Employing Strategic Cyber Competition in Latin America
A Senior Cyber Leader Mission

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Introduction

The United States is rapidly changing its approach to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), demonstrated directly by increased congressional support to US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH), through its Directorate of Communications (A6), is uniting in efforts with USSOUTHCOM’s cyber operations division (J38) to affect the Department of Defense’s (DoD) activities in a whole-of-government approach to the theater of operations. Thus AFSOUTH is seeking to enrich information-sharing with LAC nations to advance cyber awareness and capability within the southern theater of operations. This new focus poses opportunities and challenges within the cyber domain. Two of these challenges will be addressed. First, in light of a current lack of overall cyber threat knowledge, China’s seemingly advantageous monetary investment is accepted by LAC countries as a fair tradeoff for advancement. However, a cost-benefit analysis that juxtaposes nation-state sovereignty and technological advancement is needed in order to help LAC nations understand the cyber security risks associated with such a tradeoff. Second, a comprehensive cyber assessment, based in the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), would aid diverse US government agencies or departments in countering Chinese influence, ultimately supporting partner countries in making well-informed choices as part of their national cyber security calculus. A comprehensive cyber assessment enables the DoD to tailor education offerings and coalition exercise objectives, matching activities to maturity levels of partners throughout the Southern Hemisphere, resulting in sound cyber methodology that truly advances partner capabilities.

A New Approach

General Laura J. Richardson, USSOUTHCOM commander, recently testified to Congress and discussed USSOUTHCOM’s posture, identifying three main lines of effort, specifically: “strengthen alliances and partnerships, counter threats,
and build our team.”

General Richardson highlighted several areas of concentration in her testimony, but this essay will focus on Chinese and Russian influence in the region and explain why United States defense and industry should be the LAC’s partners of choice for cyber security cooperation. It will also address the need for greater cyber application and training.

Most recently, Matt Ferchen noted a strategic competition friction exists between the US and China, and it is advancing in the region. For example, Honduras recently pivoted to China, away from Taiwan, in order to open up greater Chinese trade and finance options. Moreover, Honduras previously abstained from the United Nation’s resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These actions correspond with Russia and China’s advancement in the region, facilitating Russia leveraging its placeholder status in LAC and directly contributing to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Part of China’s influence includes technological advancement and is not constrained to loans or hydroelectric dam projects. Ferchen describes China’s ‘Digital Silk Road,’ exposing a fiber optic cable connecting Brazil to Africa, mostly financed by Chinese companies. One can infer that Latin and Caribbean partnerships with Chinese firms, possibly stemming from budget restrictions (as seen with Honduras) or lack of understanding about cyber defense, calls their technical acumen into question.

While LAC has been progressing steadily toward utilizing the cyber domain, it has become a complex field that governments race to understand, defend, update, and maneuver within. Areas like cloud computing, zero trust, domain name service configuration, and cyber hygiene are foundational to cyber professionals. These areas can be used to develop a trust-relationship and trusted alternatives, leading toward a greater US-LAC effort to increase cyber engagement and cyber education across the hemisphere. China’s advancement is not new: its BRI has steadily increased over a few short years, but new indications suggest BRI may be in decline or advancing under a different name as the Global Development Initiative. Nevertheless, it is pursuing advantage in space and information operations. It is estimated that LAC theater competition it not simply a result of China’s regional expansion, but is also bolstered by the US focus on the Middle-East and lack of attention to South America. Ostensibly, the US offered fewer engagements and investments to its regional partners for an extended time, thereby allowing China and Russia to creep in.

So, why hasn’t the US advanced further in light of its refocused efforts on cyber education and cyber defense for LAC? A BNAmericas article on the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei exemplified how rapidly China grew over the last ten years; the company is a force within LAC, and has a presence in schools and universities (90 in Brazil alone), 5G mobile networks, cloud
computing via its CloudCampus 3.0 solution, routers, computer switches and other investments, of which they maintain approximately a 50-80 percent market share across several countries. In short, a progressive friction occurred for years between the US and LAC, possibly stemming from the US’s focus on the Middle East and its on-again, off-again interaction with LAC, combined with the US-LAC defense policy that focused more on partners operating in supporting roles to combat narcotics trafficking and thwarting external terrorism and threats, all contributing to a discontinuous relationship within the region that allowed China to fill the gap.

**Reclaiming Advantage**

Since the Chinese have sought to progress trade, projects, and loans within LAC, the Department of State acted to counter China’s maneuvers with its 18 December 2019 release of the América Crece effort as a whole-of-government approach to foster deliberate economic development in the hemisphere. Since that time, other governmental agencies initiated their own advocacy toward LAC partnership, such as the Department of Commerce’s inclusion at the 51st Annual Washington Council of the Americas, where they called for greater ties and cooperation. Likewise, the conferences and activities of the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America and the Caribbean contributed toward LAC investment. These efforts foreshadowed General Richardson’s posture statement and sought to synergize governmental and industrial organizations to contribute to the whole-of-government approach as an alternative to Chinese and Russian influence.

**AFSOUTH as a Partner**

In his essay on outcompeting China, AFSOUTH’s Deputy Commander, Brig Gen Sean Choquette, outlined air component lines of effort supportive to US-SOUTHCOM, naming the cyber domain as a centered focus area within the LAC theater. As a line of effort, the cyber domain acts as an Area of Interest (AOI) within AFSOUTH’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). General Choquette championed information-sharing and collaboration in cyber as well as calling for AFSOUTH’s subject matter experts (SMEs) to deliver partner education spanning cyber and infrastructure security. To make these strategic aims a reality, AFSOUTH A6 will coordinate with USSOUTHCOM J38 in joining LAC diplomatic and military forces to identify and employ Measures of Performance (MOP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) through deliberate joint planning processes. AFSOUTH A6 will act to collectively lead and support cyber SME
Employing Strategic Cyber... exchanges (SMEEs) with its country partners, NIST, and academic bodies to stimulate cyber maturity toward an upward glide slope to advance cyber awareness and capability. To facilitate this maturity, there are three specific cyber capability areas to develop: standardization, education, and employment, which are linked to respective USSOUTHCOM lines of effort.

**Assessing and Standardizing the Cyber Domain**

The great American baseball coach, Yogi Berra, once said: “If you don’t know where you are going, you might wind up someplace else.” Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated more stoically: “If you don’t know where you are going, every road will get you nowhere.” The US needs to understand cyber capabilities across all 31 AOR country partners. As our Latin American neighbors face their own cyber complexity, challenges such as political swings, the right to trade with world exporters, and regional differences cause distraction in the cyber domain. Since the 31 partners possess varying levels of cyber maturity, what standard should be used to create a cohesive and hardy AOR-wide cybersecurity capability? To have all 31 partners practice at the same level of cyber maturity concurrently is unrealistic; true cyber maturity takes years to develop. For example, the Organization of American States sought to rally its members for cyber awareness through a joint report released in 2013 that examined cybersecurity trends, but there was limited collective LAC participation, which frustrated momentum. Therefore, AFSOUTH encourages and advocates for adopting the NIST cybersecurity framework (CSF) model. NIST CSF is designed to work with the US whole-of-government, institutions supported by US federal grants, and US federal agency supply chains. Heitor et al. advocated for this route of security as they affirmed that “[t]his is a program of the outmost [sic] importance and relevance that has helped American innovative firms to growth.” This comes from an internal LAC perspective since these researchers were native to Portugal, Mexico, Brazil and Chile.

NIST CSF uses areas of the ISO 27001 standard, but while ISO 27001 is an international standard, it is not a legal requirement for specific areas of business, unlike risk management frameworks such as NIST CSF, GDPR, and HIPAA. LAC already has a starting point: Uruguay’s Agency for Electronic Government and the Information Society has already adopted the 5-level model of the NIST CSF and has been a member of the Digital Nations, a collaborative network of the world’s leading digital governments, since 2018, using NIST CSF as a roadmap. NIST representatives have also traveled to Colombia and Brazil to discuss NIST standards for industry, markets, and smart government adoption in trade and defense. As LAC partners adopt common standards, it will be easier to
assess, understand, and develop cyber partner capabilities. Using AFSOUTH’s cyber Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI), A6 will synchronize efforts to weave USSOUTHCOM’s theater campaign support plan for domain awareness into OAI engagements to fill cyber defense gaps. Deliberately developed MOPs and MOEs will then measure progress utilizing a NIST CSF baseline assessment as a reference point, iteratively reusing it as a gauge of maturity while also acting as a common cyber lexicon within and throughout the LAC theater.\textsuperscript{30}

Education occurs at every level of OAI. In fact, OAI’s offer flexible approaches to cyber employment during US-LAC interaction. Key Leader Engagements (KLE) work at a senior leader-to-leader level to introduce and reinforce best practices, in this case cyber practices. US military leaders offer their insight into how the DoD matured through their cyber capability at a strategic level. Likewise, SMEEs foster expert, thought provoking dialog and/or application-based involvement, such as the intelligence and cyber SMEE conducted in Chile seen in Figure 1. SMEEs

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\caption{EE. UU. Fuerzas Cibernéticas / Intel and Cyber SMEE, A6 rep, Captain Jefferson in Chile}
\textit{Source: Authors}
\end{figure}
allow individuals within the cyber domain AOI to collectively brainstorm problems and resolutions. When experts in cyber exchange ideas, best practices can be employed rapidly, thwarting network intrusion and multilevel threat vectors. The exchange of ideas should also encompass areas such as cyber assessments, exercise objectives, conferences, and formal cyber training.

**Assessments**

USSOUTHCOM J38 and AFSOUTH A6 partner to execute Joint Combatant-Command Cyber Assistance Teams (JCCAT). JCCATs operate at the request of a LAC partner, enabling experts to assess cyber network policies, procedures, and practices. JCCATs act like SMEEs but differ in the immediate application of the assessment; these small teams use their tacit knowledge to work with country partners to dissect a network hack or system malware threat and detect that threat’s impact. Ideally, JCCATs happen before a threat, to identify vulnerabilities, but regardless of the need or timing, the US is willing to collaborate pre- and post-assessment in order to educate like-minded cyber professional teams.

**Exercises**

Exercises exist to test military forces, allowing those forces to learn from their mistakes; and critical analysis during After Action Reports allow for understanding of the decision-making cycle. Thus, to be effective, actions in the field need to be deliberately linked in a cause-and-effect methodology. Historically, there was no line drawn through the multi-year planning phases of exercises to determine MOEs. AFSOUTH A6’s intention is to now use a deliberate, staggered, and measurable approach toward OAsIs that promote cyber maturity. In short, assessing, teaching, testing, measuring, and adjusting are the decisive points toward cyber maturity and partner nation exercises will utilize these skills.

**Conferences**

LAC hosts some of the best technical conferences in the world. Conference attendance and interaction not only educates at an academic level, but bolsters sidebar discussions apart from formal presentation of cyber practices. COVID-19 shattered conference attendance and we are now overcoming the shortfall of idea exchange. To lead in this space, A6 attended several LAC conferences to engage with our counterparts and the results are very promising. Notwithstanding, that means that the US should be hosting cyber awareness conferences as well.

A6 is therefore working toward hosting LAC Partners in order to partake in a joint discussion of LAC cyber and information technology at the Armed Forces
Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) Alamo ACE event in San Antonio, Texas. The ability for industry professionals, as well as Soldiers, Sailors, Guardians, and Airmen to hear challenges and advances in cyber capabilities from our LAC partners builds community understanding and support, and might just solve some problems in support of shared interests. AFSOUTH is very excited about the AFCEA forum and seeks to make it a recurring event.

Integrated education through international conferences also enlightens participants to industry best practices, standardization, and risks. Such an example is NIST programmatic cooperation where Safe/Smart cities are discussed. NIST warns that this technology, if implemented poorly, could be a threat toward personal privacy and security, but if done through multi-nation industry collaboration, could bring interoperability in accordance with ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee standards.31

**Formal Military Training**

Formal training comes in many forms. General Richardson promoted the Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA) in USSOUTHCOM’s Strategy as a mechanism toward professional military education and collaboration. To leverage this Spanish speaking vehicle, AFSOUTH A6 partnered with IAAFA to establish a new Defense Cyber Operations course commensurate with our country partners’ abilities.32 This course targets our enlisted forces; educating them is key to effective deterrence, especially in the cyber domain. Carrying that concept forward, A6 is working with IAAFA and the National Defense University, to employ a Senior Leader Strategic Cyber course that would imbue partner leaders with a foundational understanding of cyber defense, enabling them to make critical defense decisions about procurement, installation, and maintenance of their military networks.

If the US and LAC are to advance toward coherent interoperability, then the end state is to work with all 31 partners toward their own maturity through various means. AFSOUTH’s approach combines joint and air operations planning with exercises. As such, a deliberate string is drawn from a standardized cyber risk management framework, through education and SMEEs, to inherent cyber awareness and defensive capability. This goal is supported by conference attendance and formal training; the culmination should then be engagement and exercise employment utilizing those experiences. This produces improved security partnerships that act to link cyber actions and create a robust understanding of cyber defense so AFSOUTH can assist meeting Partner maturity goals.33
Employment

Richard L. Manley theorized that future cyber operations will occur in the shadows, in the gray area, in order to avoid full scale war or armed conflict. He also asserted that both China and Russia already operate in this area: China specifically navigates without restrictions, combining the elements of national power, Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics (DIME), to dictate its agenda. If LAC fails to acknowledge that China has an agenda, then LAC partners unavoidably and systematically renounce their national sovereignty through every cyber purchase or agreement.

To counter Chinese and Russian forces, the utilization of recently published US Air Force (USAF) doctrine readily offers a framework for defense and advancement of cyber awareness and capability. Friendly forces can employ the tenet of Persistence, which “denies an adversary an opportunity to seize the initiative or to directly accomplish assigned tasks,” and combine it with Flexibility and Versatility, which permit “Airpower to achieve synergy through asymmetric and parallel operations.”

Actions supporting these tenets stimulate inherent capability to overcome cultural and language barriers. One such example is the leveraging of the formal relationship that exists with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) as it conducts the State Partnership Program (SPP), which pairs Air and Army National Guard units with LAC countries. A6 is seeking to take advantage of interchanges that already occur between NGB-LAC associations to maximize partnerships. Ideally, if a SPP operates within a cyber AOI, such as conducting a military exercise or spearheading a SMEE, then A6 would be on that team as well. For example, in 2021, AFSOUTH A6 led and executed three cyber events and supported JCCAT. Then, in 2022, A6 led three of its first-ever, in-person cyber engagements, all of which relied on support from force providers sourced from the USAF, Space Force, and NGB.

To cross the external language barrier, AFSOUTH A6 reached out to language-enabled cyber experts from various organizations, including IAAFA and the USAF Culture and Language Center (AFCLC), which manages the Language Enabled Airmen Program (LEAP). LEAP is a force multiplier since its role is to deliberately develop language enabled, cross-cultural Airmen with working-level foreign language proficiency to directly support air power, which strengthens partnerships and interoperability. Operating internal to the LAC theater, Partner nations often have a Security Cooperation Officer (SCO) assigned to identify and project OAIs and training for their respective country. SCOs provide data regarding re-
cently executed OAIs that may include an abridged evaluation of their countries’ current state of cyber capability.

SCOs encourage service components to work together when conducting joint cyber events, as opposed to executing service-specific events, in order to reduce component-centric silos or stovepipes. This advocacy is well placed since some LAC Ministries of Defense appoint specific service components as operational leads for the conducting of cyberspace operations, since they may not be focused on joint component symmetry. Thus, achieving parity with country partners may offer a challenge since their force structure may not coincide with US cyber force structure, but flexibility in cooperation helps to overcome differences in disparate partner joint force constructs. While the US works to streamline its own jointness, it should also encourage joint collaboration amongst LAC partners for successful cyber defense. For example, during two different partner SMEEs in 2022, AFSOUTH tested joint cyber plans, proving these engagements could be successful and productive when communication barriers were set aside, with participating military branches conversing openly and exchanging information.

To foster our LAC connectivity, we must follow the call to action from USAF Chief of Staff Gen Charles Q. Brown, Jr., and “Accelerate Change or Lose” to engage in the strategic competition that he described in his challenge. To facilitate this challenge, AFSOUTH will need to find new ways to recruit technical and language-enabled experts to conduct engagements, assessments, and training. One possibility is to source force providers from across theaters and commands, utilizing untapped Airmen potential to augment cyber security cooperation OAIs in USSOUTHCOM.

The Way Forward

AFSOUTH is planning to execute three SMEEs in Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 and is refining concepts for events proposed for FY 2024 to advance cyber awareness and capability. In FY 2024, AFSOUTH A6 will amplify its reach and double its number of OAIs to approximately 12. AFSOUTH recognizes that while it is important to maintain engagements with larger strategic partners, it will also build and maintain relationships with smaller countries in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. This will allow us to find new ways to identify and allocate resources, funding, and personnel, and will require creativity as well as knowledge of funding authorities under which US security cooperation operates. Creating new events will be challenging but will deliver the advantage needed to strategically compete with China and Russia in the cyber domain.

The way forward to strengthen and advance cyber awareness and capability is to create tactic-based scenarios that require military forces to maneuver through
exercise objectives and the friction they are meant to create. For example, disrupting a radio network, introducing a denial-of-service network effect, or simulating an insider threat during an exercise enables planners, leaders, and military forces to think critically in a joint and coalition way to mitigate threat.

This path already has precedent, such as Columbia becoming a Non-NATO Nation as a Global Partner in 2018. They recognized the need to synchronize and standardize their defense posture with other nations, thus they sought to become a LAC leader in training and cyber defense. As they progress, Columbia exercises and hosts academic forums to train and test their cyber capability.

The Cost of Inaction

Cyber hacks, attacks, and vulnerabilities repeatedly occur, as seen in Peru, Chile, Mexico, El Salvador, and Colombia, and they continue with impunity. Not surprisingly, Curtis A. Ward’s 2010 essay discussed the Caribbean’s need to initiate preventative action for their national security and regional economic interests. While there has been progress, there has also been Chinese advancement within the Caribbean region, with China going so far as to create a roadmap for advancement during the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Forum. One of the areas identified for expansion includes a China-CELAC Science, Tech, and Innovation Forum. Why should this be a concern? Recent research from Gartner Inc. highlighted that Huawei possesses a significant presence in the firewall space, and continues to develop AI and machine learning capability, partly attributed by its attractive pricing model. However, this accelerates China’s entrenchment in LAC with “standard-setting technology companies like Huawei, ZTE, Dahua and Hikvision—all sanctioned by the US—in regional infrastructure, allowing Beijing to dictate the rules of commerce for a generation.”

These Chinese technology industry leaders effectively use their market share and expertise to exfiltrate data, in accordance with Chinese law, from host countries that install their equipment. LAC has unknowingly bolstered Chinese expansion via infrastructure contracts which can have negative results on a nation’s cyber security, since these contracts have been deemed as “predatory” when analyzed. One example is the case of data exfiltration from the African Union’s headquarters that occurred over a multi-year timeframe, serving as a witness to the effects of Chinese contracts in action. A further example of information technology installation is the integration of Safe Cities, under the guise of safety and crime reduction, which gathers biometric data on host countries’ populations while locking the host nation into legal replacement contracts. Synchronizing with and leveraging honest broker cyber and communications industry to offer value-based
software and hardware to the LAC community, although often higher in cost, would certainly ensure a sovereign defense posture in the LAC region.

Warning signs of nefarious Chinese cyber actions and Russian hacks are plentiful and branch into areas often thought benign. Hospitals or biomedical labs that China sponsors, or the vaccine tests they offer, help to exfiltrate host population DNA to directly gather data which contributes to China’s disease control and pharmaceutical marketing. Each slow and deliberate Chinese step forward is a step taken away from the US and its LAC Partners, as China slowly gathers data and gains soft power for their AOR foothold and maneuver.

**In Summary**

USSOUTHCOM named AFSOUTH as the command’s innovation lead. Additionally, Brig Gen Choquette called for greater information-sharing between AFSOUTH and LAC nations. As a result, A6 is answering those calls in order to advance international cyber awareness and capability within the southern theater of operations. This will be done through a deliberate method of standardization, education, and employment of processes and procedures. Facilitating partner nation cyber operations through the linkage of NIST CSF, training, and military exercise objectives should produce a positive upward glide slope in their cyber journey. Additionally, a whole-of-government approach should be used to synchronize organizational efforts in partner nation engagements and should include the DoD, Department of Commerce, Chamber of Commerce, and other honest broker industry communities. A6 will also take advantage of Spanish speaking capable Airmen, through AFCLC and LEAP programs, to bridge the language gap to facilitate connective tissue between US and LAC cyber professionals. A6 will also synchronize KLE cyber input, SMEEs, JCCATs, conference attendance, education efforts, and training to positively affect a hearty cyber security framework for theater maturity. A6 will do this through interfacing with the partner nation cyber community to determine their respective requirements, from a reciprocal point of view, in order to tailor cyber efforts and effects.

However, LAC nations must determine whether budget-friendly technological advancement is worth the cost of their nation-state sovereignty. Their citizens’ data, as well as defense security data, is at stake with Chinese technology. Moreover, Russian hackers continue to introduce malware and questionable narratives that pose a cyber security risk in an immature cyber defense theater of operations. Latin America and the Caribbean has the opportunity, based on US proximity, to heavily invest in cyber industry partnerships friendly to partner nations’ growth to thwart China and Russia. The US is indeed staged for strategic competition, but it is LAC that holds the defining choice.
Notes


17. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits.”


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43. Tisha Bhambrly, “The Gartner Top Cybersecurity Predictions for 2023 (APAC).”


45. Dept. of Homeland Security, “DHS Warns American Businesses about Data Services and Equipment from Firms Linked to Chinese Government | Homeland Security,” Department of


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