

The Role of Diplomacy and Negotiation as a Military Economic Strategy in the New World Order

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Present Situation

The international arms race consumes economic resources in a vicious circle as nations invest in weaponry to keep pace with external threats. However, if a nation's economy is weakened or destroyed, it cannot continue these investments. Thus, the need for diplomacy and negotiation to play a strategic economic role in support of a nation's military.

Within international politics, Hans J. Morgenthau emphasizes in his book *Politics Among Nations* that all politics constitute a struggle for power and that whatever the ultimate goals of international politics, power is always the immediate objective.¹ But what is power? Robert A. Dahl, one of the leading exponents in political science, defines the concept of power as an actor "A" having influence over an actor "B" such that the latter is compelled to do something it would not otherwise do.² With this as an assumption, it then makes sense to specify the extent of power of each particular actor, as well as the issues involved—that is, each one's domain of power.³

However, this succinct description of power leaves many other factors unexplained.⁴ Since there exists a great interdependence between states in current international relations, "there is an urgent need to create better and fairer global rules, policies and institutions."⁵ To achieve this, effective negotiation methodologies and diplomacy are essential.

This article explores the pertinent elements of power relationships within military economic strategy (taking into account the impact of public and cultural diplomacy), as well as the methodologies related to negotiation and the use of soft power, to answer the research question: What is the role of diplomacy and negotiation as a military economic strategy in the new world order? The conclusions highlight the relevance of strategies that combine soft and hard power and offer recommendations for future research.

The New World Order

History and experience have shown a strategic hyperactivity in international relations in the time period leading up to a new world order.⁶ Between the end of WWII and the 1980s, the integration of economic blocs of countries worldwide contributed to the development of a cold war between the two major powers at the time, the Soviet Union and the United States (US), both of which strove to influence different ideologies in the states looking at them as economic and strategic models to follow. Unfortunately this struggle featured the risk of mutual destruction, due to their emergent nuclear capabilities.⁷ However, with the fall of the Soviet bloc, global bipolarity seemed to be coming to an end, with the US, with its demonstrated efficiency and capability in the global market, becoming a hegemonic power.⁸

Challenges to this hegemonic power have emerged in recent decades: the development of the internet, other communication technologies, and international trade linked to increasingly stronger globalization. New rising actors, driving both diplomatic and economic multilateralism, have created a New International Economic Order (NIEO). As stated by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “This is not simply a new movement in the economic cycle or an anecdotal alternative in the international situation. It is a turning point in contemporary economic history, a moment for a composed review of experience and the patient construction of a new system of international economic relations.”⁹ The ECLAC contends that the phenomenon of globalization is causing multilateralism to become increasingly indispensable and unstable at the same time, where the United Nations (UN) and related organizations are depended upon to provide the basis for international policies in areas such as economic development, peace and international security, as well as many other technical and social fields.¹⁰ Additionally, the ECLAC asserts that “multilateralism, including a universal, rules-based, open, transparent, predictable, inclusive, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system, is the most appropriate platform for international cooperation to solve the problems facing humanity” and that this cannot be achieved without diplomacy and negotiation.¹¹

However, multilateralism has also generated a greater need for military resources to defend against threatening policies or actions. As was the case at the beginning of WWI when “the imperialist powers had begun an arms race that was already reflected in pre-war economies and public finances,” a similar arms race exists today, which has been further driven by the war between Russia and Ukraine.¹²

Although it is true that there have been multiple efforts to reduce the demands of military expenditures for the social and economic benefit of humanity, “the

arms race has continued at the same pace and, although there have been numerous attempts to reverse this trend, they have not been very effective to date.”¹³ This pace threatens to destabilize world peace, as resources are allocated to weaponry instead of education and health.¹⁴ Today’s global environment needs the UN to adapt the processes and efficiencies brought about by globalization to lead to a greater balance of power among states. However, the “demands of developing countries” have been “making international negotiations difficult, provoking the anger and frustration of all parties, and reducing the effectiveness of international organizations.”¹⁵

A clear example is the UN Security Council (UNSC), which “has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”¹⁶ While the goal of the UNSC is to guarantee the new world order which humanity yearns, actual ability to implement concrete actions is hampered by its permanent members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the US), who act based on their own national interests, and use their veto power to prevent concrete actions from being implemented.¹⁷ Even among these permanent members, there appears to be two competing sides or ideologies. Russia and China on one side, while the US, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) on the other. This denotes, through a strategic game of diplomacy and negotiation, an emerging re-polarization of international relations once again. This represents a new world order in which nations will once again need to align with a permanent UNSC member to ensure their protection against opposing members of the UNSC.

It is then understandable the high level of effort that these permanent members have been expending to establish alliances with other nations, to either expand their ideologies or enforce sanctions outside of UN mandates. A current example is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which the UNSC has been incapable of stopping due to Russia’s veto power, which has forced the US, France, and the UK to ask their respective allies to act on their own in condemning Russia’s actions.

Thus, despite the framework of the UNSC, “the governments of developed countries reserve and exercise the right to unilateral and bilateral action, and the right to participate in regional spheres, simultaneously with global debates and negotiations.”¹⁸ For this reason, as the *International Labour Organization* (ILO) states: “The current trajectory of globalization must change. Too few share in its benefits, and too many lack a voice to contribute to its planning and influence its course.”¹⁹ While the constant interaction of political, economic, social, and technological factors make the new world order difficult to clearly and precisely define, it seeks greater respect, equity, peace, equal opportunities, commitments, and nonintervention among the actors, forcing them to have greater and more efficient diplomacy and negotiation systems.²⁰

Globalization of Information

From every point of view, it can be argued that globalization has been fostering a world that is increasingly dynamic, connected, and unstable, capable of generating new problems at any moment that military strategists must be able to solve or at least minimize effectively. As Karl Case and Ray Fair write, “dramatic increases in the flow of information and commerce over the Internet and the increased speed and lower cost of travel have made the world a much smaller place and much more aware of cultural, political and religious differences.”²¹

The increase in information flow has also encouraged greater human interaction, which can be defined in one word: personality. This has made difficult the ability to separate interaction from people.²² As Evan Ellis explains, the internet, social media, and even telephones encourage greater participation in the creation of ideas and opinions.²³ Such ideas have included calls for a more peaceful, equitable, and balanced world, with opportunities for all. This can be seen through a more profound interest in the social and economic aspects that have a direct impact on states and their inhabitants.²⁴ What’s more, Fabiola Rodríguez states:

(...) one could not speak of globalization without the globalization of culture, nor of a new economy without the advances of cultural industries, nor of citizenship and human rights without the profile of cultural rights. It is in this context that culture has gained significance in international relations in vital issues such as the phenomena of globalization, migratory flows, the affirmation of cultural rights as fundamental human rights, cultural diversity, and the increasing influence of new technologies on the social and cultural life of citizens.²⁵

Thus, it is important to remember that in historical times of war “it was not military deterrence or economic interest that saved Paris and Rome from demolition, but the cultural projection of those cities.”²⁶ This reflects a phenomenon that has allowed the international community to observe and experience the interrelationship that now exists between countries.²⁷ This interrelationship obliges us to seek “a globalization with a social dimension, which preserves human values and improves people’s well-being in terms of freedom, prosperity and security.”²⁸ Today, with the support of information technologies, it has been possible to project power through the creation and development of networks that have transformed the world into a more multipolar and multipower one, with more platforms and more interests competing for global influence.²⁹

One of the most significant effects of the transformation of information technologies has been the increased need for public diplomacy. The following section details the elements of both public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy, and the concept of soft power.

The Roles of Cultural and Public Diplomacy

For Théophile Funck-Brentano and Albert Sorel, diplomacy “is the science of the social and political constitution of states and the art of reconciling duties, rights, and interests. Its aim is to maintain, assert and develop peaceful relations between the states.”³⁰ Similarly, Henry Kissinger described the concept of diplomacy as the art of restraining power, as well as the art of containing force, force being an element of power but hardly its only manifestation.³¹

Cultural diplomacy is the exchange of ideas, information, art, or other aspects between nations and their peoples with the aim of achieving mutual understanding.³² This type of diplomacy has been gaining special relevance in recent years within states’ foreign policy declarations.³³ This serves as a reminder that diplomacy is one of the oldest activities that social groups carry out to establish relationships with other social groups and that now, as a result of globalization and technological advances, there are multiple actors which make the balance and harmony in relationships more complex.³⁴

According to Geoffrey Pigman, cultural diplomacy focuses on how governments use their state’s culture to communicate to others about themselves as a means of overcoming alienation.³⁵ Furthermore, an important aspect of cultural diplomacy is “the search for mutual understanding through the expression of values, traditions and artistic and cultural manifestations.”³⁶ This can be clearly seen in the current war between Russia and Ukraine. For example, “in recent months, diplomatic action by cities, especially in Europe and North America, has maintained a frenetic pace. For example, in March 2022, the mayor of Rotterdam sent a letter to his counterpart in St. Petersburg to denounce the invasion,” trying to reach peaceful agreements that would allow for a ceasefire, and of course less damage to the global economy.³⁷

More broadly, public diplomacy refers to the communication that governments and other diplomatic actors make to the public. Constantly evolving information technologies have spurred public diplomacy to ever greater relevance, which has been used to encourage support for a government’s foreign policies as well as for the objectives and operations of a multilateral organization, such as the UN.³⁸

Cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy are closely linked under the concept of soft power. According to Joseph Nye, soft power is the ability to influence others to obtain the results that one desires through attraction, without having to resort to coercion or payment.³⁹ Conversely, Nye emphasizes that hard power consists of one actor exerting force on another actor (such as physical subjugation) to get desired results.⁴⁰ Hard power does not always depend solely on coercion, it also depends on the perception of other actor, thus the relationship is bidirectional

and dependent on soft power as well. Another example of the advantages of including soft power in military strategy is the use of psychological operations in wartime. These operations are designed to influence the behavior of foreign actors, which, in the end, can deter direct confrontations.⁴¹

Military Economic Strategy

The Royal Academy of Spain states that strategy is the “art of directing military operations.”⁴² Yet, if we ask ourselves what “art” is, we find that it is the “capability or ability to do something.”⁴³ Therefore, we can say that strategy is the capability or ability to direct military operations.⁴⁴ We can also state that strategy is the capability to direct actions that seek to achieve a clearly proposed objective through the element of surprise against a competitor state. Continuing with other definitions, Henry Mintzberg states that strategies are “plans for the future and patterns from the past”—in other words, learning from what we have experienced in the past to plan our future activities, including, of course, our economic and military actions.⁴⁵

Ohmae Kenichi explains that strategy constitutes the means to “achieve the most favorable conditions for oneself, judging precisely the right moment to attack or withdraw and always evaluating the limits of the commitment correctly.”⁴⁶ This could be interpreted as the capability to accurately analyze internal and external factors to attack our enemies through the element of surprise, thus achieving a competitive advantage in war. Lastly, for Carlos Segura, strategy “is the action of surprising, confusing or deceiving our competitors with the help of the information available to us, with the intention of achieving a goal.”⁴⁷

The phenomenon of globalization has brought unprecedented interaction and connection in the political, economic, social, technological, and military spheres. In one way or another, these interconnections have forced states to seek effective strategies to minimize negative outcomes as much as possible in the face of a society that is increasingly hypersensitive to human rights violations. These strategies have meant that “the economic policies adopted by countries in their attempt to succeed in the global economy have brought with them a far-reaching liberalization of trade, investment and financial policies,” which in one way or another have become their own trap.⁴⁸

Military economic strategy centers discussion around the importance of states’ economic development; with international crises having the potential for extensive, severe consequences for the economy. For example, 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror caused a great decrease in tourism traffic and business travel worldwide, with several major airlines and hotels suffering great losses. Similarly, the war in Iraq and a strike in Venezuela in 2003 sent the world’s oil markets into turmoil, which led to a global increase in the cost of energy.⁴⁹ Thus, having a

healthy and growing economy allows states to invest in various areas of interest to their society. As stated by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO):

The experience of recent decades indicates that the development of warfare technology leads to a situation in which the warfare potential of nations increasingly depends on their overall economic potential, including the development of scientific research and their potential to applying their results.⁵⁰

In evaluating the above quote, we can infer that if a state's economy is not constantly growing, and is well developed and balanced, it will be difficult for the state to develop its military industry. The same is true if there is a fundamental imbalance between a state's economy, society, and politics.⁵¹ The "search for dialogue and peace" by some states can be considered a "strategy" that outwardly reflects a desire for dialogue and peace, while driven internally by a need to increase its military funding and capabilities. This type of strategy serves to deceive and confuse other states, and is in line with the assumption that the development of globalization is a complicated, multidimensional phenomenon whose most visible and determining facets are economic.⁵² This explains how international actors seek to avoid direct conflicts, and instead promote multilateral cooperation despite being, in some cases, more powerful countries.⁵³ An example of this cooperation is the international collaboration effort for the production of warfare resources by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization members.⁵⁴

"The imbalance between a state's economy and its system of government undermines democratic accountability," but helps, in part, to reduce large-scale warfare.⁵⁵ Nations who outwardly demonstrate little interest in world stability and peace may just be implementing a strategy to preserve their own economies via an arms race. This is where "diplomacy and negotiation as a military economic strategy" play a transcendental role. Through diplomacy and negotiation, nations can reach agreements that guarantee a stable economic environment, allowing them to secretly continue their arms races.⁵⁶ This diplomatic and negotiation strategy has a direct relationship with soft power, given that "the ability of a state to achieve its objectives is not through threat and economic reward, but through the attraction and persuasion, culture, or ideals of a country."⁵⁷ Yet, we can observe from "The Soft Power 30" study, which measures and analyzes "the political stability of countries, their contribution to world culture, their commitment to international affairs, their quality of education, their use of technologies and their investment environment," that the five countries that account for more than 60 percent of military spending worldwide are among the top 30 countries with the greatest soft power diplomacy.⁵⁸

However, there doesn't seem to be a correlation between military spending and a state's ranking in the study. For example, the UK occupies the number two position in this ranking, but its military budget increased by 2.9 percent in 2020. In the case of the US, it occupies the fifth position, but its military spending increased by 4.4 percent in 2020. For its part, China, which has been experiencing an increase of more than 76 percent in military spending since 2011 (1.9 percent in 2020), occupies the twenty-seventh position in soft power ranking. Meanwhile India, which does not appear on the list of the top 30 countries with the greatest soft power, increased its military spending by 2.1 percent in 2020. Lastly, Russia occupies the thirtieth position in the ranking, with a 2.5 percent increase in its military budget for 2020. If we compare these states with others on the same list whose military budgets are much lower, we can observe that there is no direct relationship between the level of soft power and military spending. In other words, having a lower military budget or being out of the arms race is not synonymous with having a better position in "The Soft Power 30" ranking.⁵⁹ This may lead to the conclusion that there's a disconnect between a state's military and economic strategies, as in many cases it is obvious: if a government emits a positive and trustworthy image, focused on dialogue and peace, then investment opportunities increase; the converse if military force is used.

Countries have realized, due to the major political, economic, social, and military developments brought about by globalization, "that in order to have a solid international presence, economic and military power alone is not enough."⁶⁰ States also realize that "conflicts can be prevented with a well-founded strategy, and not with just openness and casual curiosity."⁶¹ For example, "culture is a strategic element due to its versatility and plasticity because it acts in the field of consciences and behaviors."⁶² Furthermore, as previously discussed, diplomacy also consists of a cultural component, which directly or indirectly has an impact on the economies of nations. A well-designed cultural diplomacy will contribute to a fundamental economic strategy that avoids the development of incoherent armed conflicts. Of note, "public diplomacy strategies seek to improve the popularity of a country based on the dissemination of an image, while cultural diplomacy seeks mutual understanding and the creation and consolidation of bonds of trust."⁶³

As discussed, economic development has a direct impact on the arms race as "the scope and significance of the economic aspects of disarmament are intimately related to their economic effects."⁶⁴ Therefore, the search for peace through diplomacy and negotiations should be considered as a military economic strategy, as the use of this overt strategy can be used to conceal a covert arms race strategy to develop long-term defensive/offensive capabilities.

Negotiation and Soft Power as Alternative Methods in Military Strategy

In addition to effective and transparent diplomacy, the analysis of a situation, judgment, and negotiation are fundamental aspects that strategic actors and world leaders can put into practice for effective decision-making.⁶⁵ Without realizing it, every day we are immersed in negotiation processes that in one way or another help us achieve our objectives and satisfy our interests.⁶⁶ As stated by Barbara Budjac:

Regardless of the nature of your business, profession, or current interests, you constantly face conflicts and negotiate. Life is full of human interactions, and these are essentially a stage for negotiation. Other people influence our emotions and behavior, and we influence the emotions and behavior of others. Therefore, our participation is a continuum in which we perceive others and form attitudes towards people, situations, things, and concepts; while others perceive us and in turn form attitudes towards us.⁶⁷

Of note, “potential misunderstandings increase not only because perceptions vary, but because of the culture and values of senders and receivers of different nationalities.”⁶⁸ People, organizations, and states relate to each other through negotiation, and it is through negotiation that it is possible to reach agreements for the balance and harmony of common environments.⁶⁹ For example, strategic alliances contribute to the enhancement of military units and their effective linkage with other organizations.⁷⁰ This is impossible to achieve without effective negotiations.⁷¹ From an economic point of view, “economic considerations dominate international relations. Therefore, economic consequences . . . play a major role in international politics and negotiations.”⁷²

However, what is the meaning of negotiation? On the one hand, Cambridge University defines it as “the process of discussing something with someone in order to reach an agreement.”⁷³ For the Royal Academy of Spain, the term negotiation refers to the actions that are carried out to conclude an agreement between parties.⁷⁴ In analyzing further definitions of negotiation, Katherine Shonk states that negotiation is the action needed to reach an agreement with a counterpart regarding a specific situation that cannot be resolved independently.⁷⁵ Thus, it can be concluded that:

negotiation is the process by which two or more people, through well-founded or unsubstantiated ideas, interact with each other with the intention of reaching an agreement that is acceptable to the parties who wish to achieve an outcome within a specific context.⁷⁶

In view of the above, it is important to have a win-win ideology for all the actors involved, as defined by Stephen Covey:

win-win means that the agreements or solutions are mutually beneficial and mutually satisfactory. Win-win sees life as a cooperative, non-competitive scenario. Most people tend to think in terms of dichotomies: strong or weak, tough or soft, win or lose. But this type of thinking is fundamentally flawed. It is based on power and position and not on principles.⁷⁷

There is no doubt that in today's turbulent and hypersensitive world of international relations, being able to negotiate effectively becomes a strategic tool to achieve one's objectives without the need to risk one's own economy through military action. Additionally, we cannot overlook the importance of properly implementing negotiation methodologies, such as the "Direct Method of Successful Negotiation," as per the following figure:




Figure 1. Elements that define a Direct Method of Negotiation

Source: Author⁷⁸

Figure 1 shows that to start the negotiation process, the people involved must be analyzed and their interests identified and confirmed, which will allow the development of proposals, which can then be used to develop design options. The dotted arrows and a two-way arrow between these elements demonstrate that either proposal options are created and supported by objective criteria, or objective criteria are compiled and, from there, the proposals are created.

Another methodology that can be put into practice in the field of negotiation is BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), as shown in figure 2.




Figure 2. Preparation of the BATNA

Source: Author⁷⁹

Using the BATNA diagram as a tool allows for the development of the steps to follow when developing a negotiation. Of note, “it is important to look for ways to balance desire to achieve a lofty objective with the need to build a good

relationship.”⁸⁰ Good relationships will facilitate the harmonious development of activities that reduce the costs that might have been incurred with military force. The benefits obtained from establishing diplomatic and effective negotiation channels are truly significant and represent a strategic advantage, as resorting to military means risking a state’s economic framework.

On the other hand, globalization has enabled soft power to be integrated into the restructuring of power. This restructuring of power or power blocs can directly or indirectly be considered as a new world order, an order in which more enemies than allies emerge.⁸¹ This further delineates the need for effective dialogues to achieve peace and economic stability.⁸² This phenomenon leads to a comparison with game theory, since this theory:

formally and abstractly studies the optimal decisions to be taken by various adversaries in conflict and can be defined as the study of mathematical models that describe the conflict and cooperation between intelligent entities that make decisions. Such decisions are considered strategic, i.e., the entities participating in the game act in consideration of the actions that others would take.⁸³

Of course, decisions or actions taken by actors in a conflict entail political, economic, social, and technological factors that will mold international relations according to the conditions of the global environment.⁸⁴ It is at this point that multinational corporations play an important role, since they are “the backbone of the phenomenon of globalization under a financial and *lato sensu* economic profile, as they manage production, trade, distribution of wealth, and technological research.”⁸⁵ Multinational corporations, in one way or another, drive “states to no longer seek peace and security through diplomacy, but to also seek their own economic development.”⁸⁶

If, for example, states were to focus on explicitly projecting their power through warfare, in addition to being condemned by today’s society, their economies would also collapse. Yet, perplexedly, military spending continues to increase. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military spending increased by 2.6 percent globally in 2020, compared to the previous year. Among the main competitors in this arms race are the US, China, India, Russia, and the UK, which together account for 60 percent of global military spending.⁸⁷ For the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO):

How to end the arms race and achieve disarmament is a priority issue of our time. Public opinion is very concerned about the persistence of this arms race and its negative social and economic consequences.⁸⁸

It is precisely because of the public’s concern regarding arms races that it is fundamental and essential for governments to be able to establish diplomacy and

negotiation as a strategic tool that will allow them, by means of an impossible peace but improbable war, provide their populations with better economic conditions, thus fostering better social development in the new world order.⁸⁹

While it is true that it is more difficult for states to exercise soft power, since outcomes depend largely on the acceptance of other actors, the investment of time and resources in soft power is of utmost importance.⁹⁰ The converse is also true, as objectives will be even harder to achieve based on hard power alone.

In the work carried out by Vicente Guerrero, it is easy to see that the use of the military as the only means, or as a direct means, for solving differences, is unwise and economically destructive.⁹¹ Therefore, not having soft military economic strategies that allow agreements to be reached through diplomacy and negotiation is counterproductive, as military confrontations bring economic problems for both those who are under attack and for those who carry it out.

As ECLAC states, “a new economic order has objective foundations. The most obvious is the reciprocal interest of all countries. A prosperous world benefits all economies and, most particularly, the more advanced ones.”⁹² Therefore, “states are called upon to strengthen cooperation, in particular within the framework of the UN system and other relevant regional or international fora.”⁹³

It is understandable that international society is thirsty for the notions of democracy, disarmament, the need for a lasting and stable peace, and the correction of economic and social inequalities to achieve a balance in the peace and development of humanity, which are aspects that are difficult to achieve without a diplomatic mechanism and use of effective negotiations.⁹⁴ However, “just as no theory explains the lack of economic progress, no development strategy is likely to be successful in all nations.”⁹⁵ Yet, it is important to make the effort for the benefit of humanity and always keep in mind that “the basic principles that should guide globalization are democracy, social equality, respect for human rights and the rule of law.”⁹⁶ There is no doubt that global political and economic actions based on diplomatic principles and effective negotiation methodologies must be the priority and only valid resources to guarantee the success of states wishing to take the lead in today’s interconnected world.

More soft power could be the key for the future.⁹⁷ In the words of Jonathan McClory, states have been realizing that their traditional hard power, such as military and economic power, is no longer sufficient to achieve their proposed foreign policy objectives.⁹⁸ Even a superpower such as the US needs the cooperation of other countries to confront threats to its national security.

Today, the success of a policy depends on the ability to attract, build, and mobilize networks of actors to collaborate; and the skill, talent, and strategy to

persuade others without the use of force is required to precisely achieve this. Lastly, as highlighted by Nye:

Finally, as the RAND Corporation's John Arquila and David Ronfeldt argue, power in an information age will come not only from strong defenses but also from strong sharing. A traditional *realpolitik* mindset makes it difficult to share with others. But in an information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so.⁹⁹

Conclusion

Diplomacy and negotiation allow a state, in one way or another, to either distract or generate trust in enemies or other actors. This enables a state to generate a good public image, of peace and capability for dialogue, which encourages direct foreign investments, generates resources, and strengthens its economy. These resources can then be used to invest in a covert arms race; thus, the search for long-term peace through diplomacy and negotiations should be considered as a military economic strategy. This is the essence of the employment of Segura's strategy, a strategy meant to deceive or confuse adversaries.¹⁰⁰ However, at the same time, this does not mean that diplomacy and negotiation can also be a part of a military economic strategy intent on resolving differences through diplomatic means and negotiation that negates the need to invest heavily in military weaponry.

The author recommends future research should conduct case studies of the countries outlined in "The Soft Power 30" ranking to analyze the extent that soft power influences military spending. □

Notes

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