




China Aerospace Studies Institute Commander's Toolkit for China

Taiwan: Background



History: Pre-Colonial and Colonial

- Prior to Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1912) colonization, Taiwan was home to a diverse group of indigenous people
- Diverse Ming and Qing colonization
- Japanese Colonization 1895-1945





History: Post WWII and Chinese Civil War

- Taiwan returned to KMT controlled ROC at end of WWII
- 28 February 1947- political crackdown
- 1949- KMT loses Chinese Civil War
- Martial law 1949-1987





History: First Taiwan Straits Crisis


- Outbreak of Korean War renews US Support for KMT
- Both KMT and CCP were intent on unification
- Conflict occurs from 3 September 1954 to 1 May 1955
- Ends with threat of US intervention





History: Second Taiwan Straits Crisis

- Continuation of First Taiwan Straits Crisis
- 23 August – 2 December 1958
- Attempted landing on Jinmen
- Ends with US support to Jinmen and alternating shelling of mainland and Jinmen





Taiwan Domestic Politics


- Taiwan functions as a de jure independent state
- Functionally a multi-party democracy
- 1992 Consensus
- Stances on independence





History: Third Taiwan Straits Crisis

- Continued democratization of Taiwan and growing apathy regarding reunification
- Lee Tenghui elected president and transit of US/Cornell visit
- PLA exercises and missile tests
- US sends two CSG to Taiwan Straits
- 1992 Consensus





Taiwan Domestic Politics 2008-Present


- 2008- Then DPP president Chen Shui-bian and his party loose election and legislative majority
- KMT president Ma Ying-jeou oversees deepening economic ties with PRC while PLA continues to undergo modernization focused on taking Taiwan
- 2014- Sunflower Movement protests against closer ties with PRC, DPP wins legislative majority
- 2016- Tsai Ing-Wen elected president, DPP wins majority





US-PRC-ROC: Guiding Documents


- Three Communiques:
 - Shanghai Communique
 - Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
 - 1982 Joint Communique
- Taiwan Relations Act
- The Six Assurances





PRC Coercion: Changing the Status Quo

- Buying out Taiwan's Partners
- Blocking Observer Status in International Organizations
- Narrative Crafting
- PLA Exercises and Flights





China Aerospace Studies Institute Commander's Toolkit for China

Taiwan: Background

History: Pre-Colonial and Colonial (Slide 2)

Before it was colonized by the Qing and Ming Empires, Taiwan was home to a diverse group of indigenous people, which eventually became the minority of the population after a diverse group of mainland settlers colonized the Island during the Ming and Late Qing Dynasties. From around 1624 to 1668 coastal portions of the island were colonized by the Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish. After the first Sino Japanese War, Taiwan became a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945. During this time Imperial Japan invested heavily in the Island's infrastructure and economy and Taiwan fared much better than any other Japanese colony as well as mainland China. At the end of WWII, Taiwan was ceded back to the Republic of China and became a relative backwater due to the KMT's focus on fighting the Chinese Civil War.

History: Post WWII and Chinese Civil War (Slide 3)

On February 28, 1947 the first KMT crackdown on the Taiwanese population occurred, referred to as the 228 Incident. This event was spurred by the Island's populace demonstrating for more autonomy and against KMT control. The crackdown would set the tone for KMT rule. After the KMT lost the Civil war, 2 million KMT soldiers and refugees fled to Taiwan in 1949. The KMT established an authoritarian one-party pseudo democratic state with limited civil liberties and freedom of expression that was under martial law till 1987. Between this time and the outbreak of the Korean War, the international community was ambivalent to the future of the KMT, but upon the outbreak of the Korean War, the US and its allies began to provide economic and military support to the KMT as a means to prevent the spread of communism.

History: First Taiwan Straits Crisis (Slide 4)

Between 1954 and 1958 there were two notable clashes between the ROC and the PRC in the Taiwan straits referred to as the First and Second Taiwan Straits Crises. These crises involved mutual shelling and aerial bombardment of KMT held islands (Jinmen and Matsu) off the coast of Fujian Province and Xiamen.

The first crisis was initiated by the transfer of around 72,000 ROC troops to Jinmen and Matsu. As the ROC soldiers began building defensive installations, the PRC initiated a bombardment campaign. Some US military advisors were killed during the bombardment of Jinmen. Subsequently, the PRC seized smaller Islands off the coast of Zhejiang province. This crisis ended after the US and the ROC signed a mutual defense treaty at the end of 1954 (ratified in 1955) and the US JCS raised the possibility of launching a nuclear strike against the mainland. This crisis is seen as an impetus for the acceleration of the PRC nuclear program. It is important to note that this the Sino American mutual defense treaty did not technically apply to Jinmen or Matsu.

History: Second Taiwan Straits Crisis (Slide 5)

The Second Crisis is considered a continuation of the first and involved shelling and airstrikes against the same ROC held Islands (Jinmen and Matsu). This crisis was initiated by PLA attempted landings on smaller ROC controlled islands in the vicinity of Jinmen. In order to support the ROC, the USN escorted supply ships and the USAF deployed a variety of aircraft to

Taiwan as a demonstration of support. US support was intended to be conventional in nature, but nuclear strikes against the mainland were not ruled out. This crisis ended with a stalemate and an agreement by the ROC and the PRC agreeing to shell each other on alternating days. This arrangement ended when the US normalized relations with the PRC in 1979.

Taiwan Domestic Politics (Slide 6)

Taiwan functions as a de jure independent state, enjoying free and fair elections (since 1996) and independent legislature and judiciary. KMT still remains as a political party, but the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was allowed to flourish, as well as numerous smaller parties.

Prior to the Third Taiwan straits crisis, ROC and PRC representatives met to create a diplomatic basis for semi-official cross-strait relations. This meeting occurred in the background of growing economic ties between the two parties due to the Deng Xiaoping initiated Reform and opening (PRC relative economic liberalization). This consensus reached at these meetings, referred to as the 1992 Consensus, implies that the PRC and ROC agree that there is only one China, but that the two sides disagree as to what China is. This consensus established more stable relations. However, any ROC move that is perceived by the PRC as going back on this consensus is seen as a reason for further PRC coercive actions.

The KMT is in favor of maintaining the ambiguous status quo, while the DPP holds that Taiwan is an independent sovereign country, but that a formal declaration is unnecessary.

History: Third Taiwan Straits Crisis (Slide 7)

The Third Taiwan Straits Crisis occurred from 1995-1996. This crisis was precipitated by the increasing reticence of the Taiwanese public towards reunification as well as Lee Tenghui's visit to Cornell to speak at an event on Taiwanese democratization. Lee had previously stopped in Hawaii as a brief stop on a flight back to Taiwan during which he was forced to sleep on his presidential aircraft. These events caused much consternation on the diplomatic front between the US, the ROC, and the PRC. The major military actions during this crisis involve PLA missile tests and exercises in the Taiwan straits, responded to by the US sailing a carrier battle group and an LHA through the Taiwan Straits. The third crisis, combined with the first gulf war, are seen as an impetus for PLA modernization.

This modernization campaign was initially a rushed buy of systems from Russia (Sovremenny's, Kilo SS, and Su-27s), French helicopters, sonar, and radar, and domestic procurement of systems such as the type 22 Houbei missile boats. Additionally, the batch production of destroyers in the late 90s and early 2000s is attributed to this rushed procurement.

Taiwan Domestic Politics 2008-Present (Slide 8)

Beginning in 2008, renewed US focus on the region (post height of GWOT) and Taiwanese domestic political developments further increased PRC prioritization of developing modern capabilities to deter US intervention in an invasion of Taiwan.

While the DPP lost the presidency and control over legislature, the KMT's rapid deepening of economic ties with the PRC would backfire. Beginning in 2014 with the sunflower movement,

protests against KMT proposed legislation that would further deepen Taiwanese economic reliance on the PRC, the DPP began a political comeback that signaled further shifts in public opinion against reunification. The DPP regained control over the legislature in 2014 and in 2016, Tsai Ying Wen is elected to her first term as president. It is important to note that officially, President Tsai is in favor of respecting the 1992 consensus.

US-PRC-ROC: Guiding Documents (Slide 9)

The primary diplomatic documents governing US-PRC relations that affect Taiwan are the three communiques. The first communique, the Shanghai Communique, signed in 1972, sets the groundwork for normalization of relations between the US and PRC and establishes that the US acknowledges the PRC's one China policy, but the US does not take a side or accept this policy. The second communique, the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, was signed in 1979. This communique established normalized relations between the US and PRC, and committed the US to acknowledging that the PRC takes the position that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it. The third communique, the 1982 Joint Communique, reaffirms US statements from the prior two communiques regarding Taiwan, and establishes the US view that continued arms sales to Taiwan are contingent upon demonstrable PRC commitment to peaceful reunification and non-aggression towards Taiwan.

After Normalization of relations with the PRC, the US passed and ratified the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in January 1979 to ensure substantial semi-official relations between the US and ROC. The TRA lays out extensive semi-official economic, pseudo diplomatic, and cultural ties. The TRA also established the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the US's unofficial embassy staffed by state department employees on leave and guarded by marines.

In 1982, the US committed to what are referred to as the Six Assurances. The Six Assurances were a commitment made to then ROC president Jiang Jingguo by Secretary of State George Shultz and have guided US Taiwan policy since. The Six Assurances are: the US has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; the US has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan; the US will not mediate between Taipei and Beijing; the US has not agreed to revise the TRA; the US has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and the US will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter negotiations with the PRC. Congress has since sort of formalized these commitments with a concurrent resolution in 2016.

A key concept governing the US's response to a PLA attempt to seize Taiwan is strategic ambiguity. It has long been a way perceived to complicate the PRC calculus as to what the cost of an attempt to take Taiwan would be. This strategy can also be interpreted to increase ROC uncertainty of US support during conflict, which can be considered to have interfered in what some people consider the desired course of ROC military modernization.

PRC Coercion: Changing the Status Quo (Slide 10)

The PRC continues to push the envelope in the diplomatic, military, and information spaces in order to shape the physical and diplomatic environments surrounding reunification in its favor.

In the diplomatic space, the PRC has been making a concerted effort to reduce the number of countries that have full diplomatic relations with Taiwan by either buying them out with aid or trade deals. Additionally, the PRC attempts to coerce smaller countries from building closer ties with Taiwan with sanctions or trade boycotts. The PRC also moves to block Taiwan from obtaining observer status in key international organizations, such as the WTO and the WHA, to further isolate the island and deny it legitimacy.

In terms of narrative crafting, the PRC attempts to conflate official US statements and policies as being in line with its own and uses its own false interpretation of history to degrade Taiwan's status and chip away at its legitimacy. The PRC continues to misrepresent the US's acknowledgement of China's "One China" Principle as accepting it, when the US has always only acknowledged this as the PRC's stance on the issue. Furthermore, the PRC has more recently engaged in a concerted effort to paint its One China Principle as an international norm, which it is not, by claiming the UN resolution which removed the ROC from the UN Security Council and replaced it with the PRC, as proof of this acceptance. Additionally, the PRC condemns and blames precedented visits by US elected and appointed officials to Taiwan for increasing tensions, when the PRC is the sole driver of these increased tensions. Combined, these efforts are aimed at placing the blame for increased cross strait tensions on the US, while attempting to further the PRC position and lessen potential international condemnation or action against the PRC for potential actions against Taiwan.

In the background of PRC generated increased tensions, it has also begun conducting more flights in Taiwan's ADIZ and crossing the median line of the strait. These flights serve several purposes, including demonstrating PLA capabilities to the ROC as a deterrent, familiarizing PLA pilots with the physical and EM environment in the area, and placing stress upon the ROCAF maintenance and logistics systems. These flights and exercises also make it potentially more difficult to differentiate between an exercise and an actual attack, thus reducing reaction times for both the ROC and the US.