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2019 Air Warfare Symposium

Combat Air Forces Commanders Panel

GEN CHARLES Q. BROWN, JR.

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There's a few things I've been thinking about since I've taken command—and I have been in command about six months now—in terms of operating concepts, logistics, and authorities. It really goes across the full spectrum from competition—the full spectrum of competition, from cooperation and conflict—it's over the past couple years PACAF has really worked at how to rethink about the Pacific. I owe a debt of gratitude to my good friend Shags [Gen Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy], who actually, just before he gave up command, signed out the PACAF strategy and left it for me to execute.

This senior-leader perspective is extracted from comments by Gen Charles Q. Brown, commander, Pacific Air Forces; air component commander, US Indo-Pacific Command; and executive director, Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff, at the Air Force Association's Combat Air Forces Commanders panel at the 2019 Air Warfare Symposium (Orlando, Florida, 28 February 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2293&v=sKRGzMPOTY4. The other panelists were Gen James M. Holmes, commander, Air Combat Command; and Gen Tod D. Wolters, commander, US Air Forces in Europe, US Air Forces Africa, and Allied Air Command. Retired Air Force lieutenant general David Deptula served as the panel moderator.

And, so part of that is how do we actually look at that, and he did a really good job of building it upon the National Defense Strategy. And, so we are looking at great-power competition. As a matter of fact, I was just in Micronesia, went to Pala, where there's obviously a little bit of competition there with China. And, it was, you know, you can see it firsthand. It's not just what we do in uniform, but it's what we do throughout the whole of government to do that. What I also believe, as we look at that, is we need commanders that really articulate intent, very clearly—looking long term. We need to trust our subordinate commanders, and we to trust our Airmen to be able to do their job and that we need our Airmen to be able to take the initiative and to contest the environment.

Within our strategy, just like the National Defense Strategy, we look at strengthening our allies and partners. Matter of fact, I just got in from Melbourne last night. Not Melbourne, Florida, but Melbourne, Australia, where I had a chance to go to Avalon and meet up with about 12 different air chiefs from the Pacific region as well as the UK.

We want to continue to look to how we enhance lethality in our interoperability in the look at new operational concepts. And in that new international operational concept, it's really looking at how we do agile combat employment, but, well, I could talk more about details but the thing I am really concerned about with agile combat employment is having agile combat logistics to support the employment aspect of it; so, I think that's important.

I think also tied to that is how we provide authorities, and I really look at conditions-based authorities, where I've got to be able to articulate my intent, give mission-type orders, and allow our Airmen to be able to do their job and just report back to me what they're doing. And, they've got to be able to take the initiative; they've got to be able to take some measured risks, because I really believe our comms will be contested, and so the way I look at it is almost like ADAs. I just gotta keep transmitting, and then people will pick up on pieces and parts. They will execute what they need to, and they just need to report back and let me know what they did. That's the way we've got to be thinking about it in the future. So, I've got to be able to delegate down the lowest-capable and competent level to do the job, and I've got to depend on my squadron commanders, group and wing commanders to do that. Thank you.

Lt Gen David Deptula (panel moderator): We have a whole spectrum of excellent questions here that . . . let me jump right into. General Brown, first for you. You mentioned controlling forces across a theater through ACE [agile combat employment] and delegating authorities. From a theater joint force air compo-

nent commander perspective, how do you see multi-domain command and control evolving in light of great-power competition?

General Brown: That's a pretty hefty question there. Thanks! There's a couple things I think about when we think about multi-domain command and control, and I think often, as Airmen, talk about air, space, and cyber—but I care about all the domains, because I am also the area air defense wing command, which means I'm also doing ballistic missile defense. So, I care about the land domain and care about the maritime domain, because they help provide some of the firepower I need in order to defend our bases. And so, when I look at the multi-domain C2, it's not only what I do inside of the air component, it's what I do with my sister components to pull all that together. It's also the expanse of the AOR [area of responsibility], which is why I think commander's intent . . . and continue to transmit them. And having traveled through the Pacific, it takes you about a day to get anywhere, and I've got to be able to work across multiple time zones, particularly if we're going to go against China. And so, from that aspect, I'm really looking at how we not only work internal to the Air Force but how we work with our partners as well. And so, how do I actually ensure that they are able . . . up on the same net, and I'm pushing ones and zeroes and communicating with them if they're gonna go to conflict with us. So, that's another aspect that we've got to think through as well.

General Deptula: Okay, here's one, General Brown, that's kind of in your court. War is all about logistics. Do we have the fuel and munitions, correct ones that pilots have on, stocks available in PACOM theater to fight regional, high-intensity conflict with the variety of actors that that might be required?

General Brown: No. I wish it was that simple, and this is the aspect, I think, when we look at our Air Force—and really all of our joint partners—it's having the flexibility to be able to do the kind of dynamic force employment that the National Defense Strategy talks about. So, there's things I need that you'd be able to use; at the same time, there's stuff that Magoo [Gen Tod. D. Wolters, commander US Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa] needs over in Europe. So, we've got to be able to flex that. I think the key part for me is, unlike Europe, I don't have roads and railroads that connect everything, and so, and, it takes time to get places. And so, that's why I think some of the forward positioning that we do in prepositioning it is important across the board. We have access to some of it. I think we are sitting in a better spot, but really, one of my goals here is to have a better understanding across the region of where our capacity is and where we can

contract for different things, which is why I think our exercise program and how we do things and have really air-fuel surveys and the like—that's gonna help me to understand where the fuel is available. What we have, what we don't have, and then how I create a command signal to ensure, you know, I can get it there early enough to be able to fight if we need to.

General Deptula: As we achieve the objective of fielding faster, we see weapons systems such as the KC-46 tanker in the hands of the war fighter sooner but with some operational problems. Although it already offers massive enhancements over legacy systems, how do we balance having weapons systems in the field that are less than perfect on day one compared to traditional acquisition decisions with our need for war-ready machines?

General Brown: (following a dramatic pause by the panelists) I'll jump on part of that, because I need tankers too. We can't let perfect be the enemy of good enough. And, well, if we go to conflict with a near-peer competitor or a peer competitor, there's gonna be a risk involved. And so, that's an aspect that, you know, in the conflicts we've been fighting over the past 17–18 years, it's been risky but not as risky as it will be in the future. And so, I think, we've got to push some of that capability out, let it get in the hands of our operators, and they'll tell us what some of the real challenges are beyond the test community. And, I think that's an important aspect of this—we can collaborate not only with what the test may be but with the industry partners to get us a solution a little bit faster.

General Deptula: Okay, there's a lot of talk about mission-type order. What examples are out there of us practicing mission-type orders, and what are some of the obstacles preventing us from doing more of that?

General Brown: So, we in PACAF or in INDOPACOM, we just had an exercise called Pacific Century, and one of the things I tasked my staff to do is actually write out some conditions-based orders or authorities where I would approve, preapprove, some of the authorities and then, once the conditions got hit, then they actually went to execute. They didn't have to come back and ask me. And so, that's an example and it's really, in some aspects, it's our integrating missile defense pieces. I think we've got to do better than that. I think we've got to be able to get down to a lower level to allow squadron, groups, and wing commanders . . . and trust them to do their job. That's why we put them in charge, and so, it's really: How do I actually allow them to go do what they need to do? And, I'll just you know, a quick story, when I worked at CFAC, I had a Brit that worked for me that

talked about, he mentioned kind of these mission-type orders and told folks perceived until apprehended, and I kind of believe that. I want to give Airmen the opportunity to go do what they need to do. And, just tell me what you're doing, and I will stop it before you get too far. You've got to be thinking that way. It's really a mind-set change more than just the example. And, we've got to trust our folks to do their job and allow them to do it.

General Deptula: How are cyber-mission defense teams being utilized within your MAJCOMs [major commands]?

General Brown: . . . really, for all of our major commands, using the cyber-mission defense teams, really it allows us to really monitor our networks, understand how they operate, and then protect our networks and give us feedback. And, I am working with Bob Skinner for 24th Air Force—he's working through some things for me right now. I just sat down with him here about a week ago. I think the other aspect I look at is how do we design, because I know we're gonna be contested, and so one of the things I've forced my staff to do is, when we do these authorized service interruptions, I talk to them about, okay, now you can't shut me down for 12 hours. You've got to tell me how we're gonna actually keep folks connected; otherwise, we're not shutting down for 12 hours. So, we've rescheduled a few, because they haven't figured that part out, and so, this is how we work with our cyber-mission defense teams to kind of figure out how do we actually mitigate when we actually do get attacked, because we will get attacked. And then, how do we kind of recover. So, that's kind of . . . I'm trying to kind of challenge ourselves to look at, just from a defense how do we actually, you know, have this resilient, self-going network we talk about on it just on a day-to-day operational training environment in peacetime. **JIPA**

Australia-Japan-ASEAN

Strengthening the Core of the Indo-Pacific

PHILIP GREEN

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Philip Green OAM, first assistant secretary, US and Indo-Pacific Strategy Division, delivered this keynote speech at the Perth USAsia Centre's Japan Symposium 2019

Distinguished guests, I am very pleased to be here today to offer an Australian perspective on the Indo-Pacific and ASEAN's central role in it. I am particularly pleased to be doing this with the Perth USAsia Centre. In a few short years, the Perth USAsia Centre has established itself as one of the most important forums for discussion of regional issues in Australia.

Philip Green OAM, First Assistant Secretary, US and Indo-Pacific Strategy Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Australia-Japan-ASEAN: Strengthening the Core of the Indo-Pacific" (speech, Perth USAsia Centre, 22 March 2019).

It is natural given the significance of this state, its people, its natural endowments, and its proximity to our region, that Perth should have a centre of this prominence. But the considerable success of the Centre has not come about by natural evolution alone. It has taken vision, good planning and hard work. There are many in this room who have contributed to that, but I am sure that you will not mind if I acknowledge the very substantial efforts of Professor Flake and his staff in that achievement.

The Changing International Environment

Many of the Australians in this audience will know Professor Allan Gyngell. A former diplomat and high ranking public servant, Allan is now amongst the foremost thinkers in this country on regional affairs.

Allan likes to remind us that each generation of Australian foreign policy practitioners is inclined to think that their era is uniquely complex and challenging. In saying that, Allan puts our contemporary anxieties rightly into context. But Allan often goes on to say that, in imagining that our times are uniquely challenging, the contemporary generation of foreign policy practitioners may well be right. Allan has written that we are currently dealing (and I quote) “with a future more uncertain than any we have known since the Second World War.”

The perspective from government is certainly that we are living through a period of profound change, and that that change brings with it substantial challenge, as well as opportunity.

The Foreign Policy White Paper

The Government’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper outlined many of the drivers of change we face: deepening globalisation; fast paced technological change; demographic shifts; and climate change.

In our region—the Indo-Pacific—the White Paper focused closely on the changes to our strategic environment—changes that have real consequence for Australia and, if not well managed, will give rise to new levels of strategic rivalry between the major powers. The White Paper gave particular prominence to the roles of the United States and China.

While the United States remains the region’s most powerful country, its dominance is being challenged.

China’s fast economic growth, which has seen its share of world GDP increase from two percent in 1980 to nearly 19 per cent today, is already translating into significant power and influence across the region. China is the largest trading partner for most of the region’s economies—including Australia—and a significant

investor. It has the largest navy and air force of any Asian state, and the largest coast guard in the world. Its aid donations to the region are considerable.

At the same time, the US retains a significant lead in military and soft power. While, by some measures, the size of the Chinese economy has already overtaken the United States, the US will continue to be far wealthier than China in GDP per capita terms. It is the world leader in technology and innovation, and it is home to the world's deepest financial markets.

So the key strategic dynamic that we expect to influence our region for the foreseeable future is the presence of two major powers, each with substantial interests and heft.

We judge that the United States' security and economic equities in the Indo-Pacific will ensure it remains deeply engaged in the region.

The US and China are of course not the only powers in our region. Japan has substantial economic reach across the region, and is developing new capabilities. India is growing fast, and will be a larger fraction of Indo-Pacific strategic realities as time goes on. Other emerging powers, like Indonesia, are also growing in strategic weight and are likely to play larger roles in shaping the future of the region.

So, while the US and China are the key players, they are not the only ones of consequence.

Opportunities and Challenges

The changes we are witnessing will provide many opportunities, as well as challenges, for Australia. Forecasts suggest that our region could be home to a middle class of around 3.5 billion people by 2030 and four of the world's top five largest economies. Economic growth and development across the Indo-Pacific, coupled with the complementary character of the Australian economy to many of those in the region, will continue to benefit this country. Demand for our minerals and energy, as well as services and premium agricultural products, is likely to grow, particularly as Asia's mega-cities expand.

But there are also risks. In 2017, the White Paper noted that the postwar international order—and the principles embedded in it—were under unprecedented pressure. Those principles—including open markets, adherence to international law and norms, universal rights and freedoms, and the need to work collectively on global challenges—are important for Australia's interests and values. Since 2017, the threats to those principles have become even clearer:

- Strategic competition in our region has further increased, with its attendant effects on stability;

- We have seen further erosion of respect for international law and institutions, with some major powers showing an increasing willingness to exercise power coercively;
- Growing protectionist sentiment is threatening the free flow of goods and capital;
- And increasing distrust is undermining our ability to collectively resolve problems.

A continuation of these trends under a “business-as-usual” scenario would lead to a region that is less favourable to our interests.

Our Vision for the Indo-Pacific

But while Australians need to be clear-eyed about the risks, we should not feel unable to influence the way our region develops. A key judgement of the White Paper is that, rather than shrink from the challenge, Australian diplomacy—indeed all arms of the Australian Government’s international efforts—should be applied more actively to help shape the sort of region that we want. To support a balance in the Indo-Pacific that is favourable to our interests and to promote a region that is secure, open, inclusive, prosperous and resilient.

A region where disputes are resolved peacefully in accordance with international law and without the threat or use of force or coercion. Where open markets facilitate flows of goods, services, capital and ideas. Where rights of freedom of navigation and overflight are upheld, and the rights of small states are respected. Where international law, rules and norms are applied. And where ASEAN and the ASEAN-centred regional architecture, maintains its central role and helps set the rules and norms for behaviour in the region.

Working with Partners

The White Paper sets out a framework within which Australia can make a deeper contribution to those objectives. It draws on Australia’s many national strengths, and a history of active regional engagement over many decades – but focuses in particular on how our engagements with others in the region can contribute to shaping the sort of Indo-Pacific that we want.

First, our alliance with the United States is central to our strategy. We will continue to broaden and deepen our alliance cooperation and support the strongest possible security and economic engagement by the United States in this region. We are conscious of course that the United States has many preoccupations. But its *National Security Strategy*, and its new and important commitments under

the BUILD Act and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act are signs of the US deepening its commitment to the Indo-Pacific. So too was last year's AusMin consultations, which focused on our region with a new level of intensity.

Second, we will also work to strengthen our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China. This objective flows from our extensive bilateral interests. It also reflects the reality that China's influence on the regional and global issues of consequence to our security and prosperity will continue to grow. We welcome China's rise and the benefits that brings to the region. At the same time, we will continue to encourage China to exercise its increasing influence in ways that enhance stability, reinforce international law and respect the interests of smaller states and their right to pursue these interests peacefully.

Third, we are also boosting our engagement with the major democracies of the Indo-Pacific—Japan, India, the ROK and Indonesia. We are working with these key regional states both bilaterally and through a range of other mechanisms that bring us together to promote our shared vision for the region. These include small groups—so-called “minilaterals”—that allow us to work flexibly with different configurations of states across a range of issues. These minilateral groups include the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and the Quad. They also include new groupings, notably our trilateral engagement with India and Indonesia, and our trilateral meetings with Japan and India. India forms a larger fraction of our calculations, as its economy and strategic reach grow, and its influence is increasingly felt beyond the Indian Ocean.

Allow me to take a moment to focus on our strengthening bilateral engagement with Japan, our “Special Strategic Partner.” Our close cooperation with Japan reflects our shared values, our mutual interests across the span of the Indo-Pacific, and the close alignment of our regional priorities. We are increasing our strategic engagement in infrastructure, security, intelligence and trade. The potential impact of our partnership was demonstrated powerfully in our work to secure the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

As I have sketched out, since 2017, the Government has been embarked on an effort to help shape the future of our region—in increasingly testing times. An effort in which our relations with the United States and China, and our partnerships with the major democracies of the region play key parts in our strategy.

For most of the rest of my remarks I want to focus on our relations with Southeast Asia and the ASEAN-centred architecture—a vital part of our framework and the focus of your conference. But before doing so, I want to touch briefly on our engagement with the South West Pacific, a region of unique Australian interest and where the Government has recently stepped up substantially its engagement.

As Foreign Minister Marise Payne has said: “Stepping up in the Pacific is not an option for Australian Foreign Policy – it is an imperative.” In November, Prime Minister Morrison announced a new package of initiatives for the Pacific, including: new support for Pacific infrastructure development and labour mobility; enhanced security partnerships; and stronger people-to-people links. These new initiatives will take our deep and enduring partnerships with our Pacific family to a new level.

The Significance of Southeast Asia

Ladies and gentlemen, Southeast Asia’s proximity to Australia and location at the junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans means its stability, security and prosperity directly affect our own. Southeast Asia frames Australia’s northern approaches and our key trade routes flow through it. Southeast Asia has become one of Australia’s most important economic partners. Our trade with the grouping surpasses our trade with the United States or Korea. Further, while our trade with ASEAN is smaller than with China, the number of Australian businesses exporting to ASEAN is almost double those exporting to China.

Australia has been significantly advantaged by the relative peace and stability that this region has enjoyed over past decades. We are conscious that that peace and stability—in a region that could easily have been difficult and divided—owes much to the statecraft of Southeast Asian leaders. It also owes much to the foundational principles of ASEAN. The ASEAN Charter and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation have helped establish norms and the expected standards of behavior of the region. ASEAN warrants our engagement also because of its role in regional architecture.

Through its key role in the East Asia Summit and other regional forums, ASEAN’s role is truly central. ASEAN hosts each of these forums, sets their agendas, chairs the meetings, and settles statements. These facts about the significance of ASEAN to Australia reflect long term realities. But in the strategic context I have set out above, Southeast Asia and ASEAN become even more important in Australia’s strategic calculus. ASEAN lies at the nexus of the Indo-Pacific, geographically, diplomatically and strategically. And the ASEAN-centred architecture takes on a greater salience as we seek to shape a region that adheres to law, rule and norm. Moreover, given the strategic risks that the region faces, all of us—the states of Southeast Asia included—will need to make a greater effort to ensure the stability and prosperity of our region is preserved.

Working with ASEAN

The Foreign Policy White Paper commits Australia to further strengthen our cooperation with the states of Southeast Asia, and to boost our strategic partnership with ASEAN.

Four months after the White Paper was released, the Government made a major down payment on that effort. The ASEAN-Australia Special Summit—held in Sydney in March last year—marked a new era in the strategic partnership between ASEAN and Australia. It was the first time that Australia had invited all the leaders of Southeast Asian states to a summit in Australia.

The Sydney Declaration comprehensively set out ASEAN and Australia's future partnership and our shared commitment to work towards a more secure and prosperous region. Fifteen new initiatives were announced at the summit which expand our cooperation in areas as diverse as security, education, infrastructure, digital connectivity, smart cities, and women, peace and security. ASEAN and Australia also committed to enhancing our cooperation on maritime security, transnational crime and defence. We will cooperate, for example, on a new ten-year A\$80 million counter-trafficking program that will support the region's efforts to stamp out trafficking in persons.

The Special Summit's momentum was sustained at a further leaders' meeting in Singapore in November. At that meeting, Prime Minister Morrison announced three new initiatives:

1. A Southeast Asia Economic and Governance Initiative—which will help the region unlock the next phase of economic growth, focusing on support for infrastructure project selection and preparation.
2. A new phase of the Greater Mekong Water Resources Program—to support more equitable, transparent and effective water resource management in this vital waterway.
3. And a further maritime cooperation package—deepening engagement with regional civil maritime organisations, on maritime domain awareness, unregulated and unreported fishing and support for a rules-based maritime order.

These initiatives have set our relations with the states of Southeast Asia collectively on a new, stronger trajectory. They have been complemented by a range of bilateral initiatives:

- The Government struck a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Indonesia in August last year and signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Indonesia just this month.
- Our relationship with Vietnam was upgraded to a Strategic Partnership in March last year.
- Since 2015, we have had a Strategic Partnership with Malaysia; and as the then High Commissioner to Singapore, I was pleased to see that relationship upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016.

Each of these upgrades has its own set of initiatives, designed to strengthen our partnerships and our abilities to focus on the key challenges that the region faces. In sum, this represents a substantial new rate of effort with the nations of South-east Asia.

The East Asia Summit

Australia has long supported ASEAN and its centrality in regional architecture. But at a moment when the rules component of the regional order is under pressure, the ASEAN-centred architecture takes on new and greater significance. That is why Australia has reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening the ASEAN-led forums and in particular the East Asia Summit (EAS).

The EAS is the region's only leader-level forum at which all key regional players—including the United States, China, Japan, India and South Korea – meet to consider our shared political and security challenges. Australia aims to strengthen the strategic focus of the EAS, and to encourage a substantive exchange by leaders on the most pressing issues facing our region. And while that is a long run effort, it is making progress.

In 2018, leaders discussed issues of real significance, including Indo-Pacific concepts, the DPRK, the situation in Rakhine State, the South China Sea, cybersecurity and the threat of terrorism. These discussions and the collective decisions made by EAS leaders help to set expectations of state behaviour and reinforce the rules-based components of the regional order.

Together with other ASEAN forums—the ADMM+ and the ARF—the development of the EAS encourages discussion of the key strategic issues we face and promotes habits of cooperation.

Conclusion


Our Indo-Pacific region is undergoing unprecedented change. If current trends persist, the region is set to become more competitive, more contested and less stable. Under those circumstances, it would become harder for us to take advantage of the opportunities offered by our region's increasing prosperity.

This set of challenges requires a high level of realism. But it would be wrong for that realism to shade into fatalism. In fact, the current environment puts a higher premium on all states in the region, in their own way, doing more to secure a stable and prosperous future. That is what, through the Foreign Policy White Paper, the Australian Government has committed to do. We are conscious that Australia is only one part of the picture, and we can only succeed in combination with others.

At this conference, you are focusing on the role ASEAN and the states of Southeast Asia can play. While much will depend on the role of the great powers, the countries of ASEAN are an important part of the drama.

Through their statecraft over the history of ASEAN, the leaders of Southeast Asia have shown how stability and prosperity can be shaped. And through the ASEAN-led architecture, they hold many of the levers that can help sustain a region that operates in accordance with laws, norms and rules.

We are also fortunate to have partners in the region—like Japan—that are committed to working towards a region that is open, inclusive and prosperous. Together we can work to shape an Indo-Pacific that serves our collective interests.

Thank you. 

Implementing the Philippine Defense Reform Program in Partnership with US Department of Defense Support of Philippine Defense Institutions*

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Begun in 2004, the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program affected the entire Philippine defense establishment. Its goal was to create more-capable armed forces. To do that, the PDR required the support of senior leaders at all levels of the Department of National Defense (DND) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)—as well as a substantial commitment of people.

This article explains why, from a Philippine perspective, senior leaders within the Philippines defense sector felt reform was needed and how it was implemented. It also describes how the United States Department of Defense (DOD) partnered with the Republic of the Philippines to implement PDR with a particular focus on defense-force planning and budgeting.

Based on observations gleaned from interviews with Philippine officials and the firsthand accounts of the authors, who were involved in the PDR effort from 2004 to 2012, the article highlights several lessons that can be derived from the Philippine experience. Specifically, defense reforms: (1) should never lose sight of improving combat effectiveness; (2) should amplify the self-identity of the organization; (3) have systemic effect on nearly all armed-forces activities; (4) are a concern not only of the armed forces but also civilian policy makers; (5) could be part of wider efforts to improve not only the armed forces but also the whole

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defense and national security apparatus; and, (6) should be owned by defense and military leaders at all levels of the organization.

Introduction

In September 1991, the 1947 Military Bases Agreement¹ between the United States and the Philippines expired, and US military bases in the Philippines² closed.³ Consequently, revenue drawn from annual rentals of approximately \$200 million was no longer available to the AFP. This led to structural deficits in the Philippine defense budget and growing capability gaps. In 1995 the Philippine Congress authorized the AFP to convert some military bases to alternative civilian use to generate funds for capability upgrades and military modernization.⁴ Unfortunately, due to an economic recession fueled by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, none of the money authorized for the defense sector was provided through budget appropriation acts. Consequently, the capability of the AFP further deteriorated.

In March 2000, after nine consecutive years of AFP deterioration, Pres. Joseph Estrada opted to wage war in Mindanao against Muslim separatist groups. The increased operating tempo exposed significant gaps in AFP capability. Furthermore, the limited resources for the operating units were centrally managed at the General Headquarters AFP and major services headquarters where corruption was further weakening a force already hollowed out by declining appropriations.

During the same period, civilian leadership never provided the military with prioritized security-policy strategic guidance. The absence led to assorted efforts to address current and emerging security challenges that were difficult to sustain, as priorities were never agreed upon. As a result, internal security threats grew while the capability of the armed forces declined.

The counterinsurgency struggle gave birth to a comprehensive defense reform program. This article examines why and how the Philippine's DND partnered with the US government (USG) to institute reforms to improve its systems of defense management. Further, the article provides an assessment of what was effective in terms of the USG's participation and highlights lessons learned that could be applied to similar situations in the future.

Framing and Implementing Defense Reform

In October 1999, Philippine Secretary of National Defense (SND) Orlando Mercado requested assistance from US Secretary of Defense William Cohen to upgrade Philippine defense capability.⁵ Cohen and Mercado agreed to a four-year joint US-Philippine assessment of the capability of the AFP to perform its es-

sential missions. Completed in September 2003, the Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) had 10 primary recommendations to address 272 deficiencies.⁶ Many of the findings rated the capability of the AFP to execute its critical missions as poor [(-) *Partial Mission Capable*]. The negative condition of Philippine military capability was largely attributed to systemic institutional deficiencies.

The following month presidents Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and George W. Bush endorsed the findings of the JDA and issued a joint statement committing to an effort to implement its recommendations.⁷ The PDR Program was established, and shortly after, Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&M) were created that served as sail plans for implementing the JDA's 10 key recommendations.

Not surprisingly, efforts to implement the PDR were met with both active and passive resistance. Those with the power to affect change had vested interests in maintaining the status quo, while those who favored change saw it as a futile effort without leadership support. To achieve reform, the Philippine government had to maintain a balance between forcing change and maintaining critical political support from senior military officers.⁸

Anticipating resistance, President Arroyo created the Office of the Undersecretary of Internal Control on 23 September 2003.⁹ Its mandate was to institutionalize reforms in the DND.¹⁰ Subsequent to the president's actions, SND Avelino Cruz created the PDR Board, which defined workflow and decision-making processes and responsibilities of the DND and the AFP.

Initially, the PDR was funded by the Philippine and US governments.¹¹ The Philippines deposited \$28.5 million to a US Treasury account, while the United States contributed \$61 million for the same purpose.¹² From 2007 to 2010, the Congress of the Philippines appropriated an additional 765 million Philippine pesos (PHP) for the PDR. Finally, in 2014, there was another 519 million PHP appropriated.

The PDR spanned through President Arroyo's term and to the end of Pres. Benigno S. Aquino's term in June 2016.¹³ The program's key areas of reform were:

1. Implementation of a policy-driven, multiyear defense planning system;
2. Improve operational and training capacity;
3. Improve logistics capacity;
4. Develop effective personnel management systems;
5. Plan, program, and execute a multiyear capability upgrade program for the AFP;
6. Optimize the defense budget and improve management controls;
7. Create a professional acquisition workforce and establish a centrally managed defense acquisition system;

8. Increase the capability of the AFP to conduct civil-military operations; and,
9. Develop accurate baseline data on critical AFP functional areas.¹⁴

PDR served as the overall framework to redesign management systems and improve the quality of AFP personnel. The program followed a three-phased implementation plan. Projects in each phase were to build upon the success of the preceding phase. This approach is depicted in figure 1.¹⁵ The rest of the article focuses on USG assistance to items 1 and 5–7 above.




Figure 1. Building block approach to PDR implementation

USG's Role in PDR

In addition to funding, another aspect of US support was the employment of subject matter experts (SME) to provide technical expertise and advice on specific programs. Initially, the USG deployed military reservists, who acted as SMEs on a rotational basis. Later on, SMEs from Anteon Corporation contracted to work with DND to address the various areas of concern replaced the reservists. Additionally, a team from Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) worked closely with the DND on a consistent, episodic basis. The IDA team was primarily responsible for assisting the DND to establish an integrated system of management and for progress of PDR Priority Programs 1, and 5–7. USG support to the PDR continued until the departure of the last SMEs in 2012.

The rest of this section will focus on USG support to the following components of the PDR program.

A. Multi-Year Capability Planning System (MYCaPS)

- B. Major Defense Equipment Acquisition Study
- C. Full Cycle of Contemporary Defense System of Management (DSOM)
 - a. Defense Strategic Planning System (DSPS)
 - b. Defense Capability Assessment and Planning System (DCAPS)
 - c. Defense Acquisition System (DAS)
 - d. Defense Resource Management System (DRMS)
- D. Implementing and Institutionalizing (DSOM)

The DOD refers to support for these components as defense institution building activities.¹⁶

Multi-Year Capability Planning System (MYCaPS)

Prior to 2003, the AFP's annual program and budget submissions were developed by the deputy chief of staff for comptrollership on behalf of the chief of staff of the AFP (CSAFP). The program and budget were centrally managed at General Headquarters AFP and major service headquarters. These organizations were the major budget account holders of the AFP.

During budget execution, a certain percentage of the annual appropriations were withheld at headquarters levels to form contingency funds. These centrally managed funds were released at the discretion of military service commanders to support other requirements not foreseen nor specifically included in the regular program budget.

SND Cruz decided to end this practice and issued a directive to institute MYCaPS in August 2004.¹⁷ MYCaPS was supposed to be the DND's overarching system to link defense policy and strategy to force planning, budget planning, and budget execution for the development and maintenance of defense capabilities. Another aim of MYCaPS was to reduce centrally managed funds held at headquarters level.

SMEs from IDA worked with the DND Proper staff to develop the MYCaPS resource management subsystem.¹⁸ This was a medium-term resource-planning process supported by a computer analytical model that related force structure to costs.¹⁹ The MYCaPS process flow and its program structure are depicted in figures 2 and 3, respectively.



Figure 2. MYCaPS process flow




Figure 3. MYCaPS program structure

The resource-management framework provided for centralized defense policy and resource planning and allocation. It included resource managers and budget account holders to facilitate resource planning and decision making as shown in table 1. Having the same person serve as resource manager and budget account holder for both the program and the budget account aligned responsibility, au-

thority, and accountability during programming, budgeting, and spend-plan development as well as during program-performance and budget-execution reviews.

Table 1. MYCaPS major programs and resource managers

Major Programs and Budget Accounts	Resource Managers and Budget Account Holders
1. Land Forces 2. Air Forces 3. Naval Forces 4. Joint C2, Support & Training 5. Central Administration	1. CG, Philippine Army 2. CG, Philippine Air Force 3. FOIC, Philippine Navy 4. VCSAFP 5. USEC for Defense Affairs

The submission of the CSAFP's Programming Advice (CSPA) in December 2004 marked the start of the first MYCaPS cycle. Taking into consideration the unified commanders' operational requirements that were included in the CSPA, the SND issued the first ever Philippine Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).²⁰ The DPG intended to institutionalize a defense planning system driven by policy and strategy and responsive to the priority capability needs of the AFP. The DPG identified seven defense-sector mission areas for the DND to assess, prioritize, and develop capabilities for.²¹ These were:

- A. Internal Security;
- B. Territorial Defense;
- C. Disaster Response;
- D. Support to National Development;
- E. International Defense and Security Engagements;
- F. International Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping Operations;
- and,
- G. Force-level Command and Control, Support, and Training.

The DPG also directed the preparation of a six-year defense program covering 2006–2011. The guidance prioritized readiness of specified units of the AFP to cover shortfalls in fuel and ammunition. The change in how the budget was developed is seen by comparing tables 2 to 3. Table 2 is the old, function-based budget. Table 3 is a program-based budget organized by mission areas.²²

Table 2. Functional-based 2006 DND Budget

PROGRAMS/PROJECTS/ ACTIVITIES	PS	MOOE	CO	TOTAL
A. PROGRAMS	731,344	401,829	50	1,133,223
I. General Admin & Support	3,528,217	1,026,902	10,000	4,565,119
II. Support to Operations	31,585,749	9,161,473	35,874	40,783,096
III. Operations	-	-	-	-
B. PROJECTS	35,845,310	10,590,204	45,924	46,481,438
Locally-Funded Projects	2,290	23,315	-	26,605
TOTAL DND REGULAR BUDGET	35,847,600	10,613,529	45,924	46,507,403

Table 3. Proposed 2006 DND budget by mission area

MISSION AREAS	PS	MOOE	CO	TOTAL
MA1 – Internal Security Operations	22,386,731	5,495,329	328,514	28,210,574
MA2 – Territorial Defense	873,698	244,521	-	1,118,219
MA3 – Disaster Response	175,659	126,585	10	302,254
MA4 – Support to National Development	1,653,252	723,893	3,214	2,380,359
MA5 – International Defense and Security Engagement	-	104,334	-	104,334
MA6 – Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping Operations	-	5,823	-	5,823
MA7 – Force-Level Central Command and Control (C2), Training, and Support	8,847,400	5,348,044	190,036	14,385,480
DND-WIDE TOTAL	33,936,740	12,048,529	521,774	46,507,043

Major Defense Equipment Acquisition Study

Starting in April 2004, the IDA team studied how current acquisition processes could be streamlined. Major equipment acquisition was a circuitous process that took a long time to complete before a decision was made. This process is depicted in figure 4.




Figure 4. Major equipment acquisition process (2004)

The process was driven from the bottom up and did not consider requirements from a joint operational perspective. Moreover, the lifecycle cost of major equipment acquisitions and other capital outlays (e.g., infrastructure) were not included in the decision analysis. As a solution, the IDA team recommended DND develop an integrated management structure with four mutually supporting systems—strategic planning, capability assessment and planning, acquisition planning, and resource management. This eventually came to be known as the DSOM, which is depicted in figure 5.




Figure 5. Defense System of Management (DSOM) processes

Full Cycle of Contemporary Defense System of Management (DSOM)

Acting upon the recommendation of the IDA team, Secretary Cruz issued guidance to implement MYCaPS, Phase II (i.e., DSOM) in November 2006.²³ Two subsequent secretaries—Teodoro and Gazmin—continued support for this effort after SND Cruz left office. Secretary Teodoro issued DSOM II²⁴ in September 2008 and Secretary Gazmin implemented DSOM III in July 2011.²⁵

At the change of each SND, there were two-year-long interregnums in DSOM implementation. These delays were characterized by reorganizations of DND Proper staff under the new SND and institutional resistance to reform efforts hoping to convince each new SND to discontinue DSOM. Figure 6 depicts the implementation schedule.




Figure 6. Evolution of DSOM

Another issue in 2011 was whether the new president would continue the reform effort. Once President Aquino directed full implementation of DSOM,²⁶ SND Gazmin issued a revised circular that:

- Defined four mutually supporting systems and how they are intended to operate (figure 7); and,
- Established policy and assigned functions and responsibilities for DSOM that conform to the organization and internal operating procedures of the DND Proper.²⁷




Figure 7. DSOM processes and products

A key improvement in DSOM III guidance was the definition and goals of different planning horizons. These are shown in figure 8.




Figure 8. DSOM planning horizons

Strategic Planning—DSPS. DSPS identifies core and peripheral security issues of greatest concern and their implications for defense planning and programming. Presidential national security objectives are the bases for the conduct of assessments undertaken by DPSP.

Developed biennially, DSPS assessments describe challenges and identify broad planning options that could be taken to address them. The assessments are used to direct planning and programming toward highest priority challenges. DSPS products and their relationship to the rest of DSOM are depicted in figure 9.




Figure 9. DSPS assessments and products

Defense Capability Assessment and Planning System (DCAPS). DCAPS is a force-planning system. It identifies priority capability gaps in the force structure and analyzes potential changes required to close those gaps. The output of DCAPS is DPG.

The first full implementation of DCAPS was in 2011.²⁸ DCAPS has three major components illustrated by figure 10:

- Senior Leader Roundtable Discussions** on AFP capability and resource-planning challenges;
- AFP Defense Mission Area Assessments:** These evaluate the adequacy of AFP capabilities already in the Defense Program; and
- Capability Planning Proposals:** These define capability gaps in broad operational terms, assess the merits of a range of potential solutions, and propose courses of actions for senior leader consideration and SND decision.




Figure 10. DCAPS process flow

In August 2011, the SND signed a memorandum that contained the findings and conclusions of the assessment teams.²⁹ Included in the memorandum were instructions on how capability gaps and capabilities of declining relevance should be addressed in the 2013–2018 Defense Program.

The assessment teams developed several proposals to address the identified gaps in the SND's memo, and after considering the proposals, the SND issued two Capability Planning Decision Memoranda to address the capability shortfalls.³⁰ Proposals included materiel and nonmateriel approaches. Options requiring materiel solutions were forwarded to the DAS, while those requiring nonmateriel or a combination of both approaches continued to be addressed by the DCAPS process.

Defense Acquisition System (DAS). DAS was designed to evaluate potential options for obtaining major equipment items and for developing fiscally constrained acquisition plans. The DND developed a two-pass assessment technique based on an approach employed by the Australian Department of Defense.³¹

The first pass assesses merits of approaches approved for further study during the DCAPS process and identifies the most-promising approaches.³² The second pass focuses on the most-promising approaches and identifies a limited set of key performance parameters that addresses operational needs and allows suppliers to submit bids. The outcomes of the DAS are documented in an Acquisition Decision Memorandum. Once an acquisition decision is made, procurement and con-

tracting activities formally begin. These activities follow the government-wide procurement procedures mandated by Philippine law. The DAS process is depicted in figure 11.




Figure 11. DAS process flow

Defense Resource Management System (DRMS). DRMS has two components—the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Financial Management System (FMS). These allocate limited resources among competing priorities across the defense sector, and for evaluating results.

The purpose of DRMS is to link policy and planning guidance to spending and performance. To coordinate these efforts, SND issue guidance for all DSOM planning efforts and established the DSOM master planning calendar (figure 12) with specific timelines for PPBS and FMS.³³




Figure 12. DSOM master planning calendar

PPBS's purpose is to provide DND resource managers analytic support for program decisions. The defense program is resource constrained, so the decisions are always about where to allocate resources to build capability in one area at the expense of another. PPBS produces a number of products:

- a) **Defense Program:** Contains the programs of designated resource managers, showing how they intend to achieve the SND's objectives and priorities; and
- b) **Annual Defense Budget Proposal:** Includes the resource managers' proposed budgets and spending plans.

FMS operates continuously throughout each year. It is a basis for controlling spending to ensure resources are applied to their intended purposes. FMS conducts quarterly joint SND–CSAFP performance reviews that assesses results achieved and reports money spent by each major program. The FMS produces a broad range of products:

- a) Annual Spending Plans and Budgets;
- b) Quarterly Program Performance and Budget Execution Reports: Record how resources were spent and what was achieved; and
- c) Budget Realignment Directives: Reallocate funds from one purpose to another to ensure priority performance objectives are attained.

During the FY13–18 planning cycle, the SND noted differences between program proposals and DPG objectives. The Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) 2013–2018, issued in May 2012, reiterated SND's objective to improve the readiness of the AFP operating forces and to merge or deactivate similar-type units with low readiness rates to form more fully capable units.³⁴

Implementing and Institutionalizing DSOM

In July 2011, Secretary Gazmin issued the *Guidance for Implementing and Institutionalizing the Defense System of Management*. The objective of the implementation plan was to establish and institutionalize a management framework and a set of supporting processes and products that incorporate the president's directions and ensure those directions are extended down to the lowest units. The intent was to implement, improve, and institutionalize DSOM in three phases (figure 13).




Figure 13. DSOM implementation phases

At the request of the military assistant for DSOM, the IDA team developed a DSOM training simulation for use by the AFP. The simulation is an educational tool to facilitate the implementation and institutionalization of DSOM.

The IDA team provided assistance to the DND Proper staff in the implementation of Phases I and II (as shown in figure 13) until their last visit in November 2012. The SND's Military Assistant for DSOM coordinated ongoing education and technical assistance throughout the AFP after the end of IDA assistance.³⁵

A result of these process improvements was that funds for the readiness of AFP operating forces increased through the FY16 budget. Further improvement will require the major services to align their programs and budgets with the president's and the SND's guidance. Further, the quality of the proposed budget depends on the quality of financial and physical information that resource managers feed into the process. Their ability to translate plans and budgets into well-designed programs and projects is another challenge that cuts across other reform areas, particularly budget execution and performance management. Finally, the most pronounced gap is the weak technical ability of the major services' staffs to fit the design of their programs to their respective mandates and the medium-term goals of the DND and the security sector.³⁶

Assessment of USG's Role

The US government's support of PDR was shaped by senior officials from the Office of the President of the Philippines, the DND Proper, the AFP, the US Embassy in the Philippines, the DOD, US Pacific Command, and the Defense

Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Support

Originally, IDA was to assist DND officials with the design and implementation of a DRMS and a DAS, which were two components of a multiyear Strategic Defense Planning and Execution System³⁸ concept that DND had developed. Initially, these efforts were sponsored by OSD PA&E and funded by the Defense Resource Management Studies program.

In fact, because the implementation of a strategy-driven, multiyear defense planning system was recognized as the first priority reform effort, the USG offered DRMS assistance even before the mechanism for PDR work has been established. The team operated in accordance with broad mission-type orders and guidelines established by the SND, the CSAFP, and the OSD PA&E DRMS program manager from 2004 to 2010. This arrangement enabled the IDA team to tailor and adapt their assistance throughout their period of work and to accommodate changes in the work plan when the SND changed.

A drawback of this ambiguous management setup was confusion in running PDR POA&Ms 1, 6, 7, and 8, which were covered by the IDA team's work. The PDR Board did not have oversight of IDA assistance, nor did it provide guidance and direction on the execution of these POA&Ms. The situation improved in mid-2011 when the DND Office for Defense Reforms took over responsibility for monitoring all POA&Ms.

For the most part, assistance provided by IDA team was effective because of close coordination between IDA personnel and the SND and his immediate staff.³⁹ Because IDA worked directly under the sponsorship of the SND, the team was accepted by DND staff to include the assistant secretaries of the four core offices central to implementing DSOM.

IDA team members played a behind-the-scenes role in crafting main DSOM documents and their annexes. They recommended the organization of implementing offices from DND Proper, civilian bureaus, and AFP headquarters down to the major services and provided initial training on technical aspects of DSOM. The SND also allowed IDA's analysts to immerse themselves in the processes of the DND and the AFP and to assist members of these organizations to produce key document and products.⁴⁰

Until mid-2011, IDA SMEs would lecture and directly advocate for defense reform to designated action officers, offices, and units throughout the armed forces. In hindsight, this was not very effective—and not only because of obvious differences in language, culture, operational experience, and perspective. IDA's SMEs were teaching the mechanical or day-to-day activities needed to implement a given process without authority to communicate the rationale, fundamen-

tals, and theories of the new systems and processes.⁴¹ This seemingly minor issue contributed to the slow progress of implementation.

More rapid progress began in mid-2011 when Philippine staff and officials took the lead in explaining processes and implementing DSOM. This demonstrated “ownership” resulted in notable progress in a comparatively short period.

IDA assistance focused on the development and implementation of the DRMS, DCAPS, and DAS components of DSOM. Little attention was given to the improvement of the DSPS process. For this, the DND Proper staff was left on its own.⁴² According to former Secretary Teodoro, the Philippines’ strategic planning is mostly reactive to situations on the ground: “We [needed] expertise not only in the DND but also at the Department of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council, as well.”⁴³ Additionally, the DND lacked long-term strategic planning capabilities.⁴⁴

Anteon (General Dynamics) Assistance Effort

In addition to IDA, Anteon International Corporation provided SMEs in support of the PDR. Anteon organized a team responsible for developing and implementing training, operations, logistics, strategic communications, and other programs of interest to both countries.

Anteon SMEs deployed to Manila in January 2005 and operated in accordance with the directions provided by the Undersecretary for PDR and the PDR Board. Anteon also played a leading role in developing the top-level plans the SND subsequently approved for implementing POA&Ms 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, and 10.

On-site Anteon SMEs periodically briefed the ESC on the status of the PDR programs they were supporting and continued to assist DND Proper and AFP officials implement PDR program initiatives. In 2006, General Dynamics Corporation purchased Anteon and performed the mission at reduced levels through 2012. The most-significant recorded result that came out of the General Dynamics effort was the design of the DAS in collaboration with IDA.

Lessons Learned and Conclusion

Though the PDR officially ended in June 2016, a new program, the Philippine Defense Transformation Roadmap (PDTR) 2028 is expected to carry on the institutionalization of the reform measures begun under the PDR.⁴⁵ PDTR is a strategic plan to continuously improve the organization and its ability to perform its mission and roles more effectively and efficiently (see figure 15).



Figure 15. PDTR Roadmap

Originally, the DND began its reforms because its military was not mission capable and because the AFP was a military with a history of continually changing or expanding roles with capability development and modernization policies always playing catch-up in an undisciplined manner. Through the PDR and its follow-on efforts, the Philippine government has brought more discipline to its defense planning and resource allocation processes. Though the nation is under significant resource constraints compared to the United States or most all NATO countries, the PDR produced an ability to make deliberate decisions about risk and tradeoffs given constraints.

Several lessons can be derived from the PDR. First, defense reforms should never lose sight of their primary focus: improvement in combat effectiveness. In the final analysis, the performance of armed forces will be the measurement of reform efforts.

Second, defense reforms need to amplify the concepts of self-identity of the organization, making it clear to its each and every member the answer to the questions: "Who are we?",⁴⁶ "What is our purpose?", and "What do we need?"⁴⁷ The issue has now assumed a critical dimension considering the expanding role of the military in noncore functions. In this connection, one of the targets of future

reform efforts should be doctrines.⁴⁸ Doctrine is significant because it documents the existing operational–tactical proclivities of militaries that may act as barriers to reform, serve as areas for reform, or provide clues to how the military can be agents of reform.

Third, defense reforms are not just improvements of individual components but also are systemic and will affect the whole of armed forces activities. These usually involve changes in doctrine, organization, training, capability development, professional military education, or facility management. Done right, these institutional level processes drive military transformation.

Fourth, defense capability is a concern of the armed forces and civilian policy makers. The latter cannot limit their attention on policy making and leave operational and tactical improvements solely to the military. Civilians have a responsibility to support and oversee the development of armed-forces capability.

Fifth, openness and transparency in dealings with all parties involved in a reform effort is a must.⁴⁹

Sixth, the PDR was supported throughout by a comprehensive strategic communications campaign directed at all levels of the AFP to ensure gains were attributed to the PDR, so service members at all levels believed the PDR was a positive program that would benefit them. A goal of this communication campaign was to create an irreversible trend toward reform that would extend past early stages and into future administrations.

Last, but not the least, is the importance of “ownership” of the reform effort among defense leaders at all levels.⁵⁰ Implementing defense reform should not be limited to the senior leaders but should permeate the mid-grade and junior levels. Common ownership also reflects a unity of purpose among members of the organization that adds to the credibility of the reform effort.

As the DND continues with the PDTR, it is hoped that senior defense leaders and civilian policy makers will not lose sight that the success of their efforts will be ultimately tested in the battlespace. The realization of these efforts cannot be achieved by the DND on its own. The department needs support and cooperation from various sectors of society. Their participation will ensure that strategies are responsive to the needs of the Filipino people. **JIPA**

Notes

1. Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Military Bases, 14 March 1947 as amended by the Bohlen-Serrano Agreement of 1966, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/b-ph-ust000011-0055.pdf>.

2. The two most important were the Naval Base Subic Bay and Naval Air Station Cubi Point in Olongapo City and Clark Air Base in Angeles City. Other ancillary facilities included Camp John Hay in Baguio City, Naval Communications Station San Miguel in Zambales Province, Naval Communication Transmitting Facility Capas, Camp O'Donnell, and Crow Valley Range in Tarlac Province, Wallace Air Station in La Union Province, and Naval Link Station Mount Sta. Rita in Bataan Province.

3. Senate of the Philippines, 8th Congress, Resolution No. 1259, *Non-Concurrence to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America* (Manila: Senate of the Philippines, 1991).

4. Congress of the Philippines, Republic Act No. 7227, *An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes* (Quezon City: Congress of the Philippines, 1992).

5. Anthonette Velasco-Allones, former head executive assistant to Secretary of National Defense Orlando S. Mercado, to the author, Facebook text message, 7 March 2017.

6. Department of National Defense, *2003 Joint Defense Assessment (JDA)* (Quezon City: DND, 2003).

7. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, *Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines* (Washington, DC: White House, 18 October 2003), <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ot/25447.htm>.

8. Though not covered in this article, the Oakwood Mutiny of July 2003 and the findings of the commission that investigated the event rattled senior political leaders in the Philippine government and was another significant impetus to reform.

9. Former chairperson of Presidential Anti-Graft Commission Brig Gen Constancia P. De Guzman, AFP (Reserves), to author, text message, 25 February 2017.

10. Malacañán Palace, Executive Order No. 240, *Mandating the Undersecretary for Internal Control of the Department of Defense to Institutionalize Reforms in the Procurement and Fund Disbursement Systems in the Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines* (Manila: Malacañán, 2003).

11. VADM Ariston Delos Reyes, AFP, retired, interview by author, 20 January 2017.

12. Former Chief of the Office for Defense Reforms, DND Brig Gen Michael Beverlyn J. Manquiquis, AFP, retired, interview by author, Quezon City, 18 January 2017.

13. Rene Acosta, "Gazmin Closes Philippine Defense Reform Program," *Business Mirror*, 23 June 2016, <http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/gazmin-closes-philippine-defense-reform-program/>.

14. Manquiquis interview.

15. The original goal of the PDR program was to complete the effort in 2010, the end of President Arroyo's term.

16. See DOD Directive 5205.82, <http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/520582p.pdf>.

17. Director Dinna Anna Lee Cartujano, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management, DND, interview by author, Quezon City, 19 January 2017; and Department of National Defense, Directive 01-2004, *Multi-Year Capability Planning System* (Quezon City: DND, 2004).

18. *DND Proper* refers to Office of the SND and his undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and directors. The DND by itself refers to the Office of the SND (or DND Proper), as well as the AFP and civilian bureaus such as the Government Arsenal, National Defense College of the Philippine, Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, and Office of Civil Defense.

19. The IDA team developed and provided the software and helped organize the Office of the AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans to administer the model. See IDA publication D-4318, January 2013, *Force Oriented Cost Information System*, for a detailed explanation of the software.

20. Department of National Defense, *Defense Planning Guidance 2006-2011* (Quezon City: DND, 2004).

21. Pursuant to Department Circular No. 3 dated 11 April 2013, "Issuing the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Revised AFP Modernization Act," the seven mission areas were later reduced to four: (1) Territorial Defense, Security, and Stability; (2) Disaster Risk Reduction and Response; (3) International Engagements, Humanitarian Assistance, and Peace Support Operations; and (4) Force Level C2, Support, and Training.

22. The horizontal axis in tables 2 and 3 summarize DND budget account structure. PS = personnel services, MOOE = Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses, and CO = Capital Outlay.

23. Department of National Defense, Circular No. 1, *The Multi-Year Capability Planning System (MYCaPS), Phase II* (Quezon City: DND, 2006).

24. Department of National Defense, Circular No. 05, *The Defense System of Management (DSOM)* (Quezon City: DND, 2008).

25. Department of National Defense, Circular No. 11, *The DND Proper Organization and the Defense System of Management (DSOM)* (Quezon City: DND, 2011).

26. Malacañan Palace, Memorandum Order No. 17, *Directing the Full Implementation of a Defense Reform Program, Institutionalizing the Proper Stewardship of Public Funds by the Department of National Defense (DND) and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and Providing for the Expedient and Effective Investigation and Prosecution of Offending DND and AFP Personnel* (Manila: Malacañan, 2011).

27. Despite the change in administration in 2016, DC 11 is still in effect.

28. Department of National Defense, *2013-2018 Capability Planning Guidance (CPG) for Programs 1-4* (Quezon City: DND, 3 May 2011).

29. Department of National Defense, *Mission Area Assessment Decision Memorandum* (Quezon City: DND, 5 August 2011).

30. Department of National Defense, *Capability Planning Proposal Decision Memorandum* (Quezon City: DND, 23 September 2011); and Department of National Defense, *Capability Planning Decision Memorandum* (Quezon City: DND, 10 October 2011).

31. Tony Kausal and Stefan Markowski, ed., *A Comparison of the Defense Acquisition Systems of Australia, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and the United States* (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management Press, July 2000).

32. For example, if more fire support is the capability gap, then approaches would be ground fires (artillery or mortars) airborne fire (fixed-wing ground attack, rotary-wing ground attack)

missiles, or naval fires. If ground fires is the most promising, then the second pass analyzes artillery and mortar options according to key performance parameters.

33. Department of National Defense, *Guidance for Implementing and Institutionalizing DSOM* (Quezon City: DND, 19 July 2011).

34. Office of the Chief of Staff AFP, *Chief of Staff Program Advice for the Defense Planning Guidance 2013-2018* (Quezon City: GHQ AFP, 22 August 2011); and Department of National Defense, *Program Decision Memorandum 2013-2018* (Quezon City: DND, 28 March 2012).

35. The principal author was SND's Military Assistant for DSOM from 01 April 2011 to 11 August 2015.

36. A still significant gap is the lack of a permanent law that mandates disciplined resource allocation. Cartujano interview.

37. PA&E is the precursor to the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE).

38. Maj Gen Antonio Santos, AFP, retired, interview by author, 19 January 2017.

39. Former Secretary of National Defense Lt Gen Voltaire T. Gazmin, AFP, retired, to author, e-mail, 4 February 2017.

40. Former DSOM Program Manager Maj Gen Jon N. Aying, AFP, to author, e-mail, 7 February 2017.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Former Secretary of National Defense Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., interview by author, Makati City, 22 February 2017.

44. Former DND Assistant Secretary for Plans and Programs Brig Gen Augusto Danilo B. Francia, AFP, retired, interview by author, Taguig City, 24 January 2017.

45. Philippine Defense Transformation Roadmap 2028, <https://www.facebook.com/Defense-TransformationPH/>.

46. Gerald Michaelson and Steven Michaelson, *Sun Tzu for Success* (Avon, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 2003), 50.

47. Francia interview.

48. Delos Reyes interview.

49. Manquiquis interview.

50. Capt Jesus Ricardo Z. Nava, PN; Marife Palencia; and Jaya Arevalo, DND-AFP Central FOCIS Office, interview by author, Quezon City, 24 January 2017.

Commodore Severino Vicente T. David, AFP, retired

Commodore David started his naval career as a cadet at the Philippine Military Academy in 1979, completing a bachelor of science degree (cum laude) in 1983. He was awarded the Philippine Navy saber for graduating number one among those cadets joining the Navy. He attended career courses at the Royal Australian Naval College in Jervis Bay, Australia, in 1983 and at the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1995. He earned a master of arts in military studies degree (with honors in naval warfare) at the American Military University in Manassas, Virginia, in 2000. He was also a fellow in Advanced Security Cooperation studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii, in 2010.

In his 36 years of service, Commodore David commanded five ships. Ashore, he distinguished himself in the fields of planning, programming, and budgeting. He served at the staff of the Flag Officer-in-Command, Philippine Navy, holding various resource-management billets. He was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of the Philippine Fleet in 2004. He occupied a senior joint command billet as Deputy Commander, Eastern Mindanao Command in 2012-2013. He served as Deputy Commander, Philippine Fleet in 2014 and then Commander, Naval Forces Northern Luzon from 2014 until his compulsory retirement in 2015.

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Mr. Taliaferro is a professional research staffer for the Institute for Defense Analyses and retired USAF officer. He specializes in the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation programs and on the development and implementation of methods to build institutional capacity that enable effective management of armed forces by defense ministries and headquarters staff. During a 25-year Air Force career, he served in numerous HQ USAF positions, working as a weapon system cost analyst and budget planner. An expert in security cooperation policy and execution, Mr. Taliaferro served the Deputy Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs for 13 years, managing major weapon system sales and system upgrades between the United States and Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. One of the first Airmen selected for specific language training during the first efforts to reinvigorate the USAF Foreign Area Officer program in the late 1990s, he learned Farsi and became an acknowledged expert on Afghanistan. In addition to numerous TDY trips to Afghanistan, he twice deployed to serve in by-name-request positions, serving as the deputy political advisor to the ISAF commander (2007) and as a staff member of the political-military section at the US embassy in Kabul (2010). His additional government experience includes time served as a national security policy advisor to a member of the US House Armed Services Committee and as an executive support officer to the Secretary of Defense from 2000 to 2003. Mr. Taliaferro's private-sector experience includes product management, marketing, and business development, working for both Ethicon Products (a Johnson & Johnson company) and Aesculap North America. He received his BS from the USAF Academy in 1993 and his MBA from St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas, in 1999.

The Globalized System, Air and Space Power, and the Geostrategic Value of Maritime Small and Middle Powers in Asia

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The question is not whether air strategy, the air domain, and air technologies can make island and peninsular nations such as Sri Lanka, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and so forth specifically of strategic value all on their own. Rather, the question is why and how these smaller nations can utilize their “buffered” geostrategic position with an “assist” from air and space power alike, particularly in the form of real-time command-and-control (C2) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities linked or even shared across sovereign boundaries. To be specific, this article defines a nation as *buffered* geopolitically if it is removed from immediate land invasion geographically while also being politically and economically independent from any one “power pole” in foreign diplomacy, economic contacts, and, not least in a globalized world, transnational social networks. In turn, latent potentialities for an outsized role in geopolitics by powers from South Korea to Singapore to Sri Lanka are strongly linked to the features of the twenty-first-century era of interstate relations, particularly its increasingly *multipolar or multi-nodal nature*, which differs markedly from features and operation of the earlier Cold War system. The “fragmented,” often practically nonaligned, nature of such powers creates an international dynamic that air and space power can further build upon for purposes of overall system security, stability, prosperity, and, in short, a balance of interests as well as power between competitive rising powers in and beyond Asia.

This article argues that the globalized order, together with the paradoxically increasing role of disparate national ethnic identities, or the “cultural nation”

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within the “state,” have created a global and regional geopolitical reality of fragmented cooperation and competition that inherently gives “buffered maritime powers” outsized leverage across all instruments of power. In part, we argue this is because, with domestic identities still mattering as much as globalized cosmopolitanism (cooperative win-win ties) in the stability and prosperity of the “nation-state,” we now have a somewhat paradoxical reality. First, great powers must still create and field military-expeditionary capabilities for deterrence of each other, but, second, a greater “gap” now exists than ever before between mixed-interest, often mutual-sum policy goals at the grand-strategic level of relations and the zero-sum, destructive nature of military force at the tactical level of purely military objectives.

Of particular importance to mitigation of man-made and natural disasters, monitoring of ocean pollution and the environment generally, and curbing the illicit sides of globalization, will be the willingness and ability of buffered maritime powers to contribute singly and in coalitions to creating a *common operating picture* via much more intensive C2 and ISR networks in the global commons. We especially emphasize ISR and C2 capacities because the core of *all* potential civilian, economic, and military missions—cooperative or competitive with other states—is *on-time information acquisition and communication*, including as well *information processing, interpretation, and exploitation*. Capabilities to see, track, fix, and identify actors and platforms of both licit and illicit natures, including commercial and military activities alike, could support sustainment of the global commons via enforcement of ocean law and curbing of illicit trafficking of all kinds, while lending far more efficiency to combined regional and sub-regional efforts to mitigate disaster damage. The latter in particular is something that is already on the rapid uptick, due unfortunately to the quickly unreeling effects of climate change. Our prescriptions are in turn as much “aerospace” as “air” strategy precisely because the future is one of using common software and hardware to *link air assets with low Earth orbit (LEOSAT) networks*, thus, even better leveraging the “geostrategic” importance of a small or middle maritime power’s dual-use air platforms.

While nations such as Sri Lanka have already gone significantly down the road of providing large airlift services for UN peace and other emergency operations, we recommend that a core part of maritime small and middle powers’ air strategies be nationally and cooperatively devoted to the matching of ISR and C2 software and hardware to airframes. This would consist of not just purely defense or purely military efforts but also the use of economic diplomacy to foster and cement links to inevitably increasing dual-use imaging and communications capabilities in commercial low Earth orbit (LEO) over the next 20 years. In this

regard, air enterprise development (AED) efforts would best be coordinated very closely with the commercial sector and with the militaries of neighboring small and middle maritime states so as to have maximum technical interoperability.

The Great Power Dilemma: Mixed Interests in a Globalized World

For great powers, the new globalized order confuses high policy diplomacy and tactical planning for forces alike, constraining and burdening the ability to arrive at a rational military-technical definition of a *balance of power* in military planning terms. This is because, as Carl von Clausewitz noted early on, the logics of “mixed relationships” at a strategic level of interests do not blend all that well with the zero-sum threat and application of force at the truly tactical level of planned, concrete engagements and combat.¹ The tactical level of combat has, as he described, a “total” and brutal character: overthrowing the opponent’s will through direct destruction and killing (or planning and threatening thereof as part of deterrence in peacetime). Without such tactical equipping, training, and deploying, any latent sovereign threats of a deterrent nature—made to protect a notional balance of power and balance of interests—lack credibility because they rest upon vague and diffuse, unclear means. One must be specific at the tactical level of combat—in other words, to be capable and credible at a strategic level with the military instrument.² Yet, in a larger mixed environment of competing and overlapping interests as exists today, one does not typically harbor zero-sum intent, motivations, and objectives at a strategic or grand-strategic level. Indeed, tactical-level, completely coercive threats are meant to buttress, paradoxically, highly stable and usually cooperative, mutual-sum relations in commerce, culture, and technology sharing, even if “relative advantage” still plays a role in defining an international pecking order.

In short, four factors intersect or interlink to create a geostrategic role for maritime powers that are buffered entirely by ocean or by some combination of ocean and land from the societies, economies, and military combined armed forces of large continental powers:

1. The realities of continued sociopolitical (geopolitical) fragmentation at the level of domestic national identities that argues against traditional alliance behaviors by middle and small powers, even as great powers seek friends to shore up their position and deny spheres of influence to the other;
2. The fact that great powers (and smaller powers) are rarely truly “enemies” anymore but rather a complex combination of cooperative mutual benefit and zero-sum competitive distrust, the former based on dense

transnational network ties and the latter on competing cultural identities or political ideologies;

3. The fact that unique national identities still create a continued need for credible and capable military power projection (i.e., deterrent threats); and yet
4. The increasing distance between *grand-strategic cooperative goals in the global economy* and the *harsh realities of promised tactical military destruction* that underlies credible deterrence, a “gap” created by unprecedented cooperation in nonmilitary areas alongside the high “collateral costs” of any conflict in a globalized setting of socioeconomic interlinkages.

All such factors combine to create a very specific “geopolitical profile” for buffered maritime powers (both small and middle powers), which the special attributes of airpower may especially increase or expand upon, if utilized wisely. Namely, such capacities allow small and middle maritime nations who are not physically abutting a great power to pursue policies of opportunistic, fluid, and highly symbolic “limited alignments” to signal implicit approval or disapproval of a larger power’s actions across the instruments of power.³ In doing this balancing act—a balance of *interests* as much as power per se—maritime powers can gain a reputation as a responsible global actor in providing “global public goods,” thereby raising their status and reputation in global forums while also providing an indirect representation of policy stances in one direction or another—whether in peacekeeping, disaster relief, curbing illicit trafficking, latent conventional deterrence, or environmental monitoring and mitigation.

This reality increasingly seems unique to the twenty-first-century globalized system—a qualitative difference in global and regional geopolitics genuinely not seen in this exact form in earlier “systems” of great, middle, and small power interactions. We still live in a world where nations jealously guard their core ethno-political identities with weapons, even as they cannot imagine using those weapons to profitable purpose in all-out war in a globalized socioeconomic environment, despite the continuing need for sovereign deterrence of predation from rival ethnic cultures. We also live in a world where paradoxically, to protect, grow, and strengthen one’s internal political stability, wealth, and ultimately unique civic nationalist identity—that is, to increase one’s “sovereign autonomy”—one must simultaneously allow extremely interventionist, anti-sovereign transnational ties in the areas of commerce, manufacturing, direct investment, and technology sharing.

This yin-yang tension between striving to balance and deter while avoiding—at all costs—upsetting the globalized appplecart creates a rather large gap between

the logic of cosmopolitan socioeconomic ties, on one hand, and the credible threat of tactical combat capabilities and concrete battle planning, on the other hand. Moreover, it is precisely the gray-area, behavioral balancing act of buffered maritime powers that will increasingly aid regional and global stability by filling this gap between strategy and tactics and nonmilitary and military instruments, practically and symbolically. Asian maritime powers seem especially adept at accepting such complexities, organically blending mutual-sum concerns about *maintaining domestic social order and economic development* with harder-edged *interstate and transnational security issues*. In addition, they do so in ways that do not slavishly follow a highly legalized, multilateral “sphere” of interactions that looks the same across spans of time, unaffected by *Realpolitik* bilateral interests and deals.⁴

For instance, in this regard, we judge it highly unlikely that Sri Lanka’s patterns of strategic relationships across the instruments of national power will dramatically differ from other small and middle maritime powers in South or Southeast Asia, which in turn do not differ in geopolitical behaviors as much as might be thought in comparison with Taiwan and South Korea further north. As broadly with the highly fragmented ethnic makeup of Malaysia and Indonesia, Sri Lanka is indeed still very much consolidating a new “civic” national identity beyond rancorous ethnoreligious divisions that defined a decades-long insurgency/counter-insurgency. This developmental task—involving not just economics but tough identity schisms and different rates of poverty—includes evolving tensions with the United Nations over Colombo’s halting institutionalization and implementation of a required “transitional justice” framework for reintegrating minorities, while also reforming police and paramilitary forces to better reflect a neutral rule of law, due process, and respect for individual rights.⁵ As it happens, these issues are entirely familiar to most Southeast Asian states—and even to some degree a South Korean populace still riven by left-right ideological schisms and human rights “skeletons in the closet” from the authoritarian Cold War years. These domestic patterns are not *sui generis* but are defining features of most small and middle powers in the Indo-Pacific arc. This means that powers from Sri Lanka all the way to South Korea may leverage and benefit from a unique role for middle powers and small island nations alike in symbolically undertaking limited alignments, politically and technologically, to aid contending stronger powers in creating a diffuse, hard-to-measure “balance of power and interests” that upholds the global and regional commons overall. Buffered maritime nations can do this using “soft-power balancing” (economics) and/or *military instruments in dual-use purposes* that simultaneously “signal” a latent ability to support another great power’s deterrent threats while more explicitly and publicly providing common security goods on nontraditional issues in the global and regional commons.

The Special Role for Air and Space Power in Leveraging the Strategic Potential of Buffered Maritime Powers

First, it is important to define what we mean by buffered, in part by giving an instance of its negative absence: The Chinese 1979 invasion of Vietnam. Our recommendations emphasize nations that have the geopolitical quality of “near distance.” This allows a small or middle power to leverage regional efficiencies, while maintaining some *choice* in free market network interactions at interstate and especially transnational (social) levels—at the same time enjoying latent geographic protection, whether by water alone *or some combination of both land and water*, from the nascent threats of a great power’s armed forces. We judge that the *absence of* direct, dense, inter-societal economic and human networks *across adjoining borders*, alongside the *absence of* the easy ability of land power (infantry, tanks, artillery) to invade, creates a de facto “safe space” that allows such maritime powers to have relative freedom of choice at strategic-elite levels of decision making. This is due to a much greater degree of *societal autonomy* in growing their own independent identity and because of a lack of an ever-present shadow or threat of invasion.

Witness, for instance, the strong latent threat of invasion still pressing upon the minds of Vietnamese political and military elites due to China’s costly, highly attritional, yet ultimately successful effort in 1979 to “teach Vietnam a lesson.” The largely punitive strike into the heart of Vietnam’s northern areas, including taking of several urban areas and latent threatening of the political capital—was enabled by the ease of traversing tens of thousands of combined-arms troops, tanks, artillery, and supporting logistics, across connected land.⁶ In contrast to such examples, landing ferries can be sunk or repulsed far more easily than a sudden landed assault can be stopped—a fact again born by Russia’s eventual conventional operations in Eastern Ukraine recently. Indeed, consider India’s armored blitz into East Pakistan in 1971 and creation of the state of Bangladesh, followed since by several tense politico-military crises involving at times up to 500,000 troops apiece in combined armored formations, staring at each other across porous borders ripe for tank and air force assaults.⁷ Consider also North Korea’s surprise blitz in 1950 that pushed US and South Korean combined forces almost into the sea at the southern tip of the peninsula; and of course Saddam Hussein’s rapid takeover of Kuwait City in 1990. To live in joined proximity to an army with thousands of artillery, infantry units, special forces battalions, tanks, and supporting short-range aircraft is to live in a virtual shadow of latent threat.⁸

This is something that large stretches of land and water help with greatly, even in the case of airpower, which against distant targets and with no landed occupation underneath *must play a sole and unaided role* with more committed

long-range aircraft *with only temporary and fleeting “presence” in the skies* (that is, ubiquity of flight sorties, but without true “persistence”).⁹ This is a lesson the Germans ruefully learned in trying to nullify the United Kingdom’s defenses with bomber and fighter sorties alone in the Battle of Britain.

In regard to the geopolitical position of buffered maritime powers, airpower’s range, speed, overhead observation, capacity for surprise, mobility in the form of both flexible dispersal and flexible concentration, and ability to be networked with land and air¹⁰ are, therefore, far more helpful in an island nation’s attempts to provide partial local balances of power and to take part in regional and global public goods provision than it is helpful to a landed great power to invade or threaten. The former is a positive contribution with virtually little political friction to get in the way, and no hard military opposition. The latter experiences gigantic political frictions (turning other maritime nations against the would-be invader) and severe military frictions for the great power because of the high likelihood of bloody, attritional homeland defense efforts by all branches of a defending maritime power’s military and society (the latter being important in our “age of nationalism,” involving strong ethno-nationalist connections to “homeland territory”). If a nation is buffered in the way defined here, this makes for a relative lack of threat that can then be combined with positive airpower contributions to “international civil society,” in turn giving buffered maritime nations outsized geopolitical weight with comparatively little cost in terms of their own core societies’ physical security—and indeed with increases in prosperity.

In leveraging this geopolitical position, airpower has arguably more relevance than any other military arm, given its efficiency compared to trying to field a sizable navy. First, airpower can offer much greater speed than sea or land domains, regardless of aircraft used. Moreover, depending on construction of makeshift or permanent airstrips in remote areas of islands or continental land, air assets can “touch down” in extremely hard-to-access areas denied to sea instruments that require ports or land transport that requires passable roads. Both of the latter are often notably beyond the reach of poorer nations or gigantic archipelagic nations such as Indonesia, where distant roads, constantly maintained in adverse jungle climates, may not be practicable for normal day-to-day affairs. Witness, for instance, the incredible dependence of Sri Lanka even in its own domestic sphere of society and economy on helicopters and aircraft to traverse complex, rough terrain of water, mountains, jungles, and fields, given still a relative lack of well-maintained and safe roadways in some areas beyond Colombo. This makes airpower especially useful for emergency response to man-made or natural disasters. Second, airpower is “flexible” in mass or concentration in terms of disparate forces being able to unite at a desired time and place in a final “mass point” of desired size

and lethality (if in military operations). That is, air travel is not tied utterly to the famous “lines of communication” that dominate land features and even, due to its utter vastness and the comparative slowness of ocean vessels, the world’s oceans and bays. While sea power theorists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett have made much of 100-percent flexibility in directional water travel,¹¹ in fact, commercial traffic is limited by cost and timeliness to certain well-known routes—and even military travel is hardly instant, therefore, again calling for picking a subset of seemingly infinite possibilities of ingress and egress. This is where the first factor, “speed,” comes in, combining with flexible traversal, to allow either humanitarian or military force concentration in time and place. Third, important given that large distances are often involved, air engines have only become increasingly more efficient, with today’s commercial Boeing 737s and 787s replacing gigantic 747s and even, seemingly, the new gigantic super Airbus, due to the former’s ability now to save up to one-third over old rates on fuel usage along with higher speed in delivering passengers.¹² Of course, long-range distance, tied to speed, tied to flexible traversal, all speak to delivering of lethal military effects—or, beneficial ISR—in a timely basis. In addition, this brings up another core characteristic: superior overhead observation of large swaths of the Earth from what Colin Gray has called “the overhead flank,” in which the greater the height, the more observed.¹³ Because of all of these innate qualities of airpower, dual-use air forces particularly offer opportunities in increasing three-dimensional awareness of the ocean, air, land, and space, or combined maritime environment, in ways that could contribute to deterrent and denial operations over key lines of communication.



Photo courtesy of the Sri Lankan Air Force

Figure 1. The Sri Lankan Air Force operates a commercial arm, Helitours. The operation uses rotary and fixed-wing aircraft not required for military use. It is currently the second-largest airline in Sri Lanka.

The Role of a Holistic Air Strategy: Pursuing Dual-Purpose AED

Generally speaking, because of all of the above characteristics, AED serves to develop a nation's globalized economic and commercial capacities and contribute to civilian peaceful operations. For instance, in regard to the domestic side,

Air Forces can be used for national development. AF engineers can build aviation hubs connecting a local economy to a global economy . . . [and in doing so], increase its global network of “well-wishers,” that is, stakeholders of distant powers. AF pilots can feed local civil aviation market—providing highly qualified, professional, and safety-conscious pilots. Air Forces can extend state reach into under-governed areas, providing medicine, government services, and incident awareness. Aircraft operations begin a virtuous cycle of increased technical competence, seeding the economy for other things. . . . Modern airports enable a nation faced with a disaster to rapidly receive foreign assistance when overwhelmed.¹⁴

These domestic benefits, in turn, segue into the international arena, because “aircraft purchases and joint training are multiyear commitments that enable persistent relationships and enlarge the number of stakeholders and well-wishers.”¹⁵ And on the international side, already it is clear that the preferred “indirect” form of military balancing lies not *primarily* in threats, combat, and hard coercion but rather in the form of peaceful, nondestructive “military engagements” at a tactical level that serve operational campaign objectives relating to governance and management of the global maritime commons. Specifically, *management of illicit globalization and its assorted ills*, or “nontraditional threats,” alongside smooth and trusted functioning of lines of communication, weather prediction, and disaster mitigation, will be the arena in which great powers “court” smaller powers and cooperate with geopolitically neutral states to “project power” toward nonviolent goals. This will not be primarily accomplished via hard and fast military alliances grounded in block-based deterrent threats but rather employment of dual-use (military-civilian) instruments, including especially the military mission of ISR to create a common operating picture. This is particularly needed for clamping down on the malicious sides of globalization such as illicit trafficking in humans, weapons, and drugs, alongside (hopefully, eventually) greater efforts to manage and prevent further massive degradation of the biosphere due to a burgeoning black market industry in overfishing, illicit forest cutting and burning, illegal poaching, and illicit industrial and private pollution of waterways and oceans.¹⁶

Schriever Scholar team member and Air Command and Staff College instructor Lt Col Pete Garretson has argued, that air forces can internationally

- Convey the status of a modern technological nation, [in which] the ability to sortie or provide forces externally establishes a nation as a potential coalition member while promoting it to middle-power status;
- Pursue armament not to contest a larger power directly, but to force that larger power to acknowledge that the smaller power could (on their own or in concert with others) create a problem, and therefore must be mollified with additional foreign aid of various kinds;
- Enable a small state to offer assistance in periods of disaster in their broader neighborhood, creating long-term good will, increasing the likelihood that they will be perceived as a “responsible actor” and a “capable actor,” leading to being invited to other rulemaking tables on global financial, trade, and new technological issues;
- Constitute highly agile, highly visible tools to signal alignment or non-alignment with major powers or coalitions (i.e., “Which team am I with” / “who am I standing beside”—or, giving the cold shoulder)—allowing a small power to communicate its pleasure or displeasure with another’s international behavior;
- Participate in joint exercises, deployments, and peacekeeping operations in ways that signal a small state’s reliability, while conversely allowing them to confer or deny legitimacy to the organizer of those activities.¹⁷

In this regard, Sri Lanka’s global peacekeeping and regional operations, such as frequent transport of peacekeeping contingents, disaster assistance, and technical parts to Nepal, Mali, South Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic, have already created an emerging “international effect.” Such operations in general “increase visibility and thus status . . . signaling a willingness and competency to be part of global enforcement of norms—something that is widely observed and says a lot about national competency and desirability as a partner or potential opponent” in the great-power deterrent equation.¹⁸

However, why should great powers care, given their superior power projection in cooperative and competitive spheres of economic and military activities? Mort Rolleston and Pete Garretson have summarized this from the opposite angle of a reigning great power’s dilemma, namely, finite resources and a confusing patchwork of sovereign air-space boundaries. This dilemma challenges global commitments: “The United States cannot effectively respond to every crisis in the world and needs the help of capable PNs [partner nations] that can contribute aviation

resources (such as airlift) to provide rapid assistance. . . . Further], neither the United States nor the international community can rapidly respond to crises if they fail to build and maintain overflight rights for the necessary route structures.”¹⁹ Thus again, domestic AED efforts can segue organically into aid for international efforts to sustain the prosperity and rule of law in the global commons—as well as diplomatic bargaining for crisis contingency planning such as air route requirements.

The Rising Importance of Globalized Command and Control and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

The core of *all* potential civilian, economic, and military missions—cooperative or competitive with other states—will innately involve information acquisition, processing, delivery, interpretation, and exploitation. In addition, our prescriptions in this regard are as much *aerospace* as *air* strategy, precisely because the future is one of *linking air assets with LEO satellite imaging and communications networks now on the cusp of rapid commercial proliferation*.

Recall what Colin Gray had to say about airpower’s unique capabilities of observation from “the overhead flank.”²⁰ While Sri Lanka has already gone significantly down the road of providing large airlift services for UN peace and other emergency operations, we recommend that a core part of Sri Lanka’s and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) island states’ air strategies be nationally and cooperatively devoted to the matching of ISR and C2 software and hardware to airframes. Such capabilities to see, track, fix, and identify actors and platforms of licit and illicit natures, including commercial and military activities, could support sustainment of the global commons via enforcement of ocean law and curbing of illicit trafficking of all kinds. At the same time, these capabilities could lend far more efficiency to combined regional and sub-regional efforts to mitigate disaster damage—*something that is already on the rapid uptick*, due unfortunately to the quickly unreeling effects of climate change.²¹ Finally, if needed, ISR alone and in flexible multinational combinations could enable flexible deterrence, whether that deterrence helps the nation itself, the interests of a coalition of small- and middle-power regional states, or the larger global deterrence efforts of an extraregional, supportive major power as needed.

In this regard, the growth of a LEO “revolution” in dual-use satellites is on the cusp of exponential expansion, given SpaceX’s demonstrated abilities to lower the most expensive component of satellites—the launching away from Earth’s gravity—via reuse of launchers and engines. Such efforts are complemented by smaller-scale efforts at quick, repeated launches by companies such as Rocket

Lab, Virgin Orbit, Athena (a Lockheed Martin spinoff), and Orbital ATK. There are also corresponding, complementary plans by multiple-launch companies to house multiple microsatellites in ever-larger nose cones on larger launchers, alongside continued downsizing in electronics and software that allow smaller satellite size (with less weight) with greater data throughput, with growing 3D printing usage to further drive costs down in this area.²² These globalized space and information technology trend lines are important because of the numbers of small satellites needed to escape the great powers' traditional monopolization of space-based ISR and C2. Numbers are extremely important in LEO, which is far cheaper for placement of satellites than very distant geosynchronous orbit (thus, more commercially realistic). Whereas a GEOSAT can observe up to one-third of the Earth's surface due to distance and breadth of vision, LEOSATs speed at thousands of miles per hour across different orbits against the natural rotation of the Earth, giving very low relative pass-over time to a given spot of terrain on Earth. Thus, greater numbers are needed to correct for this deficiency to provide 24/7 reliable coverage, and not just numbers, but engineering of hardware and software to "interlink" either in space or with ground terminals and back to space, to offer a "GEO-like" ISR function on a truly flexible basis.²³

All of this matters for buffered maritime small and middle powers because such globally interdependent orbits and capabilities are far safer from malicious offensive threats, as satellites that are "stationary" in space relative to a fixed point of the Earth in GEO orbits *are now nascently being targeted by the great powers, against each other*. This evolving coercive factor is abetted by the oft purely military aspects of such GEO imaging and communication satellites, untied to the global commons, something that increases the likelihood of their selective destruction with low collateral costs to the power using offensive means.²⁴

With enough dual-use LEO satellites in the right orbits, space ISR and C2 provides far more reliable "presence" and "persistence" compared to the "brevity of presence," as put by Colin Gray, which dogs aerial attempts at "control of the air"—which again loops back to high expense if one wants to use continual sorties to create an artificial "virtual persistence" in the air domain.²⁵ Finally, weather does not burden the orbital paths of satellites (although space debris does). Overall, space assets offer instantaneous acquisition of radio and light signals (imaging in infrared or electro-optical or multispectral radio-wave interception); improved onboard processing of such signals with advanced software; and increasingly flexible crosshatching of communications to either other linked satellites and/or to ground platforms, the latter of which then can again beam signals back to another passing satellite, and so on.

Therefore, one key recommendation is for all Asian middle and small powers, and particularly island powers of all sizes, to pursue assiduously win-win, mutual-sum contacts with each other's government ministries. Similar arrangements should be fostered with new globalized start-ups, industry conglomerates, and the evolving launch, telecom, and imaging consortiums in the business world (and sympathetic government agencies in these companies' home countries, such as the US Department of Commerce).²⁶ Such studious linkages would maximize synergies early on via "baking in" common hardware and software of commercial companies and military air establishments.

Creating "Air Diplomacy" in Relationships across Maritime Sub-regions in Asia

We in particular argue for buffered maritime powers to synergize technological acquisitions and procurements toward the goal of a common ISR operating picture that involves not only "maritime domain awareness" but rather true multi-domain awareness based upon aerospace assets. At the very least, such countries should coordinate and synergize doctrine, tactics, procedures, and operational exercises for combating nontraditional threats and sustaining the global commons via a common information network or "infosphere." The goal would be to create *latent foundational conditions* through studious AED programs that would allow for beneficial "coalitions of the willing and able" in ISR and C2 operational missions in the air domain when disasters and interstate conflicts alike arise, via shared technical interoperability alongside shared tactics and procedures.

Southeast Asian states in particular will resist such intensive operational cooperation. However, there are promising signs that Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines are leading sub-regional efforts to start thinking along the lines of something the US Navy has been pushing off and on, increasingly in multilateral naval symposia: the idea of maritime powers to actually cooperate, at an operational military level with dual-use assets, to create a "*common operating picture*" (*ISR footprint*) in support of the maritime cooperative order, via achieving cooperatively "maritime-domain awareness."²⁷ Currently, such symposia, workshops, and exercises have largely supported gaming exercises that utilize principally Singapore as a politico-military hub via the latter's Information Fusion Center, using in turn a US-aided common communication network, the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), as well separate maritime operations centers (MOC) in Brunei, the Philippines, and Thailand.²⁸ In our view, maritime small and middle powers could particularly utilize airpower to do this "on the cheap" via leveraging commercial off-the-shelf

technologies wherever possible. As argued in a recent thesis by two US Naval Postgraduate School student officers entitled “A Concept of Operations for an Unclassified Common Operational Picture in Support of Maritime Domain Awareness”:

The maritime domain is an area of significant strategic concern to the United States and its allies. When the need arises, U.S. forces are able to detect and monitor vessels of interest (VOIs) in support of maritime interests throughout the world. However, current maritime domain awareness (MDA) processes lack the ability to provide actionable information in a timely and usable manner. Advances in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) technology—particularly unclassified data sources, analytical processes and tools—available in the commercial sector could be leveraged to make MDA data more accessible and productive.²⁹

All of this said, I am not, as a Western author, calling for a copying of US–Western “allied” practices of a value-based character; this would be extremely contrary to the systemic and regional realities outlined in this article. Rather, “slight outsiders” such as Sri Lanka—a similarly buffered maritime state external to Southeast Asia—should stubbornly pursue, even if diplomatically difficult, *dual-use, civilian–military aerial cooperation with the air forces of “core” ASEAN states*, particularly technology leader Singapore, in providing *a common, coordinated, and technically interoperable ISR and C2 mapping of the maritime terrain from Oman to the Philippines*, notably separate from any great power. The point would be to avoid de facto technological and geopolitical dominance of crucial energy and sea-lanes by either India, China, or, yes, the United States—even with India, for instance, owning the Andaman and Nicobar Islands near the mouth of the Malacca Straits.

Of course, because of the latter political-geographic reality just outside the Malacca Straits’ western entrance, this would likely therefore require similar coordination, doctrinally and technically, with a rising India. However, such cooperation would not represent a “sphere” for India, which has its own pretensions to a morally exceptional great-power role,³⁰ including increasing geostrategic frictions with Beijing.³¹ In this regard, cooperation with Australia, which has excellent relations with Beijing, has less “irons in the fire” in this sensitive maritime area, and avoids a nationalistic version of great-power status,³² might be smart from both a symbolic and technological perspective. Such “information operations and missions,” whether in training and equipping, doctrine, technological procurement and common capabilities, and even eventually common exercises, could increase the multilateral power of highly similar maritime nations outside the rarified,

highly issue-prescribed boundaries of ASEAN forums. That is, such efforts would hopefully go beyond the Southeast Asian straitjacket of either strict bilateralism or diffuse, lowest-common-denominator, military-constrained multilateral cooperation. As such, it would be of incredible value both to sustainment of the commons and in leveraging the geostrategic power of buffered maritime nations.

Conclusion

In sum, countries such as Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and so forth should reach out to each other across geopolitical sub-regions in Asia, particularly if they share geopolitical distance from the larger societies and combined-forces militaries (including short-range air forces) of any one great-power pole. By *reaching out*, I mean purposeful synergizing of technological acquisitions and procurements toward the goal of a common ISR operating picture that involves not only maritime-domain awareness but rather true multi-domain awareness based upon aerospace assets. Such buffered maritime powers should slowly, progressively synergize doctrine, tactics, procedures, and operational exercises for combating nontraditional threats via a common information network or infosphere. The goal would be to create *latent foundational conditions* through studious AED programs that would allow for beneficial coalitions of the willing and able in ISR and C2 operational missions in the air domain when disasters and interstate conflicts alike arise, via shared technical interoperability alongside shared tactics and procedures. The more that such nations can collaborate on hardware, software, and air-platform capabilities in covering areas regardless of great-power capacities, the more they can sustain the cooperative aspects of globalization while being flexible pivot powers in contributing to a multipolar balance of interests. JIPA

Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 579–80 and 603–4.
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3. Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil, “China’s Rise through the Prism of Middle Powers,” in *Middle Powers and the Rise of China*, ed. Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 2–15.
4. J. N. Mak, “Malaysian Defense and Security Cooperation: Coming Out of the Closet,” 127–53, and Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia and Regional Security: The Quest for Cooperative Security,” 71–87, in *Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order*, ed. Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). See particularly Mak, 128–29 and Sukma, 74–81.
5. Kelli Muddell, “Divided by Years of Conflict,” *International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)*, 24 July 2017, <https://www.ictj.org/news/sri-lanka-justice-not-fulfilled>.
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7. Robert Citino, *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 188–212; and Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, “The 2000–2001 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” *Security Studies* 14, no. 2 (2005): 290–324.

8. This basic logic is laid out in Julian Corbett, *Principles of Maritime Strategy*, (1911; repr., Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004), 49–55; and Clausewitz, *op cit.*, 90 and 99. (Author’s note: Clausewitz is assuming in these pages two landed neighbors); going beyond pure logic: historically, the tragedy of the geographic position of the “Low Countries” of Belgium and Holland (Netherlands), and France and Germany acting both through the Low Countries and directly against each other, is shown in the failure for peacekeeping and arms control to account for de facto landed invasion threats from 1919–1939, and in the onset of World War II. See *inter alia* Melvyn Leffler, *The Elusive Quest: America’s Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919–1933* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); and Ernest R. May, *Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000).

9. Colin Gray, *Explorations in Strategy* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 1996), 73–77.

10. *Ibid.*, 67–72.

11. Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971, 1986); and Corbett, *Principles of Maritime Strategy*, 49–55.

12. Ashley Halsey III, “Is the Airbus 380 the Future of Air Travel or a Relic of the Past?,” *Washington Post*, 19 August 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/is-the-airbus-380-the-future-of-air-travel-or-a-relic-of-the-past/2018/08/19/d98bae82-539f-11e8-9c91-7dab596e8252_story.html?utm_term=.89c923849692.

13. These attributes are taken from Colin Gray, *Explorations in Strategy*, 67–72; and J. C. Slessor, *Air Power and Armies* (1936; repr., Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2009), 1–10.

14. Lt Col Peter Garretson, interview by the author, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama, 6 March 2018.

15. *Ibid.*

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23. See, for instance, one commercial-academic venture to create better inter-linkage and onward propagation of data acquired by LEO sensors in Caleb Henry, “Bridgesat Plans Optical Network.”

24. Indirectly, this is the underlying concern and subject of an unclassified web report on a series of sensitive US “space situational awareness” assets being deployed to near-GEO orbits to observe in real time—including repositioning to look “up close”—satellites of competitors that seem to have their own maneuvering or “kinetic” capabilities against existing US C4ISR assets. For instance, the USAF has had to increase budgets and capacities of the 1st Space Operations Squadron (1 SOPS), 50th Space Wing, Schriever AFB, Colorado, to monitor in real time the GEO belt for increased “space situational awareness.” It has had to do this from low-earth orbit (pointed outwards towards GEO) and via near-GEO satellites that now uniquely can maneuver and reposition to “visit” and loiter around suspicious, possibly threatening competitor’s satellites, which themselves may possibly be targeting US crucial GEO C4ISR military satellites for disabling in a crisis, affecting US communications of voice and imagery data from the Indo-Pacific region to the continental US command authorities. See “GSSAP Satellite Overview,” *Spaceflight 101.com*, 12 September 2018, <http://spaceflight101.com/spacecraft/gssap/>.

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Kashmir Imbrolio

Geostrategic and Religious Imperatives

DALBIR AHLAWAT

SATISH MALIK

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The Indian Independence Act partitioned India into two independent states: India and Pakistan. In conjunction with this legislation, the existing 564 princely states had the option to join either of the states based on religion and geographical contiguity. Most of these states readily joined one of the two new countries. However, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K, commonly referred to simply as Kashmir), was a peculiar case where Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu ruler, governed over a majority Muslim population (77 percent Muslim and 20 percent Hindu), while sharing geographical contiguity with both India and Pakistan.¹ The ruler wished to retain J&K as an independent state, though it was not an available option under the Indian Independence Act.

In this imbrolio, Pakistan considered that the ruler would ultimately decide to merge with it due to the contiguous geographical boundary, the majority of the population being Muslim, and the signing of a “standstill” agreement that ensured free and uninterrupted trade, travel, and communication. India granted a year’s time to make a decision, considering that Kashmir’s Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, and even Muslims who adhered to a centuries-old form of pluralistic, secular nationalism, Kashmiriyat, were keen to join India, hoping that Hari Singh wanted to buy time to convince some sections of the Muslim population to join India.²

Kashmiriyat

It is a well-established fact that in the ancient times Kashmir was a prominent Hindu kingdom. Buddhism was introduced in Kashmir in third century BCE. Both religions flourished side by side in the region until the introduction of Islam in the twelfth century CE. Kashmir accepted Islam, not as “a negation but as a culmination of a proud spiritual heritage.”³ Thus, Kashmir became a mosaic of three religious faiths: Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. The transition was peaceful, accomplished through preaching and not through compulsion.⁴ In sum, diverse communities of Gujjars, Bakkarwals, Hindu Pandits, Dogras, Ladakhi Buddhists,

Sikhs, and Sufi Muslims constituted a composite culture, one that was “more ethnic than religious.”⁵ According to G. M. D. Sufi, “the cult of Buddha, the teachings of Vedanta, the mysticism of Islam have one after another found a congenial home in Kashmir.”⁶ Finally, it culminated in the development of a unique identity known as *Kashmiriyat*, meaning “a harmonious relationship cutting across religious and sectarian divisions or pluralistic tradition . . . *Kashmiriyat* is . . . an institution with societal, political, economic and cultural currents and undercurrents.”⁷ Although the majority of the population were Muslims, they and their fellow Kashmiris followed a very “syncretic culture and mixed religious practices.”⁸



Figure 1. The disputed area of Kashmir. (Courtesy of Central Intelligence Agency, 2002.)

Pakistan's Policy toward Kashmir

Pakistan's claim over J&K emanates from the two-nation theory, which posits that the Partition was intended to create India for Hindus and Pakistan for Muslims. This claim draws its rationale based on Kashmir being a Muslim majority state. However, while considering the matter from the religious perspective, one can observe that Pakistan is a Deobandi/Salafi-dominated Islamic republic, whereas Kashmir is a Sufi-dominated Muslim state. Sufism does not follow the strict orthodoxy of other strains of Islam; rather, it is a syncretic version that accepts all religious faiths and respects their practices. This indicates that from the very outset, Islamabad realized that despite Kashmir being a Muslim-majority state, Sufi Islam drastically varied from the Deobandi and Salafi forms of Islam prevalent in Pakistan.⁹ Thus, J&K had better prospects to prosper in a multicultural, multiethnic, and secular India than in a sectarian, sharia-oriented Pakistan.¹⁰

Aside from the signing of the standstill agreement with Hari Singh in August 1947, Pakistan grew impatient and, in violation of the agreement, orchestrated a tribal invasion on 22 October 1947 to perpetrate militancy in J&K and acquire it by force.¹¹ However, the major objective of the invaders, once on ground, appeared not liberation but committing mass atrocities like plunder and rape; these actions not only "provoked anger amongst the Kashmiris" but also exposed Pakistan's true intentions.¹² Facing tribal invasion from Pakistan, and with his army unable to control the pandemonium, to safeguard his kingdom the maharaja approached India for military support, but India's Governor-General Lord Louis Mountbatten put a condition of "Accession first and troops later."¹³ Realizing the invaders were about to capture the airport, Hari Singh signed an Instrument of Accession with India on 26 October 1947 under the auspices of the India Independence Act 1947.¹⁴ The accession was total and unconditional. Although, the accession took place because of Pakistan's aggressive measures, Pakistan claimed that Hari Singh signed the agreement under duress as he had fled the valley, further asserting he was thus unauthorized to do so.¹⁵ No doubt, Hari Singh left the valley, but he remained very much within his kingdom.

After accession, India rushed its forces by air and contained the situation at the nick of time. India declared a unilateral ceasefire and took the grievance of the Pakistani invasion before the UN Security Council (UNSC). In its resolution, the UNSC recommended a plebiscite.¹⁶ As a precondition for the plebiscite, Pakistan was required to withdraw all its forces from Kashmir. However, Pakistan's foreign minister, Zafarullah Khan, unequivocally denied that Pakistan had any forces in Kashmir. This notwithstanding, Document I Para 3 of the UN Commission's First Interim Report (S/100) concluded that Pakistan was unofficially involved in

aiding the raiders.¹⁷ When the UN Commission arrived in Pakistan in July 1948, Khan contradicted his own statement by affirming, "Pakistan had five brigades in Jammu and Kashmir."¹⁸ Pakistan knew well in advance that the plebiscite would not be in its favor, as Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, a Muslim leader and advocate of Kashmiri independence, enjoyed wide popularity in J&K; so, Islamabad refused to withdraw its forces from Kashmir. This quashed any hope for a plebiscite, in contravention to the UNSC's resolutions.¹⁹

In an effort to advance a Kashmiri solution to the problem, the Muslim Conference, headed by Sheikh Abdullah, attempting to reflect the ground realities in J&K, had already changed its name to National Conference (NC) in 1939. This shifted the organization's focus from Muslims only to all the people of J&K and transformed it into an icon of Kashmiri identity. When the choice of joining either of the dominions came, the NC preferred India, holding that doing so was more congruent with the precepts of Kashmiriyat.²⁰ The NC's popularity was evident when it won all 75 seats in the constituent assembly elections in 1951, in a sense a *de facto* plebiscite in favor of India.²¹

Pakistan, unable to acquire J&K through legitimate means or by force on its own, got a boost when China invaded India in 1962. Taking advantage of India's vulnerability, Pakistan regionalized the J&K issue by illegally ceding "5180 sq km of Indian territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to China" in 1963.²² Thus, Pakistan successfully made China a *de facto* stakeholder in the already vexed issue of J&K. More importantly, in real terms, ceding territory to China violated the UN resolutions of April 1948 and January 1949 that supported a status quo until implementation of the UN resolutions.

Furthermore, a holy relic (a hair from the beard of Prophet Mohammed) went missing from Hazratbal, a Muslim shrine in J&K in 1963.²³ In response, a protest erupted and created a serious law-and-order situation in J&K. Although the hair was found, the Pakistani military hyped the protests as "the defiant struggle of Kashmir's four million Moslems to be free."²⁴ Islamabad considered this an opportune time to incite anti-India sentiments mainly on religious grounds. In this regard, Minister of Foreign Affairs Zulfikar Ali Bhutto pushed Pakistan's military dictator, Ayub Khan, "to provoke a conflict with India in order to seize Kashmir."²⁵

To provoke conflict, Pakistan's military launched Operation Grand Slam in 1965, sending militants to cut off India's access to the Kashmir Valley.²⁶ Ironically, the militants received little support from residents of the Valley, who remembered the rapes and atrocities committed by the Pakistani invaders in 1948. In response, India launched Operation Ablaze.²⁷ Considering the volatility, Pakistan accepted a Soviet-mediated cease-fire in September 1965.²⁸ Pakistan's depiction of itself as the protectorate of the Kashmiri Muslims, after defeat in the war, lost the nation

substantial credibility among the Kashmiris, who saw beyond the rhetoric. This war also had severe impact on the domestic politics of Pakistan; Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army Yahya Khan removed Ayub Khan from office, in part due to Pakistan's defeat in the war.

To overcome its embarrassment, low morale, and poor image in the eyes of the Kashmiris, Pakistan waged another war in 1971 under the leadership of Yahya Khan, now president of Pakistan. Again meeting with defeat, this time Pakistan not only failed to achieve its aspirations in Kashmir but also lost East Pakistan, which emerged from the conflict as the independent nation of Bangladesh. India had intervened on behalf of the Bangladeshi separatists, forcing Islamabad to surrender its 93,000 soldiers as prisoners of war.²⁹ The war's outcome forced Yahya Khan to relinquish power unceremoniously. Considering the immediacy of the release of the prisoners, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the new president of Pakistan at the time, signed the Shimla Agreement in 1971, committing India and Pakistan to resolve all outstanding issues bilaterally, thus rendering UN or any other third party's role redundant.³⁰ The liberation of Bangladesh affirmed to the Kashmiris that even liberal Muslims did not wish to be part of Pakistan and demonstrated that Pakistan was incapable of maintaining its own sovereignty and integrity. Accordingly, Kashmiris lost faith in Pakistan and compromised to seek autonomy within India.

Taking cognizance of India's military power and trying to recuperate from the 1971 defeat, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, another martial law administrator deposed Bhutto in 1978. Seeking to turn adversity to his advantage, Zia joined the United States and its allies in countermeasures toward the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Among other measures, Zia fostered various mujahidin groups, some of which were the precursors to the Taliban, with support from the United States—which hoped to use these religious fanatics as proxies to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. Zia also Islamized Pakistan, seeking to gain legitimacy at home—exponentially increasing the number of state-recognized madrassas (Islamic seminaries) and unofficial religious schools. Thus, from 1978 to 1988, while fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, Pakistan placed J&K's cause on the back burner. This change in focus was a welcome respite for the Kashmiris.

However, this peaceful lull was short-lived. Witnessing upheaval in J&K in the aftermath of 1987 state elections, which were conceivably rigged, public opinion shifted in favor of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), and Pakistan found it opportune to initiate a proxy war, calling for Islamic jihad to “liberate” J&K. Islamabad offered its support to the JKLF, encouraging the group to seek secession from India and merge with Pakistan. However, the JKLF's agenda for the liberation of Kashmir from India and did not envision union with Pakistan

but rather independence, as such the organization clashed with the Pakistani agenda and disassociated itself from Islamabad in 1992. Nonplussed, Pakistan created the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) terrorist organization to supplant the JKLF. HM recruited local Kashmiri cadres but was controlled from Islamabad by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).³¹ Facing a lack of support for Islamic jihad and having weak command and control in J&K, Pakistan adopted a two-pronged policy. First, Islamabad sought to assassinate Kashmiri moderates, who worked as a firewall between the common people and the proxy war. Prominent among those targeted were Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq, chairman of the All Jammu and Kashmir Awami Action Committee, and Mirwaiz Qazi Nisar Ahmed, a Kashmiri poet and scholar and a leader of the Muslim United Front.³² However, such assassinations backfired, as around 50,000 people gathered at the funeral of Ahmad and chanted "death to Hizbul Mujahideen," "get the killers," and "whoever demands Pakistan will get a grave."³³ The second and far more successful prong of Islamabad's efforts was to facilitate entry of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) militants into J&K to perpetrate terroristic activities against the state.³⁴ Finding cross-border movement difficult because of enhanced border security by India, limited local support for jihad, and inefficacy of its proxy war, the Pakistan Army formed the United Jihad Council in 1994.³⁵

Still failing to achieve the expected results and paying heavily through its blood and treasure, Pakistan's military waged the Kargil War in 1999, employing non-state actors as well as its regular military personnel.³⁶ However, India exposed Pakistan's role through an intercepted communication between Pakistan's president and his army chief, which resulted initially in denial, then acceptance, and finally unconditional withdrawal of Pakistan's forces from Kargil. The entire episode graphically presented Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism.³⁷ Kargil also exposed Pakistan as a weak actor that could not be trusted as a protector of the rights of the people of J&K. Even the Pakistani establishment criticized this war, as illustrated by former ISI chief Asad Durrani (a retired lieutenant general of the Pakistan Army), who stated, "one and all blamed us for Kargil, which was anyway a foolish operation."³⁸

In the post-9/11 period and Pres. George W. Bush's ultimatum to the world, "Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists,"³⁹ Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, ditched the Afghan Taliban to ally with the United States. This change in policy toward the Taliban, which included providing land routes and air bases to attack coreligionists in Afghanistan, led to apprehensions among Islamabad's Kashmiri allies regarding Pakistan's commitment to their cause. Additionally, the shifting situation in Afghanistan had a perceptible effect on the people of

J&K; notably, they appreciated New Delhi's efforts to provide USD 2 billion in aid to needy Afghans.

Having lost the Kargil War, facing Western pressure to do more to counter terrorism, and recognizing the embitterment of the Kashmiris, Musharraf found no alternative to offering an olive branch to India, shifting Islamabad's focus from Kashmir alone to a host of other issues. In July 2001, he visited India to attend the Agra Summit, which aimed at resolving a number of long-standing issues between the two countries, including commercial ties, release of prisoners of war, and the ubiquitous Kashmir issue. However, due to Musharraf's unwillingness to denounce or forgo further support to cross-border terrorism, the parties were unable to reach any agreement.⁴⁰

To alleviate the local angst among Pakistan's proxies and to extract maximum leverage from Islamabad's support for the US war in Afghanistan, Pakistan-based terrorists attacked the Indian parliament in December 2001. Islamabad denied any role in the attack, but Washington, realizing the gravity of the situation, responded by placing the LeT and JeM—the two Pakistani groups responsible for the attack—on the US list of terrorist organizations. Embarrassed, Musharraf was forced to not only ban these organizations but also assure that “none of the groups would be permitted to start any kind of armed movement in the name of the Kashmir struggle from the Pakistani territory.”⁴¹ While such rhetoric was offered half-heartedly, this demonstrated that Pakistan had limited leverage and maneuverability in the regional strategic framework, despite its newfound role as a key American ally in the Global War on Terrorism. If Islamabad continued to openly support terrorist organizations, Pakistan risked being declared a “terrorist state,” which would jeopardize that new relationship.

Under immense pressure from New Delhi and Washington, Musharraf agreed to a peace process and signed a cease-fire along the Line of Control (LoC) in 2003. Furthermore, he proposed a four-point formula to resolve the Kashmir issue that included the initiation of a dialogue; acceptance of the Kashmir issue as central to the disputes between India and Pakistan; elimination of whatever is not acceptable to Pakistan, India, and the Kashmiris (a rather vague point to be sure); and arriving at a solution acceptable to all the three stakeholders.⁴² Furthermore, Musharraf assured India that “Pakistan would not permit any militant organization to operate from its territory.”⁴³ Such overtures generated a degree of optimism regarding J&K and led to a resumption of dialogue in 2004. However, facing opposition at home, Musharraf backtracked and, rejecting his earlier proposal, suggested dividing Kashmir into seven regions: Azad Kashmir, Jammu, Kargil, Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, Poonch, and Northern Areas.⁴⁴ Yet finding it unfeasible, he proposed another four-point formula in 2006 that included the gradual withdrawal of troops, local

self-governance, no redrawing of boundaries, and mutual administration by India and Pakistan.⁴⁵ Obviously, Musharraf lacked a consistent and coherent policy. This shifting stance reflected to the Kashmiris that Pakistan had its own strategic priorities rather than Kashmir's best interests at heart.

After Musharraf's resignation in 2008, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government, headed by Pres. Asif Ali Zardari, to the chagrin of many, openly stated "India has never been a threat to Pakistan" and castigated militant Islamic groups operating in J&K as "terrorists," which contradicted previous narratives that venerated them as "freedom fighters."⁴⁶ Around the same time, India began a major upgrade of its anti-obstacle infiltration fence along its border with Pakistan, supporting the barrier with enhanced security measures and the introduction of thermal imaging to track the cross-border movement—making infiltration more difficult.⁴⁷ These developments did not bode well for the Pakistani military, who, with the help of nonstate actors, perpetrated the Mumbai attack in November 2008 that resulted in the death of 174 people. Indian security forces captured one perpetrator alive, Ajmal Kasab, and US agents arrested another terrorist who helped plan the attack, an American-born Pakistani named David Headley. Both terrorists named an ISI official as the mastermind of the planning and execution of this attack.⁴⁸ To avert another armed conflict between the two countries, international pressure was mounted on Islamabad to assuage India's "9/11." In response, the PPP government arrested seven senior Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) leaders and banned the organization.⁴⁹ Resultantly, Pakistan was again forced to place Kashmir on the back burner. For a few years thereafter, militancy fell to its lowest ebb in Kashmir, until the election of the Pakistan Muslim League government of Nawaz Sharif in 2013.

Finding Sharif to be conciliatory and supporting peace with India, his adversaries deposed him for openly admitting Pakistan's role in the Mumbai attack, under the pretense of corruption charges brought before the Supreme Court of Pakistan.⁵⁰ In the aftermath, the Pakistani military escalated hostility along the LoC and committed barbaric crimes like ambushing, mutilating, and killing of Indian soldiers. To illustrate the escalation, there were 62 cease-fire violations in 2011; that number jumped to 583 in 2014.⁵¹ In addition, the Pakistani military changed its tactic and directed the infiltrators to attack Indian military installations, such as the Pathankot attack in January 2016, the Pampore attack in June 2016, and the Uri attack in September 2016. India, in witnessing excessive militant activities, for the first time took punitive action through surgical strikes across the LoC on terrorist launch pads in September 2016.

The current government in Pakistan, headed by Imran Khan, has adopted a more moderate approach on J&K, aiming to resolve the issue through dialogue.⁵²

However, Pakistan's tarnished image at the international level as a sponsor of terrorism and its unfavorable status on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list in June 2018 have placed Khan in a difficult position.⁵³ Notwithstanding the positive signals by Khan to improve relations with India with the view that "if you take one step, we will take two steps,"⁵⁴ the nonstate actors prevailed, as witnessed on 14 February 2019 when the deadliest terrorist attack in Kashmir was conducted on a paramilitary convoy, killing 44 security personnel. JeM claimed responsibility for the attack, which the UNSC condemned. The latter organization has listed JeM as a terror entity since 2001. However, JeM chief Masood Azhar continues to receive military protection in Pakistan. As per an expert, Abdul Hameed Khan, "Support to the Kashmiri cause is only an excuse for Pakistan's devilish designs. . . . That Kashmiris are being used as fodder to Pakistani strategic ambitions is not hidden from Kashmiris."⁵⁵



Photo courtesy of Voice of America.

Figure 2. Indian paramilitary soldiers stand by the wreckage of a bus after an explosion in Pampore, Indian-controlled Kashmir, 14 February 2019.

India's Policy toward Kashmir

In facing invasion from Pakistan, Hari Singh signed the Treaty of Accession, a legal document, with the consent of Governor-General Mountbatten. When the Indian forces on ground had an upper hand and possibly could have taken back the whole area from the occupation of the Pakistani forces, New Delhi made a

misjudgment in first declaring a unilateral cease-fire and subsequently taking the matter to the UN for resolution. Failing resolution of the conflict, the cease-fire line became the LoC. The strategic region of Gilgit, the Haji Pir Pass, and Muzaffarabad, a town adjacent to Uri along the Jhelum River, remained under Pakistani occupation, under Islamabad's label of Azad Kashmir—comprising more than 5,100 square miles of Kashmiri territory. This resulted in India losing a border with Afghanistan and Pakistan gaining a contiguous geographical boundary with China. Despite the legal Instrument of Accession and Pakistan being deemed an aggressor state, India remained on the defensive and compromised on the cease-fire line. Even India remained muted in 1949, when it approached the UN to censure the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir, but the UN passed a resolution for a plebiscite to be held in the entire Kashmiri territory under both Pakistani and Indian control without considering the Instrument of Accession. This gave the impression to the people of J&K that India had limited control over the destiny of the state.

After 1947, Sheikh Abdullah emerged as a towering Kashmiri leader, eventually becoming the prime minister of J&K in March 1948. However, due to Abdullah's softening stance toward Pakistan in order to gain maximum autonomy for J&K from India, Karan Singh, the Kashmiri head of state, dismissed him in August 1953. It appears this decision was made in haste, as India envisioned a repeat of the 1948 incursion by Pakistan, rather than giving due importance to the key concept of *Kashmiriyat*.

Undoubtedly, the Indian government initiated several measures to grant autonomy to J&K. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution (1949) awarded autonomous status, and the subsequently Delhi Agreement of 1952 granted Indian citizenship to J&K residents. Further, to retain the existing demographics of the region, the president of India issued an October 1954 order through Article 35A of the constitution awarding special rights to the J&K residents and prohibiting other Indians from acquiring immovable property and settling permanently in Kashmir. The J&K Constituent Assembly adopted its Constitution on 26 January 1957, emphasizing the status of J&K as an integral part of India. Kashmiri and Indian leaders introduced these articles to gain legitimacy, but in reality, such measures alienated the people of J&K from the rest of India by creating a state within a state.

The 1965 war between India and Pakistan was the time to adjudge true intentions and aspirations of the people of J&K. Instead of supporting Pakistan, Kashmiris fully supported India. However, in the postwar period, India "failed to reward Kashmiri loyalty. Instead of recognizing the *Kashmiriyat*, New Delhi—

emboldened by a military victory against Pakistan—fell back upon its traditional dictum of Kashmir's integration with India.”⁵⁶

To bridge the ongoing distrust, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Abdullah signed an accord in 1975. As a result, Sheikh Abdullah conceded to tone down his voice for separatism and became the chief minister of J&K. After this accord, he faced twin setbacks. First, he lost the confidence of the Indian government over his previous demand for separatism. Second, his formerly ardent supporters dubbed him a traitor for his acquiescence to the newly signed accord.⁵⁷ Knowing Sheikh Abdullah's predicament, New Delhi continued to operate through him, rather than simultaneously building direct connections, trust, and legitimacy with the Kashmiri people. Even after Sheikh Abdullah's death in 1982, New Delhi promoted his son Farooq Abdullah as the new leader in J&K, notwithstanding the lack of legitimacy and trust.

Against these circumstances, while looking for an alternative leadership to mitigate their grievances and retain *Kashmiriyat*, Kashmiris faced unexpected developments during the 1983 state assembly elections when Indira Gandhi played a communal card with her popular slogan “Hindu minorities of Kashmir in danger.” Further, taking a myopic view on the Resettlement Bill passed by the Farooq government to resettle people from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, Gandhi labelled it as an attempt to strengthen Muslim demographics.⁵⁸ Ultimately, as the elections approached, she went to the extreme by labelling Farooq as a national security risk and claiming the situation was a “Muslim invasion” of the Hindu-dominated Jammu region.⁵⁹ This electoral engineering sowed communal seeds of discord and generated tension between Hindus and Muslims. In 1983, the Farooq-led NC won 46 of the 76 state assembly seats—out of these, 42 seats were from the Muslim-dominated valley—and Congress secured its 26 seats from the Hindu- and Buddhist-dominated Jammu and Ladakh regions.⁶⁰

Notwithstanding the majority votes in the 1983 elections, a defection of a dozen NC legislators prompted the governor of J&K to dismiss the Farooq government in July 1984. As an alternative, the Congress Party supported G.M. Shah, the eldest son-in-law of Sheikh Abdullah, to form a new government. This horse trading did not sit well with the Kashmiri electorate, and they demonstrated their reaction in the December 1984 national elections, when the NC won all the three seats in the Muslim-dominated valley. With this political polarization along religious grounds, a “breach between *Kashmiriat* and the Indian State appeared to be complete. . . . An irrational electoral game played by the ruling party in Delhi was now to drive a significant section of Kashmiri Muslims to the path of ‘extremism’.”⁶¹

Against this critical background, the signing of an accord between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah in 1986 indicated the NC's betrayal of *Kashmiriyat*, a final dent on the credibility of Farooq and another demonstration of the Indian government's lack of sensitivity toward the concerns and aspirations of the Kashmiri people. In a sense, Farooq became a mediator between the people of J&K and Delhi. Thus, in the absence of legitimate avenues to address their grievances, Kashmiris oriented themselves toward radical Islam and formed a Muslim United Front (MUF), which gained further credence and legitimacy when the NC and Congress contested state assembly elections jointly in 1987 and won the rigged elections. Although Farooq formed a government with the support of Congress, many Kashmiris and observers considered it a sellout to Delhi. This angered the common people and united the radicals.

The situation took a new turn in December 1989, when JKLF militants abducted Rubaiya Sayeed, the daughter of Indian Minister of Home Affairs Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, in Kashmir. For her release, the government acquiesced to the demand of JKLF and released five hard-core militants, including a Pakistani citizen. This action bolstered the morale of the militants and generated a feeling that the "mighty India can be defeated too."⁶² With this soft approach, specifically the abductee being the home minister's daughter, familial interest prevailed over the national interest. Witnessing this vulnerability, Pakistan actively supported Hizbul Mujahideen's rise.

In light of these critical circumstances, the appointment of Gov. Jagmohan Malhotra in January 1990 against the consent of the J&K government, the resignation of Farooq Abdullah, and the devolving law and order situation, New Delhi imposed direct central government rule in J&K. With these developments, *Kashmiriyat* faced increasing challenges in a secular India. Given the predicament in which Muslim Kashmiris found themselves, they looked to mosques and madrasas for direction. This also gave Kashmiri Muslim youths new impetus to seek cross-border support from Pakistan and to narrate their grievances with the wider Islamic community.

Facing domestic unrest as well as the cross-border flow of militants, the government of India enacted the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990 in September 1990. This authorized Indian security forces to stop, search, arrest, and shoot suspects with impunity. It took the security forces about three years to normalize the situation, but by 1993, Pakistan began direct intervention in the J&K affairs by infiltrating radicalized militants. Subsequently, Kashmiri Hindus faced the first massacre in Kistwar in 1993 and fled the state. To reinforce its agenda, the Pakistan Army formed the United Jihad Council in 1994,

and by 1995 HM, a pro-Pakistan group, became more prominent in comparison to JKLF in the perpetuation of terrorist attacks.⁶³

By late 1990, other groups like LeT, JeM, and Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) became active in conducting terrorist activities in J&K. Between 1993 and 1996, on an average, 1,000 civilians and around the same number of militants were killed each year.⁶⁴ It appears the government of India, without understanding the underpinnings of the cross-border terrorism, considered it simply a law-and-order situation and restricted itself to political solution. It was only toward the end of 1996 that India was able to control the inflow of the cross-border militants and win the trust of the local people. However, the government failed to anticipate Pakistan's strategic ploy to wage war in the Kargil district.

It is undoubted that India exposed Pakistan's role in Kargil, and "Especially damning were the transcripts of telephone conversations between Musharraf and his Chief of General Staff . . . describing their early success as 'a brilliant tactical operation'."⁶⁵ However, subsequent international condemnation forced Pakistan to withdraw its forces unconditionally. Indian forces, despite being in an advantageous situation, refrained from entering into Pakistani territory. This emboldened the radical elements in Kashmir to think that India had its own limits.

India won the Kargil War, but finding some of its prized jihadis languishing in Indian prisons, the ISI facilitated the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane in December 1999, which eventually ended up in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.⁶⁶ The Pakistani government denied any involvement, but after India released the aforementioned imprisoned terrorists the hostages were released. The Taliban government gave the hijackers safe passage out of Afghanistan. Among the terrorists released as part of this episode was Masood Azhar, the founder of JeM, who with the others released has lived openly in Pakistan ever since.⁶⁷ Management of the hijacked flight was India's epic failure, specifically when the plane landed in India for fuel; New Delhi took no action but rather allowed the plane to fly onward without any challenge. This development signaled to the Kashmiris that India had limited or no capacity to avert the hijacking, and the release of the dreaded terrorists lodged in J&K prisons to free the plane hostages only exacerbated this impression. This was the lowest point in India's strategic thinking hitherto.

Furthermore, Musharraf's visit to India in July 2001 created a conducive environment for dialogue, as he appeared sincere in his desire to break the ice during the negotiations. However, Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani bungled, either accidentally or intentionally, the opportunity by grandstanding and agitating Musharraf.⁶⁸ For India, this was a missed opportunity, as New Delhi failed to constructively engage Musharraf, who was in a defensive mode. The failure of the summit resulted in intensified cross-border terrorism and violence that resulted in

suicide bombing outside the J&K State Assembly in October and a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. In response, India mobilized its forces along the Pakistani border under Operation Prakaram but limited itself to threat perception. India preferred the use of soft power diplomacy, which garnered international support against Pakistan's embracement of terrorism. In fact, under US pressure, Islamabad was placed on the defensive because of better coordination among Indian security forces, completion of an anti-infiltration obstacle fence, and the turning of local Muslims against the militants in the strategic Poonch and Rajouri regions.⁶⁹ This witnessed remarkable progress in reducing the casualties from 4,517 in 2001 to below 1,000 in 2007 and just 117 by 2012.⁷⁰

To win the hearts and minds of the Kashmiris, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) leader, declared *Kashmiriyat*, *Insaniyat*, *Jamhooriyat* (inclusive Kashmiri culture, humanitarianism and democracy) in 2003. This proved to be a cornerstone for reconciliation between New Delhi and the Kashmiri people. The period between 2002 and 2012 remained quite peaceful. These positive results were mainly due to US pressure on Islamabad to do more to constrain terrorism and the Vajpayee government's open-ended approach. Vajpayee made an offer of unconditional talks with all militant groups, gave weight to "*insaniyat*" (humanism), allowed militant groups to visit Pakistan and have consultations there, and promoted power devolution to Kashmiri elected representatives.

Witnessing a relatively peaceful situation in J&K, in the December 2014 state assembly elections people voted in favor of the People's Democratic Party and BJP (a nationalist Hindu Party) rather than the NC and Congress alliance. The new coalition became embroiled in the usual tussle over state-versus-national issues. Specifically, the BJP planned to remove Articles 370 and 35A to withdraw the autonomous status of J&K. This undertaking ultimately created a situation of ambiguity in J&K. Combined with the US drawdown of its forces in Afghanistan, this situation encouraged Pakistan to beef up cross-border militant movement. Adding to the volatile situation, Indian security forces killed Burhan Wani, a HM "commander" in an encounter in July 2016. His death resulted in violent protests.⁷¹ To maintain order, the security forces resorted to firing, killing several people and blinding others—the latter injured by nonlethal, antiriot pellet ammunitions.⁷² This incident was unique, as it involved enhanced local youth participation and stone pelting, an increase in active militants from 30–35 to over 300, uniting various fragmented militant groups, and an increased infiltration of militants from across the LoC with the specific purpose of targeting police stations and military camps.



Photo by Seyyed Sajed Hassan Razavi.

Figure 3. Indian security forces use tear gas and pellet guns to disperse Kashmiri demonstrators.

To counter these offensives, for the first time, Indian leadership flexed its muscle by threatening Pakistan. Presaging this stronger response, in July 2015, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval admonished Pakistan, “You do one more Mumbai, you lose Balochistan,” referencing repeated terrorist attacks against Mumbai targets, specifically the spectacular episode of 2008, and the ongoing Baluch insurgency in Pakistan—the implication being India would openly support insurgents should Islamabad fail to rein in its lapdogs in Kashmir.⁷³ Having witnessed further attacks against Pathankot Air Force Station and army bases in Uri and Nagrota military bases, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi hinted of reprisals in his speech on India’s Independence Day on 15 August 2016.⁷⁴ Thus, in this imbroglio, national security became primary, and the concerns of the people of J&K became secondary.

Currently, there are around 450 militants in J&K, and the demographics of this group is especially worrisome.⁷⁵ They are young and local, drawing inspiration from international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS). However, so far no Kashmiri has been identified as having traveled abroad to fight for al-Qaeda or ISIS.⁷⁶

Considering the critical nature of the challenge, India significantly enhanced the presence of its security forces to 500,000. Under the Armed Forces Special Power Act and the Public Safety Act (PSA), Indian forces started operations to weed out the militants from among the civilians. However, this gave rise to human rights violations and fostered local resentment.⁷⁷

Shifting Focus: Kashmir to Terrorism

With the killing of 19 security personnel at the Uri military camp in J&K by Pakistan-based militants in 2016, India for the first time conducted surgical strikes on the terrorist launch pads inside Pakistan. Still undeterred, these terrorists perpetrated another grisly attack on a paramilitary convoy in Pulwama in J&K, which resulted in the killing of more than 40 Indian soldiers on 14 February 2019. The JeM leadership located in Pakistan claimed responsibility for the attack and even vowed to conduct more such attacks.⁷⁸ Receiving very strong public support for a retaliatory action and being in the midst of national election cycle, the Indian government was compelled to act against the terrorists. Thus, India conducted air strikes on JeM training centers in Balakot, Pakistan. New Delhi labeled this a “pre-emptive non-military strike”—that is, not against the people of Pakistan, their government, or the military establishment but, instead, against the terrorist training centers and undertaken for self-defense.⁷⁹

Although this situation turned into a limited aerial war that led to the shooting down of one plane on each side, it is significant that both countries acknowledged that war was not an option. However, two points stand out. First, if the militants conduct another terrorist attack, India will retaliate and target their bases in Pakistan. Second, the origin of terrorism from Pakistani soil resulted in a major strategic shift in the calculus of the situation from focusing on India, Pakistan, and Kashmir to instead on India, Pakistan, and the terrorist groups operating from within Pakistan. Contrary to previous offers made by the United States, Russia, and even China to mediate between New Delhi and Islamabad on the issue of Kashmir, these third parties have also shifted their emphases on mediation between India and Pakistan—interestingly with the issue of Kashmir nowhere mentioned.

Considering all of these developments, Pakistan’s agenda to “liberate” Kashmir has seemingly lost international legitimacy. In the current context, even the big powers appear to side with India as a rising power, whereas the FATF has placed Pakistan on its grey list with a possibility of placement on the blacklist in the near future, as a sponsor of terrorism.

Seeking support elsewhere, Pakistan has turned to the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC). This organization has been an ideal platform for Islamabad to

raise the Kashmir issue, mainly because of Pakistan's premier place in this organization as a founding member, having the second-largest Muslim population, being the only nuclear-armed Muslim country, and possessing a highly professional defense force. Interestingly, in the February 2019 OIC Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, the group invited India for the first time as a guest of honor. In protest, Pakistan boycotted the meeting.⁸⁰ India's minister of external affairs firmly asserted in her address at the OIC that "We reaffirm that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and is a matter strictly internal to India."⁸¹ This demonstrates that Pakistan is perhaps even losing ground among its Muslim allies.

In addition, three of the five permanent members of the UNSC—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—proposed, for the fourth time, that the UN designate Pakistan-based terror group JeM chief Masood Azhar to be declared as a global terrorist. In response to the Pulwama attack, Russian president Vladimir Putin stated, "We strongly condemn this brutal crime. The perpetrators and sponsors of this attack, undoubtedly, should be duly punished" and reiterated Russia's "readiness for further strengthening counter-terrorist cooperation with Indian partners."⁸² Similarly, the US national security advisor, John Bolton, openly "supported India's right to self-defense against cross-border terrorism" and explicitly called on Pakistan to "crack down" on JeM.⁸³ While the Chinese foreign ministry condemned the Pulwama attack, it did not mention Azhar in its statement. Beijing has supported Pakistan by blocking the motions to officially brand Azhar as a global terrorist.⁸⁴ However, China faces its own Islamic insurgency in its western provinces and fully understands the menace terrorism poses to state security. Therefore, recently, Beijing has also diluted its support for Islamabad in regards to the latter's support of militants.

In sum, the major world powers have condemned religion-based terrorism. As a result, Pakistan has been exposed and ostracized as a sponsor of terrorism from its soil and is further marginalized on the international scene, at the OIC, and in its own region.

Options to Resolve the Kashmir Issue

Over the last seven decades, Pakistan has failed to gain confidence and establish legitimacy among the Kashmiris, and India has also been unable to deter the cross-border terrorism or adequately demonstrate respect for Kashmiriyat. In this spat, the common people of J&K have suffered cross-border terrorism and endured the presence of the Indian security forces. The younger generation in Kashmir is getting more radicalized rather than adhering to Kashmiriyat. Undoubtedly, in the twenty-first century, war and occupation of the territory is not a continued option when both the adversarial countries are nuclear armed. Likewise, the cession of

territory by a sovereign state to the other—either under pressure or through negotiation—does not appear to be a viable option. Against this, both India and Pakistan have the option to initiate an open-border policy and free trade, which would be beneficial for the development and prosperity of the two countries. However, neither country appears prepared to do so at this stage, and both face a significant trust deficit about the intentions of the other.

A more viable solution might be to turn the currently de-facto border line—the LoC—into an international border and de-escalate militarization of the border areas. After initial trust building, a one-off people's movement from both sides of the LoC can be permitted, this means giving choice to the people whether they want to live in India or Pakistan. Subsequent to this, there can be few entry points controlled by the immigration authorities with the back-up of police forces rather than the military. This will help facilitate regulated people's movements across the border and also some small-scale trade and business. Should this mechanism work well, further short- to mid-term visas could be granted to the traders and business people.

This may not have been possible previously, but in the current period, with Imran Khan as prime minister in Pakistan and demonstrating apparent sincerity in his desire to resolve the Kashmir issue amicably it might now be a viable option. There are obvious benefits all around. Prime Minister Khan can alleviate the financial crisis that Pakistan is currently passing through, lead Pakistan off the FATF list, and establish a sound democracy if the military also intends to improve its image and remove the blemish of sponsoring terrorism. In India, Prime Minister Modi has enjoyed one full term as prime minister and will most likely win a second term in the upcoming elections. His government has attempted to play a proactive role in resolving the Kashmir issue and even turned the policy postures from defensive to proactive. However, the Kashmir issue persists. Both prime ministers enjoy quite strong followings in their respective countries and have an historic opportunity to give new direction to the bilateral relations by resolving the Kashmir issue and respecting Kashmiris' unique identity, as expressed by *Kashmiriyat*.

Conclusion

The Kashmir issue has been ongoing since the Partition of India in 1947. Notwithstanding several confidence-building measures, wars, and low intensity clashes, the conflict persists.

The Kashmiri people have a distinct identity (*Kashmiriyat*) and, as such, have historically favored secularism and multiculturalism rather than the communalism championed by Pakistan and Islamabad's local proxies. Furthermore, the Kashmiri perception about Pakistan's budging during the Kargil War and aban-

donment of the Taliban for Islamabad's own opportunistic gains has raised apprehensions about the reliability of Pakistan even among those sympathetic toward its regional aspirations.

Pakistan's policy toward Kashmir lacks continuity and coherency and demonstrates duality and duplicity. The democratically elected governments have adopted conciliatory approaches, whereas the military appears to follow a policy intended to "bleed India with a thousand cuts."⁸⁵ There is no doubt that Pakistan has been successful in tying down over half-a-million Indian security forces in counterterrorism operations, exacting heavy economic costs, and engaging India in a low-cost proxy war through militant groups. However, in the process, by sponsoring cross-border terrorism, Pakistan itself has become an international pariah, condemned by many of the world's preeminent powers and placed on the FATF grey list. It has also lost its standing in the Islamic world, at regional and international levels, and despite China's stalwart, if sometimes lukewarm, support Islamabad is becoming increasingly isolated on the world stage.

India, on the other hand, since the dilution of the *Kashmiriyat* and New Delhi's fiddling with the electoral machinery, has developed a distinct trust deficit with the Kashmiri people. Certainly, elections are held regularly and sufficient budget is allocated for the development of the state, but recurrent overtures regarding the desire to revoke Articles 370 and 35A disturb Kashmiris. Moreover, the presence of excessive security forces have a negative psychological impact on the Kashmiris.

In its dealings with Pakistan, India has been consistent in resolving the Kashmir issue per the Shimla agreement signed by the two countries. Although India has been unsuccessful in thwarting cross-border terrorism, New Delhi has certainly exposed Pakistan on the international scene as a sponsor of terrorism from its territory, isolated Islamabad diplomatically, and successfully placed Pakistan on the FATF grey list.

Pakistan appears to have reached a dead end in its Kashmir policy. It has not been able to annex J&K through war, jihad, diplomacy, or proxy stakeholders. Since the May 2011 discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, few observers or political leaders view Pakistan as legitimately concerned with dealing with terrorists operating within its territory. Rather, most consider Islamabad's propaganda promoting a freedom struggle in Kashmir and its fostering of groups seeking to enact such a struggle as terrorism. In the current times, no country would acquiesce to seeing part of its territory secede due to religious terrorism. Doing so would set a precedent that would embolden religious fundamentalists, terrorists, and the state sponsors of terrorism to pursue further such operations around the world. Thus, for Pakistan, "defusing the Kashmir crisis and establishing a long-term peace with India" would remove its "dependence on jihadi groups to wage

proxy war in Kashmir” and return to Islamabad some level of legitimacy on the international stage.⁸⁶

It is clear that the Kashmir situation is not what it was in 1948; Hindus are no longer resident in the Kashmir Valley, Islamabad has changed the status of the neighboring Pakistani regions of Baltistan and the Northern Areas—merging the two to form the new Gilgit-Baltistan territory. China has also become a stakeholder in the Kashmir conflict.

A viable solution would be to convert the LoC into an international border, allowing a one-off movement of residents across the border without altering the border, totally sealing the border, and opening several controlled entry points. The two countries should also commit to non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. JIPA

Bowing to international pressure, on 1 May 2019, China lifted its technical hold on a UNSC measure to label Masood Azhar, the founder and leader of the Pakistan-based terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), as a global terrorist. See Kamran Yousaf, “UN Blacklists JeM Chief after Kashmir Struggle Delinked,” *Express Tribune*, 1 May 2019.

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Strategic Competition and Future Conflicts in the Indo-Pacific Region

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In the mid-twenty-first century, the Indo-Pacific's security hinges on the convergence of four major interrelated developments: (1) the adroit management of China's rise, both internal and external; (2) the challenge in reassessing strategic interests in the US-led web of Asian alliances; (3) the regional disparities in addressing endemic global security issues; and (4) the prevalence of traditional security quandaries in flashpoints such as the Taiwan Strait or the Korean Peninsula.¹ These trends are reflected in the struggle for dominance by the region's two major powers—China and Japan; the future of the Korean Peninsula; intraregional competition in territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea; and perhaps most importantly, the contours of long-term regional strategic competition and cooperation between China and the United States. At the same time, however, the Indo-Pacific security dynamics are bound to interlocking global and regional economic interdependencies, which present a paradox: notwithstanding historical rivalries and tensions, perennial strategic distrust, and weak multilateral regional institutional architecture, the Indo-Pacific's security complex is defined also by nonmilitary norms of state behavior.² These centripetal and centrifugal forces both amplify and mitigate sources of conflict in the region. Yet, the risks of miscalculation and potential confrontation exist: economic interdependencies cannot resolve the region's enduring security dilemmas amid contending national interests, strategies, and rising power-projection aspirations and capabilities. Seen from this perspective, this article argues that the increasing global and regional economic interdependencies juxtaposed by the strategic uncertainties, costs and risks of potential conventional conflicts shape preferences for long-term competitive strategies between major powers in the region. Consequently, asymmetric negation and strategic ambiguity in emerging new domains of warfare—space, cyberspace, near-space, and underwater—will increasingly characterize future conflicts in the Indo-Pacific.

To begin with, in every major security issue facing the Indo-Pacific, there is a major Chinese footprint, whether direct or indirect. The economic, political, and

military rise of China, reflected in three decades of relentless Chinese economic growth, has provided Beijing with new geopolitical opportunities by increasing the range of its strategic options and choices. At the same time, however, the attendant consequences of China's rise and its power-projection capabilities have led to perennial uncertainties surrounding its long-term political transition, and by extension, the Indo-Pacific's future security trajectories. As Zhu Feng noted, "China's greatest challenge is to manage its own rise—to take advantage of its stronger capabilities to expand its regional influence without provoking the regional instability that could undermine its long-term economic prosperity and integration."³ Indeed, on one hand, China faces perennial internal political, socio-economic, and environmental challenges that permeate into external foreign policy insecurities about its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and extended "core" national interests. On the other hand, China is seeking greatpower status—reasserting its geopolitical role and influence in the region by leveraging its global economic power and advancing military capabilities. The cumulative effects of these developments have been substantial as the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) catalogue of air, land, and naval platforms and assets are gradually catching up in terms of both qualitative sophistication and operational effectiveness.⁴

China's cumulative political, economic, and military rise is thus reshaping global and regional geopolitics, including the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, in ways that are inherently detrimental for US interests and Washington's regional strategic partners and allies. Indeed, for nearly seven decades, the US strategy in the Asia-Pacific has remained relatively constant—maintaining robust forward active presence embedded in bilateral alliances to preserve access and mobility in the Western Pacific, and in doing so, defend its allies and ensure peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. While the United States continues to maintain comprehensive strategic advantages through its ongoing regional presence and relative military-technological superiority, China is arguably challenging Washington's ability to underwrite stability in the Indo-Pacific region.⁵ In one school of thought, the diffusion of advanced military technologies coupled with asymmetric operational concepts is increasingly undermining US military advantages and, to a limited degree, its freedom of action in the region. Accordingly, the key issue for the US military is overcoming challenges of securing operational access in contested areas of global commons, and maintaining sufficient freedom of action—the ability to gain and maintain localized air superiority, maritime superiority, space and cyberspace superiority and security—in addition to the ability to conduct cross-domain operations and operational maneuver.⁶

These trends can be observed in China's aim for deeper regional power-projection into its "three seas" (the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas) or an area defined by the "first island chain," consisting of the Kuril Islands, Japan, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. Such projection is interpreted in US strategic thought as denying American forces freedom of action by restricting deployments of US forces into theater (antiaccess) and denying the freedom of movement of US forces already there (area denial).⁷ Over the long term, however, China envisions its strategic control over its periphery up to the "second island chain," which means the dilution of US power up to American bases on Guam. The United States, meanwhile, with its policy of strategic rebalancing toward the Indo-Pacific, seeks to remain a "Pacific Power" through economic, diplomatic, cultural, and military presence and influence.⁸

Perhaps more importantly, deepening economic regional interdependencies and linkages juxtapose the strategic ramifications of the Sino-American contending visions, strategies, and interests, which poses complex challenges for traditional US alliance partners. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and ASEAN economies now trade more with China than with the United States. The chief challenge for these key regional US allies is pursuing two fundamentally opposing policy objectives: strengthening and maintaining security ties with the United States, while deepening economic linkages with China.⁹ With the prevailing uncertainty about the future strategic and security landscape, US allies in the region—Japan, South Korea, and, to a lesser degree, Taiwan—are increasing their military spending and pursuing hedging strategies to address their expanding security concerns. Indeed, they are acquiring select indigenous power-projection capabilities, including reduced-signature fifth-generation air platforms; standoff precision weapons; ballistic and cruise missiles; early warning, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets as well as naval assets, including maritime patrol, antisubmarine warfare, and submarines.




Figure 1. Sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. (Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China* [Washington, DC: DOD, 2012], 37.).

At the same time, they are demonstrating the political willingness to use these assets for different strategic reasons. Japan seeks to overcome the limitations posed by its pacifist postwar constitution and the Yoshida Doctrine to exercise greater strategic adaptability and operational flexibility in responding to regional

contingencies, particularly North Korean ballistic missile threats and Sino-Japanese tensions in territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diayou Islands in the East China Seas. In doing so, Tokyo is rethinking its national defense posture and its overall future security role in the region. In November 2013, Japan's cabinet under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched the country's first National Security Council, followed by the approval of the first National Security Strategy and increased efforts to reinterpret Japan's constitution.¹⁰ South Korea's ongoing defense reforms and acquisition programs have aimed not only at strengthening capabilities vis-à-vis North Korean asymmetric threats but also developing joint air and naval capabilities that would complement long-term US strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific.¹¹

Notwithstanding these strategic uncertainties, US allies in the region must also grapple with the operational consequences of Sino-US ongoing military-technological advances. In particular, as Carnes Lord and Andrew Erickson argue, the current constellation of US forward bases in the Indo-Pacific—including “main operating bases” with permanent US military presence, “forward operating sites” maintained by a relatively small US support presence for temporary deployments, and “cooperative security locations” designed for contingency use with little or no permanent US presence—will become increasingly vital, yet paradoxically vulnerable” with the emergence of robust Chinese theater-strike capabilities.¹² At the same time, US allies in the Indo-Pacific must calculate their potential future roles, level of active participation, and defense resource allocation requirements supporting future US military strategy and operational conduct in the region—envisioned in concepts such as the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) formerly known as AirSea Battle.¹³

Smaller- and medium-sized states in Southeast Asia are also gradually modernizing their naval and air forces to keep their vital sea lanes open, conduct intelligence missions, and, perhaps most importantly, provide options for deterring China's naval forces from seizing disputed islands in the South China Sea. While there are different political, strategic, and technological drivers shaping regional military modernization trajectories, including long-standing intraregional rivalries and competition over borders, resources, and history, most Southeast Asian countries share concerns about China's “coercive diplomacy,” military capabilities, and future aspirations in the region.

Consequently, Southeast Asian countries are responding by revamping their force modernization priorities, partnerships, and overall strategic choices. Given their varying levels of development and defense resource allocation, however, their military-technological trajectories show considerable variation in the pace, direction, scope, and character of adaptation. This is reflected in the resulting regional

“arms competition,” characterized by incremental, often near-continuous, improvements of existing capabilities as well as in a mix of cooperative and competitive pressures; continued purchases of advanced weapon platforms, including the introduction of new types of arms; and therefore, unprecedented military capabilities.¹⁴ In short, China’s increasing power-projection capabilities are gradually redefining regional military balance and, subsequently, US strategy and that of its partners and allies. The resulting broader strategic debates converge on the question of how to attain long-term, credible, cross-domain, attack-and-defense in-depth capabilities while sustaining joint operational capabilities in select contested areas in the Indo-Pacific and simultaneously mitigating a range of escalatory risks.

China’s Military Modernization

In the context of the above strategic debates is the challenge of ascertaining the pace, character, direction, magnitude, and impact of China’s ongoing military modernization. Indeed, China’s development of its military capabilities under Pres. Xi Jinping has seen many accomplishments—from the introduction of the next generation of supercomputers to aviation prototypes such as the J-16, J-20, J-31; from new helicopters and UAVs to the ongoing construction of a second aircraft carrier; and a record number of commissioned ships such as Type 054A, 056 frigates, and 052C destroyers. Arguably, China’s political and military elites believe that a new wave of the global revolution in military affairs is gathering pace, led principally by the United States, and Beijing must therefore accelerate the pace of its military development. In the next 5–10 years, China is expected to transfer many experimental models from a research-and-development (R&D) phase to a production stage, including a number of systems in what the PLA calls domains of emerging “military rivalry”: outer space, near-space, cyberspace, and underwater.¹⁵ These include the next generation of ballistic missiles, nuclear and conventional, long-range precision-strike assets such as hypersonic vehicles, offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities, new classes of submarines, supported by a variety of high-tech, directional rocket rising sea mines with accurate control-and-guidance capacity. The key question, however, is whether China’s defense industries and the PLA can sustain their relative progress in terms of confronting internal constraints while facing external competition?



Photo courtesy of Danny Yu,
<http://www.airliners.net/photo/China-Air-Force/Shenyang-J-31-F60/2546527/L>.

Figure 2. Shenyang FC-31 (F60) at 2014 Zhuhai Air Show.

Since the late 1990s, the PLA has been selectively upgrading its existing weapons systems and platforms, while experimenting with the next generation of design concepts. This is apparent in the gradual modernization of China's nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles; integrated air, missile, and early warning defense systems; electronic and cyberwarfare capabilities; submarines; surface combat vessels; and fourth- and fifth-generation multirole combat aircraft.¹⁶ With the qualitative shifts in "hardware," the PLA has been also revamping its "software"—military doctrine, organizational force structure, operational concepts, and training. Notwithstanding the PLA's most important grand strategic objective—the preservation of the political supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—embedded in the concept of "safeguarding China's national sovereignty, national security, and territorial integrity and supporting China's peaceful development," the scope of its "core missions" has been gradually extending. The PLA's mission templates now include both "traditional" as well as "new" missions consistent with

the objective of protecting China's national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity.¹⁷

According to a recent study, the PLA's notion of traditional missions includes Beijing's traditional threat perceptions that have remained relatively constant since the founding of the PRC in 1949: "resisting aggression" from neighboring countries, such as India and Russia, and countries that can project power into China's territorial and maritime domains, such as the United States. Additionally, this notion includes "containing separatist forces" in the provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet and deterring Taiwan moves toward independence. Furthermore, the concept includes "safeguarding border, coastal, and territorial air security" from intervention or interference from either state or non-state threats. Moreover, the PLA has increasingly placed an emphasis on "protecting national security interests in space and cyberspace" as a core mission-domain.¹⁸

At the same time, the PLA has been gradually expanding its area of operations under the broader concept of "New Historic Missions," in line with "China's peaceful development" strategy that essentially provides legitimacy for the CCP. The new missions include "participating in emergency rescue and disaster relief operations," internally and externally; "subduing subversive and sabotage attempts and cracking down on separatist forces" to counter terrorism; "accomplishing security provision and guarding tasks" through the PLA's involvement in peace-keeping operations; "merchant vessel protection" for state and non-state actors; "evacuation of Chinese nationals overseas"; and "security support for China's interests overseas," including protecting maritime commerce through antipiracy operations.¹⁹

The shifting character of the PLA's operational template toward diversified missions in turn compels the Chinese defense industry to deliver much-more-advanced weapons platforms, system, and technologies. For most of its history, however, the results of these endeavors have been decidedly mixed. According to Richard Bitzinger et.al., as late as the late 1990s, China still possessed one of the most technologically backward defense industries in the world; most indigenously developed weapons systems were at least 15 to 20 years behind those of the West—basically comparable to 1970s- or (at best) early 1980s-era technology—and quality control was consistently poor. Observers generally regarded China's defense R&D base to be deficient in several critical areas, including aeronautics, propulsion (such as jet engines), microelectronics, computers, avionics, sensors and seekers, electronic warfare, and advanced materials.²⁰ Furthermore, the Chinese military-industrial complex was traditionally weak in the area of systems integration—that is, the ability to design and develop a piece of military equipment that integrates hundreds or even thousands of disparate components and

subsystems. Consequently, aside from a few “pockets of excellence” such as ballistic missiles, the Chinese military-industrial complex appeared to demonstrate few capacities for designing and producing relatively advanced conventional weapons systems. Especially when it came to combat aircraft, surface combatants, and ground equipment, the Chinese generally confronted considerable difficulties when it came to moving prototypes into production, resulting in long development phases, heavy program delays, and low production runs.²¹

Historically, the development of China’s defense industry progressed gradually in four overlapping waves: (1) the Maoist Era (1949–1978), (2) Deng’s Demilitarization Era (1980s–1990s); (3) Reform Era (1998–2012); and (4) the current Xi Jinping’s Reform Era 2.0 (2012–present).²² In 2003, after another decade of stagnation, Beijing decided to build a new civilian technological and industrial base with embedded military capabilities (Yujun Yumin). At that time, China’s political establishment envisioned this strategy as paving the way for a new round of associated reforms in the defense industry, including allowing select private-sector firms to engage in defense work. The key areas of China’s dual-use technology development and subsequent spin-on included microelectronics, space systems, new materials (such as composites and alloys), propulsion, missiles, computer-aided manufacturing, and particularly information technologies. Subsequently, Yujun Yumin became a priority in the last several Five-Year Defense Plans. These plans have emphasized the importance of the transfer of commercial technologies to military use, calling upon the Chinese arms industry to not only develop dual-use technologies but also to actively promote joint civil-military technology cooperation. In the early 2000s, Beijing worked hard to encourage further domestic development and growth in these sectors and to expand linkages and collaboration between China’s military-industrial complex and civilian high-technology sectors.²³

Currently, China’s long-term strategic military programs yield evidence of deep integration with China’s advancing civilian science and technology (S&T) base, which in turn is increasingly linked to global commercial and scientific networks. Technology transfers, foreign R&D investment, and training of Chinese scientists and engineers at research institutes and corporations overseas are part of China’s indigenous innovation drive to identify, digest, absorb, and reinvent (IDAR) select technological capabilities, in civil and military domains.²⁴ In the process, Beijing is benchmarking emerging technologies and similar high-tech defense-related programs in the United States, Russia, India, Japan, Israel, and other countries.²⁵ Specifically, China’s government under President Xi views the indigenous innovation strategy as mutually supporting the PLA’s military modernization and the country’s economic future to achieve long-term sustainable

growth, efficiency, and productivity gains, while mitigating serious problems, including labor shortages, stretched resource supplies, unequal distribution of income, social tensions, and unprecedented environmental pollution. In the process, China is attempting to translate its absorptive capacity to recognize, assimilate, and utilize new and external knowledge into an innovative capacity that may in theory lead to disruptive innovation. Inherently, IDAR also aims to circumvent the costs of research, overcome technological disadvantages, and leapfrog China's defense industry by leveraging the creativity of other nations. This includes exploitation of open sources, technology transfer and joint research, the return of Western-trained Chinese students, and, of course, industrial espionage—both traditional and, increasingly, cyberespionage.²⁶

Notwithstanding the much-improved technological capabilities, however, the potential of Chinese defense S&T is still constrained in its continuing path dependencies. These include overlapping planning structures, widespread corruption, bureaucratic fragmentation, and most importantly, no real internal competition. Other barriers to innovation also include ensuring the structural strength, quality control, process standardization, evident for example in the development of engines required for next-generation aircraft. In the long term, the question is whether China will transform into a leading critical technological innovator of major weapons platforms and systems comparable in sophistication to global defense S&T powers. China's historical path dependence suggests this is unlikely. However, China will continue to seek niche technological developments that could potentially revolutionize the PLA's military operations by providing a credible asymmetric edge in regional flashpoints: i.e., anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-satellite ballistic missiles, hypersonic cruise missiles, and systems converging cyber and space capabilities. Ultimately, as China becomes more technologically advanced, Beijing's ability to align its strategic goals with technological advancements will increasingly shape its military effectiveness. These, however, must be viewed in the relative and comparative context of other countries' technological developments.²⁷

Cyber-Enabled Future Conflict Trajectories

With the convergence of conventional, asymmetric, low-intensity, and nonlinear security threats—coupled with the diffusion of advanced military and dual-use technologies—one could argue that the Indo-Pacific's future conflict spectrum will be increasingly characterized through overlapping strategic rivalries in multiple domains: space, cyberspace, near-space, underwater, and information. These domains enable and reinforce strategic ambiguity in terms of effects, sources, and motives.²⁸ For example, nearly all cyber-operations are based on the

use of ambiguity—neither confirming nor denying direct use of cyber-weapons vis-à-vis existing or potential adversaries and their select proxy targets. Direct and, to a lesser degree, indirect results of cyberwarfare are often invisible, which amplifies uncertainties on the sources of the intrusion, attack, or malfunction. Even if the source is known or detected, the purpose of the cyberattack might be less clear. Perpetrators may frame deliberate attacks to mislead people or their equipment. As Martin Libicki noted, “if cyber-attacks work—and this is a tremendous if—they change the risk profile of certain actions, and usually in ways that make them more attractive options.”²⁹ Accordingly, cyber-strategies may be used as a response to a limited kinetic attack or aggression with a lesser risk of escalation than a physical retaliation. Alternatively, cyber-strategies can be used to affect the outcome of a conflict in another state without any visible commitments. Consequently, however, strategic ambiguity may shape the propensity for offensive cyber-operations given the prevailing perceptions of lesser risks of detection, the lack of accountability, and the resulting low probability of successful deterrence.³⁰

The convergence of the above characteristics of cyberspace as a warfighting domain translates into a continuously expanding tactical envelope for cyber-kinetic operations, and perhaps more importantly, increasing strategic overlap with other domains of warfare—physical, informational, and cognitive. In the former, the concept of *cyberspace*—broadly characterized as a virtual information environment supported by system-of-systems physical infrastructures—increasingly serves as a mutually supporting layer connecting, empowering, and enabling content, actions, and capabilities of land, sea, air, and space systems operating in all physical domains. Simultaneously, the use of cyberspace in the information domain is intended to use either for *exploitation*—how the use or manipulation of information can be utilized to an advantage—or *protection*—how to prevent an opponent from using or manipulating information to an advantage. Moreover, cyberspace is also increasingly used as a sphere of influence in the psychological or cognitive domain—in the ability to penetrate target audiences in real time, for example, crafting messaging campaigns to go “viral” to create cognitive effects, whether cohesive or divisive. Accordingly, traditional regional security flashpoints in the East and South China Seas, the Korean Peninsula, and the Taiwan Straits will likely have parallel and continuous confrontations in and out of cyberspace, with potential cyberattacks on physical systems and processes controlling critical information infrastructure, information operations, and various forms of cyberespionage.

In China, the PLA’s Strategic Support Force has conceptualized future conflicts under the construct of integrated network electronic warfare (网电一体战 *wangdian yitizhan*, or INEW). INEW’s principles closely emulate Russian

conceptions through a holistic representation that combines simultaneous and coordinated use of computer network operations (CNO), electronic warfare, and kinetic strikes designed to paralyze an enemy's networked information systems. These include the PLA's electronic warfare and counter space forces using electronic jamming, electronic deception, and suppression to disrupt information acquisition and information transfer; and the PLA's computer network attack and exploitation units to disrupt, destroy, or subvert an adversary's data and networks using advanced virus attacks, hacking, deception, and sabotage information processing. INEW is expected to be employed in the earliest phases of a conflict and possibly preemptively with the objective to deny the enemy access to information essential for continued combat operations by creating "blind spots" against an adversary's command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.³¹

For the PLA, achieving information dominance (制信息权 *zhi xinxi quan*) is a key prerequisite for allowing the PLA to seize air and naval superiority, according to two of the PLA's most authoritative public statements on its doctrine for military operations: "The Science of Military Strategy" and "The Science of Campaigns." Both documents identify an enemy's C4ISR and logistics systems networks as the highest priority for select INEW operations. At the same time, the PLA recognizes the importance of controlling space-based information assets as a means of achieving true information dominance, calling it the "new strategic high ground." Meanwhile, the PLA's cyber units are involved in comprehensive cyber reconnaissance, probing the computer networks of foreign government agencies and private companies. These activities, which China denies, serve to identify weak points in networks, understand how foreign leaders think, discover military-communication patterns, and attain valuable technical information stored throughout global networks.

Consequently, the effectiveness of conventional defense strategies and weapons technologies could be potentially negated through a range of CNOs—defensive, offensive, and intelligence-driven, such as exploiting vulnerabilities in the country's systems and technologies for C4ISR.³² For militaries, cyber-enabled conflicts will evolve parallel with technological changes (i.e., the introduction of next-generation robots and remotely controlled systems) that will alter the character of future warfare. Cyberspace and space are likely to become major theaters of operations, arenas of continuous struggle, as major regional powers will continue to invest in full-spectrum CNO capabilities. The key challenge for militaries in the Indo-Pacific will center on ensuring the security, reliability, and integrity of country's mission-critical C4ISR systems that will become increasingly vulnerable to cyber threats as well as other emerging forms of electronic warfare, including

threats from electromagnetic pulse and high-powered microwave weapons. The propensity for cyber-offensive operations will create a greater uncertainty about the functionality of C4ISR in the event of a regional crisis.³³

Inherently, these challenges will apply to nearly all operational functions and processes that depend to some extent on cyberspace, including combat support and logistics systems. A sophisticated cyberattack on these systems would likely result in cascading effects with ramifications for the individual services and their abilities to carry out operational missions. Depending on the magnitude of cyberattacks on combat support systems, the operational capabilities will likely degrade. If the effects are immediate, the system degrades catastrophically. If the effects are gradual, the system's functions will degrade in phases depending on the ability to identify, diagnose, respond, and recover from the attack. Therefore, military organizations will have to focus on achieving operational mission assurance rather than traditional information assurance. A number of factors, including vulnerability and impact assessment of combat and logistics support systems that fall into a high criticality/high risk areas to operational missions will determine the ability to respond and recover from a major cyberattack.³⁴

Conclusion

In the long term, the deepening socioeconomic interdependencies and information architectures integrated in nearly all aspects of civilian governance (i.e., energy systems, communications, water, transportation, finance, and so forth) could be compromised to varying levels through various cyber-enabled operations. Consequently, the continuously evolving character and reliance on cyberspace in civil-military domains provides a new arena for strategic competition, increases uncertainty, and enables a spectrum of operations other than war.

With the widening complex operational requirements, the United States and its partners and allies may have to rethink existing concepts of operations, doctrinal command-and-control methodologies, organizational force structures, training programs, and ultimately, military-technological acquisition priorities. Indeed, major changes in the direction and character of conflicts will have implications on defense planning, resource allocation, training, organization and the use of force—propelling the need for a sustained conceptual, organizational, and technological innovation intended to enhance the military's ability to prepare for, fight, and win new types of wars. In this context, US strategic partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific must enhance their ability to change military posture rapidly based on the changes in geostrategic environment, while having the flexibility and robustness to employ novel strategies, tactics, and technologies in different ways and scenarios. As new strategic realities create new powers, new types of future conflicts

will emerge. Select military technologies and capabilities will diffuse to other major and many minor military powers, reshaping the paths and patterns of regional military modernization. The confluence of new strategies, technologies, organizations, and doctrines in the broader context of global power transitions will shape the direction, pace, character, and outcome of military change in the Indo-Pacific. **JIPA**

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BOOK REVIEWS

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Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation and Cooperation with Russia and China, 1945–2016 by David F. Winkler. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017, 320 pp.

David F. Winkler, a former commander in the US Navy, is indisputably the leading scholar of the Incidents at Sea Agreement, a 1972 accord negotiated between the United States and Soviet Union (USSR) that regulated maritime interactions on the high seas and contributed considerably to the Cold War staying cold. In *Incidents at Sea*, Winkler updates his now 20-year-old doctoral dissertation in a fascinating enquiry that shows that navies can cooperate and coordinate their behavior not just despite broader political tensions but also because of them. His narrative can be summarized by dividing the Cold War at sea into four phases.

In the first of these, the 1950s, American naval dominance was unchallenged because Soviet strategists believed the nuclear revolution had made naval power irrelevant. Even so, confrontations in the sky were common because American Navy and Air Force aircraft operated alongside—and even within—Soviet territory on “ferreting” missions intended to detect Soviet radars. The agitated Soviets did not have much success against American ferrets, and instead only managed to mostly down American aircraft outside their territory. The violence, however, was not one way, as seen by the American fighters that shot down a Soviet passenger plane in July 1953 in airspace the United States claimed to be North Korea’s and the USSR claimed as China’s. In this phase, more than one hundred airmen would die.

Happily, satellite technology, which could perform reconnaissance activities formally reserved to aircraft, helped move relations to a new phase by the fall of 1960, after which hazardous ferreting missions receded. But what technology gave with one hand, it took with the other, as the Soviets realized when the submarine *George Washington* successfully fired a Polaris ballistic missile underwater in July 1960: the nuclear revolution had moved beneath the waves. In response, the USSR reprioritized its navy, beginning with disguised trawler-type spy vessels Western navies called auxiliary general intelligence (AGI) ships. AGIs commonly performed aggressive maneuvers, both to harass US vessels and to gain the best information, particularly from aircraft carriers. Crashes between vessels would occur, but because AGIs were unarmed the potential for escalation was limited.

As the Soviet Navy grew in the second half of the 1960s, this changed, ushering in a third phase of relations. A series of high-profile incidents followed; warships of adversarial nations rubbing hulls and playing games of chicken, as they did in the Sea of Japan in 1967, was not a recipe for stability, particularly given rising tensions from unrelated developments, such as Israel’s 1967 War. In 1968, the Department of State approached the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to propose holding discussions on the “safety of the sea.” This was the genesis of what would become the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), the negotiations for which were led by John W. Warner, Under Secretary and then later Secretary of the Navy. The formal negotiations, which were preceded by laborious interdepartmental preparations in Washington, DC, were welcomed by the Soviets, apparently because they had a real fear that their young and inexperienced naval officers might rashly precipitate a superpower showdown. The announcement that Pres. Richard Nixon would visit Moscow in spring 1972 lent an urgency and legitimacy to the negotiations. The final agreement essentially regulated the game of naval chicken, laying out fairly

objective standards of behavior. Winkler stresses that the provisions for communication about INCSEA covenants via naval attachés (rather than via foreign affairs personnel) and annual review meetings were essential to the durability of the agreement.

After the agreement was inked, Winkler demonstrates that the number and severity of incidents at sea declined dramatically—moving the narrative to the fourth conceptual state of the Cold War at sea. Trouble began to brew again, however, when Pres. Jimmy Carter in 1979 launched a newly aggressive Freedom of Navigation (FON) program. The INCSEA agreement only covered interactions on the high seas; consequently, in disputed zones such as the Black Sea, the rules were no longer clear. As if to intentionally antagonize the Soviets, the Reagan administration, in early 1988, dispatched two warships to exercise “innocent passage” in the waters just off the Crimean Peninsula. Both were rammed, in a precarious incident that can be watched today on YouTube. At the INCSEA annual review that summer, a Soviet admiral protested that such US operations were “unnecessarily provocative.” Vice Adm Henry Mustin, America’s representative, concurred with his Soviet counterpart and thereafter “recommended that we [the United States] back off.” In a fascinating development, the United States did just this: in an implicit exchange, at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the USSR acknowledged the right to innocent passage and the United States acknowledged there was no longer any need to provocatively demonstrate this right. Shortly thereafter, the Cold War was over, and INCSEA annual meetings had become almost a formality.

The perceptive reader will at this point be wondering why this review has not yet mentioned China. The reason is: despite the title of the book—evidently added to draw interest—China remains only a short afterthought in the text. The book is also subject to more-serious criticism. Essentially, Winkler, despite his undeniable fair-mindedness, has provided a one-sided or “national” history. He appears to have interviewed or corresponded with virtually every important player on the American side. Yet he uses virtually no Russian sources, not even secondary or translated sources—with the only exception being a handful of token references to articles in *Morskoy Sbornik* (*The Russian Naval Digest*). As a consequence, he leaves many questions unanswered. Did Soviet officials agree that Americans were virtually always “in the right” vis-à-vis the “rules of the road?” Or was the belief of Soviet officials essentially parallel to that of their American colleagues—i.e., that the other side was almost always at fault? Even more intriguingly, how did the Soviets envision the strategic function of incidents at sea vis-à-vis the sending of “costly signals?” As relations become tenser between the US and China today, having some grasp on the answer to both questions could provide insights valuable to understanding, and regulating, maritime interactions.

Looking forward, the agreement of the September 1989 Jackson Hole summit may be the most important episode for contemporary policy makers to rediscover. FON operations today in the South China Sea are just as provocative to China as such operations were to Russia in the 1980s. A bargain that mixed explicit acknowledgements on the part of China and implicit commitments on the part of the United States could be a realistic compromise that would reduce the likelihood of an incident at sea resulting in a new world war.

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Dragon Wings: Chinese Fighter and Bomber Aircraft Development by Andreas Rupprecht. Shepperton, UK: Ian Allan Publishing, 2013, 219 pp.

Dragon Wings: Chinese Fighter and Bomber Aircraft Development is a history of Chinese military aircraft development, acquisition, and modification from the declaration of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 to the current day. Andreas Rupprecht authored multiple books and articles on Chinese aviation development and is recognized as an expert on the subject. His ability to extract information on China's aviation industry, despite limited resources on the subject, is impressive.

Rupprecht catalogues Chinese aviation history into easily digestible sections beginning with imports and indigenous designs from first-generation to fifth-generation fighters while also detailing bombers, antisubmarine aircraft, and new projects such as the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. He astutely draws connections between aircraft development and political turmoil that plagued the PRC during the economic and technological downfalls throughout the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolutions. Rupprecht also highlights the importance of PRC diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Russian Federation and analyzes how those relations impacted PRC acquisition of aviation technology.

This book focuses on aircraft development and not operational successes or failures. This is recommended for someone who is interested in the aerodynamic and engine development of the PRC aviation industry and desires a clear understanding of differences and similarities of variants between platforms (e.g., J-8H versus J-8F). However, the reader would have a better understanding of the impact of aircraft development if operational performance were discussed. Some mention is made to operational intentions, but lacks a follow-through. For example, the PRC was incapable of successfully intercepting high altitude US reconnaissance aircraft during the 1960s, and efforts were made to develop an aircraft that could successfully engage aircraft like the U-2. Rupprecht goes on to mention a PRC pilot who attempted to ram the U-2 unsuccessfully, and how ramming was later developed as a tactic, but it does not elaborate on how these tactics were employed—successfully or unsuccessfully.

Finally, the author's intent was to detail how China developed its aviation industry since its inception. One of the biggest surprises in the West has been the development and operational status of the J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighter. It is widely known that the PRC committed industrial espionage against the US and other Western countries to develop the J-20, but the book downplays the importance of how the Chinese acquired information illicitly about the F/A-22 or F-35 to assist in J-20 development.

Dragon Wings is a very thorough and comprehensive catalogue of Chinese military aircraft development and details the challenges, failures, and successes of its aviation industry and is recommended for anyone interested in PRC aircraft development.

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