

# Genocide and Airpower

*Douglas Peifer*

AS THE November 2008 elections draw ever closer in the United States, Democrats and Republicans emphasize their foreign-policy differences regarding the Iraq War, the global war on terrorism, the importance of international law and institutions, and a host of other issues. Yet, on one issue, the leading contenders from both parties as well as the outgoing administration sound a similar note: genocide is intolerable in today's interconnected world. Both Democratic candidates have taken a strong position on Darfur. Senator Barack Obama participated in the "Save Darfur" rally on the National Mall in April 2006, delivering a speech along with other speakers such as Elie Wiesel, Rwandan survivor Paul Rusesabagina, and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to an estimated 100,000 people. He has personally visited Darfur refugee camps in eastern Chad (September 2006), and until early March 2008 listed Samantha Power—a leading crusader against genocide—as one of his foreign-policy advisers.<sup>1</sup> Senator Hillary Clinton has cosponsored seven acts, resolutions, and legislative measures dealing with Darfur and is described as a "champion of the cause" who has taken "crucial action to end the genocide" by the activist pressure group DarfurScores.org.<sup>2</sup> Senator John McCain, the Republican candidate for president, wrote an op-ed with Senator Bob Dole for the *Washington Post* entitled "Rescue Darfur Now" (10 September 2006); voted for the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, Genocide Accountability Act, and the No-Fly Zone legislation; and was one of the few Republican senators to support the Clinton administration's policies to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in the late 1990s.<sup>3</sup> Lastly, outgoing president George W. Bush, while unwilling to unilaterally commit US troops to Darfur given military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, has at least rhetorically elevated genocide prevention

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and intervention to the national security realm. In 2002, Bush listed genocide as an issue that needed to be addressed in his first *National Security Strategy*,<sup>4</sup> expanding on the topic in his 2006 *National Security Strategy*. Devoting an entire page to the issue, President Bush warned:

It is a moral imperative that states take action to prevent and punish genocide. History teaches that sometimes other states will not act unless America does its part. We must refine United States Government efforts—economic, diplomatic, and law-enforcement—so that they target those individuals responsible for genocide and not the innocent citizens they rule. Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required, preferably by the forces of several nations working together under appropriate regional or international auspices.

We must not allow the legal debate over the technical definition of “genocide” to excuse inaction. The world must act in cases of mass atrocities and mass killing that will eventually lead to genocide even if the local parties are not prepared for peace.<sup>5</sup>

Skeptics may dismiss these statements as largely rhetorical, with little influence on US foreign policy in practice. As Samantha Power points out in her 2002 best-selling book *“A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide*, few politicians have been censured for inaction in the face of mass killings, famine, or genocide overseas.<sup>6</sup> Occasionally, however, public outrage and the personal convictions of influential policy makers have generated action to stop outrageous violations of human rights, with George H. Bush, William Clinton, and George W. Bush justifying interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq, at least partially on humanitarian grounds.

This article explores how and when genocide prevention became an issue in the US political realm, how genocide was defined by the United Nations, and how scholars and activists have pushed to expand the public understanding of the term. Moving from definition to evaluation, conceptual frameworks are introduced for recognizing the warning signs and stages of genocide and mass killings. Having defined the term and provided a conceptual framework, the focus then shifts to ongoing efforts to reframe our understanding of intervention in terms of an international “responsibility to protect.” Lastly, this article tackles the difficult issue of how the United States, already stretched with commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, can best contribute to the operational success of peace enforcement operations that seek to make our rhetorical commitment to genocide prevention and intervention a reality.

## **The Emergence of Genocide as an Issue in the American Political Sphere**

Never again. These two words captured the grim determination of Holocaust survivors, that the world should never forget what happened and never allow another cold-blooded murder of millions based on their religion, ethnicity, race, or national origin. Following Raul Hilberg's groundbreaking *Destruction of the European Jews* in 1961 and the Eichmann trial that same year, a dense network of scholars, university programs, foundations, and museums slowly developed to ensure that the Holocaust, or Shoah, would never be forgotten and to examine the causes and conditions that allowed it to happen. Parallel efforts emerged dedicated to understanding the Armenian genocide, the destruction of Native Americans, and other mass killings. Yet, despite these efforts, the international community stood by and allowed genocide to unfold in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and elsewhere during the closing decades of the twentieth century. The twenty-first century has proved equally disturbing thus far, with perhaps as many as 400,000 lives extinguished in Darfur and some 2.3 million Darfuris displaced by the violence.<sup>7</sup> Genocide Watch, an international group dedicated to raising awareness of and influencing public policies toward potential and actual genocides, lists one genocide in progress (Darfur), one region where genocide is deemed imminent (Chad), and four areas exhibiting warning signs of possible mass killings (Burma, Kenya, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe) as of January 2008.<sup>8</sup>

Outraged by the inaction of nations and the international community to the killing fields of Cambodia, the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the slaughter of some 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995, and the deteriorating situation in Kosovo in the late 1990s, concerned individuals and organizations began to network and become more active in generating pressure to prevent future genocides. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) established a Committee on Conscience charged with alerting the national conscience, influencing policy makers, and stimulating worldwide action to confront and halt genocide, mass killings, and related crimes against humanity.<sup>9</sup> Power, a war correspondent, pricked America's conscience with her frontline articles on the Balkans during the 1990s and best-selling book.<sup>10</sup> Gregory Stanton, an international human rights lawyer who worked for the US State Department's Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigations, founded Genocide Watch. Existing nongovernmental organizations such as Refugees International became increasingly concerned about the over-

lap between humanitarian assistance, war, and genocide. Last but not least, universities became ever more engaged in genocide studies, with institutes and centers such as the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies and Yale's Genocide Studies Program generating both scholarship and activism.<sup>11</sup> Not surprisingly, among the most vocal voices pressing the US government and the United Nations for action were student groups such as Students Taking Action Now: Darfur (STAND), whose chapters have organized dozens of rallies, vigils, and teach-ins about Darfur since the first chapter was founded in Georgetown in 2004.<sup>12</sup>

As journalists, citizen coalitions, student action groups, university centers, and policy institutes generated public awareness of mass killings and genocides, American politicians responded. In the 1970s and 1980s, few politicians beyond William Proxmire seemed interested in the issue. Pressured by activists and shamed and shocked by the experience of Rwanda and Srebrenica, a growing number of senators, congressmen, and executive branch officials voiced a determination that future genocides would not be tolerated. While concerned citizens and activists unhappily note that mass killings continue in Darfur and threaten to unfold in southern Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and elsewhere, the president's appointment of a special envoy to Sudan (Andrew Natsios) stands in stark contrast to US hands-off policy during the Rwandan genocide.<sup>13</sup> Invoking the word *genocide*, however, has not resulted in effective action. Seeking to generate concrete "practical recommendations to enhance the U.S. government's capacity to respond to emerging threats of genocide and mass atrocities," former secretary of state Madeleine Albright and former secretary of defense William Cohen announced in November 2007 the creation of a Genocide Prevention Task Force. Madeleine Albright's opening statement captures the problems that policy makers face when confronted with mass killings: "The world agrees that genocide is unacceptable and yet genocide and mass killings continue. Our challenge is to match words to deeds and stop allowing the unacceptable. That task, simple on the surface, is in fact one of the most persistent puzzles of our times. We have a duty to find the answer before the vow of 'never again' is once again betrayed."<sup>14</sup>

## Defining Genocide

One of the first steps in stopping genocide is defining what constitutes genocide and establishing the legal framework for international, coalition, or unilateral prevention and intervention efforts. Mass killings and massacres are by no means a recent phenomenon; witness Rome's solution to its Carthaginian problem, William the Conqueror's ravaging of Northumbria following the Norman conquest where it was said he "left no house standing and no man alive," and Andrew Jackson's 1814 campaign against the Red Stick Creeks in Alabama.<sup>15</sup> Yet, by the nineteenth century, "just war" concepts that distinguished between combatants and noncombatants had moved from the sphere of philosophy, ethics, political theory, and custom and into the sphere of international law. The Hague Convention of the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1899), for example, specifically prohibited shelling undefended towns or cities and obliged an occupying power to "take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Furthermore, contracting parties pledged that "family honors and rights, individual lives and private property, as well as religious convictions and liberty, must be respected." Subsequent treaties provided additional protections to noncombatants from air attack, naval shelling, and the like. Yet, the Hague Conventions aimed at restricting violence in wartime, and while they established a framework for protecting civilians from foreign occupiers, the conventions did not address the threat of mass violence by the state against its own citizens.

The prospect of a state employing massive violence against unarmed men, women, and children became a reality with the Armenian genocide, Stalin's campaign against the kulaks, and Nazi Germany's efforts to eradicate all Jews within its grasp. The term *genocide* was devised by Raphael Lemkin in 1944 as he struggled to convey Nazi extermination policies in his book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. Born in what was the Polish portion of the Czarist empire, young Lemkin had grown up under the shadow of pogrom and persecution as a Polish Jew. Graduating from Lvov law school in the 1920s, he felt drawn to the topic of mass killings, studying the fate of the Armenians and the Assyrian minority in Iraq. Well before the contours of the Holocaust became apparent, Lemkin proposed at a conference in 1933 that the League of Nations should ban the crime of barbarity, which he defined as the "premeditated destruction of national, racial, religious, and social collectives."<sup>16</sup> The rise of the Nazi party in Germany and

deepening anti-Semitism throughout Eastern Europe signaled that the topic was of more than academic interest. When the Wehrmacht stormed into Poland in 1939, Lemkin sought refuge first in Sweden and then in the United States. Deeply concerned about the fate of those now under German rule, he devoted himself to assembling the laws, orders, and decrees that chronicled Nazi policy toward Europe's occupied peoples, particularly its Jews. His massive 712-page study sought to document Nazi policy and introduced the term *genocide* into the English vocabulary.<sup>17</sup>

At Nuremberg and in various postwar trials, the Allies charged and prosecuted German organizations and individuals with planning, initiating, and waging wars of aggression; conspiring to commit crimes against peace; committing war crimes; and committing crimes against humanity. Nazi efforts to eradicate the Jews as a people fell within the framework of the ill-defined category of "crimes against humanity." Lemkin, who advised the US chief counsel at the Nuremberg Trials, accelerated his campaign for an international law defining genocide as a crime. He believed that international law had power and felt strongly that just as the Hague Conventions had defined war crimes, the newly created United Nations should explicitly outlaw the destruction of entire groups of people based on religion, ethnicity, and group identity. In December 1946, the General Assembly of the young United Nations passed a resolution condemning genocide and tasking a committee to draft an international treaty banning it.

Committee members engaged with drafting the convention devoted much discussion and debate to defining genocide. What distinguished genocide from other forms of mass death, such as famine or war? How should the crime be defined so that the Soviets—guilty of their own mass murders—would not obstruct the treaty?<sup>18</sup> And how could the treaty be made meaningful as a measure designed to stop the process of mass killing rather than simply punish those responsible after its completion?

By 1948 the committee had completed its task. Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defined both the concept of genocide and what acts would be deemed punishable:

Article 2

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article 3

The following acts shall be punishable:

- (a) Genocide;
- (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- (e) Complicity in genocide.<sup>19</sup>

The effectiveness of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has been limited. Adopted by a resolution of the General Assembly in December 1948, the convention required ratification by 20 members of the United Nations before coming into force. By October 1950, 20 states had ratified the convention, but the United States was not among them. Initially, the American Bar Association and southern senators opposed the treaty due to the ambiguities of Article 2. Later, conservatives opposed the convention due to concerns about US sovereignty. But its supporters never abandoned the issue, with Senator William Proxmire delivering some 3,211 speeches on the topic between 1967 and 1986.<sup>20</sup> With President Reagan's strong support, the Senate finally ratified the convention in 1986, dragging its feet another two years before passing the Genocide Convention Implementation Act in October 1988.

After exerting little influence for 40-odd years, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide became an important reference point for tribunals, courts, and legal cases in the 1990s and twenty-first century. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court have all tried perpetrators of genocide, drawing upon the convention's definition of genocide. Yet Lemkin, Proxmire, and others had hoped that the convention would be an effective tool for *preventing* genocide, with Article 7 calling for the "United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article 3."<sup>21</sup>

Here the record is less encouraging. During the Cold War, the international community made no effort to invoke the convention when Mao's Great Leap and Cultural Revolution killed millions of Chinese between 1958 and 1968, when Suharto's anticommunist campaign in Indonesia targeted entire villages for liquidation in 1965–66, when Pakistan's civil war veered toward genocidal mayhem in 1971, or when the Khmer Rouge eliminated an estimated 20 percent of the Cambodian population between 1975 and 1979.<sup>22</sup> Some of these mass killings did not fall within the narrow framework of the Genocide Convention, which made no mention of targeting political groups. Others were ignored due to Cold War politics and the power of the perpetrating nation. Nonetheless, supporters of the convention believed that the United States' accession to the treaty in 1988 and the end of the Cold War might render it more effective. This was not the case: the "international community" did little to stop the slaughter of 800,000 Tutsis by Hutu extremists in Rwanda in April–July 1994, and UN peacekeepers helplessly looked on the next year as Serb forces rounded up some 7,000 Bosnian men and boys for execution at Srebrenica.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, during the Rwandan genocide, the State Department and the National Security Council deliberately avoided using the term *genocide* precisely because they feared that use of the term might compel some sort of action.<sup>24</sup>

This fear proved misplaced. In 1995 and 1999, NATO intervened to stop ethnic cleansing and war in Bosnia and Kosovo, subsequently stationing robust peacekeeping forces in the region. Sickened by the violence on NATO's doorstep and fearful that further inaction would undermine the alliance's credibility, European and American leaders responded both out of perceived national interest and humanitarian concern without directly invoking the genocide convention. Yet, when genocide reared its ugly head in Darfur, the international community did little to stop the killing until prodded into action by various grass roots activist organizations. Ten years after the Rwandan genocide, the United Nations and the United States began to directly invoke the term as the killings in the Darfur region of Sudan mounted. On 7 April 2004 UN secretary-general Kofi Annan announced an Action Plan to Prevent Genocide, subsequently appointing a special advisor on genocide prevention.<sup>25</sup> Later that year, Secretary of State Powell specifically termed the crisis in Darfur a genocide.<sup>26</sup> Yet, only after protracted and difficult negotiations did the contours of an effective intervention force become apparent. In July 2007, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1769 authorizing a joint United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force projected to number some 20,000 troops, more than 6,000 police, and a significant civilian com-



ponent.<sup>27</sup> Three years had elapsed between Annan's Action Plan and the UN resolution. And despite rhetorical support for stopping genocide from the White House and State Department, the UN still had received no pledges for "key enabling capabilities in areas such as aviation and ground transport" as of January 2008.<sup>28</sup>

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide clearly defines genocide and associated acts in Articles 1 and 2 and opens the door for contracting parties to "call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3."<sup>29</sup> Yet, the treaty has been disappointing in its effect: for much of the Cold War, nations simply ignored the convention and even during the post-Cold War era, signatories have been slow and reluctant to put speedy and effective intervention forces at the UN's disposal. Despite this, the treaty should not be dismissed as entirely ineffective: the special tribunals set up by the UN to try responsible parties for crimes of genocide, war crimes, and gross infractions of international law may well exert a deterrent effect on groups contemplating mass murder.

### **Recognizing the Warning Signs and Stages of Genocide and Mass Killings**

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides a legal framework for international action to stop genocide, yet prevention and intervention hinge on recognizing the warning signs of impending genocide. This entails understanding the stages and steps towards genocide, assessing the likelihood of genocide, and then formulating preventive and interventionist responses. The Genocide Intervention Network, the USHMM's Committee on Conscience, Genocide Watch, Prevent Genocide International, and various other nongovernmental organizations now issue specific alerts regarding potential and ongoing genocides, joining organizations with a broader mandate such as the International Red Cross, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch.<sup>30</sup> The Genocide Intervention Network and the USHMM Committee on Conscience do so by providing action alerts and listing areas of concern, with Genocide Watch ranking crisis into genocide emergencies when "genocide is actually underway," genocide warnings when "politicide or genocide

is imminent,” and genocide watches when “early warning signs indicate the danger of mass killing or genocide.”<sup>31</sup>

The concept of analyzing genocide structurally and identifying its stages owes much to pioneering studies of the Holocaust. Raul Hilberg’s *The Destruction of the European Jews* has proven particularly influential.<sup>32</sup> Hilberg, like Lemkin, fled Nazi rule and settled in the United States. He attended Abraham Lincoln High School in Brooklyn, served in the US Army, and participated in the US Army’s War Documentation Project, which assembled German records for use in postwar trials and for historical purposes.<sup>33</sup> His Columbia dissertation (1955) broke new ground by analyzing the structure and process of the “Final Solution.” Five publishers turned down the manuscript due to its length and subject matter, but since its initial publication in 1961, Hilberg’s work has become an essential, if controversial, reference point.<sup>34</sup>


*The Destruction of the European Jews* provoked debate because it asserted that traditional Jewish strategies for dealing with force and persecution had failed disastrously during the 1930s and 1940s. Hilberg noted that many German policies, ranging from laws banning Jews from certain jobs to decrees assembling them into ghettos to requirements for distinct clothing, had historical precedence. He asserted that Jewish communities had over the centuries focused on alleviating the impact of discriminatory policies while generally complying with rather than confronting state policies. This tendency toward alleviation, evasion, paralysis, and compliance rather than resistance served Jewish communities well during the medieval and early modern periods, but Hilberg claimed that it failed to recognize the contours of the process of genocide.<sup>35</sup> And it is here that Hilberg has been most influential: his discussion of the structure of destruction laid a model for understanding how the Holocaust had been very different from the pogroms, massacres, and communal violence to which the Jewish community had been long subjected.

Hilberg concluded that the Final Solution involved a number of steps. First, the Nazi state had to define who was a Jew. This initial step proved more complicated than anticipated, in that Nazi racial ideology had abandoned religious definitions of Jew and Christian in favor of racial categories of Jew and Aryan. If laws banning Jewish employment and ownership were to be enforced, lawyers would have to clarify the status of children of mixed ancestry, determine whether exceptions should be made for Jewish veterans, and decide whether or not converted Jews should be subjected to these policies. Next, Jews found themselves the targets of expropriation as Jewish firms were seized, special

taxes and levies were passed, and family property and savings were confiscated. Expropriation led to concentration as Jews were turned out of their houses, crowded into ghettos, and exploited as forced labor. Concentration, in turn, enabled more efficient annihilation, whether by mobile killing operations, by working Jews to death, or by the industrialized process of gassing large groups in specially designed gas chambers.

Hilberg's structural analysis of the destruction of Europe's Jews, laid out in the figure below, has been adopted and disseminated widely. Clearly laying out the stages and steps involved the murder of some six million European Jews, Hilberg provided a structural analysis to which others have turned in seeking to understand subsequent mass killings and genocides.

Hilberg's model seeks to explain the stages that led to the Holocaust, a uniquely modern horror, which prompted Lemkin to conceive of the term *genocide*. Since its publication, the world has experienced additional mass killings, establishing the necessity for a broader, more general model for understanding genocide. Gregory Stanton, drawn to the field of genocide studies due to his early involvement examining the Cambodian killing fields, has proposed the following schema, noting that "prevention of genocide requires a structural understanding of the genocidal process."<sup>36</sup> Stanton believes that genocides typically develop through eight stages, as described on the next page.



**Hilberg's Stages of the Holocaust.** (Reprinted from Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, rev. and definitive ed. [1st ed. 1961] [New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985], 50-1.) -

**Classification**

Distinguishing between different groups of people, establishing “us” and “them” categories.

**Symbolization**

Identifying certain symbols with “out-groups,” using either customary dress or government-imposed identifying symbols or distinctive clothing.

**Dehumanization**

Associating targeted groups with repellent animals or microbes. Stanton gives the examples of Nazis calling Jews “vermin” and Rwandan Hutu hate radio referring to Tutsis as “cockroaches.”

**Organization**

Formation of groups and institutions ranging from mobs to militias to advanced bureaucracies that support and implement the genocide process.

**Polarization**

The deliberate, systematic effort to cut social connections between targeted groups and the broader society. Stanton notes that “the first to be killed in a genocide are moderates from the killing group who oppose the extremists.”

**Preparation**

Stanton borrows from Hilberg, noting that preparation involves identifying those targeted, expropriating their property, concentrating the victims, and in the most extreme cases, building facilities for extermination.

**Extermination**

Killing the targeted out-group.

**Denial**

Stanton adds an eighth stage, denial, to the process. He notes that typically records of the killing are burned, international accusations are dismissed, and efforts to cover up the killings are made.<sup>37</sup>

As president of Genocide Watch, Stanton combines the attributes of activist, advocate, and scholar. His schema, fully developed on Genocide Watch's Web site, provides a conceptual model for understanding genocide, with Stanton providing examples of preventive measures that can be taken at each step.

Barbara Harff, a political scientist at the US Naval Academy, has added to our understanding of the genocide process by analyzing its causal factors. Using a comparative, empirical approach, Harff has sought to identify key factors that should provide warning signs of possible genocide. The factors she identifies as contributing to its occurrence include (1) prior incidents of genocide or politicide in the region, (2) a high degree of political upheaval, (3) a ruling elite defined in terms of ethnicity, (4) a "belief system that . . . justifies efforts to restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain categories of people," (5) an autocratic form of government, and (6) a trade system opposed to openness.<sup>38</sup>

Harff notes that her social-scientific approach is "not enough to tell us . . . precisely when genocidal violence is likely to begin" but believes that an effort to systematically assess the risk of genocide improves the prospects for prevention and early response.<sup>39</sup> Her work moves beyond Hilberg's and Stanton's studies, which analyzed *how* genocide takes place, with Harff engaging the question of *why* genocides occur.

Lastly, the United Nation's Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has developed a set of indicators designed to provide early warning of the increased possibility of violent conflict and genocide. These indicators can be used as tools for assessing whether genocide is likely, with the committee further elaborating that one should take into account prior histories of genocide or violence against groups, policies of impunity, expatriate communities fostering extremism, and the presence or absence of UN or regional peacekeepers.

These indicators provide the analytical tools for anticipating genocide and mass killings, with Hilberg's and Stanton's stages of genocide providing models for understanding how far the process has progressed. Yet defining genocide and understanding its stages and indicators do not equate to preventing genocide. Increasingly, international and domestic pressure groups are arguing that recognition of impending or ongoing genocide imposes the duty to intervene. This assertion contradicts the long-standing Westphalian assumption that sovereign states are free to do as they will within the boundaries of their international borders, with advocates of intervention attempt-

## **CERD Indicators of Increased Possibility of Violent Conflict and Genocide**

1. Lack of a legislative framework and institutions to prevent racial discrimination and provide recourse to victims of discrimination.
2. Systematic official denial of the existence of particular distinct groups.
3. The systematic exclusion—in law or in fact—of groups from positions of power, employment in State institutions and key professions such as teaching, the judiciary and the police.
4. Compulsory identification against the will of members of particular groups, including the use of identity cards indicating ethnicity.
5. Grossly biased versions of historical events in school textbooks and other educational materials as well as celebration of historical events that exacerbate tensions between groups and peoples.
6. Policies of forced removal of children belonging to ethnic minorities with the purpose of complete assimilation.
7. Policies of segregation, direct and indirect, for example separate schools and housing areas.
8. Systematic and widespread use and acceptance of speech or propaganda promoting hatred and/or inciting violence against minority groups, particularly in the media.
9. Grave statements by political leaders/prominent people that express support for affirmation of superiority of a race or an ethnic group, dehumanize and demonize minorities, or condone or justify violence against a minority.
10. Violence or severe restrictions targeting minority groups perceived to have traditionally maintained a prominent position, for example as business elites or in political life and State institutions.
11. Serious patterns of individual attacks on members of minorities by private citizens which appear to be principally motivated by the victims' membership of that group.
12. Development and organization of militia groups and/or extreme political groups based on a racist platform.
13. Significant flows of refugees and internally displaced persons, especially when those concerned belong to specific ethnic or religious groups.
14. Significant disparities in socioeconomic indicators evidencing a pattern of serious racial discrimination.
15. Policies aimed at the prevention of delivery of essential services or assistance, including obstruction of aid delivery or access to food, water, sanitation or essential medical supplies in certain regions or targeting specific groups.<sup>40</sup>

ing to shift the debate from the “right to intervene” toward a “responsibility to protect.”

### **The Responsibility to Protect Argument, the UN’s Action Plan to Prevent Genocide, and the Genocide Prevention Task Force**

Survivors, scholars, and activists have pushed our understanding of genocide and mass killings a good deal further than the legalistic definitions of the genocide convention. We now have well-researched models that explain mass killing as a process and identify the factors that contribute to its onset. Numerous organizations provide updates on global areas of concern, issuing watches, warnings, and emergency declarations. Yet despite this knowledge, it has become clear that information alone provides neither the impetus to intervene nor guidance on how to prevent or stop mass killing. A growing community of individuals, think tanks, and governments now advocate that the international community has the “responsibility to protect,” or R2P. Rather than focusing on specific terminology, proponents of R2P argue that the international community has the responsibility to protect civilians when states fail to do so themselves. Whether victims of genocide, ethnic cleansing, intentional famine, or indiscriminate war, civilians subjected to mass killing have a right to protection. And when their governments and rulers fail to provide that basic right, then the international community has the responsibility and duty to do so.<sup>41</sup>

Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who headed the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations during the Rwandan genocide, appointed a panel in 2000 tasked with undertaking “a thorough review of the United Nations peace and security activities” and presenting a “clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations.”<sup>42</sup> Among its recommendations, the panel advised that the UN should develop its “ability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing such an operation, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations.”<sup>43</sup> Moreover, UN peacekeepers who witnessed violence against civilians were to presume that they were authorized to intervene.

While the panel thereby recognized the responsibility of UN peacekeepers to protect civilians from violence, it cautioned that “the United Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement action is required, it has

consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.”<sup>44</sup> The UN’s Action Plan to Prevent Genocide, issued in 2004, emphasizes prevention, protecting civilians, ending impunity, acting early, and acting swiftly and decisively. Kofi Annan provided little detail about what form swift and decisive action should take but conceded that “by ‘action’ in such situations I mean a continuum of steps, which may include military action. But the latter should always be seen as an extreme measure, to be used only in extreme cases.”<sup>45</sup>

The problem of confronting genocide is that the political will to act is proportionate to the extremity of the situation. Study after study has shown that the best remedies are preventive, ranging from inculcating a respect for human rights and the rule of law, to addressing basic economic needs, to resolving armed conflict before it breaks out. Scores of nongovernmental organizations, numerous international organizations, and various national offices and agencies seek to promote development, human rights, democratic values, and conflict resolution across the globe. Yet the pressure for Western governments to “do something” only becomes high once images of mass suffering flicker across the television screens of Europe, North America, Australia, and the First World. In short, while military action may be an extreme measure to be used only in extreme cases, genocide is an extreme case where traditional UN Chapter 6 peacekeeping concepts have proven inappropriate. Recognizing that Chapter 7 peace-enforcement concepts are undeveloped, the Canadian government established an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in September 2000. The commission’s report, issued in December 2001, became the blueprint for the concept of R2P.

Citing the experience and aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Kosovo, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty asserted that when sovereign states are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens from “mass murder and rape, from starvation . . . that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.”<sup>46</sup> The commission broke down the responsibility to protect into preventive, reactive, and rebuilding components, seeking to change the terms of the international debate on intervention from right to responsibility.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty emphasized that “prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect,” noting that “prevention options should always be



exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more resources must be devoted to it.”<sup>47</sup> The commission’s report explored diplomatic, political, economic, and legal actions that could be taken to discourage the recourse to genocide. Yet, as a last resort, the commission claimed that the international community had not only the right to intervene when genocide took place but also the duty and responsibility to do so. In contrast to purely academic panels and committees, the commission went so far as to offer some general operational principles that should guide military interventions to stop mass killings. The commission held that R2P missions needed to have the following:

- A. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match.
- B. Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal communications and chain of command.
- C. Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state.
- D. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to international humanitarian law.
- E. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective.
- F. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations.<sup>48</sup>

Since 2001, numerous other organizations, think tanks, and institutions have taken up the challenge of providing more specific operational concepts for R2P missions. In the United States, the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC, has a vibrant program exploring “The Future of Peace Operations.”<sup>49</sup> Harvard’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and the US Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute are cooperating on the Mass Atrocity Response Operations Project, which seeks to develop “credible and realistic operational planning for responding to genocide and mass atrocity.”<sup>50</sup> Most recently, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, the American Academy of Diplomacy, and the United States Institute of Peace convened a Genocide Prevention Task Force charged with issuing a report on genocide prevention and intervention by December 2008.<sup>51</sup> The US Army and US Marine Corps have provided the primary points of contact to these various endeavors, and

one might anticipate that R2P concepts will draw heavily from ground-force peace operations doctrine.

This would be unfortunate in that the United States would be best served by encouraging other nations and regional groupings to provide the ground forces necessary for R2P missions. The US Army and Marine Corps already are stretched by commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, and elsewhere. Even as STAND and other activists groups argue that the United States should lead the way in stopping genocide in Darfur, popular support for extended military operations in Iraq is declining, and isolationist sentiment appeals to at least a fringe element of the electorate (Ron Paul supporters). Constructing operational concepts based on US leadership, Army doctrine, and the commitment of American troops would be ill advised and may simply result in American inaction. As for simply equipping African Union forces with the latest high-tech gadgetry, as one paper by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University proposes, this concept rests on shaky assumptions.<sup>52</sup> A net-capable intervention force would have to be generously equipped with communication gear, computers, and C3ISR (command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets, a questionable proposition given funding constraints. Furthermore, its members would have to be highly trained, another questionable proposition given that UN and regional organizations are dependent on voluntary, often rotating troop commitments from member nations. Yet the concept has merit: UN and regional peacekeeping and peace enforcement troops lack precisely those sorts of capabilities we associate with network-centric warfare. US operational concepts for genocide intervention should focus on supporting and enabling UN and regional intervention missions through small expeditionary task forces that supply the capabilities they sorely lack.

### **Expeditionary Task Forces in Support of Regional Peace-Enforcement Missions**

Regional and UN peace-enforcement missions tend to be weakest precisely in those areas where the United States and its Air Force excel: strategic airlift and theater mobility, communications, ISR, medevac and emergency care, radio suppression and broadcasting, and (as a last resort) coercive airpower.

The US Air Force already has the organizational construct to provide an expeditionary force that could support and assist regional or UN intervention ground forces engaged in genocide intervention and peace enforcement. In 1998, Gen Michael Ryan, chief of staff of the Air Force, and F. Whitten Peters, acting secretary of the Air Force, launched a reorganization of the Air Force for the very purpose of generating enhanced capability to deploy and sustain air and space expeditionary task forces (AETF). These task forces, ranging in size from wings to groups to squadrons, each have a built-in structure of command, control, staff support, and fully tailorable forces.<sup>53</sup> The Air Force has emphasized that all personnel and assets should fall within the framework of this expeditionary construct. While task forces deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan have focused on supporting US, NATO, and coalition war fighting, the concept of organizing an AETF with the sort of capabilities that lend themselves to supporting peace-enforcement and genocide-intervention operations led by others is entirely reasonable. At present, a number of platforms and assets ranging from reconnaissance aircraft to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and special operations aircraft are “low density/high demand” assets that fall outside the framework of the air and space expeditionary force construct, yet the point is that one could organize small, self-sustaining task forces that could be rapidly deployed. The Air Force is currently exploring the concept of “contingency response groups” that are designed to “respond rapidly to contingencies as well as secure and protect airfields, rapidly assess and open air bases, and perform initial airfield/airfield operations.”<sup>54</sup> With a little imagination, the AETF and contingency response group concepts could be molded into deployable support forces designed to help regional and international peacekeepers and peace enforcers.

Devising genocide-intervention strategies and operational concepts will be highly contextual. The concept of safe havens, for example, was appropriate for Kurdish Iraq, problematic in Bosnia, and inappropriate in Rwanda, where Tutsis intermingled with Hutus and roadblocks impeded movement.<sup>55</sup> Likewise, imposing “no-fly zones” depends on local conditions: a no-fly zone might have protected Shiites in southern Iraq from Saddam’s ruthless post-Desert Storm subjugation campaign in which Iraqi helicopters played a crucial role, yet even a massive Allied (largely US) air presence over Kosovo in 1999 could not stop Serbian ground forces from terrorizing and expelling Kosovar civilians. Rather than focusing on devising detailed operational plans for stopping genocide, the

United States should focus on developing small, expeditionary task forces that enhance the capabilities of non-US forces. Whether in Darfur or in other crisis areas, peace-enforcement missions could be rendered much more effective without committing large contingents of US ground troops. Instead, small joint expeditionary task forces could be assembled that provide the following capabilities to regional peace enforcers:

### **Strategic and Theater Mobility and Airlift Support**

The US Air Force clearly understands the importance of strategic airlift in genocide intervention operations and already directly contributes to African Union operations in Darfur by transporting and supplying various AU contingents. Since 2003, for example, the 786th Expeditionary Squadron operating out of Ramstein Air Base has conducted seven missions transporting Rwandan contingents into the region. Its C-130s, along with C-17s from South Carolina, have provided the essential strategic airlift underpinning the operation, with Air Force personnel also contributing to airfield operations.<sup>56</sup> Yet strategic airlift is only part of the equation. Intervention forces, once transported into the region, often lack theater mobility. The joint United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) that replaced the African-Union-only operation (AMIS, the African Union Mission in Sudan) as of January 2008 has faced great difficulties in finding donor nations willing to supply helicopters and tactical airlift assets. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon commented in January 2008 that “in the past weeks and months, I have contacted, personally, every possible contributor of helicopters—in the Americas, in Europe, in Asia. And yet, not one helicopter has been made available.”<sup>57</sup> Ban Ki-moon attributed the difficulty of finding donors to “lack of political will,” with unnamed diplomats at the UN elaborating that “past attacks on helicopters” have dampened the enthusiasm of donor nations loathe to put their valuable aviation assets at risk. In short, the United Nations understands the need for theater mobility. It simply cannot find countries willing to contribute to filling this vacuum.<sup>58</sup> And as of March 2008, UNAMID has “just 9,000 of an expected 26,000 soldiers and police officers” in place, with the *International Herald Tribune* warning that the “Darfur peacekeeping force [is] at risk of failing, already.”<sup>59</sup>

The US Air Force, which has staked the claim to be the leading organization dedicated to theorizing, organizing, and implementing airpower solutions (note that the Air Force uses the term *airpower* rather

than *air force*), should move beyond simply patting itself on the back for supplying the indispensable long-range airlift that underpins many crisis-intervention operations. Building on the mechanism of the AETF, it should cobble together an expeditionary task force that provides ground-centric UN or regional peacemakers with theater and tactical mobility as well. This may well entail drawing in US Army and USMC components, with a joint expeditionary airlift package conceivably including Air Force C-130s, Army CH-47 transportation helicopters, and Marine Corps V-22 Osprey tilt-wing rotor aircraft. The numbers required would be limited: UNAMID, currently slated to become one of the largest UN missions to date, desperately seeks 24 helicopters. Operation Licorne, the French intervention effort in the Côte d'Ivoire, supported its substantial ground forces with an initial aviation contingent consisting of "a single Fennec light helicopter, which was reinforced by two SA.330 Cougars of the COS (Commandement des Opérations Spéciales), and a Transall C.160 of ET 2.64. . . . Another Transall, four Gazelles from the 5 RHC and two Pumas were added subsequently."<sup>60</sup>

### **Communications Support**

While the United States Air Force can and should take the lead in providing airlift and mobility to peacemaking forces, it can contribute in many other ways, with communication support leading the way. UN and regional forces often are poorly equipped with communication gear and support and at times are dependent on contractor support, which may evaporate if the situation becomes dangerous. This is no indictment of private contractor support, but contractors who have signed up to support peacekeeping and monitoring missions may be unprepared for peace enforcement. Lt Gen Roméo Dallaire, recalling the communications capability of his small UNAMIR force (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda) wrote that "it was difficult to get messages to troops in the field. . . . Getting messages to headquarters was equally difficult. They either had to be hand delivered—a problem when both fuel and vehicles were at a premium—or relayed over our radio network. Unfortunately, our Motorola radios (unlike those carried by both the RPF and the RGF [the Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic Front and the Hutu-dominated government Rwandese Patriotic Army]) had no encryption capability."<sup>61</sup> As for communicating with

UN Headquarters, Dallaire depended on contractor support to operate and maintain his satellite communications. Luckily for him, six of his civilian communications staff “had insisted on staying with [UNAMIR] after the rest of their colleagues had been evacuated,” even though “they were living in squalor.”<sup>62</sup> A small AETF that could provide robust, secure, and dependable communications and support personnel to regional and UN commanders engaged in genocide-intervention missions would be immensely valuable.

### **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support**

The US Air Force excels at providing timely operational ISR support to ground commanders, a capability that many regional and international organizations sorely lack. UN and regional peacekeepers operate largely in the dark once observation posts are overrun and established separation lines are ignored. The Dutch commander in charge of the southern sector of the Srebrenica safe zone in 1995, for example, had to send out one of his armored personnel carriers “to find the enclave’s new front line” once Serbs rolled past his observation posts.<sup>63</sup> More recently, an African Union observation mission in Darfur was overrun by rebel forces on 30 September 2007, suffering 10 dead, 10 wounded, and 30 MIA. The lightly equipped African Union forces apparently had no idea of the size or strength of rebel groups forming in the area.<sup>64</sup> The US Air Force certainly could support intervention missions by sharing satellite imagery, launching reconnaissance aircraft, or deploying sophisticated UAVs, such as the MQ-1 Predator, RQ-4 Global Hawk, or MQ-9 Reaper.<sup>65</sup> This support would be costly and contested, given concurrent demands in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Far more useful would be providing less costly, lower tech ISR assets, such as the Army’s tactical hand-launched RQ-11 Raven, RQ-5/MQ-5 Hunter, or RQ-7 Shadow unmanned aerial system (UAS). To give a sense of the personnel, cost, and capabilities of these lower tech Army systems, consider that the aerial reconnaissance company that supports a package of six MQ-5B Hunters consists of 48 military personnel and five contractors, associated data terminals and control stations, and 13 vehicles. The Hunters supported by this company have a range of 125 km, an endurance of eight to nine hours, and provide live video and infrared (IR) transmissions that can be recorded or kept as still pictures (see table).<sup>66</sup>

**Table. Characteristics of RQ-5A and Extended Center Wing (ECW) Hunter UAS**

Design Feature	RQ-5A	ECW
Wing Span	29 ft (8.84 m)	33 ft (10.06 m)
Weight	1,600 lb (725.75 kg)	1,800 lb (816.47 kg)
Range	125 km radius (line of sight [LOS] data link)	
Airspeed	70 kt loiter, 70 kt cruise, 100+ dash	
Altitude	15,000 ft (4,572 m)	16,000 ft (4,876.8 m)
Endurance	8–9 hours	10–16 hours
Payload(s)	Electro-optical/IR, airborne data relay and attack	
Launch/Recovery	Unimproved runway (paved or dirt). Runway length depends on air density and location surface. Up to a 1,600 ft runway may be required for takeoff. The minimum distance for a landing area is 600 ft (182.88 m).	

(Adapted from Field Manual Interim 3-04.155, *Army Unmanned Aircraft System Operations*, April 2006, 2-4, [www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-04-155.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-04-155.pdf).)

If Army or Marine UASs are unavailable due to commitments elsewhere (or to interservice rivalry), the Air Force should consider the utility of substituting disposable, high-altitude observation balloons for UAV or satellite coverage. Tethered balloons have been used to monitor activity along the Mexican border and provide coverage at “a fraction of the cost of one” manned surveillance aircraft.<sup>67</sup> Rather than thinking in terms of US “boots on the ground” in crisis areas such as Darfur, Somalia, and the Congo, the United States should support regional and international forces by providing them with ISR capabilities so that reconnaissance rests on more than lightly armed troops in a jeep.

### **Medevac and Field Hospital Support**

One of the key challenges to intervention forces embarked on peace-enforcement operations is providing emergency care and timely medical evacuation to peace enforcers. While blue-helmet peacekeepers can claim that both sides have acknowledged their special neutral status and therefore are obliged to assist in evacuating injured personnel, forces intervening to stop genocide must recognize that they have taken sides and may well be the target of those whose genocidal campaign they intend to thwart. Indeed, those groups conducting genocide may specifically target intervening forces in order to demoralize them, stun them into passivity, or convince the populace of the contributing country to withdraw their forces. This certainly was the case in Rwanda, with Hutu extremists inten-

tionally targeting Belgian peacekeepers in the correct belief that the Belgium government would react by withdrawing its forces.

Providing timely medical evacuation and emergency care is essential if third-party forces are expected to put their lives on the line to protect innocents. Depending on contractors to provide medevac services can be risky. When the situation deteriorated in Rwanda in 1994, for example, the two helicopters that the UN had contracted to provide this service simply disappeared. General Dallaire, force commander of the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda, later commented, "With the country exploding, the pilots had fled to Uganda. They were both contract employees, so who could blame them? But the result was that we were confined to Kigali with no ability to evacuate casualties. In all likelihood any seriously wounded would die. In every decision I was to take over the coming weeks, I had to balance the risk of the operation against the fact that we had no medical safety net."<sup>68</sup>

The United States military leads the world in the field of medical evacuation and emergency care: in Iraq, some 90 percent of wounded US soldiers survive, compared to some 75 percent during the Vietnam and Korean Wars and around 70 percent during World War II.<sup>69</sup> The US Air Force's aeromedical evacuation teams and the large Air Force hospital in Balad have played an important role in saving American lives. Over 96 percent of injured service personnel who make it to the Balad Field hospital survive, with urgent/priority patients air evacuated within an average of 13.2 hours to even more capable facilities in Landstuhl or the continental United States.<sup>70</sup> The DoD's medical establishment is hard-pressed dealing with US casualties flowing in from Iraq and Afghanistan, but should a smaller American footprint in the Mideast result in decreased US casualties, the United States is capable of providing a critical-niche service that regional and international peace-enforcement missions lack. The United States could boost the effectiveness of these efforts by offering mobile battalion aid stations, a small field hospital, and aeromedical evacuation services. If appropriate, the United States could back intervention efforts by stationing hospital ships such as the USNS *Mercy* or *Comfort* in the region to receive injured peacemakers. These assets should not be seen as substitutes or alternatives to the large-scale efforts of nongovernmental organizations such as the Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, and Refugees International, but rather as enabling components supporting the inter-



vention forces that would create an environment where large-scale humanitarian intervention is possible.

### **Radio Suppression, Broadcasting Capability, and Strategic Communications Support**

The case studies on Rwanda and the Côte d'Ivoire point out the importance of radio in instigating and organizing genocide (Radio RTLM in Rwanda) and in preventing it and garnering support for peace enforcement (ONUCI FM in Côte d'Ivoire). Over the course of the Cold War, the United States spent hundreds of millions of dollars on electronic warfare and has various platforms at its disposal capable of conducting offensive electronic countermeasures such as jamming. In addition, the United States has devoted considerable thought and treasure to psychological operations and strategic communications. Currently, the US military has organizations and platforms capable of both message suppression and promulgation. The US Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group and the US Air Force's 193d Special Operations Wing have specialists trained in generating positive messages in support of operations, with the EC-130J Commando Solo aircraft capable of suppressing undesired radio broadcasts and substituting alternative radio transmissions.<sup>71</sup> One must note that the United States has only six of these aircraft in its inventory and that specific political authorization would be necessary in order to mobilize and deploy these Air National Guard assets. The likelihood of deploying these assets without direct political direction is low, and the cost is high, but the US commander in charge of supporting regional or UN peace-enforcement efforts should be aware of their potential and offer these capabilities to the mission commander if appropriate. More importantly, UN peace-enforcement missions need to be authorized to establish and deny information channels that use the electronic spectrum—during the Rwandan genocide much of the discussion about jamming centered on possible violations of international law even as Radio RTLM cheered on the *genocidaires*.<sup>72</sup>

### **Coercive Airpower**

As a final option, the United States can provide coercive capabilities to the peace-enforcement commander. The US Air Force has embraced this mission above all others, as evidenced by the pattern that every single chief of staff of the Air Force since its creation in 1947 has been either a bomber

or a fighter pilot. The US Air Force could certainly provide a wide array of coercive options to peace-enforcement commanders but should remain reticent about employing coercive airpower for three reasons.

First, the intent of offering an airpower support package for peace enforcement is to assist and support the efforts of non-US-led regional and international intervention missions. Our intent should be to act as a force multiplier for others, not to take over and lead the effort directly. Yet inevitably, once US coercive airpower is employed, our superior technology and capability will shift leadership of the intervention effort from other nations to ourselves. This might be justifiable if coercive airpower had a proven record of effectiveness in protecting civilians and stopping mass killings. This is far from the case. Airpower did, indeed, deter Saddam from crushing the Kurdish north of Iraq as he had the Shia South following his defeat in 1990, but it proved entirely ineffective in stopping Serb paramilitaries from driving out hundreds of thousands of Kosovars in 1999. Coercive airpower can act as a shield and sword for ground commanders, protecting ground forces and punishing those who attack them. It is far less effective at shielding civilians from light ground forces intent on slaughtering them, nor is it easy to distinguish perpetrators from victims from thousands of feet in the air.

There is a second reason to be wary of using coercive airpower for peace enforcement: the vaunted pinpoint accuracy of our weapon systems does not rule out civilian casualties and collateral damage. During the ill-fated UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II effort during the early 1990s, for example, the decision to target an alleged Somali National Alliance command center killed “up to 70 traditional clan leaders and civilians, most of them unassociated with Aideed.”<sup>73</sup> The use of coercive airpower may well have accomplished the opposite of its intended effect, increasing Aideed’s influence and prestige rather than diminishing it. As for the feasibility of demolishing the killing barricades where Hutu militias massacred Tutsi civilians, this could hardly have been done without killing many of the civilian onlookers and cheerleaders. One might make the case that humanitarian war is justified, but the United States could well find itself scapegoated and pilloried should it cause collateral damage in employing coercive airpower. We should set a high threshold before employing coercive airpower as an instrument of peacemaking: only after intervention ground forces have confronted, cajoled, and done their very best to stop

mass killings from up close should we resort to doing so from far high in the skies.

Lastly, we should be wary of employing coercive airpower because of the cascading dynamics it will introduce into the AETF or joint task force supporting genocide-intervention efforts. Air mobility, communication support, aeromedical evacuation, and psychological operations will receive a smaller proportion of the commander's attention once he or she begins to tackle the challenge of employing coercive airpower. Nonetheless, should the intervention force commander need coercive airpower, some form of it should be available. The form and level of force will depend greatly on context. If intervening against groups that have no airpower or an extremely limited air force, then armed UASs, helicopter gunships, Harrier vertical and/or short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft, and AC-130 gunships will suffice. In cases where the enemy has an air force that needs to be deterred from operating, more advanced aircraft may be necessary. An element of coercive airpower should be put at the disposal of the intervening force in recognition of the wisdom of T. R. Roosevelt's adage to "speak softly and carry a big stick." However, both the force commander and the AETF commander should think hard before employing that stick.



A wide array of actors are pressing for action to stop the mass slaughter of civilians. Both domestically and internationally, the concept of R2P missions is gaining ground. While all recognize that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, the pressure to do something becomes most intense when the situation has become most challenging and genocide is imminent or in progress. Harvard's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and the US Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute are working on operational concepts to combat genocide. The Albright/Cohen Task Force on Genocide Prevention has established an expert group tasked with examining concepts related to military intervention.<sup>74</sup> These groups should consider that while boots on the ground are essential, those boots need not be American. Instead, the United States can perform a tremendous service simply by supplying capabilities to others, whether in Darfur or some future crisis area. Our contribution should and must go beyond simply airlifting poorly equipped peacekeeping contingents into

crisis areas where they will be called to do more than keep the peace. Genocide intervention entails peace enforcement, and those tasked with enforcing the international community's will must be supported with theater mobility, ISR capabilities, medevac and emergency medical support, and, if necessary, sufficient coercive power to persuade mass killers to cease and desist. These will not be risk- and cost-free operations, but the United States can increase the prospects for successful peace enforcement on the part of others. This will serve both American values and interests. **SSQ**

### Notes

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2. "Darfur Grade Report for Hillary Clinton," <http://www.darfurscores.org/hillary-clinton?download=y>.

3. "Darfur Grade Report for John McCain," <http://www.darfurscores.org/john-mccain?download=y>

4. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2002), 6, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html>.

5. *Ibid.*, 2006, 17, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006>. Bush reemphasized that the United States opposes genocide in his State of the Union speech of 28 January 2008, transcript available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080128-13.html>.

6. Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002). Power now teaches at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, where she was the founding executive director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy.

7. Save Darfur Coalition, "September Briefing Paper: The Genocide in Darfur," [http://www.savedarfur.org/newsroom/policypapers/september\\_briefing\\_paper\\_the\\_genocide\\_in\\_darfur](http://www.savedarfur.org/newsroom/policypapers/september_briefing_paper_the_genocide_in_darfur).

8. Genocide Watch, <http://www.genocidewatch.org/resources/newsmonitors.html>.

9. The US Holocaust Memorial Museum's Committee on Conscience maintains a Web site on "Responding to Threats of Genocide Today," <http://www.ushmm.org/conscience>.

10. Power, *Problem from Hell*.

11. Visit the Web sites of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies and Yale University's Genocide Studies Program, <http://migs.concordia.ca> and <http://www.yale.edu/gsp>, for a sense of the interaction between scholarship and activism. Dozens of other universities have established or expanded genocide programs and institutes, among them Northwestern University, the University of Vermont, the University of Minnesota, and the University of Nevada at Reno. For a sense of the number of programs, see Yale University's links to genocide programs at <http://www.yale.edu/gsp/links/index.html>.

12. For a history of STAND and its current campaigns, see <http://standnow.org>. While still dedicated to generating support for action in Darfur, the student group has renamed itself the

Student Anti-Genocide Coalition and has become this generation's equivalent to the antiapartheid student movement of the 1980s.

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14. USHMM, press release, "Madeleine Albright and William Cohen to Co-Chair Genocide Prevention Task Force," 13 November 2007, <http://www.ushmm.org/conscience/taskforce/press/?content=2007-11-13>. The task force includes Senator John Danforth, Senator Tom Daschle, Amb. Stuart Eizenstat, Mr. Michael Gerson, Secretary Dan Glickman, Secretary Jack Kemp, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Amb. Tom Pickering, Ms. Julia Taft, Mr. Vin Weber, and Gen Anthony Zinni.

15. For an overview of mass killings throughout history, see Ben Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

16. Power, "Problem from Hell," 21.

17. *Ibid.*, 21, 38–40.

18. Anton Weiss-Wendt, "Hostage of Politics: Raphael Lemkin on 'Soviet Genocide,'" *Journal of Genocide Research* 7, no. 4 (2005): 552.

19. United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 12 January 1951, [http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p\\_genoci.htm](http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm).

20. Power, "Problem from Hell," 166.

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25. United Nations, press release, "UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Action Plan to Prevent Genocide," 4 July 2004, <http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/KofiAnnansActionPlanToPreventGenocide7Apr2004.htm>.

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28. *Ibid.*; and USHMM, press release, 13 November 2007.

29. United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

30. See <http://www.genocidewatch.org> and <http://www.genocideintervention.net>.

31. See Genocide Watch description of its levels of alert at <http://genocidewatch.org/alerts/alerts.htm>.

32. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, rev. and definitive ed. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985); and Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961).

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46. *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), <http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf>.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., xiii.
49. The Henry L. Stimson Center's research program on "The Future of Peace Operations Program" lists past and ongoing projects at <http://www.stimson.org/fopo/programhome.cfm>.
50. For information on the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy program on National Security and Human Rights, visit <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/programareas/nshr.php#2007>. For details of the Mass Atrocity Response Operations Project, visit [www.maroproject.org](http://www.maroproject.org).
51. USHMM, press release, 13 November 2007.
52. David Gompert, Courtney Richardson, Richard Kugler, and Clifford Bernath, *Learning from Darfur: Building a Net-Capable African Force to Stop Mass Killing*, Center for Technology and National Security Policy paper (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2005).
53. Richard G. Davis, *Anatomy of a Reform: The Expeditionary Aerospace Force* (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2003).

54. Alexander Wathen, "Contingency Response Group: Time to Expand the Box and Think 'Coalition,'" *Air and Space Power Journal* 19, no. 2, (Summer 2005): 70–72, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/quicklook2.html>.

55. Scott Feil's report differentiates between a safe haven and "safe sites." The former is appropriate where the targeted population is concentrated in one geographic area, such as the Kurds in Kurdistan. In Rwanda, where Hutus and Tutsis lived intermingled among each other, one would instead have had to create numerous local safe sites to protect the Tutsis.

56. Patrick Winn, "Air Force propping up peacekeepers in Darfur," *Air Force Times*, 30 October 2007, [http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2007/10/airforce\\_africa\\_darfur\\_071029w](http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2007/10/airforce_africa_darfur_071029w). NATO moved a total of 31,500 troops and civilian police from contributing African countries to the African Union Mission in Sudan between 2005 and the end of 2007. NATO press release, "NATO Supporting African Union's Missions, 1 February 2008, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-018e.html>.

57. IRIN (the humanitarian news and analysis service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), "SUDAN: Waiting for peacekeeping muscle in Darfur," 31 December 2007, <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=76050>.

58. For a fuller discussion on the difficulty of finding donor nations willing to support UN and AU peacekeepers with helicopters, see "Getting boots off the ground. Choppers are vital—and hard to find," *The Economist* 386, no. 8564 (26 January 2008): 70.

59. Lydie Polgreen, "Darfur peacekeeping force at risk of failing, already," *International Herald Tribune*, 23 March 2008.

60. Tom Cooper with Alexander Mladenov, Air Combat Information Group, "Cote d'Ivoire, since 2002" (Western and Northern African Database), 5 August 2004, [http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article\\_463.shtml](http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_463.shtml). Cooper notes that "US forces became involved as well. The USMC deployed C-130 Hercules transports, Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallion and UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters crewed by special forces to evacuate foreign nationals from Korhogo."

61. Roméo Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), 203.

62. *Ibid.*, 308.

63. David Rohde, *Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre since World War II*, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), 79.

64. BBC News, Khartoum, "Africa's troubled Darfur mission," 15 November 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7097438.stm>.

65. For unclassified details about Air Force UAVs' payload, range, and endurance, see summary sheet on "Predator RQ-1/MQ-1/MQ-9 Reaper—Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)," [http://www.airforce-technology.com/project\\_printable.asp?ProjectID=1137](http://www.airforce-technology.com/project_printable.asp?ProjectID=1137).

66. Field Manual Interim 3-04.155, *Army Unmanned Aircraft System Operations*, April 2006, 1-7, 2-4, [www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-04-155.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-04-155.pdf).

67. Charles Eastman, "The Application of Airpower in Genocide Intervention," Air War College Professional Studies paper, 15 February 2008, 17. Eastman references Donald Mabry, "The Role of the Military in the War on Drugs in the Caribbean Basin," October 1989, <http://www.historicaltextarchive.com/sections.php?op=viewarticle&artid=104>; and Air Combat Command Web site, "Tethered Aerostat Radar System," fact sheet, January 2003, <http://www.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=2359>. Eastman points out that the USAF would have to work out the logistics of transporting, deploying, and supporting observation balloons.

68. Dallaire and Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 264.

69. "Iran and Afghanistan Producing New Pattern of Extremity War Injuries," presentation remarks at the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons (AAOS) Conference, 23 March 2006, <http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/528624>.

70. Ibid.; and Craig Seals, "Aeromedical evacuation teams ready to help anytime," Air Force Link, 25 June 2007, <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123058500>.

71. Air Force Special Operations Command Web site, fact sheet, "EC-130J Commando Solo," <http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=221>.

72. Jamie F. Metz, "Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio Jamming," *American Journal of International Law* 91, no. 4 (October 1997): 636.

73. See Aaron Steffens' case study in Douglas Peifer's soon-to-be-published book, *Stopping Mass Killings in Africa: Genocide, Airpower, and Intervention* (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 2008).

74. Expert Group 4, led by Victoria Holt of the Stimson Center, will examine operational concepts for military intervention. See <http://www.usmmm.org/conscience/taskforce>.