In Their Own Words:
Foreign Military Thought

Science of
Military Strategy
(2013)
China Aerospace Studies Institute

CASI's mission is to advance understanding of the capabilities, development, operating concepts, strategy, doctrine, personnel, organization, and limitations of China's aerospace forces, which include: the PLA Air Force (PLAAF); PLA Naval Aviation (PLAN Aviation); PLA Rocket Force (PLARF); PLA Army (PLAA) Aviation; the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), and the civilian and commercial infrastructure that supports the above.

CASI supports the Secretary, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Chief of Space Operations, and other senior Air and Space leaders. CASI provides expert research and analysis supporting decision and policy makers in the Department of Defense and across the U.S. government. CASI can support the full range of units and organizations across the USAF, USSF, and the DoD. CASI accomplishes its mission through conducting the following activities:

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CASI supports the U.S. Defense Department and the China research community writ-large by providing high quality, unclassified research on Chinese aerospace developments in the context of U.S. strategic imperatives in the Asia-Pacific region. Primarily focused on China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces, CASI capitalizes on publicly available native language resources to gain insights as to how the Chinese speak to and among one another on these topics.
Overview

Project Everest is a strategy design start-up inspired by Andrew Marshall’s call to cultivate comprehensive understanding of U.S. competitors in pursuit of national security. Project Everest contributes to this vision in two fundamental ways: by recurrently educating defense professionals on adversaries’ ways of war and by facilitating the development of novel strategies that achieve competitive advantage over these adversaries. Founded in 2013, Project Everest has grown its membership to hundreds, and shaped policy and education campaigns at the national level.

The Problem

Project Everest tackles two significant national security problems for our nation. First, Project Everest seeks to cultivate understanding of an adversary over a career, rather than upon assignment to a given region or staff.

Project Everest seeks to invigorate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs’ 2013 charge to develop an officer cadre with deep regional expertise and to answer the 2018 National Defense Strategy’s charge to “prioritize developing the intellectual firepower of our warfighters and workforce via education and training”. We bring motivated individuals with subject-matter expertise in their primary specialty together to recurrently interrogate key strategic issues throughout their careers. Over time, Project Everest will generate a cadre of high-caliber officers familiar with the near-peers’ ways of war and experienced in thinking through the toughest operational and strategic challenges.

Second, Project Everest seeks to inject creativity into stale strategy development methods for the Department of Defense, inspiring novel approaches to competition and warfighting.

Defense strategy development methods are outdated. Linear, industrial assembly-line approaches to strategy development overlook opportunities to understand how the adversary thinks about and plans for competition and war. Prevalent strategy development techniques fail to unlock the creative potential of functional experts.

Project Everest was founded by six SAASS graduates who range in gender, expertise, rank, status, ethnicity, and personality, but who have a shared vision to inspire change in the way our nation prepares to compete and fight.
In Their Own Words

The “In Their Own Words” series is dedicated to translations of Chinese documents in order to help non-Mandarin speaking audiences access and understand Chinese thinking. CASI would like to thank all of those involved in this effort.

In the “In Their Own Words” series, CASI and its collaborators aim to provide Chinese texts that illustrate thoughtful, clearly articulated, authoritative foreign perspectives on approaches to warfare at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Project Everest Comments

The Science of Military Strategy is part of the Project Everest “Foreign Military Thought” series. This particular volume was published under the auspices of Project Everest in conjunction with the China Aerospace Studies Institute. The text is a capstone document on PRC’s current military strategy, articulated starting in December 2013, having been selected as a highly prioritized (“key-point”) PLA-wide topic of 2011. The text was prepared by China’s Academy of Military Sciences faculty with very high-level review, and this is the third publication of the text after the 1987 and 2001 publications. This document is one of the featured “Military Academic Works of the Academy of Military Sciences.” In a comprehensive way covering many elements, this text documents the codified current PRC strategy for the preparation and conduct of a spectrum of warfare.

The U.S. editors apply a stringent vetting process to select foreign texts. Selected texts will help build a deep understanding of different approaches to warfare and clarify details of foreign perspectives that may have both commonalities and asymmetries to U.S. approaches. This series will stimulate thought on both the core elements of military strategy and operational concepts for force application during war. CASI and Project Everest believe that cultivating a holistic understanding of foreign perspectives by learning from high-quality original material articulated from a foreign perspective offers an invaluable starting point for the exchange of ideas and the development of military thought.

The translation and publication of Science of Campaigns does not constitute approval by any U.S. Government organization of the contents, inferences, findings, or conclusions contained therein. Publication is solely for the exchange of information and stimulation of ideas.
Translators’ Notes

This translation of the original text aims to accurately capture the technical meanings, in both English and Chinese. This will ensure that the reader will not inadvertently draw the wrong substantive understanding based on inaccurate translations.

Note on Trouble Terms:

Throughout the text are certain terms that are translated with the Chinese pinyin modifying the terms. This convention allows the reader to distinguish nuances that exist in the Chinese terms.

Jihua and guihua plans. The jihua plan is a more specific plan, a plan that is meant to be carried out to the letter, whereas the guihua plan is a more general plan that is macroscopically focused. In order to retain the intended Chinese distinction, the jihua plan is rendered as “plan {jihua}” due to its prevalence in this translation. The guihua will be rendered in a more customary fashion of guihua plan.

Bushi and bushu dispositions. Bushi disposition is the mission differentiation, organized grouping, and positioning [deployment] accomplished for strengths within the campaign task-based organization. Bushi denotes the relationship between one’s own military forces, the opponent’s military forces, and the combat environment (e.g., terrain). Bushu disposition is the positioning of participating force-strengths for a fixed time and space on the basis of mission differentiation and the organized grouping of campaign and in accordance with operational conditions and the enemy’s possible activities.

Xitong, tixi, tizhi, and zhidu systems. The system {xitong} is an elemental system, one that can operate on its own. The tixi-system is similar conceptually to a System of Systems as often seen in systems engineering; in Chinese, a tixi-system is understood to be composed of elemental systems {xitong} acting together as a larger whole. The tizhi-system is a large-scale system, typically a national-scale system and understood to be formalized embodiment of a zhidu-system. The zhidu-system describes a conformance system, one where all elements of that system conform to how that system is defined.

Note on Table of Contents:

The double pagination shown in the Table of Contents represents: 1) the original page numbers from Science of Campaigns (2006) followed by 2) the actual page number of this translation. Additionally, the headings throughout the document also reference original page numbers from the original-language text.
The Science of Military Strategy
(2013 Edition)

战略学

{zhanlue xue (2013 nianban)}

Academy of Military Science Military Strategy Studies Department

Translator’s Note: The front cover of the Chinese book shows an English title of The Science of Military Strategy. For consistency purposes in referring to the book by name, this translation adopts the same printed English title on the title page. The actual title of this book in Chinese is zhanlue xue, translating in English to science of strategy. Zhanlue xue, as the term appears in the text other than the title, is thus translated as science of strategy.
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Preface

The *Science of Strategy* is an academic brand that our Academy has persisted in crafting for a long time; regardless of it being the 1987 edition or the 2001 edition, both have produced an extensive academic effect on the military and the nation, domestically and internationally. With the previous versions of *Science of Strategy* as a foundation, the new edition of *Science of Strategy* does not rely on the stylistic content of the previous two editions, and it does not think grandiosely or attend to every detail; it tightly seizes on the major strategic issues of the new phase of the new century that are related to PLA building and application; it carries out the spirit of the Party’s Central Committee and the Central Military Committee’s [CMC] instructions on forcefully pushing forward strategic theory innovation and strengthening military strategic guidance by keeping up with the times; it gives prominence to the main themes of military strategy, especially in local war strategic guidance under informationized conditions, as well as the problem of peacetime military strength application; and it strives to systematically summarize and innovate new military strategic theory so as to even better serve new military practices.

In terms of basic structure design, the entire book attaches attention to reflecting three major distinguishing features: first, it is constituted in accordance with the basic essential factors of ordinary discipline theoretical works, it builds a basic theory of strategy, and it maintains the relative completeness of the theoretical tixi system framework. Secondly, it persists in combining theoretical and practical qualities that allow it to possess a high degree of strategy, depth of theory, and powerfully current focused quality; and in terms of theory, it is able to expound and explain the major issues in the area of PLA military strategic guidance under new circumstances. Thirdly, it gives prominence to the main theme of the era and the academic main thread of military strategic theory innovation development under the new historical conditions.

The book is approximately 240,000 characters, and based on the internal logic of strategic basic theory → strategic circumstance assessment → strategic thought innovation development → strategic operations research-based planning of military strength application {junshi liliang yunyong zhanlue chouhua} → strategic operations research-based planning of military strength building {junshi liliang jianshe zhanlue chouhua}, it is divided into the four-part content of basic theory, circumstance analysis, strength application and strength building. The entire book has 12 chapters: Chapter 1, Strategy; Chapter 2, The Evolution of Strategy; Chapter 3, China’s Strategic Environment and Armed Forces Historical Mission; Chapter 4, Development of Modern War and the Wars China May Face; Chapter 5, Enriching and Developing the Active Defense Strategic Thought; Chapter 6, Strategic Guidance of Local War under Informationized Conditions; Chapter 7, Strategic Guidance of Military Deterrence
Activities; Chapter 8, Strategic Guidance of Non-War Military Activities; Chapter 9, Military Struggle in Nuclear, Space and Cyber Domains; Chapter 10, Service Strategy and Theater Strategy; Chapter 11, Strategic Space and Layout; Chapter 12, Building a Modern Military Strength Tixi System with Chinese Characteristics.

Compared with the Academy’s previous two editions of Science of Strategy, the new edition of Science of Strategy conforms to the developing changes in world, nation and military situations, while adding some new content blocks, for example: the strategic operations research-based planning and guidance of peacetime military strength application; the strategic operations research-based planning and guidance of military struggle in the major domains of nuclear, space, and cyber; service strategy and theater strategy; strategic space and strategic layout; and the operations research-based planning and guidance of military strength tixi system building with Chinese characteristics; etc.

The new edition of Science of Strategy attaches importance to carrying ‘science’ with ‘theory,’ and it diligently conforms to China’s strategic circumstance, the PLA’s historical mission, and the new developments and new requirements of the form-state of war. It centers on building a consolidated national defense and formidable armed forces that corresponds to China’s international position and conforms to national security and development interests (fazhan liyi). It achieves the strategic objective of a strong nation and a strong military, and it tightly seizes on the major issues related to current and future PLA building and application. It conducts forward-looking consideration, study and operations research-based planning, and it strives to become a strategic theoretical work that blends epochal quality, focused quality and innovative quality into one. Its main academic points of innovation and breakthrough follows.

1. On the basis of sorting through the traditional strategic notions, it puts forth that strategy is the operations research-based planning and guidance of the overall situation conducted for armed strength building and application with war as its core; it clarifies problems in 10 areas that strategy needs to resolve in a key point manner with operations research-based planning and guidance of a future war as its orientation; it puts forth that China’s strategic tixi system should be constituted from the three levels, five types of national strategy – military strategy – service strategy, theater strategy, and the major security domains (nuclear, outer space, and cyber spaces) strategy.

2. It systematically sorts through the rich development course of China’s Active Defense Strategic Concept, and it briefly puts forth the basic spirit of several decades of Active Defense strategy while it simultaneously combs through the development and newest trends and characteristics of the military strategy of the U.S., Russia, Japan, India, etc. since World War II.
3. From the two perspectives of political and technological, it expounds on potential developments of the war form-states 10-20 years from now; it briefly puts forth basic characteristics of war under informationized conditions in seven areas; and it conducts a general assessment of war threats China may face at a future time.

4. It focuses on the epochal implications of enriching and developing the active defense strategic thought; from the three areas of carrying out forward edge defense \( qianyan fangwei \), giving prominence to effective control, and persisting in diversified applications, it elaborates on the problem of strengthening PLA strategic guidance under new historical conditions.

5. It systematically elaborates on the problems in performing strategic operations research-based planning and guidance for local war under informationized conditions, military deterrence, non-war military activities, and nuclear, space, and cyber military struggle; it gives prominence to the operations research-based planning of military strength application [end of page 2] in a period of relative peace; and it further expands the scope of the military strategy field of view and the strategic application of military strengths.

6. From the two large basic areas of building and application, it expounds on the basic issues of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Second Artillery strategies, and it puts forth a strategic quality consideration for future building of the services and their application direction. It also conducts an exploration of the main theoretical problems of theater strategy.

7. It puts forth important problems such as the strategic spaces for a moderate outward expansion of military activities relying on one’s own territory; it expands the depth of Active Defense Strategy; it takes aim at the two-fold needs-requirements of taking aim at fighting and winning a future war and safeguarding the expansion of national interests; and it transitions from a territorial defense model strategic layout to a forward edge defense model strategic layout under informationized conditions.

8. It conducts a theoretical inquiry and strategic operations research-based planning for building a modern military strength \( tixi \) system with Chinese characteristics from the high level of the overall situation; it systematically expounds on the strategic orientation, building principles, structure and functional features, and building paths of a military strength \( tixi \) system with Chinese characteristics; and it reflects the major strategic thought of achieving the objective of a strong military.
The new edition of *Science of Strategy* systematically sorts through the strategic studies achievements of recent years and conducts an innovative quality theoretical sublimation. There were some breakthroughs in terms of a series of key point and difficult point problems in its basic theory study of strategy, and there were a deepening degree of thought, extensive degree of field of view, a distinguishable degree of theory, as well as conciseness of style, plainness of writing, and prominence of distinguishing features. The publication of the new edition of *Science of Strategy* will produce the necessary academic benefit and positive role across the PLA: to go deep into carrying out the spirit of the Party’s 18th National Congress; to completely carry out the important instructions of the Party Central Committee, the CMC, and Chairman Xi on Strong Nation and Strong Military; to further deepen strategic studies, to bring into play the leading role of the science of strategy within the military science tixi system; to push forward the development of the basic theory of military strategy; and to strengthen the study of current major strategic issues.

*Science of Strategy* Writing Team  
24 September 2013
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Chapter 1
Strategy...1

Section 1: What Is Strategy?...1

Strategy originated in warfare, and it has developed as warfare has developed. The concept of strategy took shape, was enriched, and developed within a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the guidance of warfare.

The ideas of strategy and related writings were first generated in the concept of strategy. Very early on in history, in regard to the overall planning of wars, there were a great many theoretical writings on warfare that produced a number of excellent ideas on strategy. China’s ideas on strategy have had a very long history. Sunzi’s Art of Warfare, a book on the art of war that was produced in the latter part of the Spring and Autumn Period and that has had a good name throughout the ages, concentrated the epitome of China’s ancient military science, and had such concepts in the area of planning and guiding warfare as “calculations with foresight” \{miaosuan\} and “being victorious [before the fighting].” The word “strategy” was first seen in the book Strategy, written by Sima Biao in the Jin Dynasty at the end of the third century. Overseas, the word “strategy” can be traced back to the ancient Greek “trick” or “generalship \{jiang lyue\}. In the sixth century, the Emperor Maurice of the Eastern Roman Empire wrote a military textbook [called] the Strategicon, which used this concept of “generalship,” primarily to refer to “the skills of a commander-in-chief,” and it was used as “strategizing for operations.” In the long years of ancient society, people had yet to clearly differentiate between political strategy and strategy and between strategy and tactics.

In the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries, as the physical basis for warfare changed and as the scale of military actions expanded, and also as people gained a deeper understanding of warfare, they clearly differentiated between strategy and tactics, and the contents of strategy expanded from the category of combat to the category of the overall situation of warfare; the concept of “strategy” in the modern sense accordingly emerged. In the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, [Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr von] Bülow of Prussia pointed out that “Strategy is the science of military actions that are undertaken beyond what can be seen and beyond artillery.” In the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, [Carl von] Clausewitz of Prussia pointed out that “Strategy is the use of combat in order to achieve the goals of warfare.” [Henri] Jomini of Switzerland pointed out that “Strategy is the art of engaging in warfare on a map, it is the art of studying the entire theater of war.” [end of page 1] This reflected the new level of understanding at that time toward the concept of strategy.
During the period from the First World War to the Second World War, with the widespread use of modern weapons like aircraft, warships, and tanks, the shape of warfare and the forms of operations underwent major changes, and the connotation of strategy also continually grew richer and more developed. The theories of strategy for mechanized warfare tended to become mature, such as the “mechanized warfare” theory of [John Frederick Charles] Fuller of the United Kingdom, the theory of “command of the air” of [Giulio] Douhet of Italy, Germany’s theory of “blitzkrieg warfare,” and the Soviet Union’s theory of “greatly in-depth operations.” Practices in the world wars revealed in a profound manner the law that there has been a further increase in the reliance that weapons and combat have on the nation’s politics, economy, science and technology, and support from the rear area. [Basil Henry] Liddell Hart of the United Kingdom initiated the concept of “grand strategy,” Fuller wrote The Conduct of War, Eric Ludendorff of Germany proposed the theory of “total warfare,” and [Andre] Beaufre of France created the concept of “total strategy;” the guidance and planning of warfare clearly exceeded the purely military sphere, and gave greater stress to the use of the nation’s overall strengths.

After the Second World War, as the practices and activities of warfare and society developed, people’s field of vision in their understanding of warfare further widened, the concept of strategy expanded outwards, and the system of strategy improved. In the early 1950s, the United States’ Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defined military strategy as the art and science of using a nation’s armed forces, by means of using armed force or the threat of armed force, to achieve the various objectives of the nation’s policies. This emphasized that the use of armed force was not merely to achieve the goal of victory in warfare, but rather to ultimately achieve the nation’s strategic objectives. In the Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage, republished by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1972, the definition of “national strategy” was first proposed, which thus clearly differentiated between national strategy and military strategy. The course on strategy at the Russian General Staff’s Military Academy believes that military strategy is “a component part and the supreme sphere of the military art, and it is a complete system of scientific knowledge regarding the nature of modern warfare and the ways to use military means to prevent warfare, regarding the preparations by a nation and its armed forces to resist invasion, and regarding methods and forms for carrying out total warfare and military actions on a strategic scale; it is also the sphere of practical activities by the nation’s leaders and its supreme military leaders for preventing war, for having the nation and its armed forces make thorough preparations for war, and for guiding their resistance to attacks and their smashing of
invaders when carrying out military actions.”\(^1\) Compared to the Soviet Union’s concepts on strategy, this concept has added details about preventing war. In an age of peace and development, [end of page 2] the concept of strategy is also widely borrowed for other spheres, prominently stressing its role in “overall, high-level, and long-term planning and guidance” for these spheres, such as strategies for economic, scientific and technological, and cultural development.

The strategy of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army emerged during the revolutionary wars years. Under the guidance of Mao Zedong’s theory of “people’s warfare,” [the Chinese Communist military] won victory in the Chinese revolutionary wars, laying the foundation for a modern military strategy with Chinese characteristics. In 1936, Mao Zedong used the concepts of “strategy,” “campaign,” and “tactics” in his *Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary Wars*; he explicitly proposed such concepts as a “science of strategy” and the “problems of strategy” and pointed out that the task of the science of strategy is to “study the laws for guiding warfare that are overall in nature.” After New China was established [in 1949], the PRC military’s concept of strategy underwent a process of continual development, and its representative definitions primarily consisted of [the following].

Strategy is the highest division in military academia; it studies methods of leading and engaging in warfare for the entire armed struggle (the 1956 *Standardization of Military Terms*).

Strategy is the planning and guidance of warfare (1972 *Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology, 1985 Course on the Science of Strategy*).

Strategy is the general plan for guiding the overall war situation (1987 Military Science Academy’s *Science of Strategy*).

Strategy is also called military strategy; it is the general plan for planning and guiding the overall war situation (1997 *Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology*).

Strategy is also called military strategy; it is the planning and guidance of the overall situation of military combat (1999 National Defense University’s *Science of Strategy*).

Strategy (that is, military strategy) in China’s new period is the building and use of military strengths, using the nation’s overall power as its basis, using the idea of active defense as its guide, and using the winning of local wars under high-tech conditions as its focal point, and it is the planning and guidance of the overall situation and overall process of preparations for war and waging war in order to uphold the nation’s sovereignty (2001 Military Science Academy’s Science of Strategy).

Strategy is the planning and guidance of warfare and the general plan for the overall building and use of armed strengths (2005 Chinese Military Encyclopedia, second edition, general outline articles and volume on categories).

Military strategy is the planning and guidance of the building and use of armed strengths as well as the general plan for the overall situation of military combat. It is abbreviated as strategy (2007 Chinese Military Encyclopedia, second edition, volume on military strategy).

Strategy is: (1) An abbreviation for military strategy. The guidelines and ploys for planning and guiding the overall war situation. It is divided into offensive strategy and defensive strategy. (2) It generally refers to guidelines and ploys for major issues that are comprehensive in nature, that are high-level, [end of page 3] and that are long-term. Examples are national strategy, national security strategy, and economic development strategy (2011 Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology).

We can see from these definitions that because of developments in the characteristics of the times, in the strategic environment, and in military technology, there have been some differences in differing periods in the focus of the concept of strategy. However, the core connotation of strategy has been relatively stable. Strategy has always been centered on preparations for and carrying out war, in building up and using armed strengths – primarily the military – and in planning and guiding wars and the strategy for the overall national defense building. Since entering the 21st century, there have been new developments in the world’s political multipolarization, in its economic globalization, and in the informationization of society; the new military transition, with information technology as its driver, has advanced in-depth; the state of warfare has quickly evolved from mechanized warfare to informationized warfare; and the relationship between military conflict and conflicts in such sphere as politics, economics, and culture has become increasingly closer. The historic mission that the [Chinese Communist] Party and the people have given the military of “providing three things and bringing one thing into play” requires that the military make thorough preparations for military conflict, centered on strengthening the ability to win local wars under informationized condition, in order to continually enhance the ability to deal with many types of security threats and complete
diverse military tasks, so as to ensure that it is able to deal effectively with crises and maintain the peace under various complicated situations and to restrain war and win wars. This then requires that we expand the connotations of strategy, based on developments in military practices, in order to deal with the characteristics of the age. Based on this, the concept of strategy should be defined as the planning and guidance of the overall situation of armed forces building and use, centered on war. Or in other words, strategy is the guidelines and ploys for planning and guiding the overall situation of the building and use of armed strengths, centered on war.

Although the concept and connotations of strategy have expanded along with developments in the age, its essence has always been “general planning for warfare,” and its core mission has been to study future wars and to plan and guide warfare. The main issues that strategy needs to resolve include: studying the conditions and nature of warfare, and getting a grasp on the characteristics of warfare and the principles of its guidance; judging the strategic situation, and evaluating strategic threats, strategic opponents, and the main targets of operations, and studying the enemy’s forms and methods of operations; clarifying strategic spaces, differentiating strategic directions, and determining the strategic setup; establishing the basic guiding thought for operations and the main forms and methods of operations; clarifying the basic military tasks and principles of use for the various services and theaters of war; clarifying the guiding principles and basic methods for support to the war; clarifying the principles and forms for strategic leadership and command; clarifying the guiding principles and forms of use of military deterrence; clarifying the guiding principles and forms of use for non-war military activities; and clarifying the objectives, key points, ways, and guiding thought and principles for the national defense building and the military as well as preparations for military combat.

We refer to the science of studying strategic issues as the science of strategy. As one of the important topics in military science, the science of strategy is also called the science of military strategy. It is the discipline that studies the overall nature of war, national defense, and the armed forces building [end of page 4] as well as the laws of these. The science of strategy is a concentrated reflection of the system of theories of strategy. The theories of strategy emerged from the practices of strategy, and the science of strategy has developed alongside developments in warfare and in other military practices and activities; similarly, it has been restricted by and influenced by such factors as politics, economics, science and technology, military matters, culture, ethnic groups, and geography. Differing nations and militaries, under differing historical conditions, have had differing systems of theories of the science of strategy.
The structure of theories of the science of strategy can be divided into two major parts, that is, the basic theory of strategy and the applied theory of strategy. The basic theory of strategy is the most basic knowledge of the science of strategy; it is the basis for building the discipline of strategy, its details are relatively stable, and it has a fairly universal meaning for guidance. The applied theory of strategy has fairly obvious characteristics of the age and points for practice; it is a theory regarding preparations for and waging war, regarding the building and use of armed strengths, and regarding the building and developing of national defense at a certain time and space. It is guided by the basic theory of strategy and especially by a given country’s traditional military thought on strategy, and it also affects the development of the basic theory of strategy.

The main tasks in the science of strategy are to reveal the connotations and characteristics of strategy; to know the main factors that affect strategy; to summarize the experiences and lessons of past strategic practices; to get a grasp on the laws of the overall situation of building up and using armed strengths in differing periods, centered on war; and to provide a scientific theoretical basis for planning and guiding strategic practices. Building theories of strategy that correspond to the characteristics of the age is a major topic that must be urgently resolved in the development of the PRC military’s science of strategy.

Section 2: The Structure of Strategy...5

I. Key factors in the structure of strategy...5

In regard to key factors in the structure of strategy, there are a number of types of formulations, resulting from differences in the angles by which they are summarized. Fairly representative viewpoints are that: strategy consists of strategic targets, strategic guidelines, and actual military strength; strategy consists of strategic goals and tasks, strategic guidelines, and strategic means; and strategy consists of strategic goals, strategic guidelines, strategic strengths, strategic principles, and strategic measures. Looking at the characteristics and functions of strategy, the three key factors of strategic objectives, strategic guidance, and strategic means are indispensable for any type of strategy, and they are the basic ingredients that make up strategy.

Strategic objectives are the basic missions that a nation (or bloc) assigns to its armed strengths [end of page 5] in order to achieve a certain political goal, they are the starting point and end point in drafting and carrying out strategy, and they basically determine the direction and focus in the building and use of armed strengths. Strategic objectives should be determined during a certain period, in accordance with the nation’s line, guidelines, and policies, with an eye on the needs of the nation’s security and development interests, and based on the nation’s overall actual strength and especially the levels of its military
capabilities. Once strategic objectives have been determined, they will have clear stipulations and a relative stability, becoming the basic foundation for determining strategic guidance and for building up strategic capabilities.

Strategic guidance is the planning, leadership, and command for the building and use of armed strengths, centered on achieving strategic objectives; it is a basic criterion for strategic actions. The basic details of strategic guidance include clarifying the thought of strategic guidance, establishing principles for strategic guidance, drafting strategic concepts and plans, and guiding the implementation of strategy. Strategic guidance permeates the entire process of strategic actions, it affects the overall war situation, and it determines victory or defeat in war. Strategic guidance must take on the overall situation, pay attention to unifying firmness and flexibility, and, proceeding from the realities of preparing for war and military conflict, fully bring into play the dynamic role of strategic guidance, so that subjective guidance corresponds to objective reality.

Strategic means are the physical strengths for achieving strategic objectives as well as the forms in which [these strengths] are used. The strengths primarily consist of the armed strengths, and include such comprehensive strengths as politics, economics, science and technology, and culture; the form in which they are manifested not only can be actual but also can be potential. The basic forms in which strengths are used include warfare actions, military deterrence actions, and non-war military activities. All strategic objectives can only be achieved through effective strategic means. Scientific strategic planning and guidance must have actual strategic means as their basis; at the same time, they also need to fully take into consideration possible developments in strategic means.

The three factors of strategy together form the basic framework for strategy; strategic objectives primarily resolve the issue of “what to do,” strategic guidance primarily resolves the issue of “how to do it,” and strategic means primarily resolves the issue of “what to use in doing it.”

II. The system of strategies...6

The system of strategies is the organic whole of interrelationships and mutual restrictions, made up of strategy at differing levels, of differing types, and in differing spheres. From the angle of national security, it is possible to divide it up by levels into national strategy, military strategy, and the strategies of services (or theaters of war). As regards the system of military strategies, it is possible to divide this up by types into offensive strategy and defensive strategy; it is also possible to divide it up by spheres into nuclear strategy, [end of page 6] outer space strategy, naval strategy, and strategy for network space, etc.
The basic structures of the systems of strategies of the major countries of the world are largely the same, but the differentiations of their systems each have their own characteristics. The US system of strategies consists of national strategy, national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater of war strategy. The Russian system of strategies includes national security strategy and military doctrine. The British system of strategies includes grand strategy (or high-level strategy) and military strategy. The Japanese system of strategies consists of three levels: national strategy (or national policy), a comprehensive security strategy, and military strategy.

The PRC’s conditions differ somewhat from those of other countries. Prior to the 1980s, there was no clear differentiation among levels of strategy, and the only one that was clearly drafted was the military-strategic concept. Since the 1980s, many concepts have been proposed, one after another, for differentiating the levels and structures of the system of strategy; for example, to divide them into three levels: national strategy, national defense strategy, and military strategy. Currently a relatively unified understanding is that the PRC’s system of strategies can consist of three levels and five types of strategy: national strategy – military strategy – the services’ strategy, the theater of war strategy, and strategies for the major spheres of security (nuclear, outer space, and network space).

National strategy is the planning and guidance of the PRC’s overall security and development situation; it is the first level in the structure of the system of strategies. Although the PRC has not formally issued a national strategy, [such a strategy] is reflected in the general lines, general plans, and general policies drafted by the Chinese Communist Party and the state. Its mission is to comprehensively utilize political, military, economic, scientific and technological, and cultural national strengths, in order to protect national security, ensure national development, and achieve national objectives. The main details in national strategy consist of two parts: the national security strategy and the national development strategy. The basic focus [of national strategy] is on firmly following the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics; holding fast to peaceful development; holding firmly to having both a rich country and a strong military; creating an excellent environment that is beneficial for national security and development; ensuring that the nation’s regime is solid, its society is stable, and its politics are long-lasting and peaceful; and achieving the objectives we are struggling for, of comprehensively building a well-off society and of the magnificent revival of the Chinese people. National strategy is the basis for drafting military strategy.

Military strategy is the second level in the structure of the system of strategies. It is restrained and guided by national strategy, and it obeys and is subservient to national strategy. For a long period of time, the main details of the PRC’s military strategy have
been determined by the military-strategic concept; the core is to prepare and guide preparations for and waging war. Upon entering the new stage in the new age, with the historic expansion of the military’s mission and tasks, military strategy not only has had to focus on completing the core task of winning local wars under informationized conditions, but it has also had to focus on carrying out its other tasks of non-war military activities. Not only has it needed to respond to traditional security threats, but it has also had to respond to other types of non-traditional security threats. Not only has it needed to protect territorial security, but it has also needed to protect the security of the seas, outer space, and network electromagnetic [end of page 7] spaces, energetically supporting the expansion of national interests. [Finally,] not only has it had to solidify the ruling position of the Party and protect the nation’s comprehensive security, but it has also had to make its due contributions to world peace.

The services’ (or theater of war) strategy is planning and guidance for the overall situation of building and using the services’ (or theater of war) strengths; they are the third level in the structure of the system of strategies. The services’ (or theater of war) strategy is an important component part of the system of strategies, subordinate to the military strategy. The services’ strategy of the PRC includes the strategies of the Ground Forces, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery; its primary task is to resolve the major issues in the building and development of the various services and in the use of their strengths, under the unified guidance of the military strategy. Currently, the PRC does not yet have a clearly determined theater of war strategy. In the future, as the situation develops and changes, [the PRC] should determine a theater of war strategy for each strategic direction, in accordance with its military strategy. Under the conditions of informationized warfare, the determination of the services’ strategies and theater of war strategy must be centered around a unified strategic objective, with an eye on the strategic needs of joint operations, taking shape based on the systemic operational capabilities of an information system.

Strategies for the major spheres of security plan and guide the building and use of military strengths in the major spheres that affect national security and victory and defeat in warfare; they not only are important component parts of the system of military strategy, but they also are tightly connected to the overall situation of national security and development, and they thus have dual attributes. Strategies for the major spheres of security at the current stage primarily include nuclear, outer space, and network space strategies. Their main tasks are to resolve major issues in the building and development of nuclear, outer space, and network space and in the use of strengths [for these], under the unified guidance of the military strategy. Limited and reliable nuclear strengths are still the strategic cornerstone for upholding national security; outer space and network space currently are becoming the new strategic high ground in international military
conflicts. Making overall plans for nuclear, outer space, and network space strategies has an inherent meaning in constructing and improving the system of strategy and in promoting the innovation and development of strategy under the new historical conditions. Strategies for the major spheres of security are open, dynamic, and developing strategies; as economic, scientific and technological, and military activities continually expand, they will add new contents.

Section 3: The Characteristics of Strategy...8

1. Its political nature and military nature...8

Strategy is a way to strengthen the military and win wars; even more, it is policy for ruling a country and bringing it peace. The political nature of strategy is determined by the nature that military affairs have of being subordinate to politics. Strategy obeys and is subservient to politics, it meets the needs [end of page 8] of politics, and it completes tasks assigned by politics. The characteristic that strategy has of being subordinate to politics is primarily reflected in three areas. The first is that the nature of strategy is determined by politics. The strategy of any country serves the politics of the ruling class. This characteristic stipulates the justness and unjustness of strategy and it affects the orientation of strategy. The strategy of hegemonistic countries usually is aggressive and expansionist in nature. The second [area] is that the objectives of strategy are assigned by politics. Politics dominates strategy, stipulates the objectives of strategy, and clarifies the tasks of strategy. At any time and under any conditions, strategy cannot exceed the political objectives of a nation, nor can it be separated from politics and exist by itself. Any strategy only exists to better achieve political goals. The dynamic role of strategy lies in the use of armed force or of deterrence related to armed force to achieve political goals, based on developments in a situation or on the postures of the enemy and of ourselves. The third [area] is that the drafting, implementation, and adjustments of strategy are allocated by politics. The political designs of political groups, of nationalities, of classes, and of nations are the foundation for strategy, and strategy cannot deviate from the course designed by politics. In the final analysis, the kind of strategy that is used, whether to fight or not, when and in what form to wage a war, whether to rely on allies’ strengths or to fight battles all on your own, whether to use deterrence or actual warfare, whether to adopt an offensive strategy or a defensive strategy, and when to stop the war, are all ultimately determined by political values. Changes in the political situation will lead to changes in strategy. How good or bad politics is often determines the victory or defeat of strategy.

The military nature of strategy refers to the special military attributes that it has; this is determined by the unique laws in the building and use of military strengths and especially
of the unique laws of warfare. Strategy has the mission and function of systems for guiding the independent completion of the overall situation, and it has a history and laws of its own formation and development. It not only is subordinate to and serves politics, but it also actively affects politics and has a very powerful reactive force to politics. Peacetime strategy plays an active auxiliary and promotional role for politics, while the success or failure of wartime strategy determines victory or defeat in the war, and victory or defeat in war also determines the fate of the nation, of the people, and of political groups. Under certain conditions, politics may have to undergo local adjustments based on the practices of strategy, and in a state of total warfare, strategy may even have to take on the role of politics. This is the reason that in a certain sense, politics needs to create favorable conditions for strategy, it needs to fully mobilize and comprehensively use manpower and materiel resources in order to guarantee that military operations will be carried out, and it needs to be skilled at collecting into one the maximum combined forces of strategy – diplomatic, economic, and spiritual – in order to win a war.

II. Its overarching nature and of being pivotal...9

Strategy is the ultimate decision-making about military issues; its overarching nature is reflected in each aspect, in each part, and in each stage as it proceeds from the vantage point of politics, [end of page 9] as it makes overall plans for and takes into account both warfare and non-war military activities, for national defense and the armed forces building, and for preparations for military combat; and it plays an overall role in comprehensive planning and guidance. Having a grasp on the overarching nature that strategy has involves the following connotations. First, military strategy is an important component part of national strategy, and proceeding from the overall situation of international strategy and the general situation of national development, it must be subservient to and serve the general situation of national development more resolutely, and act under this general situation in a more conscious manner. Second, military strategy guides the national defense building and the armed forces building as well as the overall situation of preparations for military combat; each service and each theater of war must be subservient to and serve the modernized building of national defense and the military in a conscious manner, expand and deepen preparations for military combat, and [meet] the integrated needs for maintaining stability in the overall strategic situation. Third, military strategy keeps an eye on the overall situation of the war, military deterrence, and major non-war military activities; each theater of war, each battlefield, and each combatant strength must coordinate their actions in accordance with unified arrangements. They must appropriately differentiate the stages of strategy, clarify the specific objectives and tasks of each stage, and based on developments and changes in conditions, [they must] make modifications at appropriate times, and push the situation to develop in a direction that helps to achieve strategic goals. Fourth, military strategy must
pay attention to relationships with combat in other spheres; it must be organically combined and closely coordinated with conflict in the political, economic, diplomatic, ideological, and cultural spheres, so as to create conditions for winning the war, maintaining the peace, and achieving the nation’s overall strategic objectives.

The pivotal nature of strategy refers to [the fact that] the focal points and joints in the overall strategic situation have a major and even decisive impact. These focal points and joints are where the crux of strategic command, strategic strengths, and strategic support exists, and they may also be where the weak links of the system of warfare and the system of operations exist, or where the focus of military confrontation between the enemy and us exists. Examples are the important nodes in information network space, the centers of strategic command, the major direction of operations, crucial operational platforms, and thoroughfares for strategic support. Just as Mao Zedong said, once you have a grasp on what is pivotal in strategy, deploy for campaigns, and once you have a grasp on what is pivotal in campaigns, deploy for combat. The core thing in what is referred to as keeping an eye on the overall situation is to identify and get a grasp on what is pivotal, to deploy and use strengths centered on pivotal issues, and to win and seize the initiative in the overall strategic situation through resolving these pivotal issues.

III. Its confrontational nature and nature of controlling things...10

The confrontational nature of strategy refers to [the fact that] the planning and guidance of strategy constantly is focused on major threats and on strategic opponents and major operational targets, and it is centered on combat between the enemy and ourselves, on the games [that the enemy and we play], and on using military strengths and means to win victory. It can be said that strategy reflects in a concentrated manner the military relationships in contradictions between nations and contradictions between classes; the reason is that war is the highest form for resolving contradictions and conflicts [end of page 10] between nations, between peoples, and between political groups. This basically has determined that strategy has a special confrontational nature. The confrontational nature of strategy is primarily displayed in three areas. The first is that it involves an explicit target of confrontation. There is no military strategy where “one size fits all;” any military strategy is proposed with a focus on a specific threat, challenge, and opponent. The second [area] is that it involves the use and guidance of confrontational strengths. Strategic guidance strives to build on strengths and avoid weaknesses, to use its own strengths to attack the enemy’s shortcomings, and to carry out focused attacks and destruction targeting the weaknesses and key points of the enemy’s system. The third [area] is that it has a focused development model for the system of strengths. In building up the structure, quantity, and quality of the armed strengths and especially of the systems of crucial strategic weapons (both unconventional and conventional systems),
not only does it pay attention to mature systems, but it also constantly targets strategic opponents, insisting on doing some things but not everything, and struggling to form an asymmetrical ability to defeat the enemy.

The nature strategy has of controlling things refers to its active exercise of regulations closely centered on military confrontational actions and developments in the combat situation, getting a firm grasp on the strategic initiative, and ensuring that military actions do not deviate from political goals and military objectives that have already been set. The restrictiveness of political goals in local wars, the great precision of informationized means of operations, and the highly consumptive nature and tremendous destructiveness of contemporary warfare have determined that military confrontational actions and especially acts of war are restrictive in nature and must be controlled. As for ourselves, in order to protect this strategic period of opportunity and to ensure that the Party’s and the state’s central work is not seriously interfered with, it is necessary to avoid confrontation purely for the sake of confrontation, and we should take the initiative to control the scale and forms of the means of warfare that are used and to focus on the “soft” use of military strengths and their use other than war, striving to subdue the enemy’s troops by means of small wars and clever wars.

IV. Its realism and foresight...11

The realism of strategy refers to the strategic guidance of military practices that are now being employed at the current time, with a focus on the real threats that the nation faces, and based on the conditions of the strengths, weapons, and equipment that the military has, in order to plan and guide warfare, military deterrence, and non-war military activities; this also is what we commonly refer to as “fighting whatever battle with whatever weapons you have.” The realism of strategy stipulates that in the process of implementing a strategic decision that has already been made, of executing strategic concepts and plans, and of carrying out strategic actions, it is necessary to focus on responding to the threat that is most real and most pressing, and to focus on resolving prominent issues that restrain national defense and the modernized building of the military; deviating from actual national conditions and military conditions in order to aspire to unattainable strategic objectives is impossible.

The foresight of strategy refers to keeping an eye on threats and challenges that could be faced in the future, on plans for dealing with wars that could occur in the future, [end of page 11] and on plans for the long-term development of national defense and the building of the military, based on dealing with actual threats and resolving current issues. An emphasis on the foresight of strategy primarily means predicting the characteristics of the age as well as developments and changes in the international and domestic strategic
environment; predicting developmental trends in the world’s military matters and especially in military science and technology; predicting potential strategic opponents and targets of operations; predicting possible changes in the ratios between the enemy’s and our strengths; predicting the nature, direction, and levels of potential threats; predicting the possible opportunities, forms, direction, scale, process, and outcome of future wars; and revealing the features and laws of future wars, thus providing an objective basis for drafting, adjusting, and implementing strategy, and [being] better at driving the building of national defense and the military, at leading preparations for military conflict, and at strengthening strategic deployments that are done in advance. Strategy manages the overall situation and manages the long term, and the more accurate strategy’s foresight is, the stronger the relevance of strategy’s planning and guidance will be, and the more marked the strategic effects that are produced will be.

V. Its stability and response to change...12

The stability of strategy refers to [the fact that] once strategy has been established, it is necessary to maintain the relative stability of its basic connotations and the continuity of its implementation during a certain period of time. The relative stability of strategy is determined by its nature of being overarching, its nature of being long-term, and its importance; it affects victory or defeat in war, it affects the nation’s survival, and it cannot be lightly changed. Otherwise problems would arise where directions are not clear and objectives are not certain, creating a huge waste of strategic resources and bringing about serious harm to national security and interests. At the same time, the development cycle of military science and technology, the replacement cycle for weapons and equipment, the cycle of evolution in warfare, and the cycle for generating the military’s combat power all objectively require that the drafting and execution of strategy remain stable and continuous within a relatively long period of time. As long as no basic change happens in the overall situation, or as long as no basic change happens in the main contradictions that hold a dominant position in the overall situation, and as long as there is no basic change in the ratio of the two sides’ strengths and in the combat situation, then the main strategic opponent, the main targets of operations, the main strategic direction, and the basic form of operations that have been determined will stay relatively fixed.

The nature that strategy has of response to change refers to [the fact that] while the fundamental connotations of strategy remain relatively stable over a given period of time, it is necessary to have a suitable flexibility and adjustability. War has no permanent situation, just as water has no permanent shape, and military practices and especially war practices are constantly changing and constantly being renewed. Act in obedience to the situation, change because of what the enemy does, and use troops after measuring the situation, are basic military laws. Strategy will change as the situation and the mission
develop, and adjusting, enriching, and improving [strategy] at appropriate times, in a way that seeks truth from facts, and strengthens the practicality and relevance of strategic guidance. [end of page 12]

Section 4: Important Factors that Affect Strategy...13

Strategy is the dynamic driver, under set conditions, of war and other military practical activities. What is referred to as set conditions is a comprehensive reflection of world condition, national conditions, and military conditions during a certain period of time; it includes political, economic, military, scientific and technological, cultural, and natural key factors, as well as the interrelationships among these key factors. A comprehensive, in-depth, and accurate study of the factors that affect the development of strategy is the foundation and premise for the accurate drafting of strategy and for the rational implementation of strategy.

I. The nation’s strategic objectives and the nation’s strategic capabilities...13

A nation’s strategic objectives are the highest manifestations of the nation’s political will and the nation’s interests, and they guide and specify each sphere in the nation’s security and development. The nation’s strategic objectives basically determine the orientation and form in which military strengths are used, they determine the scale of and investment in national defense and armed forces building, and they determine the allocation in time and space of military resources. The starting point and end point of strategy is that it must focus on using military strengths and means to support achieving the nation’s strategic objectives; they must always adhere to observing and handling military issues from a political vantage point, always adhere to planning the building of military strengths under the overall arrangements of the nation’s development strategy, and always adhere to treating protection of national interests as the highest criterion of the military struggle. National interests can be divided into core interests, important interests, and ordinary interests. Core interests are basic interests that affect a nation’s survival and development; any sovereign nation must firmly defend these. In strategy, it is necessary to treat the issue of whether core interests are seriously endangered as the “red line” in deciding on war and peace, but [it is necessary] to leave room to maneuver on issues that are not core interests, doing everything possible to avoid creating unnecessary interference and impacts on achieving the nation’s strategic objectives.

The nation’s strategic capability is a crucial and supportive capability for creating situations, for responding to crises, for restraining wars, and for winning wars, and thus for achieving the nation’s strategic objectives. It originates in overall national strength, and it comes from the mobilization, organization, and transformation of the key factor of
comprehensive national strength, under the overall planning of the state. More directly, strategy is affected by the quantity, quality, and structure of the nation’s strategic capabilities and especially of its military capabilities. The ability of the nation’s decision-making levels to lead and command, the ability of governmental organizations to organize and coordinate, the abilities of the armed strengths in deterrence and actual warfare, and the ability of the economy and society to support a war are capabilities and conditions that strategy should give priority to and focus its considerations on. In drafting and implementing strategy, it is necessary to focus on integrating the use of military [capabilities] with political, [end of page 13] economic, scientific and technological, and cultural capabilities in the nation’s strategic capabilities; it is necessary to focus on overall planning in both the use of current capabilities and the development of long-term capabilities; and it is necessary to focus on enhancing efficiency in the transformation of potential capabilities into actual capabilities.

In drafting military strategy, it is necessary to focus on providing powerful support for the nation’s economic construction and for strengthening the nation’s strategic capabilities; it is also necessary to take into consideration the support that enhancement of economic development and especially of the nation’s strategic capabilities will have for the development of military strengths. Determining the objectives of military strategy and the standards for building up the armed strengths, within the scope of what the nation’s strategic capabilities can bear, allows military means to bring into play the role that they should have in the general situation of protecting the nation’s development, and to ensure that the nation’s strategic objectives are smoothly achieved.

II. The international strategic setup and the nation’s development potential...14

Since the formation of civilized nations and the international system in premodern times, the influence that the international strategic setup and nations’ development potential have on each nation’s military strategy has grown increasingly stronger. Today’s world has entered a period of political multipolarization, economic globalization, and social informationization, and relationships among nations are tending to become closer and their games are also tending to become more complex.

The international strategic setup is a power structure formed by interactions among the world’s various strategic strengths; there are three types – unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar – and differing forms mold differing models of strategy. Two basic types of strengths – peace and war – exist in and are bred by the international strategic setup; the issue of whether the development of strengths for peace is greater than the development of strengths for war, or whether the development of strengths for war is greater than the development of strengths for peace basically determines the characteristics of the age,
and thus affects the starting point and orientation of strategy. In the mid-1980s, based on his correct grasp of the international strategic setup, Deng Xiaoping judged that no world war would be fought, and at an appropriate time, he modified the foothold military strategy had from fighting an early war, a major war, and a nuclear war in dealing with an enemy to a path where [the PRC] was focused on preparing to deal with a local war, and he made the decision to cut a million troops. Because the major nations’ strengths are continually shifting in the international strategic setup, they undergo major and even basic changes. These changes inevitably create contradictions in the international community as well as concentrated outbreaks of conflict; opportunities and risks coexist for any nation, and each nation must make corresponding adjustments to its strategy, in order to protect and use opportunities and to avoid and lower risks.

The nation’s development potential is changes in a nation’s status within the international system that fluctuations in its overall national power, and especially in its strategic capabilities, lead to, as well as the corresponding situations that these changes create. Differing development potentials determine differing strategic pursuits. For example, before the United States developed from a North American regional power [end of page 14] into a world power, it only had a homeland strategy, a Caribbean strategy, and a Pacific strategy, for a fairly long period of time; its true global strategy took shape during the period of the Second World War. Changes in a nation’s development potential inevitably bring about changes in hostile and friendly relations within the international community, and will bring about changes in the quality and intensity of the international pressure that that nation bears. Looking at history since premodern times, it is easy for a nation’s rapid rise to become the focal point of international contradictions and struggles; it is easy for it to suffer restraints from hegemons, pressure from other powers, and suspicions from neighboring countries; and military pressure subsequently continually increases. These are important factors that a nation in the crucial stage of its rise must take into consideration as it drafts and implements military strategy.

The international strategic setup and a nation’s development potential are inseparable. Major adjustments to the international strategic setup inevitably will involve realignments in the power status of differing countries within the international system, while major changes to the development potential of a country and especially of a power often result in a profound impact on trends in the international strategic setup. The people who plan and guide strategy not only need to have a grasp of their nation’s development potential within the dynamic development of the international strategic setup, but they also need to examine the impact that changes in the international strategic setup will have upon themselves, based on their country’s development potential; this impact is not only political and economic, but it also inevitably is military.
III. International geopolitics and a nation’s geographical environment…\textbf{15}

With the development of political multipolarization, economic globalization, and social informationization, and with the development of means and forms for long-range operations in the sphere of warfare, the direct impact that international geopolitics and a nation’s geographical environment have on military affairs has relatively declined, but they are still basic conditions for drafting and implementing military strategy.

International geopolitics is the political situation that takes shape as nations use their geographical relations to seek and uphold national interests; they can be differentiated into three basic types: sea, land, and a composite of land and sea. Each type of country will have corresponding characteristics appear in its military strategy. Since premodern times, the international geopolitical struggle has for a long time been manifested as a struggle between sea power and land power, and the nature of the struggle has been to fight over strategic key points, strategic resources, and strategic thoroughfares. The hot points of the struggle have been situated in Northeast Asia-Southeast Asia-South Asia-the Middle East, on the outskirts surrounding the Eurasian continent, and in the North Africa-Balkan Peninsula, the zone where the land and the sea interconnect. The large-scale local wars since the end of the Second World War have mostly occurred in this zone, and the sixteen important straits that the United States proposes it needs to control [end of page \textbf{15}] are mostly also located in this zone. In the future, this will still be an important stage of international geopolitical contention. At the same time, new geopolitical struggles for control over such global public spaces as the seas, the polar regions, outer space, and the network will tend to become intense, and this will inevitably tend to result in a major and profound impact on the great powers’ military strategies.

A nation’s geographical environment includes its geographical location, the extent of its territory, its topography, its natural resources, and its climate conditions; these have an extremely stable role in restricting the building and use of a nation’s military strengths. In drafting its military strategy, any nation must take into full consideration the factor of that nation’s geographical environment, doing everything possible to adapt to local conditions, fully utilizing favorable conditions in the geographical environment, and striving to overcome unfavorable effects in the geographical environment, in order to more effectively construct a system of battlefields, deploy military strengths, and allocate military resources, thus better achieving the goal in warfare of “preserving yourself and destroying the enemy.” What must be pointed out is that the favorable and unfavorable effects that a nation’s geographical environment has on military affairs are relative and changeable, and that they are closely related to the strength and weakness of national power and military and to strategic orientation. For example, the PRC faces a geographical feature where there is a curved prominence into the western Pacific Ocean...
and northern Indian Ocean; in the past, under conditions where national power and military power were relatively weak and where the emphasis was on defending against invasion by foreign enemies, this increased the difficulty of strategic defense, but under today’s conditions where national strength and military strength are continually growing and where there is a stress strategically on the need to provide effective support for national interests that are “going out to the outside,” this provides a number of directions and thoroughfares that can be selected from.

International geopolitics are dynamically developing, while the nation’s geographical environment is basically stable. Changes in international geopolitics can bring about a rise or fall in the weight of the strategic value of certain key factors in a nation’s geographical environment. How to rely on and use the nation’s geographical environment and how to struggle for the initiative in complex and intense international geopolitical games, are not only the task of national strategy but they also have inherent meaning for topics in military strategy.

IV. The development of science and technology and changes in the state of warfare...16

Science and technology are important strengths that drive the development of human society, as well as important changes that drive the military sphere to generate revolutionary changes. As soon as progress in science and technology is widely applied to military goals, this inevitably will give rise to changes in the forms of operations and the organization and structure of the military and even to a transformation, and it will also inevitably lead to profound modifications of military strategy. Using scientific and technological advances to seek optimization of military capabilities, and to thus overwhelm and defeat opponents, is an axis of the world military contest and competition. Upon entering the Information Age, advanced and new technology with information technology at its core has presented a tendency to speed up development, and the speed at which it has been combined with military affairs has accelerated more and more, at ever more profound depths; the struggle between advanced nations and the countries [end of page 16] that are pursuing after them, where the “generation gap” in military technology expands and contracts, has tended to become more intense. This objectively requires that military strategy pay more attention to the newest trends in scientific and technological development, that it rely more on scientific and technological progress to transform the model by which combat capabilities are generated, and that it adapt more actively to forms of operations that science and technology develop and innovate and to reforms in the state of the military’s organization. At the same time, it is also necessary to prevent “blind faith in science and technology” and “the theory of the unique importance of weapons,” and [to avoid] exaggerating the impact that the key
factor of science and technology has on military strategy and to regard this impact as absolute. The prospects for warfare that scientific and technological progress presents and the actual developments of warfare cannot be completely the same, and technological superiority is not equal to victory in warfare; the “fog of war” and the “obstacles of warfare” still exist, and asymmetrical warfare and using what is inferior to defeat what is superior still are important starting points by which the side that is weak plans and guides strategy.

As differentiated by the standards of military technology, the forms of warfare in human society have undergone four basic stages of development up until now: swords and spears, firearms, mechanization, and informationization. Military strategy has clear characteristics of its age, and it is necessary to have a grasp on the basic features of the dominant state of warfare in the age when it occurs, and to abide by the objective realities of warfare and the laws for guiding warfare within that state. Major changes in the state of warfare are not transformed by the will of man, but instead there is a strong need to innovate and develop military strategy; those who abide by this are victorious, whereas those who go against it are defeated. On the eve of the Second World War, Germany’s strategic reaction to its knowledge of mechanized warfare differed from that of the United Kingdom and France, and this to a very great extent determined their differing fates in the early period of the war. After the Gulf War broke out, the [Chinese Communist] Party and the Central Military Commission foresaw that the state of warfare would undergo major changes, and they adjusted in a timely manner their military-strategic concept of active defense, adding the connotation of winning local high-tech wars; after entering the 21st century, they also clearly focused the key points of preparations for military combat on winning local wars under informationized conditions. This was a strategic choice that had decisive significance.

Developments in science and technology open paths forward for changes in the state of warfare. Scientific and technological progress promotes changes in the forms of operations and the state of the military’s organization, going from quantitative to qualitative, and it ultimately triggers epochal changes in the state of warfare. For a period of time in the future, the state of informationized warfare will become increasingly mature and, as regards military strategy, it will need to organically combine innovations in science and technology, innovations in combat methods, and innovations in the military’s organizational system, as it strives to find the path to victory in future wars.

V. Security threats and military capabilities...17

Military strategy in the traditional sense is determined based on security threats. The points that it focuses on are who now or in the future will pose a threat, where is the
location of the threat, what is the nature of the threat, what form [end of page 17] does the threat take, and how strong is the threat. By having a grasp on these situations, it is possible, strategically, to carry out relevant and focused planning and preparations. In an age of political multipolarization, of economic globalization, and of social informationization, security threats are still the most direct basis for drafting military strategy; what differs is that the sources, nature, and forms of security threats are more complex and variable. At the same time that military strategy pays attention to threats of war, it also has to pay attention to threats other than war; at the same time that it pays attention to traditional security threats, it also has to pay attention to non-traditional security threats; at the same time that it pays attention to land, sea, and air threats, it also has to pay attention to outer space and network space threats; and at the same time that it pays attention to actual threats, it also has to pay attention to potential threats. That is to say, the diversity of security threats requires that military strategy has stronger flexibility and adaptability, and that on the basis of stressing planning for and guidance of warfare, it also needs to incorporate into the category of preparations for military conflict an effective response to a number of other threats that affect the nation’s security and development.

If we say that security threats are an external impetus for drafting military strategy, then military capabilities are the internal foundation for drafting military strategy. The effects of military capabilities on military strategy are divided into two levels: one is that strategic intentions and strategic concepts are drafted based on existing military capabilities, that is, you use whatever capabilities you currently have to fight whatever kind of fight, while the other is that you determine what kind of military capabilities you need with a focus on future possible wars, that is, what abilities you will develop in order to fight what kind of fight over the long term. What is called being based on military capabilities refers to, given that the uncertainties of security threats are rising, [the need to] switch the focus primarily to a building where you yourself dominate, [to a building] where ensuring development dominates, and [to a building] that is based on long-term military capabilities, using the expansion of future military capabilities to strengthen the resilience of military strategy.

In regard to the foundation for drafting and implementing military strategy, the focus of the influence that security threats have on military strategy differs from [the focus] that military capabilities have, and the two have a relationship of dialectical unity. Military strategy requires that overall planning pay equal attention to factors involving the aspects of both threat and capabilities, that near-term and long-term points of convergence be found between the two, and that an optimal match be achieved between responding to actual threats and developing long-term capabilities.
VI. Strategic culture and strategic thought...18

Culture is the sum total of a country’s or people’s spiritual wealth and physical wealth that has taken shape under long-term natural, social, and economic effects. Strategic culture, on the other hand, is strategic thought and strategic theory that takes shape on the basis of a country’s or people’s historical culture and traditions. Strategy is subordinate to and serves politics, and at the same time it is also deeply branded by the country’s or people’s historical and cultural traditions, independent of people’s will. Speaking in a certain sense, culture is internal, while strategy is its manifestation, and culture is the seed, while strategy [end of page 18] is the plant. The characteristics of strategic culture and in particular the characteristics of its core values, have a profound but stable effect on the strategic practices of a country or a people. The Chinese people have lasted for more than 5,000 years, and the soul of their strategic culture is manifested in a concentrated manner as a search for peace, a search for unity, and a focus on defense. The search for peace is expressed as valuing peace and valuing unity, embracing love and opposing attacks, being cautious about war and restraining the military; it uses armed force as a last resort, and the use of armed force must be somewhat restrained, trying to use relatively low wounds in warfare in order to maintain peace and restore peace. In the search for unity, ever since the Qin and Han Dynasties, successive dynasties have treated unification of the empire and joining the empire together as their highest and most sacred political ideal, and in the process of carrying out their unification strategy they have insisted on using both military and civilian means, on using both hard and soft [techniques], and on combining suppression and nurturing; they have stressed winning hearts more than winning land. An emphasis on defense means not using war to force the empire [to obey you], adhering to a position of self-defense, and that if people do not attack us, we will not attack them. The inherent characteristics of this kind of strategic cultural tradition is merged with the political attributes of contemporary socialism with Chinese attributes, forming the national strategic choice to follow a road of peaceful development, and to resolutely uphold and promote the search for a strategy of complete unification of the fatherland, as well as the military strategic thought of active defense that has clear connotations of the age.

Strategic thought is epistemological and methodological thought about the overall situation, while the essence of military strategic thought is the objective process of studying the use of military matters, from the angle of planning and guiding war, and uncovering what things are inevitable, what have cause and effect, and what have patterns.2 Strategic decisions at all times and in all places, in addition to being based on

objective conditions, also are determined by the levels of strategic thought of decision-makers. The essence of strategic thought is the need to use a certain epidemiology and methodology, to uncover the laws of war and the guiding patterns of wars from out of numerous and unorganized [situations] and also from out of war movements that involve intense confrontations and innumerable changes in the twinkling of an eye, and then to use these to plan and guide the practices of war. Differing strategic cultures engender differing strategic thought. For example, since premodern times, the West, with its hegemonistic culture whose self-centered main axis has been conflict, violence, and power politics, has given birth to expansionistic strategic thought, and it is accustomed to using armed force as a support and means to export “democracy” and carry out economic plundering. China’s traditional strategic culture has simple but also deep philosophical genes, and regardless of whether it is the Confucian school, the Taoist school, the Legalist school, or the Military school, these all provided philosophical epidemiology and methodology for planning and guiding wars, from differing angles. In particular, Sunzi’s Art of War can be said to be a classic on the philosophy of war; the radiance of dialectical thought radiates in its thirteen chapters. Mao Zedong, as the synthesizer of China’s ancient military science and Marxist military theory, towers before us as a peak of modern strategic thought. For example, he stressed being rational, being advantageous, and being restrained; he emphasized fighting if you can win and [end of page 19] leaving if you cannot win; he stressed carrying out attacks at the campaign and combat [levels] as [part of] defense at the strategic [level], rapid fighting at the campaign and combat [levels] as part of endurance at the strategic [level], and operations along the outer lines at the campaign and combat [levels] as part of operations along inner lines at the strategic [level]. The speculative strategic thought contained in this is still the quintessence of strategic planning and guidance, even up until now.

Strategy is the crystallization of history and culture; even more, it is the product of developments of the age. Strategy has the clear cultural characteristics of a given country and a given people; at the same time, it also must absorb nutrients from the world’s diversified culture. Contemporary China is changing from being big to being strong, and it is becoming a rising strategic strength whose global influence is continually expanding. This requires that at the same time [China] is carrying on with the outstanding strategic cultural traditions of the Chinese people, it is widening its field of sight, keeping the world in mind, learning from the strong points of the strategic cultures of various countries, and becoming familiar with the impact and restrictions that the international legal system has on the use of military strengths, thus molding new models of strategic thought that are suited to the country’s rise.
Section 5: The Drafting of Strategy...20

As the supreme manifestation of military science and military skills, strategy originates in military practices and guides military practices. As a special form of movement in human society, military practices, with strategy at their core, are a dialectical unity of certainties and uncertainties and of inevitabilities and probabilities, and they require getting a grasp on special military laws, with a basis on abiding by general military laws. The objective existence of features and laws in the sphere of military practices has determined that the drafting of military strategy will have certain thought, processes, and methods in common.

I. The orientation of thought in drafting military strategy...20

Forward thinking. Forward thinking is an important source for initiative in planning and guiding strategy. Sunzi said, “The reason people can strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.” Mao Zedong’s ability to guide the People’s Army to follow a smooth path to victory at many crucial stages of the Chinese revolutionary wars, benefited from his strategic thought, which was very much forward in nature, and it benefited from strategic foresight that was basically suited to development in the situation. His predictions about the stages of development in the War to Resist Japan and the War of Liberation, and his strategic planning and guidance for every stage, were all glorious models for this aspect. However, in military practices, it is easy for many people to conform, to disregard changing circumstances, and to be accustomed to borrowing the experiences that had been victorious in previous wars, as [these people] guide future [end of page 20] military struggles; the result leads to failure or defeat. The most important thing in military strategic thought is to base yourself on actual problems; to aim at future needs; to link yesterday, today, and tomorrow together as a temporal framework for strategic study; to be based on the context of historical and actual developments; and to get a grasp on the contradictory movements that hold a dominant position in military practices, so as to reveal the possible trends, stages, and characteristics in future military conflicts and military building in an accurate or largely accurate manner. In particular, it is necessary to be able to depict in general the basic outline of the future state of warfare and major forms of operations, and to draft in a relevant manner strategic concepts for restraining future wars and for winning future wars. This is the living soul of military strategy.

3 Sunzi’s Art of War, “Chapter on the Use of Spies.”
Holistic thinking. War is a violent confrontation in which the two combatants use almost all the key factors of their strengths. The systemic nature and comprehensive nature of war have basically determined the holistic orientation of military strategic thought. Mao Zedong emphasized that the person guiding a war must pay attention to looking after the overall situation of the war. The characteristic of confrontation between systems in warfare under modern conditions is even more pronounced, and the relationship between military affairs and political, economic, scientific and technological, and cultural aspects in conflict is even closer in the area of national security, so the holistic nature of military strategic thought is becoming more and more prominent. This requires that we must base ourselves on observations and considerations about the overall situation of national strategy and the overall situation of military strategy; that we adopt a process of thinking that is top-down, that proceeds from what is major to what is minor, that first combines things and then divides them, and that draws close from far away; that we make overall plans that take into consideration the relationship between each part of both military building and military conflict and the relationship among differing stages; and that we fully take into consideration the roles and effects that each part and each stage have on the overall situation. For example, now and for a period of time in the future, the PRC military needs to make overall plans for a military transformation that has Chinese characteristics and preparations for a military struggle, to make overall plans for mechanized building and informationized building, to make overall plans for the building of the various services’ and services arms’ operational strengths, to make overall plans for the current building and long-term development, and to make overall plans for construction of the main strategic direction and the construction of other strategic directions. That is, we must keep our eye on achieving the overall objectives of winning an informationized war and building an informationized military, and to doing a thorough job of overall plans for the building and use of military strengths in the two dimensions of time and space.

Active thinking. Seizing the initiative and [seizing] superiority in interactions between the enemy and us are crucial to planning and guiding military strategy. Sunzi said, “The clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him,”4 while Mao Zedong proposed that “You fight your way, and we will fight our way.”5 These both stressed seizing the initiative in the complex and variable military struggle [end of page 21] and treating active thinking as the highest level in strategic thought. Active thinking not only needs to be skilled at making changes because

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4 Sunzi’s Art of War, “Chapter on Weak Points and Strong Points.”
of the enemy and making moves because of the situation, but it also needs to guard against passive thinking that “reacts to stimulation;” in the orientation of strategic thought, it is necessary to rely upon yourself and have others seek after you, to outmaneuver your opponent rather than be outmaneuvered by your opponent, and to create situations rather than being fettered by the situation. In wartime, the enemy brings into play his advantages and you bring into play your advantages; you select times, places, and forms that are advantageous to you in order to combat the enemy, rather than clash with the enemy at a time and place that is restricted by the enemy. In peacetime, you modernize yourself while the enemy modernizes himself, and you develop a system of military strengths that has your own characteristics, in accordance with your own rhythm, rather than engaging in a reciprocal arms race with your opponent and especially with a powerful enemy; and you strive to target the enemy’s weak points and develop your own strong points, thus ensuring your ability to defeat the enemy at crucial times, so as to seize and keep the initiative.

Thought that considers hardships. Military strengths are the last support of national security, and war is the supreme but also final means for resolving contradictions between countries and between political groups, so the planning and guidance of military strategy must have thought that takes precautions. People of old said that man is born in hardship but dies in peace, “if abroad there are no hostile states or other external calamities, the kingdom will generally come to ruin.” In 1950, when Mao Zedong was planning to send troops to resist the United States and aid North Korea, he came up with a great many estimates about the possible consequences, and believed that “the most inopportune situation would be for the Chinese military to be unable to destroy large numbers of US soldiers in Korea, and for the two militaries to reach a stalemate, and for the United States to also openly enter into an state of war with China, so that the plans for economic construction that China had started at that time would be hurt,” and he made full preparations and careful arrangements concerning this. A basic principle in guiding military strategy is to try to do the best you can based on the most difficult and most complex situation [you might face]. Regardless of whether it is war or it is military deterrence or it is major non-war military activities, the starting points for thinking about and making plans cannot only be conditions that are favorable to you, but rather must “carefully estimate each type of difficulty that could be encountered and that inevitably will be encountered, and to be prepared to use enthusiasm, courage, meticulousness, and

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6 *The Mencius*, “Gaozi, Chapter 2.”
hard work to overcome these difficulties.”8 Only in this way, by preparing for disadvantages and struggling for optimal results, is it possible to take precautions and to put yourself in an unbeatable position, [end of page 22] and only thus is it possible to first [ensure] you have victory and only then fight.

II. The basic process in drafting military strategy...23

A good military strategy is not a subjective assumption by people, but rather, it is generated through a comprehensive understanding and grasp of various aspects of war and other major military actions; it is generated through the objective process of “observation – judgment – decision-making – action.” No matter how complex and diverse military missions and actions are, and no matter how the war situation and combat methods develop and change, the basic links and procedures in this process will not change; what changes is primarily the cycle in the process. That is to say, the basic process for drafting strategy is relatively stable.

Strategic judgments. As the primary link in drafting military strategy, strategic judgment analyzes the strategic situation from the overall situation, it clarifies strategy needs, and it provides a basic foundation for strategic decision-making. Strategic judgment primarily includes the characteristics and topics of the age, evolutionary trends in the international strategic setup, trends in world military development, the war situation and features, the needs of national interests, the national security environment, real and potential war threats, battlefield spaces and battlefield conditions, and the ratio of the enemy’s and our strengths. The basic requirements for strategic judgment are, under specific strategic situations, to “know the enemy and know yourself” and “to be familiar with both the enemy’s and your situation in each aspect, and to find patterns in his actions.”9 This requires the use of all possible and necessary means of reconnaissance in order to get a grasp on the enemy situation, and to connect together various situations in order to get thought that discards the dross and keep the essential, that gets rid of what is false and keep what is true, that goes from here to there, and that goes from what is on the outside to what is on the inside, and then afterwards to include your own side’s situation, studying the ratio between the enemy and yourself and their interrelationships, thus making a judgment and reaching conclusions. Because environmental conditions are constantly changing and because of the dynamic games of both the enemy and yourself, it is impossible to pray to have subjective judgment completely correspond to objective

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realities; rather, it is necessary to have a grasp on the main contradictions and the aspects of these contradictions, to stress key points and crucial links, and to have a grasp on changes in major [conditions] and especially in [conditions] that play a supporting role, so that the judgments that are made largely correspond to objective conditions. In particular, the parts that have decisive significance must correspond to conditions, thus laying a foundation for seizing victory in military actions.

Strategic decision-making. Strategic decision-making is a central link in drafting military strategy; decisions are primarily made for overarching issues that are centered on war, on military deterrence, on non-war military activities, and [end of page 23] on the building of military strengths. Its core is that it resolves strategically such issues as why we would act, against whom we would act, where we would act, how we would act, and what strengths we would use to act. The first thing to do is to clarify the strategic objectives. The national strategy’s tasks are transformed and manifested as the historic mission of the military, based on changes in national interests and in accordance with the overall requirements of national security and development, and this determines the goals that war and other major military actions need to achieve. The second thing to do is to draft a strategic concept. This usually includes determining the main strategic opponent, the main target of operations, the main strategic direction, the basic points for preparing for a military conflict, the basic strategic guiding thought for strategy, and the basic forms of operations and main combat methods, as well as the principles guiding the use of military strengths for things other than war. The main contents of a strategic concept are relatively stable, but they must be modified and amplified at suitable times based on major changes in the strategic situation, the strategic objectives and tasks, and the war situation, giving [the concept] new details so that it always maintains very strong relevance and practicality. The third thing to do is to make plans for the strategic layout and the building of the military strengths. Based on the strategic concept, consider the strategic needs of both wartime and peacetime; determine the task organization, allocation, and tasks of the various strategic areas, the various services and service arms, and the strategic reserves; determine the spatial differentiations, allocation of strengths, and battlefield systems of deployment, in the strategic front lines and the strategic depths; determine the basic framework and main functions of national defense mobilization systems, national defense scientific and technological industrial systems, and national defense infrastructure systems; and determine the system of objectives in the building of military strengths, the paths for achieving these [objectives], the stages and steps [involved], and the means for supporting them.

Strategic planning. Strategic planning is an intermediary link for transforming strategic decisions into strategic action; its essence is that it focuses on implementing the strategic objectives that have been set and the macroscopic concepts, top-level designs, and overall
arrangements that have been done in advance; and its basic function is to select strategic paths and allocate strategic resources based on the strategic objectives; to form strategic concepts for future warfare; and to lead the military’s modernized building and the process of preparing for military combat. As the military’s building and the trends toward informationization, systemization, and heavy investments become increasingly obvious, the status and role of strategic planning have been greatly enhanced, and the target of planning has been transformed from a focus on planning for war-readiness to overall planning for the overall situation of the building and development of military strengths. The types of planning have been transformed from the design of individual items to a combination of overall planning with planning for single items, with an emphasis on overall planning. The orientation of planning’s time-effectiveness has been transformed from an emphasis on the near term to a focus on getting a grasp on long-range directions and on having this drive mid-term and short-term development. [Finally,] the form of planning has been transformed from schematic designs that are primarily qualitative to meticulous designs that combine man and machine. To a very great extent, strategic plans determine the direction and amount in which military resources are invested, and they determine the benefits of the building and use of military strengths; it is necessary to have an authoritative and scientific organic unity, and drafting should be done under the guidance of strategic decision-making departments. It should comprehensively integrate the ideas of the various departments for executing strategy, and be carried out in accordance with the basic process of “information collection [end of page 20] – program design – information feedback – program revision;” moreover, it should be adjusted at a proper time in the process of planning and implementation, thus ensuring that plans accord with the dynamic development of strategic requirements. The leading [issue] in strategic planning is strategic concepts about future wars, including strategic concepts about war that is overall in nature, but it also includes strategic concepts about war that focus on differing strategic directions and differing targets of operations. Only through precise determination of strategic concepts about future wars is it possible to realistically drive the drafting of overall strategic plans for the building and use of military strengths.

Strategic assessment. Strategic assessment is an important basic link in drafting demonstrations and in testing and revising military strategy. Its basic function is to comprehensively inspect strategic judgments, strategic decision-making, strategic plans, and strategic actions within a given system of strategic values and assessments. It compares the good and the bad and the high and the low, it balances the pros and the cons and the gains and the losses, and it thus provides a basis for reference in drafting or revising strategy. What is referred to as “numerous calculations lead to victory, while few calculations lead to defeat” is manifested in a concentrated manner today in strategic assessment. Strategic assessment permeates every link in the drafting and execution of strategy; evaluation and assessment are primarily done in four areas: strategic
requirements, strategic capabilities, strategic effects, and strategic risks. Not only is it necessary to carry out specific analysis separately about needs, capabilities, effects, and risks, but even more, it is necessary to treat these as an interrelated organic whole in which they restrain one another, in order to carry out systemic considerations. Their gist lies in [the fact that] requirements and capabilities match each other, effects and risks balance each other, and feasibility and reliability are consistent with each other, and on the basis of a full comparison, they provide strategic choices that are as rational as possible and as beneficial as possible. As information technology rapidly develops, strategic assessment is being broadly infused into such methods as computer simulation and integrated discussions on man-machine integration, and the prospects of quantitative assessment, dynamic assessment, and gaming assessment \{boyi pinggu\} are increasingly broadening, and are providing important conditions for strengthening the precision and timely effectiveness of strategic assessment.

Getting a grasp on the basic process for drafting military strategy, from strategic judgment to making decision, drafting plans, and carrying out assessment, must be flexibly done based on the conditions of objective reality.

### III. The basic requirements and methods for drafting military strategy...25

Basically speaking, military strategy is the way for a powerful military to win wars. Winning wars is the basic starting point in military strategy. Studying war, studying your opponent, and studying what actions may be like in the future are basic requirements and methods for drafting military strategy.

Learning war from war. Mao Zedong pointed out, “Learning war from war – this is \[end of page 25\] our main method.”\(^{10}\) As long as war does not withdraw from the stage of history, as long as the core function of military strategy, “the strategy of war” \{zhan zhi fanglyue\}, does not change, then learning war from war will be the basic requirement and method for drafting military strategy. In regard to the study of strategy and to decision-makers, under conditions where there has been peace for an extended period of time, they first must be skilled at studying war from history. “All military laws that are principled in nature, or military theory, are a summation of past war experiences that people in the past or in the present have made. We should study in a focused manner the bloody lessons that wars of the past have left for us.”\(^{11}\) [Decision-makers] should be based on the present and


have an eye on the future, and look upon the wars of the past using the vision of development, learning those things that still have benefits, while avoiding errors that might be repeated and discarding experiences that are outdated. In particular, they cannot revel in the glories of [the PRC’s] own victories in past wars; they must see that the victories of the past may be the seeds of future defeats. Second, [decision-makers] must learn from contemporary wars of other countries. Opportunities for direct war practices are rather rare under peaceful conditions, so in a certain sense, it is more necessary to pay attention to indirect war practices, to treat wars that other countries wage in the present age as references for [decision-makers] in drafting their own military strategy, and from these to get a grasp on the state of war, the forms of operations, the basic features of methods of operations, and developmental trends, in order to find and summarize the dominant contemporary laws of war and laws for guiding warfare, and to then add their own national conditions and military conditions, so as to plan in a focused manner the wars that they could face and to guide the military’s modernized building. The basic motivation in the military strategic-concept for the new era that the PRC military drafted in 1993 was to predict the advent of an age of high-tech wars, from [having seen] the Gulf War.

Learn from the enemy in order to contain the enemy. Military strategy is planning and management that is specific and focused; drafting military strategy is not aimless and marginal discussions about warfare on paper. Confrontation between the enemy and ourselves, where we struggle for superiority in peacetime and seek victory in wartime, has determined that the drafting of military strategy must target real and potential opponents, using a studious attitude to conscientiously ponder their military theory, military system, military capabilities, and characteristics of operations. Learning from and studying the opponent is not learning for the sake of learning or studying for the sake of study, but rather has the goal of overcoming the opponent, “being familiar with each aspect of the enemy and ourselves,” and striving to search for laws and methods for defeating the adversary. On the one hand, it is necessary to study the opponent’s strong points, to learn from and absorb these in peacetime, and “to beat him [end of page 26] at his own game” in wartime. On the other hand, it is even more necessary to focus on learning the drawbacks of the opponent, and to seek out his weak points at the levels of his system of operations and his system of warfare, that is, to include his insufficiencies in military matters and also to include his “soft underbelly” in terms of politics, economics, and the spirit and psychology of his people. Thus, when drafting strategy, we will have more than one string to our bow and we will have broader space for strategic planning and management, as well as rich forms and methods for strategy, so as to more effectively achieve our strategic intentions of fostering our strong points and controlling the enemy’s weak points.
Focus on practices before a war happens. Practices before a war happens are a scientific method for designing a war in advance, planning national defense and the military’s long-term development and building, and winning the initiative in future wars, all based on developmental trends in future warfare. Their essence is to face the future, to design the future, and to win the future. First is to innovate theories of operations and combat methods in simulation laboratories, and then afterwards to implement these in training and in war. Under informationized conditions, the means and methods for practices before a war happens have been greatly expanded by using computers and network technology, and emulation, simulation, and base exercises have ascended from the campaign and tactical levels to the strategic level. Strategic concepts, strategic scenarios, and strategic theory will be generated, tested, and improved in an environment of practices before a war happens. For example, the US military has already formed a complete system of innovations in operations; sophisticated theories of operations, from the “Air-Land Battle” that was proposed in the 1980s to the “Air-Sea Battle” that was recently proposed, have made broad use of advanced scientific and technological means to launch relevant laboratory demonstrations, providing traction and support for their development and improvement. In adapting to this new trend, the PRC military should organically combine the research departments that innovate ideas and theories of operations, testing departments that show ideas and theories of operations, testing departments that demonstrate ideas and theories of operations, and operational units that actually generate combat capabilities, thus forming a new type of mechanism for practices in advance of warfare that combines man and machine and that is a closed loop, changing from passively adapting to future warfare to actively designing future warfare, and thereby providing advanced scientific methods and support for drafting military strategy and innovating military strategy. [end of page 27]
Chapter 2
The Evolution of Strategy...28

It is extremely important to study and get a grasp on strategic knowledge from out of historical developments. [Friedrich] Engels pointed out, “Whenever history began, the thought process also should have begun then, and the further developments of the thought process is nothing more than an abstraction of the historical process, a reflection of theory in a coherent form.” Strategy developed as warfare practices emerged, and warfare practices are the source and driving force in the formation and development of strategic theory. Exploring the track of changes in strategy from the starting point of history, and getting a grasp on their developmental trends and laws of evolution, and then generalizing and summarizing these, are the logical foundation and important details in the science of strategy.

Section 1: The Historical Development of Strategic Thought...28

For thousands of years, strategic thought in both China and abroad has been primarily manifested as the process of the planning of strategy and the implementation of strategy, as has been recorded in works on strategic theory. The history of the development of warfare and the military from antiquity to the mid-20th century can be divided into four major stages, which are: the classical age (prior to the fifth century), the medieval age (the 5th to the 17th centuries), the premodern age (the 17th to the 19th centuries), and before and after the two world wars (the first half of the 20th century).

I. The foundation of strategic thought, in the classical age (prior to the 5th century)...28

The classical age in world history went through three important stages in the development of human civilization. The first of these was the birth of nations and the engendering of early civilization; in the old world there appeared, one after the other, such centers of ancient civilization as Babylon, [end of page 28] Egypt, India, the Aegean seacoast, and China’s Xia, Shang, and Zhou [Dynasties]. The second of them was the explosion and major development of thought in the East and West; the most representational of these in the East was China’s Spring and Autumn period and Warring States period, when “a hundred schools of thought contended,” and in the West there was the academic flourishing of ancient Greece. The third of these was the formation of early empires and their rise and fall. The most important of these in the East was the

establishment, power and prosperity, and collapse of the Qin and Han Dynasties, while in the West there was the establishment, expansion, and disintegration of the Roman Empire. In these three major historical stages, accompanied by magnificent warfare practices, rich and colorful military strategies were deduced, and a series of classical theoretical works laid the foundation for strategic thought in the East and the West.

Classical-age China created a brilliant Chinese culture, and also composed magnificent pictures of war. The Battle of Zhuolu occurred during Yan Di and the Yellow Emperor’s war against Chi You, as told in legend; King Qi of Xia’s Battle of Gan in his expedition against the Hu clan; and King Wu of Zhou’s Battle of Muye to destroy the Shang Dynasty, were all important wars in the formative process of China’s early culture. In the practices of this long period of warfare, ancient people’s ability for strategic planning and their level of strategic thought incrementally increased, and the ideas of strategy also incrementally germinated and developed. In the oracle bone inscriptions of the Yin-Shang Dynasty as well as pre-Qin Dynasty classics such as the Book of Changes, the Book of Shang, and the Zuozhuan, there was already some very valuable strategic ideas, such as “A person who is advanced forestalls his opponent by a show of strength, while a person who lags behind waits for a decline” (the Zuozhuan, Duke Zhao’s 21st Year), “Do what is suitable and then return” and “If you are moral then you cannot be defeated” (the Zuozhuan, Duke Xi’s 28th Year), and “Advance if you see it is possible, and retreat if you know it is difficult” (the Zuozhuan, Duke Xuan’s 12th Year).

In the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods, society was in upheaval, wars were abnormally frequent, and strategies and practices were colorful, giving shape to systematic theories of strategy. During this period, the Lu army’s striking back [at Qi] in the Battle of Changshao between [the states of] Qi and Lu, the Chu army’s preemptive strike in the Battle of Bi between [the states of] Jin and Chu, and the Qi army’s encircling [the state of] Wei to help [the state of] Zhao during the Battle of Maling between [the states of] Qi and Wei, all were extraordinarily outstanding [cases of] strategic guidance. The Hundred Schools of Confucian, Mohist, Taoist, and Legalist scholars separately issued their views on military issues. The Confucian school advocated just wars, the Legalist school emphasized cultivating and fighting, the Mohist school advocated “not attacking,” and the Taoist school proposed that “The soft overcomes the hard; and the weak the strong;” these all had a profound impact on the formation of strategic theory. The school of the military, as represented by Sun Wu, emerged, and a group of classic books on warfare – Sunzi’s Art of War, the Wuzi, The Methods of the Sima, Sun Bin’s Art of War, and others – constructed the mansion of strategic theory during China’s classic age.
Sunzi’s Art of War, in the space of thirteen chapters and about 6,000 words, essentially summarized the key factors and basic principles for guiding warfare, such as: the close relationship between war and politics, where “he will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks;” the huge impact of warfare on the economy, where “if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain” and “let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns;” the highest objective of strategy is not to attack cities and destroy areas, but “to keep the country at peace and the army intact,” and “to subdue the enemy’s troops [end of page 29] without fighting;” strategic preparations are extremely important, and it is necessary to “first put yourself beyond the possibility of defeat, and then wait for an opportunity to defeat the enemy;” the basic point of strategic decision-making is “being favorable,” so that “when it is favorable, make a forward move; when otherwise, stop still;” the premise for strategic decision-making is “knowledge,” so that “if you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt, and if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete;” the key to strategic guidance is to hold the initiative, so as to “impose your will on the enemy, and not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on you;” strategic deception is a necessary means for winning victory, so that “in war, practice dissimulation,” and be skilled at concealing what is true and revealing what is false; the key point of strategy is to concentrate troop strengths, so as to “attack an inferior force with a superior one;” and strategic deployments must have “the direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn;” and strategic attack must avoid what is real and attack what is false, and strategic actions must “attack the enemy where he is unprepared, and appear where he does not expect you.” Other military experts also enriched and developed strategic theory, from differing aspects; for example, Wuzi proposed “using politics for victory,” and Sun Bin proposed that a “rich country” is “urgently [needed] for a powerful military,” and “it establishes the strength for victory in warfare.” In summary, the military experts of the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period profoundly revealed the general laws for warfare and for guiding warfare, they established the basic content and character of China’s ancient strategic theory, and they held an extremely important position in the history of the development of the world’s strategic theory.

During the Qin and Han Dynasties period, when there was a struggle over unification and division and there were practices for protecting border security, strategic thought and theory came into widespread use and were richly developed. In the aspect of strategy for unification, the establishment and strengthening of rear area bases, the selection of correct strategic directions, the establishment of favorable strategic situations, and an accurate grasp of strategic opportunity became common features. For example, during Qin’s Wars of Unification, it treated with those who were far away and attacked those who were near, military strategy and political stratagems were closely coordinated, and
[unification] advanced in order. In the war between Chu and Han at the end of the Qin Dynasty, Liu Bang established Hanzhong, set up the three Qins, and moved east to struggle to gain the empire. In the unification wars of the Eastern Han Dynasty, Liu Xiu first took Guandong as his base, went from what was near to what was far, and destroyed each [opponent]. In the aspect of border defense strategy, in order to resist incursions by the northern nomadic peoples, Qin built the Great Wall, starting from Lintao in the west and going to Liaodong in the east. During the period of the Emperor Wu of Han, in order to thoroughly eliminate the threat of the Xiongnu, [the emperor] combined with the various states of the western regions diplomatically, while militarily, he vigorously developed cavalry, sending troops three times, one after the other, deep into [the Xiongnu capital of] Mobei, striking at the Xiongnu tribes. Afterwards, offensive strategy that used cavalry to take the initiative in launching attacks and defensive strategy that relied on the Great Wall to guard the border became the two basic forms by which the dynasties of the Central Plains defended against incursions by the northern peoples; when the dynasties flourished, they mainly attacked, while when they were in decline, they mainly defended.

After the third century, with the fall of the Han Dynasty, the empire fell into confusion, many people vied for supremacy, and the strategic practices of maneuvering among alliances again impelled the development of strategic thought; military experts who had remarkable abilities for strategic logistics emerged in large numbers, like Cao Cao and Zhuge Liang; and masterpieces of strategic stratagems appeared, like Zhuge Liang’s The Longzhong Plans and Yang Gu’s Pingwushu.

Echoing Eastern civilizations, as represented by China, Western civilizations, also achieved outstanding results as regards strategic thought, as represented by ancient Greece and Rome. The germination of Western strategic thought was manifested [end of page 30] in a series of stratagems and guidance for warfare. In the 13th century B.C., in the Battle of Kadesh between ancient Egypt and the Hittite Empire, the Hittite army adopted combat methods of concealing what was real and revealing what was false, luring the enemy into rashly advancing, suddenly attacking him, and retreating into strongholds, and they defeated the army of ancient Egypt, made up of elite troop strengths led by Ramses II; they manifested the characteristics of coordination between troops defending strongholds and units outside cities and between infantry and chariot troops. After Egypt and Babylon declined, Greece arose to become the center of the Western world, and it guided the development of Western strategic thought. In the wars between Greece and Persia, the Greek city states, faced with attacks from Persia, fully brought into play the qualities and advantages of the Greek military, resolutely launched decisive engagements, and achieved victory in campaigns at Marathon and Plataea. Because Persia crossed the sea for its expeditions, supply at sea became the lifeline of the Persian military, and the strategic significance of command of the sea became
highlighted. At the famous naval battle of Salamis, the Greek navy battered the Persian navy, and the Persian ground forces had no choice but to withdraw because of supply problems. This strategic guidance had a profound impact on later generations. In ancient Greece, there were also some famous tactics that were elevated by later generations into universal strategic thought. For example, the combat method adopted by Epaminondas at the Battle of Leuctra, where massed troop strengths carried out a main attack against one wing, later became a basic tactical principle: “Do not evenly spread your troop strengths along the front, but concentrate troop strengths in a decisive section in order to carry out a main attack.” (Engels’ words)

Practices in frequent large-scale wars further enriched and developed Western strategic thought. Rome was a large empire founded on military conquests; during the Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage, the Carthaginian commander-in-chief Hannibal and the Roman commander-in-chief Scipio [Africanus] both adopted forms of attack that were strategically circuitous, and were summarized by Liddell Hart of a later generation as an “indirect approach to strategy.” In the famous Battle of Cannae, Hannibal used the tactic where his two wings outflanked and went around [the enemy], annihilating more than 70,000 Roman soldiers and creating a glorious military achievement. The Roman commander-in-chief Fabian, under conditions where the enemy was strong and he was weak, avoided a decisive battle and used strategic forms of continual harassment and waiting for a change; this was called the “Fabian strategy” or “strategy of delay” by later generations. Before and after this, Western military experts still believed in the important impact of politics on military matters, and treated struggling to get allies and dissolving the opponent’s alliances as an important detail in strategic guidance. The Macedonian king Alexander and Rome’s [Julius] Caesar both were known for this, and Caesar won the acclamation as “a political general” in his military expeditions against areas in Europe, Asia, and Africa.

In classical times, the East and the West, proceeding from their individual practices in warfare, happened to touch on the essence of military strategy and on many core issues. However, because of differences in their histories, cultures, and geopolitical environments, the strategic thought of the East and the West also manifested clear differences. [end of page 31]

First, as regards the types of strategy, continental strategy predominated in China, while the West had both continental and maritime strategy. China’s culture arose in East Asia, with agriculture as its basis, and the security threats that it faced primarily came from land frontiers in the north, west, and south; for over a thousand years, the eastern maritime territories had no strong enemy, and therefore, the strategy of China’s classical era was entirely a continental model. Western culture arose in the Mediterranean region,
adjacent to the European, Asian, and African continents; its commerce and trade were advanced, and the sea was not merely a strategic artery, but also an economic lifeline. Whoever had command of the sea would have the key to victory. Therefore, struggling for command of the sea often became the focus of strategy. This was clearly manifested in the Greek-Persian wars, the Peloponnesian War, Alexander’s eastern expedition, and the Punic Wars.

Second, as regards strategic culture, the East and West clearly differed. The Hundred Schools of Thought in China’s pre-Qin period and the academic flourishing of Greece determined the characteristics of Eastern and Western culture, and fixed and affected the differing orientations of Eastern and Western strategic thought. What Chinese culture stressed was the concept of a great unity, where political thought based on the rule of virtue and ethics whose foundation was ceremony were mature; these influenced strategic theory to a certain extent. For example, it had a cautious attitude toward warfare, and believed that arms were a curse and war was a dread thing, and that war was a last resort; it had the “total victory” of “subduing the enemy’s troops without fighting” as its highest strategic goal; the focus of strategy was often internal integration rather than external expansion; it had an intense tendency toward moralism, and stressed the example of the ruler, righteous soldiers, and righteous wars; and it had a dialectical attitude toward the contradictions between benefits and harm and between victory and defeat. The ancient Greek civilization of the West had the city state system as its basis, and conflicts, conquest, and colonial expansion among city states became a distinct topic for the evolution of civilization. The consciousness of conflict and struggle in Western culture caused the advocacy of warfare and praise of warfare to become a constant tradition, and utilitarianism that had rights and interests at its core became the logical starting point for Western strategic theory. In the struggle with external threats and in expansion, the search for existence and development became the focus of strategy.

Third, as regards the elucidation of the theory of strategy, China was far ahead of the West. Early on in the final years of the Spring and Autumn period at the end of the fifth century B.C., China’ produced Sunzi’s *Art of War*, the classic on military science. But for a long period of time in the West, there were no works on military theory; thoughts related to strategy were scattered about in various works on history, such as Herodotus’s *History*, Thucydides’s *History of the Peloponnesian Wars*, Xenophon’s *The March Up Country*, and Caesar’s *The Gallic Wars*. These historical works analyzed the gains and losses of warfare and proposed some excellent insights. For example, Herodotus believed that the main interest of a state was to protect its own security and autonomy, that facing a common threat is the basis for establishing and maintaining an alliance relationship, and that “deception” is a regular means for pursuing a nation’s interests. Thucydides [end of page 32] thought that rulers must keep an eye on the nation’s long-term interests, that
generals have an important significance for victory or defeat in warfare, and that you should follow up on victories. Caesar believed that it was necessary to use political and diplomatic means together with military attacks, that you should cut off your opponent’s logistics supply in order to force the enemy to submit, and that the essence of command in operations lies in selecting opportunities, concentrating troop strengths, moving quickly, attacking resolutely, and attacking the enemy’s key points. However, these thoughts were not condensed into a systematic exposition of theory. It was not until the first century that the West began to have special works on military theory appear; [Sextus Julius] Frontinus’s *Stratagems* and [Publius Flavius] Vegetius [Renatus’s] *On Military Matters* were representative of these.

II. The evolution of medieval strategic thought (5th to 17th centuries)...33

China’s Han Dynasty and the Roman Empire fell apart, one after the other, marking that the world had entered into the chaotic and turbulent Middle Ages. China’s history manifested an intensive cyclical characteristic, the so-called “division over a long period of time inevitably will result in unity, while unification over a long period inevitably will result in division,” but the basic orientation of strategy was to seek a grand unity. In the West, following the fall of the Roman Empire, the situation of a grand unity, once gone, was never to return; a large number of tribes and states emerged, and were trapped in a prolonged [period of] disputes and wars, the Dark Ages. In medieval times, military experts of the East and West carried on with and used the results of the ideas that the great sages of the classical age had created, with a focus on the new environment and new conditions that each of them faced, and they continually supplemented, revised, and extended these, thus causing strategic thought to exhibit major developments. The Islamic civilization of the Middle Ages and the rise of the Arab empire on the Eurasian continent were also new factors that were injected into the development of strategic thought.

In the Middle Ages, China’s feudal culture continued to develop, up until the middle of the Ming Dynasty, and it still held a leading position in the world. In the military sphere, wars to fight for and maintain the nation’s unity and wars to resist the northern nomadic tribes were always the two grand subjects for strategy, and the two were also interwoven with the wars of peasant uprisings and wars over dynastic turnovers. Successive military experts, faced with various complicated situations, applied traditional theories of strategy to the guidance of wars, and they proposed many excellent strategic plans. For example, Zhao Pu and the Taizu Emperor of the Song Dynasty’s “Asking questions on a snowy night,” proposed a strategy for first [conquering] the south and then the north, and for first [conquering] what was easy and later what was hard; Liu Zheng’s *Stratagem for Pacifying the Song* [that he provided] to Khubilai [Khan], advocated constructing a navy,
breaking through the middle, attacking and annihilating the Southern Song Dynasty, and unifying China; and Zhu Sheng and Liu Ji proposed aggressive stratagems to Zhu Yuanzhang that he “build high walls, stock up rations, and not be too quick to call himself a king,” and that he “first [attack] Chu and then Wu, destroying each of them. These strategic plans not only successfully guided practices [end of page 33] in major wars, but they also provided correct methods for analyzing and plotting strategy, thus forming important aspects of the development of strategic thought in medieval China.

Compared to the brilliance created in the pre-Qin period, developments in the theory of strategy in medieval China clearly slowed down; they lacked systematic innovation, and a great number of the theoretical results were elucidations, supplements, and intensifications of the pre-Qin ideas about strategy. The new developments that are most worth paying attention to in military strategy during this time were first, the cavalry strategy of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty. The advantages that Chinggis Khan brought into play, of rapid cavalry movement and of strong surprise attacks, and his long-range raids, bypassing in depth, and coordinated attacks, developed the strategic form of large-scale expeditions by cavalry groups to the ultimate. The second was the naval defense strategy of the Ming Dynasty. China’s naval defense strategy originated in defense against Japanese pirates. The early Ming was based on defense against the enemy at sea; at the same time, it was combined with island and coastal defense in order to effectively contain intrusions by the Japanese bandits. Famous generals who resisted the Japanese pirates, such as Yu Dayou and Qi Jiguang, all used “defense against the enemy at sea” as their main policy, and they advocated the vigorous development of a navy. Zheng Ruozeng’s A Maritime Survey: a Compilation of Plans was the first monograph to discuss naval defense strategy, and it advocated establishing a system of multiple defenses of “defense at sea, defense along the coast, defense along inland rivers, and defense of cities and towns;” these sustained each other, combined offense and defense, and played an active role in guiding the struggle to resist the Japanese pirates. However, after the middle period of the Jiajing Emperor’s [reign], the government and the military grew corrupt, naval defense grew lax, and the strategy of naval defense gradually atrophied, so that annihilating the enemy on land became paramount, and [it became] increasingly conservative.

Prior to the middle Tang Dynasty, border defense strategy basically continued the Qin and Han model of border defense that combined offense and defense, but after the middle Tang, the loss of the northwest region where horses were reared made it difficult to organize powerful cavalry; this, together with the strategic shortsightedness of the rulers and the negative influence of Confucians’ thinking, which preferred peace over war and focused more on domestic affairs than the outside situation, resulted in strategic defense
becoming the dominant trend for border defense strategy in the Song and Ming Dynasties.

Unlike the historical developments in China, where the trend was toward unity, separation was the main characteristic in the West’s Middle Ages. During this time, the focus in the development of the West’s strategic thought was one branch of the remnants of the Roman Empire – the Eastern Roman Empire. With the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea as its center, the Eastern Roman Empire’s territory spanned three continents – Europe, Asia, and Africa – and for a long period of time it was surrounded and under attack by many differing peoples. It focused on defense in its strategic guidance, it emphasized bringing into play its advantage of operations along internal lines, it concentrated its troop strengths, it destroyed each [of its opponents], and it successfully resisted the numerous incursions by foreigners, so that it continued for almost a thousand years after the death of the Western Roman Empire. The Strategicon, written by the Eastern Roman Empire’s Emperor Mauritius, was the West’s most important work on the theory of strategy during this time. This book advocated establishing a powerful cavalry; in strategic guidance, it emphasized surprise in operations, it believed that victory or defeat in warfare was determined to a very great extent by selection of the time and place of attack, it stressed the personal abilities of the general, and it believed that superlative command skills were necessary conditions for defeating the enemy. [end of page 34] In the 1770s, the Strategicon was translated into French by the French military expert [Brigadier General Paul Gedeon Joly de] Maizeroy, and from this was created the word “strategy.”

In the 15th century, the Renaissance was flourishing and Western civilization was breaking free of the fetters of Christian theology and following a path of creative development. In the military sphere, as science and technology developed, weapons and equipment transitioned from swords and spears to firearms, leading to changes in military systems and strategy and tactics. European powers like Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden actively promoted military reforms, established standing armies made up of their own countries’ people, adjusted the organizational structure of their militaries based on the needs of using firearms, used line-style tactics, and implemented new systems for supplying military munitions. The Battle of Breitenfeld in the Thirty Years War (1618 to 1648) was called “the first time that mobility and firepower defeated the momentum of numbers and lances,” and it led to a transformation from an emphasis on phalanx tactics of impact to an emphasis on bringing into play the line-style tactics of firepower; Western military circles have called it “the first modern war.”

Under the influence of the Renaissance and military changes, Western theory of strategy underwent breakthrough advances. The Art of War and The Prince, written by the Italian
politician [Niccolo] Machiavelli of the 15th and early 16th centuries, are considered masterpieces. Machiavelli summarized the concepts on strategy of the ancient Roman period, combined these with the current practices of warfare, and proposed some important thoughts on strategy: politics and military matters are closely related, and the political system must correspond to military needs; any means can be employed, as long as it is possible to win; generals must have strategic vision and have strategic planning and rational means; it is necessary to carry out meticulous analysis and judgment about the various factors; it is necessary to pay attention to the ideas of experts and to intelligence collection; it is necessary to be skilled at gaining allies; it is necessary to adjust strategy and tactics based on changes in the environment; it is necessary to pay attention to the use of strategic reserves; it is necessary to be cautious at the beginning of a war; it is necessary to have complete stockpiles of materials; and it is necessary to stringently protect military secrets. Machiavelli’s ideas on strategy had a great impact on the West, and he has been praised as the West’s “father of modern strategy.”

In the 17th century, the Austrian military expert [Raimondo] Montecuccoli wrote such books as On Combat, On the Art of War, and Treatise on the Art of War. He believed that warfare, just like other sciences, had universal and basic rules, and that by properly using these rules, it was possible to correctly predict wars and to reduce losses in war. He pointed out that victory in any war relied upon careful preparations, cautious planning, and operational actions that were secret, rapid, and firm. He advocated mobile warfare, but at the same time did not deny the decisive significance of battles. He gave a great deal of emphasis to the importance of command and logistics, and treated keeping “reserves” as a basic principle in the guidance of warfare, saying that “Whoever ultimately is able to have a relatively intact troop strengths [end of page 35] will be able to win the battle.”

In the Middle Ages, the Islamic civilization and Arab empire in the middle of the Eurasian continent gradually arose, and Arab armies, with cavalry as their main force, with strong mobility, and with weak ability to attack fortified positions, emphasized speed and mobility in their operations as well as the killing of the enemy’s effective strengths; they did not focus on winning or losing cities and territories. In showdowns with Mediterranean countries, Arab navies also played an important role; as regards strategy, they stressed coordination between land forces and navies, where these jointly seized and occupied coastal cities. In the process of unifying the Arabian Peninsula, Muhammad used the religion of the Islamic civilization to exercise his influence, and he gave shape to very distinctive thought on strategy that used both military offense and political stratagem.
III. Transition and transformation in premodern strategic thought (17th to 19th centuries)...36

Europe’s Renaissance and Religious Reformation movements and the subsequent capitalist class revolution and Industrial Revolution launched a new age in world history. The development of industry and technology provided Western countries with powerful weapons and combat power, and the intrinsic drive to seize capital touched off waves of colonial aggression. The colonialist expansion and struggle over interests by the Western powers pushed world history into an age of “iron” and “fire” power politics, and had a serious impact on the established order in Eastern countries, so that they had no choice but to follow the path to premodernization. Against the background of this history, strategic thought ushered in revolutionary major developments, which were manifested in the West as flying leaps in qualitative changes and in the East as a transformation in response [to these changes].

In the mid-17th century, Europe entered the age of capitalism. Large mechanized industry replaced handicraft production, and the output and performance of weapons like rifles and artillery were greatly improved. Ironclad ships that were powered by steam appeared, greatly strengthening the abilities of militaries for operations on distant seas. The appearance of wireless telegraphs, telephones, railroads, and other new means of communications and traffic greatly improved militaries’ abilities to move and the efficiency of their command. With technological advances as their foundation, the organizational structure and strategies and tactics of militaries underwent a series of revolutionary changes, and the theory of strategy also developed by leaps and bounds.

The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other capitalist powers were the leaders in the West’s strategic practices. A French military expert, Napoleon [Bonaparte], initiated an offensive strategy; he advocated the flexible use of strategy and tactics, concentrated troop strengths, rapid movement, bypassing in depth, and using decisive and courageous sudden assaults to annihilate the enemy. At the Battle of Ulm, he arrived at the battlefield in a way the enemy did not expect, faster than was expected, and at a cost of only somewhere over 1,500 casualties, he destroyed more than 50,000 of the enemy. Thereafter, he also followed up on his victory by correctly choosing an area of operations [end of page 36] and rapidly seizing and guarding key points on the battlefield, for a quick battle and a quick resolution, and he won a decisive victory in the Austerlitz campaign. The general staff that Napoleon established also provided a “template” for the modern general staff system that Prussia later established. But when Napoleon carried out a major invasion of Russia, he was defeated by Mikhail Kutuzov’s retreat, which traded space for time, and by [Kutuzov’s] strategy of procrastination. After the Napoleonic wars, the idea of a war of annihilation was continually developed, and with the
development of railroad traffic and the improvement of the military’s mobile capabilities, the form of "first assembling and then fighting" was eliminated, and was replaced by the strategy that was prized by the Prussian military expert [Helmut] von Moltke, of "advancing separately for a combined attack."

During this time, the theory and practice of Western military strategy influenced each other, and there emerged some outstanding works on the theory of strategy. On War, written by the Prussian [Carl von] Clausewitz, was the classic on Western premodern theory of strategy. Its contributions were that it for the first time explicitly pointed out that "War is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means;" it categorized the key factors of strategy into five types, that is, the key factor of the spiritual, the key factor of the material, the key factor of mathematics, the key factor of geography, and the key factor of statistics; he emphasized that numerical superiority is the most ordinary factor for victory in strategy and tactics, and that the most important but also the simplest criterion in strategy is to concentrate troop strengths; and he stressed concentrating all strengths in order to attack the enemy’s "core," and that the "core" may be the enemy’s military, capital, or his allied countries’ militaries, but it may also be the principal leader or the emotions of his people. Summary of the Art of War, written by [Antoine-Henri] Jomini of Switzerland, summarized the experiences of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. He believed that the art of war is to first study the state’s war policies and the various factors that affect victory or defeat in war, that there are differences among the laws of the various differing types of war, and that national wars in which all the people participate have a fearful strength; [he believed] that the important task of strategy lies in correctly judging the enemy’s area of war, in carefully analyzing the decision points {jueding dian} for the enemy and ourselves, in getting a grasp on favorable opportunities to seize the advantage through movement and speed, and in concentrating the main troop strengths in order to attack in a coordinated manner the center or flank of the enemy’s troops whose significance is decisive.

With capitalism’s worldwide expansion, the theory of the strategy of naval power arose; [the idea] that had the greatest influence was the "theory of command of the sea," proposed by [Alfred Thayer] Mahan of the United States. In his book The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, he summarized the history of Western naval warfare and believed that establishing a powerful naval power was the center of strategy, and he stressed that the establishment of sea power relied upon superior naval strengths, including a powerful fleet, merchant marine, and advance bases; the means for seizing command of the sea were fleets’ decisive warfare and blockades at sea; the key factors in naval strategy were concentration, central positioning, inner lines, and lines of traffic; centralized superior troop strengths were crucial for winning victory, and simultaneous operations in two [differing] directions should be avoided; and it is necessary to ensure
that your own traffic lines at sea are secure, while at the same time damaging and blockading the enemy’s traffic lines at sea. Mahan also pointed out that the navy exists [end of page 37] to attack, and that defense is merely preparations for attack; even when the overall situation is in a defensive mode, the navy’s fleets must actively attack.

At the same time that the Western capitalist class’s strategic thought was undergoing major development, the proletarian class’s strategic thought, as represented by [Karl] Marx and Engels, was also emerging. Using the world views and methodology of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, Marx and Engels proposed scientific theses about the origins and nature of warfare, they correctly understood the impact that science and technology had on warfare and on strategy and tactics, they explained in-depth the violent revolutionary doctrine whereby the proletarian class’s armed forces would seize power, they emphasized the establishment and development of a proletarian military, and they creatively proposed brand-new details such as the concept of people’s warfare, the strategy of active defense, and the proletarian class’s methods of operations. These became powerful ideological weapons that guided the proletarian class in carrying out revolutionary warfare to seize power, and they produced an important and profound impact on the world’s strategic thought.

While Western capitalism was in turmoil, China was still repeating its cyclical replacement of a feudal dynasty. In the early days of the Qing Dynasty, there was a fusion between nomadic tribes and Central Plains cultural traditions as regards strategy, which manifested a certain amount of innovation. As regards the strategy of border defense, there was a change from the tradition of past dynasties that armed the border and relied mostly on the Great Wall; [the dynasty] resolutely attacked rebellious and separatist activities in the border regions and it upheld the nation’s unity. However, the Qing Dynasty’s adjustments in regards to strategy were not based on revolutionary changes in economic and social development; their foundation was still the cultural traditions of feudal society and an agricultural civilization, and the gap with the West’s capitalist civilization grew ever larger. After the 1840 Opium War broke out, China was increasingly trapped in the abyss of a semi-colonial semi-feudal society. In response to this “situation where there had been no change for thousands of years,” some people with insight proposed “learning the barbarians’ technology in order to control the barbarians.” A westernization movement arose in the 1860s and 1870s, and using the slogans of “training troops” and “self-strengthening,” the Chinese military’s premodernization gradually developed, from establishing military industries to establishing and training a military in accordance with Western drill rules.

Changes in premodern Chinese strategy were primarily manifested as a response to threats from a maritime direction. In the 1870s, a full-blown crisis appeared in the
nation’s coastal defenses. Through repeated discussions and tradeoffs, the Qing court finally decided to pay equal attention to defense at sea and defense at strategic passes; on the one hand, sea defenses were built for the southern and northern seas, while on the other, Zuo Zongtang was dispatched to lead troops to recover Xinjiang. In the thinking of the Qing Dynasty rulers, the core of sea defense strategy was the defense of seaports; the role of the navy was not to seize command of the sea but rather to strengthen the stability and mobile capability of seaport defense. Therefore, although the Northern Fleet was commissioned in 1888, and the scale of the fleet was declared to be the best in Asia, no new ships were added after [the fleet’s] commissioning, and a gap gradually opened with its eastern neighbor Japan [end of page 38] in terms of weapons and equipment and tactics and training. Ultimately, the entire fleet was doomed to destruction in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894.

Upheavals in the strategic environment and the worsening of the strategic situation also caused China’s traditional military thought to face grim challenges. For example, as the premodern thinker Zhang Guanying said, “Today’s warfare is not what we have had over the past twenty-one centuries, nor are today’s tactics what could be done in Sun Wu’s books on warfare.”13 In the sphere of military theory, studying from the West became a fashionable tend. The intelligentsia of premodern China translated some Western works on military science, such as A Brief Discussion on Firearms, Some Opinions on Facing the Front, and Guiding and Mastering Military Strategy, but most of these treatises were limited to weapons and equipment and to the level of tactics. It was not until the beginning of the 20th century that outstanding Western treatises on strategy, such as Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History and Clausewitz’s On War were translated and introduced to China, so the impact that they had on China’s premodern theory and practices of strategy was limited.

IV. The two world wars and the development of strategic thought (first half of the 20th century)...39

Progress in science and technology and advances in industrialization led to huge changes in means of warfare and the state of warfare, and the world wars caused military showdowns between blocs of nations to reach a scale unprecedented in history; new types of weapons and equipment, like aircraft, tanks, huge ships and heavy artillery, and aircraft carriers, were broadly used on the battlefield. Strategic thought was active to an unprecedented extent, the field of vision was more macroscopic, details were richer, and this achieved new heights. At the same time, changes in the global strategic setup that the

world wars led to provided strategic opportunities for Eastern countries to escape colonization and move toward independence and revival. During this process, China, as a representative country, fused the theory and practices of Chinese and Western strategy, and in the practices of the wars and practices for achieving the independence and liberation of the Chinese people, it created a complete set of military strategies for defeating the enemy, which made unique contributions to the development of the world’s strategic thought.

Fairly major effects on Western strategic thought during this time primarily consisted of [the following].

The theory of command of the air. In 1909, the Italian military theorist Giulio Douhet foresaw the strategic significance of command of the air, and in the book that he wrote, Command of the Air, he for the first time systematically discussed the building and operational theory of the air force. His primary viewpoints were to build up an independent air force that would stand side by side with the ground forces and the navy; to establish powerful bomber units; to separate the tasks of fighters and bombers; [to note that] destruction of enemy air force bases, stockpiles of air force materials and aviation industry centers were more effective than aerial dogfights; and to coordinate the operational relationships [end of page 39] of the ground forces, navy, and air force.

The theory of the indirect approach. The British military theorist Liddell Hart wrote Strategy: The Indirect Approach, in which he believed that strategy was the art of allocating and using military tools in order to achieve political goals, that military strategy is subordinate to the nation’s grand strategy, that the success of military strategy is primarily determined by the meticulous planning of goals and means, and that the “indirect approach” is the most rational and effective form of strategy; the core of this strategy lies in reducing combat actions to a minimum extent, he advocated outflanking and bypassing [the enemy], in order to avoid direct collisions with the enemy from the front; and [he called for] using various means to attack and shock the enemy, in order to achieve the strategic goal of winning without undergoing a decisive battle.

The theory of mechanized warfare. After the First World War, a number of European military experts began to consider the effects that mechanized equipment, as represented by the tank, would have on future warfare. Armored Warfare by Fuller of the United Kingdom; Warning! Tank! and Tank – Advance! by [Heinz Wilhelm] Guderian of Germany; Issues of Modern Strategy, Important Coordination of Campaigns, Early and Effective Annihilation of Aviation Troops, and Current Military Plans of the Germany Army by [Mikhail] Tukhachevsky of the Soviet Union; and Building a Professional Military by Charles de Gaulle of France all described theories on the strategy of
mechanized warfare, from differing angles. They believed that future warfare would be mechanized warfare, that the scope of the battlefield would be further expanded, that the rhythm of warfare would be further accelerated, and that cooperation and coordination by the various services and service arms would have an important significance for victory in operations. The various combatant countries would do as much as possible to finish wars in a quick and decisive form, and the clear defensive lines of past wars would be broken up, to be replaced by operational actions by mechanized units of both sides moving at high speeds, such as penetrating, cutting off, bypassing, and surrounding [the enemy] in depth. In the theory of mechanized warfare, Germany’s theory of “blitzkrieg” and the Soviet Union’s theory of “in-depth operations” are representative. The theory of “blitzkrieg” stressed beginning military actions with a surprise attack; concentrating superior troop strengths and weapons along the main direction of attack, for a quick fight and a quick resolution; and carrying out high-speed in-depth concentrated attacks. The theory of “in-depth operations” stressed correct choice of the main direction of attack, concentrating troop strengths and weapons along this direction, and striving to achieve strategic and campaign surprise; carrying out positional, in-depth, and high-speed attacks; and continuously or simultaneously launching several attack campaigns.

In addition, Germany’s [Eric] Ludendorff proposed a theory of “total warfare.” In his book Total Warfare, he pointed out that modern warfare is not merely a confrontation between armies but is a confrontation between all the people of both combatant sides, and in order to achieve victory in total warfare, your people must sincerely unite and militarize the national economy. Although the theory of “total warfare” was the theoretical basis for the German Fascists’ strategic thought, it also, to a certain extent, reflected the characteristics of confrontations in modern warfare and especially in all-out warfare [end of page 40] where the two hostile sides would mobilize all of their national power.

In this historical period, Marxist military theory had new developments. In 1917, [Vladimir Ilyich] Lenin led the Russian October Socialist Revolution and the civil war to protect the Soviet regime, he developed Marx and Engels’ theories on violent revolution, and in the process of creating a new model of military, he emphasized turning the Red Army into an army that the proletarian class led and that fought for the interests of the workers, and he advocated continuously developing the national economy and strengthening the national defense building. [Josef] Stalin, in leading the Soviet Union’s national defense building and in the practices of struggling for victory in the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War, emphasized building up reliable strategic rear area bases and powerful assault groups and strategic reserves, pointed out that the most important task in strategy is to stipulate the basic direction of attack, and formed a series of theories related to strategic defense and especially to strategic offensives.
The tide of world revolution resulted in the Chinese people’s anti-feudal and anti-colonial struggle entering into a new stage. In the Chinese revolutionary wars that broke out in the 1920s, people of the Chinese Communist Party, as represented by Mao Zedong, combined Marxist military theory with the practices of the Chinese revolutionary wars; at the same time, they carried on with China’s superb traditions of strategy and borrowed from Western modern strategic thought, in order to form a theoretical system of strategy with unique characteristics – Mao Zedong military strategic thought. Its core is that it closely relied on the people, created a people’s army, launched a people’s war, established [practices] where the weak defeated the strong, and carried out active defense. Mao Zedong military strategic thought successfully guided the practices of the Chinese revolutionary wars, developed China’s theories on strategy to new heights, wrote with a colorful brush in the history of the development of the world’s theories on strategy, and had a huge and profound impact on the development of China’s and the world’s military practices and military theory.

Section 2: The Formation and Development of China’s Military Theory of Active Defense...41

China’s military strategy is a military strategy of active defense. During the prolonged revolutionary wars, the establishment of socialism, and the process of reform, the Chinese Communist Party combined Marxist military theory with the practices of the Chinese revolutionary wars and the military struggles to preserve the nation’s security, and initiated and established a military theory of active defense that had distinctive Chinese characteristics. The idea of an active defense strategy emerged and was formed during the years of the Chinese revolutionary wars, and it led the Chinese revolutionary wars to achieve magnificent victories. Following the founding of New China [in 1949], the military-strategic concept of active defense was formally established, and it was continually used and developed during the military struggles to uphold the nation’s sovereignty and security. Upon entering the new historical period of reform and [end of page 41] opening up, faced with new changes such as the topics of the age, the strategic setup, and missions and tasks, the details of the military-strategic concept of active defense were enriched, becoming the master plan for planning and guiding the overall situation of the building and use of the armed forces, centered on war.

I. The formation and development of the thought about a strategy of active defense in the revolutionary wars period...42

From the creation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 to the establishment of New China in 1949, during the torrent of twenty-eight years of revolutionary war with its blood and fire, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, as represented by Mao
Zedong, led the people’s army to victoriously wage domestic revolutionary wars and wars against invasion, creatively proposing and developing the idea of a military strategy of active defense.

During the period of the Agrarian Revolution, the idea of a strategy of active defense centered on “luring the enemy in deep” was created, and this formed tactics in the strategy of people’s warfare, where guerrilla warfare predominated. Faced with repeated “encirclement and suppression” by a powerful enemy, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and others summarized the experiences of the Red Army’s initial operations and proposed the “sixteen-word formula” principles of operations where “when the enemy advances, we retreat, when the enemy stops, we harass, and when the enemy retreats, we attack.” In October 1930, Mao Zedong further proposed a concept of luring the enemy in deep in order to counter “encirclement and suppression.” Under the guidance of this concept, the Central Committee’s Red Army carried out flexible mobile warfare that had the nature of guerilla attacks, and it achieved victory in the four counter-“encirclement and harassment” operations. In December 1936, Mao Zedong issued The Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War, which concentrated and explored the characteristics of China’s revolutionary wars and the laws for guiding warfare, and which pointed out that what the Red Army’s operations adopted was active defense rather than passive defense; which discussed such issues as strategic retreat, strategic counterattack, the concentration of troop strengths, mobile warfare, rapid and decisive warfare, and warfare of annihilation; which revealed the spiritual essence and basic principles of the idea of a military strategy of active defense; and which marked the elevation of the idea of a strategy of active defense from a basic operational experience to a theory of military strategy.

During the War to Resist Japan, [the Chinese Communists] waged an overall concept of a “protracted warfare” strategy, carried out “basically a guerilla warfare, but without easing up on mobile warfare, under favorable conditions.” At the beginning of the War to Resist Japan, the Party’s Central Committee pointed out that it was necessary to comprehensively carry out a transformation in the military strategy of the entire Party and the entire army, that is, a transformation from a domestic conventional war to a guerilla war to resist Japan. At the Luochuan Conference of August 1937, Mao Zedong pointed out that the Chinese Communist military-strategic concept should be an independent and autonomous guerilla war in the mountain regions. What was referred to as “independent and autonomous” was relatively independent and autonomous command under conditions where there was a united front and joint consultation on strategic concepts. What was referred to as “mountain regions” meant first creating bases in mountain areas, relying upon the mountain regions to launch a guerilla war, and then developing toward the plains. [Finally,] what was referred to as a “guerilla war” meant to scatter in order to
mobilize the masses and to concentrate in order to annihilate the enemy; if they could win, [end of page 42] they would fight, but if they could not win, they would leave. In May 1938, Mao Zedong issued *On Protracted War*; on the basis of analyzing that the enemy was strong but the Chinese Communists were weak, that the enemy was withdrawing but [the Chinese Communists] were advancing, that there were few of the enemy but many of [the Chinese Communists], and that the enemy lacked morality and had little help but [the Chinese Communists] had morality and a great deal of help, he pointed out that the War to Resist Japan could only be a protracted war, and he predicted that the protracted war would pass through three stages: strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and strategic counterattack. He pointed out that in the first and second stages, they would carry out “offensive fighting for campaigns and combat within a strategic defense, rapid fighting for campaigns and combat within a protracted strategy, and operations along the outer lines for campaigns and combats within strategic inner lines.” The proposal of the idea of protracted warfare clarified the direction for winning victory in the War to Resist Japan, and it marked that the idea of a strategy of active defense had moved further toward maturity.

During the War of Liberation, [the Chinese Communists] adopted a strategic concept of “concentrating superior troop strengths and annihilating the enemy one by one,” and they abided by the “ten great military principles.” After the War to Resist [Japan] ended, the Party Central Committee made strategic deployments of “advancing toward the north and defending toward the south,” and it carried out a strategic transformation from guerilla warfare to mobile warfare. After full-scale civil war broke out, the Central Military Commission in September 1946 issued instructions to “concentrate superior troop strengths, and annihilate the enemy one by one;” it specified that relying upon favorable conditions in the liberated areas, [the Chinese Communist military was to] carry out operations along the outer lines in campaigns and combat within strategic inner lines; primarily concentrate troop strengths to fight mobile warfare, with guerilla warfare fought by dispersed troop strengths as a supplement; have annihilation of the enemy’s effective strengths as the main objective, and not to have defending or taking localities as the main objective; in each battle, it was to concentrate an absolute superiority in troop strengths, surround [the enemy] on all four sides, and strive to annihilate him; and it was to carry out protracted warfare strategically, but quick battles as regards campaigns and combat. In the second half of 1947, the People’s Liberation Army on every battlefield gradually shifted from strategic defense to strategic offense, and in December, Mao Zedong proposed his famous “ten military principles,” which had specific stipulations for programs of operations, for forms of operations, for methods of operations, for preparations for operations, for objectives of operations, and for styles of fighting. The essence of its spirit was to concentrate superior troop strengths in order to fight a battle of annihilation. The proposal of the “ten major military principles” formed a complete set of
theories for the strategy of active defense, and it provided correct strategic guidance for winning ultimate victory in the War of Liberation; this marked a comprehensive enrichment and major development of the idea of a strategy of active defense.

II. The establishment of the military theory of active defense after the founding of New China and adjustments to it and enrichment of it...43

After the founding of New China, the military strategy of active defense was always adhered to and implemented, and based on the adjustments and enrichment arising from major changes in the tasks and state of warfare that took shape in differing historical eras, the planning and guiding of the overall situation of the building and use of armed strengths, with warfare at its core, energetically defended and supported the nation’s security and development.

Establishing the military-strategic concept of active defense for protecting the fatherland. In the initial period of New China’s founding, a hundred things were [end of page 43] left undone: it faced economic blockade, military encirclement, diplomatic isolation, and political subversion by hostile forces, and it also underwent the grim test of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. Solidifying the newborn people’s regime, resisting possible invasion by foreign enemies, and overall planning for national defense and armed forces building, all strongly required an explicit concept for guiding military strategy. In April 1952, Vice Chairman of the General Staff Su Yu proposed, given the conditions that the contemporary engineering construction of national defense and the building of the services and service arms were not yet completely combined, that it was necessary to first determine an overall strategic concept for the PRC, and then afterwards, based on the strategic concept, to draft arrangements for national defense and plans for coordinating the various aspects. In March 1956, the Central Military Commissions held an expanded conference, and the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, made a report on “Regarding Issues for a Strategic Concept for Protecting the Fatherland and Building National Defense,” in which he pointed out that a strategic concept was a precondition that affected the drafting of plans of operations, training plans, and the work of preparing for war; it also was a precondition that affected the building of each service and service arm and the work plans for the various industrial sectors; and it also was an issue that affected the planning and arrangements for the PRC’s economic construction. Therefore, determining a strategic concept for the PRC military had become a pressing task for current military tasks. The conference formally determined a strategic plan for the fatherland’s active defense, and it clarified the principles for planning and guiding wars. The basic ideas were [as follows].

(1) To be prepared at any time to deal with surprise attacks and sudden incidents. (2) The main enemy was the United States, the main targets of operations were the US military
and the Japanese military, and the main strategic directions were the east and northeast of the PRC, North China and the Shandong Peninsula regions, that is, a line from the Tumen River and the Yalu River to Lianyungang. (3) Using the ground forces as the main actor and with coordination and cooperation from the air force and navy, to annihilate the enemy’s invading main forces on the PRC’s territory along its coastal regions, to stop the enemy’s attack in predetermined regions where defenses had been set up, to stabilize the battle lines, to destroy the enemy’s plans for a quick fight and a quick resolution, and to force the enemy into protracted operations, so that the PRC military would gradually shift over to the initiative strategically, and shift from strategic defense to strategic offense. [It was also] to adopt positional warfare combined with mobile warfare during the initial period of the war, using a form of operations that combined positional defensive warfare and mobile offensive warfare; in-depth hierarchical dispositions that would get a grasp on mobile units level by level, resolutely defend along important directions while luring the enemy in deep along secondary directions, use the main strategic mobile units along the main direction and at decisive moments, have the mobile units in defensive zones closely cooperate with garrison units, and have garrison units be prepared for independent operations.

Adjusting the military-strategic concepts based on resistance to a large-scale war of invasion. From the 1960s to the 1980s, in accordance with unified arrangements by the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, certain adjustments were made to the military-strategic concept. One feature in common with these adjustments was that they involved responding to a large-scale war of invasion against China by a powerful enemy and that they were aimed at resolving the critical issues of survival faced by the nation and the people [end of page 44] in this historical period and in a grim environment.

In February 1960, an expanded conference of the Central Military Commission proposed a program of “holding back [the Americans in South Korea and Japanese] in the north while luring in [Nationalist forces] in the south.” In the early 1960s, new changes appeared in China’s security situation; the rift in the Sino-Soviet alliance expanded, the United States’ military deployments in the PRC’s southeast coastal waters continually grew stronger, Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-shek clique’s harassment actions against the Mainland tended to become more active, and India’s armed provocative activities in the Sino-Indian border regions also increased daily. In February 1960, the expanded conference of the Central Military Commission proposed a concept of “holding back [the Americans in South Korea and Japanese] in the north while luring in [Nationalist forces] in the south.” The basic ideas were [as follows]. (1) Of the two possibilities that a large-scale war using nuclear [weapons] would be fought and that it would not be fought, the main [one] was that it would be fought, but it was necessary to strive to keep it from
being fought; a non-nuclear and small-scale war would certainly be fought. (2) The main enemy was the United States, and the main target of operations was the US military; the main strategic direction was still the northern region of China’s east, with a greater stress on the importance of the northeast region and the Shandong Peninsula (including Lianyungang), while at the same time there was also an emphasis on the important significance strategically of five island groups: the Waizhangshan islands, the Neizhangshan islands, the Choushan archipelago, the Wanshan archipelago, and Hainan Island. (3) Resolutely hold back the enemy’s attack in regions north of Lianyungang, while luring the enemy in deep in regions south of the Yangtze River, and after consuming the enemy to a certain extent, then first shift over to a counterattack from either the north or the south, as the situation warranted, and finally carry out a strategic pursuit and attack, recovering the territory that had been occupied, and then depending on the size of [the enemy’s] strengths, pursue and attack him beyond the borders. The “holding back [the enemy] in the north” region primarily involved positional warfare, while the “luring [the enemy] in deep in the south” region primarily involved mobile warfare.

The strategic concept of the mid-1960s prominently stressed “luring the enemy in deep.” Given that the US war in South Vietnam was escalating, that the Sino-Soviet relationship had ruptured, and that the situation in the Sino-Indian border regions was grim, the national security environment had further worsened. Mao Zedong believed that the United States, the Soviet Union, and India might jointly launch a military attack against the PRC, and thus the guiding ideas based on “fight early, fight hard, and fight a nuclear war” emerged; [Mao] gave instructions a number of times that the strategic concept needed to respond to “all directions” and to resist possible invasions by foreign enemies along multiple strategic directions. It was necessary to focus both on holding back and luring the enemy, to lure the enemy in deep, and to annihilate the enemy in depth. He conceived of the possibility that the enemy would attack along four directions – Tianjin, Qingdao, Lianyungang, and Shanghai – and as regards the method of fighting, he emphasized that only by luring the enemy in deep would it be possible to fight well; moreover, he expected that the first and second depths for annihilating the enemy would primarily involve annihilating large numbers of the enemy in northern China and on the Central Plains. During this period, he judged that the main enemy and the main target of operations would be the US military, while the secondary one would be the Soviet military. At the end of the 1960s, as the Soviet Union’s threat to the PRC grew, the Soviet military became the main target of operations, and the main strategic direction shifted from the east to the north, with northern China being the “three norths” region [of Northwest China, North China, and Northeast China] that was to be focused on; the strategic mission shifted from primarily defending against a large-scale US invasion (and particularly defense against the United States carrying out a breakthrough in the middle)
to primarily defending against a large-scale invasion by the Soviet Union. [end of page 45]

In 1977, the strategic concept of “active defense and luring the enemy in deep” was drafted. Upon entering the mid- and late 1970s, major changes appeared in the PRC-U.S.-Soviet triangular relationship; after the Cultural Revolution in the PRC ended, there was an urgent need to unify the understanding of the entire Party and the entire military, to clarify the military-strategic concept, and to resolve the issue of how to fight future battles. In October 1977, the Central Military Commission established a Commission on Strategy, specifically to study and resolve the issue of strategy. In December of that same year, a plenary conference of the Central Military Commission summarized how the strategic concept had been revised and changed since the 1960s, it focused on resisting a large-scale Soviet invasion, and it proposed the strategic concept of “active defense and luring the enemy in deep.” Its basic ideas were [as follows]. (1) Soviet hegemonism is the most dangerous source of war and the greatest threat to the PRC’s national security, and so the main strategic direction was still the “three norths” region, and the Soviet military was still the PRC’s main target of operations. (2) The PRC military’s strategic goal and task was to respond to a large-scale Soviet war that invaded the PRC; the most important thing in the early period of a war would be to pulverize the enemy’s strategic assault, preserve the PRC military’s effective strengths, prevent the enemy from driving straight in, shield the nation as it shifted to a wartime system, and subsequently lure the enemy in deep in a planned manner to a preset battlefield; then as the situation warranted, [the PRC] would concentrate superior troop strengths and annihilate the enemy one by one through mobile warfare with differing scales, assisted by necessary positional warfare and guerilla warfare.

In 1980, the strategic concept of “active defense” was again clarified. In the process of implementing the strategic concept of “active defense and luring the enemy in deep” that the Central Military Commission had determined in 1977, many high-ranking military cadre felt that the limitations of dealing with a future large-scale anti-invasion war by strategically luring the enemy in deep were becoming increasingly highlighted. They believed that the initial period of a war that lured the enemy in deep could be one of the means of operations for active defense, but it was not a universal guiding principle for the overall management of the entire process of the war. The regions along the PRC’s four borders mostly have mountainous lands to act as a shield; some political, economic, and military key points are also located along the strategic frontier, and luring the enemy in deep means opening up completely and thereby eliminating an indispensable defense that must be adhered to during the strategic defensive stage; not only would [the PRC] lose favorable positions, but its war potential would also be greatly weakened, so that the strategic counterattack would lose its solid material base. There were new developments
in the forms of warfare; local wars of mutilation \( jubu zhijie zhanzheng \), proxy wars, and wars involving quick fights and quick withdrawals had appeared, and luring the enemy in deep probably would play right into the enemy’s hands. The substantial resources of the PRC’s socialist economic construction were increasing daily, and some important construction projects were located along the strategic forefront or the campaign depths region, and it would not be easy to give them up without repeated struggles, which would have major drawbacks and few benefits for a war’s development. Against this background, Deng Xiaoping clearly favored having the strategic concept be the two words “active defense.” The Central Military Commission’s “801” Conference transformed the strategic concept of “active defense and drawing the enemy in deep” into the strategic concept of “active defense,” and it gave a new explanation. The new strategic concept of “active defense” focused on large-scale operations for defending national territory; it still had the Soviet military as [end of page 46] the main target of operations, it had the “three norths” region as the main strategic direction, it emphasized setting up defenses at key points and garrisons at key points, and it stressed the status of the initial period of a war. [It stressed] that within the beginning three to six months of a war, [the PRC] would concentrate on a defensive war that firmly held to positions, supplemented by small- and medium-scale mobile warfare that would not be far from the positions and by wide-ranging guerilla warfare, resolutely withstanding the enemy’s strategic assaults, preventing the enemy from driving straight in, preserving effective strengths and war potential, stabilizing the war situation, and shielding the country as it shifted to a wartime system, thus winning time and creating conditions for the subsequent annihilation of the enemy in large numbers and in a planned manner.

Transforming the military-strategic concept, with an eye on winning local wars. In the mid-1980s, Deng Xiaoping made a new strategic appraisal of the issues of war and peace, and he believed that peace and development were the themes of the age, and that a world war could be avoided. In 1985, an expanded conference of the Central Military Commission made a decision to carry out a strategic transformation of the guiding thought for national defense and armed forces building. The PRC military would shift from a state of being on the verge of war to the path of building in a peaceful period, shift from preparing to fight total war to preparing to fight local wars, and shift from having war-readiness as the core to having modernized building as the core. The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, with Jiang Zemin at the core, carried out major adjustments to the military-strategic concept, based on profound changes to the international strategic setup and the national security environment, as well as developmental trends in the world’s new military changes and the evolution of the state of warfare. In January 1993, an expanded conference of the Central Military Commission established the military-strategic concept of active defense
for the new era, and in June 2004 it again enriched and improved this military-strategic concept.

In the new era, the military-strategic concept still maintains the basic spirit of active defense; at the same time, it has also enriched and expanded its connotations of the age. First, it has transformed the way of doing things that was originally established, of “fighting early, fighting hard, and fighting a nuclear war” against the enemy. It proposes putting the focus of preparations for a military struggle on winning a modern technological local war, and especially one under high-tech conditions; afterwards, it again further stresses that the focus is on winning a local war under informationized conditions. Second, it has broken through the original limitations where it was primarily to deal with a war of invasion, and primarily involved strategic guidance for the initial period of a war, and has proposed the strategic tasks of protecting the nation’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, of upholding the fatherland’s unity and social stability, and of providing powerful security guarantees for reform and opening up and for modernized construction. Third, based on major changes in the strategic threat, it has adjusted the main strategic direction and main target of operations in a timely manner, clarified the strategic opponent, and made preparations for a military conflict more focused. Fourth, on the basis that originally stressed being able to win a war, it has further strengthened the idea of restraining war, and as regards strategic guidance, it emphasizes restraining crises, controlling the war situation, winning a war, and maintaining peace. Fifth, as regards basic operational thought, it has broken through the fetters of the model of mechanized warfare and proposed the idea of a “sabotage and strike warfare against systems” that corresponds to the basic laws of local wars under informationized conditions. [end of page 47] Sixth, with an eye on achieving the strategic objectives of building an informationized military and winning an informationized war, it has clarified the guiding principles of the military’s modernized building and its preparations for a military struggle.

III. The basic spirit of the military strategy of active defense...48

Since the founding of New China, the military strategy of active defense has passed through a number of adjustments; although there have been some changes to its contents and forms during differing historical periods, its basic spirit has always been consistent. This has been determined by the PRC’s nature of being a socialist country, its defensive national defense policies, and its independent and peaceful diplomatic policies; it is the essence of the strategic thought of the PRC military, which has undergone the experiences of war; and it corresponds to the conditions of the state and the conditions of the military and is also conducive to maintaining the initiative politically. Therefore, it must be maintained for a long period of time, and it must be flexibly used in conjunction
with the development of military practices. Considering things historically, the basic spirit of the military strategy of active defense is concentrated and manifested [as follows].

Adhere to a position of self-defense and stay with striking back. The basic goal of China’s military-strategic concept of active defense is to defend the nation’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity; it has always treated resisting invasion, protecting the fatherland, and protecting the people’s peaceful work as the basic tasks of the armed strengths, rather than these [tasks] being the launching of wars, arms races, and aggressive expansion. Strategically, it has adhered to a position of self-defense and has stayed with striking back, but this does not preclude preemptive strikes as regards campaigns and combats; making thorough preparations in peacetime for military fighting, and being vigilant; as soon as there is an invasion from abroad, it will quickly make a vigorous response and make a counterattack and win. This is what Mao Zedong called, “if people do not attack us, we will not attack them; if people attack us, we inevitably will attack them.” Politically, justice will be on our side, and militarily, we will [make sure] we have victory first and then fight.

Combine strategic defense with campaign and tactical offense. Active defense is an offensive defense and not an exclusively defensive defense; its essence is that under the premise of strategic defense, it focuses on a combination of offense and defense and it supplements defense with offense. Just as Mao Zedong said, our warfare is the use of defense and offense by turns. For us, we can say either that offense comes after defense or that offense comes before defense. Active defense is manifested in two areas during the use of actual combat. The first is that operations are organically combined in that they are defensive as regards strategy and offensive as regards campaigns and combat, protracted as regards strategy and rapid as regards campaigns and combat, and internal lines as regards strategy and external lines as regards campaigns and combat. They use the external lines of campaigns and combat for quick attacks, gradually weakening the enemy, reversing the combat situation, and achieving the goals of strategic defense. The second is that strategic defense is organically combined with strategic counterattack and strategic offense, carrying out a strategic transformation at an appropriate time based on developments and changes in the situation; they thus guide strategic defense toward a strategic counterattack or strategic offense, and fully utilize the advantageous situation [end of page 48] created by strategic defense; through a decisive strategic counterattack, they transform that defensive status of the overall situation; and they then develop it into a strategic offense and completely win victory in the war.

Operations are based upon fully taking the initiative. For a fairly long period of history, the Chinese Communist military mostly had conditions where the enemy was strong and
it was weak, but it was able to use weak strengths to engage powerful enemies with a dauntless revolutionary spirit and a firm strategic will, it dared to use what was inferior to defeat what was superior, and it dared to use what was weak to defeat what was strong. What this was based upon was what Mao Zedong spoke of: “Despise the enemy strategically, but take the enemy seriously tactically,” “You fight your way, and we’ll fight our way,” “If you can fight and win, then fight, but if you cannot win, then leave,” and “strive to seize the initiative, and strive to avoid being put on the defensive.” That is, firmly carry out highly flexible mobile strategies and tactics where we predominate; seize strategic hubs to deploy for campaigns, and seize campaign hubs to deploy for combat; appear where the enemy does not expect it and attack where the enemy is not prepared; carry out decisive battles that are advantageous, while avoiding battles that are not advantageous; concentrate superior troop strengths to annihilate the enemy one by one; seize and hold the military’s freedom of action; and using a number of local superiorities and local initiatives, gradually create strategic superiority and a strategic initiative, change what is inferior into what is superior, change being on the defensive into taking the initiative, and achieve the strategic objective of annihilating the enemy and preserving yourself.

Based upon the most complex and most difficult circumstances, strive for the best possibilities. Mao Zedong stressed that if you make thorough preparations, the enemy probably will not come, but if you are not well-prepared, that enemy probably will come. Active defense requires that war preparations be based upon the most difficult and most complicated situations in order to get the best results; do not fight a battle for which you are not prepared, and do not fight a battle that you are not certain about. War is filled with probabilities and uncertainties, and it is necessary to give a great deal of thought to various types of circumstances and to have a lot of preparation. As was said in Sunzi’s Art of War, “Do not rely on the likelihood that the enemy will not come, but on your own readiness to receive him.” Planning and deployment for operations require having a more complete grasp of the enemy’s conditions, having a more complete estimation of difficulties, having more vigorous preparations in advance for room to maneuver, ensuring that you are situated in a place where you will not be defeated, and striving to first be sure of victory and then afterwards seeking a fight. In peacetime it is especially necessary to be vigilant in order to continually expand preparations for military conflict; it is preferable to be prepared and not fight, but it is definitely impossible to fight if you are not prepared; and it is better to make a great deal of preparation and fight [just] a little, but it is definitely impossible to fight a great deal if you have [only] a little preparation.

The dialectical unity of restraining war and winning war. The military strategy of active defense not only needs to keep an eye on winning victory in war and to resolve the issue
of how to be prepared to fight and how to fight, but it also has to keep an eye on effective restraint of warfare, and resolve the issue of how to avoid fighting and stop fighting. The strategic concept of active defense that was established in 1956 contained the idea of restraining war, and even more, the military-strategic concept for the new era had restraining war and winning war listed as basic strategic requirements. Restraint of war combined the development of the strategy and tactics of people’s warfare with powerful conventional strengths, reserve strengths, new types of operational strengths, and limited but effective nuclear strengths, based on the nation’s strategic needs; it combined the military struggle with the political and diplomatic [end of page 49] struggle; and it strove to subdue the enemy’s troops without fighting. At the same time, restraining war required having sufficient preparations and reliable capabilities, materially and spiritually, to win the war; once the war was unavoidable, you should resolutely make your opening move, using war to stop war.

Soldiers and the people are the source of victory. Mao Zedong pointed out that the most solid source of power exists among the masses. The strategy of active defense is the product of people’s warfare, and launching a people’s war is the basic condition by which the strategy of active defense brings its role into play. Combining active defense and people’s warfare requires upholding the just nature of the war, fighting for the basic interests of the masses of the people, and getting the endorsement and support of the masses of the people. It requires being skilled at widespread mobilization and organizing the masses of the people to participate in and assist the war, and transforming war potential into actual war strength in an effective manner. [Finally,] it requires keeping combat by the armed strengths closely coordinated with combat that is not done by the armed strengths, and keeping the military coordinated with the various political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural battle lines, thereby giving shape to the overall power of people’s warfare. In the current age, it is not only necessary to conform to the trends in the world’s military development and to upgraded weapons and equipment, and to reform the organizational system and organizational structure of the military, but it is also necessary to continually develop the strategy and tactics of people’s warfare, to constantly innovate the organizational system and mechanisms by which the military and the people are integrated, and to foster and build up the most solid power of people’s warfare under informationized conditions.

Section 3: Military Strategies of the Major Powers in the Contemporary World…50

I. The United States’ military strategy...50

The United States has been established for over 200 years, and its military strategy has passed through a process of development from having nothing to having something, and
from being fragmented to being systematic. The study of the things that have been regular \{dai quyuxing\} in its military strategy, and especially in its military strategy following the Second World War, helps us to understand and get a grasp on the essential characteristics of US military strategy and of its developmental trends.

For more than half a century after the end of the Second World War, the world was trapped in a Cold War situation where the United States and the Soviet Union struggled for hegemony. The United States’ military strategy underwent five fairly major transformations, which primarily were the Truman administration’s “containment” strategy (1945 to 1952), the Eisenhower administration’s “massive retaliation” strategy (1953 to 1960), the Kennedy-Johnson administrations’ “flexible responsive” strategy (1961 to 1968), the Nixon-Ford-Carter administrations’ “real deterrence” strategy, and the Reagan administration’s “new flexible responsive” strategy (1981-1988). [end of page 50] During this period, the US military strategy always had containment of the Soviet Union as its basic orientation, it had the Soviet military as its main target of operations, it established a global network of military bases and a system of alliances, and against a background of “mutually assured destruction” nuclear deterrence, it adopted a form where strategic encirclement and proxy wars were combined; it exerted strategic pressure against the Soviet Union for a long period of time, and with an eye on defeating a large-scale attack against Europe by the Soviet military, it proposed the concept of air-land warfare.

From the end of the Cold War to the beginning of the 21st century, the basic orientation of the United States’ military strategy has been to use the dividends of the Cold War to solidify and expand its global hegemony. This mainly has been the “regional defense” strategy of the George H. W. Bush administration, the “flexible and selective engagement” strategy of the first Clinton administration, and the “shape, respond, and prepare” strategy of the second Clinton administration. Its main points included ensuring that after the Cold War, the United States enjoyed the ability for strategic depths, for effective prevention and control over nuclear proliferation and for dealing with various types of nuclear threats, for actively building strategic defense systems for dealing with ballistic missile attacks, for adjusting and reducing deployment of overseas troop strengths, for maintaining the US military’s forward presence in crucial world regions, and for developing the ability to rely upon its own territory to quickly deploy troop strengths in order to deal with overseas regional conflicts. It pursued a concept for simultaneously fighting and winning two large-scale regional wars, it stressed first concentrating its main troop strengths to fight one large-scale regional war, while at the same time separating a small number of troop strengths to get involved in the second war, and after waiting for victory in the first war, to then lead troops in winning the second war.
In 2001, not long after George W. Bush took office, the 9-11 incident happened; relying upon the global anti-terror situation, he launched the Iraq War and the Afghanistan War, and he drafted the military strategy of “protect, prevent, and prevail,” which had very much of a preemptive tint. He listed international terrorism, headed by al Qaeda, as the main actual threat, he determined that protecting the security of the US homeland was the main strategic objective, and at the same time, he emphasized molding a favorable security environment, preventing and deterring conflicts, protecting military access to crucial regions, protecting the security of strategic thoroughfares at sea, and winning unavoidable wars. He carried out an adjustment to overseas military forces that was the largest in scale since the Second World War. In Europe, he reduced the garrisons in Western Europe and expanded the deployments of troop strengths toward Eastern Europe. In the western Pacific region he strengthened the US-Japanese military alliance, increased the ability to command and control US forces stationed in Japan, moved the US forces stationed in South Korea southward in stages, and at the same time reinforced Navy and Air Force troop strengths in Guam. In the Central Asia region he used the opportunity of the Afghanistan War to establish a number of military bases and to reinforce the [US] military presence. He intensified a new generation of weapons testing and sped up construction of the Asia-Pacific regional anti-missile system. He stressed transforming the model for building up the military from being “based on threats” to “being based on capabilities;” he comprehensively promoted military transformation, and he tried to build a joint military that could effectively respond to various uncertain threats.

After [Barack] Obama took office in 2009, faced with a severe situation that was mired in two wars and a financial crisis, he advocated “smart power,” he produced a “non-nuclear” theory, and as regards military strategy, he focused on “winning the current wars, preventing and deterring conflicts, and being prepared to defeat enemies,” and he carried out a series of important adjustments. He shifted from relying purely on military attacks to seeking comprehensive security, he shifted from unilateralist security thought to relying more on a system of global alliances, and he shifted from an emphasis on counterterrorism to paying attention to both current threats and future challenges. He began to withdraw from the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, and he shifted the focus of his strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region and especially to the western Pacific direction, a “rebalancing” strategy, which was very much focused in nature, and a concept of “air-sea battle” operations. At the same time that he advocated reducing the role of nuclear weapons, he emphasized continuing to maintain the United States’ nuclear superiority. At the same time that he solidified and expanded its superiority in conventional strengths, he vigorously developed new types of operational strengths, such as outer space and network [strengths].
Taking a macroscopic look at the post-war evolution in US military strategy, it is possible to see its basic strategic pursuits and characteristics.

First, it has expansion and domination as the basic objectives of its military strategy. Winning independence, then solidifying the regime, then continental expansion, then overseas expansion, then struggling with other countries for dominion, and then dominating the world, has been the basic thread of thought in the development of the United States’ military strategy. In US history, its military strategy during the War of Independence and the Civil War periods had the nature of winning independence and solidifying the regime. In 1846, the United States instigated the Mexican-American War, which marked the start of the United States engaging in a strategy of continental expansion. Beginning with the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States broke with the tradition of an “isolationist” strategy that had been established by [George] Washington when the country was founded, and took the first steps toward a global strategic expansion; it relied upon its advantageous geopolitical situation of being a “world island” and its overall national power that was the envy of the world to use the two world wars and carry out a historic transformation from a regional power in the Americas to a world superpower. After the Second World War, although the US military strategy switched a number of times, there was always the same strain as regards the strategic objective, which was to seek and solidify its position of world dominance. After the Cold War ended, the United States became the sole superpower, and successive administrations treated solidifying the United States’ global hegemony and preventing, containing, and suppressing strategic forces that posed a challenge to it, as the basic pursuit in its military strategy.

Second, it maintains powerful military strengths that overwhelm all opponents. The United States has always engaged in power politics, stressing that military strengths are the core of its actual power. During the Cold War, the United States always treated engaging in an arms competition with the Soviet Union and achieving superiority over the Soviet Union in arms as the core task of its defensive policies. After the Cold War ended, the United States believed that the security environment it faced was even more complex and that its opponents were even more varied, and it gave greater emphasis to turning the US military into a military that could do anything and win any war; it paid more attention to seeking technical superiority, emphasized staying ahead {dai nei cha} of its allies, and maintaining a “generation gap” with its opponents. [end of page 52] As regards the objectives of its military buildup, the US Department of Defense in 2000 proposed the concept of “full-spectrum superiority,” which was that in all military actions, it would be able to coordinate the defeat of opponents, alone or together with multinational units and across agencies. In 2001, it again proposed the concept of a “military that can do anything,” requiring that the component parts of the various services
and various military strengths have comprehensive military capabilities, that they not only could create an international security environment favorable to the United States, carry out small-scale emergency-response operations, and win large-scale theater of war wars, but that they also could deal with asymmetrical threats. As regards the principles of building up the military, the US Department of Defense after the 9-11 incident proposed a theory of “a national defense that was based on capabilities.” It believed that faced with a number of uncertain future threats, only by having corresponding capabilities would it be able to deal effectively with them, regardless of who the enemy was and where the threat was coming from. Against this background, the US Army proposed the principle of “multifunction,” stressing that it would be able to carry out any task, in all spheres of military action and at the strategic, campaign, and tactical levels, and that it would be able to quickly transfer from one region to another region, to shift from one type of operations to another type of operations, and to shift from one task to another task, and that it would also be able to switch from war operations to non-war military activities.

Third, it has Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia as its key strategic regions. For more than sixty years after the war, the United States consistently treated Western Europe and East Asia as its strategic bridgeheads, and treated the arc-shaped zone along the periphery of the Eurasian continent, from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia to South Asia to the Middle East to the Balkans, as a geopolitical battleground. During the Cold War period, the United States treated Europe as the key area for its overseas military deployment; after the Cold War ended, even though it reduced its garrison in Western Europe, it still strengthened its military cooperation with its NATO allies, pushed for NATO to expand east, and supported NATO’s bringing its role and influence into play beyond Europe. During the Cold War period, the United States viewed the greater Middle East region as an important battle line in its struggle with the Soviet Union; after the Cold War ended, the United States believed that anti-U.S. forces in this region were gaining ground and that the threat of a combination of terrorism and a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was rising. One after the other, it launched the Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War in this region, further seeking to control West Asia and North Africa in the midst of the turbulent situation of this strategic region. At the same time, the United States viewed East Asia and the western Pacific as an area that was closely tied to its national interests, and it consistently treated them as one of the key directions for its overseas military deployment. Upon entering the second decade of the new century, as the emerging major Asian-Pacific states sped up their rise, the United States shifted the focus of its military strategy toward the East Asian and western Pacific region, continually improved the US-Japanese-South Korean military alliance system, and expanded it to Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Australia, further improving the air defense and anti-missile capabilities of this system and its abilities for naval and air attacks.
Fourth, it carried out military deployments for “a global presence plus reinforcement from the homeland.” After the Second World War, in order to support its global deterrence and operations, the United States adopted a global military deployment that had its homeland as the strategic rear area and overseas theaters of war [end of page 53] as its forefront. Its basic idea was to deploy the main forces of its strategic nuclear strengths and conventional strengths in its homeland, using the homeland as a support, while at the same time deploying necessary troop strengths overseas, in order to carry out a forward deployment; as soon as a war broke out, the homeland strategic reserves would reinforce the forward-deployed units for operations. During the Cold War, the United States carried out a “forward defense;” it organized regional military alliances, entered into bilateral and multilateral military agreements with a number of nations, and established military bases overseas. After the Cold War ended, the United States changed “forward defense” into “forward presence” and reduced its overseas garrisons, but it still stressed maintaining a certain number of forward garrisons in Western Europe, the Middle East, South Korea, Japan, and other key regions, and it maintained its overseas military presence through such forms as alliance treaties, joint military exercises, pre-positioned equipment, providing military assistance, and helping to train host countries’ militaries. At the same time as this, it treated the strategic nuclear strengths and conventional strengths that were deployed in the homeland as a backup, using the strategic nuclear strengths to prevent nuclear attacks and large-scale conventional attacks against the United States and its allies, and treating the conventional active-duty units and reserve units stationed in the homeland as central reserves, with an emphasis on strengthening the quick reaction capabilities of the homeland strategic reserves in order to deal with regional crises and conflicts; these would rely on strategic means of air and sea transportation for quick deployment as needed, reinforcing units stationed along the front lines at any time, so as to strengthen their ability for sustained operations.

Fifth, it actively promoted integration of its alliances. Since the end of the Second World War, successive US administrations have pursued a strategy of integrating security policies and alliances, and they have stressed that “collective security is the pillar of grand strategy” and “powerful alliances are an important component part of US military strategy.” Starting in 1947, the United States has organized regional military alliances, and it has entered into bilateral and multilateral military agreements with over forty countries. After the end of the Cold War, the United States further emphasized its strategy of alliances, and it tried to form a system of alliances in many spheres and at many levels that would have itself as the core and NATO and the Treaty [of Mutual Cooperation and] Security between Japan and the United States as its basis; it emphasized having Western values and joint economic strengths as the basis for ensuring collective security; it upheld interchanges with its allies in the areas of command, control, communications, and intelligence; it provided assistance to its allies in the areas of
weapons and equipment, training and education, bases and installation, and control over crucial regions; it intensified carrying out joint military exercises with the militaries of its allies in each region and especially in Asia and the Pacific; and it incrementally urged its allies’ militaries to move closer to the US military in such areas as their systems of operations, theories of operations, and forms of operations, and forms of their militaries’ organization, thus laying a seamless technical and organizational foundation for future joint operations.

II. Russia’s military strategy...54

After the end of the Cold War, Russia, as the inheritor of the Soviet Union’s huge military legacy, became a military power [end of page 54] in the contemporary world that was second only to the United States; to a certain extent, it continued on with the quintessence of the Soviet Union’s military strategy, and based on the conditions of the times and on developments and changes in its national interests, it formed a new system of military strategy that had “a Russian Federation military doctrine” as its core.

From the end of the Second World War to the early 1990s, developments in the Soviet Union’s military strategy underwent four periods: Stalin, [Nikita] Khrushchev, [Leonid] Brezhnev, and [Mikhail] Gorbachev. The core was to protect vested interests, to expand the scope of its power, and to actively constrain US hegemonism. From the mid-1950s to the 1960s, it was based on fighting a nuclear war with rockets. Its views on the role of nuclear warfare and nuclear weapons underwent a major transformation in the 1970s, and it paid more and more attention to local conventional wars that had nuclear deterrence as a backup. After Gorbachev took power in the mid-1980s, he believed that “nuclear war would annihilate all of human civilization, that non-nuclear war would also create destructive consequences that would be about the same as those of nuclear war, and that there would be no victor in a future global nuclear conflict and a world war,” and he emphasized that preventing and avoiding war would be his primary task. He proposed the “five noes” principle,14 which would treat “non-offensive type defense” as the basic type of military operations, limit military operations to its own territory, abandon preemptive and surprise attack methods of operations, comprehensively reduce its strategic deployments, and withdraw most of its overseas garrisons and military bases.

14 That [the Soviet Union] would not be the first to start military operations and would not be the first to employ nuclear weapons, under any conditions; that it would not draft, that it would not control, and it would not use surprise attacks or preemptive strike operations aimed at any enemy; that it would not be the first to carry out pre-planned assaults against an enemy’s major cities, cultural centers, and a series of other civilian targets; that it would primarily resist incursions through actions that fight back, which mostly would be defensive and counterattack operations; and that it would not specify and under many conditions would even eliminate from the start the possibility of launching a large-scale offensive campaign.
At the beginning of the 1990s, Russian military strategy made a sharp turn. The Yeltsin administration remolded its national defense organizational system and model of [military] building, based on its ideological and political needs. Because it harbored unrealistic fantasies about the United States and NATO, deviations appeared in its judgment of actual and potential threats; in addition, because of turmoil in the domestic political situation and because national power sharply declined, [Boris] Yeltsin added the “three noes”\(^\text{15}\) principle on the basis of Gorbachev’s “five noes” principle; this seriously weakened military morale, and the strategic role played by the military was greatly restricted. Its military strategy was criticized as being “a strategy of death [end of page 55] by which the state would be predestined to inevitable defeat in future wars.”\(^\text{16}\) In 1993, Yeltsin changed course and established guiding thought for strategy that combined offense and defense, abandoned his promise to not be the first to use nuclear weapons, cancelled his concept not to use the military to respond to domestic turmoil, and proposed that nuclear weapons could be used in carrying out assaults involving fighting back, engagements, and preemptive [strikes]. He stressed the prevention of war in any form, of any scale, and of any type; he [stressed] adopting defensive- and offensive-type defense actions, proceeding from the principle of “sufficient defense;” and he [stressed] striving to end wars within the shortest amount of time and with the fewest losses. In 1995, Russia’s Ministry of Defense drafted a *Strategic Concept for Dealing with Main Foreign Threats to Russia’s National Security*, which “defined NATO as the main external threat and potential enemy.” In 1996, Yeltsin pointed out in the *President’s State of the Nation Address* that [Russia] would not seek to maintain parity with other powers in terms of the numbers of weapons and armed forces, but to carry out a “real containment” strategy that used [Russia’s] own armed forces to resolutely counterattack invasion as its basis.

After [Vladimir] Putin was elected president of the Russian Federation in 2000, he actively revived national power and military strength, and required that the armed forces must be able to contain in an effective manner threats of nuclear attacks against Russia and the members of its collective security organizations, to contain in an effective manner foreign countries or blocs of countries from using conventional weapons to carry out a large-scale invasion of Russia and its allies, and to carry out regional wars, local wars, and peacekeeping operations in an effective manner. In 2002, he proposed a strategy of “strategic mobility that relies upon nuclear containment;” and he advocated pursuing a

\(^{15}\) That Russia would not view any nation as its own enemy, that it would not view any country that pursued a differing political system or any neighboring country including those that had separated from the Soviet Union as a potential enemy, and that it would not use its armed forces and other military forces against any country; only when the Russian Federation and its citizens, territory, armed forces, or allies came under armed attack would it be necessary to carry out independent or collective self-defense.

“preemptive” program, drafted the strategic idea of “simultaneously winning two armed conflicts or local wars, and clarified that when national security faced a critical situation, “it was possible to use nuclear weapons to fight back against a large-scale conventional invasion,” and that [Russia] “retained the right to carry out a preemptive nuclear strike.” He required that elite, highly effective, and highly mobile conventional units be built up, and that when necessary, these would carry out rapid strategic movement, in order to win armed conflicts and local wars in peripheral regions.

[Dmitry] Medvedev took power in 2008 and he approved, one after another, such documents as Russian National Security Strategy up until 2020 and the 2010 Russian Federation Military Doctrine; this further enriched and improved military strategy, forming a strategy of “flexible reaction under practical containment.” First, as regards his appraisal of threats, he believed that external threats were greater than domestic threats, and he viewed the United States and NATO as the primary strategic opponent. Second, as regards preparations for war, he focused on preparing to fight local wars and armed conflicts; [he focused] on joint operations by the various services and service arms along the strategic direction as the main form of operations; [he focused] on having the navy, air force, air defense units, and strategic missile forces be responsible for resisting enemy air raids and missile assaults; and [he focused] on organizing coastal defense operations, striving to resist the enemy at sea [end of page 56] and having the ground forces carry out campaigns to resist landings and defensive campaigns in border regions, in cooperation with the navy and air force, thus resisting invasion by foreign enemies. Third, as regards the strategic setup, he established four major military area commands – the west, south, central, and east – with the west, south, and east as the main strategic directions, and he established corresponding joint strategic headquarters. The focus of deployment in the western military area command was the space defense strengths and the strategic attack strengths, for responding to aerospace attacks, sea and air blockades, and anti-missile operations that the United States and NATO could launch; the focus of deployment in the southern military area command was mobile and flexible mountain units and airborne units, for responding to low- and medium-intensity armed conflicts and for carrying out counterterrorism operations or peacekeeping operations; the focus of deployment in the eastern military area command was powerful sea and land operations strengths, for dealing with the United States’ “return to the Asia-Pacific region” and the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan over the Southern Kuril Islands; and the central military area command was for strategic reserves, which were prepared to support the other military area commands at any time and to also take into account the Central Asian direction. Fourth, as regards strategic strengths, these would carry out both nuclear containment and non-nuclear containment, and nuclear strengths and aerospace defense strengths were treated as the two main pillars that protected national security. They maintained a powerful nuclear containment capability and situation, they optimized the
“triad” nuclear strengths structure, they focused on developing new kinds of land-based and submarine-based strategic nuclear missile strengths, they further lowered the threshold for using nuclear weapons, they announced that “not only was it possible to use nuclear weapons in a nuclear war and large-scale conventional war, but it was also possible to use them when coming under any kind of aggression in any form by conventional weapons that threaten the existence of the nation,” and “nuclear weapons not only are used to protect national security but they also can be used when allied nations’ survival was threatened.” With an eye on responding to aerospace threats that were daily increasing, they drafted a “national aerospace defense concept,” established an aerospace defense unit, established a unified national aerospace defense system, and expanded from traditional air defense to integrated air defense and space defense. Fifth, as regards a model for building up the military, they shifted from a model that mobilized for a major war to a standing mobile model. This required thoroughly abandoning the heavy military that had been established since the Second World War for dealing with large-scale warfare, and promoting reforms for a “new face of the armed forces,” and it sped up making the command organizational system flat and networked, miniaturizing and modularizing the structure of the military, and making logistics support social and integrated. They intensified the research and development of weapons and equipment, gave priority to upgrading existing strategic missile systems, and intensified research and development of new types of strategic missiles, space monitoring systems, anti-satellite systems, intelligence and reconnaissance support and combat command systems, supersonic weapons, and future aerospace (including unmanned aerial vehicle) systems. They also carried out shipbuilding plans and constructed platforms for joint operations. Sixth, as regards joint strategy, they actively built military alliances within the scope of the Commonwealth of Independent States, in order to counterbalance the squeezing and infiltration that the United States and NATO did against the scope of [Russia’s] traditional strengths, relieve the pressure of the geopolitical struggle, and strengthen control over the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Taking an overall view of the development of Russia’s military strategy over more than twenty years, its basic characteristics include [the following].

First, it has shifted from a global military strategy to a regional military strategy. The collapse of the Soviet Union [end of page 57] caused Russia’s economic and military power to precipitately contract; the unified economic spaces and strategic spaces of the former Soviet Union that were centered on Russia no longer existed, its territory and population had plummeted, and some former political, economic, and military centers had overnight become the strategic front lines, while the Baltic Sea and Black Sea corridors that Tsarist Russia had fought over for several centuries had again narrowed. Against this background, Russia had no way to continue to engage in a worldwide
military competition and strategic confrontation with the United States; it had to tailor itself, reduce its military spending, cut back on the scale of its military, pull back on its strategic deployments, restrain the sphere and scope in which its military strengths were used, and shift to carrying out a regional military strategy with defense of the homeland at its core.

Second, it has resolutely used military strengths to uphold national interests. As a warlike nation, Russia has a vivid tradition of a nation that was founded and strengthened by war; as soon as its national interests and the scope of its influence are threatened, it has never hesitated to use military means to protect itself, and it has molded its image as an inviolable and tough country, deterring real and potential opponents. In the ending stage of the Kosovo Campaign, Yeltsin suddenly sent troops to occupy the airfield there, thus declaring Russia’s strategic influence in the Balkan Peninsula. During the two Chechen wars, it had repeated setbacks and repeated fights under conditions where the national conditions had hit rock bottom, [but] it never gave up until it reached its goal. It used the opportunity of the Olympics in 2008 to launch a blitzkrieg style assault against Georgia, smashing the United States’ and NATO’s deployments and intentions to squeeze Russia’s strategic space.

Third, it has advocated offensive and defensive operations that take the initiative. Russia’s military history, its culture that pursues absolute security, and its traditional strategic thought have determined that its military strategy has a distinct tint of taking the offensive; even though in certain historical periods it has emphasized defense, this has been a transitory choice forced upon it by its national power. When Russia was first established as a nation, although Yeltsin continued Gorbachev’s “purely defensive” military strategy for a while, he very quickly abandoned [this strategy]. After entering the 21st century, Putin stressed a strategic orientation toward an active offense and defense, and he explicitly proposed that “no matter in what form a war and armed conflict breaks out and in what form it is carried out, under conditions where the enemy makes large-scale use of modern weapons and futuristic weapons including various types of weapons of mass destruction, the Russian Federation’s armed forces are prepared at any time to counterattack an invasion, to attack the invaders, and to carry out defensive and offensive operations;” when necessary, they can “launch a preemptive strike.” Medvedev further expanded the scope in which Russia used troops against the outside, and he pointed out that it was possible to use military power beyond its borders in order to protect Russian armed forces and citizens who are abroad, to counterattack or prevent invasions of allied countries, and to attack pirates and protect the safety of navigation.

Fourth, it has been skilled at using the enemy as a teacher, at learning from the enemy, and at using the enemy as a target. In each period, the military strategy that the post-war
Soviet Union drafted [end of page 58] basically was a symmetrical response to US military strategy, with very strong targeting and directivity. After the Soviet Union dissolved, although Russia no long openly had the United States as its enemy, its military strategy was always focused on and aimed at the United States and NATO military developments; in particular, it paid a great deal of attention to and did its best to prevent the United States and NATO from squeezing its strategic space, using its own “preemptive strikes” to counter the United States’ “preemptive strikes,” striving to seek local strategic parity with the United States in peripheral regions, and striving to develop an asymmetrical balance with the United States’ and NATO’s sophisticated strategic strengths.

As its overall national power has rebounded, Russia has sped up the informationized transformation of its military and has intensified its strategic containment, by relying upon its nuclear strengths and aerospace defense strengths. In January 2013, the Russian Federation’s Space Agency announced a national plan, where Russia would invest 2.1 trillion rubles (about $69.3 billion) over the next eight years in developing its space industry, and that it would invest 4 trillion rubles (about $131.7 billion) in purchasing ships and especially strategic nuclear submarines. At the same time that it has been reviving and solidifying its traditional scope of influence, it has vigorously managed and governed its Siberian and polar regions; from a long-range point of view, it is also possible that it will resume its ability for military projection and influence on a global scope and that it will pay more attention to using military means to achieve its national interests.

III. Japan’s military strategy...59

After the end of the Second World War, the United States rearmed Japan, and Japan and the United States concluded a military alliance. With the Korean War as a turning point, Japan gradually established military strengths called “Self Defense Forces;” statements about its military strategy were primarily expressed in national defense programs and in the National Defense Program Outline.

During the Cold War, Japanese military strategy underwent an evolutionary process from “collective defense” to “exclusively defensive defense.” In 1954, in the name of “self-defense,” Japan again established a military, and in 1957, it drafted the National Defense Program Outline, and proposed that “based on national power and national conditions, within the limits required for self-defense, it would gradually develop effective defense strengths.” In 1960, Japan and the United States signed a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and they proposed the strategic concept of “Japan-U.S. joint defense;” Japan initially abandoned its passive status of purely relying upon the United States and
formed a strategic setup where Japan and the United States joined hands to undertake Japan’s defense. Japan proposed a basic principle of “gradually creating a military, based on its national power and national conditions,” and one after another, it carried out three development plans for defense strengths, focused one after the other on the ground forces, the navy, and the air force. In 1970, Japan formally proposed a military strategy of “purely defensive defense” in a Defense White Paper, and emphasized that it was building necessary self-defense strengths that were as minimal as possible, that it was developing high-performance conventional weapons, and that it would not have strategic offensive weapons that would constitute a threat to other countries; that it would not carry out preemptive strikes against its opponents, but only when it came under armed invasion [end of page 59] would it engage in limited armed self-defense; that its defensive operations would only be limited to Japanese territorial airspace, territorial waters, and the surrounding sea regions; and that it would not permit attacks on its opponents’ bases or allow strategic reconnaissance and counterattacks to be carried out against the opponents’ territory in-depth. In regards to small-scale local invasions, it would rely solely on its own strengths to expel these; for wars that were larger than medium-sized, it would rely upon US support. In 1976 and 1978, Japan’s National Defense Program Outline and the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation appeared, one after the other, and adjustments were made to the “purely defensive defense” strategy: these further strengthened the Japan-US military cooperation relationship, they drafted the essentials of Japanese-US joint operations, and they enhanced the autonomous status of Japan in the bilateral military alliance. They also expanded the scope of defense, and changed the scope of “peripheral seas” from “300 nautical miles on the Pacific Ocean side, 200 nautical miles on the western side of Kyushu, 100 nautical miles in the Sea of Japan, and 500 nautical miles for routes in blue waters,” to “several hundred nautical miles along the periphery and 1,000 nautical miles on sea routes.” [Finally,] as regards the guidance of operations, they emphasized “a strategy of containment” and “taking preventive measures.” In 1983, a Japanese Defense White Paper for the first time proposed the program of “destruction at sea,” which modified the previous defense strategy that focused on the homeland, implemented a “strategy of handling things at the front at an early period;” and emphasized intercepting and annihilating an invading enemy on the high seas. Its basic concept was to use the United States’ strategic deterrence strengths as its backing, Japan’s high-quality military strengths as the main force, and the western Pacific Ocean’s broad spaces as the battlefield; to use “one route (Hokkaido), two fronts (the southeast and southwest blue water lines and the triangular sea area that these and the homeland encompassed), and three sea straits (the Soya Strait, the Tsugaru Strait, and the Tsushima Strait)” as the focus of defense, and a decisive sea and air battle as the main form of operations, then at the same time that it ensured territorial security with Hokkaido as the focus, it would ensure that Japan obtained
resources and energy and that it occupied overseas markets, and that it developed into the broad spaces of the Pacific Ocean.

After the end of the Cold War, Japan began to make major adjustments to its military strategy, changing from passive defense to active defense; the main symbol of this was the three National Defense Program Outlines that were drafted after the Cold War, which were the 1995 Outline, the 2004 Outline, and the 2010 Outline that appeared at the end of 2010, as well as The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security that was issued in the late 1990s and the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. These can largely be divided into three stages.

The “defense in all directions” strategy that was carried out from 1989 to 2000. Japan issued relevant documents, such as the 1995 Outline, the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, and the Law on Emergencies in Areas Surrounding Japan; and it carried out the first adjustment to its strategy after the Cold War. [First,] it shifted from a focus on dealing with the Soviet threat to defense in all directions, with the main hypothesis being that enemies were, in order, North Korea, China, and Russia. [Second,] military deployments shifted from the past, where they were purely focused on the north, to balanced deployments to the north, west, and southwest, with a focus on strengthening anti-missile capabilities, rapid reaction capabilities, and mobile operations capabilities in the western and southwestern directions, and on increasing the number of high-tech weapons and equipment in the central and western regions. [end of page 60] [Third,] it proposed “rational, highly effective, and highly capable” thought on building the military, and gave the Self Defense Forces three major strategic tasks: defend Japan; respond to various emergencies, like large-scale natural disasters; and make contributions for constructing a more stable security environment. [Finally,] it strengthened the Japanese-US alliance, expanding the scope of Japanese-US military cooperation to Japan’s periphery.

From 2001 to 2010, it implemented a strategy of “active containment.” After the 9-11 incident occurred, Japan issued, in order, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Law, and the Law to Respond to Armed Attack Situations, and at the end of 2004, it introduced the National Defense Program Guidelines for Fiscal 2005 and Beyond (2004 Outline), launched the Japan-U.S. “two plus two” security consultations mechanism, and drafted the Japan-U.S. Joint Strategic Objectives, thereby completing the second adjustment to its military strategy after the Cold War, which basically changed the passive defensive nature of “purely defensive defense” to a strategy of “active containment.” It proposed “keeping threats from directly spreading to Japan” and “improving the international security environment” through Japan’s own efforts, with allies, and in cooperation with the international community.
The Law to Respond to Armed Attack Situations that was passed in 2003 brought forward the opportunity for the Self Defense Forces to employ armed force before an armed attack is launched, in order to keep from coming under armed attack, thus breaking the principle of “only carrying out a very minimal amount of necessary self-defense after coming under armed attack.” It proposed that, at the same time that it ensured using strengths as the basis of taking precautions against conventional invasions, it develop in an effective manner “multi-functional, flexible, and effective” defense strengths that are fast, mobile, flexible, and have multiple goals and whose mainstay is advanced technology and intelligence capabilities. It adjusted the three major tasks of the Self Defense Forces, and emphasized effective response to new threats and multiple situations, including ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerillas and special forces, and military invasions of islands, violations of territorial airspace and territorial waters, and large-scale catastrophes; preventing conventional invasions; and independently and actively doing its best to improve the international security environment. It established a Japan-U.S. alliance relationship oriented toward the entire globe; in 2005, the Japan-U.S. “two plus two” security consultations committee issued a joint statement, establishing twelve strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific region, including the Taiwan issue, and seven global common strategic objectives; in 2006, the Japanese and US heads of state issued a joint statement on the Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century, expanding the scope of cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. allies from Japan’s peripheral region to the globe, and the sphere of cooperation from the security sphere to the political and economic spheres.

In December 2010, Japan introduced the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond, and established a Japanese military strategy for the new era. It proposed the “concept of mobile defense strengths,” and carried out “dynamic deterrence;” it emphasized thoroughly abandoning the concept that previously focused on “basic defense strengths” with “existential static deterrence,” and to instead build “mobile defense strengths” that focused on “effective dynamic deterrence,” and to enhance [end of page 61] the speed, mobility, flexibility, continuity, versatility, and high-tech capabilities and intelligence capabilities of military strengths, thus ensuring the security of islands far from the homeland and of the peripheral seas and airspace. It proposed giving the Self Defense Forces three functions, and requiring that they have seven postures. The three main functions consisted of carrying out effective deterrence and response to various situations, a further stabilization of the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and improvements to the global security environment. The seven postures consisted of ensuring the security of peripheral sea and airspaces, responding to attacks on island areas, responding to network attacks, responding to attacks by guerillas and special forces, responding to ballistic missile attacks, responding to composite situations, and responding to large-scale or special disasters. It proposed that the focus be
on strengthening military deployments in the southwest direction and on ensuring the security of the southwestern islands. The military focus shifted to the southwest direction, with a focus on strengthening the building of alerts and monitoring, air defense, anti-missile, and transportation and command and communications capabilities in the southwestern area.

In the more than sixty years after the war, Japan’s military strategy has undergone a process of change from “collective defense” to “exclusively defensive defense,” and from passive defense to active containment. This was primarily manifested in the following several characteristics.

The objectives of strategy have continually expanded, and the means have become more varied. In the Cold War period, the objectives of Japan’s military strategy were to prevent armed invasion and to ensure the security of Japan’s homeland. After the Cold War ended, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the reduction of the “threat from the north,” the possibility that a large-scale war could occur was greatly reduced, and threats tended to become varied. In its 2004 Outline, Japan for the first time proposed two major objectives, which were to protect Japan and improve the international security environment. The 2010 Outline went on to propose three major objectives, adding the details of the so-called “create a secure Asia-Pacific environment and make contributions for world peace and mankind’s security.” This shows that the objectives of Japan’s military strategy have incrementally expanded from domestic to the outside. During the Cold War, Japan’s main means were to form an alliance with the United States and to rely upon the United States’ military strengths to protect Japan, while at the same time developing necessary defense strengths. After the Cold War ended, at the same time that Japan emphasized bringing into play the role of its own strengths, it launched security cooperation at multiple levels with the United States and its other partner countries, at three levels: the allied country [level], regional [level], and international [level]. In particular, it stressed constructing a regional multilateral security cooperation system in the Asia-Pacific region consisting of Japan, the United States, South Korea, Australia, India and ASEAN.

The tint of active containment has gradually strengthened. After the Cold War ended and especially after the 9-11 incident, Japan gradually changed its passive defense posture, and its tendency to develop in the direction of active containment became increasingly obvious. First was the concept of “predicting armed attack situations,” which was proposed in the Law to Respond to Armed Attack Situations (June 2003), which moved the opportunity for the Self Defense Forces to employ armed force forward, from after coming under armed attack to before an armed attack occurred. Second, the three Defense Program Outlines after the Cold War expanded the focus of Japan’s security [end of
from Japan’s homeland to the region and the globe, and the scope of the Self Defense Forces’ activities also expanded from the homeland to the peripheral region and the globe, marking that “exclusively defensive defense” has been replaced by the ideas of active defense and advance containment. Third, the 2010 Outline proposed the concept of “mobile defense strengths” and of carrying out effective “dynamic deterrence” against various situations; this changed the previous passive idea of “static deterrence,” and showed that the tint of “active containment” in its military strategy had further strengthened.

The strategy is very much targeted and directed. During the Cold War, Japan’s hypothetical enemies were primarily the Soviet Union, North Korea, and China. After the Cold War, Japan’s hypothetical enemies were, in order, North Korea, China, and Russia, but the trend toward treating China as its main opponent clearly strengthened. Japan has consistently viewed North Korea as its main real threat, but as China’s overall national power rose and the modernized building of its military developed, Japan has become more on guard against China and has intensified its containment [of China]. For example, it strengthened its military deployments in the southwest islands region, it increased its monitoring and tracking of China’s maritime activities, and it carried out joint “island capture” military exercises with China as the hypothetical enemy, in order to constrain China’s strategic development toward the seas and to make preparations for struggling over the Senkaku Islands and interfering in the Taiwan issue. In 2012 it openly engaged in a process of “purchasing [the Senkaku] islands” and “nationalizing” them, touching off an “island dispute” in the East China Sea. After the [Shinzo] Abe cabinet came to power, it called for a “democratic security diamond” jointly composed of Australia, India, Japan and (the United States’) Hawaii, and began drafting Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation Guidelines and a Defense Plans Outline, which gave rise to continued unrest in the East Asia situation. Because the territorial dispute over the “four northern islands” exists between Japan and Russia, the two countries have yet to sign a peace agreement even today, and thus Russia is still one of Japan’s targets to be guarded against.

The scope of cooperation of the Japan-U.S. alliance has expanded. “Associating with someone who is strong” is a tradition in Japan’s strategic culture. Japan’s strategic experts have reached [the following] conclusion from the Japanese-Russian War and the Second World War: Japan’s alliances with continental countries have often been defeated; only its alliances with powerful maritime nations have been successful. This has thus become one of the major theoretical bases for Japan to maintain its alliance with the United States. Since Japan formed an alliance with the United States in the 1950s, the Japanese-US alliance relationship has undergone a process of strengthening and expanding, from “the United States leads and Japan follows,” to “joint Japanese and US defense” to “global cooperation in all directions.” The Japanese-US “two plus two”
security consultations conferences of recent years have drafted a number of global and regional common strategic objectives as well as spheres for their defense cooperation, and the scope of cooperation in the Japanese-US alliance has expanded from protecting the security of Japan’s homeland to intervention in regional and even global security matters. The new type of Japanese-US alliance, which cooperates in all spheres and over a broad scope, has become the main pillar in Japanese military strategy. [end of page 63]

IV. India’s military strategy...64

India is a regional power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and is also an emerging major country that is in the midst of arising, and so its international status is improving every day. Understanding and analyzing trends in its military strategy have an important significance for understanding and grasping the world and regional strategic setup, and even its security situation.

From India’s independence in 1947 to the end of the Cold War, India’s military strategy largely underwent three stages of development.

The first stage was a period of limited offensive strategy (from India’s independence to the beginning of the 1960s). At the start of Indian independence, its domestic economy was backward and its military power was weak; externally, it formed a confrontation with Pakistan, and it also faced an intense competition between the United States and the Soviet Union as they struggled to dominate the South Asian region. Under these circumstances, the [Jawaharlal] Nehru government adopted a policy of “non-alliance” with the outside, it dealt with both the U.S. and the Soviet blocs, while internally, it adopted a policy of “first the economy and then national defense;” it struggled for time, it developed the economy, it deepened and accumulated national power, and it strove to achieve the strategic goals of preserving India, developing India, and strengthening India. Militarily, it promoted a strategy of “limited offense,” viewed Pakistan as its most direct threat, put its strategic focus on the west, and continually improved its deployment for operations against Pakistan. At the same time, India intensified its military penetration into areas that it had yet to occupy south of the McMahon Line, in order to achieve the goals of territorial expansion and long-term control over contested areas along the Sino-Indian border; by 1958 it had seized a large area of Chinese territory north of the traditional and customary lines south of the McMahon Line, and had established the so-called “Himalayan security system” in India’s north, aimed at China.

The second stage was the period of a strategy of “expansion on two fronts” (the 1960s to the early 1970s). [India’s] defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict had a major impact on India’s military strategy. India reevaluated its security environment, rethought
its military policies, and summarized its experiences and lessons. First, it gave priority to military buildup; starting in 1964, it implemented its first five-year plan for national defense, spending 50 billion rupees, and expanding its armaments on a large scale. Second, given the situation that it was difficult for [India’s] national power to contend with China, it adopted an in-depth defense program against the PRC for a given period of time. Third, it actively prepared for operations against Pakistan in the west and against the PRC in the north. In the late 1960s, India received a great deal of aid from the United States, and it formed a de facto alliance with the Soviet Union; in addition to this, its domestic economic situation improved somewhat, there was some strengthening of its overall national power, its military expansionist thinking accordingly looked up, and it adopted a strategy of “expansion on two fronts” where it had China and Pakistan as simultaneous targets of major operations and prepared for simultaneous operations along both the western and northern battle lines. It adopted [end of page 64] a program of “attack to the west and defend to the north,” where the western front would be primarily for offense and the northern front would be primarily for defense, and it directly aimed the spearhead of its expansion toward the western border, in an effort to weaken Pakistan strategically. In November 1971, India launched a large-scale assault against Pakistan, in order to dismember Pakistan at one blow.

The third stage was the period of a strategy of “maintain the land and control the sea” (1970s to the late 1980s). After the third India-Pakistan War, the setup where India dominated South Asia basically took shape. US-Indian relations and Sino-Indian relations, which had been tense for a time, tended to ameliorate; the United Kingdom withdrew its troops from the Indian Ocean because of a lack of financial and military strength; the Soviet Union gradually reduced its interference in the South Asian region after the mid-1980s; and this resulted in a major change in the South Asian strategic situation that benefited India and provided strategic opportunity and conditions for it to expand into the Indian Ocean region. Under these conditions, based on [the fact that] India’s strategic intentions on land had fundamentally been achieved, it gradually shifted the focus of its strategy from the South Asian subcontinent to the Indian Ocean, it proposed the military strategic idea of “maintain the land and control the sea,” and it comprehensively sought superiority at sea over the northern Indian Ocean.

After the end of the Cold War, there was a major adjustment to India’s military strategy, where it shifted from a strategy of “regional offense” to a strategy of “regional deterrence.” India believed that the traditional concept of war in the Cold War period, where you annihilated the enemy country’s military strengths, plundered its territory, and conquered its will through warfare, was no longer suitable to the international strategic setup and the South Asian subcontinent situation, which had developed and changed, and that it should “put its stress on emphasizing the role of deterrence and not emphasize
conquest and occupation of territory.” Based on this idea, India began in the early 1990s to execute the military strategy of “regional deterrence.” What was called the “region” included a broad scope that started with the Himalayan range in the north and went south to the Indian Ocean, and started in the west with Iran and went east to Burma. What was called “deterrence” was based on making worst-case preparations for major fighting, using powerful military strengths as a backup, and carrying out shock and awe that had effective military force against various targets of operations, including deterrence at sea and nuclear deterrence. Throughout the entire 1990s, the core of India’s strategy of “regional deterrence” was “denial” \{juzhi\}, and it emphasized maintaining absolute military superiority over the countries within the South Asian subcontinent, deterring these from engaging in military adventures that would threaten India, and achieving such goals as ensuring the security of the nation’s seacoasts and territorial waters and preventing major countries from infiltrating [the subcontinent].

Upon entering the 21st century, as India’s economy quickly developed and its overall national power continually strengthened, its economic and military power exceeded the sum total of the various other countries in South Asia, and the other South Asian countries in actuality had no power to pose a major threat against India. India believed that the possibility of a large-scale total war breaking out between Pakistan and India in the future because of border disputes was small; it was more likely that there would be small- and medium-scale limited and conventional wars on the border. At the same time, the threats of terrorism, splittism, and transnational organized crime were [end of page 65] increasing daily, and non-traditional security threats and traditional security threats were similarly serious and interwoven. Therefore, the Indian military gave the strategy of “regional deterrence” new details, and transformed the passive defense-type thinking of “denial deterrence” into a preemptive strike-type idea of “disciplinary deterrence;” it emphasized taking the initiative to attack, acting before the enemy does, and doing its best to win a high-tech “limited conventional war” under conditions of nuclear deterrence. The main details included [the following]. As regards strategic targets, it stressed having military matters subordinate to political ones; not seeking to threaten the existence of an enemy country; and influencing or impelling an enemy country to modify its anti-Indian policies through the flexible use of military means in a restrained way, while at the same time, it itself was prepared to make necessary compromises in exchange for the enemy’s concessions. As regards preparations for war, it shifted from being prepared to fight a total war, as in the past, to being based on fighting a high-tech limited conventional war under conditions of nuclear deterrence. As regards strategic guidance, it discarded the passive defensive concept of “waiting for the enemy to arrive within [India’s] borders and then getting rid of him” and adopted a guiding program of actively taking the initiative and of preemptive strikes, blocking the enemy in advance from large-scale attacks, so that the war would be waged on the enemy’s territory, forcing
the opponent to be trapped on the defensive and in an opportune situation. As regards guidance of operations, there was a stress on joint operations by the three services, and an emphasis on “seamlessly mobilizing all resources in attacking, routing, and defeating the enemy,” and “concentrating all operational strengths for use at a single decisive point, and thus producing maximum effect.” As regards guidance of deterrence, it emphasized the use of both nuclear and conventional deterrence, using nuclear deterrence to ensure that India basically avoided invasions in war, that it was effective in keeping opponents from using nuclear weapons against India, that it limited warfare to the scope of a limited conventional war, that it developed reliable and powerful conventional means of deterrence, that it formed deterrent strengths at multiple levels, and that it used conventional military forces as the “spearhead” of the attack, that it used nuclear strengths as the “shield” of defense, and that it strengthened the flexibility and selectivity of military deterrence.

Taking an overall look at developments in India’s military strategy since independence, it is possible to see four interrelated basic characteristics.

First is a strong geopolitical nature. Since the day of its independence, India has determined its national interests through geopolitical thought, to plan its national security and draft military strategy. It has stressed that India is the heart of Asia and that the Indian Ocean is India’s ocean, it has treated the South Asian subcontinent as its sphere of influence, and it has regarded some neighboring countries as the main obstacles blocking it from achieving its geopolitical interests. India’s military strategy has treated protecting its geopolitical interests and eliminating geopolitical obstacles as its starting point and end point. After the end of the Cold War, the international security environment underwent major changes, but India still treated geopolitics as a basic factor that was the source for considering and designing military strategy, and it still determined the direction of its strategy, the means of its strategy, and the targets of its operations from the angle of a geostrategic competition, as it attempted to build the South Asian subcontinent into a strategic foundation with itself as the center, and to thus manage and control the Indian Ocean. [end of page 66]

Second is that it has comprehensively carried on with what it has inherited. After India’s independence, at the same time that [India] received intact the United Kingdom’s colonial political borders, it fully carried on with the United Kingdom’s imperial expansionist military strategic thought; the most important part of this was the idea of so-called “Indocentri­sm.” The core of this was to treat Kashmir, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Assam as “the internal lines of India’s defense;” to incorporate Tibet into its sphere of influence as a “buffer state;” and to treat the illegally concocted McMahon Line and the Johnson-Ardagh Line as its “security inner ring.” Nehru viewed the South Asian
subcontinent and the Indian Ocean as a “security ring,” and pursued a regional security policy that had India as its main body. In addition, India also absorbed local traditional ideas of strategy. For example, it treated peripheral countries as its main opponents to be restrained against and as the targets of its operations; it was deeply affected by the traditional ideas of its historically famous strategist Chanakya, “that treated neighbors as enemies and that dealt with those who were far away and attacked those who were near,” and the “law of fish.”

Third is limited offensives. India has proposed the national strategic objectives of “dominating South Asia, controlling the Indian Ocean, and striving to be a first-rate power in the world;” this inevitably has determined that its military strategy will have a fairly strong offensive tint. Although India insists that it pursues a “defensive” strategy, a series of military actions that it took after its independence, including three India-Pakistan wars and its armed annexation of the kingdom of Sikkim, its instigation of the Sino-Indian border conflict, and its sending troops to Sri Lanka have all fully proven that its strategy has a distinctly offensive nature. In recent years, with the rapid rise of India’s national power and military power, this offensive nature has been increasing. At the same time, because its national power and military power are limited by not being strong enough yet, the offensive nature of this strategy is restricted to the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean situation, and it temporarily has no way to fully prevent major countries outside this region from infiltrating and controlling the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. As regards its strategy against the PRC, India has adopted a defensive posture overall, but at the same time has also used offense as a defense to actively seek local superiority, and has also used its unremitting nibbling away in peacetime to create conditions for switching from defense to offense in wartime.

Fourth is deterrence in all directions. In order to resolve the contradiction between its ambition for dominance and its limited national power and military strength, India has proposed carrying out deterrence in all directions in various spheres. After the end of the Cold War, India strengthened its relations with such great powers as the United States and Japan, adjusted its previous emphasis on actual war to an emphasis on deterrence, and has emphasized carrying out deterrence that differed in nature against differing targets and along differing strategic directions. In regard to China, it has carried out “dissuasive” deterrence, to deter China from using troops against India, and has restrained China from entering its sphere of influence. In regard to the small countries along the South Asian periphery, it has carried out “punitive” deterrence, to ensure that they do not dare go against India’s interests and to force them to humbly heed India’s

17 Translator’s note: That big fish eat little fish.
control. In regards to the United States, China, and India, it carries out “nuclear symmetry” deterrence; its nuclear strategic concept [end of page 67] is to “discourage” the United States, “deter” China, and “deal with” Pakistan. Of these, “deterring” China is its focus, because it thinks that only by “deterring” China will it be able to “deal with” Pakistan and have the possibility of “discouraging” the United States.

As India’s consciousness [of itself] as a great power grows stronger and as its overall national power and military strength continually grow, clues to the future developmental trends of its military strategy will gradually be revealed. The orientation of India’s strategic objectives may advance from regional dominance toward global participation, its strategic guidance will put more emphasis on active offense, its strategic deployments will be reflected more in its intentions to control the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean, and it will give more stress to paying attention to both the land and the sea, and to stabilizing the western front, strengthening the northern front, advancing to the east and expanding to the south, and to developing toward the sea; its forms of operations will pay more attention to joint air-land operations, mobile operations, and information warfare by the various services and service arms; the building of its military strengths will change from being inward toward being outward “trans-border operational strengths;” and it will vigorously develop a new type of system of operations that will have as their backbone aircraft carriers, fourth-generation fighters, nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles as well as anti-missile systems and outer space military systems. [end of page 68]
Chapter 3
China’s Strategic Environment and the Historic Mission of the Armed Forces…69

The modern world is currently in a period of great development (fazhan), great revolution (biange) and great adjustment, in which development and turmoil, revolution and crisis, and cooperation and competition interweave and interact with each other, and the epochal tide of peaceful development is irreversible. World multi-polarization, economic globalization and social informationization have developed deeply, the international community has had closer interconnection and interdependence, and countries with newly emerging markets as well as developing countries have continued to develop and grow. China’s development is still in an important period of strategic opportunity in which much can still be accomplished; however, the connotation and conditions of the important period of strategic opportunity have had new changes. Since modern times, the Chinese nation has never been so close to realizing its revival like today, but the risk and challenges it faces are also rising. Accurately judging international strategic circumstances, having a sober understanding of the opportunity and challenges of China’s development, focusing on realizing the dream of a strong nation and the dream of a strong military, and fully grasping and carrying out our armed forces’ historic mission in the new phase of the new century are preconditions for military strategic operations research-based planning (junshi zhanlue chouhua).

Section 1: Backdrop of China’s Peaceful Development Era…69

Changes in strategic circumstances and the objective environment are an important basis for determining the armed forces’ mission. Lenin once pointed out that, “Only by first analyzing the objective conditions for one era to transition into another era can we understand the major historic event happening in front of us.” “Only on this basis, that is first taking into consideration different basic features of each era (rather than an individual historic event of an individual country), can we correctly formulate our own strategy; and only by understanding the basic features of a certain era can we take into consideration more specific characteristics of this country or that country on this basis.”18 When facing a complicated objective circumstance, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping both emphasized that we must [end of page 69] “look towards the sea to observe the world with a cold-eyed [attitude]” (lengyan xiangyang kanshijie) and “calmly observe.” Only by taking in all the world, nation and military situations and conducting long

deliberation and thoughtful consideration can we bring forth strategic operations research-based planning and guidance that conform to reality.

I. Major changes in the international strategic pattern…70

An international strategic pattern {guoji zhanlue geju} is an external condition and the main basis for a country to understand and judge war and peace circumstances and national security environment situations. Major adjustments and changes in the international strategic pattern are determined by major changes in international strategic strength comparison {guoji zhanlue lilaing duibi}, although this type of strength comparison has different emphases in different eras. In the modern era of peaceful development, comprehensive national power, which takes economy and science and technology as the core, has become a critical factor in deciding the international strategic strength comparison and then in deciding the evolution of the international strategic pattern.

The international strategic pattern is currently going through a structural change from unipolarity to multipolarity. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S., the sole superpower, has dominated and led the international tixi system, and an unprecedented unipolar pattern {danji geju} has emerged in the world. Since entering the 21st century, though the overall pattern {zonggeju} of “one superpower with multiple powers” {yichaoduqiang} has not been shaken fundamentally, the prospect of multipolarization has become clear. Great nation relations {daguo guanxi} are in the midst of profound and complicated changes, and the international strategic strength comparison is developing towards a relatively balanced direction, causing an even greater impact on the world order that has centered on the West since modern times. The old balance in the international tixi system with unipolar dominance {danji zhudao} as the basic feature is being broken, and a new balance in the international tixi system with multipolar co-governance {duoji gongzhi} as a development trend {fazhan quxiang} is currently being constructed {goujian}. Differences in great nations’ centers of gravity of interests as well as objectives they pursue are prominent, and intertwined interaction among new and old great nations, as well as among newly emerging great nations are frequent.

A fundamental driver {dongyin} for the evolution in the international strategic pattern is imbalance in the world’s economic development. In recent years, the world economy has shown a new posture {taishi} of ascending in the east and descending in the west, slowing down in the north and speeding up in the south {dongshengxijiang beihuannankuai}. Economies of newly emerging great nations have grown rapidly, and the ones of developed Western countries, such as the U.S., have developed slowly. Two anti-terrorism wars and the international financial crisis have greatly undermined Western
countries led by the U.S. The US GDP has declined from occupying 31.8% of the world economy in 2001 to below 23% in 2011. And the BRIC countries’ contribution rate to the world’s economic growth has increased from 16% in the last decade of the 20th century to 30% in the first decade of the 21st century. At a future time, it is still hopeful that newly emerging countries’ economic growth rates will be higher than the ones of developed countries, and their shares in the world economy will increase further. What accompanies with this is that more and more countries will participate in international affairs and demand to share international power {guoji quanli}, and the international power structural situation will further show a decentralized trend {fensanhua qushi}. [end of page 70]

A fundamental change to the international strategic pattern will not happen overnight. The state {zhuantai} of “one superpower with multiple powers” will continue for the next ten years or even longer. Economic strength {jingji liliang} transforming into political, military, science and technology, and cultural strengths is a progressive historical process. America’s comprehensive actual strength {zonghe shili} and the capability to manipulate international affairs have declined relatively, but compared to other countries, the U.S. still has significant superiority {youshi}, and the entire Western capitalism tixi system also has significant superiority over newly emerging countries. The economic development of newly emerging countries still has some uncertainty, and it will encounter all kinds of setbacks and difficulties. Even though their economic aggregate {jingji zongliang} has surpassed developed countries, it will still take some time before their [economic] strength will shift towards political, military, science and technology, and cultural aspects. For newly emerging great nations to truly ascend into the center of the international tixi system, to establish new international relations structure as well as norms and formats {guizhi}, and to change the situation of monopolized dominance by developed Western countries, they will still undergo long-term, complicated, and arduous games and struggles {boyi zhengdou}.

II. Accelerated development in cooperation and competition among countries…71

In the era of peaceful development, relations among countries, particularly relations among great nations, develop in cooperation and in competition, with intricate complications and interweaved contradictions, and they influence as well as decide the basic moving direction {zouxiang} of international strategic circumstances.

Viewed from the modern world development trend, we can clearly grasp the following basic features.
Continuous expansion of cooperation between countries. Deepened development of economic globalization and social information has enabled the modern world to form a mutually dependent and mutually influential network constituted by resources, capital, finance, information, and technology. Between one country and another, their connection is unprecedentedly close, their economies are unprecedentedly fused, and their gains and losses {li’hai} are unprecedentedly intertwined. The way of pursuing one’s own interests only while disregarding other countries’ interests could entangle and damage oneself instead. National security’s comprehensive quality, interactive quality, and varying quality {zonghexing, hudongxing, duobianxing} are unprecedented. When a country maintains its own security and develops its own interests, it is not enough to merely contemplate issues from one’s own stance and viewpoint; the country must have a global horizon {quanqi shiye} and take into comprehensive consideration two grand situations {quanju}, domestic and international. Some affairs that traditionally belong to the scope of national sovereignty would have to take into consideration influence from the international community. National economic interests’ mutual blending has specifically required [countries to] strengthen adjusting-coordination in politics, cooperation in science and technology, and exchanges in cultures. At the same time, requirements of responding to global challenges, such as financial crises, climate change, international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and transnational crimes, have also enabled cooperation between great nations to develop towards multiple domains and higher levels. Even between two strategic opponents, it is not completely the traditional “zero-sum” relationship, and between great nations, cooperation has become a behavioral mode {xingwei fangshi} that [the great nations] are forced to choose, as well as an important means for conducting strategic games {zhanlue boyi}. [end of page 71]

Continuously fierce competition between countries. The period when a major shift {zhuanshuan} is happening in the international strategic pattern is also the period when great nations have the most fierce competition and rivalry between them. For the purpose of occupying an advantageous status in the new international strategic pattern, the domain of competition between great nations has become more extensive, the degree of competition has become fiercer, and the means of competition have become more diverse. Not only do a rising country and a hegemonic country compete with each other fiercely, but also main Western countries and newly emerging countries compete with each other fiercely and extensively. This type of competition exists not only in traditional political and security domains, but also in newly emerging non-traditional security domain, and it is expressed more as competitions revolving around the world market, comprehensive national power, the international order, geopolitics, and strategic resources. Existing great nations {shoucheng daguo} are not willing to give up their established rights {jiyou quanli}, which are less and less commensurate with their actual strengths, and do their utmost to suppress newly emerging great nations in order to retain their dominance rights.
in the international ́ixí system. And for newly emerging great nations, with the growth of their actual strengths, while making corresponding international contributions and undertaking corresponding international responsibilities, they inevitably demand to have corresponding international rights ́guoji quanlì}. From a historical viewpoint, the rise of newly emerging great nations and the fall of old great nations frequently lead to fierce confrontations ́duikang} and even wars. And the reasons include factors of rising countries challenging the existing international order, and even more [the fact that] hegemonic countries cling to, forcibly occupy, and abuse international authority ́guoji quanlì} in disregard of development and changes in international strategic strength comparison as well as international circumstances. And that is why we say that hegemonism is the root of modern wars.

Increasingly complicated relations of cooperation and competition between countries. Intertwining interests and the requirement of responding to common global challenges are overturning the past relationship between countries with strict alignment and clear friend or foe distinction, showing a posture of competition within cooperation, struggles within adjusting-coordination. [The way of] distinguishing foe from friend and judging security threats with the traditional confrontational-quality thought ́duikangxing siwei} and the “zero-sum” idea ́linian} can no longer accurately reflect the objective reality among changes and developments, and it is difficult to adapt to the requirement of maintaining national security and development interests. For countries, they cannot stop cooperating with each other in all the other aspects because of their differences in one aspect, and cannot conduct full-scale confrontation ́quanmian duikang} because of confrontation in one domain; rather, they can only cooperate in domains with common interests ́gongtong liyi}, compete in domains with interest homogenization ́liyi tongzhihua}, and conduct confrontation in domains with contrary interests ́liyi xiangbei}. Even within the same domain, it could be that they cooperate in one agenda ́yiti} and struggle in another agenda, showing a situation of agenda-style ́yitishi} cooperation and struggle coexisting with each other. From now on, the development of great nation relations will become more practical, thus greatly increasing the possibility of seeking common ground while reserving differences ́qiu tongcunyi}. In this way, political and military conflicts’ “thresholds” will be raised, becoming an important factor in restraining, delaying the eruption of a war and constraining the escalation of a war. [end of page 72]

III. Increasingly fierce international military struggles…73

Countries actively pushing forward revolution in military affairs to seek military superiority. Presently, main countries around the world have successively adjusted their military strategies according to changes in their national strategic objectives, and pushed
forward a revolution in military affairs oriented by informationization to enhance their military strategic capabilities. As the world revolution in military affairs that takes information technology as the core is entering a new phase, international military competitions have developed towards high end \{gaoduan\}; competitions among countries in nuclear, space, and cyber \{wang\} domains have become increasingly fierce; new concept weaponry, such as electromagnetic, laser \{weapons\} will soon be committed to actual combat; and breakthroughs in quantum technology and biological computers might trigger a new revolution in military affairs. Long-range warfare \{yuanzhan\} that is based on information systems and integrates land, sea, air, space, network \{wang\}, and electromagnetic into one will become more mature; intellectualized, networked, and unmanned equipment will be massively employed; and the space of war \{zhanzheng kongjian\} will be further expanded to the deep sea, space \{taikong\}, and network space \{wangluo kongjian\}. On the basis of replacing the old “Triad” with the new “Triad,” the U.S. has picked up the pace in realizing critical technological breakthroughs in nuclear, space, and cyber \{wang\} domains, upgrading and renewing nuclear weapons and deploying missile defense systems, and organizing and building space warfare \{tianzhan\} and cyber warfare \{wangzhan\} professional units. At the same time, by taking expanding strategic commands’ functions as a pull, the U.S. integrates nuclear, space, cyber and other newly emerging strategic strengths and pushes forward the progress of their \[application in\] actual combat at an accelerated pace. The U.S. has organized and built a global strike command for unified command of strategic long-range warfare strength \{zhanlue yuanzhan liliang\} and has planned to develop a new conventional “prompt global strike” system in the next decade so as to have the capability to implement conventional strikes anywhere within one hour. By taking advantage of its abundant economic and science and technology actual strengths, the U.S. has committed large quantities of manpower, material strength, and financial strength to vigorously develop \{yanshi\} new-concept, new-mechanism weaponry in an attempt to obtain new breakthroughs in military technology, and its result might make other countries in the world face another round of “generation gap” \{shidaicha\} in the high-end strategic strength domain \{gaoduan zhanlue liliang lingyu\}. Our peripheral great nations, including Russia, Japan, and India, have also picked up the pace in integrating their network strengths \{wangluo liliang\}, developed astronautical strength \{hangtian liliang\}, and developed \{yanzhi\} and changed to new-generation weapons and equipment at an accelerated pace.

International military struggle’s center of gravity shifting towards the Asia Pacific. With decreasing economic actual strength, for the purpose of safeguarding its hegemonic status and responding to the rapid rise of China, the U.S. has gradually compressed its stationed troops in Europe, actively shrunk the antiterrorism battlefront \{fankong zhanxian\}, shifted its military strategic center of gravity towards the Asia Pacific, strengthened
traditional military alliances relations, established new strategic partnerships, and attempted to set up an enormous ocean alliance tixi system {haiyang lianmeng tixi} so as to realize the strategic need and requirement {zhanlue xuyao} of containing China’s rise. Against this backdrop, Japan’s going southward and India’s advancing eastward might intersect in the South China Sea, forming “dual arcs” {shuanghu} from the directions of two oceans, and Japan and Australia would constitute “dual anchors” {shuangmao} at the south and north ends of the Western Pacific. Russia carries out an Orient strategy of facing the Asia Pacific {mianxiang taipingyang de dongfang zhanlue}, focuses efforts on increasing strengths in its east theater of war {dongbu zhanqu} and Pacific Fleet, and actively strengthens [end of page 73] military cooperation with India, Vietnam, and Mongolia. Japan has clearly listed North Korea and China as its principal threats {shouyao weixie}, relied even more on the US-Japanese alliance, and taken responding to the “China threat” {zhongguo weixie} as an axis {zhuzhou} of its security strategy. India practices a look east strategy {dongxiang zhanlue}, and on the basis of ensuring its interests in the Indian Ocean, attempts to realize a military presence in the South China Sea.

Responding to non-traditional threats becoming an important content in military struggle preparations {junshi douzheng zhuonbei} of countries. In the present world, non-traditional security threats, such as terrorism activities {kongbu huodong}, ecological disasters, disease propagation, trans-border crimes, and climate changes, have had increasing influence on the security of countries. Compared to traditional security threats, these threats have more frequent occurrence and more extensive development, and their levels of endangerment to national security have continued to increase and deepen. Armed forces of the world’s great nations have emphasized more maintaining a balance between responding to traditional security threats and [responding to] non-traditional security threats, and have successively taken [the act of] responding to non-traditional security threats as an important content of military struggle preparations to develop diversified military capabilities with faster response, greater maneuvering quality {jidongxing}, and stronger adaptive quality {shiyingsxing}. At the same time, due to non-traditional security threats’ transnational quality {kuaguoxing}, extensive quality and special quality {teshuxing}, strengthening cooperation in non-traditional security domains has also become an important content in international military games {guoji junshi boyi} and military cooperation.

Fighting for a new strategic space {zhanlue kongjian} becoming an important orientation {qixiang} of military development of countries. The process of human development and advancement, in a certain sense, is a process of continuous expansion from land to the space {kongjian} of oceans, the sky, etc. Presently, countries are accelerating to expand their interests and activities {xingdong} in international public
spaces \{guoji gonggong kongjian\}, including space \{taikong\}, network \{wangluo\}, the deep sea, and polar regions \{jidi\}, and international public spaces have become hot spots for strategic struggles \{zhanlue zhengduo\} among countries. Some developed countries take advantage of their own superiority in an attempt to monopolize and control international public spaces, creating obstacles for latecomers to access and use international public spaces. Conducting military preparations and pre-positioning \{yuzhi\} in fighting for a new strategic space is not only an important brace-support \{zhicheng\} for supporting a country to freely use international public spaces, but also an important move \{jucuo\} in fighting for a new military strategic commanding elevation \{junshi zhanlue zhigaodian\}, and it has been attached with high-degree importance and attention by great nations around the world.

Section 2: The Opportunity and Challenges of China’s Peaceful Development…74

Walking the path of peaceful development is a strategic choice \{zhanlue xuanze\} made by China according to the world’s trending wave \{chaoliu\} and the nation’s fundamental interests \{guojia genben liyi\} in times of complicated and profound changes happening in international circumstances. The future period will be China’s period of strategic opportunity for peaceful development, and also a period of strategic risks \{zhanlue fengxian\} for China to face various challenges, with unprecedented opportunity, as well as unprecedented challenges. Grasping the opportunity and resolving the challenges are necessary requirements for building a moderately prosperous society in full scale [end of page 74], and realizing the great revival of the Chinese nation.

I. Strategic choice for China’s peaceful development...75

China’s peaceful development is a historical inevitability, as well as a strategic choice. Since the mid-19th century, the ancient China that was stricken by calamities at home and abroad, and the Chinese nation that was ridden with disasters and underwent wave-upon-wave and arduous struggles over a hundred years ago, finally established a socialist new China under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), realizing independence of the nation and liberation of the people. After the establishment of new China, over twenty years of hard work, practice, and exploration laid down the fundamental political preconditions and the zhidu system foundation for contemporary China’s development and progress. With over thirty years of development in reforms and opening up, we have finally blazed a path of socialism with Chinese characteristics that is in accordance with our national situation and time requirements \{shidai yaoqiu\}. We have successfully achieved a historical turning point from a highly centralized planned economy \{tizhi\} system to a vigorous socialist market economy \{tizhi\} system, from closed, semi-closed to opening up in all dimensions \{quanfangwei kaifang\}. Our comprehensive
national power and international status have risen in large scale, and the national strategic center of gravity has turned from seeking survival to being strong. We are currently struggling tenaciously, struggling hard, and struggling unremittingly to build a moderately prosperous society in full scale by the 100th anniversary of the CPC, and build a rich, democratic, civilized, and harmonious modernized socialist country by the 100th anniversary of new China, to make a newer and greater contribution to the cause of peace and development for humankind.

The concept \{fangzhen\} and policy for China’s peaceful development has one principle run through them all \{一以贯之 yiyiguanzhi\}. The development sought by China is peaceful development, opening-up development, cooperative development, and win-win development. Building a harmonious society internally and promoting world peace externally is a major strategic choice that is in accordance with the world’s development trending wave as well as with [China’s] basic national situation. Practice has proven that China has become a country who participates, makes suggestion, and makes contributions to the international tixi system. China’s continuous, rapid development benefits from world peace and development; and at the same time, China’s development also provides a precious opportunity and a vast space \{kongjian\} for common development of countries around the world. Viewed from the depth of Chinese history, contemporary China’s peaceful development is to adhere to China’s historical and cultural tradition of deeming harmony as the most precious, as well as good neighborliness, to break away from the law of historical cycles \{lishi zhouqi lü\} of alternating peace and upheaval, to avoid chaos, separation, or wars in the country, and to realize a long period of order and stability as well as sustainable development of the country. Viewed from the development of world history, contemporary China’s peaceful development is to break away from the cycle of rise and fall of great nations over the last 500 years, avoid going down the old path of hegemonic wars \{baquan zhanzheng\}, and blaze a road to [China’s] rise that is different from the one of other great nations, different from old historical conventions \{lishi chengui\}, and that has a world significance.

The world is now undergoing profound and complicated changes, and peace and development are still an epochal theme. [end of page 75] International strength comparison is developing towards a direction that is favorable to world peace, and wanting peace, not war, wanting development, not poverty, and wanting cooperation, not confrontation \{duikang\} are common aspirations of peoples of all countries. Facing objective circumstances in which overall peace and stability coexist with local conflicts and turmoils, and opportunities and challenges for development and security coincides, we must seek security with development. Development is of overriding importance, and only when countries around the world are all developed can it be more favorable to
safeguard global peace and stability. We must seek security with equality. Only when we insist on the five principles of peaceful coexistence at any time and in any situation, do not interfere with other countries’ internal affairs, do not forcibly impose our own will upon other people, and through dialogue on equal footing and mutually beneficial cooperation, can the universal security of countries be realized. We must seek security with mutual trust. For countries, only with mutual trust, not mutual suspicion, with mutual respect, not mutual confrontation, can they transcend differences, resolve contradictions, and manage and control crises, to continuously expand strategic consensus \( \text{zhanlue gongshi} \) and lay down a deep-rooted foundation for safeguarding security. We must seek security with cooperation. Only through frank and deep dialogue and consultation, full-scale and consistent exchanges and cooperation, and by insisting on solving international disputes with peaceful modes \( \text{heping fangshi} \), and striving to seek and expand the converging point for interests of all parties, can countries realize win-win and mutual victory \( \text{shuangying he gongying} \), and realize seeking peace with cooperation and protecting security with cooperation. We must seek security with innovation. [We must] adapt to the diverse quality, infectious quality \( \text{chaunranxing} \), linkage quality \( \text{liandongxing} \), and sudden quality \( \text{tufaxing} \) shown by the contemporary world’s security problems; abandon the thought and viewpoints that lag behind the epochal development trending wave as well as outdated modes and methods \( \text{fangshi fangfa} \); firmly establish a new security viewpoint of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and collaborative cooperation \( \text{xiezuo} \); and establish new ideas of comprehensive security, common security, and cooperative security, to continue to solve development puzzles and security dilemmas confronting humans.

For the purpose of realizing the three historic tasks — building modernization, completing unification of the motherland, and safeguarding world peace and promoting common development — China will unswervingly walk on the path of peaceful development. At the same time as insisting on our peaceful development, China also actively endeavors to safeguard world peace and actively promotes common development of countries. The starting point and finishing point of China’s peaceful development strategy is opposing hegemonism and power politics of various forms \( \text{xingshi} \), not interfering with other countries’ internal affairs, never claiming hegemony, and never engaging in expansion. We oppose resorting to force easily, or threatening with force, and we advocate peacefully resolving international disputes and hot-spot issues. [We advocate] promoting the spirit of equality and mutual trust, tolerance and mutual learning, and cooperation and mutual victory in international relations to jointly safeguard international fairness and justice. That is, to develop and create a stable and good strategic environment for our self; that is, to expand national interests by relying on modes of cooperation, mutual benefits, and mutual victory; and that is, to push forward establishment of a new international political and economic order that is more fair, just,
and reasonable with modes of peace, progress, and improvement. While insisting on the peaceful development path, China is resolute to safeguard the country’s core interests, that is, national sovereignty, security, and development interests. They are the fundamentals of our country’s survival and development, and the cornerstone for full-scale building of a moderately prosperous society and realization of the great revival of the Chinese nation; they are not allowed to be violated and damaged.

II. Strategic opportunity for China’s peaceful development…

China’s peaceful development has a bright future, an arduous mission, and a major responsibility. To realize China’s peaceful development, we must firmly grasp the important period of strategic opportunity of national development. Up to 2020, China is still in the important period of strategic opportunity in which much can still be accomplished, and China’s development is facing a rare historic opportunity. This is a basic strategic judgment made by the CPC Central Committee in conducting unified operations research-based planning of two grand situations — domestic and international. This type of opportunity is mainly manifested in three aspects.

One, accelerated development of the world’s multi-polarization progress has provided China with an even broader international arena. Even though there has been no qualitative change to the international strategic pattern of “one superpower with multiple powers,” the progress of revolution in the international tixi system has accelerated significantly. The hegemonic influence’s {baquan shili} ability to continue to promote power politics, unilateralism, and to control international affairs has somewhat decreased. Developing countries’ integrated-whole actual strengths {zhengti shili} have increased, and countries of newly emerging markets have risen with a group quality {quntixing} and become a leading strength in promoting the world’s multi-polarization. The existing south-vs-north contradiction, and east-vs-west contradiction within the international tixi system have not been eradicated; contradictions between hegemonic countries and emerging countries have become increasingly prominent; multiple contradictions interweave and interact with each other; fierce games have unfolded between various strategic strengths revolving around the re-distribution {zaifenpei} of international power and interests; and great nation relations have been adjusted and re-organized at an accelerated pace. Thus this has provided a rare opportunity for China to form alliances or sow dissension by maneuvering among various groups {纵横捭阖 zongheng baihe}, expand space for maneuver {huixuan kongjian}, and resolve strategic pressure in the international arena.

Two, deepened development of economic globalization and social informationization has provided China with an immense driving power {dongneng} for sustainable
development. The international financial crisis has exposed the structural contradiction in the world’s economic tixi system as well as deep-level drawbacks in the capitalist economic tizhi system, but it is not the end of the historical progress of globalization and informationization. On the contrary, it foretells that globalization and informationization will develop in depth with a new mode {fangshi} from a new starting point. Under the grand trend {daqushi} of globalization and informationization, great nations around the world will still endeavor to reform the global economic governance structure {quanqiu jingji zhili jiegou}, adjust their own countries’ economic policies, and seek a new point for economic growth {jingji zengzhanguian}. The international economic structure and the industrial layout {chanye buju} are facing new major adjustments, and global science and technology are nurturing new innovative breakthroughs. Thus this has provided China with a window of opportunity to transform its economic growth mode {fangshi}, optimize its industrial structure, and realize its economic and social transformation. As one of the countries that benefit the most from globalization and informationization, China can still expand national interests in a global scope by effectively utilizing the free flow and optimized positioning {youhua peizhi} of resources, capital, science and technology, information, and commodities in a global scope with peaceful, cooperative, and win-win modes {fangshi}, so as to provide indispensable, fundamental conditions for realizing its sustainable development.

Three, with rapid escalation of its comprehensive national power, China’s ability to create a secure environment has continued to increase. China’s own development is a decisive factor in winning itself the historic opportunity. In 2010, China’s economic aggregate leaped to second place in the world, with foreign trade ranked second in the world, foreign exchange reserves ranked first in the world, and contribution to world economic growth ranked first in the world. China is not only the world’s factory, but also the world’s market, and even more, the world’s capital exporting country {shijie ziben shuchuguo}. Solid economic actual strength and good development impetus have made China a strategic strength with increasing weight in the international community, and have become an important factor in influencing the future moving direction of the international strategic pattern. Countries generally are optimistic about China’s development prospect, and they have greatly increased their willingness to draw on and cooperate with China. Developed countries have increasingly depended upon China in solving numerous global and area problems, such as financial crisis, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and climate change; newly emerging countries and many developing countries also hope to get a ride on China’s economic development “express;” and interdependency in geopolitics and geo-economy between peripheral countries and China has increased. It is difficult for any country to bear the cost of a full-scale confrontation {quanmian duikang} with China; to a great extent, this can deter a country from rashly violating China’s core security and core interests, and moreover, create good conditions
for China to further seize the initiative \{zhudong\}, expand the international influence, and have more say in international affairs. History has proven that development is the grand strategy \{dazhanlue\} for solving all problems; only when China is developed and has taken care of its own business \{shiqing zuohaole\} can it win and grasp the strategic initiative rights \{zhanlue zhudongquan\}.

Along with the increasingly clear trend of multi-polarization in the world’s strategic pattern in the future, the world’s peace strength has continued to grow, and the international community has become an interest “community” \{liyi gongtongti\} to some extent. Cooperation and competition that take economy and science and technology as a core have become the crux to determine the destiny of countries; the world will carry on the epochal theme of peaceful development; exchanges, conversations, and cooperation among countries will continue to deepen; and pursuing peace, seeking development, and promoting cooperation will become the common will and a relentless pursuit of the peoples around the world. Of course, we also must solemnly see that, even though the conditions for China to eliminate various interferences and realize peaceful development will continue to exist, by comparison with the first decade of the 21st century, China will face more difficulties in the next ten years, presenting even higher requirements for actively creating good international and peripheral environments.

III. Major challenges to China’s peaceful development...78

Grasping the opportunity and responding to challenges are a dialectical unity \{bianzheng de tongyi\}. In today’s world, for countries of different zhidu systems, \[end of page 78\] different types, and different development phases, their interests blend together, they share safety and danger together, and the connotation of their security problems have surpassed far beyond the security of a balance of standoff \{duizhi pingheng\} in the Cold War era, beyond military security in a traditional sense, and at the same time, beyond the security of one country in one zone. Facing situations in reality where area hot-spot problems rise one after another, terrorism runs rampant, anti-nuclear proliferation circumstances remain harsh, and deep-level impacts of the international financial crisis continue to emerge, etc., the arduous task of safeguarding world peace and promoting common security \{gongtong anquan\} still has a long way to go. Profound adjustments in the international strategic pattern, rapid escalation of the nation’s international status, full-dimensional expansion of national interests, and the continuous transformation of the domestic economy and society have determined that China is faced with complex, multi-dimensional, and changeable security challenges. Traditional security threats interweave and interact with non-traditional security threats; international and domestic security factors influence each other; and development crises are more important than survival
crises. It should be said that we have both long-term and short-term worries. And in the present and future period, we must calmly respond to the following challenges.

New strategic containment {zhānlù ezhi} against China implemented by Western countries led by the U.S. After the Cold War, the U.S. has always taken guarding against the re-emergence of a great nation on the Eurasia continent capable of posing a challenge to its status as a fundamental national policy {jiben guoçe}. Presently, the US strategic trending direction {zhānlù zouxiàng} is undergoing a new adjustment. Facing the impetus of China continuing to develop and grow, on the one hand, Western countries, including the U.S., attempt to incorporate China into the international tìxi system led by them by contact and cooperation, and on the other hand, they intensify efforts to tie down {qiánzì} as well as guard against China’s rise, and the orientation of containment in their China strategy is increasingly prominent. They use policies and means, such as Westernization, splitting up, and taming {xìhuà, fènhuà, xúnhuà}, to implement peaceful evolution against China; use “Taiwan independence,” “Tibet independence,” and “East Turkestan” separatist influence to disrupt China internally; use issues including RMB exchange rate, to continuously apply pressure on China; implement various forms {xíngshì} of trade protectionism against China; and interfere with overseas energy resources cooperation unfolded by China in an attempt to delay the development of China’s economy and society. It is particularly worth noting that the U.S. has picked up the pace of its return to the Asia-Pacific strategy. It has already shifted the strategic center of gravity to the Asia-Pacific, implemented a “re-balance” strategy, made an utmost effort to bolster and expand its Asia-Pacific military alliances, strengthened with key points its military disposition in the Western Pacific area, and put forth an “Air Sea Battle” concept that takes China as the main adversary and the Western Pacific as the main battlefield. Taking a comprehensive look, between China and the U.S., there will be more frequent strategic interaction {zhānlù hudìng}, mutual game playing {xiànghù bōyì}, and at the same time, increasingly deepened dependency in the future. It is not likely that in Sino-US relations, a situation of full-scale confrontation {guānmíng duìkàng} will occur, like the one between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era; however, interest conflicts and structural contradictions between China and the U.S. will not be completely resolved easily. Struggles of containment and counter-containment {fàn èzhi}, extrusion {jìyà} and counter-extrusion between China and Western countries, such as the U.S., are long term and complex, and a phased cycle {jiédúnxìng xúnhùan} of “ease—intensify—ease” will inevitably emerge.

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19 Translator’s Footnote: The English translation of the Chinese term “空海一体战 {kōnghǎi yìtìzhàn}” is “air-sea integrated warfare.”
Growing security risks and hidden dangers in peripheral areas. China’s periphery is an area [end of page 79] where world major strategic strengths’ interests converge, and contradictions tangle; an area with the most concentrated problems left behind by the Cold War pattern; an area with the most serious nuclear proliferation and terrorism threats; and an area with frequent natural disasters, such as earthquakes and tsunamis. There are as many as 29 peripheral countries with a total population over 2,500 million, and the diversity and differences in their histories, religions, ethnic groups, economies, societies, and cultures have also determined that China’s peripheral relations have a particular complexity. In recent years, great nations outside of the zone {yu} have intensified their efforts to intervene; great nations inside and outside of the zone have stepped up seizing dominance rights {zhudaoquan} in the area; geostrategic competitions have intensified; arms races in the area have heated up; and hot-spot issues have risen one after another. Along with the rapid rise of China’s economic actual strength and area influence, while some peripheral countries are sharing the radiation effect {fushe xiaooying} of China’s economic development, their apprehension and alertness against China have also somewhat increased; particularly with respect to issues including maritime boundary delimitation, island ownership, and maritime rights and interests {haiyang quanyi}, they have increasingly taken a hardline stance and continued to provoke conflicts. Some great nations outside of the zone have taken advantage of contradictions between China and peripheral countries to sow discord in China’s relations with peripheral countries in an attempt to unsettle China’s peripheral security environment. Multiple factors, interlacing and overlapping, have increased the difficulty for China to scheme and manage {jinglue} the periphery, stabilize the periphery, and bring harmony to the periphery.

The Taiwan issue is still constraining China’s grand situations in domestic politics and diplomacy in the long term. China is the only great nation in the world that has not realized a complete unification. Since 2008, relations across the Taiwan Strait have maintained an impetus of peaceful development; cross-strait economic and cultural exchanges have become more extensive; channels for cross-strait political dialogue have trended towards greater diversity; and the material foundation and spiritual bond for interaction and mutual trust between the two parties have become sturdier. However, critical resistance factors {zuli yinsu} for solving the Taiwan issue have not been fundamentally eradicated. The “Taiwan independence” influence’s scheme to split up the motherland has not changed, and it might run wild again under certain conditions. The US strategy of “containing China with Taiwan” {yitaizihua} has not changed, and the U.S. still continues to expand and sustain the implementation of arms sales to Taiwan. The protraction of the Taiwan issue has become a major factor that ties down and consumes China’s strategic resources in politics, the economy, diplomacy, and the
military, and it has become a long-term hidden danger obstructing the Chinese nation from realizing its great revival.

Increasing pressure for maintaining a stable domestic and social situation. China is currently in the period of tackling difficult issues in reform and opening up as well as in the period of economic and social transformation. On account of profound transformation in the economic tizhi system, profound transition in the social structure, profound adjustments in the interests pattern \{liyi geju\}, and profound changes in thoughts and viewpoints, problems of imbalance, no adjusting-coordination, nonsustainability in development of the entire society have become increasingly prominent, contradictions of various interests among the people have become more complex, and the extensive-mode development \{cufangshi fazhan\} has become unbearable for the resource environment. Supported and instigated by the anti-China influence in the West, ethnic separatist influence, religious extremist influence, terrorism influence, and “democracy movement” activities and a few religious cults and organizations have worked in collusion to continuously conduct infiltration, separatism, subversion, and sabotage activities. Major natural disasters, epidemic diseases and extreme changes in weather conditions occur from time to time, endangering [end of page 80] the security of people’s life and property, and if not handled in a timely and proper fashion, they might trigger social and even political problems. Financial turmoil in the international economy and tense international security circumstances, in particular worsening peripheral security circumstances, can all possibly be transferred to China internally, bringing an unfavorable influence to economic development and social stability. Under these background conditions, the complexity for the State to handle internal affairs has increased unprecedentedly, and its task of maintaining social stability has become more arduous.

Increasing resistance confronting the expansion of national interests. The existing international economic regulatory system \{guizhi\}, led by developed Western countries, has formed a tizhi system-quality constraint \{zhiduxing yueshu\} on the expansion of China’s overseas interests. World strategic resources and energy have mostly been controlled by Western monopolies, and China as a resource and energy consumption great nation lacks a reliable external supply \{waibu gongji\}. Main strategic passages in the world are controlled by great nations, including the U.S., and China’s overseas transportation has a relatively great hidden security danger. Early opportunities in the deep sea, polar regions, space \{taikong\} and network space \{wangluo kongjian\} have been seized by other great nations, and the difficulty, costs and risks for China’s interests to expand towards these strategic spaces \{zhanlue kongjian\} have increased. Along with continuous expansion of national security and development interests, and continuous changes in the structure of overseas interests, strategic risks undertaken by China will
also continue to rise, and problems associated with national development security have become increasingly prominent, including energy supply security from outside of the border, strategic passages security, overseas market security, and overseas assets and overseas personnel security.

Section 3: Completely Carrying Out the Armed Forces Historic Mission…81

Ever since the establishment of new China, our armed forces’ mission has transformed from seizing political power of the whole country in the Revolutionary War period to solidifying the people’s democratic dictatorship, guarding the socialist motherland, and participating in socialism building. After entering the 21st century, unprecedented opportunities and challenges have presented new requirements for national defense armed forces building and military struggle preparations. In order to realize the historic tasks of continuing to push forward modernization building, completing unification of the motherland, maintaining world peace and promoting common development, the CPC Central Committee has explicitly given our armed forces the historic mission of “three providing, one giving full play” {sange tigong yige fahui}, established a new objective of building a consolidated national defense and formidable armed forces that corresponds to China’s international status and conforms to national security and development interests, and clearly pointed out a new approach for realizing full-scale adjusting-coordination and sustainable development of national defense and armed forces building.

I. Insisting on scientific development, grasping the objective of a strong military…81

As the newest achievement of the Party’s innovative theories, scientific development view is an important composition of [end of page 81] the socialism theoretical tixi system with Chinese characteristics; a guiding concept for pushing forward socialist economic building, political building, cultural building, social building, and ecological civilization building in the new phase of the new century; and a guiding concept for national defense and armed forces building. In order to realize the unity of a rich country and strong military during the progress of building a moderately prosperous society in full scale, we must insist on taking Mao Zedong’s military thought, Deng Xiaoping’s thought on armed forces building in the new era, Jiang Zemin’s thought on national defense and armed forces building, and Hu Jintao’s thought on national defense and armed forces building as guidance, and insist on taking pushing forward scientific development in national defense and armed forces building as the main theme as well as taking transforming the mode {moshi} of generating combat power as the main line, to strive for creating a new situation for national defense and armed forces modernization building.
The overall requirements \{zongti yaoqiu\} for implementing scientific development view in national defense and armed forces building are to: insist on the fundamental nature and aim of the people’s armed forces under the Party’s absolute leadership; focus on effectively carrying out the armed forces historic mission in the new phase of the new century; take enhancing deterrence and actual combat capabilities under informationized conditions as a starting point as well as a finishing point; strengthen revolutionization, modernization, and regularization \{geminghua, xidaihua, zhengguihua\} building in full scale; fulfill the “five-sentence” general requirement \{zongyangqiu\} in full scale; conduct unified operations research-based planning of the revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics and military struggle preparations; conduct unified operations research-based planning of mechanization building and informationization building; conduct unified operations research-based planning of services and arms operational strengths building; conduct unified operations research-based planning of current building and long-term development; conduct unified operations research-based planning of building in the main strategic direction and other strategic directions; further implement the strategy of [building] a strong military through science and technology; focus efforts on pushing forward military theory innovation, military technology innovation, military organizational tizhi system innovation, and military management innovation; speed up transforming the mode of generating combat power; give full play to the role played by the numerous officers and men as the main body \{zhuti\}; insist on military-civilian blended development \{junmin rongheshi fazhan\}; and realize full-scale adjusting-coordination and sustainable development of national defense and armed forces building.\(^{20}\)

After the 18\(^{th}\) National Congress of the CPC was held, Chairman Xi Jinping and the Central Military Commission clearly put forth the objective of strong military by building a people’s armed forces that obey the Party’s command, is capable of winning battles, and has a fine style of work \{zuofeng youliang\}, thus clarifying the point of focus and the point of efforts in strengthening armed forces building under new circumstances. Obeying the Party’s command is the soul, being capable of winning battles is the core, and having a fine style of work is the guarantee. The entire military must accurately grasp the epochal connotation and essential requirement of the strong military objective, and apply them in leading armed force building, reform, and military struggle preparations to strive to escalate national defense and armed forces building to a new level.

II. Carrying out the PLA’s new historic mission…82

Entering the new phase in the new century, [the question of] how national defense and armed forces building can conform to the Party’s strategic task \{zhanlue renwu\} [end of page 82] and national development’s historic progress so as to shoulder the sacred historic mission under the correct guidance of scientific development view has become a major epochal topic. Since the 16th National Congress of the CPC, the Party’s Central Committee and the Central Military Commission have made a new summary of the PLA’s historic mission by fully analyzing changes in the epochal conditions and national security circumstances, and centering on the magnificent blueprint of building a moderately prosperous society in full scale, developing socialism with Chinese characteristics, and realizing the great revival of the Chinese nation, as well as accomplishing the Party’s three historic tasks.

First of all, providing an important strength guarantee for the Party to solidify its ruling status. The CPC turning into the ruling party was the choice of history, the choice of the people. Adhering to the Party’s leadership, enhancing the Party’s ruling capability, solidifying the Party’s ruling status, and always maintaining a flesh-and-blood connection between the Party and the masses of the people are a core requirement and fundamental guarantee for us to overcome various risks and challenges, ensure stability of the strategic overall situation \{zhanlue quanj"u\}, realize lasting stability and durable peace in the country, and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics. China’s armed forces are the people’s armed forces under the leadership of the Party, as well as an armed group \{wuzhuang jituan\} executing the Party’s political tasks. They shoulder a sacred mission and play an important role as the mainstay in solidifying the Party’s ruling status, ensuring the country’s socialist nature, and maintaining fundamental interests of the masses of the people. Presently, hostile influences at home and abroad question the legitimacy of the Party’s ruling status, deny the Party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces, sow discord in relations between the Party and the masses of the people, and their ultimate goal is to subvert the Party’s ruling status, subvert the national regime of the people’s democratic dictatorship, and subvert China’s socialist zhidu system. Experiences from both sides — Chinese and foreign, positive and negative — have enlightened us that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, and political power is solidified in the barrel of a gun \{qiangganzili chu zhengquan, qiangganzili gonggu zhengquan\}. As long as the Party makes itself stronger, more united, more pure, relies closely upon the people across the country, and tightly grasps the people’s armed forces, it will have fear of any squalls and storms, and will be able to ensure that the great ship of socialism with Chinese characteristics can brave the wind and waves to navigate safely. For this purpose, we must take pushing forward the armed forces’ revolutionization, modernization, and regularization building as an important strategic task of the Party in
ruling; center on two historic topics, “winning the battle, and never changing the nature” {dadeying, bubianzhi}; adhere to the fundamental principle of the Party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces; faithfully practice the fundamental aim of wholeheartedly serving the people; and forever act as the faithful defender of the people’s interests. [We must] insist on placing thought [building] and political building in the first place among the armed forces’ various building; insist on arming the entire military with the newest achievement in the Party’s theoretical innovation; and guide the officers and soldiers to consciously practice the core value of being contemporary revolutionary servicemen and to vigorously carry forward the excellent tradition of obeying the Party’s command, serving the people, and fighting bravely and skillfully. This is the essential feature of our people’s armed forces, the biggest political superiority {zhengzhi youshi} that differentiates our armed forces from other armed forces, a deep source for generating our armed forces’ combat power, as well as a necessary requirement for ensuring that our armed forces will always be the backbone strength for the Party to solidify its ruling status under new historic conditions. [end of page 83]

Secondly, providing strong security support for maintaining the important period of strategic opportunity for national development. Since the 16th National Congress of the CPC, the Party Central Committee has scientifically judged that the first two decades of the 21st century is the important period of strategic opportunity that we must grasp tightly and in which we can accomplish much. In the past ten years, with an unprecedented development speed, China has realized large-scale enhancement of its comprehensive national power and significant escalation of its international status, and it has created a new situation for the undertaking of [building] socialism with Chinese characteristics. In the next ten years, we will still be in the period of strategic opportunity in which much can still be accomplished; however, China will face more deep-level contradictions and problems, greater internal and external strategic pressures, and more complex and changeable risks and challenges. This will need and require us to focus on the overall situation of national interests, resolutely implement the Party’s grand policy and concepts, properly handle the relationship between maintaining stability and maintaining power, and comprehensively employ various political, economic, diplomatic, military and cultural means in continuing to meticulously maintain and make full use of the period of strategic opportunity. This will need and require the armed forces to always conduct activities {xingdong} under the overall situation, place safeguarding national sovereignty and security first, resolutely maintain the country’s core security and core interests, strive to shape a peaceful and stable security environment, attach importance to crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and war containment, and when necessary, dare to stop a war with a war, control the war situation, and win the war.
Third, providing powerful strategic brace-support \{zhante zhicheng\} for maintaining national interests. Since reform and opening up, China’s national interests have gone beyond the traditional scope of land territory, sea territory, and air territory, and they are currently expanding and extending towards global public domains \{quanqiu gonggong lingyu\}, including oceans, space \{taikong\}, and electromagnetic space \{dianci kongjian\}. These public domains are not only important passages for global exchanges \{quanqiu jiaowang\}, but also a treasure trove of resources for humans’ sustainable development in the future. A small number of great nations are currently speeding up to seize control rights to the global public domains, and a future battlefield will definitely be an expansive space \{kongjian\} that integrates multiple dimensions of land, sea, air, space, and networks \{wang\} into one. This thus requires our armed forces to further emancipate the mind, change viewpoints, keep pace with the times, and continue to explore and innovate new methods and new approaches to maintain national interest. On the basis of ensuring domestic security and stability, [our armed forces must] conform to the trend of national interests extending towards all dimensions, expand the horizon of security strategy and military strategy, and continuously enhance military capabilities that maintain stability and maintain power in a greater scope. At the same time as paying attention to and maintaining national survival interests, [our armed forces must] pay attention to and maintain national development interests; at the same time as paying attention to and maintaining territorial land, territorial sea, and territorial air security, [the armed forces must] pay attention to and maintain ocean, space \{taikong\}, and electromagnetic space security as well as national security in other aspects.

Fourth, giving full play to an important role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development. China’s connection with the world has become increasingly close, China’s economy and world economy have increasingly blended into one, China’s development has become more and more inseparable from the world, and the world’s prosperity and stability have become more and more inseparable from China. No matter how the international climate turns and churns, China will always hold high the flag of peace, development, and cooperation, and insist on [end of page 84] taking the path of peaceful development, pursue an opening-up strategy of mutual benefits and win-win, and strive to implement inclusive growth \{baorongxing zengzhang\}. [China must] make full use of two markets, two resources — international and domestic — to realize the circulation of essential factors, interconnection of industries, and mutual complementarity of superiorities \{yaosu liutong, chanye dujie, yushi hubu\} in the global scope; promote common development of the area and the world with its own development; and increase its own development’s international boost with prosperity and stability in the area and the world. China insists on developing friendly cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, opposes hegemonism and power politics in various forms \{xingshi\}, endeavors to create an international environment of peaceful
stability, equality and mutual trust, and win-win cooperation; and pushes the new international political and economic order to develop towards a fair and reasonable direction. Maintaining world peace and promoting common development concern the future and the fate of people around the world, as well as the strategic environment for China’s development; and they need and require unremitting efforts in political, diplomatic, and economic aspects, as well as having powerful military actual strength as the backing. Therefore, China must insist on the unity of a rich country and strong military, and on the basis of a continuously developing economy, strive to build a military strength that matches China’s international status and conforms to China’s security and development interests, so as to give full play to the active role of doing a better job at fulfilling international responsibilities and obligations, and maintaining area and world peace.

The new historic mission is a new summary made in accordance with conducting operations research-based planning of national defense and armed forces modernization building with a scientific development view, on the basis of scientifically analyzing national security needs in the new phase of the new century; a new regulation made regarding our armed forces’ functions and tasks in accordance with new changes in security circumstances and security viewpoints of the contemporary time, on the basis of ensuring the country’s comprehensive security; and a new requirement put forth for full-scale growth and integrated-whole optimization of our armed forces by placing the foothold at full-scale building and long-term development. It [the historic mission] concentratedly manifests a new specification \{guifan\} for the armed forces’ mission and tasks given by the objective that the Party is striving for, reflects a new requirement in the strategic overall situation of national security and development, and conforms to the new trend of world military development. This historic mission further expands our armed forces’ functions and tasks under new historic conditions; manifests an organic unification of maintaining national survival and development, of responding to traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats, and of safeguarding national security and promoting world peace; specifies the development direction of armed forces building under new circumstances; elevates standards for military struggle preparations; and enriches the guidance principle for employment of military strength.

III. Enhancing the capability to respond to multiple types of security threats, to accomplish diversified military tasks...85

According to the armed forces historic mission in the new phase of the new century, our armed forces must respond to not only traditional security threats, but also non-traditional security threats; must maintain not only national survival interests, but also national development interests; must maintain not only territorial land, territorial sea, and
threats, informationized tasks.

By scientifically analyzing security threats confronting China and accurately grasping the armed forces’ historic mission, we should solemnly understand that: our armed forces must respond to multiple types of security threats, and the most important one is responding to the threat of invasion, subversion, and splitting up of the country; our armed forces must shoulder diversified military threats, and the most primary one is winning local wars under informationized conditions. For a relatively long period at present and in the future, the main contradiction in our armed forces building will remain to be that: the armed forces’ modernization level does not conform to the requirements of winning local wars under informationized conditions, and their military capabilities do not conform to the requirements of implementing the armed forces’ historic mission in the new phase of the new century. Therefore, [the work of] enhancing the capability to respond to multiple types of security threats and accomplishing diversified military tasks is full-dimensional with key points, and the core is to enhance the capability of winning local wars under informationized conditions. Only when the core military capability of winning local wars under informationized conditions is obtained will there be the reliable strengthened guarantee for maintaining national core security and core interests, and will there be an ample capability foundation {nengli jichu} for accomplishing other military tasks. Our armed forces must center on this base point, [i.e.,] winning local wars under informationized conditions, in pushing forward modernization building, conducting operations research-based planning of armed forces reform, and successfully performing military struggle preparations.

At the same time as enhancing the core capability, [i.e.,] winning local wars under informationized conditions, our armed forces also must attach great importance to enhancing non-war military activities capabilities {feizhanzheng junshi xingdong nengli}. Along with the expansion of national interests and the rise of non-traditional security threats, non-war military activities have increasingly become an important mode {fangshi} of employment of national military strengths, and they play an important and unique role in successfully conducting war preparations and enhancing armed forces

territorial air security, but also ocean, space {taikong}, and electromagnetic space security [end of page 85] as well as national security in other aspects; and must not only maintain domestic security and stability, but also actively participate in international and area security cooperation, UN peacekeeping, international antiterrorism, international humanitarian relief, etc., to contribute strength in maintaining world peace. Based on the historical-quality expansion of their functions and tasks, our armed forces need and require to further enhance awareness of opportunities, awareness of potential dangers, and awareness of missions; to deepen armed forces reform; to strengthen military struggle preparations; and to enhance in full dimensions the capability to respond to multiple types of security threats and accomplish diversified military tasks.
operational capabilities in a relatively peaceful environment. Non-war military activities capabilities take war capabilities \{zhanzheng nengli\} as a foundation, but there are also unique laws \{guilü\} for their generation and employment. We should earnestly conduct scientific operations research-based planning and implementation of non-war military activities capabilities building by placing it within the overall situation of armed forces modernization and military struggle preparations, aiming at the strategic needs of non-war military activities in multiple domains, multiple spaces \{duokongjian\}, and multiple modes \{duofangshi\}, starting from the reality to actively strengthen building professional strengths for non-war military activities, and organically blending them [the professional strengths] into military-wide operational strengths tixi system, so as to accomplish [the task of] responding to emergencies in peacetime and responding to wars in wartime, as well as successfully grasping the work in aspects of focused-quality training, professional talent cultivation, technical equipment support \{baozhang\}, and improving related laws and regulations, in striving for continuous enhancement of our armed forces’ non-war military activities capabilities so that they are qualified to take on various dangerous and perilous tasks. [end of page 86]
Chapter 4
Development of Modern War and the Wars China May Face…87

Having a clear understanding of war development trends is a basis for conducting operations-research-based planning of and guiding war preparations, strengthening armed strength building, as it is also a foundation to innovate operational methods. Only by having a clear understanding of war development trends can we combine analysis of real contradictions and interest conflicts, accurately assess \( \text{panduan} \) wars China may face and their basic patterns \( \text{jiben yangshi} \), and conduct preparations with a focused quality ahead of time to strive for winning victory first and seizing the initiative of war.

Section 1: The Main Motives of Modern War Development…87

Wars have always had a profound epochal characteristic \( \text{shidai texing} \). Factors that influence war development have many aspects, and viewed from a global scope, the development and evolution of modern war are a profound reflection of the modern development trends of political multi-polarization, economic globalization, and social informationization. In particular, the essential characteristics of the modern world’s politics and science and technology development have fundamentally stipulated the trending \( \text{quxiang} \) of modern war development.

I. Political needs are the fundamental pull for modern war development…87

War is a continuation of politics. Political characteristics of a war, that is, characteristics of the political interests of a certain interest group in a certain phase, decide the goal, nature, and mode \( \text{fangshi} \) of a war, stipulate a war’s evolutionary trend, and profoundly influence the development direction of weapons and equipment and military technology, as well as the armed forces’ structure and form-state \( \text{xingtai} \).

Since modern times, accompanying the continuous expansion of the Western colonial \( \text{tixi} \) system, colonial wars and anti-colonial wars have never ceased. At the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century and in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, newly emerging imperialist countries’ capital expansion and struggles for resources and markets led to a rise in their political needs of invading and occupying other countries, while expanding the scale of war to a global scope. In the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, international politics was epitomized as big powers fighting for hegemony \( \text{lieqiang zhengba} \) and seizing a domineering status in the world’s political and economic \( \text{tixi} \) systems, [end of page 88] as well as the dominant rights \( \text{zhudaquan} \) over international political and economic orders. And the continuous accumulation and intensification of political and economic contradictions within the global scope led to the eruption of the two World Wars. These wars’ political
goals {zhengzhi mudi} displayed a typical feature of limitless {wuxianxing} — [that is,] to completely annihilate enemy armed forces, occupy enemy territory, conquer enemy people, and ultimately make the enemy compromise or surrender unconditionally. In conforming to this, war tools — including armed forces and weapons — relied on industrialized mass production and reached an unprecedented scale, and weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical weapons, biological weapons and nuclear weapons, emerged as the times required. The limitless of the political goals led to incomparable brutality and an unprecedented scale of the wars.

World War II completely shook the global colonial tixi system of the modern times. After the war, the international pattern {guoji geju} rapidly evolved into a bipolar pattern, and the international community was differentiated into two major camps of east and west, led by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and international politics displayed a feature of confrontation between the two major camps. Continuous enhancement of international political mechanisms, represented by the United Nations, establishment and continuous development of international economic trade tixi systems, establishment of a sovereign country tixi system {zhuquan guojia tixi} within a global scope, and gradual establishment of global as well as area political, economic, and security mechanisms, to an extent, resolved various contradictions and conflicts that would lead to wars, and constrained the development of a large-scale war of aggression and conquest. More importantly, due to an unprecedented rise of risks and costs of a war, neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union was willing to fight a large-scale war that would bring damages and losses to them both, and their competition strategy turned from seeking victory with war {yi zhan qiu sheng} to gaining victory with comprehensive [means] {zonghe zhisheng}, hence the emergence of the Cold War that lasted for nearly half of a century. Local wars during the Cold War era, though, resulted from complicated contradictions and struggles associated with territory, ethnic races, religion, etc., happened against the strategic backdrop of the US-Soviet confrontation, and some local wars had the nature of a typical “agent war” and were inevitably influenced and constrained by bipolar politics. Nonetheless, not a single local war was a head-on clash between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; all local wars that could lead to a direct military conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were under powerful strategic control to avoid unlimited escalation {wuxianzhi shengji}.

During this period of time, the direct constraint {zhijie zhiyue} of a war’s political goal on a war’s military means became increasingly prominent, and political requirements’ stipulatory quality {guidingxing} over technological development became even stricter. With rapid development of nuclear weapons, nuclear terror and nuclear parity {hejunshi} to a great extent suppressed the development trend of the war scale’s unlimited expansion. When nuclear weapons first came out, many people believed that they would
bring about a greater operational efficiency \{zuozhan xiaoili\}, and speed up a war’s progress to avoid the kind of war that prolongs and protracts. But soon people gained a profound understanding of the weapons’ uncontrollable scope of influence and uncontrollable consequences. Nuclear weapons’ ultimate destruction effect placed human society’s war goal and war means in extremely great contradiction. And the limitlessness of the destructive might of the weapons, in turn, demanded an explicit restriction on the political goal of war, so as to avoid the limitlessness of the war’s political goal to bring the disasters of a nuclear great war. After a nuclear balance of terror \{hekongbu pingheng\} was achieved through a nuclear arms race, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were forced to face [the fact that] a nuclear great war yields no winner and would cause the harsh reality of “nuclear winter,” so they had to make a new strategic choice \{zhanelue xuanze\} to actively control the strategic impulse of using nuclear weapons and turn to rely on fighting limited wars or local wars against the backdrop of nuclear deterrence to achieve a limited war political goal.

After the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the “bipolar” international strategic pattern shifted to an international strategic pattern of “one superpower with multiple powers.” The U.S. obtained a “global leadership status,” and the first global hegemonic country in a true sense emerged in human history. For over twenty years, the U.S., on the one side, enjoyed a “peace dividend” brought about by the end of the Cold War, and on the other side, relied on its tremendous military superiority to successively fight four large-scale local wars — the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Afghan War, and the Iraq War. Also in 2011, it led NATO countries from behind the curtain, including Britain and France, to fight the Libya War, which has triggered turmoil and chaos that continue to develop to this date in the Arab countries as well as in areas of Western Asia and North Africa. These wars and upheavals refract \{zheshi\} the basic reality in international politics under the “one superpower with multiple powers” pattern, and they are the epitome of modern international political games \{boyi\} and struggles. Thus we can see the following.

First of all, hegemonism and power politics are still the root of modern war. Even though the U.S. initiates or participates in wars by waving the flag of maintaining area order, preventing humanitarian disasters, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and antiterrorism, its strategic intent \{yitu\} of expanding and solidifying the global hegemony with war means is extremely evident. Controlling the Eurasia continent, balancing various strategic strengths in the Eurasia continent, and preventing great nations on the Eurasia continent from impacting its hegemonic status is the basic design of the US global strategy since the end of World War II. Through post-war political maneuvering \{zhengzhi yunzuo\}, the U.S. gained solid strategic bridgeheads in Western Europe and East Asia respectively, and after the end of the Cold War, through several
wars the U.S. also seized a geostrategic key point on the “arc of instability” \(\{dongdang zhi hu\}\), the Balkans-Middle East (North Africa)-Central Asia, so as to realize a strategic looking down and controlling \{战略遏制 zhanlue kanzhi\} of the Eurasian continent from three directions: east, south and west.

Secondly, exporting “democracy” has become an important political goal for Western countries, headed by the U.S., in initiating a war. The U.S. has always considered itself “a nation upon a hill” \(\{shandian zhi guo\}\) for modern Western democracy, and taken popularizing “American democracy” in the global scope as an ultimate guarantee for pursuing absolute security and solidifying its world hegemony. After the end of World War II, Truman starkly claimed that, “The whole world should adopt the American zhidu system, and the American zhidu system can only survive when it becomes a world zhidu system.” The U.S. took the opportunity after winning World War II to accomplish a democratization transformation \[end of page 89\] of Germany and Japan, and then promoted the collapse of the Soviet Union regime with the Cold War, thus firmly establishing its status of the world’s overlord. Since the end of the Cold War, whenever there is turmoil and conflict in a non-Western country, Western countries, headed by the U.S., always interfere with various forms \{xingshi\} and even export democracy at the cost of war, and hence turmoil-interference-war has become their strategy trilogy. The Kosovo War and the Libyan War are the typical examples.

Thirdly, imbalance \(\{shiheng\}\) in the strategic strength comparison \{zhanlue liliang duibi\} has led to a trend of expansion in the war political goal of Western countries. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has directly made a bipolar balance — the biggest political factor in containing war in the Cold War era — cease to exist. The U.S., on the one side, avoids having direct military conflicts and confrontation with great nations, in particular nuclear great nations. And on the other side, it draws on its powerful force to continuously initiate low-risk wars in which bigger nations fight small nations, modifies the limited war principles established in the Korean War and the Vietnam War, and frequently takes subverting the enemy regime, annihilating the enemy’s top leader, and controlling all the territory of the enemy as the political goal of war. The expansion in a war’s political goal has to a great extent resulted in [the situation] that the U.S. would conduct quick battles but have difficulty in resolving the battles, occupy [enemy territory] but have difficulty in controlling the situation, unable to transform military victory into victorious political circumstances, and have difficulty in freeing itself from the mire of long-term wars. Presently, forced by the economic crisis as well as responding to the rise of a newly emerging great nation, the U.S. has conducted strategic adjustments and explicitly shifted its strategic center of gravity to the Asia Pacific. Viewed from the overall strategic situation, the U.S. is eager to rid of the heavy burden of the decade-long “antiterrorism” war, and has downplayed to a certain extent its strategic orientation
\{zhanlue quxiang\} of overreliance on hard power \{yingshili\}. However, as long as its international status of “one superpower,” and particularly its status with superpower military actual strength, is not fundamentally shaken, its strategic orientation of seeking hegemonic interests by relying on force and even war will be difficult to constrain completely.

Since the advent of the 21st century, though situations of great revolution, great adjustments, and great turmoil have emerged in the world, the historical trend of political multi-polarization, economic globalization, and social information has not changed, and the epochal tide of peace, development, and cooperation has not been reversed. The world connection is unprecedentedly tight, countries’ gains and losses interweave in depth, and there are competitions within cooperation as well as struggles within adjusting-coordination. The pattern of ensuring mutual destruction in the military and in-depth mutual dependence in the economy among great nations, in particular great nuclear nations, has become more prominent. Strategic games \{zhanlue boyi\} between great nations hinge not upon completely destroying an opponent with war means, but upon seeking a new strategic control and deterrence posture to pressure the opponent into submission or from public opposition against oneself. A full-scale conflict and confrontation between great nations can be avoided for a relatively long period of time. Military conflicts and local wars triggered by contradictions of territories, ethnic race, religions, maritime rights and interests, energy resources, ideology, etc., rise one after another. [end of page 90] The non-occurrence of large wars, the incessancy of small wars, and the restlessness of upheavals have become a basic posture of the evolution of strategy in the current world.

II. Science and technology development is an important driver for modern war development…91

Science and technology development is an important driver for pushing forward evolution of the form-state of war \{zhanzheng xingtai\}. When revolutionary advancement appears in science and technology, a revolutionary change in the war form-state follows. In the mid-20th century, the world entered a new cycle of great science and technology development, with burgeoning microelectronics technology, electro-optical technology, computer technology, nuclear technology, space technology \{kongjian jishu\}, new materials technology, new energy technology, bioengineering technology, etc. High and new technologies blended with each other and promoted each other to gradually converge into a wave of the information technology revolution. Since the 1990s, a brand-new information industry has been growing and thriving to become an important engine for leading the global economic development, information networks have rapidly covered the entire globe to forge new economic, political, cultural and
military patterns \{geju\} in the world, and the human society has marched forward from being an industrial civilization to an information civilization at an accelerated pace. Since the dawn of history, whatever technology humans would use to make tools, that technology would be used to make weapons; whatever mode \{fangshi\} [humans] would use for production, that mode would be used to conduct wars. Information technology’s rapid development and its extensive application in the military domain have pushed the war form-state to transform from mechanized wars to informationized wars. The social structures, \textit{zhidu} systems, and ideas created by information civilization have provided a brand-new paradigm for modern armed forces building and war development.

Informationization has fundamentally influenced and changed the mode of generating combat power. Material \{wuzhi\}, energy \{nengliang\}, and information \{xinxi\} are three major essential factors for generating combat power. From cold weapon wars to hot weapon wars, then to mechanized wars, the generation of combat power was realized by relying mainly on the expansion of the two essential factors, material and energy. Mechanized wars were the peak of material-, energy-dominated wars. Large-scale energy development \{nengyuan kaifa\}, machine production, and population growth in the industrial era gave unprecedented prominence to the combat power essential factors with material quality and energy quality, such as firepower, mobility \{jidongli\}, and force-strength \{bingli\}. Armored [force] task groups \{zhuangjia jiqun\} conducting lightning surprise attacks, aviation [force] formations conducting long-range raids, and large groupings of aircraft conducting strategic bombing are all for projecting as much material and energy with lethal quality as possible and as fiercely as possible towards the enemy. The scale of the armed forces, and the quantity of main battle platforms — including aircraft, ships, tanks, guns — have become important standards for measuring combat power. Informationization has caused a fundamental change in the traditional relationship among material, energy, and information in a war. Material and energy are still important resources in a war, but they no longer occupy a dominant status in generating and giving full play to combat power; information has transformed from being an assisting essential factor to being a dominant essential factor that commands material and energy. Military information systems have replaced mechanized operational platforms to become the center as well as a multiplier in generating combat power: \textbf{[end of page 91]} “information flow” guides “material flow” and “energy flow,” and “information link” supports “command link” and controls “strike link.” The generation of combat power takes rapid development of high and new technologies, in particular information technology, as a direct driving force, takes informationized weapons and equipment building as a basic brace-support \{jichu zhiheng\}, takes metasynthesis \{zonghe jicheng\} based on information systems as an important approach, and takes reform and innovation of military theory, \textit{tizhi} system task-based organizational structure \{tizhi bianzhi\}, and education training as important support \{zhongyao baozhang\} in realizing the
transformation from the growth of essential factors to metasynthesis, as well as the transformation from scale expansion to tixi system optimization. Enhancing tixi system operational capabilities based on information systems has increasingly become a common orientation {gongtong quxiang} for armed forces of countries around the world in transforming the mode of generating combat power. Informationization enables a main war body {zhanzheng zhuti} to have multi-dimensional reconnaissance surveillance capability, automated command and control capability, intermediate-range precision strike capability {zhongyuancheng jingque daji nengli}, long-distance high-speed maneuverability, all-time and all-space information attack-defense capability {quanshikong xinxi gongfang nengli}, highly-sensitive protection capability {gaolingmin fanghu nengli}, and focused escort support capability {jujiaoshi bansui baozhang nengli}. These capabilities would blend together to form a high-effectiveness integrated-whole operational capability {gaoxiao de zhengti zuozhan nengli}.

Informationization has fundamentally changed the mechanism of gaining victory in war {zhanzheng zhisheng}. The political goal of war is to force the enemy to submit to one’s own will. The military goal of war is to preserve oneself while annihilating the enemy. Mao Zedong once pointed out that, “To annihilate the enemy is to disarm the enemy, that is, to ‘deprive the enemy of resistance strength,’ and not to completely annihilate his physical flesh.”\(^{21}\) In a traditional war, in order to achieve the political goal and the military goal, while limited by war means, one takes eliminating the enemy’s vital strength {yousheng liliang} and attriting {xiaohao} the enemy’s material foundation as basic approaches to deprive the enemy of resistance capabilities. Because attrition is reciprocal, while attriting the enemy, one is also attriting oneself, and one might even be forced to drop the pursuit of victory due to one’s over attrition, or to give up because the attrition one undertakes is too much compared to the strategic objective pursued. A powerful country could afford to attrite material and energy, but not afford to attrite lives and will; it could afford to attrite economic and military strengths, but not afford to attrite politics and reputation. With a continuous increase in the degree of informationization of a war, one will be able to attain victory in war without massively annihilating the enemy’s vital strengths, and will be able to realize the goal of war through controlling and paralyzing enemy tixi systems to make the enemy lose its integrated-whole resistance capabilities. New changes in the mode of war {zhanzheng fangshi} have nurtured new mechanisms for gaining victory. Centers of gravity in enemy tixi systems, including leadership institutions, command and control centers, and information hubs {xinxi shuniu}, have become primary targets in attacks; strategic, campaign, and tactical

activities \( \{ xingdong \} \) are blended into one to directly achieve strategic goals through precision strikes against vital site targets, in particular targets of opportunity \( \{ shoumao mubiao \} \); asymmetrical, non-contact, and non-linear operations \( \text{end of page 92} \) are extensively implemented to conduct synchronous strikes against targets in all-depth \( \{ guanzongshen mubiao \} \), leaving the enemy no room and no time to adjust and adapt; and physical strikes \( \{ shiti daji \} \) and psychological shock and awe \( \{ xinli zhenshe \} \) are combined together so as to increase the intensity of psychological shock and awe with physical strikes and to expand the effect of physical strikes with psychological shock and awe. Compared to the traditional mechanism of gaining victory by annihilating the enemy and attriting the enemy, the mechanism of gaining victory in informationized wars by controlling the enemy and paralyzing the enemy is much closer to war’s original goal \( \{ benyuan mudi \} \).

Section 2: Basic Characteristics of Modern War...93

As great nations around the world enter a new round of a military strategic adjustment period as well, as weapons and equipment upgrade and replacement period, arms races in nuclear, space, and cyber \( \{ wang \} \) domains have increasingly become fierce, a new revolution in military affairs has advanced deeper, the war form-state of informationization has evolved towards a higher and more mature phase, and informationized war’s characteristics have become more prominent.

I. Tixi system confrontation has become a basic confrontation form for belligerent parties...93

An informationized war is no longer confrontation between individual operational essential factors, operational unit \( \{ zuozhan danyuan \} \), and operational strength; tixi system confrontation of all essential factors and all systems is currently becoming a reality. Because in modern war, the connection \( \{ guanlianxing \} \) between the military and domains of politics, economy, legal laws \( \{ falü \} \), public opinion, etc., has become closer, winning or losing a war is not only directly determined by the effectiveness \( \{ xiaoneng \} \) of an operational tixi system, but is also determined more by the effectiveness of a war tixi system. Therefore, tixi system confrontation includes not only confrontation of operational tixi systems, but also confrontation of war tixi systems. Under informationized conditions, every subsystem within an operational tixi system and a war tixi system is closely related with each other; every subsystem’s operation \( \{ yunxing \} \) and functions \( \{ gongneng \} \) are under the interlinked influence of related subsystems; and the adjusting-coordination among every subsystem directly decides the functions of the entire tixi system, so they [the subsystems] can realize an integrated-whole effect \( \{ zhengti xiaoying \} \) of “1+1>2,” and they also have a hidden danger of deterioration, like “2-1<1.”
The essence of tixi system confrontation is, from the strategic plane {zhanelue gaodu}, to view the enemy as an organic integrated-whole {youji zhengti}, and focus on vital points {yaphai} of its operational tixi system and war tixi system in implementing precision strikes to trigger its tixi systems to break down by linkage {posun liandong} and cause a sharp decline in its systems’ integrity, stability, and equilibrium {juhengxing}, so as to further paralyze its structure, disarrange its programs {chengxu}, and weaken its functions. Since the Gulf War, the US armed forces have no longer taken annihilating adversary armed forces as a primary task in several local wars, and instead, they have attached importance to giving full play to its own tixi system superiority as soon as the battle begins to directly strike center of gravity targets of the opponent’s tixi system so as to enhance its own operational effectiveness, expedite the war progress, and control war risks and costs. During the Kosovo War, even though the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s (FRY) ground vital forces {dimian yousheng liliang} did not suffer a serious setback, their function as superiority in the FRY operational tixi system was completely limited, deprived, and rendered useless; this is exactly the result brought about by tixi system confrontation.

II. Intermediate-range precision strikes become a decisive operational pattern...94

Striking an enemy from as far away as possible so as to better preserve oneself has always been a tactical pursuit, as well as a strategic pursuit. Modern war has been developing compositely along two dimensions, informationization and mechanization. The combination of precision, controllability, and intelligence on the informationization dimension with being farther, faster, and stronger on the mechanization dimension has enabled intermediate-range precision strikes that integrate land, sea, air, space, and networks into one to gradually become a decisive operational pattern, and intermediate-range strategic strike strength combining with lean, flexible, and multifunctional joint units {lianhe budui} is becoming a new trend in armed forces transformation. Viewed from the practice in high-tech local wars after the end of the Cold War, the side with superiority would massively employ long-range warfare weaponry {yuanzhan bingqi} to implement asymmetrical, non-contact, and non-linear precision strikes in all-depth. Consequently, the adversary, if lacking corresponding intermediate-range attack-defense means, would not have much strength to fight back even with the possession of tremendous mechanized units {budui}. In the Quadrennial Defense Review, 2010, the US military clearly put forth that [it will] enhance future long-range strike capabilities, expand its long-range warfare system {yuanzhan xitong} from land, air, water surface to space {taikong}, network {wangluo} and underwater, and combine together persistent surveillance and electronic warfare, with precision strike capabilities, including both penetrating platforms and stand-off weapons, to brace-support {zhicheng} US force-strength projection in the next twenty to thirty years. The same year, the US Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments submitted a report, *Sustaining America’s Strategic Advantage in Long-Range Strike*, to the Department of Defense (DoD), suggesting [the U.S.] update and develop a long-range strike weapons system, and develop long-range warfare *{yuanzhan}* capabilities covering five dimensions — land, sea, air, space, and cyber — to establish “global lightning strike” *{quanqiu shanji}* superiority in long-range warfare. Great nations in China’s periphery have also successively established the strategic idea of gaining victory with long-range warfare *{yuanzhan zhisheng}*，and have competitively developed an intermediate-range offensive operational strength with new-generation fighters, carriers, nuclear submarines, missiles, space weapons *{taikong wuqi}*，and network weapons *{wangluo wuqi}* as the backbone.

III. Concentrating capabilities in networks has become an important brace-support for operational activities...94

Relying on, as well as using, networked military information systems to concentrate capabilities and enhance effects *{jueng zengxiao}* of the operational *tixi* system is an important orientation of the new world revolution in military affairs, and operational activities are currently transforming from taking platforms as the center in the industrial age towards taking networks as the center in the information age. Some strong nations’ armed forces have realized posture awareness sharing *{taishi ganzhi gongxiang}* through linking systems of reconnaissance early warning, command and control, joint strikes, comprehensive support *{zonghe baozhang}*，etc., into a network to form a higher command speed, a faster operational pace *{zuozhan jiezou}*，more precise strikes, survivability with higher adaptability *{shiyixing}*，[end of page 94] as well as a certain degree of autonomous coordination *{zizhu xietong}* among every strength participating in a war *{cangzi liliang}*。At the end of the 1990s, by borrowing from the commercial model *{shangye moshi}* of “net-centric computing” *{wangluo zhongxin yunsuan}*，the US military first put forth a “network centric warfare” *{wangluo zhongxin zhan}* notion，and employed the notion in actual combat in the Afghan War and the Iraq War。During the Afghan War，the US military utilized networks for the first time to link aerial operational aircraft，unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)，and ground special forces units into an integrated-whole，by having special forces units personnel who were approaching the enemy provide target guidance *{mubiao zhiyin}* in real-time for aerial strikes to implement precision strikes against small，scattered，and hidden operational strengths and cave targets，like the Taliban and “Al-Qaeda” organization，greatly expediting the progress of clearing out [insurgents]。In 2012，the US DoD published a defense guide titled *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense*，proposing to “adopt measures to push forward armed forces and national defense building in networked wars” *{wangluohua zhanzheng}*，and “establish a global, network-linked *{lianzhan}*，and full-spectrum joint units。” It can be foreseen that in a future war，
networked armed forces, and a networked battlefield will be increasingly common, and there will be no military without networks and there will be difficulty in gaining battle victory without networks.

IV. Integrating information and firepower becomes a main operational means...

In an informationized war, information soft kill and firepower hard destruction \{yingcuihui\} complement each other. Firstly, information warfare has become operations with a pioneering quality \{xiandaoxing zuozhan\}, and runs through the entire process of the war. Since the Gulf War, the US military has formed a basic mode for initial battle \{chuzhan moshi\}, that is, focusing on an opponent’s reconnaissance and early warning, command and control, and air defense radar systems to first implement network-electronic integrated \{wangdian yiti\}, high-intensity information attacks, jamming, and suppression activities in order to put the opponent’s operational tixi system in state of “unable to see, unable to hear clearly, unable to connect,” so as to create conditions for follow-up fire strikes. The newest “Air Sea Battle” conceptualization \{gouxiang\} put forth by the US military clearly lists blinding the opponent’s operational networks \{zuozhan wangluo\} as a primary operational activity. It includes damaging the opponent’s space posture awareness system \{kongjian taishi ganzhi xitong\}, over-the-horizon radars and ground-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) nodes, airborne ISR sensors and communications relay platforms, and maritime ISR and communications links; and deploying area and zone electronic warfare and operational deception platforms, and jamming, spoofing \{youpian\} and blocking \{zuse\} the opponent’s ISR systems. Secondly, information dominates firepower, and it enables fire strikes to be more precise and doubles their effects \{xiaoguo beizeng\}. According to statistics, precision-guided munitions (PGMs) used by the US military was 0.2% of its ammunitions usage in the Vietnam War, 8% in the Gulf War, and it rose to 35% in the Kosovo War and reached above 60% in the Afghan War. In the Gulf War, only about 10% of US operational aircraft had the capability to launch \{toushe\} PGMs, while in the Iraq War, almost all US operational aircraft were installed with the targeting system, data links, and navigational positioning electronic equipment \{daohang dingwei dianzi shebei\} used in precision strikes, [end of page 95] and they were capable of launching multiple types of PGMs.

V. Operational space extends from three to five dimensions...

Following traditional land, sea, and air battlefields, space \{taikong\} and network space \{wangluo kongjian\} have increasingly become important battlefields. A new type of battlefield is currently forming, and it has a large scope that integrates five dimensions — land, sea, air, space, cyber — into one, and that is highly three-dimensional \{gaoliti\} and
interwoven by the tangible and the intangible. And, battlefield dominance rights \{zhanchang zhiquan\} are extending from dominating land, sea, and air towards dominating space, and dominating cyber. Space \{taikong\} has become a strategic elevation point \{zhanlue zhigaoqian\}, and space-based assisting-support and support systems \{tianji zhuanhe he baozhang xitong\} are an indispensable strategic brace-support \{zhanlue zhicheng\} in winning informationized wars. In several recent local wars, 10% of the US military’s navigational positioning and over 90% of its communications relied on satellites. Military great nations, such as the U.S. and Russia, are all vigorously developing military-use astronomical technology \{hangtian jishu\} and space weapons systems \{taikong wuqi xitong\}, and strengthening space battlefield building. The US military is focusing efforts on developing \{yanfa\} a “prompt global conventional strike system” that takes space \{taikong\} as an operational path \{zuozhan lujing\}. The Russian military is organizing and building aerospace defense units \{kongtian fangyu budui\} to constitute a unified national aerospace defense tixi system \{goujia kongtian fangyu tixi\}. Network space is becoming a “fifth dimension” battlefield listed alongside land, sea, air, and space. As early as the 1990s, the US military began to develop a professional strength for network space operations \{wangluo kongjian zuozhan zhuanye liliang\}, and in 2009, it organized and built a network space command \{wangluo kongjian silingbu\}, and formulated Strategy for Military Activities in Network Space in 2011. Presently, the US military has 80,000-90,000 people in strengths related to network space operations, and it is: starting to develop \{yanfa\} new types of network attack weapons, including “CyberCraft,” “digital ordnance,” and the “Suter system;” vigorously developing cyber warfare \{wangzhan\} projects, including “National Cyber Range” and “cybersecurity center data center;” and developing \{kaizhan\} multilevel, multimodal network attack-defense confrontation series exercises \{wangluo gongfang duikang xilie\}. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated the Joint Operational Access Concept in 2012 and put forth a “cross-domain jointness”\textsuperscript{22} \{kuayu lianhe\} notion, emphasizing that key points of jointness are the newly emerging operational domains of space and network space, and activities of all services must realize jointness with space and network space. The Russian military calls network warfare \{wangluo zhan\} “sixth generation warfare,” deeming that networks \{wangluo\} have already become a powerful means that is capable of directly destroying an enemy. A future war might first begin with attack-defense confrontation in space and network space, and seizing command of space \{zhitianquan\} and network dominance \{zhiwangquan\} will become the crux to obtaining comprehensive dominance rights on the battlefield \{zhanchang zonghe zhiquan\} to further conquer the enemy and gain victory.

\textsuperscript{22} Translator’s Note: This is “cross-domain synergy” in the US DoD document of origin.
VI. Operational pace highlighting that the faster beats the slower…96

In the history of war, regardless of a quick or protracted battle, time is a type of important “weapon.” And people have always used time specifically according to different situations. An informationized war emphasizes even more time control [end of page 96], and pursues even more time benefit \(\text{shijian xiao}yi\). The informationization of war means has provided an unprecedented possibility to pick up the operational pace and shorten the war progress. Former US Secretary of Defense Cohen thinks that whereas in the past the philosophy of war was the bigger eats the smaller, now it is the faster beats the slower. Both belligerent parties strive to shorten one’s own “awareness—decision-making—activity” \(\text{ganzhi juece xingdong}\) cycle, and extend the opponent’s “awareness—decision-making—activity” \(\text{ganzhi juece xingdong}\) cycle; transform information superiority \(\text{xinxi youshi}\) into decision-making superiority, and transform decision-making superiority into activity superiority \(\text{xingdong youshi}\); and try as much as possible to have awareness beforehand, make decisions beforehand, and conduct activities beforehand to disrupt the enemy’s operational pace and upset the enemy’s operational disposition so as to firmly grasp the time initiative \(\text{shijian zhudongquan}\) in one’s own hand. The time it requires for the US armed forces to complete a “discover—locate—strike” process has shortened from 100 minutes in the Gulf War and 40 minutes in the Kosovo War to approximately 10 minutes in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US military attempted a “rapid decisive operations” theory in the Iraq War by paying attention to combining speed, precision, and intensity together, attack time sensitive targets with priority, put aside or bypass targets with no or little time effectiveness \(\text{shixiaoxing}\), and strive to conclude the main operational activities in the shortest time possible. Covered by air strength, US ground units implemented a “leapfrog” style offensive to advance at high speed towards Iraq’s heart – Baghdad – by ignoring important towns and cities guarded by the Iraqi armed forces along the way, and storming Baghdad within three weeks in one fell swoop to topple the Saddam regime. In a traditional war, one often uses space \(\text{kongjian}\) in exchange for time, and relies on protracted attrition to realize the waxing and waning of actual strengths as well as the switch of being superior and being inferior between the enemy and oneself, so as to recover control of the space \(\text{kongjian}\) that was lost previously. But in an informationized war, time control and space control \(\text{kongjian kongzhi}\) go hand in hand, complementing each other. High speed and fast pace in the time dimension can effectively compress the enemy’s defense space. All-depth synchronous strikes in the space dimension \(\text{kongjian weidu}\) can also effectively save operational time. Dual control and squeezing \(\text{jiya}\) in time and space can maintain strong pressure on the enemy from beginning to end, and deprive him of conditions and opportunities to adjust his disposition, enhance his combat strength \(\text{zhanli}\), and adapt to the war.

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VII. An “unmanned, intangible, silent” war beginning to emerge…97

Viewed from the development trend, the operational tixi system will evolve towards the direction of intellectualization at an accelerated pace on the basis of becoming precise, long-range, and networked. The blending of intelligent technology, unmanned technology, stealth technology, and other new concept technologies will possibly enable future wars to display a new feature of being “unmanned, intangible, silent.” Unmanned operational systems that adopt intelligent technology, nanotechnology, micromachines technology, etc., have played an increasingly prominent role on the multi-dimensional land, sea, air, and space battlefield. Reconnaissance-strike weaponry {zhengcha daji bingqi} [end of page 97] that adopts stealth, blinding {mimang}, jamming, trajectory changing {biangui} technologies, etc., has made it harder for an opponent to discover, avoid, and guard against it. New concept weapons that adopt electromagnetic, laser, biological technologies, etc. have made high-decibel military activities, such as maneuvers and attacks, become silent and soundless. The US military first used the “Predator” UAV carrying the “Hellfire” laser-guided missile to conduct air raid tests in the Afghan War, employed UAVs extensively to implement precision strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan respectively in 2008-2010, and committed over 70 UAVs to implement precision strikes in the War in Libya. In recent years, the US military has been developing {yanfa} and equipping unmanned, intangible, and silent weapons at an accelerated pace. It already has the world’s most advanced stealth fighters, including the B-2, the F-22, and the F-35, and over 10,000 UAVs; and it is developing {yanzhi} and testing the X-37B unmanned aerospace plane, the X-47B shipboard unmanned stealth attack aircraft, the X-43A unmanned attack aircraft, the “Hummingbird” unmanned anti-tank helicopter, the K-MAX unmanned transport helicopter, new-generation stealth strategic bombers, new stealth ships, unmanned underwater vehicles, and new concept weapons such as electromagnetic gun, high-energy laser, and microwave [weapons]. As one looks to the future, unmanned operational systems consisting of highly automated intelligent weaponry will partially replace the vital strength within the armed forces, and unmanned, intangible, and silent operational platforms and strike weaponry will gradually be employed massively on the battlefield. This will inevitably bring on a new round of revolutionary changes in operational theory, operational patterns, and even in the war form-state and armed forces’ structure.

Section 3: The Wars China May Face in the Future…98

Through the ages, crises surely arise when one forgets to prepare for war {忘战必危 wanzhanbiwei}. As long as war has not exited the stage of history, the primary task of strategy is to conduct operations-research-based planning of and to direct {zhidao} war, and the core mission of the armed forces is to prepare for and implement war. China
insists on walking the path of peaceful development, adheres to defensive-quality national defense policy and the open-up strategy of mutual benefit and win-win, and endeavors to build a harmonious society internally and promote world peace externally. China’s comprehensive national power and international influence will be further enhanced, and it is hopeful that the national security environment will retain overall stability. However, the threat of war \{zhanzheng weixie\} is always there, and one must maintain a strong awareness of [potential] dangers and crises, and successfully conduct full preparations to contain war and gain victory in war.

Correctly assessing \{panduan\} the threat of war is the starting point for formulating and implementing strategy. Even though a world war and a full-scale war between great nations will not be fought, the world is not peaceful yet. The imbalanced quality in the world’s political and economic development is still prominent; struggles between seeking hegemony and anti-hegemony, control and anti-control as well as contention centering on strategic vital areas and strategic resources will continue to exist for a long period of time, and sometimes even become more acute and fierce. \[end of page 98\] China’s rapid rise has incurred containment and squeezing \{jiya\} from hegemonic influence, as well as apprehension and precautionary guarding from some countries; its full-dimensional expansion of national interests has encountered resistance, frictions, and even conflicts in multiple domains and multiple spaces \{duokongjian\}; its disputes regarding territories, maritime rights and interests with some peripheral countries are complicated and difficult to solve, and at times trend towards being intensified; and the arduous task of realizing a complete reunification of the motherland still has a long way to go, and the “three strands” of [evil] influence \{sangu shili\} continue to stir up troubles. The objective existence of these factors has fundamentally decided that China still faces many real and potential threats of war.

With different objects and different causes that trigger conflicts, the wars China may face in the future also have different nature, type, and scale. From a practical and long-term perspective, China will mainly face four types of war (military) activities:

Large-scale, high-intensity defensive war \{fangwei zhanzheng\}. In the critical phase of China’s peaceful development, we do not rule out that a hegemonic nation might provoke a war with the goal of delaying or interrupting the progress of China’s rise. The cause of the war may be the loss of control over a crisis, which escalates gradually, or it may also be a premeditated plot \{yuxian tumou\} [by the hegemonic nation], which comes surprisingly and unexpectedly. This type of war has a low probability of breaking out \{baofa zhishu\}, but a high danger index \{weixian zhishu\}. 
Relatively large-scale, relatively high-intensity anti-separatist war 《fanfenlie zhanzheng》. In the historic progress of China’s peaceful reunification, we do not rule out that the “Taiwan independence” influence, supported 《zhichi》 by international anti-China influence, might act obstinately and cross the “red line” stipulated by China’s Anti- Secession Law, and China will be forced to attack the “Taiwan independence” influence with force in safeguarding the reunification of the nation. This will be a typical political military battle 《zhengzhi junshi zhang》, and we must take great precautions against military intervention from foreign enemies. This type of activity has a relatively high danger index and probability of breaking out, and it is an objective for China’s long-term military struggle preparations. The two types of war (military) activities mentioned above will be high-end local wars 《gaoduan de jubu zhanzheng》 conducted under informationized conditions.

Small- to medium-scale, low- to medium-intensity self-defense and counterattack operation 《ziwei fanji zuozhan》. This is focused on the mid-range type of local war 《zhongduan leixing de jubu zhanzheng》 under informationized conditions instigated by main opponents in the periphery. One is armed conflicts and local wars triggered in the sea direction due to encroachment on islands, intensified quarrels over maritime delimitation, and plundering of large quantities of maritime oil and gas resources. Two is counterattack operations on the border triggered by problems in land border delimitation. And three is border blockade and control operational activities 《bianjing fengkong zuozhan xingdong》 triggered by the chaos of war in neighboring countries due to unstable political situations. This type of activity has a medium danger index and probability of breaking out, although it is showing an upward trend.

Small-scale, low-intensity anti-terrorist, stability-maintenance 《weiwen》, and rights-defending 《weiquan》 operational activity. This is war (military) activity of a relatively lower level, and it is closely related to the confrontational-quality activities within non-war military activities. One, the “three strands” [of evil] influence instigate terrorist raids and riots and uprisings, and for the purpose of safeguarding national security, [end of page 99] social stability, and protecting people’s lives and properties, China takes anti-terrorist and riot-quelling operational activities. Two, when outside-of-the-border 《jingwai》 national interests, strategic passages, and security of citizens living abroad are seriously threatened, in particular by violence, China takes defensive outside-of-the-border military rights-defending activities 《fangweide jingwai junshi weiquan xingdong》.

A comprehensive assessment: For a very long period of time at present and in the future, the likelihood of an enemy initiating a large-scale ground invasion war is very small, but the danger of the enemy implementing a high-end war in air and sea, air and space, and network space 《kongtian wangkong》 is rising. The threat of war in the east is greater than
the threat of war in the west; the threat of war in the sea direction is higher than the threat of war in the land direction; the threat of a space or cyberspace \{taikong, wangluo kongjian\} war has gradually become reality; and the probability of an out-of-the-border rights-defending [activity] with the military and even a limited operational activity \{youxian zuozhan xingdong\} is increasing. The most serious threat of war is a large-scale strategic raid \{daguimo zhanlue tuxi\} that is initiated by a powerful enemy and has an aim to destroy China’s war potential so as to force us to yield; the most possible threat of war is a limited military conflict in the sea direction; and the one [threat of war] that requires the most preparations with key points in responding to is a relatively large-scale, relatively high-intensity local war in the sea direction against the backdrop of nuclear deterrence.

According to real and potential threats of war confronting China and the armed forces’ historic mission entrusted to it by the CPC and the people in the new phase of the new century, our armed forces in a future period must insist on taking winning local wars under informationized conditions as the core, and carrying out three basic modes \{jiben fangshi\} of military strength application \{junshi liang yunyong\}: operational, military deterrence, and non-war military activities. Main operational activities include information attack-defense confrontation \{xinxi gongfang duikang\}, joint fire strikes, air and missile defense operations, sea and air blockade operations, island contention operations \{daoyu zhengdu zuozhan\}, area-denial operations \{quyu juzhi zuozhan\}, border counterattack and blockade and control operations, space attack-defense confrontation operations \{taikong gongfang duikang zuozhan\}, and network space attack-defense confrontation operations. Main military deterrence activities include nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence, space deterrence \{taikong weishe\}, network space deterrence, and integrated nuclear and conventional deterrence \{he chang yiti weishe\}. Main non-war military activities include non-war military activities with confrontational quality (e.g., anti-terrorism and quelling riots, and striking pirates), non-war military activities with law enforcement quality \{zhifaxing\} (e.g., international peacekeeping, and domestic martial law), non-war military activities with rescue assistance quality (e.g., emergency rescue and disaster relief, and protecting and evacuating citizens living abroad), and non-war military activities with cooperative quality (e.g., international joint military exercises).

Regarding objects of operations \{zuozhan duixiang\}. The complexity of the security environment and the diversity of threats of war have decided that our armed forces will face many types of objects of operations in the future. According to the threat’s degree of seriousness \{qingzhong chengdu\}, they [objects of operations] can be subdivided \{qufen\} into main objects of operations and general objects of operations. According to the threat’s degree of urgency \{huanji chengdu\}, they can be subdivided into real objects of
operations and potential objects of operations. A hegemonic nation is currently
strengthening military preparations that focus on China, and its corresponding operational
countourization \{zuozhan gouxiang\}, strength disposition, battlefield building,
equipment development, training and exercises, etc., are currently unfolding and being
implemented. If the hegemonic nation has the strategic intent as well as military
capabilities to raise a hand \{dongshou\} against China, but what it lacks is a time
opportunity to make up its mind \{dingxia juexin\}. War’s cruelty and damaging quality
have decided the severity \{yansuxing\} of military strategy, requiring that [end of page
100] our strategic operations-research-based planning and direction must keep its
foothold at complex and difficult conditions and not turn a blind eye to or avoid talking
about major real and potential threats of war. In the future, regardless how great the
probability of a powerful enemy implementing large-scale military intervention or
directly initiating a war against us, we cannot count on luck and must keep a foothold at
the foundation of having ample war preparations and powerful military capabilities of our
own, rather than at the assessment \{panduan\} that the enemy will not come, intervene, or
strike. [The question of] if, how, and when the powerful enemy will raise its hand against
us does not depend upon whether we subjectively view him as an opponent, but rather,
depends upon his trade-off [analysis] between war risks and costs. The more ample our
war preparations are and the stronger our military capabilities are, the less likely the
powerful enemy dares to rashly initiate a war against us.

Regarding the operational pattern. It is now difficult for traditional land battle and close
combat \{luzhan jinzhan\} to effectively realize operational goals \{zuozhan mudi\} under
the new war conditions. We must conform to features of the new form-state of war and
characteristics of new spaces for new military activities, focus on the main real and
potential objects of operations, combine with the comprehensive environment of main
future battlefields, and have a foothold for possible development of our own military
capabilities in a future period to firmly establish a new operational pattern that is capable
of expressing the common law \{gongxing guili\} of operations under informationized
conditions and also capable of giving full play to the advantages and strong points of our
armed forces’ combat strength \{zhanli\}. [We must] attach importance to
considering both offense and defense, and on the basis of enhancing defensive operations
on our own territory \{bentu fangwei zuozhan\}, we must give full consideration to multi-
dimensional, joint long-range warfare \{duowei lianhe yuanzhan\} that relies on our own
territory to develop an asymmetrical, non-contact, and non-linear operational pattern with
Chinese armed forces’ characteristics. [We must] keep close track of development and
changes in military technology, weapons and equipment, operational strengths, and strike
means of strong nations of the world, and continue to innovate a series of fighting
methods \{xile zuozhan\} for fighting UAVs, stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, carrier
formations, and space-based platforms, as well as for defending against reconnaissance
surveillance, precision strikes, network attacks \{wangluo gongji\}, outer-space attacks \{waikong daji\}, and new-mechanism [weaponry] strikes \{xinjili daji\}.

Regarding the strategic direction. The diversity \{duoyuan\} of threats and adversaries has decided the diversity of China’s strategic direction in the future. The main direction that may face war is the direction of oceans in the east and in the south. In this direction, the real as well as potential objects of operations are most prominent with the greatest threat, and in particular, there are powerful hostile military alliances. The eastern and southern littoral areas are an area and zone concentrated with China’s population, cities, industries, traffic, and trade; and [China’s] core areas — including the capital, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta — are all in this area and zone, which is actually where the country’s strategic center of gravity is. Meanwhile, this area faces a great uncertainty in defending against threats in the sea direction — an opponent at sea can flexibly choose any target for attack along the entire coastal area from north to south. When confronting a strong enemy, on the basis of integrated-whole defense \{zhengti fangyu\}, we need to firmly grasp crucial junctions \{guanjiedian\} that the enemy will surely attack and that we must surely defend. We need to implement tenacious interior front defense \{neixian fangyu\} combined with the initiation of powerful exterior front attacks \{waixian chuji\}, so as to attempt to seek and grasp the initiative [end of page 101] in a passive [situation].

Development and changes in the form-state of war have decided that the aspects covered by a strategic direction of a future war will be much wider. At the same time, in the new environment of asymmetrical, non-contact, and non-linear operations, operational strengths can be rapidly projected and maneuvered in a large scope, and considering particularly the situation of attack-defense confrontation in space and network space \{taikong, wangluo kongjian\}, the enemy might implement offensives from multiple dimensions: land, sea, air, space, and cyber, and therefore, the division of strategic directions must have greater flexibility and adaptive quality. From a historical viewpoint, several local wars that have been fought since the establishment of new China almost all happened in a secondary strategic direction at that time. This then requires that when strengthening military struggle preparations for the main strategic direction, we must also conduct unified operations-research-based planning considering all factors \{tongchou jiangu\} in all other strategic directions so as to ensure stability of the overall strategic situation \{zhanlue quanju\}.

Regarding strategic space \{zhanlue kongjian\}. The forming of a new “integrated five-dimensional” \{wuwei yiti\} battlespace has made the determination of strategic space become an important problem in military strategy. The determination of strategic space depends upon our own strategic task, requirements of the operational goal, and also upon the object of operations as well as the characteristics of the enemy’s operational strength’s spatial distribution \{kongjian fenbu\}. Facing a potential opponent who has
tremendous superiority in sea and air strengths as well as superiority in space and network space technologies, seas and oceans, air, space, and network space will undoubtedly be the strategic space for our armed forces’ defensive operations in the future. For the purpose of ensuring security of our own territory in wartime and maintaining the expansion of national interests in peacetime, we need to consider moderately expanding the space for defensive operations and other military activities by relying on our own territory so as to increase the strategic depth for [our] active defense. For the purpose of effectively freeing our self from being constrained by the opponent as well as striving for the initiative \{zhengqu zhudong\}, we should fully uncover as well as bring into play our own spatial superiority \{kongjian youshi\}; at the same time as competing in a space at the same level \{同度空间 tongdu kongjian\}, we must also attach importance to confrontation in a space at a different level \{异度空间 yidu kongjian\}. For example, when contending with a powerful enemy in the sea direction, we must bring into full play conditions of our vast national land and diverse terrains in order to form a strategic momentum disposition \{zhanlue bushi\} of controlling seas by relying on land, and controlling oceans by using seas \{倚陆制海、以海制洋 yiluzhihai, yihaizhiyang\}.

[end of page 102]
Chapter 5
Enriching and Developing the Active Defense Strategic Thought…103

Changes in conditions of the ages and developments in military struggle actualities require military strategy to necessarily advance with the times. Our nation’s vigorous defense military strategy is developing an open tixi system, suited to changes in the strategic circumstances and military struggle missions. To bestow it with new contents in a timely manner, clarify new requirements, and maintain from the beginning to the end characteristics of the times and strategic vitality, is our military’s consistent method and basic experience. The Party’s 18th National Congress Report pointed out that “building a solid national defense and powerful armed forces that match our nation’s international status and suit the national security and development interests is national modernization building’s strategic mission;” “we need to adapt to the national development strategy and security strategy’s new requirements, focus on fully fulfilling the new century and new phase’s military historical missions, put into effect the new time period’s vigorous defense military-strategic concept, and strengthen with the advancement of the times the military strategic guidance.” To that end, we need to further enrich the vigorous defense’s new age contents, under the prerequisite of continuously persisting in the vigorous defense’s basic spirit, and raise its corresponding nature and suitability. We focus on the dual-important strategic requirements of effective response to warfare threats and the maintenance of national interests expansions; we also focus on such key-major relationships as the handling of internal stability and external defense, between attack and defense, between combat and control, and between warfare and non-warfare, etc., to give prominence to the strategic functional direction of “pushing forward, working out an approach in controlling the situation, and multi-formed.” On the basis of developing home territory defense strategic guidance, we empower the strategic guidance for attack-momentum activities that rely upon the home territory. On the basis of scientific-based planning of preparations for war and the winning of wars, we attach importance to the bringing about of the military strengths’ strategic control function, while maintaining and extending the national development’s important strategic opportunity time period. At the same time as the continuous persistence of “combat planning [fanglue]” as the core function, we focus on the requirements of the military strengths’ peaceful multi-formed application to enrich and develop the strategic guidance of local wars, military deterrence, and non-warfare military activities, under informationized conditions.

Section 1: Carrying Out Forward Edge Defense…103

Since the establishment of New China, the vigorous defense military strategy has undergone several adjustments; [end of page 103] however, in terms of the general body, it still belongs to national home territory defense strategy. Faced with new changes in
world military development, the nation’s peaceful development strategy’s new location, as well as the military’s new historical missions, the military strategy needs to break through in terms of the contents the traditional strategic thought of only defending the borders and territory, and vigorously and reliably realize the expansion from home territory defense to forward edge defense.

I. Historically speaking, forward edge defense and vigorous defense’s basic spirits are not mutually contradictory…104

During the Revolution War period, under the conditions of the enemy being strong and us being weak for long periods of time, Mao Zedong put forward during the Land Reform Revolution War’s counter-“encirclement and annihilation” operations, the cooperation issue between strategic internal lines and strategic exterior lines, and emphasized the implementation of exterior line offensive operations at the same time as the attaching of importance to internal line defense. By the latter period of the War of Liberation, along with changes in the ratio of the strengths between the enemy and us, strategic exterior line attack operations became the operational form possessing decisive significance in occupying main guidance status. Since the establishment of New China, vigorous defense’s strategic forward edge actually displayed the trend to gradually expand. As early as the 20th Century’s 50s, Mao Zedong, et al., had already put forward the conceptualization of strategic pursuit attacks and the annihilation of the enemy through remote combat. In February of 1958, Mao Zedong once put forward in a speech during a Central Politburo meeting that: “to make mid-range missiles and strike one thousand five hundred kilometers or two thousand kilometers… if we can manufacture a kind of artillery with an interval of one thousand five hundred kilometers or two thousand kilometers to be able to strike upon the enemy, how wonderful would that be.”23 In July of the same year, Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai also put forward during a speech at an expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission that: “relying upon our nation’s favorable terrain, especially the scattered islands, we can annihilate an attacking enemy’s main strength on the coast and at sea, while we cannot allow the enemy’s main strength to penetrate deep into our nation’s home territory, and also need to strike the bases which the enemy launches attacks from.” Mao Zedong specifically added a sentence after this phrase of speech: “after annihilation of an invading enemy’s main strength, we adopt a pursuit strategy and dissolve the invading armed strengths of the base areas from which the enemy starts from, and thus stamp out future problems of

In the early-80s, the Central Military Commission restored “vigorous defense and inducing the enemy to penetrate deeply” as “vigorous defense,” while in reality also pushed forward vigorous defense, especially the strategic center of gravity of a war’s initial period, to the border and coastal areas. [end of page 104] In a letter written by then Military Science Institute’s Superintendent Song Shilun to the Central Military Commission regarding recommendations on the issue of strategic concept {fangzhen}, he deeply expounded basic considerations for this key-major adjustment. Within which there were three areas that were most important: one was that our nation’s borders and coast had protective screens as reliance, while some political, economic, and military vital grounds are also in the strategic forward edge areas; two was that warfare patterns {yangshi} had new developments, with more areas emerging with local area dismemberment warfare, war by proxy, quick strike and quick retreat warfare… if we allow the enemy to penetrate deeply, it will be well suited to his heart’s desire; three was that after the entire nation’s overall concept switched to socialist economic construction, our nation’s recourses increased by the day, while some important construction projects were still in the strategic forward or campaign interior regions, they could not withstand repeated contentions and thus would be easily abandoned, and thus they offered great disadvantages and minor benefits to wars.  

Therefore, vigorous defense is a dynamically developing strategic idea {理念 linian}, while regardless of the past, present, or future, one cannot equate it to a purely single home territory defense. Looking at it in terms of development trends, in order to support the national interests’ omni-direction expansion and to win future wars we may face, it is necessary for us to establish a forward edge defense guidance thought.

The full establishment of a Well-Off Living society and the realization of the Chinese race’s great rejuvenation is the national strategic objective for the first half of the 21st Century. A secure, stable, and persistent expansion of the nation’s interests is the basic condition and important channel for realizing this objective. The expansion of great powers’ interests historically had mostly armed strengths and warfare as the means, while mainly expressed in the invasion, occupation, and plundering of other nations’ sovereignty spaces. In the Globalized Age with peace, development, and cooperation as the main topic, China chooses to walk the path of peaceful development, to persist in an opening up strategy of win-win in mutual interests, and to pursue a defensive national defense policy. This has fundamentally determined that expansion of the national interests is expansion of peace, expansion of cooperation, and expansion of win-wins.

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and that it is a reasonable and legitimate expansion with economic exchange and cultural blending as the main mode. Of course, this absolutely does not signify that the expansion of our nation’s interests will not encounter resistance and will not ignite contradictions and conflicts. On the contrary, along with the continuous increase in the broadness and depth of the expansion of our nation’s interests, the restraint of international regulations under the lead of the West will become prominent by the day, while geopolitical pressure of global nature and regional nature will also rise by the day. Thus, the possibility of requiring flexible employment of armed strengths due to the difficulty of reconciliation from conflicts in interests or key-major threats facing our interests outside of our national boundaries cannot be eliminated. Our nation’s national interests have surpassed the traditional territorial, territorial sea, and territorial airspace scope to continuously expand towards the periphery and the world, and continuously extending towards the ocean, space, and the electromagnetic space. The risk for great powers fundamentally is competition that revolves around the realization of maximizing national interests. In the future, this kind of competition will focus more and more on such contention and control of such global public spaces as the ocean, poles, space, and networks, etc. [end of page 105] Under this background, our military must expand its military strategic view and provide strong and powerful strategic support within a greater spatial scope to maintain the national interests.

Along with the deepening development of the world’s new military transformation, the development of informationized weapons and equipment has accelerated, while the land, sea, air, space, and networks multi-dimensional distant combat based on information systems has become by the day the main operational forms, and the operational activities have emerged with the characteristics of becoming long-range, rapid, precise, and intelligent. The world’s military powers and some peripheral nations are all striving to develop informationized long-range operational tixi systems with new generation aircraft carriers, aircraft, missiles, submarines, unmanned weapons, and space-based information and weapon platforms, etc. as the backbone, and to raise the land, sea, air, space, and networks multi-dimensional long-range operations capability based on information systems. Along with the continuous rise in our nation’s comprehensive national power, the possibility of facing a large-scale invasion, especially invasion on land, is further decreasing. The main war threat has switched from the traditional inland direction towards the ocean direction, while the main mode of the threat has changed from the traditional land invasion to integrated air and space, air and sea, and networks and air non-contact strikes, and our home territory’s interior will be under the enemy’s mid- and long-range firepower coverage. This is especially true in the case in which the strong enemy will borrow its comprehensive distant combat superiority in the oceanic direction to threaten our home territory from a relatively long distance with the intention of being able to strike upon us while we cannot reach him, and to maintain deterrence against us
during peacetime while rapidly breaking up our operational tixi system during wartime. Under this kind of situation, the difficulty of guarding the home territory from the home territory and guarding the near seas from the near seas will become greater and greater. At the same time, it can even lead to “self-entrapment” and therefore we must consider the implementation of outward defense operations within a larger scope.

II. The fulfillment of forward edge defense requires a reliance on the home territory’s appropriate expansion of the strategic spaces…106

Currently, the limitation of home territory defense based strategic direction differentiation is becoming more obvious by the day. In order to fundamentally answer such key-major questions as how to fight future battles, what form of military strengths tixi system to structure into, and what form of strategic layout to form into, etc., one must conduct more macroscopic and more forward looking general-body planning with scientific methods, in terms of the spatial scope. We break through the traditional strategic space view of “enclosed to land and flat surface unfolding” to establish a new strategic space view of “giving considerations to both the internal and external, and multi-dimensional and three-dimensional,” to externally push the strategic forward edge from the home territory to the peripheral, from land to sea, from air to space, and from tangible spaces to intangible spaces, to expand the strategic depth and gradually form into a new three-dimensional strategic space of: surrounding and protecting the home territory, radiating to the peripheral, and taking care of both the physical and virtual realms, in order to carry out strategic layout within a larger scope, to support expansions of interests during peacetime, be able to effectively respond when crisis emerge, and to adopt attack-momentum defense during wartime. In the subsequent period, we need to consider with key-points the external extension of the strategic forward edge from the coastal and border regions of the three directions of the northeast, southeast, and southwest, to form into a limited area arc shaped strategic zone that covers the western Pacific Ocean and the northern Indian Ocean. [end of page 106] Under a new strategic space concept, the strategic direction differentiation and theater setup also should have new considerations. We can expand the spatial coverage of a single strategic direction, with combination of inside the border with outside the border and with dual considerations for land and ocean, and to expand towards space in a three-dimensional manner. The inner land theaters conduct the necessary radiation and extension to outside the border while the coastal theaters expand and extend to the oceanic direction. When conditions are mature, we can consider the setting up of independent oceanic theaters to better plan with scientific methods {tongchou} the advancement into the ocean and management of the ocean. Borrowing from the daily rising defense requirements for space and the network space, future strategic direction differentiation and theater setup also should place space and the network space as important consideration factors.
III. Fulfilling forward edge defense requires prominence of attack-momentum operations on the basis of firm defense…107

The righteousness or unrighteousness of a war is determined by the war’s political attributes rather than the adoption of defensive or offensive military activities. The military objective of a war is to preserve oneself and eliminate the enemy. Mao Zedong once emphasized that wars have historically required the two hands of attack and defense. He skillfully applied the two kinds of basic means of defense and attack. He adopted defense strategically but emphasized exterior line attacks for rapid resolutions in terms of campaigns and battles, including mobile defense in some directions. Mao Zedong realized fundamentally that defense and stalemate were both for the accumulation of small victories into large victories and to change the contrast of the enemy’s and our strengths and the warfare posture, in order to create conditions for the elimination of the enemy through strategic attacks and to win complete victory in the war. Since the era of the Revolutionary War, the vigorous defense fulfilled by our military included both strategic defense and strategic counterattacks and also included strategic attacks and strategic pursuit attacks. The three major campaigns of Liaoshen, Huaihai, Pingjin in the War of Liberation’s latter period, as well as the Chang Jiang-Crossing Campaign and the Advancing into Southwest China, all belong to classical large-scale strategic attack operations. Since the 20th Century’s 90s, along with developments in asymmetrical, non-contact, and non-linear operations under informationized conditions, the combination of attack and defense has become tighter by the day, the boundaries are becoming fuzzier by the day, and the great powers’ militaries are attaching more and more importance to attack-momentum operations. Looking at it from our nation’s actual situation, in terms of the Taiwan issue, East China Sea issue, South China Sea issue, and southwest border and territory dispute, the opponents are both beneficiaries and with complex international factors behind them. Fundamentally speaking, we cannot wait for the enemy to attack us. Only through possession of strategic attack capability and the building of strategic attack posture to adopt strategic attack activities when necessary can we break through the impasse that is unfavorable towards us in order to open up new paths to political resolution of the issues. Therefore, at the same time as our military’s persistence of subduing an opponent only after the enemy has attacked, we place strategic attack as an important operational category of vigorous defense, especially with the need to highly focus on the relatively large-scale strategic attack operations by joint multiple military services and arms in the oceanic direction. [end of page 107]
IV. To fulfill forward edge defense and to give prominence to the strategic requirements of attack operations, one should rely upon the home territory’s joint distant combat as the important operational form…108

Under the new historical conditions, the expansion of our nation’s interests has the periphery as the pivot, with external conflicts gathered at the periphery, the main battlefield in contention against strategic opponents at the periphery, and the threats facing us also mainly coming from the periphery, especially the oceanic direction. Our military’s traditionally proximate combat with ground strengths as the main is already very difficult to compose into a powerful and large deterrent against peripheral enemies, especially powerful enemies, and also difficult to maintain stability and autonomy along the periphery, especially in the oceanic direction. This objectively requires us to be able to expand when necessary the operational activities to outside of our homeland territory, to implement distant combat within a certain scope of the periphery. Since the 20th Century’s mid-90s, our military’s comprehensive actual strengths have dramatically risen, especially the acceleration in pace of the construction of the Second Artillery, the Navy, and the Air Force, while the confrontation capability in space and the information domain has clearly strengthened, which has provided a basis in capabilities for our military’s implementation of distant combat under certain conditions. However, relative to the world’s military powers, our military’s distant combat capability, especially air and naval distant combat capabilities, are still limited in terms of the whole, while the construction of a strategic air force and long-range oceanic navy are still in the crawling phase. Within a considerably long period of time, it will be impossible to carry out symmetrical and relatively large-scale air and naval combats in areas distant from the homeland against an opponent. We should fully consider bringing about the geographical superiorities in which our nation’s land territory is broad, the terrain is complex and multiple-formed, as well as a protruding arc facing the Western Pacific Ocean and the Northern Indian Ocean, and utilize the rapid development of such basic infrastructure such as national transportation and communications as well as the favorable condition of their simultaneous radiation towards the periphery. In the event of a loss of control of the circumstances, we implement operations with the mainland and the coastal waters as the strategic inner line to deter, absorb, and control the Western Pacific Ocean and Northern Indian Ocean strategic outer line. The core is to rely upon the homeland territory, to not be distant from the homeland territory, and to utilize the distant combat strengths and weaponry in disposition in the homeland territory and coastal waters to implement a land, sea, air, space, network, and electronic multi-dimensional integrated external facing attack-momentum operations against the periphery region enemies’ important targets. We have the Second Artillery, Air Force, Navy, and military space systems as the strengths main body and with non-contact medium- to long-range firepower strikes as the main operational activities, to supplement the forwarding raids by the limited naval and air
sharp force-strengths, to strike the enemy from as far range as possible, to prevent the
enemy from striking our interior, and to form effective threat and destruction against the
enemy. In terms of the fighting method, it is embodied as multi-dimensional focused
assault and soft and hard composite attacks, with dispersions and disposition in large
scopes to raise the distant combat force-strengths and weaponry’s survival capability,
with multiple directional and multi-dimensional and dynamic focused assaults to raise the
distant combat’s kill effectiveness, with firepower strikes as the main and to supplement
the necessary space, network, and electromagnetic attacks, to implement selective
destruction against enemy reconnaissance and early-warning, command and control,
crucial combat strengths as well as logistic provisioning systems’ high-value targets, and
effectively attack the enemy’s operational tixi system. [end of page 108]

In the joint long-range warfare with reliance on homeland territory, the essence is
integrated joint operations under informationized conditions. It is a strategic concept that
matches our nation’s phased nature strategic position and military capability. Its three
basic focus points are: one is asymmetrical operations, i.e. you fight yours and I’ll fight
mine. It is to not compete against an opponent’s strong areas, but rather to fully bring
about the protective function of the homeland territory’s broad space, to bring about the
national comprehensive support’s system {xitong} superiority, to conform and
accumulate the superiority of our military’s continuously rising distant combat capability,
to supplement the inadequacies in our military’s strategic protection, strategic projection,
and outside of the border support capability, to promulgate the strength and avoid the
weakness to overcome the enemy to achieve victory, and to realize the strategic goal of
subduing the sea by relying on land and subduing the ocean by relying on the sea. Two is
the integration of deterrence with combat, with its soul with combat while usage is with
control. For the joint long-range warfare with reliance on homeland territory, it is not a
requirement to fight early and in a major manner against actual and potential opponents.
Fundamentally, it is to establish oneself for the long term and accomplish the
preparations to deal with complex and difficult situations, to deter war, and to control the
situation. In the future, only by accomplishing the fulfillment of full preparations for
relatively large-scale joint operations beyond the first island chain can our military: be
able to strive for local balance against the powerful enemy strengths under a posture of
general-body imbalance, and be able to create military conditions [opportunities] for the
appropriate resolution of the Taiwan issue, South China Sea issue, and East China Sea
issue. Three is to emphasize strategic draw-in, to raise the capabilities, and to push for
transitions. With the taking of joint long-range warfare with reliance on homeland
territory as the concept for our military’s fulfillment of high-end wars under
informationized conditions in the future, it can enable our military to realize tixi system
renewals and capability remodels and provide powerful operational requirement draw-
ings, thereby accelerating the pushing forward of our military’s realization of the historical
transformation of the transition from a national territory defense model to a forward edge defense model military strengths.

Section 2: Give Prominence to Effective Controls…109

Warfare is politics and peace is even greater politics. Under the new historical conditions, at the same time as the maintaining of world peace, the maintaining of the strategic opportunity period, the supporting of national interest expansion, the requirement for the military strategy to maintain a “warfare general plan” essence, and the maintaining of an unshakeable core of winning wars, we will extend our field of view from warfare towards peace. We make overall planning \{tongchou\} on the two kinds, both intimately related and also differentiated strategic requirements for subduing wars and winning wars. We attach high importance to the management of peace, to work out an approach in the circumstances and to control the situation, and to deter the enemy and achieve victory. Therefore, we should place “effective control” as the important idea of vigorous defense strategic thought under the new circumstances.

I. Give prominence to the basic considerations for effective control…109

Control has historically been the quintessence of strategy. Sun Zi’s Art of War emphasized the subduing of one’s troops without fighting, with the entire nation as the upper hand and \[end of page 109\] the attacking of cities as the lower hand.\(^2\) Its basic direction is the seeking of control momentum to strive for victory. Clausewitz believed that: “warfare is simply a continuation of politics through other kinds of means,” that “political intent is the goal and warfare the means,” and that warfare “is a kind of violent conduct to force an opponent to obey our will, therefore what it seeks will inevitably only be collapse of the enemy from the beginning to the end, which is to cause the enemy to be without the strength to resist.”\(^3\) Mao Zedong pointed out that: “the elimination of the enemy is to remove the enemy’s arms, which is also so-called ‘depriving the enemy’s strength to resist’ and not to completely eliminate their flesh.”\(^4\) These all indicate that in terms of warfare’s essence, it is violence with control rather than unlimited annihilation. The two world wars, especially the emergence of nuclear weapons, caused warfare goals and means to fall into a paradox. The warfare means’ annihilation nature has conversely required the constraint of warfare goal’s limitlessness. The idea of warfare control has

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\(^2\) See Sunzi Art of War, Attacking by Stratagem Chapter.
become prominent by the day among the major powers’ military strategies. They have the intention of increasing new strategic selections between full war and full peace, to consider adjustable armed strengths as ideal tools in realizing national policies, and the limiting of wars and the controlling of the war situation have become the inevitable trend in the development of history. Regardless of Western militaries’ limited war theory or the Soviet military’s local war theory, they have all embodied the self-conscious and active strategic control thought.

The placement of effective control as the military strategy’s important idea complies with our nation’s current peaceful development and historical direction. Our nation is currently in the crucial phase of enriching the nation and empowering the military, with dramatic rise in comprehensive national power but still limited in strategic capabilities, especially outside of the border military activities capability. Our international influence has rapidly expanded but can easily become the focal point for international contradictions and struggles. Therefore, within a new round of international strategy gaming, our nation cannot be either passive and respond nor can we easily break through the fixed setup. We need to continuously abide by the concept of “persistence in hiding the brilliance and vigorous in having deeds,” to actively participate in creating new setups internationally and peripherally, with controllable, flexible, and gradual modes to dissolve the security pressure, to clearly display the national will and expand the national interest, and to maximally transform the world’s great changes and great adjustments into opportunities for the nation’s rise. The military is subordinate to politics and to serve the national interests and overall situation. [end of page 110] The military strategy abides by and serves the nation’s overall development strategy. Therefore, under the major background of the nation’s peaceful development, the application of military strengths requires more embodiment of the “soft arms” spirit to bring about the support, shock, persistence, and fixed strategic functions, and achieve the strategic goal of controlling the posture and stabilizing the grand situation.

The placement of effective control as the military strategy’s important idea complies with contemporary local wars’ strategic features. As a kind of limited warfare, contemporary local war’s essence is to employ in a controlled manner armed strengths to achieve limited strategic goals. Along with informationized warfare becoming the warfare form-state with a guiding nature, the warfare tempo has dramatically accelerated while the links between warfare’s mutual factors have become more intimate, and the mutually influencing domains have further expanded, with the role of high-technology factors becoming prominent within warfare and the significance of war situation control becoming greater. This includes: the requirements on control becoming higher and higher, the means of control becoming more and more numerous, the modes of control becoming more and more flexible, the comprehensive nature of control becoming
stronger and stronger, and the whole-body benefits of control becoming more and more dramatic. At the operational tixi systems confrontation layer, the controls are embodied in a concentrated manner in terms of precision, speed, and intensity. It seeks meticulousness in working out an approach in planning, precision in targeting and precision and accuracy in strikes. It seeks rapid reconnaissance and judgment, rapid decision-making, rapid projection, rapid disposition, and rapid strikes. It seeks active adjustment and control of the time opportunities, spaces, tempos, and scales for the release of war energies. At the warfare tixi system confrontation layer, one mainly controls the military activities from the political level. One mainly revolves around limited political goals to determine the military targets, select the strike objects, implement whole-body operations with the combination of physical destruction, disintegration of public opinion, and psychological awe, and adjusts and controls the links and cooperation between the military and political and military and civilians, to grasp the key-major node transitions from peace to war and from wartime to post-wartime. In terms of our nation’s reality, after over 60 years, especially the construction and development of the 30 years of Reforms and Opening Up, the economic and social development has already accumulated a gigantic amount of wealth, while the level of informationization, industrialization, and urbanization has deepened without precedence, and the level of external reliance for resources, energy, and markets has risen without precedence. Compared with pre-Reforms and Opening Up, the warfare actual-strengths and warfare potentials have increased to an extremely large extent. However, the warfare endurance capability has dropped comparatively and we are long past the “having bare feet and thus not afraid of wearing shoes” phase. Therefore, we must actively implement control on local wars that may occur in the future and mitigate as much as possible the risks for war and the damage from war.

The placement of effective control as the military strategy’s important idea complies with the new task of accomplishing multi-formed military missions. Deep changes in the international strategic setup, deep transformations in our nation’s social structure, as well as deep changes in the earth’s natural environment have caused us to face security challenges of mutually interwoven domestic and international factors and which are complex and constantly changing. Especially with the non-traditional security threat factor that is more pronounced by the day, it influences more and more the national development and security grand situation. For the contradictions, frictions, and struggles encountered within the nation’s Reforms and Opening Up and interest expansion, we need to rely more upon such non-armed strengths means as political, economic, and diplomacy to resolve them. [end of page 111] However, as a pillar strength for maintaining national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, the military is both a powerful back shield for supporting the bringing about and role of other non-military means and also needs to shoulder urgently difficult and perilously important missions under multiple kinds of complex and arduous postures. In terms of strategic guidance, we
need to adjust and control the time opportunities, modes, and scales, etc. for the application of military strengths, corresponding to the different characteristics of multi-formed military missions, to strive to accomplish the missions of maintaining stability, supporting rights and interests, and controlling the situational-circumstances at the appropriate time-opportunities, with the appropriate modes, and by mobilizing the appropriate strengths.

In sum, effective control has fully embodied the features of the military-strategic concept of the new era under these new circumstances. It is both the strategic guidance for operational activities and also the strategic guidance for military deterrence and non-warfare military activities; both the requirement for the main direction and also the requirement for other important directions; both suited for military activities within the borders and also suited for military activities outside of the borders. In the placement of effective control as the military strategy’s important idea, the core is to transition from “defense” heavy towards “control” heavy, to expand from “combat” heavy to “momentum” heavy, and to rise from seeking “combat victory” to seeking “early victory.” We rely upon continuously strengthening national strategic capability, fully bringing about the military strengths’ whole-body effectiveness, actively influencing strategic opponents and operational objects, gradually grasping the strategic initiative and even guiding initiative within a domain of an ever large scope, and earnestly placing development as the fundamental placement for strategy.

II. Basic connotations of effective control…112

One is the attaching of importance to creating posture. The working out of an approach in momentum, creating momentum, using momentum, and controlling momentum are historically relatively high boundaries for military strategy. Sun Zi said: “one who is skilled in combat always tries to seek momentum rather than make excessive demands on people.”29 Li Jing of the Tang Dynasty said: “the employment of troops for mission momentum is like walking on planks situated on balls, with a slight use of strength one can have success and even abundance.”30 The British strategist Liddell Hart believed that the task for strategy is to seek to achieve one’s own goal under the most favorable condition in order to seek the best effects. He said: “its genuine goal is not only in seeking opportunities to carry out combat but lies in creating a kind of most favorable strategic circumstance.”31 Within the current and subsequent period of time, at the same

29 Sun Zi Art of War, Momentum Chapter.
time as our military’s tightening of military struggle preparations without any sluggishness, [end of page 112] we also need to mutually cooperate with such means as political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural, etc., under the unified adjustment by the nation, to strive with efforts to create a strategic posture that is favorable for internal stability and external expansion and which is lasting in stability and durable in peace. The core lies in strategic balancing, peripheral stability, and anti-independence [secession] while boosting unity.

Corresponding to the hegemony momentum-strength’s strategic containment and control, we persist in having ourselves as the main, with two hands against two hands, persistency in the intermingling with other people, while we do not dance to the rhythm of his provocation and we do not contend with him the spirit of the moment for any particular time. We empower tying up of the interests and borrow strength to fetter, to be adept at struggles in intelligence, clever in struggles in strength, and unafraid in struggles in bravery, to supplement the comparative weakness in terms of the full situation strategic capability with strength in the strategic will, while striving to control the political, economic, and diplomatic contradictions and not extend into strategic conflicts, to prevent military expansion and development in military alliances against us as the object under the hegemony’s guidance, and strive to avoid the passive situation of crisis loss of control and conflict escalation. At the same time, we persist in long-term focus, to dare to have combat preventing combat, to unify deterrence momentum creation with actual combat victory, to vigorously seek the contention and grasping of the military struggle initiative within a limited region, to increase the risk and price for the opponent to implement strategic deterrence and control, especially armed strength interference, on us, and force him to not dare to act rashly.

We put into effect the concept of “friendly with neighbor, partner with neighbor” and the policy of “good neighbor, secure neighbor, and rich neighbor.” We focus on opening up the peripheral, stabilizing the peripheral, and molding the peripheral, to seek advancement within stability, constructing durable nodes, appropriately making predetermination, and managing the peripheral into a stable and fixed strategic basis to shield national security and support expansion of the interests. We strive to boost joint development with the peripheral, effectively deal with key-major sudden events that may emerge in the peripheral, and strive to have no wars and reduce chaos in the peripheral region. We need to especially consider the main peripheral nations with key-major relationships with our nation’s development and security as the key-points for inevitable contention, stability, and protection to manage them. We need to dare to shoulder the responsibility of regional power, empower the relationship that is as close as lips and teeth with these nations, and provide them with the necessary security protection at crucial times. For potential peripheral enemy nature nations, we maintain peaceful modes
to alleviate and dissolve contradictions, while simultaneously maintaining appropriate alert and precaution, to cause them to necessarily take into account China’s will, security, and interests during their formulation of policies and adoption of strategic activities.

We persist in the general plan {fanglue} of “attacks through civil and preparations through arms.” At the same time as the peaceful development in relationships on both shores [Taiwan Strait], we continue to maintain a high level of alert against “Taiwanese Independence” momentum, to transit in a timely manner the strategic center of gravity from containing secession to boosting unification. We will never promise to undertake the abandonment of armed strength, we will accomplish multiple kinds of military struggle preparations against the complex situation, and strive to control the Taiwan issue within the “One China” framework, to create favorable conditions for the ultimate realization of the Motherland’s unification.

Two is the attaching of importance to prevent and control crises {防控制危机 fangkong weiji}. Crisis is between peace and war. It is the dangerous condition for possibly igniting wars. In the current age of peace and development, the roots for contradictions and struggles between nations and political groups [end of page 113] still exist, but the modes for the contradictions and struggles has some transformations. The frequency of the eruption of wars has shown a downward trend but the frequency of the eruption of crises has shown an upward trend. With the subsequent phase, for our nation, it is both a period of strategic opportunity and a period of strategic risk. We will unavoidably face various categories of complex and changing crisis events. However, if the crises are not appropriately handled, they may create serious interruptions and damage to the nation’s development and the security grand situation, and even influence the nation’s rise and the course of history. Therefore, we must place the containment and control of crises as important content for the military strategy to prevent having small chaos brew into major problems through the empowerment of crisis management, especially with the adoption of the corresponding military deterrence and non-warfare military activities, in order to prevent crises from escalating into wars.

We persist in establishment of prevention defense and take preventive measures. We strengthen the long-term tracking of the key-point regions and key-point objects, strengthen crisis early-warning and normal monitoring, vigorously and actively adopt such non-military means as political, economic, and legal, etc., to get involved first, when necessary supplemented with appropriate and effective military activity modes to awe an opponent. We grasp well the time opportunities and proper limits between blockage and dispersion, strict and leniency, and pressure increase and pressure decrease, to control the crisis factors’ increase, alleviate the crisis energy accumulation, prevent event developments from breaking through the critical points of the eruption of crisis, and
strive to understand everything thoroughly beforehand and get rid of chaos before it occurs.

We persist in handling by categories and implement policies through the assessment of the situation. We differentiate the essence and extent of the crises. We determine whether or not to use military strength under the national policy and legal framework corresponding to different crises that may be initiated by disputes in territorial and oceanic rights and interests, peripheral hot topic issues, secession momentum, terrorist momentum, religious extremist momentum, and large-scale group events, etc.; strictly control the time opportunities, modes, and scale in the employment of military strength; avoid with effort having economic and social crises elevate into political crises; avoid with effort having international crises, especially peripheral crises, evolve into domestic crises; and avoid with effort having non-military crises transform into military crises.

We persist in joint administering of the symptoms and root and stamp out future trouble. Ideas about crises are fierce and sudden events, while the roots of crises are contradictions accumulated over a long period of time. We establish two supplemental and complementary objectives for controlling a crisis currently and dissolving a crisis over the long term. We adopt a principle of differentiated alleviations and dissolving and handling on crises events and crises root causes, adopt a principle of divide to administer and breakthrough with each one on multilateral and joint nature crises, and avoid interweaving of contradictions, long procrastinations without resolution, and the creation of having the events become complex. When a crisis suddenly erupts, we should resolutely make decisions, jointly move through all sides, rapidly dispatch and assault, rapidly calm down the situation, firmly control the situational circumstance, and avoid expansion and elevation of the crisis. We attach importance in extending crisis management to post-crisis, to persistently maintaining military activities’ intensity within a certain time period, gradually reduce the pressure and recall the troops by viewing the situation, while at the same time [end of page 114] we comprehensively adopt such multiple kinds of measures as political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and legal, etc., corresponding to the root of the eruption of crisis to fundamentally eliminate the crisis’s hidden danger.

We persist in favorable guiding based on the circumstances and to transform crisis into opportunity. Crises both accumulate with risk but also are windows of opportunity to resolve contradictions and issues. To have opportunities with a crisis and to seek a resolution within chaos is an important law {guīlǜ}. For example, after the 1959 suppression of the Tibetan Dali Lama group’s armed rebellion, Mao Zedong resolutely decided to implement the carrying out of Tibetan reforms originally set for 1963 in an accelerated manner and thereby completely eradicated Tibet’s serf system. The
containment and control of crisis is not to be stable for stability nor to do something for something, but rather to vigorously forge ahead strategically; to not stir up things when nothing is going on, but when events arrive we are not afraid of them; to strive to change bad events into good events; to utilize crisis event conditions to grasp the opportunities to implement some strategic measures that are difficult to decide to push ahead during peacetime; and to enable the entire situation to develop and transform towards a direction favorable to us.

Three is the attaching of importance to controlling the war situation. War situation control involves actual activities by the warfare guidance person in grasping the war’s initiative, to be able to adjust and control the war goals, means, scales, tempos, time opportunities, and scopes, and to strive to obtain a favorable war conclusion, at a relatively small price. In the event the situation of peace and development is damaged, we should grasp the general laws {guīlì} of local wars under informationized conditions, focus on maintaining the period of strategic opportunity for national development, strengthen the war situation controls, lower the war risk, resolutely win the war’s victory, and strive to maintain the strategic initiative. This is a key-major issue facing our military’s strategic guidance. Based on our military’s future operational war situation control’s characteristics and requirements, we need to grasp the following crucial links:

We focus on limited goals and persist in full-course control of the situation. We establish appropriate warfare goals and differentiate them into the two layers of political goals and military goals. The military goals abide by and serve the political goals. Under the prerequisite of maintaining the political goals’ resoluteness and based on the war progress and changes in the international and domestic circumstances, we appropriately adjust the military goals when necessary. When the operational activities are smooth, we need to prevent a blind expansion of the political goals which leads to war escalation; when the circumstances and conditions occur with key-major changes and it is no longer possible to achieve the fixed military goals, we need to prevent inappropriate recklessness. We fully bring about the handlebar function of goal control, determine and adjust the operational patterns, scales, and intensities based on the political goals and military goals, and strengthen the control of the war’s full-course by revolving around the key-major nodes of war opening, war ending, and war progress.

We strengthen initial war control and ensure victory in the initial war period. We look down upon the enemy strategically, focus on the enemy in terms of campaign and tactics, and grasp well the unified principle of dare to battle, prepared for battle, and cautious in battle. On the basis of meticulous planning based on scientific methods and full preparations, we differentiate the different time windows of political propaganda warfare and military start of war, carefully select the time opportunity to start the war, and
resolutely accomplish combat with preparations and victory before combat. Li Yu once repeatedly emphasized that for modern warfare, especially the large scale at-sea joint operations that our military is not skilled at, operational preparations are more important than grasping combat opportunities. An extra share of victory comes with an extra share of preparation. If there is no absolute assurance, we should not easily launch attacks and would rather delay for some time. Once the preparations are full and there is earnest assurance, we would concentrate the crack troops and ferociously attack, to open up the situation within a relatively short period of time, to strive to catch the enemy unexpectedly and attack him when he is not prepared, to seize and control the battlefield initiative, paralyze and destroy the enemy’s operational tixi system and shock the enemy’s will for war.

We set a foothold on the difficult situation and strive to avoid falling into impasse. To strive for the best possibilities starting from the most complex and most difficult situations has historically been an important principle of our military’s strategic guidance. The war situation control of our military future local wars requires preparations in such multiple kinds of situations as dealing well against a strong enemy’s military interference with one direction in operations while the other directions are in chained reactions, etc. We save beforehand a powerful and large defensive position, steadfast in the strategic will, strive to be fast in resolution, not dreading persistency, grasp well the relationship between attack and defense and fighting and negotiation, be adept at empowering our won superiority within a locked stalemate, and expand an opponent’s weakness, to force the enemy to come to terms and retreat, and strive for a favorable conclusion.

Properly conclude the war and stabilize the post-war situational circumstance. We formulate a complete war conclusion plan, grasp the appropriate war conclusion time opportunities, and flexibly select such war conclusion modes as active ceasefire, detachment from contact, transition into peace talks, military occupation, etc. based on the war posture and reactions from the operational object and strategic opponents. The military aftermath activities are mutually linked and cooperate with the political, economic, diplomatic aftermath activities. We maintain the appropriate pressure on the enemy, maintain the theater’s security and stability, eliminate the war’s negative influences, improve the internal and foreign strategic environment, promptly transform the battlefield victory posture into a strategic victory situation, and transition from a war condition to a peaceful condition favorable to us.

Section 3: Persist in Diversified Application…116

As long as the roots of war are not eliminated, the response to the threat of war will always be the military’s primary duty. Under a long period of peaceful environment, the nation’s security and development face a multi-elemental security threat and challenge that is increasing by the day, some of which are not much less than wars, and are also more complex threats and challenges than wars. We should widen the military strategic “spectrum” and realize the transformation of traditional “war strategy” to a “strategy fully fulfilling the missions.” Corresponding to the reality in which the traditional security threats are mutually interwoven with non-traditional security threats, which concerns both national survival and national development, at the same time as the persistence of having war preparations and the using of scientific methods to plan and guide war implementation as the core, we attach importance in the strategic application [end of page 116] of the military strengths during peacetime, attach importance to the bringing about of the strategic role of military deterrence and non-warfare military activities, correctly apply the three military strengths application’s basic modes of war, military deterrence, and non-war military activities during a time of peace and development, borrow from the abundant strategic means, increase the strategic selections, and strengthen the strategic elasticity, to better terminate wars and win in wars and maintain stability and sovereignty.

I. Establish in winning local wars under informationized conditions…117

The Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission have assessed that informationization is the core of the world’s new military transformation. Informationized warfare will be the main warfare form-state of the 21st Century. They have clarified the adjustment of future military struggle preparation point from the winning of local wars under modern technology, especially high-technology conditions, to the winning of local wars under informationized conditions. The establishment of this basic point has embodied having the contemporary warfare form-state’s development trend as the fundamental nature and overall nature requirement for our military’s construction [building] and application. We also should see that for the multi-elemental nature of our nation’s strategic directions, strategic opponents, operational objects, and war threats, they objectively have required the revolving of the military struggle preparation basic point, have to abide by the warfare laws \{guilu\} and warfare guidance laws \{guilu\} under informationized conditions, have to correspond to the local wars of multiple varieties and of different informationized levels that may occur in the future, to further develop and perfect our warfare scientific based planning and guidance.
Overall plan {tongchou} the various strategic directions’ operations. The main strategic direction is the focal location of the most serious in terms of war threat and the most urgent in the military struggle mission within a time period. It is a region that one must attach importance in terms of priority, make scientific based planning with key-points, and with full readiness. For future main strategic direction operations, in terms of the political high level, it relates to national unification and the revival of the national race; in terms of the military characteristics, they are different from the land wars and approximate wars our military was usually involved in, and they are key-major tests for national power and military strength, and it is one thing if we do not fight but we must seek victory if we do fight. At the same time, we should also see that during main strategic direction operations, one cannot discard the possibility of the occurring of chain reactions in other strategic directions; during the maintenance of peace and stability for the main strategic direction, one cannot discard the possibility of military conflicts and wars occurring in other strategic direction. Since the founding of New China, several relatively large-scale local wars such as the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the Counterattack in Self-Defense on the Sino-Indian Border, Counterattack in Self-Defense on the Sino-Vietnamese Border, etc., were all fought not in the main strategic direction at the time. Therefore, we need to grasp well the relationship between giving prominence to the key-points and caring for the full situation, to focus on the preparations to fight a local war with a relatively high level of informationization with a background of powerful enemy interference in the main strategic direction, while at the same time accelerate preparations for the capital’s strategic air defense operations, as well as effectively respond to the high intensity military conflicts and even local wars that may occur in the other directions. We differentiate the different missions, different objects [end of page 117] and battlefield conditions, as well as comparisons in strengths between the enemy and us for each and every strategic direction and each and every theater, to correspondingly formulate specific operational concepts, clarify the different operational requirements, and combine them with the actualities to innovate new combat methods and apply them.

Overall plan for multi-dimensional space operations. Warfare involves confrontation activities launched by antagonistic sides with violent modes. It is a combination of the necessary and the occasional. Within a certain time period, the operational scale can be controllable and stable but it is also difficult to eliminate multiple possibilities. When faced with the making of long-term preparations to fight big while there is only the possibility of small fights or medium fights, it will influence the strategic center of gravity and the consumption of strategic resources. On the contrary, when there is the possibility of fighting big with only preparations for small fights or medium fights, one will fall into full-situational passiveness and even lose the war. The complex and constantly changing security posture and the actual and potential multiple kinds of war
threats have determined that our military should “not rely upon having the enemy not coming but rely upon us having preparations” in terms of the military preparations. We consider the worst, the best, and the most possible situations, corresponding to the conflicts most likely to occur and the most favorable situations to strive for during wars, while simultaneously accomplishing preparations to respond to the most difficult and most complex situations, to ensure we are established in an undefeatable situation. This requires us to overall plan for the three scales of operations of small, medium, and large in terms of the strategic full situation. At the same time as the preparations to fulfill relatively large-scale operations in the main strategic direction, we also should prepare to respond to border conflicts and armed insurrections in the other directions. For the strategic direction with relatively heavy enemy situation, one also should overall plan for the three scales of operations of small, medium, and large within the scope of the theaters, to accomplish preparations for independent fulfillment of small operations while at the same time accomplish preparations for the fulfillment of medium-scale and [end of page 118] relatively large-scale operations under assistance and cooperation.

II. Consider military deterrence as an important strategic activity pattern…119

Within a long period of time since the founding of New China, based on the posture in which the enemy is strong and we are weak and in which the enemy attacks and we defend, our military was relatively focused on anti-deterrence strategically. In the current age, military deterrence has become an important content for international military struggles. Military deterrence means have continuously increased. Our military also should focus on multiple kinds of strategic requirements in the actual and in the future, place military deterrence as an important strategic activity pattern and as an important military struggle means carried out during peacetime and wartime, to convince an opponent through display of military capability and the determination to employ military strengths, and to realize subduing one’s troops without fighting or to create favorable conditions to subdue one’s troops with fighting. Within a subsequent period of time, the primary objective and mission for our military’s deterrence is to apply composite nuclear and conventional deterrence means to: flexibly adopt multiple kinds of deterrence modes, deter key-major military crises, effectively contain war, defer the eruption of wars, curb warfare escalation, avoid or reduce warfare damage, and maintain the period of strategic opportunity and national security interests.

Corresponding to the peacetime’s potential source of threat, we adopt preventive deterrence activities. Based on the strategic circumstance’s development and adjustment and control of deterrence modes and intensities, we form a normalized deterrence posture to force an opponent to not dare to act lightly or rashly. When crises, especially key-major military crises erupt, we should combine strategic unfolding with actual combat
disposition to create a high intensity deterrence posture, to show a strong resolve of willingness to fight and powerful actual strength, to force an opponent to promptly reverse course at the last minute before danger, and accomplish well the full preparations to transition from deterrence to war. When necessary we adopt appropriate amount of activities that borderline on warfare to force an opponent to acknowledge the difficulties and retreat and terminate when seeing danger, through the adoption of limited and yet effective warning nature firepower strikes and information attacks. We deter for deterrence’s sake. When deterrence lacks confidence, warfare resides within deterrence and thus deterrence is effective. During the 1958 Artillery Bombardment of Jinmen, our military successfully applied warfare borderline policies and achieved the goal of striking Jiang [Chiang Kai-shek] and deterring America. Mao Zedong once pointed out that: “they are on the borderline of war and we were also on the borderline of war. We use ‘warfare’s borderline’ to deal with ‘warfare’s borderline.’ In the end, they did not dare to advance and terminated at the borderline of warfare.”33 Under warfare conditions, we should carry out military deterrence activities through the entire course of the war. We persist having deterrence residing in war as well as the dual-upholding of deterrence and war, to strengthen the effectiveness of the operational activities, effectively control the development of the war situation, and strive to achieve strategic objectives at a relatively minor cost. [end of page 119] Especially during operations against the main operational object, we need to attach importance to the application of military deterrence to contain the powerful enemy’s military interference; during operations in the main strategic direction, we need to attach importance to the application of military deterrence to contain possible military provocations from opponents in other directions.

III. Attach importance to strategic application of non-warfare military activities...120

The expansion of the military’s strategic function from warfare towards the non-warfare domain is a universal trend in the current world military development. The fundamental essence and purpose of a peoples’ military under the Party’s leadership has determined that our military had to shoulder multiple kinds of missions with operations as the core since its establishment. This is also our military’s excellent tradition. During the years of the Revolutionary War, Mao Zedong figuratively described our military as both a combat team and also working team and production team. Under the new circumstances, at the same time as our military’s persistence in having the unshakeable duty of winning wars as the core, it should also focus on satisfying the nation’s multiple kinds of strategic

needs and requirements during times of peace, to fulfill various categories of non-warfare military activities, to use a price lesser than war and a mode more flexible than war to obtain greater strategic benefit. This is the basic requirement in performing the new century and new phase of military historical missions, to directly manifest the Party’s political will. It relates to the support or protest of the will of the people, relates to the image of the military and the nation, and relates to national security and the great situation of development.

Our military should establish a new notion of “supporting troops for a thousand days and employing troops for a thousand days”\textsuperscript{34} while we flexibly adopt such non-warfare military activities as those of confrontational nature, cooperative nature, law enforcement nature, and rescue and assistance nature, etc., based on different missions’ essences, objects, and environments. Confrontational non-warfare military activities mainly correspond to low intensity military activities \{huodong\} against actual and potential opponents, to use under specific political backgrounds to display the existence of the military, to express security concerns, to declare the strategic bottom line, and to detect the opponent’s movements. We need to both clearly deliver our side’s standpoint, attitude, and resolution, to not enable the opponent to generate an error in strategic judgment, and we also need to strive to avoid over-drawing the sword and upsetting the opponent, leading to a loss of control in escalation. Cooperative non-warfare military activities mainly cooperate with the nation’s political diplomacy requirements to launch full-directional, wide domain, and multi-layered military diplomacy. They revolve around the common security interests and security concerns, deepen bilateral and multilateral military cooperation, to gradually expand into participation in such scale and scope of military activities \{huodong\} that touch upon the foreign international peacekeeping, joint military exercises and joint law enforcements, etc. They borrow from the understanding of foreign militaries’ developmental dynamics to strengthen strategic confidence, increase military transparency, display our military’s excellent image, raise our military’s international prestige, and expand our nation’s international influence. Under certain conditions, we vigorously carry out necessary outside of the border strategic preposition in a stable and appropriate manner with cooperative, mutually-beneficial, and win-win modes, to strengthen the construction of strategic support points, to establish common crisis response mechanisms with the relevant nations, and to better expand our military’s space in overseas applications. \textbf{[end of page 120]} Law enforcement nature non-warfare military activities mainly correspond to terrorism activities, riots and disruptions, large-scale illegal group-nature events, as well as other serious criminal

\textsuperscript{34} Translator’s note: this is a deviation of the traditional Chinese saying “supporting troops for a thousand days and employing troops in one moment.”
activities, to adopt the necessary enforcement means in accordance with the law to carry out handling of them. They should be differentiated into the event’s nature and objects to strictly grasp the conditions, modes, and intensities in the employing of troops to show no mercy and resolutely strike on the terrorism and violent activities intended to topple regimes and harm societies. One should limit the employment of armed strength against emergencies caused by peoples’ internal contradictions, while avoiding as much as possible personnel casualties and property losses. Rescue and assistance nature non-warfare military activities mainly involve the full bringing about of the military’s superiority in rapid reaction, flexible maneuvering, and group assault, to fulfill such missions as domestic disaster relief, protection and evacuation of residents abroad, protection of properties abroad as well as international humanitarian assistance and aid that we can provide, etc., to as much as possible control the aftereffects of the disasters within a relatively short period of time, and maximally reduce losses in life and property.

Maintaining the strategic needs and requirements of the nation’s peaceful development as well as characteristics and laws {guilì} for military activities under informationized conditions have fundamentally determined for our military that regardless for operations or for the implementation of military deterrence or non-war military activities, they all possess numerous common characteristics, and one needs to abide by some common requirements. The first is persistence in the scientific-based planning and guidance of military activities from the high point of politics. The political nature of war, military deterrence, and non-war military activities are all very strong and all come under complex international and domestic factors’ constraints. They all need to start from the full situation of the maintenance of the period of strategic opportunity and the maintenance of the national interests, to make plans based on scientific methods and implement within the scope stipulated by the nation’s politics, and to not create passiveness politically for the nation. Second is persistence in being reasonable, with benefits, and with joint-ness. We seriously handle the relationship between struggle and peace, between advance and retreat, between the internal and the external, and between talk and work, to not seek momentary advancement, not be corrupt for one moment of accomplishment, to not revolve around sentiments, and to prevent from being impatient and aggressive under situations when the time opportunities and conditions are not mature. Furthermore is persistence in the rapid and precise employment of troops. We shorten the cycle of reconnaissance and early-warning – judgment and decision – implementation of activities, to transform information superiority to decision-making superiority, to transform decision-making superiority to activity superiority, to effectively prevent and control crises {防控制危机 fangkong weiji} state of affairs, and rapidly control the situations and win victories in operations. [end of page 121]
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Chapter 6
Strategic Guidance for Local War Under Informationized Conditions…122

Strategic guidance signifies the principle-quality instructions and guidance for war preparations and implementation. Strategic guidance must adhere to the basic laws of war, face the development of the times and the changes in the form-state of war, and from thought to principles constantly carry out renewal and perfection. It also must conform to the specified nature of politics, embody the will of the state, clearly display the real strength of the state, and reflect the latest appeals to the interests of the state. Under the new circumstances {形势 xingshi} of world polarization, economic globalization, and societal informatization, strategic guidance for local war under informationized conditions must grasp the major changes in the strategic setup and the developmental trends in military transformation, set out from the overall situation of national security and development, and thus even better abide by and serve the needs and requirements of the constantly expanding interests of the state.

Section 1: Strictly Control the War Goals…122

The war goals determine the scale of war and the mode of application of war strength, and have a major influence on the progress and outcome of war. The limited war goals serve as the essential feature which distinguishes local war from all-out war, and have reflected the era’s requirements for peace, development, and cooperation as the main topics. In past all-out war, the main driving factors were the contention for raw materials producing areas and outlets for goods, the war goals were directly expressed as the capture of territory, and the means of war involved large-scale operations to wipe out in large quantities the enemy’s effective strength. That type of war was often expressed as immoderate pursuit of state interests, with the entire people participating, and the opposing sides regarding “either you die or we die” as the sole standard for victory or defeat in war. This not only made the defeated nation suffer the disaster of a defeated country with its homeland lost, but also brought about a heavy burden for the victorious side in the war. After entry into the Information Age, the various restricting factors in war further developed, and the feature of the limited nature of the war goals became more pronounced, so that strict control of war goals became a requirement of the age. Adapted to this, strict control of the scale and intensity of war similarly became the ideal choice for the guiders of war. From the political viewpoint, after the Cold War ended, the desire for peace, the pursuit of cooperation, and the promotion of development became the value orientation pursued by many nations, and the peaceful [end of page 122] mode for resolving international disputes became the mainstream mode for competitive trials of strength in contemporary society. In particular, the aversion to and protests against war
by the peace-loving peoples of the war often caused isolation of warring nations and the collapse of war governments, and also had sustained and deep-going restrictive effects on war. From the economic viewpoint, after the Cold War ended, nations around the world grasped the new opportunities in economic globalization; this set off a competition in comprehensive national power [CNP] with science and technology [S&T] as the core, and spurred increasingly close economic contacts among nations. Moreover, the increasing expansion of economic common interests, while deepening the degree of interdependence, formed relational ties of war risk where “if you harm one, you harm them all;” in terms of the economic foundation this was an important reason behind the opposition to and restriction of war. From the military viewpoint, the high investment and high consumption in war also maximally limited the expansion of the scale of war. After the wide-ranging application of the means of war as represented by high- and new-technology weapons and equipment in the local wars of the present era, the costs and losses of war thus saw geometric-series growth. In the British-Argentine Falklands War of 1982, the war outlays of the British and Argentine sides already amounted to several billion dollars. By the Kosovo War of 1999, NATO’s war expenses reached $100 billion. And in the Iraq War which broke out in 2003, America’s direct payments for military expenses as of 2011 had almost reached $500 billion, while the total cost of the entire war had exceeded $1 trillion. This high consumption quality of war is certain to harm the CNP of nations participating in war, and long-term, large-scale war also will shake the power base of the rulers. This will force the war decision-makers to have no choice but to consider the advantages and disadvantages and the gains and losses of war, and to consciously control the expansion of the scale of war. Precisely due to the pursuit of war with unlimited goals — difficult to realize in military terms, easily causing passivity in political terms, and generating losses outweighing the gains in economic terms — nations around the world universally choose to adopt moderate war goals in order to avoid the expansion, long-term practice, and internationalization of war.

We have entered a critical period of peaceful development, where development has become a matter of primary importance. In order to adapt to the circumstances and the new changes in missions, the PLA put forth the historic mission of the “three provides, and one bringing into play.” further expanded the scope of armed forces functions, and standardized the criteria for military activities. Under the guidance of national strategic objectives and the PLA’s new historic mission, all military activities — including those within war — must take as the supreme criteria what is beneficial to safeguarding state interests, realizing the state’s overall objectives, and promoting the state’s prolonged political stability, and avoid interfering with and sabotaging the progress of the state’s peaceful development. Hence, in local war under future informationized conditions, [we] must strictly control the war goals, and employ the controllability of the means of war in order to realize these goals, so as to even better serve the general strategic objectives.
formulated by the state. The key to strict control of the goals of local war will be to grasp three points: first is the need to conform to and serve the big picture of national security and development. This means a need to give unified consideration for placing war within the overall situation of national security, and to ensure that the wars which do occur do not reach the point of threatening national survival, and do not reach the point of the two dangerous situations, viz. the domestic and international situations. There is also a need to fully consider national overall strategy with economic construction as the center, and to ensure that war costs do not reach the point of causing fundamental harm to the national economic entities, and do not reach the point of influencing the realization of the strategic objectives of national development. Second is the need to effectively safeguard the interests of the state. State interests are distinguished by their relative importance, so the safeguarding of state interests is divided into more and less urgent parts. In clarifying the limited war goals, one key point lies in ensuring that the state’s core interests and major interests are not harmed, and that the state’s important interests do not come to major harm; another key point lies in ensuring that state interests are not infringed upon in the short term, and are not left with hidden dangers to security in the long term. Third is the need to match the interests of the state with military capabilities. The main foundation for war is military capability, and the war goals are mainly realized by military means. Strict control of local war goals not only requires considering real military capability, but also requires considering the friendly war potential, as well as the mobilization efficiency for converting it into real strength in war. Only by taking war under informationized conditions as the basic standard and the enemy’s military real strength as the reference system, then objectively evaluating and estimating one’s own comprehensive military capability, and on these grounds formulating the corresponding military objectives, can [commanders] ensure that the limited war goals conform to objective reality, and only thus can they carry out scientific decision-making, and convert the theoretical courses of action [COAs] into real victorious results.

The goals of local war are specifically expressed as limited political goals, limited military goals, and limited economic goals. In strategic terms, [commanders] must on these grounds carry out operations-research-based planning and guidance for war, and do everything possible to accomplish the following: not overdo the degree of force in war, and not take as primary threatening of the adversary’s survival and comprehensive stripping away of the adversary’s military capability, but rather take forcing the adversary to come to terms as primary; see that the size of the operational scope is moderate, and not try to cover the entire space of the enemy and friendly sides’ homelands, but rather limit the scope to within a certain area (zone); ensure that the strike objectives are distinguished by relative importance, mainly involving striking at military and political chief organs, military command and control [C2] centers, high-tech weapons bases, and
important supply installations which play a strategic brace-support {zhicheng} role in conducting and maintaining war, but not focusing on civilian targets; give precedence to the effectiveness of the operational means, respect the correlated laws of war and international conventions, and as much as possible employ conventional weapons while as much as possible avoiding the use of weapons of mass destruction [WMD]; see that the force-strength commitment is rational and sufficient for use, and lay stress on quality, while not overly emphasizing quantitative scale; and see that the operational progress is relaxed and orderly, and as much as possible accelerate the operational tempo, while shortening the operational time. By setting up a series of concretized behavioral criteria, [commanders can] put into effect limited war goals, to ensure implementing effective control of the war.

Section 2: Conduct Integrated Joint Operations…124

Integrated joint operations are integrated-whole linked operations relying on a networked military information system, [end of page 124] employing informationized weapons and equipment as well as the corresponding operational methods, and carried out on or in the land, sea, air, outer space, and cyber space. Local war under informationized conditions is warfare of system of systems [SoS] versus SoS, and its basic operational form is integrated joint operations. Two conditions must be present when conducting integrated joint operations: viz., a seamlessly linked up networked military information system and highly fused joint operational strengths from all services and arms. The former can provide safe and reliable information support {baozhang},35 so that all operational elements have a common awareness of battlefield postures, and via precisionized real-time C2, can provide autonomous deployment and application of operational resources, to achieve adaptiveness and self-adjusting-coordination of operational activities, and to the maximum extent bring into play integrated-whole operational might. The latter are the material basis on which the operational strengths realize complementarity of functions and aggregation of effectiveness, and are inevitable requirements for breaking through the service and arm boundaries and the hierarchical differentiation of strategic, campaign, and tactical operational strengths. The essential feature of integrated joint operations is expressed as integration of weapons and equipment, integration of the operational strengths, integration of C2, integration of the operational activities, and integration of assisting support and safeguarding support {zhiyuan baozhang}.

35 Translator’s note: unless otherwise indicated, all “support” in this chapter is safeguarding support {baozhang}.
The differences of integrated joint operations from combined operations and coordinated joint operations lie in that the services’ operational functions are trending from the unitary toward the integrated, the operational activities are trending from sequential toward concurrent, the mode of capabilities release is changing from extensive to precise, and information support is changing from auxiliary to the lead. These fundamental changes put forth very strict requirements for the capabilities possessed by the armed forces, as well as for command standards in war. The PLA has developed from just the Army to a complete set of services and arms, but its mechanized and informationized levels are relatively low. Since the founding of New China, although the PLA has participated in several fairly large-scale wars, nonetheless these all have been coordinated operations with a certain service as lead, and the PLA has not undergone the trials of real combat in integrated joint operations. In view of local war under future informationized conditions, for effective organizing of integrated joint operations, [we] must change the traditional idea of unitary, non-autonomous joint operations with the Army as lead; tightly center on the unified operational goal; and under unified jihua planning and overall control, carry out integrated joint operations. [Commanders] must bring into play the systematic functions of the various services’ basic operational units \{danwei\}, and based on the degree of coupling among the operational essential factors and on the degree of grinding in during peacetime, carefully screen from the different levels’ operational essential factors the most appropriate essential factors to fulfill the operational missions, so as to form the optimal operational combinations. Also, based on the battlefield situation changes, [commanders must] constantly make dynamic adjustments to boost the agility and adaptiveness of the operational SoS. They must emphasize equality in the employment of strengths from all services and arms, not simply rely on a certain service, and also not one-sidedly emphasize the position and role of a certain service within operations; instead, they must optimize the combination of the service and arm strengths, develop the strong points and avoid the shortcomings, and thus form comprehensive superiority in operations against the enemy and bring into play the integrated-whole operational effectiveness of “1 + 1 > 2.”

From the viewpoint of the own laws of local war under informationized conditions, conducting integrated joint operations [end of page 125] requires bringing into play the role of information as the lead. Within mechanized war, since the technological content of main battle weapons was fairly low, the release of combat power mainly relied on “mechanical energy + chemical energy;” and even though the opposing sides could show differences in strength and superiority, in actual operations they nonetheless often could make up for qualitative differences via time differences and numerical differences. However, in local war under informationized conditions, the enemy and friendly sides will carry out contention centering on shortening the “observe, orient, decide, and act” [OODA] operational loop, and whichever side holds information superiority will often be
able to hold decision-making superiority, activities superiority, and even victory superiority. Hence, [commanders] must firmly establish the thought of gaining victory with information, fully bring into play the leading role of information, and promote the optimized employment of war resources and the SoS-based realization of the units’ operational functions.

The conducting of integrated joint operations emphasizes the application of the basic fighting methods of SoS sabotage \{poji\}. Traditional war of annihilation pursued the principle of “injuring all of a man’s fingers is not as effective as chopping off one finger,” and once operational activities commenced they involved “striking at elements and striking at essential factors,” so that via strikes against single essential factors operational effects were progressively accumulated, and the operational goals were ultimately achieved. By contrast, local war under informationized conditions is SoS warfare, with integrated-whole operations. In the future, no matter whether we will face an enemy with superior equipment or an enemy with inferior equipment, we will always need to focus on paralyzing the enemy war SoS, and emphasize “striking at systems,” “striking at vital sites,” and “striking at nodes.” This then requires excelling at optimized combination of operational strengths, and seeing that the capability of the entire operational SoS via network control centers on high-efficiency release against specific targets. It especially requires aggregating elite forces against the critical targets having a bearing on the stability of the enemy political, military, and economic SoS; aggregating them against the vital site nodes having a bearing on realization of integrated-whole effectiveness in the enemy operational system; and conducting SoS-based, “direct-reach”-based, psychology-based “decapitation,” “acupuncture,” and “breaking the chain” \{polian\} operations — to achieve the war goals in one stroke. In terms of strategic guidance, the main focus is on destroying the enemy’s will to launch war and carry out war, and by conducting effective jamming and sabotage of the enemy’s national information network system, or by executing precision and effective strikes against important strategic targets, including enemy military, economic, and political targets, thus maximally weakening and destroying the enemy’s real strength for war and war potential, so that the enemy has difficulty continuing or cannot continue to conduct war activities, and is thus forced to abandon his resolve to resist and finally surrenders. Via a series of operational activities, mainly involving harassing and sabotaging the enemy’s military decision-making procedures, [the friendly side] executes structural sabotage and paralysis of the enemy armed forces’ operational SoS, so that the enemy’s operational system over the entire battlespace, including combat units, combat assisting support units \{zhiyuan budui\}, and combat-service assisting support units, and the enemy operational essential factors, including battlefield intelligence, command, control, communication, strike, and damage assessment, cannot conduct consistently adjusted-coordinated activities, and so that the opponent loses confidence, loses the will to fight, and is forced to submit. By
executing “acupuncture”-style attacks against the enemy’s vital site targets, [the friendly side] lays stress on rapid, precise destruction and paralysis of critical or vital site positions, to cause [end of page 126] intense shock and fear in the enemy psychology.

The conducting of integrated joint operations also stresses a firm grasp of the keys to precision gaining of victory: precise selection of targets, streamlined forces, precision strike, and precision support. A typical feature of mechanized war was reliance on the enormous lethality of weapons and equipment, to as much as possible wipe out the enemy’s effective strength, strip away the enemy’s resistance capability, and destroy the enemy’s will for war. By contrast, a typical feature of informationized war is that mechanical energy and chemical energy, under the lead of information capability, can be precisely released, directly strike at vital sites, and swiftly strip away the enemy’s C2 capability for war, as well as his capability for using weapons and equipment. Of course, precision operations must have certain conditions present, such as real-time information support, precisioned munitions, and a rapid transport system. Accompanying the further acceleration of the PLA’s modernization effort, our capability for conducting precision operations will further improve. The future conduct of integrated joint operations should abandon the pure reliance on the quantitative extensive operational mode; as much as possible achieve precision fixing of points for attack and defense targets, precision timing of force-strength maneuver, and precision positioning of fire strikes; and thus realize precision disposition, precision engagement, and precision support.

**Section 3: Persist in Asymmetric Operations…127**

Sunzi said: “The direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to ensure victory.” What such indirectness reflects just for confrontation thought is that within war, what is most universal and also most practical is the tenet of asymmetric operations. From the viewpoint of history and reality, an asymmetric quality is widely present within war SoS’s. This is because the opposing sides will show certain differences in [many] respects — weapons and technical equipment, numbers of personnel, armed forces structure, thought ideas, cultural background, behavioral criteria, temporospatial conditions, and operational activities modes — and objectively will constitute asymmetric relations in different forms, but these asymmetric relations often will form the superiority of one side over the other side. This superiority not only can be expressed as a difference in the strength of the forces, but also can be expressed as a difference in strength in regard to the mode of application of operational means. Some examples follow: air power holds superiority over ground forces in terms of speed, submarines hold superiority over surface ships in terms of concealed quality, precision-guided munitions [PGM] hold superiority over general weapons in terms of strike precision, general weapons hold superiority over high-tech
Persistence in asymmetric operations is correlated to overall real strength and is also correlated to the subjective dynamic quality; this requires specific analyses for specific situations, exploiting a given situation for all favorable factors, and flexible application. In local war under future informationized conditions, the real-strength comparison of the enemy and friendly sides in war will assume one of three situations: we will be strong and the enemy will be weak, the enemy will be strong and we will be weak, and the enemy and we will be equal. When we will be strong while the enemy is weak, we will have even more asymmetric superiority, and the restricting conditions on bringing into play asymmetric superiority within war will be few, making it easy to grasp the operational initiative. At such time, [we] should concentrate on the adversary’s weak points, and conduct continuous operations with large forces against smaller forces, with strength against weakness, and with superiority against inferiority. Within operations, [we] not only must excel at pitting our strong points against the enemy’s weak points, but also must excel at pitting some strong point of ours against a different strong point of the enemy’s, to as much as possible weaken the advantage which the enemy can exploit. In view of our holding even more superiority, in war we will need to overcome the thought of using quantity to gain victory, emphasize bringing into play the operational effectiveness of the technical equipment, carry out decisive attacks as much as possible from beyond the operating scope of the adversary’s weapons, avoid our weak points, and limit the adversary’s strong points. When necessary, [we] must adopt frequent and rapid maneuvering to rouse the enemy, so that the enemy reveals his weak points or converts his strong points into weak points, and thus form an asymmetric momentum with strength attacking weakness, to defeat the adversary in one stroke.

When the enemy will be strong while we are weak, bringing into play the subjective dynamic quality and persisting in asymmetric operations will seem even more important. Being limited by the nation’s overall development levels, as well as by the intrinsic laws of armed forces building, for a certain period in the future, the PLA will still be facing the
difficult situation of using inferior equipment to resist an enemy with superior equipment. In particular, within local war under future informationized conditions, the intervention of the powerful enemy could make it difficult to avoid battlefield postures where the enemy is strong while we are weak, or where the enemy and we are equal. In view of the enemy seizing even more battlefield initiative, so that our bringing into play asymmetric superiority becomes even more difficult, we will then need to fully bring into play the subjective dynamic quality of the officers and men; exploit weather conditions, favorable geographic positions, and unity and coordination within the ranks; and adopt irregular, nontraditional operational models, methods, and means, to constantly shorten the gap in strength between the enemy and us, and to seek the initiative within passive situations. In terms of the application of strength, [we] must bring into play the strong points of all services and arms in the different operational phases and the different operational patterns, strive to create resistance among the different services and service arms, and form operations where multiple services and arms go against a single service and arm, and where multidirectional and multidimensional spaces go against a unidirectional, unitary space. In temporal respects, by rushing to seize the first opportunity, and by rapid, accurate, sustained, and uninterrupted means, [we must] form momentum by dislocation/offset {错位之勢 cuowei zhishi}, use the time effectively, and limit the enemy’s effective use of time. In spatial respects, via wide-ranging infiltration and projection of locations, [we must] as much as possible expand the friendly activities space, and limit and decrease the enemy’s operational space, so as to gain the operational initiative. The most prominent characteristics of persisting in asymmetric operations lie in a high degree of flexibility, not confined to one form in the application of strength, so that whichever strength is practical and ready for use should be employed; in terms of methods, not being limited to established practices, so that whatever is effective should be used; in spatial respects, regardless of the zone, wherever it is favorable is the place to strike; and in temporal respects, regardless of day or night, whenever the enemy is slackest is the time to strike. In order to fully create the conditions, [we] must absolutely avoid the times and points prescribed by the enemy, and absolutely not adopt methods expected by the enemy to conduct operations with him; and must avoid operations coming into an unavoidable confrontation with the enemy in the high-tech areas where he holds superiority.

Section 4: Seizing the Initiative in War…129

Seizing the initiative in war has always been the foundation for gaining superiority and victory in war. More than 2000 years ago, Sunzi: The Art of War put forth the war rule, “[the clever combatant] imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.” Mao Zedong, in his famous essay On Protracted Warfare in the early period of China’s War of Resistance Against Japan, said the following:
“Freedom of activities is the lifeblood of the armed forces, and when they lose this freedom, the armed forces will be close to being defeated or wiped out.” Amid the battle of wits and battle of bravery, and in war games full of uncertainty, the initiative in war is relative; and in the different times, points, processes, and aspects of the enemy and friendly sides’ confrontational trial of strength, which also means under the different conditions, there can occur many complex situations: integrated-whole initiative with local passivity, pre-combat initiative with passivity during combat, initiative on land with passivity at sea, etc. Moreover, due to growth of objective real strength in one place but decline in another, as well as the influence of subjective effort being in error and difficult to determine, the initiative in war all along is in a state of dynamic change; absolute initiative does not exist, just as absolute passivity does not exist.

In local war under future informationized conditions, an enemy having high-tech superior equipment objectively will be able to create a situation where he has the initiative, while we are passive. One of the measures for turning around this situation will be to create a favorable posture \(zaoshi\) for the initiative prior to combat, adopt an integrated-whole favorable posture to make up for inferiority in weapons and equipment, and actively seek the initiative in war. In the war preparations period, [this means] setting out from the principle of acting on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint; excelling at application of economic means to impose sanctions on the opponent, and weaken the enemy’s real strength; cleverly applying diplomatic means to isolate the opponent, so that the enemy cannot obtain assisting support from outside, especially assisting support for weapons and equipment; flexibly applying psychological warfare [PSYWAR/PSYOP] means to shake the opponent, and split up and disintegrate the opponent’s war foundation; and daring to apply military deterrence means — in particular, applying the means of struggle in new fields such as outer space and cyberspace — to sabotage the enemy’s war command SoS. Via synthetic application of political, economic, diplomatic, legal, and public opinion means, [we must] create a favorable pre-combat posture, and do everything possible to seize the initiative in the early stage of war.

After the war’s launch, the initiative in war is centrally expressed as comprehensive battlefield dominance, with command of the sea, command of the air, [end of page 129] and information dominance as the core. Of these, information dominance is the foundation for seizing battlefield initiative; without information dominance it will be difficult to effectively organize the friendly forces to seize command of the air and command of the sea. Also, command of the air and command of the sea are the keys to and key points in the battlefield initiative; without command of the air and command of the sea, information dominance will lose a forceful means of seizure and control, and cannot maintain the battlefield initiative. The practice of high-tech local war such as in the Persian Gulf War and Kosovo War yet again demonstrates that war invariably begins
with a contention for the “three dominances,” and that whether the “three dominances” can be seized and maintained will directly influence the progress and outcome of war. In local war under future informationized conditions, [we] will need to set out from the reality of the PLA’s fairly low quantities of high-tech equipment, and not only must attach importance to using superior equipment for seizing and controlling the “three dominances,” and regarding the “three dominances” as a prerequisite for unfolding the follow-up activities, but also must attach importance to using inferior equipment to contend with the powerful enemy for the “three dominances,” and bring into play the subjective dynamic quality, to ensure the ability to continue unfolding the operational activities when momentarily holding the “three dominances” or even in adverse circumstances without the “three dominances.” Seizing and controlling the “three dominances” requires laying stress on preempting the enemy; emphasizing in the preliminary operations phase the careful selection of first-attack targets, the concentration of elite troops and efficient weapons, and the launch of high-intensity strikes in a concealed and surprise fashion; and doing everything possible in the first strike to basically paralyze the enemy operational SoS, and in one stroke seize the “three dominances.” Along with the gradual advance of the war’s progress, [we] must exploit information operations [IO] forces for rigorous surveillance of the enemy’s naval and air force movements, and for uninterruptedly carrying out suppression and jamming of enemy information systems, and concentrate the application of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery long-range strike forces, to continue strikes at enemy targets which have newly restored functioning after being attacked, as well as at newly detected targets, so as to continually maintain powerful pressure against the enemy, and firmly seize the “three dominances.” Seizing and controlling the “three dominances” requires achieving a balance of offensive and defensive, and focusing on the enemy’s preemptive and counter-preemptive operational activities; this not only requires active offense, but also requires rigorous protection. [We] can focus on the characteristics of the distinct electromagnetic [EM] features in the enemy targets and of his fairly rigorous protection SoS; take care to combine soft with hard, so that the soft kill means such as EM attack and cyber attack and the hard destruction means such as missile attacks and special [forces] attacks are mutually complementary and mutually supplementary; and thus strive with integrated strikes {zonghe daji} to strip away the enemy capability for maintaining the “three dominances.” At the same time, [we must] lay stress on concealment and camouflage and on resistance to EM jamming and fire strikes; maintain the normal operation of the friendly reconnaissance and detection system, communication system, and C2 system; and maintain the integrity of the operational SoS.

Entering the 21st century, the full-speed development of space systems and network technology, plus their wide-ranging application in the military, resulted in outer space and networks becoming new fields for seizing the battlefield initiative. Reinforcing the
obtain apply employ gongji peacetime, military as characteristic systems. space [forces] sea, ground capability, focusing of contention called highly superiors and huge number support, to enhance the space military support capability, and focusing on the characteristic of space attack and defense relying on ground support, to persist in the synthetic application of multiple means, including land, sea, air, space, network, and EM, to specially emphasize sabotage of the enemy ground support and signal communication systems, and severing of contacts between enemy space [forces] and the earth’s surface, so that the enemy cannot control and exploit space systems. Reinforcing the contention for networks as multipliers requires focusing on the characteristic of networks as easy to attack but difficult to defend, and upholding attack as primary, to not only sabotage the enemy’s software systems, but also destroy the enemy’s hardware facilities equipment; focusing on the characteristics of the fuzziness of peacetime-wartime boundaries in cyber warfare and the difficulty of identification of military-civilian attacks, upholding manufacture of products for both peacetime and wartime use and military-civilian integration, using the civilian to screen the military in peacetime, and executing military-civilian joint integrated attacks {junmin lianshou yiti gongji} in wartime; and focusing on the characteristics of network security’s high degree of reliance on technical means and of physical destruction being difficult to repair, to employ intrusion and destruction in parallel, and do everything possible to synthetically apply technical attack and defense means and physical attack and defense means to obtain the optimal effects in network attack and defense.

The rapid development of new media as represented by the Internet has made the right of speech become yet another form of expression of seizing and holding the initiative in local war under informationized conditions. Whether the right of speech can be controlled not only will have a bearing on whether a good national image can be established, to win sympathy and support {zhichi} from international society, but also will have a bearing on whether [the military] can maintain the domestic masses’ attitude of support {zhichi} for war, and safeguard the political foundation for domestic brace-support for war. In the Iraq War, the US military in its operational units arranged for a large number of embedded correspondents, to track and report on the progress of the war. The on-the-spot reports from the battleground correspondents on one hand reflected the highly efficient operational capability of the US-British joint forces, and produced [shock and] awe in the enemy and potential opponents; on the other hand, they revealed the so-called humanitarianism within the US-British joint forces’ operations, which concealed
the unjustness of their launching the war, to a certain extent weakened the sense of
disgust of the U.S. generated among the world’s people due to the war, and also laid a
certain popular foundation for post-war reconstruction. The right of speech plays a role in
the “information – belief – thought {心×智 xinzhi}” [process], and the contention for the
right of speech in war must lay stress on the synthetic application of public opinion
warfare, legal warfare, and PSYWAR/PSYOP. In local war under future informationized
conditions, these “three warfare” activities must be adapted to political and diplomatic
struggle; this will require energetically propagandizing the situation related to political
and diplomatic activity {huodong}, in political respects seeking the sympathy and
support {zhichi} of international society, and in diplomatic respects gaining the initiative
and superiority, in order to provide forceful brace-support for supporting all operational
activities. Based on the general operational intent, this means the need to focus on
bringing into play to the maximum extent the effects of military activities, and selecting
the corresponding “three warfares” mode. Sometimes this will require concealing the
operational intent, and require public opinion propaganda emphasizing making a feint in
one direction while actually attacking in another; and at other times this will require
expanding the effects after the military strikes and special operations, i.e., stressing the
scope and intensity of the propaganda. Via “three warfares” activities, the influence of
our possible and just underway military activities is fully enlarged, weakened, or shifted,
causeing them to have a powerful psychological deterrent force against the enemy officers
and men, and achieving the effect of yielding twice the result with half the effort. [end of
page 131]

Section 5: Appropriately Conclude the War…132

In local war under informationized conditions, concluding a war has equal importance to
launching a war. Before the Second World War, the form for concluding a war often was
fairly simple: basically it ended with one side thoroughly victorious, while the other side
was thoroughly defeated. However, the practice of local war is increasingly making clear
the following: relying on powerful military real strength makes it easy to gain success in
operations, but difficult to gain complete victory in war; launching a war is easy, but
concluding a war is difficult. The local war under informationized conditions facing us in
the future will not be war with the fate of the nation in question, but rather will be war
where the whole people meet the enemy. Hence, under circumstances where the social
conditions and technical conditions of war undergo major changes, the determination of
when and in what mode to conclude a war requires fully considering many aspects — the
degree of realization of the war goals, the basic postures of the battlefield, the reaction of
international society, the strategic intent of the adversary, and the changes in the enemy
and friendly sides’ strength comparison — and active launching of military, political, and
diplomatic struggle on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, to force the
adversary to conclude the war according to the conditions, model, and timetable we have put forth.

Whether the war can be concluded at the right time will be dependent on multiple factors: the battlefield postures, domestic and/or foreign intervention, and the war potential. Of these, the political wisdom and strategic courage of the war guiders will play the decisive roles. According to the usual principle, when the war goals are achieved, the war can be immediately concluded. However, the goals of the two sides in war are offset from one another: the achieving of goals by one side in the war means a deviation from the goals of the other side in the war, and this offset [dislocation] quality {cuoweixing} also often leads to the war being prolonged without resolution. When faced with a complex war situation, it is necessary for the war guiders to set out from the principle of realizing maximization of state interests, in order to be able to conclude the war within a controllable scope; and when necessary, they must dare to sacrifice some interests, resolutely carry out decision-making, and firmly conclude the war. The experience of the Sino-Indian border counterattack operation and the counterattack operation in self-defense against Vietnam carried out by the PLA in the mid-20th century, as well as the lessons of the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan carried out by the US military in the early 21st century, tell us that military strikes are only a means for achieving political goals, and that once the main body of war goals has been achieved, military activities are better called off, or sacrifice to a certain extent can expand the military achievements, in order to leave the adversary space for political talks, when it will be even easier to conclude the war. Otherwise, insistence on achieving 100% of the war goals could result in falling into the difficult plight of sustained use of armed force, and difficult in controlling the development of the situation.

In the globalized, informationized present era, armed conflict and war often have internationalized characteristics. [end of page 132] While making the war’s political resolution more complex, this also has made drawing upon the intervention of external forces become an important avenue for timely concluding of the war. In recent years, several international organizations such as the UN, as well as several regional organizations such as the African Union, the Arab League, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], have played increasingly greater roles in international security matters. In particular, they have played roles not to be ignored in postponing the outbreak of regional wars and in halting the escalation of regional wars. During periods of war, in order to change [our] own unfavorable circumstances, [the war guiders] can seek the intervention of a relatively neutral third party, to jointly exert pressure, and benefit the timely concluding of the war. In particular, when [our] real strength is weaker or when having an unfavorable posture within war, in order to halt the development of the war in a direction unfavorable to us, they should actively seek to
draw aid from favorable international factors, leverage the 3rd-party’s exertion of pressure against the opponent, and strive to conclude the war under relatively favorable conditions. When concluding the war under 3rd-party intervention, [the war guiders should] excel at exploiting international law commonly used in handling national relations so as to safeguard the state’s interests, with the goal lying in seeing that the war interests are affirmed, so that they become [elements of] treaties, peace treaties, and agreements having legal validity and formally acknowledged by hostile states.

Concluding a war at the right time is the ideal result sought in the efforts of the war guiders. [They must] give consideration to the nature of the war and to the enemy’s war will and capability, and also must properly handle the relationship between a quick decision and protracted [operations], so as to grasp the initiative within the process of concluding the war. Under the usual circumstances, for the stronger side, quick decision is the most important option. By contrast, for the weaker side, protracted [operations] are an important choice. Their realization relies on the changes in the development of a series of factors, such as the war objectives, the real strength for war, and the war environment. In local war under future informationized conditions, the PLA’s object of operations could be the facing enemy, under the support {zhichi} of the powerful enemy. Moreover, the powerful enemy’s intervention could change warfare of quick decision into protracted warfare. The war guiders should from start to finish persist in regarding quick decision as the most important option, but they also must set out from the most complex and most difficult situations; draft operational COAs doing everything possible for a quick decision, daring to be locked in a stalemate, and seeing that postwar control is organically unified; and guide the units in properly carrying out all material and mental preparations. If the war cannot be concluded at the right time according to the wishes of the friendly side, they must timely guide the units in carrying out thought transition, adjusting their mental state, and ensuring that their morale is not influenced by the protracted nature of the war. At the same time, [the war guiders must] transition the operational activities mode, and use the most effective means to realize and maintain stability and control in strategic respects. The war guiders must from start to finish work hard to maintain firm will and the confidence in certain victory, properly perform the public-opinion guidance work, and adopt rational avenues to continually rouse the active quality [enthusiasm] of the masses for supporting {zhichi} the continuation of the war. As long as the preparations are full and the response smooth, they can adopt firm operational activities to smash the enemy’s vision of a very quick decision and delay of protracted [operations], grasp and control the progress of the war, gain victory, and as rapidly as possible conclude the war. [end of page 133; end of chapter]
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Chapter 7
Strategic Guidance of Military Deterrence Activities…134

Military deterrence, as an important means for containing war and safeguarding peace, has increasingly attracted the attention of countries around the world. Military struggle preparations in the future must not only strive to enhance the capability to win local wars, but also strive to establish and strengthen a military deterrence system and military deterrence capabilities that are capable of containing the eruption of a war and stopping the escalation of a war \{zhanzheng shengji\}. Therefore, strengthening military deterrence strategy research, constructing a military deterrence theory with Chinese characteristics, and flexibly applying basic forms \{jiben xingshi\} of this type of military struggle — military deterrence — are important choices in adapting to the world’s military development and safeguarding national security.

Section 1: Modern Military Deterrence Theory and Development of its Practice…134

I. Connotations and features of military deterrence…134

Military deterrence is a strategic activity \{zhlanue xingdong\} of a country or political group, for the purpose of achieving certain political goals, to influence an opponent’s strategic judgment \{zhlanue panduan\} with the threat of use or with the use of military strength, so that the opponent gives up his hostile activities from sensing the difficulty in realizing his anticipated objective or feeling more harm than good will come of this. [As a result] the certain political goals are achieved. According to different classification standards, military deterrence can be subdivided into many types, including conventional deterrence and nuclear deterrence, space deterrence \{kongjian weishe\} and information deterrence, direct deterrence and indirect deterrence, peacetime deterrence and contingency deterrence \{yingji weishe\}, actual combat deterrence and non-actual combat deterrence \{feishizhan weishe\}, and local deterrence and integrated-whole deterrence \{zhengti weishe\}.

In summary, military deterrence’s main features are expressed in the following aspects. First of all, deterrence is a continuation of politics. As a type of military activity, deterrence is implemented for the purpose of achieving a certain political goal. This thus decides that deterrence is essentially subordinated to politics, and it is a special political behavior that is distinct from war. The relationship between politics and deterrence is one of goal and means; there is no deterrence that can be separated from politics. Secondly, deterrence’s fundamental goal is to stop an opponent’s certain behavior [end of page 134] from endangering ourselves. Deterrence intends to make the opponent believe that
the cost of his activity will exceed the benefit \{haochu\} he might gain, and therefore, change his strategic judgment; and the basic goal is to contain a possible offensive from the opponent or to maintain the status quo \{xianyou zhuangkuo\}, and stop activities that endanger oneself from happening. Thirdly, the foundation for deterrence to bring full play to its role may be violence. Deterrence is not to express political will through the mode of friendly consultation, and mutual understanding and compromises, but to transmit \{chuandi\} the danger, urgency, and reality \{xianshixing\} of possible violence. This type of possible violence must be established on the basis of a matching actual strength \{xiangying shili\}; otherwise, it will be hard to convince the opponent. Fourth, the most fundamental means of deterrence is threat \{weixie\}. The essence of deterrence is a type of violent threat. In order to make the deterred side believe the reality \{zhenshixing\} of the threat issued by the deterring side, the deterring side must make the threat tangible so that the deterred side can sense and perceive it [the threat]. Compared with oral threats, threats expressed by a display of military strength \{junshi liliang zhanshi\} are more credible. Fifth, the carrier for deterrence to produce an effect \{chansheng zuoyong\} is the opponent’s psychological activities \{xinli huodong\}. Deterrence is a military notion \{junshi gainian\}, and also a psychological-political notion. The deterring side strives with various modes \{fangshi\} to let the deterred side imagine or speculate the horrible consequence that might be produced by this type of threat, so as to incite psychological fear in the deterred side. Sixth, deterrence is application \{yunyong\} of comprehensive strengths \{zonghe liliang\}. Only by putting to use a series of political, diplomatic, military, economic, science and technology, etc., means of the nation can we create optimum conditions for achieving the deterrence goal.

Deterrence, as a military thought that has been around since ancient times, develops along with development of the human society, and in particular the continuous advancement of military technology. After the end of World War II, the emergence of nuclear weapons has fundamentally changed the rules of war and enabled military deterrence to develop to a mature phase, and hence modern deterrence theory and deterrence strategy have become an important content of national security strategy theory and military strategy theory.

II. Functioning mechanism \{zuoyong jili\} of military deterrence…135

A functioning mechanism of military deterrence refers to a basic tenet \{jiben yuanli\} for three essential factors — deterrence strength, resolution \{juexin\}, and information transmission \{xinxi chuandi\} — to interact with each other, produce deterrence effectiveness \{weishe xiaoneng\}, and realize the deterrence goal.
Deterrence strength is an objective foundation for implementing deterrence. Without having real and solid strategic deterrence strength as a pillar, strategic deterrence could not possibly achieve an anticipated result \(\text{yugu de xiaoguo}\), and might even land itself into a passive position. The more powerful the deterrence strength is, the greater the possibility for deterrence activities to succeed. Military strength, in particular strategic strike strength, is the main body of military deterrence strength, as well as the most basic, direct, and effective factor in implementing strategic deterrence. In addition to military strength, the strategic deterrence strength of the entire nation also includes ending page 135 non-military factors, such as the nation’s territorial area, the quantity and the quality of the population, geographic conditions, economic real strength, and the science and technology level. Military strength is an important deterrence strength that can be applied directly, while some strength can only be transformed into deterrence strength under certain conditions, that is, the strength can only have deterrence effectiveness \(\text{weishe xiaoneng}\) after being consciously developed \(\text{kaifa}\) and enhanced, and also being used as a type of means. In making a type of strength combination \(\text{liliang zuhe}\) become effective deterrence strength, it must be capable of not letting the opponent to correctly predict the deterring side’s specific responding policy, responding mode, and making the opponent feel difficulty about making a choice by forcing the opponent to guess constantly. In the situation when there is no urgent war looming, a peacetime deterrence posture \(\text{pingshi weishe taishi}\) formed by the nation’s comprehensive national power, in particular strategic capabilities, plays a role of maintaining a balanced relationship with the opponent for a relatively long period of time, and it is an important expression of the nation’s static deterrence capability \(\text{jingtai weishe nengli}\). When facing the threat of war or other military security threats, a dynamic deterrence capability \(\text{dongtai weishe nengli}\) that takes applying military strength fully as the main body and uses support \(\text{baozhang zhichi}\) from other strengths as backing would form an emergency deterrence posture \(\text{jinji weishe taishi}\) that poses a threat [vis-à-vis the opponent] by revenge \(\text{yi baofu xiang weixie}\), so as to achieve a certain deterrence goal. When implementing deterrence, even though one does not rule out the component \(\text{chengfen}\) of bluffing in terms of strength application, without real and solid deterrence strength as brace-support \(\text{zhicheng}\), it will be hard to truly achieve a result of deterrence \(\text{weishe de xiaoguo}\).

The resolution to use strength is the crux that influences deterrence credibility \(\text{kexindu}\). The resolution to use strength expresses the degree of steadfastness in safeguarding interests by the side that implements deterrence. If merely having powerful strength but lacking the resolution to use the strength, that is, having no courage to hang the sword of deterrence strength high above the opponent’s head, it is difficult to make the opponent fear oneself. To judge if the deterring side has the resolution to implement a threat, we must inspect mainly from two aspects: the importance of the interest, and the willpower. The effectual quality \(\text{youxiaoxing}\) of the resolution is directly proportional to the
importance of the deterring side’s threatened interest: the more important the interest is, the greater influence it has to security, then the higher the cost that [the deterring side] is willing to pay, the higher the resolution’s effectual quality is, the more steadfast and powerful the possible deterrence activity is, and the higher the threat credibility is. Willpower is a comprehensive reflection of the deterring side’s subjective factors, including the will, intelligence, and psychological qualities, and it is directly related to the effectual quality of deterrence.

Effective information transmission is an indispensable link in prompting the strength and the resolution to produce an effect \{fasheng zuoyong\}. Information transmission refers to the deterring side transmitting deterrence information to the deterred side via certain channels; it is a tie \{niudai\} for the both sides to connect and produce effects \{fasheng zuoyong\}, and it includes two aspects: the information content being transmitted and the transmission mode. Information content mainly takes the objective to be achieved, possible activity to be adopted, and the resolution to actualize \{duixian\} the threat as the main body, and it is a comprehensive display \{zonghe zhanshi\} of strength and resolution. Among which, \[\text{end of page 136}\] the resolution to actualize the threat is the core part of the deterrence information content, as well as the link with the most wisdom quality and the artistry quality in the deterrence activity. Kissinger once pointed out that, “From a deterrence viewpoint, being weak on the surface produces the same result as being weak in reality. If a posture \{taishi\} aimed to bluff is viewed seriously, its deterrence effect \{weishe zuoyong\} is greater than a genuine threat treated as a bluff.”\(^{36}\) Successful deterrence must make the deterred side be aware of the exact meaning expressed by the deterrence strength and the deterrence resolution. When the deterred side gradually accepts this threat information and his psychological pressure reaches a certain extent, the deterrence result \{weishe xiaoguo\} can then be achieved. If the deterring side has the resolution, but the deterred side does not truly understand the meaning of the signal, the deterrence will have no effect. The information transmission mode can not only be verbal transmission, but also be activity transmission \{xingdong chuandi\}; it can be direct transmission, but also indirect transmission. The specific form \{xingshi\} is mainly determined in accordance with information transmission’s results \{xiaoguo\}. During the information transmission process, keeping the transmission channel unobstructed is a basic prerequisite for realizing effective transmission, and deterrence cannot be formed if the transmission channel is obstructed. In an informationized society, transmission channels are of many aspects and they have a feature of diversification.

III. Characteristics and trends of modern military deterrence…137

Along with accelerated development of the form-state \{xingtai\} of informationized wars, and in particular profound changes in weapons and equipment structures and functions, military deterrence has shown many new characteristics and new trends in aspects of its application time opportunity, mode, orientation \{zhixiang\}, and stratagem \{moulue\}; and the connection between deterrence and actual combat is tighter, so is the connection between nuclear- and nonnuclear-strength in military deterrence. From an overall perspective, modern military deterrence’s characteristics are mainly expressed in [the following].

Conventionalization of deterrence strength \{weishe liliang changguihua\}. In the Cold War era, nuclear weapons were always the core of military deterrence strength, while conventional deterrence strength was in an inferior position. After the end of the Cold War, conventional strength that takes information technology as the core can inflict unbearable damage to an opponent through highly-integrated, highly-precise, high-effectiveness \{gaoxiaoneng\}, and highly-flexible application. This thus has enabled informationized conventional weapons’ presence, manifestation \{xianshi\}, and application to have more powerful deterrence strength than traditional conventional weapons, and at the same time, to have relatively stronger availability \{keyongxing\}, focused quality, and flexibility than nuclear weapons, making them [informationized conventional weapons] a powerful deterrence means to realize political objectives. [end of page 137] This fundamental change has prompted militarily strong nations \{junshi qiangguo\} around the world to attach great importance to the development and application of conventional deterrence strength and to continuously enhance their conventional deterrence capabilities. For example, a 1996 book Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance, written by a group of retired generals and scholars, clearly emphasized achieving “shock and awe” \{zhenshe\} in the enemy’s psychology through physical damage caused by informationized conventional means. The 2010 Russian document, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, highlighted and emphasized that “The intensive use \{miji shiyong\} of weapons and military technology equipment systems that are based on new physical principles and that have equivalent effects as nuclear weapons” is “an important feature of modern military conflicts.” They both reflect a rapid rise of conventional deterrence strength’s status and role from a side view \{cemian\}, and they also reflect that various new conventional deterrence means will produce a revolutionary influence on traditional deterrence ideas, modes, and mechanisms, and that new “blinding,” “paralyzing,” “deranging” \{致乱 zhiluan\}, etc., means may have even more ideal deterrence results \{weishe xiaoguo\}. 

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Deterrence mode turning towards actual combat \{weishe fangshi shizhanhua\}. Through a limited actual combat mode of conventional strength — to display a horror effect, enhance the deterrence credibility, achieve the deterrence goal, and even provide an empirical model \{shizheng yangban\} of deterrence for the next war — this has become an important mode for modern deterrence application. After the Cold War, most conventional deterrence activities are closely associated with actual combat activities, and achieving a deterrence result \{weishe xiaoguo\} with the actual combat mode has become a normal state \{changtai\}. For example, in the 2003 Iraq War, the US armed forces implemented “rapid dominance” \{kuaisu zhuai\} and “shock and awe” thoughts, and through modes including sudden strikes, hammering attacks, saturation suppression, and day-and-night air raids, brought on powerful shock and awe of a complete annihilation to Iraq. Expanding the deterrence result \{weishe xiaoguo\} with actual combat and enhancing the actual combat effectiveness with deterrence is a classic [example] of combining deterrence with actual combat. With continuous enhancement of conventional weapons’ damage power \{huishangli\}, the deterrence result \{weishe xiaoguo\} produced by actual combat activities frequently has a long-lasting deterrence effect \{weishe xiaoying\} to other potential opponents, the deterrence result \{weishe xiaoguo\} has a broader emanation range \{fushe fanwei\}, and the object of deterrence also trends towards being wide-ranging. At the same time, Western countries, such as the U.S., not only emphasize making conventional deterrence become actual combat \{shizhanhua\}, but also begin to attach importance to nuclear actual combat deterrence \{heshizhanweishe\} and make high-profile assessments of possible results \{keneng xiaoguo\} of new nuclear weapons, such as nuclear earth penetrators, in an attempt to provide means for implementing “surgical style” nuclear strikes by relying on the technological breakthrough in super-low-yield high-precision tactical nuclear weapons, so as to achieve the dual goal of deterrence and actual combat.

Deterrence activity becoming [present] in the whole process \{weishe xingdong quanchenghua\}. Under informationized conditions, the real-time quality and focused quality of information dissemination, as well as the controllability and flexibility of informationized conventional military means, have created conditions for implementing deterrence with focused quality during the entire process of war according to the development of the war situation and responses by the opponent. Viewed from several post-Cold War local wars, using deterrence as the lead \{xiandao\} and actual combat as the backing, as well as deterring first and attacking later, attacking while deterring, and deterring throughout the entire process, have all become important application modes of deterrence. For instance, in the Kosovo War, [end of page 138], NATO successively conducted three sea and air military exercises of a relatively larger scale in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) border areas prior to the war so as to hype up a war atmosphere in an attempt to press and compel \{bipo\} the FRY into submission with a
deterrence posture of large forces closing in on the borders. After the war began, NATO adopted the concept \{fang\hao zhen\} of gradual escalation with air campaigns by: first striking with key points FRY air defense systems, principal organs \{shounao jiguan\}, and targets that brace-supported operations of the FRY armed forces and special police units \{budui\}; next, striking command, control, and communications systems, as well as oil facilities, roads, and bridges; and lastly, striking field operations units, power systems, and industrial systems. This was also complemented with the powerful offensive of psychological warfare so as to force the FRY to accept NATO’s conditions for stopping the bombing through the method of work of continuing to escalate the intensity of deterrence and actual combat.

Deterrence means becoming multi-dimensional \{weishe shouduan duoyuanhua\}. Every type of deterrence means can only bring full play to its optimum deterrence results \{weishe xiaoguo\} by focusing at a specific opponent, a specific goal. After the end of the Cold War, the complexity, comprehensive quality, and uncertainty of sources of security threats have significantly increased. And the object of military deterrence is going from being clear to being fuzzy, from being unitary to being complicated, and from being centralized to being distributed: it could be a sovereign country, or some political organizations, and it could also be a great nation, strong nation, or a weak nation, small nation. Therefore, deterrence means have also correspondingly trended towards being diverse, and deterrence means designed for the specific object of deterrence have also emerged one after another. In recent years, Western militarily strong nations have vigorously developed new deterrence resources such as informationized conventional deterrence, space deterrence \{taikong weishe\}, and information deterrence, and have attached importance to applying multiple means in politics, the economy, science and technology, culture, stratagem, etc., to achieve deterrence goals. After the 9-11 incident, the U.S. rapidly established the military strategy of “preemption” as well as the nuclear deterrence strategy of combining nuclear [strength] with conventional [strength], giving consideration to both attack and defense \{he chang jiehe, gongfang jianbei\}; initiated antiterrorism wars; deployed a missile defense system; and conducted the global strategic disposition adjustment at an accelerated pace, in an attempt to achieve the dual goal of eradicating terror threats and containing potential strategic opponents.

Maximization of deterrence effect \{weishe xiaoguo zuidahua\}. Under the informationized conditions, in terms of deterrence orientation \{威慑指向 weishe zhixiang\}, it refers to concentrating deterrence’s points of efforts \{zhuolidian\} on military, political, and economic targets that have the most strategic value and the most influence in order to strive for producing the most profound shock and awe result \{zhenshe xiaoguo\} within the object of deterrence and even the masses of the people so as to incite the most extensive attention and fear. In terms of the use of deterrence
strength or weapons and equipment, it refers to giving prominence to the surprise quality \{turanxing\} of operational activities, the high end quality \{gaoduanxing\} of operational means, and the shock and awe quality of operational effectiveness \{zuozhan xiaoneng\}. In terms of conduction of deterrence effects \{weishe xiaoguo chudandao\}, it refers to attaching importance to treating the masses of the people as the most basic medium for amplifying fear, through manufacturing various strike results \{daji xiaoguo\} to disrupt popular sentiments of the people, weaken the nation’s will to resist, and form a scope of influence that proliferates gradually and strengthens continuously, so as to realize maximization of deterrence results \{weishe xiaoguo\}. For example, during the period of the Kosovo War, NATO units headed by the U.S. took important transportation hubs and electricity facilities as targets for bombing, [end of page 139], with an attempt to incite psychological fear in the people of the FRY, in a situation that they were unable to respond to the enemy face to face. In the Iraq War, the US armed forces even fully influenced the will of the people in aspects of the sense of sight, sense of hearing, and psychology, via modes including high-profile propaganda regarding the might of “the Mother of All Bombs” and the use of special bombs with a tremendous explosion sound. In terms of deterrence stratagem, it refers to striving to achieve the maximum deterrence effect \{weishe xiaoying\} with the minimal cost through activities of showing form and creating momentum \{shixing zaoshi\}. During the Iraq War, the U.S. launched high-intensity psychological deterrence by showing off the effectiveness of new weaponry, actively “leaking out” its strategy and fighting methods, conducting strategic and tactical deception throughout the entire process, and selectively allowing the media to participate in the war process, etc., to effectively amplify the deterrence effect \{weishe xiaoying\}.

Presently, as an important means for safeguarding national interests, military deterrence has received high-level attention and extensive application from the main countries around the world. Deterrence ideas, deterrence objectives, and deterrence means are having profound changes; and using military deterrence means to resolve a crisis, contain war, and create an environment are becoming important choices for enhancing the strategic benefit of military strength application. In particular, after entering the 21st century, rapid development of high and new technologies that take information technology application as the core have made [certain] features of war — including high input, high attrition \{gaoxiaohao\}, and high damage — become more evident than before. Contradictions between war needs and war affordability, between the cruelty of war and international public opinion, and between the finitude of war and the maximization of strategic benefit, demand that countries around the world fully apply military deterrence means, try as much as possible to realize the strategic goal with lower input, reduce the application of war means, and contain war and avoid war escalation.
Section 2: PLA Military Deterrence  Tixi System Building…140

In the new circumstances, the PLA must profoundly understand as well as apply the Party’s strategic thought regarding military deterrence, correctly grasp military deterrence’s characteristics and needs under informationized conditions, and scientifically establish the basic composition and development objectives of a deterrence tixi system \{weishe tixi\}.

I. Development of the PLA’s strategic deterrence thought since the establishment of new China…140

In the practice of military struggles for safeguarding national security and unity since the establishment of new China, the PLA has formed deterrence strategic thoughts with Chinese characteristics, including people’s war, active defense, stopping war with war \{以战止战 yizhanzhizhan\}, limited nuclear counterstrike, and combining military strikes with political disintegration \{zhengzhi wajie\}. From an overall perspective, the development of new China’s military strategic deterrence thought \{junshi zhanlue weishe sixiang\} can be divided into three phases on the whole. [end of page 140]

The first phase is from the beginning of the establishment of new China to the 1980s. Its main characteristics are expressed in:

Taking containing full-scale wars \{quanmian zhanzheng\} as a basic objective of deterrence. Revolutionaries of an older generation, such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, took actively preparing for war, daring to respond to war, and preventing escalation of war as an important foundation of strategic deterrence, and displayed deterrence capabilities through a series operational activities — including the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Vietnam, counterattack in self-defense against India, counterattack in self-defense on the Zhenbao Island, and counterattack in self-defense against Vietnam — as well as related military struggle preparations, and realized the goal of containing the eruption of a full-scale war.

Taking full preparations for war as a basic approach to deter wars. Mao Zedong emphasized many times the importance of full and necessary war preparations on deterring an enemy invasion and clearly pointed out that, “The way of things in the world is always like this: when you are ill-prepared, the enemy will come; when you are well-prepared, instead, the enemy will not dare to come.” During the 1950s-1970s, we conducted large-scale battlefield building in the eastern coastal area, southwestern borders, and the “three northern” areas; developed strategic rear building that took the big
Taking development of nuclear weapons as an important material foundation for containing nuclear threat. Mao Zedong thought that, in order to break the nuclear monopoly and oppose nuclear blackmail 《he ezha》，we must embark on undertaking the development of atomic energy, and he emphasized that, “In today’s world, in order for us not to be bullied by other people, we cannot be without this,”37 and “We must have nuclear bombs, but there won’t be too many once we set the ball rolling. We set the ball rolling to scare people, embolden ourselves.”38 In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping also pointed out that we do have some nuclear weapons, and this in itself has a role of [putting on] pressure, and we “want to compel superpowers to dare not to use them [nuclear weapons],” and, “Our small quantity of nuclear weapons is nothing! It is only for expressing that, you have them [nuclear weapons], we too have them; you want to destroy us, you yourself also must be subject to reprisals.”39 He clearly stated that [end of page 141] missile nuclear weapons are “deterrence strength” and “deterrence weapons,” and insisted on combing conventional strength with strategic nuclear deterrence strength, while continuing to enhance armed strength’s actual combat capability and integrated-whole deterrence capability.

Taking people’s war as a fundamental basis of military deterrence. The tremendous might of people’s war was produced from the practice of China’s Revolutionary War. After the establishment of new China, the Central Committee of the CPC combined historical conditions of each time period, and put forth a strategic thought of deterring aggression with people’s war. Mao Zedong pointed out many times that, if imperialists initiate a war of aggression against China, we will realize [the idea that] all people are soldiers so as to completely defeat the aggressors. Deng Xiaoping also once pointed out that, “As long as we adhere to people’s war, even if the enemy comes right now, we will be able to fight with existing weapons, and we will also ultimately gain victory.”40 “China’s ‘three

39 Deng Xiaoping’s Talk with Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, November 29th, 1983.
combination’ \textit{\{sanjiehe\}} alone will draw the enemy into a vast ocean of people’s war.”\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Military Strategy}, published by the US Military Academy, deemed that people’s war is a deterrence strategy unique to China, and “this type of deterrence has been proven to be as fully effective as the relatively modernized deterrence in the West.”\textsuperscript{42} It is exactly by taking the vigor of people’s war as a solid foundation that our armed forces’ military deterrence has formed characteristics of integrated-whole quality and persistence, making it significantly different from the thought of relying merely upon a certain superiority of the armed strength to implement deterrence.

The second phase is from the 1990s to the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Its main characteristics are expressed in:

Raising deterrence up to a strategic height \textit{\{zhanlue gaodu\}}. After taking office as chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Jiang Zemin attached high-level importance to the issue of deterrence. In 1993, the CMC formulated a military-strategic concept for the new era to clearly take containing war as an important content in strategic guidance, emphasizing “through strategic deterrence to contain war, or delay the eruption of war, or stop the war from escalating in order to avoid or reduce war damage.”\textsuperscript{43} Military struggles were actively and closely tied in \textit{\{peihe\}} with political, diplomatic, and economic struggles in striving to improve the nation’s strategic environment, and reduce factors of insecurity and instability so as to avoid impacts of war on national economic building.

Paying attention to enhancing deterrence’s credibility. Jiang Zemin clearly put forth the study of the issue of military deterrence credibility under the new circumstances. On the one side, [he said that] we must insist on taking nuclear weapons as the core strength of military deterrence, and ensure limited and effective nuclear deterrence; and on the other side, [he] emphasized that we must focus efforts on constructing a modern operational \textit{tixi} system \textbf{[end of page 142]} that is in accordance with requirements of high-tech wars, and “form a strategic deterrence \textit{tixi} system complemented by multiple means in a step-by-step fashion.”\textsuperscript{44} Jiang Zemin attached great importance to forging a new deterrence capability that takes “assassin’s mace” \textit{\{shashoujian\}} as the core, and emphasized that

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[we must] “grasp several projects that truly have decisive significance, so as to form our own ‘assassin’s mace’ in high-tech weapons and equipment as soon as possible.”

Attaching importance to bringing into full play the deterrence role played by people’s war under high-tech conditions. Jiang Zemin pointed out that, “No matter how weapons and equipment will develop, how the form-state of war will change, people’s war will always be our talisman {fàbào} for conquering the enemy and gaining victory. This talisman can never, ever, be thrown away.” Jiang demanded {us} to combine new historic conditions with the practice of high-tech wars in the future to creatively develop the thought of people’s war and strive to create a set of strategies and tactics for conducting people’s war under high-tech conditions.

Attaching importance to bringing into full play the deterrence effectiveness {weishe xiaoneng} of comprehensive national power. Jiang Zemin emphasized the importance of developing comprehensive national power for enhancing military deterrence. He mentioned multiple times that, “a weak country has no diplomacy,” and old China, which was weak, was “weak” mainly from being weak in terms of actual strength. Today China has increasingly carried more weight internationally, and what safeguarding national security and unity boils down to is that it relies upon enhancing comprehensive national power. “You can speak loud only when you roll in money; you get beat up if you lag behind. We oppose engaging in ‘actual strength policy’ {实力政策 shílì zhéngce} in international affairs, but we must have our own actual strength.”

The third phase is since the new phase in the new century. Its main characteristics are expressed in:

Taking safeguarding the period of strategic opportunities as an important objective of military deterrence. The 16th Party Congress’s report pointed out that, “The first twenty years of the century are a period of important strategic opportunities, which we must seize firmly and during which so much can be accomplished,” and, “The period of strategic opportunities does not come by easily, and arduous efforts must also be paid for safeguarding as well as successfully utilizing the period of strategic opportunities.” It was emphasized that “To safeguard as well as successfully utilize the period of strategic opportunities, we must safeguard national security, defend national sovereignty and territorial integrality so as to create a peaceful international environment [end of page

and harmonious social environment for national development.”\(^{48}\) The crux to ensure the period of strategic opportunities from being interfered with and even interrupted lies in prevention against risks and challenges that are foreseeable as well as difficult to foresee, resolving crises, containing war, effectively deterring various local conflicts and wars, and avoiding conflicts and war escalation.

Taking preventing and containing crises as an important point of efforts for military deterrence. On the basis of placing a foothold at winning local wars under informationized conditions, [we must] take containing crises as an important prerequisite for containing war by enhancing the foreseeability, the initiative quality \(\{zhudongxing\}\), and time effectiveness \(\{shixiaoxing\}\) of containing crises; prevent, control, and handle crises with active activities and measures to not let crises happen or escalate into a military conflict and war; and strive to resolve and eliminate war risks so as to provide a good security environment for national development.

Taking successfully performing military struggle preparations as an important pull \(\{qianyin\}\) in enhancing military deterrence capabilities. Hu Jintao pointed out that, “At present, the PLA’s most important, most real, and most urgent strategic task is successfully performing military struggle preparations.”\(^{49}\) It was repeatedly emphasized that, [we must] take military struggle preparations as the lead as well as the handle \(\{longtou he zhuashou\}\) in “pushing forward a composite development of mechanization and informationization, realize integrated enhancement of units’ firepower, attack power \(\{tujili\}\), maneuverability, protection capability, and information capability, and strengthen the PLA’s deterrence and actual combat capabilities under informationized conditions.”\(^{50}\)

Taking winning local wars under informationized conditions as the core of military deterrence capabilities. Hu Jintao pointed out that, we must “take strengthening capabilities of winning local wars under informationized conditions as the core, and continue to enhance the capability of responding to multiple types of security threats so as to ensure that the PLA can effectively respond to crises, safeguard peace, contain war, and win a war in various complicated circumstances,”\(^{51}\) and emphasized that we must


“take enhancing deterrence and actual combat capabilities under informationized conditions as the fundamental starting point and stopover point {luojiaodian}.”  

The deterrence capability under informationized conditions is highlighted and expressed as a tixi system operational capability based on information systems.

Taking military-civilian blending {junmin ronghe} as a fundamental approach to enhancing the integrated-whole deterrence capability. Hu Jintao clearly put forth the strategic thought of uniting rich nation and powerful military. He emphasized a military-civilian blending style development so as to enable national defense and armed forces modernization building to have an even more solid material and technological foundation, to enable the nation’s integrated-whole deterrence capability to have even richer resources and more powerful sustainable development staying power {chixu fazhan houjin}, expanding the connotation of the deterrence function of people’s war under informationized conditions.

From historical and practical {shijian} perspectives, China’s military deterrence has fundamental attributes {genben shuxing} of self-defense, defense, and finitude {youxian}, making it essentially different when compared with Western countries, including the U.S. Viewed from the fundamental goal, China’s military deterrence is for containing external aggression, preventing a conflict from escalating to a war, or implementing anti-deterrence {fanweishe} against hegemonic-style deterrence {baquanshi de weishe}; it is not for threatening or “coercing” {xiepo} other countries with force, and much less for seeking area and global hegemony. Viewed from the application mode, China’s military deterrence emphasizes a comprehensive application of various strengths, and gains a foothold in the application of overall strength, which includes people’s war. It is a comprehensive application of military and non-military means, including political, diplomatic, military, and economic [means], and it does not gain a foothold at merely military strength application, much less take military deterrence as a tool to dominate others. Viewed from strategic guidance, military deterrence is subordinate to the military-strategic concept of active defense; gains a foothold in self-defense, finitude, and striking after the enemy has struck {houfazhiren}; strives to contain a big war by deterring a small war; and strictly controls the deterrence objective. And it is an active response {jiji fanying} when [China is] infringed upon by aggression or behaviors that damage interests, rather than strategically conducting an offensive or preemption {xianfazhiren}.

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II. Correctly grasping basic needs that pull military deterrence 티셔츠 system building…145

To firmly establish basic needs for pulling military deterrence 티셔츠 system building, we must focus on the basic trend of national security interests development under globalization and informationized conditions, objectively analyze security threats and their sources that may face China in the progress of peaceful development, correctly pinpoint access points {금Pwd만} in military deterrence strength 티셔츠 system building, and strive to form a strength 티셔츠 system with multilayered strategic deterrence {多重战略威慑} and actual combat capabilities.

From an overall perspective, the basic needs that will pull the PLAs deterrence strength 티셔츠 system building in the future are mainly expressed in:

One, the basic need to safeguard a global strategic balance {全球战略平衡}. A long-term security need in China’s peaceful development progress is striving to create a strategically stable posture required for national development, safeguarding the period of important strategic opportunities of national development, ensuring that the nation’s territorial sovereignty integrity as well as security and unity are in a basic posture of being controllable and stable, and providing [end of page 145] a more favorable security environment for the nation’s security and development. The core is to take comprehensive national power as the foundation; take multiple means, including political, diplomatic, military, and economic [means] as reliance; eliminate interference in and tying down {前质} China’s peaceful development from various international anti-China influences to the maximum extent; rule out the influence from various uncertain factors of security threats to the maximum extent; and strive to form a strategic posture within the international strategic pattern {国际战略格局} that is favorable to national security development. This requires that military deterrence 티셔츠 system building must take prevention as well as effective responses to impacts from major international events and area crises as the basis, and take creating a favorable strategic posture as an important focal point of peacetime deterrence in strengthening the military deterrence 티셔츠 system’s global strategic balance capability.

Two, the basic need to contain local conflicts and wars under informationized conditions. Along with profound adjustments in the international strategic pattern, factors of traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats have interwoven with each other; the time opportunity, location, and pattern {时机} of various crises and conflict eruption have shown features of uncertainty, unforeseeability {不可预见性}, etc.; and the comprehensive quality, complexity, and changeability {多变性} of national security problems have developed further. Responding to various outbreak situations and
preventing a crisis from escalating to a local conflict and war are important tasks that we are forced to face at any time. This requires that the PLA’s military deterrence tixi system building must enhance the capability to accomplish diverse military tasks, which takes the capability of winning local wars under informationized conditions as the core; emphatically strengthen the emergency handling capability and the informationized operations capability; focus efforts on enhancing the tixi system operational capability based on information systems; and endeavor to have the willingness to contain conflict and war eruption by being brace-supported by an increasingly strong military power {junli}.

Three, the basic need to safeguard the nation’s maritime sovereignty rights and interests {haiyang zhuquan quanyi} and the security of sea passages. Guarding national territorial seas and maritime rights and interests, and defending the nation’s increasingly developed maritime industry, sea transportation, and security of strategic passages for energy resource are important components in supporting {baozhang} national development interests. This requires that, in the process of building a deterrence tixi system, China must focus on the needs and requirements of strengthening maritime military activity capabilities in guarding islands and reefs, sea patrol, declaration of sovereignty, rights-protection at sea {haishang weiquan}, etc., in peacetime; take enhancing air and sea military strengths’ projective effect {toushe xiaoying} as the core; take enhancing capabilities of near-seas {jinhai} comprehensive operations and far-seas {yuanhai} defensive operations as a basic foundation; and take the capability to execute international joint patrols at sea, sea escort, anti-piracy activities, and strikes against terrorist activities at sea as an important form {xingshi} in striving to form a sea-air strength tixi system that combines the dual effect {shuangchong xiaoying} of strength presence and emanation of capability {liliang cunzai yu nengli fushe}.

Four, the basic need to respond to new challenges of space {taikong}, information, etc. Space is a new domain for modern international competition and confrontation, and a commanding elevation {zhigaodian} for wars under informationized conditions. Information superiority {xinxi youshi} [end of page 146] and network superiority {wangluo youshi} are becoming the core to obtain military activity superiority under informationized conditions, and a crux to seize the initiative in future wars. Some military great nations endeavor to develop new concept weapons, strengthen the development {kaifa} and control of space, electromagnetic, and network space {wangluo kongjian}, and focus efforts on occupying this new “commanding elevation” to seek absolute military superiority. From a long-term perspective, new security threats that come from space, electromagnetic and network space will have an increasingly great influence on national security. This requires military deterrence tixi system building to focus on the essential characteristics of the new security domains, fully develop {kaifa}
and utilize space resources and network resources {wangluo ziyuan}, and attach importance to dual development of strategic countering means {zhanluexing fanzhi shouduan} and strategic defensive means to form a new strength tixi system with a highly effective connection {gaoxiao xianjie} between peacetime and wartime.

Five, the basic need to safeguard security and stability in the world and in the area. The PLA’s historical mission in the new phase of the new century clearly put forth that it [the PLA] must bring into play its important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development. Along with continuous enhancement of China’s comprehensive national power, the international community’s expectation of China in the security domain has also increased gradually. In particular, the frequency and scale of the PLA participation in external military activities {shewai junshi xingdong} have continued to grow, including international antiterrorism, international peacekeeping, joint exercises, and escort at sea; and the role brought into play by the PLA in safeguarding area security and stability, as well as shock and awe and striking “the three [evil] influences” {sangu shili} has become increasingly great. The defensive national defense policy {fangyuxing guofang zhengce} adhered to by China has decided that it is impossible for us to pursue a global military strength like the one the U.S. has. Nonetheless, safeguarding security and stability of the world and the area requires us to possess an external emanation strength tixi system {duiwai fushe liliang tixi} with limited goal, limited capabilities; actively implement cross-area and region military activities {kuaquyu junshi xingdong} relying on one’s own territory; and execute military tasks within the global scope, including international peacekeeping and strikes against piracy and terrorist influences. This requires that, during the process of military deterrence tixi system building, we must take strengthening cross-area and zone strategic projection and long-range maneuverability as key points to form an operational strength capable of supporting {zhichi} global limited military activities {quanqiu xing youxian junshi xingdong}.

III. Constructing a military deterrence tixi system with PLA characteristics…147

Deterrence capability originates from actual combat capability; there is no qualitative difference between the composition of deterrence strength and the composition of operational strength, and deterrence strength is harbored within {寓于 yuyu} actual combat strength. Only by enhancing the actual combat capability for winning local wars under informationized conditions at an accelerated pace can we have a foundation of ample capability for implementing strategic deterrence. We must insist on taking the scientific development view as guidance, take the armed forces’ mission and tasks in the new phase of the new century as the pull, and follow the basic development train of thought of “integrating nuclear and conventional, integrating deterrence and war, integrating deterrence and control” {hechang yiti, shezhan yiti, shekong yiti} to
conscientiously pinpoint efforts for deterrence strength building, fully discover new
deterrence resources, and strive to expand [end of page 147] multiple types of deterrence
functions {weishe gongneng}.

From an overall perspective, the PLA deterrence tixi system should mainly include the
following content:

Lean and effective nuclear strike strength. We should have a profound understanding of
the important role played by nuclear strength in ensuring [our] unwavering status as a
great nation, safeguarding national core interests from infringement, and creating a secure
environment for peaceful development so as to firm up the resolution of developing
limited, yet effective nuclear strength and earnestly take nuclear strength as a pillar
{zhizhu} of the deterrence tixi system. At present, the building and development of
nuclear strength should take enhancing the informationized level of the nuclear weapons
system as a core; strengthen command and control, strategic early warning, and rapid
response capabilities building; continue to increase the penetration ability, protection
[capability] and survivability, rapid response capability, maneuverability, etc., under
informationized conditions; and strive to enhance the credibility of nuclear deterrence.

Informationized conventional operational strength. We should take enhancing the tixi
system operational capability based on information systems as a core; pay attention to
new-generation information infrastructure building; establish an integrated land, sea, air,
space, and electromagnetic information brace-support environment that relies on grid
information networks {zhagehua xinxi wangluo}; and focus efforts on pushing forward
the adjusting-coordination development {xietiao fazhan} of battlefield awareness,
command and control, precision strike, comprehensive support capabilities, etc., to have
the expansion of deterrence capability harbored within the continuous enhancement of
the informationized tixi system operational capability.

Information attack-defense strength with local superiority {jubu youshi}. [We must]
insist on practicing active information defense strategically; on the basis of continuously
enhancing information network tixi system defense capability, speed up building
information operations units {xinxi zuozhan budui} that take information warfare
weapons and equipment as main operational means and specialize in carrying out
information warfare tasks; and strive to develop diverse information operation attack-
defense means to effectively guard against and deter an enemy from initiating a large-
scale information invasion {daguimo xinxi ruqin}.

Flexible and diverse space strength {kongjian liliang}. We should take having the
capabilities to support {baozhang} free utilization of space {kongjian ziyou liyong} as
well as to accomplish strategic early-warning and strategic reconnaissance tasks with high efficiency as a core; speed up the enhancement of space information assisting-support capability \(\text{kongjian xini zhiyuan nengli}\), information defense capability, and information control capability; strengthen our own counter-strike, counter-interference, and counter-damage capabilities; and continue to enhance the capability to safeguard the nation’s space security \(\text{kongjian anquan}\) so as to effectively contain and deter an enemy’s intention \(\text{qitu}\) of conducting space deterrence and attack against us.

Integrated deterrence strength of people’s war with innovative development. [We must] establish a national defense reserve strength mobilization \(\text{tizhi}\) system with high speed and high effectiveness \(\text{kuaisu gaoxiao}\) as well as a strategic industry \(\text{zhanlue chanye}\) with strong adaptability; strive to increase the scientific and technological content \(\text{keji hanliang}\) of the national defense reserve strength; promote an organic connection between local professional strength \(\text{difang zhuanyehua liliang}\) and informationized support for future operations \(\text{weilai zuozhan xinxi zaozhang}\); give prominence to firmly grasping high and new technology weapons and equipment mobilization as well as comprehensive support mobilization building; continue to enhance the rapid transformation capability of the nation’s war potential; and strengthen the integrated-whole actual strength of people’s war under informationized conditions. [end of page 148]

Section 3: The Strategic Guidance Thought and Principles of Military Deterrence…149

The application of military deterrence means by the PLA must take the Party’s strategic thought regarding military deterrence as importance guidance, take the military-strategic concept \(\text{junshi zhanlue fangzhen}\) in the new era as a fundamental basis, and under the prerequisite of taking into full consideration situations of the world, the nation, and the military, as well as the future development trend, closely combine them [the guidance and the basis] with the reality of military deterrence development, gain a foothold for solving the main problems facing national security from a new starting point, gain a foothold at dealing with the most difficult and most complicated situations, and continue to enrich and innovate military deterrence’s ideas and forms.

I. Scientifically establishing strategic guidance thought for military deterrence…149

(1) Insisting on taking controlling crises, containing war as fundamental tasks

Military deterrence’s fundamental tasks are subordinate to as well as serve the general strategy of national security and development, and they are correspondingly adjusted in
accompanying with changes in national security circumstances. Currently, along with a continuous increase in the nation’s comprehensive national power as well as continuous enhancement in the international status, the danger of a large-scale invasion war initiated from the outside is basically ruled out. However, the complexity, comprehensive quality, and uncertainty exhibited by national security threats have increasingly become evident, and moreover, the danger of a local war triggered by the escalation of a crisis and conflict is always present, and has become an important factor interfering with and even interrupting the period of important strategic opportunities for national development. This requires that, in a present and future period, we must insist on taking controlling crises and containing war as military deterrence’s fundamental tasks; focus efforts on reducing the risk of escalation and expansion of various crises and conflicts; try as much as possible to prevent the tremendous damage and negative impacts brought on by a war; strive to provide support {baozhang} for the whole situation {daju} of national security and development with a lower cost, more flexible mode, and more reliable means; and successfully safeguard the period of important strategic opportunities for national development. And this requires that we must enhance the forward looking quality {qianzhanxing}, the initiative quality, and flexibility in terms of strategic guidance; and gain a foothold for not only containing real war threats {xianshi zhanzheng weishe}, but also for foreseeing crises, resolving crises, responding to crises to strive with the utmost effort to control the occurrence of crises and conflict, and try hard to apply all means to contain war and delay the eruption of war.

(2) Insisting on taking safeguarding stability of the overall national strategic situation {guojia zhanlue quanju} and fighting for initiative in the overall strategic situation {zhanlue quanju} as the base point for working-out-an-approach in planning {chouhua jidian}

In peacetime, the military deterrence tixi system as well as its implied deterrence effect {weishe xiaoying} have significant and sustained strategic influence, deterring strength {shezhili}, and check and balance strength {zhihengli}. They are important counterweights {fama} [end of page 149] in safeguarding national security, using operations-research-based planning in international strategic games {yunchou guoji zhanlue boyi}. After the 1950s, in the difficult situation of a tough economy, lagging science and technology, and talent shortage, China still put in considerable manpower, material strength, and financial strength to independently develop national defense science and technology industry; broke down imperialist [countries’] nuclear monopoly, nuclear blackmail, and nuclear threat with its “two bombs, one satellite;” and established a relatively sound conventional military strength tixi system to provide the nation with a solid deterrence strength guarantee for effectively responding to the threat of large-scale war aggression, create favorable conditions for striving for the initiative in international
strategic games, and lay down an objective foundation for solidifying its great nation status. This historical experience has shown that, during the process of building and applying military deterrence strength, we must not only pay attention to effectively responding to various real and potential security threats, but also correctly grasp the overall situation quality, the initiative quality, and the forward-looking quality of working-out-an-approach in planning military deterrence \{junshi weishe mouhua\} from the height of safeguarding the stability of the national strategic overall situation and fighting for the initiative of the strategic overall situation. At present, we must focus on the essential requirements \{benzhi yaoqiu\} of local wars under informationized conditions, take effectively deterring behaviors that endanger China’s core interests and major interests \{hexin liyi he zhongda liyi\} as a basic objective, and take enhancing strategic early-warning capability, strategic maneuver capability \{zhanlue jidong nengli\}, and strategic strike capability as an important pull to continuously strengthen the tixi system building \{tixihua jianshe\} of military deterrence strength and lay down a foundation for safeguarding stability of the national strategic overall situation as well as fighting for the initiative of the strategic overall situation.

(3) Insisting on taking innovating deterrence means as an important approach to enhance deterrence credibility

Deterrence means are application modes of deterrence strength and an external expression of deterrence capability; a dynamic reflection \{dongneng fanying\} of the organic combination of deterrence capability and stratagem art \{mouhua yishu\}; and an important prerequisite and foundation for achieving military deterrence’s anticipated goals and basic objectives. To continue to enhance the credibility of deterrence, the crux is to choose appropriate deterrence means to display the horribleness \{kepaxing\}, severity, and urgency of the consequences. Brand-new deterrence means that taking new ideas, new mechanisms, and new technology as brace-support \{zhicehng\} can produce even greater uncertainty for the opponent in the aspect of assessing both sides’ military capabilities, so as to effectively disrupt the opponent’s original strategic preparations and enhance [our] deterrence’s credibility. In particular, the emergence of new deterrence strengths that take high and new technologies — such as information, networks \{wangluo\}, space \{taikong\}, and new materials — as reliance has caused revolutionary changes in the mechanism, mode, and domain of deterrence strength application, and has enabled the forming of new deterrence means that take asymmetrical deterrence modes as its mark \{biaozhi\}. Traditional deterrence strength also requires innovative deterrence means to enable itself to choose activity time, location, and mode according to its own wishes so as to form a result \{xiaoguo\} of “singing an old play with new interpretation.” Presently, [the approach of] innovating deterrence means must take pushing forward development of high and new military technologies and new operational strength as an
important reliance, and strive to form local superiority in some strategic domains, particularly new strategic domains, so as to realize new breakthroughs in the deterrence mechanism, deterrence idea, and deterrence mode. [end of page 150]

(4) Insisting on taking strengthening comprehensive national power as a fundamental reliance

Powerful comprehensive national power is a basic foundation for constructing a military deterrence tixi system with Chinese characteristics, as well as a reliable backing for effective application of deterrence strength. Only by taking powerful comprehensive national power as reliance and transforming it into national strategic capability {guojia zhanlue nengli} can we effectively release the tremendous deterrence potential contained within and produce an even greater deterrence effect {weishe xiaoying}. Without powerful comprehensive national power as the fundamental reliance, it is difficult to form a truly effective deterrence capability by depending solely upon military strength. Presently, we must take constructing a deterrence tixi system structure, one that combines peacetime and wartime together with flexible transition and conducts local operations with support from the entire country, as a pull to strive to strengthen national defense mobilization tixi system building, to form an entire set of national defense mobilization tixi systems with division of responsibility, with smooth and unobstructed command, and high effectiveness and flexibility, so as to continue enhancing the nation’s integrated-whole adaptability to changes {yingbian nengli} and transition capability, forming a deterrence tixi system with comprehensive deterrence validity {zonghe weishe xiaoli}.

II. Correctly grasping basic principles for applying military deterrence…151

(1) Formulating clear and limited military deterrence objectives

The general requirement {zongyaoqi} of safeguarding national development’s period of important strategic opportunities and winning local wars under informationized conditions has determined that in the future the PLA’s strategic deterrence activities must take subordinating to as well as serving the strategic overall situation of the nation’s peaceful development, subordinating to and serving the military-strategic concept as the fundamental yardstick {genben chidu} for setting objectives, and take resolving crises, containing war, and safeguarding peace as the basic focus of attention to conduct unified operations-research-based planning and working-out-an-approach in planning {tongchou mouhua} for strategic deterrence’s specific objectives in different situations. We must scientifically and rationally determine military deterrence activities’ limited objectives and ensure deterrence’s credibility in accordance with the nature of the threat we are facing as well as the national security interests’ needs with a phased nature {jieduanxing}
We must choose appropriate deterrence objectives according to deterrence means and modes available for use, avoiding an overly big objective while having a capability that is too small, or vice versa. [For questions regarding] to what extent will military deterrence activities escalate, and when to move and when to stop, we must conduct full-scale considerations politically and strategically, and we must center on established objectives in conducting operations research-based planning and designing {chouhua sheji}.

(2) Mustering {diaodong} and effectively utilizing all deterrence resources

[We must] strive to transform continuously enhanced comprehensive national power into effective and useful strategic capabilities, continue to expand the capability foundation for deterrence activities, and continue to enrich effective approaches for deterrence activities. [We must] inherit as well as carry forward the excellent tradition of people’s war, pay attention to extend strategies and tactics for people’s war under new historic conditions, and actively adopt various measures for enhancing the deterrence effectiveness {weishe xiaoneng} of the new people’s war. [We must] gain a foothold in integrated-whole deterrence {zhengti weishe} by rationally differentiating functions of deterrence activities’ military means and non-military means, and paying attention to [end of page 151] the organic combination of various deterrence resources, including military affairs, politics, the economy, diplomacy, and laws, [paying attention to] the integrated-whole linkage {zhengti liandong} between deterrence from the armed forces’ war readiness activities {jundui zhanbei xingdong weishe} and deterrence from reserve strength mobilization {houbei liliang dongyuan weishe}, [paying attention to] integrated application of material strength and mental strength {jingshen liliang}, and [paying attention to] adjusting-coordination between mental battle and strength battle {xinzhan yu lizhan}. Once [we are] determined to implement a major deterrence activity, we must establish the confidence of daring to act and be sure of victory, firm up the will to never give up before achieving the goal, have the Party and the government, the military and the civilian, conduct the activity in a concerted way, and successfully perform full preparations for going from deterrence to war {由摄转战 youshezhuanzhan} to impose powerful strategic pressure on the opponent.

(3) Insisting on composite deterrence {fuhe weishe} that has both nuclear and conventional [strengths]

Nuclear strength is a fundamental means for China to deter a large-scale invasion from a foreign enemy, and a pillar of strength for safeguarding China’s great nation status. Conventional strength is an important component of the PLA’s strategic deterrence strength, and a main tool for containing crises, controlling war situations {zhanju},

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winning a war, and realizing military strategic objectives. Insisting on taking nuclear deterrence as an important backing and taking conventional deterrence as basic means can enable PLA deterrence activities to have an even more flexible application strategy, an even more broad-spectrum response scope \{yingdui fanwei\}, and even more effective deterrence credibility. On the basis of continuously strengthening the informationization building of China’s limited nuclear strength, [we must] deepen research of effective application of the nuclear deterrence strategy under different conditions to ensure the effectiveness \{youxiaoxing\} and focused quality of nuclear deterrence in future wars. In terms of conventional strength deterrence application, [we must] strive to closely combine information and space \{kongjian\} with conventional strength on land, at sea, and in the air, so as to deter security threats of different intensity, difference sources, and different forms.

(4) Harboring deterrence in solid and earnest military struggle preparations

The closer war preparations are to requirements of actual combat, the more capable they are to express strategic resolution and strategic capability, and the higher deterrence effectiveness \{weishe xiaoneng\} they have. Sheer bluffing and fear-inciting intimidation \{donghe\} will only have the opposite outcome \{shideqifan\}. In peacetime, we should insist on combining hiding one’s capabilities and keeping a low profile with active action \{jiji zuowei\} to talk less and do more, harbor deterrence in building \{寓慑于建 yusheyujian\}, and harbor deterrence in preparation \{寓慑于备 yusheyubei\}; earnestly blend deterrence intent \{zhanlue yitu\} and activities into the integrated-whole process of national defense, armed forces modernization building, and military struggle preparations; and through the initiative of conducting adjustment control \{tiaokong\} for military struggle preparations’ object, key points, scale, and pace \{jiezou\}, generate as well as release deterrence effectiveness \{weishe xiaoneng\} with a focused quality. Low-intensity activities must at least have the preparedness of medium-intensity activities, and medium-intensity activities must have the preparedness of high-intensity activities. Only when we successfully perform war preparations that are full-scale but also with a focused quality, continuous but also with key points, can we conduct effective escalation after low-intensity activities fail, depending on the situation, until our deterrence goal is realized.

(5) Attaching importance to close cooperation between deterrence activities and actual combat activities

One is giving prominence to starting with heavy deterrence \{重慑开局 zhongshe kaiju\}. It refers to creating powerful momentum with heavy forces, seeking significant results with a victorious momentum, and in particular, combining together the realness
zhenshixing} of actual strength, the feasibility of revenge, and the resoluteness
guoduanxing} of activities so as to manifest {xianshi} [end of page 152] the resolution
daring to fight and gaining victory, as well as the will to attack massively and
ruthlessly. “Brewing” a deterrence effect {weishe xiaoying} with “in-advance” deterrence
yuxianweishe} will not only express the rapidness, precision, and irresistibility
bukekangjuxing} of operational activities, creating a powerful psychological pressure
within the enemy to strive for subduing the enemy without going to battle, but also at the
same time, creating favorable conditions for going from deterrence to war. Two is
insisting on integrating deterrence with war {债战一体 shezhanyiti}. This is to assist war
with deterrence, promote deterrence with war, and conduct deterrence and war
simultaneously to realize maximization of deterrence results {weishe xiaoguo} and
turning actual combat activities into shock and awe [activities]. On the basis of paying
attention to the whole situation and attaching importance to results {xiaoguo}, we must
grasp the relationship between deterrence and war, between advancing and retreating, so
as to not only strive for resolving problems with deterrence and without battles, but also
successfully perform the preparation of assisting deterrence with battles. [We must]
reduce the intensity of psychological shock and awe with actual combat strikes, and
amplify actual combat strikes’ deterrence results {zhenshe xiaoguo} with psychological
shock and awe. Three is to have control within deterrence {债中有控 shezhongyoukong}.
[We must] focus efforts on performing adjusting-coordination of the relationship between
strategic deterrence activities and the development of the integrated-whole war situations;
conduct adjustment control of deterrence activities’ time opportunities, intensity, and
posture with initiative; create a favorable combat opportunity {zhanji} with deterrence
activities; and divide and disintegrate the opponent with deterrence intensity. [We must]
leave a proper retreat route for the enemy, preventing him from fighting an all-out battle
in desperation {殊死一搏 shusiyibo}. [end of page 153]
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Chapter 8
Strategic Guidance of Non-War Military Activities...154

Section 1: The Development of Practices and Theory for Non-War Military Activities...154

The practices of non-war military activities have had a long history, and the summary of their theory has been continually clarified and enriched. Since entering the 21st century, non-war military activities, as a normalized form of military activities, have become an indispensable and important detail in military strategy.

I. The details about non-war military activities...154

Military activities can be divided into two types, war and non-war. Compared to war activities, non-war military activities have two main attributes. One is that their nature is not warfare and the other is that their focus is on peacetime. With the development of practices whereby militaries carry out non-war military activities, the definition of non-war military activities has given rise to discussions in military theory circles. The United States was the earliest to formally propose the concept of “military operations other than war,” and it listed all military activities outside of formally declared wars and those authorized by the War Powers Act as non-war military activities.53 The US military’s 2001 Doctrine for Joint Operations also defined them as “a series of operations carried out by the nation’s military strengths apart from large-scale engagements in warfare.” The PRC has more than ten definitions for non-war military activities. The definition in the new edition of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology is “Military activities that the armed strengths carry out to protect the nation’s security and developmental interests but that do not directly constitute warfare. They include such actions as counterterrorism and maintenance of stability, disaster relief, protecting rights and interests, security alerts, international peacekeeping, and international rescues.”

Generally speaking, military activities are organized activities that the armed strengths pursue in order to complete military missions. Therefore, not all activities that the

53 Translator’s Note: The US concept of “Military Operations Other Than War” is referred to in Chinese as feizhanzheng junshi xingdong, and this Chinese term translates to “non-war military activities.” In earlier translations, many translators opted to translate this term to “military operations other than war.” This is primarily because the U.S. pioneered the concept, and translators assumed the Chinese term refers to this US concept. With further development of this concept by the Chinese, this assumption no longer applies. Thus, for translation accuracy purposes, this chapter translates all occurrences of feizhanzheng junshi xingdong as non-war military activities, with the exception to instances where the passage quotes and/or refers directly to the US concept.
military engages in are military activities; and not all activities outside of warfare [end of page 154] are non-war military activities. Non-war military activities are limited, they have boundaries, and they have standards, and they are divided into a broad sense and a narrow sense. In the broad sense, non-war military activities cover a broad area, that is, as long as they are not war, military activities that are launched in order to achieve certain political goals come under non-war military activities, and their contents include almost all military activities that the military participates in. In the narrow sense, non-war military activities primarily focus on maintaining national security, social stability, and the deterrence of war; the direction of the activities is explicit, their military and political meaning are prominent, and their military attributes and characteristics are distinct. Looking at this from the angle of military strategy, the narrow sense of non-war military activities presses closer to military practices, and it is easier to strategically plan and direct the military’s building and preparations for military conflicts; it is also possible to avoid simple interpretations and being awash in generalities.

The concept of “non-war military activities” appears in military technical language, it is closely connected to the formation of an informationized society and the development of globalization, it is the result of the concept of national security and changes in military thought, it is the product of diversification in choices about the means for protecting national security and interests, and it is also inevitable in the historic process of the development of military activities. In an age of peace and development, control over warfare has been greatly strengthened, costs have increased, difficulties are greater, and the scope in which [warfare] is used is strictly limited. Non-war military activities, which are characterized by non-violence, conform to the characteristics of the age; they appear more and more frequently, and the types of activities are continually expanding; they are being used more and more broadly in social, political, and economic life and in international relations; and their importance is growing ever stronger. In sum, non-war military activities can eliminate hidden security dangers and promote stability and harmony in society through the peaceful declaration, manifestation, and use of strengths, internally, while externally, they can create a secure environment and protect national interests.

II. The development of the practices and theory of non-war military activities...155

As the product of military thought, military concepts, and military practices develop to a certain historical stage, non-war military activities are the enrichment and improvement of the contents of military activities. The practices of non-war military activities have moved to the forefront of military theory. As we look back at history, non-war military activities existed early on; it was just that they were there in deed rather than in word. Given the limitations of factors like knowledge, conditions, and the environment, it was
just that they were not expressed by the explicit use of the concept “non-war military activities.”

Compared to non-war military activities as practiced by the various countries of the world, the PRC military carried out a great many tasks [involving] non-war military activities in the process of its establishment and development, due to the nature and attributes that a people’s army has, and it thus possesses rich practices in non-war military activities. During the period when the people’s army was first created, it not only undertook the role of combat units, [end of page 155] but at the same time, it also undertook the functions of work units and production units. At the same time that it fought, it carried out many non-war military activities; the two were done together, and they were done in parallel. After the founding of New China, the PRC military participated a number of times in a series of activities, such as suppressing rebellions and suppressing violence, doing rescue and relief work, attacking transnational crime, and aiding in local construction, thus forming the unique characteristics of non-war military activities that a people’s army has. Upon entering the 21st century, as the international security situation changed and as the PRC’s appraisal of its security threats changed, and as the nation’s understanding of the expansion of its interests changed after the process of its integration into globalization, the PRC military’s non-war military activities became a normalized state of military activities. From dealing with flood disasters, snow disasters, earthquakes, SARS, counterterrorism and maintenance of stability, and major social turmoil (or riots) that have occurred within the PRC, to overseas participation in a series of activities such as Indian Ocean tsunami rescues, rescues in earthquakes in Pakistan and Iran, convoys in the Gulf of Aden, international peacekeeping in hotspot regions, and multinational joint military exercises, there has increasingly been a tendency for the types of activities to grow in number, for the scope of the activities to expand, and for the frequency of activities to increase.

Non-war military activities commonly occur in international political life; even during the Cold War when national military security relations were tense, they were often seen. Although preparations for war and waging war were the main motivators in the building of some major nations’ militaries as well as the main forms of their military activities, non-war military activities also emerged in the agenda of military strategic guidance, security policies, and international relations of military powers; these mostly appeared in the form of crises, and were dealt with in the form of crisis management. Among these, the use of military strengths in incidents like Germany’s Berlin crisis, the Cuban missile crisis, and the Iranian hostage crisis can be rated as model instances of non-war military activities. After the Cold War ended, non-war military activities became more and more frequent, and they were focused upon to an unprecedented degree; the main thing in their background was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact,
so that military confrontation between the two large blocs that could lead to a world war no longer existed, and the various nations’ evaluations of their security threats underwent major changes. The most pronounced characteristic was that traditional threats of war clearly declined, while nontraditional security threats increased daily. Against the background of this new age, the need for suitability and applicability to war decreased, while the necessity and suitability for non-war military activities increased to a corresponding degree. The militaries of the various countries of the world treated dealing with nontraditional security threats as an important mission and task, and non-war military activities gradually became an important form of military activities for the various countries; particularly in such areas as international disaster relief, counterterrorism, countering piracy, and attacking transnational crimes, they received more and more affirmation from the international community. Non-war military activities appeared more and more frequently on the political and military agendas of the various countries, becoming an important topic that affected military decision-making, as well as an important detail that affected national security and influenced the military’s buildup.

[end of page 156]

Looking at the United States, which was the first to propose the concept of “military operations other than war,” the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the United States losing a clear-cut main enemy for a time, and for a short period of time the possibility of war between major nations could not be seen. The orientation of the military strategy of the United States, which was the victor in the Cold War, was trapped in perplexity in the early 1990s; the US military carried out a number of practices in non-war military activities, including carrying out Operation Send Hope humanitarian aid to former Soviet regions, Operation Sea Angel for Bangladesh’s water disasters, Operation Sharp Edge for evacuating alien residents from Libya, and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, as well as the Indian Ocean tsunami aid, the multinational earthquake aid, the Hurricane Katrina aid, and the Gulf of Aden convoys that were done after this. Although these activities were limited in scale and their scope was not great, they all had an impact domestically that benefited maintaining national security and social stability, and they established a certain peaceful international image outside the country. At the turn of the century, non-war military activities became an important marker for evaluating the changes and expansion of the US military’s functions. After the 9-11 incident, the United States viewed terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction as the greatest and most pressing threat to its national security, but at the same time that it launched counterterrorism wars, it paid a great deal of attention to using non-war military activities to deal with a number of other threats.

Other major countries have also changed in accordance with the times and their situations have developed; recognizing the importance of non-war military activities, they have
actively promoted the practice of non-war military activities. Although many countries do not have a distinct term for “non-war military activities,” they have transformed their understanding of military activities in the new age, added to and expanded the functions of their militaries, and incorporated non-war military activities into the important tasks that their militaries undertake. Russia’s military has carried out a large number of peacekeeping activity tasks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and the Commonwealth of Independent States, and it has sent nuclear submarines to the Arctic Ocean for patrols, sent long-range aviation troops to cruise South America, and carried out convoys in the Gulf of Aden. Japan has also seized the opportunity and broken past the fetters of its constitution, sending Self Defense Force [strengths] to the Gulf of Aden to carry out convoy tasks. India has also participated in tsunami relief missions in the Indian Ocean, multinational earthquake relief, and withdrawing foreign nationals from the Lebanon-Israel conflicts, as well as in actions to attack pirates in the Gulf of Aden. In recent years, major nations have frequently carried out joint military exercises at various levels, at [various] scales, and with [varying] topics, and have continuously supported international peacekeeping activities; this shows the importance of non-war military activities in national, regional, and international security agendas.

It can be predicted that with new changes in the international environment and security threats, the practices of non-war military activities of the various countries of the world and especially of the various major nations will become ever more frequent, and the execution of non-war military activities will be an important function of the military; the forms of these activities also will become ever more enriched. As an important [end of page 157] component part of military activities, non-war military activities will continually enrich and expand the sphere of military practices and activities, and will play an irreplaceable strategic role.

Military practices propel and promote the development of military theory. The theory of non-war military activities is a new generalization and new formulation of the features of military activities, as well as a new detail in the development of military theory. The large number of the practices of non-war military activities, both domestic and abroad, has provided ample conditions for developing the theory of non-war military activities.

After the end of the Cold War, the theory of non-war military activities received worldwide attention and was affirmed. The US military was the first to raise non-war military activities to the heights of military strategy; in 1993, the US Army’s Doctrine of Operations54 for the first time set forth the theoretical sense, operational principles, plan

54Translator’s note: Probably FM 100-5 Operations.
of organization, and types and patterns of military operations other than war, and preliminarily laid the theoretical foundation for military operations other than war. In 1995, the US military especially put out Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War (JP[3]-07), which explained in a fairly systematic manner military operations other than war as well as related theoretical key factors. In 1999, NATO, headed by the United States, launched the Kosovo Campaign, under the banner of humanitarianism; it treated so-called humanitarian aid as the focus of the non-war military activities, and in coordination with such forms of modern warfare as focused attacks and precision attacks, it integrated this into the theory of warfare, which resulted in an evolution and elevation of the theory of non-war military activities. In 2001, the US military published the Doctrine for Joint Operations, which listed military operations other than war and war operations as the two major types of operations by the US military and which clarified theoretical guidance for military operations other than war. In 2006, the Doctrine for Joint Operations, published by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, again clearly included The Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War in this. The US military’s theory of military operations other than war is a supplement to the theory of warfare and especially to the theater of war theory of operations, rather than being purely a decipherment of military operations other than war. Although the US military has abandoned the concept of military operations other than war, its category of military operations other than war still is completely retained in the newly published Doctrine for Joint Operations. For more than ten years, the US military’s theory of military operations other than war, which took shape in practices, has had a broad-ranging and profound strategic impact.

At the same time that the various countries in today’s world and especially the various major nations have promoted research into the theory of warfare, they have followed one another as they studied the theory of such aspects as non-war, nonviolent, non-conventional military activities, and special warfare, and they have made corresponding strategic adjustments based on their individual actual situations. The various nations’ names for non-war military activities are not the same, but the details are largely identical; they are mainly manifested as: using the concept of overall security as their basis, they stress the integrated use with war activities, and they emphasize the actual functions of non-war military activities [end of page 158] as well as their legal scope. Russia, France, Italy, Japan, India, and other countries all have written non-war military activities into their operational regulations; drafted them in the form of laws and regulations, they have clarified the military’s detailed rules and regulations at a number of levels, such as military training, military equipment, the building of strengths, and international cooperation, and they have thus ensured that the tasks of non-war military activities will be carried out in a rational and legal manner. Russia has stressed that “special operations” that use non-combat and non-traditional methods can achieve
specified objectives, and it has increasingly focused on using means of non-actual warfare in the functions of protecting national security and creating a military posture. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and other members of NATO have universally identified the role of non-war military activities and have put it into an important position in their national security strategies and military strategies. Japan has transformed the results of its studies into the theory of non-war military activities into laws and regulations, national defense policies, and military theory for the Self Defense Forces’ actions. In 2003, a Japanese Defense White Paper for the first time expounded on non-war military activities. Afterwards, there also appeared the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Law, the International Peace Cooperation Law, the Law Concerning Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team, and the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, which have specifically guided the Self Defense Forces in engaging in such non-war military activities as counterterrorism, in participating in international peacekeeping and aid, and in responding to large-scale disasters. India enacted at the national level the Disaster Management Act, while at the military’s level it has clarified the detailed laws and regulations for the military in activities in such areas as domestic and overseas counterterrorism, participating in international peacekeeping, and countering piracy at sea; this has highlighted the function and status of non-war military activities.

For a period of time [up until now], the PRC military’s studies into non-war military activities have continually intensified, its understanding of the characteristics and laws of non-war military activities [has deepened], and its understanding has gradually deepened about such major strategic issues as the relationship between non-war military activities and military activities for war, the relationship between traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats, and the relationship between the building of core operational capabilities and the building of capabilities for non-war military activities; it has also focused on resolving a series of specific issues such as command and control, organizational systems and organizational structures, structural adjustments, professional training, weapons and equipment, and the building of laws, in order to provide an important theoretical basis for new practices in non-war military activities. As the practices for non-war military activities have developed, the theoretical content for non-war military activities have also continually expanded and developed; together with the theory of military activities, it has formed a complete system of military theory.

III. The status and role in military theory of non-war military activities...159

Non-war military activities have increasingly become an important form in which a nation’s military strengths are used, and they have an ever-greater impact on the nation’s
security, so their status and role in military strategy are increasingly important, and they are primarily [end of page 159] manifested in the following six areas.

(1) Non-war military activities are an important strategic means for achieving the nation’s political intentions

War is a continuation of politics, and non-war military activities are a requirement of politics. The supreme objective of military strategy is to serve political interests; non-war military activities similarly are always centered on the nation’s political goals, support economic and social development, and are launched in coordination with the diplomatic struggle. Under many conditions, non-war military activities are guided by political factors and can directly achieve the military goals of politics. To a certain degree, non-war military activities, as an active and effective means of strategic response, and using its clear “non-warfare” and “non-confrontational” characteristics, and by exhibiting an image of a force of peace, find it easier to establish a new type of military cooperative relationship with potential war adversaries and possible targets of competition, to create an excellent international and regional security environment, and to more easily achieve political intentions and objectives, and this will help the PRC protect its strategic opportunity of a peaceful rise.

(2) Non-war military activities are an important manifestation for carrying out military-strategic concepts in a time of peace

“Defeating the enemy’s troops without fighting” is the supreme state of military conflict, as well as the meaning that non-war military activities should have. Non-war military activities reflect the essentials of China’s traditional military security concepts, and they also reflect the important characteristics of the military-strategic concept in peacetime. Since entering the new historical era, the PRC military has widened the connotations and denotations of military combat, enriched the forms and means for using military strengths, and treated non-war military activities as an important sphere for military practices in peacetime. Under the new conditions, the military-strategic concept of active defense needs to have non-war military activities serve as major strategic practices and serve as important strategic measures, and [they need to] continually strengthen strategic guidance for non-war military activities.

(3) Non-war military activities are important means for carrying out new missions

Missions and tasks are the drivers and directors for the building of military strengths and for military activities. Given the new changes in the international and domestic security situation, the military must undertake new missions and complete new tasks in protecting
the period of strategic opportunity for the nation’s development, and in supporting the nation as it achieves the strategic objective of peaceful development. The functions of non-war military activities have expanded and developed and they [now] have a number of forms, and by carrying out non-war military tasks, the military can eliminate a number of hidden dangers to security, in many spheres and at many levels, and protect the nation’s important interests and realistically carry out a new historic mission.

(4) Non-war military activities are an effective means for supporting the expansion of interests

The effective upholding of national interests is the starting point and the end point of military strategy. Against a background of globalization [end of page 160] and informationization, the threats that national interests and their expansion face are no longer purely the traditional threats posed by a given hostile country (or bloc) or a given number [of hostile countries (or blocs)], but instead are a mixed form of threats. Not only are there traditional security threats, but there are also non-traditional security threats; some of these threats are difficult to anticipate and are uncertain. It is necessary to be prepared in multiple directions and to unify and coordinate [preparations], and to simultaneously and comprehensively respond to them through preparations for war and through non-war military activities. Non-war military activities can promote the achievement of national interests and support an expansion of national interests to a global scope, through their relatively peaceful forms, through the abilities that the military itself has and through its role of deterrence, and through a combination of soft power and hard power.

(5) Non-war military activities are vigorous tools for upholding world peace

Non-warfare is the basic attribute of non-war military activities. In the long flow of history, warfare has been a special stage; as soon as war breaks out, non-war military activities become incorporated into the wartime agenda. But in a peaceful environment that lasts for a fairly long period of time, non-war military activities are an important form for bringing the role of military strengths into play, and the frequency of their use becomes ever greater. An active and effective launch of non-war military activities benefits upholding a peaceful and stable security environment, as regards both strategy and policy. In particular, faced with common security threats that are increasing daily, it is possible to bridge contradictions and divisions among nations through a series of non-war military activities, and to promote understanding and mutual confidence among the militaries of various nations, thus vigorously promoting regional and world peace.
(6) Non-war military activities are an important form for enhancing the military’s operational capabilities

The scope of the tasks of non-war military activities is extremely broad, and the skills that are required are complex and diverse. Given that non-war military activities are largely the same as war activities and that command departments are normalized {guiyi}, the two have very similar requirements in a number of areas, such as their building of strengths, their spiritual attainments, the generation of their capabilities, the preparations of their mechanisms, their information support, and their logistics support; in a situation where the chances of war breaking out are low, it is possible to test the organizational and command capabilities of leadership organs and the military’s command organizations; to examine the forms, levels, and effectiveness of military combat preparations; to test the composite quality of the military; to raise the level of preparations for war; and to enhance the military’s operational capabilities, through such actions as active participation in counterterrorism, anti-piracy, carrying out rescues, and preventing and containing crises.

Section 2: The Types and Characteristics of Non-War Military Activities...161

Non-war military activities are carried out in a number of spheres, centered on the nation’s military, political, economic, diplomatic, and social needs; their types are diverse, and their characteristics are distinct. [end of page 161]

I. The main types of non-war military activities...162

The various nations of the world differentiate non-war military activities into differing categories, in accordance with their own security orientations, security needs, military postures, and military tasks; although there are clear differences, there are also a number of points of similarity. The US military has often adjusted and summarized its categories of military operations other than war, and the items [for these] have both increased and decreased in number, but in general they include such policies as national aid; security aid; humanitarian aid; emergency disaster relief; counterterrorism; drug enforcement; armed convoys; intelligence collection and sharing; joint exercises; displays of military power, attacks, and assaults; evacuation of non-combat personnel; enforcement of peace, support to or suppression of riots; and support to domestic local governments. Other countries’ categories of non-war military activities coincide with the United States’ [categories] more often than they differ from these.

The PRC’s academic circles have more than ten categories for non-war military activities, but their ideas [about these] are not unified. For example, there are differing
views on whether to include military aid, military trade, military diplomacy, and military
deterrence among non-war military activities. Non-war military activities can be
categorized in accordance with their nature, scale, degree, space, and goals; just as the
perspectives from which they are looked at differ, the categories that they are divided into
also differ. For example, as divided by their nature, there are three types: the enemy, us,
and friends. The first is dominated by deterrence and low-intensity violent actions; the
second and the third are dominated by peaceful aid actions. As divided by their scale,
there are three types – large, medium, and small – or three levels: strategic, campaign,
and tactical; there is not only participation by units from more than two theaters of war or
by more than a single service (or armed police), with command and coordination by a
headquarters, but there are also ones that are primarily commanded by a theater of war or
service, and activities that are carried out in local areas by units below the level of an
army. As divided by their level, fairly large strengths are deployed when the scale is large
and the situation is serious, medium-level strengths are deployed for an ordinary impact,
and in individual situations there may only be a need to deploy specialized strengths. As
divided by geographical spaces, it is possible to divide these into non-war military
activities that are done abroad (or overseas) and non-war military activities that are done
domestically. As divided by goals, they can be divided into activities with political goals,
activities with economic goals, and activities with military goals, as well as activities
with two or more than two goals. Looking at things overall, or proceeding from the
attributes of military activities, and with an emphasis on the nature of activities, the
combinations and subsequent differentiations of their forms are fairly rational. Based on
this, it is possible to divide non-war military activities into four major categories:
confrontational activities, law enforcement activities, aid activities, and cooperative
activities.

Confrontational activities primarily include such activity patterns as counterterrorism,
armed drug enforcement, attacking transnational crime, anti-piracy, and preventing social
unrest and riots. The targets of activities for the most part appear as hostile individuals,
groups (or organizations), or nations, and they directly affect social stability; the security
of national sovereignty, rights, and interests; [end of page 162] and the security of the
people’s lives and property. The scope of activities is largely limited, and usually is
primarily in border regions or certain areas within the nation, but it can also be abroad.
The goal of activities is to eliminate major non-traditional security threats that endanger
national security and that are developing into [threats] that are violent in nature. The
process of activities often appears in the shape of low-intensity confrontations and violent
conflicts; under special conditions, the intensity and severity of the activities can
approach that of war activities for a short period of time. [Finally,] the means of activities
include monitoring, constraint, investigation, control, and attack.
Law enforcement activities primarily include border and coastal sealing and control (or blockades), air alerts (or blockades), defense of rights at sea, convoying, security alerts, international peacekeeping, and military patrols. The targets of activities primarily are some hostile (nations or blocs), organizations, and people. The scope of activities is mostly domestic, or is in disputed border regions and international hotspot regions. The goals of activities are to respond to fairly large-scale, organized, and provocative activities that endanger security and development, through rational, favorable, and restrained military law enforcement activities to uphold rights, thus restraining the escalation and growth of the situation, eliminating major factors for insecurity and instability, and restoring and maintaining a normal security environment and social order.

Aid activities primarily include emergency disaster relief (the handling of various natural disasters, both domestic and abroad, and aid for major epidemics and for nuclear, biological, and chemical accidents); evacuating foreign nationals and protecting foreign nationals; and medical assistance. The targets of activities are not only specific groups, and national and international organizations, but they also consist of production and living facilities and the natural environment. The scope of activities is broad; it not only can be domestic but it also can be foreign, and foreign aid activities are tending to become more numerous. The environment of activities is relatively complex; there are many factors that cannot be predicted and cannot be controlled, and there are heavy requirements placed on the time and means of activities. Activities for the most part are emergencies, and primarily are aid and assistance activities under crisis and special conditions, so that it is easy to get recognition from the international community. Foreign aid-type activities basically appear in a peaceful state; although they sometimes can occur against a background of an emergency situation, they are not motivated by conflict.

Cooperative activities primarily appear as international joint military exercises; based on the needs of differing situations, they mostly are held in important peripheral regions and at sea. Through transnational joint exercises, interactive exchanges are strengthened, military mutual confidence is strengthened, and the ability for joint activities is improved; they display resolve to jointly use troops and the power to do so, and they use shock and awe against their common opponent to control actual and potential crises and to stabilize regional situations.

The above four types of military activities include a number of patterns of activities. Among them, the first type includes a certain use of armed force, and has the possibility of escalating, but the intensity of the use of armed force is low, and does not reach the level of warfare. The latter three types are mostly done in peacetime, they are used over the long term, the frequency of their use is fairly high, and they are forms of non-war military activities that are commonly seen. In recent years, the PRC military has carried
out more and more non-war military activities; [end of page 163] counterterrorism, disaster relief, protecting rights and interests, security alerts, international peacekeeping, anti-piracy, and an ever-increasing number of international joint military exercises have become recurrent tasks.

**II. The main characteristics of non-war military activities...164**

Non-war military activities and war activities have points in common in many aspects. However, as military activities whose essential characteristics are that they are “non-war” and “emergency response,” non-war military activities have distinct characteristics in such areas as their nature, their targets, the scope of their tasks, the forms of their behavior, and the requirements for their activities.

Their level of violence is low, and their situations are relatively controllable. Non-war military activities, whose principle is non-violence and which are bounded by the fact that they do not directly cause war and conflicts or lead to armed confrontations between nations, usually use limited conventional weapons and equipment. Non-war military activities primarily are conducted in peacetime, and their goals are to respond to crisis situations, to uphold the international security environment, and to uphold the nation’s political, economic, and social order. They are military forces that do not wage war, their armed strengths appear as rescuers, cooperators, and law enforcers; and they are only used as special, organized strengths that have combat capabilities. Mentally, the basic requirements for non-war military activities are that they shock and awe the opponent and that they control the situation as regards the state of affairs. Although some non-war military activities, such a counterterrorism and pacifying violence, can use armed force, the circumstances [for using this] are special, the scale is relatively small, the goals are limited, and the situation is controllable.

The integrated quality is strong, and they have a strong need for coordination. The strengths that participate in non-war military activities are diverse, and under many circumstances they involve integrated military-local government and military-civilian activities; international activities also involve many sectors, such as politics, economics, and diplomacy. The work of organizing them is complex, their coordination is quite difficult, and this requires that the military complete its task in coordination with multiple organizations and departments. Under some circumstances, the activities will have the military dominating, with cooperation from local governments; under other circumstances, the local government will predominate, with cooperation from the military. Non-war military activities that are carried out abroad, involving foreign militaries, also require establishing coordinated and cooperative relationships with the civilian and military departments of these countries and with international organizations.
At differing stages of non-war military activities, the role, tasks, and effects of military, political, diplomatic, and economic actions will intersect and will be converted into one another, so the military needs to establish and maintain close and continuous coordinated and cooperative relations with other departments and even with foreign militaries.

The targets are complex, and means and uses are varied. The targets of non-war military activities consist of countries, blocs (or organizations), individuals, and even the natural world; the tasks are varied and the means are diverse. There are some activities that cross between theaters of war and between national boundaries; the environment of the activities is not definite; and their targets are unfamiliar [to the units involved]. In adapting to differing targets, the handling of such areas as the task structure, strengths architecture, coordination and cooperation, allocation of resources, logistics support, and media control of the activities [end of page 164] will be correspondingly adjusted. Non-war military activities that have differing natures, differing types, and differing patterns will require the use of differing means; sometimes, the same pattern will require differing means in differing times and spaces. Under many circumstances, non-war military activities will require adopting composite and compound forms or to switch among numerous means in order to handle [the circumstances].

They cover a wide area, and the scope of their impact is large. Although the scale of non-war military activities is limited, still, against the background of globalization and informationization, and in particular given the role of the new media’s broadcasting, their impact goes far beyond national boundaries. Some non-war military activities have a strong political nature, they are highly sensitive, and their relevance and coverage is broad; they involve international political, diplomatic, economic, social, and other spheres; the international and domestic media pay a great deal of attention to them; and their emergence, development, and outcome are all broadcast within the nation in real-time. The active transmission of the activities’ positive energy helps to establish an excellent image for the military and the country. But some forces with ulterior motives or foreign media that have prejudices seek in general to distort the facts and to exaggerate their rendering of negative news, and to thus slander the PRC’s activities. If the activities make the slightest mistake or if the media are not vigorously managed, this could become an excuse for other people to launch political attacks.

They very much involve policy, and they have a fairly large number of restrictions and limitations. Decisions about non-war military activities are made at high levels of the state and the military, and are primarily carried out by the military. The political requirements for carrying out their tasks are heavy and they very much involve policy; they have restrictions as regards their scale, forms, means, environment, laws, and morals and justice; they must be firm, rational, and reliable; and they must pay a great deal of
attention and take into full consideration the relationships of the military activities’ political objectives, policy implementation, and legal scope. In carrying out non-war military activities in border defense and coastal defense areas, in disputed border regions, and especially abroad, it is necessary to understand international law; the political situation, military situation, and civilian situation of relevant countries; and local customs. In carrying out non-war military activities in minority nationality regions, it is necessary to be familiar with and abide by the Party’s and the state’s nationalities and religious policies. It is necessary to have a firm grasp on the relationships of contradictions between the PRC and the enemy and internal contradictions, [on the relationship] between open combat and on concealed combat, and [on the relationship] between the military struggle and the political struggle, and do things that are rational, beneficial, and restrained and that are plausible, reasonable, and legal.

There are limited requirements for resources, and strategic benefits are fairly great. Non-war military activities often are limited to a given sphere and a given region; they touch on local benefits and deal with local harms, and there generally is no need to mobilize all of society’s and all of the military’s resources. However, some non-war military activities, such as disaster relief and attacking violent terrorist forces, catch national attention and have marked strategic effects. Getting maximum strategic benefits through limited investment of resources is not only an objective requirement for the state as it responds to non-traditional security [threats], but it is also a subjective requirement for the military as it carries out the tasks of non-war military activities. [end of page 165]

The risks are relatively controllable, but it is difficult to entirely eliminate the possibility that a situation will escalate. One of the important goals of non-war military activities is to keep the situation from escalating and avoiding the start of war. In the process of non-war military activities, the military must actively bring into play its role as a peaceful and constructive strength. However, there are some confrontational non-war military activities that entail the risk of triggering a war. Confrontational non-war military activities usually occur between hostile nations (or blocs) and have the possibility of becoming fuses for igniting war; there always exist various factors that set off and are transformed into war, such as mutual suspicions [regarding] strategy, conflicts of interest, policies of confrontation, and increased competition. If the level of one or several of these factors increases or if the process gets out of control, this has the possibility of triggering a war.

Section 3: Principles of Strategic Guidance for Non-War Military Activities...166

The principles of strategic guidance for non-war military activities are the basic foundation and criteria for the tasks of non-war military activities. In carrying out the
tasks of non-war military activities, the military should abide by the following principles of strategic guidance.

I. High-level decision-making, and macroscopic coordination...166

What non-war military activities usually focus on are sudden incidents whose background is complex, that have a major impact, whose evolution is difficult to predict, and that affect the overall situation within a given time and space. The peacetime work of the Party, government, and military leading organizations in the area where an incident occurs is relatively independent, and their strengths are dispersed. In responding to major sudden incidents, it is necessary to have unified command and coordination, and to have the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission make decisions, issue orders about the activities, make disposition for the activities, and clarify the requirements of the activities, based on specific conditions and on the needs of relevant aspects. For example, most domestic counterterrorism tasks, tasks for maintaining stability, and tasks for ensuring security are requested by local Party committees, governments, and public security systems, while international peacekeeping and disaster relief are done in response to requests by the UN. The military’s leadership organs, under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, mobilize units, armed police, and special strengths of the reserves, with a focus on such conditions as the area where the incident occurred, the incident’s nature, its scale, and the requirements for strengths. They also can empower the command organs of the headquarters of the relevant theater of war or navy and air force and armed police to act on their behalf in organizing command responsibilities, in further clarifying the command and coordination relationships among the military and armed police units, and in coordinating at a high level relations with the state’s administrative departments or local governments. The military’s organizations that are responsible for commanding the activities must form a highly effective coordination mechanism with relevant local departments, centered on achieving objectives in common as they coordinate the activities. [end of page 166]

II. Seizing the initiative and classifying and guiding things...167

Prior to the start of a non-war military activity, the various echelons need to pay close attention to how the situation is developing and changing, and to revise the plan of activities in a timely manner, in accordance with the nature, characteristics, patterns, and requirements of the tasks that the military might undertake, so as to be thoroughly prepared to get involved into activities at any time and to struggle for the initiative. When the military or armed police units accept tasks in non-war military activities, they should find out about the task and comprehend [the task’s] intentions in as short a period of time
as possible, and organize units and launch their movements in a synchronized manner. The command organization should actively take the initiative to establish relations with relevant local departments and to get a grasp on relevant intelligence information about the region where the unit’s task is located. When the tasks of the activities fall under the nature of operational or readiness service, the process of organizing command and the means of communication and liaison must be strictly organized and carried out in accordance with the military’s or armed police units’ command principles. When the tasks of the activities fall under the nature of such armed law enforcement as maintaining social stability, counterterrorism, being on guard, or eliminating dangerous factors, the military usually needs to receive orders from an emergency response command center that the state especially sets up, and to coordinate its actions with public security and the armed police. When the tasks of the activities fall under the nature of emergency disaster relief, the military and the armed police should actively assist the state’s or local administrative leadership organizations in organizing and commanding units and various specialized strengths for assistance to be entered into assistance activities.

III. Implementing policies because of the situation, and flexible response...167

Based on differences in the motivations for the incident, in its background, in the region, and in its possible effects, the patterns, goals, nature, means, and requirements of non-war military activities vary. A comprehensive appraisal and judgment should be made based on a concrete analysis of the actual situation, and action should be taken in a resolute, flexible, and rapid manner, based on how serious and rapid developments in the situation are as well as on the scope and impact of the incident, in order to prevent sudden changes in the situation and to keep it from escalating out of control, thus satisfactorily completing the task and doing a good job with the aftermath. Usually the circumstances should be quickly ascertained and a decision made based on readiness programs or emergency response plans of actions [that were made] in peacetime, and these should be put into action, based on orders and instructions from the upper echelons. When tasks are undertaken that take coercive measures or where the situation is controlled by armed force and dangerous targets are eliminated, it is necessary to firmly carry out the orders and instructions of the upper echelons, to strictly organize things, and to use effective means in order to carry out objectives that have already been determined. When carrying out tasks for conventional non-war military activities, and based on the overall requirements of the upper echelons for the tasks that are to be undertaken, one should be fully prepared, concentrate one’s elite [strengths], carefully organize groupings, scientifically divide up tasks, and draft a number of scenarios, thus ensuring that the activities are foolproof. In case of a major natural disaster, a disaster [involving] fatal accidents, or a serious secondary disaster, the military, armed police, and reserve units should immediately, after receiving orders and instructions from the upper echelons,
concentrate personnel and equipment, and based on the task and the plan of activities, quickly make careful preparations and launch [end of page 167] various tasks.

IV. Targets are limited, and control is vigorous...168

Major non-war military activities have wide-ranging political, economic, military, and social impact, and sometimes will also have a major international impact. In particular, non-war military activities that are counterterrorist in nature and that suppress violence are very sensitive politically and have a fairly strong confrontational nature, so that the situation is urgent and complex; if they are not handled correctly, we could be trapped into being on the defensive. When the military is involved in handling a major sudden incident, the direction must be explicit and the objectives must be clear. There must be a firm grasp on a sense of proportion that is “rational, beneficial, and limited,” and the division must be rational, the response must be planned, and the handling must be measured. Based on the nature and requirements of the tasks, rationally determine the objectives of the activities, comply with political requirements, and have it fit its strategic goals; rationally select the forms and means of the activities, and be prudent in using heavy troops and heavy equipment; and keep the scale and scope of the activities under strict control, clarify the rules of the activities, and do all one can to reduce collateral damage and avoid causing negative consequences. In handling major crisis situations, it is necessary to display a resolute will through firm but appropriate military activities and to control developments in the situation through rapid and resolute actions and vigorous measures, in order to strictly prevent and control the situation from escalating or changing into a situation that is not favorable to us and where we are on the defensive.

V. Act in accordance with the law and have a grasp on policies...168

Non-war military activities must be carried out under the guidance of the state’s policies and within a framework of rules and regulations, with strict and impartial law, clearly displaying morality and justice, using both kindness and sternness, and tempering force with mercy. It is necessary to actively use the weapons of law, to reveal the criminal acts of your opponents, to deter and restrain criminal activities, to divide up and smash groups that have been hoodwinked, to struggle for and protect the masses as much as possible, and to isolate and attack the small number of principal culprits who violate the law, and to thus ensure that the activities have a broad social foundation. It is necessary to firmly and resolutely punish in accordance with the law those principal criminal gangsters who stubbornly will not change and who resist in remote places. In counterterrorism activities and activities to quell disorder and calm riots, and using the law as a criterion, one should resolutely adopt forceful measures against those stubborn elements where exhortations and explanations have been ineffective, who resist desperately, and who are a great
danger. Throughout the process of carrying out the tasks of major non-war military activities, the military and armed police must carry out unified management and control over public opinion, and have the Party and the government organize authoritative media to issue objective and fair information at appropriate times, thus maintaining correct guidance for public opinion. When necessary, one should also place controls and limitations on foreign media’s news broadcasts. [end of page 168]
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Chapter 9
Military Struggle in the Nuclear, Space, and Network Domains…169

Military struggle in the nuclear, space, and network domains has a bearing on the safety of the state and on victory or defeat in war. Ever since the debut of nuclear weapons, the strategic trial of strength in the nuclear field has never ceased, and the present era is also faced with new development postures. The building of nuclear forces cuts across many levels — national, armed forces, and services and arms — and nuclear strategy at the same time has the traits of national strategy, military strategy, and service strategy. Outer space and network space serve as new domains; they have already become important brace-supports which the normal functioning of human society and military activity $\text{huodong}$ cannot do without even for a moment, and have an overall-situation-quality influence on economic sociology and national security. They not only involve military-civilian integration $\text{junmin yiti}$ and military-civilian sharing, their building and application in military respects also has far exceeded the scope of a certain service or arm or certain department, has covered all military fields, and influences a variety of military activities $\text{xingdong}$. The prominent characteristics of military struggle in the major domains — nuclear, space, and network — have put forth even stricter requirements for strategic operations-research-based planning $\text{chouhua}$ and guidance, and these require our particular attention, study, and grasp.

Section 1: Military Struggle in the Nuclear Domain…169

Military struggle in this domain mainly involves confrontational activity — including nuclear deterrence, nuclear real combat, and nuclear military-controlled struggle — carried out by use of nuclear means among nuclear weapons states (or groups), in order to achieve certain political, economic, and/or military goals. Military struggle in this domain plays a decisive role in the military strategic overall situation of states possessing nuclear weapons, and is an important avenue for safeguarding national security and influencing world circumstances. Since mastering nuclear weapons, China has all along been faced with sharp and complex military struggle in the nuclear domain. Along with the changes in the development of the strategic circumstances since the turn of the century, strategic guidance for military struggle in the nuclear domain also should in good time be enriched and perfected. [end of page 169]

I. New trends in development of the circumstances of military struggle in the nuclear domain…170

The new changes in international political, economic, and security circumstances, as well as the growth and decline and competition in the comprehensive real strength of the
major powers, have caused the struggle in the international nuclear domain to take on several new characteristics and new trends.

(1) The U.S. and Russia continue nuclear reductions, but a “nuclear-weapons-free world” is still far from possible

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and Russia have carried out several rounds of nuclear reductions. As of late 2009, the quantities of U.S. and Russian nuclear payloads had been reduced approximately ⅔ [i.e. 75%] compared to the [height of the] Cold War period. According to the specifications of a new nuclear-reduction treaty signed by the U.S. and Russia in 2010 and formally entering into force in February 2011, by the year 2020, the numbers of nuclear payloads in US and Russian real-combat disposition will be further reduced to less than 1550. At present, the U.S. is also deliberating on a new nuclear-reduction jihua plan.

The large-scale reductions of nuclear weapons by the U.S. and Russia, although constantly propelling international disarmament forward, nonetheless are far from realizing the proposal for a “thorough elimination of nuclear weapons” upheld by China, as well as still being very far from the objective of a “nuclear-weapons-free world” proposed by the U.S. in recent years. First of all, the U.S. still regards other nations’ thorough elimination of nuclear weapons as a prerequisite for its own elimination of nuclear weapons. The US Nuclear Posture Review Report of 2010 clearly points out that as long as nuclear weapons are still present around the world, the U.S. will maintain a safe, reliable, and effective nuclear arsenal. In January 2012, the U.S.-issued Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st-Century Defense (defense strategic guidebook) reaffirmed this stance. Around the world, the U.S. is the nation having the most nuclear weapons with the most advanced performance, and following this logic, it is self-contradictory to its stated objective of a “nuclear-weapons-free world.” Next, an extremely small number of non-nuclear-weapons states are working hard to develop nuclear weapons. Due to the influence of the international political and economic order, as well as of historical and religious factors, several nations look upon the possession of nuclear weapons as an important means for safeguarding national security, and will try various devices to propel the progress of their respective development of nuclear weapons.

(2) The danger of nuclear world war has dropped, but the essence of nuclear strategy for a nuclear world war has not undergone fundamental change

Since the end of the Cold War, the circumstances of world nuclear confrontation have eased, and the possibility of large-scale nuclear war breaking out has further decreased.
The trait of nuclear weapons as mainly used for deterrence goals is even more prominent, and the scope of the role they bring into play is further concentrated in the directions of halting the outbreak of nuclear war, and safeguarding the state’s core security interests. Nuclear development no longer is in the sharp environment of the nuclear trial of strength among world powers, and the possibility of reducing the scale and quantities of nuclear weapons has somewhat increased. The U.S., on the background of its superiority in conventional military forces continuing [end of page 170] to grow and of accelerated construction on its global missile defense xitong system, will reduce the number of its nuclear weapons and limit the scope of the role played by nuclear weapons, and thus further reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons.

Although the factors which influence the use of nuclear weapons are numerous, the U.S. and Russia, in terms of the problem of “no first use” of nuclear weapons as most able to embody the role of reducing nuclear weapons, have not at all made substantive changes, and still pursue nuclear deterrence strategies established on the basis of first use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons and nuclear forces possessed by the two nations all along have remained in a state of high alert where they can be used at any time for nuclear strikes. The U.S., while reducing the number of its nuclear weapons, has retained and even also reinforced the ability when necessary to rapidly augment its nuclear forces, and increase the manpower, technical resources, and infrastructure for nuclear real strength. Russia is now speeding up the fielding of new types of nuclear-weapon means of delivery and launch platforms, and is implementing renewal and replacement of older generations of missile nuclear weapons. The essence of US and Russian nuclear strategy has not at all undergone fundamental change, and the competition and trial of strength in the nuclear domain continue to be sharply carried out.

(3) The nuclear security circumstances facing China are growing more complex every day

In recent years, the nuclear security circumstances facing China in overall terms are tending toward [greater] complexity. First is that the main object facing China’s nuclear struggle is the nation with the most powerful nuclear real strength in the world. The U.S. regards China as the main strategic opponent; it is speeding up construction of a missile defense system in the East Asian area, and its reliability and effectiveness for executing nuclear counterattack against China constitute an increasingly grave influence. Second is that the number of nations on China’s periphery which have nuclear weapons (or potentially have nuclear weapons) has increased. In 1998, India and Pakistan respectively conducted several nuclear tests, and in one stroke thus strode into the world nuclear states club — in particular, India’s development of nuclear real strength has been swift. After entry into the 21st century, the North Korean nuclear problem has seen continual ferment,
the possibility of thoroughly resolving it within the short term is very small. Third is that the main nations of the world are energetically developing new conventional military capabilities. The U.S. is currently implementing a conventional “rapid global strike” plan, and once it forms a real-combat capability for this, it will be used for executing conventional strikes against our missile nuclear forces. This will put us in a passive position, greatly influence our nuclear counterattack capability, and weaken our nuclear deterrence effectiveness. Fourth is that the external pressure on the development of China’s nuclear forces also will correspondingly increase. The quantitative scale of China’s nuclear weapons is far from being on the same level as that of the U.S. and Russia, and along with the further development of the international nuclear reduction circumstances, the modernization of China’s limited nuclear forces will bear ever greater external pressure.

II. Nuclear deterrence…171

The essential attributes of nuclear weapons have decided that they mainly are a type of deterrent weapons, and the deterrent application is the basic mode of application of nuclear forces. The most important goal in the real-combat application of nuclear forces similarly is the need to increase [end of page 171] the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrence. No matter whether in a nuclear state, a de facto nuclear state, or a nuclear threshold state, its nuclear strategic thought invariably will first be expressed as nuclear deterrence. Hence, nuclear deterrence also is the main pattern of military struggle in the nuclear domain. After World War II, the continuous evolution of nuclear deterrence strategy is very good evidence of this.

(1) Main characteristics of China’s nuclear deterrence

The directed [focused] quality of the objects of deterrence. From the first day it possessed nuclear weapons, China has openly announced and promised that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nations and areas not having nuclear weapons. This then has limited the application of China’s nuclear forces and the objects of nuclear deterrence to nations having nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear deterrence is only directed at nuclear weapons states, and can play a role only in regard to nuclear weapons states.

The limited nature of the deterrence goals. For a long time, the goal of China’s development and application of nuclear weapons has been concentrated in stopping hostile nations from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against us. China’s nuclear deterrence may not be used for deterring nonnuclear hostile military activities, and its role in other nonnuclear military fields is similarly not distinct. Limiting the functional scope of nuclear deterrence to the hostile nuclear activities of other nuclear
states will result in further focusing of China’s nuclear deterrence goals and functional scope.

The defensive nature of the deterrent mode. China pursues a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and only after a hostile state has used nuclear weapons against us can we apply nuclear weapons in self defense. China’s nuclear deterrence is established on the basis of effective counterattack, and the use of real strength able to cause the enemy unsustainable nuclear destruction, as well as its possibility to achieve the goal of deterring the enemy’s nuclear attack, is nuclear deterrence of a defensive nature.

(2) Problems for key point grasp in the application of China’s nuclear deterrence

First is attaching importance to the existential deterrent role of nuclear weapons. Nuclear explosions have immensely strong lethal and destructive effects, but it is difficult for the means of nuclear delivery such as missiles to be completely defended against interception. Thus, as long as one nation possesses nuclear weapons, and has a basic nuclear counterattack capability, then regardless of the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile, it can always generate potential influence on and restriction of the military activity of other nations, and bring into play a role in safeguarding national security interests. This role, based on the essential attributes of nuclear weapons, and not arising from significant changes in the scale of nuclear forces or from the strength or weakness of their actual capability, is precisely the existential deterrent role of nuclear weapons. China’s earliest decision to develop nuclear weapons aimed at smashing the nuclear blackmail and nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers, and was a typical existential deterrent strategy. Its later development of nuclear weapons similarly followed the understanding of “if you have something, we also will have it,” as well as of “the presence of nuclear weapons in itself is a deterrent.” Under the new historic conditions, even better bringing into play [end of page 172] the existential deterrent role of nuclear weapons, and containing nuclear threats and the outbreak of nuclear war, still are the basic objectives of national strategy and nuclear military struggle. They require establishing the idea of “united building and use,” and placing nuclear deterrence within the process of nuclear force building and development. This requires continuing to uphold the principle of “small but streamlined” in nuclear forces development, and placing the key points of nuclear force building on conscientious boosting of nuclear counterattack capability.

Second is upholding the retaliatory deterrence train of thought expressed in “using nuclear to contain nuclear.” The lethal and destructive force of the nuclear weapons controlled by the powers has almost reached the limit of human capability, and only when they are used to respond to the gravest security threats, at critical moments with the
very existence of the state in question, can the deterrent role truly be credible and effective. Nuclear war threats to any nation always are the most extreme and gravest security threats, and “using nuclear to contain nuclear” is a rational choice for effectively bringing into play the role of nuclear weapons. Viewed from another aspect, nuclear destruction — in terms of any nation — always will be something difficult to bear, and a nuclear weapons state which is first to use nuclear weapons is certain to suffer nuclear retaliation from its adversary. The best method for avoiding the aftermath of a disastrous nuclear strike is for both sides not to be first to use nuclear weapons, and thus halt the occurrence of nuclear war. Mao Zedong and other older generation of revolutionaries and strategists profoundly recognized that the essence and laws of the nuclear weapons role lie in the practice of nuclear military struggle of the hegemonic nations, established the retaliatory deterrence train of thought of “using nuclear to contain nuclear,” and thus correctly and effectively guided China’s practice of nuclear deterrence. Halting the outbreak of a future nuclear war still is the strategic objective for the presence and application of China’s nuclear forces. This requires unshakable persistence in the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and enhancement of the practical results of nuclear counterattack, to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.

Third is a cautious grasp of nuclear deterrence tactics. China’s nuclear forces, regardless of their quantitative scale or technical levels, still show a fairly large gap in comparison to those of the world’s [two largest] nuclear powers, the U.S. and Russia. China’s persistence in the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons pursues a self-defense defensive nuclear strategy. A cautious grasp of nuclear deterrence tactics has important significance for boosting China’s nuclear deterrence effectiveness. First is moderate ambiguity. The military thought has the orientation of according with important matters and not lesser matters, and keeping grounded in the most difficult and most complex situations. Maintaining moderate ambiguity in nuclear deterrence issues causes the adversary to guess at China’s nuclear real strength and at the timing and scale of China’s nuclear counterattack; this may increase the degree of difficulty in the adversary’s decision-making, and contributes to elevating the deterrent effectiveness of China’s limited nuclear forces. Second is expansion of the train of thought. This means centering on the objective of making the strategic opponent truly believe in and truly fear [China’s nuclear forces], and working out an approach for the nuclear deterrence tactics. Issuing the same statements high and low usually can enhance the deterrent effects, but sometimes having different persons issue different statements can yield even better deterrent effects. [This involves] setting out from the actual circumstances of nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterattack; seeing that the different activities, different means, and different tactics are adjusted-coordinated and complementary; and thus truly transmitting [end of page 173] the powerful resolve of China to resolutely execute nuclear counterattack. Third is seizing time opportunities. For information on nuclear real
strength and for information on the resolve for using nuclear real strength, the timing of transmission should be somewhat different. The transmission of information on nuclear real strength is primarily in peacetime, and in synchrony with the development of nuclear force building. After clearly stating the hostile relations, the main thing in imminent battle or wartime transmission then is information on the resolve for using nuclear forces. The application of nuclear deterrence tactics must adapt to this characteristic of the transmission of deterrent information. Fourth is applying the tactics according to the circumstances. The actual effects of nuclear deterrence are directly dependent on the deterred side’s awareness and understanding of the nuclear deterrence information. The same holds for real strength and the resolve for use of real strength: against different objects of deterrence, or against the same object of deterrence under different circumstances, the deterrent effects actually produced similarly will not be the same. Nuclear deterrence and deterrent tactics must change with variation in the object and in accord with the circumstances, and strictly avoid always following the same pattern. On the basis of fully considering many factors and conditions — the character, psychology, and degree of rationalness of the decision-makers on the deterred side; the adversary’s political tizhi system, decision-making mechanisms, value tixi system, and tradition of social change; and the influence of the masses on decision-making, plus the informationized levels of society, and the degree of national integrated-whole prosperity — [we should] select the corresponding deterrence mode, deterrent intensity, and deterrence tactics, and strive to have a tactic for each nation, a tactic for each event, and a tactic for each circumstance {势 shi}. Under the circumstances of the complex nuclear security environment facing China and the increasing multidimensionality {多源 duoyuan} of the objects of nuclear deterrence, reinforcing the flexibility and directed [focused] quality of the nuclear deterrence tactics seems especially necessary.

III. Nuclear real combat…174

In the current era, the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war in human society — and in particular, large-scale nuclear war — has already greatly decreased in comparison to the Cold War era. However, as long as nuclear weapons are still present around the world, the possibility of real-combat use of nuclear weapons cannot be completely excluded. Around the world, most nuclear states so far have still not promised no first use of nuclear weapons, and first use of nuclear weapons still is an important choice for other nuclear strategies. Along with the development of science and technology [S&T], the boundaries between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons have blurred, and the possibility of future informationized conventional war developing into nuclear war still remains.
Nuclear real combat includes two main patterns: preemptive nuclear strike and reactive nuclear strike. The most important objective of nuclear real combat is to boost nuclear deterrence effectiveness, to halt the outbreak of nuclear war. When nuclear deterrence truly fails, then real-combat use of nuclear weapons [must] strive to achieve the war goals. Under modern conditions, nuclear real combat still is the core link in military struggle in the nuclear domain. In China’s persistence in the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and in its pursuit of a self-defense defensive nuclear strategy, the real-combat application of China’s nuclear forces is in retaliatory nuclear counterattack. Thus, within strategic practice, [we] should place the key points on grasping the following basic principles. [end of page 174]

Centralized command, with unified operations-research-based planning. Nuclear counterattack activities belong to major strategic activities, and have the maximum influence on the safety of the state and on the strategic overall situation. For the major problems involved in nuclear counterattack, decision power must be concentrated at the supreme decision-making level. At the same time, nuclear counterattack involves a wide range of aspects, and requires unified jiuhua planning, to achieve close adjusting-coordination and complementation between nuclear forces and conventional forces, and between nuclear counterattack and political struggle and diplomatic struggle. Under circumstances of encountering an enemy nuclear raid, the Second Artillery Corps and sea-based strategic nuclear force will be faced with enormous danger of suffering heavy casualties. This requires integrated-whole working-out-an-approach in planning; concentrated, unified employment of all surviving, even more limited nuclear forces; adjusting-coordination of the strike objectives and strike timing for the different nuclear forces, to fully bring into play their integrated-whole effectiveness; and striving to achieve the proper effects of a nuclear counterattack, to realize the strategic objectives of nuclear counterattack.

Rigorous protection, to ensure survival. Ensuring survival under conditions where nuclear forces have encountered an enemy nuclear raid is a basic prerequisite for executing retaliatory nuclear counterattack. Defensive operations are critical links and important components of nuclear counterattack operations. When the enemy executes a preemptive nuclear strike against us, our nuclear forces are the targets of first choice for the enemy strike. In wartime, [we] must fully grasp the enemy situation, and in particular the dynamic state of the enemy nuclear forces; timely and accurately issue early warning information; and command the nuclear forces in properly carrying out the corresponding protective preparations. [We must] conduct multi-position, multi-point operations and maneuver operations, and as much as possible stop the enemy from accurately grasping our launching locations. When the conditions are present and it is necessary, under circumstances of truly ascertaining that the enemy has already launched nuclear missiles
against us, and before the enemy nuclear payloads have reached their targets and effectively exploded, and thus before they have caused actual nuclear damage to us, [we] can rapidly launch a nuclear missile counterattack. This approach not only complies with China’s consistent policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, but also can effectively avoid even greater losses to our nuclear forces, and boost the survival and counterattack capability of the nuclear missile forces.

Key point counterattack, with emphasis on actual results. In order to fully bring into play nuclear counterattack effectiveness, [we] should execute key point strikes, by concentrating limited forces in strikes on vital site targets which the enemy most fears will be struck, which our side has the capability to strike, and which have a major influence on the strategic overall situation. The nuclear strike objectives are mainly divided into two types, viz., military targets and urban targets. Strikes on military targets may be fairly beneficial in political respects, can gain the initiative in military respects, and are beneficial to controlling the war situation; but they have stricter requirements on the numbers of nuclear weapons, on hit precision, and on damage effectiveness. In order to effectively destroy the adversary’s nuclear forces, it is often required to execute a preemptive nuclear strike, which usually is the choice of nuclear powers pursuing an offensive nuclear strategy. Strikes on urban targets can create enormous disruption of the enemy’s society and large numbers of casualties among personnel, and generate intense shock effect; at the same time, their requirements on the scale of the nuclear strike forces, on the performance of the nuclear weapons, and on the nuclear strike timing are relatively low, so this approach can be adopted both by the nuclear powers and by nations with a limited nuclear strike capability. China’s nuclear forces scale and capability, as well as nuclear weapons performance, all show fairly large gaps compared to the nuclear powers, so China’s execution of nuclear counterattack [end of page 175] should lay even more stress on meticulous selection of targets and key point strikes, to boost the real results.

Moderateness in advance and retreat, with seizure of the initiative. In developing nuclear real-combat capability and carrying out nuclear real-combat preparations, the most important goals are to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, and to halt the outbreak of nuclear war. In order to boost nuclear deterrence effectiveness and to conduct activities for nuclear real-combat preparations, if the degree of control is immoderate, then on the background of interaction in the enemy and friendly sides’ confrontation, such control could contrarily propel an escalation of the nuclear confrontation, and ultimately could set off nuclear conflict. In the deterrence process, we should organize nuclear counterattack preparations centering on displaying our firm resolve to execute nuclear counterattack; and the nuclear forces’ specific preparations activity and readiness state must be driven by the enemy’s actions, without any initiative to elevate the intensity of the enemy and friendly sides’ nuclear confrontation. When executing nuclear
counterattack, [we] not only must be able to cause the adversary unsustainable damage effects, and to awe the adversary, but at the same time also must control the counterattack intensity, tempo, and scope of objectives, not take winning of a nuclear war as the goal, and avoid forming a situation of mutual attack {duigong} with the adversary.

IV. Nuclear arms control and disarmament…176

Nuclear arms control and disarmament signify the limitation and reduction carried out by states or international organizations on research, testing, production, disposition, use, and transfer of nuclear weapons systems, or on the scale of nuclear forces. This includes the following content: prohibiting nuclear testing, halting nuclear proliferation, conducting nuclear inspections, implementing nuclear transparency and nuclear-domain confidence building measures, and limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. Of these, the limitation or reduction of nuclear weapons mass and quantities is the core.

After the emergency of nuclear weapons, the associated nations unfolded a struggle centering on nuclear arms control and disarmament. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union continually launched nuclear arms races, causing the two sides to amass more and more nuclear weapons; this not only created heavy economic burdens, but also aggravated the nuclear confrontation, and increased the instability in the nuclear situation. In the final stage of the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union strengthened cooperation on nuclear arms control and disarmament issues, and realized several substantive advances. After the Cold War ended, the U.S. and Russia also concluded many agreements on nuclear arms control and disarmament, the mass of the two sides’ nuclear weapons was limited to a certain extent, and the quantities were significantly reduced. Nuclear arms control and disarmament increasingly received the attention of international society.

On one hand, nuclear arms control and disarmament have an active role in maintaining strategic stability, halting the outbreak of nuclear war, limiting the scale of nuclear war, reducing nuclear war’s destruction, and saving on military spending. This is the main driving force and basic reason behind the constant advance of nuclear arms control and disarmament over a worldwide scope. On the other hand, nuclear arms control and disarmament also are an important means by which nuclear states — and in particular the nuclear powers — contend for and maintain their own nuclear superiority and strategic superiority, and limit and weaken the nuclear capability of their strategic opponents. [end of page 176] No matter whether during the Cold War or after the Cold War ended, the struggle centering on nuclear arms control and disarmament has always been very sharp. Although international nuclear arms control and disarmament constantly advances, the process nonetheless has been tortuous, and the progress slow.
China all along has maintained an active attitude toward nuclear arms control and disarmament issues, and starting in the 1960s, when China first had nuclear weapons, it has worked hard to ultimately realize the objectives of comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons within a global scope. Since the 1980s, China has actively participated in international nuclear disarmament activity, and has brought into play a unique role, to become an important driving force in international arms control and disarmament. Since the end of the Cold War, along with the constant development of the US-Russian nuclear disarmament process, China has been faced with constantly increasing pressure for nuclear transparency and nuclear disarmament, and the circumstances of the struggle facing China in nuclear arms control and disarmament have become ever more complex; moreover, the position of nuclear arms control and disarmament within military struggle in the nuclear domain has become increasingly prominent.

China has consistently advocated and upheld the following: all nuclear weapons states should work hard toward comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and openly promise not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons; nuclear arms control and disarmament should abide by the principles of maintaining international strategic stability and ensuring that no nation’s security is reduced; states having the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and precedential responsibility for nuclear disarmament, and their permitted adoption of nuclear inspection and [other] irreversible modes, as well as those having legally constraining force, to greatly reduce their own nuclear arsenals, is a necessary condition for ultimately realizing comprehensive, thorough nuclear disarmament; when conditions mature, other nuclear weapons states also should enter into the process of multilateral nuclear disarmament talks; and before the comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear weapons states should renounce their nuclear deterrence policies based on first use of nuclear weapons, promise at any time and under any circumstances to not be first to use nuclear weapons, and unconditionally refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states or against nuclear-weapons-free areas.

China’s conduct of the nuclear arms control and disarmament struggle must involve a key point grasp of the following several points.

First is safeguarding [state] interests, with unified operations-research-based planning {tongchou} of participation. According to the standards and requirements for benefitting the safeguarding of state security and development interests, [we will] select and determine the modes, methods, steps, and tactics for the nuclear arms control and disarmament struggle, and integrate {zhenghe} into an organic, unified integrated whole.
all of the contents included in arms control and disarmament, plus all factors involved, all forces participating, all influences produced, and all roles brought into play.

Second is active promotion, with prudent gaming. Nuclear arms control and disarmament are important directions in world nuclear military development; they conform to the tide of the times, and also are consistent with China’s nuclear policy and nuclear weapons development objectives, as well as conforming to the overall requirements of national peaceful development. We must actively make the proper efforts toward nuclear arms control and disarmament, and assume the proper responsibilities. At the same time, China’s nuclear forces are relatively small and weak, [end of page 177] its nuclear foundation is fairly weak, and the influence of nuclear arms control and disarmament on national nuclear real strength is fairly significant. Hence, in terms of the specific operations in nuclear arms control and disarmament practice, [we] must be very prudent; when the timing is not ripe, the conditions not present, the grasp of the adversary’s motives not accurate, or the aftermath of activities difficult to forecast, [we] must not go off the deep end.

Third is the state taking the lead, with multisided cooperation. Nuclear arms control and disarmament are games or trials of strength between one state and another, and between states and international society, and bear on national security and national image; they also are important components of state diplomacy, and belong to the state’s bedrock-layer strategic activity. Nuclear arms control and disarmament cover a broad range of aspects, and involve many departments and fields; they should be implemented under the unified guidance of the state at the bedrock level, involve a grasp of and operations-research-based planning for the overall situation, and achieve adjusting-coordination of the unified activities of the correlated domains — diplomatic, armed forces, and industrial — and their departments and institutions, so as to fully bring into play the roles of the officers and men, research institutions, and scholars in all respects, thus forming composite strength.

Fourth is seizing opportunities, to lay the foundation. At present and for a time to come, international nuclear arms control and disarmament mainly will still be a struggle between the two nations fielding the most nuclear weapons: the U.S. and Russia. Nuclear real strength is the foundation for carrying out the nuclear arms control and disarmament struggle, but China’s nuclear real strength is still relatively weak, and shows a fairly large gap from the real needs and requirements of safeguarding state security and the requirements of future military struggle. We should leverage development to seek the initiative, seize time opportunities to lay the foundation for future participation in the process of substantive nuclear arms control and disarmament, and progressively gain the initiative in the nuclear arms control and disarmament struggle.
Fifth is flexible application of tactics, to ease the pressure. In the nuclear arms control and disarmament process, all nations from the standpoint of safeguarding their own security and interests will determine the stances correlated to their homelands, and will adopt the corresponding activities. Between the U.S. and Russia, between the nuclear powers and the weaker nuclear states, and between nuclear states and de facto nuclear states, as well as nuclear threshold states, in regard to the specific issues of nuclear arms control and disarmament, it will be difficult to avoid possibly very great divergences of views, and the international arms control and disarmament field is full of contradictions. We should maintain flexibility and a directed [focused] quality in tactics, excel at easing the various types of pressures faced in the nuclear arms control and disarmament process, and actively build the corresponding favorable posture.

Section 2: Military Struggle in the Space Domain…178

Space, also called outer space,\textsuperscript{55} signifies the scope of the cosmos above 100 km from sea level on earth. [end of page 178] Since 1957, when the Soviet Union launched the world’s first artificial earth satellite, the struggle unfolded by different nations (groups) centering on exploitation of space, being on guard against space security threats, seeking space superiority, and contending for space dominance has never ceased. Entering the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, military struggle in the space domain became even sharper, and its position and role within the national strategic overall situation have constantly risen. The development of space forces \{kongjian liliang\}, and in particular military space forces \{junshi hangtian liliang\}, already has become an important foundation for pulling China’s economic and S&T development, and protecting the safety of our space assets. The development of space forces also consolidates and boosts our strategic deterrence capability; ensures an important brace-support \{zhicheng\} for the expansion of state interests; and is of important significance for building informationized armed forces, for winning informationized wars, and for propelling the PLA’s strategic transformation.

I. Main characteristics of military struggle in the space domain…179

(1) The influence of the struggle is extremely wide-ranging

Along with the constant development and wide-ranging application of space technology, the ties between space and the practice and activity of production and scientific research

\textsuperscript{55} According to Chinese People’s Liberation Army [CPLA] Military Terms, the outer layers of space \{waiweng kongjian\} are called outer space \{talikong\}, but in many situations “space” \{kongjian\} also specially signifies outer space. For example, the “space” used in the terms for space weapons and space station directly signifies outer space.
in human society are becoming closer every day. The normal operation of social activity and the social system is more and more reliant on the support \{zhichi\} of space xitong systems; space systems have become the basic brace-support for the Information Age and the Information Society, and the influence of space activity on the military field is even more significant. Along with the development of the form-state of war under informationized conditions, information is increasingly becoming the leading factor. The organizing and unfolding of operational activity and the boosting and release of operational effectiveness all are highly dependent on information support.\(^\text{56}\) The information strength and weakness comparison decides the selection of operational methods and the changes in operational forms, and directly influences victory or defeat in war. The military intelligence information of the world space powers mainly comes from space systems. The space activity of nations around the world, as well as their spacecraft operating in orbit, is mostly used for military goals. Based on this wide-ranging quality and profoundness in the role and influence of space, the world’s main nations competitively contend for the space battlefield, and rush to capture these commanding heights. The strategic position of military struggle in the space domain is even more prominent.

(2) The space of the struggle is extremely vast

Military struggle in the space domain covers all areas (zones) associated with human space activity. At present, human space activity and the various types of spacecraft are mainly concentrated in the space area (zone) below 40,000 km from the ground, and this area (zone) is the main site for military struggle in the space domain. Moreover, the launch of spacecraft, the transmission of space information, and the firing of space weapons all require penetrating the atmosphere. The atmosphere acts as the channel linking the earth with the spatial area (zone), and occupies an important position within the space attack and defense confrontation. Spacecraft operate in space orbit, but their research and development [R&D], testing, launch, command and control [C2], and assisting support and safeguarding support \{zhiyuan baozhang\} \(\text{end of page 179}\) activity basically are always carried out on the earth. The earth is the basic backing for human space activity, and the “root” of the spacecraft operating in orbit is on Earth. In sum, military struggle in the space domain covers vast areas (zones) from the cosmos at tens of thousands of km from the Earth to the Earth’s surface, with many areas (zones) forming an organic whole. Space military struggle also has thus become a synthesis of

\(^{56}\) Translator’s note: unless otherwise indicated, all “support” in this chapter is safeguarding support \{baozhang\}. 
many types of correlated military activity, including space to space, space to ground, and ground to ground.

(3) The struggle is growing sharper day by day

Along with the constant development of S&T and the constant deepening of people’s reliance on outer space, the military contention and struggle centering on space is growing sharper every day. Around the world, the U.S. is the nation with the most powerful space real strength, and approximately one-half of the spacecraft effectively operating today belong to the U.S. In recent years, the U.S., via a series of measures and methods — adjusting its space policy, issuing and implementing new space development plans, increasing its investment in space, conducting R&D and testing of new space-warfare weapons systems, perfecting space operational theory, and holding space operational exercises — has consolidated its superior position in space, with the intention of further opening up its lead over other nations in the space domain, so as to effectively control outer space. Russia, as an old hand among the space powers, is similarly unwilling to lag behind in space development. Russia has already determined that space is a key point in military development, and along with improvement in its economic circumstances, it continues to increase investment to accelerate the recovery of its space capability, and assume and return to the powerful development momentum of the position of a space power as in past days. Several nations or regional organizations, including the European Space Agency, India, Japan, and Brazil, already have a firm foothold in the space domain and have built a certain foundation; they too are accelerating the degree of force in space development, with the intention of capturing relatively favorable locations in the military struggle for space. Moreover, a group of other nations — South Korea, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan — having a certain comprehensive real strength but not yet entering outer space also are successively initiating their own space development plans, boldly driving on toward outer space, and hoping to be able to carve out a niche in outer space. The circumstances of space military struggle are assuming the complex situation of the U.S. in the lead, other space powers (or organizations) following up one after another, and a number of nations currently working hard to enter [outer space]. Military struggle in the space domain — and in particular the contention centering on dominancy {zhudaoquan} in space — is thus growing sharper day by day.

(4) The restrictions from economic and S&T factors are significant

Outer space is a special area (zone) with distinct differences from the earth’s surface and the atmosphere. Sending spacecraft into outer space, implementing effective telemetry, tracking and control [TT&C] of spacecraft, carrying out space military confrontation, and
exploiting space means to achieve certain political and military goals, all have very high S&T thresholds, and quite significantly are influenced by S&T. The composition of space systems often is very complex, and the building of space systems and the development of space capability require the investment of large quantities of financial resources, material resources, and manpower. They have the typical features of high investment, high risk, and high benefit, and their reliance on national economic real strength is very high. At the same time, the requirements on space systems building, on the integrated-whole quality of systems in space activity, and on a coordinated quality are unusually strict. Only by applying advanced management science, and having very strong unified operations-research-based planning and management capability, can one effectively organize the correlated essential factors and associated departments, so that all parts are closely complemented and adjusted-coordinated in operation, to realize building of space capability, and order and high efficiency in space activity. A nation’s capability and levels in space military struggle often can objectively reflect that nation’s comprehensive real strength. The strength and weakness comparison of economic real strength and S&T levels always can have a significant influence on that nation’s selection of objectives and modes in space military struggle, as well as on the ultimate results of the struggle.

II. Basic types of military struggle in the space domain…181

(1) Space information assisting support

Space information assisting support signifies information assisting support and safeguarding support activity which exploits a space information system composed of multiple types of satellites, including reconnaissance and early warning and navigational positioning, to provide space reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning, communication relay, navigation, and positioning for friendly units and military activities in land, naval, and air operations. Space information system building all along has been a key point in the building of space forces in nations around the world. The various types of military satellites operating in orbit today almost all are used for providing space information assisting support. Space information assisting support is now, and for quite a long period to come will be, the main mode for the application of space forces among the various nations. Stopping the friendly space information system from encountering jamming or sabotage, to ensure its normal effective operation, and at the same time when necessary jamming and sabotaging the adversary’s space information system, to degrade its system operating effectiveness, are important content in military struggle in the space domain.
(2) Space deterrence

Space deterrence, also called outer space deterrence, is deterrence implemented by means of space military forces. The reason why space systems and space military forces can be used for the goal of deterrence and generate significant deterrent effects, is closely correlated to the rapid development and wide-ranging application of space technology, as well as its far-reaching influence. Due to human daily life, the operating of society, and the unfolding of military activity, there is an ever greater reliance on assisting support and safeguarding support by space systems, and human society has ever greater difficulty bearing the grave aftermath when space systems fail to work, become disordered, and are incapacitated. The means and activity which potentially can cause jamming and sabotage of the normal operation of space systems, even if they do not cause actual sabotage, still can create psychological fear to a certain extent, and have an influence on national decision-makers and the associated strategic decision-making activity. Space systems mainly [end of page 181] provide space information assisting support for friendly military activity, and prevent or block the adversary’s jamming and sabotage, to ensure the normal operation of friendly space systems. This completely conforms to the deterrent mechanism of “blocking the adversary from doing a certain thing” in order to maintain the current state. These traits of space military activity have decided that deterrence is a basic pattern of space military struggle.

One of the most basic functions of space systems is the ability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance [R&S] of the enemy, control the adversary’s military movements, and reduce the concealment and element of surprise in the adversary’s activities, while at the same time also being able to significantly enhance the effectiveness of friendly military activities, so that the friendly side holds a certain initiative and superiority within the military confrontation. This certainly will influence the adversary’s military decision-making, and reduce the possibility of the adversary’s initiative-based adoption of military activities, so that the adversary dares not act rashly and blindly. Even in a relatively peaceful period, under circumstances where a hostile relationship is unclear, the presence and development of one side’s space systems, and the boosting of its space capability, still can potentially influence and constrain the military activity of other nations and generate a certain deterrent effect.

Space military systems serve as the commanding heights of the modern military field, and are certain to be key point targets of the opposing sides’ attack and defense confrontation. In order to effectively contain the space hostile activity of other nations, and prevent friendly space systems from suffering attack and sabotage, while reinforcing the building of space protection capability, [we] also must in a directed [focused] manner develop certain space offensive means and capability, and when necessary reveal the
capability to cause substantive sabotage of and adversely influence the adversary’s space systems, as well as reveal the firm resolve to dare to and prepare to use this capability, thus creating certain psychological pressure on and fear in the adversary, and forcing the adversary to dare not conduct space operations with initiative. When necessary, [we] even can conduct limited space operational activities with warning and punishment as goals, to stop the adversary from willfully escalating the intensity of a space confrontation.

Space deterrence not only can be a process and an activity, but also can be a status and a posture. Prior to combat and even in the course of war, [we] can implement space deterrence, and space deterrence is also present in peaceful periods. The application of space means and space forces in directed [focused] fashion can generate significant deterrent effects, and the normal building and development activity for space means and capability also can produce certain deterrent effects.

(3) Space attack and defense operations

Space attack and defense operations are [a type of] direct military confrontation activity carried out mainly in outer space by the opposing sides. Space warfare takes military space forces as the main operational strengths, takes the opposing sides’ direct attack and defense as the basic form of expression, and takes seizing and maintaining dominance of outer space over a certain scope and within a certain time as the basic goal. It is the form of space-domain military struggle sharpest in confrontation and highest in intensity. [end of page 182]

Up to the present, although the space military activity of the world’s main nations still takes providing space-information assisting support and safeguarding support as primary, nonetheless along with the development of space technology, the trend of development of space military struggle in the direction of space attack and defense operations is becoming more evident every day. Since the entry into the 21st century, the U.S. has clearly put forth the military objective of control of outer space, and has made preparations for building full-time space attack units; it has also formulated space operations plans, and repeatedly held space warfare exercises. The U.S. is now conducting R&D and testing of a group of weapons systems used for conducting space attack and defense operations; its R&D on the X-37B aerospace plane and other space weapons has already realized breakthrough-quality advances, and its capability for executing missile interception in outer space is gradually maturing. Russia has adopted a series of measures, including reorganization of its air and space defensive forces, to respond to fairly large-scale aerospace wars which can occur in the future.
Any attack executed with space systems as the means, including an attack on a space system, as well as resistance to the enemy’s attack on a space system, always belongs to space attack and defense operations. According to the attack and defense operations area (zone), space attack and defense operations can be divided into operations using the ground (air) to control space, space-to-space attack and defense operations, and operations with space attacks against ground (or aerial) [targets]. Based on the weapons employed and on the characteristics of the operational activities, space attack and defense operations can be divided into the following: satellite attack and defense operations, including the use of ground-based, air-based, and space-based weapons and platforms to attack enemy satellites and to conduct protective activities for friendly satellites; space anti-missile operations, i.e., operations using space-based laser weapons or kinetic energy weapon [KEWs] to intercept and destroy enemy missiles passing through outer space; space operational platform attack and defense warfare, i.e., offensive and defensive operations conducted against space operational platforms by exploiting weapons systems on space delivery platforms, such as aerospace planes and space stations; and space-based attack operations against ground (air) [targets], i.e., operations which fire laser, particle-beam, or KEWs from space operational platforms to attack and destroy enemy targets situated on the ground (sea surface) or in the air.

(4) Struggle centering on non-weaponization of outer space

The weaponization of outer space is the process of the development and disposition of space weapons used for directly attacking enemy targets. Military needs all along have been the main driving force in humankind’s development of space capability. For more than half a century, among the thousands of spacecraft launched into outer space by the space powers — the U.S. and Soviet Union (Russia) — most have been used for military goals. The militarization of space is an uncontestable fact. Up to the present, the military application of space systems basically has only been realized via the mode of providing space information assisting support and safeguarding support — reconnaissance, early warning, communication, and positioning — for the various types of military activity of friendly ground (sea) and air operations units, and has indirectly participated in operations by bringing into play a role in multiplying the effectiveness of the ground (air) operational strengths. However, along with the development of space technology, some nations, in order to [end of page 183] control outer space, and to seize and maintain an even more favorable space warfare posture, have initiated R&D and disposition of space weapons which can be directly used for attacking enemy targets. These include weapons from outer space attacking space, ground, air, or sea targets, and weapons from space, ground, sea, or air attacking space targets. Space systems have begun to develop in the direction of direct participation in attack and defense operations, so the trend of the weaponization of outer space has emerged.
The weaponization of space usually has seizing and maintaining space dominance as the objective, and has unusually strict requirements on a nation’s comprehensive real strength, and in particular on its space technology. Thus, the weaponization of space mainly is pulled by the positions and development directions of those space powers which already have fairly clear space superiority. Moreover, a nation’s determination to propel and implement the weaponization of space is certain to induce directed [focused] reactions from other nations, lead to an arms race in the space domain, trigger tension and instability in relations among areas and nations, and influence international security. The weaponization of space will change space into a real battlefield, and gravely worsen the space environment. The presence of large quantities of space debris and space trash constitutes a serious threat to all types of spacecraft operating in space. The vast majority of nations worldwide oppose the weaponization of space and a space arms race, and different nations have unfolded a sharp struggle centering on the issue of non-weaponization of space.

The U.S., as the nation with the most advanced space technology and strongest space capability around the world, on one hand ensures other nations that it may not carry out weaponization of space, while on the other hand it constantly actually propels the progress of its space weaponization. The U.S., since it does not agree on treating missiles traveling through outer space as space weapons, and persists in holding that talks on space weapons issues may involve spacecraft such as satellites and space shuttles, has taken the inability to define space weapons and the non-presence of a space arms race as grounds for the lack of a need to carry out talks on the correlated issues, and thus for a long time has opposed carrying out talks on prohibiting an outer-space arms race.

The Chinese Government has consistently advocated the peaceful use of outer space, opposed the weaponization of space and the space arms race, and has made enormous efforts in this regard, as well as carrying out resolute struggle. In February 2008, China and Russia jointly presented to the [UN] Conference on Disarmament a draft proposal for a Treaty Banning the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, and the Use or Threat of Use of Armed Force Against Objects in Space. In August 2009, China and Russia jointly presented a working document responding to the issues and comments raised by all parties in the Conference on Disarmament on the Sino-Russian space treaty, and made active efforts to unfold talks on this draft treaty with all parties at an early date, and to conclude a new outer space treaty.

III. Strategic guidance for military struggle in the space domain…184

[We] must focus on safeguarding national space security; keep grounded in the basic characteristics and development trends of military struggle in the space domain; [end of
and scientifically determine the integrated-whole objectives, mode of struggle, and principles of force building for military struggle in the space domain.

(1) Taking as the objectives ensuring the safety of national space systems, and effectively safeguarding national space rights and interests

The objectives of military struggle in the space domain embody the state’s basic pursuits of space interests within a certain period, reflect the basic orientation of space struggle and the development of space capability, and have an overall-situation-quality leading role in military struggle in the space domain. The determination of the objectives for military struggle in the space domain requires synthetic [comprehensive] consideration for multiple factors: the nature of the state, the strategic objectives of the state, national economic and S&T levels, and the foundation of national space capability, as well as the space real-strength comparison with the main opponent. For different nations or for the same nation in different periods, the objectives of their (its) space military struggle may not be the same. Generally speaking, nations which seek world hegemony, pursue absolute security in space, and have a high degree of reliance on space and a strong space capability, often takes the control of space, and when necessary the limiting and even stripping away of other nations’ rights to use space, as the objectives for their space military struggle, and the objectives of their space military struggle usually bear a distinct expansionary quality, offensive quality, and exclusiveness.

China is a socialist state; it pursues a defensive national defense policy and a military strategy of active defense, advocates peaceful use of outer space, and persists in holding that each nation has an equal right to open-up develop and exploit outer space. China’s lawful rights and interests in outer space are mainly expressed as space systems not subject to hostile sabotage and operating normally, and able to provide the proper space assisting support and safeguarding support for socioeconomic and military activity. The overall objectives of China’s space military struggle are — under conditions of not harming other states’ rights and interests and security — to ensure the safety of space systems, and to safeguard the state’s lawful rights and interests in the space domain. China’s military struggle in the space domain has distinct features of a defensive quality and non-exclusive nature: it takes ensuring the homeland’s space rights and interests and space security as the starting point and home point for the struggle, does not take the initiative to infringe upon the space rights and interests of other states, and does not seek space hegemony; via development and not attack, China adopts the mode of benefitting itself while not harming others, to exercise the homeland’s lawful space rights, and ensure space security; and only when another state conscientiously infringes upon China’s space rights and interests and causes harm to national space security, may China implement space deterrence against the enemy, and launch a space counterattack. In the
space domain, what China still follows is the principle of we will not attack unless we are attacked.

(2) Scientific unified operations-research-based planning for the various patterns of struggle, to bring into play integrated-whole effectiveness

Laying stress on space information assisting support. The provision of space information assisting support and safeguarding support is a basic function of space systems, and also is the main pattern and core of military struggle in the space domain. Space deterrence, space [end of page 185] attack and defense operations, and other types of space military struggle basically all unfold by centering on the enemy and friendly sides’ space-information assisting support and safeguarding support systems, and take as the main goal ensuring that the space systems’ assisting support and safeguarding support functions are not influenced. Compared to the world space powers, China’s space-information assisting support systems are still not perfected; their role as “multipliers” of military capability has still not been fully brought into play, and they still show a significant gap from the requirements for winning informationized war. In the military struggle in the space domain, China must lay stress on this key point of space information assisting support and safeguarding support, and by perfecting and developing space-information assisting support systems thus drive the integrated-whole development of China’s space capability, and leverage a significant boost in space-information assisting support effectiveness to gain a position of initiative for China’s space military struggle.

Attaching importance to space deterrence. [This means] constantly enhancing space deterrence capability; grasping space deterrence mechanisms; innovating the space deterrence modes; upholding the principle of focusing on containment and control, comprehensive balance, and containing deterrence in momentum {yushe yushi}; regarding containing of the enemy’s intention and actions to harm our space rights and interests and threaten our space security as the basic objectives of deterrence; and synthetically applying space attack and defense forces and other military and nonmilitary means to form integrated-whole composite strength for strategic deterrence. This lays stress on developing space capability, displaying an asymmetric operational posture, and when necessary firmly resolving to conduct space counter-preemption operations {fanzhi zuozhan}, to achieve the deterrence goals. At the same time, [we] must carefully adopt the mode of warning/demonstrative {jingshixing} space hard destruction, to prevent losing control of the situation and prevent escalation of the confrontation. In peacetime, [space deterrence] is used for containing space crises, maintaining peace and stability in the space domain, and elevating the position of the state in the space domain. Before war and during war, it is used for deterring enemy space harassing attacks and wartime risk-taking, so that other states dare not lightly jam and sabotage our space systems, and to
ensure the normal operation of our space systems, as well as to control the enemy’s influence within a limited scope which our side can accept, and effectively safeguard our space security.

Not excluding necessary space attack and defense operations. While reinforcing the building of space information assisting support capability and attaching importance to the application of space deterrence, [this means] conscientiously and properly carrying out the preparations for the space attack and defense operations, and when necessary resolutely conducting the space attack and defense operations. First is using space attack and defense operations to boost space deterrence effectiveness. Space deterrence is, in the present phase, the main mode for safeguarding China’s space rights and interests, so space attack and defense operations first of all must be able to meet the needs and requirements of space deterrence, and contribute to the boosting of space deterrence effectiveness. [We] should on this basis specifically guihua plan and conduct the space attack and defense operations. Second is carefully grasping the timing for launch [of these operations]. In general, [we] should not take initiative to escalate a space confrontation posture, and not carry out direct space attack and defense confrontation with the powerful enemy. Only under circumstances where the space deterrence is of no avail and where our space systems encounter enemy harassing attacks or are faced with space strikes can [we] consider conducting space counterattack operations against the enemy. Third is trying our best to avoid engaging in an all-around space confrontation with the powerful enemy. The space basic posture where the enemy is strong and we are weak has decided that our side should not engage in an all-around space confrontation with the powerful enemy. [end of page 186] [We] can focus on the characteristics of the space systems being easy to attack and difficult to defend, and of the enemy’s even greater reliance on space systems; select attacks against the critical node targets of the enemy space systems; and sabotage {poji} the enemy space operational system of systems [SoS] {tixi}.

Continuing to carry out firm struggle against acts of space weaponization. Space weaponization where individual states regard control of space and limiting of other states’ use of space as the main goals not only has violated the basic criteria of international society in regard to the peaceful and equal use of space, but at the same time also has constituted a threat to China’s space security and its rights and interests. China should continue with other nations on the path of opposing space weaponization, adhere to the relevant international law criteria, propel the formulation of international treaties related to halting space weaponization, exert public-opinion and moral pressure on nations which carry out space weaponization, and influence and retard the progress of their space weaponization. To focus on individual states’ space weaponization, [we] can selectively develop and reveal China’s space technology and space capability, and adopt
an oppositional mode to reduce their expectations for space weaponization and to increase their degree of difficulty and costs in space weaponization.

(3) Building streamlined, effective forces for military struggle in the space domain

The building of space military capability has the characteristics of high investment, high costs, and high technological content, so “streamlining” and “effectiveness” are universal principles for the building of space military forces among all space powers around the world. The streamlining of China’s space military forces on one hand signifies that it does not seek a scale of space forces equal to that of the space military powers, and its commitment in building [such forces] does not compare with theirs; on the other hand, it signifies that space military forces must be highly effective, including being advanced in equipment technology, high in operational personnel quality, and scientific and rational in force structure and task organization. The effectiveness of China’s space military forces first means that the space information assisting support is full and effective, can provide high-efficiency space information support \{zhichi\} for operational strengths and military activity in other domains, and earnestly brings into play the role of “multiplier” of their military effectiveness. Second, it means the ability to effectively balance the space powers by having the capability to create a certain space deterrence of, and conduct counterattack operations against, the space powers, so that the space powers dare not lightly execute space attacks on us.

Setting out from the characteristics of space military force building and from the actual situation of China’s military development, China’s space force building should mainly grasp the following principles.

Unified planning using mathematical and scientific methods, with cooperative building, and concentrated employment. Space military development and force building involve many fields and many departments, large investments, and high risk; they are typical national projects, and must be given unified leadership and integrated-whole operations-research-based planning by high-level, authoritative departments, to straighten out and adjust-coordinate the relationships among all sides, to form integrated-whole composite strength, and to propel the ordered, high-efficiency development of space military forces. [We] must set out from the intrinsic laws and requirements for space force building and development; give consideration to the traditions of China’s space force development and to the military force-structure characteristics; [end of page 187] according to unified guihua planning, have the corresponding headquarters \{zongbu\} and services and arms synchronously adjust-coordinate the building of the military space means and capability; according to the intrinsic requirements of space operations, build high-efficiency space operational command mechanisms and authoritative operational command institutions;
ensure the implementation of centralized, unified command and employment of the space forces and the various types of space operational means; and thus form composite strength and to the maximum extent bring into play the integrated-whole effectiveness of space operations.

Combination of symmetric and asymmetric development. The development of space-information assisting support systems and capability should aim at the world space military powers, do everything possible to rise to the same bedrock level as the strongest opponents, and ensure not being left behind by too much; in this way, [we] can have the foundation and conditions for holding space military games and carrying out struggle with the powers. The development of space attack and defense capability mainly has deterrence of and balance with the space powers as the goals, and upholds asymmetric development with the space powers. [This involves] fully bringing into play the advantages of the respective weapons and equipment and operational capabilities in the space operations, leaving some things undone, and developing the strong points while avoiding the shortcomings, to rapidly elevate the PLA’s integrated-whole space real strength within a fairly short time.

Giving consideration both to realizing needs and requirements and to long-term development. This means the need to keep grounded in realizing the needs and requirements of space struggle, along with the need to properly carry out preparations in advance for future space military struggle, on the basis of accurately forecasting the future development trends in space struggle. [We] not only must attach importance to the building of space military capability, but also must attach importance to forward-looking-quality studies on high and new technologies in the space domain, and doing a good job of technical and talent reserves, to seize the initiative in military struggle in the future space domain.

Section 3: Military Struggle in the Network Domain…188

Information networks serve as one of the basic marks of the Information Age and as an important part of the social infrastructure. They have already become an intangible domain involving national security and development interests, and are increasingly receiving the concern and attention of nations around the world. Among different nations and in particular among the powers, there has unfolded a sharp struggle centering in peacetime on the goals of ensuring information security and ensuring the stable operation of information systems, and in wartime on maintaining the network confrontation initiative and seizing network dominance. Network space has already become a very important new domain for military struggle in today’s world.
I. Main characteristics of military struggle in the network domain…188

Information networks are systems and structures which use data fiberoptic cables and other auxiliary facilities equipment to interconnect computers, processors, and servers, and other electronic installations operating according to certain standards and protocols, to carry out information storage, exchange, transmission, processing, and use. Speaking in integrated-whole terms, information networks have characteristics such as a wide-domain quality with global spread and involving all aspects of social life, rapidity in information transmission flow, and a hidden quality in the identity of the network activists \( \text{wangluo xingweiti} \). This to a certain extent also has decided that military struggle in the network domain has distinct features different from those of military struggle in the other domains. These features are mainly expressed in the following several respects.

(1) Wide-ranging quality of the scope of struggle

In the Information Age, information networks are the foundation and conditions which human living and social activity cannot do without even for a moment. The Internet covers almost every corner of the entire world, and has become the fundamental means by which people regularly understand the world and connect with one another; and society’s important firms, departments, and institutions — including telecom, electric power, traffic, banking and finance, and social security — all have built and mainly rely on their own intranets or local area networks \( \text{LANs} \) to launch work, and to maintain the normal operation of their root systems. Moreover, in the military field, computer-centered network systems serve as the nerve centers of modern military forces and military activity, and interlink the various operational strengths, as well as military activity of different types and in different spaces, into an organic integrated whole, which is a decisive factor and basic condition in the transformation of the form-state of war into informationized war. Thus, those terrorist raid activities with networks as the targets may have an influence on every nation and area in the world. Military struggle in the network domain, and in particular hostile network-attack confrontational activity — although it may not directly create tens of millions of casualties and grave damage to social installations of the kind created by nuclear, biological, and chemical \( \text{NBC} \) weapons of mass destruction \( \text{WMD} \) — still could lead to traffic chaos, communication interrupts, and financial paralysis in the adversary; severely upset the social order; and also could create certain casualties and major losses in economic and social assets. The influence of network-attack activity within military confrontation is even more direct and even more distinct. The side holding network warfare superiority can adopt network warfare to cause dysfunction in the adversary’s command \( \text{xitong} \) system, loss of control over operational strengths and operational activities, and incapacitation or failure of weapons
and equipment, and thus seize the initiative within military confrontation, and create the conditions for effectively achieving military activities goals and gaining ultimate victory in war. Military struggle in the network domain directly bears on the stability of human living and society, on victory or defeat in war, and even on the survival of regimes and the safety of states; its strategic influence is growing more prominent day by day. In recent years, the main nations and organizations around the world — including the U.S., Russia, Japan, and India, as well as the EU — one after another have issued national policies and strategies related to struggle in the network domain; the U.S. and other nations also have organized and built special network forces and full-time network operations command institutions, to lead active preparations for military struggle in the network domain. The circumstances of military struggle in the network domain are becoming increasingly complex and grave. [end of page 189]

(2) Concealed quality in the modes of struggle

Information not only is the basic thing carried by networks, but also is the main medium for executing network attack and defense confrontation. Information is intangible, and if one lays aside the influence and restrictions of network bandwidth, information can flow at the speed of light through network space. Thus, network attacks can be launched at any time, and be completed in an instant, so they have a very strong outbreak quality. Due to the lack of clear signs like those before the outbreak of traditional war, it is very difficult to make an accurate forecast of when one might suffer a network attack, and difficult to timely issue early warning and effectively conduct a defense; so the degree of difficulty in responding to network attack threats is extremely high. Information networks are distributed extremely broadly, and contain countless network nodes, but any one network node always can be used for executing an attack against another network node or network system. Thus, within network warfare, determining the sources of threat and the directions of an attack is very difficult, and even impossible. A network per se also is a relatively open “virtual space,” and any activist entering a network or using a network always can conceal his/her own true identity, and usually will adopt any other virtual identity and appearance to emerge in a network and use the network. At the same time, activists also can via wireless access, use of false IP addresses, and use of other nations’ servers or the mode of alternating ports, shift the responsibility for network attacks and sabotage to others. Thus, in the actual practice of network struggle, even if one knows the source or direction of a network threat, it will still be difficult to swiftly determine completely whether it is the act of individuals or is an organized state act, or is sabotage activity conducted by a terrorist organization or criminal group, and it will be difficult to clearly distinguish who bears the responsibility. Very many information networks bear the characteristic of military-civilian sharing; network attack and defense having military goals often may spread to civilian fields, and cause an increase in the collateral influence
and damage from military confrontation in the network domain. Moreover, the global interconnection and intercommunication of networks also often cause network attack and defense acts directed at specific objects to spread to third parties, resulting in an expansion of the scope of influence. Thus, the aftermath of network warfare is very difficult to effectively control. These characteristics of ambiguity and uncertainty present in military confrontation in the network domain in respect to confrontation time, the struggle objectives, the identity of the opponent, and the confrontation aftermath have greatly influenced the effectiveness of the attack and defense confrontation in the network domain. This in integrated-whole terms has also influenced and restricted the development of the circumstances of military struggle in the network domain, and is an important reason restricting the outbreak of a large-scale network war.

(3) Low expense and high effectiveness in the cost of struggle

In modern war, the large quantities of active-duty weapons and equipment with a high-tech component, such as operational aircraft, ships, and missiles, have maximally increased the cost of war. However, computer network operations only require small numbers of personnel and network computers to be conducted, and fairly low investment of funds enables achieving the anticipated operational goals; [end of page 190] computer network operations thus have the prominent characteristics of low cost, high benefit, and low risk. Precisely because of these traits, network warfare more easily occurs than other types of war. The US military holds that the U.S., with the highest degree of reliance on networks, more easily encounters the threat of network warfare than other nations, and that militarily weak states, base institutions, or individuals all have the possibility to very conveniently use networks to execute information attacks against the U.S. It is said that during an exercise, one US Air Force [USAF] first lieutenant, using only one personal computer and universal modem, was able over the Internet to quietly seize command authority for the US Navy’s Atlantic Fleet, and thus cause profound shock in the US military. In summer 2012, a group-issued “terrorist brief” caused large-scale exile of tens of thousands of Indian [Roman Catholic] church members. Along with the acceleration of informationized progress among nations around the world, very many civilian or military resources have realized networking, and this will make the deterrent capability of network warfare no weaker than that of conventional destructive strategic weapons. One successful [round of] network warfare can cause collapse of the adversary’s economy, and paralysis of his operational systems. Within future war, the side holding the superior position in computer network operations will seize the initiative in war and generate powerful psychological awe in the enemy. Network warfare serves as a new type of strategic deterrent means, which may gain ever greater use among personnel.
(4) Professional quality of the struggle strengths

Attack and defense confrontation in the network domain is confrontational activity which has as the main goal sabotage of the enemy’s network system and network information, while at the same time protecting friendly network systems and network information. No matter whether carrying out network attack or defense, thorough familiarization with the tenets of network operation, enabling skillful application of networks, always is the foundation. But intruding into specific network systems, seeking and finding vulnerabilities and loopholes in specific information systems, and effectively exploiting them or rapidly offsetting them, is where the key lies in achieving the objectives of information attack and defense confrontation. The information carried over networks is intangible, and network space is a “virtual” space; thus, in terms of people in general, information networks are a very strange field. Although people’s lives no longer can do without various information networks, and people all the time use information networks and enjoy the convenience provided by networks, there are still very few persons truly familiar with the tenets of network operation and capable of skillfully employing networks. As for computer “hackers” and “network warriors” who can in a confrontational environment exploit the adversarial network system’s vulnerabilities, launch network attacks, and achieve network or information sabotage effects, they are even rarer and more precious persons. Military confrontation in the network domain essentially is a comparison and trial of strength of opposing sides in terms of the knowledge, intelligence, and professional capability of the cream of network talent, and is a confrontational field with extremely strong professionalism. Thus, although network attack can be launched from any zone and any node in the entire world, it is not the case that every person using a network can execute an attack. Network warfare, although having a certain mass foundation, nonetheless [end of page 191] cannot generate “an entire nation in arms;” the network attack and defense operational strengths are extremely streamlined forces.

II. Main patterns of military struggle in the network domain…192

(1) Network reconnaissance

Network reconnaissance signifies reconnaissance activity conducted against the network information systems of the objects of reconnaissance, under circumstances of not being noticed and not being [specifically] authorized, with the goal of acquiring the opponent’s non-open information, and employing technical equipment and methods. It is the most common, foremost military struggle activity in the network domain today.
The avenues for conducting network reconnaissance mainly include the following: cracking of the opponent’s network passwords or ciphers to enter the opponent’s encrypted network systems and acquire intelligence-related information; exploiting the characteristics of network broadcast and multicast to run information interception programs, in a process of transmitting information to the target computer via wired, wireless, or electromagnetic [EM] avenues, to acquire documents, and from them read important files and information; and exploiting loopholes in the adversary’s computers to sneak into the adversary’s network systems, and via spyware collect and steal information stored and processed in those computers.

Network reconnaissance has as its goal stealing and exploiting the opponent’s non-open information; it usually does not sabotage the adversary’s associated information and data, and does not directly influence the normal running of the adversary’s information systems and the users’ normal use of the electronic facilities equipment, so it has nondestructive and nonviolent features. Although all nations around the world conduct network reconnaissance activity to different degrees, nonetheless since the possibility of thus setting off two-sided conflicts and of launching a war on these grounds is not high, network reconnaissance thus cannot simply be viewed as network operations. But viewed from the technical standpoint, the operating tenets of network reconnaissance and network attack are basically the same; the means and methods of network reconnaissance usually also are the means and methods of network attack. Based on the desire and intent of the activists, they only need to press a button or issue a procedural instruction, and the transition from network reconnaissance to network attack can then be immediately completed. Thus, unseverable ties are truly present between network reconnaissance and network attack and defense operations. Network reconnaissance often is preparation for future possible network attack and defense operations; network reconnaissance thus very easily transforms into attack in network space.

(2) Network attack and defense operations

Network attack and defense operations are network warfare actions with the goals of sabotaging the enemy’s information network systems and network information, and weakening their operating effectiveness, while at the same time protecting friendly information network systems and network information from enemy sabotage. These operations include network offensive operations and network defensive operations. Network attack and defense [end of page 192] operations are the highest form of military struggle in the network domain.

Network attack and defense operations have multiple specific patterns. Network offensive operations in integrated-whole terms can be divided into two types: “soft
“sabotage” carried out by use of software, and “hard destruction” implemented by using EM means. Software attacks are usually called “hacker attacks;” the common patterns include the following: direct implantation of “worms,” “trojans,” “logic bombs,” and other malware or destructive code to carry out sabotage of enemy computers or network systems; adoption of the mode of fabricating and transmitting false information to acquire or sabotage the enemy’s important information; and adoption of the modes of excessive occupation of enemy information system resources, and revision or sabotage of enemy network system deployment information, so that the enemy systems cannot make responses to rightful requests by their legitimate users, and cannot provide normal services. By contrast, the weapons used for executing “hard destruction” of enemy networks mainly include EM-pulse [EMP] bombs and microwave bombs, and achieve network attack effects mainly by sabotage of the components in computer facilities equipment and network systems. Network defense mainly includes the following: building firewalls to block information from unlawful entry into systems; adoption of data encryption to prevent information leaks or tampering; use of identity verification to prevent systems from being unlawfully accessed and system resources from being unlawfully employed; use of intrusion detection and blocking systems, with automatic adoption of the corresponding measures to respond to network attacks; and so on.

Network attack has a very large element of surprise. Network attack weapons are inexpensive, and their development speed is extremely rapid; moreover, the risk of being punished when executing network attacks is relatively low. A network system per se is a complex SoS, with numerous links; and errors or loopholes in the system are difficult to avoid. At the same time, offsetting this on the defender’s side is that the loopholes are only those which have been successfully attacked, since it is difficult to take initiative to resolve those security problems not yet detected. Networks in integrated-whole terms have the features of susceptibility to attack and difficulty of defense, and the asymmetric quality of network attack and network defense is prominent.

(3) Network deterrence

Network deterrence signifies actions which display network attack and defense operational capability, as well as implementing a firm resolve for retaliation, to forcibly prevent the adversary from daring to willfully carry out large-scale network attacks, and to prevent causing a severe aftermath.

Network deterrence has the following characteristics: first is that it has a distinct strategic quality. What network deterrence stops are those network attack actions which can cause severe sabotage, and what it protects in reality is the security and development interests of the major nations; its influence and role are those of an overall situation quality and a
strategic quality. However, under circumstances where nations universally attach importance to information network security and reinforce the building of information-network protection capability, [end of page 193] network attacks by individual network users often have difficulty achieving an aftermath of causing major losses to a state. Hostile nations or an extremely small number of terrorist organizations clearly are the main objects of network deterrence, and network deterrence mainly also involves network warfare actions among states. Second is that the means of deterrence are diverse. Network deterrence is not at all merely deterrence carried out by using network weapons; in reality, it is deterrence carried out to focus on large-scale network attack actions. The network deterrence forces not only include the typical network attack and defense operational strengths and means, but also include the traditional military strike forces and means. Third is that the deterrent effects are difficult to accurately evaluate. Speaking in a general sense, the deterrent effects are embodied by influencing the psychology of the adversary’s decision-makers, and by changing his decision results. But the concealed quality and element of surprise in network attack are very strong; people find it very difficult via adjustments to and changes in hostile network activities to assess the changes in the adversary’s decision-making and intent. The non-occurrence of large-scale network attack actions is not equivalent to the absence of network attacks executed by the adversary; very likely this is because the hostile network attacks cannot penetrate functionally powerful network defense systems, and is not necessarily because the adversary has been deterred and thus forced to abandon or alter his intention to execute network attacks. When a hostile large-scale network attack occurs, it means the failure of network deterrence. However, when no hostile large-scale network attack has occurred, this simply cannot indicate that network deterrence has played a critical role.

Compared to traditional deterrence, and in particular nuclear deterrence, network deterrence exhibits distinct differences in respect to the objects of deterrence, the deterrence objectives, and the avenues of deterrence. Although deterrence is important content of military struggle in the network domain, there is nonetheless very great diversity in the various understanding of network deterrence, and both the theory and practice of network deterrence await further development and perfection.

**III. Strategic guidance for military struggle in the network domain…194**

Strategic guidance for military struggle in the network domain should keep grounded in the characteristics and laws of military struggle in the network domain, and implement the general requirements of national security strategy and military strategy for military network struggle.
(1) Take safeguarding the state’s important information and information network security as the basic objective

The objectives of military struggle in the network domain specify the basic orientation of military network struggle, and play a leading role in military struggle in the network domain. The determination of the objectives of military struggle in the network domain is influenced by multiple factors: the nature of the state, the national strategic objectives, the degree of informatization and networking in society, the IT industry base, and the network attack and defense capability, as well as the opponent’s situation. Generally speaking, the world’s hegemonic nations [end of page 194] which pursue absolute security often regard the freedom to control networks and to limit other nations’ use of networks as strategic objectives, bearing a distinct destructive quality, hostile quality, and exclusive quality within military network struggle. In nations with higher degrees of informatization and networking, and thus higher reliance on networks, the objectives of network struggle usually can be relatively higher; and in nations where the IT industry base is good, in particular where they have a monopoly on computer and network core technologies, their network attack and defense capability often is stronger, and the network struggle objectives and standards they pursue also may be higher.

China is an IT industry power, and information networks are already very widespread across China. However, the core technologies associated with computers and networks, as well as Internet dominance, basically still lie within other nations, and China in integrated-whole respects is still in an inferior position within network warfare. Thus, China’s objectives for military struggle in the network domain mainly are to ensure information security in the core fields and departments, including those of the national financial, transportation, energy, and main national defense industries, as well as the armed forces, and to ensure the normal and stable running of the corresponding information networks.

China’s objectives for military struggle in the network domain are to “benefit itself,” but not to “harm others;” they bear distinct defensive and nondestructive features. China’s objectives for military struggle in the network domain do not at all require completely stopping hostile network attacks of any type or any intensity, but only require limiting the scope of hostile network attacks, and limiting the influence of hostile network sabotage to the scope acceptable to our side. This not only conforms to the general characteristics of networks and network struggle, but also conforms to China’s actual situation, and is relatively feasible.
(2) Properly handle the network warfare relationships of peacetime to wartime, attack to defense, and deterrence to fighting

To effectively carry out network warfare and boost the network warfare effects, proper handling of the relationships of peacetime to wartime, attack to defense, and deterrence to real combat is very important.

[The relationship of] peacetime to wartime. Under the influence of a network’s own traits, any network at any time [may] be faced with and bear network reconnaissance and network attacks in numerous classes; and the network’s own protective systems at every instant are carrying out struggle with these unlawful reconnaissance and attack actions, to protect the information and network system security. It can be said that network attack and defense warfare is routine-quality network struggle carried out at every moment. However, network attack and defense operations in wartime, due to an even larger scale, even sharper struggle, and even more severe influence and aftermath, naturally should receive even more attention and advance planning of countermeasures. Operations-research-based planning for military struggle in the network domain takes peacetime network warfare as the foundation, but the center of gravity [COG] should be placed on wartime network attack and defense warfare. [end of page 195]

[The relationship of] attack to defense. Viewed from the technical standpoint, network warfare in integrated-whole terms has the characteristic of “ease of attack but difficulty in defense.” How to adjust-coordinate the relationship between network attack and network defense has become a critical problem in operations-research-based planning for military struggle in the network domain. Compared to the main strategic opponent, China is still in the inferior position in integrated-whole terms within network warfare. Neither attack nor defense should be emphasized at the expense of the other; China should take defense as primary, but also give consideration to attack. The use of network defense for “self-preservation” without question takes first place, and is the single most important [element] of China’s network struggle.

[The relationship of] deterrence to real combat. The ambiguity and uncertainty in network attack and defense operations, as well as the determinacy and foreseeability of the difficult-to-bear aftermath created by a large-scale network war, result in network deterrence to a certain extent having the feature of similarity to nuclear deterrence. Based on the terrifying aftermath of a network war, as well as the indefiniteness of whether it is possible to avoid encountering an adversary’s network attacks, no nation ever dares to lightly launch a network war. In regard to network problems, the first thing people consider is how to avoid setting off a network war, and not how to win a network war. Although different nations to different extents are all developing their own network
attack means and capabilities, their most important goals still are to avoid network war and to stay grounded in strengthening the network deterrence effects, but not to use these means and capabilities to win a network war. Viewed from this standpoint, among the future network powers, there is the possibility of forming a “balanced” deterrence posture where they all possess network attack means and capabilities, but none will dare to lightly employ them.

(3) Build streamlined professional network operations forces

The characteristics of the universality of networks and of their military-civilian sharing have decided the diversity of network attack and defense forces. The forces employable in network operations can be divided into three types: armed forces professional network warfare forces, authorized forces, and civilian forces. Professional network warfare forces are armed forces operational units specially employed for carrying out network attack and defense; authorized forces are organized local strengths authorized by the armed forces to specially engage in network warfare, and mainly organized and built within the associated government departments, including the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security; and the civilian forces are nongovernmental forces which spontaneously carry out network attack and defense, and which after mobilization and organization can be employed for network operations. Military network struggle has a strong professional quality, with sharp network war confrontation and strict requirements on political quality. Thus, the armed forces professional network operations forces clearly are the core strengths for carrying out network warfare, and also are the key points in the building of network warfare forces.

Network attack and defense operations are typical contests in wits, and personnel truly having the capability to carry out network operations are not at all numerous. Network warfare is also different from battlefield confrontation in the traditional sense, and the quantitative scale of the operational strengths is really not the decisive factor. Thus, “streamlining” is a basic requirement for professional network warfare forces. [end of page 196] In other words, professional network warfare forces must be few in number, small in scale, and unusually professional; they should be composed of the cream of network warfare talent.

The streamlined professional network warfare strengths organized and built by the armed forces should stress a grasp of two points. The first is reliance on civilian forces. The universality of networks, and the generality and fundamentalness of network tenets, have decided that the cream of network talent mainly comes from among civilians, and that the potential of national network warfare is mainly contained in the broad masses of the people. The organizing and building of professional network warfare forces and the
boosting of network warfare capability require excelling at uncovering and exploiting civilian network warfare talent and resources, so that the armed forces professional network warfare forces truly can gather together the cream of network talent from all of society, and truly embody and reflect the nation’s network warfare capability and levels. Second is integration of R&D, building, and application {yan, jian, yong yiti}. Viewed from the technical standpoint, network attack and defense mainly signifies the use of the corresponding network software, and the process for use of this network software often is very simple. Thus, the routine exploitation and development {kaifa he yanzhi} of network attack and defense software weapons are the most direct and most important network warfare preparations, and also are the core of network warfare force building. The network software weapons R&D personnel at the same time also are the typical network warfare warriors. It is thus clear that in the building of network forces, [we] must carry out operations-research-based planning for integration of R&D, building, and application, to jointly propel [the effort]. [end of page 197; end of chapter]
Chapter 10
Service Strategy and Theater Strategy…198

Service strategy indicates the concepts \{fangzhen\} and tactics in operations-research-based planning \{chouhua\} and guidance for the building and application of the services; it is subordinate to and in the service of national strategy and military strategy. Theater strategy is the general plan \{fanglue\}, based on the national military strategic intent, for military activities in strategic areas, planning areas (zones) \{jinglue quyu\}, and military security and guidance areas (zones). Under the new historic conditions, building and perfecting service strategy and theater strategy are needs and requirements for adapting to world military development trends and to the changes in the form-state of war, and also are needs and requirements for adapting to the PLA’s further optimized architecture \{tixi jiegou\} and comprehensively elevating military capability. They have their important theoretical and practical significance.

Section 1: Army Strategy…198

Army strategy indicates the concepts and tactics in operations-research-based planning and guidance for the overall situation of Army building and application; it is subordinate to and in the service of military strategy. The constant development of operational modes under informationized conditions and the historic expansion of PLA missions in the new era and new phase are propelling the transformational development of the Army. Operations-research-based planning for the diversified application of the Army with operations as the core requires constructing an Army strategy having PLA characteristics.

I. The Army’s strategic missions…198

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army is one which developed and grew up on the foundation of the Army. Over the long Revolutionary War, as well as the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and all of the successive border counterattack operations in self-defense after the founding of New China, the Army made indelible historic contributions. Under the new historic conditions, the Army as before is the strategic cornerstone of national security; it is the main body of China’s armed strengths; it is the decisive force by which the PLA carries out ground operations; and it is the basic force complementing the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Corps in conducting joint operations. The Army brings into play irreplaceable roles in ensuring China’s land border security, in maintaining social stability, in deterring actual and potential opponents, in containing various crises, and in brace-supporting \{zhicheng\} the expansion of the state’s interests. [end of page 198] Centering on the strategic needs and requirements for the
nation’s peaceful development, and based on the armed forces’ new historic missions, the Army will mainly carry out the following strategic missions.

Participating in large-scale operations in the main strategic direction, to maintain national unity. Once a war breaks out in the main strategic direction, the Army will stay grounded in this basic form of joint operations, and participate in conducting blockade operations, fire strikes, landing operations, and defensive operations. In particular, within joint island-landing operations, the Army will undertake important missions such as rushing onto beaches in the landing, conducting on-island assaults, assaulting fortified positions in cities, and maintaining stability after combat. It must be able to mount the beaches, capture territory, make rapid assaults, assault fortified positions, and control the situation, and bring into play an important role in maintaining national unity in the war.

Conducting border counterattack operations in self-defense, to safeguard land border security. China’s bordering nations on land are numerous, with a total border-line length reaching more than 22,000 km. Even though the possibility of a large-scale land invasion war occurring is fairly low, nonetheless some border demarcation problems are hanging in the balance, and some border-area nibbling and counter-nibbling, and frictional and counter-frictional struggles will be present for the long term, so the threat of neighboring-state turmoil imperiling the security of our border areas cannot be ruled out. In future border counterattack operations in self-defense, Army units will join with the units of other services and arms; based on the characteristics of the battlefields and opponents in the different strategic directions, launch operational activities such as border blockade and control, staunch defense, fire strike, deep-going insertion, attack on enemy reinforcements in assaults on fortified positions, and capture and control of local areas; and actively improve the defensive posture, resolutely safeguard territorial sovereignty, and restore peace and stability in the border areas.

Participating in strategic vital-area defensive operations, to ensure central security. Along with the constant development of long-range operational strength and means among actual and potential opponents, and the constant improvement of precision strike capability, in wartime, China’s capital and other strategic vital areas can become important targets for the enemy’s strategic surprise attacks. Within future strategic vital-area defensive operations, the Army — while undertaking ground defensive operational missions such as protecting important targets, screening massive forces groups, and guarding against and countering infiltration by enemy special operations forces [SOF] — also will fully bring into play the roles of multiple air defense weapons, including Army surface-to-air missiles [SAMs] and anti-aircraft guns, and will complement and assist-support {zhizhiyuan} the Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery Corps in resisting the enemy air raids, to ensure gaining success in the anti-air raid operations.
Participating in multiple non-war military activities, while giving consideration to both safeguarding rights and maintaining stability. This fully brings into play the Army’s characteristics of wide-ranging distribution, abundant force-strength, diversity in the service arms, flexible maneuver, rapid reaction, and forceful control, to assist the state’s relevant departments in rigorously guarding against and firmly striking at the “Three Evils” [i.e., terrorist forces, national secessionist (“splittist”) forces, and religious extremist forces]. In particular, the Army carries out missions such as striking at terrorism, suppressing disturbances and riots, and handling major large-group outbreak situations; actively participates in responding to major natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods; and thus ensures social stability and the safety of the people’s lives and property. At the same time, the Army is gradually expanding its participation in carrying out overseas non-war military activities, including international peacekeeping, international rescue, protecting and evacuating those living abroad, and protecting foreign assets and strategic thoroughfares, to effectively brace-support the expansion of state interests and to mold a favorable strategic posture.

Along with the historic expansion of state security interests and of the PLA’s missions, the strategic missions undertaken by the Army also have undergone major changes. First is the expansion of the mission fields. This expansion, from responding to traditional security threats to responding to nontraditional security threats, requires that the Army, while placing the key points on boosting the core military capabilities for winning a local war under informationized conditions, also give consideration to developing a capability for non-war military activities with its own characteristics and capable of bringing into play its own strong points. Second is the expansion of the mission space. This is an expansion from the traditional ground spaces to a multidimensional space with the land battlefield as primary, but also including ultralow and low altitudes, the sea surface, and network space. At the same time, the campaign and tactical depth has unprecedentedly extended; this requires that the Army be pulled by the new needs, take new technology as the brace-support, and, while propelling the transformation and elevation of the traditional operational strengths, also energetically develop new operational strengths, and form new capabilities for rapid maneuver operations over a broad scope and in multidimensional space. Third is the expansion of the mission patterns. There not only is the need to keep grounded in being qualified for Army operational activities of different scale, in different zones, and with different opponents under informationized conditions, but also the need to at all times prepare for carrying out domestic or foreign non-war military activities of multiple natures. There not only is the need to be able to independently carry out missions of grave danger, but also the need to excel at jointly carrying out missions with the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Corps. There not only is the need to be able to rapidly maneuver and for rapid disposition, but also the need to excel at precision destruction and system of systems [SoS] sabotage {tixi poji}. 

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All these require the Army in an all-around and adjusted-coordinated manner to propel the transformation and development of the system and organizational structure \{tizhi bianzhi\}, weapons and equipment, and military training.

II. Army transformation and development…200

Since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of a full-scale ground war breaking out around the world has fallen, but the threats of area crises and conflicts and local wars are tending toward diversity, and have even more uncertainty and suddenness. The traditional Army units for carrying out large-formation operational missions exhibit defects such as ossification in organizational structure, weakness in maneuver quality \{jidongxing\}, poor flexibility, and singleness of the executed missions, and have difficulty adapting to the new changes in the security environment and in the strategic needs. At the same time, the development and application of information technology [IT] similarly have fundamentally changed the pattern of the mechanized era’s reliance on quantitative scale to boost the Army’s combat power. The possibility that China in the future will be faced with a large-scale ground invasion is very minute, but the territory is vast, the borders are very long, and the terrain is complex; moreover, the land threats have multidirectional, multidimensional \{duoyuan\}, and multi-opponent characteristics. The former have decided that the Army has no need to retain its original huge scale, while the latter have decided that the Army still has a need to a moderate quantitative scale. From the overall viewpoint, [the Army] should conform to the development trends of informationized war and of ground forces around the world, cast off the traditional “grand Army” thought, [end of page 200] make the transition from keeping grounded in responding to a large-scale ground invasion to keeping grounded in winning a local war under informationized conditions, make the transition from mechanized and semi-mechanized to information/mechanized composite development with information as the lead, make the transition from area (zone) defense to full-zone maneuver \{quanyu jidong\}, make the transition from ground operations to 3-D attack and defense, and thus build a streamlined and high-efficiency new type of Army. Realizing this transformation will require laying stress on a firm grasp of the following several critical links.

Promoting innovation in the Army system and organizational structure. Right now, the functions of leadership organs in China’s Army are exercised by the four general departments \{zongbu\}, and the PLA Military Area Commands directly lead the subordinate Army units. Along with the changes in the composition and position of the services, in particular along with the development of the new military transformation and the evolution of the form-state of informationized war, this system is not beneficial to bringing into play the functions of the four general departments, not beneficial to the Army’s integrated-whole building, and not beneficial to the gradual revelation of the
defects in the establishment of the joint operations command tizhi system. In adjusting and reforming the Army’s system and organizational structure, first is strengthening “unity” {tong}, by putting forth effort to resolve the problem of decentralization of management functions in Army leadership. Second is strengthening “streamlining” {jing}, by putting forth effort to resolve the problems of too many management levels, overstaffing of institutions, intersection and overlap of functions, and low operating efficiency. Third is strengthening “jointness” {lian}, by putting forth effort to resolve the problems of insufficient jointness or inability to achieve jointness in the operations and training of the various services and arms. [The Army] should set out from reality, in good time adjust the system and organizational structure institutions, and form a command system and Army leadership tizhi system adapted to the needs and requirements of joint operations. In each strategic direction, [this involves] building a consistent peacetime-wartime joint command institution, with the operational units gradually building a corps-brigade-battalion tizhi system; energetically driving an extension of integrated {yitihua} command platforms and operational data links toward the operational units; further reducing the command levels; and realizing a flattened command structure longitudinally short and laterally broad, longitudinally linked up, and having lateral intercommunication. [This means] moderately reducing heavily equipped units, reorganizing and expanding medium- and lightly equipped units, and realizing a relatively balanced deployment of heavy, medium, and light units. At the same time, [this also means] moderately reducing the traditional service arms; expanding the organizational-structure proportions of the SOF, electronic warfare [EW] units, network attack and defense units, tactical missile units, and Army aviation units; realizing a transformation of the new types of operational strengths from assisting strengths to main battle strengths; and gradually forming elite land-battle forces integrating ground and low-altitude [operations], special warfare, and network warfare (netwar).

Scientific partitioning of the Army unit types. Focusing on the characteristics of the multidimensional {duoyuan} and multidirectional land threats to China and the complex geographic environment, [this means] integrated-whole unified operations-research-based planning {tongchou} and rational partitioning of the Army unit types, to facilitate peacetime classification and building, and wartime joint application. First is classification per operational function. Based on the different battlefield environments, [the Army] can be partitioned into different types of units: amphibious, mountain land, desert, plains, urban, and frigid-area, as well as plateau. Some examples follow: in the southwest direction, placing the key points on building mountain land and plateau types of units; in the southeast seacoast direction, placing the key points on building amphibious, light, and air landing types of units; in the northeast direction, placing the key points on building high/frigid-area and heavily equipped units; and in the north China direction, placing the key points on building plains units and heavy/medium/light combination types of units.
Second is classification per the nature of the mission. [end of page 201] The brigade-level operational units adapted to the objects of operations in specific areas (zones) and some heavy division-level units can be composed into “area (zone) garrison-duty units” and given a disposition in the various mission areas, where they independently execute missions to maintain a posture and to respond to medium- or low-intensity conflicts. The medium and light brigade-level units are then composed into “full-zone maneuver units,” and given a disposition in strategic vital areas and at traffic hubs, where at any time they will execute assisting-support operational missions in each direction and temporarily assigned missions of various types. Third is classification according to the readiness state. An example is partitioning of Army operational units into mission units, maneuver units, and testing units, and, based on unit-building and combat-power generation laws, implementing periodic rotations.

Realizing modularization in the task organization of strength. Modularization is a characteristic of Army building in the Information Age. The basic operational unit \{danwei\} of the units \{budui\} has changed from the division to the brigade, so as to elevate the combat effectiveness of the operational units to the maximum extent, and be able to better adapt to the diversified operational needs. In 2003, the US Army initiated modularized building, and has organized/built 73 operational brigades (45 on active duty and 28 on reserve duty). Since Russia implemented a “new look” military reform in 2008, its Ground Forces have organized/built 85 new operational brigades in three types: heavy, medium, and light. Based on the actual situation, the PLA should carry out Army modularized building, accelerate the organizing/building of new types of operational brigades, and gradually develop in the direction of the brigade as the basic campaign operational element and the battalion as the basic tactical operational element.

Operational units can be differentiated into basic modules for ground firepower, surface-to-air firepower, special operations, and information warfare [IW]. Support units \{baozhang budui\} can be differentiated into basic modules for intelligence support, communication support, engineering support, and chemical defense support; but based on the needs and requirements or carrying out missions in non-war military activities, a certain number of modular units with a stronger professional quality can also be organized/built.57 Examples include special reconnaissance, medical treatment and rescue, and emergency discharge of explosives. Building of the various modular units not only requires laying stress on professionalism, but also requires adhering to the principles of standardization and interconnection and intercommunication, so as to provide reliable basic brace-support for realizing metasynthesis and SoS operations. Once there is a need

57 Translator’s note: unless otherwise indicated, all “support” in this chapter is safeguarding support \{baozhang\}.
and requirement, the modular units can be rapidly and flexibly dismantled or combined. The organizational grouping of force modules employs not a simple superposition of one module over another, but rather, according to mission needs, the construction of an ad hoc SoS of strengths, with the need to realize linkup and fusion among all modules within the shortest time.

Developing advanced land-battle weapons and equipment. This takes the path of composite development of mechanization and informatization, with informatization driving mechanization, and mechanization promoting informatization, to energetically propel Army weapons and equipment development. First is perfecting the Army equipment architecture. This uses new research and development [R&D] and replacement of older generations to accelerate and boost the proportions of new types of mechanized equipment, and adopts informationized embedding to transform and elevate the technical capabilities of active-duty weapons and equipment, and progressively realize informationized mechanization of Army equipment. This also increases the organizational-structure quantities of Army high-performance early-warning xitong systems and advanced air defense weapons; reinforces the precision strike forces, including long-range rocket artillery and operational and tactical missile units; [end of page 202] and accelerates the development of special operations, IW/netwar equipment, and Army aviation helicopters, to actively exploit new-concept and new-mechanism land-battle weapons, and reduce the weapons “generation gap” with the developed nations’ armies. Second is laying stress on fusion and building of command xitong systems. [This involves] constructing and perfecting an information network with a network-type SoS {wangzhuang tixi} and 3-D deployment; developing communication systems with strong performance in destruction resistance, security {baomi}, and jam resistance, plus distributed, intelligent automated data processing systems; and designing general-purpose applications software, to realize mutual compatibility among the command and control [C2] systems of all Army service arms. The key points are on building functionally perfected battlefield awareness and transmission systems which have the capability for end-to-end joining with those of the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Corps, so that the Army command information xitong system develops in the direction of integration {yitihua}, light equipping, automation, and adaptiveness. Third is perfecting the Army equipment management mechanisms. [This means] studying and formulating Army equipment technical standards; progressively building models for presenting the needs of the operational units, for the development {yanzhi} carried out by scientific institutes, and for standardized R&D and procurement of weapons and equipment tested by testing units and organizations; improving the quality of weapons and equipment R&D, production, and maintenance services; realizing optimization of weapons systems models; reducing the varieties of similar weapons; achieving
standardization and modularization of the equipment SoS; and strengthening the ease of employment and ease of maintenance for Army weapons and equipment.

Propelling the transformation of Army military training. [This means] accelerating the transition of Army units from military training under mechanized conditions to military training under informationized conditions. First is laying stress on real-combat training. This abandons the method of “unilateral exercises based on scenarios,” unfolds “real strikes and real resistance” with autonomous interaction of the “opposing” sides, and — under high-intensity, fast-changing, and high-uncertainty circumstances — truly achieves the effects of practice in stratagem, practice in command, practice in coordination, and practice in support. Focusing on the diversity of future operational missions and on the complexity of battlefield environments not only requires strengthening training under complex electromagnetic [EM] environments to boost the units’ capability to contend for EM dominance with the powerful enemy, but also requires strengthening training under complex terrain environments, so that the units can adapt to mountain-land, plateau, desert, plains, riverine-belt, and urban operations, and still more requires strengthening training under complex meteorological and hydrological [M&H] conditions, to harden the units in the will, style, and tactical technical standards for fulfilling operational missions in adverse weather. Second is laying stress on projection and maneuver 〈tousong jidong〉 training. This requires improving the projection and maneuver training modes, raising the projection and maneuver training standards, and increasing the projection and maneuver training frequency. On the basis of a good grasp of ground projection and maneuver training, [this means] energetically launching land-sea-air coordinated projection and maneuver training; on the basis of a good grasp of autonomous projection and maneuver training, energetically launching military-local joint projection and maneuver training; on the basis of a good grasp of projection and maneuver training under peacetime environments, energetically launching projection and maneuver training under near-real-combat confrontational conditions; and on the basis of a good grasp of in-theater projection and maneuver training, energetically launching projection and maneuver training cutting across theaters. Third is laying stress on joint training. On the basis of deepening cohesive joint training, [end of page 203] [this means] wide-ranging launching of joint training with units of other services and theaters, and joint training with active-duty units and reserve-duty units, as well as transnational joint training. [This involves] perfecting the joint training mechanisms; improving joint training means and methods; making the transition from cooperative joint training to integrative 〈jichengshi〉 joint training; fusing together the unit training in service arms with different organizational systems; fusing together the training for the various operational essential factors, operational elements, and operational strengths; fusing together all training resources with a decentralized deployment; and “incubating”
Accelerating the building of the Army’s digitized units. Based on the strategic objectives of Army development, and according to the principle of “pulled by needs, laying stress on key points, with rolling development and step-by-step implementation,” [this involves] ensuring that Army digitized-unit building and development are adapted to the overall steps for armed forces building and adjusted-coordinated with the development of the other services (arms), to ensure the Army’s all-around, sustainable development.

[Next is] conducting in-depth military theory studies of Army digitized units. Within the training practice, [Army leaders should] demonstrate and establish the position and role of Army digitized units within integrated joint operations, the missions and tasks, the guidance thought, the application principles, the organizational grouping modes, and the basic fighting methods; explore the command tizhi system, command institution organizational grouping, command relationships, command modes, command means, and support measures for Army digitized units on the background of integrated joint operations; and study within the different operational patterns the principles and modes of equipment support for Army digitized units, the composition of support strength and its organizational grouping, and the organization and implementation plus command of support. On the basis of a profound understanding of the building and operational laws of Army digitized units, and constant summary of their practical experiences and theoretical study achievements, [the aim is to] progressively establish Army digitized unit building and operational theory SoS.

According to the principle of “reducing the levels, enlarging the span, compressing the scale, and increasing the benefit,” [the Army should] explore innovating the system and organizational structure of the digitized units, and increase the degree of force in R&D and fielding of informationized weapons and equipment. [This means] constructing an organizational system {zuzhi xitong}, institutions at all levels, organically assigned units {jianzhi danwei}, and leadership command relationships and functions, all adapted to the operational needs and requirements of digitized units; constructing command institutions, a hierarchical structure, service-arm structure, and functional structure for the digitized units; realizing flattening, integration {yitihua}, modularization, and combinedness {hechenghua}; and meeting the requirements for streamlining, combinedness, multiple functions, and high efficiency. Based on the digitized-unit weapons and equipment system characteristics of high precision, high yield, rapid maneuver, and high operational effectiveness, the focus [should be] on reducing the scale of combined units; extending downward the operational basic units; laying stress on independent operations, rapid maneuver, self-support, and independent command capability for combined units (elements) at all levels; conducting repeated tests to establish the digitized units’ internal
combined modules, service-arm modules, professional modules, and support modules; enhancing the combined degree of the digitized units; improving the lateral interconnection with other Army combat units; and as rapidly as possible forming a SoS operational capability, [end of page 204] to play a forward-looking role in the building and development of the Army’s corps-brigade-battalion tizhi system, and in adjustment and reform of the entire Army system and organizational structure.

III. Strategic application of the Army...205

The transformation of operational modes under informationized conditions, and the historic expansion of the armed forces’ missions, have decided that the strategic application of the PLA Army [PLAA] in a future period, on the basis of carrying forward and developing the fine traditions, also should have further change of ideas {guannian} and enlargement of the field of view; innovation of the strategic guiding principles; embodiment of the strategic orientation of full-zone maneuver, 3-D attack and defense, and strengthened control; constant expansion of the application fields; and innovation of application modes.

Full-zone maneuver. Mao Zedong once said that the armed forces not only need to fight battles, but also need to walk away; if they can win a battle they should fight, but if they cannot win it they should walk away. Maneuver power is the basis of modern Army combat power. After the founding of New China, [the PLA] for a long period was grounded in responding to large-scale ground invasions and conducting homeland defensive operations; PLAA formed a basic setup of area-by-area garrisoning and area (zone) defense. Since the mid-1990s, under the pull of the preparations for military struggle in the southeast seacoast direction, this setup began to be adjusted and changed. In order to adapt to the characteristics of a broad scope of operational activities in local war under informationized conditions, a strong maneuver quality in operational strength, and a rapid operational tempo, Army strategy gradually broke with the limitations of area-by-area garrisoning and area (zone) defense, and laid even more stress on maneuver operations. In particular, this relies on a mutual combination of railway, highway, sea, and helicopter transportation plus the units’ own motorized [transportation]; [requires] adapting to complex conditions, including various types of meteorological, geographic, and EM conditions; and cuts across theaters to organize and implement fairly large-scale rapid projection. When necessary, [Army leaders] also can rapidly project force-strength of a certain scale to key point areas beyond the borders. This type of full-zone maneuver should focus on strategic application of the Army on a background of wartime high-intensity confrontation; meet the needs of using troops in many directions, for many threats, and for many missions; according to the requirements for rapid reaction, rapid projection, rapid disposition, and rapid activities, conduct organic {chengjianzhi} full-
zone maneuver integrating personnel with equipment and operational strength with support strength; and work hard to realize combat as soon as completing projection, as well as combat while implementing projection.

3-D attack and defense. The many high-tech local wars since the 1990s demonstrate that land battles under informationized conditions are increasingly evincing trends toward “multiphibious” {duogiqi} activities, integrated network-electronic [warfare (INEW)] {wangdian yiti}, and an emphasis on the offensive, but also emphasizing special operations. The main battlefield for future PLAA operations will not be inland areas in the homeland depth, but even more frequently will be border areas, seacoast [littoral] areas, and offshore islands and reefs, but also could extend beyond the borders and to strategic channels and strategic vital areas where our security and development interests are at stake. Strategic application of the Army should break with the longstanding limitations of ground defensive operations as primary and close combat as primary; establish the strategic orientation of large-scope, [end of page 205] full-depth, 3-D attack and defense operations; and realize 3-D fire strike, 3-D assault operations, 3-D battlefield protection, and 3-D comprehensive support, all under informationized conditions. The main things are to rely on broad-zone, multidimensional military information systems; synthetically apply ground forces, Army aviation forces, EW forces, information attack and defense forces, SOF, and air-defense/anti-missile forces; execute combined air-ground medium/long-range precision fire strikes; carry out operational activities such as ground assault operations, low-altitude/ultralow-altitude strike operations, amphibious assault operations, information attack and defense operations, special infiltration operations, and battlefield air defense/anti-missile operations, as well as legal warfare, public opinion warfare, and psychological warfare [PSYWAR/PSYOP]; and synchronously carry out full-zone, full-course, rapid and precise comprehensive support.

Strengthened control. As the Army is the decisive force for ground operations, its functions and role, under the conditions of the new era, are absolutely not just limited to attacking cities and seizing territory, but even more lie in bringing into play strategic effects in controlling situations and gaining victory. Strategic application of the Army requires emphasizing the idea of control; implementing strengthened control over the entire course of military activities, and a mutual combination of centralized unified command and ad hoc decision; precisely adjusting-controlling the activities objectives, modes, tempo, and intensity; laying stress on flexible combination in application of force-strength; fully bringing into play handling power for crises and disturbances, decisive victory power for attacking fortified positions and overcoming difficulties, responsive power for complex situations, and control power for maintaining stability; and seeking the maximum strategic benefit. In peacetime, by actively preparing for war, and carrying out military deterrence and non-war military activities, [the Army] achieves the goals of
deterring foreign enemy threats, maintaining domestic stability, and safeguarding the rights and interests of the state. In wartime, under complementation by the other services, it will actively seize land battlefield dominance, sabotage and capture the enemy’s critical nodes on the ground, limit enemy ground maneuver, suppress enemy ground firepower and information attacks, and strip away the enemy ground forces’ will to resist. After the war, it will serve as the main force for wide-ranging participation in activities to maintain stability; maintain a presence, control the posture, and lead the situation; ensure a smooth transition from war status to peacetime status; and ultimately convert victory in military terms into victory in political terms.

Section 2: Naval Strategy…206

Naval strategy indicates the concepts and tactics for operations-research-based planning and guidance of the overall situation of naval building and application; it is subordinate to and in the service of military strategy. Under the new historic conditions, naval strategy should focus on winning an informationized local war in the sea directions, consolidating the nation’s coastal defense security, safeguarding the sovereignty of the state’s territorial waters, maintaining the state’s maritime rights and interests, and brace-supporting the expansion of the state’s maritime rights and interests; uphold the basic spirit of active defense; persist in a mutual combination of deterrence and real combat; constantly innovate and develop naval strategy; and work hard in the struggle to realize the objectives of a “sea power.” [end of page 206]

I. Historical evolution of naval strategy…207

Since the People’s Navy was founded on 23 April 1949, its strategic development has undergone three historic phases: “coastal defense to inshore defense,” “offshore defense,” and “offshore defense and blue-water defense.”

The first phase was from 1949 to the late 1970s. The Navy took Mao Zedong’s important expositions on Navy building and application as the overall guide, and its strategic thought underwent a conversion from “coastal defense” to “inshore defense.” In January 1949, the Party Central Committee [CCCPC] issued a strategic decision on organizing/building “a Navy to safeguard the coastal and river [areas],” which provided basic adherence for the “coastal defense” strategic thought in the Navy’s newly established period. After the founding of New China, Mao Zedong further clarified the Navy’s strategic missions: “to eliminate the harassment from the pirates, and support the safety of seaway transport; to prepare strength for recovering Taiwan at a suitable time opportunity and finally unify the entire homeland; and to prepare strength for opposing the aggression of imperialism coming from the sea toward us, China must for a long time
— based on the situation of industrial building and development and on the public-finance situation — build a powerful Navy in planned fashion and in step-by-step fashion.”\textsuperscript{58} The Navy fought while building and accelerated its development; by the end of 1955, it had become a sea force having five service arms: surface ship forces, submarine forces, naval aviation force units, coastal-defense force units, and naval marine forces. Moreover, it had outstandingly fulfilled operational missions to penetrate naval blockades and liberate the eastern Zhejiang coastal islands. In this period, since Navy building was just getting started, the ships were few in number, low in tonnage, and weak in firepower; the operational SoS had still not taken shape; and the Navy lacked the capability for independently carrying out strategic missions. It could only complement the Army and Air Force in coastal water zones in carrying out operational missions, and “coastal defense” essentially was a limited extension of land military struggle in the coastal areas. From the late 1950s to the end of the 1970s, the Navy’s strategic mission changed from liberating the enemy-held coastal islands to safeguarding the nation’s coastal defense. Navy building also constantly achieved progress; in particular, weapons and equipment realized a conversion from assigned manufacturing and copying improvements to basically self-development \{ziwo yanzhi\}. The Navy, as an independent strategic-quality service, turned to implementing “inshore defense,” and correspondingly put forth the strategic theories of “naval sabotage-raid guerrilla warfare,” “opening up an independent battlefield at sea,” and “relying on island and coastal operations.”

The second phase was from the 1980s to the early period of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. The Navy, taking Deng Xiaoping’s and Jiang Zemin’s \textbf{[end of page 207]} important expositions on Navy building and application as guidance, formally put forth the “offshore defense” strategy, and formed a Navy strategic theory SoS. In July 1979, Deng Xiaoping pointed out: “Our strategy is offshore operations. Unlike the hegemonists, we do not reach out our hands everywhere. Our building of the Navy basically is for defense, and in the face of the powerful navies of the hegemonists, not having the appropriate strength would not at all do.”\textsuperscript{59} In order to adapt to the major changes in national and armed forces strategy, based on the offshore-defense strategic thought put forth by Deng Xiaoping, at the end of 1985 the Navy for the first time clarified the “offshore defense” strategy, and began to propel a major transformation from “inshore defense” to “offshore defense.” The main connotations of this strategy included the following: first, offshore defense belongs to an area (zone) defense-type strategy; i.e., it is not blue-ocean offense \{yuanyang jingong\}, nor is it coastal defense. Second, the nature of offshore defense is a defensive one. This is


something decided by China’s socialist nature and independent and autonomous peaceful foreign policy; and even in future Navy modernization, this defensive nature still cannot be changed. Third, the Navy’s operational sea areas for a fairly long time to come mainly will be the First Island Chain and the outlying sea areas along this island chain, as well as the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea areas within this island chain. Fourth, the strategic goals are to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity, as well as maritime rights and interests; to deal with local wars at sea; to contain and defend against imperialist and hegemonist aggression from the sea; and to maintain peace in the Asian-Pacific Area. Fifth, the strategic missions can be differentiated into two respects: peacetime and wartime. The peacetime missions mainly are to realize and maintain national unity, to safeguard territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, to serve the state’s foreign policy, to deter any aggression which can come from the sea, to deal with any local war at sea which can occur, and to assist-support and participate in socialist construction. The wartime missions mainly are to conduct independent or coordinated Army-Air Force operations, to effectively resist enemy attacks from the ocean direction, to protect friendly sea lines of communication and transport, and under unified guidance by the supreme command, to participate in nuclear counterattack operations. Entering the 90s, the 3rd-generation CCCPC leadership collective, with Jiang Zemin as the core, focused on the overall situation of, and long-term guihua planning for, national development strategy; seized the historic development opportunity of the turn of the century; and further enriched, perfected, and developed “offshore defense” strategic thought. The Navy adhered to the new era’s military-strategic concept, and laid the foundation for forming a streamlined and effective weapons and equipment SoS adapted to operations under high-tech conditions, for accelerating construction of emergency mobile operational units, for having deterrent and real-combat capabilities to carry out new-era military struggle missions, and for realizing the “Three Step” development strategy.

In the third phase, in place since 2004, the Navy has fully implemented Hu Jintao’s important expositions on Navy building and application, and has accelerated realization of the strategic expansion from “offshore defense” to “offshore defense and blue-water defense.” This gradually extends the strategic forward edge from offshore to blue waters which involve the state’s survival and development interests; it also carries out unified operations-research-based planning of strategic requirements for responding to multiple security threats at sea and for fulfilling diversified military missions at sea, unified operations-research-based planning for offshore and blue-water battlefield construction, and unified operations-research-based planning for mechanized and informationized

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composite development. While constantly boosting the offshore comprehensive \{zonghe\} operational capability, [this involves] a gradual transformation to blue-water defense, boosting of blue-water maneuver operations capability, progressive construction of a sea defense SoS adapted to the requirements for maintaining the state’s ocean security and development interests, and active containment of and effective response to war threats coming from the ocean direction.

II. The Navy’s strategic missions...209

At present and even for quite a long period in the future, the expansion of our state’s interests will mainly be in the ocean, the national security threats will mainly be in the ocean, and the focal points of military struggle will mainly be in the ocean; responding to a local war at sea under informationized conditions has become a key point of the preparations for military struggle. Synthesizing China’s maritime security circumstances and the phased-nature features of the development of maritime interests, the Navy’s strategic missions have a concentrated embodiment in the following several respects.

Participation in large-scale operations in the main strategic direction. The Navy serves as the main-body strength for the PLA’s naval operations; it must stay grounded in the most difficult and most complex situations, place the key points on centering on the requirements for large-scale operations and decisive battles for decisive victory in the main strategic direction, and earnestly and properly carry out the preparations for military struggle. In accord with unified disposition by the CCCPC and the Central Military Commission [CMC], [the Navy] tightly joins with the forces of the other services and arms to conduct multiple operational activities, including information assault \{tuji\}, fire strike, sea-air blockade, 3-D island landing, and multidimensional \{duowei\} protection, plus countering of the powerful enemy’s intervention; seizes and controls battlefield comprehensive dominance; controls the development of the war situation; seizes victory in war; and resolutely safeguards national unity.

Containment of and resistance to military invasion at sea. Mao Zedong once pointed out: “From 1840 to the present day — more than 100 years — the Opium War [1830-42], the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and the Eight-Power Allied Forces War of Invasion of China [in 1900] all made their way in from the sea.” Opposition to foreign enemies’ sea invasions was a basic strategic consideration in our Party’s establishment of the Navy, and is the fundamental long-term strategic mission of the People’s Navy. The coastal areas are the sites of China’s political, economic, cultural, and transportation centers, and the 12 coastal provinces (cities, autonomous areas) concentrate 38.5% of the national population, plus 34.3% of the large and mid-sized cities and 66.1% of GDP. From an overall viewpoint, the defensive forces for these areas are still not very strong; moreover,
these areas directly face the powerful enemy’s sea/air/space-net superior operational [end of page 209] SoS, and under war conditions they very likely will become the strike areas (zones) of first choice by the powerful enemy. The Navy should join with the forces of the other services and arms to contain, guard against, and resist attacks which can come from the sea directions, and in particular should ensure homeland security against fairly large-scale and fairly high-intensity medium/long-range precision strike. The capital’s future air defense should mainly consider the powerful enemy’s air and space-net strategic surprise attacks coming from ocean directions; and the Navy should actively pre-position, expand the blocking and strike depth, bring into play strategic containment and strike effectiveness, and thus play an important role in maintaining the capital’s security.

Maintaining island sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. China has a seacoast line of more than 18,000 km, more than 6500 islands, and approximately 3 million square km of jurisdictional sea zones. Gross marine economic output rapidly rose from more than 6 billion yuan in 1978 to almost 4.3 trillion yuan RMB in 2011, representing 10% of GDP, and sea products already have become an important industry brace-supporting the sustained development of the national economy. For historical and actual reasons, China and several neighboring nations in the sea directions are engaged in disputes on island and reef ownership or jurisdictional sea-zone borders. Approximately 1.5 million square km of jurisdictional sea zones are actually controlled by other nations, and more than 50 islands and reefs are occupied by the associated nations. This has formed a situation where islands and reefs have been invaded and occupied, sea zones broken apart, and resources plundered; and the struggle centering on island and reef sovereignty and maritime rights and interests is complex and sensitive. Under the premise of maintaining overall stability in maritime circumstances, effectively maintaining sovereignty and rights and interests, halting maritime infringement and illegal activity, and ensuring the normal launching of our maritime production, exploitation, and scientific research activity are long-term and arduous missions facing the Navy.

Protecting the security of ocean lines of communication and transport. China already has become a world economic and trade power, with both ends of its production process — resources and marketing — on the world market. The foreign-trade total export-import volume already exceeds 60% of GDP, foreign dependence on China’s raw uranium and iron ore exceeds 50%, and more than 90% of export-import materiel relies on sea transport. China has successively opened up more than 30 blue-water transport navigation routes, connecting to more than 1200 harbors in more than 150 nations and areas around the world via many internationally important straits and waterways, such as the Strait of Malacca. These navigation routes and waterways already have become the “lifelines” of our socioeconomic development, and although in overall terms they are kept unimpeded,
they are nonetheless not owned by us, nor are they controlled by us. Once a crisis or war at sea occurs, our sea transport has the possibility to be cut off. In recent years, pirates and seagoing terrorists have rapidly multiplied, and some important international sea zones as represented by the Gulf of Aden-Somalia sea zone have become frequently occurring areas for piracy, which is an increasingly prominent threat to the safety of our sea traffic and transport. Since December 2008, the Navy has launched standing escort activities in the Gulf of Aden-Somalia sea zone. In the future, the Navy’s missions to protect the sea lines of communication [SLOC] and to ensure the safety of sea traffic and transport [end of page 210] will be very strenuous.

Participation in maintaining overseas interests, as well as the rights and interests of citizens and overseas nationals. Along with the advance of the state’s “going out [going global]” strategy, Chinese institutions, personnel, and assets are spreading across the whole world. China also has opened up fishing grounds in the three big oceans other than the Arctic Ocean; every year more than 1800 fishing boats carry out trawling in sea zones near more than 30 nations. Overseas safety problems are growing more and more prominent; overseas assets have been encroached on, and incidents of harm to the lives of citizens and overseas nationals are assuming a rising trend. In 2010, the Navy travelled to Libya to conduct activities for evacuating [Chinese] personnel, and thus set the first example of the Navy’s overseas rescue activities. Safeguarding the state’s overseas interests and the rights and interests of citizens and overseas nationals will become a regular strategic mission for the Navy.

Participation in carrying out nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterattack. Sea-based nuclear strength is an important component of China’s strategic nuclear forces. Along with the development of science and technology [S&T] levels and the constant elevation of equipment performance, the integrated-whole capability of China’s sea-based nuclear strength has constantly improved. Within future military struggle and especially under war conditions, the enemies facing China may possess nuclear forces and even have nuclear superiority, and their carrying out of nuclear threats and even nuclear strikes against us is not excluded. The Navy must bring into play superiority in the fine concealed quality, powerful strike capability, and broad operational scope of its sea-based nuclear strength, coordinate with the other strategic nuclear forces, actively launch nuclear-deterrence and nuclear-counterattack operational activities, and smash the enemy’s nuclear blackmail and nuclear strike plots against us.

Complementation of military struggle in the land directions. China’s future land-perimeter security environment overall will tend toward stability, but many unsafe and unstable factors will still be present, and under certain conditions there will be the possibility for crises occurring, for setting off conflicts, and even for escalation into war.
Under unified guidance and disposition by the CMC, the Navy should actively unfold sea deterrence and operational activities, bring into play the strategic flanking and containment roles of the sea battlefield, and forcefully complement and assist-support the land operations.

In addition, participation in maintaining the security of international ocean space also is an increasingly important strategic mission for China’s Navy. The oceans are treasure-houses for humanity’s strategic resources and great channels for humankind’s association; and maintaining the security of this space has major significance for promoting the peace and development of humankind. The prominent characteristic of the oceans lies in that the vast majority [of its space] is open seas, and is common space for humanity’s survival and development. China, as a power having world influence, participates in maintaining international ocean security; this not only is a need and requirement for maintaining its own security interests, but also is an important embodiment of performing international duties. In 2008, Hu Jintao put forth to the world a proposal for constructing harmonious oceans, and clarified the direction for the Chinese Navy’s participation in maintaining international ocean security. In 2012, the Party’s 18th National Congress Report put forth the objective of “building an ocean power.” Along with the enhancement of China’s comprehensive real strength and the development of Navy building, the Navy as an [end of page 211] international-quality service, will undertake even more missions and play even greater roles within the historic progress of maintaining international ocean security, constructing harmonious oceans, and building an ocean power.

III. Building and development of the Navy…212

Building a powerful modern Navy has since the founding of New China been a strategic long-cherished wish of the CCCPC and CMC leadership collective. In the early period of the Navy’s founding, Mao Zedong five times in a row wrote an inscription saying, “In order to oppose imperialist aggression, we surely must build a powerful Navy.” At the end of the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping put forth the need to “build a powerful Navy having modern combat capability.” In the 1990s, Jiang Zemin put forth the need to “build a powerful modern Navy having comprehensive operational capability.” In the new century and new phase, Hu Jintao put forth “the need to build a powerful People’s Navy worthy of the nation’s position, and adapted to the requirements for performing the PLA’s historic missions in the new century and new phase.” He also put forth clear objectives in the struggle for building and development of the People’s Navy.

In the early period of army building, the Navy established a building concept {jianshe fangzhen} which set out from a long-term building focus and from the situation at that
time, to build a modern, light naval combat force for offshore defense and rich in attack and defense capabilities. The Navy regarded development of new forces such as torpedo boats, submarines, and naval aviation forces as the key points of building, and from this it formed a naval equipment building concept with “air, diving, and speed” as the key points. By the end of the 1970s, the Navy had developed into an inshore-type naval operational strength with a shore-based fighter aviation force, conventional submarines, and various types of fast [attack] craft as primary. After the mid-80s, along with the strategic-quality transformation carried out in the guidance thought for PLA building, the Navy put forth the “offshore defense” strategy; laid stress on building a streamlined, useful People’s Navy having modern operational capability; and put forth a building concept which had key points and followed proportional, balanced development. Since the 90s, under the pull and driving of the new era’s military-strategic concept, centering on having comprehensive operational capability offshore for carrying out sea campaigns, the pace of Navy building significantly accelerated, and resulted in progressive formation of a Navy weapons and equipment SoS which took nuclear submarines, long-range sea strike aircraft, large-to-mid-sized surface ships, and long-range precision strike weapons as the backbone, electronic information equipment as the tie, and logistics and assisting-support equipment as support. The Navy thus became a strategic-quality service composed of five arms — surface ships, submarines, an aviation force, a coastal defense force, and marine forces — as well as associated professional support strengths, and having fairly strong offshore operational capability.

Entering the new century and new phase, following the main-topic, mainline, major strategic thought of national defense and armed forces building, and according to the strategic requirements for “offshore defense and blue-water defense,” the Navy continued to perfect mechanized building; [end of page 212] energetically drove informationized building; and emphasized boosting of sea-based nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterattack capabilities, sea-maneuver operational capability, and land-based defensive capability, as well as the capability for conducting non-war military activities. It also exerted effort to resolve prominent problems such as low informationized overall levels, “short boards” present in the joint operational SoS, a force-strength structure still not sufficiently optimized, and the comprehensive quality of the officers and men — especially their informationized quality — not being sufficiently high; and it gradually constructed a sea defensive SoS adapted to the needs and requirements of winning informationized sea battles, and adapted to the requirements for performing diversified military missions.

All-around reinforcement of sea information system building. Information systems are the centers in which the Navy carries out military activities at sea, and are the main brace-support for forming at-sea SoS operational capability. The developed nations’
Navies are equipped with satellites, early-warning aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and shore-based and sea-based long-range radar; the functional scope of their information systems can cover the outer-space, air, surface, underwater, and EM spaces. These systems can realize long-range detection, identification friend or foe [IFF], tracking and positioning, fire distribution, and weapons vectoring for sea-air targets, and not only can support the needs and requirements of operational command at different levels — strategic, campaign, and tactical — but also can support the needs and requirements for use of the various types of weapons. The US aircraft carrier formations, under the assisting support of reconnaissance satellites, have a monitoring scope as large as 1500-1800 km — basically matched to the sea and shore strike range of shipboard aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. Compared to the developed nations’ navies, our Navy’s information-system building levels still show a very large gap, and in some important fields still show a void. In view of this, we need to regard reinforcement of information system building as a strategic-quality, basic project for altering the Navy’s combat-power generation model and for building an informationized Navy; strengthen the building of shore-based information systems, space-based information systems, air-based information systems, and underwater information systems; drive the expansion of the critical nodes for information awareness from land-based and sea-based to air-based and space-based; drive the development of information transmission toward networking and SoS [functionality]; and drive the linked advance of C2 toward strategic, campaign, and tactical mutual fusion, and integration \{yiti\} of force-strength command and weapons control.

Accelerated development of the Navy’s new-generation main battle weapons and equipment. [This means] adapting to the operational needs and requirements for offshore defense and blue-water defense under informationized conditions; aiming at the naval-weapons development trends of the world powers; and based on the deep and shallow-depth characteristics of the natural geography in the sea areas facing us, placing the key points on developing aircraft-carrier-centered heavy/mid-sized surface operational ships, advanced strategic nuclear submarines [SSBNs], attack nuclear submarines, and conventional submarines, plus long-range multifunctional naval operational aircraft, sea (surface, underwater, air) unmanned operational platforms, and high-performance surface-to-air, anti-ship, and ship-to-shore missiles \{duikong duihai duian daodan\}. [This also involves] synchronously developing operational support equipment; earnestly resolving the equipment short boards restricting the current Navy’s SoS operational capability, and in particular its blue-water operational capability; and accelerating the formation of an equipment SoS with 4th-generation equipment as the backbone and 3rd-generation equipment as the main body, so as to have [end of page 213] a mutual combination of underwater, surface, and air, and mutual linkup of long, medium, and short ranges. For the foreseeable future, aircraft carriers still will be the main platforms
for the integrated projection \{zonghe toudong\} of sea firepower, force-strength, and information power. Around the world today, there are 9 nations possessing more than 20 aircraft carriers of various types, with the U.S., Russia, UK, and India now actively developing new types of carriers. Development of aircraft carriers has major significance for maintaining China’s international position, and for boosting sea deterrence and real-combat capability. The PLA within practice needs to gradually explore forming a set of aircraft-carrier development and application models with Chinese characteristics, accelerate the development of China’s carrier formations, and thus bring into play an important role in military struggle at sea under the new historic conditions.

Concerted effort to develop sea-based strategic nuclear strength. Sea-based strategic nuclear strength can launch a nuclear strike from a concealed spot in the ocean depths, and is seen by the world’s main nuclear powers as a reliable means for maintaining a nuclear counterattack capability. At present, in the U.S. and Russia, the proportion of their total nuclear strength represented by sea-based nuclear strength exceeds one-half; in France it exceeds 80%; and the UK’s nuclear strength totally relies on SSBNs. After the founding of New China, owing to the explorations and struggles of several generations of men, sea-based nuclear strength building has realized achievements of world interest; but the gap compared with the developed nations is still large, no matter whether in scale or in quality. In view of the objective circumstances of active development of a missile defense system by the U.S. and some of [China’s] surrounding nations, development of sea-based nuclear strength has important significance for maintaining the reliability, dependability, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterattack. According to the principle of “having both nuclear and conventional [capabilities] for dual operations,” the Navy should accelerate the development and fielding of new types of SSBNs, to form an operational capability for sea nuclear counterattack of a certain scale.

Readjustment of naval force-strength dispositions and battlefield arrangements. According to the strategic requirements for offshore defense and blue-water defense, via unified operations-research-based planning of the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea force-strength dispositions and battlefield construction, [the Navy will organize:] proper organic linkup of the three strategic areas (zones), viz., the mainland coast, offshore, and blue water; consolidation in the north and expansion southward, with a southward shift of the center of gravity [COG] and moderate advance; and a mutual combination of bases for brace-support and forward-edge pre-positioning. [The Navy will thus] progressively construct a large-area (zone) sea defense SoS backed by the mainland, relying on the islands and reefs and projection of forces, and so create a favorable posture for operations within the First Island Chain and radiating outward. [This involves] reinforcing large/mid-sized harbor and backbone airfield construction.
with strategic home ports as the key points to meet the needs and requirements for mooring and replenishment of aircraft carriers, SSBNs, and heavy destroyer-escort formations.

Focus on future sea-battle characteristics, for optimized force-strength structure. [This means] changing the Navy’s long-standing force-strength task organization model of organizational grouping per service arm, progressively converting to a force-strength task organization model with missions in the lead, and thus greatly elevating unit rapid reaction capability and comprehensive operational capability. Based on the progress of aircraft carrier development and fielding, [the Navy should] in good time organize/build aircraft carrier formations, and form strategic “fist” forces for naval maneuver operations. [This involves] reinforcing the building of new types of operational strength and support strength at sea, moderately augmenting them with naval special operations and amphibious operations force-strength, [end of page 214] further optimizing the Navy command structure, and appropriately reducing the command levels, to boost command effectiveness.

IV. Strategic application of the Navy...215

Along with the change of sea-battle modes under informationized conditions and the energetic expansion of the state’s interests in the ocean direction, the spaces, timing, modes, and guidance principles for strategic application of the Navy are now undergoing major changes. As a synthetic-quality, strategic-quality, international-quality service, the Navy must comprehensively perform the armed forces’ historic missions in the new century and new phase, and — while persisting in winning local war at sea under informationized conditions — it also must attach high importance to peacetime non-war application, fully bring into play its strategic effectiveness, and provide firm assurances for maintaining national unity and security and for safeguarding maritime rights and interests and the expansion of those interests.

(1) Wartime application of the Navy

The People’s Navy was born and grew up in war, during which it successively fulfilled a series of naval operational missions, and put forth naval operational guidance thought rich in PLA characteristics. In the early days of building, in order to prevent a U.S. invasion at sea and safeguard coastal security, the Navy established the concept of operations [CONOPS] of “strategic defense with tactical offense.” In 1953, in order to respond to the naval blockade and sabotage by the Taiwan Kuomintang [KMT] armed forces, the Navy established the CONOPS of “projection of strength, for active operations.” In 1957, it formally put forth the CONOPS of “sea sabotage-raid warfare,”
and in 1960 this developed into “development of sea sabotage-raid warfare, and opening up of sea independent battlefields.” In the 80s, based on the “offshore defense” strategy, and focusing on responding to and resisting large-scale invasions by foreign enemies, the Navy established the CONOPS of “active defense, with offshore operations.”

Under the new historic conditions, the [type of] war facing the Navy has changed from all-out war under mechanized conditions to local war at sea under informationized conditions. The characteristics of this type of sea battle are as follows: first is the background complexity. In the conflicts and even wars set off in the sea directions, the contradictions are many and the incentives are many; among these conflicts and wars there are not only the differences in terms of battlefield conditions, strength comparisons, and operational goals, but also very strong relevance due to the interweaving of the contradictions in interests. Our operations in a certain direction and against a certain specific opponent may trigger a chain reaction in other directions and even areas up to an international scope. Second is the high informationized degree. Our possible objects of operations in sea directions attach full importance to developing naval operational strength, and have fielded advanced offensive-quality weapons. Some of these nations also have naval maneuver-operations formations with perfected attack and defense capability, and during operations can obtain assisting support from extraterritorial powers. One can foresee that in the local wars occurring in the future in the sea directions, the battlefields will involve the land, sea, air, space, and EM domains; the various missiles, smart torpedoes and mines, and other informationized weapons will see wide-ranging use; and air, surface, and [end of page 215] underwater long-range precision strike, network and EM warfare, and special sabotage-raid will become the basic modes of sea battle. Third is the complexity of operational activities. On one hand this is expressed by the diversity of naval operational patterns, including offensive naval force-strength group operations, naval blockade operations, island and reef offensive operations, operations to protect SLOC, base defense operations, and conventional shore-raid operations. On the other hand, this is also expressed by these operational patterns very likely concurrently intersecting. The scope and degree of their concurrent intersection will be somewhat different based on the differing objects of operations, and even when directed against the same opponent they will still show very great differences on the different backgrounds: low-level strike, mid-level strike, and violent strike.

Based on the characteristics of sea battles under informationized conditions and on the reality of our naval operational capability, our Navy’s future operations should lay stress on the following four aspects:

First is to lay stress on deep operations. Naval operations cannot be limited to offshore, and cannot be plugged in offshore; they must have unified operations-research-based
planning for the two battlefields — offshore and blue water. Expanding the scope of naval operations requires mutually combining strikes at the enemy’s forward edge with strikes in the enemy rear, and mutually combining naval operations with operations in the air, mainland-coast, outer-space, and network and EM spaces. In view of military intervention by external forces — especially the emphasis on “knockout” \( \{dachuqu\} \) — [the Navy should] put into effect a policy of advancing if the enemy advances, and form a momentum \( \{shi\} \) of deep defense and deterrence against the enemy.

Second is laying stress on offensive operations. In view of the complex and changeable maritime security circumstances, future local war at sea will rely on offensive operations to gain the initiative and strive for victory. Naval operational guidance will elevate offense from the campaign and tactical levels to the strategic level, and will conduct resolute, swift, uninterrupted offensive activities to paralyze the enemy operational SoS, strip away the enemy operational superiority, control the battlefield situation, and control the progress and outcome of the war. In terms of force-strength application, under assisting support by the other services and arms, the emphasis is on conducting offensive activities such as naval joint-maneuver formations for sea-air strike, submarine force-strength for underwater blockade and control, a strike aviation force for air strike, and special forces for infiltration and sabotage-raid — to seize battlefield comprehensive dominance.

Third is laying stress on joint operations. Integrated joint operations are the basis for forming SoS superiority in local war at sea, and are the Navy’s main form-state in offshore operations. The Navy not only needs to bring into play the role of the main operational strengths at sea, but also needs to focus on forming joint operational superiority, and — according to the requirements for unified distribution of missions, unified task organization of force-strength, and unified implementation of command — subordinate itself to the overall situation needs and requirements, form a naval operational SoS with tri-service integration and military-civilian integration, and bring into play the integrated superiority \( \{zonghe youshi\} \) of information, force-strength, and firepower.

Fourth is laying stress on asymmetric operations. Focusing on the different characteristics of the offshore battlefield and blue-water battlefield, [the Navy] should put into effect operational guidance which has differences but also has connections. The offshore battlefield emphasizes integrated-whole attack and defense operations with multiple operational patterns simultaneously or alternately in play, to form battlefield victorious momentum in the main direction and against the main object of operations, \[end of page 216\] and to create the conditions for blue-water operations. The blue-water battlefield emphasizes relatively independent operations under joint operations conditions, lays
stress on the application of submarines and a long-range-strike aviation force, and also lays stress on strikes against the enemy’s important nodes and high-value targets. By pushing the battlefield toward the enemy’s campaign and strategic depth, this eases the pressure on the offshore battlefield.

(2) Non-war application of the Navy

Since its establishment, the People’s Navy has undertaken and fulfilled a large number of non-war military missions, including fishing patrol and escort and marine scientific exploration. Entering the new century, along with the expansion of the state’s interests in the sea directions and the growth of non-traditional security threats at sea, the position and role of non-war application of the Navy took on unprecedented prominence. As marked by the Gulf of Aden and Somalia escort and the Libyan evacuation activities, the Navy’s non-war military activities evinced new features, including normality of blue-water escort, regularity of blue-water activity, and diversification of activities content. The Navy’s track spread across the vast majority of the sea zones around the world, and the Navy’s activities covered the main fields of non-war application: sea reconnaissance, marine survey, maintenance of maritime rights, military cooperation at sea, antiterrorism at sea, anti-piracy, rescue and disaster relief, and handling of outbreak incidents at sea. Under the new circumstances, the People’s Navy’s launching of non-war military activities not only was an important embodiment of the state’s external policy, but also was specific practice for China’s construction of harmonious oceans.

Non-war application of the Navy should uphold subservience to the needs and requirements of the state’s political and diplomatic policies and economic development, take maintenance of maritime rights as the key point, take maritime security cooperation as the backing, focus on serving the big picture, actively participate in wide-ranging cooperation, constantly enlarge the scope and fields of activity, exert effort to expand the influence of the state and the armed forces, and promote area and world peace. The Navy should lay stress on grasping the following several aspects.

First is expanding the force-strength activity space. The state’s new security and interests setup in the sea directions objectively requires the Navy to constantly boost its capability to respond to outbreak incidents at sea and to maintain overseas interests. This inevitably requires the Navy to further expand the spatial scope of force-strength peacetime activity, and further reinforce the seagoing military presence focusing on the strategic transport channels and the important rights areas. Such expansion and reinforcement not only include further regularity in Navy blue-water tours to launch anti-terrorism and anti-piracy activity, but also include further regularity in blue-water scientific exploration and
survey, medical treatment at sea, and ship visits to foreign countries, as well as maritime peacekeeping and humanitarian relief.

Second is expanding the scope of force-strength employment. Non-war military activities are an important avenue for boosting and testing the core military capabilities. The diversity of China’s sea threats has decided the diversity in the Navy’s non-war military activities and the wide-ranging quality of the unit missions. The Navy should further broaden [end of page 217] the scope of force-strength employment for launching non-war military activities. It should have even more operational units participating in non-war military activities for testing of equipment, refining of work style, and boosting of capability. At the same time, it also needs to lay stress on bringing into play the role of the Navy’s professional support strengths; reinforce the building and unified allocation and use of the Navy’s professional strengths; take medical treatment and rescue, materiel replenishment, special equipment maintenance, and the foreign affairs and legal professions as key points; and thus gradually forge a Navy non-war professional contingent adapted to blue-water mission requirements and having multiple capabilities. The Navy should also have even more hospital ships, replenishment ships, and professional support detachments mounting the stage of military activities at sea.

Third is expanding maritime security cooperation. In line with the spirit of openness, dealing with concrete work-related matters, and cooperation, and adapting to the new characteristics and new requirements of normality in naval escort missions and of diversification in force-strength activities, the Navy should place the key points on the ocean common-security field centering on international peacekeeping, disaster relief and rescue, and maritime anti-terrorism and anti-piracy; deepen the relations with friendly nations’ navies; reinforce contacts with the associated nations’ navies; and increase the degree of force in personnel and warship mutual visits and military exchanges of views. The Navy especially needs to fully exploit the international platforms provided for multinational activities such as blue-water escort and joint rescue, constantly expand and deepen maritime security cooperation, and progressively boost our right of say and influencing power in international ocean security matters.

Section 3: Air Force Strategy…218

Air Force strategy indicates the concepts and tactics for operations-research-based planning and guidance of the overall situation of Air Force building and application; it is subordinate to and in the service of military strategy. Along with the changes in China’s security environment, as well as the expansion of air and space where the state has interests and the increasing sharpness of the struggle in the air and space field, China’s strategic needs for air and space security have further increased. The People’s Air Force
is now accelerating transformational building, and energetically propelling the conversion from aviation forces to integrated air and space forces {kongtian yitihua liliang}, the conversion from a mechanized Air Force to an informationized Air Force, and the conversion from air assisting-support-type strength to strategic leading strength — and is thus bringing into play an increasingly prominent strategic role in performing the PLA’s historic missions in the new century and new phase.

I. Historical evolution of Air Force strategy...218

The People’s Air Force was founded on 11 November 1949. In the more than 60 years since then, the Air Force’s strategic development has undergone three important phases.

(1) Period of initial establishment

On an occasion when we were about to gain nationwide victory in the Revolutionary War, the CCCPC in its [end of page 218] instructions The Present Circumstances and the Party’s Missions in 1949, clearly pointed out that in 1949 and 1950, [we should] strive to compose an Air Force capable of employment. In July 1949, the CMC sent a cable to the Fourth Field Army, and in it put forth the building of an Air Force as the most important mission at that time. After the Korean War broke out, Mao Zedong on 28 June 1950 in his essay Halting the New Aggression of the American Imperialists Against Asia, pointed out the following: “We have fought battles for several decades, and have built a powerful Army …. Today, we have the conditions for building a Navy and Air Force, and should set our hands to building a powerful Navy and a powerful Air Force. In particular, the Air Force is extremely important to national defense, so we should quickly build it” [ellipsis in the original]. By 1955, the People’s Air Force had gone through the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and the preparations for military struggle to liberate Taiwan in the early period of New China’s founding, plus the severe test of air defense struggle, and had already begun to take shape. Since the national economic and S&T foundation in the early period of New China’s founding was weak, and the aviation industry was very backward, the CCCPC and CMC established the guidance thought of “building an Air Force on the Army’s foundation,” required the Air Force to undertake strategic missions to “annihilate the enemy remnants and consolidate national defense,” and took the path of first establishing the Air Force and then developing the aviation industry. In particular, during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the newly established People’s Air Force — faced the world’s most powerful air force, viz. the US Air Force [USAF] — formulated the strategic concept of “tempering and development within real combat.” In the war, [the People’s Air Force] “built up strength, chose its timing, and achieved concentrated employment;” created effective fighting methods such as the “one zone, multiple layers, with a 4-4 system {sisizhi};” and
cultivated a large contingent of combat-experienced pilots.\textsuperscript{61} The People’s Air Force thus swiftly developed and grew.

(2) Homeland air defense period

From 1956 to the 1980s, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and the older generation of revolutionaries and strategists attached high importance to building and development of the People’s Air Force, and stressed placing Air Force building in a precedential position within national defense building. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping said, “In the future battles to be fought, not having an Air Force will not do, and not having command of the air will not do. The Army needs cover and assisting support by the Air Force, and the Navy also cannot do without cover by the Air Force, since our main task is offshore operations. Without command of the air, the enemy’s aircraft can run amuck. No matter what future operations will be like, the Air Force will be first. Among the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, first of all we need to have a powerful Air Force, with which we need to gain command of the air. Otherwise, we will not be able to fight any kind of battle. I see the future key points placed on developing the Air Force. The key points for investment should be placed on the aircraft industry and developing the Air Force.”\textsuperscript{62} In this period, the Air Force established a united air defense tizhi system, with the main strategic missions being to conduct [end of page 219] homeland air defense and to assist-support Army and Navy operations. The Air Force successively established many service arms — an aviation force (including fighter, bomber, ground attack, reconnaissance, and transport aviation forces), an antiaircraft artillery [AAA] arm, a SAM arm, a searchlight arm, a radar arm, and air landing forces — and the People’s Air Force further developed and grew. Based on the CMC’s strategic concept of active defense, the Air Force established the strategic thought of homeland air defense as the main operational goal. At the same time, it implemented the concept of “relying mainly on our own efforts while seeking assistance from abroad;” accelerated the aviation industry’s development; and in terms of weapons and equipment, progressively extricated itself from a situation of total reliance on foreign assistance, and formed a development model with a mutual combination of purchasing and copying and self-development. The Air Force formulated and published a series of laws and regulations, including \textit{Air Force Combat Regulations} and \textit{Flight Orders}; reinforced military training; and played an important role in driving Air Force building and development.

\textsuperscript{61} Translator’s note: the “4-4 system” used two closely coordinated groups of 4 aircraft as the basic operational unit.

(3) Air-border defense period

In the 1990s, our Air Force’s main strategic mission was to conduct air-border defense, so as to ensure seizing command of the air. Under the guidance of the new era’s military-strategic concept, and under the driving force of the worldwide new military transformation, the CCCPC and CMC put forth even stricter requirements for the Air Force’s strategic application and building. In 1997, Jiang Zemin pointed out that the Air Force needed to reinforce the building of offensive air power and of the corresponding full sets of equipment, and to progressively realize the conversion from a homeland air-defense type to a type with both attack and defense [capability]. In 1999, he also stressed the following: “The Air Force undertakes major missions in maintaining national sovereignty and security, and its position and role in future high-tech war will be unusually important. We must build a powerful People’s Air Force with both attack and defense [capability] and having Chinese characteristics.”

On the basis of Air Force strategic studies that unfolded in the mid-to-late 1980s, the Air Force also put forth the strategic thought and mentality of “air-border defense” and “Air Force transformational building;” formulated the building objectives, principles, and measures for conversion from a “homeland air defense type” to a “type having both attack and defense [capability];” accelerated the adjusted-coordinated development of Air Force strategic capability toward attack and defense capability; and propelled the progress of informationized building of the People’s Air Force.

After entry into the 21st century, the CCCPC and CMC clearly required that “In terms of new starting points, [the PLA must] propel the proper but also rapid development of Air Force building, and work hard to build a powerful People’s Air Force adapted to the requirements for performing the PLA’s historic missions in the new century and new phase.”

From the strategic high ground of performing historic missions and maintaining national security and development, this put forth the objectives for Air Force building in the new century and new phase, clarified the development direction for the People’s Air Force, and innovatively developed important strategic thought on building a powerful People’s Air Force. In 2004, [the CCCPC and CMC] clarified the Air Force’s strategic requirements for “air and space integration, with both attack and defense [capability].” On these grounds, the Air Force’s strategic missions further expanded, and on the basis of carrying out homeland air defense and air offensive missions plus

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64 “Work Hard to Build a Powerful People’s Air Force Adapted to the Requirements for Performing the PLA’s Historic Missions in the New Century and New Phase,” carried in Jiefangjun Bao [PLA Daily], 2009-05-23 (1).
missions of assisting support to Army and Navy operations, “planning of air and space” \(\text{jinglue kongjian}\) was regarded as the basic orientation for strategic missions.

II. Strategic missions of the Air Force…221

The Air Force should grasp the strategic requirements for air and space forces to maintain national air and space security, implement the military-strategic concept of active defense, put into effect an Air Force strategy of “air and space integration, with both attack and defense [capability],” establish integrated attack and defense operational thought with seizure of battlefield command of the air as the core, carry out military activities in national sovereignty areas and spaces of strategic interests, mold an air and space posture, control air and space crises, win air and space wars, and provide reliable air and space security support and forceful air and space forces brace-support for the nation’s peaceful development. The Air Force should bring into play its strong points in regard to air and space defense, strategic projection, rapid reaction, 3-D maneuver, area reach, and wide-zone coverage; further bring into play full-dimensional \(\text{quanwei}\) operational functions for reconnaissance, surveillance, attack, defense, and projection; and effectively carry out major military missions and activities for air and space forces display, air and space deterrence and counter-deterrence, and air and space security cooperation. In peaceful times, [this involves] rigorous surveillance of the security posture in strategic spaces, and resistance to all types of outside invasion and harassment. In wartime, [this involves] forceful screening of security for the nation’s core targets, active seizure of command of the air, and bringing into play the main-body role in the struggle to maintain the state’s air and space security. For a time in the future, the main strategic missions of the Air Force will include the following.

First is participation in military struggle in the main strategic direction. Adapting to the needs of military struggle in the main strategic direction [involves] adopting multiple modes and means for air struggle to maintain the pressure on the objects of operations, and at all times preparing to respond to the various crisis incidents which can arise. Once a situation changes, based on unified disposition by the CCCPC and the CMC, the Air Force will conduct operational activities (such as warning/demonstrative fire strikes \(\text{jingshixing huoli daji}\), contingency operations, joint fire strikes, blockade operations, and island-landing operations) of different patterns, scale, and intensity, to participate in joint operations, and at the same time will organize theater air defense operations, to safeguard the security of important targets. [This means] rigorous vigilance and preparations for resisting the air and space military intervention activities which the powerful enemy can adopt.
Second is organizing and conducting peacetime and wartime homeland air defense operations. [This involves] rigorous organizing of routine air defense with the capital as the center, and with the coastal areas as the key points. [The Air Force should] gradually expand the scope of air monitoring and activity, [end of page 221] to effectively maintain the nation’s territorial airspace security and sovereignty. In wartime, under coordination with units of the other services and arms, it should organize joint air defense operations for the capital and other important air defense areas, to ensure air security for the nation’s important strategic targets.

Third is participation in military struggle to safeguard security and stability and maritime rights and interests in border- and coastal-defense areas. [This means] participating in aerial defense of the border- and coastal-defense areas, joining with other services and arms to safeguard homeland security in national border areas and the ocean, and safeguarding the state’s maritime rights and interests. In the sea directions, [the Air Force will] conduct various operational activities coordinated with the Navy; and in the land directions, it will reinforce air warning for border areas, and coordinate with the Army to conduct self-defense operations and contingency activities.

Fourth is participation in activity to maintain domestic social stability and assist-support national construction. [This means] participating in striking at terrorism, striking at the sabotaging activity of hostile forces harming national security and the security of the lives and property of the masses, and maintaining social stability. [The Air Force also will] actively participate in emergency and disaster-relief activities, and provide assisting support to activity for national economic construction.

Fifth is participation in international military exchange and cooperation. This mainly includes activity such as international rescue, peacekeeping activities, escort and evacuation of overseas nationals, and joint military exercises.

**III. Building and development of the Air Force…222**

Under the deep concern and support \{zhichi\} shown by Mao Zedong and the older generation of revolutionaries and strategists, the People’s Air Force building rapidly developed from scratch. Since the mid-1990s, the Air Force has implemented the new era’s military-strategic concept; the various building projects have realized breakthrough advances, and comprehensive operational capability has significantly improved. At present, according to the overall disposition of the armed forces’ “Three Step Development Strategy” for the first half of the 21st century, [the PLA] should phase-by-phase propel the Air Force’s modernization building. The objective of the Air Force’s future development is to build a modern Air Force suited to China’s international
position, adapted to safeguarding national security and development interests, capable of comprehensively carrying out strategic and campaign missions, and having “air and space integration, with both attack and defense [capability].” Today, [the PLA] should aim at a world-class Air Force; adapt to air-combat development trends; focus on meeting the nation’s air defense needs; take information as the lead, air and space integration, having both attack and defense [capability], and full-zone reaction as the development trends; and work hard to drive forward the conversion from a homeland air defense type to a type having both attack and defense [capability], from an aviation type to an air and space integrated type, and from mechanized to informationized [operations].

In order to realize the strategic objectives of Air Force building and development, [the PLA] must work hard to perfect one xitong system, possess five forces, and have seven types of operational capability. This one system is the command information system, which has space-based information platforms as the important [end of page 222] backing; integrates the air, space, and land into a strategic/campaign/tactical 3-level network; covers the Air Force’s strategic activity space; and has advanced technical means, various types of data information fusion, and high integration of systems {xitong gaodu jicheng}. These five forces are as follows: an air offensive force adapted to the needs and requirements of air offensive operations and offensive air defense operations under informationized conditions, and having stronger long-range precision strike capability; an air-defense/antimissile force adapted to ensuring stability in the national air defense posture, and having the capability to resist high-tech air raids under informationized conditions, plus key point area (zone) antimissile operational capability; a reconnaissance, early-warning, and surveillance force adapted to Air Force attack and defense strength, matched with the Air Force’s operational space, having air-space-land integration, and able under a variety of complex conditions to provide strategic early warning and maintain battlefield transparency; an information operations [IO] force possessing soft- and hard-kill means and integrated {zonghe} protection technology, and having the capability to execute effective suppression and destruction of all types of enemy information systems, plus having integrated information protection capability; and a strategic air transport force adapted to the needs and requirements of strategic projection and of Air Force maneuver operations and air landing operations. The seven types of operational capability are the capabilities needed and required for simultaneously carrying out a large-scale, high-end air offensive campaign and a large-scale, high-end air and space defensive campaign. They specifically include the following: first is a stronger medium/long-range air precision strike capability; second is an air-defense/antimissile operational capability for resisting enemy air raids under informationized conditions; third is an information assisting support capability covering the Air Force’s operational space; fourth is an EW and netwar capability combining air and ground; fifth is an air strategic projection capability; sixth is an air-landing operational capability; and seventh
is a comprehensive support capability adapted to large-scale, high-intensity sustained operations.

Grasping the key points of Air Force building and development is an important link in the objective of putting into effect the “Three Step Development Strategy.” Its main content is as follows.

Construction of a full-territory integrated information system. This will fully exploit PLA-wide space-based information resources; further boost the quality and quantity of the airborne reconnaissance, early-warning, and command platforms; develop and field advanced data links; and per real-combat standards and requirements, drive the networking of a space, air, and ground multidimensional information system. [This involves] energetic development of a strategic and campaign early-warning system and operational command system; elimination of radar blind areas, and acceleration of radar netting; formation of a strategic early-warning system centered on the capital and covering the entire homeland, as well as the vast peripheral areas (zones); formation of an air-combat command information system covering high, medium, and low altitudes and long, medium, and short ranges; and in fundamental terms resolution of the problems of inability to detect at long range, to see [targets] clearly, and to control [system elements].

Development of a medium/long-range air precision strike system. [This involves] accelerating activation of a medium/long-range air precision strike system with 4th-generation aircraft as the backbone and 3rd-generation aircraft as the main body. First is a need for streamlining. This lays stress on quality, optimizes performance, and strives to basically maintain same-generation technical standards with the air forces of the world powers. Second is emphasis on remote combat. [end of page 223] The effective operational radius should reach 3000 km beyond the borders, so that platform radius or platform radius + firepower radius reaches the Second Island Chain, to provide capabilities support for expanding the air defense areas (zones) and for repelling from as far as possible the enemy’s air and space attack. Third is forming a system {xitong}. According to the requirements for adjusted-coordinated full equipping and development {petiao fazhan} of operations and support and of platforms and munitions, [the Air Force should] work hard to develop multifunctional 4th-generation aircraft, aerial refueling aircraft, long-range reconnaissance aircraft, early-warning and command aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs], as well as guided munitions such as air-launched cruise missiles [ALCMs] and anti-radiation missiles [ARMs], and focus on future operational needs for operations-research-based planning and development of a stealth strategic bomber, as well as air and space integrated equipment such as air and space operational aircraft, near-space strike weapons, and airborne laser weapons.
Forging of a new type of air-defense/antimissile SoS. [This means] giving consideration to the needs and requirements of both nationwide air defense and multidirectional operations, and building an air-defense/antimissile SoS forming a net but having key points. First is appropriately making up for voids. The even greater number of ground stations built for a modern air defense SoS also make it difficult to achieve a “seamless heavenly robe” [i.e., a perfect net]; moreover, the resources invested in air defense will be much greater than those for offensive means. By suitably increasing the number of command stations and greater use of new means such as early warning aircraft, [the Air Force] should as much as possible make up for the areas (zones) lacking ground surveillance and C2. Second, for the capital and other key point areas, is operations-research-based planning for countering stealth combat aircraft and UAV systems and for terminal antimissile systems. The correlated R&D, testing, and disposition should include integrated-whole operations-research-based planning and iterative promotion, doing everything possible as early as possible to form a real-combat capability of a certain scale, and on this basis gradually activating an air-defense/antimissile SoS covering the entire homeland.

Development of a strategic air transport system. Strategic air transport capability is an important mark of a strategic air force, and is the basic brace-support for PLA-wide maneuver capability. From the viewpoint of worldwide scope, strategic air transport capability is the basic capabilities essential factor of a strategic air force. The PLA should focus on the needs of future long-range rapid air transport, air drop, and air landing missions; energetically develop large/mid-sized, long-flying-range, multifunctional transport planes; do everything possible to see that strategic air transport capability within a short time span realizes historic leaps; and ensure peacetime and wartime ability to conduct long-range, rapid, large-scale air projection maneuver.

Building of an arrangement with “3-line control.” This readjusts and optimizes the disposition of Air Force strengths and the battlefield construction, to gradually form an air defense arrangement with bases as the brace-support, with nationwide coverage, and having effective outward radiation. This arrangement can take territorial airspace as the absolute-security area for implementing reliable control; take the territorial airspace’s actual control line up to the First Island Chain and the surrounding main nations as a limited control and security cooperation area for conducting early warning and reconnaissance, warning patrols, long-range interception, and limited strike against hostile forces, and for launching air and space cooperation with friendly states; and take the First Island Chain up to the Second Island Chain as a long-range surveillance and limited deterrence area, for conducting rigorous monitoring of military forces and military bases in the Western Pacific, and for maintaining a necessary deterrent posture.

[end of page 224]
IV. Strategic application of the Air Force…225

Along with the development of local war under informationized conditions, and according to the needs of the increasing expansion of the state’s interests, the spaces, timing, modes, and guiding principles for strategic application of the Air Force all have undergone major changes. The basic objectives of China’s Air Force strategy are as follows: to realize national reunification and safeguard national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, so as to provide forceful air safety support for all-around activation of a well-to-do society; conducting active offensive defense of all Chinese territory and in the skies above the sea zones correlated to strategic interests; on the basis of ably carrying out real-combat preparations, joining with other armed strengths to construct an integrated-whole military deterrence posture, so as to contain the outbreak of war and control the development of a war situation; and laying stress on bringing into play the strong points of the Air Force’s rapid flexibility, so as to form integrated-whole operational might, and effectively respond to air threats in different directions and of different patterns. In view of the above objectives, under the new historic conditions, strategic application of the Air Force has the following requirements.

Having both attack and defense [capability]. The practice of high-tech local war since the 1990s shows that air raid and anti-air raid operations have become the main operational pattern, penetrating the entire course of war and determining victory or defeat in war. The superior side’s initial battle will employ an asymmetric air attack to paralyze the opponent’s operational SoS, so that the inferior side has difficulty organizing effective air defense activities. Contemporary air operations increasingly emphasize offense as the lead, with attack to assist defense, and with swift and fierce air attacks to achieve operational goals. The U.S., Russia, France, and Israel are all actively developing air and space offensive forces. Today, several nations on China’s periphery also are developing offensive-type air forces. India’s 2020 Air Force Vision proposed building a powerful long-range, multirole strategic air force capable of carrying nuclear weapons, to realize the conversion from the traditional “homeland air defense type” to a “strategic-deterrent air defense type.” The strategic application of China’s Air Force also requires breaking through the limitations of homeland air defense; tightly combining air offensive, air-defense/antimissile, and air landing operations with IO; having both attack and defense [capability], with attack aiding defense; and employing air attacks in campaign combat to achieve strategic defensive goals.

Air-space-network integration {kongtianwang yiti}. Air-space-network integration is a development trend in the strategic application of air forces in today’s world. The USAF, in its 2005 Mission Statement, put forth the need to “forcefully launch a war at any time — to fly and fight in Air, Space, and Cyberspace.” In 2007, the USAF established the
Cyber Command, whose mission was to fully fuse network operations with air and space operations. Along with the development of local war under informationized conditions, the war threats facing China also increasingly have the characteristic of air-space-network integration. This then requires our Air Force to adapt to the air-space-network trans-domain fusion trend; focus on [end of page 225] responding to air-space-network integration threats; stress space-based information application; elevate the defense intensity; expand traditional air defense operations into air-defense/antimissile/space-defense operations; expand traditional air offensive operations into air, near-space, and outer-space integrated strikes; and actively carry out network-space operations, to effectively fulfill air-space-network integrated attack and defense missions.

Long-range employment. Long-range employment is a common objective in air force development among the world powers. The USAF emphasizes “global strike,” which strives to be able within 1-2 hours to strike at any target in any area of the world; the Russian Air Force emphasizes mounting rapid reactions in theaters involving state interests even at points thousands of km away; and the Indian Air Force emphasizes area-type strategic strike, and possession of “potential strategic influencing power from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca.” For a period hereafter, the scope of strategic application of China’s Air Force will further undergo deepening; it should take territorial airspace as the absolute-control area, take the First Island Chain as a limited-control and security cooperation area, and take the Second Island Chain as a long-range monitoring and flexible reaction area. Adapted to this, the Air Force needs and requires in an even greater way to conduct activities such as long-range early warning, long-range reconnaissance, long-range control, long-range strike, long-range projection, and long-range support; accelerate the conversion from homeland air defense to full-territory application; realize nationwide disposition, full-territory reach, and full-zone reaction; and have an activities capability effectively covering all of China’s land territory and the skies above sea zones correlated to strategic interests.

Rapid reaction. Rapid reaction and seizing the first opportunity to defeat the enemy are a basic principle of Air Force application under informationized conditions. Our Air Force, no matter whether responding to traditional security threats or to nontraditional security threats, and no matter whether conducting operational activities or non-war military activities, always needs and requires to fully bring into play its own superiority in rapid maneuver speed, large maneuver scope, and lesser influence from ground transportation conditions and terrain conditions; rapidly and accurately project the operational strengths to the mission areas; and with high efficiency fulfill the activities missions. The Air Force must be able to rapidly transition from executing strategic missions to executing campaign and tactical missions, or transition from executing campaign and tactical missions to executing strategic missions; rapidly transition from air defense operations to
air offensive operations; rapidly redeploy from one theater to operations in other theaters; rapidly fly from the homeland to overseas points to conduct the necessary military activities; and even draw upon aerial refueling to conduct non-touchdown transnational activities — to earnestly become reliable strategic forces for the PLA to carry out contingency activities of multiple natures and scale.

Joint seizure of dominance. Wartime strategic application of the Air Force, according to the requirements for integrated joint operations, and with close complementation by the other services and arms, should treat seizing and maintaining battlefield comprehensive dominance as the COG in Air Force operations, and effectively conduct integrated attack and defense operations with seizure of command of the air as the core. Via active air attack and defense operational activities, [the Air Force can] paralyze and suppress the enemy’s air defense operational SoS, while ensuring [end of page 226] the stability of the friendly air defense operational SoS, and strip away and limit the enemy’s freedom of air activities, while ensuring the freedom of friendly air activities. Or, [it can] employ air attack to directly achieve strategic goals, provide forceful assisting support to tri-service joint operations, to gain success in the joint operations.

Under the new historic conditions, the basic modes for strategic application of the Air Force mainly include the following.

Strategic reconnaissance and early warning. Under circumstances where air and space threats are growing day by day, Air Force reconnaissance and early warning should extend from the campaign and tactical bedrock layer to the strategic bedrock layer, develop from surface-to-air reconnaissance and early warning to surface-to-air and space integrated early warning, and regard normalized integrated air and space strategic reconnaissance and early warning as an important mode for regular application of the Air Force.

Air and space deterrence. First is organizing activities having strategic significance, to display the Air Force’s strategic capability and strategic resolve. In recent years, the Air Force has actively participated in disaster and emergency rescue and joint military exercises, which have displayed the Air Force’s strategic capabilities to the outside world. In the future, it should realize some breakthroughs in terms of blue-water training and strategic cruise. Second is making new breakthroughs in air and space integration and air defense/antimissile [respects], actively participating in space military struggle, and gradually developing the deterrent role of controlling space from the air.

Air defense/antimissile. In peacetime, air defense — besides traditionally guarding against invasion and harassing attack by enemy flight vehicles — also needs to timely
organize and implement air safety for major activity, rigorously guard against and handle nontraditional security threats such as air terrorist activity, and participate in international territorial-airspace management. In wartime, [the Air Force must] rigorously organize and conduct air-defense/antimissile operations, with the key points on defense against and strikes at stealth aircraft, UAVs, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, and on resisting space strikes.

Air and space attack. Once war breaks out, air strikes under space-based information assisting support will be the Air Force’s main strategic application mode. [The Air Force] not only needs to conduct campaign-scale air attacks on the object of operations in peripheral and nearby areas, but also needs to actively conduct “surgical” decapitation activity, conduct special operations and air landing operations, command of the air and information dominance, control the land from the air, and control the seas from the air. When the future conditions are ripe, it also needs to use land-based and air-based platforms to conduct space-defense, counterspace, and space-control {fangtian, fantian, zhitian} operations.

Strategic projection. First is long-range projection of Air Force operational force-strength. Second is the application of various strengths to support the long-range projection of the PLA’s other contingency forces. The maturation of future aerospace plane development also can make projection of space-based forces be regarded as an important mode of Air Force strategic projection.

Air and space security cooperation. The Air Force should actively launch foreign military cooperation, and actively participate in joint military exercises, joint antiterrorism, and international humanitarian rescue. This not only enables the Air Force to go abroad in a peaceful mode, but also can bring into play the Air Force’s role in stabilizing the security posture in peripheral areas. [end of page 227]

Section 4: Second Artillery Corps Strategy…228

Second Artillery Corps strategy indicates the concepts and tactics for operations-research-based planning and guidance of the overall situation of Second Artillery Corps building and application. As a service strategy, Second Artillery Corps strategy belongs to military strategy, but at the same time it accepts the guidance and restraints of national nuclear policy and nuclear strategy. Under the new historic conditions, [the PLA] needs to further reinforce Second Artillery Corps building so that it truly becomes a firm shield for safeguarding the expansion of the state’s interests and for realizing national reunification. This then requires constantly innovating and developing Second Artillery Corps strategy.
I. Strategic positioning of the Second Artillery Corps...228

The Second Artillery Corps takes land-based strategic nuclear missiles and conventional missiles as its basic equipment, occupies a very special position within the national military strength SoS, and has a very important role in maintaining national security.

(1) The Second Artillery Corps is a strategic force directly controlled and employed by the CCCPC and the CMC

Strategic-missile [borne] nuclear weapons have a long range (of fire), rapid speed, and great yield, and have fundamental, overall-situation-quality influence on war and national security; they are typical strategic weapons. Missile nuclear forces, for any nuclear-weapons state around the world, always are the main strategic forces; they occupy a very important position, their operational employment moreover is highly concentrated, and their operational activity is strictly controlled. The Second Artillery Corps, since its formal organizing on 1 July 1966, has always been China’s main strategic force, which is directly led and controlled by the CCCPC and the CMC. The major problems and major activity of Second Artillery Corps building, development, and application are all directly decided by the CCCPC and the CMC. This specified quality based on the nature of strategic nuclear missile weapons cannot undergo essential change due to changes in circumstances or the passage of time.

(2) The Second Artillery Corps is the core force for China’s strategic deterrence

Nuclear explosions have ultrastrong destructive effects, and the missiles have the characteristics of rapid flight speed and difficulty of effective defense. The combination of these two has caused missile nuclear weapons to become the main strategic-quality weapons used for the goal of deterrence. Over a very long period after its organizing, the Second Artillery Corps always was China’s only strategic deterrent force. Since the entry into the new century, along with the rapid development and wide-ranging application of S&T, and in particular IT, networks and outer space gradually developed into new strategic deterrence [end of page 228] fields, and strategic deterrence could be achieved by synthetically applying multiple means of deterrence. However, no matter whether analyzed from the intrinsic operating mechanisms of nuclear and nonnuclear means of deterrence, or from the viewpoint of the actual effects of nuclear and nonnuclear means of deterrence, for the present time and for a period hereafter, nuclear deterrence without question will still be the core and backbone of China’s strategic deterrence, and will bring into play important roles in containing large-scale war and in effectively balancing the main strategic means. Today, the Second Artillery Corps is the main body of China’s nuclear forces, and also is the core strength of China’s strategic deterrence.
(3) The Second Artillery Corps is the main component of China’s conventional long-range strike forces

The rapid development of the economy and the constant expansion of state interests have put forth new and even stricter requirements on the capability for long-distance effective control of military strengths. Long-range control has become an important direction in the development of the PLA’s conventional military capability. At the start of the 1990s, after approval by the CMC, the Second Artillery Corps began to organize/build conventional surface-to-surface missile [SSM] forces. Undergoing development over 20 years since then, the Second Artillery Corps conventional missile forces have already formed a certain scale; their operational capability has constantly improved, and they have played significant roles in the military struggle and practice of safeguarding national sovereignty and the state’s rights and interests. Compared to other conventional weapons, conventional SSM weapons have the characteristics and superiority of a long strike distance, high hit precision, strong penetration ability, rapid reaction, and total reliance on homeland operations; and they are currently the main battle weapons for the PLA’s conduct of long-distance operations. Under the circumstances of diversification in the future PLA’s remote-combat weaponry and significant improvement in its long-range operational capability, conventional missile weapons will still have their fairly distinct strong points in confrontation with the powerful enemy. The Second Artillery Corps, as an important strength of the PLA for executing conventional long-range strike, has an irreplaceable special role.

(4) The Second Artillery Corps is an important backing for the expansion of PLA operational capability

In recent years, the competition and confrontation centering on the space and network domains has been ever sharper, and the extended development of military capability toward these domains has become an inevitable trend. The ballistic missiles fielded by the Second Artillery Corps in practice basically all travel through outer space. The confrontation centering on strategic missile attack and defense, penetration, and interception constitutes typical space operational activities. But the important foundation and basic prerequisite for jinglue planning of space and conducting of space activities are the ability to send spacecraft into outer space. The missile means of delivery fielded by the Second Artillery Corps, after undergoing simple transformation, can then be used for projection of spacecraft [into orbit]. From the viewpoint of the worldwide space development situation, the use of ground-based missiles to execute attacks against satellites and other spacecraft will be a feasible and reliable space attack means for a period to come. The Second Artillery Corps, undergoing more than 40 years of development and building, already has the infrastructure and hardware conditions needed
for rapid development of space capability, [end of page 229] as well as the corresponding personnel and intelligence {zhili}. It now has a solid foundation and very good conditions for developing space capability and for conducting space operations, and is an important backing for the expansion of PLA operational capability toward the space domain.

II. Strategic missions of the Second Artillery Corps…230

The strategic missions of the Second Artillery Corps, along with the changes in national security circumstances as well as the state’s interests, have correspondingly undergone adjustments and changes. China’s missile nuclear weapons were first developed under conditions of the hegemonic nations again and again issuing threats of nuclear war against China. Before the formal founding of the Second Artillery Corps, the main strategic missions of China’s SSM forces were to grasp and employ missile nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible, and form a nuclear real-combat capability, to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and oppose nuclear deterrence by the nuclear powers. From the establishment of the Second Artillery Corps to the mid-1980s, the armed forces were grounded in the strategic guidance thought of “strike early, strike hard, and fight a nuclear war,” and exerted effort to properly carry out the preparations for a large-scale war against aggression. In this period, the Second Artillery Corps’ strategic missions mainly were to constantly enhance its nuclear real strength in order to contain hostile nations’ use of nuclear weapons against China, and at all times prepare to execute an effective counterattack in self-defense after suffering an enemy state’s nuclear raid, to safeguard national security. After the mid-80s, along with the formation and development of China’s intercontinental nuclear strike capability, as well as the overall easing of international circumstances, bringing into play the deterrent role of missile nuclear weapons to contain the outbreak of nuclear war occupied a prominent position within the Second Artillery Corps’ strategic missions. Theoretical studies on Second Artillery Corps strategy also gradually deepened. In the early 90s, the Second Artillery Corps began to organize/build conventional missile forces, and carrying out conventional deterrence and conventional operations became new content within the missions and tasks of the Second Artillery Corps. Entering the new century and new phase, the PLA shouldered the historic mission of the “three provides and one role.” The Second Artillery Corps’ functions and missions also saw new substantiation and development. To generalize these, it mainly would bring into play the “four roles.”

Adapting to the development trend of world multipolarization, the Second Artillery Corps should fully bring into play a balancing role in maintaining world peace and stability, to make its proper contribution to China’s holding high the banner of peace, development, and cooperation in international society. During the Cold War, China’s nuclear forces
“moved a thousand jin with four liang” [i.e., exerted enormous leverage] and thus made a distinct contribution to maintaining world peace. Under the new circumstances, this distinct role of “balancer” played by China’s nuclear forces is still effective, and is an important embodiment of the PLA’s performing of the historic mission of “fully bringing into play the important role of maintaining world peace and promoting common development.”

Adapting to the strategic needs for China’s increasing fusion with international society and peaceful development, the Second Artillery Corps should fully bring into play the role of a pillar embodying China’s international position, and make its proper contribution to establishing a great-power image, [end of page 230] performing the duties of a great power, and maintaining the state’s interests. Nuclear weapons centrally embody and reflect a nation’s comprehensive real strength and S&T levels. The influence of nuclear weapons on the molding of a nation’s great-power status and international prestige, as well as on state-to-state relations, is something difficult to achieve with other types of weapons. Nuclear weapons have always played the role of a pillar for China’s great-power status, and hereafter will remain important marks and symbols clearly displaying China’s international position.

Adapting to the needs of all-around activation of a well-to-do society, the Second Artillery Corps should fully bring into play the role of a shield for safeguarding China’s security environment, to make its proper contribution to effective response to threats and challenges which influence strategic opportunities. To maintain and extend strategic opportunities, and build an external environment favorable to China’s peaceful development, [the PLA] must effectively contain war, and in particular prevent the outbreak of a large-scale war; but this has put forth even stricter requirements on the means and capability for strategic deterrence. Nuclear weapons serve as a firm “shield” for safeguarding national security, and the Second Artillery Corps serves as the core strength for China’s strategic deterrence; in responding to possible war threats and challenges, it should bring into play a unique and important role.

Adapting to the evolution of the form-state of war and to the real needs of the preparations for military struggle, the Second Artillery Corps must fully bring into play a strategic “heavy fist” role in containing war threats and in gaining success in defensive operations, to make its proper contribution to safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Second Artillery Corps is equipped with conventional missile weapons in multiple models and able to effectively strike at multiple types of targets at different distances; it has the “elite troops and sharp weapons” for the PLA’s conventional operations, and has a very strong role in deterrence of the powerful enemy.
In order to effectively perform the PLA’s historic missions in the new century and new phase, the Second Artillery Corps mainly undertakes the following strategic missions.

Containing the enemy’s use of nuclear weapons against China. When responding to such maximally severe security threats as nuclear war, the ultrastrong lethal and destructive force of nuclear weapons has decided a deterrent role for nuclear forces. Since its successful detonation of the first atomic bomb, China has openly declared a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and has promised not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states not having nuclear weapons. The Second Artillery Corps all along has regarded containment of an enemy’s use of nuclear weapons against China and halting of the outbreak of nuclear war as its strategic missions. As long as the main nuclear-weapons states around the world have not abandoned the policy of nuclear deterrence with first use of nuclear weapons as its foundation, China’s peaceful development will be facing severe military challenges coming from the world’s hegemons. Effective containment of hostile states’ use of nuclear weapons against China still is a firm foundation for ensuring national security, and this too is a concentrated embodiment of the Second Artillery Corps’ performance of the historic missions in the new era. [end of page 231]

Conducting strategic nuclear counterattack. When China encounters an enemy’s nuclear raid, the Second Artillery Corps, based on orders from the CMC, will resolutely and effectively conduct nuclear counterattack operations, to safeguard the state’s survival and interests. Conducting nuclear counterattack not only is a basic mode of real-combat application of the Second Artillery Corps, but also is the basis for carrying out effective nuclear deterrence. Only by truly having a nuclear counterattack capability, and ensuring under conditions of suffering an adversary’s nuclear raid the ability to organize effective nuclear counterattack and cause a certain degree of nuclear damage to the adversary, can the goal of deterring the outbreak of nuclear war truly be achieved. Hence, carrying out nuclear counterattack operations is critical content and an important mission for the Second Artillery Corps in effectively performing its historic missions.

Conducting conventional missile precision strike. Application of conventional missile weapons to execute precision strike is the main avenue by which the Second Artillery Corps participates in actual military struggle, and is a specific reflection of bringing into play the Second Artillery’s strategic “heavy fist” role.
III. Building and development of the Second Artillery Corps…232

Based on the Second Artillery Corps’ strategic missions in the new era, combined with the own characteristics of nuclear and conventional missile weapons, the Second Artillery Corps’ building and development in overall terms should grasp the following principles.

(1) Adjusted-coordinated development of nuclear forces and conventional forces

The Second Artillery Corps is not only equipped with nuclear missile weapons, but is also equipped with conventional missile weapons. Gaining a clear idea of the relationship between nuclear and conventional, and realizing adjusted-coordinated development of nuclear and conventional, are basic requirements for Second Artillery Corps building and development.

Propelling the modernization of the Second Artillery’s nuclear forces. Before the 1990s, nuclear forces were the totality of the Second Artillery Corps; the Second Artillery Corps was a strategic nuclear missile force. After the fielding of conventional missile weapons, the nuclear forces served as the fundamental and basic position of the Second Artillery Corps, and did not undergo essential change. The Second Artillery Corps had the nature of “the strategic force directly controlled and employed by the CCCPC and the CMC,” and had the position of the “core force for China’s strategic deterrence,” as well as the role of “strategic brace-support” and “firm shield” brought into play within safeguarding of national security and support for national development — all these were closely correlated with the nuclear forces of the Second Artillery Corps. History has convincingly proved that without the strategic decision on the “two bombs and one satellite” made by Mao Zedong, China could not have been in a position of playing a decisive role internationally, and could not have had the kind of national security circumstances present today. Thus, working hard to propel the modernization of nuclear forces, by consolidating and strengthening its base, is a long-term, fundamental mission in Second Artillery Corps building and development.

Strengthening the building of the Second Artillery’s conventional forces. Since the 1990s, the Second Artillery Corps’ conventional missile forces have rapidly developed under the pull of the needs of actual military struggle, [end of page 232] and within the practice of actual military struggle for safeguarding national sovereignty and security, they have brought into play a significant role; this also is the main reason for the Second Artillery Corps’ rapid development and growth. From the viewpoint of the future development trends in international and domestic circumstances, for the present and for a period to come, China’s security environment will remain complex, the actual military struggle circumstances will still be severe, and the contradiction between the Second
Artillery Corps’ real strength in conventional missiles and the needs and requirements for responding to actual security threats will remain very prominent. Strengthening the building of conventional missile forces, enhancing the real-combat capability of the conventional missile units, and further bringing into play the role of the Second Artillery Corps in actual military struggle are the key points for Second Artillery Corps building and development.

Developing new types of operational means. The expansion of national security interests and the changes in the development of the form-state of war have made the struggle and confrontation in the space and network domains ever sharper, and have put forth new requirements on the development of military capability. Keeping grounded in and relying on the own characteristics and superiority of missile weapons, developing new types of operational means, and expanding the Second Artillery Corps’ operational capability toward new domains such as outer space are important directions for Second Artillery Corps building and development at present and for a time to come.

(2) Listing improved nuclear counterattack effectiveness as the overall responsibility for the Second Artillery’s nuclear forces building and development

China adheres to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and will carry out nuclear war [only] in self-defense. The application of China’s nuclear forces upholds the principle of “striking after the opponent has struck;” nuclear counterattack operations are the only pattern in the real-combat application of China’s nuclear forces, and the level of nuclear counterattack capability directly influences the effectiveness of China’s nuclear deterrence. Thus, effectively increasing the quantity of missile weapons usable for nuclear counterattack, to boost the real-combat effectiveness of nuclear counterattack, not only is the basic objective in Second Artillery Corps nuclear forces building, but also is a principle-quality basis for concrete operations-research-based planning and decision-making for nuclear forces building and development, and for leading the building and development of the Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear force.

Under circumstances where China’s nuclear forces in overall terms maintain a certain scale, boosting the Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear counterattack effectiveness is of utmost importance. First is increasing the proportion of missile weapons with an intercontinental range (of fire). The geographic-location relationship of China to its main strategic opponent and object of nuclear counterattack has decided that intercontinental-range missile weapons should be the main body of the Second Artillery’s missile nuclear weapons. Increasing the number of intercontinental-range missile nuclear weapons is an important avenue for effectively boosting the Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear counterattack effectiveness. Second is laying stress on the key points for development of
nuclear capability. Effective self-preservation when the adversary executes a nuclear raid is a prerequisite and the foundation for conducting nuclear counterattack operations. The ability to effectively penetrate interception by the adversary’s missile defense system is a necessary condition for causing the enemy actual nuclear destruction effects. Thus, building of the Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear forces capability should lay stress on the development key points of survivability and penetration ability. By developing and applying rapid maneuver and launch, gliding, and MIRVing (duodantou) technology, and by renewing and replacing older-generation missile weapons, [the Second Artillery] in overall terms will boost the missile nuclear weapons’ [end of page 233] survivability and penetration ability, and enhance nuclear counterattack effectiveness. Third is reinforcing the fielding of full complements of equipment {peitao jianshe}. The nuclear-counterattack operational environment is complex, the limiting conditions are numerous, and the integrated-whole quality is strong. Any one of the essential factors — the unit personnel, the weapons and equipment, the operational positions, or the support — [can] have a major influence on successfully conducting a nuclear counterattack. Only via peacetime unified operations-research-based planning considering all factors, and via integrated-whole propelling of fully complemented development {peitao fazhan} having key points, can [the Second Artillery] in wartime conduct effective nuclear counterattack operations, and achieve the predetermined nuclear counterattack effects.

(3) Key point development of superior operational capability in the conventional missile units

Joint operations under future informationized conditions will be a process of selection, optimization, and integration (zhenghe) of various participating strengths and operational capabilities, and will require that all participating strengths must have and be able to fully bring into play their respective unique military capabilities or hold clear superiority. Conventional forces building in the Second Artillery Corps should be grounded in the characteristics of conventional missile weapons and their operational application, take fully bringing into play the operational superiority of conventional missile weapons as the orientation, earnestly boost and enhance the conventional missile forces’ unique military capabilities or holding of clear superiority, and on this basis drive the long-term sustained development of the Second Artillery Corps’ conventional forces.

First is enlarging the scope of fire control for the conventional missile forces, with the key points on developing and fielding conventional missile weapons with an effective range of more than 1500 km. Second is boosting the penetration performance of conventional missile weapons. Based on the situation of some surrounding nations (areas) and the main strategic opponent stepping up the building of a missile defense capability, [there is a need to] maintain the unique penetration superiority of the Second Artillery
Corps’ conventional missile weapons. Third is boosting the conventional-missile rapid reaction capability. By avoiding reliance on rapid launch, and boosting the time effectiveness quality of conventional missile strike, [the Second Artillery] creates the conditions for the use of missile weapons in different strategic directions. Fourth is boosting the missile weapons’ precision. At present, missile hit precision still is the main factor influencing the scope of real-combat application of conventional missiles and the types of targets to be struck, so boosting missile hit precision is one of the key point directions in conventional missile weapon development.

IV. Strategic application of the Second Artillery Corps…234

The application of Second Artillery Corps forces takes national nuclear policy, nuclear strategy, and military strategy as the basis, and strives to effectively bring into play the strong points of nuclear and conventional missile weapons.

Centralized, unified command. As one type of weapons of mass destruction [WMD], missile nuclear weapons — no matter whether in deterrent application or in conducting nuclear counterattack operations — always have an extreme major influence on the overall situation, progress, and outcome of military struggle with war as the core, and directly bear on the safety of the state. In all major nuclear deterrence activities, nuclear counterattack operations of any scale without question always belong to major strategic activities. Decision power for the operational employment of the Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear missile units can only belong to the CMC. The deterrence modes, nuclear counterattack scale, timing, and targets, plus any major problems associated with nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterattack operations, all must be decided by the CMC. Although the Second Artillery Corps conventional missile forces are also used for conducting campaign-level and even tactical-level operational activities, the influence of their activities nonetheless often is one of overall situation quality and strategic quality. The scale and timing for the real-combat application of Second Artillery Corps conventional missile forces also are both decided by the CMC.

Complementation by other means. The dependability of nuclear counterattack threat is an important factor influencing the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. China’s nuclear counterattack is a strategic-quality activity when the integrated whole of the state is in a special status after suffering an enemy’s nuclear raid. Thus, when threatening to carry out nuclear retaliation and nuclear counterattack, the political, economic, and diplomatic fields also should complement the activities, to demonstrate China’s firm resolve to carry out nuclear counterattack. Only in this way can the nuclear retaliation threat be believable, and only thus can the nuclear deterrence be effective. During nuclear counterattack operations, the Second Artillery Corps nuclear forces should be closely
complemented by conventional forces and by sea-based nuclear strength, to bring into play the nuclear weapons’ effectiveness to the maximum extent, and achieve the strategic objectives. When Second Artillery Corps conventional missile forces participate in joint operations, only via close adjusting-coordination with the other services’ participating strengths in terms of the strike objectives, strike timing, strike duration, and damage effects can they develop their strong points and avoid shortcomings, fully bring into play the superiority of conventional missile forces operations, and thus boost the integrated-whole effects of the joint operations.

Nuclear forces’ emphasis on deterrence and striking after the enemy has struck. Nuclear weapons have lethal and destructive effects difficult to bear, and are typical deterrent-quality weapons. The ability to conduct effective nuclear counterattack is the foundation for effective nuclear deterrence. Application for deterrence is the main mode of application of nuclear forces. In the Second Artillery Corps’ boosting of nuclear-counterattack operational capability and sound carrying out of nuclear-counterattack operational preparations, the most important goals are to deter the hostile state from using nuclear weapons against us, and to enhance nuclear deterrence effectiveness. Conducting nuclear counterattack operations is a further activity after the failure of nuclear deterrence. Based on the essential traits of nuclear weapons and the functional mechanism of deterrence, as long as a state controls nuclear weapons, and has a basic nuclear counterattack capability, then even in peacetime in situations where the object of nuclear deterrence is unclear, [those weapons] still can have a deterrent role. Thus, the process of building and development of nuclear forces often is a process of deterrent application of the nuclear forces. China from the beginning has attached importance to and taken care to bring into play this deterrent role based on the presence of the nuclear weapons themselves. The deterrent application of Second Artillery Corps nuclear forces includes or in other words mainly is the peacetime building and development of nuclear forces, and is an organic unity of building and deterrence. China’s holding of the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons upholds striking after the enemy has struck, in terms of real-combat application of nuclear forces, and only after China suffers an enemy’s nuclear raid can it conduct nuclear retaliation [end of page 235] and nuclear counterattack operations. Defending against the enemy’s nuclear surprise raid and surviving during the adversary’s nuclear raid, plus truly preserving the power to strike back, are important operational patterns in nuclear real combat by the Second Artillery Corps, and also are critical links in carrying out nuclear counterattack operations.

Use of conventional missile forces for precision strike against vital sites. Under the influence of factors such as the destructive effectiveness of conventional missiles, the quantitative scale of missile weapons, and the cost of conventional missile strikes, the target types suited to employment of conventional missile strikes are limited, and the
number of targets which Second Artillery conventional missile forces can strike at also are limited; and use of conventional missiles for striking at some targets is not economical. Thus, Second Artillery Corps conventional missile units are mainly used for the critical directions and critical time opportunities, and used for striking against vital site targets. In joint operations, conventional missile weapons are mainly used for striking at those targets which other types of weaponry cannot reach or strike at, while at the same time also posing major threats to the PLA, having an important influence on the progress of operations, and playing a brace-support role in the overall situation of war. An example during a joint fire strike is the use of Second Artillery Corps conventional missile units for preliminary strikes against the enemy’s reconnaissance and early-warning systems, EW systems, air-defense/antimissile positions, and aviation force bases, to paralyze the enemy’s operational SoS and suppress the enemy’s operational strength, so as to create the necessary conditions for the PLA’s other services to conduct follow-up operational activities. Under special circumstances, [the Second Artillery] also can exploit the distinct superiority of missiles by using missile weapons to strike at the enemy’s space network of military satellites and his information system nodes, influence the enemy’s operational SoS within an even larger scope, awe the opponent, and thus create the conditions for us to gain the strategic initiative and as rapidly as possible achieve the strategic goals.

Section 5: Theater Strategy…236

I. Nature of theater strategy and functions of the theater…236

A theater, also called a strategic area, [originally] signified the operational space of a fairly large-scale large formation; it later gradually evolved into a military entity for executing operational activities of a zonal quality or directionality, and has become the level-one military command institution. The new edition of Chinese People’s Liberation Army Terms defines a theater as follows: “a short name for a strategic area, and an area (zone) partitioned per strategic missions.” Serving as the concept and tactics for operations-research-based planning and guidance of building and application of a strategic area’s armed strengths, theater strategy progressively formed along with the development of war and the evolution of the theater. Modern theater strategy, and in particular the theater strategy of the world powers, has become an important component of the national military strategy SoS. Theater strategy is based on the national military strategic intent, and in each [end of page 236] strategic direction it plans {jinglue} for area (zone) military security, and expands and maintains the concept for area (zone) military interests. Theater strategy also can be understood as the military strategy related to each strategic direction. Its nature is as follows: first is its specific embodiment of, and subordination and service to the military strategic intent, plus its consistency with
national strategic goals. Second is its relative independence, embodying the special quality of different strategic directions. Third is its involvement in many factors — political, economic, military, social, cultural, diplomatic, and geopolitical — and thus its strong synthetic quality. Fourth is its joint operational function for all services within a command area (zone): this is operations-research-based planning and guidance of the military strategy for the joint military activities of all services within an area (zone).

Clarifying theater functions is a necessary prerequisite for formulating and implementing theater strategy. Theater strategy must be based on national military strategic intent, plan 〈jinglue〉 the area (zone) military security in the different strategic directions, and expand and safeguard the military interests present in this area (zone). Hence, theaters act as the military command institutions in the strategic directions, and their fundamental functions are to plan area (zone) military security and to expand and safeguard area (zone) military interests. In wartime, the theater is responsible for commanding and adjusting-coordinating the operational activities within the area (zone). In peacetime, the theater is responsible for planning and molding the peripheral environment. Adapting to this, the theater leaders must have a very strong comprehensive quality. They not only need to understand military matters, but also need to understand political and diplomatic matters; they not only must be thoroughly familiar with and understand the domestic situation, but also must understand the geographic, human, and social situations in the peripheral nations. In this way, they can properly perform their own functions, capably fulfill the various strategic missions undertaken by the theater, and make their proper contributions to the success of the overall situation in the theater.

II. Necessity of formulating theater strategy…237

Within China’s military strategy system-of-systems, the category and corresponding content of each service’s strategy and of theater strategy have had a development process. During the Revolutionary War, the PLA usually regarded the main base areas and main battlefields as strategic areas. After the founding of New China, based on the security threats facing the state and on the needs and requirements of the preparations for military struggle, PLA Military Area Commands [MACs] were set up in the different strategic directions, and had responsibility for the main missions assigned by national military strategy. Some of the strategic missions were jointly undertaken in a certain main strategic direction by two or more PLA MACs. Faced with a grave security environment, the PLA in its strategic guidance put special emphasis on homeland defense and on preparations to conduct defensive operations in the inland depth. Over quite a long period, the point of concerted effort in the building and application of military forces was on homeland defense, and the basic choice in military strategy was to lure the enemy in deep; i.e., by allowing the enemy to advance, and conducting protracted attrition
operations to alter the two sides’ strength comparison, and finally carrying out counteroffensive or offensive large-scale defensive operations in the inland depth, [end of page 237] [the PLA would] gain victory in the war against aggression. The characteristics of conducting homeland defense and large-scale defensive operations in the inland depth decided that each strategic area — under centralized unified command by the Supreme Command, and based on the root strategic direction and the situation in the root strategic area — would execute the unified strategic concept and strategic jihua plan, and that the objects of operations and the operational objectives and operational missions undertaken also would have a high degree of identity. It can be said that each strategic area was a component of a nationwide unified grand battlefield. Under such circumstances, each strategic area, based on the intent of the military strategy, decomposed the unified strategic concept and strategic plan into an activities concept and activities plan for the root strategic area and root strategic direction, and separately implemented and fulfilled them. Thus, there were still no objective needs and requirements for independent formulation of a theater strategy.

After the 1980s, international circumstances on the whole tended to ease. Deng Xiaoping made a major strategic decision that a world war would not be fought, clarified the military-strategic concept for active defense, and issued requirements for putting into effect a strategic-quality transformation in the guidance thought for armed forces building. After 1992, Jiang Zemin further made a decision that [the possibility] of a large-scale invasion basically could be excluded, and put forth the requirements for winning local war under high-tech conditions and local war under informationized conditions. In this period, major adjustments were made to China’s military strategy, which shifted from preparing to deal with a large-scale invasion to this new starting point of preparing to deal with local war under informationized conditions. This was a major turning point in national military strategy, and had an extremely important influence on national defense and armed forces building. Since entry into the new century, the complex changes in China’s peripheral environment have decided that the local war which China is preparing to deal will be complex and diverse. First is that the military opponents are multidimensional {duoyuan}, second is that the military missions are complex, and third is that the military activities and operational modes are diverse. Correspondingly, the military security problems on the borders, in the air, and in the coastal areas are prominent; the strategic position of the border areas especially in the ocean direction is rising day by day, and seaside defense has gradually changed from the original “signal lights” during response to a large-scale war of aggression, to “forward support” {qianchu yituo} for expansion of state interests in the new century and new phase. The new changes in the objective circumstances make it clear that China’s actual military struggle and future operations in the various strategic directions already have independence and outward-directedness to different degrees, and have taken on the characteristics and trend
of “directional expansion.” Thus, theater strategy needs to have a proper position within China’s military strategy system-of-systems. It should be seen that even since the starting point of military struggle was placed on winning a local war, and in particular local war under informationized conditions, there have been real needs and requirements for formulating theater strategy. The deepening of China’s reform and opening up and the development of its economy and society — in particular the constant expansion of state interests over a worldwide scope — inevitably will further call for the publication of the PLA’s theater strategy.

Under the new circumstances, China’s military strategy should expand its field of view, and shift from guarding the borders and defending the homeland to [end of page 238] safeguarding the development of state interests over an even more expansive zone and space. This conversion on one hand causes the “layered” characteristic of national military strategy to be even more prominent, and the interrelationship of national military security and military security in the strategic directions (areas (zones)) also shows their mutual differences; on the other hand, it causes the “directional expansion” characteristic of each strategic direction to be even more prominent, so that military activities in strategic directions rely on border and coastal defense, have an influence beyond the borders, and radiate into common spaces. If military strategy should be used for the different strategic directions, it must adapt to the new situations, new characteristics, and new requirements in each direction (area (zone)), and thus should clarify the strategy in each theater (direction).

III. Establishing a theater strategy conforming to the expansion of state interests…239

Theater strategy, although it will embody the special quality of each strategic direction and have relatively unique content, nonetheless serves as an organic component of military strategy, and must implement the concept and principles of military strategy. Hence, the theater strategy executed in the various strategic directions in essence will be unified, and have identity. This then means that when formulating theater strategy, there is a need first, from the high ground of military strategy, to use mathematical and scientific methods for resolving some basic problems in theater strategy.

The theater is not only a locality within the overall situation of war, but at the same time is also an integrated whole of strategic quality. When partitioning a theater, there is usually a need to give consideration to the ability to respond to situations of diversity, complexity, and change in war; a need to have relative integrity in administrative and economic respects; a need to have relative independence in military respects; and — under the macroscopic guidance of national strategy, and under the unified disposition of
military strategy — a need to be able to fully bring into play the root theater’s superiority and to independently carry out the strategic missions undertaken. In geographic respects the theater must have good natural conditions as a support \{yituo\}, in spatial respects it should have a certain capacity, and should constantly expand along with the forward shift of the COG in military strategic guidance.

The formulation of theater strategy must rely on the principle of unity of the state’s survival interest with national development interests. This not only means fully resolving the problems of maintaining national sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also means fully resolving the problems in maintaining the state’s expanding interests. First is upholding a defensive national defense policy, taking as the most important missions the safeguarding of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and vigilance against and defeat of a foreign enemy’s invasion, while not taking as goals the expansion of territory and the seeking of dominance over the peripheral nations or dominance over areas. Second is implementing a strategic guiding concept for controlling crises, maintaining peace, containing war, and winning war; establishing COGs in theater strategy; appropriately advancing the military security lines; effectively controlling the peripheral situations; and creating a peripheral environment of peace and stability. Third is setting out from the objective of maintaining peripheral peace and stability, and establishing the operational thought of having both attack and defense [capability]. [end of page 239]

This not only requires effective awing and blocking of the powerful enemy’s military intervention, but also requires effective awing and blocking of his “playing with fire” on our periphery. Fourth is providing strategic brace-support for China’s planning \{jinglue\} of the periphery and the ocean, doing a good job in control of rising temperatures in peripheral hot spots, maintaining sea and land strategic channels plus the property and safety of overseas personnel, and making preparations for military activities outside the borders. Fifth is properly carrying out the preparations for using military means to resolve territorial disputes and maritime rights and interests disputes, controlling escalation of the disputes, and providing brace-support for political resolution.

The strategic directions are the fundamental basis for partitioning a strategic area. [We] should proceed from the sources of national security threats, and from the direction of expansion of state interests, to ascertain who the real and potential opponents are, and analyze against whom to conduct operations in the future, where to fight battles, and what battles to fight. After clarifying the strategic directions, the theater partitioning problem splits up and is easily solved. Strategic space is a necessary condition for partitioning the theater. This requires synthetically considering the various conditions, mainly including the natural conditions, the socioeconomic conditions, and the area capacity. This means considering the natural geographic characteristics and strategic positions of all areas, but also requires considering the operational dispositions in all strategic directions, and
striving to construct a complete operational SoS in terms of the strategic overall situation, so that [the partitioning] is not only beneficial to independent operations in all areas, but also can reinforce and maintain the stability of the entire war situation. Partitioning of a theater usually takes the big mountain ranges, rivers, and straits as the boundaries. Determination of the theater’s scope also should consider the geographic conditions and strategic missions in the adjacent theaters, so that it will benefit mutual assisting support and coordinated operations. In sum, partitioning of a theater not only has a traditional inherited quality, but also will constantly develop based on the changes in the circumstances, conditions, and missions. [end of page 240; end of chapter]
Chapter 11
Strategic Space and Layout...241

Focusing on modern warfare and military activities’ \{huodong\} space features, based on the national security and development’s space needs and requirements, to make an overall plan for the military strengths’ disposition and battlefield tixi system construction within certain space scopes, etc., to thus form into a favorable strategic layout \{buju\}, are important attention points for military strategy’s scientific-based planning and guidance.

Section 1: The Epochal Features of Strategic Space...241

Since entrance into the 21st Century, along with the accelerated pushing ahead of the world’s political multi-polarization and economic globalization, as well as the continuous deepening of the nation’s Reforms and Opening Up and the continuous development of the national economy, China’s national strategic interest has expanded in all directions. At the same time, China’s security and development environment also has experienced profound changes, especially in the war threats coming from the multi-dimensions of space. Strategic space has become a brand new proposition within the course of China’s rise. It relates to the future fate of the national race and the nation.

Strategic space is a space area required for the national race and the national resistance of external interference and invasion and the maintenance of self-survival and development. Its external edge is determined by both the expansion scope of the national interests and determined even more by the range in which the military capability can project. For any national race and nation, they always thrive within a certain geographical space and scope. After a long period of struggle with external strengths as well as internal fusion, they gradually form into a unified single body and form into comparatively fixed geographical boundaries. The nation’s strategic space has such sovereign jurisdiction scope as our nation’s territorial land, territorial sea, and territorial air, etc., as the basis, while it appropriately extends and radiates based on the requirement to maintain security and development. The natural extension of the nation’s territorial land, territorial sea, and territorial air inevitably has some areas with direct relationships with adjacent regions under sovereign jurisdictions. In the development and utilization of its own nation’s territorial land, territorial sea, and territorial air, the nation cannot but come under the influence of adjacent land, ocean, and airspace; the development and utilization by neighboring countries on land, ocean, and airspace or the carrying out of military activities \{huodong\} on land, ocean, and airspace is bound to influence our nation’s security and development. [end of page 241]
The strategic space expands along with the development of human beings’ economy, science and technology, and warfare actual activities. At different times and ages, the strategic space has a different scope and features. A correct recognition of the strategic space’s time era features is the starting point of the scientific-based planning of the strategic layout. Generally speaking, the contemporary age’s strategic space possesses the following features.

Three-dimensional and multi-dimensioned, expanding without precedence. During the Agricultural Age, for a majority of nations, strategic space was limited to the scope of land space, while the resource provisioning and external transportation function of the oceans received only limited development and utilization. Under most situations, the oceans provided a natural barrier for the guarding of land frontiers. During the Industrial Age, along with the continuous development of sea navigation technology and ocean-based civilization, the strategic space gradually expanded towards the oceans; along with the development of air navigation technology, the strategic space also expanded from a two-dimensional flat surface space into three-dimensional space. Since the 20th Century’s 50s, along with spaceflight technology and human beings’ space development and utilization activities’ sudden advancement, outer space has become the “high frontier” for maintaining national security and interests and a new source of growth for comprehensive national power. It has become an emerging strategic space that nations cannot be without. In view of human beings’ expansion of space, new space possesses natural superiority to old space, as “those with rapid feet land first,” while the first ones to arrive are the first ones to benefit, and differences in time signify differences in space. This has become a kind of law {guīlǐ}. Because there still has not formed game rules and regulations within new emerging spaces, the first ones to enter could occupy favorable position momentum, could grasp the rules and regulations, could guide the space’s future, obtain further strategic benefits, and thereby become a world power. US “Star Wars”’ advocate Daniel O. Graham said that: “within the entire human history, any nation that could effectively leap from one domain of human activity to another domain has already achieved gigantic strategic superiority.”

Mutual interweaving of tangible space with intangible space. Since the birth of the ARPANET in which the U.S. used for military objectives in the 20th Century’s 60s, information network technology has rapidly expanded from the military domain to the civilian domain. It has expanded at unprecedented speed on a global scope. With the continuous development and perfection of the international Internet, numerous countries

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are racing to construct information network basic infrastructure, and human civilization has accelerated the steps into the information network age. The network space is becoming by the day a basic nature, a crucial nature, and a strategic nature key-major emerging domain that influences the world’s development. It has become the fifth dimension of space that human society, production, and even warfare highly relies upon. It is shaping in a historical manner a new social system, strength structure, lifestyle, value concept, [end of page 242] and warfare form-state. As an artificially virtual environment composed of information networks as well as the information borne by them, the network space transverses the two major domains of the traditional and non-traditional, covers the two dimensions of the actual and virtual, and draws together the joining of the two boundaries of material and spiritual. It possesses unprecedented openness, transparency, and fusion natures, is fully in depth interwoven with the physical realm, information realm, and knowledge realm, can break through the constraints of geographical and time factors, and realize unprecedented broad linkage, connectivity, and operations within a global scope at the speed of light.

High level of linkage between sovereign space and the global public space. The inevitable result brought upon economic globalization and science and technology development is: having a nation’s security and development interest surpassing the traditional territorial land, territorial sea, and territorial air scope, to continuously expand and extend into such global public spaces as ocean, space, polar regions, and networks, etc. However, the broad application of long-range reconnaissance and early-warning command, long-range rapid projection of force-strength, and long-range precision strikes have also enabled the maintenance of sovereign space’s security to necessarily possess the military capability to carry out attack and defense confrontations within the global public spaces. Under a situation in which the various nations’ sovereign spaces have basically stabilized, the world is currently entering into an age of a race to develop, utilize, and control the global public spaces. The US Department of Defense’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review clearly pointed out that global public spaces are the connecting links of the international tixi system, while “global security and prosperity are determined by freedom in aerial and at-sea goods transports, while similarly are also determined by freedom of information transport through the sea bottom and space.” The challenges faced by the maintenance of global public spaces’ stability are increasing by the day, while future enemies may very possibly possess the capability to seize or wreck command of the air, command of the sea [sea dominance], command of space, and command of networks [network dominance]. The global public spaces are capital in common possession by the human race. They relate to the future common fate of the human race. Such international nature treaties as the Antarctic Treaty, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Outer Space Treaty, and the Moon Treaty, etc., have all confirmed that for all regions and their resources outside the jurisdiction scope of
national sovereignties, regardless of the deep sea, outer space, or Antarctica, all belong in common possession by the world’s various nations. The development, utilization, and protection of the global public spaces to prevent opponents from launching attacks upon one’s own national sovereign spaces from the global public spaces has become an important factor in the various nations’ strategies’ scientific-based planning.

Balancing towards weakness and some rise in instability. The scientific-based planning and management plan for strategic space has tight relationships with the national strategic interests, strategic capability, geographical location, strategic culture, and international strategic setup, etc. The size of the strategic space is an external display of the strength or weakness of comprehensive national power. Only those strategic spaces structured on the basis of comprehensive national power are effective and stable. They can form into complementary virtuous cycles between comprehensive national power and the strategic space. [end of page 243] Otherwise, the strategic space will not be stable. In the world’s Modern Era of history, the root cause of colonial wars and the two world wars was the contention for the strategic space to bear resources and markets, which led to numerous nations on a global scope to display highly theological and extended features in terms of strategic spaces. During the Cold War, although the two main camps of the East and West repeatedly seesawed and competed in the middle ground with a “proxy war” mode, after the two sides reached basic balance, their own strategic spaces maintained overall stability. At the 20th Century late-80s and early-90s, along with Eastern Europe’s sudden changes, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO’s eastward expansion, and the US’s military advancement into the Middle East, the global strategic space again experienced a sudden change. Entering into the 21st Century, other than war and chaos in the Middle East region, the globe’s other regions are in comparatively stable condition, and the mode for managing and planning the spaces are embodied more in such comprehensive policies’ indirect control such as political, economic, military, and diplomacy, etc. At the current and subsequent period, along with continuous changes in the global strategic strength ratios, the global strategic setup will emerge with new changes, the global geo-strategic competition will enter into a new active period, and the world, especially the strategic space within the Asia-Pacific space’s instability will rise somewhat.

Section 2: Moderate Expansion of Strategic Space Based on One’s Own Territory...244

The strategic space is the spatial scope that focuses on the maintenance of national security and responses to various kinds of threats, in which the military strengths as well as its effectiveness can reach and even control. For the military actual development history of the ancient and modern and of China and foreign, it is a history of expansion of
strategic spaces from a certain significance. The expansion of strategic space is frequently an important channel and means for maintaining and realizing self-strategic interests. China’s historical dynasties have attached importance overall to the managing and planning of strategic spaces, which brought about an extremely important role in the maintenance of national security, the establishment of frontiers and territories, and the keeping of regional stability. Under the new historical conditions, we should focus on maintaining the nation’s peaceful development and fully fulfill the requirements of the new century and new phase’s military historical task, to persist in a vigorous defense military-strategic concept \{fangzhen\}, create a favorable environment, compact the basic conditions, and rely on the home territory \{bentu\} to moderately [appropriately] expand the strategic space.

**I. Moderate expansion of strategic space based on one’s own territory is an important content of strategic actuality…244**

Ever since the emergence of nations and warfare, the expansion of human society strategic space has always continuously expanded along with the development of strategic actualities, and sometimes it has become the fundamental symbol of strategic actualities. Along with the continuous development in economy and in society, the continuous rise in science and technology levels, and the continuous strengthening [end of page 244] in military capabilities, the expansion of strategic space based on one’s own territory has experienced the three historical periods of flat surface expansion, three-dimensional expansion, and expansion from tangible space towards intangible space.

The age of flat surface expansion on the earth’s physical surface. The earth’s physical surface is the most basic and most reliable strategic space for human survival and development. It is also a strategic space that is relatively easy to develop, utilize, and control. During the long years from the emergence of warfare until the 20th Century, due to limitations in the science and technology level and in military capability, strategic space expansion was limited to the land and ocean on the earth’s surface. Hence, that it was also played out the magnificent history of human societal evolution and development of invasion and anti-invasion, contention and anti-contention, control and anti-control. Regardless of whether it was the West’s Roman Empire, Byzantium Empire, Africa’s ancient Egyptian Empire, West Asia’s Arabic Empire, or the East’s Chinese, Huns, Turks, and Mongol empires, they all once revolved around such various kinds of strategic objectives as the expansion of national interests, or the expansion of territory and cover, or the maintenance of peripheral stability, etc. They mainly revolved around land (some Western nations also revolved around the ocean) to carry out expansion in strategic spaces.
The age of three-dimensional expansion from the earth’s surface to the air and space. Along with the development of aviation and space science and technology and strengths in the early-20th Century, aerial and space generated increasingly key-major influences on human beings’ survival, security, and development, and they also generated crucial functions for victory or defeat in warfare. The world’s main nations have all placed the seeking of aerial and space strategic command \( \text{kongzhi quan} \) as a key-major realistic topic for national strategies and military strategies. This has boosted the expansion of strategic space to enter into a new period from the flat surface expansion to three-dimensional expansion. The main military powers all attach high importance to the development of aviation and space science and technology and have continuously strengthened the construction of military space strengths. The U.S. is prepared to organize and establish a space service in 2015, while Russia is prepared to organize and establish a space service in 2020, and some other nations have also accelerated the pace in military space technology development and strengths construction, to boost the expansion of the space to push towards ever higher, ever farther, and ever deeper cosmos space.

The age of expansion from tangible space to intangible space. In the 20th Century’s 70–80s, along with the flying speed development and broad application of information technology and network technology represented by computer technology, human society entered into informationized society, and warfare form-state also stepped into the Age of Informationized Warfare. The information network space has not only become an important strategic space for the influencing of national economic and societal survival and development but also plays a crucial role in the victory or defeat of future wars. The world’s main nations all attach high focus on the seizure and control of the information network space and have placed it as the crux in winning the strategic initiative. This has boosted the evolution of the expansion of strategic space from visible tangible geographical spaces into intangible information network space. How to focus on the requirements of maintaining national security and development and realize the effective grasp and control of the information network space [end of page 245] is a key-major topic facing our military.

For thousands of years, China’s historical dynasties were all relatively focused on seeking strategic expansion of space in the peripheral regions on land. The Xia, Shang, and Zhou Dynasties gradually expanded to the peripheral Yi, Di, Rong, and Man regions from the midstream and upstream of the Yellow River. The expansion of the Qin Dynasty in the Min and Yue regions, the expansion of the Han, Tang, and Qing Dynasties in the western region, the expansion of the Yuan Dynasty in the Tubo [Tibetan] region, etc., and the expansion of the Ming Dynasty in the southwest region, etc., all brought about
extremely important functions for the defense of national interests, the establishment of frontiers and territories, and the maintaining of vassal stability.

Since the foundation of New China, we have persisted in a vigorous defensive national defense policy. We have defended our territorial sovereign integrity and maintained national interests through the establishment of national territory defense’s strategic requirements and with our nation’s continental home territory as the strategic support. After entering into the new century and new phase, our military has focused on the requirements for the nation’s peaceful development and full fulfillment of the new century and new phase’s historical tasks. We have adopted such multiple kinds of forms as international peacekeeping, counter-piracy [operations], and strategic presetting, etc., to vigorously expand the necessary strategic space, which has brought about an important function in the maintaining of national sovereignty and security, the expansion of interests, the boosting of world peace, and the raising of great power status. Subsequently, along with the continuous changes in the international strategic setup, along with the acceleration of the nation’s peaceful development’s progress, and along with the continuous rise of our military’s military capability, we will have higher strategic requirements and needs in the area of relying on one’s own territory [home territory] to expand the strategic space. We need to gradually push forward from the current strategic space mainly at the home territory and coastal seas toward the relevant sea regions, space space, and information network space, under the guidance of the vigorous defense strategic thought and in accordance with the strategic thought of “reliance on the home territory, stabilize the peripheral, grasp and control the coastal seas, advance into space, focused on information,” to form into a strategic space that has key-points, divided into echelons, and is mutually supporting and linked, with the home territory as reliance, the two oceans region as key-point, and the network space as the crux.

(1) Expand towards the two oceans region

The two oceans region mainly includes the Pacific ocean, Indian Ocean, as well as the littoral regions of neighboring Asia, Africa, Oceania, North America, South America, and Antarctica, etc., with a total area occupying over 50% of the globe. Within which, the two oceans have a total area of 254.6 million square meters, occupying 71% of the global ocean area. This region is a crucial area in influencing our nation’s strategic development and security in the future. It is also the intermediate zone of our entrance into the Atlantic Ocean region, Mediterranean Sea region, and Arctic Ocean region. At the current and subsequent time period, along with our nation’s increasingly deep Reforms and Opening Up and outward development of economy and society, activities in such realms as diplomacy, economics and trade, investments, energy resources, and cultural and media
dissemination, etc., have gradually moved toward the globe. The national interests will surpass in an extremely large manner the traditional territorial land, territorial sea, and territorial air scope, while the two oceans region will become the most important platform and medium. Subsequently, we also will create conditions [end of page 246] to establish ourselves in the two oceans region, participate in resource extraction and space utilization of the oceans, and boost development in the two polar regions. Challenges always accompany interests and expansion in the national interests inevitably faces new security threats. Our nation comes under various kinds of traditional security and non-traditional security threats coming from the peripheral regions, especially the oceanic direction. Because our at-sea sovereignty and interests have frequently come under intrusions, while intensification in the crises may very possibly ignite conflicts or war, we need to form into a powerful and strong two oceans layout in order to face the crises that may possibly erupt. Therefore, we should focus on maintaining expansion in the national interests, defend the at-sea interests, and rely upon the home territory to reasonably and appropriately expand the strategic space toward the two oceans region.

(2) Expand towards space

With earth as reference, space can be separated into near-earth space, distant from earth space, interplanetary space, as well as other space, etc. The space space is very broad, possesses potentially key-major strategic value, is an important region for our national interests’ expansion, is an important space in the integration of the military strengths tixi system, the response to the powerful enemy’s threats, and the formation of a new strategic deterrence capability. It is also a new strategic high ground in which the subsequent national development and military transformation should seize hold of from the beginning to the end. Along with the acceleration in the progress of space’s militarization, the world’s main military powers are strengthening the construction of military space strengths, are continuously expanding their disposition space, expanding their application domains, empowering the functions and roles, and accelerating the formation of actual combat capabilities. A space setup broader in scope and more complex in relationship is currently forming. The U.S. is plotting for command of space [space dominance], attempting in vain to exercise independent hegemony in space, and has already established in an initial manner its space layout. Even though we have had some expansion in the space space, however, regardless of strength or intensity, they are inadequate. Subsequently, the potential threats facing our nation from space will increasingly increase. Based on the development requirements and possible conditions, we should revolve around the strategic requirements and needs of the expansion of national interests and military transformation construction, and expand toward near-earth space and distant from earth space in a planned and step-by-step manner.
(3) Expand towards information network space

Currently, informationized industry has become a pillar industry of the national economy. Its direct contribution rate to the gross domestic economy has reached over 10%. Subsequently, this ratio is expected to continuously rise. At the same time, we have become a main country for information intrusion. The density and complexity level of network raids upon us are continuously rising, while the network space security is increasingly serious. Especially when some Western nations are trying to utilize advanced network technology means to continuously implement information network penetration and attacks on us through computer viruses, network attacks, junk e-mails, system vulnerabilities, network theft, and fictitious information, etc. Individual powers are currently strengthening the surveillance and protection of their computer networks and sensitive information. [end of page 247] At the same time, they are strengthening the consultation and joining with allied nations to form into network attack alliance against our nation, and when necessary will implement network attacks against our basic infrastructure. We are not in grasp of core technologies possessing autonomous properties. If we are inadequate in the protection of information networks, we will easily come under raids and ignite disastrous aftereffects. Our military should place the prevention and containment of possible network attacks as the key-point, develop new types of strengths in network attack and defense, and strive to maintain the nation’s network space security.

II. Moderate expansion of strategic space based on one’s own territory is a long-term strategic task…248

Powerful comprehensive national power is the forceful support for the expansion of strategic space, while the expansion of the strategic space is also an important condition for the strengthening and raising of comprehensive national power. Within a subsequently long period of time, we need to make an overall guihua plan, comprehensively apply the national and societal strengths, and combine with the key-major infrastructure’s engineering and construction, to provide a basic assurance for the expansion of strategic space based on one’s own territory [home territory]. The basic principles and main measures we should grasp include the following several areas.

Persistent defense. We persist in walking a peaceful development path and pursue a defensive nature military strategy. This kind of stipulation in terms of the essence requires the necessary employment of future space expansion in defense goals, and the necessity of having the maintenance of peace as the direction. For the future management of strategic space, we should start from the beginning to the end with the requirements of: supporting national security and development, maintaining expansion in national
interests, defending the region and world peace and stability, and walking a road of expansion possessing characteristics of the times and Chinese characteristics.

Reliance on one’s own territory [home territory]. Home territory is a reliable reliance for national strategic space expansion. China has broad and rich land home territory and a vast sea frontier. It has such strengths as a colossal economy, science and technology, culture, and resources, etc., and is embedded with extremely significant development potential. The tighter the reliance upon the home territory, the more powerful the expansion of the strategic space. At the same time as the nation’s accelerated economic, science and technology, and industrial construction pace, we need to focus on the spatial area and direction in the expansion of national interests, correspondingly strengthen the military construction, disposition, and presets, and realize the expansion of the strategic space in a planned \( guihua \) and step-by-step manner.

Strengthen coordination. We focus on pushing forward the strategic space expansion and effectively strengthen the links between the various strategic spaces. During the process of strategic space expansion’s preparation and implementation, we should attach high focus to the coordination and cooperation between the land, sea, air, space, and network space. We strengthen the linkups between the various spaces’ strength construction and development plans \( guihua \) and courses of actions, to obtain their strengths and supplement their weaknesses, to plan \( guihua \) overall, and strive to realize mutual supplementing in superiorities. We revolve around the key-point direction and domains of expansion and strengthen the service and support awareness on other space domains, in order to act in a coordinated and consistent manner. [end of page 248]

Having multiple measures simultaneously. We comprehensively apply such means as the strengthening of military construction, the pushing forward of the forward edge existence, the accomplishment of strategic presets, and the boosting of military cooperation, etc., to maintain the existing spaces, and gradually expand toward new strategic spaces. For the vigorous pushing forward of the forward edge area’s existence, including displayed forward edge existence and concealed forward edge existence, the key-point is to face the ocean space and space space. We persist in military and civilian combined pushing forward of the strategic preset in order to provide feasible channels and the establishment of a solid material basis for the expansion of strategic space. We launch military technology exchanges and cooperation with peripheral nations as well as such regions as Africa and Latin America, etc. We attach importance to the bringing about of the role of international law, vigorously strive for the right to speak internationally, to provide services for expansion of strategic space.
Implementation in phases. We overall plan \{guihua\} the direction, mission, and measures for the expansion of strategic space, with the current key-point response to the requirements and needs of at-sea local war under informationized conditions as the grasp, with the long-term objectives as the draw-in, to differentiate the importance and priorities, and vigorously push forward the fulfillment of the various measures in a stable and reliable manner in accordance with different phases.

During the process of gradual expansion of strategic space based on home territory, we need to attach importance to resolving the following issues: one is raising the long-range reconnaissance, early-warning, command, strike, projection, and support capabilities, to develop advanced new attack and defense means and support strengths, and provide a reliable material technical basis for managing the strategic space. Two is to deepen cooperation with relevant nations in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, as well as East Africa, the Atlantic Ocean, and South America, to establish the necessary overseas supply points and form into limited strengths existence through multiple kinds of forms, to maintain security for the strategic pathways and create conditions for managing strategic space. Three is to strengthen studies in relevant laws and regulations for such international public spaces as the oceans, space, polar regions, and networks, etc., as well as their public resources utilization, based on the national policy concepts \{fangzhen\} and international law, in order to provide legal support for managing the strategic space. Four is to focus on the needs for future implementation of military activities within a broad scope, establish a new joint command tixi system that is concentrated and unified, sensitive and highly effective, transparent in layers, and rapid in reaction, in order to provide effective organizational support for the managing of strategic space.

**Section 3: Optimize the Strategic Layout…249**

Optimization of the strategic layout is to suit to the needs of national territory defense’s transformation to forward edge defense, in response to the warfare threats and to maintain the national interest expansion. It possesses very important significance for the creation of strategic posture and the achieving of strategic goals.

Strategic layout is the carrying out of full-situational allocation activities \{huodong\} on the strategic strengths and resources in order to achieve strategic goals. [end of page 249] Its goal is to form into a favorable strategic posture. Strategic layout has differences between within the border and outside of the border in terms of spaces, has differences between current and long-term in terms of time, has differences between industry, agriculture, energy, strategic resources, armed strengths, and reserve strengths in terms of content, and has differences between land, sea, air, space, and networks in terms of the
domain. The strategic layout in the area of the military is the full-situational disposition conducted on military strengths and national defense infrastructure with the maintenance of national security, especially the response to the threat of war as the fundamental goal, to focus on forming a favorable strategic posture. It can be differentiated into defensive and offensive strategic layouts, and also be differentiated into homeland territory, regional, and global strategic layouts. A good strategic layout makes it convenient to bring about our side’s whole-body might and structures into a favorable strategic posture. It is an important condition for the ensuring of smooth implementation of strategic activities \{xingdong\} and the obtaining of success. Strategic layouts develop by accompanying the development of warfare. It is not only that the areas of strategic layouts are broader and broader, but the contents of strategic layouts are also more and more abundant. Strategic layout has become an important component part in which the contemporary world’s various nations’ military strategy implementations cannot be without.

Strategic layout is the starting phase of strategic implementation. It unfolds based on the strategic guidance to create conditions for the full implementation of strategy, while at the same time, it is also an important embodiment of strategic guidance. For example, the US’s strategic layout adjustment in the Asia-Pacific region in the last two years was thus carried out in accordance with the U.S.’s return to Asia-Pacific “rebalancing” strategy, which reflected the strategic intent \{yitu\} that the U.S. will further bring about influencing strength in the Asia-Pacific region. Although a strategic layout is the starting phase of strategic implementation, the key-point is to create conditions for subsequent strategic implementation, while it is also by itself an important component of strategic implementation. Under some specific conditions, the adjustment of strategic layout is also an important content for the structuring of strategic deterrence. The increase in number of bomber aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft on Guam at the end of 2010 and the temporary place in disposition of F-22 stealth fighter aircraft on Japan’s Okinawa Island in early 2010 was a movement in the implementation of strategic deterrence toward relevant nations in the Asia-Pacific region.

A strategic layout’s core is the creation of favorable strategic posture and the contention for strategic initiative. During the implementation of strategy, the strategic layout’s main role is to shape a strategic posture to create conditions for subsequent strategic activities \{xingdong\}. The so-called strategic posture is the condition and circumstances formed in such areas as overall strength ratios, strategic disposition, and strategic maneuvers, etc., between the two sides of the enemy and us within the course of military activities. The superiority or inferiority of the strategic posture can develop and change, while one can form into new relationships in the strategic real-strength contrasts through controls of the crucial nodes. If our side’s strategic real-strength possesses superiorities compared with
the threat side, we can further solidify and raise this kind of superiority through control of
the nodes. If our side’s strategic real-strength [end of page 250] contains certain
disparities with the threat side, we can thus decrease and eliminate the disparities through
control of the nodes, and even transform the unfavorable into favorable.

The crux in strategic layout is the formation of core capabilities. The allocation and
transferring of strategic layout on military strengths is not a simple combination, but
rather unfolds by revolving around the generation or increase in core capabilities
possessing a leading nature and differentiation. This is to say that what strategic layout
seeks is the full bringing about of our side’s military strength, to make it convenient to
change the inferiority and form into superiority.

The key-point of strategic layout is to control the crucial nodes through the allocation and
transferring of military strengths. Strategic layout fulfills into specific time and space and
is embodied in realistic situations. Its manifestation mode is to revolve around strategic
targets to carry out allocation and transferring of the military strengths by relying upon
the strategic layout’s overall scientific-based planning \(\{chouhua\}\), to realize control of
relevant areas. Whether or not one can effectively control the crucial nodes is the crux in
the success or failure of the strategic layout.

During the world’s various nations’ using of scientific-based methods to plan the strategy
layout, they mainly consider factors in the following three areas: one is the threats facing
the nation. This mainly corresponds to the realistic threats faced, to unfold strategy layout
on the threatened direction and intensity, in order to prevent the threatening side from
effectively employing force-strength or to constrain his threat intent. Two is the nation’s
military strengths. They mainly rely upon the existing military strengths’ scale and
technical equipment level to make scientific-based planning and implement the strategic
layout. One fully brings about the role of our side’s military strengths and forms into
strategic activity capabilities required for the confrontation against an opponent. Three is
the nation’s geographical factors. One mainly relies upon the nation’s geographical
placement and environmental conditions to make scientific-based planning to carry out
the strategic layout. One fully utilizes geographical superiority and realizes the control of
strategic vital grounds. Generally, for land power nations’ strategic layout, the strategic
vital grounds selected and controlled mainly are vital grounds on land as well as the seas
near land; for sea power nations’ strategic layout, the strategic vital grounds selected and
controlled mainly are vital grounds at sea or on land near oceans. The various nations’
strategic layouts each have their own characteristics. However, they all need to
comprehensively consider factors in these three areas to add weights and determine them.
Along with developments in the international security circumstances, the progress of military science and technology, and the continuous acceleration of the military’s modernization steps, the making of scientific-based planning in strategic layout has emerged with some new characteristics: one is the emphasis on the strategic layout’s flexibility. In response to more and more indeterminable threats, the strategic layout needs to have more powerful flexibility, to not only be able to deal with determined threats but also be able to deal with threats that are multi-formed and multi-elemental. Two is the emphasis on the strategic layout’s three-dimensional nature. The developments in space technology and network technology has boosted the development of strategic layout from the flat surfaces of land and sea to the three-dimensional spaces of land, sea, air, space, and networks, [end of page 251] while the contention for the control of space and networks has become an important focal point of strategic layout.

Three is emphasis on the strategic layout’s whole-body nature. The military strengths layout needs to be mutually coordinated with the nation’s overall strategic layout, while strategic layouts in each and every direction and the strategic layouts in each and every area need to form into a unified and mutually linked whole-body.

Since the foundation of New China, based on adjustments in the strategic concept {fangzhen} and by focusing on changes in the security threats, our military has placed the main military strength in disposition in the main strategic direction and important strategic direction[s]. This kind of strategic layout has brought about a critically important function in such areas as the creation of a favorable strategic posture, the tying up of possible external enemies’ large-scale invasions, and the support of the nation’s military security, etc.

After entering into the 21st Century, the international and domestic circumstances have occurred with a series of new changes. The main factors that influence our military’s strategic layout such as the security threats, the strategic objectives, the strategic tasks, the military capability, the warfare form-state, the geographical conditions, and the strategic thoughts, etc., have all occurred with changes at different levels, which objectively requires the adjustment and optimization of the military strategic layout. This is mainly embodied in three areas: one is the emergence of new changes in the national security circumstances, especially with the emergence of new trends in traditional security threats and the rise in non-traditional security threats as well as their influences. The security threats’ joint nature has strengthened, which requires us to focus on the new security circumstances, to adjust and optimize the military strategic layout with a forward-looking nature, to raise the capability to deal with the main strategic opponent and operational objects, to raise the capability to deal with multiple kinds of security threats, to raise the capability to deal with chain reactions, and maintain national sovereignty, security, and development. Two is the national interests currently surpassing
national boundaries in a gradual manner. This has shown an expansion trend in multiple realms, in full directions, and in large depths. The status of oceanic interests, space interest, information interests, and overseas interests, etc., within the national interests’ full situation has been highlighted. This requires the military strategic layout to keep up with the footsteps of the expansion of national interests, to both place the main attention point on the maintenance of national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, and also to attach high importance to the new requirements brought upon by national development, especially by expansion of the interests, in order to provide a strong backing and support for the nation’s peaceful development. Three is the continuous development in the world’s new military transformation and the acceleration in the speed of warfare form-state evolution. The operational means are increasingly becoming informationized and multi-elemental, command and control is increasingly becoming networked and intelligent, while the strike activities are increasingly becoming long-range and precise, while full-systems \( \{ \text{xitong} \} \) and full essential-factors whole-body confrontation has gradually become a reality, and future warfare will further display large three-dimensional body, non-contact, and \text{tixi} \text{ system} confrontation characteristics. These changes require us to necessarily focus on modern warfare’s characteristics, actively adapt to warfare form-state evolutions, change from the traditional “land warfare,” “close distance war,” and “national territory defense” strengths momentum disposition, to be prominent on the thoughts of jointness, long-distance war, and attack momentum, and scientifically make scientific-based plans in the construction and disposition of reconnaissance and early-warning, command and control, operational strengths, [end of page 252] battlefield infrastructure, and comprehensive support, in accordance with the requirements of breaking through \text{tixi} \text{ systems}, seizure and control of the three powers, and joint victories, to future optimize the military strengths layout, in order to deal with the realistic threats and long-term challenges of warfare in the Information Age.

The adjustment and optimization of the strategic layout is not only necessary but also feasible. In recent years, our nation’s economy and society has developed in full areas, the economic and science and technology real-strength is increasingly strengthening, while the strategic basic infrastructure in such realms as transport and transportation, information networks, and aviation and space, etc., has developed at flying speed, which has established an excellent basis for further optimization of the strategic layout; in order to realize the military targets, national defense and military construction has pushed forward in a deeper manner, while our military’s strategic capability construction has stepped into an era of leaps, especially with the breakthrough and application of a series of key-major science and technology military projects’ crucial technologies, this has enabled the operational capability of the weapons and equipment’s informationization, becoming long range, and mobilization to continuously rise, which has provided a forceful support for optimization of the strategic layout; in order to realize the objective
of “two 100 years” of strengthening the nation and strengthening the military, along with the Reforms and Opening Up’s continuous push forward, the scope of external economic and technology assistance and cooperation has continuously expanded, with a continuous increase in the number of projects and continuous deepening of the levels, our nation’s level of participation and influencing power on international affairs is expanding in an unprecedented manner, which has created favorable conditions for the optimization of the strategic layout in ever larger strategic spaces.

By focusing on the effective fulfillment of the new century and new phase’s historical task for our military, and by revolving around the winning of future wars and the supporting of national interest expansion, the adjustment and optimization of the strategic layout should be established on our nation and our military’s actual situation, to push for “four changes,” and structure into a “multi-formed functional, multi-dimensions in one, internally and externally combined, and whole-body coordinated” new layout.

One is the attaching of importance to the change in security from the maintaining of security to supporting development, to form into a “multi-formed functional” strategic layout. The fulfillment of our military’s historical mission in the new century and new phase and the maintaining of national sovereignty, security, and development have become the main mission for the new period’s military strategy. This requires the strategic layout to transition from the attaching of importance to security to the maintenance of security and to support development, and to establish a multi-functional composite strategic layout. It will need to both maintain national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity and also need to maintain the nation’s interests in such spaces and domains as overseas, space, and networks, etc., to support expansion in the national interests; to be able to deal with both traditional security threats and also deal with non-traditional security threats, and enable the nation’s peaceful development to have a secure and stable internal and external environment. During peacetime, it can form into a strategic deterrence posture and cause the powerful enemy to not dare to rashly carry out direct military confrontation against us, while the peripheral nations dare not to be indifferent to our national interest and will, and the “Taiwanese Independence” separatist momentum dare not to break through our strategic bottom line; when crises occur, we can rapidly react, effectively control events from deteriorating and spreading, and prevent small chaos from brewing into major chaos and crises from evolving into conflicts and even war. During wartime, we can rapidly form into a favorable strategic posture in the operational region, seize and master [end of page 253] the strategic initiative, and ensure our military’s mission of full completion of containment and the winning of local wars under informationized conditions.
Two is the transition from having land as the main towards a large three-dimensional layout to form into a “multi-dimensional and integrated” strategic layout. Future warfare combat-exchange spaces are large, touching upon broad domains, while the characteristics of the confrontation tixi systemization and the circumstances of the national interests’ expansion in full-directions, multi-domains, and large scopes require us to further change the concept of “continental military” in terms of the military strategic guidance, to expand the strategic layout from ground to the air and from such tangible spaces as the land, sea, and air, etc., to such intangible spaces as networks, to form into a full-directional, large three-dimensional, and multi-domains strengths layout that covers such spaces as the land, ocean, air, space, and networks, etc. For this kind of strengths layout, on one hand requires the display of three-dimensional networkization to realize multi-dimensional integration. One relies upon informationized information systems to link up operational strengths from various theaters, various military services and arms, and various domains into a large system that is mutually supportive, mutually increasing in effectiveness, with orderly operations and whole-body optimization, to raise the information systems based tixi systems operational capability, to realize full fusion of such various kinds of operational essential-elements as firepower, mobility, information strength, and support strength, etc., and form into a joint land dominance, sea dominance, air dominance, space dominance, and information dominance capability. On the other hand, we need to strengthen or weaken echelon allocations to bring about as much as possible our home territory’s superiority as well as its radiated effects. From the hinterland to the peripheral, from the coastal sea to the distant sea, and from overhead to outer space, we need to place in disposition the operations strengths in echelons for all of them in accordance with the principle of going from the approximate to the distant, to enable us to both implement operations within the borders and also make it convenient to fulfill missions outside of the borders; to be able to both maintain national security and also make it convenient to support the expansion of the national interests.

Three is transition from homeland territory defense towards forward edge defense to form into an “internally and externally combined” strategic layout. Under the new circumstances, our checks and balancing of the powerful enemy, deterrence and control of the periphery, anti-independence and boosting of unification, and maintenance of national security and development require breakthroughs in national territory defense thoughts’ fixated mode and appropriately externally expanding the defense space, to structure into a strategic layout of forward edge defense combining internal and external. One is the need to appropriately place in disposition towards the front the operations strengths. By focusing on dealing with the strategic opponent’s “air and sea integrated warfare” threat, by focusing on the maintenance of power and stability on the periphery’s larger space scope, especially in the oceanic direction, and by focusing on the large-scale operations that may possibly be carried out to completely resolve the Taiwan issue, we
will appropriately shift forward the main operations strengths in disposition in the hinterland region to the coastal and border regions, and gradually extend externally the strategic defense’s forward edge. Two is the need to structure overseas strategic branch points that rely upon the home territory, radiate to the periphery, and venture toward the two oceans, in order to provide support for overseas military activities, or to serve as forward bases for the disposition of overseas military strengths, to bring about political and military influences on the relevant regions and form into a posture with the homeland territory strategic layout that considers both the internal and external, links up the distant with the approximate, and mutually supporting.

Four is the transition from fragmentation of the pieces into combination of the components to form into a “whole-body coordinated” strategic layout. [end of page 254] The characteristics of modern warfare spaces being broad, the battlefield flow being large, our strategic opponents and operational objects’ being multi-elemental, and having complexities and constant changes in traditional and non-traditional threats have required the elevation of the scientific-based planning of the strategic layout from regional scientific-based planning and scientific-based planned in pieces to whole-body scientific-based planning, to make overall plans for the construction of the military services and arms and theaters, to make overall plans for the battlefield *tixi* systems, to construct the relationship between defense strengths in station and strategic projections, strategic reserves, and strategic predeterminations, to strengthen the strategic layout’s whole-body nature, coordination nature, and flexibility, and to raise the strategic layout’s whole-body effectiveness. On one hand, we need to fully consider the various strategic directions’ social and geographical conditions and the specific military requirements, to clarify their peacetime and wartime main missions and secondary missions, to refine the areas of responsibility, and to carry out battlefield construction with strong corresponding nature. On the other hand, we need to consider the requirement for mutual coordination between the various strategic directions, delineate the corresponding functional radiation areas, fully bring about the force-units’ force-strength and firepower maneuver capabilities, and form into a mobile momentum-disposition that mutually combines preliminary disposition with on-the-eve of opportunities disposition, fixed disposition with mobile disposition, and actual troops disposition with capabilities pre-allocations, to enable the various theaters, various strategic directions, and various military services and arms to be able to cooperate mutually and maintain the strategic full-situation’s comparative balance and stability.

The optimization of the strategic layout touches upon a broad area, is very complex, and requires the persistence in the principle of correct guidance. By summarizing the actual experiences of our military’s many years of strategic layouts and by borrowing beneficial methods from abroad, the optimization of our military’s strategic layout should be
prominent on three key-points and be persistent on four basic guidance principles. The three key-points are as follows. One is adjusting the strategic layout of the various strategic directions on land. By focusing on a larger scope to create a strategic posture to create maintenance of stability and power, we make an overall plan for a strategic layout on the various strategic directions on land, and form into a strategic layout with relatively large strategic depth that is mutually reliant and in which the strengths can extend outward. Two is perfecting a strategic layout in the oceanic direction. We make an overall plan for the requirements to safeguard the near seas, to maintain oceanic rights, and to fulfill distant ocean mobile operations and non-warfare military activities, to optimize the oceanic direction’s strategic layout and form into a strategic layout that effectively supports the coastal sea defense and distant sea defense. Three is the structure of a strategic layout in the space direction. By focusing on future space defense operations, we establish a space operations strengths layout that combines space launches, telemetries, assistance, defense, and strategic deterrence into one body, and which is high in three-dimensions, great in depths, and multi-layered. The four basic guidance principles are: one, the necessity for the strategic layout to mutually combine with the national economic layout; two, the necessity for the strategic layout for military-civilian combining and peacetime and wartime combining; three, the necessity for the strategic layout to mutually combine with the strategic storage, strategic maneuvers, and strategic pre-allocation; four, the necessity for the strategic layout to be multi-dimensional in momentum-disposition, prepared for both land and sea, internal and external integration, and externally radiating. [end of page 255]
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Chapter 12
Building a Modern Military Strength *Tixi*-System With Chinese Characteristics…256

After entrance into the 21st Century, our military’s modernization stands on a new historical starting point. Within the great journey of persistence and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, in order to victoriously realize the “Two 100 Hundred Years” powerful national and power military objective established by the Party’s 18th Congress, we must adapt to the requirements of the age of maintaining peace, supporting development, and supporting expansion of the national interests, to closely track the world’s new military revolution’s accelerated development tide, focus on fully raising the national core security requirements as the guide, put into practice the strategic requirement of the ability to fight and ability to win, and structure into a modern military strength *tixi* system possessing Chinese characteristics.

Section 1: Optimize the Military Strength *Tixi*-System Structure…256

Since the foundation of New China, after over 60 years of construction and development, we have formed a military strengths *tixi* system with land combat strengths as the main, with sea and air strengths as supplemental, and with limited nuclear strengths as the back shield. This *tixi* system is established on the basis of mechanization and semi-mechanization, belonging to, in terms of a whole-body, land combat, approximate combat, and national territorial defense. It faces the basic contradiction between unsuitability with the requirements of the modernization level and the winning of local wars under informationized conditions, and unsuitability with the requirements of the military capability and fulfillment of our military’s historical mission in the new century and new phase. Under the new circumstances, we need to adapt to the new requirement of world military development trends and our nation’s passage of a peaceful development path and expansion of national interests, to abide by the laws {guilü} of operations under informationized conditions and military construction, to accelerate the informationization construction, push forward the strategic transitioning, strengthen the strategic concept, optimize the *tixi* system structure, change the capabilities generation model, and raise the strategic capabilities.

I. Be prominent on joint, distant combat, and multi-capabilities strategic functional guidance direction…256

The *tixi* system structure of military strengths determines the military strengths’ strategic functions, [end of page 256] while the adjustment and optimization of the military
strengths’ tixi system structure must have the military strengths’ strategic needs and requirements as the tow-in. The adaptation to the development trends in the warfare form-states and operational forms under informationized conditions, and adjusting and optimizing our national military strengths tixi system structure in the future time period in accordance with the effective fulfillment of the strategic requirements of the new century and new phase’s military historical mission, requires prominence in the “joint, distant combat, multi-capabilities” functional guidance direction.

First, we embody the joint operational requirements in a better manner. Future informationized warfare is tixi systems and tixi systems confrontations established on the comprehensive integrated basis of the various kinds of operational essential-factors, various kinds of operational elements, and various kinds of operations strengths, with the various military services and arms’ joint operations becoming the basic operational form, while coordinated joint operations are currently developing toward integrated joint operations. Currently, our military is still overall a composite military of various military services and arms with the army as the main, mainly with displays of assistance and coordinating relationships between the military services and arms, and the construction [building] of the military services and arms strengths still not having broken through the bounds of Mechanized Warfare Age’s traditional model. In order to suit joint operations under informationized conditions, we need to be in accordance with the strategic requirement of aggregation in the integrated employment of the military services and arms strengths and attaching importance to the bringing about of whole-body operational effectiveness. We abide by the objective trend of the various military services and arms’ operational spaces going from branched out towards fusion, while we appropriately make the boundary limits between the military services and arms thinner on the basis of persistence in the military services and arms’ basic architecture, to give prominence to the integrated features based on information main guidance, comprehensive integration, and network support, in order to establish a sound joint command, joint operations, and joint support tizhi system mechanism. At the same time as the strengthening of the various military services and arms’ coordinated development, we attach importance to the horizontal linkages between the various military services and arms as well as between the various military services and arms’ internal strengths plates, and push forward the mutual links, mutual connections, and mutual movements of the various military services and arms strengths from such dimensions as the tizhi system, mechanism, legal system, and technology, etc., to gradually establish an information systems-based integrated strengths tixi system.

Second, to embody the requirement to fulfill distant combat while established on the home territory in a better manner. The development of mid- and long-range precision operations strengths is a popular selection by the current world military powers, while the
US military emphasizes even more the development of conventional global rapid strike systems. Our military should, on the basis of strengthening home territory defense strengths, and based on the individual superiorities of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Corps, develop strengths plates possessing distant combat features, expand with key-points the distant combat functions of the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Corps, accelerate the cultivation of new operations strengths plates that can surpass geographical barriers, directly threaten the enemy operations tixi system centers of gravity and crucial nodes, and which can create strategic shock and awe against the enemy, for such domains as near space, space, and networks, etc., and organically fuse them into the whole-body strengths tixi system, to gradually establish a land, sea, air, space, and network multi-dimensional integrated distant combat tixi system, to continuously raise the mid- and long-range joint operations’ comprehensive capability, and be able to fulfill outside of the border operations including long-range sea defense operations and limited space and network attack and defense operational missions.

Third, to embody the multi-capability requirement for accomplishing multi-formed missions in a better manner. [end of page 257] Along with the development of the informationization level and rise in weapons and equipment operational effectiveness, in the future, our military services and arms should continuously and appropriately shrink the numerical scale and further raise the mobile and flexibility nature. The composition of the various military services and arms’ internal strengths attaches importance to: modularization, the creation of conditions to realize mutual-links, mutual-connections, and mutual-operating, to establish an organizational structural basis for the different military services and arms force-units realization of rapid regrouping, rapid sticking together, and rapid formation of joint operations strengths corresponding to different mission requirements, to ensure that we can both fight and win local wars in multiple kinds of spaces, multiple kinds of patterns, and multiple kinds of intensities under informationized conditions, and also be able to fulfill such non-warfare military activity missions as social crises handling, domestic and abroad rescue activities, outside the border military power maintenance, and international military security cooperation, etc. We comprehensively consider non-warfare military activity missions’ special requirements, fully utilize the two kinds of resources of military and local in accordance with the principle of military and local combination and peacetime and wartime dual-usage, to appropriately intensify the construction of the emergency response specialty strengths, to enable them to become the backbone strength in the fulfillment of non-warfare military activity missions, and to organically fuse them into the existing strengths tixi system structure.
II. Grasp the air and space, at-sea, nuclear weapons, and network strengths construction key-points…258

Simultaneously with the world’s various powers solidification of their nuclear strength strategic cornerstone status, and the competition in such new operations strengths as development of the oceans, space, and network space, etc., they are fully grabbing for the strategic high ground of 21st Century international competition. In the current and subsequent time period, in our military’s adjustment and optimization of the strengths tixi system structure, we need to both abide by the tixi system construction laws {guilü} under informationized conditions, and make overall plans to develop such strength essential-factors as reconnaissance and early-warning, command and control, firepower strikes, information attack and defense, three-dimensional maneuvers, full-dimension defense, and comprehensive support, etc.; we also need to grasp well such construction key-points as air and space, at-sea, nuclear weapons, and networks, etc., in accordance with the principle of solidifying, strengthening, and supplementing the weakness, to enable their structures to better trend toward reasonable and their functions to trend toward more powerful, through key-point breakthroughs to drive optimization of the entire strengths tixi system.

Strengthen air and space. We focus on seizing future military struggles’ strategic high point, defend our nation space security as well as ensure freedom of passage into and out of our space, bring about the hub [pivot] function of military spaceflight systems within our military’s joint strength tixi system, and accelerate space and near space’s strengths system construction. In the short term, we should accelerate the development of space-based information support and assistance systems, to have space strengthen land, space strengthen the sea, space strengthen air, and space strengthen nuclear. In the long-term, we can focus on prevention and containment of possible space military confrontations, and develop reliable and usable space defense operations strengths tixi systems to form into a certain level of space strategic early-warning capability and limited comprehensive space dominance capability. On the basis of strengthening air defense and anti-missile strength, we increase the ratio of aerial stack strength, optimize the aerial operations and assistance strength ratio, and give prominence to the construction of aerial strategic assault means, to form into a new aerial operations strengths tixi system [end of page 258] with campaign scale aerial assault strengths as the main-body, with a certain scale of aerial long-range strike and projection strength as the “fist,” and with near-space strength initially possessing actual-combat capability as the high end.

Emphasis on at-sea. We coordinate the development of land, sea, air, space, and network multi-dimensional strengths in the oceanic direction, gradually form into an integrated coastal sea defense and distant sea defense operations strengths tixi system, focus on
creating our nation into a regional at-sea strengths power, be able to effectively deter and deny the powerful enemy military’s intervention, be able to effectively satisfy the military requirements to completely resolve the Taiwan issue, be able to effectively control the coastal sea posture, and be able to fulfill in distant oceans multi-formed military activities of certain scales.

Sharp on nuclear weapons. We focus pushing forward the informationization of the limited nuclear strengths, further optimize the nuclear strengths structure, strengthen the nuclear strengths’ security protection, strengthen the nuclear strengths’ rapid reaction, early-warning and launch, and *tixi* system defense penetration capability, and ensure the reliability and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterstrike operations. At the same time, we accomplish the coordinated development of nuclear and conventional [weapons] and accelerate the construction of the conventional missile strengths.

Expand the networks. We focus on ensuring the national and military network security, fulfill network defense operations when necessary, implement soft and hard composite strikes against enemy network systems, increase the level of whole-body development network warfare strengths, construct the three categories of force-units of network maintenance, network attacks, and network defense in synchronized steps, create network operations means possessing their own characteristics, and establish a network operations strengths *tixi* system that assembles reconnaissance, attack, defense, and control into one body.

**III. Strengthen the strategic projection strengths and strategic reserves construction…259**

Our nation’s surface area is vast and the boundaries are long, while territorial and sea rights disputes remain long term and unresolved. Along with the continuous expansion in national interests, the continuous expansion of the strategic space, military activities involving the outside have increased, and the “stationing of defense in accordance with the regions and guarding in accordance with the troops” model of the past is now difficult to suit to changes in the circumstances and missions, while the contradiction of “having too many troops does not raise victory while having too few troops is not adequate for defense” is becoming more prominent to a certain significance. Therefore, the development of strategic projection strengths and the strengthening of strategic reserves construction, to enable our military to possess large-scale, multi-directional, and high speed contingency reaction capability within national land territory, sea boundary, airspace, as well as a certain scope outside of the borders, and to raise the strategic elasticity and to maintain freedom of activities, are not only favorable to the winning of
future wars but also favorable to peacetime effective handling of various categories of sudden events, to maintain national security interests and to ensure social stability. Looking at it from a long range, this also possesses very important significance for the venturing of the path of sharpening the troops with Chinese characteristics, the optimization of the military strength structure, and the pushing forward of military transformation construction.

The acceleration of the construction of multi-dimensional strategic projection strengths under the main guidance of informationization. [end of page 259] Corresponding to the increasingly multi-formed military missions and the increasingly expanding military activities space, our existing military’s strategic projection strength construction is clearly lagging, with a singular projection mode, limited projection means, inadequate projection scale, and backward projection support, which has become the “bottleneck” for constraining the force-units’ rapid mobility and rapid reaction. In order to fully raise the development of strategic projection strength into a breakthrough for our military maneuver capability, on one hand, we need to rely upon the rapidly developing national transportation and transport basic infrastructure to establish a military and civilian fused and military and local integrated strategic projection strengths tixi system, and on the other hand increase the level of the innate strategic transport strengths construction. We appropriately develop large military transport aircraft, military helicopters, large comprehensive transport ships, landing ships, and supply ships, to gradually form into a strategic projection “fist” strengths of appropriate scale with the mutual combination of multiple kinds of projection modes such as land transport, water transport, and air transport, etc., and construct a three-dimensional projection strengths tixi system with information forming into chains, communication forming into networks, and which supports precision and visibility and multi-elemental and multi-directional.

Attach high importance to the construction of sharp, highly effective, and composite strategic reserves. Warfare actualities have indicated that the employment of strategic reserves at the decisive locations and decisive time links is the crux in shifting the war situation and winning victory. In the contemporary age, local wars under informationized conditions are prominent and are war openers in terms of strategic guidance. While it emphasizes rapid combat and rapid resolution, this does not mean a downgrade in the status and function of strategic reserves. On the contrary, a series of local wars in recent times have indicated that wars under informationized conditions can be rapid in combat but difficult in rapid resolutions, while warfare’s progress is still complex and full of uncertainties, and strategic reserves are still a strength that cannot be missing in the winning of local wars under informationized conditions. This requires our military to necessarily attach high importance to the construction of strategic reserves at the same time as the great efforts strengthening of the construction of first line force-units in
military struggle preparations, to ensure that it can be committed into usage during crucial moments in future local wars, and play the important role of overwhelming an opponent, controlling the war situation, transforming the posture, expanding the combat results, and achieving victory. Furthermore, the non-military activity missions shouldered by the military during peacetime possess such prominent characteristics as sudden eruption, rapid spreading, broad areas touched upon, strong linkage nature, and large influences on subsequent events, etc., and complex situations in which multiple events may emerge in one direction or having issues simultaneously in different directions. Under this kind of situation, it is frequently difficult to independently respond by relying upon the basic strengths in one direction. We need to step over theaters and promptly commit adequate and usable reinforcement force-units. Looking at it from a series of non-warfare military activities of our military in recent years, [this means] having strategic reserves such as strategic nature mobile force-strength as a backbone strength in the fulfillment of key-major non-warfare military activity missions, which can be committed to employment during the first time periods and rapidly control the development of events. The strengthening of the strategic reserves construction is not only favorable to the response to warfare during wartime but also favorable to contingencies during peacetime. It is both the basic requirement for winning local wars under informationized conditions and also an important assurance for the fulfillment of key-major non-warfare military activities. [end of page 260] Therefore, our military should place the construction of strategic reserves in an important status, push forward the transformation of the strategic reserves from the “large and heavy” of the Mechanized Age to the “flexible and light” of the Informationized Age, to venture on a development path of becoming lightweight, modularized, and joint applications, to strive to construct a new sharp strength that is “ready for emergencies, rapid in response, full realm in maneuvers, assault to control the situation, and of multiple kinds of capabilities,” to fully raise their three-dimensional rapid projection, three-dimensional firepower strike, and three-dimensional assault operations’ comprehensive capabilities under informationized conditions, and to place them in disposition in the strategic vital grounds and transportation hubs, in order to execute at any time assistance operations and temporarily bestowed non-warfare military activity missions for all directions.

IV. Establish a highly effective informationized assistance and support tixi system…261

An assistance and support tixi system is an organic whole-body composed of various kinds of supportive strengths and facilities established by the military to fulfill missions. It is an important component part of the modern military strength tixi system. A scientific and highly-effective assistance and support tixi system is the basic prerequisite for accomplishing various support missions. Under informationized conditions, regardless of
operational activities or non-warfare military activities, the need for assistance and support is ever greater and the requirement is ever higher. Under the tow-in by the requirements, the assistance and support means are increasingly multi-formed, the specialties division of labor is more meticulous, the support range is continuously expanding, and the tixi system features are further highlighted. The placement of the assistance and support strengths on a more prominent strategic status, to make overall plans to push forward the construction of the operations strengths and assistance and support strengths, have become an innate requirement for the fighting of battles and the winning of battles. Our military should tightly revolve around the raising of information systems tixi system based operational capability, persist in having informationization as the basic direction, and accelerate the establishment of a highly effective informationized assistance and support tixi system.

Informationized operations support tixi system. First is the operations support tixi system. This is an organic whole-body composed of various kinds of specialty support strengths established by our military in order to fulfill operational missions. It mainly includes such essential-factors as intelligence, communications, electronic (information) confrontation, nuclear, biological and chemical defense, camouflage, military weather (hydrology), military mapping, aerial (battlefield) management, etc. Along with the deepening development of the new military transformation, tixi system operations based on information systems have become the basic operational pattern, which further strengthen the construction of informationized operations support strengths, and form into informationized operations support strengths tixi systems that are complete in functions, comprehensive and integrated, and with full domain support. This is an important link in the raising of information systems tixi system based operational capability. One is the strengthening of the construction of operations support command information systems. We continuously apply advanced information collection, transmission, and analysis means, carry out upgrades and improvements in the operations support command information systems, perfect the integrated operations support command platforms that link up each and every operations command support essential-factors, to realize seamless linkages, ensure [end of page 261] that the various kinds of operations support data and information are promptly and accurately transmitted and are processed and employed in a highly effective manner, and further raise the military’s integrated operations support capability. Two is the raising of various support essential-factors’ informationization level. The categories of operations support strengths specialties are numerous, while the support domains touch upon the multi-dimensions of space of land, sea, air, space, networks, and electromagnetics. In order to form into forceful support for tixi system operations, we must strengthen the innate informationization construction level of the various essential-factors, and further raise the various essential-factors’ effectiveness in accomplishing the specialty support missions through the adoption of advanced
information technology. Three is the strengthening of the construction of new operations support strengths. We adapt to the expansion of the strategic space and the transformation of the operational means, tightly combine it with the construction and development of new operations strengths, on the basis of continuously perfecting the construction of traditional operations support strengths, we establish new operations support strengths and construct with key-points such strengths as network operations support, space operations support, and distant sea operations support, etc., to ensure that the operations support strengths possess full-dimensional and full-domain support capability.

Informationized logistics assistance and support tixi system. The logistic assistance and support tixi system is very important within modern warfare. It is an organic whole-body composed of various kinds of logistic specialty support strengths established by the military to smoothly fulfill the missions. It mainly includes such support strengths as financial, materiels and fuel, health logistics, transport, and logistics engineering, etc. To make an overall plan of the various areas’ logistic support strengths and resources to establish a military and civilian combined, peacetime and wartime combined, of information fusion, and sharp and highly effective logistics support tixi system, based on the military logistics realistic condition, and focused on raising the operations logistics support capability based on the information systems tixi system, is the basic requirement for the full construction of modern logistics. One is the strengthening of the construction of logistic support integration command. We focus on the requirements for the military to carry out military struggle preparations as well as the fulfillment of strategic missions’ logistic support, attach importance to the adoption of various kinds of advanced information technology means, continuously strengthen logistic support’s integrated command construction, establish logistic support integrated command platforms that vertically crosses the various layers and horizontally connect the various military services and arms, and realize a seamless link between logistic command institutions and the various essential-factors’ information systems; we persist in the principle of peacetime and wartime combination, change the traditional method of division of labor organizing in accordance with administrative duties, give prominence to the optimization and simplification of command composition, differentiation of duties, and information flow, to structure joint, modularized, and mutually connected flattened information systems. Two is the structuring of complete logistic base networks. With strategic rear bases as reliance, we combine the various military services and arms’ strategic missions and disposition, and further perfect the various military services and arms logistic base construction, to form into complete logistic base networks, and adopt a mutually combined mode of assistance through the levels and assistance by surpassing the levels, to implement logistic assistance and support in terms of becoming bases on the theaters and main strategic groups {jituan}. Three is the perfection of logistics assistance and support strengths construction. In accordance with the principle of military and civilian
combination and peacetime and wartime combination, and by corresponding to the requirements for the military to fulfill the strategic missions, we fully apply the military specialty logistic support strengths, mobilize [end of page 262] and organize the local logistic support strength by viewing the situation, and establish sharp and highly effective logistic specialty support strengths, logistic reserve strengths, as well as other mobile support strengths, in order to implement non-intermittent and full-process logistic support and assistance for the military’s fulfillment of the strategic missions.

Informationized equipment assistance and support tixi system. The equipment assistance and support tixi system is something that cannot be without within warfare under informationized conditions. It is an organic whole-body composed of various kinds of equipment support strengths established by the military for the smooth fulfillment of missions. It mainly includes such strengths as equipment adjustment and allocation, repairs, upgrades, and technical support, etc. Wars under informationized conditions are multi-dimensional space integrated joint operations implemented with a concentration of sharp weapons and equipment. The operational tempo is fast, the intensity is high, the weapons and equipment consumption is large, and the losses are great, and it inevitably requires the establishment of a sound informationized equipment assistance and support tixi system to promptly and highly effectively accomplish the equipment support mission. One is the strengthening of equipment assistance and support information systems construction. We focus on raising the military’s effectiveness in equipment management, usage, repairs during peacetime and wartime, with the national and military information networks as reliance; and we comprehensively adopt modern communications technology and military materials link network technology to further strengthen the construction of the equipment’s integrated command platforms, to realize multi-channel equipment support posture awareness, and to accurately seize, process, and analyze equipment support information, in order to provide a reliable basis for the equipment command institution’s prompt and correct decision-making, to realize the equipment support’s integration and becoming precise. Two is the structuring of scientifically complete equipment support strengths. We focus on the informationized weapons and equipment’s features and characteristics, adapt to informationized warfare equipment support requirements, and persist in the principle of system integration, structural optimization, and effectiveness leaps, to reasonably adjust the military equipment support strengths structure, and form into an equipment support mode with mutual combination of general purpose support and the various military services and arms’ special usage support; we strengthen the construction of a military and civilian fused support mechanism, and establish a sound military and civilian joint contingency support mechanism within peacetime or key-major military activities, at the same time as the raising of the military’s own equipment support capability, and through the adoption of such measures as signing of equipment protocols and formulation of support statues with local military
enterprises, etc., to raise the equipment’s comprehensive assistance and support capability. Three is the construction to strengthen the equipment and support strategic projection capability. We comprehensively apply land, ocean, and aerial projection means, establish equipment support strategic projection strengths with military and civilian fusion, mutually supplemental in functions, and with strong adaptive nature, and adopt a method mutually combining strategic predetermination, planned projection, and contingency projection to form into a powerful equipment support strategic projection capability.

Section 2: Develop the Military Strategic Capability…263

For the construction of a modern military strength tixi system with Chinese characteristics, the crux lies in raising the national military strategic capability [end of page 263] to ensure we can safeguard and respond to various kinds of key-major threats, crises, and wars, to maintain the national comprehensive security, and to support the nation’s long-term development. The military strategic capabilities we need to develop currently mainly are [the following].

I. Strategic command and management capability…264

Strategic command and management capability is the capability to carry out scientific-based planning, decision-making, and adjustment and control by the Party and the nation [government] on national defense and military building, warfare, and other military activities, from the strategic high ground. It possesses the characteristics of controlling the full-situation, macroscopic operation, and comprehensive adjustment and control, while it embodies the unification between the art of strategic capability application with scientific dialectics. It mainly includes the following four kinds of capabilities.

Strategic intelligence collection, integration {整合 zhenghe}, and assessment capability. It is the capability to make beforehand discovery, to accurately notify, and to master and control in real-time key-major events and threat factors relevant to national interests, including strategic intelligence collection capability, strategic intelligence integration capability, and strategic intelligence assessment capability. It is the basis for strategic working-out-an approach in planning, decision-making, and adjustment and control. For the strategic intelligence collection capability, it is separated into artificial intelligence collection capability and technical intelligence collection capability in accordance with the collection means, and into government intelligence collection capability and military intelligence collection capability in accordance with the collection departments. Strategic intelligence integration capability is the capability to carry out gathering of and processing of strategic intelligence collected through various kinds of channels and
means, while we need to realize intelligence systems cooperation and coordination, comprehensive processing, and intelligence sharing through the establishment of national level authoritative intelligence integration and research and assessment centers. Strategic intelligence assessment capability is the capability to carry out analytical comparison to provide assessment conclusions through integrated strategic intelligence.

Strategic consultation capability is the capability to assist the Party and the nation [government] by strategic consultation institutions and experts to carry out key-major decision-making. Under modern conditions, the factors that influence the Party and the nation are continuously increasing, while the comprehensiveness and forward prospect nature have strengthened, the difficulty in decision-making has continuously increased, and we need to continuously raise the strategic decision-making consultation and assistance capability, and fully bring about the decision-making consultation roles of strategic consultation institutions and experts.

Strategic decision-making capability is the strategic decision {决断 jueduan} capability to handle national defense and military buildings’ key-major issues as well as national security’s key-major events. Strategic decision-making is the main duty of the Party and the national [governmental] strategic command layer, and it is closely relevant to the Party and national strategic decision-making tizhi system. The Party and nation’s strategic decision-making must be established on the basis of scientific recognition of the national defense and military construction’s basic characteristics and laws {guilü}, a full grasp of the national defense and military building situation, as well as the highly effective command of the armed strengths and effective mastery and control of the crisis management resources, to accomplish with high perspectives, long views, and total control of the full-situation, to accurately grasp the strategic direction, tightly grab the strategic pivots, and to tightly grasp the strategic initiative. [end of page 264]

Strategic adjustment and control is the capability to scientifically organize and apply various kinds of strengths and means, by revolving around predetermined strategic objectives and resolutions, and with real-time grasping of strategic posture changes, during the organization of national defense and military building as well as the response to national security key-major events. We need to establish a unified coordination and command mechanism, including authoritative coordination and command institutions, as well as the legal laws and regulations mutually fitting with them, in order to ensure the carrying out of full coordination and forceful control of the various duty departments of the Party, government, and military during the handling of key-major issues.
II. Military strengths joint operations capability...265

The joint operations capability in the military strengths’ fulfillment of local wars under informationized conditions is the overall combat strengths of the military strengths’ execution of the national will and the fulfillment of the missions and tasks. It is the core of national military capability. By focusing on the war threats the nation may possibly face in the future, the raising of the joint operations capability mainly should focus on the following six areas.

Intelligence collection capability is the capability to carry out information collection, analysis and processing, and delivery and utilization, in order to satisfy operational requirements. In view of the actual requirements by our nation’s military strengths in the fulfillment of the missions and tasks, the technical reconnaissance and early-warning scope for a period of time in the future should cover the entire border as well as such regions as East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean, etc. In the area of battlefield posture awareness, we can form into comparative superiority against the main operational objects, and we can grasp the possible force-strength disposition and operational activities situation by the main strategic opponents opposing us.

Command and control capability is the capability to implement command, control, and coordination on the activities of the land, sea, air, space, and electromagnetic multi-dimensional spaces of the subordinate military services and arms’ operations strengths. In the future, our military needs to form a highly effective and stable command and control tixi system in which it possesses the capability to carry out effective command and control of joint operations in various strategic directions and within the Second Island Chain region, and at-sea patrol and defense operations in the Western Pacific Ocean and the Northern Indian Ocean, as well as the capability to implement reliable command and control of strategic weapons systems.

Rapid maneuver capability is the capability to rapidly transfer force-strengths in an organized manner in order to seize and maintain the initiative or to form into a favorable posture. It mainly includes strategic projection capability and battlefield maneuver capability. Looking at it from the operations and non-warfare military activity missions our armed strengths may possibly shoulder, we should possess the capability to project armed strengths to fulfill operations missions in the southeast coastal direction, southwest direction, and the First Island Chain’s important ground (and sea) areas; gradually possess the capability to project armed strengths that fulfill non-warfare military activity missions for places where we import petroleum from such as Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, etc.
Comprehensive strike capability is the capability that relies upon the assistance of comprehensive electronic information systems, employs land, sea, air, and space weapons platforms and even new concept weapons, with mid- and long-range precision firepower destruction as the main mode, with electronic attack and network attack as the important means, and for all-weather strikes of predetermined targets. Our precision firepower strike means should be able to break through the enemy’s various kinds of defense systems, to implement effective destruction of fixed targets on land and moving targets at sea, to effectively cover the First and Second Island Chains in the near future and gradually expand to cover part of the area of the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific Ocean in the mid to long term.

Multi-dimensional protection capability is the capability to effectively withstand the enemy’s implementation of destruction, wreckage, as well as various kinds of detrimental natural condition destructions on us in the land, sea, air, space, and network multi-dimensions. Local wars under informationized conditions require us to focus on strengthening the capability against the enemy’s multi-dimensional reconnaissance and surveillance, precision strikes, and information attacks, at the same time as raising the protection capability against enemy nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The goal of our military’s comprehensive protection capability construction in the future is to ensure the effective fulfillment of operational missions within various kinds of battlefield environments and under adverse natural conditions, and to provide effective support, especially for “the ability to see, ability to be joined, and ability to strike accurately” during operations against the powerful enemy.

Whole-body support capability is the capability to uniformly implement operational support, logistic support, and equipment support on the various military services’ outside of the border fulfillment of joint operations as well as other military activities, based on a networked and digitized support tīxī system. It mainly includes: the ability to provide such operational support capability as real-time, accurate, and reliable intelligence, communications, drafting, and engineering, etc., under complex electromagnetic environments and adverse natural conditions; to provide continuous logistics and equipment support capability for high intensity and high consumption joint operations. In the future, our military activities may possibly unfold in border regions at significant distance from the strategic hinterland or oceanic islands at significant range from continents, and also possibly be implemented outside of our borders. This requires us to be able to effectively support joint operations of various kinds of patterns and scales, in various strategic directions and corresponding to different operational objects, especially the ability to provide long-range, rapid, accurate, and continuous whole-body support in operations against Taiwan and overseas military activities.
III. The nation’s support capability for military activities…266

National defense mobilization is the bond and bridge linking the nation’s social and economic development with the raising of the nation’s military real-strength, while national defense science and technology and industry provides the most important material basis for national defense and military construction, the national defense mobilization, and national defense science and technology, and industrial capability is the basic component essential-factor of the national military capability. For the adaptation to the new strategic circumstances and strategic missions, we should develop coordination capabilities in these two areas.

Rapid and highly effective national defense mobilization capability is the capability by the nation to transfer human strength, materiel strength, financial strength, and science and technology [end of page 266] strength during peacetime to support national defense and military construction, as well as to transform military potential into military real-strength on-the-eve of battle and during wartime. Our nation’s national defense mobilization capability should be able to satisfy national defense and military construction’s basic requirements, ensure the ability to rapidly fulfill local war missions in the main strategic direction when necessary, as well as the ability to effectively support non-warfare military activities. The national strategic reserve [storage] capability is tightly relevant to national defense mobilization capability. The strategic reserve [storage] level should be able to support the implementation of one medium-scale local war, as well as be able to effectively deal with continuous military and economic blockade we may possibly face. We need to further perfect our nation’s national defense mobilization tizhi system, establish a sound entire nation defense mobilization law and regulation zhidu-system, and ensure the transition from national potential to national defense real-strength.

The national industrial production capability is the capability required for the national defense industry to produce weapons and equipment as well as other military products, as well as to support national defense and military construction and military activities. The national industrial production capability is mainly demonstrated through the categories, quantities, qualities, as well as continuous [production] capabilities of weapons and equipment and military materials production. Our nation’s national defense industry should be able to realize leap style development within two to three decades, gradually form into tixi systemized and scaled autonomous production capability for such main weapons and equipment as well as support equipment as large scale aircraft, precision-guided weapons, and large surface warships, etc. The weapons and equipment produced are not only advanced in technical and tactical characteristics but are also reliable in quality and also possess relatively good economic affordability.
Section 3: Transform Combat Power [Strength] Generation Model…267

For the development of a modern military strength tixi system with Chinese characteristics, the basic focal point is to construct an informationized military and the winning of informationized warfare, while the fundamental requirement is to transform the combat strength generation model as the main line, and transform from a combat strength generation model that suits to mechanized technology features and embodies mechanized warfare victory mechanism into a combat strength generation model that suits to informationized features and embodies informationized warfare victory mechanism, to realize the leap style development of deterrence and actual combat capability under informationized conditions. The boosting of combat strength generation model transformation needs to grasp well several links of “having information as the main guidance, boosting by science and technology, towed by reforms, and development in fusion.”

I. Information as the main guidance…267

The basis of military combat strength generation is man, machine, as well as a combination mode of man and machine. The ferociously fast development of high and new technology represented by information technology as well as its broad application [end of page 267] in the military realm has profoundly changed the content and generation mode of combat strength. The growth style of combat strength has also emerged with key-major changes. It has transformed from the expansion style growth through increase in force-strength and weaponry quantity scale of the Mechanized Age to a cohesive style growth relying upon information networks’ fusion of various categories of operational essential-factors and operational elements. Within combat-exchange sides’ tixi system confrontations, information flow adjusts and controls material flow and energy flow, information links support command links and strike links, the seizure and control of command of information [information dominance] has become the prerequisite and the basis for the mastery of battlefield comprehensive dominance, while information operations with the integration of networks and electromagnetics has become a kind of new operational pattern, and they bring about functions through new kill mechanisms that are incomparable by traditional operational patterns. Operational victory is no longer purely obtained by the quantity of operational resources committed, but will rather evolve into the seizure and establishment of information superiority, thereby transform information superiority into decision-making superiority and activity superiority, to ultimately obtain victorious momentum in wars.

The role of the information essential-factor within the combat strength multiplier has become obvious without precedence, while the occurrence of key-major changes in the
warfare victory mechanism has determined the construction of a modern military strengths *tixi* system with Chinese characteristics. We must abide by the ordinary laws *gūlìlì* of military building under informationized conditions, to set foot simultaneously on the objective reality in which our military mechanization construction is still not yet complete and also the facing of the urgent task of informationization construction, and walk a path of having informationization as the main guidance, with mechanization as the basis, and a composite development of informationization and mechanization, to have the development of information strength drive the whole-body leap and rise in firepower, assault power, maneuver power, and protection strength. We revolve around such systems as fused together situation awareness, command and control, soft and hard strikes, multi-dimensional protection, and comprehensive support, etc., focus on the vertical and horizontal seamless links and smooth and highly effective flow of information within the *tixi* system, with comprehensive integration as the basic channel, with mutual combination of whole-body design from top to bottom and level by level integration from bottom to top, and accelerate the pushing forward of the progress of integration. We firmly establish the basis of electronic information systems construction, being prominent in the construction of the data links and technical standardization, and gradually perfecting the information network grid, in order to provide materials and technical support for the realization of mutual linkage, mutual connectivity, and mutual operating. We grasp the two cruxes of situation awareness systems and command and control systems to carry out key-point construction, to seek to realize full area and multi-dimensional precise awareness and precise command and control within a broad strategic space, to thereby realize precision strikes and precision support.

II. Science and technology boosting…268

Science and technology is the first production strength and also an important basis of combat strength generation. Under the background of the world’s new military transformation’s deepening development, our nation has implemented a strategy of having science and technology strengthening the military, to push forward the transformation of military building from a quantity scale model to a quality effectiveness model, from human strength density model to a science and technology density model, while the basic focal point is to progress from a military combat strengths generation model to one that relies upon science and technology progress, especially high and new technology with information technology [end of page 268] as the main symbol, to have self-innovation and leap style development, in order to plant new high and sharp strengths growth points for the future military strength *tixi* system.

National defense science and technology self-innovation is the cornerstone of structuring a modern military strength *tixi* system with Chinese characteristics. It is the prerequisite
for the military strategic capability’s realization of leap style development. Historical experiences tell us that the development of a distinct strength tixi system and the raising of military strategic capability do not rely solely upon having a resolution and the increase of commitments to be naturally obtained. Without a powerful self-innovation capability, there will be no powerful national defense science and technology competition capability, and it will be difficult to provide a material and technology support for the structural optimization and functional expansion of a strength tixi system. Our nation’s “Two Bombs and One Satellite” was developed by relying upon self-innovation under the situation of suffering from an international science and technology blockade, which realized the key-major leap of the strength tixi system from conventional to nuclear and from land to the sky, which also raised to an extremely large extent our nation’s big power status. Within a future time period, our nation will come under a certain level of international blockade in the high science and technology, especially military high science and technology, realm. In order to shrink the disparity in the whole-body level between our nation’s military strength tixi system and the world powers’ military strength tixi system, we must be prominent on original innovation, empower integrated innovation, attach importance to drawing-in \{yinjin\}, digestion, absorption, and further innovation, and strive to obtain key-major breakthroughs in some basic, forward-edge, and strategic technology realms. We need to especially select core technologies and crucial technologies that possess strategic significance to our military strengths tixi system’s transformation development and raising of military strategic capability, increase the level to tackle key problems and scientific research commitment for space technology, precision-guidance technology, propulsion and driving technology, materiels technology, network technology, stealth and anti-stealth technology, high supersonic technology, and advanced nuclear weapons technology. We strive to obtain breakthroughs as early as possible, to form into autonomous intellectual properties, and accelerate the progress of becoming a reality in combat by viewing the situation and accelerating the fusion into the existing military strength tixi system, to form into actual combat capability as early as possible. At the same time, we need to stand on the future strategic high ground to vigorously explore and develop new realms, new concepts, and new mechanism technologies, to develop national defense science and technology’s strategic pre-allocation, to strive to be on the same running line as the world military powers’ whole-body, to strive to realize us having some while the enemy has none and the enemy having some while we are superior with what we have in certain realms, in order to provide a new strategic technical tow-in for our nation’s future military strength tixi system construction, the launching of new technological development channels, and also to provide earnestly usable strategic means to overcome the enemy and achieve victory in the future.
III. Towed-in by reforms…269

The development of the world’s new military revolution and evolution of warfare form-state have strongly towed the military transformation with Chinese characteristics. In order to accelerate military transformation with Chinese characteristics, we must deeply push forward military theory, military technology, military organization, and military management and innovation. We need to push forward military reforms up to the [end of page 269] level of national will, and we need to fuse military reforms into the whole-body progress of national reforms. The starting point and settling point of economic and social reforms is the liberation of the production strength, the development of the production strength, to transform the economic growth mode, through the adjustment of production relationships and social relationships. However, the starting point and settling point of military reforms is rather the liberation of combat strength, development of combat strength, and transformation of the combat strength generation model, through the adjustment of military organizational form-state. Construction of a modern military strength tixi system with Chinese characteristics is in terms of a certain level of significance the dialectical unification of transformations and innovations; we need to eliminate the key-major contradiction and “bottleneck” issues that obstruct the transformation of the combat strength generation model through reforms.

Under the push of fierce international strategic competition and the high and new science and technology’s ferociously fast development, the world’s new military revolution has entered into a new development phase. The world’s main nations are focused on the generation and raising of new quality combat strengths under informationized conditions. At the same time as the advanced weapon and equipment’s development with great efforts, we vigorously push forward the military’s informationization transformation and accelerate the remodeling of the military organizational form-state. Since the 20th Century’s mid-80s, our military has obtained dramatic effects in the resolution of two prominent issues of overly large scale in terms of quantity and backwardness in the technological level of the weapons and equipment. However, some systematic nature and structurally deep layered contradiction and issues that constrain the generation and raising of our military’s combat strength still have not been resolved in an excellent manner. Therefore, we need to switch from the adjustment to suppress the quantity and scale originally to the adjustment to optimize the tizhi system structure, for the center of gravity of the reforms, in order to strive to establish as early as possible a military organizational form-state that suits informationized warfare joint operations requirements, with realization of strong military objectives as the tow-in, by revolving around the main topic of military construction’s scientific development and transformation of combat strength generation mode; with the establishment of a sound strategic management and joint command’s tizhi system mechanism and legal system as
the breakthrough, we develop a systematic zhidu system innovation, sort out the relationships, adjust the duties, and optimize the structure. To deepen reforms, one needs to persist in combat strength standards from the start to finish, focus on construction of an informationized military and the winning of informationized warfare’s strategic objectives, focus towards the implementation of integrated joint operations’ requirements, and place information capability that can be favorable to the bringing about of a main guidance function within combat strength development and tixi systems operations capability that can be favorable to the raising of information systems as the fundamental basis.

IV. Development in fusion…270

A modern military strength tixi system with Chinese characteristics has the military as the nation’s military strength main body, and with support by the nation’s economy and society on national defense and the military as the fundamental base. The level of the military combat strength as well as the benefits of the combat strength generation are determined both by the military’s own quantity and quality and also determined by the level of fusion of the military and national economic and societal whole-body. Therefore, the construction of a military strength tixi system with Chinese characteristics, [end of page 270] the transformation of the combat strength generation mode, and the raising of the national strategic capability, especially military capability, requires a general-body disposition in accordance with an overall plan for economic construction and national defense construction, and the realization of mutual unification of enriching the nation and empowering the military, to accelerate and push forward the fusion style development of military and civilian combination and residing the military within the civilian. We need to focus on realizing the synchronized development and coordinated growth of the national economic real-strength and the national defense real-strength, expand the fusion of the military and civilian from having its main concentration in the national defense science and technology industry realm to each and every realm of economy, science and technology, education, and human talent, and raise it from industry and department level to national strategic level.

Looking at it from a world scope, the deepening development of economic globalization, society’s informationization, as well as the new military transformation have caused the combination surface between society’s economy with the national defense economy, civilian technology with military technology, and civilian human talent with military human talent to become more and more broad, the level of fusion is even deeper, the relevancy between military and politics, economy, society, and culture within informationized warfare is increasingly tight, the characteristics of general body warfare {zongti zhan} are becoming more significant, and there is a development trend of
military and civilian in one and forward and rear areas in one. Some countries are successively increasing the level of vigor of military and civilian combination. They have continuously pushed forward, in terms of policies and laws and regulations, the integration and mutual transformation of the two kinds of resources of military and civilian. Our military is a peoples’ military under the Party’s leadership. Mao Zedong emphasized that the most profound might of warfare originates from the broad military and civilian [masses], while persistence in and development of peoples’ warfare strategy and tactics will always be the magic of our military’s overcoming of enemies and achieving of victory. In the 30 years since the start of the Reforms and Opening Up, along with the socialist market economy’s gradual establishment and the profound adjustment of society’s economic structure and national industry layout, as well as the accelerated development of national defense and military modernization construction, the relationship between the military and the nation [government], the military and the locals, and the military and the people have occurred with key-major changes, and military and civilian combination and the military residing within civilian face new opportunities and challenges. Currently, we must further deepen military and civilian fusion in accordance with a scientific development general-body thought path, to push forward military and civilian fusion in a broader scope, at a higher layer, and to a deeper extent, to strive to explore a military and civilian fusion style development path with Chinese characteristics. Through reasonable guihua planning and jihua planning, we fuse military modernization construction into the national modernization construction’s strategic full-situation, to enable military modernization progress to maintain consistency with the national modernization progress. We combine the new world situation, national situation, and military situation, focus on perfecting the weapons and equipment scientific research and production tixi system, the military human talent fostering tixi system, and the military support tixi system. These contain military and civilian combination and military residing within civilian, to gradually form into a development setup of deep level military and civilian fusion in such crucial realms as key-major basic infrastructures, ocean, air and space, and information, etc., in order to better rely upon and utilize the continuously developing national economic and societal resources, and to provide a powerful and large support for the acceleration in the combat strength generation mode transformation and the full raising of informationized combat strength.

The military should fully bring about the main guidance role of the military requirements, [end of page 271] to fuse in a more active manner the national defense and military construction into the national economic and social development tixi system. The various levels of Party commissars and governments of the locals should attach even more attention to the fulfillment of military needs within economic construction in order to combine economic layout adjustment with national defense layout perfection. We need to grasp the main contradictions and issues that influence a military and civilian fusion style
development, and strengthen the military and civilian fusion style development strategy
guihua planning, tizhi system mechanism construction, and laws and regulation
collection, to gradually form into a guihua planning and jihua planning tixi system that
links up from top to bottom, is sound and fitting, and with strong operating nature. We
need to strengthen overall planning and coordination at the national layer, establish a
mechanism for leadership decision-making, and military and local coordination, linked
with the requirements, sharing of resources, and expenditure management, that is sound
and favorable to concentrated overall planning. We need to perfect a military and civilian
fusion style development’s legal and laws and regulations tixi system, perfect such policy
zhidu systems as government commitment, tax collection incentives, and financial
support, etc. We need to deepen the development of national defense education, and
perfect a national defense mobilization tizhi system mechanism, accelerate the
construction of a modernized armed police strength, and raise the quality of reserve
force-units and militia construction. We persist in upholding the military’s superior
attributes, persist in the government’s love of the people, solidify and develop military
and civilian unity, and establish a powerful and large basis for the persistence and
development of peoples’ war under the conditions of the new era. [end of page 272]
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[End of page 274]
Since the 21st Century, the international strategic layout-pattern {guoji zhanlu geju} has entered a profound adjustment while the world’s new revolution in military affairs has continuously and extensively developed, and the form-state of war has accelerated to evolve towards the informationized form-state of war. China has tightly seized upon as well as successfully used the strategic period of opportunity to firmly and steadfastly develop and advance along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and as comprehensive national power {zonghe guoli} has substantially elevated, the international position and influence has continuously ascended. The Party and the people have entrusted the armed forces with a new historical mission {lishi shiming} with a requirement to build a consolidated national defense and powerful armed forces corresponding to China’s international position and conforming to national security and development interests. In order to achieve the mighty strategic objective of a Strong Nation and Strong Military, we must, at the same time as persisting in the Active Defense Military-strategic concept, continuously enrich and develop its new epochal connotations and strengthen military strategic guidance that keeps up with the times. In the face of the profound changes to the international and domestic circumstances, in the face of a historical expansion in the duty-function mission of the armed forces {jundui zhineng shiming de lishixing tuozhan}, and in the face of the new situations, new problems, and new characteristics of military struggle as well as defense and armed forces modernization building, we urgently need to innovate and develop a military strategy theory that is full of the flavor of the times, embodies Chinese characteristics, and guides future wars.

In 2010, the AMS decided to project list and begin development in the research and writing work of the new edition Science of Strategy. In 2011, this topic was also listed as a key point topic of PLA-wide military theory, and the War Theory and Strategic Studies Dept. (now called “Military Strategic Studies Dept.” {junshi zhanlue yanjiubu}) shouldered the research. Department Chief Shou Xiaosong {寿晓松} took charge as the team chief and chief editor of the topic team, and assimilated over ten experts and academic department research personnel inside and outside of the Academy to unfold the research and compilation work. They underwent two years of outlining and deliberations, special topic research, and initial draft writing, and in February 2012, they formed individual revised drafts. In June and August, Shou Xiaosong twice conducted draft compilations, finally completing the entire book and sending it for draft review before sending it to the experts to solicit ideas in October 2012. After receiving approval from the Academy’s Scientific Research Guidance Dept., the review committee was convened on 14 December 2012, and received the appraisal of the experts’ evaluation. Post-committee, on the basis of the ideas put forth by the experts, Shou Xiaosong once again
conducted a revision of the manuscript. In Chapter 1, contents such as the connotations, study object, theory constitution, and main tasks of the science of strategy were added; in Chapter 11, relevant content on strategic support building was added; some content put forth by the experts [end of page 275] as needing appropriate strengthening, such as strategic pre-positioning \( zhanlue yuzhi \), mobilization, maneuver, and digitalized units, etc. were further emphasized separately in Chapters 10, 11, and 12. In accordance with the spirit of the 18th National Congress, relevant content was also substantiated, resulting in more distinctiveness in the basic guidance thought, main thread of the main topics of the manuscript and thus further raising the quality of the entire book. In April 2013, AMS Director Liu Chengjun \{刘成军\}, Political Commissar Sun Sijing \{孙思敬\} approved the conclusion of project for Science of Strategy and its publication and distribution by Military Science Press.

During the course of writing this book, we received the loving care and support of the AMS leadership and organs. AMS Scientific Research Guidance Department Chief He Lei \{何雷\}, AMS Strategic Studies Department Chief Zhao Pi \{赵丕\}, Operations Theory and Regulations Studies Department Chief Zhang Shiping \{张世平\}, former Chief Editor of Strategic Studies \( zhanlue yanjiu \) Deng Xiaobao \{邓晓宝\}, National Defense University’s Strategy Teaching and Research Department former Director Fan Zhenjiang \{范震江\} and Professor Ma Bao’an \{马保安\} all participated in reviewing and appraising the book, and they put forth many constructive-quality ideas. For this, we express our heartfelt appreciation.

In war, there is change in momentum, and in strategy there is innovation. The study of strategy has no limit and it is difficult to exhaust. At present, in terms of some of its significant theoretical problems, it is also a case of the benevolent sees benevolence, while the wise sees wisdom [different people have different views]. With the limited view of this book, it is difficult to avoid limitations, omissions and mistakes, and how precise and appropriate are the arguments presented also must await the test of their practice. We sincerely hope that in the study and exploration of the domains of war and strategy and in the great tide of military reform, we can kindle a small spark in thought and wholeheartedly look forward to everyone’s critiques and comments.

Science of Strategy Writing Team
October 2013

[End of page 276]