the late 30s to mid-40s. All of us stemmed from the college and academy classes of 1939–43; and all had reasonably good records and potential, or else we would not have been selected for the National War College.

Though well beyond the WWII years, all of us dwelled, with nostalgia and endless anecdotes, on our WWII experiences—often with excessive hyperbole and exaggeration! Several of my classmates had heroic episodes in their records—Congressional Medal of Honor, Navy and Army Distinguished Service Crosses, etc.—but, all earned in war as junior officers, not as major unit commanders. The post-WWII turbulence and uncertainties of mission and organization—which, to put it mildly, was a sorry state of affairs—was behind us. In my case, Lt Gen Curtis LeMay (the 42-year old, gutsy combat commander in Europe and the Pacific in WWII) had left Europe—where he was running the Berlin airlift—to take command of the newly created SAC in October 1948, and move its headquarters to Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska.

Upon his arrival at SAC General LeMay believed: We didn't have one crew—not one crew—in the entire command who could perform a professional job. We would need to rebuild the organization completely before we would be ready to fight. And General LeMay proceeded to rebuild it completely and make it ready to fight. His creed was: "A force that cannot fight and win will not deter."

The extent to which General LeMay succeeded in his rebuilding and training efforts with SAC through the next decade—and his incomparable example to other commands—must be evaluated as one of the (if not *the*) most significant command actions of the Cold War. I would say today that he was—for over 10 years—the consummate Cold War commander.

General LeMay's demands were "you must train as you plan to fight," "every training mission must be as intense and demanding as an actual combat mission," "there is no room for second best," and "measure up or get out." Under LeMay we began serious, all-source intelligence collection on potential targets—on Soviet equipment, tactics, command constructs . . . we knew our enemy! General LeMay instilled in all of us a sense of purpose—a sense of mission—a mission in which every one of us (from the lead pilot to the ground crewman pulling the chocks from under the wheels) felt that he had an absolutely integral role in the success of our efforts. And this was carried down through the organization with an intensity and zeal that inspired excellence.

General LeMay was tough—he was uncompromising, but he was *not* sadistic, all of us knew "where he was coming from" and what he was trying to do, and we wanted to be part of his team.

But—now, to get back to 1959 as I entered the National War College. The Korean War was a recent, but traumatic, memory for most of us; a memory in which our forces fought valiantly but lacked the military professionalism that was to be demanded in the Cold War years that were ahead of us—both in our strategic forces and in our deployed theater forces.

The Suez crisis was still fresh in our minds—and, to some degree, a "bone in the throat" of most of our State Department colleagues. At this time, I didn't appreciate just how much this episode had impacted our cooperation with our Allies, particularly the French—but, I saw the fall-out later in my days in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Europe.

In Europe, the early estimates of NATO's force size and the conventional weapons equipping needed to counter and stop a full-scale Soviet attack to the West were absolutely staggering . . . the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) staff estimated hundreds of divisions and several dozen air armies. Conventional blocking—using conventional weapons for deterrence—was seen to be inadequate. Then came the economical promise of "nuclear deterrence"—the relative economy in force size, cost, and basing structure for a nuclear countering force to deter any Soviet thrust to the West. This illusory promise of economy of effort was captured with enthusiasm by our NATO allies—and by us. We adopted NATO's newly fashioned nuclear strategy in the mid-1950s with alacrity!

We who had come from SAC, and a few from our tactical and naval units, were proficient and experienced in handling nuclear weapons—and in the procedures for their delivery. We had mastered radar navigation and all-weather bombing—plus the air-refueling tactics and techniques—that gave us an intercontinental, all-weather capability with our B-47 jet bombers, and the emerging eight-engine B-52s. We knew how to handle and employ nuclear weapons.

As we entered the War College, intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles were proliferating at a rapid rate—some becoming obsolete and being retired within a few years from inception. Ballistic missile technology was racing ahead. We had just mastered the technology for employing solid fuel in our big rockets—making both silo and submarine basing of ballistic missiles feasible and affordable.

The exotic technology of guidance systems for our ballistic missiles—and that of our air or surface launched cruise missiles—was making great strides, as was the SENS (system of accurate navigation) for our ballistic missile submarines. We were now thinking of accuracy in hundreds of feet rather than thousands; we saw that we could develop a "triad" of nuclear deliver systems to insure survival and reliability . . . air delivered bombs, silo based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and submarine based submarine–launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). We could beef up and enhance our deterrent position with these survivable forces—external to the theaters.

Unfortunately, the same thing was happening on the Soviet side. In some respects, it was even more dramatic. They had demonstrated the technology of building huge nuclear weapons—of delivering them by air, by sea, and by land-based missiles at all ranges—from theater areas to intercontinental. Their numbers of weapons were expanding exponentially; particularly their theater range nuclear weapons, with which they could hold Europe hostage to their mid-range forces.

We were acutely aware that we were entering a period where there would be a plethora of nuclear weapons on both sides of the Iron Curtain—and effective deterrence would become ever more difficult—even questionable. We no longer held most of the cards in our hand.

We achieved significant military command successes during these days—but these command achievements were largely in the fields of research, development, and logistics—not in the classic "combat leader" roles. Adm "Red" Rayburn, in the development of the missile carrying Polaris submarines; Gen Bernard "Benny" Shreiver, the production genius who was responsible for the IBMs and early space achievements; Adm Hyman Rickover who was building nuclear propulsion for submarines and surface ships with a legendary, uncompromising intensity; comparable to General LeMay's success with SAC.

On the military/political scene, both in writings and in lectures, trenchant comments, quotes, articles, and books on the nuclear weapons milieu were coming out in record numbers. The Bernard Brodies, Al Wohlstetters, and the Henry Kissingers of the military/political "world" were authoring material faster than one could absorb it. Our political and diplomatic leadership was becoming steeped in the overall strategy of "deterrence."

We War College students were trying to "soak it up" like blotters. We wanted to master everything available in this arcane area of nuclear deterrence—and to understand the interactions of nuclear forces—ours and the Soviets. We knew that most of us were on the threshold of periods of senior positions in our services—when the direct military responsibilities of Cold War command were going to be dumped directly in our laps!

It was a sobering time for all of us. A new appreciation of the importance of precluding conflict between the major powers—of fashioning reliable firebreaks to the onset of war—particularly in the areas of direct confrontation in Europe and Asia—weighed heavily on all of us. In 1947 George Kennan had given us the idea of "Containment" in our approach to burgeoning Soviet Communism and, by and large, containment had become our central political theme. Professors Brodie ("Anatomy of Deterrence"), Wohlstetter ("The Delicate Balance of Terror"), et al., had coupled political and military containment with a military strategy of deterrence made vital when one weighed the global catastrophe of a major nuclear conflict, or a nuclear war in Europe. Into this environment that I have just sketched there came a distinguished lecturer to our National War College podium—from the Military Academy at West Point. Permanent professor and head of the Social Science Department, "Abe" Lincoln—one of the most distinguished and respected academics in the nation. Many of Professor Lincoln's prior students were in the audience—those of us who had not gone to the Military Academy knew all about his prescience and wisdom. His lecture was profound. All about the importance of fresh water, as I recall.

But after his lecture, we scrambled to get a seat in the smaller, more intimate seminar session for the informal question and answer period that followed. I made it into the session. Someone asked him about the strategy of deterrence. Professor Lincoln walked to a chalk board in the center of the room and wrote in big letters: "Capability x Will = s Deterrence." Then he proceeded to emphasize that he had written a political/military problem as one of *multiplication* and not of *addition*. He said that deterrence must be thought of as a "product"—not as a "sum." No matter what capability one had, if the factor of "will" to employ it was seen to be lacking, the deterrent product was sure to be "zero." On the other hand, one could have the most viral and intense "will" imaginable, but if multiplied with little or no "capability," the product, i.e., "deterrence" would not be consequential.

Professor Lincoln said that, to produce the product of deterrence the military *capability* underlying it had to be *real*. It could not be ersatz or phony. In a like vein, the *will* had to be recognized and accepted as a serious and believable intention to employ the capability.

I have thought about this simplistic—but profound—analogy a thousand times since that day in 1959. I have played it over and over again in my mind throughout my times as an operational unit commander and as a commander in chief of a major US command. I can not fault it! This was exactly what General LeMay had created in SAC. Professor Lincoln simplified a major problem with all of its implications. General LeMay gave it substance. I share it with you as an assist in understanding some of the things that will follow.

Now, back to my story: Late in my year, I was tasked by the War College to produce a formal dissertation on the validity—and utility—of a military strategy based on deterrence—but to cast it *not* in a situation where we held all the trumps, and an overwhelming nuclear arsenal, *but* in a world situation where there was an abundance—a "plenty," if you will—of nuclear weapons of all sizes and shapes available on both sides of a military deterrent equation.

To spare you the pages and pages of text in my dissertation, I concluded that "containment" of the Soviet Union was the only feasible, short-term objective—and that our deterrent strategy and posture, to be effective in such a situation, required: (1) A rational (probably misguided, but not insane) antagonist who could assess, with reasonable accuracy, the probable effect of his attacks; (2) It required a confident assessment by this antagonist that, no matter what the circumstances of his attack, he could not succeed—could not achieve his objectives, and would, assuredly, pay a penalty far beyond any possible gain he might achieve. (3) Then, finally, it was necessary to make sure that any enemy was convinced that our *capacity* to inflict such a penalty was real and in being. That this capacity was adequate, no matter what he did; and, importantly—that our nation had the unquestioned will and intention to mount such a response to any threat or challenge he might impose.

So, I took into my command years a real appreciation of what my first commander in chief, Gen Curtis LeMay, had done in SAC during the early years, saying something to the effect that everything we do must be real, consequential, and meaningful—and it must be recognized as such by the Soviet Union. No bluff, no smoke and mirrors—just raw and recognizable capability to extract unacceptable punishment—and with the unquestioned ability of our forces to employ it effectively under all circumstances.

But, I also took from the National War College a more balanced view of the essential *synergy* of our nation's strengths required by an overall strategy of deterrence. We, and our allies, needed strong forces—but much more—we needed the political, the economic, the *psychological* strengths, *and the focus of all of these*, to make deterrence work.

Let me share with you a memorable event that occurred when I assumed the command role of SAC in 1972—13 years after my War College experience. I was flattered that General LeMay would join us for the change of command ceremony, when my predecessor, Gen J. C. Meyer (our top WWII ace still on active duty), retired and I took command of SAC.

Immediately after the change of command ceremony, there was a full-scale reception in the officers' club. When General LeMay arrived to go through the receiving line, the protocol people brought him up to the front of the line and he stood for a relatively lengthy period looking directly at me. He said, "Russ, I hope you are fully aware of the implications of your command responsibilities." I assured him that I was aware of my role and authority—and sobered by the scope and potential of SAC's extensive nuclear equipped arsenal. Then General LeMay asked me pointblank: "Who do you remember from Pearl Harbor?"

The question was so surprising, and I was so taken aback that I did not give a quick, direct response. When General LeMay pressed me to "answer his question," I gave him the only reply that came immediately to mind: "Sir," I said, "I remember General Short and Admiral Kimmel." (After the Pearl Harbor disaster, Lt Gen Walter Short, USA, and Adm Husband E. Kimmel, USN, were relieved of their commands in Hawaii for dereliction of duty, notwithstanding the contributory failures of others.)

"You are exactly right," he said. "The responsible military commanders are the ones that history remembers in the aftermath of disasters and defeats." He emphasized that history does not record, nor do people remember, all those others who may have abetted, or even caused, the debacle—it is the one with command responsibility who is charged with failure! He warned me that my nuclear command responsibilities to this nation were such that I *must not fail*—I must never do anything wrong myself, nor ever condone mistakes on the part of others that affected the mission of my command. "Don't you be remembered in history for a single mistake," he concluded. I shall remain forever grateful for this trenchant advice and the memorable way he gave it.

The "kick the tires—light the fires—damn the torpedoes—follow me" élan of the WWII period gave way over the Cold War years to more sober and thoughtful acts of major commanders whose arsenals brooked no mistakes—and, mistakes, once made, could cause a global catastrophe. Training in the nuclear commands of the Cold War was intense. Training scenarios were designed to be as rigorous, as realistic, and demanding as they could be made in peacetime—even when such training exacted penalties and incurred hazards—as it did. Such training permeated the last 35 years—and paid off for us in the end.

Every single procedure and requirement for employing these weapons—"from communicating the national command authorities' order to launch to the actual delivery, penetration, and impact on designated targets had to be seen to be believable, robust and reliable" . . . and, by and large, it was seen in just that light.

Crew procedures in all of our nuclear delivery systems had to be well thought out and followed explicitly. Throughout all the nuclear commands we had what was known as a "human reliability program"—to ensure that what must be done was done and, likewise, what was *not* to be done was *not done*.

I had a missile control officer in my command who was asked routinely *if*, upon receipt of a properly authenticated and valid execution order, he would have any doubt or hesitation concerning his ability to "turn the activation key" and fire his missile. It was reported to me that he hesitated, professing that "Yes" he really would turn his key *if* he thought the order was legal—*if* he thought the circumstances required a missile launch; *if* he was convinced that it was rational and moral, and so on. Every affirmative answer was *qualified* by a personal, subjective condition.

This just would not *cut it* in a nuclear command, for we had designed our command and control system so that these conditions had to be fulfilled to the satisfaction of the National Command Authorities before the launch order was issued—and that subjective "what-iffing" after the order was given, had no place in the execution chain.

Throughout the Cold War, in all the commands in which I served, I found it essential that people be disciplined "to do their country's thing"—and found no place for those who insisted on "doing their own thing" with the nation's nuclear arsenal.

The real challenge that all of us exercising command responsibilities throughout the years of the Cold War was that of keeping our people and our equipment in a state of peak readiness for instant employment—without ever employing those capabilities. The command challenge was that to ensure that we were equipped, trained, and ready to fight a war that we recognized must never be fought.

Then, in the '60s and '70s we were faced with the sociological, human challenges occasioned by the liberal revolution in our young people—the "flower child" years. We had to form our commands from "volunteers" recruited from a new sort of society and had to turn them into a truly disciplined force. If we had lost society's support and understanding during those years, we could not have had the continuing flow of trainers and recruits required to maintain a relevant size force, but we did not lose it!

Another unique aspect of military command during those years was that of leading and inspiring our forces without being in the van of their employment—and that continues today. Technology now demands absolute proficiency in our warriors; senior leaders lack this finely honed proficiency.

I well remember a night early in the 1950s when, as the squadron commander of 15 B-47s we were alerted and required—on a "no notice" basis—to deploy those 15 aircraft and crews to England from Arizona. My wing commander got the squadron commanders together and said, in effect, "Now fellows, ours is a 'new ball game.' It is your command responsibility to get those 15 aircraft and crews off the ground in a combat-ready condition—not to be in the first aircraft yourself. Forget the WWII commander, gallantly leading his forces into combat—today, it is up to you to get them ready and launch them in perfect condition for combat—not to lead them off with dash and daring." He said, "That is the way it is going to be in the new Air Force—our excellence will be measured on our overall performance as a unit, and not on individual acts of heroism." My observations are that this absence of individual acts of heroism has been the hallmark of our Cold War success.

I was asked to discuss the *key attributes of military commanders* during the Cold War. In preparation for my talk with you today, I have searched my mind and my recollections of the Cold War years to bring to you a list and an analysis of the brilliant, bold, and effective commanders through these years. But—such commanders just do not jump out for me as do those great commanders of the hot war periods—the Pattons, the Bradleys, the Jimmy Doolittles, the Arleigh Burkes, the Ira Eakers, the MacArthurs, and the like.

I asked myself "why not?" Why do no single commanders during the Cold War years come to mind? I continued to provoke my recollections—surely effective command in the Cold War years must have been maintained—for I knew that it *was*, having been a part of those years. Of course, we had superb field commanders throughout the Cold War, such as the Lemnitzers, the Norstads, the Goodpasters, the Joneses, the Rogers, the Dixons, the Ike Kidds, the Wheelers, the Browns, the Haigs, the Creeches—even the Doughertys and they go on and on. The Cold War commanders of our nation's forces are legion, and they were, by and large, superb leaders. Nevertheless, in the short term they are not found to dominate our history of that period—they aren't prominent in our recollections, nor in our biographical tributes. Why not? Why are they not given accolades for having won the Cold War?

Obviously, the reason is that the Cold War victory was not *just a military campaign*—it was a *total campaign* waged by the totality of our nation and our key allies. It was our nation's *total victory* of all its attributes—not just its military.

Slowly it began to take shape in my mind that these Cold War military commanders, albeit effective, were not the *sine qui non* of our Cold War achievements. That our Cold War victory, if victory is the right word, was not occasioned by the actions of a few heroic military commanders; but rather, the result of the effective actions of all of us—throughout our democratic, capitalistic society. Actions that were sustained over a period of years by us—and our allies. Our system had worked, and worked well, notwithstanding our stops and starts and the turbulence often accompanying the acts of our society. No doubt, our military backstopping was critical to Cold War success—but it was only a part of the total posture of the West.

Our political leaders had stayed the course and had kept us as second to none, even though there were periods when many of us doubted what the future would bring. We had stayed the course from the early 1950 "long haul" commitment to military development and equipment promised by President Eisenhower during the Korean War years—through the technological revolution associated with the space program of the Kennedy administration. We had recovered from General "Shy" Meyer's shocking exposé of a "Hollow Army." We had supported President Reagan's vigorous commitment to technological achievements, military modernization, and space defense technology—to the recent period when, just as the Berlin Wall was coming down in 1989, our weapons were finally modernized and procured in quantity and of such consequence that they were the envy of the world.

Witness the Gulf War activities: we had built a modern military system, based on democratic principles and in the midst of a peace-loving, capitalistic society. A force that, when employed, exploited modern technology rather than battlefield slaughter—that leveraged our strengths and preserved our people through the Cold War years. Our research and development technology was second to none. Our innovations in all aspects of command, control, intelligence, and military equipment was superior.

Our production genius (no matter how we joke and malign it) provided equipment that could not be matched. Our space achievements gave us unchallenged control of the "high ground" of intelligence, communications, and command and control. Our gross national product continued to grow and meet the test of these improvements and military equipping. Our political leaders exploited our strengths wisely and effectively. Our military leadership subsumed themselves into the whole —to achieve total victory.

I could go on and on but, suffice it to say, we not only contained the Soviet Union but we drove it into the wall, we broke its back—and we proved the political fallacy of the Soviet Communist system. So I leave you with the thought that I hope you will understand—possibly will agree—that there were no truly heroic military commanders of the Cold War period. And only Gen Curtis LeMay comes up "on my screen" as a Cold War commander of truly unusual stature––not because of his combat exploits (and, in World War II, General LeMay's combat exploits were legion!), but because of his unusual wisdom and skill in the art of applying force to support a deterrent strategy. I think it was he who set the military stage for the full impact of our overall democratic, capitalistic system to pin Soviet Communism to the wall. He championed the military actions that made military deterrence work over the Cold War years—whether it was in the forces of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. He deserves our commendation—and not the trite condemnations so often seen in the tabloids and short-sighted Op-Ed criticisms of our national press. And, I think he was exactly right when he cautioned me, as I assumed command of SAC, "Russ, make sure that you are not remembered in history."

Academic Leadership at Air University: Ten Steps to Resource the Research Mission

Dr. Bruce Murphy

Over the last few years successive Air Force chiefs of staff and Air University (AU) commanders have increasingly emphasized the research mission at AU. Over time this emphasis has become one of the most debated issues at the university. The positive side of increasing AU's role in research is straightforward. Currently, airpower largely lacks the intellectual foundations enjoyed by ground and sea power. It would be difficult to overemphasize how serious this problem is in the field, in Washington, in the national media, in the classroom, and wherever else air, space, and cyberspace are used or debated. AU contains a large pool of the Air Force's smartest and best educated thinkers. If these students and professors systematically applied their knowledge base and their research and writing skills to generating new ideas about how to use air, space, and cyberspace, they could accomplish great things for the nation.

The problem is that, in a time of dwindling budgets, AU's resources are diminishing. As a result, AU administrators are in the awkward position of being asked to do more with less. Making matters worse, although conducting Air Force-oriented research has been part of AU's mission statement since 1946 and was a central emphasis for the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) before that, in recent decades this research emphasis has all but disappeared to make room for a more narrowly defined education mission. For the most part, the schools at AU are acculturated or organized for teaching and not research. As a result, there is significant institutional resistance to the notion that resources—mainly instructors' time—should be transferred from the classroom to the library and the field.

There is no easy solution to this problem and it will not go away; the Air Force's need for intellectual firepower will only increase with time. To move toward implementing the new mission emphasis, AU will need to make some significant changes both in terms of the relative value it places on education and how it organizes to accomplish the new mission. The central change will involve finding ways to free up the schools' best researchers and thinkers to publish on air, space, and cyberspace related issues. The main obstacle will be finding ways to do so, while minimizing the cost to the broader education mission.

Nevertheless, the situation is hardly hopeless. The most common argument against pushing a new mission emphasis is that AU is not staffed for research. This is inaccurate. As a whole, AU has better than a five-to-one student-to-faculty ratio. This ratio (see table) is far better than even the nation's top tier civilian research schools.[1] Yet because AU is not organized to perform this mission, it does not currently produce even a fraction of the research published by civilian research schools.

Table1

Student to Faculty Ratio

College	*Academic Depts.*	*Law School*
Harvard	8/1	13/1
UCLA	13/1	14/1
UC Berkeley	15/1	15/1
Notre Dame	11/1	22/1
Average for top tier schools	15.1/1	15.3/1

There is no reason why AU schools cannot do better. Improving AU's productivity will, however, require innovation. Below are 10 suggestions that will begin to improve AU's ability to research and publish material on air, space, and cyberspace. The intent of these proposals is not to present research and teaching as a zero-sum game, but rather as an opportunity to reprioritize and rebalance resources and incentives to achieve the desired outcome.

1. Research requires long blocks of unbroken time. AU instructors currently have a fair bit of time that could be used for research, but that time often comes in short spurts that are virtually useless for writing. One hundred hours of unbroken research time is far better than 1,000 hours broken up into one-hour blocks. This problem can be addressed by compressing instructors' teaching time into concentrated blocks and working to ensure that their research time is not fragmented.

2. If research is a priority, administrators must treat research time as sacred. When an instructor is not teaching, he or she must not be burdened with meetings or committee work. AU holds many more meetings than is the norm at research schools.

3. Leave curriculum rewrites to the faculty teaching the courses. One of the biggest time sinks at some of the schools involves rewriting curricula. This is sometimes done by committee and more often than not has a limited payoff. Rewriting syllabi does not generally have a high payoff. The faculty members are the experts, trust them to write the courses.

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4. Let faculty work at home. It is difficult to conduct research in the office, particularly if it is a shared office. At most AU schools, gossip and discussion steal thousands of hours of potential research time each year. In a collegial environment, it can be difficult to close an office door or tell colleagues to go away. When researchers are not teaching, they should work at the location of their choice. Outside of the military, universities do not ask their instructors to remain in their offices during duty hours because they are more productive away from the office. Account for instructors' time by measuring productivity, not location.

5. Shift the teaching burden to faculty who do not wish to conduct research. Faculty who are not inclined or able to publish should be given larger teaching loads to free up time for researchers. While all faculty are evaluated on their performance at teaching, scholarship (research), and service, the relative proportion of each can vary with faculty desires and institutional goals. Virtually all research schools have mechanisms—research leave, sabbaticals, teaching buyouts, etc.—for channeling researchers toward research and teachers to the classroom.

6. Decrease the time students spend in the classroom and increase the time they spend reading and writing. Most universities would consider a single two-hour seminar with 210 pages of reading to be a more effective teaching tool than three two-hour seminars with 70 pages of reading each. Almost all research schools employ the former method. It both frees up instructors' time and is better for the students. Making it work requires holding students accountable for what they learn by asking them to write substantial seminar papers.

7. Hire adjunct faculty and post-doctors. Montgomery, Alabama, has a sizable population of retired Air Force officers, many with relevant subject-matter expertise and some with experience teaching at AU. Many of these retirees would relish the chance to teach a course at AU, would do as good a job as our fulltime faculty, and would not be expensive. Similarly, across the country the academic job markets remain a buyer's market and new PhDs would jump at the chance to teach at Maxwell for a year for a fraction of the price of a regular hire. Young PhDs are generally more current in their fields than seasoned instructors and often bring élan into the classroom.

8. Seek out grant money. Billions of Department of Defense dollars are spent on research, and a sizable portion of that goes toward the types of research done at AU. An added benefit of seeking grants is that it will channel AU research in defense-related directions. The money is used to pay temporary hires to teach classes, while the grant winner writes. While most universities encourage faculty to apply for grants, AU (except for the Air Force Institute of Technology) provides its instructors with little incentive to seek out external funding.

9. If necessary, increase the size of classes. No one wants larger seminars, but few research universities cap their seminars at 10 or 12 students. Some seminar topics are conducive to larger groups. Sometimes a shortage of instructors necessitates combining seminars. This is not a good option, but it is an option that research universities regularly resort to without significantly reducing their ability to educate students.

10. Explicitly reward faculty who publish. It is a truism that you get what you reward. Currently many of AU's best minds find the greatest rewards in administration. Certainly the pay scale encourages ambitious instructors to seek jobs in their schools' bureaucracies rather than to publish. This is the opposite incentive system from most research schools, which reserve their highest rewards for their best researches. AU will only become a first-rate research school when publishing becomes the path to professional (and financial) success.

Clearly, the above steps, in conjunction with other reforms, will make AU a better research institution; however, they will do more than this. Over time, experience shows that greater emphasis on research improves faculties and eventually results in students receiving better educations. Research is the means by which professors keep up with and advance their fields. Research stretches and challenges instructors. This growth pays dividends in the classroom. Change is seldom easy, but transforming AU into a research university will benefit its students, its faculty, and the nation as a whole.

Note

1. *Barron's Profiles of American Colleges 2005*, 26th edition.

Senior Leader Education: Preparing for Senior Leader Roles and Responsibilities

Maj Gen Robert J. Elder

Promotion to senior officer grades (colonel and its equivalents) brings the responsibilities of institutional leadership and the requirement for new skills and attributes to enable success. Senior leaders are expected to do much more than lead large organizations; of even greater significance, senior officers represent their institution through their actions and words, both on and off duty. Senior professional military education (SPME) is specifically designed to prepare students for these new responsibilities, building on their experience as field grade officers.

These programs assume that their participants are already accomplished team and organizational leaders, and focus on providing the foundation for a continuous personal learning process that is critical for successful progression as a senior officer and institutional leader. Senior PME is an important part of senior developmental education (SDE) for all officers, serving as the foundation for other senior developmental experiences, and is the only SDE program designed to develop the strategic skill sets and institutional leader attributes critical for success as a senior military leader. Understanding the goals of these programs can help participants and their mentors best utilize SPME, such as Air War College, as part of an individual professional development plan.

Institutional Leadership

First, it is important to understand the concept of institutional leadership. Similar to "corporate executives" in the private sector, senior leaders provide and implement the institution's vision. Most senior leaders clearly understand the need for visioning, and find great satisfaction when their jobs allow them the opportunity to establish an organizational vision. However, vision implementation is just as important; and implementing the institutional vision is the responsibility of all senior leaders within an institution. It is common to find vision statements published for most military organizations, but it is not nearly as common to find published plans to implement either the institutional or organizational vision. And, many organizational leaders tend to focus only on their organization and not the institution to which the organization belongs. Recognizing this natural shortfall, SPME looks beyond the organization level to focus on every senior leader's role as an institutional leader. This is an important distinction, and a key element of the SPME experience. To be a good institutional leader you must be a good team leader and a good organizational leader; but you must also understand that your team and your organization fit into a larger institution, and that you have institutional responsibilities in addition to those associated with your organization. Regardless of your position, as a senior leader it is your job to adapt the institution's vision to your organization and help your people implement it.

Senior Professional Military Education

All SPME programs share common features. First, these programs help develop the attributes commonly associated with senior leaders in government service. Second, they develop the new skills typical of senior executives in and out of government such as visioning, vision implementation, and managing large organizations. And perhaps most importantly, they develop the strategic leader skills that are critical for success in dealing with the complexities of situations at this level. These include critical analysis, creative thinking, decision-making (with ambiguous information), time-phased planning (which is critical for vision implementation) and cross-cultural communications. It is also important to note that senior developmental education (SDE) programs other than SPME are also designed to develop professional knowledge, skills, and attributes; however, while SPME is designed to develop senior leader skills and attributes, SDE is generally designed to develop or deepen specific technical or functional knowledge and skill sets. The knowledge imparted in each SPME program varies significantly, but each of these programs is designed to enhance the attributes and develop the skills expected of senior leaders. Knowledge acquisition remains important, and these programs operate with great academic rigor, but SPME opportunities exist primarily to provide professional development, not to confer academic degrees. The master's degree now associated with most SPME programs is a relatively recent phenomenon that primarily exists to independently validate the program's academic rigor. A good way to think about professional military education is to compare these programs to advanced medical or legal professional education programs where the objective is to graduate a competent senior professional prepared for the responsibilities of their functional specialty. So, what are the attributes of senior military leaders? They recognize that their actions are watched closely by not only their direct reports, but by junior members across their institution and people outside the institution as well. For this reason, these programs focus extensively on senior leader derailment and ethics issues. And although a relatively small percentage of senior leaders become involved in such situations, it has a devastating impact on the military institution, particularly the affected service. Senior leaders must be acutely sensitive

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to the impact of their actions, and understand how seemingly innocuous behaviors can be misperceived and bring discredit to their organization, service, and the officer corps in general. It is critical that senior leaders in all services understand two critical realities: first they live in a "fishbowl" where even minor improprieties will be portrayed as "gross misconduct" should they become public. And second, every minor impropriety will become pubic knowledge because as senior leaders they are seen as representatives of the institution. Just as celebrities find their private lives discussed in public, senior leaders must appreciate that they too are now public figures.

Air War College

An examination of the two programs offered by Air War College, one in residence and the other through distance learning, will help put the SPME discussion in context and serve as background for the examples which follow. The distance-learning course is intended for all prospective Air Force senior leaders, either as a stand-alone course or as preparation for participation in other SDE programs. It focuses on developing Air Force officers as institutional leaders who are prepared to represent the Air Force in their own organizations, as well as to sister services, Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, Congress, and the Nation in general. For this reason, the program includes a robust joint doctrine module, which not only examines the joint lessons learned, but also discusses the nuances of the Air Force perspective. There is an extensive module on senior leadership which focuses on leading large organizations, as well as the increasing importance of avoiding how senior officer actions can lead to misperceptions about Air Force values, ethics, and intentions. This module depends heavily on the use of senior mentors in the participants' own organizations. Finally, the course examines the Air Force role in joint war fighting and national security. You can see that this program uniquely focuses on the role of senior leaders in the Air Force. Although sometimes perceived as redundant, no other SDE programs focus on the special responsibilities of Air Force institutional leaders, so this program is of particular importance for Air Force officers selected for resident SDE. As institutional leaders, they must be prepared to properly represent the Air Force when dealing with other Services and agencies.

The AWC residence program is designed to prepare selected senior officers to serve in key joint war fighting and international security positions. Class and military faculty composition are limited to 60 percent Air Force to meet Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II criteria, and its war fighting and international security focus provides a somewhat unique SDE experience: It is the only program that develops specific regional and cultural expertise through a combination of education, field research, and experiential learning. And, it is the only program designed to develop both strategic and operational art in the areas of combat operations, expeditionary force operations (military force enablers such as mobility, communications, and logistics), and expeditionary force support operations focused on joint operations as an element of multinational and multi-agency operations in support of international security. To do this, students are grouped during a portion of the Joint Military Operations Course based on their functional experience to facilitate development of operational art in the areas of combat operations, expeditionary operations (use of military forces in and out of combat), and expeditionary support (capabilities required to support deployed military forces). So, while the AWC JPME Phase II program reflects the Airman's perspective on war fighting and international security operations, it advocates and studies all of the services' capabilities equally. For this reason, we encourage AWC resident program participants to complete the AWC distance learning program, or "Air Force Senior Leader Course" before attending the AWC program in residence so they will be prepared to advocate the Air Force perspective in discussions with other participants. With this background, we are now ready to discuss the skills and attributes of senior leaders.

Strategic Leadership Skills

The most pervasive commonality of all senior PME programs is their emphasis on strategic leader skills development. We begin to develop these skills even before entering military service, but they become particularly important later in our careers. These are the skills that make us complex problem solvers, dependable decision-makers, and effective communicators across multiple disciplines—all critical when operating at the super-organizational level of a large institution.

Critical Analysis

Perhaps the most important skill for senior leaders is critical analysis. Because we are known as problem solvers, we are often quick to identify what we believe is the problem so we can begin solving it. But imagine if you sought help with a stomachache and the physician decided to operate immediately before gathering additional information? You would wonder, and most probably ask, "Are you sure?" Typically, the doctor asks the patient a series of questions as part of a discovery process, then develops a hypothesis regarding the ailment and performs a series of tests to determine if the hypothesis is correct. This is the reason we consult professionals, and as a professional military officer, it is our responsibility to understand situations we are presented to the best of our ability before we begin attacking the symptoms. Since our actions can affect large numbers of people, or require significant resource expenditures, we owe the people we serve the full advantage of our professional wisdom and experience. For this reason, we focus heavily on this particular skill throughout the Air War College programs, and look for development in this area in our evaluations. There are many methods available to help with the analysis itself, but the key is to discipline yourself to conduct the analysis, develop and test a hypothesis, and where practical, seek alternate opinions from other professionals.

Creative Thinking

Once we have identified the problem with some degree of certainty we can begin to look for solutions. As a senior leader, you are expected to use your experience and education to look for innovative approaches to improve effectiveness and reduce costs, recognizing that not all costs are monetary—there are often manpower, political, and other costs to the institution that must also be considered. To be innovative requires the ability to examine problems from multiple perspectives. In some cases, solutions can be found through "simplification" of factors, in other cases it pays to parse the situation and solve components of the problem individually. An example can be found with the AWC program development: on the one hand, we wanted to implement the JPME Phase II program which requires a total "joint" approach to the curriculum, while we also knew the need continues to provide our Air Force senior leaders with a solid dose of "Air Force" in preparation for their new duties. Working with the Air Force professional development office (AFIDPD, now AFJAID) we developed an approach that provided Air Force senior developmental education for all officers, and a joint war fighting program for those selected to attend the resident JPME Phase II program. Both programs are designed to promote critical analysis, imaginative thinking, ethical and value-based decision-making, structured planning, cultural understanding and sensitivity, and lifelong learning. The distance learning "AWC Senior Leader Program" focuses on Air Force institutional leadership, the Air Force role in joint and multinational military operations, and air and space force operational planning; while the resident "AWC Joint Warfighting Program" focuses on strategic and institutional leadership, joint and multinational war fighting, multi-agency international security operations, integrated joint force development with emphasis on air and space, and national security planning. Here is an example where a simple, but innovative approach allowed us to achieve all our objectives. In a similar manner, we wanted to expand our coverage of operational art in the Joint War Fighting Program to include not only combat operations, but also expeditionary operations, which enable combat and noncombat use of military forces, and also expeditionary support operations. After some analysis, we concluded that all participants require similar experience in strategic art, but each has different operational art requirements based on their own tactical-level experience. This is logical since operational art infers knowledge of both strategic-level objectives and tactical-level operations. The approach we implemented was to establish concentration tracks so that each participant could focus on developing their skills in the area where they were most likely to be needed. This proved again that innovative doesn't necessarily mean complex; although implementing this program did require an extensive rework of the entire Joint Military Ops curriculum, and significant other work on the part of the resident faculty.

Decision-Making with Ambiguous Information

The next strategic-level skill is decision-making with ambiguous information, which senior leaders in both government and the private sector must exercise frequently. We provide a variety of tools to assist senior leaders: Multiple courses of action development, hedging strategies, branch and sequel plans, effects-based operations, and more. The objective here is to understand that as a senior leader, you will often need to make decisions without all the facts, so these decisions must provide flexibility to adapt as new information becomes available. Consider how experienced travelers plan their trips: They gather as much information as possible about different routes, road conditions and construction areas, rest areas, gas stops, weather, and so on to select a route to their destination. If there are key points along the trip where one route may be preferable to another if certain conditions exist, the traveler may plan multiple iterations to allow quick changes (branches and sequels). If there are major accidents, unexpected road repair work or weather, they use the information gathered during their trip planning to adjust their route to minimize the impact of the impediment. And the traveler may have pre-coordinated a place to overnight if conditions along the route cause excessive delays (hedging strategy). The point here is that senior leaders will be called on to make decisions, knowing that they may need to alter their plans as new information becomes available. Developing the skills to move an institution with the same agility as the traveler in the example above can spell the difference between success and failure.

Vision Implementation

Most institutional changes are accomplished over long periods of time, and with many different components that must fit together to be successful. This next skill is the ability to sequence a number of actions conducted over time in a manner that maximizes effectiveness and minimizes resource expenditures. In joint war fighting this is done through campaign planning conducted in phases. For institutional work, this is the work of vision implementation. It takes coordinated actions over time to evolve an organization from an existing state to one envisioned for the future.

The AWC program evolution provides a good example. The Air Force provided a three-element institutional vision primarily aimed at the resident course: focus the War College program on war fighting, take advantage of the wealth of experience and expertise associated with the college for the benefit of the institution, and increase its prestige so the institutional Air Force would recognize it as the premier SDE experience for its senior officers. However, there was also a significant institutional constraint: Air War College remains charged to provide a nonresident program for all Air Force officers that mirrors the resident program. The critical analysis outlined earlier led us to emphasize strategic leader skill development in both programs, with the resident program focused on joint war fighting and international security operations, and its "mirror" distance-learning program focused on the Air Force role in joint war fighting with multiagency and multinational partners. This was implemented over several academic years, using a spiral development process involving both the resident and nonresident programs.

To address the second vision element (fully use the intellectual capital available at AWC) required that we improve the linkages with the institutional Air Force. To get this started, we formed research study groups and partnered them with sponsors at the Air Staff, Joint Staff, and OSD to address issues of interest. We then "presented" the capabilities of the faculty members associated with these study groups as "research and innovation centers." This presentation makes it easier for agencies outside of Air University to find sources of expertise that could be of benefit to them in areas such as regional and cultural studies, national space studies, cyberspace and information operations, strategy and technology, negotiations, strategy and law, and behavioral analysis. Additionally, we revamped the student research program to focus on strategic leader skills development with special emphasis on critical analysis, and required every project to work with an institutional sponsor. This ensures that the research provides information of benefit to the institution while satisfying the professional military education program requirements. Again, these changes were implemented in phases over multiple academic years.

Finally, and perhaps most challenging, were the efforts to gain recognition for the college itself. Academic prestige comprises three major aspects—faculty, programs, and graduates. We already enjoyed a superb faculty, but realized that few Air Force senior leaders were aware of their talents. The establishment of the research and innovation centers was instrumental in getting this information disseminated. To ensure senior leaders learned of the program changes, we began sending letters to the gaining supervisors of all graduates outlining their performance while explaining the program. With the nonresident program, we actually began to involve the supervisors in the program, giving them first-hand knowledge. We also worked with the Air Force and sister-service developmental teams to ensure they understood the programs, since they were often the source of information to potential students. This was greatly enabled with the Congressional legislation enabling the Secretary of Defense to accredit senior service schools for joint PME Phase II completion previously available only through attendance at National Defense University. Because of our previous efforts, we were able to take full advantage of this opportunity as soon as it was available. So, while the Air Force vision for AWC remains a work in progress, you can see that we were able to implement the actions to enable this vision over a three-year period by focusing on the goals and creating ways to move in that direction.

Cross-Cultural Communications

The final strategic leader skill we will address, but certainly not the least important, is cross-cultural communications. We must first define the term. There are many different cultures of interest to senior military leaders: functional (for example operations, logistics), mission (mobility, surveillance and reconnaissance), service, agency (DOD, Department of State [DOS], Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland Security), country (United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates), and many more. The key point is that we communicate based on our education and experiences; so to communicate effectively requires that we establish a common foundation for our information to be understood. It also requires that we listen carefully to provide a closed loop system to assess the effectiveness of our transmissions. Much of the work in "jointness" has revolved around a common lexicon; however, we must beware of miscommunication such as the old story about different service interpretations of the order, "Secure the Building." If you haven't heard it, the abbreviated version is that the Army will conduct an operation to take over the building, the Marines will post guards, the Navy will prepare the building to weather a storm, and the Air Force will take out a lease. The lesson: Communication implies two-way transmission of information. Therefore, simply asking the information "recipient" to respond can be very useful. But, to explain more complex direction requires detailed study of the information recipient. For example, American football analogies work well with a US-only audience, but will likely result in blank stares when the audience involves coalition partners. The same situation can occur with cross-functional and cross-service discussions. Airmen think differently from other services—our way of thinking provides us an advantage in many situations. But, the way other services think about warfare constitutes their individual advantage as well! The problem is that Air Force jargon may not be well understood by other services, and even more insidious, the terminology might be similar to their own, but have a very different meaning. As a result, AWC has taken several approaches to cross-cultural communication. The nonresident program includes a doctrine module that examines different service perspectives on joint doctrine. In the resident program, we study service and interagency perspectives throughout the program, but place DOS officers in every seminar for a week of discussion of national security decision-making, planning, and operations. Participants from both DOD and DOS are amazed to learn the magnitude of their cultural differences! Additionally, the Air Force Negotiation Center of Excellence, which is associated with AWC, supports courses throughout the year with foundational theory and experiential learning to understand not only what is important to a negotiation partner, but to appreciate the basis for our own negotiations. Negotiation is impossible without cross-cultural communication, so this is a valuable tool.

Every SPME program provides opportunities to develop senior leader attributes, as well as institutional and strategic leadership skills. While we hope participants expand their knowledge as a result of these programs, it is important to realize that the information is there to serve as a foundation to develop senior leader skills and attributes. Knowing the objectives and methodologies allows both participants and their mentors to optimize the senior leader development experience. One final point: Senior leader development requires a career-long, even life-long, commitment to self-improvement. A successful graduate understands that no SDE program is an end to itself; rather, these programs provide the tools for senior leaders to adapt and develop to meet evolving requirements as they advance in organizational and institutional responsibility. Taking full advantage of senior PME is perhaps the best way that senior leaders can prepare for the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. It's a tremendously rewarding experience—enjoy it!

Shortened Decision Cycles: Historical Perspectives Help Leaders Shape and Craft Informed Decisions

Mark Stanley

In an age of ever-shortening decision cycles perhaps it would not surprise you to know that our decision makers are answering tough questions about the future of the Air Force—sometimes with 30 minutes or less to respond. Do such short cycles afford leaders the opportunity to examine enough information to develop an informed perspective and thus make informed decisions? Given the premise that informed perspectives lead to better decisions and enhanced outcomes, how can historians help decision makers at all levels consider as much information as possible to develop sound conclusions? We can find one answer in historical perspectives.

Creating perspective takes time. It involves digging through data, extracting the pertinent nuggets, and forming the results into usable information. While this takes time, it is time well spent. Part of the Air Force History and Museums Program mission is to ". . . improve combat capability through the collection, preservation, interpretation, dissemination, and display of historical information, artifacts, and Air Force heritage to commanders and the public."[1] Though time-consuming, it still needs to be done efficiently and effectively to support not only commanders but all leaders and decision makers.

Leaders and decision makers are not alone in building historical perspective. In fact, the Air Force provides them with many resources to promote sound decisions. These resources include numerous publications,* professional military education, functional training, and the Chief of Staff's Reading List just to name a few. While not alone, it is up to the individual to ground themselves with historical perspective.

American patriot Patrick Henry remarked in his famous speech *Give me Liberty or Give me Death*: "I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience. I know no way of judging the future but by the past."[2] When possible, history's lamp of experience should light the way ahead by objectively portraying successes and failures in the proper perspective.

Indeed, not all decisions follow historical patterns, but ignoring historical perspective can lead to wasting precious resources. When used effectively, such a perspective will support the decision-making process.

The situations below are just two examples where the value of historical perspective may have enhanced the outcomes intended by past decision makers (table 1).

Table 1

Past examples in peacetime decision making

Topic	*Use of History*
Tactical Airlift: After years of treating tactical and strategic airlift separately, in 1974 the Secretary of Defense brought all USAF airlift under a single organization dedicated to managing that function. In 1993 the Air Force extracted tactical airlift from Air Mobility Command (AMC). This lasted until 1997 when most of the C-130 fleet returned to AMC control.	Following a series of tragic accidents, the warnings from AMC analysts suggesting "that standardization of training, equipment, procedures, command and control, and tactics would suffer," proved true—and resulted in all tactical airlift C-130s based in the continental United States reverting to AMC control effective 1 April 1997.
Composite Air Strike Force (CASF): The idea of a small, self-sustaining force used to deter limited or small wars dates back to 1953. The concept developed into the CASF, which proved very effective in two early deployments in 1958—one to Turkey during the Lebanon crisis and the other to the situation in the Formosa Strait (Taiwan). Both events validated the concept, which endured until the CASF was discontinued in 1973 when the Air Force inactivated Nineteenth Air Force.	The CASF set a precedent for what became the air and space expeditionary force (AEF) in today's Air Force. The USAF limited the CASF to one numbered air force, which saw use in a bipolar geopolitical environment. The current AEF however, is a total force solution that affects the entire Air Force in a destabilized, post–Cold War world. Ultimately, both provided the Air Force with a means to carry out national policy despite the constraints of the day.

Sources: Robert Frank Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1961-1984*, vol. II (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, December 1989), 315; History, Air Mobility Command, 1996, 19–20; Maj Curt A. Van De Walle, USAF, "Back to the Future: Does History Support the Expeditionary Air Force Concept?" *Chronicles* Online Journal, 5 June 2002, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ airchronicles/cc/vandewalle.html; and A. Timothy Warnock, et al., *Short of War: Major USAF Contingency Operations, 1947–1997* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2000), 11.

Both of these issues are relevant in today's Air Force. Command and control issues arise regularly, as does balancing the operations tempo of the air and space expeditionary force (AEF). The history and heritage of the Air Force is replete with such illustrations—the key is ensuring that leaders have an opportunity to examine pitfalls and successes from pertinent examples before making a decision. The kernel of truth that might sway a decision resides in the corporate or

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*Publications include but are not limited to formal instructions, periodicals (journals, magazines, and newspapers), books, and Web-based information.

institutional memory of the Air Force. Getting at that kernel can be challenging, but it represents an important first step in managing the pace of change. Col John A. Warden III, a key planner in developing the air campaign for Operation Desert Storm, wrote, "The pace of change is accelerating and shows no sign of letting up. If we are to succeed in protecting our interests in this environment, we must spend more time than ever in our past thinking about war and developing new employment concepts."[3]

Indeed, our past experiences in war often guide future actions in both peacetime training and future conflicts. In peacetime, decision makers face many activities which can benefit from historical perspective (table 2). History might also prove useful in examining issues during a wartime operations tempo (table 3).

Table 2

Peacetime decision making

Issue	*Historical Perspective*
Base Closure -Force-Structure Changes -Personnel Reductions	What mission changes have occurred since the last base-closure commission and why? How did other bases handle personnel cuts? What impact did those actions have on local communities?
Exercises	Are there any trends developing over the past few years with wing exercises?
Inspections	What did the wing do to prepare for the operational readiness inspection in previous years?
Environmental Issues	What mission activities were assigned to the base, and which areas of the base were most affected?
Operations and Training	How many sorties/missions did the wing generate over the past year? Were there any training shortfalls over the past year(s)? If so, why?

Table 3

Wartime decision making

Issue	*Historical Perspective*
Fratricide and aircraft crashes during Operation Enduring Freedom	Highlight previous incidents to increase aircrew situational awareness
Personnel recovery/combat search and rescue during Operation Desert Storm	Review lessons learned from the same operational environment—ensure timely support during critical events
Urban warfare lessons learned	Help in mitigating collateral damage, discuss past tactics in urban warfare, and recall useful vignettes
Outline role of A-10s during Operation Desert Storm	Recall lessons learned in preparation for future operational actions

Preserving data so historians, analysts, and decision makers can find, access, and retrieve it has become a critical skill for today's Air Force historians. Regardless of whether the issues occur in peacetime or during war, future researchers must be able to access the data and turn it into usable information. In this sense, maintaining a corporate or institutional memory in the information age is more imperative than ever. The fact that electronic documents are easily destroyed makes the effort to find and preserve historical perspectives a much steeper challenge.

Historical perspective is a critical aspect in sound decision making. Col William A. Ganoe, General Eisenhower's chief of military history, once said, "History is the last thing we care about during operations, and the first thing we want afterwards."[4] In this day of digitization, questions come during the operation rather than at its termination. The questions can be timely, pointed, and pertinent: How has airpower been used in support of Iraqi elections? How has the Air Force used close air support in the past to combat counterinsurgencies? When did the Air Force arrive at "base X," and what condition was it in when we got there? If previous historians had access to this data and preserved it, then answering such worthwhile questions can certainly be gratifying for the researcher; even more importantly, the answers may add substantially to mission capability.

Becoming more adept in quickly answering tough questions can provide decision makers the informed perspective they need in today's shortened decision cycles. Decision makers can help historians too. By maintaining the historian's access to important data, we can preserve the information and make it available for future use, especially in light of fleeting electronic documents. Additionally, considering historical perspective as early in the decision cycle as possible can only improve the informed perspectives that leaders and decision makers need to carry out their duties effectively. Shortened decision cycles may be a way of life, but ensuring leaders are afforded informed perspectives will increase their chances of arriving at the right solution.

Notes

1. Dick Anderegg, Air Force History and Museums Program Strategic Plan, March 2004, 1.
2. Patrick Henry, "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death," 23 Mar 1775, *Liberty Online*, http://libertyonline. hypermall.com/henry-liberty.html.
3. Col John A. Warden III, USAF, "Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century," in *Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues*, rev. ed., Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1998), 104.
4. Web page, author unknown, "Remember My Service, A Military Historical Record on CD," Storyrock, http://www.remembermyservice Publishing,.com/pages/index.asp?section=2&page=3.

Challenges for the Senior Leader: Potential Landmines in the Senior Leader Decision-Making Landscape

Dr. Stefan Eisen Jr.

I've never seen a senior American military officer get fired for messing up the big stuff, like losing a nuclear weapon or bilking the government of millions. It's the little stuff that gets under their radar scope because their energies are only focused on the big pieces of their landscape that they forget the details at the fringes. . . but it's at the fringes where they get into trouble.

—Anonymous

Recognize that senior leadership is not "more of the same"—it is a wholly different level of power, influence, authority, and responsibility.

—Synopsis of a general officer's leadership discussion with the Air War College, 2003

Our society at-large is struggling with professional behavior. A presidential sex scandal, greed and avarice in the commercial sector, deceptive practices by powerful bureaucrats and leaders have shaken the foundation of trust between citizens and many of their institutions.[1] Indeed, there is an increase in the study of ethics in the legal, medical, and business professional schools as well as these professions' continuing education requirements (their version of professional military education [PME]).[2]

To retain trust, individuals within a profession and the profession as a body must behave in a way that corresponds to their claim. Part of that ability to sustain the claim to trust is for professionals to periodically reassess their environment (also called landscape) and assess how they will maintain high levels of professional behavior as they operate in an increasingly difficult landscape. In the military, the threshold of becoming a senior leader is suggested as an opportune time to assess the new landscape because this landscape, and its challenges, is significantly different from any previous landscape within which an officer might have worked. An officer might have commanded awesome power in the form of a weapon system as a squadron commander. Or, if not in direct command of that combat power, an officer might have had direct responsibility for the support of these systems. But as a senior leader, there is a move away from the direct responsibility of employing systems and a move to the responsibility of influencing and having power over large numbers of *people and resources*—both requiring the use of consistently exceptional judgment. The physical (combat risks) may have diminished somewhat for the senior leader, but the **volatility,** uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA) environment will challenge the senior leader both personally and professionally—with little margin for error.[3]

Senior decision making allows for the use of a powerful tool—discretion. The strongest ethical base and sense of self-control must underpin this power of discretion. Any lapse in judgment and poor use of discretion can have severe professional consequences, not only for the senior leader, but also for the senior leader's family and service component (or beyond). More importantly, it also weakens the bond of trust between the profession and the public. The press has several examples of senior leaders stepping on professional landmines.[4] These senior leaders are unquestionably hard-working and dedicated career military leaders. The forces and rationale that might have contributed to their poor judgment is the point of this paper.

This paper has two objectives. First is explaining the three concepts of (1) a mental map and how it is inherently flawed, (2) an explanation of the impact of narcissism (referred to as "normal narcissism" in this paper), and (3) how self-control is applied and the possible explanation for the energy source to implement self-control. The second objective is to outline the change in professional and personal landscape that is largely the result of having risen to a high level of rank and with it, responsibility. One of the changes in the landscape is the amount of scrutiny an action (or inaction) can receive. The other is that the need to be more aware of how the flaws in a person's mental maps, effect of normal narcissism, and use of self-control may interplay to either successfully navigate the senior-officer landscape or succumb to its subtleties and potential problems. The result should be an increased awareness of the context and underpinnings of the senior leader's total environment, both psychologically and sociologically so that action can be proactive rather than reactive and trust can be maintained rather than lost and then arduously rebuilt (or perhaps never regained).

Mental Maps

A mental map is a term used to explain how the human mind transforms raw input stimulus (see, hear, smell, taste, feel) into meaningful information on which one acts.[5]

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Through nurture and nature, one develops a pattern of thinking that helps the individual quickly assimilate input from stimuli, organize it into recognizable patterns, compare it against what they know, and then make decisions. This works pretty well. It is continuously working to turn input into information for decision making for survival as well as higher-level decisions. It is the fundamental mechanism supporting basic instinctive reactions (like "instinctively" letting go of an object that is too hot), as well as the mechanism that allows one to work through both routine logic problems (like purchasing decisions) and solve complex problems. The system generally works, but it is not perfect because it is iterative.[6] In other words, it largely bases future decisions on taking input stimuli and arranging it according to historic patterns. When faced with a totally foreign or new situation, the mental map will do its best to fit whatever input it gets into the existing mental maps, even if doing so results in arriving at totally irrational conclusions.

Multiple experiments demonstrate that the mental maps everyone possesses are all adequate for routine chores, but usually become tasked when challenged by novel scenarios.[7] The system reacts to these scenarios in the best way it knows how, by forcing the inputs into mental maps that helps maximize the individual's chances of survival. It also forces information into patterns that decrease internal tension. The result is a pattern where the mind is always working to make the individual feel "all right" about an action or decision. People inherently avoid conclusions that make them look or feel "wrong." Intense rationalization sometimes occurs to make the data fit the mental map to ensure this "correct" outcome.[8] This is due in part to a psychological phenomenon known as normal narcissism.

"Normal Narcissism" and the Mental Map

Normal narcissism refers to a portion of the mental map people use in how they see themselves and how they compare themselves to other people. Generally, individuals assess themselves as better than other people—consistently. For example, 89 percent of the respondents in a large survey rated themselves more positively than they rated others.[9] In a meta-analysis of industrial/organizational research, 15 of 22 studies showed a significant tendency toward this idea of self-enhancement.[10] Most research showed the self-enhancement to be mild, but it was persistently found. The point is that it exists in a nonclinical setting (i.e., is not considered an illness). However, it may present a "land mine" in the senior leader's landscape.

Similar narcissist patterns emerge when examining how people rate themselves on other evaluative devices and standards, like personality tests, intelligence tests, ethical questionnaires, and assessments of their driving skills, as compared to others. The adage of Lake Woebegone comes to mind where " . . . all the children are above average." It is our nature to think positively about ourselves and our mental maps support this naturally occurring desire. In the work setting, most employees tend to think they are superior to the average employee in their organization and tend to see themselves more positively than appraisals of themselves from other sources.[11] Why is this?

The mental map and normal narcissism are related. A mental map is designed to enhance survival. To do this, the mental map tends to make positive self-relevant information more available than negative self-relevant information.[12] This mechanism is self-preserving—this allows us to better manage our self-image and is a support mechanism to the survival instinct. When in athletic competition, the "winning attitude" is a mental map that is enhanced by normal narcissism. Nobody plans to or desires to lose an athletic competition, so inputs are naturally forced onto a "winning" mental map. Coaches do this, players do this, and in the profession of arms, so do military professionals. Nobody likes to lose, and winners always keep the positive mental attitude. This mental map, reinforced by normal narcissism where a person considers him or herself better than the opponent, creates environments where athletes (through both their natural athletic skills and competitive nature, as well as, their coach's nurturing) discard negative information (joint pain, fatigue, etc.) and focus on the items that will enhance their ability to win (superior skill, morale, etc.). This, in and of itself, is not a bad quality. However, in a less positive scenario, this pattern of self-preservation and the flawed mental map may be used to rationalize a poor act. It may discard all the negative impacts a decision may have on subordinates and only consider the positive outcome for the senior leader. If not aggressively managed, this flawed assessment of reality has the potential for creating poor decisions.[13]

This predisposition to the positive self-relevant information and avoidance of negative information also helps us maintain our self-esteem and self-image.[14] This is all a side effect of a person's strong drive for survival and self-maintenance, where people tend to exaggerate moral and interpersonal aspects of their character while simultaneously denying (or rationalizing) less socially accepted behavior.[15] This is the psychological aspect of how the mental map may be imperfect when it comes to making judgments. It is naturally predisposed to an answer favorable to the individual because of the "preferred tracks" of normal narcissism that it likes to operate within. In several research efforts, volunteers were presented a novel situation that was contrary to their beliefs and asked to choose between one of two outcomes. The first outcome was rational (and correct, but ran counter to the volunteers' mental map). The second response was irrational and incorrect, but fit the volunteers' mental map. The research revealed that people tended to choose the irrational outcome, even when they were cognizant that it was wrong—they chose it because it "felt right" and fit their perception of what was correct and self-enhancing—it fit their imperfect mental map that was placing this novel information into historic mental patterns to help expedite decision making. This research has also been referred to as illusions research, where the mind forces new information onto established mental patterns. If the new information doesn't fit the established mental map and the individual does not make a forceful, conscientious effort to overcome this dissonance, then the mind will toss out all information that doesn't fit the pattern to help rationalize the illusion of correctness.[16] In research on irrational choices, Piattelli-Palmarini states: "Between rationality and our cognitive pride, we chose the latter."[17]

The central theme to this part of the discussion is when the mind is challenged between what is rational and what is in one's cognitive comfort zone, people choose their comfort zone—even when they know they'll be wrong. Thus it is suggested that the mind is fallible and requires continuous reevaluation. Even when one is guessing, the mind is in a continuous observe, orient, decide and act (OODA) loop trying to reduce uncertainty and resolve conflict— and sometimes it resolves conflict by disregarding information that runs contrary to what it would take to resolve the conflict.[18] To compensate for these flaws and make better decisions, it requires a person to actively regulate their normal narcissism tendencies and recognize and manage the imperfect mental map.

As simple examples, the classics of visual illusions are offered (see figs. 1, 2, and 3). The mind, when faced with a new vision/picture/etc. will always attempt to force it into an existing framework. [19] Sometimes that is the wrong framework for analysis and decision making.

Figure 1. The three pillars of non-reality. The eye sees the blending of the colors as the three columns morph into other shapes, but the mental map continues to solve the dilemma by seeing three columns. (Courtesy of Genesis Visibility, Associate of Verisoft Info Services.)

Transitioning from the psychological to the sociological realm where our personality interacts with the environment, mental maps and normal narcissism also come into play. In a social environment, humans tend to take cues from their environment, monitor these demands, and respond in the best possible way to gain acceptance from that environment and maintain self-preservation.[20] If this sounds similar to narcissism, it is. It is the sociological application of normal narcissism and should be considered a *normal* component of human personality as it interacts with the environment rather than a clinical syndrome, although at the extreme, narcissism is a clinical condition.[21] As for life goals, normal narcissism tends to motivate people to have long-term aspirations related to being successful and getting ahead in life rather than being communal and submissive. Again, this is not a condemnation of narcissism. It is a description of how normal narcissism may motivate behavior and how people motivated by normal narcissism may interact with the environment—and to suggest that most people do not have clinical narcissist tendencies but most people display certain levels of narcissist behavior in their daily routines—it's just a part of one's personality. The narcissist tendency helps inflate a person's view of himself or herself regardless of whether they are evaluating their task performance, personality traits, expected academic performance, behavioral acts, intelligence, or physical attractiveness. These inflated self-tendencies are not necessarily how people record their views of themselves on reports (such as a Myers-Briggs or the Executive Assessment Development Program 360 assessment tool), but how they see and report to themselves (i.e., how one might "look at themselves in the mirror in the morning")—there is a difference between what a person might tell others about himself or herself and what a person might tell themselves about themselves.[22]



Figure 2. The "Visible" Invisible Square. The eye does not see a square in the above sketch, however the mental map perceives a square and so "fills in the blanks" to make the sketch fit historical references in the brain. (Courtesy of ACM Siggraph.)

Under normal circumstances and lower stress, normal narcissism is a reasonable task to manage. What is interesting to note is that when this character element is threatened by the environment through actions like strong criticism or significantly stressful situations, the individual tends to react by perceiving themselves more positively than is justified, denigrating others, engaging in arrogant social behaviors, assigning self-serving attributions for their behavior and reacting with hostility towards others, especially when they are wrong.[23] It is suggested that this may be a manifestation of normal narcissism under stress without the benefit of self-control. The concept of self-control and its relationship to normal narcissism will be introduced later in this paper.

"Normal Narcissism"
Reinforced by Society Advocating Self-esteem

Another issue that adds to the effect of normal narcissism is the American society's pre-occupation with self-esteem. For at least the past 30 years, American society has advocated the concept of positive self-esteem. The belief is that high self-esteem leads to positive outcomes and that accurate self-appraisals might contribute to depression.[24] This positive view "promotes psychological adjustment" as well as "higher motivation, greater persistence, more effective performance and ultimately greater success."[25] In other words, thinking positively about an outcome makes the outcome more likely to happen (in basketball lingo—"be the ball"). This concept adopts many of the features of normal narcissism and the individual's desire for self-preservation. Again, normal levels of self-esteem are most likely healthy, but taken to the extreme and in combination with elevated levels of normal narcissism, can prove counterproductive to the intended outcome of positive, well–adjusted citizens of a society.[26]



Figure 3. "The Brain Won't Let Me See the Big Picture." The eye can only take in bits and pieces of this sketch, because the mental map cannot accept the entire sketch, it doesn't fit any of its current paradigms. So it forces the eye to look only at small bits and pieces that do make sense to the mental map. (Courtesy of M. Rible, "Playful Imaginings: The Illusions of M. S. Escher, graphics.stanford.edu/courses/cs99d-00/online_projects.html.)

It is further suggested that there may be a dark side to the psychological benefits of only encouraging high self-esteem or self-enhancement.[27] It has the potential to be maladaptive and may promote self-enhancing behavior. If normal narcissism operates in this context and is not properly controlled, it may become a potential contributor to maladaptive behavior. If taken to the extreme, self-enhancers may become absorbed in their self-importance, and this trait may cause friction within an organization because "getting ahead" (promotion of self) becomes more important than "getting along" (promotion of the team). What tends to keep all this in check is a person's external and internal controls on their behavior. The external controls may be represented by rules, regulations, policies, peer pressure, direct supervision, and consequence management. The internal control is primarily represented by the concept of self-control.

> Steve Jobs—founder of Apple Computers Inc. Steve's self-promoting, self-aggrandizing style was conducive to launching breakthrough technology that had the potential to revolutionize an entire industry. His belief in his genius helped overcome the industry's initial skepticism about the concept of the personal computer. However, once the industry was up and running, his style became a serious threat to the organization—he was seen as manipulative, rude, and condescending—and eventually lost his job. 28 What might work as a Captain might not work as a senior officer? Unchecked narcissism might work in some professions (Pablo Picasso (artist), Armand Hammer (industrialist), Naomi Campbell (supermodel) or Mohammad Ali ('I am the greatest'), but perhaps not in the military profession where teamwork is better translated into success than individualism.

"Normal Narcissism" and Leadership

So far, normal narcissism has been discussed in psychological and sociological terms. This is good for descriptive and exploratory explanations of the concept. To be more useful, a practical leadership application of normal narcissism is provided. Psychologists posit that leadership may actually be only an illusion of control—the idea of leading a group based on one's inherent skills and charisma is really not as important as the willingness of the subordinates to actually be led or at least not resist being led.[29] According to this position, leadership is romanticized and put way out of proportion to its real impact on people. This research points to the performance of organizations being consistent across several leadership turnovers, some periods of time being led by "competent" personalities, and others being led by incompetent people.[30]

However, significant other research does support the notion that it does matter who is in control, and that this person's makeup can affect their leadership quality. Research supports the construct that personal qualities that guide a person to "do the right thing" does count in leadership.[31] This moral imperative to do the right thing rests on two distinctive qualities. First is the ability to detect the morally correct action, and second is the capacity to act in accordance with this judgment and overcome whatever inducements exist to do otherwise.[32]

The Abuse of Power

> In the early 1970s, an experiment at Stanford University simulated the conditions of a prison to examine the social relationships and power between the 'guards' and the 'inmates.' Volunteer college students were randomly assigned these positions, and knew of the method of assignment—knowing that the 'guard' was not more intelligent or superior in any basic quality than the student who played the 'inmate'. The two-week experiment was terminated after 6 days because the guards were overwhelmed by the 'excess' of their power over the inmates and proceeded to abuse that power—even in the controlled setting of the lab experiment. Observing this setting, one can surmise that the assignment of power must be carefully exercised to ensure only 'mature' leaders get such power—another observation is that regardless of who you give the power to (since these college students were assigned randomly, one can assume a normal distribution of maturity) power corrupts regardless of who you may give it to. This second observation is not to mean that leaders are naturally corrupt, but the thought that they are potentially corrupted by the opportunity and temptations of the high position that includes significant power. This illustration leads us to the practical application of the theory of unchecked narcissism.[33]

"Doing the right thing" is not a problem in the junior officer years—guidelines were distinct and the situation fairly certain with ample amounts of clear and visible direct supervision and oversight. As senior leaders, the ability to ascertain the morally correct position is more difficult due to

VUCA, and the ability to choose correctly is confounded by the lack of immediate and visible oversight and the existence of counterpressures and temptations to do otherwise. This new landscape provides new situations that may amplify the effect of a flawed mental map and the naturally occurring narcissist tendency that resides in most people. The VUCA environment blurs the lines for several reasons. First, the field of operations is wider. As a captain, the field of operations is probably confined to the arena of an air base and one's specific area of military expertise. As a senior leader, the field of operations is often outside the immediate area of military expertise and cuts across large segments of the military environment, as well as crossing the boundaries of civil-military relations. Second, the expectations are different. As a captain, compliance, obedience, and conformity, are hallmarks to successful teams and career advancement. The senior officer is expected to be a bold risk-taker and accept the consequences of all that this perspective entails. Third, as a captain, the standards are relatively clear. Regulations and those senior in rank detail the accepted standards. They also enforce those standards. As a senior officer, there may still be regulations, but few officers senior in rank to either explain those standards or provide daily enforcement in the form of close supervision. Finally, the pressure to perform is greater. As a captain, there are many more in the "herd", each captain is important, but each captain is also one of many captains in the field. As a senior leader, there are very few, and they are usually known by name and reputation. In this setting, the daily performance is very visible and subject to instant criticism and oversight (i.e. actions after the fact or act) versus supervision (i.e., actions prior to the fact or act). This after the fact visibility may come in the form of scrutiny by the press, Congress, or other segments of society. A positive self-outlook may be vital to succeed in this environment.

The subordinate-to-leader relationship has also changed. As a captain, the difference in experience and age between the leader and the led is small. As a senior leader, the leader may be a generation removed from those being led. This sets up different expectations from the subordinate. The subordinate sees the senior leader less of a near-peer and more of a "parent" role model. The subordinate wants to see the senior leader succeed, for that is where his or her future success also lies. Subordinates succeed when their leader succeeds. For the senior leader, this means that his or her thoughts and suggestions become the subordinate's "marching orders," sometimes their unintended marching orders due to their zeal to please the boss. The subordinate, because of the desire to "please the boss," may translate what the senior leader is musing about into a direct order. The subordinate also sees the senior leader working hard and desires to see them treated like a star—and the senior leader may begin to believe he or she may be worthy of exceptional treatment and begin to lose touch with the landscape and their true responsibilities as a senior leader.

All this serves to bolster and feed the normal narcissism tendencies in the senior leader and may set the groundwork for potential problems. It is suggested that a senior leader, in believing this paradigm that he or she deserves to be treated differently than convention due to rank, get used to this concept and perhaps believe that notion of "deserving this good deal." This digression from the straight and narrow (inflated temporary duty assignment [TDY] voucher, perk from a contractor, and deviation from the regulation) may be incorrectly rationalized more as a reward for a previous (legitimate) sacrifice rather than for what it is, deviation from accepted behavior. The consistency and frequency of these opportunities to digress from the straight and narrow path increase in frequency and intensity in positions of senior leadership. But why do some otherwise hard-working and dedicated senior leaders fall prey to their flawed mental maps and/or normal narcissism? The condition that was seemingly under control earlier in the career path has now turned into a potentially detrimental force.

Doing the Right Thing—The Issue of Senior Leadership and Self-Control

So far, the discussion has set the landscape of a senior leader's flawed mental map and normal narcissism and how he or she potentially interact with the environment. The following discusses the self-control mechanism in theory and application. Senior leadership provides opportunities to exercise discretion and the use of great power without much direct supervision. Without this significant external control mechanism, the internal control mechanism must compensate. This internal mechanism is referred to in this article as self-control. The issue of self-control becomes the tool to maintain the healthy management of both a flawed mental map and normal narcissism.

It is important to see that a flawed mental map and narcissism are natural—and in the past these were partially controlled with external factors such as regulations, instructions, checklists, supervision, etc., and supplemented with an individual's application of self-control. But the changing landscape allows for greater use of discretion and judgment by the senior leader, while simultaneously the formerly prominent external controls begin to fade into the backdrop. This movement to the backdrop is confounded by the cloudy moral standards held by the general public (see below).

Relative behavior

> The boundaries of acceptable behavior in the general public have also changed, and this confounds the issue of acceptable behavior in the military. Think of the first time you heard of drug abuse occurring and your (probable) strong reaction to it (you evaluated it as bad behavior that should be punished . . . now that same transgression is considered a daily routine—not even worth noting. The friction is that many of the current 'accepted' behaviors in the pubic are still strictly forbidden in the profession of arms. When confronted with the decision to act morally, the immoral act that used to be abhorred by the majority of the publics is now 'ho-hum' and the relative distance is narrowed between acceptable and unacceptable behavior in their eyes, but they still will hold the profession of arms to a higher standard, which makes the moral judgments of a member of the profession of arms the more difficult.[34]

It is also important to consider that just because an officer has arrived at the threshold of senior-leadership opportunities it does not mean the officer also has arrived with all the requisite awareness and skills to successfully cope in this environment. It is suggested that one must actively self-appraise and listen to the appraisal of others to prepare for the challenges of this new landscape.

Three Mechanisms of Self-Control

It is fairly well documented that most of the major personal and social problems affecting people are due to the failure of self-control.[35] Drug abuse, alcoholism, computer fraud, indebtedness, and gambling are simple examples. Few people manage themselves as well as they should or would like.[36] Why people lack self-control is the subject of considerable research. Some scholars suggest that self-control is a resource that is finite and deteriorates with time, use, and or other environmental factors. Some believe it is unrecoverable and incapable of rejuvenation, while others have the opposite perspective.[37] Baumeister proposes that these finite views of self-control may be modeled three ways. Self-control can be explained and described as strength, a schema, or a skill.[38]

The first technique for looking at self-control is its application through a tool called willpower. This is a strength concept. Willpower relies on an inner strength to resist and control one's responses to the environment and avoid poor decisions. The strength model describes willpower as a finite, nonrenewable energy resource and is reduced in its ability and durability each time it is utilized by the individual. In this model, self-control must be exercised smartly and sparingly, for once expended, the resource is not capable of being rejuvenated. This concept of self-control may be visualized as a type of nonrechargeable battery, where willpower is the level of electricity stored in the battery is used to exercise self-control.[39]

The second technique is to explain the application of self-control as a schema (a plan or logic mechanism). The schema approach is a more recent explanation of self-control and follows an information-processing approach.[40] A schema relies on an internal set of processes that relies on accumulated knowledge, comparing that knowledge with the current situation, and constructing a scheme to deal with the new situation in the most rational manner. This explanation posits that self-control actually gets stronger as one matures because the information base gets deeper and gains validity through repeated cycles of comparison and action. This is similar to the iterative process in the mental maps explanation, except it assumes that the quality of the decision always gets better as experience is gained. It does not completely address other research that proposes that the iterative process of the mind is inherently flawed, as the mind constantly tries to put new data in established (and possibly flawed) mental maps.[41]

The third major way to explain the application of self-control is through skill. The skill approach is a method where an individual learns to control him or herself using an applied skills process. Subsequent requirements to use self-control use the same skill set over, and over and repeated use does not affect the quality of the decisions. The quality of each decision remains constant over time, even with frequent or rapid use. The skills explanation, unlike the schema, proposes that the skill level remains relatively constant and does not improve with each encounter requiring the use of self-control.[42]

These three models on how to apply self-control mechanisms end up predicting different results, either poorer, better, or unchanged results for the same input. In testing these models of how mechanisms might apply self-control, researchers investigated the conflicting outcomes from these three models by having participants engage in two consecutive but seemingly unrelated acts of self-control.[43] The results of the study favors the outcome predicted by the first model proposed above, the willpower theory. The experiments suggest that willpower, used frequently, decreases with subsequent uses. Additional support for this conclusion was provided by a several subsequent studies by other researchers.[44]

The researchers in these studies found that self-control in the form of willpower, although finite in its capability to sustain self-control in the short run, actually behaves similarly to a muscle in the long run. When used often in a short amount of time, self-control tires and loses strength and resiliency. In some studies, self-control diminished quite rapidly, sometimes in as short as five minutes of exposure to the adverse situation.[45] Also, researchers point out that unrelated items requiring self-control drew on the same source of finite willpower. But they also discovered that similar to a muscle, when allowed to rest, willpower recovered.[46] Thus the suggestion is made that self-control, as explained through the willpower model, is finite in its strength in the short run but recoverable for sustained use in the long run.

This model may help explain why, in field observations, most lack of self-control incidents occur late in the day verses the morning (breaking a diet, addictive relapses, and even impulsive crimes).[47] It is suggested that by the end of the day the energy resources left in the willpower stores are depleted, and the ability to effectively exercise self-control is potentially compromised. The researchers went further to determine what events helped rejuvenate the stores of self-control through willpower. They observed that not only rest, but also physical exercise helped improve the stores of willpower.[48] Physical exercise has been shown as an especially effective stress reliever, as it releases endorphins into the system that allow more efficient and effective mental processes to occur.

With rest and exercise recognized as mechanisms that could restore self-control, researchers went on to see what the lack of rest and exercise did to self-control. Observations from this research first suggest that simple stress draws on and weakens the stores of willpower considerably. It is not a prerequisite for an event to be extraordinary for it to weaken the self-control mechanism. The same finite, short-run resource that is used for self-control in grave situations is also weakened by everyday stress.[49] Further, observations were made that suggest that either a lack of rest or a lack of physical exercise contributed to reduced levels of self-control. In some situations, the normal stresses of everyday life were requiring so much of the available stores of willpower that little was available to address more serious issues requiring decisive use of this self-control mechanism.[50] This seems rather like pedestrian information; self-control is a concept powered by this energy source called willpower and willpower, a finite short-run energy resource, can be restored through rest and/

or exercise. However, there is more to this model, and it is pertinent to the senior leader.

In a parallel research effort to see if the source for willpower was also the same source of mental energy used for other decisive actions, researchers asked participants to first complete a decision-making chore and then subjected them to a situation requiring self-control. The experiment had two groups, one group had to complete a complex, senior level decision-making chore and the other had a less arduous task. Individuals in both groups were then subjected to a subsequent task requiring the use of self-control. The individuals in the group with the complex, senior level, decision-making task had less self-control on the second task than those in the other group.[51] This conclusion is also supported by other research.[52] Thus, it is suggested that the "short-run" finite energy source used to execute self-control through willpower is also the same energy source used to make difficult decisions. It is suggested that as a senior leader, the "duty day" will provide more opportunities to draw on this finite energy source to make these good decisions than were presented to a decision maker when he or she was a captain.

Some, when realizing the daily challenges of senior leadership and realizing that there is only "so much effort to go around", counter this daily (and rapid) drain on their energy source with a conservation mechanism. Essentially the leader paces the use of this energy, knowing the daily routine is long and challenging.[53] Thus, it is suggested that the quality of self-control decisions may be affected long before the point of "exhaustion" is reached because the stores of willpower are being consciously conserved. This is similar to an athlete realizing that the contest is long and arduous. The athlete, seeing this situation, begins to reduce the level of overall effort in an attempt to complete the contest.[54] It is suggested that a senior leader, facing the VUCA environment on a daily basis, may unconsciously "conserve" to ensure achieving some unknown (and sometimes moving) end game. This may have the unintended effect of reducing the overall quality of all decisions being made by the senior leader.

A series of studies was conducted to determine if this position has merit. When faced with self-control tasks requiring more energy than the participants knew they had, participants "conserved" their self-control mechanisms to attempt to complete the course of the experiment. Their self-regulation on subsequent tasks in the series presented during the experiment was weaker than initial self-control outcomes.[55] This did not reflect a diminishing level of motivation to complete the self-control tasks successfully, but a diminished in the level of positive effort due to conservation. The participants meant to do well, but could not generate the level of self-control on subsequent tasks to equal the level of self-control demonstrated on the initial task. Other research supports this observation.[56] This suggests some poor outcomes may be the result of becoming passive due to the technique of conservation. The result may not be from a poor decision, but from not taking appropriate avoidance action. However, the net outcome of either choice may be the same, a poor choice because of the lack of active self-control.

At this point, an emerging senior leader may consider throwing in the towel and avoiding the challenges offered. The objective of this article is not to discourage, but to encourage the use of this knowledge and research into mental maps, narcissism, and self-control so that proactive and anticipatory mechanisms can be adopted to avoid the unfortunate consequences of poor personal decisions and avoid the unpleasant need for after the fact "damage control" and "spin." As an interim summary, prior to heading off into illustrations and proposed solutions, the following are suggested:

1. Mental maps are inherently flawed and new information is constantly being mapped onto these existing templates. Sometimes, to make the data "fit" the mental map ignores negative information. The mind does this in the name of self-preservation and tension reduction.
2. Narcissism is normal and natural. However, narcissism tends to elevate one's positive self-evaluation and perceptions, while suppressing one's negative self-evaluation and perceptions.
3. Self-control is a strength exercised through willpower.
4. Willpower draws on a finite, short-run energy source that may be rejuvenated.
5. The energy source can be rejuvenated with rest and/or physical exercise.
6. This energy source is also used by other decision-making mechanisms.
   a. Daily stresses in living deplete the resource and
   b. Complex decision-making processes also draw on this energy source.
7. Long periods of activity tend to make an individual conserve this resource and not apply it fully to the situation. This may lead to an overall decrease in decision quality and self-control execution.

The Landscape of the Senior Officer

The senior-officer environment is understandably complex. VUCA is the order of the day, and the task at hand is attempting to solve dilemmas. Senior leaders will focus on making frequent significant decisions that affect large numbers of people and hundreds of millions of dollars in resources. The senior officer "duty day" landscape consists of

1. high demands for outstanding performance,
2. low tolerance for errors,
3. perceived harshness of "outside" critics (media, civilian critics, special interest groups),
4. decisions that may affect large groups of people in moderate ways (policy changes, program changes, etc.), and
5. decisions that may affect a small number of people, or individual people, in significant ways (quality of force

actions, adverse adjudication, punishment, administrative discharges, etc.).[57]

At the end of the duty day, the senior leader takes on a myriad of social and unit morale engagements to support both the mission and the local community. After virtually all the resources are depleted, the senior leader retreats to the home to find not a haven of rest, but rather the potential challenges of

1. teenage and/or college kids and their attendant problems, demands, and financial woes,
2. elderly and/or sick parents and the high level of care that may be required,
3. peers going through difficult times (sickness, divorce, retirement, civilian career change, and layoffs), and
4. spousal issues (health, life goals, and attendant crisis associated with the spouse's family aging).

The "home front" demands do decrease in frequency of occurrence as compared to the early days in a military career, but although decreased in frequency, the occurrences increase in their intensity, because the infrequent events are usually high in their emotional, psychological, and/or financial impact (parent's death, child leaving home).[58] At times, the home may become as stressful as the workplace, and rather than a place of rejuvenation and recharge, a place where additional demands exist for the use of finite energy resources.

A summary of disciplinary actions against senior officers in one of the Department of Defense military braches offers the following data. From 1993 to the present, over 80 senior officers were dealt Article 15 punishment. In addition, 19 senior officers were dealt court martial convictions. The majority were cases of improper conduct (sex), falsifying documents (money), or taking advantage of their rank and/or position (harassment or dereliction of duties).[59]

A Senior-Leader Landscape Scenario

Thus far, this article has discussed the elements of mental maps, normal narcissism, and self-control. It has also quickly described the senior-officer landscape and its challenges. Next is a combination of these elements into scenarios to illustrate how they may interplay to create a situation where a senior leader may make a poor judgment. The following scenarios are based on actual events—the names are fictional.

Scenario 1

This first scenario involves a senior officer (Colonel A) on a new and challenging assignment. There are high levels of responsibility, but unlike Colonel A's earlier days, low levels of physical threat exist (i.e., little chance of risk in combat). Colonel A is given significant latitude and only gets intermittent supervision, but the Congressional oversight is stressful. He also has two children in college, aging parents, and aging in-laws. Colonel A's program management skills are exceptional, but there are significant challenges to the program he's currently in charge of because service-related priorities are changing in light of transformation. The external audits are also nit-picking. The duty day is long and there is little opportunity for escape to a decent meal or physical exercise. A long-time friend of Colonel A (they deployed together to some rough places when they were younger) calls Colonel A late one night, at the office (the friend has since retired and is now a contractor). Conversation turns into an offer to meet for a late meal and drinks. Disappointed with the long day of fruitless negotiation of the program's positive attributes to the Air Force mission to seemingly disinterested outsiders, he takes the friend up on the offer. The dinner conversation ends up with the friend offering the colonel a superb retirement job opportunity. The friend claims Colonel A has earned the position and the colonel, after having reviewed the past few years, tends to agree. Colonel A feels that he has "paid his dues." The friend, after paying for dinner, casually asks for some information from Colonel A's program. The colonel sees this as harmless, routine data. It ends up giving the friend's firm (and Colonel A's potential future employer) a leg up on the bidding process. What happened?

Colonel A is a diligent and conscientious leader. He didn't lose a nuclear weapon or embezzle millions of program dollars, yet he made a poor choice in divulging the information to a friend. Potential issues involved in this decision may involve a flawed mental map, narcissism, and the withering of willpower. First, the flawed mental map may have seen the friend as just that, as a friend and not a contractor. People change roles and responsibilities during life, but the mental map may tend to leave the person in the role that they were best liked and remembered. Second, narcissism may play a role in the paid-your-dues perception of the job offer. It tended to exaggerate the accomplishments and put in the background the continued requirement to follow the military-contractor relationship rules exactly as prescribed. Added to this, there is no immediate supervision; Colonel A has significant autonomy in much of his work. Finally, the energy source that Colonel A has successfully drawn on for so many years to make the "good call" in these situations is worn out by the difficult demands of the current job and home life, with minimal opportunities to "recharge" and regain the right perspective.

Scenario 2

Colonel B has been in her current assignment for two years. An incredibly rewarding job, it however involves significant travel and time away from home. She misses her family and lost family opportunities. Her boss praises her work and the selfless sacrifice of her time. On one of her last TDY's she did not get reimbursement for a travel fee. It amounted to $90.00 in fuel fees charged to a personal credit card but used to fuel a government vehicle. The paperwork "hassle" of getting this straightened out was not worth her effort, she would rather be with her family than deal with this bureaucratic frustration. A subsequent TDY ended up being long and tough where things did not go well at the meeting. It was topped off by a weather delay resulting in her missing her daughter's senior prom. When filing the voucher for this trip, she has the opportunity to "pad" her voucher with nonexistent fees, and does so for $90.00. This is the exact amount she feels she is owed by the government from her previous TDY.

Colonel B doesn't think she has cheated the government out of money, just settling the overdue balance. Potential issues involved in this decision may again involve a flawed mental map, narcissism, and the withering of willpower. First, the flawed mental map may have seen the $90.00 pad as something owed to her by the government. She is accepting the positive information, that she is owed the money, and possibly rejecting the negative information, that she is falsifying a travel voucher. Second, narcissism may have rationalized her action as just "settling this money issue with the government with minimum hassle" rather than going through the arduous task of completing special paperwork to explain the unusual fuel charge from the first TDY (although she would expect a captain in her unit with the same problem to "do the right thing" and complete the paperwork "hassle"). Finally, the willpower stores may well be depleted as she endured the emotional drain of missing a special family event and the prospect of losing even more family time as she dealt with a multistep effort to fix the first voucher or the simpler step of just padding the second voucher for what she was owed.

Summary and a Recommendation

This article has presented a possible explanation to what might contribute to poor decisions by senior leaders. Through examining the research it is suggested that mental maps are inherently flawed and that new information is constantly being mapped onto existing templates. Sometimes to make the data "fit," the mental map ignores negative information. The mind does this in the name of self-preservation and tension reduction. Next, narcissism should be considered normal and natural. However, narcissism tends to elevate one's positive self-evaluation and perceptions and suppress one's negative self-evaluation and perceptions. Finally, self-control is a strength exercised through willpower, but willpower draws on a finite, short-run energy source. However, this source is capable of rejuvenation. Some methods that may rejuvenate this energy source are rest and physical exercise. This energy source is also used by other decision-making mechanisms to deal with the daily stresses in life, as well as those mechanisms that address complex decision-making processes. Finally, long periods of activity tend to make an individual conserve this resource and not apply it fully to the situation. This may lead to an overall decrease in decision quality and self-control execution.

This summary may be viewed two ways. It may be seen as a prescription for failure or as a set of warning signs requiring the senior leader to actively manage the situation. Active management means that the senior leader must recognize the conditions exist and understand how they are amplified by the challenges present in the senior-officer landscape. To avoid the potential pitfalls of a poor decision, a senior leader must constantly evaluate the situation and aggressively manage the conditions of a flawed mental map and normal narcissism. Also, the "normal" lifestyle of the senior leader is counterproductive to restoring the common energy source used for handling daily stress, making complex decisions, as well as exercising willpower. Senior leaders must make conscious efforts to afford themselves (and their organizations) sufficient time for rest and exercise. The combination of awareness of the situation, aggressive management of the conditions, and proper planning for rest, exercise, and other options to help rejuvenate the critical common energy source should help the senior leader be more effective. It may also help the senior leader help his or her peers to avoid the poor judgment pitfalls within the senior-officer landscape.

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The Nelson Touch:

A Study in Leadership

CDR Jeff Bohler

England expects that every man will do his duty.

—The signal sent by Vice Adm Lord Horatio Nelson, from his ship HMS *Victory* as the Battle of Trafalgar was about to commence.

Introduction

For the English, the victorious Battle of Trafalgar gave the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland control of the seas, removing the possibility of a French invasion during the Napoleonic Wars. Admiral Lord Nelson, loved by his men and country, respected by his enemies, and immortalized by history, was the commander in chief of the victorious English fleet. Although he died a hero at the Battle of Trafalgar, his story is one of excellence and error, great military triumphs and private challenges. However, his exceptional leadership style has survived the biographers' scrutiny. Let us try to understand who Lord Nelson was, reflect on his time as a commander, and learn about his leadership style, the "Nelson Touch." In doing so, we may well develop our own leadership style. So, please join me on a journey to investigate—the leadership of Vice Adm Lord Horatio Nelson.

Relevance to Modern Leaders

Like many before and since, calamitous events and opportunities shaped and hardened Lord Nelson's life and naval career, preparing him for greatness. He embraced both the good and the bad of life with passion. Indeed, the possibility existed several times for Nelson's nautical exploits to end fatally, or at least expulsion from the service due to his behavior. What if young Lieutenant Nelson's naval career had been cut short due to "reshaping" the Royal Navy? One of the world's greatest naval heroes might not have been at the battle of Cape St. Vincent, the Battle of the Nile, the Battle of Copenhagen, or most importantly, the Battle of Trafalgar, and Napoleon might have still had the opportunity to invade and conquer England. How should the Department of Defense ensure that it does not overlook the next generation of talented military leaders as we transform our services for warfare in the twenty-first century?

Goals of this Article

To explore this question, let us follow the career of Lord Nelson from midshipman to admiral using the tools available to us as leaders today to assess his potential for service to his country. Since we can only surmise from documented sources what type of naval officer Lord Nelson was during his lifetime, we must take a few liberties to imagine how he might have managed as an officer in today's US Navy. There are two goals for this evaluation of Lord Nelson: To identify the traits of effective leadership and highlight methods of mentoring young officers. While not the intent of this article, some nautical history has been included to help the reader appreciate the milieu that a sailor of the late 1800s endured and thus further respect the inspirational leadership of the heroic Lord Nelson during those arduous times.

Who was Vice Adm Lord Horatio Nelson?

Horatio Nelson was born of humble beginnings, the fourth of eight children to grow up in a parsonage house attached to a church in the city of Burnham Thorpe. By all accounts, he was a spirited young lad, who attended the Royal Grammar School at Norwich with his brothers, had little but needed little, and grew up as normal as was possible in the England of the 1760s. However, in December of 1767 the Nelson family encountered severe misfortune. Horatio's mother died on 26 December, and a week later, his grandmother died. At the age of nine, young Horatio realized that he would have to make his own way in the world, without much assistance from his father who had also become weak and ill. It was at this time that his dead mother's brother, who did not have any children of his own, offered to help as he could in the upbringing of the children. Two years later, this uncle, Capt Maurice Suckling, was appointed as the new captain of the HMS *Raisonnable*, a 64-gun ship of the line, which afforded Horatio an opportunity to go to sea at the ripe age of 12 to become a midshipman. In response to the request from the family for Horatio to join Captain Suckling, he replied "What has poor Horace done, who is so weak, that he above all the rest should be sent to rough it out at sea? But let him come; and the first time we go into action, a cannon-ball may knock off his head, and provide for him at once."[1]

Midshipman Nelson's introduction to the Royal Navy was not a happy one. His journey from home to the ship was long, uncomfortable and alone for the final leg. Once he arrived, Horatio went unwelcomed since Captain Suckling did not anticipate Horatio's arrival for several days and was not on the *Raisonnable*. Horatio finally made his way to the ship, but spent the next several days surely wondering about his future.

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When Captain Suckling received orders to the *Triumph* and command over the home guard that would mostly stay at anchorage, he realized that most of the crew would be consumed by their desires for heavy drinking and female companionship. He worried that with the ship full of "wives" and an allowance of a gallon of beer per day, the rampant sexual activity below decks would not be a healthy environment for his nephew. He correctly deduced that Midshipman Nelson would learn more about seamanship aboard a sea-going vessel and had Horatio transferred to the *Mary Ann*, a merchant ship making a run to the West Indies. The genesis of the "Nelson Touch" probably came from Midshipman Nelson's experience with the merchant fleet during the early, formative years of his naval career. Nelson once remarked of his time on the merchant ship that "I returned a practical seaman with a horror of the Royal Navy."[2] The year spent with merchant sailors seems to have taught him how to lead men with compassion rather than cruelty. He certainly developed distaste for harsh punishment that was normal operating procedure aboard most British warships of the day. He learned to distrust "flogging" and forcing sailors to "run the gauntlet" to enforce discipline. These traits would serve him well in the years to follow.

Another incident that illustrates an aspect of Lord Nelson's personality and illuminates his style of leadership deserves mention before we proceed. Midshipman Nelson joined an expedition to search for a route to the Pacific Ocean through the Arctic. The trip was a failure, and the ships were soon stuck in ice. Midshipman Nelson, along with another, snuck off the ship to hunt a polar bear to get a hide for Nelson's father. Nelson ignored the signal to return, hot in pursuit of his quest. His musket misfired when he took a shot at the bear, so he used the musket as a club and attacked the polar bear. Someone on the ship fired a cannon, frightening off the animal, and probably saved Nelson's life. However, this story underlines the fact that, throughout his life, Lord Nelson, during the heat of battle, had the ability to focus all of his attention and energy onto his enemy and resist distraction.[3] Midshipman Nelson continued to learn more about navigation, signaling, hydrographical charts, and the art of leading sailors. When Nelson was eighteen and a half years old, he took the formal examination for the rank of lieutenant, an honor he was too young to earn officially.

Whether by coincidence or not, the newly appointed comptroller of the navy (Nelson's uncle—Captain Suckling) chaired the examining board, which determined the fate of each candidate. Midshipman Nelson passed the oral examination with flying colors. Only then did the comptroller reveal his personal relationship with Nelson to the rest of the Board. The comptroller explained that he wanted Nelson to earn the promotion to lieutenant based on his own merits, and not because of family ties. The next few years saw a flurry of assignments and promotions, successes, and failures for Nelson. The new lieutenant was assigned to the frigate *Lowestoft*, transferred to the *Bristol* as first lieutenant 18 months later and subsequently appointed to the *Badger* as commander in December 1778. In June of 1779 at the age of 20 Nelson was promoted to post-captain, and in effect, overcame the last barrier to his naval career. From now on, all of Nelson's promotions would be based on seniority, with advancement to admiral almost a surety. Before we continue to examine Nelson's leadership style, it might prove useful to review the life of the common sailor of Nelson's era.

A Sailor's Lot

Life was hard aboard warships of the late 1700s. Records indicate that of the 176,000 men who shipped out between the years of 1774 and 1780 in the British Navy, 1,243 were killed in action, 18,541 died of disease, and 42,069 deserted. Aboard a first-rate ship of the line, hundreds of men (and sometimes women) might live with little ventilation and no plumbing. Spoiled food, foul drinking water, lice-infected clothing and bedding, and hard and dangerous work caused a certain Dr. Samuel Johnson to observe wittily "going to sea was like being jailed with the added risk of drowning."[4] Disease was widespread aboard the ship due to poor nutrition and inadequate health care, with rats and roaches spreading sickness from stem to stern. On one particular voyage to the West Indies in 1726, 80 percent of the crew died from fluxes, scurvy, and fevers—including an admiral and many of his senior officers. Midshipman Nelson nearly died of malaria in 1775, almost ending his naval career before it started.

Minor offences earned a "flogging," and most officers were inhumane in their daily treatment of sailors. Such deplorable conditions had the effect of creating high desertion rates, resulting in the practice of denying sailors shore leave while in home port. Thus, many "wives" (no questions asked—one wife allowed per man) made the trip to the ship to spend time with their sailor, sharing a hammock slung between cannons on the gun deck. Indeed, many women quietly remained onboard when the ship sailed and even fought alongside their men when the ship saw action. Two common phrases "son of a gun" and "shake a leg" come from this practice. The first phrase of course relates to children born under conditions of dubious parentage; however, the second phrase requires further clarification. When sailors were roused to stand duty the next morning, the petty officer would demand that the persons still in their hammock "show a leg" in order to prove that it was a woman and not a sailor to be awakened. The phrase "show a leg" became "shake a leg," which we use today to mean "get a move on." Apparently, having women on board warships was a common occurrence in those times, requiring one British admiral to complain of the women laundering while on board the ship by remarking "the hold is continually damp and the vapor rising from it highly pernicious."[5] Admiral Nelson and Lady Hamilton (to be discussed later) reportedly conceived their daughter Horatia, while under way.

Due to these dreadful conditions, the eighteenth century British navy never had enough sailors to operate their ships and impressed sailors to man them effectively. Though normally used only in times of war, legal sanction for the practice went back to the time of King Edward I. The Royal Navy impressed many British merchant sailors who had deserted for better treatment, as well as eligible men from other nations. History shows that the impressments of US citizens (estimated to be more than 6,000 sailors) into the British navy was one of the primary causes of the War of 1812. Few served willingly; seaman's pay had not increased in 100 years, sailors were routinely denied shore leave, and subjected to harsh and arbitrary discipline. These deplorable conditions eventually resulted in widespread discontent, many minor incidents, and even several serious mutinies that culminated in the hanging of mutineers. The threat of revolution and social upheaval was especially dangerous to the wartime Royal Navy, as well as the ruling class of Britain, which carefully watched activities on the continent.

A captain with a reputation of fairness and success in getting prize money and glory might be able to retain a few men from his hometown, but to fill out the crew, bounties would be offered, jails emptied, and press-gangs used to snatch the unsuspecting, and the young. Remarkably, it was in this hostile environment that young Lieutenant Nelson developed his "Nelson Touch" leadership style.

Evaluating Nelson's Leadership

Scores of books chronicle the events that propelled Lord Nelson's naval career from the examination for lieutenant to his death at Trafalgar. However, for this study, I propose to analyze Nelson's leadership style using a standard US Navy Fitness Report and Counseling record for the ranks (E7–06), commonly referred to as a FITREP. Using selected comments gleaned from letters and interviews from friends made shortly after Nelson's death; I hope to give a reader a sense of how our evaluation system may have assessed one of the greatest naval heroes of all time. To be precise, I am not so bold as to evaluate a legend; history has done that quite well. Nor is it my purpose to judge the adequacy of the US Navy's evaluation system. Rather, the FITREP is the tool we have to document leadership potential and performance that is most familiar to us in the Navy, and thus it provides a common reference for us to discuss aspects of Nelson's leadership accomplishments. While the other uniformed services have their own methods of evaluation, the analogies to their specific performance reports should be readily apparent.

There are seven "performance traits" evaluated for senior (E7–06) Naval personnel: Professional expertise, command climate/equal opportunity, military bearing/character, teamwork, mission accomplishment and initiative, leadership, and finally tactical performance. These traits are scored from one (below standards) to five (greatly exceeds standards). By creatively applying what biographers of Lord Horatio Nelson have deduced from his letters (over 5,000), and other official documents of that era, one can interpolate how this enterprising officer would have fared on his annual evaluation. However, sailors in the ranks of E7–O6 currently receive a FITREP upon the change of a duty station; change of reporting senior, or annually. Additional special FITREPs are authorized as needed. To do likewise for Lord Nelson's entire career would require the creation and discussion of an estimated 44 different FITREPs, including a period of six years while he was ashore earning half pay. For the sake of brevity, we will condense the evaluation of Nelson's performance to one report, highlighting just a few of the highs and lows of his career to expand our understanding of his leadership style.

The first trait that we will look at is professional expertise: Professional knowledge, proficiency, and qualifications. To be marked a five in this trait, a sailor should demonstrate that they are a recognized expert, sought after to solve difficult problems, exceptionally skilled, developing and executing innovative ideas, and achieving early and highly advanced qualifications. In this trait, Nelson clearly excelled throughout his career. As a young acting lieutenant, he earned the comment from his captain that "he felt as easy when [Nelson] was on deck [in charge of the watch] as any officer in the ship."[6] Apparently, Nelson knew his business. A remarkable seaman, adroit in navigation and ship handling, with superior situational awareness, he was exceptionally skilled. When it came to ships and fighting at sea, few could equal Nelson. However, biographers have noted that Nelson did have troubles translating his strategic gifts to land battles and politics, but for our purposes, in the trait of professional expertise, we must award Nelson a five.

The next measure that we will consider is the ability to create a positive command or organizational climate and provide equal opportunity: Contributing to growth and development, human worth, and community. In this characteristic, we must reflect on the prevailing values of the era in which Nelson lived. Additionally, this trait has several sub contexts better understood individually.

- *Measurably contributes to the Navy's increased retention and reduced attrition objectives*. In this area, Nelson truly was a leader. Sailors who served with Nelson loved him and fought to stay under his command. In an era where impressments were used to obtain crews, sailors would compete to be on Nelson's ship.
- *Proactive leader/exemplary mentor: Involved in subordinates' personal development leading to professional growth and sustained commitment*. Here also did Nelson shine. From the newest midshipmen to the youngest captain, Nelson took pains to ensure that they were exposed to opportunities that encouraged increased knowledge, skills, and confidence. He also understood that it was important for his protégés to learn how to "network" and make the acquaintance of people with power within their society. Ironically, although he received a great deal of support from those above him, Nelson apparently never truly felt that he had been properly mentored in his own career. Letters and documents attesting to this support abound, some from Nelson himself—but he once said, "Not being a man of fortune is a crime which I cannot get over, and therefore none of the Great care about me."[7] A strange thing for Nelson to say since many of the "great" did care about him. In fact, one of his biggest fans was Prince William IV, who would later become the king.
- *Initiates support programs for military, civilian, and families to achieve exceptional command and organizational climate*. Disregarding the modern need to provide both a civilian and family friendly environment, we could argue that Nel-

son did provide an exceptionally successful command climate for those under his command. His men felt valued, understood their responsibilities toward the team's mission accomplishment, and were usually successful—a winning combination.[8]

- *The model of achievement: Develops unit cohesion by valuing differences as strengths*. Nelson, himself of humble beginnings, never judged anyone by their lack of pedigree. Rather, he only valued their capacity to contribute to the common effort. The highest commands of the Royal Navy were open to anyone with talent and determination as opposed to the navy of pre-revolutionary France, thus increasing the likelihood of finding talented officers to lead. Additionally, the British Royal Navy's advantage increased with each use of the guillotine, as the French revolutionaries executed its aristocracy and simultaneously, France's most experienced commanders.

To summarize, Lord Nelson created a very positive command climate that encouraged everyone to achieve, and provided everyone with equal opportunity. This earns him a grade of five.

If Lord Nelson had a weakness, it may be found in the trait of military bearing and character: Appearance, conduct, physical fitness, and adherence to Navy core values. While Lord Nelson apparently was fastidious about his appearance and enjoyed satisfactory physical fitness (injuries and illnesses aside), he was after all human, and thus subject to affairs of the heart. Early in his naval career, Lady Spencer, wife of the First Lord of the Admiralty, opined that Nelson was "a most uncouth creature, his general appearance that of an idiot."[9] Many also said in subtle ways that Nelson had a reputation within the naval service as a difficult subordinate. While genius is often chastised by mediocrity, Nelson did display a streak of stubbornness and rigid application of rules—as long as he agreed with them. For example, his ongoing argument with Sir Richard concerning application of the Navigation Acts and the proper saluting of ships entering port actually worked against Lord Nelson with his superiors after he took it upon himself to jump the chain of command with his complaints. On the other hand, Lord Nelson could literally turn a blind eye to orders when it suited him, as it did when he remarked to his flag captain, Thomas Foley during the Battle of Copenhagen "You know, Foley, I have only one eye—I have a right to be blind sometimes. I really do not see the signal."[10] He could also be very self-deprecating and melancholy. After the amputation of his right arm, he wrote, "a left-handed Admiral will never again be considered as useful; therefore the sooner I get to a very humble cottage the better, and make room for a better man to serve the state."[11] Nelson's challenges in his personal life also affected him professionally. As a younger man, he was quick to give his heart away. However, in his later life, the scandal his adulterous affair with Lady Hamilton ignited nearly derailed his career for good. Further study along this vein is unnecessary for our purposes other than to comment that vanity and ego can become serious character flaws when left unchecked. Strictly applying the standards of the FITREP to Nelson's professional life, we could give him a five, but due to his personal challenges that did affect his performance and his documented failure to meet standards of honor to his wife and others, he should receive a grade of one. Vice Adm John Bulkeley (a WWII Medal of Honor recipient) offered the observation that "The Naval Officer is truly unique for he must have the capacity to simultaneously love his country. . . his service . . . his family . . . his shipmates . . . and the sea. He needs each of them unquestionably as each of them needs him . . . and the demands which are placed on him never diminish, they only grow."[12] While there was no doubt that Nelson truly loved his country, his service, his shipmates, and the sea, he never assumed the responsibilities for his actions concerning his wife, or the family he made with Emma Hamilton. For this failure, we must give Lord Nelson a score of one for military bearing and character.

In evaluating the trait of teamwork: Contributing towards team building and team results, we will consider several representative comments from and about Lord Nelson. He once commented that "my seamen are now what British seamen ought to be . . . almost invincible; they really mind shot no more than peas."[13] That comment exemplifies Lord Nelson's feelings about the team that he had put together. His ability to inspire loyalty was legendary. When injured during the Battle of the Nile, the ship's surgeon moved to attend to Nelson ahead of the other casualties. Nelson stopped him and ordered, "No, I will take my turn with my brave fellows."[14] Nelson chose reward for hard work well done over discipline for idleness and mischief. Lord Nelson was quick to praise the efforts of others and ensure they received their just mention in battle reports (even if Nelson was his own best promoter). For the members of his team, his "Band of Brothers," Lord Nelson would ensure that everyone was fully aware of the tactics to pursue before a battle. For example, prior to the Battle of Trafalgar, he communicated to his captains "in case signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy," thus ensuring that everyone knew the game plan and their responsibilities for success. There are many other examples, but perhaps none as poignant as a statement he made before the Battle of Copenhagen, "it is warm work; and this day may be the last to any of us at a moment. But mark you! I would not be elsewhere for thousands."[15] Again, Nelson exemplifies his team-building leadership style, that "Nelson Touch." Lord Nelson was in the thick of the action, leading the team that he put together and trained, and facing the same dangers his men encountered. What more could be asked of a leader? So, in team building, let us give Lord Nelson a five.

The next trait is perhaps Nelson's most defining characteristic, mission accomplishment and initiative: Taking initiative, planning and prioritizing, achieving mission success. In the Battle of Cape St. Vincent in particular, Nelson overcame the tactical inertia of his superior, and executed his plan without authority, securing victory for the British, again displaying his life-long reputation for taking the initiative. In regards to this action, Adm Sir John Jervis was forced to admit: "Commodore Nelson . . . contributed very much to the fortune of the day."[16] It is important to note that Nelson was disregarding over 100 years of official British navy doctrine in "breaking the line," but he did what every other captain within visual range knew had to be done. Not only was this a display of Nelson's limitless initiative and physical courage, but also of moral courage—Nelson could have been hanged for his actions if his chain of command had wished it. However, victory has a way of erasing many sins, so for mission accomplishment, Lord Nelson deserves much more than the highest score possible, a five.

One of the most critical traits of an officer to evaluate is that of leadership: Organizing, motivating, and developing others to accomplish goals. As regards leadership, Nelson was more progressive than his peers were; his style of leadership was almost idealistic. To paraphrase a description from Lady Hughes, who witnessed his leadership style on dealing with his midshipmen: "the timid he never rebuked, but always wished to show them he desired nothing of them that he would not do instantly himself."[17] He would race the midshipmen to the masthead and discuss in a cheerful manner leadership and courage, providing an outstanding role model for the young men to emulate. Nelson would check on their academic progress and ensure that they were given the opportunity to socialize with those in positions to sponsor the young men into society. Nelson referred to the captains that served with him at the Battle of the Nile as his "Band of Brothers," quoting a line from Shakespeare's *King Henry V*. One of the most noted paintings of Nelson is of him conferring with his captains prior to the Battle of Trafalgar, ensuring that they were of one mind. How different in contrast was the perspective of Vice Adm Pierre-Charles-Jean-Baptiste-Silvestre de Villeneuve who wrote "that about all one can expect from a career in the French Navy today is shame and confusion."[18] Before the Battle of Trafalgar, Villeneuve, the commander in chief of the allied fleet, also gathered his commanders to council and provided a very accurate prediction of Nelson's strategy. Villeneuve's message of commander's intent "the captain who is not in action is not at his post" sounded as if he was ready for action, and his men fought bravely, but without strong leadership, the battle was over before it started. [19] Nelson thought offensively and how to achieve victory, whereas Villeneuve considered defense and how to avoid defeat.

Whenever possible, Nelson would have his captains come aboard to spend time with him and discuss strategy, tactics, and ship handling to name but a few topics. This allowed Nelson's commanders to know the mind of their leader and likewise for Nelson to understand the nature of those he commanded. In essence, Nelson had created a combat information center centuries before its use in the US Navy. Nelson communicated his intent, expectations for each ship and commander, and empowered his captains to execute their duties in the fog of war to support the overall plan. The results were that officers fought for a chance to serve with Lord Nelson. In my opinion, his sincere interest in the professional development and personal welfare of all that served under him and the fact that he was always "on watch" alongside his men are the defining elements of the "Nelson Touch" of leadership. As a leader that has provided a role model for sea captains ever since, we must award a five in leadership to Lord Nelson.

The last trait on a FITREP is tactical performance: Basic and tactical employment of weapons systems. Nelson always dedicated time and resources to ensure that his ships were ready, his men well trained, and his plan understood by everyone involved. In fact, his knowledge of his men's proficiency in gunnery drove his tactic of seeking close action. At close range, accurate and rapid cannon fire could turn the balance of victory in favor of the usually outnumbered British ships. Nelson knew this, planned for it, and used it to his advantage repeatedly. While at sea, Nelson was nearly unbeatable, but on land (the expedition to Lake Nicaragua, and the expedition to the Mosquito Coast [east coast of Nicaragua and Honduras] are examples) he seemed to overestimate his own capabilities and underestimate the advantages of the enemy. Nonetheless, Nelson observed on several occasions the effect sea power could have on the land war. Here is a great example of innovative tactics involving Nelson using his weapon platform. After Nelson spent two months assisting the Austrian army, he observed a strategic situation on land that was subject to forces directly from the sea. Logistic routes along the Riviera coast were very close to the sea due to the proximity of the Alps. This coastal road was therefore a significant strategic factor, control of which was important to both sides of the war. An amphibious attack to sever this supply route behind the enemy's front lines could produce dramatic results. Nelson may have been the first tactician to understand the potential impact of sea power on land engagements. It is fair then to mark tactical performance a five as well for Lord Nelson.

Conclusion

Although the Battle of Trafalgar and Lord Nelson's life ended over 200 years ago, a careful examination of his career, accomplishments, and leadership style can still inspire modern leaders. Admiral Horatio Nelson was a clever strategist, a brave fighter, and an enlightened leader. At a time when "thinking outside of the box" was usually punished, Lord Nelson opted to serve his country rather than be a slave to prevailing doctrine. Most of all, Lord Nelson was "on watch" throughout his career. These traits served him well as a leader. Nelson's life story unfolded out on the quarterdeck and in the cabin of his many ships. From the time he joined the *Raisonnable* as a midshipman at the age of 12, he spent over 28 of the next 35 years at sea. Aboard the *Agamemnon* in 1793, Nelson stated "Firstly you must always implicitly obey orders, without attempting to form any opinion of your own regarding their propriety. Secondly, you must consider every man your enemy who speaks ill of your king; and thirdly you must hate a Frenchman as you hate the devil."[20] In a sense, the navy was the perfect career for Nelson, who was comfortable with its customs and sense of duty. While he was innovative and bold, and yes, sometimes difficult—he nonetheless believed in the British navy and all of its rules, regulations, and order—but courageously defied orders when necessary to accomplish the mission. Early in his career, he engendered a spirit of courage, justice, and fairness with his subordinates, peers, and superiors, thus earning their respect and confidence. Thus, he understood the importance of mentoring those that served with him. During the Battle of Trafalgar, Nelson's daring strategy put him in harm's way, ultimately costing him his life. He died from wounds inflicted by a sharpshooter's bullet, but only after he was assured of the destruction of the enemy fleet. Utilizing innovative tactics, Lord Nelson and his men overcame superior numbers with skill, professionalism, and courage. The Battle of Trafalgar destroyed Napoleon's dream of invading England and gave the British uncontested control of the world's oceans, enabling British economic and political success for a full century afterwards. Mission accomplished.

In conclusion, we must ask ourselves, "Are we retaining, training, and mentoring the best men and women of our armed services to forge great leaders for the future?" Former chief of naval personnel vice adm Gerry Hoewing commented that US Navy personnel requirements would be changing dramatically to include both the number and the types of manning required for fighting this nation's wars. To better combat emerging threats, the Navy will leverage technology and the "unique talents of individual Sailors" to make the US Navy more efficient, effective, and flexible. While talking to Navy leaders Admiral Hoewing also stated, "The United States Navy is going to have far fewer people in the next five to 10 years than it does now . . . There are a lot of people in America who want to be United States Navy Sailors, and we've gone from allowing in 57,000 Sailors per year to 39,000. It is becoming more and more competitive to get into the Navy, and it is harder to stay in. We want to make sure that we retain the very best Sailors, and you are the ones who determine who will lead the future of the Navy."[21] With the "force shaping" of personnel in the Navy, we must ask what types of officer are we keeping in the service. Are we keeping officers that are tactically proficient in their specialty, that also have the physical and moral courage to take calculated risk for the benefit of the organization and mission accomplishment, or are we keeping officers who have learned to play it safe? "Everything starts and ends with leadership," Admiral Mullens observed in his 2006 Chief of Naval Operations Guidance for 2006. "Nothing else we accomplish, no other priority we pursue, is of much consequence if we do not have sound and effective leadership in place to enact it."[22] Are we keeping officers that sincerely care about their Soldiers, Sailors, Marines and Airmen? Regardless, we are molding the military of the future today; with every selection and promotion board, we send a signal to the field defining our expectations. Is there a place for leaders with passion, the courage to do what needs to be done, to learn from their mistakes and carry on? Can we foster an environment where creative and critical thought are expected and develop an evaluation system that promotes innovative officers while we shape the force? Do we develop leaders that know how to follow orders, but are willing to disobey orders when it is the right thing to do in support of national security? Specifically, ask yourself are you ready to take on the responsibility of leadership in this demanding security environment? Clearly, it will take officers who exhibit elements of the Nelson Touch leadership style to achieve victory in the military challenges of tomorrow.

Notes

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Leadership under Severe Stress: A Grounded Theory Study

Gerry Larsson, Ann Johansson, Tina Jansson, Gunilla Grönlund

Abstract

The aim of this study was to develop a theoretical understanding of leadership under severe stress, using a grounded theory approach. Interviews (n=16) were conducted with military officers from Norway and Sweden, soldiers from Sweden, and psychologists from Norway. Data were analyzed according to the constant comparative method. A model was formulated specifying several aspects of task-directed and relationship-directed leadership under severe stress. This leadership can be understood against the background of three interrelated factors: characteristics of the leader, organizational characteristics, and everyday leadership. The significance of trust-building leadership on an everyday basis for the outcome of leadership during severe stress was particularly emphasized.

Introduction

Leadership under stress appears to be a constantly central issue in applied psychology. In his latest review (1990), B. M. Bass lists approximately 200 articles, books, and chapters in books in the chapter titled "Stress and Leadership."[1] However, leadership under *severe stress* appears to have attracted less attention. In a recent (January 2000) survey of the literature (*PsyLit*, from 1887), leadership plus severe stress yielded two references, both dealing with war neurosis. Combining leadership and performance with severe stress, or acute stress, or extreme stress all resulted in null references.

Narrowing the focus to leadership under severe stress from a performance perspective has a strong impact on the amount of existing research. There also appear to be inconsistencies in the available writings. The importance of the leader's personality characteristics illustrates this. The critical reviews of Stogdill (1948) and Mann (1959) led to a longer period where leader actions, rather than personality traits, came to the fore.[2] However, in recent years, personality appears to have recaptured its legitimacy as an approach to leadership research.[3]

Following from this lack of consistent findings, we concluded that more generative approaches are needed to enhance the understanding of the issue. The aim of the current study was to develop a theoretical understanding of leadership under severe stress from a performance-oriented perspective, using a grounded theory approach.

We will conclude this introduction with a couple of clarifications. When we refer to severe stress, we end up close to what Elliot and Eisdorfer call "acute, time-limited stressors."[4] Accordingly, it is primarily a question of extremely strenuous situations that are defined in time and space; for example, to come under shellfire.

The second specification refers to our limiting our interest towards leadership in organizations that are more or less permanent, that have a formal structure, and are designed to master extreme situations. Leadership within the armed forces falls within this framework whereas, for instance, leadership within a family in crisis does not.

Method

The method used to facilitate this study is the one known as *grounded theory*. Persons not familiar with this theory may refer to Glaser and Strauss.[5]

Participants

Participants in the study comprised 16 people. The group of informants included five Swedish officers and three Swedish soldiers who had served for a six-month period in one of the Swedish armored United Nations (UN) battalions in Bosnia from 1993 to 1996. The selection of these persons was based on personal knowledge among research colleagues at the Department of Leadership, the National Defence College, Sweden. We wanted to get in touch with people who had experienced stressful leadership situations, and who could be assumed to be willing and capable of relating their experiences. Following the methodological recommendations of the grounded theory tradition, we wanted to select participants with varying experiences. The group selected therefore represents the entire spectrum, ranging from a battalion commander (full colonel) to the ordinary private soldier. All were men, and their ages varied from about 25 to 55 years old. All suggested individuals accepted participation in the study.

This article was written especially for AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership*.

The second half of the study group came from Norway. Four officers and a psychologist from the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy took part. All of these were men aged 38 to 44 years old. Three psychologists from the Norwegian Underwater Technology Centre A/S (NUTEC) also participated—two women and a man between the ages of 41 to 47 years old. Characteristic for all the Norwegian participants was that they had had many years of experience in leading exercises where those participating had been subjected to moments of high stress. At the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, officers undergo extremely stressful exercises. Among other things, NUTEC conducts exercises among crews on ships and on offshore oil rigs in simulated disaster situations. The selection of participants from the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy was steered by a wish from our perspective to have people with extensive and varied experience as exercise instructors. At NUTEC, no selection was carried out; three psychologists worked there and, at the same time, took part in the study.

Data Collection

The collection of data consisted of interviews with each of the study participants. In an attempt to stimulate participants to come up with additional points of view, follow-up group interviews were also conducted at NUTEC and at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. The same procedure was impractical in Sweden because these informants lived in various parts of the country. All interviews were conducted by the authors in 1998, and they were based on the themes presented below.

Swedish Substudy. The Swedish officers and soldiers based their facts on their own personal experiences. The following questions were asked:

- Tell us about your own experiences in stressful situations where you played a leading role (for soldiers, stressful situations only).
- What was it about you in situation X that made you ("my superior" for soldiers) handle it well/poorly?
- What in the social context (organization) made things go well/poorly?

Norwegian Substudy. The Norwegian officers and psychologists based their opinions on their participation in simulated stressful situations where they had played the role of an exercise instructor. The following questions were asked:

- Give some examples of severely stressful leadership situations (during exercises).
- What are the characteristics of individuals (commanders) who handle these situations well/poorly?
- What are the characteristics of organizations that handle these situations well/poorly?

Common Follow-up Questions. Added to these initial questions was a series of individually adapted sequential questions of the type "tell me more," "give some examples," "why?" and so on. Each interview took about an hour to conduct and record on tape.

As noted above, we did not start from any specific stress situation in the interviews, but with the participants in the study themselves giving examples of severely stressful incidents. Among the situations focused upon can be mentioned armed combat, risks to a colleague's life or health, the risk of comprehensive material damage and loss, and simulated oil rig disasters.

Analysis

The interviews were transcribed verbatim and consecutively analyzed according to the constant comparative method.[6] Following these guidelines, the first step of the analysis was open coding. Data were examined line by line in order to identify the participants' descriptions of thought patterns, feelings, and actions related to the themes mentioned in the interviews. The codes derived were formulated in words closely resembling those used by the participants. This was an attempt to maintain the semantics of the data. Codes were compared to verify their descriptive content and to confirm that they were grounded in the data. As a second step, the codes (about 950 in total) were sorted into categories. This was done by constant comparisons between categories; and between categories, codes, and interview protocols. For instance, *self-knowledge* and several other codes formed the category "Characteristics of the leader." The third step consisted of fitting together the categories using the constant comparative method. This resulted in a model of leadership under severe stress and the underlying circumstances.

Data collected at later stages in the study were used to add, elaborate, and saturate codes and categories. In practice, the steps of analysis were not strictly sequential. Rather, we moved forward and backward constantly reexamining data, codes, categories, and the whole model. In the following section, the whole model will be described first, followed by a presentation of its parts. The reason for this order is that the parts receive their meaning when understood in relation to the whole model.

Results

A Model of Leadership under Severe Stress

Leadership during severe stress can be understood against the background of a number of interacting factors. Interplay between the characteristics of the leader and the organization shape everyday leadership. These circumstances in combination affect the adaptation that is to take place to meet the demands of a severely stressful situation and the leadership in such a situation (fig. 1).

Characteristics of the Leader

Two main classes of leader qualities could be noticed in the interview responses. They were *more general, person-related characteristics and more profession-related characteristics*, respectively.



Figure 1. Model of Leadership under Severe Stress and the Underlying Circumstances

General, Person-related Characteristics. Somewhat simplified, the responses indicated that it is easier to command under severe stress if the leader has *good physical* and *psychological capabilities*. It was pointed out that it is important to make commanders aware that a lack of sleep, food, or drink can lower the leadership capabilities of a normally resourceful person. Psychological capability refers to having a good spatial ability, good simultaneous capability, and the ability to learn new things quickly.

Several of the responses within the category "general, person-related characteristics" dealt with a commander's *self-confidence, personality, and self-knowledge* qualities. The interview responses were mainly about self-knowledge. According to several informants, it doesn't make all that much difference whether one is extrovert or introvert, as long as one knows one's strong and weak points. Egocentricity, however, was expressed as a negative tendency; egocentric people were claimed to mainly use their role as a leader for personal gain. Psychological imbalance—one or several unsolved problems that form a "heavy backpack"—as well as alcohol problems were also mentioned as negative factors for good leadership during severe stress. The value of having experienced and then subsequently managed stressful incidents recurred in the responses. One of the respondents expresses it as follows: "One should have been down in the cellar, to also feel one's weaker sides and thereafter worked oneself upwards."

To the more general, person-related tendencies should be added *social skills*. Here we have coded points of view of the type that comprise a basic interest in people: to note the individual members of a group; to take the time and trouble to talk to people; to be able to communicate effectively with different people; and the ability to listen to others.

Responses also dealt with empathy and the importance of being able to show one's own emotional reactions. This is how one officer put it: "The commander should be able to show a certain amount of empathy. I don't think you are able to communicate empathy if you can't express fear at all (the response describes a threatening situation—our comment). You must recognize some of the consequences yourself." Leaders who show their own fear should also be able to show that they can overcome it (see also the code *managing one's own personal feelings* in the section on leadership under severe stress, below).

Some of the persons interviewed also took up *ethical and moral issues and values*. It appears that leaders who have a moral backbone and live as they learn, tend to have greater respect from group members during severe stress than do their opposite numbers. Some of the respondents expressed this fact as a form of moral courage. It may be a matter of daring to say no when no should be said from an ethics-moral standpoint. It could also be a matter of daring to take a decision that might be regarded as negative by the group.

Profession-related Characteristics. The code *personal, task-related competence* includes responses that deal with a leader's ability to have the necessary knowledge and skills in relation to the task in hand. Some of the responses are more general for the role of an officer, others are specifically aimed towards a certain type of leadership role. The concept of experience recurred in responses with different contents. One was that a leader with earlier experience from similar missions is often more capable during a time of severe stress of grasping the situation quickly, virtually intuitively.

Another aspect of experience dealt with *social, task-related competence*. Responses that were sorted out beneath this code dealt with the ability to "read" correctly one's own group members in relation to a given task. Someone compared this with the role of a team leader or coach in sports circles. It's about the ability to compile the right team and optimize its performance. It might also be a question of "peaking" the team in a critical situation.

The third type of response was also directed socially but dealt with consideration; we named this code *consideration-related competence*. Leadership during severe stress seems affected by the leader's ability to show consideration during critical situations, and the ability to preclude and handle strong emotional reactions among group members.

The fourth type of response has been designated *identification and commitment*. The responses here dealt with the commander's ability to identify himself in the role of a professional, to feel involved or committed towards the goals determined, or which he or she has helped to define. Responses touched upon those we previously presented as ethical and moral values, under general, person-related characteristics. However, in the profession-related context, involvement or commitment is more directly connected towards a given task. Here, it's also about a leader's capability to distribute inspiration and create motivation among those being led, in order to tackle the task at hand.

Characteristics of the Organization

Two main groups of organizational characteristics could be seen in the interview responses: the structure and values of the organization and its members respectively.

Structure and Values. Belonging to this category are the *physical-technical conditions of an organization*. An organization can be described as more or less resourceful with regard to access to the necessary surrounding infrastructure, as well as its own physical-technical structure. It may, for example, be a question of the quantity and quality of technical equipment. Leadership during severe stress is facilitated by a favorable situation in this case and vice versa.

Most of the responses within the category "structure and values" dealt with formal and informal rules and routines; something, which could be called *administrative conditions within an organization*. A combination of two aspects could be traced. One of these is that leadership under severe stress is made easier if there is a clear division of the roles and responsibilities between different actors. This may, for example, be in the form of a clear and unambiguous command and control hierarchy. The second aspect is that leadership under severe stress is facilitated if communication has grown on an everyday basis, where different actors freely cooperate, without considering the formal hierarchy. One could compare this by laying out a free network structure over the formal hierarchy. The more an informal network structure dominates a course of events in everyday life, the more effective the formalized command structure will become when the network structure steps back during severe stress and vice versa.

We illustrate: "The horizontal, that is, the informal communication that goes across organizational levels, creates trust and cohesion, also across departments as well as a higher level of understanding, a much more sound understanding. It will also enable decisions to be made at a lower level."

Said another officer: "One cannot have an organization where there is no trust or confidence among co-workers when the going gets tough. Then they won't be able to solve the problems; the channels that are needed, the teamwork that is necessary between individuals and departments in the organization do not exist at the starting point. This brings development to a halt."

A third group of responses was named *basic values within an organization*. This code is similar to the one designated for ethical and moral values within the leadership dimension. Now, however, it is a question of which values and goals an organization emphasizes, how distinctly this is done, and how consistently it is emphasized by the leaders of the organization. Our model assumes that leadership under severe stress is easier if the basic values of an organization are explicit and familiar, and if they coincide in agreement with the majority of personal norms and value systems.

Members of an Organization. The category organization members are composed of three codes. The two first mainly have the same content as the two categories under the dimension characteristics of the leader. They are therefore named *general, person-related characteristics and profession-related characteristics* respectively. In general, leadership under severe stress should be facilitated if the members of the organization are resourceful with reference to the two of these.

The third code we name as *group cohesion*. A large proportion of responses built up this code, and expressions such as *mutual trust and respect, comradeship, and a supportive* climate were common. The connection to leadership under severe stress was evident in the responses that it is easier in groups with a strong sense of teamwork and cohesion, and vice versa.

Everyday Leadership

A leader must be a leader full-time, all of the time. It is this sort of leadership that followers learn to trust and do not question during periods of severe stress.

Trust-building Leadership. One dominant theme in the responses surrounding leadership under severe stress was the importance of mutual trust between the leader and the followers. Responses to follow-up questions indicated in an equally lucid manner that trust is something one builds up on a day-to-day leadership basis.

One essential prerequisite for being trusted is *perceptibility*. We quote a psychologist: "Perceptibility—that you as a person sitting on the top are not sitting in the office with the door closed but actually are at hand in time of peace. I think that also contributes to building up trust and respect for you as a leader, because trust and loyalty is not something you can demand, you have to earn it." A soldier expressed it by saying that a senior officer approaches and starts talking, that they share the soldiers' situation in the matter of living quarters and risk factors, that they talk with each other, socialize, show an interest, and listen.

A related group of responses dealt with the *respectful treatment of individuals* by leaders. Here are included types of responses that the soldiers should be treated as people: leaders should be fair and consistent, show care and consideration for individuals and groups and not merely think of themselves; leaders should also recognize the potential and knowledge of soldiers; they should be flexible enough to adapt to the group, be humble, have a good sense of humor, and a glint in the eye.

A third code was named *freedom to speak one's mind*. One of the psychologists said, "It is in the everyday work you lay the foundation of the organization, an organization where there is a good work environment—open communication." An officer stressed that those commanders who are used to a strict stereotypical form of control at home often lack the ability to improvise and to be humble when it becomes necessary during international missions. A psychologist pointed out that a paradox could occur between evaluation and development. If a demand for evaluation is submitted too strongly, then one may not dare to try something new. Instead, one does what one thinks one's superior wants him to do.

A related matter is how a leader reacts when someone does something wrong. If, as a leader, you've made a mistake yourself, then the trust and confidence within a group rises if you admit it. It could also be about the leader self-intuitively letting someone else take over responsibility temporarily. If anyone in a group has made a mistake, this should be pointed out in a constructive and encouraging manner.

A fourth group of responses dealt with values, morals, and *sincerity*. A leader should illustrate his or her values—what he or she stands for—to win people's trust and confidence. It's important too that a commander doesn't bluff. Several responses also dealt with courage; to dare to be straight-backed, and to be a role model.

A fifth group of responses on how to achieve trust dealt with *competence* within one's own area. The importance of competence was highlighted more in questions about leadership during severe stress (see below).

Exercises. Positive responses included the importance of conducting exercises. One knows what one must do, and it is this one resorts to when one becomes scared. It is about reacting without thinking too much and attaining an *experience platform* to make one feel safer and more secure.

On the negative side of stress exercises was mentioned that these can give a *false sense of security*. There is a risk that one misses the general picture of a new, stressful situation, because one hasn't practiced unexpected situations. According to the psychologists, however, this risk can be prevented or reduced by the exercise commander's inserting surprise incidents.

Leadership under Severe Stress—Categories and Codes

Mutual trust between leaders and group members is a recurrent theme in the interview responses to questions about what characterizes successful leadership during severe stress. Contents-wise, the same types of arguments recurred as those shown above under everyday leadership.

In addition, the response picture was dominated by expressions that, in different ways, had to do with the competence of leaders. Some of these mainly dealt with competence in relation to tasks. The second group of responses dealt with competence in relation to the group one is leading.

Task-directed Leadership. One code in this category was labeled *stop and survey the situation*. It is a question of stopping for a moment (sometimes just a few seconds) before making an important decision. Examples of the opposite of surveying the situation is to focus on details or not to see the seriousness of the consequences of one's own actions. Underestimating the seriousness of a situation is another variant of this theme. It was also pointed out that leaders in high-stress situations must have an accurate overall picture so as to decide where "the point of no return" lies and what decisions are to be taken at this point.

Another type of response is about *thinking ahead*. This is for leaders to quickly review the situation and then think ahead, proactively. The lack of this action can cause a leader to concentrate more on what has already happened than on the future. Returning to a task that requires a previously acquired professional knowledge is also reported as an example of the absence of proactive thinking.

Still another example of the absence of proactive thinking is when a commander shows obvious signs of insecurity regarding what should be done next. This in turn creates a tendency towards a feeling of insecurity within a group. The inability to constructively think ahead can also lead to excessive consideration of the group and insufficient attention to the tasks in hand. One psychologist expressed this by bluntly using the English colloquialism "kindness can kill." The fear of one's superiors or the media's reactions can also lead to a commander's devoting more effort to "saving his own ass" than thinking and acting proactively.

A third code was named *risks with excessive courage*. The officers quoted examples of selfish and rash commanders during moments of stress. These people do not see their own limitations and can involve an entire group in a problem. A psychologist commented that leaders with an infallible belief in themselves often react in a one-track manner under high stress. Another psychologist pointed out that leaders of this type are dangerous. They give a bad impression to others and don't trust their team. Instead, they argue, "I'm the only one with a brain." Even if these leaders are highly qualified and competent within their current fields, they absorb far too heavy a workload personally and risk a speedy "sinking."

A fourth code name is *managing one's own personal feelings*. The officers pointed out that leaders should show they are "adequately vulnerable." If the leader puts on a front that appears totally unaffected, people will easily lose confidence in him or her. And, if the leaders can't handle their feelings at all, the same thing will happen. Several responses also emphasized that uncontrolled emotional reactions among leaders make them lose their authority easily. In this context the importance was mentioned, among other things, of having the right, mild tone of voice when talking to lower the stress factor rather than to increase it.

A fifth task-related code was named *clarity towards senior officers*. Soldiers and officers pointed out that some leaders were unable to question orders they considered inappropriate, and, alternatively, didn't dare to ask for clarity if they regarded a superior officer's orders as indistinct or unclear. This could lead to their doing their own thing, without the authority to do so, exposing the group to unnecessary risks and losing their trust and confidence.

Relationship-directed Leadership. The responses that refer to the code *distinctive role of a leader* are about being able and willing to accept a commander's responsibilities. It is also about daring to issue orders and to be authoritative. It is about being able to switch from a democratic commander's role into a more authoritative role and doing it so that the members of a group understand the necessity of it. The psychologists pointed out that inexperienced leaders often have problems in asserting their authority in acute, high-stress situations.

The second group of responses dealt with the *motivation of group members prior to tasking*. The officers stressed the importance of information prior to a task; that the commanders help soldiers to mentally prepare themselves for coming stressful situations. The importance of doing this in such a manner as to create a positive frame of mind was also emphasized: "We'll make it!"

A third type of response dealt with *individual consideration through activation*. One psychologist stated the following: "Consideration does not necessarily require that you pat someone on the shoulder or comfort him. It might just as well be to take hold of someone and give him or her a task." Attention was drawn to the fact that it is the leader's task to quickly assign meaningful secondary tasks, since activities of this kind tend to cushion anxiety.

The fourth and last code contains responses centering on *crisis management following an acute situation*. These responses are aimed in two directions. One group of responses aimed towards their own group. Participants pointed out that it is important that a leader manage handling his or her group in the aftermath of an acutely stressful situation. This may entail grief, anger, doubt, and guilt. The second group of responses dealt with the symbolic function of a leader in times of grief. We quote a psychologist: "It is the leader who has an extremely important symbolic function for his department or group. This is to express sorrow, compassion. It's to put a face to a name. Being an external spokesperson for the department or group, not least towards the press and media."

Discussion

This study shows that leadership during moments of severe stress can be understood against the background of leader characteristics, organizational characteristics, and leadership in everyday circumstances. Since the purpose was to obtain in-depth knowledge and understanding of leadership in circumstances of severe stress, the information obtained has not been gathered with the intention to permit a complete analysis of these underlying circumstances per se. The significance of trust-building leadership on an everyday basis for the outcome of command during incidents of severe stress, however, was not predicted. Neither have we found that this dimension is equally as emphasized by other researchers.

The main value of this study should lie in the data-based map of leadership during incidents of high stress or severe crisis, with the codes and categories that make up this dimension, as well as the codes and categories in the dimension "underlying circumstances." Benefits could also lie in the opportunity to connect the study to existing theoretical formulations, which our model construction gives.

The content in what we called trust-building leadership as a part of everyday command shows significant similarities with the three main ingredients (inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration) in what Bass calls "transformational leadership."[7] The division in task-directed and relationship-directed leadership respectively can be found in classical models of leadership such as the Ohio school and Hersey and Blanchard's model of situational leadership.[8] A third illustration of possible theoretical associations is R. S. Lazarus's stress theory.[9] Lazarus's model emphasizes appraisal processes; the truth lies in the eyes of the beholder. Leaders can play a crucial role in stressful situations by affecting how their followers appraise ambiguous conditions.[10]

In our proposed model, leadership on an everyday basis is regarded as a product of interaction between leader and organizational characteristics. It should be mentioned that there will probably be an effect also in the reverse direction; in other words, ordinary, day-to-day leadership will have repercussions on leaders as individuals and on organizations.

One of the essential findings of this study is that additional research needs to be done to differentiate the concept *severe stress*. This additional research will enable us to provide more precise descriptions of leadership under severe stress for different types of particular acute stress situations.

In constructing our current model we were limited to data obtained from a selected group of military officers, soldiers, and psychologists. It should also be emphasized that the concepts derived from the data may be of a sensitizing rather than of a definitive character in Blumer's words.[11] Bringing a variety of leadership actions together under the heading "trust-building leadership" could, for example, be questioned although this actual word occurred frequently in the interviews. It should also be noted that the study relies on self-reported data only. These may be inaccurate, and a broader range of data would have been desirable.

Another limitation may be that two to five years had passed between the incidents and the interview for the Swedish participants. Although it appears that humans remember central issues of stressful episodes quite well (Christiansson, 1992), it cannot be excluded that various kinds of psychological processing may have affected the memory.[12] Little is also currently known about the generalizability of the model. However, this was not the goal of this qualitative study. In the general terms of Glaser and Strauss, "Partial testing of theory, when necessary, is left to more rigorous approaches (sometimes qualitative but usually quantitative). These come later in the scientific enterprise."[13] Thus, further studies of leadership under severe stress are needed in a variety of contexts to further, develop, formalize, and evaluate the effectiveness of the present model.

Notes

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Leadership: Creativity and Innovation

Dr. William R. Klemm

Leaders know in their gut that creativity and innovation are the lifeblood of their organization. New ideas can lead to programs that are superior to those that are already going on or planned in the organization and which would have been divested or never initiated had a better idea or program come along. So, the mission of every leader should be to search continually for ideas and programs that are superior to the ones the organization is currently committed to. In a word, it's called PROGRESS.

But what can the leaders do to promote creativity and innovation? The most obvious answer, short of hiring a new workforce, is to use management initiatives that create a work environment that stimulates the existing staff to be more creative and innovative.

Creativity CAN Be Stimulated by Leaders

There are many who would challenge the implicit assumption that leaders can do anything to foster creativity. They would argue that creative people, like baseball hitters, are born, not made. Indeed, much of the anecdotal literature about creativity would suggest that creativity is some mystical power that only a chosen few possess. But, then, why are all children creative?

Common Anecdotes about Creativity Are Wrong

People who have looked carefully at the creative process have learned that everyone of ordinary intelligence has latent creative abilities that can be enhanced by training and by a favorable environment. One recent book that is dedicated to defending this proposition is by D. N. Perkins, *The Mind's Best Work.*[1] He finds that after-the-fact anecdotes about well-known examples of great leaps of creative thought have generally received little or no close scrutiny of the mental processes that led to them. There are too many opportunities for the real mental correlates of creativity to be lost through excitement and distraction (as part of the "eureka" phenomenon), lack of need or desire to reconstruct the thought processes, and faulty skill and memory in reconstructing the process. Experiments where people have been asked to think aloud or report their thoughts during an episode of invention led Perkins to conclude that creativity arises naturally and comprehensibly from certain everyday abilities of perception, understanding, logic, memory, and thinking style.

The Unconscious Is Not Magic

Some people believe that creativity emerges from unconscious thinking (fig. 1). Even if that were true, it would not necessarily impart any special mystery to creativity, compared to other aspects of thought and behavior. Unconscious thought appears to contribute to creativity no more or no less than to mundane activities. Most all thinking operates in the unconscious, including everything we do from taking out the garbage, to tying our shoestrings, to driving our car, to hundreds of other covert mental processes.

Why Leaders Hesitate to Foster Creativity

Listen to a typical commander as he thinks through the problems:

> I Need My People to Be More Creative. I wish our people would come up with ideas to cut our costs, ideas to make us more effective. What would really be great is to get some ideas for hot new plans, products, and services! Then if we got creative ideas, I wish we had a management structure in place that could get these new ideas out into the field.
>
> But My Boss Might Say: We Can't Afford Any More Creativity! "What would I do with new ideas?" he could say. "I don't have the time or resources to complete work on the old ideas." "Good point," I'll reply; but I will also remind him about the innovations of our competitors in the bureaucracy—not to mention those of the enemy! I'll remind him that the cheapest place we are going to get better ideas is to stimulate the creativity and innovation processes right here in our own organization.

Why Leaders Should Stimulate Creativity

Leaders should stimulate creativity for two very important reasons: to prevent obsolescence and to increase productivity. Let's consider both in turn.

In-House Obsolescence

If the organization is not getting a steady stream of new ideas, a focus on the old ideas runs the risk of current work being obsolete before it is even finished. Moreover, just how sure can you be that the old ideas are the best ideas? You say you can't afford to do new things. Maybe you can't afford

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Figure 1. A Common Misconception about the "Magic" of Creativity—Somehow "Stuff" Is Put into the Mind and Wondrous Creations Come Out.

NOT to do new things. Managing programs should be done with an "eye open" to incorporating changes that will make the work of higher quality, lower cost, or faster completion.

Worker Output Can Always Be Increased

Professionals tend to have the same capabilities in all organizations, and there is certainly room for improved productivity. The survey of 1,300 research and development (R&D) scientists and engineers by Pelz and Andrews,[2] for example, revealed that half of the engineers surveyed had no patents in the last five years; two of five junior scientists had not published anything, not even a report, in the previous three years. The noted science historian Derek de Solla Price has shown that scientific research papers come from a small elite, whose number is calculated to be about the square root of the total population of scientists; in a population of 10,000 scientists, for example, over 50 percent of the papers are written by only 100 people.

The payroll is going to be about the same, whether workers become more innovative or not. Wouldn't it be nice to get more for your money?

What Do We Know about the Creative Process?

The literature on the creative process is vast,[3] and we can only summarize it here.

Have you seen the ad from IBM Corporation, in which there was a long, alphabetized list of "old English" words? The ad's caption read, "Anyone could have used these 4,178 words. In the hands of William Shakespeare, they became *King Lear*." *King Lear* epitomizes the essence of creativity: to take commonly used and understood ideas and recombine them in elegant new ways; clearly the combinations have to have value.[4]

The basic condition for a creative act is to combine known elements into new combinations or perspectives that have never before been considered.[5] Perkins writes of the utility of deliberately searching for many alternatives so that many combinations and perspectives can be considered. He stresses that superior creative effort involves deliberately searching for many alternatives. Creativity is much more likely to emerge when a person considers many options and invests the time and effort to keep searching rather than settling for mediocre solutions.

Scratch Pad of the Mind

The first and fundamental step in the creative process is to have a clear notion of what the problem is and to be able to state it clearly. The effective thinker begins by first focusing on the structure of the problem, rather than its technical detail. I symbolize putting the problem statement onto a scratch pad because the next series of mental operations occurs in the "scratch pad" of the mind, the so-called working memory (which is like the memory involved while you are remembering the phone number you are dialing) (fig. 2).

Also brought into working memory from creative operations are the potential solutions. These come from each person's permanent memory store, his or her lifetime database of knowledge and experience. Other potential alternatives are brought in from such external sources of input as reading, ideas from colleagues, databases, and other sources. Next, these alternatives can be processed logically (by associating, sorting, and aligning into new or unusual categories and contexts) or more "illogically" by the use of images, abstractions, models, metaphors, and analogies. The next stages involve noticing clues and potential leads, realizing permutations of alternatives that are significant, and finally selecting those thoughts that lead to a new idea. The process of considering and choosing among alternative approaches involves a progressive narrowing of options in the early stages of creation and a readiness to revise and reconsider earlier decisions in the later stages. This narrowing process requires the creator to break down and reformulate the categories and relationships of thoughts and facts that are commonly applied to the problems and their usual solutions. The creative thinker examines all reasonable alternatives, including many which may not seem "reasonable." Each alternative needs to be examined, not only in isolation, but in relation to other alternatives—and in relation to the initial problem expressed in different ways. The practical problem then becomes one of reducing the size of the problem and alternative solution space to workable dimensions. That may well be why one has to be immersed in the problem for long periods, with subconscious "incubation" operating to help sort through various alternatives and combinations thereof.

Note that all of these operations must occur in the working memory, which unfortunately has very limited capacity. That is probably the reason why insight and creativity are so hard to come by. Researchers of the subject of creativity would do well to look for ways to create more capacity for our working memory and to make it more efficient. The most manipulable factor would seem to be the mechanics of supplying information input from external sources. One example of a way that we already use to increase the efficiency of external source input is the use of brainstorming.

The final stages of creativity are more straightforward. They involve critical, logical analysis, which typically forces a refinement of the emerging ideas. Analysis should force the rejection of premature ideas and reinitiation of the search and selection processes. Sometimes, analysis will force the realization that the wrong problem is being worked or that it needs to be reformulated. Eventually, out of these iterative processes will emerge the bright idea.



Figure 2. The Creative Process Is a Systematic Organization of Distinct Mental Events.

Creativity Can't Be Planned—Directly

We know that discovery and creative thought cannot be planned by a leader; such thought just happens, emerging often during the course of ongoing activity that may have nothing to do with the new ideas.

In reviewing the literature on the creative process, Arieti[6] concluded that there are three stages in creative work: (1) an initial analysis that terminates when a "dead end" is reached, (2) a period of rest, recovery, and relative inattention to the problem, and (3) a sudden and unexpected burst of insight and solution. Perkins would argue that this last stage only seems to be sudden; the actual processes described earlier on our mental scratch pad have probably been going on consciously and unconsciously for quite some time.

The Way We Classify Things Creates a Logjam to New Ideas

Something in Newton's sensory or cognitive world caused him to see the similarity between an apple and the moon in a new way; of course they were both round, solid bodies. But it is not clear what caused him to perceive what is now obvious, namely that both are subject to the effect of gravity. Even seeing the apple fall from a tree would not be a meaningful mental stimulus to most people because they are not used to thinking of the moon as "falling." Creative thought is affected by the ways in which we classify things. We put apples and moons into categories, but by insisting on describing and naming them, we restrict the categories to which they belong. Apples are supposed to be round, red, and sweet, while moons are large, yellow, rocky, and far away. The names themselves get in the way of thinking of either as a classless object that is subject to gravity. A lesser order of creativity is commonly seen in the simple realization of the significance of obvious associations. The associations may even be negative (i.e., if penicillin is present on a bacteriological plate, the organisms will NOT grow).

Imagery Is More Likely to Stimulate New Thought than Language

Great discoveries may emerge from primitive imagery. Words and language, according to Einstein, had no role in his creative thought. Some famous scientists claim that their best thinking occurs in the form of visual images, even at the level of fantasy. Einstein, for example, in one of his fantasies visualized himself riding on a beam of light, holding a mirror in front of him. Since the light and the mirror were traveling at the same speed in the same direction, and since the mirror was a little ahead of the light's front, the light could never catch up to the mirror to reflect an image. Thus Einstein could not see himself. Although fantasy, such thinking is not the product of a hallucinating mind; there is clear logic and order imbedded in the fantasy.

Neuroscientists know that humans have a "split brain" wherein the left half controls analytical thought involved in speech and mathematics, while the right brain deals more holistically with imagery, music, art, and assorted nonverbal thought. The creative process seems to depend on freeing our right brain from the domineering control of our left brain. Managers tend to reward people for left-brain thinking, which is rigorous and precise. Are we thereby stifling creativity?

What Do We Know about Creative Leaders?

We do know some facts about creative leaders. They can be summed up as follows:

Creative Leaders Have Modest Intelligence

In summarizing the personal characteristics of creative thinkers, Arieti[7] concluded that they must be intelligent. The paradox is that they generally are not TOO intelligent. Excessive intelligence cripples creativity by imposing an examination of self and ideas that is too strict, too "logical."

Creative Leaders Are Well Informed

A profound knowledge of a problem area is needed in order to understand the limits of current dogma and to identify those areas where creative thought will be most fruitful. However, too much knowledge impedes the creative process, producing that thinking-process disease known as "hardening of the categories." This becomes a special problem when the knowledge is focused in a small specialty area because the breadth of alternative information that could be used in creative synthesis is missing.

Creative Leaders Are Original Thinkers

Original thinking is not the same as creativity but is obviously prerequisite for creative thought. Originality requires an active search for the different. This may involve deliberate attempts to conjure contrasts, opposites, bizarre associations, and symbolic thinking. Original thinking is sometimes no more than mere recognition that what is accepted by everybody else has flaws, is not adequate, or needs to be done differently. To complete the creative process, however, requires more than originality. Original thoughts that are not examined critically cannot be refined into useful and correct concepts; less creative people tend to be too quick to judge or reject ideas. Creative people think out carefully what they are looking for, and they clarify the reasons for their reactions to emerging ideas. They tend to search longer for original thoughts that can improve upon or even replace the emerging ideas.

Creative Leaders Ask (the Right) Questions

A question calls forth an answer; a problem, its solution. The trick is not only to ask questions, but to ask questions or pose problems in the most effective ways. A question can easily limit creative thinking if it restricts the space of potential answers. It therefore is important to pose questions in open-ended ways and ways that do not make too many assumptions about an acceptable answer (fig. 3). A major part of the creativity task is proper formulation of the problem itself.

Figure 3. Creative People See Things in More Than One Way.

Creative Leaders Are Prepared to Be Creative

What this means is that creative people have a mind-set that enables creativity to happen, as if by chance. We have all heard the famous axiom

> Chance favors the prepared mind.
>
> —Pasteur

But the more complete explanation is

> Accident arises out of purpose. . . . The essence of invention isn't process, but purpose.
>
> —Perkins

In other words, creative people

1. desire to be creative,
2. believe that there is a creative solution, and
3. expect that they will be the ones to find it.

Some Characteristics of the Creative Person Are Innate

We know that creative people are self-directed, self-starting. Creativeness of scientists and engineers, as explicitly examined in the study by Pelz and Andrews, was found in those workers who maintained distinctive work styles and strategies.

To some extent, the attributes that foster creativity are innate, and cannot be "trained." For example, one evaluation of several studies of highly creative physical scientists revealed the following common denominators, indicating that creative scientists were most likely to be

1. men,
2. intensely masculine in interests and outlook,
3. from a background of radical Protestantism,
4. not very religious themselves,
5. reticent about interpersonal contact,
6. disturbed by complex human emotions, especially aggression,
7. hardworking, to the point of obsession,
8. music lovers, while disliking art and poetry, and
9. interested in analysis and structure of things.[8]

Can We Expect Leaders to Make a Difference

The creative ability of any given individual ranges from little to great. All professionals have some creative ability, but creative acts cannot occur in a vacuum. Creators must identify a problem, must be motivated to solve it, and must know at least some "facts" (but not too many) about the problem. They must criticize and refine their ideas to make them amenable to developing an innovative concept, process, or product.

In one study of the creative, innovative process, 115 senior scientists were evaluated for their native creative ability by a special psychological test for creativeness (the "RAT" test).[9] Some personal characteristics, such as innate creative capability and verbal intelligence quotients (IQ), were clearly NOT related to innovativeness. The analyst thus concluded that what really counted was the environment in which innovation is supposed to occur.

Taking the Plunge—How Do We Get Started?

"O.K." the boss says, "I am convinced we need to change our leadership style to foster creativity, but where do we start?"

For starters, look around to see how other organizations have been successful in generating new ideas.

Scientists in Organizations[10]

Pelz and Andrews summarize their findings on the effect of management practices on the productivity of over 1,300 scientists and engineers in 11 government and industrial laboratories. A composite productivity score for each scientist and engineer was determined by taking into account the number of publications and patents and the ratings assigned by a panel of colleagues on their contribution to the organization, as well as their more general contribution to science and technology. These scores were then used to compute correlation coefficients for the relationship of productivity score to various managerial practices. The analysis allowed them to identify many management practices that foster creativity and innovation, as well as interfering practices.

In Search of Excellence[11]

This best-seller was published in 1982 by T. J. Peters and R. H. Waterman Jr. This book was based on the authors' analysis of management in dozens of high-tech Fortune 500 companies that were especially well known for their ability to develop many new and widely accepted products. Such companies included IBM, 3M, GE, Boeing, and Hewlett-Packard. Peters and Waterman started with the premise that these companies "must be doing something right," and they wanted to find out what it was. They found some common denominators that these companies use to foster creativity and innovation. All these companies have built-in management mechanisms to stimulate individual entrepreneurs to take the lead in generating new ideas and pursuing them to the new product or service stage. The entrepreneurs "champion" their own cause and recruit fellow enthusiasts to a development team. Often the team is assigned an expediter whose function it is to cut red tape and provide needed logistical and other support. Typically there is an "executive champion" of the development team who has enough clout in the hierarchy to shield the team from administrative harassment or disruption.

Both of the above-mentioned studies make it clear that creativity and innovation are not beyond the control of enlightened leaders. Although leaders cannot create genius where it does not exist, there are many practices that influence creativity and innovation, for better or for worse.

Greasing the Wheels of This Creative Machinery

The self is a growing thing, battered into shape by all sorts of forces.

—R. B. McCloud

The creative self is also a growing thing, amenable to influence of the environment and self-education.[12] Leaders have more control over the creative process than they think. First, if they know what kinds of people are more creative, they can make it a point to hire such people. With people already on board, leaders can educate them as to what creativity entails and show them that some degree of creativity is within the grasp of everybody. Finally, there is a host of management practices that create the work environment that enables creativity.

Create the Right Environment—Creativity Is Contagious

Although we may not fully understand the processes of creativity, we know that they are "contagious." Certain environments contain something that enhances the creativity process. Hans Krebs,[13] the Nobel prize-winning biochemist, has worked out the "scientific genealogies" of certain famous scientists. Krebs himself had a Nobel Laureate teacher, Otto Warburg, who in turn was taught by Emil Fischer, who won a Nobel for his work on the chemistry of sugars. Fischer in turn was a pupil of another Laureate, Adolph von Baeyer, who won the prize for work on chemistry of dyes. Adolph von Baeyer's mentor was Reinhard Kekule von Stradonitz, famous for studies on organic compounds with ring structures. Kekule was a pupil of Justus von Liebig, who is the acknowledged "father" of organic chemistry. Liebig's teacher was a giant in the field of inorganic chemistry, Joseph-Louis Gay-Lussac, who discovered many of the gas laws. Gay-Lussac was a pupil of Claude Louis Berthollet, who helped to introduce the concept of combustion and elucidated the chemistry of such compounds as chlorine, ammonia, and cyanide. Berthollet's mentor was the famous Antoine Laurent Lavoisier. Thus, this family tree of teacher and pupil extended in an unbroken chain over 200 years.

The contagion of creative fever can also be seen in industrial laboratories; the famous Bell Labs are a good example. Bell has had seven of its scientists to receive the Nobel prize. There are not many single work environments that have spawned such fundamental innovations as the transistor, the laser, and fiber optics. But the creative atmosphere at Bell is not limited to spectacular innovation. The staff at Bell has acquired over 31,800 patents since the lab was formed in 1925, and the current rate is about one patent every day![14]

Expect Creativity

Innovation correlates strongly with a person's perception of whether or not he is *expected* to be innovative.[15] When leaders shoulder the burden of responsibility for innovation, the workers shirk it. In part this may be because such environments may actually discourage or penalize workers for innovation.

Challenge People

Without challenge, there is not enough stimulus to elicit creative responses. But too much challenge burdens and overwhelms the emotions and the mind, shutting off the capacity for creative thought. Ever notice how some of your best ideas occur when you are NOT working, even when you are on vacation? Most creativity theorists believe that it is important, even essential, to have an intense and sustained grappling with a problem if creative solutions are to emerge, but often the flash of insight will only occur when you stop thinking about the problem.

In terms of leadership practices, Pelz and Andrews concluded from their study that a certain amount of "creative tension" had to exist between the conflicting states of worker security and challenge. They noted particularly that scientists' and engineers' productivity increased when the laboratory changed established patterns or when technical disputes arose. Productivity also increased when the scientists and engineers were given positive reinforcement and were encouraged to participate in policy making. Peters and Waterman found that the best high-tech companies instituted management practices that were deliberately designed to stimulate competition, sometimes even to the extent of assigning the same problem to two different teams and creating a contest atmosphere to see who would come up with the best solution.

Get Some Kind of Peer Review

The ultimate goal of the true professional is to be respected by his peers. If there is no way for professionals to know how they stand in the opinion of their peers, an important incentive for doing their best work is also absent. Where peer-review programs do exist, they often are administered in very negative ways, where the emphasis is judgmental and punitive. The real purposes should be to specify what is considered high achievement and who is doing it, to reassure workers that they will be judged on merit and technical productivity rather than on ancillary or political grounds, and to stimulate all workers to "keep up the pace."

Get a System of Rewards for Creativity

When workers know that management rewards new ideas, they will try to generate them. The best way that management can make its wants known, and believable, is to provide tangible rewards for new ideas. Rewards can take the usual forms, ranging from more money (bonuses or salary increments) to a wide variety of "perks." More subtle, and less expensive, devices include arranging for professionals to present their ideas in semiformal gatherings of peers and superiors. It is particularly important to give direct access to policy makers, not only for the ego-gratifying effect on the workers, but also because this is the one way to ensure that policy makers keep informed and stimulated.

Professionals may need frequent prodding to produce reports or papers that bear their name. Nonetheless, such efforts produce a positive feedback that will stimulate the worker to future creative activity.

Pelz and Andrews found that scientist and engineer productivity was stimulated when the workers knew that their ideas and work were evaluated by people other than their immediate supervisor, particularly people outside the hierarchy or high in it. Evaluations by peers and end users had great impact on motivating scientists and engineers when they knew that higher management sought and listened to such evaluations.

Get People Involved, Immersed, in Problems

Numerous anecdotes concerning great creative achievements have in common the feature that the discoverer was deeply immersed in the problem area.[16] Even Einstein had grappled for several years trying to clarify the relation of movement to electromagnetism. Not surprisingly, the best ideas have usually come in the fields that the discoverer knew a great deal about. There is a paradox here: knowledge often gets in the way of creativity. Professionals who are overly specialized as a group are less productive than are their more broadly based colleagues.[17] I suspect that the paradox exists because the creative person takes a different, more detached, and uncommitted attitude toward his or her knowledge, whereas the noncreative person is more inclined to believe what he or she "knows."

Without direction and specific goals, research programs tend to flail and flounder. In the recent critique of American industry's R&D efforts,[18] Deborah Shapley and Rustum Roy levy the charge that R&D managers have largely failed to provide direction to their workers. They charge that we devote too much time, effort, and money to basic research that does not go anywhere. What we need, they argue, is more "purposive" basic research, where workers are given purpose and guidance, even for their basic research. Some practical objective should always be kept in mind, even for the most basic of research. This need not diminish the pure science value of the basic research; the work of Louis Pasteur should serve as ample proof.

Get Rid of the Disincentives

The most common disincentives for creativity and innovation arise in an atmosphere of fear—fear of being penalized for failure, fear of not getting adequate administrative support, or fear of not having enough time. That is one reason the new venture-team programs in the Fortune 500 companies surveyed by Peters and Waterman are usually specifically designed to relieve team members from all other duties during the project. The team is protected by the "executive champion" from external forces, disruptions, and punitive actions for failure. The team is protected from the red tape of their company's bureaucracy by the ombudsman/expediter. The "champion" programs in the Fortune 500 companies that were evaluated by Peters and Waterman exemplify just the opposite of micromanagement—at least once a champion and his or her development team are established. There is a good bit of management imposed during the initial stages of project approval, setting of goals, allocation of resources, and establishing the ground rules for the team. But once the team is formed and under way, successful management seems to require that they be left alone. The team does its own managing, at least to the extent they are able.

Avoidance of micromanagement is equivalent to providing more autonomy for professionals and their teams. But excessive autonomy is probably not desirable. Pelz and Andrews found that the most autonomous of their scientists and engineers did poorly, presumably because they were isolated from stimulation; some central coordination and direction are necessary for best productivity. The self-reliant and autonomous individuals should be able to produce more; in fact, if their superiors do not provide direction, they must be self-reliant in order to achieve. In a climate of complete freedom, autonomous individuals must have exceptional drive and motivation in order to keep achieving. On the other hand, under tight, micromanaged situations, the productivity of self-reliant individuals is not enhanced.

Give Your People Some Slack, Freedom, and Time for Meditation

Here we refer to mental freedom, as well as freedom from external constraints, to let emerging ideas take one where they will, even if they violate common wisdom or the constraints of time, money, and facilities.

Arieti also makes the point that the creative person must have time where he or she does nothing, as viewed in conventional terms by superiors in an organization, for example. If the workers must always be "doing" something (running an experiment, shuffling paperwork), they do not have the opportunity for uninterrupted reflection on their work. A case can be made for being too productive in the usual sense. One junior scientist I know was given some wise advice by his more experienced mentor: "Young man, you would do well to publish less so that you can publish better."

Arieti asserts that creative thought usually involves a period of meditation and aloneness. Aloneness is akin to sensory deprivation, a state in which the subject is less distracted by conventional stimuli, clichés, modes of thinking, and is free to tap his or her inner basic resources.

The common emphasis on teamwork is justified, as seen in the Pelz and Andrews study. Yet each team member must have time alone, free of distractions and interruptions, to reflect creatively on the team's problems.

Continued pursuit of a problem is often required before the creative solution emerges.[19] Leaders should give people time to pursue unresolved problems and not punish them as long as they are earnestly trying. Jung is quoted as saying that to get creative thought to emerge from its incubation stage, one must have a "special training for switching off consciousness, at least to a relative extent, thus giving the unconscious contents a chance to develop."

Be Quick to Recognize—and Use—Error

A rat uses its errors to help find the way through a maze, and in a similar but more sophisticated way creative thinkers must be assisted by their leaders and colleagues to recognize and use their thinking errors as they grope with the creative solution to a problem. In scientific and technical arenas of thought, mistakes can be quite useful in posing issues in a new way and in inviting unique approaches to a problem.

Be Quick to Recognize—and Use—Good Ideas

Although leaders can't force creative thought, they certainly can be receptive to it and recognize and value it when it happens. The best way to express value for an idea is to implement it.

Make Your People Secure, Not Threatened

The companies surveyed by Pelz and Andrews have found that it is important to provide opportunities for scientists and engineers to have their names associated with a product, a report, or a process.

The companies also favored practices that promoted the status of individuals, such as

1. letting professionals present their own work (briefings, reports, and so on),
2. giving them some autonomy,
3. minimizing the management from above, and
4. letting them help set goals and priorities.

The Pelz and Andrews study showed a clear increase in productivity in those workers whose managers let them set their own goals and priorities and influence policy making. This principle is explicitly embodied in the "champion" programs of the Fortune 500 high-tech companies that Peters and Waterman studied.

Change Attitudes about Yes-Men and Conformity

Conformity is the enemy of creative thought. As might be expected, people differ greatly in their conformist tendencies. Some conformity is probably imposed by cultural and educational conditions. For example, in one formal test which quantified conformist tendencies in terms of percentage of responses to questions that were influenced by group pressure, *military officers had the highest conformity score of 33 percent;* by comparison, college sophomores had a conformity score of 26 percent, while scientists in industry had a score of only 14 percent.[20] Notably, the range of individual scores in each group was from 0 to 100 percent, which means that each group does contain potentially creative people, even though in some groups conformity may be very conspicuous.

In examining common practices that get in the way of creativity and innovation, Hickman and Silvan[21] have developed a list of six common blinders that keep leaders from creativeness and innovation. They are

1. resistance to change,
2. reliance on rules and conformance,
3. fear and self-doubt,
4. overreliance on logic and precision,
5. black and white thinking, and
6. overreliance on practicality and efficiency.

As practical remedies to such blinder problems, Hickman and Silva suggest several exercises that will help both leaders and workers: (1) set a personal quota of one new idea a day, (2) pick an organizational rule that gets in the way and break it (in a benign way that won't harm you or the organization), (3) read literature on creativity, (4) indulge in fantasy and wild thinking, particularly when you are swamped with technical detail, (5) for any problem, force yourself to consider many solutions, and (6) defer evaluation of an idea (toy with it, explore its ramifications).

Show the Mavericks You Tolerate—Even Value—Them

By definition, creative people are more likely to be nonconformist, not only in their thinking but sometimes in their attitudes and behavior. If such people are valued in an organization for what their ideas can do for the group, then a certain amount of tolerance for unconventional behavior is the price that has to be paid.

Sometimes creative, innovative people are uncomfortably aggressive. They may be driven by ambition and are not very tolerant of obstacles, be they material or managerial. "Best workers gripe the most" was the conclusion drawn by one analyst of a survey of industrial productivity. Clearly, malcontents and chronic complainers are not much of an asset to an organization. But it is axiomatic that the best producers and self-starters are assertive, sometimes "pushy," and even obnoxious. In the Pelz and Andrews survey, there was a striking correlation between productivity and the fact that the scientists and engineers did NOT fully share the goals and interests of higher management. However, they were responsive to input and direction, both from management and from colleagues.

Provide Formal Means for Idea Generation

Among the various tactics that can be used are frequent use of seminars and symposia, where the "in-house" people are expected to make presentations. Debate should be encouraged, but it needs to be conducted in a positive, nonthreatening way.

Brainstorming sessions can be especially useful, provided they are well structured and controlled. The proper environment for effective brainstorming has been described by Osborn.[22] The basic premise is that creativity requires free and uninhibited thought, coupled with critical analysis and synthesis. However, the typical human cannot think imaginatively and critically at the same time. Thus, Osborn advocates a brainstorming session in which (1) criticism is ruled out, (2) freewheeling is welcomed (the wilder the idea, the better), (3) many ideas are better than a few, and (4) combining of ideas into new ways is encouraged. To make sure that "imagineering" is fully stimulated, an atmosphere of excitement and enthusiasm is needed, along with a tolerant, noncritical attitude toward "off the wall" ideas. But, if a brainstorming session ends at this point, then all one has is a collection of imaginative ideas, none of which may have real value. Subsequent critical analysis is required to winnow out those ideas that can be criticized, reformulated, and recombined into useful concepts that can lead to true innovation.

How about computerized Delphi conferences? I don't think anybody does that, but the technology is available. One popular technique to make such problem-solving communication more systematic could employ a modification of the so-called Delphi method.[23] This is a structured communication approach to problem solving, planning, forecasting, and decision making that involves individual contributions of information and insight, followed by some critique of all the individual contributions, followed by responses of the individuals and revisions of their original ideas. To modify the approach for brainstorming functions, it would be ideal to have a computerized conference approach, wherein a computer tallies all the input and makes it available in real time.

Create a Climate for Discussion and Disagreement

In their analysis of successful executives, Hickman and Silva concluded that they never ceased their curious probing. "They are imaginative and innovative developers who can transcend old habits. . . . They make an abiding commitment to creativity, always setting aside the time and resources to nurture it."[24] Such a climate stimulates workers to come forth with their ideas, giving management a chance to use those inputs to generate even better, more workable ideas. Creativity feeds upon itself, producing more and more creative ideas.

The creativeness of professionals is directly proportional to the extent to which they can communicate with both supervisors and with peers. Leaders should openly solicit the ideas of workers—and then LISTEN to what they say. This serves not only the positive motivational. purpose of making workers feel like they are important, but it also gives the leadership access to information and ideas they might otherwise not obtain (fig. 4). This principle lies at the heart of Deming's quality control philosophy, which has been so successfully employed by Japanese industry.

Workers need good, clear channels of communications with superiors, particularly the leaders who operate at the policy-making levels. Among the reasons this is important is that in this climate workers have some hope that they have access to policy makers when they get a good idea. They need not fear that somebody else will "steal their thunder" and get the credit for their idea. The leadership, in turn, encourages the surfacing of new ideas only if they openly value it and



Figure 4. Good Ideas Have to Be Nurtured to Yield Their Fruit.

provides positive reinforcement to those who advance new ideas, even ideas that are not feasible.

In the case of peer communication, Pelz and Andrews found that increased productivity was directly correlated with the number of peers whom a given worker contacted as well as the total number of contacts.

Give Your People Influence on Policy Making

Another factor that correlates positively with innovation is the degree to which the workers exert influence upon decision making.[25] Not surprisingly, if workers know they have no clout with the leaders, they have little confidence that their ideas can get accepted and implemented. So why risk exposing one's ideas to possible criticism? Thus, it is in the best interests of leaders and their organizations to make all workers feel important and to solicit their ideas in nonthreatening ways.

In any hierarchy, one of the hurdles that a new idea must overcome is the worker's immediate administrative superior. The superior sets the psychological tone of his or her unit, and that tone may encourage creativity or may actively discourage it. Junior-level professionals are easily intimidated or disheartened in attempts to sell their ideas. The senior scientists studied by Pelz and Andrews who were the most effective in implementing ideas were those whose superiors "stayed out of the way," with respect to the actual conduct of the research. For this level of employee, the proper role of leaders would seem to be limited to encouragement, friendly criticism, and making resources available.

It is one thing for workers to have a good idea. It is another to get them to "surface it." Some work environments discourage innovation, if not actively, at least unwittingly. Leaders of the 3M company, noted for the large number of diverse product innovations, have a slogan: "Thou Shalt Not Kill a New Product Idea."[26] Of course they do not implement all of the employees' ideas, but they make it company policy to encourage all the ideas they can get. They don't intimidate their employees with criticism, but rather encourage and help them to develop their ideas into marketable products.

To sell an idea, it must be communicated comprehensibly. Although the illusion of success can be obtained by "snowing" superiors with complex ideas they do not really understand, their sustained support will ultimately require that they do in fact understand what they are supporting. In most cases, support is not given in the first place if the idea is not clear and understandable. The advocate of ideas must also have sufficient status and credibility for the ideas to be taken seriously.

Optimize Interpersonal Interactions

Progressive leaders actively seek ways to increase communication and break down interdepartmental barriers among their workers. Specific actions range from the physical design of work and recreation space to open forums where workers make presentations in front of their peers and superiors. Such devices not only improve technical communication per se, but they also make workers more aware of the skills and achievements of their peer competitors. This environment instills a desire to run faster just to keep up.

Get the Right People Together

The principle of critical mass in personnel management is well known. Bright people stimulate each other, particularly if each person has a different background and set of technical skills that he or she brings to a common problem. This team concept is explicitly fostered in many R&D companies.

In many organizations, it is not feasible to create critical mass; there just is not enough money to hire necessary new talent. Sometimes, however, the problem can be overcome by tearing down the barriers that separate the boxes on an organization chart and building dashed-line connections between the boxes so that close interaction can occur among the people with common interests but who are assigned to different organizations. Administrators who are real leaders rise to the top and impose massive reorganization where necessary to reassign people to create critical mass and optimize effectiveness. There must be clear lines of authority and responsibility, however. Cavalier use of dashed lines on an organizational chart leads to situations where nobody is responsible to anybody for anything.

Create Study Teams, Evaluation Groups

Many traditionally managed R&D operations have historically seen the value of creating interdisciplinary teams to solve problems. A recent workshop review of this management practice by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has confirmed its utility.[27] Where management often falls short is in implementing the good ideas that emerge from such study and evaluation groups.

Periodically Regroup the Organizational Teams

Research teams grow stale with age, and their productivity generally falls off after four or five years, as the Pelz and Andrews study clearly showed. They also learned, however, that shuffling people around to new research teams was not effective if it was done against their will.

Give the Teams Autonomy

The success of new-venture teams derives not only from the positive motivation that comes from championing a cause but also from the fact that the team is autonomous. Each member knows that he or she is responsible to the team and that the team is responsible for its own success or failure. If teams are allowed to operate in an environment where nobody can get the credit and nobody can take the blame for foul-ups, there is little incentive to do one's best.

Keep People from Getting Too Specialized

Overspecialization gets in the way of creative thought. A research team with people of diverse backgrounds creates a stimulating intellectual environment that can promote the evaluation of problems from a broader perspective and lead to new ways of seeing problems and solutions. Moreover, many projects require a diversity of technical skills, which is obviously provided in a diversely structured team.

Many of us have habitually considered technical expertise as a critical component for productivity. Thus, workers who specialize are considered experts. But Pelz and Andrews found that the most productive workers were those who specialized in more than one technical area. Presumably, this served as a stimulus for creativeness. A related observation was that research teams that have worked a long time in a certain area and acquired status as the in-house experts gradually declined in their productivity. Better results are sometimes achieved when management deliberately assigns a project to a team other than the one with the most expertise.

Pelz and Andrews also found, to their surprise, that productivity was greater in those scientists and engineers who worked at several levels, including both basic and applied research. Those who focused only on either basic research or applied research were usually much less productive. This may indicate that the more productive scientists and engineers are more productive because they are capable enough to work at several different levels. However, it is also possible that efforts to make them work at different levels actually can stimulate their creativity and productivity.

Unexpectedly, it was the younger workers whose productivity was most impaired by being required to focus in depth on a subject. Leaders are advised not to assign young workers to a narrow piece of the problem, but rather to see that they read and talk about it from many angles.

Recognize and Exploit the Age Effects

Conventional wisdom holds that young people are the most creative. In physics, for example, it is commonly believed that great discoveries must be made before the age of 35, or they will not happen at all. When this issue was examined by Pelz and Andrews, they found a biphasic curve, with a peak in the 30s, followed by a decline, especially in the late 40s. However, there was another spurt of creative productivity after 50. The late 40s decline was quite distinct and was most marked with government workers, compared with those in industry or the universities. At all ages and in all work environments, productivity was greatest in those scientists who were motivated by their own ideas rather than the ideas of management.

Newly formed research groups are the most creative and productive. For example, when research directors of 21 industrial labs were asked to rank their teams or sections on such criteria as "creativity," they found that the most creative groups were less than 16 months old. According to the survey by Pelz and Andrews, the height of a group's creative powers lasts about five years, after which they generally decline. They explain this phenomenon on the basis of their idea that a certain amount of creative tension is needed; in this case, the tension and stimulation are achieved by placing staff on a new team in which the insecurity of proving oneself to new peers brings out the best in each worker.

The typical decline with age of the group can be partially offset if the group becomes especially cohesive, while at the same time becoming intellectually competitive. The cohesiveness is illustrated by the frequency of communication among team members, which under normal circumstances is quite high during the first year but falls off drastically as the group ages. Competitiveness included competition among individuals in the team as well as competition between a given team and other teams.

Stagnation also sets in because an older group tends to get specialized, and the members' approaches to problems become more stable and stereotyped. The loss of a broader perspective and the creativity that goes with it are best offset when management challenges an older group with problems outside its expertise. Leaders are advised to avoid letting a group come to believe that they are the in-house experts in a special area; in fact, some leaders will deliberately assign a problem within an older group's specialty to *another* group which has no such expertise.

Reorganize

The more productive professionals in the Pelz and Andrews study were those in organizations that had a relatively "flat" organization tree, with few levels at which veto or interference can occur. Pelz and Andrews also found that conventional management schemes that were designed to make workers dependent on their supervisors were counterproductive.

Specifically, real productivity declined when the primary source of evaluation was the immediate supervisor. As Pelz and Andrews put it, "If you deliberately wanted to stamp out independent thought in the subordinates, could you design a better system?"

Transitioning Creativity to Innovation

To get a creative idea is one thing, but to get it transitioned into the innovation of a new product or service requires other personal characteristics. Innovative people need the kind of mind-set that can produce the succession of processes that lead to successful innovation, such as

1. generating the idea,
2. informing "significant others,"
3. "selling" the idea effectively,
4. planning the development process, and
5. overcoming constraints (time, money, relevance).

Even though an organization may have plenty of such people, management practices will determine the extent to which these personal characteristics can be expressed. Technology transition is the theme of a growing body of business literature, which we need not dwell on here.

The Bottom Line

Creativity and innovation are not mysterious forces over which leaders have no control. Progressive leadership can and does create a climate that encourages creativity and innovation. As we have reviewed here, there are many specific leadership initiatives, validated by the success of certain high-tech companies, that enlightened leaders can take to stimulate creativity and innovation in any work setting.

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Leadership

Address by

**Maj C. A. Bach, Giving Farewell Instructions
to the Graduating Student Officers
of the Second Training Camp at
Fort Sheridan, Wyoming, in 1917**

Presented by Mr. Shipstead

27 November 1942

This is the soldier's analysis of how to be a leader—the farewell instructions given to the student-officers at the Second Training Camp at Fort Sheridan by Maj C. A. Bach, a quiet, unassuming Army officer acting as an instructor at the camp. This address to the men commissioned as officers in his battalion should be read by every young officer in the Army and every private soldier and noncommissioned officer as well. It is the best composition on the subject of "Leadership" ever recorded.

The reserve officers in Major Bach's battalion were so carried away by the speech that they besieged the major for copies that they could take with them into the Army and re-read. The Waco (Tex.) Daily Times Herald, hearing of the great interest aroused, secured a copy of the address and, with the approval of Col James R. Ryan, published the speech in full on Sunday, 27 January 1918.

Major Bach entered military life through the National Guard, going out as an enlisted man in the Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry. When the regiment was sent to the Philippines young Bach went along as a sergeant. He was promoted to a lieutenancy in the Thirty-sixth United States Volunteer Infantry. He then went into the Regular Establishment as a first lieutenant in the Seventh Cavalry and advanced grade by grade to his majority.

In a short time each of you men will control the lives of a certain number of other men. You will have in your charge loyal but untrained citizens, who look to you for instruction and guidance. Your word will be their law. Your most casual remark will be remembered. Your mannerism will be aped. Your clothing, your carriage, your vocabulary, your manner of command will be imitated.

When you join your organization you will find there a willing body of men who ask from you nothing more than the qualities that will command their respect, their loyalty, and their obedience.

They are perfectly ready and eager to follow you so long as you can convince them that you have those qualities. When the time comes that they are satisfied you do not possess them you might as well kiss yourself goodbye. Your usefulness in that organization is at an end.

From the standpoint of society, the world may be divided into leaders and followers. The professions have their leaders, the financial world has its leaders. We have religious leaders, and political leaders, and society leaders. In all this leadership it is difficult, if not impossible to separate from the element of pure leadership that selfish element of personal gain or advantage to the individual, without which such leadership would lose its value.

It is in the military service only, where men freely sacrifice their lives for a faith, where men are willing to suffer and die for the right or the prevention of a great wrong, that we can hope to realize leadership in its most exalted and disinterested sense. Therefore, when I say leadership, I mean military leadership.

In a few days the great mass of you men will receive commissions as officers. These commissions will not make you leaders; they will merely make you officers. They will place you in a position where you can become leaders if you possess the proper attributes. But you must make good—not so much with the men over you as with the men under you.

Men must and will follow into battle officers who are not leaders, but the driving power behind these men is not enthusiasm but discipline. They go with doubt and trembling, and with an awful fear tugging at their heartstrings that prompts the unspoken question, "What will he do next?"

Such men obey the letter of their orders but no more. Of devotion to their commander, of exalted enthusiasm which scorns personal risk, of their self-sacrifice to ensure his personal safety, they know nothing. Their legs carry them forward because their brain and their training tell them they must go. Their spirit does not go with them.

Great results are not achieved by cold, passive, unresponsive soldiers. They don't go very far and they stop as soon as they can. Leadership not only demands but receives the willing, unhesitating, unfaltering obedience and loyalty of other men; and a devotion that will cause them, when the time comes, to follow their uncrowned king to hell and back again if necessary.

You will ask yourselves: "Of just what, then, does leadership consist? What must I do to become a leader? What are the attributes of leadership, and how can I cultivate them?"

Leadership is a composite of a number of qualities. Among the most important I would list self-confidence, moral ascendency, self-sacrifice, paternalism, fairness, initiative, decision, dignity, courage.

Let me discuss these with you in detail.

Self-confidence results, first, from exact knowledge; second, the ability to impart that knowledge; and, third, the feeling of superiority over others that naturally follows. All these give the officer poise.

To lead, you must know—you may bluff all your men some of the time, but you can't do it all the time. Men will not have confidence in an officer unless he knows his business, and he must know it from the ground up.

The officer should know more about paper work than his first sergeant and company clerk put together; he should know more about messing than his mess sergeant; more about diseases of the horse than his troop farrier. He should be at least as good a shot as any man in his company.

If the officer does not know, and demonstrates the fact that he does not know, it is entirely human for the soldier to say to himself, "To hell with him. He doesn't know as much about this as I do," and calmly disregard the instructions received.

There is no substitute for accurate knowledge. Become so well informed that men will hunt you up to ask questions that your brother officers will say to one another, "Ask Smith—he knows."

And not only should each officer know thoroughly the duties of his own grade, but he should study those of the two grades next above him. A twofold benefit attaches to this. He prepares himself for duties which may fall to his lot at any time during battle; he further gains a broader viewpoint which enables him to appreciate the necessity for the issuance of orders and join more intelligently in their execution.

Not only must the officer know, but he must be able to put what he knows into grammatical, interesting, forceful English. He must learn to stand on his feet and speak without embarrassment.

I am told that in British training camps student officers are required to deliver 10-minute talks on any subject they may choose. That is excellent practice. For to speak clearly one must think clearly, and clear, logical thinking expresses itself in definite, positive orders.

While self-confidence is the result of knowing more than your men, moral ascendancy over them is based upon your belief that you are the better man. To gain and maintain this ascendancy you must have self-control, physical vitality and endurance and moral force.

You must have yourself so well in hand that, even though in battle you be scared stiff, you will never show fear. For if you by so much as a hurried movement or a trembling of the hand, or a change of expression, or a hasty order hastily revoked, indicate your mental condition it will be reflected in your men in a far greater degree.

In garrison or camp many instances will arise to try your temper and wreck the sweetness of your disposition. If at such times you "fly off the handle" you have no business to be in charge of men. For men in anger say and do things that they almost invariably regret afterward.

An officer should never apologize to his men; also an officer should never be guilty of an act for which his sense of justice tells him he should apologize.

Another element in gaining moral ascendancy lies in the possession of enough physical vitality and endurance to withstand the hardships to which you and your men are subjected, and a dauntless spirit that enables you not only to accept them cheerfully but to minimize their magnitude.

Make light of your troubles, belittle your trials, and you will help vitally to build up within your organization an esprit whose value in time of stress cannot be measured.

Moral force is the third element in gaining moral ascendancy. To exert moral force you must live clean, you must have sufficient brain power to see the right and the will to do right.

Be an example to your men. An officer can be a power for good or a power for evil. Don't preach to them—that will be worse than useless. Live the kind of life you would have them lead, and you will be surprised to see the number that will imitate you.

A loud-mouthed, profane captain who is careless of his personal appearance will have a loud-mouthed, profane, dirty company. Remember what I tell you. Your company will be the reflection of yourself. If you have a rotten company it will be because you are a rotten captain.

Self-sacrifice is essential to leadership. You will give, give all the time. You will give yourself physically, for the longest hours, the hardest work and the greatest responsibility is the lot of the captain. He is the first man up in the morning and the last man in at night. He works while others sleep.

You will give yourself mentally, in sympathy and appreciation for the troubles of men in your charge. This one's mother has died, and that one has lost all his savings in a bank failure. They may desire help, but more than anything else they desire sympathy.

Don't make the mistake of turning such men down with the statement that you have troubles of your own, for every time that you do, you knock a stone out of the foundation of your house.

Your men are your foundation, and your house leadership will tumble about your ears unless it rests securely upon them.

Finally, you will give of your own slender financial resources. You will frequently spend your money to conserve the health and well-being of your men or to assist them when in trouble. Generally you get your money back. Very infrequently you must charge it to profit and loss.

When I say that paternalism is essential to leadership, I use the term in its better sense. I do not now refer to that form of paternalism which robs men of initiative, self-reliance, and self-respect. I refer to the paternalism that manifests itself in a watchful care for the comfort and welfare of those in your charge.

Soldiers are much like children. You must see that they have shelter, food, and clothing, the best that your utmost efforts can provide. You must be far more solicitous of their comfort than of your own. You must see that they have food to eat before you think of your own; that they have each as good a bed as can be provided before you consider where you will sleep. You must look after their health. You must conserve their strength by not demanding needless exertion or useless labor.

And by doing all these things you are breathing life into what would be otherwise a mere machine. You are creating a soul in your organization that will make the mass respond to you as though it were one man. And that is esprit.

And when your organization has this esprit you will wake up some morning and discover that the tables have been turned; that instead of your constantly looking out for them they have, without even a hint from you, taken up the task of looking out for you. You will find that a detail is always there to see that your tent, if you have one, is promptly pitched; that the most and the cleanest bedding is brought to your tent; that from some mysterious source two eggs have been added to your supper when no one else has any; that an extra man is helping your men give your horse a super-grooming; that your wishes are anticipated; that every man is Johnny-on-the-spot. And then you have arrived.

Fairness is another element without which leadership can neither be built up nor maintained. There must be first that fairness which treats all men justly. I do not say alike, for you cannot treat all men alike—that would be assuming that all men are cut from the same piece; that there is no such thing as individuality or a personal equation.

You cannot treat all men alike; a punishment that would be dismissed by one man with a shrug of the shoulders is mental anguish for another. A company commander who for a given offense has a standard punishment that applies to all is either too indolent or too stupid to study the personality of his men. In his case, justice is certainly blind.

Study your men as carefully as a surgeon studies a difficult case. And when you are sure of your diagnosis apply the remedy. And remember that you apply the remedy to effect a cure, not merely to see the victim squirm. It may be necessary to cut deep, but when you are satisfied as to your diagnosis don't be divided from your purpose by any false sympathy for the patient.

Hand in hand with fairness in awarding punishment walks fairness in giving credit. Everybody hates a human hog.

When one of your men has accomplished an especially creditable piece of work see that he gets the proper reward. Turn heaven and earth upside down to get it for him. Don't try to take it away from him and hog it for yourself. You may do this and get away with it, but you have lost the respect and loyalty of your men. Sooner or later your brother officer will hear of it and shun you like a leper. In war there is glory enough for all. Give the man under you his due. The man who always takes and never gives is not a leader. He is a parasite.

There is another kind of fairness—that which will prevent an officer from abusing the privileges of his rank. When you exact respect from soldiers be sure you treat them with equal respect. Build up their manhood and self-respect. Don't try to pull it down.

For an officer to be overbearing and insulting in the treatment of enlisted men is the act of a coward. He ties the man to a tree with the ropes of discipline and then strikes him in the face, knowing full well that the man cannot strike back.

Consideration, courtesy, and respect from officers toward enlisted men are not incompatible with discipline. They are parts of our discipline. Without initiative and decision no man can expect to lead.

In maneuvers you will frequently see, when an emergency arises, certain men calmly give instant orders which later, on analysis, prove to be, if not exactly the right thing, very nearly the right thing to have done. You will see other men in emergency become badly rattled: their brains refuse to work, or they give a hasty order, revoke it; give another, revoke that; in short, show every indication of being in a blue funk.

Regarding the first man you may say: "That man is a genius. He hasn't had time to reason this thing out. He acts intuitively." Forget it. "Genius is merely the capacity for taking infinite pains." The man who was ready is the man who has prepared himself. He has studied beforehand the possible situation that might arise, he has made tentative plans covering such situations. When he is confronted by the emergency he is ready to meet it.

He must have sufficient mental alertness to appreciate the problem that confronts him and the power of quick reasoning to determine what changes are necessary in his already formulated plan. He must have also the decision to order the execution and stick to his orders.

Any reasonable order in an emergency is better than no order. The situation is there. Meet it. It is better to do something and do the wrong thing than to hesitate, hunt around for the right thing to do and wind up by doing nothing at all. And, having decided on a line of action, stick to it. Don't vacillate. Men have no confidence in an officer who doesn't know his own mind.

Occasionally you will be called upon to meet a situation which no reasonable human being could anticipate. If you have prepared yourself to meet other emergencies which you could anticipate, the mental training you have thereby gained will enable you to act promptly and with calmness.

You must frequently act without orders from higher authority. Time will not permit you to wait for them. Here again enters the importance of studying the work of officers above you. If you have a comprehensive grasp of the entire situation and can form an idea of the general plan of your superiors, that and your previous emergency training will enable you to determine that the responsibility is yours and to issue the necessary orders without delay.

The element of personal dignity is important in military leadership. Be the friend of your men, but do not become their intimate. Your men should stand in awe of you—not fear. If your men presume to become familiar it is your fault, not theirs. Your actions have encouraged them to do so.

And above all things, don't cheapen yourself by courting their friendship or currying their favor. They will despise you for it. If you are worthy of their loyalty and respect and devotion they will surely give all these without asking. If you are not, nothing that you can do will win them.

And then I would mention courage. Moral courage you need as well as physical courage—that kind of moral courage which enables you to adhere without faltering to a determined course of action which your judgment has indicated as the one best suited to secure the desired results.

Every time you change your orders without obvious reason you weaken your authority and impair the confidence of your men. Have the moral courage to stand by your order and see it through.

Moral courage further demands that you assume the responsibility for your own acts. If your subordinates have loyally carried out your orders and the movement you directed is a failure, the failure is yours, not theirs. Yours would have been the honor had it been successful. Take the blame if it results in disaster. Don't try to shift it to a subordinate and make him the goat. That is a cowardly act.

Furthermore, you will need moral courage to determine the fate of those under you. You will frequently be called upon for recommendations for the promotion or demotion of officers and noncommissioned officers in your immediate command.

Keep clearly in mind your personal integrity and the duty you owe your country. Do not let yourself be deflected from a strict sense of justice by feeling of personal friendship. If your own brother is your second lieutenant, and you find him unfit to hold his commission, eliminate him. If you don't, your lack of moral courage may result in the loss of valuable lives.

If, on the other hand, you are called upon for a recommendation concerning a man whom, for personal reasons you thoroughly dislike, do not fail to do him full justice. Remember that your aim is the general good, not the satisfaction of an individual grudge.

I am taking it for granted that you have physical courage. I need not tell you how necessary that is. Courage is more than bravery. Bravery is fearlessness—the absence of fear. The merest dolt may be brave, because he lacks the mentality to appreciate his danger; he doesn't know enough to be afraid.

Courage, however, is that firmness of spirit, that moral backbone, which, while fully appreciating the danger involved, nevertheless goes on with the understanding. Bravery is physical; courage is mental and moral. You may be cold all over; your hands may tremble; your legs may quake; your knees be ready to give way—that is fear. If, nevertheless, you go forward; if in spite of this physical defection you continue to lead your men against the enemy, you have courage. The physical manifestations of fear will pass away. You may never experience them but once. They are the "buck fever" of the hunter who tries to shoot his first deer. You must not give way to them.

A number of years ago, while taking a course in demolitions, the class of which I was a member was handling dynamite. The instructor said regarding its manipulation: "I must caution you gentlemen to be careful in the use of these explosives. One man has but one accident." And so I would caution you. If you give way to the fear that will doubtless beset you in your first action, if you show the white feather, if you let your men go forward while you hunt a shell crater, you will never again have the opportunity of leading those men.

Use judgment in calling on your men for display of physical courage or bravery. Don't ask any man to go where you would not go yourself. If your common sense tells you that the place is too dangerous for you to venture into, then it is too dangerous for him. You know his life is as valuable to him as yours is to you.

Occasionally some of your men must be exposed to danger which you cannot share. A message must be taken across a fire-swept zone. You call for volunteers. If your men know you and know that you are "right" you will never lack volunteers, for they will know your heart is in your work, that you are giving your country the best you have, that you would willingly carry the message yourself if you could. Your example and enthusiasm will have inspired them.

And, lastly, if you aspire to leadership, I would urge you to study men.

Get under their skins and find out what is inside. Some men are quite different from what they appear to be on the surface. Determine the workings of their minds.

Much of Gen Robert E. Lee's success as a leader may be ascribed to his ability as a psychologist. He knew most of his opponents from West Point days, knew the workings of their minds, and he believed that they would do certain things under certain circumstances. In nearly every case he was able to anticipate their movements and block the execution.

You do not know your opponent in this war in the same way. But you can know your own men. You can study each to determine wherein lies his strength and his weakness; which man can be relied upon to the last gasp and which cannot.

Know your men, know your business, know yourself.

Applying Office Leadership Solutions to Internal Audits

Dr. Martin Cain

Internal audit recommendations calling for corrections in behavior from leaders and those they lead can bring about a change in culture and attitudes that may or may not be consistent with overall long-term goals and objectives of achieving excellence. Audit reports have the potential to influence a leader's behavior to act in a manner to satisfy the recommendations from auditors to make improvements. The incentives to comply with audit recommendations ought to be congruent with the leader's desire to earn the trust and cooperation from others and be free to take risks when the potential benefits can justify the actions. In order for leaders to understand and work within the organizational culture they require an awareness of the perceptions resulting from an audit that influences relationships. One study suggested that for best results leaders should understand their subordinates enough to predict the outcomes from their actions and get the intended outcomes.[1] Not knowing the outcomes from an audit could decrease effective results from leadership.

Consequently, this commentary focuses on the non-quantifiable implications from internal auditing. Data was derived from a research study exploring leader perceptions to internal auditing, and the principles gained have application to commercial and governmental organizations with an internal audit function. The conclusions expressed here relate to the identification of leadership outcomes from the writer's research study conducted for a doctoral dissertation for the University of Phoenix. The research included 30 interviews of leaders and an analysis of 10 audit reports published between 2000 and 2004.

Audit vibrations consist of the movement within an organization as a result of internal audit activity. Not only are the economic and financial factors affected, but non-quantifiable factors relating to human relations are also put into motion. Information presented here is in two broad categories: (1) Audit influences are qualitative as well as quantitative; (2) Leadership skills are needed to address audit recommendations from a qualitative perspective of human relations. Leadership skills are detailed into areas of empowerment, management actions, trust and risk taking, and potential leadership benefits from auditing.

Qualitative Implications of Auditing

Influences of leadership are often qualitative and long term. Management influences are often quantitative and short term. Softer principles of leadership are difficult to quantify and include principles such as honesty, being visionary, modeling behavior, listening empathically, displaying kindness, and using long-range system thinking. Management, on the other hand, measures productivity, profits, expenses, and time in short periods such as quarterly or annually. The focus on reporting of short-term results could detract from long-range leadership goals and objectives that are not measured as accurately or frequently.[2] Thus, an audit report could either encourage systems thinking and long-range leadership principles or encourage short-term management reporting that may not be consistent with the leadership. The influences of objectives of an internal audit report could be adjusted to help align this quality resource to long-term leadership objectives.

The value of an internal audit may be distorted if the value is solely based on quantitative data in an audit report and not the impact on human relations within the culture of an organization.[3] The writer's research indicated non-quantifiable implications from audit vibrations including fear, stress, tension, motivation, management behavior, and the perceived quality of the workforce. The motivation of followers and leaders is impacted by tension and fatigue that result from the inspection process.[4] An understanding of both quantitative and non-quantitative aspects from an audit could help leaders make informed decisions and better understand the influence of their actions.

Internal audit reports have an influence on the actions leaders take to prepare for an audit and comply with audit recommendations. For example, if internal auditors identify a potential to save $850 million, then management would be required to take actions to achieve the predicted results. Responses to the audit would require management to use leadership skills to motivate others to comply with changes and achieve the desired savings. A lack of leadership skills in forcing change could result in negative outcomes. The non-quantifiable outcomes generated from management responses to an audit could throw an organization off-balance, force managers to be preoccupied with audit processes, and distract from essential leadership objectives of inspiring others to change.[5] Management actions should also be consistent with efforts to improve or maintain effectiveness and efficiency.

Leadership Skills Are Needed to Address Audit Recommendations

To improve effectiveness and efficiency, management must respond to audit recommendations with actions that will not

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only improve the audit process, but result in effective leadership too. By its nature, an audit tends to focus on attributes and factors that are quantifiable. The audit process also serves as a catalyst that generates numerous outcomes that are not quantifiable and impact team and individual performance. Those outcomes may impact organizational culture and levels of trust in leaders. For example, an audit resulting in additional controls over executive travel expenses could create a change in the culture of leadership and perceived level of trust from subordinates and top management. A change in management can come as a result of the findings and recommendations in an audit report.

The findings and recommendations of audit reports have an influence on the behavior of management and the perceptions of their abilities and intents to establish trust, take appropriate risks, solve problems, and cope with change. An audit often finds discrepancies and faults of management, and the process tends to encourage management to take corrective actions and comply with policies years after an audit is completed. When significant discrepancies are reported through an audit, management can respond with a plan of action to solve the problem. The scrutinizing of management actions can impact the cultural environment and influence perceptions of such qualitative factors as trust from subordinates and limitations on the extent of risk taking that management is willing to allow. Low trust can lead to low collaboration and weaken group effectiveness that could impact the mission of the organization.[6]

One outcome of auditing is the perceived quality of the workforce. To recruit and retain quality people management needs to perform as leaders in a manner that models the behavior they seek. A survey claimed that the number one reason why federal employees left their jobs, other than retirement or personal reasons, was due to poor leadership in the management.[7] The leadership culture requires attention to various aspects of leadership. A survey reported the number one concern about leadership was ineffective communication. Another big concern was inappropriate goal setting.[8] Effective communication should include empathic listening to understand one another and improve group cohesiveness.[9] Inappropriate goal setting may involve goals derived from audit actions that could be misaligned with overall long-term objectives. The organization's structure, processes, and systems should be aligned with the mission and not compete with it or dominate it.[10]

Many influences compete for the attention of leadership. Finding the right formula for successful leadership is a constant challenge. An understanding of the perceptions of audit outcomes could provide insight into how well management models the behavior they seek, how well they listen to subordinates, how well subordinates communicate their perceptions to management, and how well the goals and actions from auditing are aligned with organizational objectives. In short, understanding the perceptions of auditing outcomes could aid in the development and growth of people. Managers can more effectively utilize the audit function through their leadership approach to the empowerment of subordinates; management actions in resolving audit issues; and trust and risk taking. All of these approaches could lead to potential leadership benefits from auditing.

Empowerment

A major part of leadership is growing people by empowering others and giving them training and learning opportunities to broaden their perspectives and abilities.[11] The perceptions from auditing could impact the way management empowers others and promotes trust and appropriate risk taking. As people are developed through empowerment, the culture of trust is impacted. Trust and appropriate risk taking are part of the qualitative culture of leadership. Subordinates need to trust the leaders to be fair and have the best interest of the organization and society as a priority. Of necessity, leaders and empowered subordinates need to be encouraged to take appropriate risks in being innovative in finding solutions to tough problems and encouraging the same in others. Leaders will have a greater insight into how to add value to people when they understand the thoughts and feelings of the people they serve. A lack of success could have serious consequences in accomplishing the mission of the organization. Since leaders need to comply with laws, the findings in audit reports of leaders either complying or not complying with laws and rules could impact the image of leadership by the subordinates and consequently impact trust.[12] Research into leadership perceptions of auditing could impact organizational performance through understanding how well trust is developed.

Management Actions

Since management of materials and processes in an audit can impact the leading of people, management actions taken as a result of an audit could influence the perception of leadership.[13] Attitudes and perceptions of leadership impact retention, morale, productivity, and dedication that are all essential for a healthy organization.[14] Michael Quinn Patton provided an example of the need to focus on more than just the quantifiable outcomes of an audit.[15] An audit may place "too much emphasis on things that can be quantified so that it misses the results . . . that are not easily measured."[16] Examples of those difficult-to-measure outcomes in Patton's example were anxiety, low trust, and an undesirable atmosphere at work.

In responding to audit recommendations, management could be responsible for actions to improve fiscal economies, managerial controls, and logistical outcomes. These managerial actions are designed to provide better policies, structures, and processes to more efficiently utilize resources to achieve effective outcomes.[17] Actions involving saving money or strengthening controls for better long-range outcomes also impact the people that carry out those actions. The statements and actions of the managers simultaneously affect the image and identity of the organization.[18] Audit actions then in theory could contribute to the identity and image of the organization that could impact perceptions that influence trust.

Trust and Risk Taking

A lack of trust could be motivated by leader managers not modeling the behavior they desire in others or giving directions that are inconsistent. Major motivators of management actions are internal audit reports that not only report on the effectiveness of management's actions, but also give recommendations and record actions taken, or to be taken, by management to improve operations. The perceptions of subordinates on those actions may be a hidden factor that is not part of the decision criteria.

A lack of appropriate risk taking could be related to management actions of not empowering subordinates or requiring compliance to internal controls that may be tied to short-term quantifiable measures rather than long-term or qualitative factors. Again, this condition is related to leadership and could also be interrelated with action involving an audit. Semler reported that he removed many policy manuals from his company (Semco) and relied on his managers to make good decisions that impacted their stewardship.[19] This non-quantifiable control of trust resulted in a better control than the measured controls that existed in policy manuals designed to maintain order. The overall long-term outcome of the non-quantifiable controls resulted in survival and profits for the company when competitors were losing profits. Empowering subordinates is just one management resource that could be impacted by an audit report.

Potential Leadership Benefits from Auditing

The worth of the audit function will increase as the leadership outcomes from auditing are better understood. The audit effort influences leadership and the effectiveness of their organizations. Effective leadership is essential in maintaining the public trust, accountability for resources, and a commitment to objectives. Just as businesses may have a calling to operate, the leadership business has a calling to accomplish extraordinary objectives that could impact the world.[20]

Aligning Cultures. Aligning the valuable audit resource with objectives of creating a culture to better understand the perceptions of those impacted by an audit could make the investment in auditing more beneficial. Auditing can be a tool in the transformational process for subordinates.[21] When subordinates are more involved in the audit process, their reactions to the process could be more favorable and lead to increased motivation rather than have their culture level collide with the culture from the top executives.[22] Schein pointed out that researchers like Lewin, Argyris, McGregor, and Likert all agreed that employee involvement was a key to effective leadership.[23] Increased leadership performance could result in better discipline and motivation. Non-quantifiable costs and benefits are essential to make effective leadership decisions.[24]

The culture can be manifested in the roles people play. Under the leader-role theory described by Bass, "Leaders behave according to what is expected of them."[25] If the image of the organization defines the leader's role as one that takes immediate and decisive action to solve a problem, the actions help form attitudes and perceptions. The same principle could be applied to followers that they in turn would behave according to what is expected of them. Thus the transformational role of leaders may be acted out without conscience direction of the implications from the roles played.[26] The role of an authoritarian leader could produce one result, and the role of a democratic leader could produce another. Those results are a manifestation of the changes initiated by the leaders, using the culture of the organization.

Better Leadership Outcomes. Understanding, learning, and morale are all essential ingredients for improved leadership. Leaders cannot get followers to understand them until the leaders understand the followers. As Kunich and Lester put it, "Leaders need to know and understand their subordinates."[27]

The audit function can either focus on policing efforts for management or emphasize learning and consulting.[28] Although an audit may conduct studies to assess compliance with laws, policies, and regulations, an audit can also act as feedback to improve effectiveness of operations. Auditing should support every level of management, with middle managers the prime customers in a stewardship environment, to give high-performance potential to human resource policies.[29]

The morale and emotional well-being of subordinates determine the effectiveness of operations and should be a major emphasis of the audit function.[30] When top management is the primary customer of auditing, it gives the appearance that auditors act as the eyes, ears, and voice of top management and creates a "separation between those who do the work and those that manage the work."[31] The Government Accountability Office and its standards are an example of "policing in the name of help."[32]

Audits stimulate change. Kanter recognized the need for involvement to get people to change.[33] Leadership is required to create the involvement to lower the resistance to change. Wren noticed that resistance builds when trying to force people to analyze assumptions in their work.[34] Actions forced on people from auditing can also create the same resistance or compliance, depending on the participation and involvement of those required to change. Chris Argyris was quoted as saying, "An organization will be most effective when its leadership provides the means whereby followers may make a creative contribution to it as a natural outgrowth of their needs for growth, self-expression, and maturity."[35] Followers of auditing outcomes may also make creative contributions to resolve audit findings and be enthused about the improvement process. Participative leadership suggests leaders create the conditions for members of the group to feel free to actively solve problems.[36] Understanding and effective leadership can overcome much resistance to change and the related cultural values.

Senge also cautioned against short-term fixes, which only appear to make problems go away. Cause and effect are separated by time and space, and the effect of changes may not happen for a long time after the changes are made. The effects of some actions may not appear for years, giving management the impression that the short-term fix was effective. The strategies used to fix problems in the present should not be structured to set off a chain of events that will require more attention and resources in the future.[38] Watered-down compromises that reflect murky assumptions could be full of contradictions that decrease trust and support from subordinates who are left to face the effects of management actions.

Furthermore, Senge warned that the process of emphasizing financial accounting, for example, as the only system to deal with neglects the dynamic complexity of the conditions that create the accounting reports.[39] By the same principles, an audit that focuses only on financial or economic systems may neglect the long-term impact from the soft systems that manage the accounting systems.

Systems Thinking. The human side of systems thinking increases understanding of the humans involved and the corporate culture in which they operate.[40] The culture, attitudes, and assumptions of the followers will impact the way they perceive the leaders. The integrity, discipline, and desires of the followers will determine what they consider important. If the goal of a worker is to gain material goods through the easiest route, the behavior may reflect the attitude. If the goal of the worker is personal mastery and growth, the behavior could be significantly different.

The soft systems may be hard to quantify. Senge wrote, "No one will ever be able to measure to three decimal places how much personal mastery contributes to productivity and the bottom line."[41] He defines personal mastery as the discipline to clarify personal vision and as seeing reality objectively.[42]

Leadership Outcomes. Likewise, the non-quantifiable outcomes from leadership may not be tied directly to profits, but all outcomes have an impact. Actions that take away from subordinates' desires for personal mastery and growth could be detrimental to exceptional productivity. Actions that transform people into better people are the results of positive leadership outcomes. Sensitive leaders need to cultivate the true dedication and innovation from subordinates who are part of the complex soft systems involving organizations and the nonquantifiable leadership perceptions and outcomes from auditing.

Conclusions

Management responses to audit recommendations could merge with the broad responsibilities of human relations and political environment, or management could ignore the implications of their actions and just direct that the changes be made. Directing the solutions can be a short-term solution, while participatory or democratic leadership could lead to more lasting solutions that followers agree to accomplish.

Managers need caution in implementing changes from audit recommendations. Block warned leaders to be cautious in implementing change all at once toward one culture with only one means.[43] Block claimed the intentions could be "destined to evoke compliance, not commitment."[44] One remedy to management would be to follow Block's recommendation to give people at the bottom more control on how to make changes, rather than have the top managers dictate consistency. One leader stated he only prepared policy letters to appease the auditors, not to effect change. The lower managers would be more aware of the environment and organizational behavior circumstances that would allow a stronger commitment to change. If auditing supported middle managers, it would give high-performance potential to the human resources.[45] This could be accomplished by the audit reports being issued to lower level managers or by top managers sharing the decision-making power with those closer to the solutions.

An audit report can also act as feedback to improve effectiveness of operations. In that regard, the audit function focuses on learning and consulting.[46] The consulting aspect of auditing is a quality control that invests in people. Audit reports act either directly or indirectly as a consultant to help management be effective. Management effectiveness could be enhanced with effective leadership styles that promote commitment.

To give up the command-and-control mentality, management would need to use the audit function as an authentic service unit rather than strictly a quality control function separate from the human relations environment. Management understanding of the audit vibrations would be a step closer in the progress to a high-performance organization rather than a high-compliance organization. In addition to quantifiable criteria, high-performance organizations also would require internal controls over the non-quantifiable perceptions to provide reasonable assurance of meeting objectives.

The accompanying impacts of auditing can be detrimental to an organization. Michel Power described the impact of auditing on organizations in a non-quantifiable manner.[47] Power wrote, "Worse still, audits may turn organizations on their heads and generate excessive preoccupations with, often costly, auditable processes."[48] Success for the auditors is often determined by management performance and quality results that are largely defined in terms of conformity to the audit process.[49]

Managers often require conformity to audit standards and compliance with rules. The short- and long-term impact of the audit reports should be included if management desires an extensive evaluation of the value of auditing. An audit emphasis on economics supports Power's claim that one reason for the expansion of auditing is that if cost-effectiveness is defined in terms of money, then "the technical and political complexity of defining and measuring outcomes is avoided."[50] The non-quantifiable leadership perceptions from auditing could contribute to the body of knowledge on the outcomes of auditing.

An audit report with recommendations to bring about changes rarely shows the root cause of a problem to be ineffective leadership, yet O'Toole explained the identification of ineffective leadership was the failure to bring about successful change.[51]

O'Toole suggested it was the more non-quantifiable roots of leadership that contributed to inappropriate behavior.[52] Audit reports that only address procedures could possibly be more effective in serving management with suggestions on how their leadership could be improved. The leader's beliefs and assumptions, especially about the usefulness of auditing, could be the root cause of some of the problems identified in audit reports.

O'Toole suggests leaders listen more to the needs of the followers to understand how to overcome their natural resistance to change.[53] Audit reports generally do not have a recommendation for leaders to listen to those responsible for the problems. Listening and understanding shows respect, and respect results in trust that is essential for leaders to lead. An audit recommendation based on human resources rather than a financial return could possibly improve the success rate of implementing changes. Subordinate and lower-level management participation and involvements are keys to success in the formula for better leadership outcomes. Whether or not the audit recommends greater involvement of the stakeholders in getting them to accept changes, management could follow the recognition of Kanter that subordinates need to be involved in the solutions and implementation of changes.[54]

Both auditors and management could face barriers to change. Bureaucratic culture of top-down change, short-term thinking, and an emphasis on status quo can present a barrier to needed changes. Managers who take appropriate risks may not be excused from violating any rules. Yet, needed changes in processes often require changes to previous rules and policies. Auditors and upper management working together could improve audit outcomes by promoting a culture of maintaining stability and control. Management could respond to auditing by either enforcing rules that were set up to avoid problems or empowering lower levels to get the desired results by the best means available.

The audit process may not be the sole issue in light of the perceptions of leaders on the audit process. Recent research indicated a need for leaders to create the conditions for subordinates to be productive.[55] Braye reported on a case in times past when the military surveyed enlisted members as if the enlisted people were the problem.[56] Indications later appeared that the problem was in those leading the enlisted members. The leaders were neglecting their role to create conditions of trust and understanding. Braye noticed it was a lack of awareness of the concerns of enlisted members that resulted in the unacceptable conditions. Likewise, the awareness of auditors of their influence on leaders and the leaders' awareness of the auditing influences on their behavior could be factors in the organizational culture. To gain or maintain trust and understanding, both auditing and management could benefit from understanding the perceptions of their actions on others. The actions of the leaders need to show concern for the followers.

Recommendations

The research exploration of non-quantifiable leadership perceptions supports the following recommendations for management to either do or continue to do as they strive for excellence.

1. Managers closer to audit findings should resolve the issues, using knowledge of the culture and audit perceptions to guide their decisions.

2. Management responses to auditing should take the emotional well-being of their people into consideration when giving directions that result from audit recommendations.

3. Management should raise awareness of the perceptions of the policing aspect of auditing and adjust actions to compensate for those perceptions.

4. Organizational management should be aware of audit outcomes in order to be a step closer in the progress to a high-performance organization rather than a high-compliance organization.

5. The internal audit focus should expand to serve management with suggestions on how their leadership could be improved.

6. Internal auditing should expand to include recommendations based on human resources and relationships rather than economics to improve the success rate of implementing changes.

7. Auditing and management should address the leadership methods through an open system, recognizing multiple influences including the soft systems of human interrelations.

8. Management should bring in a systems thinking approach when responding to an audit to include the soft systems of the human activities.[57]

Implications from the above recommendations would be positive, however, resources would be required to expand the use of auditing and apply additional understanding and knowledge to making changes. The investment should be worth the effort in the long-term as the organization runs more efficiently and effectively to perform its mission.

Summary

The exploration of the perceptions of leaders influenced by auditing indicated management concepts of structure and control were emphasized at the expense of leadership concepts of human relations. The management functions of auditing and strengthening internal controls were separated from the leadership role of understanding human emotions and effectively motivating followers to make changes. While auditing is a management tool, the activity should be combined with leadership roles to fully benefit from auditing. A leadership focus in the audit process as a cause of either positive or negative findings could be a method of integrating management with the leadership role and becoming more effective at both managing and leading. Also, a leadership emphasis in taking management action and implementing changes could make the effort more effective in leading people and creating the conditions for them to be productive. People and organizations win when leadership skills are applied to management actions on audit recommendations.

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Resource Management for Commanders: An Evolving Strategy

Lt Col Paul G. Hough

The complexity of a modern Air Force, coupled with its global field of operations, has been great; the complexities which face a smaller Air Force in physical size will be even greater in the future because the limitation of funds and of personnel will not permit of the margin of safety against error given by multiple projects, but will require a more accurate selectivity of projects and a more intense follow-up of the application of limited funds allocated to such projects. In short, we must be sure that every dollar allocated goes to the most needed project and we must get a full dollar's worth out of every dollar expended.

—Robert A. Lovett

Effective resource management is a key responsibility of all commanders. Exactly how commanders should discharge their responsibility is an issue of great importance. Since the creation of the Air Force in 1947, there has been continuing debate about which resource management strategy would provide the greatest incentives for efficient operations commensurate with the commander's authority. This debate basically centers on two dimensions: the extent to which funding should be decentralized and the level of flexibility to be afforded the commander. In general, decentralization and flexibility should work together. Decentralization of funds without the ability to move them where needed adds little more to the mission than additional accounting workload. Although Air Force and Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) initiatives in the past five decades have tended to increase the level of funding control and flexibility at installation level, there has been significant resistance at every step. Nonetheless, decentralization as an operating philosophy has gained preeminence in thought and practice. After briefly reviewing the history of Air Force budgetary experience, this paper explores the role of the commander in today's fiscally constrained defense environment.

Origins of Centralized Funding

With the establishment of the Air Force came the need to develop its own budget and accounting systems at all levels of command. On 12 July 1949, the Air Force published Air Force Regulation (AFR) 170-10, *Comptroller – Wing Commands,* which instituted a comptroller staff section in Air Force wings worldwide.[1] Like the directors of most federal agencies, military commanders prepared budgets by identifying the categories of resources (equipment, personnel, construction, and so on) and their total cost. The comptroller had a fiduciary responsibility to make sure that funds appropriated for these purposes were spent only for those purposes and in a legal manner. For the commander, the congressional appropriation structure was, and remains, the fundamental constraint on flexible funds management. Commanders do not have the authority to spend money appropriated for one purpose on another project. For example, the Air Force cannot use military personnel funds to pay for additional military construction without explicit reprogramming approval from Congress. In a truly unified budget, the commander would be given a total sum of money and told to execute the mission as he or she saw fit. Instead, Air Force leaders instituted other financial controls on top of the basic appropriation structure to ensure that commanders operated within narrow funding boundaries. Such devices include floors (minimum spending), ceilings (maximum amounts), and fenced or protected categories of spending. Finally, some funding categories were simply removed from the purview of the commander through centrally controlled accounts. The commander's financial duties were limited indeed.

Perhaps because there was so little flexibility, some commanders paid only lip service to the virtues of economy and efficiency. Generally, the commander's time was better spent trying to obtain more resources rather than trying to use existing funds more wisely. In fact, there has been a common perception in the resource management community that this problem is most profound among our operators. Commanders argued that they were warriors, that all their needs were wartime essential, and that the nation had a duty to fund those needs without question. The same arguments have been used with military failures, in particular, bantered about as glaring examples of impoverished funding instead of evidence pointing to ineffective and inefficient use of resources. Effectiveness, not efficiency, has always been the measure of command.

> Traditionally, the Air Force has measured the effectiveness of its units in terms of ratings on operational readiness inspection(s), accident rates, operational readiness of aircraft, combat crew readiness, etc. When a unit met these criteria well and its base was well kept, the commander was inevitably headed for bigger things. Missing from that evaluation was the test of cost. Despite great effort to provide this test, it is still missing—that is, missing in any simple, identifiable, meaningful form.[2]

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In the first two decades after the inception of the Air Force, commanders operated in a highly centralized system that greatly constrained their flexibility to accomplish assigned missions. An attitude that financial management was of little importance to commanders would prove to be detrimental whenever Congress reduced the flow of funds. However, the pendulum started to move in the other direction beginning in the late 1960s.

Budget Reform

In the 1950s, Air Force commanders relied upon the Financial Management System (FMS) for resource decision making. Unfortunately, the FMS was incapable of providing commanders with a detailed breakdown on how units were spending their money. The accounting system could provide either the *total* amount spent by each unit or a breakdown by category of expense for the wing but was unable to provide line-item detail by squadron. In other words, commanders could request information on *who* spent how much money or *what* it was spent on, but not both.[3] The lack of historical budget information greatly complicated the commander's job of executing the budget and preparing budget justifications for major commands, many of which required line-item detail for all temporary duty trips, each piece of equipment, and so on.[4]

In 1961, Robert McNamara began implementation of the most significant management revolution since the 1947 National Security Act. His Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) was a departmental-level budget tool that centralized budgetary control within the OSD. Despite the apparent increase in control, it was McNamara's stated philosophy to assign decisions to the lowest level of the organization that could intelligently make them. In practice, however, bureaucracy rarely releases decision-making power to lower levels. Defending himself against critics of this centralizing tendency of PPBS, McNamara suggested that the real problem of PPBS stemmed from a "difference of opinion, I'll say, between me and the services as to whether they were competent to make the decision. And if you just take that illustration—Was the Air Force chief of staff competent to make the decision on the number of Minutemen we should have? Not on your life."[5] In other words, the proper demarcation line between centralization and decentralization is a matter of opinion.

The controversy over PPBS had a silver lining in that commanders everywhere began to pay at least some attention to budgetary matters. Furthermore, the pressure of financing the Vietnam War without a tax increase meant that efficiency became a concern of some commanders, although effectiveness was still the overarching measure of success. The elevation of the commander's resource-management duties was reinforced by the Department of Defense's (DOD) Primary Management Effort (Project PRIME) in the late 1960s. Project PRIME gave the Air Force the Resource Management System (RMS) still in use today.

The problem with the implementation of RMS was that commanders were not given the authority and flexibility to make cost-beneficial trade-offs that were now apparent with greater cost visibility. Lt Gen Charles S. Blanton, USAF, retired, argued strongly against the system and continued to maintain that commanders should not be held accountable for resources over which they have little control.

The focus of PRIME was to improve the commander's execution of the operating budget by making him or her aware of trade-offs between types of resources. The backbone of the plan was a new center where work was performed (a squadron could have one or more cost-centers accounting system that charged Operations and Maintenance, and Military Personnel costs to cost) and aggregate these cost centers into responsibility centers at a higher level of command at the wing (typically wing and group commanders). Accounting reports now provided both the *what* and the *who* for commanders. The new system was thought to be necessary because commanders budgeted for so little of the actual resources needed to execute the mission. An Air Command and Staff College student report from 1979 noted that prior to PRIME and RMS, units were charged with approximately 20% of their operating costs. There was little incentive to use 'free' resources efficiently. The Resource Management System, the major DOD program for managing resources, was developed to deal with this situation."[6] The other 80 percent of the costs, such as military personnel, aviation petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), and depot maintenance, were centrally funded. The RMS's guiding philosophy was that individuals and organizations that consume resources should be responsible for budgeting and accounting for those resources. In other words, the commander should be accountable for mission efficiency as well as mission effectiveness.

> I think a wing commander's job is a wonderful job left to those things he can properly control and have the authority to do it or not to do it. Flying hours he has no control over. He's going to fly his training missions . . . or he's not going to be wing commander very long. Now, therefore, anything that's consumed as a result of those flying hours ought to be essentially provided to him based on some standards. If he goes above standards in consumption of those related resources then we ought to look at why and try to fix the why. Not kill him because he went above the standards. Therefore, what's really available and controllable at the wing level is ten percent of the dollar.[7]

Although some schemes were developed to force commanders to make trade-off decisions between the cost of military personnel and operating and maintenance funds, the mechanisms were eliminated due to the fundamental congressional constraint on appropriation integrity. Moreover, while cost visibility for commanders was a stated goal of PRIME, another aim was to develop an accounting feedback that related actual expenses to the budget developed through PPBS. In other words, if the Air Force president's budget submission requested and justified X dollars in program element Y for a given fiscal year, the RMS system would show how much was actually spent in that program element. Thus, the new system presented a new control technique or higher headquarters which now had much greater visibility into how units actually spent their funds. The ability to centralize and constrain commanders was greatly enhanced. Despite failing to provide an objective test of a commander's financial performance, the new budget system certainly raised cost visibility in Air Force operating units and led to calls for decentralized fiscal management. Subsequent reforms and the post-cold-war downsizing would eventually lead to a much more decentralized environment where efficiency is almost on an equal plane with effectiveness.

Decentralized Funds Management

A common complaint within DOD is that congressional controls on spending prevent more efficient financial execution. In point of fact, DOD demonstrated that commanders could save money with fungible resources through the Unified Budget Test in the late eighties. Although Congress would not provide the authority to continue or expand the experiment, it did give commanders more flexibility by raising the threshold for defining investment equipment (appropriation 3080). In the early 1980s, an investment was just about anything that cost over $5,000. Commanders had to budget for a separate appropriation to buy industrial equipment for their units. Since then, the threshold has been raised four times and is now $100,000 (proposals to raise the threshold to $500,000 in fiscal year [FY] 2000 were denied). For all practical purposes, Congress has eliminated one category of appropriation that was limiting a unit commander's flexibility. Yet many other controls which bother operating-level commanders are inflicted by the Air Force. It is the Air Force, not Congress, which so frequently establishes centrally controlled pots of spending rather than releasing funding to the field and allowing them to keep any savings. It is the Air Force, not Congress, which implements commanders' kitties and withholds every description to fund pet projects and to maintain reserves for unforeseen execution-year bills. The Air Force's Resource Management provides headquarters staffs with the tools for tremendous central control but is equally capable of decentralized funds control. Decentralization is becoming a reality due to the confluence of many events and senior-leader support.

Some of the more significant financial reforms at the operating level in recent years have been the decentralization of funds for depot-level reparables and aviation POL. Commanders now manage the funding for millions of dollars of resources associated with the flying-hour program. The underlying assumption, as with Project PRIME, is that commanders should be responsible for the resources they use and that they can influence the rate at which those resources are consumed. Likewise, higher levels of command are reducing the number and extent of withholds they maintain and, instead, are pushing the funds down to the bases. In effect, the commands are telling wing commanders to do the job with what they have and not to come back for more money because the vast majority of funds are being given out at the beginning of the fiscal year. Unfortunately, today's funding levels are probably much less than requirements and current standards dictate. In short, the Air Force has passed its funding shortfalls down to those who are closest to the problem—the commanders.

Ten Tips for Commanders

1. Assess the financial health of your unit as soon as possible after taking command. The exercise of control over resources and the budget process is a major source of power for commanders far beyond the formal authority of their rank and position. Commanders at all levels must ensure that their priorities and resource philosophies are incorporated into budgets and implemented during execution.

2. Understand the role of the comptroller. The comptroller is the wing's chief financial officer. He or she is the wing commander's key advisor for reviewing budget requests, validating the wing's requirements, and providing recommendations for the best use of resources to achieve the unit mission.

3. Get more out of your comptroller. Ask your comptroller what he or she can do in addition to the current level of financial services to help you get more out of the existing budget. If you aren't sure how the comptroller can help you, ask him or her what you need and what he or she offers.

4. Carefully define the role of your comptroller on the wing staff. There are many advisors at your disposal. Set boundaries and mark territory accordingly. Make your expectations clear that commanders and wing staff members work in harmony despite increasingly tight budgets.

5. Ensure that the real needs of the mission are funded before dollars are allocated to any pet projects. When resources are shrinking, commanders must realistically review unit missions and determine bottom-line levels of funding necessary.

6. Balance the needs of the mission with infrastructure and quality-of-life concerns. Financing current mission readiness at the expense of long-term infrastructure and unit morale is the military equivalent of the businessman's preoccupation with the quarterly balance sheet. The commander must ensure that the unit is viable in both the short and long run.

7. Keep an open mind about the difference between needs and wants in the lean resource environment of today. Old paradigms about what base services are essential must be discarded to preserve combat power.

8. In light of the need for new operating paradigms, commanders must be careful when economizing. Instead of a lean and mean organization, you may end up with one that is weaker and demoralized. Downsizing, outsourcing, privatization, business processing, reengineering, Quality Air Force, and other management tools are only means to an end. Use these methods only if they preserve capability in the face of declining resources.

9. Pick the right person for your own resource advisor. Even the wing commander will have a resource advisor supporting resource management for the wing staff. Most squadron commanders will not have an authorized position for this job, meaning the commander will have to eat the man-hours out of hide. However, a good resource advisor will "earn" you a good return on the investment. This person should either have some knowledge of the Resource Management System or at least an aptitude for numbers and a desire to learn.

10. Remember, the mission is second only to the law. Appropriated dollars must be used for their general purpose according to the funding guidance from command and according to the "plain meaning" of the law. When in doubt about the propriety of any expenditure, always contact your comptroller and staff judge advocate.

Resource Management Today

Commanders have a very difficult job. Along with all the other pressures of command, they are expected to perform to the same level as their predecessors, even as operating budgets are cut from year to year. Although everyone knows that eventually less will yield less, no commander wants to be the first to have to cut back on the standards of performance and service established over many years. Nonetheless, many commanders will have to do just that.

There is no magic formula for success in the era of retrenchment. More than ever, commanders must learn the basic lingo of the Resource Management System, ensure they are receiving effective advice, and use the existing corporate-board process (the Financial Working Group and Financial Management Board at installation level) to establish their firm requirements and to share ideas. Commanders should be receptive to new ways of doing business and to the resources available to them—in particular, their own people. Above all, commanders must ensure that funds entrusted to them are spent legally. As resources become ever more constrained, commanders are being held to a tighter standard of accountability. Although a legal search turned up no courts-martial for any fiscal matters through 1996, there have been some "close" calls in recent years. Administrative action, including being relieved of command, is more likely in the event of abuse of funds. In brief, there are four rules that commanders must follow to ensure fiscal propriety.

1. Ensure that expenses are necessary to accomplish the mission. Keep in mind that even if the expenses are necessary, the purchase is illegal if prohibited by law or provided for in another appropriation. For example, European bases need coal to heat their facilities. Coal is a necessary expense, but the commander must buy American coal. Congress requires the military to purchase US coal, so use of the 3400 appropriation to buy German coal would be an improper purchase. Likewise, aircraft hangars are necessary expenses of the operational mission. However, Congress provides funds for these purposes in the Military Construction Appropriation, so commanders cannot use Operations and Maintenance funds to build major facilities.

2. Do not overspend your budget. Funds are allocated to subordinate units from the Air Force down according to a strict procedure to ensure compliance with the Anti-Deficiency Act (e.g., agencies cannot spend more than allocated by Congress). Violators of this act are reported to Congress through the secretary of defense by name. Although an overobligation in your unit may not result in an antideficiency violation, at a minimum, the comptroller will have to take funds from other places to cover the deficit. You will *not* be the envy of your fellow commanders.

3. Make sure you adhere to the "bona fide need" rule. This legal doctrine states that the current year's funding must be spent on requirements that arose during the fiscal year. Advance funding of next year's mess attendant's contract with this year's money is illegal.

4. Use your common sense. In the course of your command, you will probably be asked to spend money on many different purposes. If such purpose is not directly essential to the mission or unjustly enriches you or your troops, it is probably illegal. Have your resource advisor check the law and follow it. The "plain meaning" doctrine states that the law says what it says, not what you want it to say or think it might mean. Your comptroller and staff judge advocate will be happy to advise you.

The challenges now faced by commanders are unlikely to go away soon. The problems of the larger federal budget will continue to pressure the defense budget, which remains the nation's largest category of discretionary spending. Fortunately, the trend in the Air Force towards a more decentralized and flexible system of financial management is giving commanders the authority to make the hard decisions.

Conclusion

As we draw down in size, the financial responsibilities of commanders have become vastly more important. Undoubtedly, this requires greater management attention (an extremely finite resource) to budgeting and financial issues. Wing commanders properly prefer to devote the bulk of their energies to the air and space mission. This is as it should be. However, today's commanders can no longer successfully argue, if they ever could, that the nation should fully fund their every request so that they can exclusively concentrate on war fighting. Through a long series of reforms, the Air Force has sought increased efficiency at the operating level. The constant theme has been to put greater responsibility for budget execution in the hands of the wing and subordinate commanders. It doesn't have to be this way. A more typical bureaucratic response is to take away decision-making authority as fiscal pressures mount. Whether the pendulum continues to swing towards decentralization depends directly on the performance of commanders in the field.

Notes

1. Jerome J. Scheela, "A Comparison of the Comptroller's Organizations in the Departments of the Military Establishment" (unpublished paper from the George Washington University Navy Graduate Comptrollership Program, January 1956), 24.
2. Lt Gen Duward L. Crow, "Air Force Management," *Air University Review* 21, no. 2 (January–February 1970): 1–18.
3. Adolph Kastenholz Jr., "The Dilemma of Financial Management" (thesis, Air University, Squadron Officer School, 1961), 8–9.
4. Ibid., 16.
5. Robert S. McNamara, interviewed by author, Washington, D.C., 29 June 1993.
6. James E. Chittick, "Installation Research Report," student research report (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1979), 2.
7. Lt Gen Charles S. Blanton, USAF, retired, interviewed by author, 23 June 1993.

NATO 1988–1991: Historical Leadership as Viewed through Three Lenses

Gen John A. Shaud, PhD

This article provides valuable historical insight from a senior officer's perspective on three different functional levels of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Such observations are particularly useful because (1) momentous changes were occurring during this period (June 1988 through July 1991); and (2) SHAPE itself represents the most highly advanced collective security alliance to have evolved in contemporary times. The author's penetrating analysis offers readers a clear view into each of the working staff levels—action officers; deputy chief of staff (DCS), Operations; and the chief of staff—to illustrate how they individually and collectively contribute to the security of a complex international alliance. With the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union and the further uncertainty this introduces, it is all the more important for senior leaders to understand the Atlantic alliance and the United States's role as a key member.

Any comprehensive attempt to analyze the events of the last few years at SHAPE would be challenging. Even a basic summary of the years from 1988 through 1991 and an analysis of their significance will probably keep scholars and historians occupied for decades. It might even be argued that it is too early to begin to understand the amazing series of events that together marked the end of the cold war. Nevertheless, by virtue of my becoming SHAPE's chief of staff in June 1988, I arrived at Mons [Belgium] in a position to observe what surely must have been the most historic three-year period in the North Atlantic Alliance's history. If it were possible to capture the essence of what went on in Europe during that period with one word, then that word would be *change.* We have seen dramatic change—almost unbelievable change—over the last three years.

Despite the difficulties in dealing with this atmosphere of change, it is worthwhile to try to understand it within the framework from which military staff professionals must operate. This article is therefore organized from the points of view of three working levels at SHAPE headquarters. It begins with the perspective of the action officer, who might be from any one of the several divisions or scores of branches at SHAPE. Afterwards, it moves on to examine events from the viewpoint of DCS/Operations. That position, then occupied by German Lt Gen Helge Hansen, had been one of the focal points for dealing with the security changes occasioned by outside events. General Hansen was responsible for the orchestration of the policy, intelligence, and operations divisions—and, in particular, for reconciling the differences between present reality and the vision of an uncertain future. Finally, the article summarizes my own views as chief of staff. My job was to bring order out of chaos. In speeches, I sometimes compared SHAPE to a 2,000-pound ball bearing rolling toward an objective. Over the years, scores of generals have put their shoulders to the ball bearing and thought that they were steering. Clearly, Gen John R. Galvin, the supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR)—assisted by a dedicated and professional staff—was steering and had succeeded in adapting his command to meet the challenge of significant change. The outline of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) new strategy emerged during this time period. NATO defined it in terms of peace, crisis, and conflict.

A strategy for peace allowed us to cement NATO's role and relevance. A strategy for crisis permitted the alliance to deal with the kinds of events we later witnessed in the Gulf. And a strategy for conflict, based in part on the experiences and lessons of the past, will be helpful in deterring or ending warfare quickly in an uncertain future.

The Action Officer's Perspective

Experience has revealed that the typical action officer at SHAPE is an experienced and hard-working professional. Consumed with daily tasks, he or she labors intently with the energy and capability that keeps SHAPE going. But it is also true to say that the typical action officer, whom I will call "Snuffy," is not terribly impressed by the large bureaucracy for which he or she works. It is fair to say that this attitude is shared by large numbers of staff officers, whether they work at the Pentagon, in the Ministry of Defense at Bonn, or in Whitehall. Despite this lack of regard for bureaucracy, the typical action officer *is* impressed by events. Four events, in particular, riveted Snuffy's attention. The first took place in 1988, the second in 1989, the third in 1990, and the fourth was the Persian Gulf War.

The first memorable event occurred on 7 December 1988 at the United Nations (UN). On that day, Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev made an address before the General Assembly and promised several things. Among these were unilateral military reductions, troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, promises on human rights, pledges of openness, and a call for economic reform. In one startling moment, Gorbachev seemed to be declaring that the Soviet Union would henceforth adopt a truly defensive doctrine and seek to rejoin the community of Europe.

Not surprisingly, this public pronouncement captured the world's attention. It also captured the attention of Snuffy, who was in a unique position to help participate in any official response to the details of the speech. Predictably, the response from SHAPE action officers was cautious. While they

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certainly welcomed Gorbachev's remarks, they adopted a wait-and-see attitude, with the prevailing wisdom being, "We wish him well, but let's keep our powder dry!" This caution was occasioned in part by the knowledge that Soviet numerical superiority was so pronounced that any reductions even on the scale offered would still not produce anything like real parity. Talking was always easier than real action, and NATO needed to remain watchful.

The second most memorable event was every bit as exciting to the action officer as the first had been. Actually, it was a series of events that led to the dramatic moment when the Berlin Wall came down on 9 November 1989. What began as a trickle of immigrants in the summer swelled to a flood in the fall as East Germans scrambled into Hungary. Vacillation and then a crackdown by the East German authorities accelerated the situation. After initially seeking safety in the West German embassy in Budapest, the East Germans then began crossing the open border to Austria and finally made their way in larger numbers to West Germany. The German Democratic Republic, which was democratic in name only, was hemorrhaging its best and brightest hopes for the future. The Berlin Wall's coming down was a logical result of more than 40 years of political illogic—the unnatural division of the German people. And it was the masses of people, not soldiers or politicians, who brought the wall down.

Snuffy was an eyewitness to these emotional events, as were many millions of television viewers around the world. SHAPE was involved in a command post exercise at the time—working together in the bunker with a closeness that only the focus of an exercise brings—and the emotion was tangible. By the way, this particular exercise may be recorded some day as the last of the cold war. Action officers at SHAPE knew they were witnessing an event that would fundamentally change the geopolitical and international security architecture of Europe. They knew also that the world they and their predecessors had dealt with for more than 40 years was likely gone forever. And from the moment the Berlin Wall was breached, the countdown to the unification of Germany and the liberation of Eastern Europe began.

These first two dramatic events took place on the world's stage. The third most memorable event for Snuffy took place at SHAPE itself. Despite its not making the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) or Cable News Network (CNN), it was every bit as significant as the first two events on the lives of scores of staff officers. In many ways it culminated the events of 1988, 1989, and even 1990 in a very personal way.

The chairman of the Soviet Defense Staff, Gen Mikhail Moiseyev, visited SHAPE on Friday, 26 October 1990. Moiseyev's official visit was conducted in a professional atmosphere. In other words, it was cordial without being marked by hearty fellowship. After a face-to-face meeting with the SACEUR, he had lunch with the senior staff and attended a series of briefings. After about five hours, SHAPE action officers came away with several impressions. First, Moiseyev was very much his own man and did not just mouth the words provided him by his staff. Moreover, he was not afraid to reveal problems in the Soviet Union, and these tracked with what the SHAPE staff already knew about problems with ethnocentrism and economics. Yet Moiseyev was able to underscore that, for all its troubles, the Soviet Union maintained a formidable military capability. All of this made a huge impression on the SHAPE action officer, who was now seeing the "enemy" invited to speak in NATO's own military headquarters.

The fourth event during this dramatic period that so impressed Snuffy transfixed the world. The Gulf War made some indelible impressions on all of us, but four things stood out in particular from the action officer's viewpoint. First, the Gulf War demonstrated conclusively that the world remains a dangerous place. The optimism that came as a result of the Berlin Wall's coming down—and all the subsequent events—was thoroughly tempered by reality. Second, the SHAPE action officer noted the pervasiveness of real-time reporting in war. CNN and network news programs had a profound impact on the development of the crisis and the war. Events took place and were reported with virtually no delay. Public perceptions and policy became a true military "center of gravity" as a result of the electronic revolution witnessed on a day-by-day basis. Decision making at all levels was affected. Third, the action officer learned firsthand about the hard realities of rapid reaction forces—and especially about the logistical complexities of moving and sustaining them. Finally, but certainly not least of all, the SHAPE staff was impressed by the coalition's military response. It was impressed by the combat capability and integration of the high-quality and high-tech military forces. Perhaps some of the hard work on "Rules of Engagement" during NATO exercises paid off in combat. And, of course, Snuffy was most impressed with the results!

The View from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

During this period, General Hansen's job was to balance policy and operations. The Policy Division dealt with a future that is uncertain and changing and that reflects the complexity of events. The Operations Division, on the other hand, focused on the reality of military capability.

In terms of policy, one of General Hansen's principal concerns was the arms control environment. SHAPE formed an arms control branch from manpower supplied with unprecedented enthusiasm by several nations. The Conventional Forces Europe (CFE-l) Treaty, successfully negotiated, awaited ratification. NATO followed Ambassador Pierre Harmel's 1967 advice, which had called for the alliance to stay strong and negotiate, and it paid off. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty was a significant milestone along the way because it established the precedent of asymmetrical reductions and on-site inspections. These were fundamental elements of the CFE Treaty.

NATO was thus able to speak of conventional parity. But that parity is really contingent on two things—neither of which was absolutely certain. First, of course, the Soviets must actually take out of commission all the equipment that was limited by the treaty. That means sizable numbers of tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, helicopters, and aircraft. This is a very expensive proposition. NATO and

SHAPE believed this would eventually be done—otherwise the alliance would not have supported the agreement. The other thing that must happen for the treaty to succeed is that the allies will have to stick to the agreed levels of equipment and not be in a rush to disarm unilaterally below the levels stipulated. The supreme allied commander and, through him, General Hansen devoted much of their time trying to make sure the latter did not happen.

While the Policy Division worked to ensure parity, or at least to make sense of it, General Hansen's Operations Division dealt with the real world and the threats to stability. With security challenges stretching from the Arctic Circle to the warm climates of the Southern Region, this was no mean feat. The Southern Region obviously remains very active in the wake of the Gulf War. It provides NATO and SHAPE with the prime example of instability and continued military risk. And further, there will likely be challenges to Turkey's security for years to come. The Soviet Union was beset with difficulties in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and faced an unpredictable future. All this heightened NATO's sense of awareness regarding security challenges in the Southern Region.

At the other end of Allied Command Europe, the Kola Peninsula was still the site of formidable military capability. The Soviets resubordinated air force assets to their navy and moved aircraft from the Western Group of Forces. Many of these units ended up in the north. We were not exactly sure why the Soviets took these actions; but it was in the north that the strategic threat to the United States, NATO, and, in particular, to our reinforcement and resupply capability, remained very strong.

In addition to those in the north and south, challenges remained in NATO's Central Region. Despite all the publicity associated with Soviet withdrawals, more than 300,000 troops and several thousand tanks remained in German territory. These occupiers were not doing well. Some were reportedly deserting, selling their weapons and uniforms, not eating regularly, and generally not feeling welcome. Worse, they were uncertain about returning to the Soviet Union. Even though they are still in the process of leaving German soil, they bear close watching until they are gone.

So General Hansen had to deal with several very trying problems that can be easily summarized. His Policy Division was working the premise of military parity that is yet uncertain. Meanwhile, his Operations Division faced strikingly different military challenges in each region.

My Perspective as Chief of Staff

My principal challenge was to create order out of what is not an orderly process. Everything was changing at once—policy, strategy, operational concepts, operational requirements, and resources. Fortunately, there was sufficient guidance to work the issues, firmly grounded in collective security and political consultation.

The London Declaration of 5–6 July 1990 was an enormously important event. It made a clear statement regarding our goals and vision for the future. In this visionary declaration, member nations asserted that both NATO strategy and its integrated force structure would be modified as Soviet forces departed Eastern Europe and a CFE treaty is effectively implemented. In London NATO leaders avowed a strengthening of the trans-Atlantic partnership consistent with the new realities of a post-cold-war world. From these concepts it is possible to discern the most important parts of NATO's future strategy. Thus, whatever problems SHAPE faces, they are not a top-down problem; the guidance is clear. The challenge is to enable NATO to function effectively in a new Europe. Key elements of this transformation are to make NATO's military forces more adaptable through enhanced flexibility and mobility and more multinational in their composition.

NATO's view of the future rests on its strategy for peace, crisis, and conflict. No longer thinking in terms of a one-dimensional Soviet threat, the alliance considers a multifaceted strategy designed to meet the challenges of an uncertain future. In brief, the policy for the next several decades will still be based on deterrence, with the fundamental bedrock continuing to rest on the viability of NATO. NATO must adapt to survive, however. Its capability to do so has been well established and repeatedly demonstrated in the past.

NATO's strategy for peace will be founded on arms control—a matrix of legally binding and actionable treaties. Reductions in arms levels to parity along with stringent verification procedures and openness will increase confidence and stability. As long as we devote sufficient attention to the mechanism of response, our warning time before any conflict should increase. The goal will be to increase dialogue, exchange, and understanding while enhancing present functioning structures. Increasing military-to-military contacts and treaty verification are part and parcel of this strategy for peace.

The strategy for crisis is similarly multidimensional. Prior to the Gulf War, it was mainly conceptual. But events brought it to life with graphic reality. A strategy for crisis is necessary and the Gulf War confirmed what we already knew: NATO is necessary for crisis management. This fact was demonstrated in several ways. First, NATO was a superb forum for discussions concerning the appropriate response to a military or political crisis where significant interests of the West are involved. It is worth recalling that it was to the councils of NATO that Secretary of State James A. Baker first talked when the crisis broke. This began to form the consensus that was completed in the United Nations. Second, NATO's usefulness as an organized approach to security cannot be discounted. It was significant that every one of NATO's 16 nations with military forces responded in some way to the call for support of the allied coalition in the Gulf. And of the military forces actually employed, a vast majority were earmarked for NATO. Moreover, they were trained by NATO and used NATO doctrine, procedures, and rules of engagement. Finally, of course, NATO reaffirmed its intention to defend the territory of its members—and that meant Turkey during the Gulf War. A number of steps were taken by the alliance for the first time ever to deploy defensive assets to ensure security and territorial integrity. In sum, as an institution NATO was involved in a direct way. More important, it is clear that much of the political will that sustained the allied force came as a result of the collective security "ethos" that has been built up in the alliance over the last 45 years.

In retrospect, it is appropriate to comment on the main lessons from the Gulf War. In general terms, as the Gulf War unfolded, we saw confirmation of the broad outline of NATO's future strategy, operational concepts, and force structure. Events in the Gulf demonstrated daily that NATO had been on the right track as it formulated the conceptual framework for a new European security architecture. As indicated, NATO did much and learned much during the entire episode.

NATO received confirmation, for example, that proper crisis management will require highly trained and capable active forces. These forces must be available for immediate deployment. That means that a sizable lift capability, both air and sea, is essential. Reinforcements need a carefully orchestrated plan that is coordinated with a theater strategy. It is necessary to avoid the "ready or not, here we come" syndrome.

Should crisis management fail, NATO will have to be prepared to employ its strategy for conflict. In the event of warfare, we would still aim to defend all of NATO territory, but with a smaller active force. This smaller active force will actually have more conventional options because it will be more mobile.

In the end, deterrence remains the primary objective of NATO. Therefore, an alliance nuclear structure with credible links from the conventional battlefield to the strategic nuclear arsenals remains an important part of the equation, and mandates a cohesive conventional defense. Also, the risks and burdens of nuclear weapons must be shared equitably across the alliance. The nuclear weapon cannot be disinvented, but both sides will have fewer of them. While the nuclear threshold will be raised by virtue of these weapons being used only as a last resort, the former Soviet Union's nuclear forces retain the capacity to do unacceptable damage to Western societies. This would still give Moscow the potential to coerce European affairs unless NATO has the ability to offset either of these two eventualities.

Regarding deterrence, the turbulent times NATO faces are very similar to the early years of the alliance. The mission then was much the same—deterrence and defense; however, the first SACEUR, Gen Dwight D. "Ike" Eisenhower, also faced the monumental task of organizing the alliance. His legacy is still with us. His vision can continue to help guide us as the future road map is plotted. Ike anticipated, for example, the utility of multinational forces. When negotiations limit the total number of troops forward, the idea looks even better. The latest ideas on multinationality envision having forward-deployed corps being primarily from one nation. That means a nation would provide at least one of the divisions plus the corps headquarters and the major corps support troops. These support components would include artillery, signal, cavalry, engineer, and logistical elements. But the corps would also include divisions from one or two other nations. This means it would be possible to have a US corps augmented by a German division. Similarly, there might be a German corps with Dutch augmentation or a Belgian corps with Americans and Germans in it. Other allied units, sometimes even at the brigade level, could be integrated with the multinational corps.

In terms of the overall force structure, NATO is considering a design that envisions three principle categories: reaction forces, main defense forces, and augmentation forces. Reaction forces, further subdivided by the speed of their availability, can be allocated to NATO commanders for an early military response to a crisis. They contain combat-capable maritime, ground, and air components. Main defense forces will form the major portion of the structure and carry the major burden of day-to-day defense requirements. A portion of the main defense forces, called ready maneuver forces, will be maintained in a higher degree of readiness and availability. These, too, may be employed early in support of crisis management. The third category, augmentation forces, are from Europe and North America and are available to reinforce a particular region or maritime command. As such, they, too, contribute to deterrence, crisis management, and defense.

It is clear that the notion of collective defense is a good one. History, and my SHAPE experience, demonstrate that collective security helps establish a proper balance of power and eliminates asymmetries that have often caused conflict. With collective security and the international stability it brings, interaction between nations is far more likely to stay in peaceful arenas.

NATO's collective defense therefore lessens the negative aspects of large national forces. This, too, was much on General Eisenhower's mind. If nations attempted to "renationalize" their defense efforts, the costs would be enormous. Some would find it necessary to build their own defense structures to replace NATO's proven integrated organization. Aside from the great cost, it would also be terribly inefficient. Certainly, too, no one would want a return to the Europe of the early part of the twentieth century.

Summing Up

At SHAPE headquarters, I found a common ingredient that connected the SHAPE action officer, the SHAPE deputy chief of staff, and the SHAPE chief of staff. This component was the quality and resolve of the people who served the NATO alliance. This unity of purpose went hand-in-hand with the deep concern of the collective security of their respective national populations in order to sustain their political, economic, and cultural way of life.

Sir Bryan Cartledge made this starkly clear when he spoke at the annual SHAPE conference, SHAPEX 1989. During his speech, Sir Bryan spoke about the contrasts between the West and the Soviet Union in very memorable terms. He described Soviet difficulties as falling into three main areas. These were political, economic, and psychological.

During this period, Soviet leaders could read about their political problems in the Soviet press almost daily. These problems ranged from difficulties inside their own party, rumors of coups and takeovers, to regional outbursts that were pulling the Soviet Union apart. Soviet problems in the Baltics and Armenia were part of the daily fare. Some "visionary" experts even predicted the eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union.

As if that wasn't bad enough, key Soviet leaders had also to contend with the horrible economic situation facing their country. The distribution system was broken and the huge defense industry had to be turned to producing consumer goods. By most estimates, any real fix to the situation was close to a generation away.

The third problem is perhaps the most daunting of all and has not changed. The psychology of the former Soviet Union is the result of its history and almost certainly is difficult to change. For decades the psychology of the industrial work force has been summarized by the phrase, "We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us." It will take a long time to overcome this kind of attitude and produce the entrepreneurial spirit necessary to a market economy.

The years 1988 to 1991 clearly demonstrated to this writer that the principles of democracy, which include individual rights, rule of law, and a market economy, have served NATO well. The idea of a social contract between governments and their peoples is fundamental. The rule of law is the bedrock of society. Individual needs must be balanced with collective need. In retrospect, the ideas of private enterprise and marketplace competition have now proven to be key elements of the human dynamic.

All of these concepts make the nations of the Western alliance inseparable. NATO's strength and utility arise not just as a result of any external threat but also come intrinsically from the nature of the alliance itself. It is the interrelationship between the West's mutual political, economic, and cultural values that constitutes the binding threads that together weave the priceless fabric of collective security and NATO. The view through all three lenses is solidly focused on peace and collective security.

Postscript

A postscript to all of this is yet another event that got Snuffy's attention—the coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991. Within a few days, 18–21 August to be exact, the entire SHAPE staff swung from widely held suspicion mixed with anxiety that the cutbacks in NATO were going too far to affirmation that the cold war was indeed over. Snuffy is now concerned about the prospects for a military career. However, faced with current realities, he continues to realize that if a challenge to security occurs, the military will be instantly held responsible *and* accountable for a suitable defense.

Managing Expectations While Leading Change

Maj Everett S. P. Spain

Understanding the importance of managing expectations is tough, and actually managing those expectations well is even tougher. But such oversight is a critical factor in leading successful change. I believe many organizational leaders see leadership and its more specific subsets of leading change and managing expectations as primarily unidirectional attempts to influence, rather than the complex two-way processes that they are.

However, to lead significant change, we as leaders will have to revamp our view of managing expectations from a simple perspective of "getting the message out" to one of a complex system of consistent, conscientious communication mechanisms that evolve as the situation develops in order to reinforce the leader-stakeholders relationship.

This paper argues that managing expectations is a critical factor in leading successful change. It goes on to provide ideas for choosing your key stakeholders, then gives a four-part definition of managing expectations, twelve applicable lessons learned about managing expectations, and a framework for analyzing what level and context of expectations management a leader should focus on.

In its essence, managing expectations involves a change-leader seeking out and building effective communication bridges to his stakeholders, and then using those bridges to understand, and to help the constituents understand, the change process. Managing expectations can significantly improve the chance of success to lead change, but it is a complex process that takes a conscientious leader's focus.

Teachers, parents, managers, and educators all need to learn how to manage expectations. Right now, there is probably no place where managing expectations is more significant than in Iraq, where the US government and the US Army are leading a massive transformation. If the United States is to be successful, many organizational leaders at all levels must make the conscious choice to actively manage the expectations of their key stakeholders.

For example, in providing oversight and legitimacy for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the president of the United States is attempting to manage the expectations of the US Congress, the global media, and international leaders. Lower on the totem pole than the president, but also of strategic importance, is US Army Lt Jeremy Holman. Responsible for the security of the al-Kinde neighborhood in Baghdad, he is simultaneously working to manage the expectations of the local tribal councils, his military bosses, and disenfranchised, but influential, former members of the Ba'ath regime living in the area. Both Lieutenant Holman and the president have a similar challenge in that they both rely on the support of their stakeholders, via managing expectations, for their success.

Identify Your Stakeholders

As a change-agent, you should know that your key stakeholders' perceptions will determine whether you are successful. Consequently, identifying those stakeholders is the crucial first step to success in leading change. The following are some examples of who the central stakeholders could be:

If you are a US Army company commander in Iraq, your key stakeholders could include your Soldiers, their families, your battalion and brigade commanders, the local Iraqi leaders, and the global media.

If you are a consulting firm vice president, your key stakeholders could include your team, your managing director inside the firm, the leaders of the firm for which you are consulting (i.e., your client), and often the key influencers of the employees of your client.

If you are a professor and head of a college academic department, your key stakeholders could include the dean, your students, the other department heads, the professors in your department, and even the staff of the school newspaper.

If you are the president of the United States, your key stakeholders include the legislature, the citizenry (via political action committees, the media, legislatures, and US corporations), political parties, leaders of multinational (and state) organizations, and leaders of other nation-states.

The major categories of stakeholders in each of the above three examples are surprisingly similar. In fact, most all organizational leaders have the following categories of stakeholders:

- Employees,
- Bosses,
- Key influencers (and potential spoilers) in your customer base,
- Key influencer peers (and potential spoilers) inside your organization, and
- The media.

Leaders should ask the following question to determine if a person or a group of persons is actually a key stakeholder: "Does the success of this leading-change effort depend significantly on this person's active support, participation, or ap-

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proval (either now or in the future)?" If the answer to that question is "yes," that person most likely is a key stakeholder.

The US government has recognized the need to manage the expectations of key stakeholders for Iraq and has taken some efforts in this direction. For example, the White House recently created the Office of Strategic Communications (OSC), headed by former presidential advisor Karen Hughes, and commissioned it to "ensure consistency in messages that will promote the interests of the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding, build support for and among coalition partners of the United States, and inform international audiences."[1]

Similarly, the US Army is doubling the size of its psychological operations (PSYOP) capabilities because one primary PSYOP mission is to convince Iraq's population to support legitimate Iraqi Security Forces and Iraq's democratically elected government. In addition, the US Army recently formed a separate Information Operations (IO) career field for select officers. The IO officers coordinate the Army's information efforts, which include communicating a consistent, effective message to multiple stakeholders, such as the American public (through public affairs officers) and Iraqi citizens (through organizations such as civil affairs units).

Although these efforts to improve communication across multiple venues are steps in the right direction, they alone may not be enough. The problem is that the OSC, PSYOP, and organizations are designed to send messages, but do not place as much emphasis on receiving messages from stakeholders: effectively managing expectations calls for two-way communication, not just unidirectional influence.

Managing Expectations Defined

Managing expectations is consistently communicating with your key stakeholders to understand their spoken and unspoken expectations, while realistically shaping their perceptions of

- your true character and intentions,
- the benefits of the long-term change process,
- what constitutes short-term success, and
- specific stakeholder responsibilities required to achieve both short- and long-term outcomes.

Managing expectations thoughtfully is a decision you make. A change-leader has too many key stakeholders with too many diverging goals and internal influences to leave managing their expectations to chance. Your stakeholders will not have realistic, positive perceptions about managing expectations unless you deliberately help them get there. Believing otherwise is overly idealistic. Let us explore in detail how the change-leader must shape the four areas of stakeholder perceptions.

If you are truly leading change to serve, rather than to manipulate, you had better prove it fast. The first aspect of managing expectations is to realistically communicate your organization's intentions and character. For example, when the US Army's 3d Infantry Division attacked Iraq in 2003, it expected most of the population to treat it as a liberator, but many Iraqi people turned out to be distrustful and leery of the American Soldiers, likely because the Americans' true intentions and character were simply unknown to them. Similarly, some members of the global media and the US population believed we were attacking Iraq for the primary purpose of securing access to oil resources in the region. Although the US government stated that the purpose of the US attack was to enforce United Nations resolutions, suppress terrorism, free the Iraqi people from Saddam's oppressive regime, and promote democracy in the Middle East, many Iraqis did not believe this because they did not trust the US government.

Convincing people you are trustworthy is the key to your influencing their perceptions, and such trust can only be built over time and with effort. For example, to establish trust with the global media, the US military now embeds reporters with deployed military units. Brig Gen Vincent Brooks, the former chief of public affairs for the US Army, said that it is essential to give the media both access and context.[2] Let them know and see for themselves what is going on (i.e., provide access), while making a deliberate effort whenever possible to explain why the US actions are what they are (i.e., include context). To illustrate, when Iraqis and the world watch television and see Soldiers passing out food and providing medical treatment, many of their perceptions of the Soldiers' true intentions and character dramatically change.

Another essential factor when building trust is to study and respect the culture of your stakeholders so that you can better relate to them. This is an essential factor when building trust: by working to understand why they think what they do and by practicing reflective listening, a change-leader communicates that his constituents have important values and needs. Even though your stakeholders won't always agree with a course of action, if you give them access and context, and if you listen to them reflectively, your stakeholders will begin to trust you and develop accurate perceptions of your character and intentions.

Building Faith in the Long-Term Process

A leader's job is to give their people hope.

—Rudy Ruettiger,
Notre Dame football player

A change-leader must help his or her stakeholders visualize the end state. Challenge and hardships are often associated with the process of change, so the final outcome must be "worth it" to the stakeholder before he or she will support the change leader. Therefore, it is important that the leader help the constituents understand the value of reaching the goals that long-term change requires and encourage them to have faith in the plan.

For example, Maj Danny Hassig, a US Army Reserve civil affairs officer, arranged a meeting with Sheik Saad, an influential Iraqi who lived in the Karada Peninsula (the Baghdad equivalent of Manhattan, New York). Because Saad was an informal leader in Karada, Hassig introduced himself and made an effort to meet with Saad every few weeks in order to help manage the expectations of the Iraqi people regarding US forces in Karada.

Saad was wounded in an assassination attempt a month prior to this particular meeting and was risking his life to meet with Hassig. When Hassig asked Saad what the locals thought about the Americans, Saad explained that his people were pleased that the United States had followed through on its promise to transfer sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to Iraq's temporary government. Saad also commented on how his people had recently seen new soccer fields and new gardens installed in their communities, courtesy of Hassig and US forces funding of local Iraqi contractors. The Iraqis were thankful American Soldiers were patrolling as partners with the Iraqi Police and mentoring the embryonic Iraqi democratic government.

Hassig believed that Saad now trusted him, so he used that trust as a foundation. He asked the sheik to apply for a coalition-funded economic development loan that would potentially energize the economy of the sheik's neighborhood. Such a large loan would tie Saad into to a long-term business relationship with the coalition. Saad applied for the $3.5 million loan because he felt the United States was reliable, pro-Iraqi, and trustworthy. Saad summarized his people's new faith in the long-term process by concluding, "When we see the U.S. Army in Iraq, we feel safe."[3]

A wise expectations manager understands and feeds such hope without promising what he cannot guarantee. Author and psychotherapist Viktor Frankel, who wrote about his experiences as a prisoner in the Auschwitz concentration camp during World War II, concluded that a person's attitude in a difficult time could overpower actual circumstances and give that person hope. However, he noted that in the fall of 1944, when fellow prisoners spread rumors that Allied forces would liberate the prisoners by Christmas, but no day of liberation came, an unusually high percentage of inmates died the next month. Their expectations had been so high that when they were not liberated, their hopes were crushed.[4]

Shaping Perceptions of Short-Term Success

The Iraqi people know the U.S. has put men on the moon, so they don't understand why they still don't have electrical power 24 hours a day, even though they didn't have 100 percent power under Saddam Hussein.

—Maj Gen Ron Johnson, US Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division

Managing expectations is a long-term process, but a change-leader can only influence those expectations within the context of consistent short-term actions. US Army Capt Darin Thomson did exactly this when leading his company in Iraq in 2003.

Two weeks after coalition forces liberated Iraq from the Ba'ath Party, Captain Thomson and his infantry troopers (known as the "Bravo Bushmasters") received the mission of securing and stabilizing the town of Taliyah, which was about 50 kilometers south of Baghdad. Although he and his troopers did not experience any hostilities from the 15,000 locals during their first 72 hours in town, Thomson was concerned that he needed to connect quickly with the local leaders. Thomson's boss, a lieutenant colonel, had stopped briefly in the town and had a cursory meeting with some local leaders before moving north, so Thomson had to convince the locals that he, a captain, was actually in charge before he could even start to manage their expectations for the more complex short- and long-term issues, especially since he had no idea of how long his company would be assigned to stay in Taliyah.

Thomson quickly discovered that most of the established local government officials were members of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party and had left town before the Americans arrived. Even though the local government was defunct, four locals came forward to claim leadership roles—including a representative from the town's dominant tribe, the town's electrician and water engineer, a food-distribution supervisor, and a man who claimed to have security expertise. Of course, the priorities of each of these emerging leaders were different. After a few hours of volatile conversation, Thomson heard a message loud and clear. The Iraqis desperately needed and expected US aid in the form of medical care, fresh water, food distribution, and security (i.e., police).

Taliyah's outpatient medical clinic was almost out of all supplies, including medicine, but continued to treat many sick people, including several who were likely wounded from combat. The tribal chief supported medical care as the main need of the town.

Taliyah had received its drinking water from a pipeline that originated in a larger city to the north, but because the power-generation facility outside of town was not working, the pumps that ran the pipeline were not operational either. Most of the large pumps had blown gaskets, and only 25 percent of the homes in town were connected to the freshwater network via underground piping. The town was surviving on imported bottled water, and those supplies were getting low. The town electrician said water was the most pressing need.

Food was scarce. The Ba'ath Party had distributed food to the city monthly via supply trucks, with residents using their government-issued ration cards to request each of their family's share, but the last food delivery had been over a month ago. The Iraqi leader in charge of food delivery argued that this was most pressing for his people.

Taliyah's prewar police force had been led by Ba'ath Party members who left town soon after the invasion and took all of the police department's small arms (AK-47s) with them. The Iraqi who claimed he had security expertise said Taliyah needed 150 weapons and help from the US Soldiers to patrol the city, because its citizens were experiencing an increase in crime, especially violent carjackings.

Clearly, the overall challenge that afflicted Captain Thomson was remarkably similar to that of many city managers during times of catastrophe—too many needs and not enough resources. Thomson assessed his capability to help. He had 125 infantry Soldiers, 14 Bradley Fighting vehicles, and six HMMWVs. His unit had no engineer capability, but it did have small maintenance, medical, and food sections, and several Soldiers had civilian skills learned before joining the service that might be useful.

Thomson knew he was the de facto government in town, and he realized that he had to develop an acceptable picture of what short-term success was to the locals, or risk losing his credibility. Therefore, Thomson called a second town meeting and showed the tribal leaders that he had no organic resources available to positively affect any of the major issues facing the town, except for security. After Thomson facilitated a thoughtful two-way discussion, tribal leaders agreed that security was the number-one concern, and that restoring a legitimate security force was the most realistic short-term goal to work for. Thomson also let the Iraqis know he could not provide large-scale assistance for their immediate food and water needs.

He informed the Iraqis what his unit was capable of in terms of medical care, and he did what he promised: he gave them two boxes of surplus supplies, including water-purification tablets. Also, on a case-by-case basis, Thomson's unit treated wounded Iraqis that the Iraqi clinic could not.

With Thomson facilitating, the four emerging local leaders worked out a security plan. US forces would immediately begin patrols to reestablish security and safety in the community. Thomson also coordinated to get the local leaders a few weapons to enable them to arm a small police force. The security plan consisted of patrolling and empowering the new police force. It was successful because Thomson had convinced the emerging Iraqi leaders to agree that security was the primary short-term goal for Taliyah. Instead of becoming frustrated that the US forces were unable to help in other areas of need, the locals viewed the new force as a great success. Because the security the Bravo Bushmasters provided met the Iraqi's expectations of success in the short-term, the Iraqis were pleased with Thomson and the American presence.[5]

Shaping Perceptions of Stakeholder Responsibilities

Managing expectations is also about getting stakeholders to do their part. For example, Capt Larry Geddings, the commander of a mechanized infantry unit assigned oversight of the sector of Baghdad that included Baghdad University, and I met with Dr. Atabee, a Baghdad University College dean. I listened as Dr. Atabee pressured Geddings to buy plane tickets and authorize him to travel to US universities to collaborate and create teacher and student exchanges. Geddings smiled and responded that he would look into it, knowing that he could ask for, but did not have authority to grant, Atabee's wishes, while knowing that Atabee and Baghdad University had a great deal of work to do before such plans would become a reality.

Geddings was concerned that several problems at the university needed to be resolved before he could do anything to promote an exchange program with an American institution. For example, security was still a major issue. An unarmed American soldier had been killed while walking near a dozen students in the center of campus a few months earlier, but witnesses would not admit to seeing anything. University concern for basic sanitation was also a problem, as evidenced by the visitor bathroom across the hallway from the college president's office, which was among the most unsanitary bathrooms of any I had seen in Baghdad. Finally, the legitimacy of Baghdad University's granting of degrees was in question, since the university had conferred a PhD in political science on Uday Hussein and a Juris Doctor on Qusay Hussein, even though Saddam Hussein's sons did not spend much time in class. However, Atabee was ready to go to the United States immediately and begin exchanges, and he told Geddings that this was "the way it needed to be." Of course, Geddings knew that, realistically, before starting an exchange program, Atabee needed to ensure his campus was safe, that sanitation at his university was reasonably acceptable, and that the degrees granted were actually earned.

Stakeholders like Dr. Atabee need to understanding that stakeholders within a transforming organization typically must take deliberate action to effect some of the changes themselves: they cannot just wait to be changed by the system. The leader of the change effort must clearly communicate what he or she expects the stakeholders to do individually and collectively to make the transformation a success.

Figure 1 depicts many of the broad changes that coalition forces in Iraq are working on. Each requires the Iraqi people to take some action themselves. Although the transformation of all of the areas in figure 1 involves significant understanding, defining the role and managing the expectations of the common people in each area are crucial steps for the macro changes to be successful. During Saddam Hussein's regime, although common Iraqis were not allowed to vote in legitimate elections, they were not required to pay income taxes, either.

Area of Change	Before	After (goal)	Action by Iraqis
Government	Totalitarian	Democratic	Run for office, vote, support elected officials
Economy	Socialist	Capitalist	Risk money and time via entrepreneurship, compete
Role of common people	Subjects, paid no income taxes	Citizens	Pay income, sales, and property taxes
Equality/ suffrage	Male only	Equal rights for women	Males accept gender equality
Political Process	Only Ba'ath Party, only Arab, discrimination and distrust	Multiparty, multiethnic	Campaign openly, support all popularly elected officials, respect all

Figure 1. Broad changes coalition forces are working on

Furthermore, they received power, water, and often food from the Iraqi government pro bono, as oil revenues funded this dependency-fostering socialist environment. The Iraqi people paid 18 cents per gallon for gasoline in the summer of 2004, a subsidized rate that caused huge lines at the few gas stations that actually existed, because entrepreneurs had almost no incentive to build a gas station to compete against the government-run and subsidized stations.

American commanders like Captain Geddings have to communicate clearly to Iraqis that they are expected do their part and vote, adopt an entrepreneurial culture, pay taxes, accept gender equality, and support popularly elected officials if this transition is going to work. Doing this well is a key tipping point for change, as it changes stakeholders from customers into partners in the change process. Stakeholders are much more likely to accept their responsibilities to facilitate change if they trust your character and your organization's intentions, have faith in the benefits of the long-term process, and understand what constitutes short-term success.

I have learned 12 lessons in my career while attempting to manage expectations. Using these lessons as a guide can help put change-leaders on a path toward creating positive and consistent communication channels with their stakeholders.

Lesson 1: Under-promise and over-deliver.

> *We believe the (U.S./NATO) mission (in Bosnia) is limited and achievable within approximately a year***.**
>
> —Vice President Al Gore

Vice President Gore's effort in expectation management may have had some traction at the time, but it quickly slid into a ditch when we stayed in Bosnia past the one-year mark. (In fact, we are still there more than 10 years later.) Gore was likely advised by his experts that his claim was reasonable, but the fact remains that it didn't strengthen his stakeholders' beliefs in the organization (the US government) or the action itself (peacekeeping in the Balkans) to claim something that didn't actually come true. The fact of the matter is that the United States cannot predict when it will successfully complete a peacekeeping operation. Every situation will be different, and claiming an end date before beginning is like adding up a mathematical sum before having the actual amounts to add together.

Wise change-leaders will always ensure they have a robust enough system to accomplish their promised goals, even if Murphy's Law hits them in the nose several times along the way. In service professions such as engineering, customers (who are stakeholders) depend on you to do a job for them, on time, on budget, and to quality standards. A customer, boss, or peer probably will not have a clear understanding of the particulars of the job (including the technical and logistical requirements and the impact of environmental factors) that can significantly influence when you can finish. Therefore, it is up to you as the organizational leader to define the measures of success by setting and communicating the timeline and standards that you intend to meet.

For example, assume you are the platoon leader with the 1st Cavalry Division's 8th Engineer Battalion, with responsibility to oversee the infrastructure rejuvenation of the town of Zapharania, a poor suburb of Baghdad located about 10 kilometers southeast of the city center. After driving around the town, you note that liquid sewage is collecting on the sidewalks in many of the neighborhoods. Further research shows that the main cause of the pooling wastewater is dilapidated and overwhelmed underground wastewater pipes. The city leaders ask for your help with this problem.

You decide to work with the city hall officials and local contractors, and conclude that you can fund and oversee a contract for a complete renovation to the city's wastewater lines. Your engineer technical advisors tell you that the project will be finished in two months if everything goes relatively well, and within four months if multiple obstacles come into play. You know that your Soldiers' level of motivation is not a variable, as you will all work just as hard regardless of what you cite as a finish date.

Let us assume that you want to announce your intentions at tomorrow's District Advisory Council meeting with the Iraq authorities. A wise expectation manager will cite the four-month expected finish date. Your unit may be able to finish early and exceed expectations (to the cheers of all stakeholders), but if the external factors turn against you during the project, you will still be able to finish within your projected timeline, and your stakeholders (primarily the Iraqi citizens) will still see you holding up your end of the deal. Remember, only promise things that are within your power to deliver.

Lesson 2: Set short-term goals together with your key stakeholders. In addition to setting realistic end dates for a project, you can (and should) manage expectations by establishing interim short-term goals with your key stakeholders, especially those who have to take specific actions to ensure those goals are realized. This will help you build trust with them and encourage them to commit to their own responsibilities.

Lesson 3: Have your stakeholders commit in a public setting. When you plan to ask stakeholders to commit to an action in a public meeting, always select the location based on who will be present. Public meetings are typically good settings for such verbal commitments because the stakeholders are more likely to be held accountable by their equals. Your stakeholders' standing with their peers and neighbors often will have a greater influence on whether they follow through on their promises than their agreement with you alone. When stakeholders know that others expect them to hold up their end of the deal, they will be more likely to meet their commitments and will become partners in the change process rather than customers of it.

Lesson 4: Repeat messages to communicate clarity. An expectation manager is fundamentally a communicator, and repetition and simplicity are crucial for effectiveness. In his book, *The Four Obsessions of an Extraordinary Executive*, Patrick Lencioni notes that three of his four "obsessions" concern creating and communicating clearly what an organization is doing and why.[6] Presidential advisor Karen Hughes states that "As a communicator, I like to boil things down and make them easy to remember. I also realized that about the time the rest of us get sick of hearing about them, is about the time when . . . they'll begin to stick, and people will actually remember them."[7]

Lesson 5: Changing the message is a strength, not a weakness. I caution change-leaders that they must modify their message appropriately whenever the truth or situation changes. If they do not, they risk alienating their constituents, who will then perceive them as a propagandist rather than an authentic communicator. Stakeholders' needs change, and they will actively try to find out whether you are listening to them by watching to see if your actions alter as a result of their new needs and requests. If you do not listen to them and keep exactly the same messages and actions, you are likely to lose their support, because you will lose their trust. You cannot make all groups happy all of the time, and you must publicly accept and address this fact so that it does not torpedo your change efforts. However, if you change in response to stakeholder needs when possible, it will build strength for your overall endeavors.

Lesson 6: Set up regular meetings and a single communications center. Wise change-leaders should establish a primary, easily accessible central information clearinghouse for updated status and information about short- and long-term goals. The central information clearinghouse could be a public Web site or blog that is updated daily/frequently, a bulletin board in a hallway that is regularly accessed by all stakeholders, or a daily newspaper with editorial space for the public.

The consistency of communication events is much more important than the consistency of the message itself. Stakeholders want to be informed and can handle bad news; they just want to hear it from the change-leader, and they lose trust when they hear it from someone else. Similar to a civil engineer's charts that track the status of engineering projects against the plan, these central information clearinghouses enable communication with the stakeholders, especially when the clearinghouses present both positive and negative factual stories, while providing a simple mechanism for the stakeholders to send their thoughts back to the change-leader. If these central communication clearinghouses do not have updated information on a daily basis, in a consistent and easy to understand format, they will be disregarded almost instantly.

Lesson 7: Managing expectations calls for establishing two-way communication. Two-way communication with your stakeholders is critical: it is simply not enough to communicate one-way by lecturing or making formal statements to your stakeholders. Research your stakeholders' culture, unspoken expectations, and body language. Ask them to speak their minds clearly and frankly.

Listen reflectively. Mentally put yourself in their positions, and think about what your expectations would be if you were them. This process will help you understand the values their culture holds dear so that you can influence their perception of your intentions.

Lesson 8: Always communicate what is not possible and why. Do not be afraid to say "no," and stick to your guns if doing so is realistic. You run the risk of stakeholders losing faith in you if you promise and can't deliver (recall Lesson 1). A change-leader must always be clear about limits.

For example, Capt Doug Copeland was the commander of Bravo Company, 2-7 Cavalry, and was responsible for providing security in the central Baghdad neighborhood of Salhiya, just north of the International (Green) Zone. His company raided the house of an insurgent and took him into custody in June 2004. A few days later, Copeland took a US patrol to the insurgent's home to inform the insurgent's spouse of her husband's status and to return his wallet and some identification papers she might need in his absence.

Copeland knocked on the door with an Iraqi translator on one side and a large soldier as his bodyguard on the other. The wife came to the door and requested her husband be returned. Copeland quickly gave the wallet and identification back to the wife and told her, "Your husband is going to jail for attacking coalition Soldiers, and he will not be back for a long time." He also told her everything he knew about the situation, including where her husband was most likely going to be incarcerated. He did not have to return the wallet and identification or speak to the wife, but he wanted to ensure he managed the expectations of one of the Iraqi citizens in his security area.

Lesson 9: The organizational leader should lead the managing expectations efforts. To build stakeholders' faith in the overall long-term process, the organization's leader should deliver the most recent managing-expectations message and allow stakeholders to communicate openly with him. If you assign the responsibility for managing expectations to a staff officer or assistant, you send the message that communicating with the stakeholder is an auxiliary task and that he or she is not important enough for the organizational leader to communicate with directly. That is not the message you want to send to your constituents.

Lesson 10: Being positive is a catalyst in managing expectations. Even when you are unable to meet expectations, providing enthusiastic and cheerful communication will help people see that the glass is half-full, not half-empty, and will encourage their positive responses.

Lesson 11: Don't fear inevitable incidents, just respond promptly to them. In almost any long-term change effort, there will be negative press, rumors, or claims against your leadership efforts. Sometimes the claims will present true incidents that, when taken alone, appear to hurt your cause. In this situation, your stakeholders may lose trust in your efforts. Such an event may influences leaders to centralize control of their messages and limit the communication and initiative of their subordinates. For example, in some theaters of operation, various US Army organizations require general-officer approval of any PSYOP product (poster, pamphlet, radio broadcast, and so forth). We all know of incidents that have captured the world stage through the global media, but a wise expectation manager will not let the potential of a negative event stifle his or her ability to conduct ubiquitous, decentralized communication at multiple levels in the organization.

Most change-leaders work hard to keep their organizations 100 percent morally straight and honorable, but, especially in large organizations, there will periodically be occasions where individuals who represent the organization bring discredit to their boss's team. Such unfortunate incidents can cause a temporary loss of your stakeholders' trust. What most expectation managers don't realize is that people expect organizations to make mistakes and typically have a much higher capacity to forgive them than the leader imagines—but only if the organization responds swiftly and publicly with appropriate corrective action. By doing so, the organization will almost always restore that trust. However, if your stakeholders sense a cover-up of any type, you will lose their long-term trust and your ability to manage their expectations. Cover-ups are what destroy trust, not the isolated incident that will inevitably occur, so do not limit communication in fear of such episodes. You cannot prevent them all, and closing down communication prevents you from dealing with them productively when they do occur.

Lesson 12: Get around egos by always using honest, two-way communication. Always present your key stakeholders with a full spectrum of news—good news and some not-so-good news—and provide a mechanism for them to express their opinions to you. Presenting just good news makes you seem insincere and sets you up for discomfort and resistance when you have not-so-good news to discuss.

As a company commander deployed in Kosovo, I thought it was important to sit down with each of my lieutenants and first sergeant once a month and give them written feedback on their performance. I always planned to give them positive impressions using specific examples I had observed, and I always gave them one area of potential improvement, even when they were clearly the best first sergeant or best lieutenant in the battalion. They also knew that I would ask them for feedback about how I was doing in my job and what specific things I could improve to help our unit. At first, my key leaders were resistant to the mandatory negative feedback during counseling because their only previous experience with such counseling was on a by-exception basis. After a few months, the bulk of the resistance went away. In fact, they started looking forward to such "what I can do better" feedback. My incredible first sergeant valued the "needs improvement" part of his assessment so much that he began asking me for even more things to improve.

Having such feedback is most critical during a long leading-change process. It says, "We are going to truly communicate." The recipient of such feedback is okay with it because it is routine. He receives it from you and, in turn, he provides input on what you can do better.

Focus Your Efforts by Knowing Your Level and Context

A wise change-leader will use multiple lenses when looking at his or her situation. This helps clarify the managing-expectations landscape and helps the leader tailor his or her actions appropriately within the context of idiosyncratic and fluid situations. Calibrating a managing-expectations strategy will differ depending on whether the change-leader is trying to influence people inside his or her organization, outside of it, or both. In addition, a change-leader must understand what level he or she is targeting, either strategic (large organizations and/or societies) or tactical (a smaller group of people, most of whom the leader can communicate with personally if he or she chooses to do so). However, it is important to note that the central themes of managing expectations and the four key perceptions of it remain the same—no matter the level and context of the situation.

A Framework for Managing Expectations

Figure 2 looks at four different situations where one would be managing expectations and presents my view of the ideal amount of activity for key variables at various levels. The key variables include the impact of global media, consistency of themes required, the priority on listening, the need to update messages, and most important, the four key perceptions in managing expectations.

Managing expectations is fundamental when leading change. Wise change-leaders will work to identify their key stakeholders, build a bridge of two-way communication with them, strive to understand their spoken and unspoken expectations, and realistically shape their perceptions of

- the leader's character and intentions,
- the benefits of the long-term change process,
- what constitutes short-term success, and
- the stakeholder's specific responsibilities to achieve short- and long-term outcomes.

Doing this will empower the organizational leader to understand the complexities of the change situation, enable alignment of goals with stakeholders, and provide mechanisms to promote understanding and teamwork to achieve those goals. Managing expectations is an essential part of the fuel required to make the impossible a reality.

Level	Strategic (large organizations, societies)	Strategic	Tactical (you know everyone you are trying to influence)	Tactical
Context	External (group outside of your organization)	Internal (employees inside your organization)	External	Internal
Example	You are commander of Coalition Forces, Baghdad, and are trying to influence the Iraqis in Baghdad to reduce violence and actively support the newly elected government.	You are the commander of Coalition Forces, Baghdad, and are trying to influence your Soldiers to stay polite, professional, and prepared to kill.	You are an Army company commander in Baghdad and are trying to influence the Iraqis in neighborhood Mulholloh 304 to reduce violence and actively support the newly elected government	You are an Army Company Commander in Baghdad and are trying to influence your Soldiers to stay polite, professional, and prepared to kill.
Stakeholders	Iraqi tribal leaders, Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurd party leaders, local imams, city council members and insurgency leaders	Your subordinate commanders (brigadier generals, colonels, etc.)	Tribe leader, neighborhood council leader, police district leader, and neighborhood electrician	Your lieutenants, senior NCOs, and Soldiers
Global Media Influence over Your Stakeholders	High	Low	Medium	Low
Consistency of the Same Message Required	High	Medium	Low	Low
Amount of Two-Way Communication (Listening Required)	Medium	Low	High	Medium
Frequency of Status Updates You Must Provide Your Key Stakeholders to be Credible	High	Low	Medium	Medium
Most Important of the Four Managing Expectations Perceptions	Their faith in the overall long-term process	Emphasis on stakeholders' responsibilities	What constitutes short-term success	Emphasis on stakeholders' responsibilities

Figure 2. Managing expectations overview

Notes

1. George Bush, "Establishing the Office of Global Communication," Executive Order 13283, 21 January 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030121 -3.html.

2. Brig Gen Vincent Brooks, address to class of 2006, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 2005.

3. Maj Danny Hassig, civil affairs team leader, 1-153 Infantry, observations and interview by author, Baghdad, Iraq, July 2004.

4. Maj Brian Tribus, interview by author about managing expectations; and Tribus's reading of Viktor Frankl's Man's Search for Meaning (Boston: Washington Square Press, 1984).

5. Capt Darin Thomson, commander, B/1-41 Infantry, interview by author, US Military Academy, January 2005.

6. Capt Larry Geddings, commander, A/1-9 Cavalry, observations and interview by author, Baghdad, Iraq, July 2004.

7. Al Gore, vice president of the United States, quoted in *USA Today*, 14 February 1996: <www.usatoday.com/news/index/bosnia/nov95/nbos100.htm>.

8. Patrick Lencioni, Four Obsessions of an Extraordinary Executive (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000).

9. Karen Hughes, undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, remarks to the 2005 Forum on the Future of Public Diplomacy, Washington, DC, 14 October 2005, http://www.state.gov/r/us/2005/55165.htm.

Foundational Qualities of Effective Leaders: A Different Perspective

Capt Stephan T. Shardy

This paper will present another perspective on leadership—one that looks from the "bottom up." It identifies a common thread in the fabric of effective leadership: attributes or traits that are critical to accomplishing the organizational mission, be it in the public or private sector. An effective leader is first an effective follower. By exhibiting the quality of dynamic subordinacy, the great leaders are better prepared for the servant-leader role. Here, one takes a deep, personal interest in the needs and welfare of others, and "rolls up the sleeves" with those he leads. With this foundation, the best leaders are principle-centered. Their reference point for decision making and mission accomplishment revolves around an "inside-out approach" to personal development and interpersonal relationships. Finally, great leaders are visionary. They set the pace for the organization by fostering an environment of teamwork and cooperation. The visionary leader provides solid direction and purpose—helping everyone find his or her unique roles and ultimate contribution to the mission.

Leadership. Just the mention of that term conjures up the image of leather-bound volumes of books, articles, and treatises written by people from all walks of life. World leaders, military leaders, distinguished college professors, and chief executive officers of major (and sometimes minor) corporations have all put pen to paper on this popular and somewhat elusive topic.

So why should I even attempt to present my thoughts on leadership? After all, I'm not a well-known political leader or military expert. But that being the case, perhaps I nevertheless can share my perspective from personal observations of the leadership styles and behaviors of my past commanders and supervisors. I've experienced both effective and ineffective leadership, and this discussion outlines my views of what I consider to be the readily identifiable and foundational qualities of effective leaders.

If we accept the basic premise that leadership is the art of influencing and directing people to accomplish the given mission, then I would not be misfocused to say that there is more to leadership than merely barking out orders from a personal power base, or smiling while quoting leadership theory and practice.

Although I do accept the limited importance of the personality approach (intelligence, competence, or special talents) to effective leadership, it nonetheless should play a minor role compared to one's character. And it is upon the basis of character that we examine the leader as follower, as servant, as principle-centered, and as visionary. After all, in the midst of difficult decisions, I hope leaders would be able to bring more to the decision table than good looks and good talk. I hope you will agree.

Discussion

In my opinion, the foundational quality of effective leadership is a thorough grasp of *followership.* After all, we are all accountable to someone else. In our lifetimes, we will spend more time taking orders than actually giving orders. Tragically, only a small fraction of the literature of leadership touches on effective followership. But what I have read is good and appears to squarely hit the target.

In centuries past, a Roman consul so eloquently stated,

> Commanders should be counseled, chiefly, by persons of known talents, by those who have made an art of war their particular study, and whose knowledge is derived from experience; from those who are present at the scene of action, who see the country, who see the enemy, who see the advantages that occasions offer, and who, like people embarked in the same ship, are sharers of the dangers.[1]

This speaks loud and clear of the impact subordinates can and should have in dealing with those in command. It speaks of a reciprocal agreement between leaders and those they lead. It speaks of listening and learning. Wise leaders do both.

This prepares us for perhaps the most distinct definition of effective followership. Followers "have the vision to see both the forest and the trees, the social capacity to work well with others, the strength of character to flourish without heroic status, the moral and psychological balance to pursue personal and corporate goals at no cost to either, and, above all, the desire to participate in a team effort for the accomplishment of some greater purpose.[2]

This definition takes the best of followership out of the realm of merely displaying sheep-like qualities of passive, dependent, uncritical thinking, or actively carrying out orders uncritically. It also discredits those ineffective followers who merely survive with a "don't make waves" attitude, or those who seek to undermine the very goals, policies, and procedures of the organization, including their contribution. Then they wrap this with adaptability and versatility within a dynamic, changing environment.[3]

One of the key principles of Scripture, so masterfully exemplified in the lives of many biblical characters, is that whosoever aspires to be the greatest among men must first be the least. This point leads me to the second attribute of great leaders—*servant-like attitude.* This attitude aligns beautifully with what we already discussed about followership.

The servant-leader gains the respect and admiration of his people by treating them with compassion and understanding; by active listening without judgment; by fostering an environment of trust where he is first found trustworthy; by recogniz-

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ing and rewarding great performance without flattery; and by setting the example of selflessness instead of selfishness. A servant-leader can be found in the "trenches"— developing and nurturing those interpersonal skills with the men and women who carry the load. Then he leads the charge into battle, forging the path to victory ahead of those same people.

Consider the example of Gen Henry Viccellio Jr., commander of Air Education and Training Command (AETC). He wanted to clearly understand the challenges his people faced, and the best opportunity was found "in his backyard"—at the training grounds for all Air Force enlisted personnel. Disguising himself as a new recruit, he captured a glimpse of basic training from the barracks. He wanted to see what they see; to feel what they feel; and, yes, to even clean latrines. When the full story emerged, one airman was overwhelmed by this senior leader's concern for his troops. He said he would never forget this lesson in servant-leadership.[4]

When a leader takes a deep, personal interest in the lives of his people, on and off the job, morale is high and people are motivated to do their best. But, when a leader doesn't care to meet the personal needs of the followers, morale plummets, motivation nose-dives, and the mission suffers. Only a fool would believe a mission can be accomplished without the support and allegiance of the people he or she serves. I have experienced organizations, firsthand, where those in charge would sacrifice their people, not for the mission (as they wanted others to believe), but for a vainglorious power surge. Nobody wanted to be in their command.

However, I have been in others where the commander cared about, listened to, and worked alongside—not over—the followers. He set the pace. We followed willingly; not because we necessarily had to, but because we wanted to. We recognized the leadership commitment and responded in kind. Perhaps our response to this quality of leadership mirrors that of the sailors who served in the command of the immortal British admiral, Lord Horatio Nelson. He had won the admiration and respect of his followers to an unusual degree because he honored and respected them as individuals. In one memorable instance, just after the admiral had improved the living conditions on ship, an anonymous note from the crew appeared on the quarterdeck: "Success attend Admiral Nelson. God bless Captain Miller. We thank them for the officers they have placed over us. We are happy and comfortable, and *will shed every drop of blood in our veins to support them."* (Emphasis added)[5]

Maj Gen Aubrey "Red" Newman, USA, retired, masterfully captured the essence of the servant-leader attitude. Listen to his comments about the "human touch" to leadership.

> Most of us are concerned about the turning points in our own lives. But every good soldier in authority should be just as concerned with his responsibility to help those under him make the right turns. . . . It is easy to decide "in the best interest of the service" where money and materials are involved. When men are concerned, however, commanders must be perceptive and alert to see the turning points for individuals. It's like finding four-leaf clovers; they're always there, but you must look for them. Otherwise you may crush them underfoot unaware.[6]

In my view, the most effective leaders reach and maintain the delicate balance between the mission and the most important resource to its accomplishment—people. Call it a quest. Call it fulfillment. Whatever label you give it, seek to possess it. That balance will most certainly preserve you in the midst of difficult leadership decisions. I believe you'll be in the minority—perhaps even marching to a different drummer.

The third attribute of great leadership is *principle-centered leadership.* And the one individual, in my opinion, who has set the pace, on a global scale, in the research and understanding of the dynamics of interpersonal relationships is Dr. Stephen R. Covey. He asserts that principle-centered leaders identify with and exhibit the Seven Habits. These habits of being proactive—beginning with the end in mind; putting first things first; thinking win-win; seeking first to understand; then to be understood; synergizing; and sharpening the saw—move a person from a paradigm of dependence to one of interdependence. It is a movement from "you didn't come through and I blame you for the results" to "we can cooperate and combine our gifts and talents for something better."[7] They clearly realize that before they can effect change in others, they first must change. Their primary ethic is one of character, not personality. Everyone is blessed by their presence and positive contributions.

Principle-centered leaders cultivate a garden of cooperation, fairness, roles, and vision. They recognize the worth of each individual in the organization, and they know and understand the meaningful, worthwhile contributions each person can make when given a chance. They recognize that the talents of many far surpass those of one, and they foster a climate characterized by that synergy.

I believe that these leaders are experts at the "vital-shift." As Covey states, "They continually seek to expand the areas over which their people could exercise self-direction and self-control as they develop and demonstrate better insight and ability."[8] As this transition from passive to active followership takes place, leaders can uplift, fulfill, empower, and inspire. They can finally do what they were originally tasked to do—effectively accomplish the organizational mission! Everyone benefits. Everyone grows. Everyone is aligned with the vision.

This leads me to the fourth attribute of effective leaders. They are *visionary.* People with vision possess that unique ability to see beyond the present—the here and now. They are forward-thinking and constantly test the boundaries of contemporary thought and practice. They think "outside the box," but in such a way as not to lose their perspective on reality. They become the "paradigm busters"—constantly looking for better ways to do business. The visionary leaders despise the status quo and hate the "we've always done it that way" syndrome. They take action and challenge others to do likewise. In fact, the more you tell persons of vision "can't," the more they pulsate "can" and "will" and "must."

Joel Barker's words shout loud and clear at all leaders: "Vision without action is merely a dream. Action without vision just passes the time. Vision with action can change the world."[9]

When an organization finds itself going in the wrong direction or aiming at the wrong target, the best leaders can make things right again. Covey states,

> A strategic leader can provide direction and vision, motivate through love, and build a complementary team based on mutual respect if he is more effectiveness-minded than efficiency-minded, more concerned with direction and results than with methods, systems, and proce-

dures. While all of the procedures are hacking their way through the jungle and their managers are sharpening their machetes for them and setting up machete-wielding working schedules and putting on training programs for machete wielders, an enlightened and courageous leader must sometimes cry out, "Be quiet! We're making progress."[10]

Conclusion

Are these four foundational qualities of effective leaders incongruent within the military or corporate environments? The question is answered with a resounding NO! To do less is a disgrace. It is not a popularity contest, but a higher calling to leadership excellence.

I believe tomorrow's leaders will face challenges that will make even the most courageous of people fainthearted and uncertain. But I also believe that only those leaders who demonstrate *followership, servanthood, principle-centeredness,* and *vision* will ultimately win the race. And those of us privileged to be in their command will share in the victory.

Notes

1. Richard L. Hughes, Robert C. Ginnet, and Gordon C. Curphy, *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience* (New York: Richard D. Irwin, 1993), 225.
2. Ibid., 224.
3. Stephen C. Lundin and Lynne C. Lancaster, "Beyond Leadership . . . The Importance of Followership," *The Futurist,* 1990, 20.
4. Sheila E. Widnall, "Watch Your Character—It Becomes Your Destiny," *Airman*, April 1994, 35.
5. Aubrey Newman, *Follow Me* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1981), 107.
6. Ibid., 63.
7. Stephen R. Covey, *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People* (New York: Fireside Books, 1989), 49.
8. Stephen R. Covey, *Principle-Centered Leadership* (New York: Fireside Books, 1990), 180.
9. Joel A. Barker, *Discovering the Future Series: The Power of Vision* (Burnsville, Minn.: Charthouse Learning Corporation, 1990).
10. Covey, *Principle-Centered Leadership,* 249.

Leadership Lessons from History

Joshua A. Lynn

Foremost among the character traits prized in past military leaders is tenacity on the battlefield. Carl von Clausewitz states, "In any specific action, in any measure we may undertake, we always have the choice between the most audacious and the most careful solution."[1] He naturally emphasizes the former as the means to victory. Yet, just as instructive are past incidents when leaders chose *not* to engage, to *not* be audacious, but rather to pursue the "careful solution." For a variety of reasons, military leaders throughout American history have had to make the difficult and, at times, unpopular decision *not* to fight.

These trying decisions provide valuable case studies for today's leaders. Edgar F. Puryear Jr. writes, "The position of command is a lonely one. At no time does a leader feel loneliness more deeply than when having to make a critical, high-level decision dealing with life and death, success or failure, victory or defeat."[2] Past leaders have had to solitarily make these dramatic choices for the good of their cause, their country, and their men, although the decisions may have defied the wishes of the public, the civil authorities, and fellow commanders. Decisions based on such principles epitomize leadership.

Gen George Washington, commanding an outnumbered and bedraggled force, had to utilize tactics of disengagement to further the strategic goal of American independence. Pres. John Adams ensured the survival of the infant Republic by keeping America out of a war with France in 1799, at the expense of his political career. Lastly, Gen Robert E. Lee, in an ironic twist of fate, helped unify the nation he warred against with his lonely decision to surrender in 1865.

These three men made the right decision because they were able to, at least momentarily, absent themselves from the turmoil of the present and take a wider view of history. Even if the exigencies of the moment demanded a display of Clausewitzian audacity, the greater long-term needs of their country and their men dictated disengagement—the "careful solution." Alone amidst voices of contention, they realized the historical consequences of their actions, and they accordingly sacrificed victory in the present for the needs of the future. These three men exemplify military leadership with their lonely decisions not to engage; decisions reached by taking into account the profound impact of their actions on the American military and the future of the nation.

While We Have an Army in the Field

In 1775 Great Britain, the world's foremost military power, dispatched additional forces to quell the rebellion in its American colonies. The same year, John Adams secured the passage of a motion in the Continental Congress to invest one man with the responsibility for America's military response—George Washington. An examination of Washington's military career offers very few decisive battlefield victories. Americans did not gain independence with one or a series of clear-cut successes in climactic battles. Rather, American soldiers triumphed because they endured. In order to keep the Continental Army intact and to achieve the American strategy of winning independence, Washington had to employ tactics of disengagement in 1776–77.

Washington, overconfident and offensive-minded, initially sought battle with British forces. His first major engagement occurred in 1776, when the Continental Army attempted to defend the city of New York from an amphibious British assault. British forces easily routed Washington's untrained army, which barely escaped annihilation. Painfully aware of British military supremacy after New York, Washington began to realize that he would have to husband his meager forces, as Congress and the several states consistently refused to meet enlistment quotas and supply requests. In subsequently adopting tactics of disengagement, Washington contradicted his very nature—he was naturally aggressive as a commander and had hoped for one climactic battle to end the war.

Washington's new tactics are commonly referred to as Fabian tactics, after the Roman general Fabius Cunctator, from whom Washington borrowed by avoiding an all-out battle against superior forces.[3] Washington tempered his aggression and steeled himself for a long war of attrition in which he would only engage on his terms and would never hazard his entire force as at New York. Washington observed, "the possession of our Towns, while we have an Army in the field, will avail them little. . . . It is our Arms, not defenseless Towns, they have to subdue."[4] Washington astutely viewed his army as the symbol of American independence—provided it survived, the American cause would endure. The hopes of the nation rested on his ragtag force, and, as early as 1778, Americans already referred to him as the "father of his country."[5] With true paternal caution, Washington knew he could not risk his army.

After New York, Washington employed his new tactics on 28 October 1776, at the Battle of White Plains. Although he yielded the field, Washington inflicted substantial British casualties using only a small portion of his army.[6] Next, against the wishes of many nervous congressmen, Washington did not fight to defend Philadelphia in September 1777 from British invasion; rather, he merely attempted to slow the Brit-

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ish advance. Even though Philadelphia served as the young nation's capital, its fall did not end the war, unlike the destruction of the Continental Army would have. However, in December 1777, after losing Philadelphia and the subsequent Battle of Germantown, General Washington pressured his generals to launch a large offensive to close the year's campaign with success. Several of his officers reminded him of his commitment to Fabian tactics, and Washington, once again seeing the greater effects of his offensive nature, ended the year's campaign.

By curbing his own aggression, Washington saved his battered army. As historian Joseph J. Ellis comments, "his decision *not* to act merits special recognition, since another major engagement [. . .] outside Philadelphia risked the existence of the Continental army."[7] Washington had to defy his very nature and the wishes of Congress on several occasions in order to ensure the continuance of his army. He was willing to make this difficult decision because he knew that American independence was indissolubly linked to his army's survival. Washington valued strategic victory more than tactical audacity. To secure independence with arms, he thus had to adopt tactics of disengagement.

Great is the Guilt of an Unnecessary War

In order to preserve the nation that Washington fought to establish, Pres. John Adams had to make a decision that was both profound for the nation and for him personally. Upon John Adams's 1797 inauguration as the second president of the United States, he inherited a potentially explosive international situation. The wars of the French Revolution engulfed Europe and affected America when France began to seize American ships bound for Great Britain. Adams sought a diplomatic solution and sent a peace delegation to Paris. However, French agents demanded a bribe from the American commissioners, who, aghast at such a demand, broke off negotiations.

When word of this insult—known in history as the XYZ Affair—reached America, the public demanded war. Yet, the American army was virtually nonexistent and the navy existed only on paper. Initially, Adams himself took a staunch position—that such an insult to American honor must be avenged. He urged the construction of a new navy and the establishment of the Department of the Navy. As a result of his unwavering support of American sea power during the Revolution and during his presidency, Adams is remembered as the "Father of the American Navy."

However, Adams soon began to lose control of the situation. The radicals in his party, the Federalists, demanded war, an option that Adams, despite his tough posturing, wished to avoid. In addition, the majority of Adams's cabinet was disloyal and intentionally subverted his more moderate decisions. Although neither country declared war, American and French vessels fought on the high seas in what has been dubbed the "Quasi-War." Presiding over what historian John Ferling calls the "nation's first cold war" and with his party and the American public clamoring for a fight, Adams found himself in a tenuous position—he was the leader of a nation that wanted a war it could not win.[8]

Adams also found himself personally torn. He had always boasted that popular opinion did not sway him, and he believed that a president should transcend political parties. Yet, in reality, Adams was notoriously susceptible to vanity. Due to his stubborn, opinionated, and self-righteous nature, Adams had never enjoyed widespread public support. Now, due to his strong position towards France, members of his party and the American people praised him, and he reveled in it. Citizens composed songs in his honor, patriotic addresses flooded his desk, and crowds cheered him.

Yet, as a student of history, Adams could easily see beyond his momentary popularity and the public cry for war. Historian Edmund S. Morgan maintains that Adams ignored his vanity and his political career because he knew the admiration of others did not matter; American independence was his primary concern.[9] He had fought for independence as fiercely as Washington had, and he refused to jeopardize it in a war against France. As Adams wrote to his wife Abigail, "Great is the guilt of an unnecessary war."[10]

Therefore, in 1799 with an election-year looming, Adams, without consulting his party or his cabinet, decided to send another peace delegation to France. When members of his cabinet protested, he sacked them. His party howled in indignation and ostracized him. Adams's actions split the Federalists, and, during the election of 1800, members of his own party sabotaged his reelection. News of a successful treaty with France did not reach America until after Thomas Jefferson defeated Adams in his reelection bid.

Adams's actions exemplify leadership, because, as commander-in-chief, he considered the limits of America's military and the devastating long-term effects of war on the nascent nation. In his study of presidential leadership, Stephen Skowronek holds that Adams's "great reversal of party and policy [. . .] offers a first glimpse at the difficulties [. . .] leaders have in accounting for the order-shattering impact of independent action."[11] Adams solitarily made the monumental decision to avoid war, a decision which ended his political career but saved America.

I Would Rather Die a Thousand Deaths

Sixty-one years after the end of the Quasi-War, the convulsions of the Civil War wracked the country. Differing conceptions of America, espoused with arms on the battlefield, endangered the very existence of the United States. By April of 1865 Gen Robert E. Lee had commanded the Army of Northern Virginia for over three years, through its peaks of glory and now, in its trough of desperation. The last days of his army marked a fierce emotional and mental conflict for Lee as he decided the proper course of action.

April 1865 opened with the Army of Northern Virginia stretched beyond its capacity defending Petersburg and Richmond in a siege that had begun 10 months earlier. Beginning the previous year, 1864, Gen Ulysses S. Grant, as the new general-in-chief of federal armies, launched a relentless war of attrition against Lee with the Union Army of the Potomac. Grant correctly concluded that the defeat of the Confederacy dictated the destruction of Lee's army, which, similar to Washington's Continentals, embodied an ideological cause. Thus, the key component of Grant's grand strategy to end the war necessitated Lee's defeat. To that end, Grant ordered Gen George G. Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, to "follow Lee everywhere he goes."[12]

The Army of the Potomac pursued as ordered, resulting in some of the bloodiest battles of the war—the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna, Cold Harbor, and finally, the siege of Petersburg. Grant enjoyed the luxury of reinforcements and matériel from the industrial North, while Lee could not replenish his losses. In April of 1865 Lee faced the reality that he would have to abandon Petersburg and the Confederate capital of Richmond, over the objections of Pres. Jefferson Davis. Faced with an overpowering force that punctured his lines daily, Lee withdrew his diminished army from the trenches on 2 April.

As the remnants of his army desperately tried to escape encirclement, Lee struggled with the decision to surrender. Jefferson Davis wanted to continue the war, even as Lee saw his army disintegrating before his eyes.[13] Grant's juggernaut, at 80,000 men,[14] relentlessly pursued Lee's forces, now with under 10,000 soldiers fit for combat.[15]

As late as 8 April many of Lee's officers wanted to continue the fight.[16] As Union forces closed in, Lee acquiesced and attempted one last failed breakthrough. Sensing the inevitable, Lee wrestled with his duty to his cause and government and his obligation to his men. Although hundreds were deserting daily, the core of Lee's army would follow him anywhere and would continue the fight—no general in American history was more beloved by his men. Lee knew his decision would affect these loyal men, and he no longer wanted to risk their lives for a doomed cause.

Therefore, on 9 April, Lee resolved to parley with Grant at the McLean House in the town of Appomattox Court House. Before Lee departed, Edward Porter Alexander, his artillery commander, suggested that the army disband and flee to the hills in order to continue the war through guerilla tactics. Lee instantly vetoed the idea, realizing that such a course would only bring years of heartache and violence to the country. Lee replied, "There is nothing left me but to go and see General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths."[17] Later that day, Lee surrendered his army to Grant; the Civil War ended soon thereafter.

As Lee left the McLean House, Union soldiers, realizing their victory, began to cheer. Grant quickly silenced them. He appreciated the momentous and difficult decision that Lee had just made. Lee's decision to surrender his forces in 1865 marks one of the most difficult military decisions of all—voluntarily ceasing to fight and ceding victory. He made his decision against the wishes of his president, his senior officers, and many of his soldiers, because he recognized his duty towards his men. Thus, like Washington and Adams before him, Lee chose not to fight, and he made the decision alone. He realized the hopelessness of the Confederate cause and decided to avoid useless bloodshed, at the expense of victory. Lee saw beyond the present and knew that the Union would triumph; he resolved that he would not impede the inevitable peace.

The Careful Solution

George Washington, John Adams, and Robert E. Lee possessed the rare gift of leadership, because each made a lonely and profound decision by taking into account more than just the momentary advantage of launching an attack, initiating a war, or continuing a struggle. All three had to contend with forces that opposed their decisions; sometimes the opposition stemmed from their own character. All struggled with conflicting loyalties, whether to one's own natural proclivities as with Washington, Adams's desire for popularity and party acceptance, or the wishes of government and fellow officers in Lee's case.

Yet, most tempting for military leaders is the chance for easy victory and immortalization as a decisive and bold commander. However, Washington, Adams, and Lee saw beyond the short-term advantages of Clausewitz's audacious solution and chose the careful solution—an alternative which does not guarantee success or fame. These three men prove that leadership decisions are lonely and often unpopular, but, as John Adams once said, "Popularity was never my mistress, nor was I ever, or shall I ever be a popular man."[18] Because they, for the good of their men and country, rejected the popular or convenient option which others demanded, all three men epitomize the best of American military leadership.

Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *Principles of War* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2003), 13.
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3. J. Ferling, *Setting the World Ablaze: Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and the American Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 143.
4. E. S. Morgan, *The Genius of George Washington* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1980), 9–10.
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6. Ibid., 143.
7. J. J. Ellis, *His Excellency George Washington* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 109.
8. J. Ferling, *A Leap in the Dark: The Struggle to Create the American Republic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 424.
9. E. S. Morgan, *The Meaning of Independence: John Adams, George Washington, and Thomas Jefferson* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 23.
10. D. McCullough, *John Adams* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 474.
11. S. Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), 67.
12. Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller, *Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), 207.
13. J. M. Taylor, *Duty Faithfully Performed: Robert E. Lee and His Critics* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 1999), 203–5.
14. Ibid., 190.
15. Fuller, *Grant and Lee*, 241.
16. Taylor, *Duty Faithfully Performed*, 213.
17. Ibid., 212.
18. McCullough, *John Adams*, 373.

Leadership: Some Thoughts after Forty Years

Dr. Dewey E. Johnson

The preface to the first edition of *Concepts for Air Force Leadership* written in 1970**,** made this observation:

> Leadership, because it involves the complexities of mankind, almost defies description and understanding. Though the evidences of leadership are well known, the process is almost unknown. The antecedent of the United States Air Force are [is] replete with examples of courageous men and women who have provided the catalytic spark to make things happen in difficult situations. But even after decades of investigation, we are unable to identify with certainty the causal factors that determine leadership success at a given time. We can describe some of the behaviors that take place, but we are frequently unable to explain why.

The quote that to me best reflects our difficulty in explaining the "why" of what impels people to act is military historian, James L. Stokesbury's, observation: "Leadership remains the most baffling of arts. . . . As long as we do not know what exactly makes men get out of a hole in the ground and go forward in the face of death at a word from another man, then leadership remains one of the highest and most elusive of qualities. It will remain an art."[1]

Just to make sure we are looking at the same concept, leadership will be defined here as a proactive process of influencing people, individually and in groups, to accomplish meaningful organizational missions. This means an influence process up, down, sideways, and diagonally throughout the organization. We are focused on leadership within Air Force organizations, although many of the same concepts can be applied in family, social, and other organizational settings.

A Changing Leadership Landscape

My purposes in this reflection are to consider some of the life altering challenges facing Air Force men and women together with the disease of egotism that destroys trust. While the act of climbing out of a hole to almost certain death may be the most threatening, there are other considerations. Think of this: Our military must carry out their missions with technologically sophisticated systems across a broader reach of the globe with more stress on themselves than ever before. The enemies are less politically motivated and, therefore, less defined. Their civilian leadership is more "politically correct" and less responsive to the advice of experienced military leaders. They are faced at every turn with rapidly changing and frequently contradictory demands placed upon them. We are asking our men and women to leave their homes and families to face a dangerous and frequently uncertain world. Let me give just one example of the changing world landscape.

> All over the globe, in such disparate places as the troubled Pacific Island states of Oceania, the Panama Canal zone, and out-of-the way African nations, the Chinese are becoming masters of indirect influence-by establishing business communities and diplomatic outposts, by negotiating construction and trade agreements. Pulsating with consumer and martial energy, and boasting a peasantry that, unlike others in history, is overwhelmingly literate, China constitutes the principal conventional threat to America's liberal imperium.[2]

Today's Air Force leader faces an exceedingly demanding challenge because the role demands are so much more complex. In 1970 we described the challenging environment in this general manner:

> Why do we repeatedly use the term, *challenging*? It is because the Air Force leader is primarily concerned with organizational members and the mission, and it is an ever-present challenge to lead toward the accomplishment of a group mission. Under skillful leadership, people drawn from the panorama of American life have a seemingly infinite ability to get the job done. Stories of their deeds are legend. Yet, in the future, with the social, technological, and economic changes that pervade our culture, there will he even greater demands on leaders. They will need to influence people who are better educated, economically more self-sufficient, far healthier, more increasingly willing to question and dissent, and much more mobile and inquisitive than military personnel have ever been. Thus organizational members and the mission offer challenging opportunities to leaders who are eager for competition, admire success, and have the personal courage to stake their reputation on their actions.

The future has brought changes far beyond those envisioned in 1970. Social, technological, political, economic, competitive, and geographic forces, both domestic and international, impact each Air Force leader. We are in a period of change that John A. Pearce III and Richard B. Robinson Jr. have termed, "radical, erratic, contradictory, and, therefore, of great importance."[3] As a result, Air Force leaders need to develop a broad strategic vision that not only seeks to understand these changes, but the flexibility to adapt to these changes and the initiative to take advantage of opportunities they present. The more dynamic the period of change, the greater are the niches of opportunity for achievement.

Leadership involves making a change. As an unknown author has suggested, "Footprints on the sands of time are not made by sitting down." People change their leadership environment when they initiate leadership. The situation will be different after they initiate leadership, and it can never be the same. It may be better or it may be worse. The point is that it will be changed—it will be different.

When we accept or take on the role of a leader, we are also accepting the responsibilities and obligations that go along with it. The most basic leadership responsibility arises out of the instant change from "me" to "we"; just a change in one letter, but what a difference it makes! This change could be

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called the "flip" side of life. When "m" is inverted, it becomes a "w" and vice versa. Your world has really changed completely upside down with the new responsibilities and obligations when you become a leader. We are responsible for our actions because we made the conscious decision to accept these roles. We decided to attempt to lead other people; we have asked them to place their trust in us.

The late Peter Drucker, perhaps the most quoted authority on leadership and management, has expressed this instant change well: "The leaders who work most effectively, it seems to me, never say 'I.' And that's not because they have trained themselves not to say 'I.' They don't think 'I.' They think 'we'; they think 'team'. . . . They understand their job to be to make the team function. They accept responsibility and don't sidestep it, but 'we' gets the credit. This is what creates trust, what enables you to get the job done."[4]

The Disease of Egotism

Leadership is such a majestic behavior. You have followers. How fortunate you are! This suggests that we need to consider our leadership actions. Our leadership changes other people's lives, hopefully for the better. We don't dump our sewage by the roadside. We shouldn't dump our sewage of anger, unethical behavior, personal gain, or egotism into our leadership environment. These behaviors destroy trust.

Some individuals are so ego-centered that they believe they can do anything they want to satisfy their own egos through self-centered behavior. They always want to get their way; are careless about their behavior, trample over rules and regulations, and show a general disregard for others. Perhaps an old Chinese saying by Liu Shao-ch'I explains this idea best: "There is no such thing as a perfect leader either in the past or present, in China or elsewhere. If there is one, he is only pretending/like a pig inserting chop sticks into its nose in an effort to look like an elephant." Egotistic leaders pretend they are perfect. There is a difference between being confident and being egotistical. Leaders need to be confident in their own actions because, very simply, if they are not confident in what they believe, why should others be confident?

Egotism is another matter. An egotistical person leads for self-purposes. Perhaps you have observed that many persons are egotistical because they lack confidence. They are basically insecure and they take it out on others. Perhaps you know of leaders whose desire for self lets nothing stand in the way of their success. They are impervious to all suggestions. They are invincible in their drive for personal achievements at all costs. Their followers talk about their trampling staff, lacking integrity, and grabbing credit from others. As former Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower suggested, "You do not lead by hitting people over the head—that's assault, not leadership." Leaders with large egos are always looking for recognition. They constantly need to be patted on the back. They think they are a cut above everyone else; they talk down to others. I think the following phrases summarize egotism (author unknown):

> In their minds, they could do no wrong.
> They made every decision.
> They made themselves the center of the organization.
> They believed the end justifies the means.
> Truly, they were the leaders from hell!

There is a world of difference between a strong ego, which is essential, and a large ego, which can be destructive. Leaders with strong egos know their own strengths. They are confident. They have realistic ideas of what they and their followers can accomplish, and they move purposefully toward their organization's goals. They build trust through their "we" approach to leading.

Effective leaders also have another dimension that was suggested by Winston Churchill, "Before you can inspire with emotion, you must be swamped with it yourself. Before you can move their tears, your own must flow. To convince them, you must yourself believe." Stated another way by former Fresno State football coach, Jim Sweeney, "Before people care about what you say, they need to know that you care."

In summary, the phrase "Jerks can't give positive strokes" is critical in leadership. If a person who knows nothing about what you are doing—or even worse is a failure at doing it—praises you for doing a task, what is your reaction? What are your feelings? Probably, "the jerk doesn't know anything about it!" The lesson here is that to be effective in praising, you have to be believable as a role model. This is what Warren Bennis means when he said, "people would much rather follow individuals they can count on, even when they disagree with their viewpoint, than people they agree with but who shift positions frequently." I cannot emphasize enough the significance of consistency and focus.[5]

A Personal Challenge

This is probably my last opportunity to share a few personal reflections on leadership. Let me then take this opportunity to issue a personal challenge: Have you reflected on your leadership legacy? Have you thought about the many courageous men and women who have contributed to your well-being? These giving men and women saw the need for action, believed in what they were doing, inspired others and, in spite of many difficulties, made you, your organization, your community, and your country better than it was before.

This is the essence of leadership. These forward-thinking men and women sought leadership roles and accepted the responsibilities that were vital parts of these roles. They understood the leaders' duties—to take the values they believed in and made meaningful change happen. It is clear that we are the beneficiaries of the servant-leaders of the past who gave back far more than they gained. Our role as servant-leaders should be much the same. If we value what we are doing and believe that our and our organization's contributions are important, don't we want to leave a legacy for the future? Don't we want to develop future leaders who can make important contributions to their next generations?

It all comes down to one simple idea. Are your values and beliefs important? If they are, then you should take a developmental approach in planning for the future. If you do not consider your values and beliefs to be important, why bother?

The song, *Be the One*, written by an unknown author, can be adapted to express the essence of leadership: to be the one who gives back, to be the one who develops meaningful relationships, to be the one who accepts the challenge

In a world full of many problems
Where solutions are hard to find;
For every challenge that is met,
there are many left behind.
And though it seems that no one cares,
it still matters that you do;
Because there is a difference that you can make,
the choice is up to you.
Will you be the one to answer the call?
And will you lead when those around you fall?
Will you be the one to help your team succeed?
Ask yourself deep down. . . will you be the one?

Wrapping Things Up

This retrospective look at Air Force leadership from a perspective of 40 years has suggested that leadership is indeed an art that can easily be despoiled through egotism. Effective leaders empower their organizations by giving them the vitality to make things happen and they challenge people to do their best by developing self-motivation through a sustaining process. Perhaps we can sum things up by returning to my concluding comments in the 1970 edition:

> We can confirm that leadership is a complex process—as complex as people themselves. This complexity makes it impossible to assure any person of achieving leadership success. Success may or may not occur depending upon the interaction of leader, group, and situational influences at a given time. There are no magic elixirs or instant prescriptions that will guarantee leadership success. Neither this article nor any other publication or development program can offer a "cookbook" approach. There are no simple recipes for success in the complex task of leadership. Effective leadership is and will continue to be the end product of understanding the causes of human behavior, analyzing the critical factors in a situation, and knowing how to use the potential of individuals and of groups—all to accomplish the organization's mission.

Notes

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4. J. J. Lewis, *Wisdom Quotes: Quotations to Inspire and Challenge from* http://www.wisdomquotes.com.
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Leadership

Air Vice-Marshal Ron Dick

In considering the concept of leadership, the first thing to ask ourselves is whether we know what we are talking about. What is "leadership"? How is it defined? To some degree, that depends on circumstances. The leadership needed to head a department in the Pentagon in peacetime is probably different from that required to command an infantry platoon under fire; and the sort of person who is good at managing a bank may not be so adept at running a maintenance unit in the Air Force. They are all leaders of one sort or another, but they are different. However, before we get around to thinking about particular problems, there are a few general aspects of leadership which are worth considering. Let us look at the historical background first.

If civilized human society is left aside, leadership is not too difficult to define. The grouping of social animals, including primitive human hunter/gatherers, produces leaders. They arise because, in any male social animal, there is a natural desire for access to food and females, and for security. In the competition for these things, one male in a group inevitably proves stronger or craftier than the others and becomes dominant. He holds his position until deposed by another male who has grown even more strong or crafty. Usually, in both nonhuman animals and in simple human societies, the change in leadership was and is achieved without undue blood being spilled. Threat, challenge, and display usually get the job done. (Even societies which we regard as civilized still retain forms of threat, challenge and display—political candidates in an election year, for instance.)

Once civilization started to grow, and human groups got to be larger and more complex, leadership began to be more complicated, too, and not everyone saw it in the same light. It is interesting to see what various people have said about the business of being in authority over the years:

- Pope Leo XIII thought that man's highest duty was to respect authority; Oscar Wilde believed that all authority was degrading. Plato said that the wisest have the most authority, but Thomas Jefferson was adamant that authority belonged to the people.
- Lord Byron felt that "when we think we lead, we are most led," and the British Prime Minister Bonar Law seemed to agree with him, when he said, "I must follow them; I am their leader."
- Hitler, as you might expect, took a rather narrow, satanic view: "The art of leadership consists of consolidating the attention of the people against a single adversary and taking care that nothing will divert that attention."
- The Bible's admonition on the subject is very forthright. The Book of Matthew reminds us that "If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch."
- More to our modern taste, probably, is Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower's definition: "Leadership is the art of getting someone to do something *you* want done because *he* wants to do it."

Eisenhower's summing up of the problem is more likely to appeal to us because it implies that the people being led should understand and accept what the leader wants to do. It suggests that the leader commands sufficient respect from his followers for them to trust his judgment and that they are content to do what he wants done. In a democracy, certainly, all that is important, even in the military—at any rate, it is now. It was not always quite like that.

It is important to bear in mind that a democracy is (or should be) a society which gives all its members an equal opportunity to strive for inequality. An aristocracy, on the other hand, establishes inequality at birth. These days, civilized people might agree that the concept of being born to lead is not an acceptable idea. The capacity for leadership can be inborn, and it can be developed—but it is not often thought of as being part of someone's birthright. Not so long ago, it was the other way around in most places, and it was not always a success.

The aristocratic tradition evolved from the simple system of group dominance that the human race was born with. It has been with us for most of human history, and, in many countries, it has a long way to go yet. The idea that those fortunate enough to be born into one of the great families had a God-given right to lead went almost universally unchallenged for centuries, both on and off the battlefield. The social gap between the leaders and the led was unbridgeable, and it was unthinkable for a peasant to even dream about leading anything.

The British Army is a useful model for studying this phenomenon. It is by no means alone in having aristocratic traditions, but its copious recorded history makes it an easy target. These days the British Army is as "democratic" as any other, but a few of the landed gentry survive within its officer corps. Born to privilege, there is sometimes a touch of arrogance about them. They can be maddeningly self-assured, often brave to the point of being foolhardy, and usually deeply concerned for the welfare of their soldiers—and their horses.

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(That is to say that soldiers—and horses—must be kept well-fed and watered, and warm and dry if possible; they should be patted and told they are good chaps when they do well, and suitably chastised when they misbehave; in other words, their simple lives must be kept well-structured and happy.)

These people often produced excellent middle-rank officers and, occasionally, superb generals. Wellington, a man who never lost a battle, could hardly have been better. He had all the attributes of the ideal military leader—an imposing appearance, a commanding presence, and the charming graces and self-confidence of the aristocrat. He had a marvelous eye for detail and a thorough knowledge of the profession of arms, he was fearless and inexhaustible, especially in battle, and he was an inspirational general. In his conduct of campaigns in India, Spain, and, of course, at Waterloo, he was the consummate professional. With all that, it is hardly surprising that he was idolized both by his men and by the British people.

However, the British Army also included men who presided over some of the greatest disasters in military history, and it is useful to examine a few of these to illustrate some important aspects of leadership. It is not too difficult to find disasters in British military history, but I will restrict myself to just three—the retreat from Kabul during the First Afghan War in 1842; the siege of Kut in what is now Iraq in 1915; and the fall of Singapore in 1942.

The Retreat from Kabul

In 1842, a British Army of 4,500, together with 12,000 dependents and camp followers, was stationed in Kabul, primarily as an insurance against Afghanistan being lost to the Russians, who could then threaten India. It was not a desirable posting. The temperature ranged from 120 degrees in summer to -40 degrees in winter. Some of the worst country in the world, crisscrossed by mountain ranges and deep ravines, lay across the army's lines of communication with India—and the natives were not friendly.

The commander of the army was Maj Gen Mountstuart Elphinstone. His qualifications for the appointment were that he was "of good repute, gentlemanly manners and aristocratic connections." He was courteous and kind, and affectionately regarded by his followers. Unfortunately for them, he was also hopelessly indecisive, lacking in moral courage, and suggestible, although he could be remarkably pigheaded when he chose. He also lacked compassion in the face of suffering, preferring to ignore it and hope it would go away.

In January 1842, there was an Afghan uprising strong enough to threaten the British position. An irresolute response by Elphinstone made things worse, and he was driven to come to terms with the Afghan leader, who demanded a complete withdrawal of the British force to India, safe passage assured. Following a chaotic series of orders and counterorders, the army and its dependents set off in the dead of winter. The march was disorganized and a long, straggling column was the result, moving slowly and without adequate military precautions.

Elphinstone did not press the march and would not move by night; no fires were lit in camp for fear of attracting tribesmen even though the guards were freezing to death; the soldiers could not wrap blankets round their legs on the march because it looked unsoldierly; hundreds of people fell out of the column to lie in the snow and be stripped and left to die by Afghans, but Elphinstone seemed not to notice, preferring to repeat a pathetic belief in the promise of safe passage. Mocking that promise, the tribesmen harried the column to such effect that, by the fifth day, losses had risen to over 12,000. At no point did the general make the slightest attempt to lead the once-disciplined force under his command in an attack on his tormentors.

On 13 January, one week after the army left Kabul, a single officer, the regimental doctor, reached the British fort at Jalalabad. He and a few Indian soldiers proved to be the only survivors of the withdrawal. Perhaps the most honest of the subsequent comments on the disaster said: "Our army perished, sacrificed to the incompetence, feebleness, and want of skill and resolution of their military leaders."

The Siege of Kut

In 1915, the commander of the British 6th Division, near Basra in Mesopotamia, was Maj Gen Sir Charles Townshend. He was both intelligent and professionally able, and a brave man. He was charming company, and he had a light touch with his troops, with whom he was popular. What they may not have appreciated was that beneath his splendid exterior, he was vain, dishonest, and lacking compassion. Worse yet, he was an egotist driven by ambition and ravenous for popular acclaim. He craved honor, rank, and the admiration of others to such an extent that his professional judgment could be overridden in their pursuit.

Townshend's division was tasked with protecting the oil pipelines around Basra from the Turkish Army. While adequate for that, it was not strong enough to undertake expeditions in the direction of Baghdad, yet that is what it soon set out to do. Townshend knew that his division was incapable of getting the job done. He wrote in some detail to a friend of his in England spelling out the problems—the need for three times as many troops and more guns, the strategic insignificance of Baghdad, the poor lines of communication, the logistic problems, and so on.

Nevertheless, when the order came for him to move, Townshend accepted the commitment enthusiastically. Initially, he was tasked to take Amarah, 100 miles north of Basra. He did that, and then pressed on to Kut, 90 miles further. The Turkish Army's resistance was now quite strong, and Townshend's force suffered 12 percent casualties, but he was winning and his appetite for glory had been whetted. Knowing the limitations of his force, it was *he* who proposed going further. He could already see himself as Gen Sir Charles Townshend, Lord of Baghdad.

As he advanced on Baghdad, Townshend was faced by a Turkish Army of 13,000, backed by another of nearly 30,000. His weakened division fought well and repulsed the Turks, but half became casualties in the process. He fell back on Kut, and could have kept going to get closer to Basra and reinforcements. He knew that was the thing to do, but dreams of glory still filled his head, and he imagined he could make a fortress of Kut's mud huts. He would withstand a siege and emerge a hero.

For the next 147 days, Townshend's division huddled in its trenches at Kut and its commander sent heroic messages to the outside world. The suffering of the troops was appalling; food was inadequate and medical supplies nonexistent. A series of relief forces failed to break through and accumulated 23,000 casualties. Townshend was unmoved. While the soldiers died of disease and malnutrition, he sent messages to his superiors recommending his own promotion. He said it would be possible for him to escape from Kut to take up a more important post. Abandoning his troops was apparently not a problem for him.

On 19 April 1916, Townshend accepted the assurances of the Turkish commander that he would be treated generously, and handed his men over to the Turks. He was taken in the greatest comfort to Constantinople, where he became the guest of honor of the Turkish commander in chief. He was entertained at Constantinople's best restaurant and established in a splendid villa with his servants. His men, meanwhile, began a 1,200-mile march across deserts and mountains, and they died by the thousand, of disease, starvation, cold, and at the hands of their Turkish guards or Arab marauders. Nearly 70 percent died in captivity.

When Townshend was repatriated, he expressed no sorrow for the fate of his soldiers, nor did he feel guilty. Indeed, he seemed surprised that his homecoming speech on being "an honored guest of the Turks" was not well received, and he could not understand the icy blast of disapproval which met his renewed attempts to gain promotion in recognition of his achievements.

The Fall of Singapore

The fall of Singapore in 1942 may have been the greatest single disaster ever inflicted on the British military. This "impregnable" fortress, with its huge naval dockyard and strategically important airfields, fell into the hands of the Japanese almost intact, after they had conducted a campaign remarkable for its ease and swiftness. With Singapore fell the myth of European supremacy over Asiatics, and the British suffered irreparable damage to their military prestige. More significantly, the defeat rocked the foundations of the Victorian British Empire and marked the beginning of the end for Britain as a world power.

The man who presided over this debacle was Lt Gen A. E. Percival. He was highly intelligent and had built his reputation by being a superb staff officer. He could not be described as a warrior. Indeed, he was known for being a gentle soul. Sadly for Singapore, he also found it difficult to be decisive, and he sought his escape from decision-making in obstinacy and rigidity.

When the Japanese opened their Pacific campaign by landing an army in Malaya a few hours before attacking Pearl Harbor, the British forces available to Percival outnumbered the Japanese by three to one. However, the British commanders had been seduced by the legend of their Imperial power. They belittled Japanese capability, they concluded that the Malayan jungles were impassable to an invading army in any case, and they made up their minds to defend Singapore only from attack by sea. No defenses were prepared for the north coast of the island, which is only a few hundred yards from the end of the Malayan peninsula—nor were there any at any point in Malaya itself.

Even when the Japanese were established ashore in northern Malaya and had begun to move south, Percival refused to take them seriously. Pressed to do something about constructing defenses on Singapore's north coast, he refused on the grounds that such activity would be bad for civilian morale. He authorized a series of withdrawals for the army in Malaya which gave the impression that the Japanese were irresistible and encouraged wholesale retreat. When the Japanese reached his doorstep and could be seen just across the straits, he still shied away from reality. For instance, he supported the view that a machine-gun crew should not be allowed to dig a strongpoint on the golf course or knock over a tree which was obscuring their field of fire without these matters being placed before the Golf Club committee.

At no point in the campaign could Percival bring himself to believe that offensive action was warranted against the Japanese. He sat in his headquarters like a rabbit in the headlights waiting for the Japanese army to run into him—and it did. Besides the loss of a vital strategic base and an immense amount of material, Percival's conduct resulted in death or captivity for 140,000 British, Indian, and Australian troops.

It might be said that this historical material is interesting but that it has nothing to do with the practice of leadership at the end of the twentieth century, and that it is particularly inappropriate when considering problems of leadership at unit level. However, leadership in any circumstances has always involved issues of character and judgment, and that has not changed. At the roots of the failures of the leaders concerned in the examples given were a number of weaknesses which are common enough and are worth looking out for, both in ourselves and in others.

Elphinstone, Townshend, and Percival were all apparently charming and capable men. Yet, when confronted with some real tests of command, one or the other of them proved to be in some degree incompetent, indecisive, irresolute, inconsistent, suggestible, lacking in moral courage or compassion, vain, obstinate, dishonest, unbending, egotistical, overambitious, or arrogant. Obviously, none of them had been able to examine his own character dispassionately enough for him to think how its weaknesses and strengths might affect the issue when the test came; nor had their superiors seen the problems coming.

That suggests a wider failure of leadership, in which friendship and influence came to count for more than honest assessment in the appointment of leaders. There is also a hint that the men involved had been adequate as long as they were not seriously challenged; their flaws became obvious only when exposed to the stress of war. However, their failings were still there, and many of them would have been noticeable even in quiet times. Probably nothing was done about them because, in peacetime, there were no life and death consequences.

That, of course, is the point for most military people for the greater part of their careers. Military units must be made to work effectively when, for most of the time, they are not being employed in their primary function. Nations may hire armed forces but they would prefer them *never* to be used in anger. It is, then, necessary for officers to exercise the skills of leadership to the best of their ability in organizations which are most of the time merely getting themselves ready in case they have to do their job. There are still life and death decisions to make for some—aircraft, for instance, can be very unforgiving if not properly treated and looked after—but, in peacetime the task of a military leader can seem to be not very different from that of a civilian.

The comparison is soon seen to be superficial, however, once it is considered that, for instance, civilian leaders are often driven by such things as corporate profits, and do not operate a system of military discipline. Nevertheless, it is probably true to say that, because most of the world now spends so much time in economic rather than military confrontation, the charismatic military leader has been largely replaced by the good manager.

Which brings us, at last, to the problem of being a leader, at any level, in today's armed forces. Gen John Chain, ex-commander in chief, Strategic Air Command, tells a story about one of his predecessors who used to keep a special paperweight in a prominent place on his desk. It was multifaceted. He said that it was there to remind him that, whatever problem he was faced with, he needed to look at it from every angle in reaching a decision. That seems to be an excellent foundation on which to build any form of leadership. Leaders (or managers) exercise much of their function in making decisions, and it is well to remember that there is more than one side to every question.

That is true, but it is not always easy to decide which facet is more important than the others. For instance, the interests of the service often come into collision with those of the individual, and the person in charge has to disentangle the wreck. On the face of it, the service must come first every time, but, especially in peacetime, that which helps the individual most often helps the service, too. It is clear, however, that there is a difference between the military and civilian communities.

Military people are responsible to their nations for providing combat capability. They cannot do that effectively without maintaining a well-structured organization in which order prevails, and that in turn requires that the leadership should be decisive. Elphinstone at Kabul is an example of those who have conspicuously failed in that regard. Firmness of that kind is not necessarily required in the business world, nor is it likely that many commercial enterprises feel that they are in business principally to serve the community at large.

When an individual takes up the reins of any supervisory post, it is as well for that person to remember that the military serves the nation—not personal ambition such as that of Townshend at Kut. Leaders should be dedicated to serving their country as well as they can, and should let the rewards of advancement follow as and when deserved. It is one of the responsibilities of leadership to ensure that the role of the military in society is well understood both by the leaders themselves and by all those under their command. There are, of course, many other responsibilities. A leader must know as much about the jobs of subordinate units and people as possible. Elphinstone at Kabul was a commander in chief who appeared to know very little about what was going on around him, but examples can be found at all levels in any service.

Of course, there are probably going to be many things a leader does not know at first, so there is no need to try to impress people with comprehensive knowledge immediately after taking command, nor should there be any rush to make wholesale changes. The rule is, or should be: See - Absorb - Evaluate - *then* Judge and Decide. Changes may be necessary (everyone has preferences about the way things are done), but it should be remembered that previous commanders had their reasons for setting units up the way they are, and it might be sensible to find out what those are before rushing in to change things.

In becoming as knowledgeable about the unit as possible, it is not necessarily the case that commanders should be able to do the job of any member of their teams—although it would be marvelous if they could—but they should know enough to understand the problems which arise, and to come to a sensible conclusion about solutions. That implies a capacity to understand and trust people when they explain their difficulties, and that in turn suggests that the trust should be mutual. General Percival at Singapore failed to establish any trust between himself and his subordinates, and the resultant debacle was almost inevitable. There must, then, be communication in both directions between leaders and subordinates. If a leader gives directions about something which needs doing, the instructions must be clear. There should never be any doubt as to intentions. At Singapore, the troops were never clear about how they were supposed to defend the base, unlike their Japanese opponents, who knew exactly what their objective was.

At the same time, not everything needs to be in the form of an order. Leadership involves much more than the issuing of orders. It is surely more sensible to explain why something should be done and to motivate people to do it. A leader should make the object clear and should try to radiate enthusiasm and confidence—they are contagious. After a while, the fact that a project is being proposed by the leader should be sufficient to point the followers in the right direction from the outset. Again, the Singapore catastrophe is a classic example of a military organization destroyed as an effective fighting force by the absence of enthusiasm and confidence in the commander.

Once something has been set in motion, a leader should have the confidence to delegate responsibility to those who are capable. If they can do the job, they should be left to get on with it. At the same time, instructions must *always* be followed up. People should be asked how they are getting on and they should be made aware that their superior has an interest in what they are doing and is determined to see the job finished. If the boss keeps in touch, most of the time there will not be a problem. Just occasionally, it may be necessary to insist and perhaps be tough. Senior officers like Elphinstone and Percival were renowned for their remoteness, and such "toughness" as they showed was mostly in the form of stubbornness founded on ignorance.

It is a mistake, however, for a commander to rush to judgment when things go awry and indulge in volcanic rages. That may make the boss feel better, but it will probably not help in the long run. Deciding that someone is "no damned good" and should be gotten rid of may prove to be correct, but it is better in the first place to ask why he or she is useless and try to induce a change. Constructive counseling can work wonders. It is not easy to do, but it must be done for the benefit of all subordinates, strong or weak. People like to know where they stand and they generally appreciate guidance, particularly from someone more experienced than themselves. Counseling is a tricky business, however, and it is all too easy to run round the problem of talking things over either by hiding behind the mask of an unapproachable martinet or by shying away from criticizing anybody—anything for a quiet life. Either of these courses is evading the issue. Leaders, their people, and their units are much better off if the nettle is grasped and individuals are told about their strengths and weaknesses.

In some cases where someone has a problem, it could be useful, also, to ask if it lies with the individual or with the person's training, or even with the unit in which he or she works. Notice that the need might be for a leader to be tough, not harsh. Each of the British Army leaders discussed could be faulted for lack of compassion. Being overbearing may gain a commander a hard-nosed reputation, but it is no substitute for being rational and using intelligence. Criticism should be constructive, and, if a job has been well done, praise is important, too.

There was a time in the middle of my career when I was not happy with the way things were going and I started to kick over the traces a bit. I turned a blind eye to a number of flying regulations and flew aircraft too far beyond the limits of sensible behavior. At length it caught up with me and I was the subject of a Board of Inquiry for breaking the rules. The air officer commanding at headquarters wanted to make an example of me, but my wing commander apparently thought I was worth saving and he insisted on being allowed to handle the matter himself.

On an appointed day, I was wheeled in to the commanding officer's (CO) office and brought to attention in front of his desk. He put on his hat and read out a formal reprimand in a very severe voice. When it was over, I was marched out, and then promptly called back in again. He had his hat off and a couple of glasses on the table. He sat me down, handed me a drink, and said he assumed that I had taken the reprimand to heart. He then went out of his way to find out what my concerns were and to reassure me that I was out of the doghouse. He added that he knew I had many good qualities which he hoped I would now put to full use.

My behavior improved sharply and immediately. Not only had my boss protected me, he had let me know where I had gone wrong while making it clear that he valued me as a member of his unit. My commander on that occasion was a man who had established a reputation throughout the service for leadership on the basis of justice, fairness, and integrity. People were glad to work for him and his units were efficient and happy. Everyone knew that he was concerned for their welfare and that he would not let them down. At the same time, no one was allowed to get away with unreasonable behavior. He kept his principal responsibilities in mind.

On another occasion under his command, I was on quick reaction alert (QRA)—nuclear alert duty. The aircraft I had been allocated was not healthy. After running a full systems check on it at 2 A.M. on a freezing cold night, I stormed into operations and told them that the aircraft was unserviceable and had to be taken off the line. That did not seem to me to be unreasonable—none of the navigation equipment was working. Unfortunately, the base had more than its share of aircraft problems at that time, and there was no possibility of a replacement. The senior engineer asked me to stick with the aircraft I had for a few hours. His crews were working through the night and would have another ready during the late morning. He pointed out that my squadron was filling a national alert slot, that the Cuban missile crisis was in full swing, and that my allocated target would have to remain uncovered if I withdrew. I was adamant.

A few minutes later, the wing commander strolled into operations as if he was always around in the middle of the night. I tensed and got ready to defend myself. He wandered about looking at the boards, then smiled at me and asked quietly if I was having a problem. I gave him both barrels about my aircraft. He nodded understandingly and thought for a while. Then he asked if the engines would run and give full power. They would. He wanted to know if the bomb could be armed and dropped. It could. Finally, from in front of a map showing the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, he asked if the standby compass was working and if I could fly roughly east for about three hours. It was and I could. Still smiling, he said it sounded as if I was still on alert, and then he went back to bed, having given me a lesson in facing a problem calmly and sorting out what was really important.

I had also been impressed by the fact that he had reacted in person to my rumpus, and that he had done so without losing his temper in spite of having been dragged out of bed. I found later that, after he left me, he visited the engineers and reinforced my views on the state of the QRA aircraft.

That story highlights the hazards of overreacting, and is not meant to suggest that no trust should be placed in personal experience. As each individual faces the countless problems of daily life, it is inevitable that the experience built up induces a gut reaction to each of them—and great store should be set by that. On many occasions there is not time to take a pace back and think it over. The unexpected arises and decisions must be made—generally the reaction which arises from experience can be trusted. If the time is available, however, leaders need not be afraid to consult others and get the benefit of their experience, too. A good rule for a leader might be: "Be a good listener and, whenever you can, think problems through; make the effort to look ahead and consider the consequences of your decisions."

If possible, of course, it is a good idea for leaders to anticipate problems by planning ahead and being so organized that they are never taken by surprise. Certainly it is a good idea, and it is sensible to develop the habit of planning ahead as far as possible—but surprises are an inevitable part of life. Nevertheless, planning well ahead eases the tension and allows priorities to be thought through. A hundred things may need doing, but some will be more important than others, and they need to be clearly identified.

Part of trusting your own judgment is being brutally honest with yourself. Nothing weakens self-confidence like the thought hovering at the back of your mind that you are doing something you do not believe in. Even if you are unwise enough to try fooling others, it is disastrous ever to try fooling yourself. Personal integrity is vital and it should never be compromised. It follows that leaders need to have the courage of their convictions. Subordinates will not respect their superiors if they think they are being swayed by the temptations of taking an easy way out or of giving in to people who have their minds made up, no matter what the facts.

As must be obvious from the thousands of books on the subject, the crystal ball of leadership has a million facets. Mostly, it boils down to using common sense and getting involved with the job and the people doing it. Leaders should get to know their people—and their wives and families, too, if that is possible. What makes them tick and what are their needs? Are there signs of strain and tiredness? They should be invited to talk about their problems, and be kept healthy, both physically and mentally. Leave is important. Many military people seem almost to brag about having had no leave for months. It makes them feel indispensable or something. It is a shortsighted policy, either not to take leave or to deny it—and that goes for the boss, too. Units need their chiefs to take leave. Worry, fatigue, and illness are the enemies of efficiency. Worse still, they are prime causes of accidents; they can kill people and must not be ignored.

All these things are relevant to the development of leadership potential, but three cardinal points need emphasis:

- Leaders should remember that they are not infallible; they must recognize, acknowledge and learn from their mistakes.
- They should be receptive to the ideas of others, taking note of the efforts of their colleagues and benefiting from the example of their successes and failures.
- In seeking inspiration from the exploits of great leaders of the past, it is a mistake to try becoming their clone. Leaders should make every effort to develop, but should be themselves. Not everyone can be Gregory Peck in *Twelve O'Clock High.*

Coalition Leadership Imperatives

Col Larry M. Forster

Coalition commanders often head a symbolic presence as well as a physical force. They encourage cooperation among the various nongovernment organizations, coordinate with United Nations (UN) personnel, and correlate with different tribes and groups. However, the greatest operational challenge is often internal—maintaining intracoalition unity. Coalition contingents may live virtually isolated from one another and may display signs of dissention and dispirited conduct of essential operations. Trust binds coalitions, and often it must grow among nations with no background of working together or worse, with contentious histories. To harness the internal dynamics and accomplish the shared mission, coalition commanders must conquer extraordinary leadership challenges.

Such challenges are common to senior leaders during complex peace and humanitarian operations, which have been the main operational employment of the US armed forces since 1991. With the exception of the initial deployments to Somalia and Rwanda, recent peace and humanitarian operations have been multinational (most often coalition) operations.[1] In some cases the United States has led a coalition of the willing. In other instances the United States has been the lead nation in a UN-authorized force, the mainstay of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation or—as in the case of the ongoing Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai—US personnel are under the operational control of a foreign commander.

US participation in coalition operations distributes the operational burden and establishes international legitimacy. While initially more difficult and inefficient than unilateral missions, coalition operations are usually more politically acceptable to both the international community and to the former warring factions in an intrastate conflict. There are also many intangible benefits of working with other nations, to include the variety of experiences accrued by US leaders, enhanced capabilities of foreign armed forces, and strengthened US ties to international partners. As a residual bonus, those now-experienced foreign militaries may execute future regional operations—in ways that support collateral US interests but with minimal or no US involvement. Coalition operations, then, pay significant dividends to all participants beyond achieving the initial purpose.

Since the structure of a coalition is often more important for its political effect than its military capability, US commanders may have to accept a suboptimal tactical organization to achieve key strategic objectives. To achieve coalition objectives with organizational constraints and in an environment where different military cultures are merged, leaders must maximize cohesion while carrying out difficult missions. Indeed, this multinational leadership requirement and the need for additional senior leader preparation was identified in the strategic-level action review of the Implementation Force operation in Bosnia.[2]

Leadership Challenges

This article addresses proven multinational leadership techniques derived from the experiences of senior US officers and feedback from coalition partners. It highlights the general dynamics of coalitions and provides context for understanding their unique leadership challenges. It also examines successful multinational leadership and recommends specific actions for leaders working with non-US military members. As with national organizations, coalitions require clear and decisive leadership but with different skill sets. Compared to leaders of US-only operations, coalition leaders must be more sensitive to diversity and mission complexity to motivate professionals from different backgrounds.

The Operational Environment

Coalition leadership challenges are shaped by the unique dynamics of specific operations. Often US leaders operate in coalitions activated after extreme deterioration of circumstances in a host nation or region. The organization is formed ad hoc to meet urgent requirements, has broad and often unclear mandates and missions, and is the result of hasty prior coordination with coalition partners. At least initially such operations often have media attention. Because such missions most likely constitute military operations other than war, knowledge of inherent noncombatant principles, techniques, and actors is imperative. Skills developed for effective coalition operations will also apply when dealing with former warring factions, members of nongovernment organizations and international organizations, the media, and the often-bewildering political entanglements.

In coalitions, US leaders must contend with foreign contingents' different operating styles and distinctive rules of engagement. Conflicting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) can cause dissension. However, a willing, flexible commander can often harmonize variances in coalition TTPs into complementary procedures. Otherwise, friction from a rigid adherence to only one way of doing things can imperil operational success.

Article courtesy of the author Col Larry M. Forster and *Military Review* November-December 2000.

Interoperability limitations and restrictions on sharing national intelligence are also significant challenges for coalition leaders. In particular, a separate and restricted US intelligence cell tends to cause friction. While often necessary for intelligence production and dissemination, classification is an issue to manage carefully with coalition partners. Appropriate "work arounds" can help assure coalition members that they are equally supported for the risks they incur. If restrictions on intelligence products must remain, they should be explained and coordinated to minimize adverse effects on coalition unity.

In addition, language barriers and different national cultures—including religion, history, values, and life tempos—can create potentially adverse processes within a coalition, unless understood and overcome. Coalition leaders usually realize quickly the vital requirements to learn as much as possible about the military cultures of the other coalition members and respect those sensibilities. Using cultural understanding of contingents, leaders can properly choose and resource officers as their liaisons and trusted agents. Likewise, the commander should make the contingent liaison officers part of his or her trusted inner circle so they can accurately convey his or her intent to their commanders. Of course, the commanders' personal touch in relationships with contingents is still fundamental to binding the organization together and facilitating the command process.[3]

Command Relationships

In a coalition operation, the force commander will likely not be the head of mission—that distinction usually goes to the special representative of the secretary general (SRSG) of the UN or a special representative of the lead nation. This dynamic is significant because the commander may have to contend with an operational chain of direction separate from his or her national chain of command, balance multinational and national perspectives, and deal with many outside authorities over which he has no control. The commander will also need to develop cooperative relationships with heads of the other coalition components. For example, in a UN mission a commander would need to cooperate with coequals: the civilian police commissioner, the humanitarian aid coordinator, and the chief administrative officer. Further, they must balance these relationships to retain consent and credibility for the military operation with both beneficiaries and participants—no easy task.

Within the coalition, foreign commanders with operational-control relationships to US leaders have command relationships with their national superiors similar to those that US commanders have with the regional commander in chief and National Command Authories. The fully effective US leader remembers this dictum: "You will need to understand that they [multinational forces] may have subtly different agendas, although completely rational for their purposes."[4] Like US officers, coalition partners are duty-bound to advance their national agendas, which US leaders must consider when providing coalition policy and direction.

Coalition Structures

Leaders and planners must assess contingents to best integrate military formations into the overall force structure. A primary consideration is each contingent's assigned area of operation (keeping in mind the compatibility of adjacent units, the contingent's relationship with host-nation factions, and other appropriate historical and cultural considerations). In addition, the coalition must include optimum control mechanisms appropriate to its structure, response force, reserve, and national logistics support.

Other important issues to resolve include contingent representation on the force commander's staff. One method arranges staff representation roughly proportionate to contingents' contribution to the operation. While individual qualifications and experience must match the requirements of specific appointments, there will still be rigorous competition for key jobs by qualified officers from various contingents. This competition (and any unrealistic expectations that accompany it) may require arbitration by the commander to resolve representation issues amiably.

In addition to structural and staff issues, the force commander will have multiple logistic challenges. While fully integrated logistic support would enhance coalition effectiveness, national prerogatives, legal constraints, and incompatible systems often make this impossible. Bosnia illustrates this problem. The British commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) requested that the US commander of Multinational Division North (MND-N) provide logistic support to the Slovak battalion in the MND-N area of operation, but the United States did not have a cross-servicing agreement with Slovakia. As a result, the MND-N commander could not legally comply with the request of his coalition superior. The ARRC commander then had to find another means to support this politically important IFOR member assigned to the US sector.[5]

Leadership Requirements

Coalition dynamics and special challenges require leaders to focus on intracoalition cohesion and multinational success. These skills and techniques often differ from the direct, aggressive, dominant styles nurtured while operating in national tactical formations. Retired Lt Gen Walter F. Ulmer states that this leadership style is often highly successful at the tactical level and most often rewarded in efficiency reports. However, as he points out, this style is often dysfunctional at levels where circumstances require contemplation, patience with ambiguity, and appreciation for participative decision making—the very skills coalitions demand. This need for indirect leadership skills shifts from one set of leader behaviors to another and is especially evident in coalition operations—and at lower levels than common in national units.[6]

When some American officers confront mismatched leadership styles and requirements, they exhibit an "if you don't like it, tough" attitude—which quickly becomes counterproductive to the coalition mission. Others continue to use "slash and burn" direct-leadership techniques that are inappropriate to multinational applications. Such failures to build consensus create unnecessary friction, resentment, and confusion in multinational organizations.

In addition, some US leaders with a strong "can do" attitude and a lack of patience often attempt to bypass foreign officers who have their own work tempo and techniques (which may be more effective in coalitions than common US variants). This happens, for example, when a US leader ignores several subordinate coalition staff officers to reach down to a US "iron major" for a quick staff product. In the process, they would likely alienate the capable foreign officers they bypassed and adversely affect the motivation of that entire contingent. Actions taken for short-term expediency may inadvertently, but profoundly, degrade long-term relations among partners.

US coalition leaders are now discovering that these challenging missions require embedding multinational leadership skills at lower organizational levels. In these operations, a junior leader's action can have strategic significance, especially if captured on television. Combined activities (such as multinational patrols, checkpoints, training and exercises, or morale activities) often depend on junior leaders to enhance coalition cohesion. This reality requires senior leaders to mentor subordinates and model the skills and sensitivities that enhance coalition cohesion. The skills imparted to junior leaders do not supplant the direct-leadership expertise that they must develop but are meant to strengthen the leadership tools historically employed by their superiors.

In its essence, then, multinational leadership often requires skills that are more readily thought of as strategic. Consensus-building, focusing mechanisms and buy-in techniques are important to overall success. With the right leadership approach, many operational challenges can be overcome through trust and goodwill generated among coalition participants. Furthermore, a coalition force is more likely to remain credible, retain support of the contributing nations, be considered professional, and effective if properly led within an optimum command climate that permeates down to the lowest levels.

Imperatives for Coalition Leaders

Successful commanders in multinational environments focus on and inculcate a vision that infuses the whole coalition. Leaders must find common ground in the varying agendas of participants, instill pride and purpose into the mix of coalition partners and focus limited resources to get the greatest return. Effective coalition leaders treat all members with respect, listen well, and settle differences and misunderstandings rapidly. When national-legal restrictions or other obstacles prevent optimum coalition arrangements, good leaders work together on the best possible resolution and attempt to offset any residual ill will if desired arrangements cannot be executed. To deal with some of these problems, US commanders have often benefited from having staff officers who specialize in the region and international law. When possible, effective commanders develop streamlined staff procedures and arrange staff training to integrate the different nationalities into an effective team before deploying. These commanders choose key staff officers with care and develop the perception that each contingent is properly represented and respected. They also try to influence the training of other contingents before their deployment and do what they can to assist sponsoring governments. When practical, these commanders include all contingents in planning and promote the coalition as a special, high-performing military organization.

The US commanding general of the UN mission in Haiti, under an Algerian SRSG, provided a model for multinational success. He used the time between his appointment and the transfer of authority from the initial US-led Multinational Force to ensure success of the new UN operation. He did this by training the core of his multinational staff in-country, developing a transition plan with the existing US force, gaining the trust of his foreign contingent commanders and working out the complex structural details to integrate foreign contingents. As a key achievement, he fostered a professional relationship with the SRSG.[7]

In past operations, successful commanders ensured predeployment training was conducted by participating contingents. This training included cultural and operational factors of the mission, orientation to the various contingents in the coalition, rules of engagement, individual skills, and force protection. Senior leaders discovered that they benefited from training in mediation and negotiation techniques, orientation to key influential players, and reinforcement of consensus-building and interpersonal skills.

Once in the area of operation, these commanders promoted an effective reception and orientation program; encouraged professional development programs, operational situation permitting; and created an effective command information program. Furthermore, they encouraged senior subordinate leaders to teach and model the techniques of successful multinational leadership. They led by example, set the appropriate command climate, and kept the coalition together by trust and mutual respect.

While the character, personality, expertise, and leadership styles of coalition leaders vary, a few tips from after-action reviews, anecdotal experiences, and coalition partners may help maximize multinational leadership. Many of these principles apply throughout an organization in which leaders find themselves working with foreign military colleagues. Recommendations for US senior leaders in coalitions include:

1. *Place the highest priority on developing trust*. Invest the time and effort in those personal relationships that are essential to success. Do not promise what may not be delivered, and always deliver what is promised.

2. *Do everything possible to foster fairness and equality*. Distribute resources, assign tasks and missions, conduct meetings, speak publicly without bias, and quickly dispel all perceptions of inequity.

3. *Articulate and demand pervasive professionalism*. Set, publish, and require high standards for training and performance. Foster intensive coalition training sessions and live-fire exercises. Form a united front within the organization and present that unity externally. Encourage officers to be advocates for the coalition.

4. *Develop stakeholders*. Using the shared vision as a foundation, continually emphasize the common risks, re-

wards, and responsibilities. Taking on a collective, coalition identity develops a new level of pride, cohesion, and sense of achievement.

5. *Be patient*. Many problems result from different techniques and will challenge all participants. It is extremely important that leaders tolerate unavoidable irritations. Coalition colleagues will praise a commander's ability to remain calm amid chaos and make decisions at the right time (not unduly pressured by national considerations).

6. *Praise in public; correct and counsel in private*. This is an especially critical technique when dealing with coalition partners. Inevitable disagreements must not become public or personal. Wisely follow a modified golden rule: treat others as they expect to be treated. Make a special effort to commend the coalition members' outstanding performances.

7. *Give others credit for your ideas*. Make suggestions and reinforce responses to your ideas as if their response was the original idea. If done subtly, this can have amazing results in terms of support, ownership, and overall execution of tasks.

8. *Encourage others to speak their minds—foster initiative*. Be approachable, listen and consider coalition partners' suggested alternatives. Effective leaders avoid talking too much and are good listeners.

9. *Be willing to take prudent risks and avoid micromanagement*. Focus on mission-type orders and encourage coalition partners to do it their way. Delegate where practicable. Recognize that other contingents can often accomplish the mission using methods that are equally or more effective.

10. *Learn about key, non-US participants*. Show interest in the other military contingents. Honor their national holidays or military commemorations and value their traditions. Identify the essential nonmilitary components and become comfortable working with civilians from other cultures.

11. *Honor coalition colleagues by being sensitive to their religious or cultural concerns*. Consider the needs of some partners for special consideration to support their religious practices (such as the physical limitations Ramadan fasting may place on Muslims). Be sensitive to words, gestures, and actions that may offend others from different cultures. If possible, learn a few words of a contingent's native language.

12. *Choose and use liaison officers well*. A US coalition commander should choose trusted American liaison officers with the professional expertise, language skills, and cultural sensitivity to be accepted and incorporated in foreign units. Conversely, the commander should find ways to include the liaisons of coalition partners among trusted assistants so they can accurately transmit his intent to their contingents.

13. *Establish an operating tempo that supports all coalition members*. As a battle rhythm is developed for the operation, make sure it is appropriate for all contingents. Coalition subordinates often comment that the workaholic approach of US leaders does little to contribute to operational success. Obviously, a balanced approach to this issue is of greatest utility in a multicultural military force.

Effective coalition leaders blend contingents' "best practices" and develop fair policies and procedures—they are known for their caring and respectful attitude as well as specific actions. Coalition leaders also tend to be highly valued for their character, expertise, and overall credibility. The best of these leaders consistently use techniques that build consensus, mediate differences, and show appreciation.

Given the complexity of coalition operations and the numerous obstacles to success, senior military professionals must hone skills and develop competencies that work well during multinational operations. They must also avoid the assumption that leadership techniques that have worked in national-tactical applications will be effective with foreign militaries. Given the likelihood of US participation in coalitions and the importance of these operations to American interests, Army leaders must carefully prepare now for the associated professional challenges. The payoff—for national objectives, international peace, and personal fulfillment—can be profound.

Notes

1. The term *coalition* is used here interchangeably with the broader term, *multinational*. Coalitions operations generally pose a greater challenge than those within an established alliance or other multilateral applications because they exist only as long as they are politically expedient and merge components that have no prior experience together.

2. Maxwell G. Manwaring, "Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia," *Parameters* (Winter 1998–1999): 31. This article reports on two strategic after action reviews on Bosnia conducted by the US Army Peacekeeping Institute.

3. Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, June 1997), 16.

4. Robert H. Scales Jr., "Trust, Not Technology, Sustains Coalitions," *Parameters* (Winter 1998–1999): 9.

5. Glenn Bowens, "Legal Issues in Peace Operations," *Parameters* (Winter 1998–1999): 66.

6. Walter F. Ulmer, "Military Leadership into the Twenty-First Century: Another Bridge–Too Far?" *Parameters* (Spring 1998): 20.

7. US Army Peacekeeping Institute, "Success in Peacekeeping, United Nations Mission in Haiti: The Military Perspective" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996).

Leadership Is in the Eye of the Follower

James M. Kouzes
Barry Z. Posner, PhD

What you have heard about leadership is only half the story. Leadership is not just about leaders; it is also about followers. Leadership is a reciprocal process. It occurs *between* people. It is not done by one person to another.

Successful leadership depends far more on the followers *perception* of the leader than on the leader's abilities. Followers, not the leader, determine when someone possesses the qualities of leadership. In other words, leadership is in the eye of the follower.

Leadership Characteristics

During a five-year period we investigated the perceptions that followers have of leaders. We asked more than 10,000 managers nationwide from a wide range of private and public organizations to tell us what they look for or admire in their leaders. The results from these surveys have been striking in their regularity. It seems there are several essential tests a leader must pass before we are willing to grant him or her the title of *leader*. According to our research, the majority of us admire leaders who are honest, competent, forward-looking, inspiring, and ultimately, *credible*.

Honesty

In every survey we conducted, honesty was selected more often than any other leadership characteristic. After all, if we are to willingly follow someone, whether into battle or into the boardroom, we first want to assure ourselves that the person is worthy of our trust. We will ask, "Is that person truthful? Ethical? Principled? Of high integrity? Does he or she have character?" These are not simple questions to answer. It is not easy to measure such subjective characteristics. In our discussion with respondents we found that it was the *leaders behavior* that provided the evidence. In other words, regardless of what leaders say about their integrity, followers wait to be shown.

Leaders are considered honest by followers if they do what they say they are going to do. Agreements not followed through, false promises, cover-ups, and inconsistencies between word and deed are all indicators that an ostensible leader is not honest. On the other hand, if a leader behaves in ways consistent with his or her stated values and beliefs, then we can entrust to that person our careers, our security, and ultimately even our lives.

This element of trustworthiness is supported in another study of leadership practices that we conducted. In that study we found that of all behaviors describing leadership, the most important single item was the leader's display of trust in others. Irwin Federman, venture capitalist and former president and chief executive officer (CEO) of chipmaker Monolithic Memories, says it best: "Trust is a risk game. The leader must ante up first." If leaders want to be seen as trustworthy, they must give evidence of their own trust in others.

Sam Walton, founder and chairman of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., provides an excellent example of trustworthiness and "anteing up first" in leadership. In 1983 Walton—rated by *Forbes* to be the richest man in the United States—made a wager. Concerned that the company might have a disappointing year, he bet Wal-Mart employees that if they achieved a greater profit than in previous years he would don a hula skirt and hula down Wall Street. They did. And he did. He kept his word and did what he said he would do. He showed he had integrity, even if it meant public embarrassment. But imagine what would have happened had Sam not kept his word. You can believe that his employees would not have anted up for the next bet!

Competence

The leadership attribute chosen next most frequently is competence. To enlist in another's cause, we must believe that person knows what he or she is doing. We must see the person as capable and effective. If we doubt the leader's abilities, we are unlikely to enlist in the crusade. Leadership competence does not necessarily refer to the leader's technical abilities. Rather the competence that followers look for varies with the leader's position and the condition of the company. For example, the higher the rank of the leader, the more people demand to see demonstrations of abilities in strategic planning and policy making. If a company desperately needs to clarify its corporate strategy, a CEO with savvy in competitive marketing may be seen as a fine leader. But at the line functional level, where subordinates expect guidance in technical areas, these same managerial abilities will not be enough.

We have come to refer to the kind of competence needed by leaders as *value-added competence.* Functional competence may be necessary, but it is insufficient. The leader must bring some *added value* to the position. Tom Melohn, president of North American Tool and Die (NATD) in San Leandro, California, is

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a good case in point. Tom, along with a partner, bought NATD several years ago. A former consumer-products executive, Tom knows nothing about how to run a drill press or a stamping machine. He claims he cannot even screw the license plates on his car. Yet, in the nine years since he bought the company, NATD has excelled in every possible measure in its industry, whereas under the original founder—an experienced toolmaker—NATD achieved only average or below-average results.

If Tom brings no industry, company, or technical expertise to NATD, what has enabled him to lead the firm to its astounding results? Our answer: Tom added to the firm what it most needed at the time—the abilities to motivate and sell. Tom entrusted the skilled employees with the work they knew well; and for his part, he applied the selling skills he had learned from a quarter century in marketing consumer products. He also rewarded and recognized the NATD "gang" for their accomplishments, increasing their financial and emotional sense of ownership in the firm.

Being Forward Looking

Over half of our respondents selected *forward-looking* as their third most sought-after leadership trait. We expect our leaders to have a sense of direction and a concern for the future of the company. Some use the word *vision*; others, the word *dream.* Still others refer to this sense of direction as a *calling* or *personal agenda.* Whatever the word, the message is clear: True leaders must know where they are going.

Two other surveys that we conducted with top executives reinforced the importance of clarity of purpose and direction. In one study, 284 senior executives rated "developing a strategic planning and forecasting capability" as the most critical concern. These same senior managers, when asked to select the most important characteristics in a CEO, cited "a leadership style of honesty and integrity" first, followed by a "long-term vision and direction for the company."

By forward-looking we do not mean the magical power of a prescient visionary. The reality is far more down-to-earth: It is the ability to set or select a desirable destination toward which the organization should head. The vision of a leader is the compass that sets the course of the company. Followers ask that a leader have a well-defined orientation to the future. A leader's *vision* is, in this way, similar to an architect's model of a new building or an engineer's prototype of a new product.

Think of it another way. Suppose you wanted to take a trip to a place where you had never been before—say Nairobi, Kenya. What would you do over the next few days if you knew you were going there in six months? Probably get a map, read a book about the city, look at pictures, talk to someone who had been there. You would find out what sights to see, what the weather is like, what to wear, and where to eat, shop, and stay. Followers ask nothing more from a leader than a similar kind of orientation: "What will the company look like, feel like, be like when it arrives at its goal in six months or six years? Describe it to us. Tell us in rich detail so we can select the proper route and know when we have arrived."

Inspiration

We want our leaders to be enthusiastic, energetic, and positive about the future—a bit like cheerleaders. It is not enough for a leader to have a dream about the future. He or she must be able to communicate the vision in ways that encourage us to sign on for the duration. As Apple Computer manager Dave Patterson puts it, "The leader is the evangelist for the dream."

Some people react with discomfort to the idea that being inspiring is an essential leadership quality. One CEO of a large corporation even told us, "I don't trust people who are inspiring"—no doubt in response to past crusaders who led their followers to death or destruction. Other executives are skeptical of their ability to inspire others. Both are making a mistake. It is absolutely essential that leaders inspire our confidence in the validity of the goal. Enthusiasm and excitement signal the leader's personal conviction to pursuing that dream. If a leader displays no passion for a cause, why should others?

Credibility

Three of these four attributes—honesty, competence, and being inspiring—comprise what communications experts refer to as *credibility.* We found, quite unexpectedly, in our investigation of admired leadership qualities that more than anything else people want leaders who are *credible.* Credibility is the foundation on which inspiring leadership visions are built. When we believe a leader is credible, then we somehow feel more secure around him or her. This sense of security enables us to let go of our reservations and release enormous personal energy on behalf of the common vision. Credibility and an attractive image of the future are the very essence of leadership.

However, credibility is extremely fragile. It takes years to earn it, an instant to lose it. Credibility grows minute by minute, hour by hour, day by day, through persistent, consistent, and patient demonstration that one is worthy of followers' trust and respect. It is lost with one false step, one thoughtless remark, one inconsistent act, one broken agreement, one lie, one cover-up.

Leadership Practices

Leaders establish and maintain their credibility by their actions, and in our research we uncovered five fundamental practices that enabled leaders to earn followers' confidence and to get extraordinary things done. When at their best, leaders (1) challenge the process, (2) inspire a shared vision, (3) enable others to act, (4) model the way, and (5) encourage the heart.

Challenging the Process

Leaders are pioneers—people who seek out new opportunities and are willing to change the status quo. They innovate, experiment, and explore ways to improve the organization. They treat mistakes as learning experiences. Leaders also stay prepared to meet whatever challenges may confront them.

Inspiring a Shared Vision

Leaders look toward and beyond the horizon. They envision the future with a positive and hopeful outlook. Leaders are expressive and attract followers through their genuineness and skillful communications. They show others how mutual interests can be met through commitment to a common purpose.

Enabling Others to Act

Leaders infuse people with spirit-developing relationships based on mutual trust. They stress collaborative goals. They actively involve others in planning, giving them discretion to make their own decisions. Leaders ensure that people feel strong and capable.

Modeling the Way

Leaders are clear about their business values and beliefs. They keep people and projects on course by behaving consistently with these values and modeling how they expect others to act. Leaders also plan and break projects down into achievable steps, creating opportunities for small wins. They make it easier for others to achieve goals by focusing on key points.

Encouraging the Heart

Leaders encourage people to persist in their efforts by linking recognition with accomplishments, visibly recognizing contributions to the common vision. They let others know that their efforts are appreciated and express pride in the team's accomplishments. Leaders also find ways to celebrate achievements. They nurture a team spirit that enables people to sustain continued efforts.

Unique Relationship

Leadership is a relationship, a unique and special trust between the leader and followers. The development of this trusting relationship requires our full and caring attention as leaders. Below are five prerequisites to building and maintaining this bond of trust.

Know Your Followers

Building any relationship begins with getting to know those we desire to lead. Get to know their hopes, their fears, their values, their biases, their dreams, their nightmares, their aspirations, and their disappointments. Find out what is important to your followers. Come to know what they seek. Only in this way can you show them how their interests can be served by aligning with yours.

Stand up for Your Beliefs

In our culture we appreciate people who take a stand. We resolutely refuse to follow people who lack confidence in their own values and decisions. Confusion among your followers over your stand creates stress; not knowing what you believe leads to conflict, indecision, and political rivalry. There is, however, a danger in always standing on principle: it can make one rigid and insensitive. The key to escaping rigidity is to remain open to others: listen, understand, and empathize. We respect leaders who can listen to and understand our points of view, yet believe in their own hearts that other viewpoints are superior. If your beliefs are strongly held, ethical, and based on sound thinking, followers will find ways to align themselves with you.

Speak with Passion

Managers constantly talk about motivating their people, of lighting a fire under them. If the leader is a wet match, there will be no spark to ignite passion in others. Enthusiasm, energy, and commitment begin with the leader. To gain the commitment of others you must communicate your excitement about the dream. Paint word pictures. Tell stories. Relate anecdotes. Weave metaphors. Enable others to see, hear, taste, smell, and feel what you experience. When the dream lives inside others, it lives forever.

Lead by Example

Leaders are role models. We look to them for clues on how we should behave. We always believe their actions over their words. We will never forget the story told us by a young manager, John Schultz, about his days as a high-school football player:

> When I played high-school football, I had three coaches. The first two were exactly alike. Each said, "Men, while you are in training I don't want you to smoke, drink, stay up late, or fool around with girls. Got that?" Then we would watch our coaches during the season. They would smoke, drink, stay up late, and fool around with women. So what do you suppose we did? Boys will be boys, after all.
>
> My third coach was the best I ever had. At the beginning of the season we had the same locker-room sermon as with the other coaches. Except this coach just said, "I have only one rule. You can do anything I do. If I smoke, drink, stay up late, or fool around with women, then I would expect you to do the same. But if I don't, you'd better not!"

If leaders ask followers to observe certain standards, then the leaders need to live by the same rules. That is exactly what we were told many times by exemplary leaders. You can only lead by example. Leadership is not a spectator sport. Leaders do not sit in the stands and watch. Hero myths aside, neither are leaders in the game substituting for the players. Leaders coach. They show others how to behave.

Conquer Yourself

Jim Whittaker, the first American to reach the summit of Mount Everest, learned that he could not conquer a mountains, because mountains cannot be conquered. He had to conquer himself—his hopes, his fears. It might brighten our heroic image of leaders to believe that they conquer organizations, communities, states, nations, the world. It might make good cinema to picture the leader riding into town on a white horse and single-handedly destroying the villains. But this Lone Ranger portrait of great leaders only perpetuates a falsehood. The real struggle of leadership is internal. The everyday struggles of leaders include internal questions such as: Do you understand what is going on in the company and the world in which it operates? Are you prepared to handle the problems the company is facing? Did you make the right decision? Did you do the right thing? Where do you think the company should be headed? Are you the right one to lead others there?

This inner struggle places enormous stress on the leader. Followers do not want to see that their leaders lack self-confidence. Certainly they like to know their leaders are human, that they can laugh and cry and have a good time—but followers will not place their confidence in someone who appears weak, uncertain, or lacking in resolve. Followers need to sense that the leader's internal struggle has been fought and won. Conquering yourself begins with determining your value system. Strongly held beliefs compel you to take a stand.

The Eye of the Follower

These characteristics, these practices, these relationships are tough measures for the leader. It may not seem right to be judged so harshly, but followers perceive leadership in their own terms, and those terms are not always fair. After all, the leader is not a leader unless there are followers; and there are no true followers unless the leader is a leader in the eye of the follower.

Bob Galvin on Heritage, Creativity, and Leadership

Kenneth Houston Paterson

When you visit Bob Galvin's office on the 12th floor of the corporate tower in Schaumburg, Illinois, the first thing that strikes you is the modest, conservative nature of Bob's Motorola home.

The second thing that commands your attention in this office is the quiet spirit of exploration that pervades the room. In one corner, a globe of the world sits on its stand. It has the air of being used, the globe spinning easily on its axis. Paintings of sailing ships hang on the walls and several superbly detailed ship scale models rest in small glass cases. One of them, Captain Bligh's ship, the *Bounty,* is depicted in the scale model smashing through stormy Pacific seas, sails partially reefed and the British flag blowing out from the stern.

On the east wall of the office, a large antique map hangs, a view of the world charted by the famous cartographer of his day, De Wit, in 1692. Another small map hangs on the south wall of the office and this one is the real surprise, for it is the first known printed map of the Americas. The map was printed from a copperplate engraving in 1507 and is credited to J. Ruysch, cartographer. An almost prophetic note is sounded in this map because the American continent is depicted as being connected to Asia. Considering Motorola's expansion in Asia today, this is an error in geography, but not in relationships.

Photos of family and friends are on tables and walls. On a couch, a small cushion—a family gift—with an embossed motto proclaims, "Anyone can be a grandfather, it takes someone special to be a grandpa." Some books sit on a shelf over at the window that looks out over the grass to the Land Mobile Products sector. The books include *The Founder's Touch,* by Harry Marks Petrakis, and Andy Affrunti's book, *A Personal Journal: 50 Years at Motorola.* One book, among the many by prominent business authors, captures your attention. It is the original edition published by Charles Scribner's Sons in 1955. *Your Creative Power,* by Alex Osborn, was a beacon of light shining on the process of creativity, and it is one of Bob Galvin's treasured references on ideas, creativity, initiative, and leadership. Years after acquiring the book, Bob asked Motorola University Press to look into republishing it. Realizing the value of the concepts and ideas expressed by Osborn, the book was redesigned and republished in 1991 and then again in 1994.

On the north wall, by the window, a small framed black-and-white photo hangs. A father and son are walking together, the father with a glint of humor in his eyes yet with determined stride. The son is barely concealing his pleasure and, with his hat tilted back, totally enjoying the company of his father. Taken in 1956, the photo is of Paul V. Galvin and his son, Bob. It is immediately behind Bob's desk.

It has been said that offices can be read like a book. It quickly becomes obvious that the person resident in this office has a high regard for the creative process, that of exploring, appraising, and planning, and that the foundation for all of this is based on heritage. Heritage is a source of inspiration to Bob Galvin. There is the family heritage starting in recent memory with the early struggles of Paul and Joe Galvin and other family members in the little town of Harvard, Illinois—the struggles being forged into triumphs as Motorola became a world-renowned corporation. The Harvard High School class of 1934 recently came together in June of 1994 at Harvard for its 60th reunion and requested some words on the value of heritage at Motorola. In a letter from Chris Galvin, Chris quoted some of his father's comments on the value of heritage.

> The term *heritage* conjures a historical event but, as a matter of fact, history is always in the making. As we practice sound principles and perform to the high standards, we are literally creating the heritages of tomorrow. The heritages we create become our legacy. There is almost nothing more valuable for any one of us to create than a legacy worth others inheriting. We must be creative. We must have anticipated the application of that which we create. We must have the courage to commit. We must therefore act boldly and thus cause that something truly new and different will occur worthy of our institution.

Like any master mariner who knows where he comes from in order to plan the voyage ahead, Bob's words on heritage are important for the Motorola voyage. It is easy to forget the past in the excitement of the present and the vision of the future, but as Bob went on to say,

> So we build on our inheritance. But the active word then is build. We must be builders and that which we build ably will become the proud heritages of tomorrow. Thus the reflections on the past will illuminate a brilliant future sustaining the renewal process of our institution.

When Bob is asked about the effect of Motorola's heritage on the many Motorolans in other countries, he doesn't hesitate in his enthusiasm for the many different cultures and people that now represent Motorola worldwide. He believes that the creativity, commitment, and cultures of the expanding global family will energize many new heritages. He is

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quick to point out, however, that success for Motorola has come about not through supporting everything that has gone before but by being able to change direction and to discard that which no longer works. As he says,

> There are other heritages that have been presented to us and which for various practical reasons did not have to be sustained indefinitely. These have to do with the pragmatic matters of products which were a part of our repertoire or markets that were our focus. To the extent that we have found that it was no longer necessary and appropriate that we pursue those inheritances, we have elected to honorably move in new directions.

During a visit to the Motorola Museum of Electronics recently, the excited chatter of children could be heard even before one walked down the stairs from the mezzanine to the great hall. Students eagerly punched buttons on the interactive displays while some sat transfixed watching the video playback of the first moon landing. Some laughed at the shape of the automobile, a 1929 Oldsmobile displaying an early Motorola car radio. A simple definition of education given to a group of parents some years ago by Bob came to mind. Some of the parents still remember the words. He said, "The purpose of education is to provide the inspiration and the competence for our young people to have dreams for themselves. Not dreams that float loosely in the air—but dreams that can be propelled by those with feet firmly on the ground."

The words seem to be equally applicable to Motorolans across the face of the globe as the company grows into new markets, new cultures, and new competitions. His enthusiasm for competition and the challenges of the marketplace are obvious.

At a gathering of education and business people at Miami University he said,

> Aren't we lucky that we're living in a period of time when virtually all the rest of the world has decided to enter the business race! Countries with recently held limited views as to the role of a private sector are now reaching out to privatization, the private ownership of the means of production. The insufficient code word is market economy. When those countries learn to mix true privatization with focus on the customer, then those countries will unleash a wealth-creating power. Happily this is happening simultaneous with more and more countries aspiring to a higher degree of democracy. These two qualities and the indigenous strength of the people of all of these remarkable countries will bring each of them into the real developing world. And our companies must be there to serve them!

The concept of learning through games is one that is as old as recorded history and undoubtedly older. Children learn through games and adults do also. Bob's attitude to learning readily encompasses the joy of learning as well as the practicality. In a meeting to discuss a publishing project, sometimes he will look up from critiquing the project and after agreeing on its merits to the company, he will say with a smile, "It looks like fun, let's do it!" At other times, he will look carefully at a prototype book, lift it, question the size, and say, "Will this be comfortable and easy for the reader to hold?" When a famous business author, educator, and consultant was asked if he would review Bob's book, *The Idea of Ideas*, he had already read it and responded with enthusiasm, saying,

> Bob Galvin is a great intuitionist, a man who starts you thinking yet never tells you what to think, who plants ideas that flower while he moves on. *The Idea of Ideas* has an almost Asian ambiguity, as if multiple meanings were always better than singular ones. It leads you into a world of paradoxes resolved, concepts recombined, processes that procreate. Rare among engineering folk, his imagery is largely organic, a vision of perpetual springtime. Perhaps his secret is that he rarely finishes a thought but simply starts another, allowing those who wish to take up the torch to run with it. Ultimately this is a book about transcendency, about the power of ideas to transform our shared realities.

Considering these words then, it is not surprising that leaving the office, new ideas are stirring and the harsh prospects of an Illinois winter are brightened by the excitement of challenges ahead.

What *Is* Leadership

Max De Pree

The first responsibility of a leader is to define reality. The last is to say thank you. In between the two, the leader must become a servant and a debtor. That sums up the progress of an artful leader.

Concepts of leadership, ideas about leadership, and leadership practices are the subject of much thought, discussion, writing, teaching, and learning. True leaders are sought after and cultivated. Leadership is not an easy subject to explain. A friend of mine characterizes leaders simply like this: "Leaders don't inflict pain; they bear pain."

The goal of thinking hard about leadership is not to produce great or charismatic or well-known leaders. The measure of leadership is not the quality of the head, but the tone of the body. The signs of outstanding leadership appear primarily among the followers. Are the followers reaching their potential? Are they learning? Serving? Do they achieve the required results? Do they change with grace? Manage conflict?

I would like to ask you to think about the concept of leadership in a certain way. Try to think about a leader, in the words of the gospel writer Luke, as "one who serves." Leadership is a concept of owing certain things to the institution. It is a way of thinking about institutional heirs, a way of thinking about stewardship as contrasted with ownership. Robert Greenleaf has written an excellent book about this idea, *Servant Leadership.*

The art of leadership requires us to think about the leader-as-steward in terms of relationships: of assets and legacy, of momentum and effectiveness, of civility and values.

Leaders should leave behind them assets and a legacy. First, consider assets; certainly leaders owe assets. Leaders owe their institutions vital financial health, and the relationships and reputation that enable continuity of that financial health. Leaders must deliver to their organizations the appropriate services, products, tools, and equipment that people in the organization need in order to be accountable. In many institutions leaders are responsible for providing land and facilities.

But what else do leaders *owe?* What are artful leaders responsible for? Surely we need to include people. People are the heart and spirit of all that counts. Without people, there is no need for leaders. Leaders can decide to be primarily concerned with leaving assets to their institutional heirs or they can go beyond that and capitalize on the opportunity to leave a legacy, a legacy that takes into account the more difficult, qualitative side of life, one which provides greater meaning, more challenge, and more joy in the lives of those whom leaders enable.

Besides owing assets to their institutions, leaders owe the people in those institutions certain things. Leaders need to be concerned with the institutional value system which, after all, leads to the principles and standards that guide the practices of the people in the institution. Leaders owe a clear statement of the values of the organization. These values should be broadly understood and agreed to and should shape our corporate and individual behavior. What is the value system based on? How is it expressed? How is it audited? These are not easy questions to deal with.

Leaders are also responsible for future leadership. They need to identify, develop, and nurture future leaders.

Leaders are responsible for such things as a sense of quality in the institution, for whether or not the institution is open to influence and open to change. Effective leaders encourage contrary opinions, an important source of vitality. I am talking about how leaders can nurture the roots of an institution, about a sense of continuity, about institutional culture.

Leaders owe a covenant to the corporation or institution, which is, after all, a group of people. Leaders owe the organization a new reference point for what caring, purposeful, committed people can be in the institutional setting. Notice I did not say what people can do—what we can do is merely a consequence of what we can be. Corporations, like the people who compose them, are always in a state of becoming. Covenants bind people together and enable them to meet their corporate needs by meeting the needs of one another. We must do this in a way that is consonant with the world around us.

Leaders owe a certain maturity. Maturity as expressed in a sense of self-worth, a sense of belonging, a sense of expectancy, a sense of responsibility, a sense of accountability, and a sense of equality.

Leaders owe the corporation rationality. Rationality gives reason and mutual understanding to programs and to relationships. It gives visible order. Excellence and commitment and competence are available to us only under the rubric of rationality. A rational environment values trust and human dignity and provides the opportunity for personal development and self-fulfillment in the attainment of the organization's goals.

Business literacy, understanding the economic basis of a corporation, is essential. Only a group of people who share a body of knowledge and continually learn together can stay vital and viable.

Leaders owe people space, space in the sense of freedom. Freedom in the sense of enabling our gifts to be exercised. We need to give each other the space to grow to be ourselves, to exercise our diversity. We need to give each other space so that we may both *give* and *receive* such beautiful things as ideas, openness, dignity, joy, healing, and inclusion. And in giving each other the gift of space, we need also to offer the gifts of grace and beauty to which each of us is entitled.

Another way to think about what leaders owe is to ask this question: What is it without which this institution would not be what it is?

Leaders are obligated to provide and maintain momentum. Leadership comes with a lot of debts to the future. There are more immediate obligations as well. Momentum is one. Momentum in a vital company is palpable. It is not abstract or mysterious. It is the feeling among a group of people that their lives and work are intertwined and moving toward a recognizable and legitimate goal. It begins with competent leadership and a management team strongly dedicated to aggressive managerial development and opportunities. This team's job is to provide an environment that allows momentum together.

Momentum comes from a clear vision of what the corporation ought to be, from a well-thought-out strategy to achieve that vision, and from carefully conceived and communicated directions and plans that enable everyone to participate and be publicly accountable in achieving those plans.

Momentum depends on a pertinent but flexible research and development program led by people with outstanding gifts and unique talents. Momentum results when a corporation has an aggressive, professional, inspired group of people in its marketing and sales units. Momentum results when the operations group serves its customers in such a way that the customer sees them as their best supplier of tools, equipment, and services. Underlying these complex activities is the essential role of the financial team. They provide the financial guidelines and the necessary ratios. They are responsible for equity among the various groups that compose the corporate family.

Leaders are responsible for effectiveness. Much has been written about effectiveness—some of the best of it by Peter Drucker. He has such a great ability to simplify concepts. One of the things he tells us is that efficiency is doing the thing right, but effectiveness is doing the right thing.

Leaders can delegate efficiency, but they must deal personally with effectiveness. Of course, the natural question is "how." We could fill many pages dealing with how to be effective, but I would like to touch on just two ways.

The first is the understanding that effectiveness comes about through enabling others to reach their potential—both their personal potential and their corporate or institutional potential.

In some South Pacific cultures, a speaker holds a conch shell as a symbol of a temporary position of authority. Leaders must understand who holds the conch—that is, who should be listened to and when. This makes it possible for people to use their gifts to the fullest for the benefit of everyone.

Sometimes, to be sure, a leader must choose who is to speak. That is part of the risk of leadership. A leader must assess capability. A leader must be a judge of people. For leaders choose a person, not a position.

Another way to improve effectiveness is to encourage roving leadership. Roving leadership arises and expresses itself at varying times and in varying situations, according to the dictates of those situations. Roving leaders have the special gifts or the special strengths or the special temperament to lead in these special situations. They are acknowledged by others who are ready to follow them.

Leaders must take a role in developing, expressing, and defending civility and values. In a civilized institution or corporation, we see good manners, respect for persons, and understanding of "good goods," and an appreciation of the way in which we serve each other.

Civility has to do with identifying values as opposed to following fashions. Civility might be defined as an ability to distinguish between what is actually healthy and what merely appears to be living. A leader can tell the difference between living edges and dying ones.

To lose sight of the beauty of ideas and of hope and opportunity, and to frustrate the right to be needed, is to be at the dying edge.

To be a part of a throwaway mentality that discards goods and ideas, that discards principles and law, that discards persons and families, is to be at the dying edge.

To be at the leading edge of consumption, affluence, and instant gratification is to be at the dying edge.

To ignore the dignity of work and the elegance of simplicity, and the essential responsibility of serving each other, is to be at the dying edge.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is reported to have said this about simplicity: "I would not give a fig for the simplicity this side of complexity, but I would give my life for the simplicity on the other side of complexity." To be at the living edge is to search out the "simplicity on the other side of complexity."

In a day when so much energy seems to be spent on maintenance and manuals, on bureaucracy and meaningless quantification, to be a leader is to enjoy the special privileges of complexity, of ambiguity, of diversity. But to be a leader means, especially, having the opportunity to make a meaningful difference in the lives of those who permit leaders to lead.

Leadership: More Doing Than Dash

Peter F. Drucker, LLD

Leadership is all the rage just now. "We'd want you to run a seminar for us on how one acquires charisma," the human resources vice president of a big bank said to me on the telephone—in dead earnest. Books, articles, and conferences on leadership and on the "qualities" of the leader abound. Every chief executive officer, it seems, has to be made to look like a dashing Confederate cavalry general or a boardroom Elvis Presley.

Leadership does matter, of course. But, alas, it is something different from what is now touted under this label. It has little to do with "leadership qualities" and even less to do with "charisma." It is mundane, unromantic, and boring. Its essence is performance.

In the first place, leadership is not by itself good or desirable. Leadership is a means. Leadership to what end is thus the crucial question. History knows no more charismatic leaders than this century's triad of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao—the misleaders who inflicted as much evil and suffering on humanity as have ever been recorded.

The Undoing of Leaders

But effective leadership doesn't depend on charisma. Dwight Eisenhower, George Marshall, and Harry Truman were singularly effective leaders, yet none possessed any more charisma than a dead mackerel. Nor did Konrad Adenauer, the chancellor who rebuilt West Germany after World War II. No less charismatic personality could be imagined than Abe Lincoln of Illinois, the rawboned, uncouth backwoodsman of 1860. And there was amazingly little charisma to the bitter, defeated, almost broken Churchill of the interwar years; what mattered was that he turned out in the end to have been right.

Indeed, charisma becomes the undoing of leaders. It makes them inflexible, convinced of their own infallibility, unable to change. This is what happened to Stalin, Hitler, and Mao, and it is a commonplace in the study of ancient history that only Alexander the Great's early death saved him from becoming an ineffectual failure.

Indeed, charisma does not by itself guarantee effectiveness as a leader. John F. Kennedy may have been the most charismatic person ever to occupy the White House. Yet few presidents got as little done.

Nor are there any such things as "leadership qualities" or a "leadership personality." Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Bernard Montgomery, and Douglas MacArthur were all highly effective—and highly visible—leaders during World War II. No two of them shared any "personality traits" or any "qualities."

What then is leadership if it is not charisma and not a set of personality traits? The first thing to say about it is that it is work—something stressed again and again by the most charismatic leaders: Julius Caesar, for instance, or General MacArthur and Field Marshal Montgomery, or, to use an example from business, Alfred Sloan, the man who built and led General Motors from 1920 to 1955.

The foundation of effective leadership is thinking through the organization's mission, defining it, and establishing it, clearly and visibly. The leader sets the goals, sets the priorities, and sets and maintains the standards. He makes compromises, of course; indeed, effective leaders are painfully aware that they are not in control of the universe. (Only misleaders—the Stalins, Hitlers, Maos—suffer from that delusion.) But before accepting a compromise, the effective leader has thought through what is right and desirable. The leader's first task is to be the trumpet that sounds a clear sound.

What distinguishes the leader from the misleader are his goals. Whether the compromise he makes with the constraints of reality—which may involve political, economic, financial, or people problems—are compatible with his mission and goals or lead away from them determines whether he is an effective leader. And whether he holds fast to a few basic standards (exemplifying them in his own conduct) or whether "standards" for him are what he can get away with, determines whether the leader has followers or only hypocritical timeservers.

The second requirement is that the leader see leadership as responsibility rather than as rank and privilege. Effective leaders are rarely "permissive." But when things go wrong—and they always do—they do not blame others. If Winston Churchill is an example of leadership through clearly defining mission and goals, Gen George Marshall, America's chief of staff in World War II, is an example of leadership through responsibility. Harry Truman's folksy "The buck stops here" is still as good a definition as any.

But precisely because an effective leader knows that he, and no one else, is ultimately responsible, he is not afraid of strength in associates and subordinates. Misleaders are; they always go in for purges. But an effective leader wants strong associates; he encourages them, pushes them, indeed glories in them. Because he holds himself ultimately responsible for the mistakes of his associates and subordinates, he also sees the triumphs of his associates and subordinates as his triumphs, rather than as threats. A leader may be personally vain—as General MacArthur was to an almost pathological degree. Or he may be personally humble—both Lincoln and Truman were so almost to the point of having inferiority complexes. But all three wanted able, independent, self-assured people around them; they encouraged their associates and subordinates, praising and promoting them. So did a very different person: Ike Eisenhower, when supreme commander in Europe.

An effective leader knows, of course, that there is a risk. Able people tend to be ambitious. But he realizes that it is a much smaller risk than to be served by mediocrity. He also knows that the gravest indictment of a leader is for the organization to collapse as soon as he leaves or dies, as happened in Russia the moment Stalin died and as happens all too often in companies. An effective leader knows that the ultimate task of leadership is to create human energies and human vision.

Earning Trust Is a Must

The final requirement of effective leadership is to earn trust. Otherwise there won't be any followers—and the only definition of a leader is someone who has followers. To trust a leader, it is not necessary to like him. Nor is it necessary to agree with him. Trust is the conviction that the leader means what he says. It is a belief in something very old-fashioned, called "integrity." A leader's actions and a leader's professed beliefs must be congruent, or at least compatible. Effective leadership—and again this is very old wisdom—is not based on being clever; it is based primarily on being consistent.

After I had said these things on the telephone to the bank's human resources vice president, there was a long silence. Finally she said, "But that's no different at all from what we have known for years are the requirements for being an effective manager."

Precisely.

A Perspective on Effective Leadership

Gen John L. Piotrowski

I'm honored to have this opportunity to set to paper a few words that attempt to capture what has been assimilated on effective leadership in nearly 38 years of Air Force service, with more than 20 years in command positions. These thoughts encompass perspectives shaped from the vantage point of airman basic to general, as well as from group commander to commander in chief (CINC).

The word *leadership* is defined within itself. The suffix *ship* holds the meanings (according to Webster) of state, condition, quality, dignity, art, and skill. Hence leadership is the sum of all these factors that describe the leader's personality in total. In a simpler context, it is the measure of a leader's ability to execute difficult tasks under adverse conditions—for example, to repair, load, and ready a wing of aircraft for combat in the dead of an arctic winter or the heat of a Middle East summer. The quality of leadership at all levels makes an enormous difference in the eventual outcome of any undertaking. This article describes several ways for leaders, commanders, or supervisors to hone the quality, art, and skill of their leadership.

I am absolutely convinced that the quality of leadership in any enterprise—be it military, civil, or commercial—shapes and determines the outcome more than any other factor. This conviction is based on my experience looking up at my many commanders, across at peers at every level of command, and down through several levels from the vantage point of wing commander through CINC. Napoléon had it right when he proclaimed, "There are no bad regiments, only bad colonels." One downside of this belief is that when your enterprise is experiencing problems, the first place you must search for discovery of the problem is your own leadership and subsequently that of your subordinate commanders and supervisors. Remember, and remember well, when problems occur and continue, look first to your leadership and then on down the line before you look elsewhere to solve the problems or to place the blame.

Brilliant leaders of the past, philosophers, and experience have led me to the conviction that the two most important prerequisites of sustained quality leadership are courage and credibility. The first is an innate quality; the second can and must be earned as the result of hard work. With regard to courage, the response of Gen George C. Marshall to the question "What qualities were you looking for when you selected the great leaders of World War II, the Eisenhowers and the Bradleys?" is most instructive. General Marshall responded, "Courage; courage is the most important characteristic of leadership because all others depend on it—not the courage to take out the machine gun or charge the hill, but the courage to do what is right!" And you will find, as you tread through the minefields of command, that there will be times when temptations of the easy path are far more appealing than doing what is right. Resist the temptation and do what is right! Lt Gen John P. Flynn, the highest-ranking officer held as a prisoner of war during the Vietnam War, lectured on his approach, which was as follows: "Armed with all the facts I can muster, I go into isolation and determine which course of action is right and which is wrong—then I pursue with vigor what is right and resist what is wrong with all my might."

As mentioned earlier, your credibility is one of the signal requisites for you to be successful as a leader in any enterprise. The following subparagraphs provide a set of five tenets for earning and maintaining credibility. First, allow me to relate how I came to embrace these guides. I had been selected for my first command (the 40th Tactical Group at Aviano, Italy) as a young colonel with six months in grade. The 40th was at that time a man-eater, the four previous commanders having been relieved within a few months of assuming command. The man I was replacing had lasted six months, and the most recent Air Force inspector general (AF/IG) inspection had rated the unit the worst in the United States Air Force. En route to Aviano, I was instructed to stop by Headquarters United States Air Force Europe (HQ USAFE) to meet with the CINC, Gen David C. Jones, and his deputy chiefs of staff one-on-one. His deputy chief of staff, operations, was a newly promoted brigadier general (select), still wearing his eagles. I'd never met the man before, but he made a profound and lasting impression in the few words of advice he offered. He held up his hand and counted off his fingers as he spoke:

> First, know your job better than any one else; otherwise you'll be swept away by the first strong wind. Second, know by heart the make-or-break–pass/fail items and manage those above all others. Third, go where the action is; don't let any important or high-risk activity go forward without your review and oversight. Fourth, take good care of your people and they will take care of you. Lastly, set high standards for yourself and your organization—if you don't, the iconoclasts will set the standards and you'll have enormous difficulty regaining control.

Upon leaving his office, I wrote down these five cryptic points and placed them in big letters under the glass on my desk where I would be easily reminded of them daily.

There are many lists and mantras for achieving success, and although most contain many more items and are more

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detailed, these five work and are easy to remember. The following subparagraphs put some more meat on the outline.

1. *Know your job better than anyone else.* This is a tall order, especially if you've just arrived and completed the change-of-command ceremony. However, in order to lead effectively, you must fully understand the unit's mission and all of the pertinent guidance that supports it. Immediately immerse yourself in the appropriate documents, such as the AF Series 23 regulation that established the unit; appropriate war plans and supporting documents; the latest operational and management inspections; recent staff assistant visit reports; and so on. Getting up to speed quickly requires burning the midnight and weekend oil, but it pays big dividends and not only prepares you to lead effectively and earn immediate credibility points for your mission savvy, but it better prepares you to deflect all the half-baked ideas the staff has been holding to try on the new commander. Moreover, of the several units that I have been sent to command, some were doing things well, others were not—but most were doing the wrong things based on mission directives.

2. *Know the make-or-break–pass/fail items and manage those above all others.* This makes enormous sense, but so many commanders, especially newly appointed ones, get lost in the day-to-day minutiae. In every enterprise there are elements of the operation that are critical to success and/or survival. I don't know what they might be for your unit, but I can assure you that I knew what they were for mine; and I knew, day-to-day, what our ability was to perform in those areas. Said another way, you should never be surprised by an IG write-up in a pass/fail item. Some examples for operational units could be nuclear security, communications security, operations security, conventional and nuclear weapons load-out time, weapons delivery scores, and so on. Missile, reconnaissance, acquisition, support, and other kinds of organizations will have their own unique make-or-break criteria—these criteria will all hinge on the critical aspects of performing their respective missions. It's hard to believe, but one of the finest USAFE wings busted an operational readiness inspection because the commander held for three hours in the command post the IG message directing a conventional weapons load-out and mission. He held the message release to operations, maintenance, security, and so on, while studying it for "subtle indicators" in mission execution—unfortunately, the bomb dump didn't get the word to prepare the munitions until it was too late to make the load-out criteria.

3. *Go where the action is.* There's an old bromide which goes as follows: "There's nothing like the farmer's footsteps to make the crops grow." The same is true of the commander's footsteps with regard to mission performance and accomplishment. Your presence throughout your command is the best and perhaps the only way for you to get to know your personnel, what they do, and how they do it. Equally important, people are more open on their own turf; they are more likely to tell you what you need to hear and know—one-on-one or many-on-one—in the comfort of their surroundings than in a staff meeting with others present or in your office. One excellent technique is to "Columbo" them to exhaustion. After the icebreaker questions of where are you from, how long have you been in this assignment, how's the family, and so on, ask questions about what they do; how they do it; and do they have the tools, technical materials, and manning to get the job done under the most demanding tasking expected. If you're trying to get them to change procedures or do things differently, you can use the question process to lead them to find the right solution and then praise them for their great idea. And while you are getting hands-on acquainted with the command's people, facilities, and process, you are earning credibility and developing the knowledge it takes to lead effectively. You're developing a willing and believing followership—an essential ingredient for success. You have to keep going back again and again; each visit speaking very loudly that those people and that function are important to you and to the mission. Equally important, they will tell you more and more what you need to know, and you'll earn more and more credibility. One more point: Every day new personnel are assigned to your command, while others depart. It's not enough for the newcomers to hear about your last visit a week, a month, or a year ago. Each new person changes the chemistry of his or her section and your command—you need to be hands-on with them—you need credibility with them! As a word of caution, one weakness we all have is the inclination to go where we feel most comfortable. For a flying wing commander, that place is likely a flying squadron much like the ones he or she spent the majority of his or her career in. Unfortunately, that's the place least likely to need the commander's attention—more likely, the trouble areas are supply, security police, aerospace ground equipment, the flight line at night, or the mobility section. My admonishment to you is to go everywhere and go often, but go most often to where your presence and guidance are most needed. Moreover, there is an additional benefit; your key staff and subordinate commanders will follow your lead. In the words of Mark Twain, "It's hard to ignore a good example."

And while you're practicing "walkabout" leadership, be enthusiastic! As Ralph Waldo Emerson said, "Nothing great is ever achieved without enthusiasm." I would go one further and say *nothing* is ever achieved without enthusiasm. Have you ever seen an athletic team take the field without gusto? If you did, they lost. As the leader you must set the tone of your command; no one else can do it for you—enthusiasm, commitment, and a can-do attitude are infectious. Your staff and subordinates throughout your command will reflect your attitude. Your bearing and your energy level are equally important. I had the pleasure of escorting the late senator John Stennis (D-Miss.) from the flight line at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, to a political rally approximately two miles distant. It was late in the evening, and the senator looked tired, bordering on exhaustion; he seemed to have trouble walking and getting into the car and fell asleep in the ensuing five-minute ride. Getting out of the car, he looked no better; however, in the few short steps to the rally hall door, a transformation took place—the senator was erect, energetic, vibrant—his voice boomed out as he greeted the assembly, and he moved quickly and aggressively shaking all hands. He won the election. As the commander, you need to project an energetic, vibrant, confident image at all times—you need to be up for every occasion.

4. *Take care of your people.* Napoléon said, "Morale is to things as three is to one." Perhaps he understated the ratio, but he was right on the importance of morale. Personal recognition, awards, decorations, and such are important elements of taking care of our people. Those programs are, by and large, institutionalized and exist at all levels within the Air Force. While these programs are very important, they touch only a small number of personnel; therefore, I strongly believe and recommend that you augment them with programs that touch every unit member often. Caring about and for your people should come naturally, but unfortunately it doesn't—*you have to work at it daily*—and as mentioned earlier, the make-up and chemistry of your personnel are changing continuously. Every day there are new people arriving who will affect the unit's ability to deploy smoothly, conduct effective combat operations, and operate safely; and you haven't touched them. They have not experienced any of the things you have done for your people—what exists when they arrive on station is the starting point for them.

The easiest way to take care of the command's personnel is to have personal and favorable contact with them; find out where there are shortages or problems and then make sure they get corrected. This is achieved to a large degree with a hands-on, walkabout leadership style.

However, while getting around is essential, it isn't sufficient. It may take a long time for you to meet someone who could be even more positive or less negative for having met the commander. As commander of the 40th Tactical Group and the 552d AWACS Wing, I personally met weekly with every new arrival, the officers, top three, and enlisted in separate groups. I shook everyone's hand and gave each group a few words on the mission, telling them how important they were because they were the ones making it happen, offering assistance for special needs, and sharing the thought that my primary responsibility was to make sure they had the training, tools, and guidance to do their job correctly, effectively, and safely. It takes time, but it may be the only opportunity for a long time to shape the attitudes of a large percentage of the unit's personnel—you can also get an early impression of where there may be problems.

The things a commander can do for his or her people are limited, but when presented with an opportunity, don't blow it because you're too busy or because it's just a little thing—too small to matter. One of the easiest ways to demonstrate caring for your personnel is to fix things that are broken. Don't ever pass up an opportunity to fix something that's easily fixed; for example, broken pool sticks in the recreation center or the dormitories, a broken streetlight, or a broken bus-stop bench. To help generate things to fix and a way to get the word back to wing personnel that things were being fixed, I created a "Commander's Gram." The Commander's Gram consisted of a lined sheet of paper with the aforementioned title and the salutation, Dear Colonel "Pete," "I want to bring the following to your attention," followed by a page of lines and ending with a place for signature and a box to check for anonymous. Attractive Commander's Gram boxes were posted at several convenient locations. Each gram box consisted of a locked mailbox with an open slot to hold a generous supply of blank forms. The senior enlisted advisor had the only key to the boxes and was the official collector. All gram responses were posted on bulletin boards—the signed ones with the salutation, Dear Sergeant Smith, to mask the author or Dear Anonymous as appropriate. Signed grams also received a personal response. The idea of the Dear Sergeant Smith salutation on signed grams was to let the base personnel know that there were many correspondents willing to sign their complaints. It worked, even though from time to time, when participation waned, I salted the system with things I noted that needed to be fixed—after all, the system was open to everyone. A word of advice: if you implement such a system, read all the letters yourself, direct the corrective action, and sign all the responses. At first I tried letting the responsible agency prepare the response—wrong! The response to the broken pool stick from the services commander was "When you stop breaking them, we'll start fixing them. . . ." My response was "Thank you for bringing this to my attention. When you return to the dorm this evening you will find that all the pool sticks have been professionally repaired and additional ones provided. In addition, each first sergeant has been furnished a repair kit to ensure the sticks remain serviceable."

5. *Set high standards for yourself and your unit.* If you have children, you've learned that high standards are not a product of good genes; rather they are acquired—sometimes painfully. The same applies to standards of performance, appearance, discipline, building maintenance, and everything else. Keep foremost in your mind that high standards in every facet of appearance and performance are not goals in and of themselves—they are critically important primarily because they directly and positively impact the self-esteem and productivity of our personnel, hence the mission. While standards of performance and appearance go hand in hand, it is important to give proper balance between the two. With regard to in-house performance standards, it is often difficult to determine what is an achievable and reasonable standard. Here I suggest you find what the best performance is in a comparable unit and set your goals just a touch higher. However, don't be unreasonable—there is not, for example, a significant difference between serving a finance center customer in five minutes or four minutes—there *is* between 15 and five. It is equally important to note that as things slip into disrepair or unsightliness, they become the norm; we get used to them and lose any inclination to fix them. An example of this was the water fountain just outside the command section of Ninth Air Force at the time of my arrival. It was horribly rusted, hanging askew, and the wall around it and the carpet under it were badly stained from past leaks. Yet no one seemed to notice—that's just the way things were.

The best thing you have going for you as a new commander is a set of fresh eyes that are not yet accustomed to the way things are and have been. Immediately after learning your mission to the 99th percentile, write down everything that needs to be fixed, spruced up, painted, and so on, as you're practicing walkabout leadership. Not everything has to be fixed immediately, but if you don't write it down, the problems will soon become “the way things are” to you too. On the other hand, have you ever had the experience of going around your area of responsibility to prepare for a distinguished visitor and notice that you were seeing things differently—that what appeared to meet standards yesterday fell short today? It may sound silly, even sophomoric, but I used to drive around the base on weekends with the perspective that I was preparing for a visit by the major command (MAJCOM) commander—things always looked different, not as good as before—often in need of fixing. It’s important to keep in mind that you are making things better for the good of your people, and it is a fact that an attractive base and a neat, clean, and attractive workplace have a dramatic and positive effect on the self-esteem and productivity of the workforce. Another word of caution: Air Force personnel are bright, sophisticated, and intolerant of the “look good for the inspector or boss” syndrome. The high standards you set are for every day because of their positive impact, not just for special occasions. Very little more than emptying the wastebaskets should be required for special visitors.

The following tips do not conveniently fall into one of the five-finger topics, but nonetheless are very useful.

1. *Selecting subordinate commanders and supervisors.* Perhaps the greatest advice Gen William L. Creech gave me as he sent me off to command Ninth Air Force was, “Spend at least 90 percent of your time picking your subordinate commanders; the 8 or 9 percent you have left will be sufficient to handle all the rest of your job, because you won’t have many problems.” He was absolutely right. To the contrary, one of my greatest disappointments was when a superstar wing commander (promoted to brigadier general well ahead of his contemporaries) selected a person, who could be generously described as barely capable, to command one of the wing’s operational F-4 squadrons. When I called the wing commander about his selection, his response was, “It was his turn.” There is no such thing as his or her turn when selecting people to put in tough, demanding jobs, especially that of commander—pick only the best that you believe are capable of stepping up! To do otherwise is courting disaster—and will likely lead to having to replace that person shortly.

2. *Understanding your responsibilities and priorities.* How many times have we heard some form of “but, if I relieve ‘Charlie,’ it will hurt his career.” First, your principal responsibilities are not to an individual; rather, they are to the unit as a whole, mission accomplishment, and to the hundreds or perhaps thousands of people who are performing in outstanding fashion and carrying “Charlie.” Second, there are two truths about poor performers you must keep in mind: (a) no matter how quickly you relieve the “Charlies” who are not doing their jobs, you should have done it earlier, and (b) everyone associated with “Charlie” knows he’s not doing the job and wondering why you’re letting him drag down the unit.

This is not to say you don’t have a responsibility to train and tutor your subordinate commanders and supervisors; the issue is, have you done enough to realize it’s a lost cause and time to make a change when you’re not achieving the desired results? My experience has convinced me that we usually put it off too long!

3. *Praise on Monday, fire on Friday.* The reason should be obvious—the high that comes from praise early in the week has a positive effect on the unit for the remainder of the week. On the other hand, relieving a person at the close of business on Friday gives that person an opportunity to prepare for facing his or her fellows come Monday. Equally important, it gets that person out of the work area before he or she can tell their coworkers how they’ve been wronged.

4. *Handling adversity.* When serious problems arise involving an individual or individuals, you must act responsively. Investigate thoroughly, document the investigation, and then armed with the facts and in isolation, after receiving legal/personnel counsel, decide what is right and have the courage to act. Often we lose the disinterested-person perspective that is critical in deciding the right course of action. An example of the wrong course is the flying wing commander who fails to take appropriate action against a pilot who has brought his professional competence into question. A classic case comes to mind of a wing commander who failed to take any corrective action on an F-16 instructor pilot (IP), resulting in the loss of four lives, one aircraft, and very nearly a second. Reasonable corrective action may have been to decertify the IP, schedule him for appropriate training, and upon completion of training and the recommendation of Standardization and Evaluation, schedule him for an IP-recertification check flight. This wing commander chose to blame the accident on an “act of God,” contrary to all the evidence and mishap board findings—it cost him his command and brought unnecessary attention on the IP, who had suffered a momentary, but costly, lapse of judgment. What should have been done initially was eventually accomplished by the new wing commander, and the soon-recertified IP was again flying with students, perhaps with a greater sense of responsibility. Remember, your responsibility is to the mission and to the people who make it happen. Even the best performers from time to time need help in the form of corrective action. Have the courage to do what is right.

5. *When dramatic changes are mandated, resist the temptation to fight them after the decision is taken on high. Instead, take care and shape the future for the best-possible outcome.* Two such mandates serve as examples: integration of the military in the late forties and integrating enlisted men and women in common dormitories in the mid-eighties. I don’t mean to suggest that the two examples are on the same level. Clearly racial integration was seminal and had a major impact on the fabric of our society, whereas the latter already existed on college campuses and was readily accepted, in general, outside the military.

Whatever the issue, when a decision is taken by the president; secretary of defense; chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff; chief of staff, Air Force; or MAJCOM commander, your response must be the same: take a positive approach, advertise the benefits of the change, and shape the outcome by taking charge and leading all the way. To do otherwise will signal that those in higher headquarters don’t understand and have dumped on us again—this only makes your job more difficult, perhaps impossible.

6. *When a crisis occurs, do something.* Here I'm referring to something way out of the ordinary. For example, one Saturday morning at roughly 1300 hours, I was notified that a race riot was forming at the Aviano enlisted cantonment area. The movie *Shaft* had played at the base theater Friday evening and a small group of black enlisted personnel saw the opportunity to create severe racial tension, which they evidently saw to their advantage. For those too young to remember, *Shaft* had a "James Bond"-like plot with the lead played by Richard Roundtree, a Hollywood superstar who happened to be black. The late-night moviegoers returning to the supply and security police dormitories were struck with racial slurs spray-painted across the buildings and notes containing similar slurs slipped under the doors of their rooms. Needless to say, the young black airmen were hurt, angry, and frustrated—they wanted something done. Once the initial anger was put to rest (credibility and hands-on leadership made the difference between severe confrontation and discussion), something had to be done that demonstrated our resolve to find the perpetrators and take appropriate action. What to do? What we did was call the security police, squadron commanders, and first sergeants and direct that all group personnel be fingerprinted following group recall, at which I explained what happened, what was being done, and called for patience and understanding. I was first in line to be fingerprinted at the headquarters squadron section. It worked; most people believed we had a plan—surprisingly the fingerprints did play a key role in the apprehension and conviction of the culprits.

The point is do something dramatic to buy time while you're sorting out what to do in a crisis—all the better if the initial action helps in some way to ease the pain—and serendipitous if it proves ultimately to be the right course of action. Trust your gut instincts; they are most often correct.

7. *Create an environment for truth to flourish.* An old Turkish proverb advises, "The bearer of bad tidings should keep one foot in the stirrup." In modern jargon we are admonished, "Don't shoot the messenger." There is an enormous belief at every level, in every enterprise, that what people do to survive is tell the boss what he or she wants to hear—not what he or she needs to hear! Nothing should be further from the truth—no pun intended. When people I associate with in civilian life find out that I was formerly a four-star general, they invariably get around to asking, in one form or another, "How did you get people to tell you what they believed to be true, instead of what you wanted to hear?" My answer was always, "With great difficulty!" You must force yourself to reward those who tell you the truth as they see it; you must encourage people to tell you what they believe rather than what you want to hear and thank them for it (even if it pains you); and you must create an environment where telling the commander the truth is commonplace! After all, if you don't know what is happening in your wing, how can you do your job?

8. *Listening and talking.* It is a proven fact that you learn more from people when you're listening to them than when you are talking at them. Practice the art of listening; it's hard enough for an airman, sergeant, or lieutenant to muster the courage to talk frankly to the commander, let alone try to break in and say something that needs to be said when the commander is talking or lecturing. Enough said on listening—talking is another matter. *Effective* communication is the responsibility of the talker. When communicating one-on-one or one-on-many, the responsibility is yours. Be sure to take into consideration the sensitivities of the audience. Again, the understanding of sensitivities must be learned—you can see the world only through eyes of your experiences and upbringing.

There is no greater reward than successful command at the squadron and wing level where you have the privilege and pleasure of working daily with real people who make it all happen! While the rewards are high, so too are the demands, the hours, and the personal commitment. When it was all over for me and I reflected back, my only regret was in not giving more! Command is not for the timid, the lame, or those protective of their own time. In the words of General Dixon to the newly formed 552d AWACS Wing, *"I wish you hard work."* Clearly, he didn't wish us luck as is traditional in such cases—he wished hard work, because in hard work, we would make our luck. I too wish you hard work—the hardest work you'll ever love. You're the commander—get out and lead!

Carry with you the mantra General Creech gave to the Tactical Air Command under his six years of dynamic leadership, in which the dramatic improvements were both legend and real. "Make it Better! Make it Happen! Make it Last!"

Leadership: An Old Dog's View

Col Dick Anderegg

Gray in the muzzle and gimpy in the hips, I slowly walk to the rug next to the hearth where I turn in two tight circles, then ease myself down, haunches first, then stretch my front legs out and put my chin on them. I've pulled all the sleds there are to pull. From all the places there are to pull them to stretching from the wildest frontiers to the fanciest boomtowns. Two dogs. Four dogs, even eight- and twelve-dog teams. Straining at the harness until it cuts, paws filled with razors of ice, and breath huffing in huge clouds of steam. With my brothers' shoulders brushing against mine we have lunged and pulled together, and together we have felt the reward of nothing more complicated than brotherhood—the simplest of words and the hardest to achieve. I look up at you, fresh from your initial training and eager to make your first pull across the high passes, and I think, "I could tell you everything, but then where would be the fun in discovering for yourself?" But some of it I must tell you because I want you to be better than I.

Our world is harsh. A mistake can cost a life, or even a whole team tumbling as one into the maw of a crevasse, gone forever in the blink of an eye. And we neither get nor seek mercy from the cruel opponent against whom we struggle—the blinding white cold that is always hoping that we will slip. Yet we pull together, my brothers and sisters and I, and we take care of each other. It is the reward of our kind, to feel unseen bonds of buddy love while we pull the load to the end of the track. And sometimes there is a pat on the head, but it is not the worldly rewards we seek. We pull because we are bred to it, and trained to it, and because an old man near the sea might have said, "it is a lovely thing to do."

Although we struggle through blizzards and soaring mountain passes as a team, we depend on the leader. Our leader may not be the strongest or the swiftest or the smartest, but he or she has proved one thing over and over—we will follow.

As I lie here, feeling the fire's warmth soothe the aches and ravages of a lifetime on the trail I can reflect on the virtues, and the pitfalls, of being the leader. Things that you must learn, finally, on your own. But I can help you learn them more quickly if you will listen and understand the words of the old dog that has pulled from every position on the team, and, yes, even a few times, a few glorious times, lived the joy of pulling from the lead and getting the job done.

Before you can earn the respect to lead us, you must first be an excellent follower, and the excellent follower is always first: the first one out of a warm bed; the first away from the breakfast bowl; the first ready to harness up; the first one to encourage the dog beside you. Most importantly, though, you must be the first to study. What is the meaning of the weather? The high clouds? The south wind and the north? How does the team pull on the soft snow? The wet? The ice? One must know our enemy, the cold, better than we know our own pack.

It is not enough, though, to be the first as a follower, you must also be the last. The last to complain. The last to sit down. The last to sleep. And always, always, the last to ask, "Why me?"

As you study it is natural that you will seek out the best teacher, and his or her name is Failure. We learn nothing from our successes. A short romp on a soft trail with a light load is quickly forgotten. Do you think 1 am a leader? Look at the scars on my face, the missing tip of my ear, gone to the single swipe of a vicious mother whose cub I bothered. This is not the face of success, this is the face of life, of lessons learned, and alas, relearned. And you will suffer these failures, too. And each of them will make you stronger and able to pull longer and harder than ever. Until time catches up with you, and there's no cure for that.

Along the way, though, continue to study. Make time to study. See how the Inuit's dogs run, but the trapper's are different, perhaps not as fast but with more stamina. While you pull as a follower, learn from them; learn from them all. You must study how the sled skids in the turn and how those in front, behind, and beside you react. Does your brother shy from the knife of the cold wind? Does your sister pull you off balance? There is precious little time to learn before you will be thrust into the front.

You will learn that there are different kinds of lead dogs. Some look at their team as a blessing, a team that can get the job done and done safely. Others look at the team as a burden, a group of ne'er-do-wells that need to be constantly nipped. But I don't have time to think about the snarlers and nippers because their teams, sadly, fail when the stakes are high. I want you to know what I know before I curl up and sleep while you go out into the cutting wind.

As the lead dog you must work the hardest. The house dogs think that the lead position is the easiest—that the traces in the rear must be the tautest while the lead dog needs only to "guide" the team, his harness loose and comfortable. This might work on a clear day over an easy trail, but not when the job is tough. Recall your days in the back, when every ounce of strength from the whole team was needed. A slacker is a liability; a leader who is a slacker could be a calamity.

This article was written especially for AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership*.

As the lead dog you must be the disciplinarian even sometimes during the run, but the best time is later, away from the team. Remember that your goal is to improve behavior, a chastened dog will pull hard to regain his spot on the team, but a humiliated dog is ruined forever. But before you growl at the errant one, look first to yourself. Did you train the offender properly? Did you provide the right equipment? Almost all of us will pull 'ti1 our hearts burst; if one does not, then it is more often the fault of training or equipment rather than attitude. But discipline when you must; no one else will do it because it is your job.

The character you build as a follower is the one that comes through as a leader when the trail is icy, the wind is brutal, and the sled is top-heavy. It is no time to be a loner, or sloppy, or short-sighted. Take heart from my experience: a leader can build character in his or her team. He or she need only show them the benefits of hard work, courage, selflessness, devotion, and excellence, and to these things they will respond with their whole hearts.

You must know what you stand for before the trail becomes difficult. Do you believe in your man or woman? In your team? Will you die in the traces for them? Ask these questions now because when the white bear circles your camp at night and then rushes in, a howling, slashing specter of evil, it is too late. You must be ready to fight in an instant or risk whimpering away with your tail between your legs.

The last and most important of these things you must learn is integrity. The leader is the first into the traces and the last out. The leader eats last and eats least. The leader treats every member of the team with meticulous fairness. The leader encourages affection for the team but never for him- or herself. The leader is honest, and this bears repeating—the leader is honest. More than any power the leader has, the leader is most judicious with the authority to lead the team into harm's way.

Now you must go and lead the team while I rest. You have studied hard and learned much during your life as a follower. During the long winter nights you have curled up close to the team and heard the telling and re-telling of the stories of how our proud breed evolved into the best that man has ever seen. Your dreams have felt the agony of crossing the high passes and the joys of pups in the spring. Your history will make you wise and your heritage will make you proud. Do not be afraid to fail. As the scars accumulate on your head, let them remind you of the difficult life you have chosen and the glorious battles it brought.

I trust you.

The Comprehending-Acting Leading Loop: A Tool for Leadership in Complex Environments

Col Yakov Shaharabani and Brig Gen Fernando Giancotti

There is a growing gap. On the one hand, humans are equipped with social skills fitted to small-group dynamics and a "narrow mind" that pursues understanding of the world through emotions and linear processes; on the other hand, reality becomes more and more complex; mega-organizations, crossed by a huge information flow, in a world that changes quickly.[1] To confront this complexity we are forced to make the best of our resources, through the awareness of the nature of the challenges we face, and the best possible exploitation of our linear logic, and providing software that can help in bridging the gap.

The model proposed, the Comprehending-Acting-Leading (CAL) Loop, (fig. 1) is of this kind; the CAL Loop is a cognitive, systematic method to assist leaders in dealing with complexity and uncertainty. It pushes leaders to seek the "broad picture" and at the same time to scan and sense tactical challenges; to understand external influences and to be mission, and vision, focused internally; but maybe most importantly, the cycle pushes the leader to take the initiative, to mitigate risks, to seed and to seize opportunities, and always act proactively.

Lincoln, one of the most respected of the American presidents, once confessed, "I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me."[2] This will always happen in some measure. But we try to establish a leadership practice that promotes an agile and proactive leadership style and decisively pushes leaders to act and let their counterpart react.

There are some good attempts to define and to comprehend the initiative-based decision-making process.[3] Nevertheless, we believe that the CAL Loop takes the concepts provided in other models at least one step ahead. It forces a proactive approach and broadens links before acting. Moreover, the CAL Loop is part of an overarching holistic model discussed elsewhere, the Confronting Complexity Proactively and Systematically (C2PS) model that enables the organization as a whole to confront complexity in a systematic, proactive, and holistic way.[4] Let's now discuss the CAL Loop.

The Comprehending-Leading-Acting Loop

The CAL Loop is a logical analysis-synthesis method that enables a leader to have a holistic and proactive approach to understanding and acting in accordance with the main organization's responsibilities. The cycle has six main phases—*Understand*, *Invent*, *Identify*, *Prioritize*, *Implement*, and *Reassess*—that have to be regularly overviewed. In essence, these phases should be the heart and soul of the decision-making process of a leader, at all levels. Each phase has its own uniqueness, which will be described. The time required to complete a cycle varies depending on the complexity and the level of operation, the stakes involved, and the time available to solve the problem; in some cases the cycle might take days, weeks, or even months, but there are situations where only minutes or even a few seconds are the given time to completion. To update our evaluation and keep extending leadership effects to a distant-time horizon, frequent iteration of the cycle should be used, especially at the strategic level. However, the most important aspect to understand is that all the phases should be mission and vision focused. Analysis and action in any phase should be according to the mission and vision of the organization, and consequently it should determine the strategy of the organization.



Figure 1. The Comprehending-Acting-Lending Loop

Understanding Environment, Trends, and Vectors (ETV)

The cycle begins with the phase understanding environment, trends, and vectors (ETV). This phase analyzes the overall environment, to achieve the so-called big picture, in which one strives to include all relevant factors: history, actors, and their relationships. Trends refer to the major evolutionary processes taking place in the environment, including

Adapted from a monograph written in 2006 for the National Defense University research and writing program.

social, political, economic, and culture ones. Trends are to be carefully considered, since they may be a shaping force for the future and trigger fluctuations. Sensitivity to vectors—shorter term, faster and less predictable likely outcomes—is also important. Vectors affecting the organization and its near environment are especially critical because they can disrupt the equilibrium of the system and may bring forward threats and opportunities. Trends and vectors are significantly important to understand the possible evolution of the broad picture and of the particular situation. However, defining the relevant trends and vectors remains a personal judgment of leaders. To form that judgment, leaders need to develop the "broader mind" discussed elsewhere.[5] Without that development, the change to be able to understand the environment and its trends and vectors decays enormously.

Thorough scanning of ETV, in the light of the organization's mission and vision, enhances a holistic understanding of the situation, both internally and externally. This phase sets the tome of the next phase in the model, which basically pushes the leader to initiate, to act.

Invent the Future or Channel the Counterpart

On Sunday, 7 June 1981, eight F-16 fighters were heading eastbound from a southern Israeli base. Their mission had never been done before: destroying the "Osirraq" nuclear reactor located near Baghdad. In less than one hour, the mission was accomplished, and Iraq never gained nuclear capabilities. ETV analysis regarding Iraq was thorough, prompted by an unpredictable hostile country that sought nuclear weapons in order to threaten Israel's existence. Now, in retrospective, the preventive attack seems the right thing to have done, but back in 1981 it was a tough decision. After endless discussions about this act, considering a wide range of issues that could be affected by this attack, Israel's government decided to do it; even the timing—Sunday—was chosen in order to minimize the collateral damage and the number of casualties (Iraqis and foreigners who worked at the reactor site). It was a tough decision, but the ETVs were eventually clear; therefore, with all its complexity and risks, the deep understanding of the ETV convinced the Israeli government to choose the option of shaping the future, being the first to act. We believe that in a volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous, and rapidly changing (VUCA**R**)[6] world, the higher chances for success are when one of the leading principles is "the best way to predict the future is to invent it."[7] Act and let the other react, is usually the best approach to strive for. Obviously, as we have seen, the deep understanding of the internal and external situation is the enabler of a proactive approach. The concept of inventing the future is well explained by Keith H. Hammonds: "You can win by using any of those methods but only if you do one thing more: Outmaneuver the other person. You have to decode the environment before he or she does, act decisively, and then capitalize on his initial confusion by confusing him or her some more. Agility is the essence of strategy in war and in business."[8] Therefore, try to initiate as much as you can.

However, it would be naïve to think that you can always invent the future. When inventing the future does not apply (due to lack of resources, capabilities, opportunities, etc.), the fallback option should be to try to channel the counterpart, the enemy, to areas where your military has better answers or to areas where the threat to your nation is less dangerous or less imminent. In complex situations, the cause-effect relationships are not direct, so a proactive fallback capability is necessary; an agile organization should seek to continue to hold the initiative and try to channel the adversary.

The Israeli and Syrian military strategies post the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when Israel was under a clear and present existential threat, can be understood through this lens. After the 1973 war, Israel's main objective was to channel the enemies, including Syria, to develop a strategy that would be less risky for Israel. The Israeli Air Force (IAF), in particular, learned many lessons from that war. One main lesson was that he who controls the air will eventually control the battle; therefore, the post-1973 IAF tried its best to strengthen its air dominance capabilities. Nine years later, in 1982 during the Lebanon war, all these lessons were translated into a unique success, in which the air clashes between the IAF and the Syrian fighters ended with 82 Syrian fighters downed by the IAF with no losses. The initiative taken after the 1973 war along with the success in 1982 has channeled the Syrians to change their strategy: from a traditional strong air force power (based on fighters) to one mainly focused on achieving asymmetric capabilities (based on both surface-to-surface missiles and support of terrorist activities). Although Israel has to face the asymmetric challenge since then, this is by far less risky than the imminent one Israel faced during the traditional nation-to-nation war, like the 1973 war. The asymmetric Syrian threat causes casualties on the Israeli side, but it is no longer an existential risk for Israel, as it was in the first days of the 1973 war. Israel channeled its enemy, Syria, to neglect its traditional, Soviet-oriented military strategy and to focus toward asymmetric warfare capabilities. The Israeli strategy since 1973 can therefore be considered a successful one.

Identify New Threats and Challenges

In complex systems, things don't always go as planned. In many cases even an initiative-oriented military doesn't have the privilege to affect its adversary's new threats. This is the main reason why every organization and every leader should have good systems to detect new threats and opportunities as soon as possible after or even before their appearance, and address them. There must be a readiness in the organization and in the leader's mind to perceive new threats or unplanned opportunities, and when they occur, to sense them and to analyze them. The analysis of new challenges should be in accordance with their potential relevance on both the organization mission and vision and at the same time within the context of the environment, the trends, and vectors that were indicated in understanding the ETV phase; identifying new threats or new opportunities is therefore the next phase in the cycle.

To have an agile organization that identifies new threats or opportunities in a useful period of time, the organization must have good sensors (intelligence). In a way, Israeli's bad experience in the 1973 (Yom Kippur) war, is monumental evidence for the need of good sensors and relevant and reliable intelligence. As a consequence of that experience, much was invested in this function. Today, many of the Israeli Defense Force operational achievements are driven by the good Israeli intelligence capabilities; moreover, even in times of budget cuts, the intelligence pillar of the Israeli military is untouchable.[9] However, good sensors and intelligence are not enough; an organization must have a culture of openness and the real willingness of leaders to seek bottom-up insights. The leader's willingness to hear new things and different points of view is a major contributor to the organization's ability to become agile and adaptive. Yet, many leaders don't confront this phase decisively, some because they don't realize its importance, some because they don't encourage or believe in bottom-up processes, and many neglect this important aspect because of the risk of being overflowed. We believe that this phase, diligently and prudently carried out, is crucial for the success of both the leader and the organization in the VUCA**R** environment. The concepts of collaborative problem solving, critical thinking, and collective ownership of the outcomes are significantly important to achieve a prudent and productive phase.[10] Leaders should strive to perceive new threats and new opportunities in order to stay relevant; therefore they should encourage their subordinate to bring new ideas and information to the table. However, the issue of being overwhelmed is a delicate one to solve; this is a great challenge for the leadership, especially in the information age where any new finding can be sent to the leader immediately just by clicking the mouse. There is no magic answer to the overflowing risk; nevertheless, we think that "balancing" is the appropriate approach, meaning that as a leader you have to be aware of whether you are overflowed with unimportant information or you don't receive the information in a relevant period of time. If you find yourself mostly on one side (i.e., overwhelmed or not updated), then you need to rebalance your inputs. In order to be able to respond and act effectively, it is better to be slightly overwhelmed in order to stay updated and adaptive.

But, there are many cases when the threat or the opportunity is not identified, and an event happens unexpectedly—irregular events. In such cases, and consistently with our approach, we offer a submodel that deals with the ability of a leader to "proactively react" to irregular events. We will address this issue shortly in the section entitled "Reacting Proactively."[11] Identifying the threat or the challenge is a necessary phase but not a sufficient one alone to adapt and to respond adequately. The next two phases in the CAL Loop are the core of the decision-making process. They synthesize all the data, prioritize the challenges and the answers, and implement them. Let's discuss first the Prioritizing phase.

Prioritize Challenges and Answers

The main goal as a leader is to provide the best possible answers, considering the mission and vision of the organization, the environment, trends and vectors and taking into account the limited resources of the organization, since they can force leaders to prioritize. We recommend prioritizing in a wide array of meanings. First, we think that a leader needs to define and then to communicate whether the organization is in the divergent part or the convergent part of the decision-making cycle. If time-to-required-decision allows, stay divergent. If you need to decide quickly, transition to the convergent, synthesis phase; this clarification makes the decision-making process more focused on effects, and therefore, more effective.

Then, prioritize the challenges and the answers. There should be a scanning of all the answers available, their approximate contribution to deal with the given challenges, and their costs. The outcome of this phase should be a list of prioritized threats, prioritized answers, and the required effects to each threat, and the combined prioritized answers. Moreover, the fact that in complexity the cause-effect link is not always clear, and to seed opportunities and mitigate risks, we recommend including in the priority list the low-cost/low-probability answers that fit in the strategy and in the mission and vision of the organization, if reasonable. If they do not cost much and even if they are minor contributions, let's try to do them because they may influence outcomes in a way we cannot see at this moment.

Implement and Communicate

Implementing the decisions is obviously a needed phase, but unlike what could be expected, this phase is not just about mechanical execution. This phase has to be mission,-vision,-and strategy-oriented as well, both for the communication and the action part; implementation is "communicating-by-doing" and, at the same time, needs communication to be effective. Therefore, as a part of implementation, a leader should decisively communicate his or her and the organization's understanding of the environment, trends and vectors, the challenges in the light of mission and vision, and the prioritized answers. His or her "information processing" is fundamental in the action phase to orient it in the right direction. The more you refer to your vision, the clearer it will become, and the more deeply you will understand it.[12] To engage those who implement the decision, they should understand the broad picture, and should act accordingly, using their empowerment and their brains to achieve the desired results.

Reassess the Situation and the Loop

The sixth phase of the cycle differentiates learning organizations from others. A frank reassessment of both the prioritized answers and their impact on the overarching strategy of the organization, reassessment of the internal method (i.e., CAL Loop) that was used, how effective and efficient it was in the light of the results are absolutely necessary for agility. The "lessons learned" must be identified and "really learned" before beginning another cycle.

Pythagoras once said "choose always the way that seems the best, however rough it may be. Custom will soon render it easy and agreeable." The VUCA**R** environment often presents a leader to complex situations where the best answer is not so clear and the right way is usually blurred; therefore, a systematic methodology that pushes leaders to seek the broad picture, to be vision and mission focused, and to be proactive, brings a higher chance for success. Adopting a methodology as the

CAL Loop from early leadership stages is essential. Moreover, we believe that adopting a systematic methodology that is based on the concepts provided by the CAL Loop is relevant for both the proactive and the reactive side of leadership. That is to say that while the CAL Loop emphasizes the initiative side of leadership, a systematic "way of thinking" that deals with the reactive side of leadership is, therefore, needed.

Reacting Proactively

Future challenges—how to shift from reactive to proactive

—Owen T. Jacobs

Imagine yourself in your office just receiving a telephone call that changes your day. You are notified of an irregular event that just happened in your organization.[13] You have to react. It is both a notable and a perceptible event that has already happened, and its outcome may shake the organization and in many cases its core beliefs. How should you react to an irregular event? What points of concern should be analyzed before responding? What are the reaction tools? And most important, can a leader transform surprising, unplanned, and sometimes unpleasant events into opportunities? While the CAL Loop pushes the leader to initiate, to deliver the answers mainly to potential threats and opportunities, and to implement accordingly, the reactive side of leadership is not addressed. Moreover, although much has been written and taught on the active side of leadership, the reactive side, the side of leadership where the leader is pushed to react is somehow neglected. Therefore, we propose the Five Step Model, which deals with the reactive side of leadership, as a subbranch of the *Identify* phase of the CAL Loop (fig. 2). This practical tool (discussed elsewhere) provides a holistic, systematic approach to the reactive side of leadership that might help all leaders, especially strategic ones, to adopt a broad and logical approach when reacting to irregular events.[14] While providing a uniform guideline, the model still enables each leader to react differently, according to his or her analysis, encouraging to seize the hidden opportunities and eventually to promote his or her vision, values, and beliefs. This ability is one of the main skills that elevate a leader to the level of a strategic leader. "It is hard for us to be consistent when we face random shocks."[15] Nevertheless, relevant leaders need to be consistent, proactive, and vision focused not only when initiating but also when reacting.

Furthermore, if the model, which provides common definitions and methodical analysis, is routinely used, it can significantly improve the communication between a leader and his or her subordinates. And communication is a powerful enabling force. Integrating the Five Step Model and the CAL Loop gives a *system* of communication capable to leverage relevant control parameters, and influence the complexity we are dealing with, establishing a decisive attempt to communicate and deliver the appropriate vision-oriented messages. For an idea of the structure of the model (see fig. 3); however, for its discussion, see our references.[16]

Here we only want to underline the proactive potential of reactive leadership.



Figure 2. The Leadership Action Mechanism



Figure 3. The Five Step Model

Will Reality Work in Theory?

To practice the CAL Loop, let's take one example from among many: the complex and delicate relationships between an air force base and the surrounding civilian community. It is clear that jet fighter's noise early in the morning does not help the quality of life. As wing commanders (in two different countries), the authors of the research monograph from which this paper is excerpted both found it very important to examine these relationships and to initiate and act in order to have a positive influence on the environment. Each could have neglected this delicate issue and done little about it, since it was not an operational priority. But understanding the trends and vectors regarding the delicate relationship between the noisy air bases and the quality of life of the civilian society around the bases suggested to both of us to act, to mitigate risks and open opportunities.

*The following section is written by Brig Gen Fernando Giancotti

A Fighter Base and the Local Community: an Italian Air Force Experience

From my predecessors I received a good wing and an excellent relationship with the local community. I had to make the choice whether to capitalize on that and concentrate on several oncoming evaluations the wing was going to have, doing the minimum for the relationship, or keep investing in it. I definitely chose the second option, reinforcing it as much as possible. This choice came because of two main reasons: the absolute necessity to act according to the vision and the awareness of the VUCA**R** dynamics of complex systems, to mitigate risks and seed opportunities.

The vision defined for the wing was: We intend the wing as a military fighting unit, a "team of teams" based upon leadership at all levels, on empowerment of people, on quality of everything we do, "to serve the Country." The statement to serve the country indicated our reason for being, and the local community was an important part of it. Considering leadership the attractor force for collective action, and the mission and vision the attractor point, they have to be implemented with clarity, to make them well understood; through synergy, relating all our actions to their meaning; and with consistency, to maintain through time the conveyance of that meaning. Implementing the vision with clarity, synergy, and consistency dictated to invest in our costumers.

The second reason was the clear perception of how difficult it is to forecast what can happen in a complex, potentially conflictual relationship with a social body, with several risks involved, such as possible protests, litigation, obstruction, and alienation from the people. The potential time loss and trouble required to deal with such issues would have impacted on the mission. The awareness of the environment, its trends and vectors, including some minor unfriendly or diffident constituencies, and its complex behavior, dictated to sweep across the environment with a flow of positive communication. The "systems of inputs leveraged a statistical approach" to trigger positive feedback loops and their networking in support of the wing's mission. It is exactly what happened. Let's apply the CAL Loop to our example, in a very synthetic manner.

Understanding ETV

Knowing the social, political, economic, and cultural picture of the regional and local environment and how it fits in the broader picture of the nation is a fundamental step. Appreciating who's who, what's going on, who likes you, who doesn't, and why are some of the questions that need answered. To do so, using external and internal sensors of different kinds is important: friendly constituencies, institutional actors, your own people, and specialized assets. Nevertheless, to really understand your environment and perceive its trends and vectors, it is necessary to participate in it. Thus, you can sense directly and interactively and communicate at the same time. Engaging and being open to listening and understanding; taking every opportunity to communicate, helped enormously in building the Big Picture necessary to understanding ETV, and useful social capital.

Invent the Future, Channel the Counterpart

In our case, the first step to *invent the future* is to create the means to influence it; again, communication becomes the key element. Creating form and the content of our communication exchange with the environment is instrumental in achieving effects. Aggressively promoting an understanding of the wing that appeals to the *customer*, proposing a positive image of it, participating actively in the community and the region's life, caring about informing the media, and allowing them to participate in the wing's life, were some of the fundamentals of that communication. Combined in a *system of inputs* that includes many other major and also minor ones, these actions could, and did, shape the external environment's attitudes toward the wing. Not everybody could be "shaped", because of actual conflicting interests, or strong prejudice. In those cases, the attempt was to at least channel the counterpart to attitudes of least regret, like ignoring, not confronting a part of radical groups or interests groups. A forthcoming attitude toward constituencies that could not be shaped reduced hostility and helped the very favorable public opinion toward the wing and helped greatly to discourage overt attacks.

Many good activities are low-cost and require more sensitivity to the issue than significant resources. All possible cost-effective engagement was pursued to "invent a future" of great support from the local community. That support paid back many, many times the investment, besides being the right thing to do. During prolonged operations on the Balkans, entailing late night flying, no complaints arose. When demonstrators came from other regions to protest those operations, local affiliates managed to reduce intensity and the duration of the protest. When the wing had a serious, unanticipated, and prolonged shortage of military doctors, civilian physicians from the local hospital volunteered for 24-hour duty for over one year, with no pay. A big one was motivational and pursued on purpose, highlighting the quality of the wing's personnel to the external audience: the good image of the wing in the community contributed to make its people proud to be part of it. These are only a few of the positive returns.

Identify Threats and Opportunities

In complex systems, regardless of the quality of the control parameters you use and how hard you work at "inventing the future," there is always a good chance of an emerging threat, or of unexpected opportunities. Sensing those in time for an intervention is critical. To do so in our example, it is necessary to set all sensors to a high-perceptiveness mode, nurturing again a high-communication flow with the internal and external environment. Active local area connections, both inside and outside the organization, and a strong open-door policy for anybody, are among the tools for enhancing perceptiveness. Always engaging assumed hostile/uncertain/unfamiliar actors is another important way to assess, and sometimes defuse, risks. In practical terms, never refuse a contact; in the worst case, you will know what it is about; in the best case, you may defuse a risk or create an opportunity. Engage whomever is trying to reach you for whatever reason, evaluating its relevance against your mission, vision, and strategy every time it is possible. An example is the direct personal processing by the commander of telephone calls or other input for noise or other complaints, including a follow-up answer, explaining that "to serve the country" means to serve its citizens. Another example is the enthusiastic support given by the wing to the archeological superintendent when during a major construction work 2,500-year-old tombs were found in the perimeter of the fuel depot. The tombs could have easily blocked the work; but by immediately using the media to highlight the cooperation between the wing and the superintendent, the all-out support given to it right away and the good reputation of the wing turned a challenge into the opportunity to further promote the wing's interests.

Prioritize Challenges and Answers

Prioritizing challenges and the answers we devise for them is decision making. Even though it has been routinely utilized in the example we are considering, it has a general relevance beyond any single case. The divergent, perceptive striving to understand, and sense must be swiftly brought to converge on decisions at the right time, to be able to seize fleeting opportunities and timely defuse risks. Understanding when to switch between the divergent and the convergent thinking phase is a critical leadership skill. If you converge too soon, you may cut relevant information for the decision. If you converge too late, you may miss the window of opportunity and fail completely. Cycling several times between divergent and convergent thinking is often necessary, and proceeding through successive approximations may be a good technique to make the necessary decisions on time and conduct further analysis for follow-on actions. Prioritizing therefore requires converging on the most relevant issues, singling them out from the context, and deciding. In assigning priorities, after looking at all the challenges and at all the answers we can define, we need to consider the resources needed for the different solutions, with all identified options and costs. Communication opportunities and needs should always be in the equation, because of their strategic nature and their *statistical influence* value. Low-priority/low-cost initiatives are to be considered favorably in complexity again, because of their possible *nonlinear* influencing potential; in a system of inputs, they contribute to shape outcomes because of the synergy and possible positive effects. Once you have considered all the significant elements and assigned priorities, it is very important to recheck those priorities often, since in a VUCA**R** environment things change very rapidly, and mistakes are frequent.

Implementing and Communicating

Implementing the decision is leading people to do things. We discussed the principles to do that effectively. For our example, it is important to note that everything you do is a message. We have seen how the wing's vision was to serve the country. This vision was communicated to the external world every possible time, with facts and words, as the following example illustrates: When an unfamiliar and possibly diffident constituency (a network of theater artists) was forced to ask for some logistic support from the wing for a region wide children's festival, they got much more than that. Rather than only receiving the generator and some transportation they requested, they also received an old plane for the kids to paint on in the city square and wing-sponsored stands, where volunteers would build flying model planes with the children. The cost for the wing was very limited; the return was huge and touched the whole local community. Again, implementing is communicating, and it does influence all other phases.

Reassess and Readjust

While implementing our public relations campaign, it is critical to monitor the feedback for actions through "sensors," assessing media coverage, evaluating the support and participation to the wing's initiatives, and any other source of useful information. If anything goes in the wrong direction, a swift, open response is generally the best course of action. Taking responsibility and acting to fix problems is usually the best approach. If you cannot fix them, explaining well why, and showing care is an effective behavior.

After our brief discussion of the CAL Loop and of its application to one of the many possible cases, let's move to some final considerations.

Considerations, Cautions, and Connections

"We teach them to be by the standard" was one general's answer to a question regarding principles used for the education of air cadets.[17] However, out of these air cadets the next generation's strategic military leaders will grow up. This concept raises the question: Is "teaching the future leaders to be by the standard" the right way to educate them? If so, should it be the only way? Our approach and our strong belief is that leaders should adopt concepts and techniques leading to a strategic perspective from the very early stages in their leadership experience, so that they can use it early on; moreover, learning these techniques from the early stages makes them become second nature. Arguably, while the level of leadership (strategic or lower) is determined by the breadth of the picture, the amount of information and of the frames of reference utilized and the stakes involved, the quality and principles of the thinking process are consistent across all levels. Therefore, educating leaders and especially future leaders to adopt and practice concepts and models that can assist them in *narrowing the gap* is crucial. It is our strong belief that methods, concepts, and cognitive models such as the CAL Loop, are useful assets in the beginning of a leader's education and training.

The CAL Loop is just a leadership tool. And as with any other tool, is no substitute for understanding, knowledge, and craftsmanship. It can be a great help, but its use needs to be based on the *broader mind* our references point to as essential to its effectiveness. Then, the loop is a whole, just like reality. Even if the loop is divided into phases, each of them contributes more or less directly, and at the same time to all the other ones. The phases are in sequence to make the tool clear and easily applicable, but there is actually a network-like relationship among the activities.

We have seen in our example one application of our tool, but we believe it is a methodology applicable to any kind of situation. It will have to be refined through use, though, because any scheme attempting to capture complex processes fails some: progressive check-out, feedback, and validation are very important further steps for it. The CAL Loop is conceived to convey assistance in making decisions and actions in complexity and uncertainty. It enhances the leaders' appreciation for the big picture, pushes them to be proactive and focuses action on the mission and vision of the organization. It is at the same time a leadership development tool aimed to enhance flexibility and disciplined decision making and action. But it is not a stand-alone asset. The CAL Loop is part of an overarching model, the C2PS model, discussed elsewhere.[18] It shows the interaction between the strategic and the tactical level and the interface with the four elements of any organized action: (1) Leadership first and foremost, (2) Culture, (3) Process, and (4) Structure. The C2PS Model uses the CAL Loop to guide the relationships in the organization, both through hierarchical levels and functional structure, to be able to shape it and make it agile and effective in the VUCA**R** environment. The *broader mind* and the C2PS Model are the connections to make our tool part of a system suited to confront complexity.

The CAL Loop's tension toward the Big Picture, its networked nature, its agile philosophy, all together are apt to support leadership in complex environments. Its use and refinement can help to make it more effective. Let's try it now, to seed and seize opportunities, to mitigate risks, and lead in our complex world.

Notes

1. For an examination both of the roots of our thinking modes and some measures to compensate our default narrow-mindedness, see Col Fernando Giancotti, "Strategic Leadership and the Narrow Mind: What We Don't Do Well and Why," AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership* (Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, 2001) 187–90.

2. Roy P. Basler, ed., "Letter to Albert G. Hodges," *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. 7. (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1864), 281.

3. For example, the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) Loop is one of the attempts to define a systematic mechanism toward agility and adaptability by Col John Boyd and the importance of a mechanism based on Orientation, Observation, Decision, and Action methodology. W. Edwards Deming's Plan, Do, Check, and Act (PDCA) model is another systematic decision making technique.

4. For a more extensive discussion of leadership through several frames of references such as, an evolutionary and historical perspective, an approach based on inferences from the new science of chaos, plus practical experiences and the C2PS Model, see the research monograph this essay was excerpted from: Giancotti and Y. Shaharabani, *The Relevant Warriors: Leadership and Agility in Complex Environments* (National Defense University, 2006). The monograph won the NDU President's "Strategic Vision Award."

5. See Giancotti, 2001; and Giancotti and Shaharabani 2006.

6. To the well-known acronym VUCA, meaning Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous, adjectives of our operating environments, we added a bold **R**, to underscore the other relevant attribute of our times: Rapidly changing.

7. A quote by Allan Kay in 1971, inventor of Smalltalk which was the inspiration and technical basis for the Macintosh and subsequent windowing based systems (NextStep, Microsoft Windows .1/95/98/NT.X-Windows, Motif, etc.).

8. Keith H. Hammonds, "The Strategy of the Fighter Pilot," *Fast Track*, 2002.

9. This emphasis is stated by the Israeli Minister of Defense, Shaul Mofaz, since taking office in 2000.

10. David A. Garvin and Michael A. Roberto, "What You Don't Know about Making Decisions," *Harvard Business Review*, September 2001.

11. Col Yakov Shaharabani, "The Five Step Guideline," unpublished paper that offers holistic approach to the reactive side of leadership. The model is presented thoroughly in appendix 1 of the Giancotti, and Shaharabani research monograph, 2006.

12. Ken Blanchard and Jesse Stoner, "The Vision Thing: Without It You'll Never Be a World-Class Organization," *Leader to Leader*, no. 31 (Winter 2004), 21–28.

13. T. Jacobs Qwen, *Strategic Leadership: The Competitive Edge* (Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces), 2002.

14. Giancotti, Shaharabani, 2006.

15. Morris A. Cohen, professor of operation and information management at the Fishman-Davidson Center for Service and Operation Management, during a discussion regarding the reaction towards Hurricane Katrina.

16. For a deeper understanding of *The Five Step Guideline*, see Giancotti, Shaharabani, 2006.

17. Statement; in the year 2000 during a visit to the Army Flight School in Fort Rucker, Alabama.

18. Giancotti, Shaharabani, 2006.

Leadership, Complexity, and Chaos: Tapping a New Science

Brig Gen Fernando Giancotti

Our logic is tired, and presumptuous. And it is so because it is old.

—Ciccio Battaggia, after a few glasses of wine.

While leaders and scholars debated leading in our complex reality, many others had long been working on a scientific approach to complexity "per se," from completely different avenues. Edward Lorenz, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology mathematician, discovered in the 1960s the "sensitive dependence on initial conditions" of complex systems, omitting a seemingly insignificant 0.000127 from a weather computer simulation, and obtaining a completely different outcome from the previous iterations. The ensuing studies opened up a new world for exploration.[1] The "Butterfly Effect" (fig. 1) deriving from that dependence, where a disturbance created by the flapping of a little wing in Brazil can trigger a tornado in Texas, has become an intellectual icon.[2] It shows––powerfully shows—how in complex systems the smallest changes can establish a network of expanding consequences in larger and larger contexts, until unexpected outcomes happen, even in faraway, time-remote, and much broader environments. While further studying the nonlinear processes pertaining to meteorology, Lorenz sensed an order beyond the unpredictability of chaos. His plotting through computer graphics of some related mathematical functions led to the amazing visualization of that order.



Figure 1. Lorenz's "strange attractor," is today universally famous

Lorenz started a field of studies opening fascinating perspectives, visualizations (through fractals), and also applications. But we are not into a history of the science of complexity and chaos. Others do very well at it, at various levels of depth, as we can see by even a quick exploration through a search engine, and our references.[3]

We are, however, into seeing what this new science can contribute to our quest for the best possible leadership. We must try to understand through as many significant frames of reference as possible and acquire useful tools to lead and operate in complex environments. The science of complexity and chaos can enable us to find some good tools for leadership. Let us see what observations and applications we are able to focus on our goal.

Observations about Complex Adaptive Systems

Over communicate. Communication is never enough.

—Yakov Nando

The first thing we need to know is what a complex system is and how it relates to our field of interest. To anticipate a simple answer to the second question, we might say that complexity relates to leadership because we are dealing with leadership in complexity. It is also true, as we will soon discuss, that human societies and their organizations fall into the "complex adaptive system" (CAS) category. We believe that some general principles of recent complex system studies yield interesting concepts for leadership applications. To answer the first question, let's start with a couple of definitions, and look into how complex systems generally behave and evolve, how communication shapes those behaviors, and what kind of approach we should use towards them.

Definitions

Even though there is no single formal definition, studies of nonlinear dynamical system converge in outlining the concept of CAS as "open, nonlinear evolutionary systems, such as a rain forest, that are constantly processing and incorporating new information."[4] Gandolfi defines CAS as "an open system,

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formed by numerous elements interacting in a nonlinear manner, which constitute a single, dynamic and organized entity, able to evolve and adapt to the environment."[5] We will refer to them as complex systems, implying the adaptive connotation.

Behaviors

So, a complex system is open: it exchanges material, energy, or information with its environment, through a process of input, elaboration, and output. It is nonlinear, inasmuch varying in a regular way the input; the output can behave in an irregular, non-proportional way: For example there is no direct relation between what you input and the results achieved. It is capable of evolving and adapting through the exchange interactions, and these are not sequential, linearly connected, but rather linked in a simultaneous, network-like process. Through these connections, a generalized feedback mechanism operates: the output of one node inputs in several other ones, which may very well eventually feed back into the former through the network. Feedback cycles are so established and diffused. When such cycles are self-inhibiting, dampening their own effects, they tend to stabilize the system. Systems in nature maintain stability through this mechanism. When feedbacks are positive, stimulating further output and thus reinforcing effects, they can push divergence of the system from the equilibrium conditions, spinning it out of control or blocking it completely.

For the above reasons, a complex system is hard to predict in the short term and practically impossible to predict in the long term. The direct cause-effect and time-relationship between input and output is lost in the extraordinarily complex and subtle network of dynamic exchanges influencing each other; the system can be very sensitive to small differences and capable of strong, rapid divergence from previous equilibriums. Observation of complex systems then yields another fundamental characteristic: their trend toward a hierarchical and self-organizing structure. From life itself, organized from the molecule to the ecosystem through many hierarchical levels, to human societies and to the economy, the growth and evolution of the interactions makes the system more complex. When these interactions cross a critical threshold, structures form, organizing many of the elements. A collective, coordinated behavior emerges, with new properties typical of a new, higher level of organization. Even very simple actions, iterated in parallel by large numbers of elements, either computer-simulated or actual, can produce an amazing higher order; like the elementary behavioral pattern that ants follow unknowingly to produce huge and outstandingly structured anthills. In this and many other cases, understanding elements is not enough to understand the system. Complex systems, actual or simulated, show other interesting characteristics. Depending on internal and external influencing factors, they exhibit different behaviors: orderly, chaotic, and "in-between," otherwise defined as "complex." When the first one prevails, the system is very static, and only limited, isolated areas display a dynamic behavior. When chaos prevails, the system shows great instability, random fluctuations, and inability to create organized behaviors and evolution. In the "in-between" status, though, the system shows the maximum capacity to evolve, to adapt and improve, displaying the trend to self-organize and attain a high degree of flexibility. These behaviors are influenced by those aforementioned internal and external factors, defined as "control parameters." Without actually understanding the control process, modulating the control parameters steers the system toward one of the behaviors. Control parameters can, if you find the right ones, strongly influence complex systems' behavior.

Evolution and Stability

As mentioned before, the evolution of complex systems happens mostly in between the static, frozen status, and the chaotic one. Most scholars of complexity from different disciplines converge on the way this evolution takes place.[6] After a long period of relative stability, where fluctuations were stabilized by negative feedbacks and balance was achieved, the spontaneous changes in the system and/or major external disturbances lead to a critical point, where instability is triggered. Fluctuations are amplified by positive feedback dynamics; vast scale-chaotic behavior and unpredictability ensue. The networking of a great number of positive feedback cycles, feeding one another with a strong reinforcement of divergent behaviors, enables the quantum leap. This kind of "chain reaction" is called hyper-cycle. Eventually one of the fluctuations projects the system into a new stable state, at a new level of complexity: we have what is defined as a "catastrophic bifurcation" (even if it has positive results), "or strategic inflection point"[7] or "tipping point."[8]

This pattern can be observed in many different environments, including social settings, like in the rise of Nazism or the Russian Revolution, in organizational dynamics, in the evolution of species, and even in the organization of ideas and thoughts when conducting a research. Laszlo states clearly that the course of evolution, notwithstanding how chaotic and disorderly it may appear, is guided by general laws that can be scientifically studied and are valid in the same way as for physical, biological, ecological, human, and social systems.[9] James Gleick's best seller, *Chaos: Making a New Science*, postulates that most of the processes of our world can be described through the chaos and complexity theory. For example, weather patterns, market behaviors, and the physiology of the brain.[10] The catastrophic bifurcation pattern of change seems to be quite common. On the other hand, observation tells us that while nature is sometimes chaotic, it is not always so—stability usually prevails. This is an interesting phenomenon, widely observed and largely unexplained. Yet it appears that an increase in the complexity of a system is generally accompanied by an increasing sensitivity toward disturbances. Yet, more complex systems are often more robust and resilient. Communication, in its widest sense, is believed to be a major stabilizing factor. The Nobel Prize–winning physicist Dr. Ilya Prigogine attributes the dynamic equilibrium we observe most often to "a competition between the stabilization given by communication and the instability caused by fluctuations."[11] Even if communication is here intended as an exchange of any medium, chemical signals, substances, information, ideas, a more specific and most fascinating question turns inevitably to human systems: What is the role of information and ideas exchange for humankind? Is it stabilizing or destabilizing?

Dr. Uri Merry explains the stability-complexity paradox, highlighting how to become more complex, a society must invest substantially in its internal ties and communication.[12] If it does so successfully, the very same network is the cause of its resilience and consequent stability. If our societies will not understand the growing communication needs, they will face times of growing turbulence. Yaneer Bar-Yam's words highlight a conceptual approach of complexity theories to communication, "Indeed, one of the main difficulties in answering questions or solving problems—any kind of problem—is that we think the problem is in the parts, when it is really in the relationships between them."[13]

We can then say that communicating, in its wider sense, is a powerful shaping force. It seems to operate through the typical evolutionary mechanism of complex systems, maintaining some kind of homeostasis between stillness and chaos, until stability is broken and a leap to a higher level of communication is achieved. We do not understand much of how and why all this happens. We do understand that we want to use it, making it one of the control parameters, in the attempt to influence the stability and agility of our systems.

Complex and Complicated Systems

Another relevant observation refers to the difference between *complicated* and *complex* systems. A system is defined as *complicated* when it is possible to know all its components and their relationships and to forecast its behavior. Building a bridge may be a very complicated endeavor, but it can be scrupulously planned and executed throughout, knowing all the relevant factors and their interplay. Complicated systems have many elements, usually simple ones, linked by linear relationships and generally serial ones; they are highly predictable, with no evolutionary capability and low redundancy and resilience, such as large software programs, administrative procedures, and automated satellite launches.

A system is defined as *complex* when it is impossible to know all its components and their relationships, much less to predict its behavior. It is not possible, for instance, to predict what conversations your child will entertain today. Complex systems have many elements as well, but these elements are often complex themselves. Their relationship is nonlinear, and the likelihood of forecasting behaviors and controlling output from inputs is very low. Processes are usually redundant, connected in parallel, and a single process is seldom critical; and, as we have seen in the communication discussion, a complex system is usually very robust. Examples of this category are ecosystems, the economy, our brain, a human society or organization, and even a group of friends.[14]

The issue of resilience of complex systems is a fundamental one. While a grain of sand in the wrong place can stop the linear mechanisms of complicated systems, the networked redundancies of complex ones make them much more resistant to disturbances and damage, even major ones. The Earth's ecosystem has endured many disturbances by humankind without collapsing, so far, just as a human body can endure and compensate for many injuries and mistreatments. As an example, despite the fact that most of Internet's physical infrastructure was disabled in a large area of the United States due to Hurricane Katrina, the rest of the country's Internet operations didn't suffer any appreciable downgrade.[15] It appears that the more decentralized, information-intensive to the environment it is, the more robust and adaptive it becomes. In fact, complex systems have strategies to neutralize errors, and sometimes they take advantage of them. In the complex status between immobility and chaos, they adapt to errors and sometimes use them to improve, as in life, copying mistakes in the DNA transcription to create mutations leading to evolution. Other examples appear in nature, such as the oyster neutralizing the intruder and transforming it into a pearl, or curiosity may have killed some cats, but fed other ones. Nature as a system is error friendly. We feel these are relevant considerations for our leadership issues.

Leadership and Collective Action: A Strange Attractor?

Transitioning from this cursory exploration of concepts about the new science of complexity to leadership applications, we return to Lorenz's strange attractor, the first graphic representation (see fig. 1) of a "relatively simple" complex system, showing the convection of heated gas in a box. The graphic describes the possible states of the system plotted in a three-dimensional space, defined by some nonlinear laws (differential equations[16]), governing the evolution of the single variables with respect to a parameter (time, in Lorenz's case). Setting the three equations in a system establishes interrelations among them, and from those relationships an order emerges: plotting the possible states of nonlinear processes (in our case its evolution through time) can allow emergence of a coherent and organized pattern. If the system has many variables, and actual complex systems can have thousands or millions of processes, the plotting should happen in a "space" of many, thousands or millions of dimensions. With some fantasy, we can conceive this hyperdimensional space, but we cannot draw it. The "region of the space" where processes are "attracted" because of their mutual-influence relationships is the attractor. Not all the nonlinear systems have attractors, nor can we plot many of them.[17] However, complex systems that show some regular pattern of behavior do so because something attracts them to it. This something emerges from the relationships of the processes, and there may be many (somethings), many attractor points for a process.[18] We do not know why and how nonlinear systems acquire their extraordinary dynamic order. We know that this happens, and it also happens in human organizations. Furthermore, we think that the major attractor in human complex systems is exactly the object of our quest *leadership*.

We actually believe leadership qualifies as a major attractor force, establishing links among human nonlinear processes in such a way as to determine the effectiveness of the collective action. Leadership is the underlying force, creating order out of nonlinear human processes, orienting them toward the goal of the organization and *attracting* the process in a coherent whole through influence on the relationships among nodes, their functions, and in the end on communication. Now, we need to discuss how the awareness of complexity theories focuses us on fundamental concepts to exercise that leadership.

Complexity and Leadership: Predictions and Actions

There is no substitute for a sense of reality.

—Isaiah Berlin

In and Out of the Box

We will now refer to the human complex systems, the object of our study. The first relevant concept emerging is that complex systems are very hard to predict even in the short term, and impossible in the long term. To have the best possible approximation, we must educate our "narrow mind" to compensate for our inherited weaknesses and exploit our strengths, so as to broaden its capabilities to understand complexity, as we discussed previously. We must also use methodologies to ensure we decide and act in a way optimized for volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA***R***) environments and that we do it consistently.[19] However, before that, the deep understanding of this concept must give us an imminent humbleness in the approach to complex problems. So far the trend to deal with nonlinear problems through our industrial-revolution linear thinking has been the widely prevalent mode of operations. Our linear processes receive all of the attention because linear thinking is the process we are most comfortable using.

An interesting way to address this dichotomy is Dr. Paul Davis's Complicated-Complex matrix in figure 2. The matrix allows a visualization of the possible thinking modes confronting problems other than simple ones. On the horizontal axis there is the nature of the problem, while on the vertical one is the logic set utilized; both can be complicated or complex and the combination of the logic used to confront what kind of problem gives indications about the adequacy of the approach.

In Dr. Davis's words,

> the boxes in lower left and upper right are the proper matches. Too often, we tend to operate in the lower right where we fail to recognize the issue or the problem is actually complex in nature and we try the methods we are expert at addressing for complicated problems. Additionally, if we mistake the relationship and find ourselves in the upper left box, we are making more of the problem than it is. The resolutions to complicated problems can be determined in advance. If studied properly and enough is known about the issues, a course of action can all but guarantee success in advance. Additionally, the resolution of complicated problems is repeatable. None of this is so with complex problems. Although complex problems often seem to subscribe to the same management that we use for complicated problems, in reality this is simply happenstance.[20]



Figure 2. "Davis's Matrix"—Fitting the Solution Logic to the Problem

We have once more seen how approaching complex problems through linear thinking is a recipe for failure, as hindsight so often confirms. On the other hand, our mind is driven by the emotions resident in our inner, ancestral brain that we share with our fellow animals and the narrowly focused linear thought processes of the cortex, our new, powerful survival tool of intelligence. We can broaden our cognitive capabilities through specific cultural training and awareness, but how do we bring to bear our inherently linear thinking on complex systems?

We can accomplish this by leveraging our true competitive advantage; our extraordinary cultural adaptability. We can redesign our mental software to make our way of thinking a system itself: a cultural complex system, adaptive, resilient, error-friendly, intensely informed and highly communicative, and attracted in a coherent whole by a clear paradigm. The one we need to build for the new millennium, and to which this work is attempting a contribution. The idea is confronting complexity through a mind-set shaped to enhance the complex system characteristics of culture. The broad, multidisciplinary education we (among many others) strongly advocate strives to build a network of concepts, understandings, and connections capable of adapting and evolving to frame complex issues and of understanding its own limitations. Moreover, a *network of minds* so educated becomes a powerful, complex, and adaptive system itself. We do need engineers and their extraordinary capability to solve complicated problems; but we need also a new way of thinking to frame all our necessary and precious linear-cognitive endeavors in a holistic framework. Our engineers, and all other agents of our collective action, should be able to solve complicated problems understanding complexity, to avoid falling in Davis's wrong box.

To deal with this composite reality, made of linear, nonlinear, and "quasi-linear" processes, interconnected in a complex whole, we believe it is first necessary to learn to "think big" and to be aware of the "nature" of complex issues, as we have previously discussed. Thereafter, we need to try to transform complex problems in complicated ones through information and knowledge as much as possible, knowing that we will not be able to capture all relationships and consequences. We must at the same time apply some specific thinking patterns apt to deal with complexity, and approach the complicated problems we could single out in the big picture through our sophisticated linear thinking. Sophistication is certainly necessary to understand and solve complicated problems. A higher level of sophistication, or (and often, and) an extraordinary intuitive capability and some luck are necessary to solve complex problems. We pointed out some of the thinking know-how available for decision making.[21] We now want to propose some ideas about the specific thinking patterns to apply to the "complex whole" to assist our leadership.

A Statistical Approach

Statistics are an old way to extract information from complex systems. What a single person may not perceive from the individual perspective becomes clear when data is aggregated in large numbers. From a single person's experience, the need for seat belts when driving may never become evident, as he or she may never get involved in a car accident. Looking at the appalling statistics of road accidents, a few (stupid ones) deny their necessity. The impossibility of keeping track of an extremely high number of processes leads to tracking only some major indicators thereof, which can be of great use for specific purposes: hence statistics are born.

Furthermore, we have seen how from complex systems and their nonlinear processes often some kind of regularity emerges, and not only through the plotting of strange attractors. In many science museums, we can observe the fascinating randomness of little balls falling and bouncing behind a glass trough, through a perfectly regular forest of horizontal nails, to come to a rest on the bottom in a totally unpredictable position. The interesting thing is that after a large enough number of balls has fallen, you can see they always pile up following a common Gaussian curve. You cannot predict the single fall, but you can anticipate the overall pattern of the ball's distribution. Many different regularities can be discovered in complex systems.[22]

We do think that, because of their capacity to capture relevant information, statistics can yield a significant help to the strategic leader if they are used appropriately, and the right questions asked. But this is not the point we want to focus on. The point is that where linear processes alone are not enough to guarantee overall success, as in complex systems, we must bring something more to bear on the goals: in a sense, we must work the "statistical nature" of complexity. How do we do that?

It is *likely* that the broad education we are discussing (aware of the characteristics of complex environments and of human limitations) might support better decision making for leaders on complex issues. We cannot predetermine the single decision-making process, but in teaching leaders we can operate on a *control parameter* to statistically influence the outcome.

On the same path, building a strong network of leaders educated both on leadership and on complexity helps to make a decision-making system more Gaussian curve–adaptive, resilient, error friendly, intensely informed, highly communicative, and attracted in a coherent whole by a clear cultural paradigm, which is how we previously defined our desired leadership mind-set. The "network of leaders" control parameter (difficult as it may be to achieve) is a very powerful one because of the synergistic effect and the motivational hyper-cycles it can trigger throughout the organization. Leadership of leaders is the critical element to make it happen. It is a strong attractor, we would say, and as such demands a radical shift of emphasis on leadership development, mentorship, and application from *the* leader to the *network of leaders*.

Many other avenues can be found to operate control parameters capable of statistically influencing complex systems. We will look into some we believe to be fundamental ones as examples of how the approach works.

Environment, Trends, and Vectors (ETV)

What everyone knows is what has already happened or become obvious. What the aware individual knows is what has not yet taken shape, what has not yet occurred. Everyone says victory in battle is good, but if you see the subtle and notice the hidden so as to seize victory where there is no form, that is really good.

—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

The very first capability a leader and the network of leaders should bring to the decision-making process is the ability to understand the environment and its trends and vectors. Environmental scanning is deemed a fundamental leadership step. Through its use, we must be very perceptive of the stability and evolution of the system we are dealing with. Perceiving the "fluctuations" that point to some longer-term trend, or at least the trends themselves once they start to move, is very important. Moreover, on a shorter time scale, it is fundamental to understand rapidly shifting vectors, faster fluctuations capable of contributing to divergence, and the instability leading to change.

Environment, trends, and vectors (ETV) describe the typical behaviors of a complex system, where fluctuations are stabilized by negative feedback loops, until change or disturbances lead to a critical point where instability and eventually change occur. Again, it is not possible to keep track of all phenomena taking place to shape ETV. However, striving for the big picture, choosing relevant indicators, and asking good questions can yield good data and information, and our evaluation can turn those into the knowledge we need. The process of doing so through the framework of a perceptive "broader mind" educated to self-awareness, and complex systems dynamics is the closest thing to wisdom we can think of.

Risks and Opportunities

A superior pilot is the one who uses his superior judgment to avoid using his superior skills.

He who wins in aerial combat is the one who makes the least mistakes.

If you cannot defeat his airplane, defeat his mind.

Never underestimate the enemy.

—Common fighter pilot wisdom

Let's think of Joe Whoever, being kind to his neighbors or providing for an education for his children. Let's think of a fighter pilot entering the air-to-air arena in his formation to kill the enemy. Let's think of leaders leading their organizations, or of any strategic choice. What do all these situations have in common? Basically, all have a fundamental pattern for confronting complexity. Each of those actors has goals to pursue in (his or her complex) environment, be it life, flying and fighting, or decision making action at the strategic level. Each uses *some* of a strategy we are going to discuss briefly, to make it explicit, and turn it into a reliable tool for a consistent approach to complex environments.

What powerfully emerges, both from this conceptual approach and from practical experience, is again the necessity to act on control parameters that influence the system, rather than confiding in linear, discrete input-output relationships. Clearly, the capability to invest in initiatives that go beyond immediate benefits for a greater good and with results hard to quantify has been the essence of strategic leadership for a long time; and its importance, though often neglected, is not a discovery of ours. However, we think it necessary to introduce a category of action that must be continuously pursued by strategic leaders, and ideally by all members of our organization, when dealing with complex environments (i.e., most of the time). This kind of background activity must be "turned on" as soon as possible in a leader's career, and possibly kept on at all times until it becomes second nature, since it operates on complex systems according to their characteristics: it establishes a constant "communication" of calibrated inputs, oriented toward establishing control parameters favorable to the achievement of the goals. We call this category of action "Risk Mitigating and Opportunity Seizing and Seeding." It is not just, as it may sound "a nice-to-have," prudent inclination to be safer; it is a highly proactive, fundamental approach to influence complex systems through their own workings. Feeding the environment a constant flow of communications, organized in a system of strategic choices and a myriad of aligned smaller ones, can establish a "critical mass" of relationship exchange, a system of control parameters capable of influencing a significant portion of the context. The concept of a "system" of control parameters, of inputs, of communication, informed by mission, vision, and strategy, is central to our approach. It connects tightly to the "systemic thinking mode strategic leadership requires."

While the quantity and pattern of the communication is important to engage the target system, its content is obviously critical. The basic question that we must answer to shape our system of communication is then about both the *form* of the transaction and *value* transacted. To define those control parameters in a functional way, leadership comes into play through its fundamental messages, which nowadays are usually synthesized in organizations through mission and vision.[23]

If leadership is the fundamental attractor force for the effectiveness of collective action, mission and vision can become the powerful attractor points for the whole system, shaping form and value of internal and external exchanges. So, how does Joe Whoever mitigate risks and seed opportunities? He knows by experience that in the complex environment of life, you cannot control what happens around you very much; but he also knows that some behaviors, *statistically*, influence that environment. He knows that if he is kind to people, likely they will be kind to him, and the likelihood of unexpected hostile behaviors is reduced. He knows that a good education helps in finding a good job, even in a complex and unpredictable place like a market economy. His personal mission and vision (probably an unstated expression of his beliefs and values) make him shape the form and content of his *communications* with the environment—for example, a positive attitude toward his neighbors, and saving dollars for his children's college. He doesn't know whether his investments will yield success; nevertheless, he is thus mitigating risks and seeding opportunities, through good control parameters capable of some influence on the environment.

A fighter pilot inbound to a big aerial battle is certainly facing a VUCA***R*** environment *par excellence*, even in a high-tech aircraft. In a "multi-bogey environment," he or she cannot be sure of how many enemy airplanes there are and of their position.[24] He or she knows the enemy will do anything to deceive him or her, counter his or her tactics, and defeat his or her weapons to kill him or her. Things evolve very fast in combat due to the high relative speeds and quick maneuvering required. Combat can express all its fierceness in a very dense few minutes. If engaged in a dogfight, his or her situational awareness shrinks suddenly to his or her near-environment, and under the huge physical stress of high Gs, focused on killing and surviving, high adrenaline flowing, his or her information-processing capability shrinks. The unexpected is the norm, and VUCA***R*** is the name of the game.

This is why a fighter pilot works on a wide set of control parameters to ensure success, pertaining to culture, training, organization, technology, and more.[25] Those, together, aim to give a *statistical* answer to good questions. Understanding which and what these parameters are and working the right set in a holistic and self-assessing mode, explains how the highly nonlinear world of aerial combat has seen the absolute dominance through time of the CAS of the fighter community of the western countries.

Leaders operate in many cases like Joe and our fighter pilot, in an intuitive and sometimes very effective way. We think it useful, nevertheless, to highlight the relationship of risk mitigating and opportunity seeding with the nature of complex systems, to make it into a thoroughly thought-out and implemented strategy to influence complex processes.

Complex Adaptive Leadership

The threads from the complexity theories that lead to leadership issues are very many, even through a cursory outlook such as ours. This is because leadership is by nature interacting with and trying to influence complex systems. We have seen how complex adaptive systems, the effective ones, between stillness and chaos, are highly decentralized, composed of many elements networked by an intense exchange flow. They are governed by the form and content of this communication, which has a critical role, much beyond the nature of its elements. When these systems are centralized, the exchanges tightly controlled and restrained, they degrade in performance until eventually they collapse because of stagnation, of emerging disequilibrium, and external pressures. If rather the form and content of the exchanges are excessive or unbalanced and inadequate to inform the system, it may fall into a chaotic state, like in social turmoil or in the development of cancer. Otherwise, when the information flow is good, these systems usually self-organize in seemingly necessary hierarchical levels, still maintaining the intense horizontal flow among the elements. They become robust and resilient in that when a part of it is degraded or elements disabled, its decentralized, self-organizing nature makes other elements and parts of the system pickup functions and rebalance the communication flow.

We have seen this at work in good military units in battle, in the Internet in the presence of major disruptions, in the economy *if* some fundamental rules of the game are in effect, in nature in many cases, some of which we discussed previously, while many are examined in the references and other literature.

We have seen how the CASs work their intensely dialectic evolution through a dense network of communication, where many sub-processes feed back into each other, often reinforcing the output, in hypercycles capable of building a new order through critical bifurcations. We think that leadership, the attractor force for collective action, can and often does activate and diffuse the strongly self-reinforcing behavior of hypercycles of various kinds: first and foremost, the motivational hypercycle that yields such extraordinary results in human organizations, if and when its powerful chain reaction is brought to bear on shared goals. When leadership is strong and cooperative and justice and fairness are the norm; when people are empowered and feel part of a team and a clear mission and a shared vision are the attractor point of decentralized action, organizations thrive and evolve, just as complex adaptive systems do.

We do believe that the new science of complexity and chaos, though in its infancy and very briefly examined here, shows an impressive convergence toward what other studies yield with regard to the effectiveness of the collective action and its attractor leadership.[26] We also believe that awareness of such dynamics can help considerably in dealing with our complex world, supporting its understanding, and the modeling of mental processes that can assist us in decision making.

Notes

1. Irene T. Sanders, *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 57; and Alberto Gandolfi, *Formicai, Imperi, Cervelli,* (Torino, Italy: Bollati Boringheiri, 1999), 69.

2. The "Butterfly Effect" is often ascribed to Edward Lorenz. In a paper in 1963 given to the New York Academy of Sciences, he states: One meteorologist remarked that if the theory were correct, one flap of a seagull's wings would be enough to alter the course of the weather forever. By the time of his talk at the December 1972 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington, DC, the seagull had evolved into the more poetic butterfly, and the title of his talk was "Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly's Wings in Brazil set off a Tornado in Texas?" In the applet we also see a second incarnation of the butterfly—the amazing geometric structure discovered by Lorenz in his numerical simulations of three very simple equations that now bear his name.* As quoted in "Chaos and Nonlinear Dynamics," by R. C. Hilborn (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1994). This information was kindly sent by Corrie Modell and Michael Cross, http://www.its.caltech.edu/~mcc/chaos_new/Lorenz.html. On this site you can also experiment with Lorenz's equations varying, the initial conditions and determining various, yet similar, attractors.

3. Gandolfi, *Formicai, Imperi*, 1999; Sanders, *Harnessing Complexity*, 1998; Uri Merry, *Coping with Uncertainty,* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995). Axelrod, Cohen, 1999; and James Gleick, *Making a New Science* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1987).

4. Sanders, *Harnessing Complexity*.

5. Gandolfi, *Formicai, Imperi*, 19.

6. Gandolfi, *Formicai, Imperi*, 76–78.

7. Andrew S. Grove, *Only the Paranoid Survive—How to Exploit the Crisis Points That Challenge Every Company* (Intel Cooperation, 1999).

8. Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 2000).

9. Laszlo A. Evoluzione, Feltrinelli, Millano, 1986, 13.

10. Gleick, *Making a New Science*.

11. I. Prigogine and I. Stengers, *Order out of Chaos* (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), 188.

12. Merry, *Coping with Uncertainty*.

13. Bar-Yam Yaneer, *Making Things Work: Solving Complex Problems in a Complex World* (Boston: NECSI Knowledge Press, 2004).

14. Gandolfi, *Formicai,Imperi* ,90.

15. Adm Timothy J. Keating, USN, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command, and Commander, Northern Command briefing to the National Defense University, (NDU), International Fellows, Washington, DC, 2006.

16. On this site you can also experiment with Lorenz equations varying the initial conditions and determining various, yet similar attractors see: http://www.its.caltech.edu/~mcc/chaos_new/Lorenz.html of Michael Cross.

17. Even if fractals show many beautiful pictures, they are just an infinitesimal part of the simplest plotting of nonlinear systems.

18. Gandolfi, *Formicai,Imperi*, 75.

19. To the well-known acronym VUCA, meaning volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous, adjectives of our operating environments, we added a bold ***R***, to underscore the other very relevant attribute of our times: Rapidly changing.

20. Paul Davis, lectures for the elective course "Complexity and Strategic Thinking," Industrial College for the Armed Forces, NDU, Washington, DC, 2006.

21. For an examination both of the roots of our thinking modes and some measures to compensate our default narrow-mindedness, see F. Giancotti, "Strategic Leadership and The Narrow Mind: What We Don't Do Well and Why," AU-24, *Concepts for Air Force Leadership*, Air University, Maxwell AFB AL, 2001.

22. Gandolfi, *Formicai, Imperi*, 1999.

23. Identifying and implementing the mission and the vision of the organization defines the goal and the desired collective identity of the team, and this is relevant both for building effective collective action and to inform the relationships with the external environment. Doing so effectively requires clarity, consistency, and synergy: clarity, for people to understand easily and deeply the message; high consistency in carrying it forward through time and situations; and a rigorous synergy such that every action carried out must have confluence toward implementation of mission and vision, or the latter needs to be changed.

24. A tactical situation in which many hostile airplanes "merge" and fight in a limited airspace, in such a way that it is extremely difficult to keep track of all of them.

25. The first one of those control parameters is culture: he or she must be humble, aware of the limitations of his or her system (man, machine, command and control); he or she must know his or her trade very well through hard and long training; the environment and the enemy through study and thought; and understand trends and vectors thereof. Then, he or she must have plans in mind to shape the battle, or channel the enemy in options of least regret. He or she must be ready, again through high quality training, to perceive immediately and act proactively upon emerging threats and opportunities, deciding in the effective time available, implementing decisively and reassessing his or her decision, to feed back into his or her understanding of the situation. He or she must know how to work as a team with his or her wingmen, in a disciplined but decentralized way, where role and responsibilities shift according to the tactical situation, again to counter threats and seize opportunities in the most swift and effective way. Then, he or she needs a very good command and control, plus on-board systems that give him or her the best possible situation awareness. He or she also needs, possibly, a good air-

plane, fast and maneuverable. His tactics will try to maximize seeing and not being seen, killing quickly and separating from the fight to avoid exposure. Briefings and debriefings maximize focus and feedback for reassessment. The synergy of all these actions enables our pilots to seed opportunities and mitigate risks on a vast scale, and with an extremely high rate of success.

26. For a more extensive discussion of leadership through several frames of references, see the research monograph this essay was excerpted from: Giancotti F., Shaharabani Y., *The Relevant Warriors: Leadership and Agility in Complex Environments.* National Defense University, June 2006. The monograph won the NDU President's "Strategic Vision Award."

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