



UNITED STATES AIR FORCE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE STUDIES

at The Air University



U.S. Air Force Posture: *Impacts to Japanese Assurance in the Indo-PACOM AOR*

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The formal bilateral relationship between the United States and Japan began with the signing of the 1951 security treaty as part of the U.S.-Japan peace settlement in San Francisco.¹ This original treaty did not commit the United States or Japan to mutual defense, nor did it require Washington to consult Japan regarding security arrangements of U.S. forces. The follow-on treaty of mutual cooperation and security, signed in 1960, formalized the U.S. requirement to defend Japan from attack. This treaty also established a Security Consultative Committee to enable discussion between Washington and Tokyo regarding Japanese and Asian regional security matters, as well as any changes in U.S. deployments to Japan or deployment of nuclear weapons.²

Article V in the treaty states: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”³

This extended deterrence commitment security arrangement with the United States served the bilateral alliance well through the Cold War. During this period, Japan felt largely assured within the U.S. nuclear umbrella and left the majority of military details in maintaining the security of Japan to Washington.⁴ Following the Cold War, with the United States in the midst of military reductions, the 1997 *Defense Guidelines* for the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreement shifted portions of security responsibility to Japan, specifically citing the increased requirements for “cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”⁵

Simultaneous to these shifts within the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the rise in China, both economically and militarily, has caused concern in Tokyo.⁶ In particular, China’s increasing assertiveness and use of coercion in the maritime and aerial domains in the East China and South China Seas regions is worrisome to Japan. Examples of Chinese coercion include the maritime patrols during the Senkaku Islands Nationalization Crisis

in 2012, the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone in 2013, and the military buildup of the Spratly Islands that same year.⁷ Despite repeated occurrences, the United States has struggled to develop and communicate a comprehensive strategy to deter China’s “gray-zone” activities.⁸ While the United States extended deterrence guarantees for high side conventional or nuclear conflict have not been in question, the increases in subconventional or low-end conflict, known as gray-zone, have caused Tokyo apprehension and consequently affected levels of assurance felt by Japan.

In Japan’s 2013 *National Defense Program Guidelines*, a document similar to the U.S. *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Tokyo reveals escalation concerns from Chinese gray-zone situations over “territory, sovereignty, and maritime economic interests,” which may develop into more serious situations.⁹ With gray-zone representing a new threshold for potential conflict, Tokyo is uncertain what role the United States will play in deterring confrontations that threaten Japanese interests.¹⁰ Moreover, experts have noted Japanese concern that the United States may not provide defense of Japan in low-scale gray-zone contingencies because challenging China’s assertiveness may undermine strategic stability within the Area of Responsibility (AOR).¹¹ This concern may prompt Japanese fears of ally abandonment. It is this uncertainty, or the general feeling of assurance, that is difficult to address. Denis Healey, British defense minister from 1964 to 1970, understood this difficulty. He famously stated: “It takes only five percent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but 95 percent to reassure the Europeans.”¹² Healey’s quote is as applicable today to the U.S.-Japan alliance as it was to Europe during the midst of the Cold War.

Adequately addressing assurance is critical to the success of an extended deterrence alliance. Permanent military basing or military deployments to the region may be one vector to influence Japanese levels of assurance directly. Increased military presence likely affects ally assurance positively by reducing the risk of ally abandonment through the increased perception of a credible and capable security guarantee.

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


Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of Assurance¹³

— Assurance and Abandonment Theory —

Extended deterrence seeks to deter a third-party aggressor from intimidating, coercing, or attacking a protégé. The bilateral security agreement between the United States and Japan is an example of extended deterrence. In this particular agreement, Japan (the protégé) must believe in the capability and credibility of the United States (the guarantor) to take action to deter external threats. If Japan does not, Tokyo may take actions or make policies that are counter-productive or subversive to the successful implementation of extended deterrence. This possibility underlines the critical importance of engagement between the security guarantor and the protégé. As a concept, assurance is represented by the means, methods, political resolve, and military capabilities employed by the guarantor to convince the protégé of its commitment.

The U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies created a conceptual framework, listed as *Figure 1*, to illustrate the means and methods normally needed to positively assure a protégé within an extended deterrence commitment. This framework captures the dual requirement of both political resolve and military capability, combined with complementary political-military support, to positively assure a protégé.

The failure to positively assure a protégé creates feelings of abandonment within the alliance. Abandonment is the fear an ally may leave the alliance, not live up to its commitments, or fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected.¹⁴ In his seminal article, Victor Cha argues abandonment

anxiety of an ally is influenced by systemic, domestic, and normative factors that generally determine the ability to which a state can “exit” from an unsatisfactory alliance and “enter” into other security arrangements.¹⁵ From this, Cha asserts, abandonment fears will be higher for a state with high external threat perceptions, few alternative alliance options, and no internal balancing capabilities.¹⁶

The U.S.-Japan bilateral security arrangement solidly fits within Cha’s expectations. First, Japan has high threat perceptions of both China and North Korea.¹⁷ Second, Japan has few alternatives other than the United States that can provide sufficient security guarantees. Finally, Japan’s ability to balance threats using internal sources is limited because of constitutional restrictions.¹⁸

Cha asserts five ways a protégé may cope with abandonment fears:

1. *Building up internal capabilities.*
2. *Seeking out new alliances or reinforcing alternate existing ones.*
3. *Bolstering its commitment to the alliance in order to get the ally to reciprocate.*
4. *Appeasing the adversary.*
5. *Bluffing abandonment in order to elicit greater support from the ally.*¹⁹

Observance of any of these indicators from a protégé infers some degree of abandonment fear, and consequently, decreasing levels of assurance. Conversely, the lack of observance of any of these indicators infer no abandonment fear and consequently, increased or neutral levels of assurance.

— Literature Review —

The literature on topics of assurance and East Asian deterrence founded the basis for this research. Though Victor Cha's article offered critical foundations for measuring the relative levels of assurance, he does not account for the degree to which any indicator measures abandonment fear.²⁰ Observance of some of Cha's indicators likely show more abandonment fear than others. For example, appeasing an adversary or seeking out a new alliance seem to indicate a high level of ally abandonment fear. Whereas building up internal capabilities could occur with little government fear of abandonment. To address this omission, a weighted scale should be used when interpreting abandonment indicators.

Payne, Scheber, and Guthe's historical review provide insight and context into how the current defense relationship with Japan has evolved to meet security threats from the Cold War, end of the Cold War period, the Global War on Terrorism, a rising China, and nuclear-armed North Korea.²¹ This historical context enables the identification of trends and likely vectors for increasing assurance and extended deterrence effectiveness.

Literature by Brad Roberts assesses four categories to improve the U.S. extended deterrence and assurance of Japan: missile defense, conventional strike, U.S. nuclear tailoring, and strategic stability requirements.²² Additionally, Roberts references the importance of a coherent and common picture between allies is needed, as deterrence in East Asia becomes more complex and multi-dimensional. Moreover, Roberts assesses the stability requirements in the region, citing increased Japanese fears of increased Chinese conventional strength.

Yugio Satoh analyzes U.S. extended deterrence for Japan by comparing the evolution of policy from both Washington, D.C. and Tokyo perspectives.²³ Using this comparison, Satoh asserts a general credibility gap regarding U.S. extended deterrence. To address this gap, Satoh asserts further specification is needed regarding U.S. nuclear weapon use in deterring an attack on Japan.

Finally, James Schoff's work recognizes Japan does not have a nuclear sharing agreement with the United States. The lack of a nuclear sharing agreement potentially limits Japanese awareness of U.S. nuclear force dispositions and how they support extended deterrence for Japan.²⁴ Together, this literature highlights the importance of Japanese assurance in executing an effective U.S. extended deterrence strategy.

— Research Question —

As we seek to further understand assurance theory, what does it mean to assure an ally in the 21st century? Does the U.S. protégé, Japan, feel adequately assured given the volatility in the Pacific region and continued blurring of what constitutes aggressive military activity? As deterrence strategists, how do we know when Japan feels adequately assured? Recognizing the requirement of positive assurance as part of providing an effectuated extended deterrence commitment, how can the United States improve Japanese assurance in light of increasing security threats in the region?

— Hypothesis —

Based on the conceptual framework provided in *Figure 1*, a comprehensive improvement in either political resolve or military capability, or some combination of the two, should improve positive feelings of assurance in Tokyo. Logic dictates an increase in any one category or subcategory within the assurance framework would provide corresponding incremental improvements in assurance as a whole.

I propose the following hypotheses:

H1 – *Changes in U.S. Air Force (USAF) posture levels will produce proportional changes in Japanese assurance.*

H2 – *The presence of USAF dual-capable aircraft (DCA) in the Indo-PACOM AOR will have mitigated reduction of Japanese assurance, holding all else constant.*

— Research Methodology —

To accurately assess Japanese assurance levels, I look specifically at what existing U.S. Air Force posture within the Indo-PACOM AOR, positively assures Japan of the credibility and capability of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment against a specific threat. In doing so, I assume that other factors that previous scholars have found to affect assurance are held constant, to hone in on the specific effect of the USAF posture. This paper will individually assess Japanese assurance during Chinese aggression and Japan's loss to China following the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45). It will also assess how China's current military and economic expansion represent a historical context and current threat to Japan's stability and security in the region that the current U.S.-Japan extended security guarantee must assure. A qualitative analysis of three Chinese aggression incidents in the Indo-PACOM AOR will be conducted to accomplish this. For each case study, a review of the USAF posture in the AOR will be assessed.²⁵ This review will sum the number of fighter and bomber squadrons in the AOR, whether permanently established or deployed during the incident, as the independent variable. Permanently established and deployed squadrons will be weighted equally and added together to create a single independent variable.

Additional demarcation of the numbers of DCA squadrons will be noted to test the second hypothesis. Japanese assurance will constitute the dependent variable and will be assessed for each case study. Assurance will be measured by reviewing statements made by the Japanese prime minister or Japanese cabinet officials for inclusion or mention of any abandonment fear indicators. Historical statements will be analyzed using records maintained by the government of Japan. Indicators will be weighted based on the assessed impact on alliance stability as specified in *Table 1*.

Weighted Value	Abandonment Fear Indicator
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appeasing the adversary • Seeking out new alliances or reinforcing alternate existing ones
0.75	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bluffing abandonment to elicit greater support from the ally
0.5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bolstering commitment to the alliance to get the ally to reciprocate
0.25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building up internal capabilities
0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Null Value, no abandonment fear indicator found

Table 1: Weighted Abandonment Fear Indicators




Figure 2: Strait 961 Exercise²⁸

Victor Cha does not rank-order or provide weight to his proposed abandonment fear indicators. However, some indicators seem to express greater fear than others. If the protégé has lost confidence in the extended deterrence of the guarantor, we would expect to see direct appeasement of the aggressor or seeking new extended deterrence protections from a different guarantor by the protégé. Whereas bluffing abandonment to elicit greater guarantor support followed by bolstering internal capabilities and commitment indicate abandonment fear to lesser degrees.

The weighted value of indicators will provide an ordinal factor of Japanese assurance for each case study. The higher the factor of weighted indicators in official records will indicate reduced assurance in Japan. The lower the factor of weighted indicators in official records will indicate neutral or positive assurance in Japan. Japanese records will be reviewed for each case study from the date of initiation of Chinese aggression plus three months, to focus results on Japanese assurance as a result of the specific Chinese aggression.

A comparison will then be made between the independent variable (summed number of USAF squadrons, specifically noting the number of DCA squadrons in the Indo-PACOM AOR and the dependent variable (weighted comparison of abandonment fear indicators in Japanese records) to provide correlation data.

Case Study	Incident Date	Assurance Indicator Date Range
Chinese Exercise Strait 961	8-Mar-96	8 March - 8 June 1996
Senkaku Islands Nationalization	11-Sep-12	11 September - 11 December 2012
East China Air Defense Identification Zone Expansion	23-Nov-13	23 November 2013 - 23 February 2014

Table 2: Research Case Studies²⁶

— Case Studies —

Three case studies (see Table 2) will be used to assess USAF posture impact on Japanese assurance, the Chinese military exercise titled Strait 961, which simulated a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the nationalization by Japan of the Senkaku Islands and China's maritime response, and the Chinese establishment of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the preponderance of the East China Sea.

Case Study 1: Chinese Strait 961 Background – The Chinese military exercise titled Strait 961 occurred in March 1996. Strait 961 was a Chinese military exercise simulating an invasion of Taiwan.²⁷ Though this aggressive action was not explicitly directed toward Japan, it constitutes a significant military threat that could affect the feelings of assurance of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. The exercise was conducted during this period to influence the outcome of Taiwan's first popular

March 1996 Posture (Squadrons)	Nuclear Capability	Not Nuclear Capable				Nuclear Dual Capable †			Total
		8				7			15
	Primary Mission	Attack	Air Superiority			Multi Role		Strategic Attack	
		2	6			7		0	
	Aircraft Type	A-10/OA-10	F-15A/B	F-15C/D	F-22	F-15E	F-16C/D	B-52	
		2	1	5	0	1	6	0	
† - Nuclear bombers are included as DCA capable									

Table 3: March 1996 Air Force Posture in the Indo-PACOM AOR³⁶

September 2012 Posture (Squadrons)	Nuclear Capability	Not Nuclear Capable				Nuclear Dual Capable †			Total
		5				6			11
	Primary Mission	Attack	Air Superiority			Multi Role		Strategic Attack	
		1	4			5		1	
	Aircraft Type	A-10/OA-10	F-15A/B	F-15C/D	F-22	F-15E	F-16C/D	B-52	
		1	0	2	2	0	5	1	

† - Nuclear bombers are included as DCA capable
* - During this period, six B-52s were deployed to Andersen AFB, Guam as part of the Continuous Bomber Presence and are counted as a complete squadron.

Table 4: September 2012 Air Force Posture in the Indo-PACOM AOR³⁹

election for a government leader, and served to underscore China's seriousness over the issue of Taiwanese independence. Additionally, the Strait 961 exercise provided the Chinese military a way to evaluate its effectiveness and capability to operate in a joint environment while training in a realistic setting. Moreover, the exercise consisted of three short-range ballistic missile launches into sea areas near Taiwan, live fire exercises of air and naval assets to achieve air and sea superiority, simulated amphibious landings, troop insertions, artillery firing, and aircraft transport drills. The geographic location of these maneuvers is indicated in Figure 2. Overall, Strait 961 was the largest multi-service Chinese military exercise conducted in the Taiwan Strait area at that time. The exercise had many purposes. Strait 961 tested the current state of Chinese joint operations doctrine while also offering realistic military training. Furthermore, the exercise served to influence the Taiwanese election. The significance of this exercise underscored China's military capability and resolve to directly challenge U.S. extended deterrence commitments and provides an excellent opportunity to assess Japanese assurance.

Case Study 2: Senkaku Islands Nationalization Background – The Senkaku Islands have been contested between China and Japan since Japan's annexation of the landmass in 1895.²⁹ The islands were privately owned by a Japanese citizen from the 1930s to 2012. Then, in July 2012, the Japanese government stated its intention to purchase the Senkaku Islands from the private owner, and finalized the purchase that September. While the dispute had previously been relatively quiet in the background of international politics, this assertion led China to denounce any unilateral action by Japan as illegal and invalid while reasserting China's indisputable sovereignty over the Senkakus.³⁰ China immediately decried the announcement and warned the Chinese government would not idly recognize

Japan's infringement of its sovereign territory. China then sent Marine Surveillance patrol vessels to the islands to assert sovereignty. This initial deployment marked the start of a regular Chinese maritime presence near the Senkaku Islands. Figure 3 on page 6 shows the Chinese maritime patrols near the Senkaku Islands from 2008-2016.

Tensions continued to increase between China and Japan, with rapidly increasing numbers of Chinese maritime patrols near the islands. When these patrols were challenged by the Japanese Coast Guard, the Chinese vessels would demand Japan withdraw from Chinese sovereign waters. Increasing its military footprint in the area, People's Liberation Army Navy warships passed through Japan's contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, China increased its military air presence over the disputed islands, prompting the Japanese Air Self Defense Force to scramble aircraft nearly 300 times.³² In response, Japan deployed half of the entire Japanese Coast Guard to the Senkaku area. This substantial commitment threatened to strain Japanese maritime capability elsewhere, and Japan sought American assistance. In response, the U.S. secretary of defense at the time reaffirmed the U.S.-Japan security treaty and its applicability to the Senkaku Islands. The secretary further warned that additional provocations on either side could result in violence and conflict. This case study offers a clear test of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment and any corresponding impact on Japanese fears of abandonment.

Case Study 3: East China ADIZ Expansion Background – In November 2013, China announced the creation of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in international airspace over the East China Sea.³³ An ADIZ is a defined area extending beyond a nation's sovereign territory, within which aircraft can be interrogated or intercepted before crossing into national airspace. No international agreements govern the creation of an




Figure 3: Chinese Maritime Law Enforcement Patrols near the Senkakus (2008-2016)³¹



Figure 4: ADIZs in the East China Sea³⁴

November 2013 Posture (Squadrons)	Nuclear Capability	Not Nuclear Capable				Nuclear Dual Capable [†]		Total
		5				6		11
	Primary Mission	Attack	Air Superiority		Multi Role		Strategic Attack	
		1	4		5		1	
	Aircraft Type	A-10/OA-10	F-15A/B	F-15C/D	F-22	F-15E	F-16C/D	B-52
		1	0	2	2	0	5	1

[†] - Nuclear bombers are included as DCA capable
* - During this period, six B-52s were deployed to Andersen AFB, Guam as part of the Continuous Bomber Presence and are counted as a complete squadron.

Table 5: November 2013 Air Force Posture in the Indo-PACOM AOR⁴¹

ADIZ. The creation of an ADIZ does not confer any additional rights to a nation. However, its establishment can be perceived as a claim of jurisdiction within the ADIZ boundary. The proximity of nations in the East and South China Seas creates an array of overlapping ADIZs of different countries. China's new ADIZ overlapped with other countries' established ADIZs and is shown in *Figure 4* on page 6. Moreover, China threatened emergency defensive measures against any non-compliant aircraft that transited its new ADIZ without properly filing of an aircraft flight plan. Both the United States and Japan criticized Beijing's decision to create an ADIZ, perceiving coercive intent behind the maneuver. Following China's ADIZ creation, the United States, Japan, and South Korea deployed military aircraft, which transited the areas to assert freedom of navigation over international airspace. Additionally, China sent a military aircraft patrol through the ADIZ. Japan scrambled fighters to intercept the patrol. Moreover, Japan demanded a rollback of the ADIZ, which China refused. Throughout these occurrences, the United States reaffirmed its security treaty obligations to Japan. The creation of the Chinese ADIZ offers a further case study to assess Japanese assurance of U.S. extended deterrence commitments.

— Significance of Research —

While limited, this research provides information regarding the impact of USAF posture in the Indo-PACOM AOR on levels of Japanese assurance following Chinese aggression incidents. This information can be used to assess the future impact on Japanese assurance by potential USAF posture changes, such as the number of squadrons or the mix of DCA squadrons in the AOR. This data can additionally contribute to deterrence and

assurance dialogue between the United States and Japan by providing assurance implications for the roles, missions, and capabilities of U.S. Air Force assets in the AOR.³⁵ Finally, while extended deterrence commitments are unique from state to state, this research broadly applies to USAF posture impacts on ally assurance for states other than Japan or incidents other than Chinese aggression.

The following subsections provide individual data for each case study.

Air Force Posture During Strait 961 – The Air Force maintained its highest allocation of fighters within the Indo-PACOM AOR during the Strait 961 exercise, as compared to the next two case studies. During March 1996, the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) maintained 15 fighter squadrons within the region. This footprint consisted of two A-10/OA-10 squadrons (30 aircraft), one F-15A/B squadron (15 aircraft), five F-15C/D squadrons (90 aircraft), one F-15E squadron (18 aircraft), and six F-16C/D squadrons (138 aircraft).

Abandonment Fear Indicators During Strait 961 – 35 Japanese records from within the specified time frame of March 8, 1996, to June 8, 1996, were reviewed. From these records, there were eight statements regarding China, U.S.-Japan alliance, Japanese security, or the Strait 961 military exercise. One of these eight statements was found to contain abandonment fear indicators.³⁷

Air Force Posture During Senkaku Islands Nationalization – The U. S. Air Force posture during the Senkaku Islands nationalization was significantly different as compared to during China's Strait 961 exercise. The overall number of fighter

Case Study	Number of USAF Squadrons	Number of DCA Squadrons	Number of Abandonment Indicators	Abandonment Fear Weighted Value Index		
				Maximum	Average	Mode
Chinese Exercise Strait 961	15	7	1	0.25	0.25	0.25
Senkaku Islands Nationalization	11	6	5	0.5	0.35	0.25
East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone Expansion	11	6	2	0.25	0.25	0.25

Table 6: Case Study Data Comparison

squadrons decreased, while the implementation of US-PACOM's continuous bomber presence, a posture established in 2004, provided significant rapid global strike capability.³⁸

During September 2012, USPACOM maintained 10 fighter squadrons and one bomber squadron within the region. This footprint consisted of one A-10 squadron (24 aircraft), two F-15C/D squadrons (48 aircraft), two F-22 squadrons (unknown number of aircraft), five F-16C/D squadrons (76 aircraft), and one B-52 squadron (six aircraft).

Abandonment Fear Indicators during Senkaku Islands Nationalization – 181 Japanese records from Sept. 11, 2012, to Dec. 11, 2012, were reviewed. From these records there were 20 statements regarding China, U.S.-Japan alliance, Japanese security, or the Senkaku Islands. Five of these 20 statements were found to contain abandonment fear indicators.⁴⁰

Air Force Posture during Chinese ADIZ Expansion – The U.S. Air Force posture during the Chinese ADIZ expansion was no different than during the Senkaku Islands nationalization. During November 2013, USPACOM maintained 10 fighter squadrons and one bomber squadron within the region. This footprint consisted of one A-10 squadron (24 aircraft), two F-15C/D squadrons (48 aircraft), two F-22 squadrons (unknown number of aircraft), five F-16C/D squadrons (76 aircraft), and one B-52 squadron (six aircraft).

Abandonment Fear Indicators during Chinese ADIZ Expansion – 223 Japanese records from within the specified time frame of Nov. 23, 2013, to Feb. 23, 2014, were reviewed. From these records there were 29 statements regarding China, U.S.-Japan alliance, Japanese security, or the Chinese ADIZ. Two of these 29 statements were found to contain abandonment fear indicators.⁴²

— Conclusions and Policy Implications —

The change in total number of USAF squadrons across case studies does not appear to correlate with changes to the maximum, average, or mode value of abandonment fear indicators. Maximum and average abandonment fear value was higher during the Senkaku nationalization, but the same during the Strait 961 military exercise and Chinese ADIZ expansion. Moreover, the change in DCA squadrons across case studies produced mixed results. Maximum and average abandonment fear values were higher during the Senkaku nationalization, but the same during the Strait 961 military exercise and the Chinese ADIZ expansion. *Table 6* compares USAF posture with weighted abandonment fear indicator data.

It can be noted the lowest number of abandonment fear indicators occurred during the Strait 961 military exercise, which corresponded with the highest USAF squadron posture. However, significantly fewer Japanese records were reviewed for this case study as compared to the other case studies.⁴³ As a result, correlating a decrease in abandonment indicators to an increase in the number of U.S. Air Force squadrons is statistically difficult.

This data would seem to confirm that, in general, overall USAF posture levels have no discernable impacts on levels of Japanese assurance, negating *Hypothesis H1*. Additionally, due to the similar number of dual-capable aircraft within the USAF posture across case studies, it is difficult to determine if the presence of USAF dual-capable aircraft in the region corresponds to any impact on Japanese assurance levels, following

aggressive Chinese actions. This data is therefore unable to confirm or negate *Hypothesis H2*. Focusing on the negation of *H1* suggests a reduction in total USAF posture in the Indo-PACOM AOR would not have a significant impact on Japanese assurance. With no direct correlation observed between USAF posture and abandonment fear indicators, we can assume that further incremental increases or decreases on USAF posture would not have an observable effect on Japanese assurance. However, it is logical that any significant and abrupt posture increases or reductions would have discernable effect on the assurance of any protégé.

Finally, this research assessed the effect on assurance based on the number of USAF squadrons and the number of nuclear dual-capable squadrons. The lack of correlation between the USAF posture in the region and Japanese assurance suggests different factors, other than the total number of USAF squadrons, may contribute to changes in assurance. Instead, specific military capabilities, tailored to counter protégé perceived threats, may have more impact on protégé assurance. For Japan, tailoring USAF capabilities to address its particular security concerns of ballistic missile attacks and gray-zone maritime coercion, could improve positive assurance. This idea of tailoring capabilities to threats is in line with previous suggestions by Brad Roberts for the United States to emphasize missile defense and conventional strike capabilities to assure Japan.⁴⁴

— Future Research —

Future research should include a broader range of case studies to provide additional data sets to assess abandonment fear indicators. Specifically, case studies tied to North Korean aggressive acts, such as missile launches, could be included to increase available data. Moreover, statements by Japanese officials indicate the presence of U.S. naval assets, specifically aircraft carriers, may affect their calculus of the strategic balance within the AOR.⁴⁵ Future research should also determine if any correlation between naval force assets and abandonment fear indicators exist.

Additionally, specific U.S. military capabilities should be assessed on their impact on assurance. For example, the deployment of missile defense, early warning, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems may positively contribute to assurance because of their unique capabilities, given the specific security threats faced by Japan at this time. Tailored assurance emphasizing functional capabilities could provide a positive assurance effect, whereas the overall quantity of air assets shows no correlating affect.

Finally, Victor Cha's original abandonment fear indicators should be expanded to include statements of vulnerability. During the 1996 Chinese Strait 961 military exercise, Japanese officials specifically cited Japan's vulnerability in the region as constraining their potential actions and dialogue with China.⁴⁶ Japanese officials further contrasted their own vulnerability against the relative lack of vulnerability of their U.S. security guarantor. Such statements of vulnerability demonstrate a loss of assurance and should be considered an abandonment fear indicator in future research.

— Notes —

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15. Cha, 265.
16. Cha, 265.
17. Japan has cited great concern over Chinese air and maritime activities and their combined effect on regional and global stability. They have also cited North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile program as a grave and serious threat to Japan's security. See Japanese Ministry of Defense, "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY14 and Beyond," Dec. 17, 2013, 2-4.
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23. Yukio Satoh, "U.S. Extended Deterrence and Japan's Security," *Livermore Papers on Global Security* No. 2 (October 2017).
24. James Schoff, *Realigning Priorities, The U.S.- Japan Alliance and the Future of Extended Deterrence* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2009).
25. Data was compiled for comparison among three sources of the publication *The Military Balance*, which quantitatively provided numerical counts of aircraft squadrons and inventory assigned by combatant command. Moreover, information regarding historic nuclear bomber deployments to the region was collected from an interview with the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Commander's Action Group via telephone.
26. Case studies were pulled from the following sources: Jeffrey Richelson, *China and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, 1960-1998*, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 19 (Washington, D.C., 1999), Green et al., "Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence," (Center for Strategic International Studies, May 2017), 124-47, Green et al., 148-68.
27. Office of Naval Intelligence, "Chinese Exercise Strait 961: 8-25 March 1996," 1996.
28. Ibid., 1.
29. Michael Green, et al., "Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence" (Center for Strategic International Studies, May 2017), 125.
30. Ibid., 131-32.

— Notes (Continued) —

31. Ibid., 142, Source from Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels,” October 2016.

32. Ibid., 143.

33. Ibid., 148.

34. Ibid., 148.

35. The importance of deterrence and assurance dialogue between the United States and Japan, which incorporates more detailed analysis about potential threats, common objectives, and implication for roles, missions, and capabilities was recommended by James Schoff, See *Realigning Priorities, The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of Extended Deterrence* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2009), 79.

36. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1996-1997* (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 29.

37. The following Japanese record contained abandonment fear indicators regarding the Strait 961 military exercise: Hiroshi Hashimoto, “Press Conference by the Press Secretary,” (May 14, 1996). Of note, the Joint Security Declaration issued by Japan and the United States on April 17, 1996, could be assessed as the abandonment indicator of bolstering commitment to the alliance to solicit reciprocity. However, this joint statement was issued following 18 months of diplomatic work between Washington and Tokyo and the Joint Declaration is assessed as not resultant from the Strait 961 military exercise and therefore scored as a null value, see Patrick M. Cronin, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance Redefined” (Institute for National Strategic Studies, May 1996), 1–2.

38. Andersen Air Force Base Office of Public Affairs, “Continuous Bomber Presence Mission,” Government, *Andersen Air Force Base* (blog), accessed Jan. 17, 2019, www.andersen.af.mil/CBP/.

39. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2013* (London: The Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 79–84.

40. The following Japanese records contained abandonment fear indicators regarding the Senkaku Islands nationalization: Yoshihiko Noda, “Address by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda at the 2012 Fleet Review of the Japan Self-Defense Forces,” (Oct. 14, 2012); Yoshihiko Noda, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda to the 181st Session of the Diet,” (Oct. 29, 2012); Osamu Fujimura, “Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary,” (Sept. 14, 2012); Osamu Fujimura, “Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary,” (Nov. 5, 2012); Osamu Fujimura, “Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary,” (Nov. 7, 2012).

41. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2014* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 50–55.

42. The following Japanese records contained abandonment fear indicators regarding the Chinese air defense identification zone (ADIZ) expansion: Shinzo Abe, “Second Gathering with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” hosted by Japan Akademeia, Speech by Prime Minister,” (Dec. 19, 2013); Shinzo Abe, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 186th Session of the Diet,” (Jan. 24, 2014).


43. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary archive data does not exist on the official Japanese website prior to 2011. As a result, significantly fewer records were reviewed for the Strait 961 case study. Only 35 records were reviewed for the Strait 961 military exercise case study as compared to 181 and 223 for the Senkaku nationalization and Chinese ADIZ expansion case studies respectively.

44. Roberts, “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia.”

45. Hiroshi Hashimoto, “Press Conference by the Press Secretary,” (March 12, 1996), www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1996/3/312.html#18.

46. Ibid.

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