



## SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES

Syllabus

SAASS 600

# Foundations of Military Theory



**"Twitter war  
is not an  
independent  
phenomenon,  
but the  
continuation  
of politics  
by different  
memes."**

**Carl von Clausewitz, approximately.**

MemeCenter.com

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**Foundations of Military Theory**

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**Course director: Dr. James D. Kiras**

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# Foundations of Military Theory

## SAASS 600

“There are those who sneer at military theory and talk contemptuously of 'chairborne officers,' but the history of the last twenty years has demonstrated the vital importance of clear thinking and farsighted planning. Naturally the theorist must be closely allied to practical realities—Guderian is a brilliant example—but without his preliminary work all practical development will ultimately fail.”

F.W. von Mellenthin  
*Panzer Battles*

“[S]trategy cannot be a single defined doctrine; it is a *method of thought*, the object of which is to codify events, set them in order of priority and then choose the most effective course of action. There will be a special strategy to fit each situation; any given strategy may be the best possible in certain situation and the worst conceivable in others. That is the basic truth.”

André Beaufre  
*An Introduction to Strategy*

### Course Overview and Description.

Unsatisfying outcomes in war and uncertainties about future war often lead to reinvigorated study of war, including its theories and works on strategy. Some critics will put the blame for failure, real or perceived, at the foot of *homo strategicus*, the “strategic man” often personified by specific political or military leaders. Theorists and their works too receive their share of critical scrutiny. The uncertain consequences of decades of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, combined with the expansion of violent Islamic extremism and the potential stakes related to future war with Russia and the People’s Republic of China, are just some of the factors driving renewed interest in military theory and the conduct of strategy.

This course is indeed a foundational one for the future strategist as it asks and allows you to think through the answers to the following questions:

- What is war? What purpose can and should it serve? What is war’s nature and what, if anything, causes that nature to change? Is war an art, a science, or both?
- Can theory be timeless or is it merely a product of its context? What drives the creation of theory? What makes *good* theory?
- What is strategy? Is strategy best conceptualized as a theory of victory, a plan to accomplish a goal, or both? What separates effective from ineffective strategies? Why is strategy easy to comprehend in concept but difficult to do in execution?

The course consists of fifteen seminars divided into three conceptual groupings: general theory, specific theory, and strategy. The first group of seminars looks at the question of war and theorizes about its nature, character, characteristics, and conduct. Although you have previously been introduced to the ideas of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, in this course you will read them in depth, in their entirety, and consider their importance. The second section of the course builds on this foundation and explores theories that reflect a specific focus. In this group of seminars we will look specifically at theories developed for individual operating domains, or environments that reflect changing social, political, economic, and technological contexts. The third and last group of seminars connects theory to the strategy, or theory in practice. In particular, this group of readings looks at both theory and strategy from the more contemporary perspective, including the theory, history, logic, and purpose of strategy.

## Grading

**Course paper (55 percent)** of your grade). On the last Friday of the course, 25 August, you will hand in your paper prior to the start of class. This written requirement forces you to confront a central issue of the course with a coherent, sustained argument in a 2,500-word essay. Your paper should draw upon and demonstrate comprehension of the ideas, concepts, and theories contained in the readings and discussed in seminar and will be evaluated on the following criteria:

- Issue awareness – How well the student incorporates factual data and coherent evidence in support of the argument.
- Originality and Creativity – How well the student draws from the readings and other sources to provide an argument that is more than glorified summation.
- Theory – How well the student incorporates a theoretical framework; that is, a logical argument and sound reasoning.
- Application – The “so what” of the paper. Is it relevant? Is it realistic? If it criticizes, does it offer a solution?
- Grammar – Technical quality of the writing. Includes writing style; writing should be succinct, readable, and organized.

The remainder of the course grade involves your **seminar participation** and includes your personal theory of war, which you will present in class on the last day of the course. Both the quality and quantity is evaluated and counts for **45 percent** of your overall grade.

## Course Administration.

This course is split into two sessions per day, one in the morning and the other in the afternoon. The morning session, which will convene in Grey and Blue seminars, will meet from 0900-1100. The afternoon session, which is split into Grey and Silver seminars, will meet from

1200-1400. Class times may be altered for guest speakers, student events, and other SAASS-related activities. Anticipated absences from class should be cleared with the instructor, course director, Dean of Students, and/or the commandant in advance.

## Faculty.

## Books.

Below is the complete list of books that you will require for the course. Review the stack of books you receive prior to the class, and if you are missing any, please do not hesitate to bring it to my attention. All other required reading material, including reproduced articles and book chapters, is provided to you either in the bound volume or posted online. If posted online, the Course Director will send out information on where and how to access prior to the start of the course:

- Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. 1832. trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Corbett, Julian. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. 1907. Introduction and Notes by Eric J. Grove. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988.
- Dolman, Everett. *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age*, London: Routledge, 2005.
- Douhet, Giulio. *The Command of the Air*. 1921, Reprint. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2009.

- Fuller, J.F.C. *The Foundations of the Science of War*. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1926.
- Gray, Colin. *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Howard, Michael. *War in European History*. Update Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Jomini, Antoine-Henri. *The Art of War*. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 2007.
- Liddell Hart, B.H. *Strategy*. 2nd rev. ed. 1967. Reprint: New York: Penguin, 1991.
- Luttwak, Edward. *The Logic of Strategy in War and Peace*, Revised and expanded edition, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2002.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *Mahan on Naval Strategy*. Reprint Edition, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015.
- Paret, Peter. ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Slessor, J.C. *Air Power and Armies*. 1936. Reprint, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2009.
- Sun Tzu. *The Illustrated Art of War: The Definitive English Translation by Samuel B. Griffith*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

# Reading Guide

## *COURSE 600, FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY THEORY*

### Course Director's Note.

This guide is provided to help you critically assess a work of military theory and creatively incorporate it into your own thought. Its use will seem burdensome at first; however, with practice and discipline it will become a natural component of your intellectual life. The mental effort involved in working your way through it will also pay huge dividends by enhancing your ability to evaluate other ideas about war and strategy and, most importantly, to develop your own!

*All great commanders have acted on instinct, and the fact that their instinct was always sound is partly the measure of their innate greatness and genius. So far as action is concerned this will always be the case and nothing more is needed. Yet when it is not a question of acting oneself but of persuading others in discussion, the need is for clear ideas and the ability to show their connection with each other. So few people have yet acquired the necessary skill at this that most discussions are a futile bandying of words; either they leave each man sticking to his own ideas or they end with everyone agreeing, for the sake of agreement, on a compromise with nothing to be said for it.*

*Clear ideas on these matters do, therefore, have some practical value.*

-Clausewitz, Note of 10 July 1827

1. Data. Standard Bibliographic Entry.
2. Author. Information concerning the author that influenced his ability to theorize about a war or a particular aspect thereof.
3. Context. Information about the author's environment that influenced the development of his theory.
4. Scope. What is the theory about? How broad or narrow is it?
5. Evidence. What is the basis of evidence for the theorist's work?
6. Central Proposition. What is the fundamental proposition put forward by the theorist, i.e., the one upon which the remainder of the theory rests?

7. Other Major Propositions. What additional propositions does the theorist advance? Think of the relationship between these propositions and the central proposition as being roughly analogous to the relationship of corollaries to a theorem in geometry.
8. Critique. Theories are evaluated on the basis of internal consistency and comprehensiveness as well as external validity and utility. Some specifics:
  - a. Internal Consistency and Comprehensiveness.
    - (1) How is the subject under investigation defined? Does this definition conflict with other definitions contained in the theory?
    - (2) How does the theorist categorize the subject under investigation? Does the totality of the categories equal the totality of the field? Are the categories distinct?
    - (3) How does the theorist explain relationships among various parts of the subject? Are these explanations internally consistent, or do some contradict others?
    - (4) How well does the theorist connect the subject under investigation to other related subjects?
    - (5) Is the theory complete? Does it comprehend all relevant topics and components?
  - b. External Validity and Utility.
    - (1) How well do the theoretical propositions correspond with the evidence of historical analysis?
    - (2) How well do the theoretical propositions correspond with the evidence of contemporary reality?
    - (3) Of what use is the theory in helping the strategist deal effectively with a contemporary problem?
    - (4) How well do the theoretical propositions help the strategist anticipate future developments?
9. Comparison and Synthesis. How does this work of theory compare and contrast with other theoretical works in the same general field? What synthesis, if any, is possible among these theories?
10. Importance. To what extent has this work influenced the theory and practice of war? How influential should it be in the present and the future?

11. Personal significance. How has this work contributed to my own theory of war?

Note: The last question is obviously the most significant. It is therefore useful to keep a running account of the evolution of your thinking about war as you read each work. It is also true, however, that the last question cannot be adequately answered until you have mentally worked through all of the preceding issues. The mental discipline of recording your responses to these questions will pay tremendous dividends in stimulating your intellectual development, not only for SAASS, but also for the rest of your life.

## SEMINAR ONE

### The Nature of Military Theory: Clausewitz & Sun Tzu

In this first seminar we explore the subject of theory from a variety of perspectives. First, you will read and discuss reflections of the purpose of military theory by SAASS Professor Emeritus and founder of this course, Professor Harold Winton. In particular, Winton identifies the criteria to assess theory we will use for the remainder of this course. From this introduction we will explore the nature of military theory from vastly different contexts: 19<sup>th</sup> century Prussia and 5<sup>th</sup> century BC China. In this first of four seminar discussions of the capstone work of Carl von Clausewitz, we will examine the study of theory in general and military theory in particular. Pay particular attention to Clausewitz's explanations of what theory should and should not be expected to do for the student of war. In addition, note how Clausewitz distinguishes the relationships and differences between theory, historical analysis, and military criticism.

We will spend the second half of the seminar discussing the oldest work of theory, Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. Both the author and his work remain the subject of considerable scholarly debate. Some suggest "Master Sun" was the greatest living strategist of ancient China's "Spring and Autumn" and "Warring States" period. Others suggest the man and his work are a composite at best, or the product of a fanciful imagination at worst. Regardless of the debate it is certain the conduct of war was an important issue for rulers to consider. Those who could offer what we would call today effective strategic advice were considered to be of great value to the kingdom. To this extent, nothing has changed. As you read *The Art of War*, ask how it was shaped by the culture from which it sprang and what counsel it offers to contemporary strategists.

#### **REQUIRED READINGS:**

##### **BOOKS**

Clausewitz, *On War*, Prefatory material and Book II, Chapters 1-6, pp. 61-71, 127-174.

Sun Tzu, *The Illustrated Art of War*, pp. 6-239.

Note: Read Liddell Hart's Foreword with an eye toward our consideration of his theory in Seminar 10; read Griffith's preface and introduction for insight into the context in which Sun Tzu wrote.

##### **Article**

Winton. "An Imperfect Jewel."

## **Guide to Further Study:**

### Clausewitz

Beaumont, Roger. *War, Chaos, and History*. New York: Praeger, 1994.

Beyerchen, Alan. "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War." *International Security*. 17 (1992/93): 59-90.

Brodie, Bernard, "A Guide to the Reading of *On War*" in Clausewitz, *On War*. An extended commentary by one of the 20<sup>th</sup> century's great strategic thinkers on the continuing relevance of Clausewitz's work. READ ONLY AFTER reading the relevant passages of Clausewitz for yourself. Brodie's analysis is useful but not a substitute for your own thought!

The Clausewitz home page, <http://www.clausewitz.com>, accessed 4 May 2016, provides a good deal of useful information including two indexes to the Paret/Howard translation of *On War*, a helpful bibliography, and a selection of recent articles on the relevance of Clausewitz's work to contemporary strategic issues.

Paret, Peter. "Translation, Literal or Accurate," *The Journal of Military History*. 78 (July 2014): 1077-80.

Sumida, Jon. "A Concordance of Selected Subjects in Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*." *The Journal of Military History*. 78 (January 2014): 277-331.

### Sun Tzu

Sawyer, Ralph. *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*. Translation and Commentary by Ralph D. Sawyer with Mei-chün Sawyer. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993.

Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. trans. with introduction and commentary by John Minford. New York: Viking, 2002.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Art of War*. trans. with introduction and commentary by Ralph D. Sawyer, with the collaboration of Mei-chün Lee Sawyer. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_ and Sun Pin. *The Complete Art of War*. trans. with historical introduction and commentary by Ralph D. Sawyer, Collaboration with Mei-chün Lee Sawyer. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996.

Wing, R.L. *The Art of Strategy: A New Translation of Sun Tzu's Classic "The Art of War."* New York: Broadway Books, 1988.

## SEMINAR TWO

### The Essence of War: Clausewitz

What is war? What are its characteristics? What are its constituent elements? What are the relationships among its characteristics and among its elements? Given the significance of war in the human experience, questions such as these have occupied reflective men for centuries; and while the answers to some of them have remained relatively stable, the answers to others have changed rather frequently. This seminar allows you to examine the thoughts of Carl von Clausewitz on these issues. Clausewitz was a Prussian soldier who closely observed the dynamic interaction of war and politics in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe. This vantage point gave him the opportunity to study two remarkable and very distinct eras of modern warfare – the state wars of the Fredrican era and the national wars of the Napoleonic period. As you read Clausewitz’s foundational book, reflect on the influence of his environment and experiences on his ideas, identify the central propositions of the mostly highly regarded portion of his work, and critically evaluate his argument.

#### **REQUIRED READINGS:**

##### **BOOKS**

Review Paret, “Clausewitz” in Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy*.

Introductory essays to *On War* by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie, Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 3-58 (read quickly for Clausewitz’s context, influence, and contemporary relevance).

Clausewitz, *On War*, Book I, pp. 75-123; Book II, Chapter 1, pp. 127-132.

##### ***Guide to Further Study:***

Aron, Raymond. *Clausewitz: Philosopher of War*. Tr. Christine Baker and Norman Stone. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1985.

Bassford, Christopher. *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Clausewitz, Carl. *Historical and Political Writings*. ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Delbrück, Hans. “Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Clausewitz,” Book IV, Chapter IV of Delbrück, Hans. *The Dawn of Modern Warfare*, vol. 4 of *History of the Art of War*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990.

- Echevarria, Antulio. *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Gat, Azar. *The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
- Handel, Michael. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Frank Cass, 1996.
- Herberg-Rothe, Andreas. *Clausewitz's Puzzle: The Political Theory of War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Heuser, Beatrice. *Reading Clausewitz*. London: Pimlico, 2002.
- Howard, Michael. *Clausewitz*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Paret, Peter. *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
- Smith, Hugh. *On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.
- Stoker, David. *Clausewitz: His Life and Work*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Strachan, Hew. *Clausewitz's On War: A Biography*. New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2007.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, ed. *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Wallach, Jehuda. *The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on German Conduct of Two World Wars*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1986.
- Watts, Barry D. *Clausewitzian Friction and Future War*. (Revised Edition) Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2004.
- White, Charles. *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militaerische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805*. New York: Praeger, 1989.

## SEMINAR THREE

### Strategy and Campaigns I: Clausewitz

Having established the essence of war and a method for analyzing war, Clausewitz's next step was to consider the elements of strategy, which he defined as the use of engagements for the purpose of the war. He does this in Book III and again in his summary in Book VIII. Clausewitz's notion of strategy thus straddles what we in contemporary parlance refer to as military strategy—the use or the threat of the use of force to further political interests—and operational art: the design, organization, conduct, and support of major operations and campaigns to achieve strategic objectives. As you read this portion of *On War*, be sensitive to Clausewitz's shifts in perspective in his use of the word "strategy" from the national level to the theater level. Also be alive to the fact that his discussion of the term "center(s) of gravity" [a valid translation, but not the only valid translation, of the German term(s) *Schwerpunkt(en)*] in Book VIII treats the concept in both a singular and plural fashion.

#### **REQUIRED READINGS:**

##### **BOOKS**

Paret, "Napoleon and the Revolution in War" in Paret, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy*.

Clausewitz, *On War*, Books III and VIII, pp. 177-222 and 577-637.

#### ***Guide to Further Study:***

Delbrück, Hans. "Napoleonic Strategy," Book IV, Chapter III of Delbrück, Hans. *The Dawn of Modern Warfare*, vol. 4 of *History of the Art of War*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990.

Echevarria, Antulio J., II. "Center of Gravity: Recommendations for Joint Doctrine." *Joint Force Quarterly*. 35 (October 2004): 10-17.

Strange, Joe. *Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language*. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Association, 1996.

Strange, Joseph L. and Richard Iron. "Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant." *Joint Force Quarterly*. 35 (October 2004): 20-27.

## SEMINAR FOUR

### Attack and Defense: Clausewitz

One would think that Clausewitz's experience of Napoleonic war would lead him to concentrate on the offense rather than the defense. In fact, he treats the latter in considerably greater depth. In Book VI he begins to tie time, a frequently neglected aspect of military theory, into his analysis with the proposition that time left unused accumulates to the advantage of the defender. In Book VII, Clausewitz examines the offense, which he calls the weaker form of war with the positive object. Here he explores in more detail the reciprocal and interactive nature of the relationship between attack and defense and again interjects time into operational calculations with his discussions of the culminating point of the attack. Frequently and incorrectly thought of as a purely material consideration, offensive culmination in the Clausewitzian sense has mental and, more importantly, moral considerations inextricably woven into it. As you come to grips with Clausewitz's ideas, see what historical examples you can cite that either support or refute his propositions concerning the relation between the attack and defense, the diminishing power of the offense, the influence of terrain and fortifications on the attack, and political considerations influencing the calculation of offensive culminating points. Also be aware that the term "center of gravity" is used in Book VII. Compare and contrast its use here with that found in Book VIII and in other places you may have discovered it in *On War*.

#### **REQUIRED READINGS:**

##### **BOOKS**

Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VI, Chapters 1-9 and 25-30, pp. 357-392 and 469-519; and Book VII, Chapters 1-7, 15-16, 20, and 22, pp. 523-31, 545-50, 562-64, and 566-73.

##### ***Guide to Further Study:***

Gat, Azar. "Clausewitz on the Defense and Attack." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 11 (1988): 20-26.

Leeb, Ritter von. *Defense*. Harrisburg, PA.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1943.

Leonhard, Robert R. *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War*. Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1994.

Sidorenko, A.A. *The Offensive (A Soviet View)*. Moscow, 1970.

Vego, Milan N. "Operational Overreach and the Culmination Point." *Joint Force Quarterly*. 25 (Summer 2000): 99-106.

## SEMINAR FIVE

### Strategy and Campaigns II: Jomini

Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini was a Swiss officer who served on the staff of Marshal Ney and as a military adviser to Tsar Alexander I. A prolific writer on military affairs, he became one of the interpreters of Napoleonic warfare to the American army of the nineteenth century. The influence of pragmatic Jominian thought is evident in our planning and doctrine today. An appreciation of the Jominian approach to theory is thus useful to the strategist. As you study his interpretation of strategy and campaigns, compare and contrast it with that of Clausewitz. You will find this task easier by referring to the *West Point Atlas for the Wars of Napoleon*, online at <http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/Napoleonic%20Wars.aspx>. Also be alive to the fact that Jomini outlived Clausewitz. Thus, his writings are both a foil against which Clausewitz argued and a response to what Clausewitz wrote. He also lived to see developments in war that Clausewitz missed. Ask yourself how these developments influenced his writings.

#### **REQUIRED READINGS:**

##### **BOOKS**

Shy, John. "Jomini" in Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy*, pp. 143-85.

Jomini, *Art of War*, read prefatory material and Chapters I-III, pp. 5-162 and Conclusion, pp. 293-97.

#### ***Guide to Further Study:***

Alger, John. *Antoine-Henri Jomini: A Bibliographical Survey*. West Point, New York: United States Military Academy, 1975.

Gat, Azar. *The Origins of Military Thought* (previously cited). See especially, "Jomini: Synthesizing the Legacy of the Enlightenment with Napoleonic Warfare," 106-35.

Hittle, J.D. "Introduction" to Jomini's *Art of War* in *Roots of Strategy, Book 2: 3 Military Classics*. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1987, 395-431.

Jomini, Henri. *Life of Napoleon*. trans. H. W. Halleck. Kansas City, Mo.: Franklin Hudson, 1913.

Reardon, Carol. *With a Sword in One Hand and Jomini in the Other: The Problem of Military Thought in the Civil War North*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012.

## SEMINAR SIX

### The Theory of Naval Warfare: Mahan

The most prominent name in the annals of naval theory is Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan, who is also the first American to become regarded as a serious strategic thinker, was the son of Dennis Hart Mahan, longtime professor of military art and engineering at the United States Military Academy. The younger Mahan graduated from Annapolis and late in his career achieved fame as the president and chief lecturer at the newly formed Naval War College in 1886. The book you are reading for today's class, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, won him world-wide acclaim and launched a prolific literary career. During the course of his life, Mahan produced 20 books, 22 contributions to other books, 161 journal articles, 109 known newspaper articles, 27 translated articles, and 13 pamphlets. Though an indifferent seaman, Mahan was a consummate publicist whose forceful articulation of "command of the sea" captured the imagination of sailors the world over and established the paradigm for Giulio Douhet's *Command of the Air*. As you read Mahan's first and most significant work, analyze it at two levels: 1) the role of sea power in the life of a nation; and 2), the dynamics of war at sea. The first set of propositions is relatively straightforward; the second must be carefully mined from Mahan's historical narrative of the struggle between the British and French navies during the Seven Years War and the American Revolution.

#### **REQUIRED READING:**

##### **BOOK**

Mahan, *Mahan on Naval Strategy*, Editor's Introduction, Introductory, Chapter I-VII, pp. ix-318.

#### **SUGGESTED READING:**

Crowl, Philip. "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian" in Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy*.

#### ***Guide to Further Study:***

Armstrong, Benjamin, ed. *21st Century Mahan: Sound Conclusions for the Modern Era*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013.

Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The US Navy, 1890 - 1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Brodie, Bernard. *A Guide to Naval Strategy*. 5th ed. New York: Praeger, 1965.

Castex, Raoul. *Strategic Theories*. trans., ed. Eugenia Kiesling. Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1994.

Gorshkov, S.V. *The Sea Power of the State*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979.

Gray, Colin S. *The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War*. New York: The Free Press, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_ and Roger W. Barnett. *Seapower and Strategy*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989.

Hagan, Kenneth J. *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power*. New York: The Free Press, 1991.

Kennedy, Paul. "Mahan versus Mackinder (1859-97)," Chapter 7 of *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. New York: Scribner, 1976.

Livezey, William E. *Mahan on Sea Power*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981.

Mahan, Alfred T. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*. 5th ed. 1894. Reprint, Mineola, NY: Dover, 1987.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1897.

Potter, E.B. *Sea Power: A Naval History*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981.

Reinhardt, George C. "Air Power Needs its Mahan." *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*. 78 (April 1952): 363-67.

Seager, Robert. *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977.

Sumida, Jon T. *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.

Sweetman, Jack. *The Great Admirals: Command at Sea, 1587-1945*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

Till, Geoffrey. ed. *Seapower: Theory and Practice*. London: Frank Cass, 1994.

Uhlig, Frank. *How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and Its Allies*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

## SEMINAR SEVEN

### The Theory of Maritime Warfare: Corbett

Sir Julian Corbett was the son of a well-to-do British architect. Like Mahan, Corbett was in his mid-forties before he began to study naval warfare seriously. He came to it, however, much differently. After taking a law degree at Cambridge, he spent a number of years as a gentleman of leisure engaging in extensive world travel. He next turned to fictional writing and then to historical biography. His book *Drake and the Tudor Navy* brought him to the attention of the Royal Navy, and several years after its appearance he found himself lecturing senior naval officers at Portsmouth. Also like Mahan, he became directly involved in naval policy, working as one of the instruments in Lord Fisher's program to reform the Royal Navy before the Great War and serving as its chief historian during and after the war. Corbett's influence on the Royal Navy was marked by controversy surrounding his part in the drafting of instructions that contributed to Jellicoe's decision not to pursue the German High Seas Fleet at Jutland and his disdain for convoys as a response to the German submarine threat. Nevertheless, his main theoretical work, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, remains one of the classics of seapower literature. Although Corbett's work builds on Mahan's, its approach to war at sea is much different. As you examine his central ideas, compare and contrast them with Mahan's and test them against the general theory of war you have developed thus far in the course.

#### **REQUIRED READING:**

##### **BOOKS**

Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*.

- *Skim* Editor's Introduction and Part I, Chapters 1-3, pp. xi-xlv and 3-51 for Corbett's context and to see how he introduced sailors to Clausewitz's ideas;
- **Read** Part I, Chapters 4-6; Parts II & III; and Appendix, The "Green Pamphlet," pp. 52-345.

#### ***Guide to Further Study:***

Cleaver, Liam J. "The Pen behind the Fleet: The Influence of Sir Julian Stafford Corbett on British Naval Development, 1898-1918." *Comparative Strategy*. 14 (1995): 45-57.

Corbett, Julian. *England in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Combined Strategy*. 2 vol., London: Longman's, Green, 1907.

- Gat, Azar. "From Sail to Steam: Naval Theory and the Military Parallel, 1882-1914," Chapter 4 of *The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 173-225.
- Handel, Michael. "Corbett, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu." *Naval War College Review*. 53 (Autumn 2000): 107-24.
- Hattendorf, John B. "The Idea of a 'Fleet in Being' in Historical Perspective." *Naval War College Review*. 67 (Winter 2014): 43-60.
- Hunt, Barry D. "The Strategic Thought of Sir Julian S. Corbett." In Hattendorf, John B. and Robert S. Jordan, eds. *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power* London: Macmillan, 1989: 110-35.
- Lambert, Nicholas A. "False Prophet?: The Maritime Theory of Julian Corbett and Professional Military Education." *The Journal of Military History*. 77 (July 2013): 1055-78.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999.
- Schurman, Donald. *Julian S. Corbett, 1854-1922*. London: Royal Historical Society, 1981.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Civilian Historian: Sir Julian Corbett." Chapter 7 in *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965.
- Stanford, Peter Marsh, "The Work of Sir Julian Corbett in the Dreadnought Era." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*. 77 (January 1951): 60-71.
- Sumida, Jon T. *In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914*. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989.

## SEMINAR EIGHT

### The Theory of Independent Air War: Douhet

One of the prominent lines of demarcation within both the theory and practice of air warfare is the distinction between the employment of the air weapon as an independent instrument of national security and its use as a complementary tool in conjunction with the efforts of other military forces. The Italian Giulio Douhet is the first, and arguably the most widely known, theorist of the former. Douhet was an Italian soldier who was court-martialed in 1916 for criticizing the Italian war effort for, among other things, paying insufficient attention to the demands of war in the air. He was exonerated in 1918 and made chief of Italy's Central Aeronautical Bureau. He was promoted to general in 1921, the same year he published the original edition of *Command of the Air*. He retired shortly thereafter and spent much of the remainder of his life thinking and writing about aeronautical issues. As you delve into his most famous work, note the resonance of its central proposition with Mahan's concept of command of the sea and think critically about the relationships among evidence, concepts, and vision in the development of military theory.

#### **REQUIRED READING:**

##### **BOOK**

Douhet, *The Command of the Air*.

- *Skim* Book Three, pp. 209-292;
- **Read** the Editors' Introduction; Douhet's Preface; and Books One, Two, and Four, pp. 1-207 and 293-394.

#### **SUGGESTED READING:**

Maclsaac, David. "Voices from the Central Blue: The Airpower Theorists." in Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 624-47.

#### ***Guide to Further Study:***

Brodie, Bernard. "The Heritage of Douhet." Chapter 8 of Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Cappelluti, Frank J. "The Life and Thought of Giulio Douhet." PhD dissertation, Rutgers University, 1967.

Hippler, Thomas. *Bombing the People: Giulio Douhet and the Foundations of Air-Power Strategy, 1884-1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Meilinger, Phillip. "Giulio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory." in Phillip Meilinger, ed. *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory*. Maxwell AFB, AL.: Air University Press, 1997.

Sigaud, Louis A. *Douhet and Aerial Warfare*. N.Y.: Putnam's, 1941.

Warner, Edward. "Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air War." In Edward Meade Earle, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943.

Winton, Harold R. "A Black Hole in the Wild Blue Yonder: The Need for a Comprehensive Theory of Airpower." *Air Power History*. 39 (Winter 1992): 32-42.

## SEMINAR NINE

### The Theory of Complementary Air War: Slessor

John Slessor was a British Airman who served in the Great War and went on to become an air marshal during WW II. A protégé of Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, the dominant figure of the inter-war RAF, Slessor was hand-picked by Trenchard to serve as the service's chief instructor at the British [Army] Staff College in Camberley from 1931 to 1934. It was a shrewd selection. Slessor combined a knack for seeing problems from a wide perspective with an uncanny ability to balance the realities of the past and present with the potentialities of the future. These qualities enabled him to conceive of and articulate a clear vision for how air forces should profitably interact with ground formations in fighting and winning a land campaign. His awareness of the realities of both air and ground combat also made him a credible interlocutor with his army audience. As you confront Slessor's argument, be sensitive to its resonance with Corbett's and ask yourself how well its major propositions have stood the test of time.

#### **REQUIRED READINGS:**

##### **BOOK**

Slessor, *Air Power and Armies*.

- Skim the appendices, pp. 216-26;
- Read the Foreword, Introduction, and Chapters I-XI, pp. 1-215.

#### ***Guide to Further Study:***

Connolly, Corvin J. "Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Cotesworth Slessor and the Anglo-American Air Power Alliance, 1940-1945." PhD dissertation, Texas A& M University, December 2001. Available from <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA399435>, accessed 25 March 2016.

Meilinger, Phillip. "John C. Slessor and the Genesis of Air Interdiction." *The RUSI Journal*. 140 (August 1995): 43-48.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II." in *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory*. Maxwell AFB, Al.: Air University Press, 1997.

Orange, Vincent. *Slessor: Bomber Champion: The Life of Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor, GCB, DSO, MC*. London: Grub Street, 2006.

Slessor, John. *The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections*. London: Cassell, 1956.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Co-Ordination of Future Services." *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*. 76 (November 1931): 722-55.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Development of Air Power: Lecture Mainly Designed for Army Officers," 1948.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Influence of Air Power upon Strategy," 1946.

## SEMINAR TEN

### The Theory of Indirect Approach: Liddell Hart

Basil Henry Liddell Hart (note for the wary: Liddell Hart is a non-hyphenated, double last name; referring to him as “Hart” and rendering the name as “Liddell-Hart” are both reflections of either ignorance or inattentiveness) was a British captain who was gassed on the Western Front in the Great War. After the war, he took to the impassioned study of military history and advocacy of mechanization and armored warfare in the British army. Between the wars he was noted biographer, defense correspondent, and trusted advisor to Secretary of State for War, Leslie Hore-Belisha. Liddell Hart popularized the idea of “grand strategy” and both coined the term and advocated the concept of indirect approach. Over the course of four decades, his *Decisive Wars of History* grew into successive editions of *Strategy*, which he periodically updated to address new developments in the strategic environment. As you examine Liddell Hart's ideas, consider the reasons they developed as they did, their strengths and weaknesses, and their contemporary relevance and utility.

#### **REQUIRED READINGS:**

##### **BOOK**

Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, Prefaces, Chapters I and X, Parts II-IV, pp. xv-xxi, 3-6, 144-147, 151-370.

#### **SUGGESTED READING:**

Bond, Brian and Martin Alexander. “Liddell Hart and de Gaulle” in Paret, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy*.

#### ***Guide to Further Study:***

Bond, Brian. *Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1977.

Danchev, Alex. *Alchemist of War: The Life of Basil Liddell Hart*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998.

Gat, Azar. *Fascist and Liberal Visions of War: Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, and Other Modernists*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

\_\_\_\_\_. “British Influence and the Evolution of the Panzer Arm: Myth or Reality?” *War in History*. 4 (April 1997): 150-73.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Hidden Sources of Liddell Hart's Strategic Ideas." *War in History*. 3 (July 1996): 293-308.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Liddell Hart's Theory of Armoured Warfare: Revising the Revisionists." *The Journal of Strategic Studies*. 19 (March 1996): 1-30.

Gray, Colin S. *Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International. 2007.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Liddell Hart, Basil H. *The Liddell Hart Memoirs*. 2 Vols. New York: Putnam, 1965-1966.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Ghost of Napoleon*. London: Faber & Faber, 1933.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Great Captains Unveiled*. Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown, and Co., 1928.

Mearsheimer, John. *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1988.

## SEMINAR ELEVEN

### The Theory of the Science of War: Fuller

In Clausewitz's day, when technological development took place almost glacially, it was not necessary to consider in detail the influence of new weapons on the conduct of war. The weapons of Napoleon and Wellington were essentially the same as the weapons of Frederick and Marlborough. Even more significantly, so were the means by which they provisioned their forces. The Industrial Revolution changed all that. Mass production techniques and the railroad fundamentally transformed the amount of materiel that could be brought to the battlefield. The pace of scientific and engineering breakthroughs seemed to put war into a permanent state of flux. The first military thinker to synthesize the impact of the Industrial Revolution on war with a Clausewitzian approach to its moral and intellectual elements was an iconoclastic British soldier, John Frederick Charles Fuller. Based on his personal study of eastern mysticism and military theory and history and on his experience as the senior staff officer of the tank corps in the Great War, Fuller developed a theory of war that attempted to integrate the experience of technological advancements with classic military thought. In the process, he also codified the "Principles of War" in a manner that still influences many military institutions. As you plumb Fuller's thoughts on war, make sure you understand the method by which he arrived at his conclusions and assess the utility of his ideas for contemporary students of military affairs.

**NOTE:** Bring to class a schematic representation of your understanding of the relations among Fuller's object of war, spheres of war, elements of war, principles of war, groups of principles, and the law of economy of force. The schematic can take the form of a PowerPoint slide, mindmap, sketch, drawing, or the like. The complexity of Fuller's argument and the opaqueness of his style make this a difficult assignment. Diagramming Fuller's argument greatly assists in facilitating and enhancing your comprehension of his work.

#### **REQUIRED READINGS:**

##### **BOOKS**

Howard, *War in European History*, Chapter 6, pp. 94-115. This brief survey of the era between the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 and the end of World War I in 1918 should give you a flavor for the major changes that had affected the nature of war between the time in which Clausewitz and Jomini wrote and the time in which Fuller wrote.

Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War*. Note: when the word "moral" appears in Fuller's text in italics, it has the same meaning and pronunciation as the American word morale, as in "the unit had high morale." When you see "moral" non-italicized, its English and American meanings are synonymous, as in "he exerted a strong moral force over his

followers." Awareness of this distinction will save you some grief when you get into the intricacies of Fuller's argument

**Guide to Further Study:**

Fuller, J.F.C. *The Reformation of War*. London: Hutchinson, 1923.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Machine Warfare: An Inquiry into the Influence of Mechanics on the Art of War*. 1943; repr., Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Art of War Colloquium, U.S. Army War College, 1983.

\_\_\_\_\_. *A Military History of the Western World*. 3 vols. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1954-1957.

Gat, Azar. *Fascist and Liberal Visions of War: Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, and Other Modernists*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

Holden Reid, Brian, "Colonel J.F.C. Fuller and the Revival of Classical Military Thinking in Britain, 1918-1926," *Military Affairs*. 49 (October 1985): 192-97.

\_\_\_\_\_. *J.F.C. Fuller: Military Thinker*. New York: Saint Martin's, 1987.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Studies in British Military Thought: Debates with Fuller and Liddell Hart*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.

Trythall, A. and B. Bond. "The Fuller-Liddell Hart Lecture: A Dialogue." *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*. 124 (March 1979): 21-31.

Trythall, Anthony J. *"Boney" Fuller: Soldier, Strategist and Writer, 1878-1966*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1977.

## SEMINAR TWELVE

### The Theory of Strategy: Dolman

Works on strategy are derived from a number of sources: experience, reading, discussion, among others. The inspiration for the following work came from teaching the course in which you find yourself today. Everett Carl Dolman is a former SAASS instructor who taught in this course more than a decade ago. His interaction with students over various years, combined with his eclectic background and intellectual interests, led him to write *Pure Strategy*. Like many authors in this course, Dolman combines insights from his experience as a practitioner (as a former analyst in the National Security Agency) with deep reading and an intellectual curiosity to find answers to the largest questions of strategy. Make no mistake: Dolman's ideas about strategy and war will force you to reevaluate your own understanding of the subjects. As evidence, consider how he begins the second chapter of today's book: "The first notion the military strategist must discard is victory, for strategy is not about winning." (p. 5) For our discussion today, consider the question whether "pure" strategy can exist and why the United States seems to have great difficulty in the current century maintaining its competitive advantage.

#### **REQUIRED READINGS:**

##### **BOOK**

Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, Chapters 1-10, pp. 1-194.

##### ***Guide to Further Study:***

Beaufre, André. *Strategy of Action*. Trans. R.H. Barry. New York: Praeger, 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Introduction to Strategy*. Trans. R.H. Barry. New York: Praeger, 1965.

Bousquet, Antoine. *The Scientific Way of War: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity*. London: Hurst and Co., 2009.

Dolman, Everett. *Can Science End War?* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age*. London: Frank Cass, 2001.

Martel, William. *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

## SEMINAR THIRTEEN

### The Logic of Strategy: Luttwak

Few contemporary theorists are as polarizing as Edward Luttwak. Some find his works intellectually provocative, while others decry what they perceive as his contrarian views. Luttwak started his career writing articles, served as a consultant to the defense industry, and became a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. Liddell Hart may have introduced and popularized the idea of “grand strategy” but Luttwak cemented its use in defense policy circles as a result of his work, *Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*. This work led to some natural comparisons and unflattering conclusions about the state of American grand strategy against the Soviet Union in the period following the Vietnam War. Arguably Luttwak’s crowning achievement as a theorist is the one you are reading for today, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*. Our discussion today revolves around Luttwak’s examination of strategy in three parts: its logic, its levels, and its outcome. Why does Luttwak conclude the logic of strategy is paradoxical? Is this paradox what makes strategy so difficult to do in practice?

#### **REQUIRED READINGS:**

##### **BOOK**

Luttwak, *Strategy*.

- Skim Preface, Appendices 1, pp. xi-xii; 239-241.
- Read Chapters 1-15, Parts I-III, pp. 3-236.

#### ***Guide to Further Study:***

Luttwak, Edward. *The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2012.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2011.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Reform*. New York: Touchstone, 1986.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century CE to the Third*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Coup d’Etat: A Practical Handbook*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979.

## SEMINAR FOURTEEN

### The Purpose of Strategy: Gray

No other contemporary author on the subject of strategy is as prolific as Colin S. Gray. He has published twenty-three books and more than a hundred articles on subjects ranging from nuclear strategy to strategic culture. Now retired and serving as *Professor Emeritus* at the University of Reading, Gray has worked in the United States and the United Kingdom in government (during the Reagan Administration in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), in think tanks (the Hudson Institute and the National Institute for Public Policy), as well as in academia. Gray's ideas have been controversial as well as popular. For example, one of his co-authored articles in 1980 created a firestorm in the disarmament and strategic studies communities by suggesting nuclear war could be fought and was winnable. Gray remains popular for several reasons, including his pragmatic view of strategy, steadfast advocacy for the value of the ideas of Clausewitz, as well as his ability to separate lucidly the intellectual wheat from chaff in terms of theory and concepts. The book you will read today is the first in his "strategy trilogy" and presents the author's self-proclaimed "general theory of strategy." Be prepared for today's seminar to evaluate this general theory.

#### **REQUIRED READINGS:**

##### **BOOK**

Gray, *The Strategy Bridge*.

- *Skim* Introduction and Appendices, 1-14; 262-283
- **Read** Chapters 1-7, Parts I-III, 15-257.

#### ***Guide to Further Study:***

Gray, Colin S. *The Future of Strategy*. Cambridge: Polity, 2015.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Strategy & Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Perspectives on Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Airpower for Strategic Effect*. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 2012.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International. 2007.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*. London: Weidenfield & Nicholson, 2005.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History*. London: Frank Cass, 2002.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Explorations in Strategy*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996.

\_\_\_\_\_. *War, Peace, & Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990.

## SEMINAR FIFTEEN

### Course Synthesis: Personal Theory of War

**Note: The course essay is due at the start of class on 30 August 2018.**

This lesson allows you to synthesize the thinking about war you have done in the course to date. To that end, you are required to bring to class a one-page (one side only, font no smaller than 12-pitch) statement of your personal theory of war. This articulation can take any form – ranging from a talking paper, to a dialogue, to a poem, to a short story; or, you may skip narration altogether and render it in visual form. It must, however, fit legibly on a single page. Make copies for each classmate in your seminar and your seminar leader. During class, you will be asked to give a five-minute presentation on the sources of and rationale for your theory and respond to questions from your classmates.

#### **SUGGESTED REVIEW.**

- Review notes taken while reading and in seminar.
- Review key passages of works that you felt contributed most to your learning as well as those passages about which you have not yet been able to develop firm conclusions.
- Ask yourself the following types of questions:
  - What is my personal theory of war? (Review notes from lesson 600/1 and the Reading Guide as necessary for the elements of a theory and standards of validity)
  - What evidence do I have to support that theory?
  - What are the issues about which I am most certain, fairly certain, and least certain?
  - What would be the main points I would cover in a three-to-five paragraph essay related to each of the course objectives?
  - Where will I look for answers to my unanswered questions in the remainder of the SAASS course?

**REQUIRED READINGS:**

**NONE**