

Ideologizing and Fundamentalism in Iranian Foreign Policy under the Hassan Rouhani Presidency

PRZEMYSŁAW OSIEWICZ*

This article provides a theoretical and empirical study of the co-occurrence of ideologizing and fundamentalism in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran under Pres. Hassan Rouhani. Without any doubt, it is essential to understand the foundations of the Iranian political system to analyze Iran's foreign policy objectives as well as actions undertaken by Iranian authorities.

Iran's post-revolutionary history is often presented as a continuous struggle between idealists and pragmatists.¹ The first group of Iranian decision makers, often referred to as the *principlists*, focuses mainly on the ideological determinants and attempts to comply with them even when forced to sacrifice political or economic interests. The second group, namely the *reformists*, is ready to give up on selected ideological factors to achieve the set objectives and safeguard national interests. The 2015 nuclear negotiations could serve as the best example of such a political cleavage. Yet, the question is if the abovementioned observations are always valid and noticeable.

The main research objective is to identify the level of co-occurrence of ideologizing and fundamentalism in the foreign policy of Iran under the Hassan Rouhani presidency. The main hypothesis is as follows: the level of ideologizing in the current Iranian foreign policy is probably not convergent with the level of fundamentalism. Do ideological principles form the basis for the final political decisions and actions of the Iranian authorities or are they nothing more than good-sounding declarations for the voters?

The selected research method is source analysis, and the research technique is qualitative content analysis. Among primary sources are relevant speeches, declarations, and official documents approved by key Iranian state bodies. Secondary sources include selected monographs, reports, and academic articles.

The empirical part of the article includes a study of elements that have constituted the core of the official state ideology since 1979 as well as an analysis of their implementation in Iranian foreign policy during the Rouhani presidency.

*This article is the result of the research project Contentious Politics and Neo-Militant Democracy. It was financially supported by the National Science Centre, Poland [grant number 2018/31/B/HS5/01410].

On this basis, one should be able to determine the level of co-occurrence of ideologizing and fundamentalism, defined as “strict adherence to the basic principles,”² in the current foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Theoretical Background: Shi’ism and Khomeinism

“In Shi’ism, specifically mainstream Twelver Shi’ism, the imams are without sin, and possess an infallible understanding of the Qur’an and sunna, granted to them through their unique relationship with God.”³ Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini exploited this concept when he devised his interpretation of *velayat-e faqih* (guardianship of the Islamic jurist). This ideological assumption was to become the core of the first-ever Islamic democracy.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a theocratic state, and its political system is based on the main values and principles of Shi’ism. Ayatollah Khomeini and his aides clarified and interpreted these principles soon after the victory of their revolutionary forces in 1979. Without any doubt, Shia Islam always played a key role in Iranian political life. Yet, this role had never been central before 1979. The revolution provided Iranian society with the dominant ideology that is noticeable in all spheres of public and political life. For this reason, it is impossible to analyze Iranian foreign policy only in terms of economic and political interests, excluding the foundations of the system. The dominant ideology provides Iranian decision makers with serious limitations. Yet, the question is if these decision makers always abide by the official rules and never take any pragmatic positions or, to put it more precisely, if the ideology always prevails over tangible benefits.

Before answering the above question, it is important to analyze briefly the Shia provisions and the key assumptions of Khomeinism that affect policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iranian society is overwhelmingly Shia, which is what makes it exceptional in the Muslim world. Hamid Dabashi, professor of Iranian studies at Columbia University, defines Shi’ism as a religion of protest.⁴ This protest dynamic constitutes an integral part of the Iranian social and political systems. This factor is also noticeable in Iranian foreign policy. For example, Iranian authorities offer their assistance to various “oppressed” groups in the Middle East or openly criticize global powers, especially the United States, to manifest their opposition to unilateralism in international relations and to challenge the dominant position of the West. Shi’ism is also based on the concept of martyrdom. During the Iran–Iraq War, young Iranians were often encouraged to fight unarmed against Iraqi soldiers. They were to protect their homeland and suffer death for a just cause. Iran’s proxies, such as Hezbollah, have also exploited this concept. Nowadays, some analysts claim that Iran and its allies have abandoned this emphasis on martyrdom.⁵ If true, one could say that the current Iranian authorities are much

more pragmatic than their predecessors. Yet, such pragmatism does not change the fact that Shia values and provisions still constitute the core of Iranian politics.

Khomeinism is a doctrine steeped in Shia ideology. The main sources of Khomeinism are political thought and legacy of the Grand Ayatollah and the first Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini. During the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran's last shah, Khomeini claimed, "Islam is primarily concerned with the whole of society, not just rituals for individuals and its rules are meant not just to be taught but implemented. In the absence of the *Imam*, those who are qualified to do this are the *ulama*, either one or a group of them."⁶ Once Khomeini came to power in Iran, he applied the concept of *velayat-e faqih* in the making of the Iranian foreign policy. According to Ima Salamey and Zanaoubia Othman, the basis of this concept rests upon "ideological considerations, as inspired by the Shias' past and collective memory, and the visionary role of the leader expand the scope of foreign policy objectives beyond the basic requirement of state survival rationalism."⁷ In the opinion of Ori Goldberg, "against the absolutist monarchies of twentieth-century Iran, Khomeini's doctrine of *velayat-e faqih*, demanding unprecedented political authority for the Shi'i clerics, was based on the notion that the most able interpreters were the most capable political leaders."⁸ As a consequence, the supreme leader is the most important political *and* religious figure in Iran. He controls not only domestic affairs but also foreign affairs. The only question is if he focuses more on ideological aspects or represents a more pragmatic attitude toward the international system.

According to Ahmad Sadeghi, ideological aspects and universalism have prevailed over national and state interests in Iranian foreign policy since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.⁹ However, certain decisions made and actions undertaken by the current Iranian administration cast doubt on the correctness of such claims. This article will analyze such assertions detail.

The Level of Ideologizing of Iranian Foreign Policy

Soon after the victory of his revolutionary forces, Ayatollah Khomeini presented the main elements of foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran:

- cooperation with other international actors based on the principles of partnership and mutual dialogue;
- a strong objection to any form of violence and cruelty;
- pacifism;
- nonalignment;
- justice; and
- unity among Muslims.¹⁰

All these elements derived from negative past experiences and observations made by the shah's opponents. In their opinion, the Imperial State of Iran was not independent and its authorities sided with the Americans during the Cold War. In addition, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his aides did not do anything to restore unity among Muslims. For these reasons Khomeini was determined to modify Iranian foreign affairs entirely.

Khomeini's guidelines resulted in more specific ideological assumptions. On the basis of Khomeinism, Ashgar Eftechari distinguished the key ideological provisions underlying the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran:

- the primacy of the Shiite values;
- promotion of Islam in the world;
- antiglobalism;¹¹
- persuasion instead of imposing Islamic values;
- pacifism;
- nonalignment and independence;
- preservation of a national dignity;
- international justice based on the fundamental Islamic principles;
- the restoration of unity among Muslims (*ummah*); and
- avoidance of disinformation and ambiguities in the foreign policy implementation, because such actions do not comply with Islamic values.¹²

There are other typologies. Yvette Hovsepien-Bearce, for example, pointed to the key themes of Khomeini's successor Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's legacy. These are Iran's attitude toward the United States, unity among Muslims, religious democracy, freedom, and Iranian youth.¹³ Yet only two out of five of the abovementioned elements are explicitly connected with foreign policy making. For this reason, Eftechari's concept is more academic, as it is more expansive and includes a wide range of ideological factors. On this basis one can analyze the current foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran to find out if the referenced ideological elements have been taken into account or not.

Fundamentalism in Iranian Foreign Policy under President Rouhani

The electoral victory of Hassan Rouhani in the presidential elections in 2013 was perceived as a precursor of significant changes in Iran, both internally and externally. Rouhani was presented as a reformist politician who would not attach much importance to ideological limitations. In addition, Rouhani himself did his best to cultivate such an image.¹⁴ The newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javad Zarif, presented the key external objectives of President Rouhani's

cabinet in the Iranian Consultative Assembly (*Majles*). Later, he wrote an article for *Foreign Affairs* in which he summarized his speech. On the basis of Zarif's article, one can point to the following elements underpinning the current foreign policy of Iran:

- multilateralism;
- opposition to American dominance on the international stage;
- tackling sources of conflict in the Middle East region;
- combating violence and extremism;
- combating negative political and social changes in the Arab world, which destabilize the region;
- combating Islamophobia and Iranophobia, which are promoted by the West;
- a wise critique of the previous administration's conduct of foreign relations;
- a restoration of Iran's relations with selected states, including European powers;
- political and economic independence;
- promotion of Persian culture, language, Islamic democracy, and other Shiite values;
- support for the cause of oppressed people across the world, especially in Palestine; and
- reaching an agreement on "Iran's peaceful nuclear program" and ending "the unjust sanctions that have been imposed by outside powers."¹⁵

From the Iranian point of view, the new diplomatic opening on the initiative of Iran was to be met with the same actions on the Western side. In 2013 Javad Zarif clearly stated, "The election of Mr. Rouhani shows that the people have decided to have constructive interaction with the world and, through his speeches and choices, Mr. Rouhani has also displayed his political determination to do so. Now, what is important is for the same determination to be formed on the other side."¹⁶ The message was clear. Iran was ready for pragmatic concessions in return for similar actions from other international actors. It also proved that ideological elements can be less important than tangible material benefits.

Taking the aforementioned objectives into account, one can select those that arise from the underlying ideological assumptions and were included in the previously mentioned list by Eftekhari. Zarif referred to six out of the 10 ideological elements, including the primacy of the Shiite values, promotion of Islam in the world, antiglobalism, nonalignment and independence, multilateralism, and pacifism. However, even within these six points one can observe inconsistencies between declarations and actions or a very flexible approach of the current Iranian government.



Photo courtesy of the Office of the President of Russia

Figure 1. Rouhani on the international stage. Iranian president Hassan Rouhani discusses issues with his peers during a signing ceremony following the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting, 1 October 2019, in Yerevan, Armenia.

The Primacy of the Shiite Values

Ayatollah Khomeini often presented the sectarian divide in the Islamic world as an example of the Western powers' interference in regional affairs. The Iranian authorities underlined the fact that all Muslims are equal and should remain united to oppose enemies of Islam. In the opinion of Khomeini, "those who want to cause disunion are neither Sunnis nor Shiites. They are the followers of the superpowers and they are serving them. Those who try to create disunity between our Sunni brothers and our Shiite brothers are enemies of Islam. They want to help the enemies of Islam to overcome the Muslims."¹⁷ Not much has changed since the 1980s.

Both President Rouhani and Supreme Leader Khamenei still confirm the validity and importance of the unity among all Muslims. In June 2018, Rouhani clearly stated, "We can witness more unity and solidarity among Muslims in the fight against violence and extremism, showing their unity and integrity against greedy powers and the unfaithfulness and unilateralism of domination seekers, as well as establishment of peace and stability throughout the world."¹⁸ Such comments only prove that the Iranian authorities still tend to present the current sectarian division within the Muslim community as an outcome of external interference.

Promotion of Islam in the World

Khomeini claimed that “Islam cares for the whole world, that is, Iraq, or by the name of Islam aims at making human beings, all the human beings. It has no kinship with any group, neither with the East, West, North or South, nor with any particular nation. It is a divine religion, and Allah, the Blessed and Exalted, is the God for all, not only for the Westerners, Muslims, Christians or Jews.”¹⁹ His successor, Ali Khamenei, also referred to the important role of Islam and its modern-day mission. During a speech in August 2019, the Supreme Leader stated, “The elite of the Muslim world, some of whom are now present at Hajj from different countries, have a crucial and important duty. These lessons must be transferred to all nations and the public through their efforts and ingenuity, and moral exchange of ideas, motivations, experience, and knowledge must be realized by them.”²⁰

In practice, however, the current Iranian government still promotes Islamic values worldwide and focuses mainly on their Shia interpretations. For this reason, Tehran’s efforts are in direct competition with actions undertaken by the leading Sunni actors like Saudi Arabia.²¹ From a geopolitical point of view, Iran has to maintain a land connection with the Mediterranean. As a consequence, Iranian politicians, military officers, and businessmen are very active in such states as Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. They promote Shia values and finance various local initiatives for Iranian entrepreneurs and intergovernmental ventures at the same time. In all these states, however, they have to compete with Sunni groups supported by wealthy Arab states from the Persian Gulf region. Although Tehran professes no intention to export its revolutionary ideas anymore, its activities in the Middle East are perceived as sources of threat to the regional order and security. Even if Iranian politicians ensure the international community of their good intentions, local residents often remain suspicious and tend to perceive Iran’s actions as a projection of power.

Antiglobalism

Antiglobalism is still noticeable in Iranian foreign policy. The Iranian authorities perceive globalism as a tool used by global powers for interference in internal affairs of small- and middle-sized states. They refer mainly to the United States and its policy toward the Middle East. A long-standing policy of opposing Washington has become a hallmark of the Iranian diplomacy. Tehran opposes the US administration at almost every opportunity. At the same time, Iranian authorities are much less critical in the case of the Russian Federation or the People’s Republic of China. Global aspirations of Moscow and Beijing do not bother Iran, although in practice some of their actions are not convergent with the Iranian in-

terests in the region. In this case the current Iranian antiglobalism is very selective. For instance, the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could be used to subordinate the Middle Eastern states to China in the future. Tehran supports the idea and declares Iran's participation in the BRI officially, but at the same time, Iranian authorities must pay attention to the nation's close economic links with India. In addition, some Chinese actions are already providing detrimental to Iran, for example, the further expansion of the Pakistani port in Gwadar, which competes with the Iranian port of Chabahar.

Nonalignment and independence

Khomeini's concept of "Neither East nor West" (*nab sharq nab gharb*) constituted an important element of Iranian foreign policy in the last phases of the Cold War rivalry. According to Rouhollah K. Ramazani, in the 1980s Khomeini believed that a conflict between superpowers and the Islamic Republic of Iran was inevitable, claiming the would-be hegemon had "arrogated all the worldly power (*qudrat*) to themselves at the expense of the exploited, dispossessed masses of the people everywhere."²² Nonalignment was to guarantee security for Iran and enable the revolutionary authorities to implement all Khomeini's political and religious ideas.

In the early twenty-first century, Iranian authorities still underline the importance of independence and Iran's special mission in the world. Tehran tries to play a global role irrespective of whether global powers accept Iran's actions or not.²³ The current tensions in US–Iran relations could serve as the best example. The more pressure the US administration exerts on Iran, the more inflexible the Iranian position and its attitude toward regional affairs become. Although it is unlikely that the Iranians are set on a military confrontation, they do not intend to modify their foreign policy objectives. During the official celebrations marking the 30th anniversary of Khomeini's death, President Rouhani declared, "Nothing can harm our system until the time it relies on people's vote. 30 years after the passing of Imam Khomeini, the system he founded has not only been safe against wind and rain, but today, Iran has displayed its power and greatness in [the] sensitive Middle East region."²⁴

At the same time, economic sanctions imposed by the United States force Iran to maintain closer relations with Russia and China. Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai describe this phenomenon quite rightly. In their opinion, "The ties between Tehran and Moscow and Tehran and Beijing are not traditional alliances. They are pragmatic relationships, based on mutual interests and necessities. This comes with both advantages and disadvantages for Iran."²⁵ These three states do not share any ideological concepts, but they cooperate on many issues. In addition,

the same could be said about the current Turkish–Iranian relations. Iran, Russia, and Turkey, for example, initiated the so-called “Astana process” with the aim to resolve the ongoing Syrian Civil War. This political threesome serves as a counterweight to the Geneva process supported by the majority of the international community, including Western powers. Although Iran, Russia, and Turkey have not formed any formal alliance, the three states act as long-term allies.

Pacifism

Javad Zarif clearly declared that “Iran has no interest in nuclear weapons and is convinced that such weapons would not enhance its security.” In addition, the minister also emphasized the fact that “even a perception that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons is detrimental to the country’s security and to its regional role, since attempts by Iran to gain strategic superiority in the Persian Gulf would inevitably provoke responses that would diminish Iran’s conventional military advantage.”²⁶ This statement matches the official position of the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially the views of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Iran was always very critical of weapons of mass destruction, not only in political declarations.

The main question is, however, if the current official declarations against the use of weapons of mass destruction are underpinned by the facts. According to some sources, the Islamic Republic of Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons.²⁷ Other analysts, for example, Shaul Mishal and Ori Goldberg, claim that “Iran uses the controversy around its nuclear prospects to further engage with different countries. It is the nuclear agenda, placing Iran at odds with the United States, that allowed it to develop close ties with Venezuela. Observed differently, it is the nuclear agenda that allows Iran to convey different messages to different international parties.”²⁸ In the opinion of Michael Axworthy, “the real intention of the Iranian regime was to acquire the capability to produce a nuclear weapon, without actually manufacturing the weapon itself. . . . This capability would in itself act as a deterrent to aggression—a lesser degree of deterrent than that provided by a real weapon perhaps, but nonetheless significant and better than nothing.”²⁹

In addition, Zarif was seeking a rapprochement in Iran’s relations with the Arab states in the Persian Gulf region. Such action was to prove the pacifist approach of the new president and his administration. However, it soon became clear that the task would remain a difficult undertaking. The new wave of regional tensions and the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2016 resulted in a new crisis. In addition, Iranians reinforced their positions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Although in Syria and Iraq members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran-backed Shiite militias officially fought against the so-called Islamic State and other radical groups, their presence

bred suspicions and mistrust not only in the West but also in most of the Arab states. Tehran's opponents claimed that such interventions represented Iran's attempt to project power and enlarge its sphere of influence in the region. Iranian authorities deny all such accusations; however, this issue became one of the arguments put forward by Pres. Donald Trump when he announced that the United States would reinstate sanctions on Iran that had been lifted during the closing days of the Obama administration. On 18 May 2018 the US president openly declared, "The Iranian regime is the leading state sponsor of terror. It exports dangerous missiles, fuels conflicts across the Middle East, and supports terrorist proxies and militias such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al Qaeda."³⁰ In response to such arguments, the Iranian authorities accuse leaders of Western powers of interfering in Middle Eastern affairs. In April 2018, for instance, President Rouhani called Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and said, "Some major Western powers think that they have to intervene in Syria in any way. It is a very ugly shift in state of affairs of international relations that some powerful and bullying countries attack a country whenever they wish."³¹

Multilateralism

The 2015 nuclear negotiations serve as the best example of a multilateral approach within Iran's foreign policy. Since 1979 Iranian authorities have avoided any bilateral talks with US administrations not only for political reasons and the lack of diplomatic relations. They are still concerned Iran could become dominated and marginalized. In addition, Iranian leaders are convinced that other partners also share their position. In the opinion of Foreign Minister Zarif, "even major world powers have learned the hard way that they can no longer pursue their interests or achieve their particular goals unilaterally."³² Without any doubt, it was a clear reference to the United States. For this reason, decision makers in Tehran are convinced that multilateral international negotiations safeguard Iranian interests best. Nevertheless, Iranian leaders like President Rouhani suggest that Iran could also engage in "respectful negotiations" with the United States to end the ongoing crisis in the Persian Gulf and revive the nuclear deal.³³ The first step toward a new opening took place on 18 July 2019, when Zarif met US senator Rand Paul in New York—although the senator was not an official US envoy.³⁴ The meeting was still a clear indication that Iranian authorities could be ready to waive one of the key ideological principles, make some concessions, and this way ease sanctions imposed on Iran by the Trump administration. If any bilateral talks between Iran and the United States take place, it would be a very significant adjustment for both sides.

Conclusion

The current Iranian foreign policy is not fundamental if one takes into account all key ideological assumptions deriving from Shiism and Khomeinism, which have held sway in Iran since 1979. This does not change the fact that ideology still plays a very important role in initiation, formulation, and implementation of Iranian foreign policy objectives. However, ideology is not as dominant as it was in the 1980s and 1990s.

President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif's vision of foreign policy is more pragmatic than ideologically based. Even after the reinstatement of sanctions by the US administration in 2018, the Iranian authorities did not raise the level of ideologizing of policy as had previously been the case. Most revolutionary elements are not observed anymore or are observed to a lesser extent. The level of co-occurrence of ideologizing and fundamentalism in the current foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is therefore low.

Contrary to the popular belief in the West, Iranian authorities are more pragmatic and their external actions are less and less based on the key ideological assumptions, despite official rhetoric and declarations. Ideology is still useful, but rather within internal affairs and for Iranian voters. Such circumstances create a possibility to engage Iran in a constructive dialogue that could ease tensions in the Persian Gulf region and/or even lead to reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran. The P5+1 negotiations³⁵ and the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action proved that Iran is ready to sacrifice ideological provisions for tangible benefits. Iran and the international community can only benefit from such developments. The only obstacle to this process is a lack of goodwill.

Przemyslaw Osiewicz

Dr. Osiewicz is an associate professor at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland, specializing in EU policy toward the MENA region, Iran, and Turkey. He was a Fulbright Senior Award Visiting Scholar at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, from 2016–2017. Additionally, he authored and coauthored four monographs and over 70 book chapters and articles in political science.

Previously, Dr. Osiewicz served as secretary of the Research Committee RC-18 of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) and served as board member of the International Studies Association (ISA), the Polish International Relations Association (Poznan), and the Asia & Pacific Association. Alongside these roles, he served as scholar and visiting lecturer at the following universities: Eastern Mediterranean University (North Cyprus), Chinese Culture University (Taiwan, 2008), National Taipei University (Taiwan, 2009), Selçuk Üniversitesi (Turkey, 2010), Linneaus University (Sweden, 2011), Konya Üniversitesi (Turkey, 2011), Hogeschool Ghent (Belgium, 2012), the Ministry of Interior (Cyprus, 2012), the Institute for Political and International Studies (Iran, 2013), the University of Nicosia (Cyprus, 2014), University of Nevada, Reno (USA, 2016), Cleveland State University (USA, 2016), Texas State University (USA, 2017), Georgetown University, Washington, DC (USA, 2015, 2016–17), and National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad (Pakistan, 2019).

Notes

1. See Said Amir Ajomand, "Constitutional Implications of Current Political Debates in Iran," in *Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics*, ed. Ali Gheissari (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 266; Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, *Religious Statecraft: The Politics of Islam in Iran* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 205–26; and Shah Alam, *Interplay of Domestic Politics and Foreign Security Policy of Iran* (New Delhi: Vij Books India, 2016), 25–31.
2. "Fundamentalism," *Lexico*, 27 July 2019, <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/fundamentalism>.
3. Faiz Sheikh, *Islam in International Relations: Exploring Community and the Limits of Universalism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 106.
4. See Hamid Dabashi, *Shi'ism: A Religion of Protest* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).
5. Zachary Keck and Matthew Sparks, "The Shia Shift: Why Iran and Hezbollah Abandoned Martyrdom," *National Interest*, 28 May 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-shia-shift-why-iran-hezbollah-abandoned-martyrdom-25992>.
6. William Shepard, *Introducing Islam* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009), 250.
7. Imay Salamey and Zanoobia Othman, "Shia Revival and Welayat al-Faqih in the Making of Iranian Foreign Policy," *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 12, no. 2 (2011), 198.
8. Ori Goldberg, *Faith and Politics in Iran, Israel and the Islamic State: Theologies of the Real* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 22.
9. Ahmad Sadeghi, "Genealogy of Iranian Foreign Policy: Identity, Culture and History," *Iranian Journal of International Affairs* 20, no. 4 (2008), 30.
10. Ashgar Eftekhari, "The Fixed Principles of the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran with an Emphasis on the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini," *Iranian Journal of International Affairs* 19, no. 2 (2007), 34–38.
11. *Globalism* is perceived in Iran as a tool used by global powers for interference in the internal affairs of other states.
12. Eftekhari, "The Fixed Principles of the Foreign Policy," 27–43.
13. Yvette Hovsepian-Bearce, *The Political Ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini: Out of the Mouth of the Supreme Leader of Iran* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016), 279–352.
14. Hassan Rouhani, "President of Iran Hassan Rouhani: Time to Engage," *Washington Post*, 19 September 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-of-iran-hassan-rouhani-time-to-engage/2013/09/19/4d2da564-213e-11e3-966c-9c4293c47ebe_story.html.
15. Javad Zarif, "What Iran Really Wants," *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 3 (May/June 2014), 1–11.
16. "US' Turn to Show Its Political Determination," *Iranian Diplomacy*, 17 August 2013, <http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/news/1919990/us-turn-to-show-its-political-determination>.
17. Ruhollah Khomeini, *Fundamentals of the Islamic Revolution: Selections from the Thoughts and Opinions of Imam Khomeini* (Tehran: Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works, 2000), 468.
18. "Eid al-Fitr the Feast of the Righteous," President of the Islamic Republic of Iran (web-site), 14 June 2018, <http://www.president.ir/en/104871>.
19. Khomeini, *Fundamentals of the Islamic Revolution*, 161.
20. "Message of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution to the Great Hajj," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 August 2019, <https://en.mfa.ir/portal/NewsView/48338>.
21. For more about the Saudi–Iranian rivalry, see Dilip Hiro, *Cold War in the Islamic World: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Struggle for Supremacy* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2018); Banafsheh Keynoush, *Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends of Foes?* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Rob-

ert Mason, *Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015); and Simon Mabon, *Saudi Arabia & Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2013).

22. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 21.

23. Imad Mansour, *Statecraft in the Middle East: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and Security* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 191.

24. "President at the Ceremony for Renewing Allegiance to Imam Khomeini's Lofty Ideals," President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 24 August 2019, <http://www.president.ir/en/110898>.

25. Dina Esfandiary, Ariane Tabatabai, *Triple Axis: Iran's Relations with Russia and China* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2018), 191.

26. Zarif, "What Iran Really Wants," 9.

27. See for example, Dore Gold, *The Rise of Nuclear Iran* (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2009); Jacquelyn K. Davies and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Anticipating a Nuclear Iran* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); and Matthew Kroenig, *A Time to Attack: The Looming Iranian Nuclear Threat* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

28. Shaul Mishal and Ori Goldberg, *Understanding Shiite Leadership: The Art of the Middle Ground in Iran and Lebanon* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7.

29. Michael Axworthy, *Iran: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 145.

30. "Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action," White House, 8 May 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/>.

31. "President in a Phone Call with His Turkish Counterpart," President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 April 2018, <http://www.president.ir/en/103925>.

32. Zarif, "What Iran Really Wants," 3.

33. "Rouhani Says Iran Ready for 'Respectful' Negotiations," *Al-Monitor*, 25 July 2019, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/iran-rouhani-talks-nuclear-deal.html>.

34. Laura Rozen, "Iran FM Met Rand Paul to Feel Out Possible US-Iran Talks," *Al-Monitor*, 19 July 2019, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/iran-zarif-meeting-rand-paul-possible-talks.html>.

35. The P5+1 refers to the UN Security Council's five permanent members (the P5); namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; plus Germany.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in *JEMEEA* are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.