Why There Is No Military Solution to the Problems of Peacekeeping

Dennis Jett

Introduction

The UN was not even three years old when it launched its first peacekeeping mission in 1948. For the past 70 years, the organization has been continuously involved in such operations—often with mixed results.

The results have been mixed, in part, because over that time peacekeeping and the wars to which it has been applied have changed. The challenges peacekeepers face have evolved from ones that were straightforward to tasks that were highly complex and multifaceted. The missions launched most recently represent a further evolution into a third phase. These missions, all in Africa, are ones where the peacekeepers are bound to fail because policy makers have given them goals incapable of being accomplished.

To say that these missions cannot succeed is not to say peacekeeping has never been successful. The UN has averaged one new peacekeeping mission a year over the 71 years the organization has existed. Some have ended well; others have not. When the UN has moved beyond keeping the peace, casualties have mounted. This history explains why, in each of the seven decades of UN peacekeeping, the number of peacekeepers who died on duty has increased. The total is now nearly 4,000 and rapidly growing.

To understand how peacekeeping has changed requires describing how it has evolved. There are currently 14 UN peacekeeping missions, employing nearly 100,000 soldiers, police, and civilians at an annual cost of almost USD 7 billion. These missions reflect the three stages of peacekeeping’s evolution. The oldest among them, launched in response to wars between countries over territory, can be described as *classical peacekeeping*. The second stage involved *multidimensional operations*, in which peacekeepers took on a wide variety of tasks to help countries recover from civil wars. The most recently launched operations are the third stage, *protection and stabilization missions*, where policy makers have given peacekeepers a mandate to protect civilians and aid governments that are threatened by violent extremism. It is these protection and stabilization missions where peacekeepers are bound to fail, because there is no peace to keep and they lack the ability to impose one.
Classical Peacekeeping Operations

The six classical peacekeeping operations have logged a combined total of more than three centuries of peacekeeping efforts. Yet none of the six is going to end in the foreseeable future, mainly because their successful conclusion does not serve the interests of some of the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council (UNSC).

Western Sahara

The operation in the Western Sahara, which started in 1991, is supposed to help hold a referendum on independence for the region. Morocco, which claims the territory, will not permit a referendum that would result in independence. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario Front), the territory’s preeminent Sahrawi rebel national liberation movement, will not agree to a referendum that does not include independence as an option, and the group seems unwilling to accept autonomy without independence. Even though Morocco restricts the movement of the peacekeepers, Rabat sees an advantage in their continued presence. Because France has a close relationship with Morocco, Paris will use its P5 status to ensure the mission does not end without Moroccan consent.

Cyprus

In Cyprus, the mission began in 1964, tasked with getting the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to live together in peace. Britain has military bases on Cyprus so the UK’s interest is in preserving the status quo. They have little to fear, as the Turkish Cypriot leaders have no desire to be a minority in a united country. Instead, these leaders have declared their own independent state on the northern end of the island, even though Turkey is the only nation that recognizes it. With the permission of a country that only they recognize, the Turks have begun to explore for natural gas in the waters around Cyprus. That has prompted the condemnation of European Union (EU) and a cutoff of aid from the EU. The Turkish government, no doubt supported by the Russians, who want to sell more weapons to Turkey, says it is going ahead with drilling for the gas despite the EU protests. While this confrontation has increased tensions in the region, it has also prompted Greek and Cypriot leaders to meet to discuss peace talks that were last held in 2017.
Kashmir

A small force of peacekeepers has operated in Kashmir for more than 70 years. Since this force is supposedly helping avoid a war between India and Pakistan, two countries with nuclear weapons, no one is ready to terminate that mission—even though what it is accomplishing is unclear. Steps taken recently by the Indian government have not made the peacekeepers’ job any easier. In August 2019, New Delhi abolished the autonomy given Jammu & Kashmir under India’s constitution. The government then flooded the area, the nation’s only Muslim-majority state, with troops to suppress any negative reaction. These harsh measures are part of a policy of aggressive Hindu nationalism that will guarantee even more the unlikelihood of any peace with Pakistan or possible end of the peacekeeping mission.

The Levant

The remaining three classical peacekeeping operations are in and around Israel. They are the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Jerusalem, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Syria, and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). There is also a fourth operation, the Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, which was created as a result of the Camp David Accords. It is not a UN effort, because Russia would have vetoed its establishment; so, the mission was set up independently.

UNTSO, the UN’s first peacekeeping effort, began in 1948. It continues to this day but makes no visible contribution to peace. UNDOF was created in 1974 after the Yom Kippur War. Because the civil war in Syria has made it unsafe for the peacekeepers, UNDOF cannot carry out its functions. In addition, the Trump administration has proclaimed that “the United States recognizes that the Golan Heights are part of the State of Israel.” Since Israel is never going to withdraw from the Golan and Syria is never going to give up its demands to recover the area, the UNDOF peacekeepers will apparently never be able to go home.

UNIFIL was established in 1978, after fighting between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israeli military forces in southern Lebanon. While the mission’s 10,000 peacekeepers from 40 different countries make dozens of patrols every day, they cannot do anything without the cooperation of the Lebanese government—a government that now includes Hezbollah, which controls southern Lebanon. The United States considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization, and the Israelis believe the group is stockpiling tens of thousands of rockets in population centers and digging tunnels under the border much as Hamas has done in Gaza. Yet, when the Israelis pointed out a brick factory that they believed was
being used to hide one of the tunnels, the Lebanese government refused to let the UN investigate because the factory was private property.

UNIFIL does facilitate communications between the two sides, which otherwise do not talk to each other, but such coordination does not require thousands of peacekeepers. Perhaps to calm tensions in the region, UNIFIL does have one accomplishment. It has organized yoga lessons.³

The MFO came into being in 1981 when Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula. Because of terrorism in the northern Sinai, the peacekeepers have now largely withdrawn to the south, far from the border. Meanwhile, the Egyptian and Israeli armies, which the MFO was set up to keep apart, are conducting joint combat operations together against the extremists.

In other words, none of these operations in the Middle East have an exit strategy. And, like Jared Kushner’s peace plan, none of them is doing anything to encourage a political process that might resolve the conflicts that caused them. Israel likes having the peacekeepers, as their presence provides someone to blame when hostilities erupt. And since the current American administration seems to have no limit when it comes to things it can do for Israel, the United States will ensure none of these missions are brought to an end.

Since wars between countries over territory are today quite rare, a new classical peacekeeping operation being launched is unlikely. The irony is that, on one hand, such operations present the peacekeepers with manageable assignments, since it usually consists mainly of patrolling a demilitarized area between the armies of two countries. On the other hand, the classical peacekeeping operations currently underway do not seem to be in any danger of ending due to the interests of powerful nations.

**Multidimensional Operations**

The second type of peacekeeping, multidimensional operations, began as a result of civil wars over political power. Once a ceasefire was established in these conflicts, peacekeepers could be sent in. Decision makers gave peacekeepers a long list of goals to help the peace become permanent. The list could include demobilization of most of the former combatants and reintegrating them into civilian life, forming a new national army that was not loyal to only one side, aiding refugees to return to their homes, providing humanitarian aid and development assistance to restart the economy, and holding elections in a country with little-to-no democratic experience.

Given the cost of such operations—thousands of peacekeepers were required for such tasks—there was pressure to achieve all the objectives on a tight schedule. If the elections produced a government with a measure of legitimacy, the peace-
keepers could declare success and depart. They were able to do that in Mozambique in a little more than two years from 1992 to 1994.

While the UN has had mixed results in its multidimensional peacekeeping missions, they are, at least for the moment, largely a thing of the past. Of the current missions, only two are multidimensional. Actually, it would be more accurate to call them unidimensional because their objectives have been drastically reduced over the years. Today they are small operations limited to attempting to professionalize the police in Haiti and Kosovo.

**Protection and Stabilization Missions**

The remaining six current operations are all in sub-Saharan Africa. They represent the third stage of the evolution of UN peacekeeping—the protection and stabilization missions. These missions are the most dangerous and difficult ones, and they are where peacekeeping will inevitably fail because of problems with manpower, mandates, and motivation.

**Manpower**

The staff of a peacekeeping operation (PKO) can be composed of five groups: military observers, civilian expatriate staff, locally hired employees, police, and military contingents. The last group are the soldiers wearing the light blue helmets who are the image most people have of peacekeepers. Their task is to carry out military functions that a PKO requires like guarding facilities and bases and, in the case of the protection and stabilization missions in Africa, protecting civilians and helping the government extend its control over its own territory.

**Challenges**

The basic problem with the military contingents stems from the fact that the UN has no standing army. For each PKO, the UN must go, hat in hand, around the world to ask the member states to provide the troops required for the military contingents. The response to this request from rich countries has increasingly been “no,” and that has left it to an increasing number of poorer countries to supply the manpower.

During the Cold War, peacekeeping was mainly confined to the classical variety, where the tasks assigned were straightforward. The countries participating in peacekeeping were often rich countries seeking to avoid a local conflict escalating into a confrontation between the super powers. That changed dramatically as peacekeeping evolved.
Prior to 1990, 33 countries had participated in three or more of the 18 PKOs initiated. Of those, just over half were wealthy countries. By 1996 there were 70 countries contributing troops, of which only 22 had developed economies. In mid-2018, however, there were 124 countries providing soldiers for peacekeeping. However, only seven percent of those soldiers came from 26 of the 31 countries the CIA Factbook lists as nations having developed economies. (The five countries with developed economies that contributed no troops to peacekeeping were Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, South Korea, and Singapore.) In the operations in Africa, the demand by some political leaders that there be African solutions to African problems may have encouraged this trend.

With armies, one gets what one pays for. The troops from rich countries come with a great deal of equipment that they can bring with them. They are better equipped because their governments can afford to spend more on their armed forces. The armies of poor countries, on the other hand, are usually equipment deficient, especially in transportation assets. A visitor to the PKO in Mali in 2018, for instance, observed one contingent driving around in 1960s vintage vehicles. Because the UN cannot afford to turn down troops when a country is willing to offer them, the limitations of those troops are unavoidable.

To put this situation in rough perspective, a crude measure of the amount of logistical and other support an army has is to divide the defense budget of a country by the number of soldiers it has. About 90 percent of peacekeepers come from countries where the defense budget per soldier was less than USD 50,000, with several of them falling below USD 2,000. Only four percent came from countries wealthy enough to spend more than USD 100,000 per soldier. The country with the highest ratio is the United States, where that figure is around half a million dollars a year (if reserve units are not included) and steadily climbing. The United States, however, only provides a handful of officers (26 in mid-2019) to peacekeeping missions, who serve as military observers and in staff functions. Washington refuses to provide any troops for the military contingents mainly because of congressional opposition to the idea of having American soldiers serving under a UN commander.

**Incentives**

There is an incentive for countries that do not spend that much per soldier to participate in peacekeeping. Countries contributing troops to a PKO receive about USD 1,400 a month per soldier from the UN. That figure was negotiated and was the subject of considerable debate in 2014. The rich countries, which pay the most for peacekeeping, felt it was too high. The developing countries, which supply the vast majority of the troops, argued it was too low. At the current level,
however, peacekeeping can be a profitable venture for any country spending less per soldier than what the UN reimburses it for its troops.

**Discipline Issues**

Another problem with peacekeeping troops, which is not limited to the ones from poor countries, arises for the UN’s lack of authority to discipline those who serve in its name. The UN has to rely on the country that provided the soldiers to also provide the discipline and the punishment for any misdeeds. In the past, the UN often dealt with the problem by ignoring it. To publicly identify those responsible would risk embarrassing a member state, which the UN is reluctant to do and run the risk of losing that country’s soldiers. With the expansion of the number of peacekeepers to today’s level, the problem has also grown and has gotten to the point where it cannot be ignored.

It is not a new problem however. In 1995, the *International Herald Tribune* reported:

> Corruption among soldiers in the UN peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia always has been a problem, and troops from the former Soviet Bloc nations are said by military and UN officials to be the most active in black marketeering, running prostitution rings and facilitating military maneuvers and resupply operations by the Serbs. UN efforts to stamp out the malfeasance have generally been ineffectual, partly because Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has hampered investigations and partly because the culture of the $1 billion-a-year UN operation in the Balkans has often turned a blind eye to the problem.\(^9\)

Sexual exploitation and abuse is now the crime most frequently associated with peacekeepers. It is not a new problem either. In 2003, the UN recognized that it had a sexual abuse problem that involved civilians and police officers as well as the troops in a number of peacekeeping missions. In 2005, the UN said it was adopting a “zero tolerance” policy toward such abuse. Despite that, nearly 2,000 accusations of such conduct by peacekeepers were reported over the next dozen years.\(^10\) A 2015 report by the internal oversight office of the UN found that from 2008 to 2014 there were an average of 76 such cases reported each year.\(^11\)

Even those numbers may be a significant underestimate of the level of abuse. As one Australian diplomat who worked in peacekeeping missions explained in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

> There are multiple barriers to reporting sexual abuse. Victims fear discrimination, stigmatization and retaliation if they report abuses by peacekeepers or civilian and military police. Victims also fear losing benefits and they know that there is
Jett

a high likelihood they will not receive justice and the perpetrators will go unpunished. Many of the victims are minors, who are unaccompanied, separated or orphaned through the conflict. UN human rights officers located in the human rights components of peacekeeping missions are usually the first responders, and hence the internal “reporters” of the sexual abuse. They have their own fears, both about their physical safety as well as their own job security.\(^\text{12}\)

**Reform Efforts**

Shortly after taking office in 2017, UN Secretary-General António Guterres declared another zero-tolerance effort and even suggested that the money paid to countries for supplying troops as peacekeepers be reduced and used to compensate victims if those countries failed to act to deal with the problem. According to one Australian newspaper, the reform plan was “met with scorn” and would get nowhere due to “a cultural cocktail of self-interest, intimidation and dysfunction—and by the UN’s opaque legal framework.”\(^\text{13}\)

Guterres did at least call attention to the problem and created a voluntary agreement that he urged all the countries to sign.\(^\text{14}\) By signing this compact, a country committed to helping the UN prevent sexual exploitation and abuse through a number of actions, including the following steps: providing support and assistance to victims, screening and training peacekeeping personnel, and ensuring accountability by enforcement of disciplinary and judicial decisions, providing DNA samples when necessary to carry out an investigation, and considering collecting DNA samples of all peacekeepers before they deployed.\(^\text{15}\) As of October 2018, 100 countries had signed the compact.\(^\text{16}\)

Whether Guterres’ effort at reform will prove more effective than previous attempts to curb the abuse remains to be seen. Initially at least, it was a problem that continued to do grave damage to the reputation of the UN and the image of peacekeepers. The abuse cases were made even more shocking by the fact that many of the victims were children living in desperate poverty, including some who were not even teenagers. The PBS program *Frontline* dedicated an entire show in July 2018 to the “UN sex scandal.”\(^\text{17}\)

In the *Frontline* program, Isobel Coleman, who had been the US Ambassador to the UN for Management and Reform from 2014 to 2017, pointed out that the troop-contributing countries have to punish the offenders since the UN does not have the power to do so. She also explained why the urgency of the situation can work against efforts for accountability and reform:

If you’re in a crisis situation and you’re, you, you think you’ve got genocide erupting in the Central African Republic and you’re looking for troops to come and
Why There Is No Military Solution to the Problems of Peacekeeping

save tens, hundreds of thousands of lives, you know, maybe you’re not asking so many questions about how they’ve been vetted and what their, you know, training has been on sexual exploitation and abuse. You want troops on the ground yesterday, you know, to save lives.18

Recruitment Issues

Another quality problem stems from a different trait of the countries that provide peacekeepers. The nongovernmental organization, Freedom House, ranks countries around the world and categorizes them as free, partial free, or not free. There were 71 countries that contributed troops to the military contingents in 2018. About 30 percent of those troops came from countries that are not free, 43 percent from countries that are only partially free, and 27 percent came from democracies. When it comes to those who contribute police officers, the vast majority come from countries that are not free (30 percent) and only partially free (39 percent). Only 31 percent come from countries that are rated as free. In nondemocratic countries, the police and the armed forces are used mainly to protect the autocrat in power. They are not trained for, or particularly interested in, protecting common citizens. And they are not the kind of examples that a country emerging from conflict should be using to help set up an effective police force, a functioning judicial system, or civilian control of the armed forces. However, because the UN has neither its own army nor its own police force, the organization has to accept what it can get even though such personnel are clearly not well suited for the job.

Once again, the wealthier, more democratic countries could provide more personnel better suited to the task, but they lack the political will to do so. And so, to paraphrase former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s explanation for the multiple failures to control the situation after the US invasion of Iraq, the UN has to go to war with the army it has and not the army it needs.

Mandate

A more serious problem for the effectiveness of peacekeeping than the manpower issues is the mandate peacekeepers are given. At the risk of being tautological, peacekeepers are bound to fail if there is no peace to keep. When a ceasefire is negotiated, peacekeepers can do their work. Without one, peacekeepers are either ineffective or have to undertake a combat role. The latter requires the international community be willing to have peacekeepers inflict and take casualties.

Since the wealthy nations with the most-capable armies are unwilling to provide a significant number of troops for this type of peacekeeping, the responsibil-
ity is left largely to poorly equipped and trained soldiers from the armies of developing countries who are not going to defeat violent extremism. If the United States cannot prevail against violent extremists in Afghanistan after 18 years of trying, there is no chance that the peacekeepers can in Africa.

After the casualties suffered in Somalia portrayed in the book and movie *Blackhawk Down*, peacekeeping fell into a period of decline. It began a dramatic resurgence after 1997 as the memories of peacekeeping failures faded a bit and it once again became an instrument for intervention by the international community. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the conflicts in which the international community chose to intervene took another turn, one that is proving deadly for peacekeepers.

In the post–9/11 world, peacekeeping increasingly became part of the fight against terrorism, without giving much regard to who or what is being defended. The six protection and stabilization missions currently underway were begun after 9/11 largely in response to violent extremism. Including stabilization in the peacekeepers’ mandate means they are tasked with helping the host government extend its control over its own territory. Having UN peacekeepers do this is, in effect, an extension of the so-called war on terrorism. However, when it comes to terrorism, there is little peacekeepers can do. In fact, there is no real role for peacekeeping whatsoever.

The terrorists are indistinguishable from noncombatants and will use any weapon available for their objective: to kill innocent people and call attention to their cause. In addition, phrases like the “war on terror” or “war on terrorism” are as misleading as they are ridiculous. Terror is an all-consuming fear, and terrorism is a tactic. There are no final victories over fear or tactics. Both will continue to be used as long as there are people willing to employ those methods.

It is hard to defeat terrorists, because it is often hard to define who they are. The government in power will tend to label any armed opposition as terrorists, and sometimes unarmed opponents as well. One way to make a distinction between insurgents and terrorists is whether the group in question attempts to take and hold territory. If they do, they can be considered insurgents. If not, the label of terrorist is more appropriate, assuming they are killing innocent people simply to make a political point.

The line between terrorists and insurgents is somewhat indistinct and can be easily crossed, depending on the military strength of the group. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had such success against an Iraqi army that would not stand and fight that it decided to establish a caliphate. It thus passed from being a group of terrorists to an insurgency. Once the Iraqi forces regrouped—with significant support, thanks to American firepower and Kurdish forces—ISIL
was routed and driven from the territory it held. It was forced to essentially revert to being a terrorist organization.

Definitions aside, without peace there is no chance for peacekeeping to succeed against violent extremism without the support of the local population. If peacekeepers have aligned themselves with a government that is seen as corrupt and repressive, even if the peacekeepers commit no abuses, they will not have the assistance of the people they are supposedly trying to protect. And they will become just another target for the terrorists to attack. In response, they are likely to go into a self-protective mode that limits their ability to take any action at all or provide protection anywhere outside the immediate vicinity of their bases. Yet sending in the peacekeepers is still the “something” that the international community often feels it must do, especially when no powerful nation has the interest to undertake a major effort or the willingness to put its own troops at risk.

**Motivation**

Besides inadequate manpower and unachievable mandates, there is the question of motivation. The UNSC can issue the orders, but it is the troops on the ground who must execute those orders. The problem of motivation arises from the fact that the five countries where these protection and stabilization missions are taking place—Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—have governments that are among the most corrupt, repressive, and incompetent in the world. One need only look at the rankings by Freedom House, Transparency International, and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation to confirm that.

These countries are therefore not particularly interested in protecting their own citizens. Their armies and police exist mainly to protect the regime in power. How then are peacekeeping troops supposed to aggressively engage in combat operations to protect governments that are not concerned with the welfare of their own citizens?

Peacekeepers are not war fighters, and asking them to play that role only ensures they will fail. The fundamental problem is that there is no peace to keep, and UN forces are incapable of imposing one. Peacekeeping has simply become a way for rich countries to send the soldiers of poor countries to deal with conflicts the rich countries do not care about. It provides the rich countries a way to claim they have done something about a humanitarian disaster—and provides the opportunity to shift the blame for the result to the UN and the peacekeepers. Peacekeeping is a bandage and not a cure. At best, it can staunch the bleeding, but it cannot heal the wound. To use it any other way is to ensure its failure.
Neither peacekeepers nor the typical reaction of governments—more violence—will be able to prevent violent extremism. There is one approach that holds promise, but whether the international community has the will, attention span, and unity to take it is doubtful.

In 2017, the United Nations Development Program interviewed 495 young African men who had voluntarily joined violent extremist groups. The study found they were motivated by a sense of grievance toward, and a lack of confidence in, their governments. For them, the extremist ideologies were a way to escape a future with no possibility of positive change. The study concluded that improved public policy and governance was a far more effective response to violent extremism than military force.

However, governments—especially in the five countries where the protection and stabilization missions are taking place in Africa—will not lessen their corruption, repression, and incompetence simply because it is the right thing to do. These countries, being as underdeveloped politically as they are economically, have weak legislative and judicial branches of government and little in the way of civil society or press freedom. The incentive to govern better will have to come from within those countries but must be supported by outside forces.

**Solution**

Figure 1. African Land Forces Summit 2019. Maj Gen Roger L. Cloutier, commander, US Army Africa, attends a military demonstration during the AFLS 2019 in Gaborone, Botswana, 25 June 2019. ALFS is a four-day seminar that brings together land forces chief across Africa to discuss topics of common interest.
That incentive will not come from the military. At the Africa Land Forces Summit (ALFS) held in Botswana in June 2019, a high-ranking officer from the US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) talked about the command’s strategic themes: diplomacy, development, and defense. Democracy apparently does not count.

Another speaker at ALFS 19 who serves in the European Union Training Mission in Mali mentioned the need to train the Malian army on basic humanitarian considerations, including the difference between criminal and legal conduct in a conflict zone. Such talk is reminiscent of the debate about the US Army School of the Americas (SOA), where the US military for many years trained their counterparts from Latin America. To meet criticism about SOA graduates returning home and committing human rights abuses, the US Army changed the schools name and introduced human rights training to the curriculum of all its courses.

The problem is that after training on how not to commit human rights abuses, soldiers have to return to the societies that they came from and follow the orders of leaders who have priorities other than respecting those rights. So, a few lectures from a foreign instructor are not going to instill that respect in soldiers. It will have to come from changes within their own countries and armed forces. Such changes need to be driven by respect for the rule of law and the rights of their fellow citizens arising from those changes. And that is something that foreign military assistance, by itself, will not only fail to bring about but will inhibit.

To ensure the necessary changes happen, the international community should apply substantial and consistent economic and political pressure and sanctions against all those responsible for the creation of these situations. The five African countries in question should be declared de facto failed states and international organizations put in charge of the governments’ finances. Any aid to or trade with these countries should be made contingent on the attainment of better governance, human rights, and adherence to democratic norms.

To do that effectively, other countries and a wide range of organizations would have to make peace the top priority instead of placing their own vested interests first. That will require addressing the problem, not just dumping it in the lap of the UN and making the peacekeepers take the blame for failure because it is the easier thing to do.
Dr. Dennis Jett

Dr. Jett is a former American ambassador who joined the School of International Affairs after a career in the US Foreign Service that spanned 28 years and three continents. His experience and expertise focus on international relations, foreign aid administration, and American foreign policy. Immediately prior to joining Penn State, he was dean of the International Center at the University of Florida for eight years. He is a regular interviewee in major media outlets and a well-published author.

Professor Jett’s career abroad began in 1973, when he was a political officer in the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. He later spent several years in Africa, first as the deputy chief of mission in the US Embassy in Malawi, where he assisted in the response to an influx of more than 500,000 Mozambican refugees, and then as deputy chief of mission in the US Embassy in Liberia, where he was the second-ranking officer during the Liberian Civil War. For his service in Liberia during this tumultuous time, he received the Department of State’s Distinguished Honor Award for “exceptional service, superb leadership, keen perception and adroitness in the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy.”

Professor Jett then became special assistant to the president and senior director for African Affairs at the National Security Council, where he was responsible for Africa policy during the first six months of the Clinton administration. He went on to serve as the US ambassador to Mozambique (from 1993–1996) and Peru (from 1996–1999). As ambassador to Mozambique, he helped bring about the successful conclusion of one of the world’s largest peacekeeping operations, enabling the country to hold its first democratic elections. For his efforts, he received the American Foreign Service Association’s Christian Herter Award. He was subsequently appointed US ambassador to Peru, where he managed the second-largest aid program in Latin America and helped to open Peru’s markets to US companies.

Notes


6. Interview with the author, July 2018.


Why There Is No Military Solution to the Problems of Peacekeeping


16. List of signatory countries to the voluntary compact as of 5 October, https://conduct.unmissions.org/factsheets.


18. Ibid.

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