Irregular Warfare

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SAASS 644

Irregular Warfare

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Course director: Professor James D. Kiras

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Irregular Warfare
SAASS 644

“Irregular war is in fact as old as the hills which offer it its best terrain: older, clearly, than ‘regular’ war which has grown out of it, as the city grew out of the village. It would be difficult to define precisely where irregular war ends and regular war begins.”

W.E.D. Allen
Guerrilla War in Abyssinia

“Let us now make an attempt to study the Quranic concept of strategy. The first step to this study is to understand the difference between total strategy, that is, Jehad, and military strategy...Jehad entails the comprehensive direction and application of ‘power’ while military strategy deals only with the preparation for and application of ‘force’. Jehad is a continuous and never-ending struggle waged on all fronts including political, social, psychological, domestic, moral and spiritual to attain the object of policy.”

S.K. Malik
The Quranic Concept of War

“Consequently, the Department of Defense will: (1) make permanent the mindset and capabilities necessary to succeed in its current irregular warfare mission sets; and (2) leverage all irregular capabilities in our arsenal, including the unique abilities of our interagency and foreign partners, to compete against revisionist powers and violent extremist organizations alike. This approach does not require significant new resources to meet our strategic vision; it requires new ideas and new means of employing existing capabilities.

“We must not — and will not — repeat the ‘boom and bust’ cycle that has left the United States underprepared for irregular warfare in both Great Power Competition and conflict. Americans expect their military to do more than react to crises, they expect us to compete and maintain our advantages.”

Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy
2 October 2020

Course Overview and Description.

For much of the Department of Defense (DoD), Great Power Competition (GPC) is a breath of fresh air, a release from the uncertainties and obligations of irregular conflicts that have been the focus of so much energy and attention in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Freedom from “irregular warfare fatigue,” with its seemingly unsatisfying outcomes and endless nature, means DoD departments and agencies can devote their efforts to future, high intensity war
with Russia and China. Yet competition is more nuanced than conflict and comprises activities existing across a continuum, including sponsorship of proxies and tying down states elsewhere. The recently published *Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy* makes this point clearly, and as the quote from it above suggests, the United States can ill-afford to ignore ongoing and future irregular warfare challenges. Indeed it would be negligence of the highest order to have to relearn lessons hard won in irregular conflicts. In the last course of the autumn semester you studied the application of airpower in conflicts with limited aims for the United States, many of which were irregular in nature. As future strategists you will ponder and answer the following set of questions about these conflicts:

- What is irregular warfare? Are irregular conflicts fundamentally different from other types of conflicts? If not, why, and if so, what does this mean for the use of force and the application of military power?
- Who instigates irregular conflicts and how do they think they can win? What types of irregular adversaries do we face and how have they conceived victory against opponents with superior forces and resources?
- How are current irregular conflicts different from those of the past? How important are issues such as ideology, geography, time, and technology to victory?
- How and under what conditions do irregular conflicts end?
- How do we balance requirements to sustain pressure on violent extremist groups and Great Power proxies globally while preparing for possible future high intensity conflict?

This course has been designed to help you answer these questions and provide you, through your reading, seminar preparation, and discussions, with sufficient understanding and knowledge to deal with irregular threats today and tomorrow. The in-class examination will help put that understanding and knowledge to a practical test.

The course consists of eleven seminars divided into three conceptual groupings: theory, practice, and application. The first group of seminars looks theoretically at how and why violence is used in irregular conflicts and, in particular, how insurgents in the past have understood achieving their desired ends with the means they have had available. You will read some of the “classic” literature on the subject—Lawrence, Mao, Guevara, Debray—and understand the importance that each has placed on the set of conditions that existed in their specific context. The second section of the course builds on this foundation and explores questions related to the timelessness, as well as the changing context, of the current generation of irregular conflicts. In this group of seminars we will look specifically at how geography, ideology, society, technology, and outside forces shape, influence, and interact with one another. The third and last group of seminars looks at irregular warfare practically from the perspective of how to combat it and how such conflicts end. In particular, this group looks at how the collective historical experience and theory has been distilled into principles and doctrine, the difficulties of putting those principles into practice, as well as the challenges and opportunities presented by future irregular conflicts.
Grading

*In-class examination* (55 percent of your grade). On the last Friday of the course, 22 January, each student will complete an in-class examination structured along the lines of a staff paper. The format of the paper will be outlined in class. You will receive the question electronically at 0800 and have until 1200 to finish. The examination, which will last no more than four hours, should draw upon and demonstrate comprehension of the ideas, concepts, and theories contained in the readings and discussed in seminar. It will be evaluated on the following criteria:

- **Issue awareness** – How well you incorporate factual data and coherent evidence in support of the argument.
- **Originality and Creativity** – How well you draw from the readings and other sources to provide an argument that is more than glorified summation.
- **Theory** – How well you incorporate a theoretical framework; that is, a logical argument and sound reasoning.
- **Application** – The “so what” of the paper. Is it relevant? Is it realistic? If it criticizes, does it offer a solution?
- **Grammar** – Technical quality of the writing. Includes writing style; writing should be succinct, readable, and organized.

The remainder of the course grade involves your *seminar participation*. Both the quality and quantity is evaluated and counts for 45 percent of your overall grade.

Course Administration.

This course is split into two sessions per day, one in the morning and the other in the afternoon. The morning sessions, which will convene in Blue and Grey seminars, will meet from 0900-1100. The afternoon session, which will convene in Blue and Silver seminars, will meet from 1200-1400. Class times may be altered for roll call, guest speakers, and other activities. Anticipated absences from class should be cleared with your instructor and/or the commandant in advance.

Faculty.

Course Director: Professor James Kiras  
Lt Col Sean Klimek  
Lt Col Mark Jacobsen

Books.

Below is the complete list of books that you will require for the course. Review the stack of books you receive prior to the class, and if you are missing any, please do not hesitate to bring
it to my attention. All other required reading material, including reproduced articles and book chapters, is provided to you either in the printed handout or posted to the course Teams page:

SEMINAR ONE

Baseline Understanding I: The Logic of Violence

This seminar is concerned with two basic questions. The first is, “Why is violence used in irregular wars?” Put simply, what purpose does such violence serve? You have engaged intellectually and philosophically with variations of this question in different courses throughout this year. One trap common to a number of academic disciplines is reducing the problems within a complex phenomenon such as irregular warfare down to a single cause (dependent variable) explanation or one based on a specific theory or school of thought.

One of the most influential contemporary academic works on irregular warfare, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, was written by Stathis Kalyvas and published in 2006. Kalyvas’ work has been well-regarded by some, and considered controversial and dangerous by others, for a variety of reasons. The first is his willingness to use different methodologies in search of an answer to the question above. The second is Kalyvas’ determination to pursue explanations at several levels simultaneously—theoretical, organizational, and individual. Be aware of these different explanations and methodologies as you read the assigned sections of *The Logic of Civil War*.

The second question for this seminar is, “Does it matter how you label such violence?” In other words, is there any meaningful or useful purpose in distinguishing irregular, hybrid, asymmetric, or small wars from “regular” or conventional ones? Contemporary theorists and writers such as Colin Gray and Paul van Riper rail against so-called “adjectival” warfare. In their view, war is war regardless of its specific form. Are insurgencies then just small wars with somewhat unconventional tactics? If so, then, how can the United States possibly fail to win, given its military supremacy? If irregular wars are different from conventional ones, what factors make them so fundamentally different? Should one make a distinction between types of irregular warfare: insurgency, terrorism, revolution, or civil war? Does it serve any useful purpose?

**REQUIRED READINGS:**

**BOOK**


**ELECTRONIC**

Suggested Additional Readings


Arguably the most famous (or infamous) theoretician and practitioner of insurgency/guerrilla warfare is Mao Zedong. Mao was best known in the West during the Cold War as the leader of the People’s Republic of China from its founding in the 1940s until his death in 1976 (and who suggested that America and its nuclear deterrent was a “paper tiger”). Among military professionals, however, he is best known as a strategist/practitioner of protracted revolutionary/guerrilla war, which he waged against a number of domestic and foreign adversaries prior to, during, and after World War II.

Although he was not the first theorist of guerrilla warfare, virtually all those who came after Mao learned much from his widely available and voluminous writings on the subject. The American defeat in Vietnam resulted, in part, from General Vo Nguyen Giap’s adoption and alteration of Mao’s theory of warfare. Significant differences between Mao’s circumstances in China and those faced in other times often led to imitation without modification to suit the local conditions.

In the first half of the twentieth century, the most famous insurgent writer in the West, and an alleged source of (bourgeois) inspiration for a young, bookish Mao, was Thomas Edward Lawrence. Lawrence’s story is widely (if not always accurately) known for a variety of reasons, including: biographies of him by such notable authors as the poet Robert Graves and the strategist Basil Liddell Hart; the popularity of Lawrence’s autobiographical Revolt in the Desert (1927) and Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1935); and, after World War II in the cinematic portrayal of the Arab Revolt in David Lean’s epic Lawrence of Arabia in 1962. Although historians continue to argue over Lawrence’s specific role in the Arab Revolt, what sets him apart from previous writers on the subject of guerrilla and partisan warfare is his unique assessment of the specific conditions for revolution in the Arabian Peninsula during the First World War.

Consider the following questions as you read through today’s material. How do Mao and Lawrence relate conceptually to the “conventional” theorists you studied earlier in the curriculum—or are they unique theories of war? Is Mao’s theory just a clever synthesis of Sun Tzu, Marx, and Lenin? What are the connections (if any) between the Clausewitzian notion of the culminating point and the protracted insurgent strategies of Lawrence and Mao? How transferable are his concepts and why are there not more Maoist-based insurgencies today?

**REQUIRED READINGS:**

**ELECTRONIC**

Lawrence, T.E. “The Evolution of a Revolt.”

**Suggested Additional Reading:**


Lawrence, T. E. *Revolt in the Desert.* Doran, 1927.


SEMINAR THREE

Baseline Understanding III: Theories of “Instant” Revolution

Not all revolutionary theorists and practitioners agree that struggle has to be protracted. This seminar offers the viewpoints of two writers who believed that time was working against the revolution in Latin America: Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Régis Debray.

Che Guevara’s ideas on insurgency have been overshadowed by his popularity as narrative writer and as an icon of youthful rebellion. Born into a relatively affluent family in Argentina in 1928, Guevara enrolled in medical studies that he never completed. Instead he traveled extensively throughout Latin America which culminated in the publishing of Diarios de motocicleta (made into a film of the same name in 2004). Che’s observations of the inequities of wealth distribution in Latin America, between wealthy (and corrupt) landowners and poor peasants led him to seek out other “self-aware” revolutionaries. In 1955, he met Fidel Castro (then in exile in Mexico) and joined the Cuban revolutionary in his attempt to overthrow the regime of Fulgencio Batista. Although the attempted revolution had an unsuccessful start, the popularity of and local support for the survivors grew to the point that within just over two years, the guerrillas had forced Batista from power. Frustrated with the peacetime direction of Cuban revolutionary reforms and what he perceived to be Soviet chauvinism and meddling, Che sought to overthrow other regimes in Africa and South America. Ultimately Che was captured and executed by US-trained counterinsurgency forces in Bolivia in 1967.

Che’s writings on guerrilla warfare capture the “best practices” that he discerned while in the field. On a theoretical level, his works leave much to be desired. Just as Lawrence’s fame was elevated by his biographers, Che Guevara’s notoriety spread as a result of the writings of his erstwhile comrade-in-arms Régis Debray. Debray is a philosopher who met the young Guevara in Cuba while lecturing at the University of Havana after the overthrow of Batista. Che’s impact on the young Debray was considerable. Debray not only joined Che’s ill-fated expedition to Bolivia but he also penned Revolution in the Revolution that same year. Among the survivors of Che’s guerrilla foco, or vanguard of the revolution, Debray was imprisoned by the Bolivian government and eventually released as a result of an international media campaign backed by a number of influential intellectuals. His Revolution in the Revolution offers a more comprehensive theoretical explanation of how and why the specific type of guerrilla warfare identified by Guevara should be pursued. Debray continues to make headlines in France, both for his support for the government’s ban on Muslim headscarves in schools as well as for his advocacy of his latest intellectual pursuit, the study of mediology—how ideas become reality.

What are the structural and environmental requirements for insurgents to achieve success? Why do some revolutionaries reject protracted irregular warfare as a means to an end? What are the comparative advantages and disadvantages to each approach to revolution? Is the belief in quick revolutionary success doomed to failure? If so, why is the lure of the “propaganda of the deed” still so appealing today?
REQUIRED READINGS:

BOOK (Handout)

Guevara, Ernesto “Che.” Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 50-74; 148-162; 313-324.

ELECTRONIC

Debray, Regis. Revolution in the Revolution.

Suggested Additional Reading:


Two questions dominated the minds of most Americans after 11 September 2001. The first was “why do these people hate us so much?” The second, and arguably more difficult one for the average American to understand, was “what motivates people to not only kill themselves, but thousands of civilians”? Although the US and its citizens had been targets of terrorism for at least two decades prior to 9/11, previous instances of terrorism (with a few exceptions) followed a rather routine pattern: the incident itself (hostage taking, hijacking, bombing, etc.), the issuing of a communiqué and/or demands, and the eventual resolution of the incident successfully or unsuccessfully. Al Qaeda has recast the norms of terrorist behavior since its influence and reputation have spread. To understand those norms, one must be aware of what al Qaeda leaders say they are trying to achieve, and how they and their followers see the world and, in particular, the United States.

The writings of Sayyid Qutb have had a considerable impact on the thought of the militant minority within the global Islamic community. The Egyptian-born Qutb provided an intellectual and theological rationalization for the use of violence in overthrowing state governments. Qutb studied in the United States after the end of the Second World War and upon his return to Egypt, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and penned a number of works including *Milestones* and a 30-volume theological work entitled *In the Shade of the Koran*. Imprisoned twice during his life, Qutb was executed in 1966 for his alleged role in a Brotherhood plot to assassinate President Gamel Abdul-Nasser. In *Milestones* Qutb provides a rationale for violence that is cast in theological terms.

A number of influential scholars and writers suggest that engaging in theological discourse to win over Islamists is a fool’s errand. Individuals join groups and radicalize, they counter, not because of any deep-seated ideological grievance but as a function of small group interaction, self-actualization, and shared values. The other reading for this day’s class is perhaps proof of the old adage “what’s old is new.” Writing in 1951, Eric Hoffer tackled the question of why individuals join mass movements and commit horrible acts all in the name of a better future. Hoffer addresses questions very much on the mind of Westerners today. Who joins mass movements and why? Why are such individuals willing to die for their cause? What is their thought process?

As you read today’s works, consider the following additional questions. What are the goals of the violent Islamic extremist groups? Successful counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism theory historically has been based on a mixture of coercion and compromise. Can the members of such groups be influenced or are they truly actors that cannot be deterred—leaving only the option of a war of annihilation? How does the thinking of writers such as Qutb rationalize the taking of life—in other words, what purpose does the use of violence serve? What implications does the concept of true believers have for US approaches to combating terrorism?
REQUIRED READINGS:

BOOKS

Hoffer, Eric. *True Believers*.


Suggested Additional Reading:


Yesterday’s seminar looked at irregular warfare from both a cultural and psychological perspective. These two views tend to dominate literature related to irregular warfare as the place violence in a normative or individual context. Both are sought to try and answer a central question: why do groups and individuals turn to violence? By understanding the motivation, so the logic goes, one can figure out how to address any one of the three so-called “root causes”: greed, god, or grievance. Another approach looks at the problem of irregular warfare from a different vantage point: the organizational, or structural perspective. As we will explore today, controlling violence and managing subordinates within clandestine organizations contains its own challenges, partly due to survival mechanisms and also as a function of preference divergence.

Professor Jacob Shapiro cut his teeth as a researcher at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center. The Center, set up after 9/11, was designed to act as a conduit between the United States Special Operations Command, the Department of Defense, and the broader academic community working on terrorism. Its reports, including the one that was the genesis of Shapiro’s dissertation and cited in the bibliography below, were and remain influential sources of cutting edge analysis of violent Islamic extremism and its associated captured documentation. He is Professor at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and is the co-founder of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Shapiro is an award-winning scholar, has impressive academic credentials, and is a retired special operator—a rarity among professionals in this field.

As you read Shapiro’s book, be mindful of the following questions: What qualities of clandestine organizations, and its constituent members, contribute to the dilemma that terrorist leaders face? How can and should leaders manage preference divergence without creating too much risk to themselves. What are the implications of terrorist “organization,” in its various forms—and what are the strengths and weaknesses of each? Is the principle/agent framework appropriate for the evaluation of terrorist groups—what is its utility and what aspects does it overlook or minimize? How confident are you recommending Shapiro’s 16 recommendations for action to policymakers—and which of these aren’t we currently pursuing?

**REQUIRED READINGS:**

**BOOK**

Shapiro. *The Terrorist’s Dilemma.*
Suggested Additional Reading:


__________. Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies. DA-PAM No. 550-104, Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 1966. (n.b., a revised, updated second edition is available online from the US Army Special Operations Command in eBook or PDF form from https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/arisbooks.html)


Until the late 1960s, insurgent leaders largely avoided large-scale activities in cities in favor of more remote, complex terrain such as jungles or mountains. Such terrain was difficult for local security forces to access and control; the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan is one such example. Revolutionary activity in cities was largely limited to political front movements, protest groups, and small terrorist cells. The leaders of some groups and movements in South America, including Brazil and Uruguay, concluded cities were ripe terrain for “urban guerrillas.” Police and security force crackdowns in Montevideo and São Paulo proved them wrong a half-century ago. Such forces turned cities from sources of revolutionary activity into a hecatomb of the urban guerrilla. More recently, insurgent and terrorist actions in cities such as Fallujah, Mogadishu, Donetsk, Nairobi, and Mumbai suggest that conditions have changed. Cities are and will become “the physical terrain of choice” for those using irregular means.

Insurgents, terrorists, and others must be located before they can be defeated. The past dozen years combating terrorists and insurgents in Iraq and elsewhere has broadened our collective understanding of the meaning of the word “terrain.” According to contemporary theorists, counterinsurgents should comprehend and use to their advantage the social structures and ethnic norms of the operating environment--what Ralph Peters famously labeled “the human terrain.”

David Kilcullen is a respected counterinsurgency author and practitioner. Kilcullen, a retired Lt Col in the Australian Army, received his PhD in politics from the University of New South Wales. He wrote his dissertation on guerrilla groups in Indonesia using a methodology based heavily on the discipline of anthropology. Kilcullen was a counterterrorism consultant to the U.S. State Department after 2005, was appointed Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to MNF-I by General David Petraeus, and currently consults with a wide range of US government departments and agencies. In his third book, he argues that future adversaries can and will exploit the difficulties inherent in conducting “human sorting” amid the complex terrain of sprawling mega-cities and urban canyons.

What is Kilcullen’s “theory of competitive control” and (hearkening back to 600) does it meet the criteria of theory discussed in class? What are the strengths and weaknesses of Kilcullen’s model? What are the implications for future U.S. and coalition operations when operating in “urban littorals”? What conditions have changed that make cities appealing to current and future terrorists and insurgents?
REQUIRED READING:

BOOK

Kilcullen, David. Out of the Mountains.

Suggested Additional Reading:


At the end of World War II, France attempted to reassert control over territories, including its colony in Indochina, which had been occupied during the war. The problems facing the country domestically and internationally were formidable. These problems included: domestic strife at home between competing (and sometimes armed) political groups, rebuilding the country’s damaged or destroyed infrastructure, and struggling against increasingly confident and capable nationalist groups in Indochina and Algeria. Although the French ultimately withdrew from both Indochina and Algeria, a number of senior US leaders sponsored efforts to learn from their experience (as well as the experience of the British in Greece, Malaya, and Kenya) given the change in US defense policy outlined by President Kennedy in his first months in office. Two French army officers in particular were noteworthy for their writings and influence here in the US: Roger Trinquier and David Galula.

Roger Trinquier had a significant impact on the development of US thinking about counterinsurgency operations. Trinquier was posted to China in the 1930s where he learned Chinese. After World War II, he was posted to both Indochina and the Commando Training Center. In 1951 he became commander of the 1st Colonial Parachute Battalion and in that capacity commanded all anti-communist guerrillas in north Indochina. His guerrilla teams achieved some noteworthy successes against the Viet Minh until the conclusion of the battle of Dien Bien Phu which resulted in the ultimate withdrawal of the French army from Indochina. Following Indochina, Trinquier was posted to Algiers as commander of the 3rd Colonial Parachute regiment during the Algerian War of Independence. Colonel Trinquier retired in 1961.

David Galula was commissioned in 1940, the same year that his country was overrun by the Germans. He campaigned as a junior officer in North Africa and later participated in the liberation of France and occupation of Germany. From 1945 Galula served in a number of political-military postings during postwar insurgencies in China and Greece. He volunteered for duty in Algeria and served as a company and later deputy battalion commander charged with pacifying one of the most difficult regions in that country. He retired from the French army shortly after Algeria gained its independence and he spent a number of subsequent years in the United States translating his experience of counterinsurgency into books and monographs for Harvard and RAND. David Galula died in 1967 and his writings were mostly forgotten until recently.

What are the fundamental differences and the greatest areas of similarity between these theories of counterinsurgency? Why do both theorists place so much emphasis on organizing the population? Many would argue that superlative intelligence is crucial to a successful counterinsurgent strategy. What does each theorist consider to be the best method of
obtaining intelligence? What are the problems associated with information operations and how are they overcome?

REQUIRED READING:

BOOKS


Suggested Additional Reading:


Not surprisingly, the policy focus on irregular warfare over the past decade has been a boon for scholarship on the subject. In a general sense, contemporary literature on the subject can divided into a number of rough categories. These categories include: understanding the ideology and goals of violent Islamic extremism; the ethical, moral, and legal dimensions of irregular warfare; organizational learning and adaptation; the nature and success of violent and non-violent mass movements; revisiting historical case studies in the light of newly available documentary sources; as well as others.

The contributions from the academic discipline of political science have been a welcome addition to the literature. These additions, some of which you are already familiar, have explored questions of the logic of violence in civil wars, the nature of alliance formation and fragmentation, among others. In this, our second lesson on the subject, we will look at irregular organization from a different vantage point.

Paul Staniland, the author of today’s book, received his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Currently an Assistant Professor at the University of Chicago, he is also the co-founder of the University’s Program on Political Violence. Staniland argues organizations can only succeed in insurgencies if they have a strong connection to the social base within the country. More specifically, insurgents are more likely to succeed, or remain cohesive, if they can mobilize the social resources of trust, information, and shared political meaning. If insurgents cannot do so, they will collapse. He develops a framework based on these resources which he applies to three different contexts in South Asia: Kashmir; Afghanistan; and Sri Lanka.

For today’s seminar, we will reach within the beginning of this class as well as the beginning of the year as the departure point for our evaluation. More specifically, how does Staniland’s theories compare with those of Stathis Kalyvas (from Day One) and Jacob Shapiro (Day Five)? On what ideas would they agree or disagree? Put another way, are these idea sets complementary or contradictory, and if so, in what areas? How central is organization to insurgency? How does Staniland’s framework explain the collapse of Daesh in Iraq and Syria—and what does it suggest about its possible resurgence?

**REQUIRED READINGS:**

Staniland, Paul. *Networks of Rebellion.*

**Suggested Additional Readings:**


SEMINAR NINE

Countering Irregular War: Terminology & Politicization

One truism about American national security and defense policy is that each generation of policymakers and implementers are confronted by “new” security challenges. In the twentieth-century such challenges have included subversion and sabotage, wars of national liberation, and terrorism. As you have learned in previous classes, too often opinion about new security challenges—whether they are operational or technological in nature—devolves down into a discussion about the nature and character of war. More specifically, opinion divides along two lines: new challenges nullify old assumptions and responses (recall Kilcullen, among others) and require radical operational and organizational change in order to counter; or, the more traditional reaction that such challenges are nothing more than “old wine in new skins” requiring little institutional change to combat effectively (recall our discussion of terminology from the first class day). More often than not, the questions are not whether to make change to meet new security challenges but rather how quickly can institutions respond and to what degree based on current and expected future strategic context.

For today’s seminar, read first the ARIS report entitled Little Green Men. This work attempted to explain how Russia was able to accomplish its objectives in Ukraine with remarkable speed and precision. As you do, recall our discussion of General Valeri Gerasimov’s article “The Value of Science is in the Forecasting” that we read in 600. Then read Ofer Fridman’s Russian Hybrid Warfare. Consider the coining of new terminology and the role it places in shaping the national security discourse. An old saw at SAASS is “words matter.” In this seminar, we will look at how words matter and to whom. Few terms are ubiquitous as “hybrid warfare” but consider the following questions: What value does this term actually have? Where did the term originate and for what purpose? How has the term been used within the Russian defense establishment? How has the term been translated within Western defense communities and what accounts for this difference? How does Fridman’s argument get you to reconsider the scope and conclusions of the ARIS report and General Gerasimov’s article?

REQUIRED READINGS:

BOOKS

Fridman. Russian Hybrid Warfare.

DOWNLOAD

**Suggested Additional Reading:**


SEMINAR TEN

The Purpose of Violence: Irregular Warfare as Politics

This course began with an inquiry into the logic of violence, and in particular, to answer the question of the political ends, or purpose, for which non-state groups use violence. Subsequent seminars have looked at insurgent theories of violence, the changed context of contemporary irregular warfare, and the means and ways in which irregular warfare can be confronted. The last seminar of course seeks to bring your journey in the subject full circle back to the question of the purpose of such violence. In particular, today’s discussion centers around discussions related to separating military from political activity in contemporary conflicts. Liberal democracies may seek to separate or combine together artificially such actions. Insurgent leaders, however, are well aware of the political purpose that violence serves and they use it as part of their strategic messaging, or narrative.

Much of Emile Simpson’s War From the Ground Up is devoted to the subject of strategic narratives and the political use of violence in irregular warfare. The book has received considerable attention thanks to the ringing endorsement it received. The late Sir Michael Howard, one of the translators and editors of Clausewitz, called Simpson’s book “a coda to Clausewitz’s On War. But it has the advantage of being considerably shorter.” Simpson himself has impressive credentials. As an infantry officer he has served three tours in Afghanistan and has experience elsewhere in south and central Asia. As an academic, he read history at Oxford and has served as a military scholar in residence there. As you read today’s book, keep the following questions in mind: Having read Clausewitz in depth, how accurate is Howard’s assessment—is Simpson the contemporary Clausewitz? If so, can we dispense with reading Clausewitz altogether? Is irregular warfare nothing more than armed politics? Should we not develop theories of counterinsurgency but rather understand better contemporary war, irregular or otherwise? How do we restore the balance in the use of armed that is weighted so heavily towards operational execution as opposed to desired outcome? What should political and military leaders learn from the Confrontasi in our contemporary use of force? What peace should be seeking as we continue to fight war globally?

REQUIRED READINGS:

BOOKS

Simpson. War From the Ground Up.

Suggested Additional Reading:

SEMINAR ELEVEN

In-Class Examination

Specific details regarding the examination will be discussed in class.