Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 42

A Rules-based

Order in the

Indo-Pacific

A View from Jakarta

Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar

n In recent years, there has been

a lot of talk about the importance

of ensuring a rules-based inter-

national order in the Indo-Pacific re-

gion. The increasing use of the “Indo-

Pacific” terminology to replace the

more familiar “Asia-Pacific” has been

promoted by the United States, Japan,

India, Australia, and Indonesia among

others in recognition of the integration

of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a

single geostrategic theater and the

growing importance of the maritime

domain. Various initiatives proposed

by different countries to promote a co-

operative framework in the Indo-Pa-

cific, such as a “Free and Open Indo-

Pacific” (FOIP) by Japan and the

United States and the “ASEAN Out-

look on the Indo-Pacific” by the Associ-

ation of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN), each stress the importance

of adherence to international laws and

a rules-based international order. On

the one hand, this emphasis on a

rules-based international order could

be seen as nothing out of the ordinary,

since naturally all regional and inter-

national initiatives would and should

be based on commonly accepted inter-

national conventions and laws that

regulate international relations. On

the other hand, however, it also re-

flects the growing concerns that a

rules-based international order in the

Indo-Pacific is being threatened by

certain events and actions.

The current rules-based interna-

tional order is understood as a

broad architecture of global gov-

ernance which has developed since

the end of World War II.

This

rules-based international order is

centered on multilateral organiza-

tions, with the United Nations

(UN) as its primary custodian; a

set of universal norms, values and

principles; and international laws

all designed to maintain interna-

tional peace, prevent conflicts, and

promote common prosperity. In an

inherently anarchical international

A Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │43

system where nation-states tend to

maximize their respective power

and compete with each other to

gain relative advantage, a rules-

based international order is aimed

at constraining power and curbing

the illegitimate use of power. The

UN Security Council has the ulti-

mate, and in the eyes of most

states, the only legitimate author-

ity to enforce compliance to the

rules-based international order by

punishing violations of the princi-

ples of the UN Charter and other

international laws. As a comple-

ment to the UN system, regional

organizations have played im-

portant roles in acting as early

warning systems, and in promoting

regional cooperation that help

maintain peace and stability in

their immediate neighborhoods.

It must be admitted that a rules-

based international order has re-

mained more of an aspiration than

a reality. Since the establishment

of the UN in 1948, world politics

was first dominated by the Cold

War between two opposing ideolog-

ical blocs led by the United States

and the Soviet Union respectively

(1948-1990), while in the post-Cold

War period there has been a prolif-

eration of interstate and intrastate

conflicts. Great power competition

has made a rules-based interna-

tional order difficult to achieve, as

adherence to international laws

has often been subjected to the

vested interests and military might

of major powers. In Southeast

Asia, international laws could not

protect the sovereignty and territo-

rial integrity of regional states, as

major powers used the former as

proxies in the Cold War. At the

multilateral level, the interna-

tional community has often found

it difficult to take collective actions

to maintain a rules-based interna-

tional order as the veto-wielding

powers on the UN Security Coun-

cil, particularly the United States

on the one hand, and China and

Russia on the other, have taken op-

posite positions in dealing with in-

ternational crises and supported

different sides in conflicts. Moreo-

ver, unilateral actions carried out

by major powers also often under-

mine the multilateral system un-

derpinning the rules-based inter-

national order.

The Indo-Pacific is a vast and di-

verse region with many security

flash points, such as the India-

China border dispute, the India-

Pakistan conflict over Kashmir,

North Korea’s nuclear threat, the

Taiwan issue, and the East China

Sea and South China Sea territo-

rial disputes. At the same time,

there are also myriad nontradi-

tional threats to security such as

transnational crimes carried out by

nonstate actors including

Anwar

Indo-Pacific Perspective │44

terrorism, people-smuggling, drug-

trafficking, and illegal fishing. De-

spite all these traditional and non-

traditional security threats, how-

ever, a rules-based international

order has overall prevailed in the

Indo-Pacific region. This region has

become a dynamic center of eco-

nomic growth, made possible by

the existence of relative regional

peace and stability which has ena-

bled countries to devote their

scarce resources to more produc-

tive uses and to engage in interna-

tional trade, investment, tourism

and other economic activities. The

relations between peace and devel-

opment are shown to be inextrica-

bly linked. In East Asia since the

1979, there have been significant

reductions in deaths from inter-

state conflicts as countries priori-

tized economic development as the

primary strategy for achieving

their national objectives, resulting

in the so-called “developmental

peace.”

While many intractable disputes

remain unresolved, regional states

have for the most part acted with

restraint to prevent open conflicts

and respect international laws,

while devoting their energies to

pursue economic development and

improve the welfare of their citi-

zens. ASEAN has succeeded in de-

veloping norms, values, principles,

and promoting ever widening and

deepening regional cooperation

that has transformed the formerly

conflict-ridden Southeast Asian re-

gion into a security community

where wars between the member

states are becoming unthinkable.

The ASEAN Treaty of Amity and

Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast

Asia has played an important role

as a regional code conduct which

stresses the importance of adher-

ence to international laws, peaceful

settlements of disputes, and the re-

jection of the use or threat of use of

force in resolving conflicts. ASEAN

has also tried to promote the prin-

ciples of the TAC to other countries

and, in fact, made accession to the

TAC as one of the conditions for

the dialogue partners to be ac-

cepted in the ASEAN-driven East

Asia Summit, now comprising the

10 ASEAN member states, Aus-

tralia, China, India, Japan, New

Zealand, South Korea, the United

States, and Russia.

In the past few years, however, the

rules-based international order has

come under greater challenge due

to the intensifying rivalry between

the China and the United Sates -

the ascending and incumbent su-

perpower, respectively - and

China’s increasingly assertive pol-

icy in the East and South China

Seas to enforce its territorial

claims. While the 1982 United Na-

tions Convention on Law of the Sea

A Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │45

(UNCLOS) has provided the legal

basis for maritime governance,

particularly the extent of waters

and continental shelves that come

under the sovereignty and jurisdic-

tion of littoral states, it has also

engendered new disputes due to

overlapping claims between coun-

tries separated by narrow seas.

Several ASEAN countries have not

fully demarcated their maritime

boundaries, but they accept the

1982 UNCLOS without reserve,

carrying out drawn-out bilateral

negotiations to achieve mutually

satisfactory agreements, and in

certain cases submitting their dis-

putes to the International Court of

Justice (ICJ) and accepting the

Court’s decisions. For instance,

Malaysia accepted the ICJ’s deci-

sion to award the disputed island

Pedra Blanca to Singapore in 2008,

while Indonesia accepted the ICJ’s

ruling which favored Malaysia over

the disputed islands Sipadan and

Ligitan in 2002.

Based on UNCLOS, the Spratly Is-

lands in the South China Sea are

claimed in parts by four ASEAN

countries (Brunei, Malaysia, the

Philippines, and Vietnam) whose

claims do not overlap, and by Tai-

wan. China, on the other hand,

claims the entirety of the South

China Sea, based on historical and

traditional rights not recognized by

UNCLOS, which has become the

major focus of contention in the

area. Although Indonesia is not a

claimant in the Spratlys, China’s

so-called “nine-dash line” impinges

on Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic

Zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna

Sea. While relations between

China and ASEAN countries have

become increasingly close, and

both sides try to manage conflicts

in the South China Sea through

the nonbinding 2002 Declaration of

the Conduct of Parties in the South

China Sea (DOC) and are currently

negotiating a binding Code of Con-

duct (COC), China has reclaimed

and militarized islands while its

navy and coast guards enforce

China’s claims through displays of

force. China has also refused to

recognize the Permanent Court of

Arbitration (PCA) ruling of 2016

which affirmed the Philippines

rights to its claims in the Spratlys

based on the 1982 UNCLOS. Alt-

hough it has ratified the 1982 UN-

CLOS, China clearly does not feel

bound by it in pursuing its claim in

the South China Sea, while its

growing economic and military

prowess has given China the confi-

dence to flout the UNCLOS openly.

The United States, while it still

has not ratified the 1982 UNCLOS,

has played a leading role in pro-

moting the concept of a rules-based

international order in the Indo-Pa-

cific, joining others in adopting the

Anwar

Indo-Pacific Perspective │46

language of a FOIP strategy, such

as that proposed by President

Trump in 2017. The United States

is particularly concerned about dis-

ruptions to the freedom of naviga-

tions and overflights in the dis-

puted areas in the East and South

China Seas due to China’s military

actions. Under the Trump admin-

istration, the United States in-

creased the frequency of Freedom

of Navigation Operations (FONOP)

in the South China Sea and revi-

talized the Quadrilateral Security

Dialogue (the Quad) between the

United States, Japan, India, and

Australia as a deterrent to China’s

military actions. China undoubt-

edly regards the emphasis on a

rules-based international order

propounded by the United States

and the other Quad members as a

strategy to contain China, thus

perceiving this concept to be exclu-

sive rather than inclusive.

Southeast Asia as the frontline in

the US-China rivalry has no desire

to see the region being forced to

take side and divided again as had

happened during the Cold War.

Both China and the United States

are important partners of ASEAN

and its member states. While most

tacitly accept that the US initia-

tives in promoting a rules-based

order in the Indo-Pacific can play

an important role in deterring

China’s hegemonic ambitions in

the region, Southeast Asian coun-

tries do not wish to see the rivalry

between the existing superpowers

escalate and destabilize the region

as a whole, which could disrupt the

peace, stability and economic de-

velopment that the ASEAN region

has enjoyed. ASEAN has played an

important role as the primary re-

gional convenor in bringing to-

gether all the main stakeholders in

the Indo-Pacific region into

ASEAN-led regional mechanisms

such as the ASEAN Regional Fo-

rum (ARF) and the EAS. In 2019,

ASEAN launched the ASEAN Out-

look on the Indo-Pacific, which em-

phasized openness, transparency,

inclusiveness, and adherence to in-

ternational laws, including the UN

Charter and the UNCLOS, and the

principle of ASEAN centrality.

Faced with increasing major power

competitions, ASEAN has tried to

put itself as a bridge to promote di-

alogues and cooperation within an

inclusive regional architecture to

build trust, foster preventive diplo-

macy, and resolve conflicts through

peaceful means, that in turn may

contribute to a more inclusive

rules-based order in the Indo-Pa-

cific region. ■

Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar

Dr. Anwar is a research professor

at the Indonesian Institute of Sci-

ences.

A Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │47

Notes

Ben Scott, Madeleine Nyst, Sam Roggeven, Aus-

tralia’s Security and The Rules-Based Order. Track-

ing a Decade of Policy Institution, https://interac-

tives.lowyinstitute.org/.

Stein Tønnesson, “Explaining East Asia’s Develop-

mental Peace: The Dividends of Economic Growth”,

Global Asia 10, no. 4 (December 2015),

https://www.globalasia.org/.

Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery Sng, The ASEAN

Miracle. A Catalyst for Peace (Singapore: NUS Press,

2017).

Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN

Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” International Affairs 96,

no. 1 (2020): 111–29.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA

are those of the authors and should not be construed

as carrying the official sanction of the Department of

Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Com-

mand, Air University, or other agencies or depart-

ments of the US government or their international

equivalents.