
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization returns to be the topic of discussion, as the current rhetoric of government leaders challenging the efficacy of NATO and the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula threatens the West's false sense of peace. The United States calls on the NATO members to increase their spending on defense and reach the 2-percent margin, and some NATO members question the American commitment to Article 5. Meanwhile, Russia slowly defies the sovereignty of the Baltic States and the integrity of NATO.

The book Strategic Challenges in the Baltic Sea Region: Russia, Deterrence, and Reassurance, edited by Ann-Sofie Dahl, focuses on the security issues faced by the Baltic countries, the hybrid warfare tactics used by the Russians, the approach that NATO has taken to address future Russian aggression, and the position of other countries in the Baltic region. This work is a collaboration between experts in the field of international relations, featuring seven professors from the discipline—Christopher Coker, Ann-Sofie Dahl, Andres Kasekamp, Robert J. Lieber, Gudrun Persson, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, and Håkon Lunde Saxi—the coordinator of the project Security and Defense in Northern Europe in Warsaw, Justyna Gotkowska; the ministerial advisor of the Finnish Ministry of Defense, Karoliina Honkanen; a senior associate in the International Security Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, Claudia Major; the defense adviser of the Embassy of Sweden in Washington, Johan Raeder; the NATO deputy assistant secretary-general for emerging security challenges, Jamie Shea; and the coordinator of a northern security issues research project at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, Alicia von Voss. All contributors have extensive work and research experience in international relations, security, and NATO. In addition, former NATO Secretary-General and former Prime Minister of Denmark, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, wrote the foreword of the book.

The book begins with the Rasmussen's foreword, which points out the relationship between Russia and the West has worsened with the unlawful Russian annexation of Crimea and the aggressive Russian military exercises in the Baltic Sea. Furthermore, NATO is unprepared to respond to Russian hybrid warfare tactics, although NATO's deterrence has been improving as cooperation among its members increased. Rasmussen concludes by saying that Europe and the United States must do their parts by meeting their military spending responsibilities and reassuring NATO members of their commitment to Article 5. After the foreword section, the book is separated in three parts.

The first four chapters explain the importance of American military presence in Europe, Russian national security doctrine, NATO cooperation programs in the Baltic Sea, and the problems and weaknesses displayed by NATO and its members. Robert J. Lieber argues that American military presence in Europe, especially in the Baltic Sea, is essential for deterrence against Russia and to promote American interest in the region. Gudrun Persson explains that Russia's goal is to create a new global order, stimulate Russian identity in the region, and defend its own interest by any means necessary—military, nonmilitary, and even nuclear. Jamie Shea demonstrates that NATO has developed programs, such as the Readiness Action Plan and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, to stimulate cooperation and increase commitment among NATO members. Christopher Coker warns us about the challenges that the Alliance faces as some members are more focused on the problems of massive immigration, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, and the rise of China than the situation in the Baltic Sea region.

The next five chapters explore the threat to Baltic States, which potentially face fates similar to that of Ukraine, the antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy in the Baltic Sea, the approach of Poland to the threats of Russia, the perspective of Germany as a major power in the Baltic Sea, and the perspective of Norway on the security of the region. According to Andres Kasekamp, even though the Baltic States have a significant ethnic Russian population living within their borders
and these countries are no strangers to Russian hybrid warfare tactics, there will not be little green men in the Baltics. Kasekamp argues that the Russian populations in the Baltic States are comfortable with having better welfare programs and economic perspectives inside the European Union. Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen explains that Russia sees the A2/AD strategy as fundamental to controlling the Baltic Sea region and illustrates how NATO must increase the cost of a Russian implementation of this strategy. Justyna Gotkowska describes the Polish perspective in the region and emphasizes how Article 5 motivates Poland to actively participate in NATO. On the other hand, Håkon Lunde Saxi, Claudia Major, and Alicia von Voss discuss how Norway is only concerned about the security of its maritime High North and Arctic regions and how Germany assumed a passive posture in the Baltic Sea situation despite its power in that region.

The final three chapters describe the strategic importance of Sweden’s Gotland Island in the Baltic Sea, the perspective of Sweden and Finland in relation to the challenges in the region, and the significance of these two nations to NATO as two non-aligned partners. Johan Raeder points out that the Gotland Island is an important territory for Russia to establish an A2/AD strategy. At the same time, Raeder writes that Swedish forces present on Gotland will defend it against Russian attacks. Ann-Sofie Dahl asserts that even though Russia views Sweden and Finland as potential targets, neither of these latter two nations plans to become members of NATO in the near future, instead investing in partnerships with the Alliance. According to Dahl, the position of neutrality holds political significance to the Swedish and Finnish societies. Furthermore, Karoliina Honkanen shows that not only does Finland use NATO programs to develop its national forces but also NATO can count on Finnish support in case of crisis in the Baltic Sea region.

Although the Strategic Challenges in the Baltic Sea Region: Russia, Deterrence and Reassurance has less than two-hundred pages, it is a thorough work that explains the situation of the Baltic Sea region. The perspectives of all countries involved in the Baltic Sea, which would be affected by an armed conflict in the region, are assessed in this work. Although the book does not refer to the demographic challenges facing Europe in terms of aging and low birth rates, the experts expose the current direct challenges and threats facing NATO. This book is recommended to anyone interested in the subjects of international relations, international conflict, and/or security and politics—especially to military personal, governmental officials involved in defense, and academicians and students of international relations.

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Lawrence Robin and Adam Stulberg have assembled an expert group of authors to help explore the complex landscape that is strategic stability in the modern era. They believe strategic stability “refers to a condition in which adversaries understand that altering military force posture in response to vulnerability—whether to avoid being emasculated or to preempt one’s opponent—would be either futile or foolish” (4). In the subsequent chapters, the respective authors detail how the nation they are writing about define this concept, those nations’ current trajectories, and how each trajectory stands to alter the overall status quo. In addition to state actors, some chapters allude to the ways nonstate entities or cross-domain deterrence may also factor into the stability equation.

The term strategic stability is primarily Western in origin. It developed out of the Cold War era from a dyadic system that was comprised of the United States and the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, strategic stability was never achieved, as both nations were constantly in a state of flux trying to gain a decisive edge over the other. This rivalry continued up to the Soviet Union’s down-
fall in 1991 (44). This state of flux was characterized by the constantly changing dynamics of conventional forces, nuclear armaments, and counter nuclear capabilities. The challenge today is not between two superpowers, but instead involves a myriad of complex relationships, each holding catastrophic potential should deterrence fail.

The volume is separated first into sections, each of which gives an overarching idea that encompasses the chapters within. The chapters follow and reflect on the arguments made by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the current nuclear states. Breaking the book down in this manner allows each author to focus exclusively on the argument that they are presenting. For much of the time, this method works well. This technique is limiting when the scope of the chapter fails to encompass all possible competitors to a nation. Taken through this lens, chapter 8, which looks at the India–Pakistan relationship could have been further expanded to include China in the analysis of strategic balance in the region.

Another major point of potential conflict against strategic stability is the use or actions of non-state entities. The chapters that address this most readily are chapters 3 and 8. Here, the authors argue that in the dyad between India and Pakistan, Pakistan understands that both its nuclear and conventional forces have not, and likely never will, achieve parity with India’s forces (72). As a means of supplementing their forces in the past, Pakistan resorted to funding terrorist organizations to conduct attacks against India, such as the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament and the 2008 attack on Mumbai (218). Happymon Jacob argues that this has upset the stability that was previously in place, as India had no intention of altering the status quo while it had a definitive edge over Pakistan. Use of state-funded terrorism provides the sponsor with a small level of plausible deniability. However, in this instance it is only destabilizing and could potentially lead to greater conflict as India has stated that in the event of future such attacks it would hold Pakistan directly responsible and take counteraction accordingly.

As is the nature of politics between nations, much has changed since 2018 when this volume was published. Several key points such as the effects of the Intermediate Nuclear Firearms (INF) Treaty between the United States and Russia, the signing of the Iran Nuclear Deal (also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA]), or the changes between the 2010 and 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and their effects on policy at the time, are no longer salient or have been significantly altered. While no fault of the editors or authors, the changes that these policies usher in would have made for interesting topics of review under their respective chapters. Given the arguments presented by the authors, these changes would most likely be upsetting for the strategic stability of the nations involved. Regarding the INF, both the United States and Russia accused the other of violating the treaty. The United States was accused of doing so through emplacement of the Mark 41 missile launcher in Poland and Romania, while Russia was accused of developing platforms forbidden by the INF treaty. Now both nations are free to develop capabilities that were previously restricted.

Finally, the JCPOA was not a formal treaty but an agreement between Iran, the United Nation’s Security Council, and the European Union. In exchange for Iran eliminating its medium-enriched uranium, restricting its low-enriched uranium, reduction of centrifuges, and maintaining compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, Tehran would receive relief from the heavy sanctions imposed by other nations involved. Consistent with Annie Tracy Samuel’s analysis in chapter 5, Iran has viewed the US withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 as a threat to its security and promised to resume enriching uranium beyond levels agreed upon in the JCPOA. If the United States is successful in getting Iran to agree to more permanent measures than the JCPOA called for, then a greater stability would be achieved in the region. If Washington is unsuccessful, then the move to leave the JCPOA could be a steppingstone toward Iran attaining nuclear capabilities.
Rubin and Stulberg sum up the discussions of the edited volume convincingly, stating that there is no consensus about how states understand strategic stability, deterrence, and cross-domain deterrence (299). Without a common understanding of the terms being used and an awareness of cultural and linguistic barriers, strategic stability cannot be achieved. By providing a detailed road map of how the world’s current, and potential, nuclear weapon states conceive of strategic stability, the authors have initiated a conversation that needs to be continued now and in the future.

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Air University Press and Air University Library have relaunched the Fairchild Series, which is an academic series that publishes cutting-edge research. The series is named after General Muir Stephen Fairchild, who served as the first leader of the Air University, located at the Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. This timely volume discusses the impact of advances in artificial intelligence (AI) that will lead to panoptic surveillance and directly contribute to highly authoritarian forms of political control.

This edited volume aims to prepare Anglo-American security practitioners for the impact of AI-related technologies on a country’s domestic political system. This book contains 27 chapters, which is divided into six sections with 24 expert contributors drawing their insights from mixed professional backgrounds. Particularly, this book traces the differential impact of AI technology on competing domestic regime types. Chapters in the book describe how China will seek to further increase its authoritarian control by utilizing AI, while making its citizens prosperous and shielding them from external knowledge influences. The Chinese model of digital authoritarianism or digital social and political control is likely to emerge as a major and direct rival to free, open, and democratic society—a model championed by the Anglo-American alliance. The Russian model, offers a hybrid approach that relies on a variety of manipulative digital tools to destabilize challenger regimes while maintaining tight state control over critical resources and quashing political rivals.

Part 1 of the book with four framing chapters authored by the editor—Nicholas D. Wright—focuses on the impact of AI technologies on domestic politics and its far-reaching impact on the evolving global order. The remaining five sections of the book are filled with contributions from 23 authors, who are some of the world’s leading experts in the field of AI and Internet technologies. Part two of the book, with five chapters, focuses on how the Chinese and Russian models of digital authoritarianism are shaping domestic political regimes with tools of surveillance, monitoring, big data-fueled AI led governance, facial recognition, and behavioral pattern recognition. Collectively these technologies are leading to intensifying political control of citizens. The third section of the book is on the export and emulation of Chinese and Russian models of digital authoritarianism to other parts of the world. Part four contains four chapters on how AI technologies influence China’s domestic and foreign policy decision making. Focus of the fifth section, with five chapters, is on the various military dimensions of AI and its application to the development of modern weapon systems such as hypersonic glide weapons and enhancement of Chinese command authority through artificial intelligence.

Probably the most provocative section in this book is the final part of the book that focuses on Artistic Perspectives and the Humanities. This section draws on science fiction writings, movies, and art to present various telling scenarios of the future. The set of five chapters offers a vivid and frightening rendering of AI driven technological futures such as precognition to prevent crime, drones to monitor public spaces and summarily execute offenders, a color-coded social credit ranking system
to categorize people in a society by obedience to authority, and AI applications that goes beyond facial recognition to diagnosing depression and mood conditions in individuals. Drawing linkages between AI technologies and terrifying dystopian futures, this set of chapters has issued a clarion call to policy makers to develop robust rules and regulations for democratic governance of the digital world without which corporate and authoritarian control will become the norm.

For the purposes of this book, AI is defined as a “constellation of new technologies” that combines big data, machine learning, and digital things (e.g., the “Internet of Things”). Application of AI implies the analysis of data in which inferences from models are used to “predict and anticipate possible future events” (p.3). Critically, what is important to understand is that “AI programs do not simply analyze data in the way they were originally programmed,” instead the AI programs respond “intelligently to new data and adapt their outputs accordingly” (p. 3). Ultimately AI is understood as giving computers new behaviors and knowledge “which would be thought intelligent in human beings” (p. 3).

The authors argue that the greatest strength of AI capabilities are primarily perceptual, the ability to process images, speeches, and other patterns of behavior and choosing bounded actions to guide decision making. Google’s Deepmind AI is one such example, which draws data from Google’s datacenters and accurately predicts when the data-load is going to increase or decrease and correctly adjusts the cooling systems for the datacenters (p.7).

This book raises legitimate concerns with regards to singularity that represents the fear that an “exponentially accelerating technological progress will create an AI that exceeds human intelligence and escapes our control” (p. 18). AI systems will self-learn from data without any human input or management. The precise concern is that AI will become super-intelligent, which may “then deliberately or inadvertently destroy humanity” or usher changes that are outside the control of humans (p. 18). The terror of singularity is well captured in the five excellent chapters in the concluding section of the book, which draw on sources from reality, fiction, and art to depict an Orwellian dystopia in which conscious human beings either fight back as depicted in the movie series—Matrix or the Terminator—or they become mindless tools of these self-thinking and re-generating machines (p. 194).

Middle sections of book focusing on the Chinese model of digital authoritarianism, the hybrid Russian model of authoritarianism, and the American model of digital openness, but dependent on corporate control are temporary predictions of AI usage. The Chinese, Russian, and American models assume that governments could, should, and will be able to control AI and maybe deploy AI toward social control and military applications. “Given the rate of progress, the singularity may occur at some point this century” (p. 18). The lead author, Wright, adds that “although clearly momentous, given that nobody knows when, if or how a possible singularity will occur” and “limits clearly exist on what can sensibly be said or planned for now” (p. 18).

The authors are hoping that humans would be able to master and control AI in the same way that we have been (so far) successful in controlling the use and spread of nuclear weapons, albeit imperfectly. The key assertion here is that much like nuclear weapons, singularity issues related to AI “will require managing within the international order as best we can, although our best will inevitably be grossly imperfect” (p. 18). Our solutions are likely to incomplete, inadequate, imperfect, and potentially counterproductive because “singularity potentially represents a qualitatively new challenge for humanity that we need to think through and discuss internationally” (p. 18). This is a serious and a major claim of the book that readers should take note!

At a more temporal level, the contributors to this important volume proffer three key recommendations: (1) the United States must pursue robust policies to keep ahead of the digital curve and it must respond by preventing the emergence of a military-industrial complex that is managed by an AI corporate oligopoly and a surveillance state; (2) the United States must build a new global order of norms and institutions required to persuade the world that the American model of
free and open digital democracy offers an attractive and viable alternative to the Chinese and Russian models of digital authoritarianism; and (3) the United States should fight back against digital authoritarianism and hybridism so that it manages the risks associated with a multifaceted interstate AI competition.

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