

## Book Reviews

*The State of the Earth: Environmental Challenges on the Road to 2100* by Paul K. Conkin. University Press of Kentucky, 2006, 320 pp., \$32.00.

Author Paul K. Conkin, a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Vanderbilt University, leaves the reader with the lingering theme of the destruction of our natural environment due to the unending growth in both human consumption and population. He addresses not only the problem but also potential solutions and concludes with somewhat ominous predictions. Each of five sections addresses key ecological challenges we currently face.

The first section begins with a review of how Earth came to support primitive, and then much more complex, life. Natural cycles like those of the sun, plate tectonics, or Earth's atmosphere all have enormous impacts on human life. Conkin emphasizes that humans are beginning to influence many of these natural processes, sometimes in positive, but mostly in negative, ways. Another topic is the challenges created by resource consumption and population growth. Increases in both are generating serious environmental problems—global warming, massive extinctions of species, and ocean pollution. The recurring challenge for each of these issues is equity. How will poor countries overcome poverty on a finite Earth while wealthy, resource-consuming countries show no signs of slowing their environmentally destructive utilization patterns?

The second section examines such vital resources as soil, vegetation, food, water, and energy. Soils around the world are threatened by erosion, salinization, acidification, and exhaustion. As a result, global food production could decrease in the future if the hazards mentioned previously are not mitigated, especially in India and China. There is a double peril—population expansion in poor states and unprecedented increases in water and energy usage in wealthy states are tightening the vise on both of these resources. Conkin is particularly pessimistic about the possibilities of new technologies solving future water or energy crunches. However, his investigation does not cover recent new advances in nanotechnology, renewables, or energy efficiency—an oversight. Nevertheless, one of his recommendations is for global society to begin the painful shift toward lower fertility rates in poor states and decreased consumption patterns in wealthy states. This is a valuable recommendation regardless of outcomes from breakthroughs in future energy or water technologies.

The third part investigates the immensely destructive impact human activities have had on much of our natural ecosystems. Pollution, waste, and damage to the ozone layer have created untold threats to mankind and nature. Many naturally occurring materials are accumulating in the environment at rates that far exceed the ability of normal processes to recycle them. For example, carbon

dioxide, surface ozone, sulfates, nitrogen-based pollutants, and methane are being produced at unsustainable rates—threatening humans, plants, and animals. The plethora of difficulties in maintaining global and regional biodiversity is highlighted. Threats come from unsustainable patterns of resource utilization, often unhindered by national and international legislation, that destroy habitats and eventually lead to mass species extinctions.

The fourth section centers on the multidimensional threats from global climate change. In a move away from the mainstream, the author is more concerned about the beginning of a new glacial period that is aggravated by global warming. He contends that we are nearing the end of a warm and stable interglacial period and may soon enter into another age of rapid cooling. Ramifications of a new glacial epoch are considered. To mitigate this new ice age, Conkin believes we may need our remaining supplies of fossil fuels. He clarifies many of the complex policy and scientific issues that surround the production of greenhouse gases as well as how emissions may be reduced. But lack of political will to reduce emissions coupled with the inadequate use of the power only affluent states have to moderate climate change lead him to conclude that temperatures will rise.

The fifth and final part scrutinizes policies and philosophies influencing environmental movements and environmentalists. It explores the role American environmentalists have had on reforming the current political and economic systems. Two major classes of environmentalists are discussed: reform and passionate. Reform environmentalists are less radical and are able to work within the US political and legal systems. Recently, they were able to craft powerful legislation such as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air and Water Acts, and the Endangered Species Act. Other nation-states copied much of this groundbreaking policy. Passionate environmentalists are part of more radical and violent social movements and include deep ecologists, ecofeminists, and bioregionalists. Organizations such as Greenpeace and Earth First demonstrate this philosophy in their practice of civil disobedience and media manipulation in attempts to protect the natural world from corporate exploitation.

Conkin provides a grim “Personal Afterword.” He identifies the following five “less secure conditions” (p. 280) that he believes are vital to our future: (1) the current unusually stable interglacial period, (2) our great soil bank of nutrients, (3) our great energy bank of fossil fuels, (4) the enormous growth of human knowledge, and (5) the tremendous extension of medical knowledge and public health management. He maintains that the first three conditions are now less secure than ever before, and that the last two may collapse if the first three continue to suffer severe environmental degradation. Concluding that human society must move toward a sustainable economy, Conkin doubts that we can make the move “voluntarily and preemptively” (p. 282). In sum, the deteriorating “state of the earth” is creating an intractable moral dilemma, primarily for the citizens of affluent states.

Anyone interested in the environmental condition of our planet will find Conkin’s book enlightening. Security specialists, in particular, will find evidence

for great concern over the national security implications of these impending environmental and, subsequently, social challenges. However, he offers little that is new to the study of environmental security except for his treatment of climate change. Few scientists are concerned that the climate is about to enter into an ice age. More are concerned that we are about to overheat our atmosphere and create what Jim Hansen calls a “transformed planet” (“The Threat to the Planet,” *The New York Review of Books*, 13 July 2006). Nevertheless, Conkin provides an instructive, well-researched, and easy-to-read work.

John T. Ackerman, PhD  
*Air Command and Staff College*

***Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*** by Steven A. Cook. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007, 189 pp., \$24.95.

There is a long, if thin, line of scholarship on the military’s role in political development, and Steven Cook’s book adds considerably to it. Building on earlier work by giants such as Morris Janowitz and Samuel Huntington, Cook perceptively examines how the militaries in three Muslim countries—Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey—have cleverly constructed the facades of democracy while exercising considerable political influence behind the scenes. Such “pseudodemocratic” institutions, for Cook, allow the military to insulate itself from public accountability while at the same time exercising its political will. The result is states that are dominated by authoritarian modernizers but that do not actually become military dictatorships.

Cook focuses on the interests that the military hopes to preserve and advance through military “enclaves,” with core interests emphasizing economic autonomy (as the best defense of state as well as a means of personal financial gains), foreign and security policies, and the maintenance of sufficient political cover. This latter objective is critical for the military establishment to achieve its interests without generating enough opposition to erode its power.

Algeria provides the first case, where the creation of pluralist facades allowed for a limited tolerance of political opposition without having to make genuine structural changes in the political order. The risks to that order included the possibility that officers could not always control the emptiness of the facades. Additionally, opposition demands for more liberalization threatened the military’s enclaves and, sometimes, its economic interests protected within those enclaves. Islamist demands for accountability and reforms, such as in Islamic banking, threatened the military’s privileged position and provided it a pretense to combat the rising Islamist tide in Algeria. Moreover, the Islamist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) (Islamic Salvation Front) exploited the military’s claim to be the protector of Algeria’s nationalism, claiming that military corruption was a new form of colonialism.

That intervention came in January 1992, when the military members of the High Security Council dissolved the National Assembly and placed one of their

own, Gen Liamine Zeroul, as president. However, as Cook notes, the subsequent defeat of the FIS over a decade-long civil war allowed the military to conclude that it no longer needed direct rule, and it retreated from the political arena. Pres. Abdelaziz Boutiflika, elected in 2004 without military interference, has distanced himself from his armed forces.

The Egyptian political landscape is somewhat similar to that of Algeria—a military-founded political system, marked by early efforts to create a democratic facade, with a centerpiece national assembly. Still, as Cook notes, “It is the military’s crucial and intimate association with the presidency that assures the continuity of Egypt’s political system” (p. 73). For Egypt’s professional military, the purpose for holding to the reins of power behind these democratic veneers was similar to that of the Algerian military—to advance the cause of Egyptian (and Arab) nationalism along with economic development and social justice. Internally, one of the threats to the military’s hold on politics was Islamic extremism. In an ironic twist, a military ally in combating Islamic militancy was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the moderate opposition to the regime. Again, as in the Algerian case, the MB’s position on economic reform hurt the entrenched economic interests of the soldiers. Nevertheless, hoping that the nonviolent MB might undermine the more radical Islamist groups, the military and the ruling National Democratic Party allowed it limited latitude to criticize the ruling apparatus—generating at best a rhetorical response from the military—according to Cook (though in 2007, the MB suffered a harsh crackdown on its activities by the regime).

The role of the military in the “ruling but not governing” paradigm is challenged most in Turkey, where the election of moderate Islamist governments in the past several decades has brought the military to power either to govern directly or to engineer conditions strong enough to collapse an Islamist regime. The four interventions alone make the strongest arm in the Turkish political climate the military, and its strength is reinforced by the secularist (indeed laicist) separation of religion and state that was initiated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and is upheld by the Turkish military. It was Atatürk and his fellow officers who defended Turkey during World War I and after, establishing a new political order that swept away the ashes of the Ottoman past. They authored the constitutions of 1924, 1960, and 1982, all of which constructed the constrained political sphere aimed at limiting rights for Islamists and Kurds (along with other minorities). The Turkish military held sway in selecting a majority of post-Kemal presidents, and more importantly, according to Cook, “Politicians must ensure that they do nothing to elicit the ire of the military establishment and its collaborators among the state elite” (p. 103). There were advantages to this indirect control: it protected the professionalism of the military and allowed it to play off factions (it could allow some modest Islamist participation in national politics to counter the political left, for example). When that participation grew beyond military-imposed limits, the soldiers cracked down—as they did against the ruling Islamist Refah Party in 1997 when Refah loaded the Turkish bureaucracy, a foundation of military influence,

with Islamist sympathizers. Though the military ended the Refah government, the party itself morphed into the Adalet ve Kalkinma (AKP) (Justice and Development Party), winning a majority of seats in the Turkish parliament in November 2002. The AKP-dominated legislature passed a number of measures effectively weakening military political power while at the same time couching those reforms in European Union (EU) language. Thus, the military was caught between its need for influence and its support for Turkish EU membership, forcing it to retreat somewhat from its early stance against Refah. However, the elections of July 2007 (after publication of Cook's book) that enhanced the power of the AKP might cause the professional military elite to adopt a more confrontational stance should AKP-induced policy challenge further their stance and the Kemalist legacy.

Can the United States guide these countries (and others like them) out of these patterns of military power? Cook persuasively argues that the roads taken—development of civil societies and economic development—do not necessarily lead to real, as opposed to facade, democracy. However, positive inducements (military aid tied to real military reform) might reduce military influence somewhat.

Cook might have examined in more detail the enterprise involvement of the military in the three countries he examined. In Egypt, for example, the military has broad involvement in various commercial enterprises, large and small, as Cook briefly notes, that constitute over 30 percent of Egypt's industrial output. Moreover, as Kristina Mani indicates, military involvement in a national economy can make the military even less accountable to civil and political society ("Militaries in Business," *Armed Forces and Society* 33, no. 4 [July 2007]: 592). But this is a minor criticism. Overall, Cook has produced a masterful synopsis of the Oz-like role of the Egyptian, Algerian, and Turkish militaries, ruling behind the facade of political institutions that serve to cover their interests with a democratic veneer.

David S. Sorenson, PhD  
*Air War College*

***Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era*** by David E. Johnson. RAND Corporation, 2007, 235 pp., \$28.00. (Also downloadable for free on <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG405-1>.)

The author argues that airpower has proven itself capable of performing deep-strike operations much better than the Army: "The task of shaping the theater—strategically and operationally—should be an air component function, and joint and service doctrines and programs should change accordingly" (p. xvii). Consequently, the Army should give up its deep-attack concept as well as the battlespace that goes with it. This would allow the Army to be redesigned so that it can better conduct military operations other than war.

RAND analyst David E. Johnson's conclusions are all the more compelling because he is a retired Army colonel of field artillery, which, along with the

aviation branch, is one of the Army's main stakeholders in its deep-operations concept. Johnson holds a doctorate degree in history from Duke University. His previous publications include *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945* (Cornell University Press, 2003), which was chosen for the US Army Training and Doctrine Command's senior leader reading list. *Learning Large Lessons* has the potential to be at least as successful because it explores contemporary interservice friction between the Army and Air Force in joint war fighting. Indeed, it has already been adopted as a textbook by the Air Command and Staff College for its airpower studies course.

Johnson's study analyzes major combat operations in five post–Cold War military operations: Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). He asks, what are the war-fighting lessons about the relative roles of air and ground power? Analysis of these post–Cold War conflicts, according to the author, suggests that a shift has occurred in the relative war-fighting roles of ground and air power, and it is most apparent in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Airpower dominates the strategic and operational levels of war fighting against large, conventional enemy forces. Exploitation at the tactical level is the domain of ground power. Moreover, successful major combat operations do not result in achieving the strategic end state. A protracted postwar US presence has been the norm, and the Army needs to be redesigned accordingly.

What makes the book especially provocative is how the author structures his analysis of each of the five post–Cold War conflicts. Johnson compares the differences in perceived “lessons learned” between the air and ground communities. In each case, the communities drew self-serving lessons based on their service cultures. In Kosovo, for example, while the ground-centric view concluded that the threat of a ground invasion was decisive, the air-centric view assessed the strategic air attacks as the key to victory. Johnson also offers a more balanced and integrated assessment of the lessons learned for each conflict.

The book's focus is on major combat operations because, the author argues, this is the arena where the greatest tension exists between the Army and Air Force. Much of this friction revolves around ownership of the battlespace. Ever since the development of the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine in the 1980s, ground commanders have demanded extensive depth for the corps' areas of operations (AO) to mount deep, shaping attacks with long-range missile fire and attack helicopters. Yet, experience has demonstrated that these high-risk attacks have been relatively ineffective. More to the point, when the Army conducts such deep operations, its relatively small and vulnerable force of attack helicopters prevents the Air Force from launching more robust and less risky attacks against the same enemy forces.

Readers interested in operational war fighting will appreciate the sophistication of Johnson's study. He shows how the “Halt Phase concept” of the 1990s, which supported the two-major-theaters war strategy, sparked the Air Force to continue to enhance its capability to destroy enemy forces on the battlefield rather than focusing all of its attention on strategic attack. This interdiction

emphasis set the stage for increasing friction with the Army over control of deep battlespace. The placement of the fire support coordination line was indeed the most obvious bone of contention. But Johnson's analysis also shows how other control measures, such as boundaries, AOs, the battlefield coordination line, and supporting/supported relationships figured in the debate. His discussion of these concepts is lucid, instructive, exemplified by his cases, and another reason his text will be useful in professional military education.

Johnson posits that Army commanders are not inclined to contract their AOs for what are largely issues of trust between the Army and the Air Force. The sort of trust that exists between the air and ground elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Force simply does not exist between the Army and the Air Force. Moreover, the Army will continue to demand expanded AOs to accommodate long-range precision strike weapons for its Future Force. Johnson maintains that the authority to establish fire support coordination measures that affect the theater campaign plan should be withheld by the joint force commander.

Why have these lessons not made their way into joint doctrine? Johnson's declaration that joint doctrine is essentially an amalgam of service doctrine rings true. "An essential first step in reforming joint doctrine is to eliminate the principle that joint doctrine must defer to that of the services" (p. xviii). Johnson's excellent study shows us that much work remains to attain a true joint war-fighting system.

**Bert Frandsen, PhD**

*Air Command and Staff College*

***Hitting First: Preventive Force in U.S. Security Strategy*** edited by William W. Keller and Gordon R. Mitchell. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006, 360 pp., \$27.95.

One of the most controversial national security issues since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 centers on the Bush administration's 2002 *National Security Strategy (NSS)* pronouncement asserting the right to preempt grave threats before suffering an attack. The controversy became more pronounced in light of how the administration used the concept to justify regime change in Iraq. The subsequent failure to uncover weapons of mass destruction (WMD), coupled with revelations of conflicting evidence prior to the decision to invade Iraq pointing to the absence of WMDs, calls into question the morality as well as the theoretical validity of the preemptive concept. The authors who contributed to this volume examine these issues to discern and to inform future policies. At issue is the credibility of US leadership when dealing with future conflicts that involve WMDs, terrorism, or rogue states.

The 2002 *NSS* asserts that international norms allow states to preempt adversaries under the customary principle of anticipatory self-defense. However, when applied to potential rather than to imminent threats, as was done in the case of Iraq, scholars argue that the Bush administration equated preemption with pre-

vention. While preemption may have a long history of acceptance in international security practice, prevention does not. The distinction is not one of mere semantics—it cuts to the heart of legitimate versus illegitimate actions among states. Dan Reiter's chapter outlines the historical experience with preventive attacks against WMD programs reaching back to World War II. The record shows that although short-term successes may occur, preventive attacks generally fail to eliminate WMD programs (p. 41). Therefore, the primary justification for preventive attacks—that they will eliminate the WMD threat—appears invalid. In more recent cases, attacks that fall short of full-scale invasion actually encouraged target states to intensify their efforts to acquire WMDs.

One of the key features of the debate surrounding the Bush administration's application of the preventive war concept is the use of information to garner congressional and public support for using force to eliminate the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. One of the key lessons military leaders and policy makers learned from experience in the Vietnam War was that national leaders must have popular support before committing the nation to war. In the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the administration conducted an aggressive campaign designed to capture both domestic and international support for deposing Saddam Hussein. As the contributors show, as far as key figures in the Bush administration were concerned, the first was critical; the second was desirable but optional. Contributors to *Hitting First* show that a succession of administration officials selected intelligence information—"cherry picking" as William Keller and Gordon Mitchell characterize it—to paint a picture of the Iraqi WMD program that posed an imminent threat.

When using information in this way, the power presidents wield to influence the debate and public opinion is remarkable. The contributors point to the Operation Iraqi Freedom case, however, to recommend caution when exercising that power. Mitchell and Robert Newman show that ad hoc groups that aggressively seek to shape public policies can truncate debate. Historically, the Committee on the Present Danger's influence on the Truman administration's framing of the communist threat in the 1950s was similar to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group's (PCTEG) influence over the debate about the threat from Iraqi WMDs. The PCTEG collected information from a wide range of sources to assemble its own assessment of the Iraqi WMD program and its relationship with terrorists. The authors cite one instance in which the "PCTEG advised policy-makers . . . to dismiss the CIA's guarded conclusions, recommending that 'the CIA report ought to be read for content only—and [the] CIA's interpretation ought to be ignored'" (p. 81, emphasis in original). The net effect of this circumventing of the intelligence community's capabilities was to allow the administration to build a convincing case for going to war with Iraq. But when the evidence proved to be suspect—and when it came to light that the administration had access to alternate interpretations—US leadership and credibility came into question at home and abroad.

While it may seem attractive to criticize the administration for its policies toward preventive war, the editors recognize that the policy is in effect. And the threat from



Iran and North Korea may require future administrations to consider using the Iraq precedent to launch a preventive (or preemptive) attack against those WMD programs. Peter Dombrowski analyzes the types of military capabilities that the nation would require to support future preventive wars. He observes that limited strikes will not accomplish desired policy goals. While the United States maintains its current dominance in conventional war-fighting capabilities, defeating conventional forces seems to be a foregone conclusion. The problem with preventive wars occurs in the aftermath of regime change—as occurred in Iraq. Dombrowski argues that the military's focus on fielding overwhelming conventional power projection and war-fighting capabilities leaves the United States ill equipped for post-conflict and reconstruction missions that are essential for achieving political objectives. He recommends rebalancing the emphasis toward providing more capabilities to deal with stability and reconstruction efforts.

The preemptive/preventive debate will likely continue. For now, US efforts appear to emphasize diplomatic initiatives to shape WMD and terrorist threats—until Iraq stabilizes, this is a prudent course. The editors and authors of *Hitting First* have provided a balanced, comprehensive analysis of the issues surrounding the policy. The individual chapters are researched thoroughly, and the editors provide an excellent bibliography that can serve as a guide for future studies. The division into four sections—Historical Context, Public Discourse Justifying the Use of Force, From Boardroom to Battlefield, and Outlook—makes it convenient to select specific topics for self-study or for framing group discussions. This is an excellent source for military, government, and academic students of policy development. As long as US policy makers encounter adversaries who seek or acquire WMDs, the issues discussed in *Hitting First* will resonate.

Anthony C. Cain, PhD  
Editor-in-Chief, *Strategic Studies Quarterly*

***The Color of Empire: Race and American Foreign Relations*** by Michael L. Krenn. Potomac Books, Inc., 2006, 147 pp., \$38.00.

Race has been an abiding theme in American life. Starting with the first contact between Europeans and New World native peoples and gaining speed with the arrival of the first African slaves in Jamestown in 1619, considerations of race have played an important role in the American historical experience. The country was born into a time when the Enlightenment interest in scientific classification joined together with European exploration and colonization to produce a seemingly irrepressible urge to categorize human beings according to their biology and behaviors. Mass migrations of (mainly European) populations thrust together large numbers of peoples formerly foreign to one another, producing the first “clash of cultures” and transforming what otherwise might have remained a hobby of intellectuals into a popular way of perceiving the world's various human tribes.

Michael Krenn provides us with a fine introduction to the ways in which a race-based understanding of humanity has colored American views of nonwhite peoples, both at home and around the world, and how this has influenced our interactions with them. Krenn, a graduate of the University of Utah and Rutgers, is chair of the History Department at Appalachian State University in North Carolina and author of a previous volume on racial integration at the US Department of State. He is well versed in his field and is able to apply his knowledge in a fashion that is both engaging and readable.

Krenn's book is divided into four chapters ("White," "Brown," "Yellow," and "Black"), each devoted to exploring how whites understood, first, themselves as a distinct and superior race (Krenn adopts the historical term *Anglo-Saxon* rather than *white*) and how they then defined and categorized other racial groups. Krenn then takes a look at how white Americans' views on race affected US interactions with nonwhite peoples abroad, focusing on events like the battles for Texas independence and the 1846 war with Mexico; our involvement in Cuba and the Philippines; US actions vis-à-vis the Chinese during the nineteenth century (Chinese Exclusion Act, Boxer Rebellion); our relations with Japan from the nineteenth century through World War II; and, lastly, the long-term US disregard for Africa and our "discovery" of the continent during the Cold War. In his conclusion, Krenn also touches on US relations with the Middle East. An appendix offers a selection of text excerpts meant to both illustrate the book's thesis and to provide evidence of the continuity of race as an element in American thinking.

In a book as short as Krenn's, many things must of necessity be left out. Such a narrowing of focus can be useful in illustrating a particular aspect within a larger complex of problems. But such a foreshortening of perspective invariably involves considerable selectivity, which can produce a one-dimensional analysis that neglects other factors and, more importantly, their oftentimes complicated interactions. Although Krenn states that his purpose is "not to suggest that race is the only determinant in U.S. foreign policy" (p. 105), he also asserts that "color—as much as economics, politics, and strategic interests—played and continues to play an important role in guiding and shaping U.S. relations with the world" (p. xiv). Indeed, in some cases, "race proved more powerful than national interest" (p. 106).

Krenn ably illuminates how white racial attitudes shaped views about and behaviors toward American Indian peoples, blacks, Chinese immigrants, Latinos, and other racial and ethnic groups living in the United States. But the link between white mentalities at home and specific US conduct abroad remains tenuous. Clearly, race influenced how we view other peoples, but its role in shaping our relations with other countries remains unclear. Was race as much of a determinant factor as Krenn suggests, or was it merely a means of presenting a case for a foreign policy action based primarily on other interests and considerations? This study provides us with too little information to make a judgement about how direct this link may be.

The book is also somewhat less than convincing in its attempt to demonstrate that racism continues to have "pernicious effects on the nation's international rela-

tions” today (p. 106). This is particularly true with regard to the discussion of “cultural racism.” Pride in Western civilizational achievements, along with a belief in the benefits these may offer mankind in general and an eagerness to spread them to other peoples, obviously can run into difficulties when translated into foreign cultures. But it is not at all clear that “old ideas about superiority and inferiority,” as Krenn says, indicate that “whether genetic or cultural, racism [has] survived” (p. 92). This would imply a deeply relativistic interpretation of progress—one in which most any view about human advancement could be interpreted as racist. While race may still play a subcutaneous role in our perceptions of other cultures, and we should beware of hubris in our actions abroad, cultural arrogance does not necessarily constitute another form of racism.

Michael Krenn’s book offers us a very good introduction to an important issue. But one cannot help but wish for more complexity. It is well and good that Americans be aware of the racial element in their national past. And they should be urged to seek a deeper understanding of other peoples and cultures. But the same applies in reverse: others should be encouraged to better understand the United States and its people. Distorted views of America and mistaken assumptions about supposedly nefarious US intentions can motivate some abroad to (re)act in ways unproductive for all concerned. It is important, therefore, that future studies of this issue abandon the one-dimensional approach for a cross-cultural, even multicultural one, and that they move from a single-minded focus on the United States (the West) toward one that examines the *mutual* disconnects that lead to misunderstanding and conflict.

**Michael Prince**

Author, *Rally Round the Flag, Boys!*  
*South Carolina and the Confederate Flag*

***Predators and Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority*** by Oded Löwenheim. University of Michigan Press, 2006, 280 pp., \$24.95.

Oded Löwenheim, currently a lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, raises the question of why the Great Powers counter the actions of the “persistent agents of transnational harm” (his acronym: PATH) at some points but not others. He divides PATHs into two categories: parasites (i.e., abusive/exploitive) and predators (i.e., destructive). He then argues that the Great Powers pay little attention to the parasites, such as small terrorist groups or drug cartels, since they do not undermine the international structures of authority and hierarchy. Conversely, a Great Power will tend to confront predators who present a challenge to the world system; they are posing an alternative to the world order in which Great Powers thrive and gain their authority.

Before turning to the heart of the book—three historical cases illustrating his argument—the author begins with two long theoretical chapters. The concep-

tual background of the authority of Great Powers in world politics is followed by the theoretical position of PATHs as predators and parasites of their global influence. He discusses what authority is and how Great Powers come to possess it, and provides a theory of challenges to authority in world politics. These two initial chapters certainly set a baseline for what follows, but their length drowns the reader in detail more appropriate in a textbook or dissertation.

The third chapter begins the empirical argument by looking at the Barbary corsairs in the Mediterranean in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Barbary city-states of Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers were nominally under Ottoman control but, more importantly, served as ports for pirates raiding in the Mediterranean and beyond. The author contends that as a Great Power, Spain did not counter the corsair raids since they essentially acted as parasites—dangerous and annoying—but were not a threat to the standing order, as Spain knew and accepted it.

Chapter 4 looks at the same Barbary pirates at the end of the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth centuries. By this time their actual physical danger had diminished, but Great Britain, the contemporary Great Power, viewed these pirates as predators, a fundamental danger to world order due to their practice of capturing and enslaving Europeans. Great Britain had begun a crusade against the transatlantic slave trade, and even though the Barbary corsairs did not threaten the British physically, the existence of white slavery in the Mediterranean threatened the British moral standing in the international arena. British attempts to produce international consensus on stopping the slave trade from Africa foundered upon the existence of the Barbary pirates. This was especially apparent on the side of the Spanish and Portuguese, who profited from the black slave trade and suffered from the white trade. Only after the British removed this moral challenge by sending a naval expedition to subdue Algiers in 1816 could they expect support from across Europe in ending the transatlantic trade.

The final substantive chapter brings Löwenheim's argument into the present by examining the US response to 9/11 and the current American global war on terrorism. He compares the parasitic terrorism of the 1980s with the current predatory al-Qaeda threat. The '80s threat from Libyan state-sponsored terrorism and Lebanese Hezbollah endangered American interests but did not threaten to overthrow the US-led Western system. On the other hand, al-Qaeda wants to replace the current Western-dominated system with a revived Islamic caliphate. Especially in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, this directly challenges US sovereignty and thus called for an aggressive US response, first with the military operations in Afghanistan and continuing with the ongoing global war on terrorism. Löwenheim further explains his argument by comparing the cartels and drug trade to al-Qaeda. The drug barons, while costing US society more lives and money each year than terrorism ever has, are merely parasites for they exist within the US-dominated world order and do not seek to overturn it. Thus, the United States can approach the drug threat more as a police issue than as a military problem. The author believes this is why the US military quickly became

involved in Afghanistan after 9/11 but has not, for the most part, played much of an overt role in Colombia.

Löwenheim offers a convincing argument through his examination of the relationship between Great Powers and smaller actors within the international system across time. However, the book does not flow well. His first two chapters could be better edited to appeal to a larger audience than just international relations specialists. The third chapter provides an ordered, schematic approach covering all facets of the theory with historical evidence. The reader expects this schema to continue in the next two historical chapters but is disappointed when the ordering principles change. Finally, while chapter 5 carries his argument up to the present, it does not connect very well with the previous chapters, making the reader question if the cases are more different than similar.

Ultimately, despite the inconsistency in the style and format, Löwenheim presents a unique perspective on the war on terror; he uses history to help clarify contemporary issues. He writes how in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries “Spain was a victim of corsairs but it operated against them through corsairs” (p. 129). One could dare to compare this with contemporary American operations. While the United States is certainly a victim of al-Qaeda attacks, it uses, in the opinion of many within the international system, “terroristic” methods (e.g., Guantanamo, CIA secret prisons, supporting repressive allies) to pursue its own ends. As the author often reminds the reader, a Great Power has responsibilities towards others in the international system based on its position. The question of special rights *and duties* of the leading power fills the book and, perhaps, should permeate discourse outside of academia.

Maj Robert B. Munson, USAFR  
*Air Command and Staff College*

***Instant Nationalism: McArabism, al-Jazeera, and Transnational Media in the Arab World*** by Khalil Rinnawi. University Press of America, 2006, 216 pp., \$29.95.

Radical though it may sound, most military leaders—most military people for that matter—would opt to engage in any other activity, no matter how difficult, rather than speak to the media. Generally, an internal military cultural reticence to engage the media regarding military matters and operations has, for the most part, generated a persistent vacuum in the information environment that the transglobal media must fill without the minimum benefit of comment.

Yes, this is a broad, overarching indictment that perhaps doesn't hold true in some isolated cases. And yes, military news conferences are standard fare on virtually every transglobal satellite network. However, my research—unscientific though it may be as it's based on anecdotal experiences from over a nearly 30-year career as a public affairs professional—validates the thesis that next to public speaking, people would rather succumb than talk to the media. You mention a media interview to most people, and what you witness is a poof of smoke—now you see 'em, now you don't. And to

a military person, the mere mention of al-Jazeera (the Arabic language news network based in Qatar) will be followed by a blue stream of expletives denigrating the quickly emerging transglobal satellite network as evil at its purest.

I believe our internal military cultural reticence to communicate more openly, persistently, and aggressively with the media, especially emerging media networks such as al-Jazeera, is unfortunate. I believe our unnecessary reservations regarding media engagements marginalize our ability to persuade and influence—yes, persuade and influence worldwide audiences regarding US military operations, its people, and the democratic processes our military represents. I believe our reservations in this regard are due to fear, inexperience, and basic misunderstanding of global media institutions and what motivates their news coverage.

Time's a wastin', and we're losing pathetically in the information war raging in the information battlespace. We see millions of words written about the need for better "strategic communication" throughout the government, but it appears we're making little progress in that regard. A key tool to reversing the tide is to acquire a fuller understanding of the information environment and the motivations of the transglobal media institutions that populate this burgeoning environment, and then engage in that environment vigorously. Khalil Rinnawi's scholarly dissertation leads the reader to begin that heuristic journey.

If you want a better understanding of what makes the emerging Arab satellite news networks (now estimated at over 150), and especially al-Jazeera, tick; what motivates their news coverage; and the general manner in which they endeavor to shape Arab opinions of the Western democracies, specifically the United States, read this book, period. In the parlance of readability, Mr. Rinnawi's scholarly work is for the most part an easy read. From the book's foreword to its annexes and bibliography, it's packed with interpretive observations and well-grounded analysis. The media assessments and content analysis, though somewhat dry and laborious to get through, are nonetheless extremely valuable to military and civilian leaders reaching for a better understanding of the powerful force transnational Arab satellite media now wield and the role they will play in the future in coalescing a far-flung culture.

In the foreword to this work, Augustus Richard Norton of Boston University notes that "half a century ago the currents of Arab identities flowed through the state-controlled radio stations or on the pages of the state-dominated press. In contrast, the Arab world today reveals rushing streams of information, commentary and news, not to mention burgeoning images of mass culture. The region is interconnected in the twenty-first century by a confluence of media that, in the aggregate, have sparked a new vitality of Arab nationalism" (p. 1).

In that regard, Mr. Rinnawi, a lecturer in the School of Media and the Department of Behavioral Sciences at the College of Management in Tel-Aviv, has coined the term *McArabism* to define that "unique kind of regionalization" (p. xiv) in the Arab world that is being spurred on by the emergence of new media technologies that are "reinvigorating regional imagined communities, in a communicative environment where borders and the state's ability to exert control over media content have become obsolete," (p. xiv) and the dramatic changes this has made in the Arab

media environment. What's more, "the penetration of new media technologies into the Arab world and their expansion via the transnational media has created a confrontation between the localism and tribalism of Jihad and the globalization forces of McWorld. The outcome of this confrontation in the Arab world is McArabism: a kind of regionalism quite different from the pan-Arabism(s) formulated during the 1950s and 1960s in the Arab world" (p. xv).

According to Mr. Rinnawi, McArabism generated by the emerging Arab transnational satellite networks is fusing a new nationalism of "imagined community, principally composed of Arabs inside the Arab world, but also Arabs in diasporas and indigenous Arab minorities in other Middle Eastern countries" (p. 7). So what, you may ask. Pragmatically speaking, the "so what" is that engagement with the transnational Arab satellite media is as critical to achieving success in the global information environment (ergo our strategic communication mandates) as engagement with CNN, Fox News, and the scores of other global satellite news networks. In some respects, it is perhaps more important that we understand and engage with these channels of influence in the Arab world. Consequently, that brings us to the subject of the al-Jazeera network.

Mr. Rinnawi's work is rich in "media content analysis" research and provides an extremely beneficial representation of the actual (versus perceived) editorial bent of the growing number of Arabic language transnational satellite networks, specifically al-Jazeera. The real value of this work is dispelling (or at the very least, leveling) the misperceptions regarding the content and editorial bent of al-Jazeera.

Is this the most insightful work I've read recently? No. Some of Mr. Rinnawi's arguments will be fairly intuitive to most readers, and the fact this is a scholarly work chock-full of supporting statistics and data to bear out his thesis makes the going a bit arduous at times. But his work is important, nonetheless, because it provides a unique perspective that many military leaders have yet to grasp regarding the prudent necessity to engage in the global media environment on behalf of US national interests.

**Col Robert A. Potter, USAF, Retired**

*College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education*

***Culture, Conflict, and Mediation in the Asian Pacific*** by Bruce E. Barnes.  
University Press of America, 2007, 184 pp., \$29.00.

Providing extraordinary insights, Barnes's work is a blend of observations on current practices of nine countries (China, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand) set against a backdrop that weaves geographic, political, religious, and ethnic considerations into an integrated narrative addressing how people resolve disputes. This effort is useful for helping break the Western perception of a monolithic "Far East" approach to negotiations and develops, instead, a series of descriptive and practical frameworks for negotiations practitioners.

His motivation for this research was to help the most diverse state in the United States (Hawaii) better address the reasons for its multiple approaches to conflict resolution. Simply put, he studied the “home cultures” of the ethnically diverse Hawaiian population to examine the antecedents to their current approach to conflict resolution, all with an eye to providing a better understanding of not necessarily what they negotiated over but how and why they negotiated the way they did, and what points of friction might occur when different negotiating styles collided.

He also acknowledges that the United States perceives alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as not only something “new” but also describes ADR’s potential as an effective and efficient alternative to the Americans’ more traditional reliance on contentious, adversarial litigation. But he also presents a successful argument debunking the concept that links the American concept of “spreading [the] ADR philosophy around the globe” as the same as spreading a new concept. He presents sufficient evidence that, in many cultures, the ADR “concept” is, in fact, many centuries old and also the historically preferred method of conflict resolution.

As with any book attempting to examine human nature and behavior, generalizations under the rubric of “culture” mean that granularity is sacrificed for the sake of brevity. This is not an uncommon approach to these studies and does not discount the book’s overall quality. However, the reader must realize that as the author reports, describes, and subsequently summarizes characteristics influencing the negotiating behavior of any one of these people within a culture, he is limited by what he can observe, summarize, and report. He cannot possibly observe and report on everyone that makes up a particular group under consideration. So this book, like many others, should act as a reference framework when preparing to engage in negotiations, not as a recipe for guaranteed success. His stories, illustrations, and observations are certainly instructive, but not directive.

Since religion is a major force within most of the Pacific Rim cultures, Barnes organizes his work into three major sections, all distinctive in their religion (Confucian East Asian Cultures, Muslim Southeast Asian, and Buddhist Southeast Asian). Furthermore, the author uses 15 “themes” to provide multiple lenses as each of the nine cultures within the three religious sections is examined. Organizationally and conceptually, the themes have merit and are based on sound principles, many addressing Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. However, in execution, the depth of treatment varied greatly from culture to culture, and although some variation is expected and natural, some unexpected imbalances were presented. The biggest illustration of this imbalance is the treatment of the 15th theme: “contributions to the global practice of conflict resolution and training applications.” In the chapters representing China, the Philippines, and Korea, this 15th theme was not addressed while other countries got a more robust treatment (notably, Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand). One could argue that with China’s current regional dominance and the real potential for its global dominance on many fronts, a discussion on the contributions to the global prac-



tice of conflict resolution and training applications from a Chinese perspective could have benefited a significant section of the reading audience, namely practitioners who are looking for clues and frameworks as they plan for and execute negotiations with the Chinese. This is, however, a relatively minor critique on an otherwise rich text, filled with confirming illustrations and numerous (over 30) case studies of just how geopolitics, religion, and culture have guided negotiations strategies for the subject cultures.

Another small but noticeable absence in his work is a closer examination of how these cultures define negotiations. For example, the Chinese symbol for negotiations is made up of two symbols, one representing “danger” and the other “opportunity.” In contrast, the Japanese perception of negotiations is very different. Traditionally, the Japanese perceive negotiations as a process to be avoided and minimized because of the cultural emphasis on *wa*, or harmony. Therefore, the act of negotiating demonstrates the failure of *wa*—something ingrained into Japanese culture as very negative. *Wa* is highly prized, and extensive efforts at preserving it occupy a central role in the harmonious and cooperative approach to Japanese culture. Many suggest that to successfully negotiate with the Japanese, extensive “prenegotiations” help to avoid disruption of the *wa* within the actual negotiations, thus preserving harmony.

A final simple but important critique. Dr. Barnes asserts that “culture is also very dynamic: it is always changing.” In this statement, he treats the multiple aspects of culture as a monolith, which runs counter to two arguments; one within his own book and one from other writings on culture. First, if culture changes are “very dynamic,” then the emphasis he places on tradition, history, religion, customs, and other shaping forces on culture should minimally impact a culture’s approach to conflict resolution. As a matter of course in his book, Dr. Barnes accurately suggests that culture does, indeed, heavily influence negotiating approaches; hence, culture may be changing but perhaps not as “dynamically” as he suggests. The second argument that runs counter to Dr. Barnes’s statement is research that suggests culture has multiple levels, and these levels have differing change rates. A much-cited model developed by American University’s Dr. Gary Weaver proposes that culture has multiple levels and reflects the essential characteristics of an iceberg (see “cultural iceberg” lecture slides developed by Dr. Weaver at <http://www.purdue.edu/hr/pdf/WeaverPPT.pdf>. Certain cultural elements (artifacts) are very visible (like the part of the iceberg above the waterline) and are capable of relatively rapid change (just like the part of the iceberg above the waterline changes as it is affected by its environment). However, culture also resembles an iceberg below the waterline in that these elements are hidden from view but form a proportionately large part of how individuals (consciously and subconsciously) present themselves (through the artifacts, etc.). As an additional note, Dr. Weaver adds that these elements “far below the waterline” are not only unconditionally accepted as individuals “enculturate” into their primary culture but are also slow to change, for these deeply enculturated values, just like the iceberg, are insulated from the stormy environment above the “waterline.” This model suggests that perhaps the visible artifacts may change rapidly (such as the Japanese adopting Western

dress), but the underlying cultural values (such as harmony, cooperativeness, etc.) may be much slower to change. I must emphasize that these three critiques are not meant to detract from the book's overall quality. It is instructive, well organized, and of great utility for leaders intent on improving their ability to resolve conflict and negotiate across and between cultures.

**Stefan Eisen Jr., PhD**

*Director, USAF Negotiation Center of Excellence*

***The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War*** by James L. Gelvin.  
Cambridge University Press, 2005, 294 pp., \$18.00.

Author Gelvin has presented a very good historical summary of this 100-year conflict. From the introduction to this book we find the author to be well studied in the areas of nationalism and the social and cultural history of the geographical area under study. His apparent knowledge of the history of the Middle East and the historical perspective gained from his research for other books provide a strong basis for some of the positions he advances throughout the document. He writes, "I have written this book for students and general readers who wish to understand the broad sweep of the history of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle and situate it in its global context." The author has, in this reviewer's mind, done a very good job of following his intent.

Gelvin does not argue but simply presents a very well-developed history of the rise of nationalism among both Israelis and Palestinians. He methodically unfolds a history of the individuals who were clearly influenced by the development of nationalism in both societies. The structure of the book is one which would help anyone who has little knowledge about these two peoples to develop a basic understanding. It is much more than you would ever learn from reading a magazine but less than you would find used in postgraduate reading. The book would be a wonderful introduction to understanding the Middle East problem—a History 101 suggested reading.

His few photographs and maps do a great deal to help the reader understand what the author presents in his analysis. He clearly builds upon the "religious" and "land" conflicts that reside between the two entities. He presents the influence of the wars fought in the European theater and the allocation of land in a postwar environment to build his case for nationalism in both parties. The picture of two groups of people, thinking they have legitimate rights to the land they live upon, is vividly presented through the eyes and words of leaders such as Theodor Herzl, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat, and numerous others. While the author sometimes shows a bias for certain leaders and their actions, he attempts to balance his history with an open presentation of what he believes to have been major mistakes and key positive actions by leaders from both sides of the conflict. He analyzes proposals for peace for the area very clearly and leaves this reader with

a better picture of those nonnegotiable items that must be placed at the head of the list for all peace negotiations.

I recommend this book be required introductory reading to begin a more detailed study of the positions of the two peoples at the peace table negotiating for their right to exist as free and independent nations. Military personnel would benefit from the author's historical collection of data as well as his personal insights into the influence of certain individuals on the fight for nationalism. Also provided, absent a lesson on national infrastructure, is a basic concept for nation building—similar to what the United States is presently attempting in Iraq.

The narrative would have benefited from an actual list of demands presented at the peace conferences and a synopsis of those conferences. Perhaps that is material for a second book. For students who desire to know more about this part of the world and its history, the author presents a wonderful recommended reading list at the end of each chapter. I recommend this book for both the professional and layman reader because of the understandability of the presented information and the chronological order in which it is presented.

Lt Col George King, USAF, Retired  
Pelham, AL

***The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*** by James Dobbins et al. RAND Corporation, 2005, 344 pp., \$35.00. (Also downloadable for free at [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND\\_MG304.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG304.pdf).)

This is the second book in a series that looks to provide an understanding of the international community's attempts to save failed and failing states. The companion volume is *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*.

As the role of the United States in post-Saddam Iraq is debated more frequently—in the press, in politics, and in the nation's military education centers—there is a growing voice arguing that post-conflict operations should be managed by a coalition under the guidance of the United Nations (UN). While this point of view is anathema in certain quarters (recall the oil-for-food scandal, the reports of rampant rapes and child abuse by UN peacekeepers on some operations, the inability of the UN to effectively control the situation in the Middle East, and the laissez-faire attitude during the genocide in Rwanda), others make a strong case for just such an involvement. Taking an objective look at the UN's ability to supervise the rebuilding of a nation, the RAND Corporation employs a case study approach looking at eight countries—the Congo, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Iraq—as well as the situation in Eastern Slavonia with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. The authors' methodology follows a set format, identifying for each country the challenges being faced (holding elections, security, economics), the UN's role (peacekeeper, facilitator), the end result (whether a success wholly or in part), and the lessons learned (recommendations for approaching similar situations in the future). A final chapter then compares the UN and US approaches to nation building, highlighting the trends, strengths, and weaknesses of both.

Acknowledging that “each nation-building mission takes place in a unique environment,” the study also notes that the “objectives, instruments and techniques remain largely the same from one operation to the next” (p. 225). This premise allows the researchers to establish five inputs—military presence, international police presence, duration of mission, timing of elections, and economic assistance—that will be the same across the board. These inputs, when contrasted with the study’s five measures of output—military casualties (a negative measure), refugee returns, growth in per capita gross domestic product, a qualitative measure of sustained peace and a qualitative assessment of whether or not a country’s government became and has remained democratic—provide an objective tool whose conclusions can be seen today in Iraq. They also provide a way ahead for planners of future rebuilding operations.

Given the amount of information required for such an analysis, the study does a commendable job of presenting its findings in a clear and easy-to-follow manner. The authors’ examples are well chosen, and we see the successes and failures—to varying degrees—of the assimilation of democracy in these nations. This subject will be of interest to anyone looking to study what is required for successful nation building and to those looking for a more balanced picture of the UN’s role in today’s world.

Maj Ed Ouellette, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

***Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support to Theaters of Operation*** by Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, and Russell W. Glenn. RAND Corporation, 2007, 240 pp., \$30.00. (Downloadable for free at [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND\\_MG607.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG607.pdf).)

“We will help you.”

What sounds like the title of a Queen rock anthem is actually a simple promise around which the US military might develop a branding strategy. It is part of 22 broad recommendations for the American armed forces in *Enlisting Madison Avenue*, aimed at leveraging the lessons of the marketing and advertising worlds to help the military win its nation’s wars.

The study’s lead author, Todd C. Helmus, is a behavioral scientist with a doctorate in clinical psychology. Thus, he is well suited to examine the cognitive side of modern combat in this monograph, prepared at the request of the US Joint Forces Command. In it, the authors contend that the United States and its allies affect popular support for stability operations in the areas they operate through the character of those operations, the behavior of their forces, and the actions of their communication professionals. As such, the authors suggest these forces stand to benefit from commercial marketing techniques—proven methods by which companies engender support for their product or service.

Such an approach has been taken before, most publicly after 9/11 when former Madison Avenue maven Charlotte Beers was put in charge of US public diplomacy efforts at the Department of State (DoS). Her Shared Values Initiative, in

which slick television advertisements extolling the happy lives of American Muslims were broadcast in numerous parts of the Islamic world, was widely derided at the time as a failure. Opinion polls tracking anti-American sentiment amongst foreign Muslims changed little in the wake of the ad campaign, and many in the US diplomatic community were more than happy that this interloper from the advertising industry had seemingly flopped. Subsequent research, most notably by Jami Fullerton and Alice Kendrick in their book *Advertising's War on Terrorism: The Story of the U.S. State Department's Shared Values Initiative*, has countered that this perceived debacle showed only the problems of mismanaged expectations and inter-DOS politics and that marketing initiatives still promise to help the United States in its war with Islamic extremism. It is therefore heartening to see a study as extensive and high profile as *Enlisting Madison Avenue* readdress the use of the marketing model in the United States' present war of ideas.

What is not so heartening is the book's first chapter following the introduction where the authors chronicle the many challenges facing the United States in the modern global information environment. Nearly one-third of the book is dedicated to this section, in which 18 major challenges—ranging from “information fratricide” to the difficulty of measuring effectiveness—are outlined in excruciating detail. In this regard, the monograph's structure does the reader no favors. Rather than present discrete problems with individual solutions, the authors choose to first cover challenges, then review marketing principles as they apply to military operations, and finally offer other solutions based on recent operational experience. While it is difficult to argue with any single one, the 18 challenges and 22 recommendations can add up to an overwhelming tangle in the reader's head. The authors seemed to have recognized this, tacking on a three-page appendix titled “Linking Shaping Challenges with Recommendations.”

Despite the structural deficiencies, there is much to be commended about this book. Whereas other recent literature on the subject tends to focus on overall US government public diplomacy efforts, *Enlisting Madison Avenue's* marketing-inspired recommendations are specific to the armed forces and provide real-life, rubber-meets-the-road suggestions. For example, in recommending better discipline and focus in military communication campaigns, the book offers 10 detailed steps inspired by marketing best practices. In this way, the authors offer not just what to do but also how to do it and get beyond the vagaries of newspaper editorials that simply demand the United States communicate better.

Additionally, the authors are sophisticated enough to understand that branding slogans alone will not win the support of the people in the areas in which the US military operates. They point out that US foreign policy and its actions on the ground often drive public opinion but do not absolve the United States from attempting to inform and influence relevant populations.

This focus on earning popular support in theaters of operation prompts today's air, space, and cyberspace strategists to consider how the US Air Force can better help the nation win today's irregular warfare fight. When service leaders describe future missions in cyberspace, they often explain them in conventional terms, suggesting

for example that the service might one day take down an enemy air defense system with the stroke of a keyboard. *Enlisting Madison Avenue* posits that the United States can win friends by encouraging indigenous soldiers to write blogs and open shielded regions to new ideas by providing free Internet access to local civilians, both of which seriously challenge current notions of just what “cyber power” really means.

*Enlisting Madison Avenue* is full of such evocative ideas—arguably, too many of them. “The details of how best to integrate marketing concepts throughout the US armed forces and interagency operations—and thereafter to design and conduct operations and campaigns with shaping adequately orchestrated throughout—promises to be a considerable challenge,” the authors write in their conclusion. This candidate for understatement of the year should not, however, dissuade readers from picking the book up or our military from taking on such a difficult task. During World War II, the American armed forces *transformed* from a depleted interwar shell into the powerful war machine that beat back fascism. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that it can similarly transform again, this time to beat back the extremism that so threatens the American way of life.

**Maj Samuel B. Highley, USAF**

*Air Force Doctrine Development and Education Center*

***State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration*** by James Risen. Free Press, 2006, 232 pp., \$15.00.

*State of War* seeks to document the failure of a few key leaders in the Central Intelligence Agency and the Bush administration in preparing for and conducting the early phases of the American invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as efforts to counteract Iran’s efforts to gain nuclear weapons.

By calling his work a history, *New York Times* reporter James Risen implies that it contains most of these features: a logical, comprehensive, substantiated, and balanced discussion of some of the most important and controversial issues of this decade. Instead, this book is a very long editorial that mixes in a few lesser-known names and incidents to a rehash of sensational headlines, scattered about various chapters that concentrate on criticizing a few individuals. Little of the narrative is fresh to a reader aware of world events, and it offers nothing in the form of notes, bibliography, or suggested reading to help a researcher who wants to know more.

In short, *State of War* is a passing partisan shot at some controversial policies of a lame duck administration whose mistakes may well “bequeath nearly unbridled executive power to President Hillary Clinton” (last statement of the book). Mr. Risen’s political sympathies drench at least part of every chapter.

Although Mr. Risen critiques many government officials, he singles out George Tenet (CIA director, 1997–2004) and Donald Rumsfeld (secretary of defense, 1975–1977 and 2001–2006). Messrs. Tenet and Rumsfeld made some controversial, even dubious, decisions during their terms in high office; most readers already know this. What would be more useful is knowing what prompted them to do

these things and whether or not the circumstances that allowed such actions were unique. Risen presents the problems of Tenet and Rumsfeld as personality flaws. It would be more useful to know whether or not these flaws were accentuated by a unique combination of events (9/11, strong president, and the same party running Congress, etc.) or by recurring circumstances with dangerous potential (comparisons with the Truman, Johnson, and Nixon administrations would be useful here).

Although I think that the story line of *State of War* is choppy and poorly supported in many parts, it does a worthwhile job in other areas. The coverage of the Abu Zubaydah case and the CIA prison system (chap. 1) was interesting and plausible, as was the discussion about the odd status of Ahmed Chalabi (chap. 3). Details about the Saudi sources of funds for al-Qaeda were intriguing (chap. 8), but some background on Saudi society, its government, and the Wahhabi sect of Islam would have been useful to make this point more plausible.

Sections of *State of War* that need substantial improvement include lack of control on the National Security Agency's eavesdropping (chap. 2) and why the CIA placed so much faith in one unreliable agent ("Curveball") concerning Saddam's weapons of mass destruction (chap. 5). By focusing strictly on CIA-Pentagon differences, the author mostly ignores the influence of the US Department of State, congressional power politics and posturing, Britain, and the United Nations (chap. 6).

*State of War* offers little that a few selected articles from the *New York Times* or Internet could not. I do not recommend this book for purchase by either individuals or the Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center. Perhaps Mr. Risen's next anthology of headlines will have more usable and lasting significance for our military readers.

Robert W. Allen, PhD  
University of London

***Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History*** by John J. Tierney Jr. Potomac Books, Inc., 2006, 289 pp., \$26.95.

*Chasing Ghosts*, according to John Tierney, "is a history that covers wars lost in memory while remaining based upon issues that have resurfaced since 9/11." The author takes us through this study of unconventional warfare in American history, including occasions when Americans utilized this mode of warfare as well as when it was used against us. He has done his job well.

Carl von Clausewitz warns that failure to know and understand the war one is fighting is a recipe for disaster. Unconventional wars are hard to define, and this is America's Achilles' heel. We do not know the type of war we are currently fighting so it is near impossible for us to develop an appropriate strategy to successfully wage it. Sun Tzu tells us that it is important to know your enemy but much more so to know yourself. Unfortunately, Americans not only are unaware of who they are but they are also wedded to a paradigm of wars fought face-to-face, or head-on.

As a result, Americans see everything in those terms. Should our enemies, or allies for that matter, have different-colored glasses, the United States is in trouble.

Yet US history contains a myriad of excellent examples from which we can learn pertinent lessons that are relevant not only in Iraq but in our war against international terrorism as well. However, in order to learn and apply these lessons, we have to be willing to change the color of our glasses. And this is what US senior leaders are reluctant to do.

As I read this book, I saw principles for success emerge and then echo throughout its 260-odd pages. When the United States has followed these principles, it has been successful in accomplishing national objectives. The scary part is that the inverse is also true; when it has not adhered to these principles, it has suffered defeat. Presently, the United States does not seem to be following these principles, thereby explaining why the situation in Iraq looks rather bleak.

Tierney suggests that one of the most important factors that leads to success in a guerrilla or counter guerrilla war is knowledge of the local landscape. This means not only the geography but also local customs and culture. If one does not already possess this type of knowledge—such as the Patriots did but the British did not during the Revolutionary War—it can be mitigated through the utilization of locals. The US Army did this to great effect throughout the Indian Wars, in the Philippines, and elsewhere. The Marines have been particularly good at identifying tribal and ethnic splits in societies and taking advantage of these to divide and conquer.

Akin to this idea and one that the author repeatedly illustrates is the hiring, training, and employment of indigenous forces, thereby removing the notion of “invader” from the equation. The purpose of such forces is twofold. First, it is to provide localized security, which includes separating the guerrillas from the people. This makes it difficult for guerrillas to gather intelligence, obtain food and necessities, and maintain a source of logistical support. The second function is to use these forces as mobile strike teams designed to keep constant pressure on the guerrillas and thus give them no rest or time to reconstitute their forces.

Furthermore, everyone who reads this book will find several things that will catch their attention. Two things really grabbed my interest. The first has to do with the employment of airpower. In several instances, airpower was used with great success. However, in other situations, such as Vietnam, it was not. A corollary is those instances in which airpower was not available. If one envisions the full capabilities of airpower, the question arises, if I had airpower in (choose your war), how could I have maximized its utility? The answer would, I posit, be intuitively obvious, and one could then adapt the concept to the fight in Iraq, the war on terrorism, or some other guerrilla war. In order to do this, one has to realize that airpower would be in a supporting rather than a supported role. Could senior Air Force leadership accept such a role? I doubt it.

Another attention grabber had to do with my war, Vietnam. In that war all three services had and employed conventional war doctrines. They were not only ineffective but also outright failures. Yet at the same time, the author notes that



special forces A-teams were heavily involved in creating and employing Civil Irregular Defense Group units. These units were quite successful wherever and whenever they were utilized—just food for thought.

After reading this book and placing the lessons available in the context of Iraq or the war on terrorism, one is compelled to ask, have we learned nothing about guerrilla war in the past 200 years or so? The answer is not encouraging. As previously noted, Tierney does a marvelous job throughout *Chasing Ghosts* in illustrating these and other war-winning principles. Politicians and senior military leaders ought to read this book, and it deserves a place on every military professional development reading list. The wars we are now fighting—especially in Iraq—are not lost. We can still win, but we need to change the way we conduct business. This book will help us make the necessary changes in direction.

**Donald A. MacCuish, PhD**

*Air Command and Staff College*

***The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror*** by Paul J. Murphy.  
Brassey's Inc., 2004, 288 pp., \$18.95.

Paul J. Murphy, a former US counterterrorism official, has added another work to the relatively small but steadily growing body of literature available in English on the Russo-Chechen War. While the Russian armed forces and security services have succeeded in tamping down much of the violence plaguing Russia's North Caucasus region, the deep roots and complexities of the conflict suggest that what Pres. Vladimir Putin has achieved is but a lull and hardly a sustainable peace. Murphy's portrait of Chechen terrorists—the “wolves” in his narrative—certainly reinforces this conclusion.

The author studied in the former Soviet Union and has taught at universities and appeared on radio and television in the United States, Australia, and Russia. His service as a congressional advisor on counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Russia may partially explain the general pro-Russian tone of this book. Indeed, Murphy states his purpose clearly: he wants to inform the West of Chechen “corruption, greed, money and terror financing” (p. 6). Moreover, Murphy tells the reader that the book will not be a catalog of Russian atrocities. Instead, he argues that the current form of Chechen terrorism is the result of the rise of radical Islam in the region and the actions of key figures in the Chechen leadership. Thus, the author treats Russian behavior and policies largely in passing and focuses instead on a notorious “cast of characters”—important Chechen leaders—who have “individually and collectively (and for their own personal, ideological, religious, and criminal reasons) led post-Soviet Chechnya down the road to chaos, political anarchy, economic ruin, and, ultimately, war and physical destruction” (pp. 5–6).

Central to Murphy's narrative is the struggle between Chechen nationalists like the late Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, who sought “only” independence from Russia, and the increasingly powerful—and ruthless—radical

Islamist terrorists pursuing a wider ideological war against Orthodox Russia. Indeed, Murphy ties Chechnya, through the likes of Shamil Basayev and the Saudi-born Ibn ul-Khattab, to a larger global jihad and specifically to al-Qaeda. The Kremlin is anxious to cast its war in the Caucasus as part of a wider global struggle, and there is certainly a fair amount of evidence to support such a view. Still, this should not overshadow the historical roots of Chechen resistance to Russian and Soviet rule; to do so would result in an incomplete assessment of the causes and possible long-term solutions to the region's violence.

The author provides often graphic accounts of many confirmed and alleged Chechen operations, including a chapter devoted to the seizure of the Dubrovka theater (the infamous Nord-Ost siege) in 2002, though the narrative ends prior to the slaughter at Beslan. He concludes with a brief postscript on the downing of two Russian airliners by female suicide bombers, known widely as "black widows," and issues a dire warning that these women might just as easily have boarded a flight bound for the West and that Chechen terrorism is, indeed, a global concern.

While the reader may disagree with the author's conclusions, certainly one very disappointing aspect of *The Wolves of Islam* is the complete absence of footnotes and a bibliography. Murphy writes that he drew many of his quotes and other data from Web sites, video, and audiotapes and gleaned information from a legion of otherwise nameless individuals—journalists, diplomats, and others living or working in Russia and the North Caucasus. Thus, the accuracy and veracity of many of the author's assertions or accounts must be accepted at face value.

Murphy does, however, draw two very stark lessons for the United States and the West in general. His methodology aside, the author shows how the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya in 1996 was not enough to satisfy the radical elements in Chechnya that sought to establish a Muslim state extending beyond Chechnya's borders and took the war into the Russian heartland, provoking a second Russian invasion in 1999. Those who maintain that the West can starve Islamic terrorism of support by simply withdrawing from the Middle East (or ending support for Israel) overlook an important ideological component of those engaged in such terrorism. Murphy also notes that the Russians successfully exploited the differences between Chechen nationalists and radical Islamists, especially the foreign-born fighters. As the US-led coalition has also discovered recently in Anbar province and other Sunni areas of Iraq, a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy can likewise exploit the seams between nationalist resistance movements and those fighting in pursuit of a radical religious agenda.

*The Wolves of Islam* is an interesting account of Russia's struggle against elements of radical Islam. Still, those in search of more balanced and intellectually rigorous accounts of the Russo-Chechen War will find those in other works such as Moshe Gammer's *The Lone Wolf and the Bear*, Matthew Evangelista's *The Chechen Wars*, or Gordon Hahn's *Russia's Islamic Threat*.

**Mark J. Conversino, PhD**  
*Air War College*

***Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919–1939***

by Keith Neilson. Cambridge University Press, 2006, 379 pp., \$85.00.

Explanations of the origins of World War II often hinge on the interplay between the European great powers in the two decades (1919–1939) prior to the start of the war. Keith Neilson, professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada, has provided a useful contribution to the body of knowledge of this subject by examining a key piece of the interwar puzzle—why did British leaders maintain their faith in post-Versailles notions of collective security, even as crises throughout the 1930s shattered hopes that a second global conflict could be avoided? To answer this question, Neilson delves into the intricacies of Anglo-Soviet relations to illuminate the twists and turns of interwar British foreign policy. To use Neilson’s parlance, he drills an Anglo-Soviet “bore-hole” into the sediment of British strategic foreign policy to obtain a “core sample” that he hopes will reveal much about the entire topic.

Neilson argues that British foreign policy failures in this period resulted not from common explanations often put forth, such as appeasement or the gradual decline of British military, political, and economic influence following World War I, but rather from an undue faith in the structural and intellectual legacies left by the war—namely the notions of collective security and general disarmament. British reliance on what would become an increasingly outdated framework, combined with an ingrained anti-Communist mind-set on the part of many British statesmen, proscribed any meaningful accommodation with Soviet Russia, regardless of the security benefits that such collaboration could have provided by the mid-1930s.

Neilson traces Anglo-Soviet relations throughout the interwar years, but the focus of the book is on the last phase—1933 to 1939. The years 1919 to 1933 receive scant attention. He argues that this was a period in which Soviet Russia did not figure largely in British strategic thinking. As Britain recovered from World War I and the Soviet leadership consolidated its grip on the country, the USSR was an enigma in British eyes—a large, potentially destabilizing force with enormous military potential. As Josef Stalin centralized his power, the Soviets increasingly impinged on British interests in both Europe and Asia. Diplomatic relations between the two states produced little in the way of lasting agreement or understanding.

The accession of Adolf Hitler to power in Germany in January 1933 and the emergence of Japan as a major power in Asia signaled both an end to Soviet insularity and a slight softening, though not abandonment, of British adherence to the post-World War I order. British debate in this period focused on whether the Soviets could provide a useful counterbalance to both Germany and Japan despite their repugnant ideology and uncertain intentions. The arguments that consumed the British foreign-policy establishment in this period alternated between those who viewed Stalin as a practitioner of *realpolitik*, and thus someone with whom deals could be struck, and those who felt the primary Soviet objective was to spread Communist ideology abroad, and thus should be avoided. Neilson takes a nuanced view, arguing persuasively that Soviet foreign policy was ideologically based but was nonetheless flexible enough to take “one step back to take two steps forward” in the face of mounting threats. In contrast,

he argues that after 1937 British leaders, particularly Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, failed to show any flexibility in dealings with Soviet Russia. By disdainful alliances and binding treaties and sticking to increasingly outdated notions of collective security, the British spurned Soviet offers of cooperation. Neilson argues that British refusal to accept such offers eventually forced Stalin to agree to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, clearing the way for the German invasion of Poland.

Neilson's argument is persuasive and well constructed, though somewhat obscured by the painstaking attention given to the ruminations and policy debates of a succession of British officials. Rather than provide a running synopsis of the broad intellectual drivers of British policy making, he spends far too much time on the specific policy preferences of individuals. While these accounts are sometimes illuminating, the book could have benefited from a more holistic account of the intellectual evolution that drove interwar diplomacy. Likewise, while Neilson demonstrates how British notions of collective security contributed directly to foreign policy defeats, he does not provide a connection between those notions and the policy of appeasement. Chamberlain's insistence on avoiding alliance commitments and interacting on a bilateral basis with dictator states at Munich in 1938 would seem to reflect a stark evolution from the intellectual legacies of the post-Versailles order. Yet, Neilson treats appeasement as somewhat distinct from British foreign policy decisions of the previous years—a curious distinction not well explained in the book.

That said, Neilson ultimately succeeds in displaying the constraints on British foreign policy placed on it by adherence to its outmoded concept of collective security. As Neilson states, British views of power and of collective security were markedly different than Soviet views of the same concepts, with the result that the two states could approach, but never reach, a lasting accommodation. This split in ideology and the competing definitions of collective security also highlight a second strength of the book. By showing the remarkable contrast between the worldviews of the two global powers, as well as the mutual suspicion that festered throughout the interwar period, we see a foreshadowing of the ideological gulf that would separate the West and the Soviet Union after 1945. The diplomatic maneuvering between the two powers in the 1930s provides a remarkable insight into the origins of the Cold War. Perhaps unintentionally, Neilson has provided a deeper understanding of how competing ideological and intellectual paradigms constrain relations between states, even when faced with imminent and mutual threats. He also succeeds in illuminating how such a split between Britain and the Soviet Union contributed to the outbreak of not only World War II but also to the decades-long ideological conflict that followed.

**Jason Zaborski**

*National Security Consultant, Headquarters USAF*