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# Obama's "Eisenhower Moment"

## American Strategic Choices and the Transatlantic Defense Relationship

Fifty-six years to the day—Tuesday, 4 November 1952—on which determined American voters elected Dwight David Eisenhower the 34th president of the United States, an equally determined electorate chose Barack Hussein Obama as the nation's 44th chief executive. The coincidence of their election date and their Kansas roots are not all they have in common. Barack Obama came to the White House in January 2009 at an equally critical moment for the future of the United States and as leader of a party which has not been the dominant voice in shaping American foreign policy since Richard Nixon defeated Hubert Humphrey in the presidential election of 1968. One of Obama's principal tasks is to restore the Democratic Party's foreign policy consensus and demonstrate to the American public that Democrats have the ideas, leadership skills, and competence, particularly in the area of national security policy, to deal with the issues confronting the country.

Instilling confidence among Americans in his party's foreign policy competence and credibility requires that Obama articulate and implement diplomatic, military, and economic strategies, the ends of which attract broad-based support both at home and abroad, and the ways and means of which reflect the realities of a global economic crisis more profound than any since the 1930s. But 20 years after the end of the Cold War, defining a framework for Euro-Atlantic cooperation and implementing tasks to accomplish common purposes will be even more difficult than for leaders of the Atlantic alliance in the 1950s. The greatest difficulties, both conceptually and practically, will arise over strategies projecting, and possibly using, military force. Despite the departure of the Bush administration, it remains unclear whether there is a consensus within Europe on the desirability of cooperating with the United States on such strategies.

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This editorial is a shortened and revised version of Dr. Edwina Campbell's chapter of the same name in *Die Außenpolitik der USA: Präsident Obama's neuer Kurs und die Zukunft der transatlantischen Beziehungen* [*The Foreign Policy of the USA: President Obama's New Course and the Future of Transatlantic Relations*], ed. Reinhard Meier-Walser (Munich: Hanns-Seidel Stiftung, 2009).

## A Second “New Look”

President Obama is taking a “new look”—as did Eisenhower—at the defense policies of the previous administration. While every administration claims to do this, in fact, since 1953, none of them have—not George H. W. Bush in 1989 nor Bill Clinton in 1993—despite the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. American presidents have reshaped and refocused specific policies, strategies, departments, and decision-making processes over the years, but changed none of the basic national security legacy created by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations from 1945 to 1961. Obama’s presidency is the first to do so, and in a context analogous in three ways to that of 1953.

First, Obama’s presidency is the first transition in the White House from one party to the other since 9/11. The president faces the same situation as Eisenhower did in 1953: he cannot draw on the extensive experience of a wide variety of American administrations in dealing with the threats of today. *His* grand strategies and their implementation will be as critical to defining approaches to the war on terror in the twenty-first century as Eisenhower’s were to the Cold War.

As a result, President Obama will have the same impact on the structures and policies he inherited from George Bush as Eisenhower did on Truman’s, deciding what survives—and what does not. The Defense Department and other decision-making reorganizations that began with the 1947 National Security Act were also a work in progress in the early 1950s. It was not until Eisenhower’s embrace of the alliances, aid programs, and structures established by the Truman administration (including the CIA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and National Security Council) that their survival into the future became clear.

Finally, Obama is inheriting a transformed military force from George Bush, a transformation driven by the failures of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result of the changes made since 2005 to American armed forces, today they bear little resemblance to the stereotype that still exists abroad. They are no longer a force highly skilled at major combat operations with maximum lethal force but lacking the will and capability for anything else. Their transformation rivals that of the years 1950–53 and in many ways surpasses it. Obama is commander in chief of a force that has a different attitude toward war, conflict, and the overall operational environment than it did in 2001, one that in 2009 is reforming its education and training to become, as stated in Army Field Manual 3-24,

*Counterinsurgency*, an even more “flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders.” The president’s retention of Secretary of Defense Gates at the Pentagon suggests he recognizes the transformation is desirable and well underway, but not yet complete.

### **The Three Ps: Prosperity, Presence, Partnership**

Obama’s Eisenhower moment in 2009 has the same three dimensions as did Ike’s in 1953: prosperity, presence, and partnership. Eisenhower dealt with each dimension, and each has become part of the national security debate in every administration since Truman’s: *prosperity*—to make possible the desired investment in defense; *presence*—the deployment of US forces overseas; and *partnership*—American defense cooperation with other countries. The context in which Obama will deal with presence and partnership is strikingly similar to that of 1953; but where prosperity is concerned, it is very different.

Unlike Eisenhower, President Obama on his inauguration day faced the greatest global economic crisis of any American president since Franklin Roosevelt in 1933. The immediate future of American prosperity is seriously in doubt and will have consequences for the administration’s ability to maintain or expand short- and long-term expenditures on defense. Long-term expenditures may fare better since they may double as domestic investments in infrastructure (as did Eisenhower’s national highway program in the 1950s) and manufacturing, but monies destined to be spent outside the United States where no American jobs are created are likely to be scarce. Obama will be faced with tough choices, akin to those that confronted the United Kingdom after World War I: like Britain then, the United States today has extensive global defense commitments, a shrinking domestic revenue base, indebtedness to foreign powers, and a competitor for global fiscal primacy with no such global commitments—the European Union.

In the economic boom of the 1950s, “guns and butter” were not mutually exclusive, and except for brief, passing moments, they never have been for the United States, until now. Obama is the first president whose defense priorities and national security commitments will of necessity reflect the twin pressures on the federal budget from declining revenues and expanding domestic job creation and social service programs. But how will the financial crisis affect American strategic choices? No one, least of all the president, can be sure; there is no reference point in American history

to which he can turn. The last global economic crisis of this magnitude came when the United States embraced isolationism and was hardly one of the great military powers. The country then played an entirely different geostrategic role in the world.

If there is any parallel to the decision-making climate facing President Obama in 2009, it is not in the American past, but in mid-century Britain's. First, in the interwar years, and then more starkly after World War II, London faced the reality of a lack of economic means to meet its global defense commitments. The mid-century British analogy is not a happy one for the United States today, although there are doubtless skeptics of American foreign policy who feel otherwise. For them, declining American prosperity may seem the ideal solution to the "problem" of the United States' global role, whether they are American isolationists who feel that ungrateful foreigners have for decades exploited a surfeit of American power or critics overseas who feel exploited by a surfeit of American power. Any rejoicing at home or celebrating abroad is ill placed, however, particularly in Europe. Even under the most favorable economic circumstances, the Obama administration in its first year would have reviewed the state of presence and partnership—eight years after 9/11. In the context of the current economic crisis, the next *Quadrennial Defense Review* will raise questions about how and where to apply scarce US defense resources and, inevitably, about the relevance of Europe's defense resources, capabilities, and will.


### **American Presence, Regional Partnership**

Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since 9/11, the concept of American military presence as a catalyst for regional partnerships has emerged as a key element in the American approach to promoting stability and security in historically unstable and insecure parts of the world—as Europe once was. Since 2005, support to SSTR—stability, security, transition, and reconstruction—has been a priority for the US military, but there is little evidence that these changes in the US armed forces now under the command of Barack Obama are appreciated—or known at all—in Europe.

The Obama administration expects a greater European military role in counterinsurgency (COIN) as well as SSTR missions in Afghanistan. Vice President Biden said at the Munich Security Conference in February 2009, "We will ask our allies to rethink some of their own approaches—including

their willingness to use force when all else fails.” Is such a greater European role likely? The prospects are not good, and American skepticism is not new: Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, despaired of his European counterparts’ approach to military force in 1953.

Today, although small pockets of European military experts recognize that the true “revolution in military affairs” in the United States is not the technological one of the 1990s but the human one that began in the past five years (with its emphasis on multilateral partnerships and support, rather than unilateral command, control, and execution), European political elites and public opinion do not want to recognize these changes. If they did, there would then be no reason to decline cooperation with Washington in developing a comprehensive strategy towards Afghanistan and, eventually, other countries. As he faces his Eisenhower moment, President Obama would be well advised to assume the absence of a robust transatlantic defense relationship in making American strategic choices in the months and years ahead.



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# The Logic of the Nuclear Arsenal

*Adam Lowther*

WITH THE historic election of Barack Obama, the United States is likely to see an equally historic review of nuclear weapons policy. In 2009 alone, the new administration will undertake a nuclear posture review (NPR), expected in early 2010, and oversee the expiration or renegotiation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expires 5 December 2009. Mr. Obama will also be responsible for ensuring compliance with obligations in the Strategic Offense Reduction Treaty (SORT), which require that the United States reduce its deployed strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012.

During his first week in office, the president gave the nation a glimpse into how he may approach these issues when the White House released his agenda stating the policies he will pursue regarding the nuclear arsenal. Three foci in Mr. Obama's nuclear agenda are apparent: securing loose nuclear material from terrorists, strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and moving toward a nuclear-free world.<sup>1</sup> He expanded on his position in Prague on 5 April 2009. What many Americans may not be familiar with is the rationale advanced by advocates of nuclear abolition as they attempt to persuade Mr. Obama to cut the nuclear arsenal further.

Attempting to influence the administration's nuclear policy are a number of individuals and organizations with very different views of the nuclear arsenal and national security. While imperfect, it is possible to organize this diversity of thought on nuclear issues into two broad groups. On the one hand are the "modernizers," led by a number of prominent military leaders. Over the past several months they have given a number of public speeches and interviews in which they outlined what it will take to maintain and modernize the most advanced and secure nuclear arsenal

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in the world.<sup>2</sup> Their views shaped—and were shaped by—recent reports published by such groups as the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, the Defense Science Board, and the US Air Force.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, there are the “abolitionists,” whose leadership is less clearly defined but whose visible members include think tank analysts, former US senators, and a substantial number of senior faculty at leading universities. While it would be incorrect to suggest that these two groups are adversaries, they do represent differing visions of the nuclear arsenal.

The following pages take a critical look at the often-unchallenged arguments advanced by nuclear abolitionists and attempt to illustrate errors in fact and reasoning that are often made when advocating nuclear abolition. In pointing out the flaws in the abolitionists’ position, this article also seeks to provide a better explanation of the position held by nuclear modernizers. Admittedly, successful deterrence—conventional or nuclear—is difficult to prove or disprove, since demonstrating the negative is difficult if not impossible. Thus, this analysis takes a middle ground between the “armchair general,” Thomas Schelling, who suggests that deterrence is akin to a logic game, and the area expert who demands deep empirical analysis as a prerequisite to validity.

## **Nuclear Modernization**

The rationale for modernization of the nuclear arsenal is extensively described in a number of DoD reports issued between 2006 and 2008. To summarize, Pentagon leaders highlight three pressing needs.

First, the United States has not developed a new nuclear warhead in more than two decades. According to the Defense Science Board, “Our lack of nuclear weapons production capability—and our stricture against not only development but [also] design—holds our future hostage.”<sup>4</sup> Although the current stockpile is regularly maintained, a majority of the warheads in the arsenal were designed and built in the 1970s and early 1980s. This led top policy makers and military leaders to call for the development of a safer and more technologically advanced Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) by the year 2000.<sup>5</sup>

Second, the personnel who design and maintain the nuclear stockpile are rapidly approaching retirement. There is an immediate need to find young scientists and engineers willing to dedicate their careers to the

nuclear mission before the knowledge and skills of the present workforce are lost.<sup>6</sup>

Third, the delivery platforms that comprise the nuclear triad are aging without a clear way ahead on their replacements. Efforts to maintain the viability of these platforms are underway, as some of the Minuteman III systems, for example, are periodically modernized through various life extension programs (LEP).<sup>7</sup>

The B-52H, the mainstay of nuclear-capable aircraft, is even older and lacks the capability to penetrate defended airspace.<sup>8</sup> This leaves the 19 B-2 bombers in the fleet as the only nuclear-capable bombers that can penetrate Russian or Chinese airspace,\* for example, and the recent DoD budget cut funding for the development of the next-generation bomber, leaving some uncertainty as to the future of manned bombers.<sup>9</sup>

America's fleet of 14 ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) is in the best relative condition of the nuclear weapons delivery platforms but is also aging. The oldest Ohio class SSBN, the USS *Henry M. Jackson* (SSBN 730), was commissioned in 1977, while the newest, the USS *Louisiana* (SSBN 743), was commissioned in 1997. A replacement for the Ohio class SSBN is not scheduled to enter service until 2029.<sup>10</sup>

## Nuclear Abolition/Minimalism

The renewed appeal of the antinuclear movement coincides with the 4 January 2007 *Wall Street Journal* op-ed piece by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. These seasoned policy experts shocked many with their advocacy of a "world free of nuclear weapons." Their article preceded a number of reports echoing the same sentiments. In the ensuing 18 months, the Arms Control Association, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Nuclear Threat Initiative, American Physics Society, and Sir Richard Branson's newly created Global Zero, have all followed suit with their advocacy of a nuclear-free world.<sup>11</sup> More recently, the November/December 2008 issue of *Foreign Affairs* published "The Logic of Zero" by Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, detailing the thoughts of nuclear abolitionists.

\*The B-1B was originally designed as a nuclear-capable bomber and could serve that purpose again. If converted back to its original mission, the B-1B will add greater penetration capabilities than the B-52H.

There are, however, fundamental problems with “The Logic of Zero” and similar publications. The line of argumentation advanced in this and other articles often provides a dearth of supporting evidence and frequently makes a priori assumptions that are logically inconsistent. In fact, both history and logic would forecast very different outcomes from those posited by Daalder and Lodal.

### **“The Cold War is Over”**

Nuclear abolitionists begin most persuasion efforts by informing the reader that the Cold War is over. By implication, this suggests that Presidents George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush failed to understand the significance of this development. While abolitionists acknowledge that the US nuclear stockpile has declined by more than two-thirds since 1991—declining from more than 24,000 warheads to around 5,000—this is not seen as a shift in nuclear weapons policy.<sup>12</sup>

Such a view is incorrect for three reasons. First, the reduction in deployed strategic warheads called for in the SORT (1,700–2,200) makes an approach to nuclear weapons use reliant on a survivable second strike more difficult. A counterforce targeting strategy is also difficult to sustain, as lower numbers force targeteers to prefer a countervalue strategy. Second, the nuclear arsenal is—at its core—designed to preserve US sovereignty by deterring adversaries from striking the United States. This objective is as valid today as it was during the Cold War. It is logical that aspects of Cold War and post-Cold War nuclear posture look similar. Third, a major shift is apparent when looking at the current force structure. There can be no doubt that the composition of the strategic force is very different today than it was the day the Soviet Union collapsed. For example, the Peacekeeper missile has been retired from service, along with a dramatic reduction in the number of warheads on each Minuteman III. It is also worth noting that the fleet of Minuteman IIIs and B-52s is far smaller than a generation ago. These reductions in the strategic force demonstrate that political and military leaders were aware of a changing strategic environment.<sup>13</sup> With the perfect vision that hindsight provides, it is easy to criticize previous administrations, but to dismiss the shifts in policy they carried out is unjustified.

### **“It’s All about Terrorism”**

The second argument made by abolitionists suggests that “In today’s war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation.”<sup>14</sup> It is then suggested that the United States must disarm to encourage the remaining nuclear weapons states to follow suit—as will those states developing nuclear weapons. With nation-states disarmed, there will be no place for terrorists to acquire fissile material which they can use to construct a nuclear bomb for use against the United States.

The logic of this view is problematic for several reasons. First, there is a lack of evidence to support such an assertion. History does not provide a wealth of occasions in which analogous efforts led to similar results. To the contrary, American nuclear disarmament is likely to be viewed by some countries as American weakness and an opportunity to accomplish foreign policy objectives absent American interference. The failure of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty disarmament efforts after World War I played an important role in the remilitarization of the Axis Powers in the 1930s and left the United States unprepared for World War II.<sup>15</sup> Utopian views of a world without war left the United States open to attack and played a role in events leading to the outbreak of World War II.

The wave of localized conflicts that followed the end of the Cold War may be indicative of a world free of nuclear weapons and the restraint they engender.<sup>16</sup> Extended deterrence plays an important role in mitigating conflict by giving America’s allies the confidence that the United States is protecting them while also serving as a warning to adversaries. Absent such an umbrella, stability may decline.

Second, to support the abolitionist position, readers are persuaded that American conventional capabilities are a substitute for nuclear weapons. The Bush administration’s “New Triad” was partially built on this view. This leads to a logical conclusion that conventional and nuclear forces generate the same strategic effect. But, if this is true, conventional forces are also a threat to stability and must also be reduced or eliminated. In fact, there is little reason to believe that the world will be more stable without nuclear weapons but with an overwhelming US conventional capability. Because America’s adversaries know they cannot match US conventional capabilities, nuclear weapons may become an even more attractive option. Fear of US conventional capabilities is a driving force behind nuclear weapons programs in North Korea and Iran, not the fear of America’s nuclear arsenal.<sup>17</sup>

Conventional and nuclear weapons are different—very different. If this were not the case, why is 9 August 1945 the last time that a nuclear weapon was used in war? The same cannot be said of conventional weapons. As Ellen Collier of the Congressional Research Service illustrated in 1993, rarely did a year go by during the Cold War that US troops were not engaged in a conventional conflict.<sup>18</sup> The same is true of the post–Cold War period.

India's response to the 26–29 November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack is a good example of the moderating effect nuclear weapons have on the behavior of nuclear-armed adversaries. Prior to developing nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan fought one another in the First Kashmir War (1947), the Second Kashmir War (1965), and the Indo-Pakistani War (1971), along with numerous artillery exchanges in Kashmir over the decades. Lashkar-e-Taiba's attack left 172 innocent civilians dead and placed the Indian government under great pressure to respond with force, yet Prime Minister Singh has shown tremendous restraint that can be attributed to the fear of a conventional conflict escalating to nuclear war. While India would likely win a conventional war with Pakistan, neither country is willing to take such a risk.<sup>19</sup> These two rivals are not the only examples of the moderating influence of nuclear weapons. The Cold War provides the single best example of nuclear weapons preventing conventional conflict among great-power rivals. While it is only possible to speculate, the probability of a conventional conflict between the United States and the USSR would likely have been much higher had both sides not possessed nuclear weapons.

### **Moving to 1,000**

While the ultimate desire of abolitionists is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, some are more modest in their immediate objectives, offering 500–1,000 as the right number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads. They do not, however, explain why this is the appropriate number, other than to say, “This would be more than enough to convince anyone that the United States possesses the capacity to respond to any use of nuclear weapons with devastating effect.”<sup>20</sup> While the current number of 1,700–2,200 established in the Moscow Treaty (2002) was taken from a Pentagon study on post–Cold War requirements for an effective deterrent, it was, in many ways, an arbitrary number.<sup>21</sup> It was later explained in the *National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* report (2008), published by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy. Here it is said that 1,700–2,200 is the correct size of the operationally deployed strategic

nuclear arsenal because it represents “the ability of the operationally deployed force, force structure, and the supporting nuclear infrastructure to meet a spectrum of political and military goals.”<sup>22</sup> The report also suggests that “contemporary force sizing is guided by the fact that the DoD infrastructure for strategic forces and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear warhead production infrastructure, even if both are fully functional, may not be capable of responding as rapidly as needed to some kinds of unforeseen operational or technical problems, or to address adverse changes in the geopolitical environment.”<sup>23</sup>

Picking an arbitrary number (500–1,000) is not an optimum approach to sizing the nuclear arsenal. Instead, the size, delivery systems, and manner of deployment should be based on current and future threats and American capabilities. If the threat posed by nuclear adversaries increases, it may be necessary to increase the nuclear arsenal. If the international environment stabilizes, it may be possible to reduce the arsenal. But, as history demonstrates, it is far more difficult to increase the size of the arsenal than to reduce it. Thus, a floor may be appropriate for the number of warheads and delivery vehicles.

Most important, the United States must always pay careful attention to maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent, which encompasses more than the possession of nuclear weapons. Even with 500–1,000 warheads, as the abolitionists suggest, the United States may not possess a credible nuclear deterrence, particularly when there are no vital interests at stake. There is no one-to-one ratio between warheads and credibility with an increase in warheads leading to a proportional increase in credibility. It is, however, difficult to develop a more effective way of undermining American credibility than to

- arbitrarily reduce the size of the nuclear arsenal,
- reduce the triad to a monad, and
- stop investing in the modernization of warheads and delivery systems.

In the aftermath of nuclear arms reductions, America’s adversaries are likely to continue their current modernization programs or begin new weapons development, as North Korea and Iran are doing to counter US conventional capabilities. Allies protected by American extended deterrence may view an arsenal of 500–1,000 strategic nuclear weapons as a sign that the United States cannot and will not fulfill its obligations to defend them. A new era of proliferation among advanced industrialized nations may

be the result. Britain and France have long maintained a hedge against the failure of extended deterrence and, as of late, both are contemplating nuclear modernization programs.<sup>24</sup> Japan may become the next ally to develop its own nuclear weapons capability as American numbers and credibility decline.<sup>25</sup> Rather than encouraging disarmament, the United States may inaugurate a new era of nuclear proliferation if it continues to disarm.

Perhaps it is time to develop a rational process by which the nation determines the appropriate number of deployed and reserve warheads. To arrive at a better approximation, the following seven questions should be answered:

- What are the threats facing the United States and its allies?
- What are the objectives of America's adversaries?
- How do nuclear weapons contribute to deterrence?
- Is a countervalue or counterforce strategy more appropriate?
- How survivable are US nuclear forces?
- What targets should be held at risk and by what delivery platform?
- What are the consequences of being wrong?

While there are certainly more variables to consider, answering these questions begins to provide some structure for determining the appropriate size and delivery method for the nuclear arsenal.

To bolster support for a 500- to 1,000-warhead stockpile, abolitionists often point out that terrorism, not the Soviet menace, is the threat facing the nation. While it is true that terrorism is the most immediate threat, it does not threaten the sovereignty of the United States. The very fact that America's adversaries must resort to terrorism is a sign that the United States has achieved success in dominating nuclear and conventional operations. Since they do not threaten national sovereignty, terrorists should always be preferred to peer competitors.

"The Logic of Zero" says nothing of a current or future nuclear threat posed by Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran. Gestures of peace from the United States rarely elicit the desired response. This is particularly true of the relationship between the United States and Russia, dating back to Stalin's betrayal of Roosevelt in Poland and Eastern Europe after World War II.<sup>26</sup> This was not the last time an agreement was violated. As the Arms Control Association has noted, the Soviet Union, and now Russia,

have a history of violating the Biological Weapons Convention, making it difficult to place much faith in a future agreement on nuclear disarmament.<sup>27</sup> American distrust of Russia is well founded and illustrated in the 1992 Bush administration decision to maintain a large nuclear stockpile as a hedge against a return to authoritarianism.<sup>28</sup> Recent developments in Russian politics give reason for concern and may signal the rise of illiberal democracy and the end of the Russian bear's hibernation.<sup>29</sup>

Russia considers its nuclear arsenal vital to its national security for three reasons. First, possession of nuclear weapons is prestigious. It should not be forgotten that the Soviet Union was once the largest empire on Earth—a fact most Russians have not forgotten. Second, Russian nuclear weapons deter the United States from intervening in Russian affairs, such as the recent conflict with Georgia. Third, nuclear weapons deter a feared “Chinese expansion” into eastern Siberia, which the Russian army cannot otherwise deter or repel.<sup>30</sup> To suggest that Russia will follow the United States in disarming is to suggest that President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin will alter their recent behavior. This is unlikely.

### **Accidental Detonation, Miscalculation, and Nuclear Proliferation**

The next line in the abolitionist argument focuses on the potential for accidental detonation, miscalculation leading to a nuclear holocaust, and proliferation. While it is true that these risks exist, in the 60-year history of the bomb there has never been an accidental detonation, much less a nuclear holocaust.

To suggest that these events are inevitable is ahistorical. Current nuclear controls separate arming codes from weapons handlers and launch officers until a presidential decision is made and require multiple levels of verification before a weapon can be armed and released. The high level of security that currently exists would be heightened even more if the United States were to continue development of the RRW, which modernizers have advocated for a number of years. This is also true of current modernization efforts in Russia and China.<sup>31</sup>

Additionally, American and Russian ICBMs have been detargeted, demonstrating a reduction in the level of tension between the two nations.<sup>32</sup> Thus, it is accurate to say that American ICBMs no longer sit on “launch on warning” status.<sup>33</sup> Most important, the notion that ICBMs sit on a “hair trigger” alert is not correct and never was. Thus, from a technical



perspective, the probability of rapid cataclysmic miscalculation leading to a nuclear holocaust is highly improbable.

With more than 60 years of experience with nuclear weapons, there is also a low probability of political miscalculation. Neither the president of the United States nor his counterpart in Moscow has ever “miscalculated” and launched a nuclear weapon. Rather than expecting miscalculation, a better approach may be to assist other nuclear powers in developing the sound practices that have led to six decades of American and Russian restraint.

Finally, it is not in the immediate interests of any state, including Iran, to transfer nuclear material and know-how to violent Islamic fundamentalists. To the contrary, it is in Iran’s interest to ensure that groups such as Hezbollah have a limited capability for waging war. An authoritarian regime (e.g., Iran or Syria) would find it contrary to its own interests and survival to create/support nonstate actors capable of toppling an adversary (Israel) because that capability could then be turned against the original benefactor. Much as Saddam Hussein was careful to limit assistance to terrorist groups because he feared they could turn against him,<sup>34</sup> Iran has limited its assistance to Hezbollah.<sup>35</sup>

As the Nuclear Threat Initiative suggests in its recent work, the potential for proliferation, particularly in Russia, is on the decline as Russia improves controls over key items and personnel.<sup>36</sup> And, as the United States continues to improve its nuclear forensics capability—ensuring that the world knows of its capacity to track material—adversaries, both state and nonstate, will face an increasing level of risk should they desire to launch a covert nuclear attack against the United States.

Among nuclear powers, Pakistan presents the greatest proliferation risk. This risk was mitigated by former president Pervez Musharraf, who was successful in establishing positive control over Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile.<sup>37</sup> As a result of the discovery of A. Q. Khan’s illicit trafficking network, security measures were substantially improved.<sup>38</sup> Contrary to what some may think, a nuclear Iran would likely pose less of a proliferation risk than Pakistan. With a stable central government and a long history of working with terrorist organizations, the Iranian political elite are experienced with internal security. And, while they may be professed enemies of the United States, the Iranian regime does not seek its own destruction.

## Luck

Finally, the abolitionists justify the lack of a nuclear holocaust by pointing out that “responsible nuclear stewardship, a relatively effective non-proliferation regime, and a good deal of luck have helped account for this achievement. But the world cannot continue to count on luck.”<sup>39</sup> As with the previous points, evidence to substantiate America’s reliance on luck is lacking. If past successes are the result of luck, how much more will the United States rely on luck once it disarms? Should the United States disarm, it will no longer be able to lay claim to Vegetius’ dictum, “*Si vis pacem para bellum*” (“If you desire peace, prepare for war”).

## Moving Beyond Criticism of Nuclear Abolition

If the modernizers are to persuade the president, a skeptical Congress, and the American people that a safe, modern, and reliable nuclear arsenal is needed, they must begin by directly addressing the arguments of nuclear abolitionists. Relying on unengaging technical reports to make the case is not a strategy for success. Instead, four mutually reinforcing approaches may offer a viable opportunity to preserve the nuclear arsenal while also accomplishing legitimate nonproliferation objectives.

First, the United States remains a representative republic where the American people have the single most important voice in determining public policy. Modernizers would be wise to engage Americans to inform them about deterrence and nuclear weapons policy. One effective way to accomplish this objective would be for senior leaders and scholars in the modernization camp to work with major media outlets by supporting journalists who seek to understand nuclear weapons operations and policy, publishing articles in major newspapers and Web sites, and appearing on television and radio regularly to discuss the issue. Turning complex issues into brief and informative columns can be an effective tool. Where abolitionists appeal to emotion, modernizers must appeal to reason. The importance of winning the support of the American people should never be underestimated. After all, it is their security that modernizers seek to preserve and their money that funds the nuclear arsenal.

Second, Congress responds to the demands of its constituents. If modernizers effectively sway American public opinion, individual members of the House and Senate will respond by supporting DoD efforts to build and maintain a safe, secure, and modern nuclear arsenal. Indirect effort is, however,

not enough. An active effort should be undertaken to educate the military legislative assistants of each member of Congress. Rather than focusing on POM and program issues, a broader understanding of deterrence strategy and nuclear weapons should be the target of educational efforts. Success will depend on persuading congressional leaders with strong factual arguments that overcome the emotional and speculative arguments of abolitionists.

Third, modernizers must work to convince the president of the continuing importance of the nuclear arsenal to national security. In any new administration, the realities of office soon overcome the rhetoric of the campaign. As with the American people and the Congress, success will be determined by the strength of the argument presented to the president.

Finally, every effort should be made to find potential common ground with abolitionists. While it is highly unlikely that they will be persuaded of the utility of the nuclear arsenal, there are areas where collaboration is possible. As in the past, the United States and advocates of modernization can support international efforts to assist in nonproliferation efforts, such as maintaining an effective command and control system in all nuclear weapons states, improving fissile material and nuclear stockpile security, and other such measures.

Pursuing a course of action that is grounded in a rational approach to US national security and supported by both theory and practice should prove successful, but it will require modernizers to vigorously defend their efforts. The alternative, however, is to allow the dreams of nuclear abolitionists to put the security of the American people at risk. That is unacceptable.

Perhaps it is the awe generated when watching footage of nuclear test detonations or the striking images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that engender respect and restraint. Perhaps it is the fear of radiological aftereffects of a nuclear explosion that drive human emotions regarding nuclear weapons. Whatever the case, nuclear weapons have a deterrent effect that cannot be recreated by conventional capabilities. Absent nuclear weapons and a credible place in the national strategy, the United States will lose much of its ability to provide some stability in an unstable international system. ❧

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# Pakistan's Stability/Instability Complex

## The Politics and Reverberations of the 2007 November Emergency

*Anita Singh*

“ALTHOUGH RADICAL Islamic groups may stage a comeback, they are very unlikely ever to impose their radical vision on Pakistan and transform it into a nuclear-armed Afghanistan,” argued Stephen Cohen in 2002.<sup>1</sup> Yet, as Taliban militia marched through the Buner district recently, just 100 kilometers short of Islamabad, many have come to question the verity of Cohen’s assertion. Further still is the memory of the democratic euphoria that surrounded the 2008 election as Asif Ali Zardari announced, “We are bound together in the spirit of democracy,” when his coalition government came into power, winning 154 of 268 seats in the national legislature. This victory came from the ashes of Pres. (Gen) Pervez Musharraf’s declared state of emergency throughout Pakistan in November 2007. Musharraf had argued the declaration was necessary to address the “activities of extremists and incidences of terrorist attacks,”<sup>2</sup> while others suggested he made this declaration to avert Supreme Court rulings on his own presidency. Police raids, opposition-party house arrests, and thousands of civilian arrests suggest that the latter might be truer than Musharraf initially indicated. It is clear that the combination of judicial, legislative, and security crises in 2007 brought Pakistan to a point of potential state failure, setting the stage for its current crisis and instability.<sup>3</sup>

As the Pakistan army successfully continues its surge against the Taliban, it is no stretch to argue that Pakistan is *not* a failed state. Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has suffered a half-dozen coups d’état, several armed independence movements, growing extremism and Islamicization within the population, and system-wide corruption and lack of political

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institutionalization. Yet, the question of its future continues to arise as it once again teeters on the brink of failed statehood. A crucial turning point for Pakistan, the November emergency encompassed multiple areas of state failure, including an out-of-control insurgency, loss of sovereignty within the border areas, and the seizing of both parliament and the judiciary. Despite these events, Pakistan has managed to bounce back from imminent state failure, engaging in elections and forming its current government in February 2008. Despite its claims, this new government is no exception to Pakistan's pattern—its beginnings marred with decisions surrounding the constitutionality of the president's office and the Supreme Court, its inability to deal with an insurgency that has moved far enough inland to threaten Islamabad, and more recently, its growing economic crisis. These conflicting outcomes are at the heart of this article, where one argument claims that Pakistan is only now emerging from its colonial past, coming to terms with the contest between its Islamic and secular identities. Conversely, others argue that Pakistan is in decline—a state increasingly incapable of addressing its internal political crises—and the aftermath of the November 2007 emergency is an example highlighting Pakistan's state failure.

With this debate in mind, what then explains Pakistan's oscillation between state failure and stability? Most scholars would point to the literature on failed states, using its theoretical framework to apply its generalizations to this case. Yet, at a theoretical level, the failed-state literature has difficulty explaining the Pakistan case because of its strong bias towards African-centric, democracy-oriented, and conflict-biased analysis. Not only does the literature fail to distinguish the characteristics of a failed state, but it is also unable to identify how states *change* from stable (non-failed) to failed-state systems. Pakistan provides an important case study, as it has not only teetered toward failure on a number of occasions but has also bounced back and continues to persist. Second, failed-state literature is problematic because its analysis is based on "snapshots" in time, unable to differentiate between the causes of state failure and its resulting effects. Pakistan's persistence can only be explained by its *historical* process, acknowledging the November emergency as a data point within the larger context of Pakistan's development.

Centered on the time frame after the November emergency, this article introduces the concept of the "stability/instability paradox" to better explain Pakistan's oscillation and persistence as a state. Its conclusion analyzes a

number of determinants for Pakistan's future stability and the security of the international system.

### **Setting the Stage: The November Emergency and its Aftermath**

Geopolitical and intrastate security ramifications of state failure have ensured its prominence in international relations, linking the phenomenon to the growth of international terrorism, refugee movements, humanitarian crises, and intra- and interstate conflict.<sup>4</sup> Despite this, the theoretical work in this area has yet to offer any concrete knowledge about its causes, prevention, or even post-failure reconstruction to protect the international system from this phenomenon. Rather, the term *state failure* has been misused as a catchall concept to explain issues of corruption, conflict, and collapse within non-Western and developing states. Therefore, for this inquiry, it is important to ask why Pakistan has *not* failed, despite its many moments of insecurity and instability. One could go so far as to argue that of all the states in Asia, Pakistan has a higher propensity for state failure than all others in the region. In fact, in the last three years, Pakistan has been in *Foreign Policy* magazine's Failed State Index top 10 twice, alongside conflict-ridden Afghanistan.

The November emergency is the culmination of several domestic and international variables that have challenged the stability of Pakistan. Before 2001, Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were used as government-sanctioned training grounds for both regional and international terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Tamil Tigers, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. After 2001, the NATO intervention in Afghanistan, growing Islamicization, and weaponization of the region shifted the objectives of terrorist and insurgent groups to include Pakistan as a target for their violent activities. Blamed for complicity with American troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan suffered its first terrorist attack on its own soil in 2003. Since then, these attacks have degraded the authority of the central government, and the autonomous tribal regions have become even less hospitable to federal authority. These ethnic, religious, and security-based tensions came to a head in November 2007, when President Musharraf declared a state of emergency in Pakistan—revoking civil liberties, imprisoning thousands, dismissing the Supreme Court, and engaging in large-scale



counterinsurgency missions in the NWFP, a shocking admission that the government had lost control in the border regions.<sup>5</sup> The aftermath of the emergency might be the best indicator of Pakistan's future, because it encapsulates many of the tensions that brought Pakistan to the forefront as a potential failed state.



**Figure 1: Border areas with insurgency in Pakistan** (Reprinted from Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire—Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” *International Security* 32, no. 4 [Spring 2008]: 41–77.)

### **The Crisis of the Judiciary and Elections in Pakistan**

One of the major catalysts for the events in late 2007 included a judicial and constitutional crisis that began earlier in the year. In March 2007, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was arrested and removed from the Supreme Court under charges of impropriety and corruption. As Chaudhry claimed innocence, his supporters argued that his arrest was due to his presiding over a number of “unfavorable” decisions, including the Supreme Court’s reversal of the sale of the national steel mill and his investigations into “disappearances” supposedly conducted by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).<sup>6</sup> Protests across Pakistan resulted in Chaudhry’s subsequent reinstatement on 20 July, suggesting that the formerly state-

controlled Supreme Court was given new life as a proactive, democratic, and independent judiciary.

The timing of Chaudhry's reinstatement was particularly important within the politically charged atmosphere in Pakistan, as he was expected to preside over two important cases in the following months. First, the Supreme Court was scheduled to rule on the constitutionality of Musharraf's candidacy in the upcoming presidential elections while holding the titles of both army chief of staff and president.<sup>7</sup> Second, the court was to rule on the legality of both Benazir Bhutto's and Nawaz Sharif's candidacies in the upcoming parliamentary elections because of corruption allegations that had removed them from office in years previous.

In October 2007, with the Supreme Court yet to render a ruling, Musharraf proceeded with presidential elections in the National Assembly. A boycott of the election by over 80 opposition members of the legislature confirmed a numerical majority for Musharraf's Muslim League-Q (MLQ) party, and he was easily reelected president.<sup>8</sup> After declaring the emergency in early November, Musharraf then disbanded the Chaudhry-led Supreme Court, replacing it with an interim judiciary, which immediately declared the election valid.<sup>9</sup> With this ruling, Musharraf resigned as head of the armed forces and was sworn in for his second term as president.

Benazir Bhutto, who had self-exiled to Dubai in 1998, returned to Pakistan in July to campaign in the parliamentary elections in the new year. She was allowed back into the country primarily due to a power-sharing agreement negotiated between the MLQ and her Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Despite this agreement, Musharraf was surprised with the level of her grassroots support, marked by protests and demonstrations across the country, and responded by keeping Bhutto under house arrest for much of the emergency. At the same time, Nawaz Sharif, who had been exiled from Pakistan after the Musharraf-led coup in 2000, attempted a dramatic political comeback in October 2007, only to have his plane turned around and sent back to Saudi Arabia. It was not until his swearing-in ceremony that Musharraf allowed Sharif back into the country and released Bhutto from house arrest to campaign for the February 2008 parliamentary elections.

After Bhutto's assassination at the end of December, the PPP came under the leadership of her widower, Asif Ali Zardari, with 84 seats in the National Assembly and formed a majority coalition with Sharif's Muslim League-N

(PML-N). In August 2008, the coalition deposed President Musharraf and elected Zardari as the new president. Musharraf did not leave office under the auspices of constitutional power change; rather, he left because of his miscalculation that he was powerful enough to retain the office of the president. His declining political legitimacy and popularity, as evidenced by the Lal Masjid crisis, assured he did not have the support to continue his presidency.

Despite its success, this winning coalition eventually disbanded over a long-term disagreement vis-à-vis the reinstatement of the Supreme Court justices dismissed by Musharraf. While Sharif's PML-N wanted full reinstatement, the PPP refused in fear that the return of Justice Chaudhry to the bench would reinstate corruption charges against Zardari. Even with the dissolution of the coalition, the PPP continues to form a coalition government with a number of smaller, regional parties, under Prime Minister Yusuf Gilani and President Zardari.

### **Lal Masjid and the Crisis of Control**

The events surrounding the judicial crisis were amplified by a further political and religious crisis over the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad. While Western commentators have often overlooked the importance of the connection between the religious institution and its political connections, the Lal Masjid has long been one of the spiritual centers for the Pakistan-based Taliban. Therefore, it was not surprising when a group of female students and teachers from the Jamia Hafsa seminary were involved in an 18-month campaign of "re-Islamicization" in the city, closing down music and video stores, movie theatres, and other entertainment venues through a *laathi raj* (rule by sticks).<sup>10</sup> In March 2007, female students from the seminary kidnapped three women accused of running a clandestine brothel, only releasing them after taping forced confessions. In response to both the *laathi raj* and the kidnapping, Islamabad police arrested two female teachers from the seminary and their drivers. With complete disregard for the authority of law enforcement, the mosque leaders subsequently ordered the kidnapping of two policemen and confiscated their vehicles, storing them within the Mosque.<sup>11</sup> In June, women from the seminary kidnapped nine Chinese nationals from their residential acupuncture center with similar accusations of prostitution. This event even drew attention from China, which called on the Musharraf government to act against the lawless mosque.

Despite these activities, the Musharraf government remained wary of military action against the Lal Masjid, expecting strong repercussions. It was not until students from the Jamia Hafsa set fire to the nearby Ministry of Environment and cars in its parking lot that Musharraf mobilized forces and attacked paramilitary forces protecting the mosque. On 5 July, a thousand students surrendered to security forces, while dozens remained inside asserting their willingness to face martyrdom.<sup>12</sup> By 11 July, with many of the innocent surrendered, the government stormed the mosque, killing 100 people. One of the more important people killed in the raid was Abdul Rashid Ghazi, a mosque leader and a principal organizer of the standoff.


Despite the successful strong-armed response by the government, the siege has become a landmark event in Pakistan for three reasons. First, it further undermined the legitimacy of the Musharraf government amongst Islamicists in Pakistan.<sup>13</sup> After Musharraf's decision to join the US-led war on terror, many accused him of pandering to the United States and, for the most part, Musharraf became a symbol of Western hatred within Pakistan. This perspective was effectively manipulated by organizers of the siege, who campaigned the events as a struggle between Islam and the corruption of Western influences, suggesting Musharraf supported the latter. For example, while trapped in the masjid, Abdul Rashid Ghazi used his cell phone to access numerous media stations, calling for Pakistan-wide action against Musharraf.<sup>14</sup> It has been suggested that a rocket attack on Musharraf's plane on 6 July while inspecting floods in Balochistan was a Taliban response to the events of the Lal Masjid. By making Musharraf a symbol of anti-Islamism, the siege had the effect of delegitimizing the government within Pakistan's population.

The siege had a second effect of highlighting the relative weakness of the government in relation to the Lal Masjid, which is often called a "state within a state."<sup>15</sup> Not only did the madrassa attempt to deliver religious law enforcement within Islamabad, it also became apparent that conflict (and the lack thereof) within Pakistan's rogue provinces was centrally dictated by the mosque. Similarly, Ghazi's call to arms within tribal regions and Musharraf's inability to stop the madrassa's re-Islamicization campaign indicate a significant failure of domestic sovereignty. Third, Musharraf's response to the siege catalyzed divisions and renewed violence between the government and Taliban-related insurgencies in border regions of Pakistan. Consequently, the siege resulted in the end of a peace agreement between the government and warring factions in North Waziristan because of retaliatory violent clashes between

government soldiers and militants. This effect was foreseen by Ghazi, who warned government forces that “any actions against the madrassa” would generate an “appropriate response” by Taliban members.<sup>16</sup>

### **Insurgency and the Crisis of Sovereignty**

By all measures, the Lal Masjid crisis marked the beginning of the uncontrollable insurgency in Pakistan's northern provinces and affirmed the existence of pseudo-states in the tribal areas, many under Taliban rule. In 2007, nearly 3,600 people were killed in insurgency-related violence in Pakistan, including civilians, security forces, and terrorists—more than double from the year previous.<sup>17</sup> President Musharraf's midnight declaration of a state of emergency on 3 November 2007 directed attention to the increasing *inability* of the government to address the growing terrorist and insurgent threat within the state. The preeminent focus of the government was on the near-Iraq levels of conflict occurring in the NWFP and the FATA, as shown by the numbers of casualties in figure 2. Musharraf's opening statement in the emergency declaration noted that the “visible ascendancy in the activities of extremists and incidents of terrorist attacks, including suicide bombing, IED explosions, rocket firing, and bomb explosions and the banding together of some militant groups have taken such activities to an unprecedented level of violent intensity posing a grave threat to the life and property of the citizens of Pakistan.”<sup>18</sup>



**Figure 2: Number of people killed in the Northwest Frontier Provinces since 2002** (Data collected by South Asia Terrorism Portal, <http://www.satp.org/>)

Referencing several disturbing trends in Pakistan's insurgency and the failure of several peace treaties earlier in the summer, Musharraf further argued that the emergency was necessary because "constant interference in executive functions has weakened the writ of the government; the police force has been completely demoralized and is fast losing its efficacy to fight terrorism; and intelligence agencies have been thwarted in their activities and prevented from pursuing terrorists."<sup>19</sup>

In addition to the increased levels of violence, the insurgency in 2007 had become increasingly bold. Two days before the declaration of emergency, insurgents paraded 48 captured soldiers in front of media in the Swat district, a once-popular tourist destination. The soldiers were dressed in local attire rather than in their uniforms, which were reported to have been thrown away or given to insurgents.<sup>20</sup> Reports estimate that 300 soldiers were held hostage at the time, all of them part of a 2,500-troop counterinsurgency paramilitary group added to the 100,000 soldiers already stationed across the NWFP and the FATA. One disturbing report suggested that many Pakistani troops voluntarily surrendered, in some cases without shots being exchanged. Upon stumbling across the bodies of a dozen mutilated paramilitary forces, troops began surrendering, hiding within the local population, and abandoning rank altogether.<sup>21</sup> By October 2007, 100 paramilitary officers had been killed, and others were found badly mutilated or beheaded by insurgents in North Waziristan.<sup>22</sup>

A third trend in the insurgency is the public security and law enforcement role assumed by militants in many of these regions. Reports argue, particularly in the Swat district, that Taliban-related insurgents have been seen delivering "vigilante-like" justice and, in one incident, killing 12 suspected thieves instead of deferring to local law enforcement agencies. In other cases, Taliban have been seen following mundane law enforcement tasks, including directing traffic and conducting public floggings for anti-Islam violations.<sup>23</sup>

Finally, as a consequence of the events in 2007, suicide bombing has increased in addition to the traditional asymmetric methods used by the insurgents. Over the five years from 2001 to 2006, Pakistan suffered 22 suicide bombings, while in 2007 alone there were 56 suicide attacks, the bulk of them occurring soon after the July siege. In addition to the increased numbers of suicide attacks, the attacks have been increasingly bold and have come from unlikely sources. In early December, a full two weeks before the end of emergency rule, Pakistan's first-ever female suicide bomber detonated

her bomb outside a Christian school in Peshawar.<sup>24</sup> As noted by much of the literature on female terrorists, the inclusion of women in terrorist activity suggests an increased radicalization of local politics in the Tribal Belt. Further, the existence of female suicide bombers undermines government claims that insurgencies are an extreme phenomenon, not representative of the population.<sup>25</sup> These overall trends have continued well into 2009, including major cases such as the Marriott Hotel bombing in September 2008, an attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in early March, and Pakistan's largest suicide bombing at a mosque in late-March 2009.

### **Post-2007: A Turning Point in Pakistan's Politics**

While events surrounding the November emergency were both drastic and destabilizing in their own right, some argue that the subsequent February elections were exemplary of state stability rather than leading to further crises. The November emergency's relevance lies in its aftermath and contribution to the current crisis in the country.

The peaceful transfer of power and the power-sharing agreement between the Zardari and Sharif camps might suggest an unprecedented move towards democratization and stabilization in Pakistan, but it does not adequately exemplify the unconstitutionality of power sharing within Pakistan's political system. Institutionally, the new government has had increasing difficulty consolidating its power and legitimacy within the state. In February 2009, one year after the coalition government victory, the interim Supreme Court reinstated corruption charges against Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbhaz, the chief minister of Punjab, barring them from running in any future election or holding public office. In light of the ruling, President Zardari used his federal power to dismiss the Shahbhaz Sharif state government in Punjab, Pakistan's largest and most wealthy state. Citizen response to this event overwhelmed security forces, as the former prime minister's latest "exile" was rejected as power-based party politics by Zardari's government.<sup>26</sup> Zardari responded to a mass demonstration planned for 15 March 2009 by placing the army on standby with orders to quash the civilian movement if necessary. During this standoff, all access to the national legislature buildings was blocked and scores of protesters were detained.<sup>27</sup> Further, the government blocked access to any media, such as GEO-TV, which had been particularly critical of the government in recent months.<sup>28</sup> Rather than reinforcing

the stability of the government, the events of March seemed to reflect its inherent weakness.

Zardari's diminishing control corresponds to the increasing political and legal dominance of Taliban-related groups in regions such as Swat. Similar to the strategy employed against the Musharraf administration, the Islamist campaign has managed to equate the Zardari government to an anti-Islam, pro-American government, simultaneously delegitimizing the national government while encouraging the growth of pseudo-statehood in tribal areas. With the success of this strategy, the national government has actively devolved its own sovereignty to consolidate its legitimacy within religiously conservative regions. No example illustrates this better than the March 2009 Malakand cease-fire, when the Pakistani Taliban successfully negotiated the implementation of Sharia law in the Swat district of the NWFP with the Pakistan government.<sup>29</sup> Under this accord, the government agreed to release 12 Taliban militants in exchange for an agreement to an indefinite cease-fire between militants and counter-insurgency forces.<sup>30</sup> Criticisms of the government's approach are unsurprising; most argue that the government has shown its position of weakness, as indicated by its major concessions. In fact, the Taliban entered negotiations with unprecedented power; they were even able to demand that they would only negotiate cease-fire terms with Mohammed Javed, a Taliban-sensitive Pakistani civil servant from the NWFP. As Christine Fair from RAND argued, "These deals have been essentially ratifying [government] defeats on the ground."<sup>31</sup> Second, numerous criticisms of the agreement have come from civil rights groups in Pakistan, noting the lack of provisions for women's rights in districts now under Sharia. Third, because of the government's weakness, no enforcement mechanism has been established within the agreement, resulting in reports of numerous violations and no Taliban disarmament.

More importantly, the insurgents' actions in the area have underscored the increasingly national political agenda espoused by the Taliban-related groups, shifting their attacks to economic, law enforcement, and political urban targets. This is exemplified by a number of Taliban activities such as the forcible takeover of two emerald mines outside Swat, inviting impoverished locals to work the mines as a sign of their economic clout in the region. Another example in early-April 2009 shocked both Pakistan's secularists and international observers: the release of a videotape showing an extrajudicial lashing of a 17-year-old girl by three Taliban members.<sup>32</sup>



The Taliban's new national agenda has taken form in the most recent round of fighting. Negotiations of the Malakand Accord allowed insurgent groups to rearm and organize; less than a month after the agreement, the Taliban led a surge into the Buner district. In its hasty yet necessary response to the cease-fire violation, the Pakistan army had retaken Buner, forced a Taliban retreat, and begun operations in Swat. By the end of May, the army had cleared the Taliban out of Mingora, the largest urban center in Swat. Mingora has been a focal point for analysis of the region, as it is the first time in this surge that Pakistan's troops have fought in an urban setting, and holding the city will be an important test case for the army. Reports have indicated that Taliban members have resorted to shaving their beards to blend in with the large numbers of refugees leaving Swat.

Despite the military's success, the fighting in Swat is representative of a larger picture of the Taliban objective within Pakistan. Instead of limiting their conflict to the autonomy of specific regions, these fighters now have set their sights on the state, targeting regions ever closer to Islamabad. This suggestion has not simply been inferred from insurgent actions, but a number of warnings have been issued by the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mahsud, that his group would take over Pakistan unless the government stopped supporting NATO operations in Waziristan and Afghanistan. In February 2009, President Zardari, responding to the suggestion that his government was fighting insurgents on behalf of American allies, stated, "We are aware of the fact [the Taliban are] trying to take over the state of Pakistan. So, we're fighting for the survival of Pakistan. We're not fighting for the survival of anybody else."<sup>33</sup>

Therefore, the aftermath of the November emergency and the most current round of fighting have resulted in three new determinants of Pakistan's future. First, Pakistan sits on a delicate balance of public opinion, highly dependent on the army's success in the current battle. Agreeing to the Sharia deal in Swat neutralized grassroots support for the government; negotiation with Taliban members has signalled to the population that resistance will not be supported from the center. Coupled with accusations of government corruption and the out-of-control humanitarian crisis, government leaders face the challenge of maintaining their public support. This being said, the latest successes by the Pakistan army and increased awareness of Taliban atrocities in Swat have improved the public perception of the government as locals have begun to denounce the religious extremism associated with Taliban rule.<sup>34</sup>

Second, Pakistan's ability to address the growing humanitarian crisis will determine whether new refugee camps become recruiting grounds for extremists. In the last month of conflict, Pakistan has become the world's fastest-growing humanitarian crisis, displacing nearly three million people to refugee camps near Peshawar, Islamabad, and other urban centers in the country. United Nations, NGO, and American aid has flooded the area but can only reach refugees if the military can sustain its victories.

Third, Pakistan's leaders face an important decision between internal political battles and victory over the Taliban. While the latest fighting has seen a surge in Zardari's popularity, Nawaz Sharif's opposition will have to decide if it uses the current crisis as an opportunity to support or denounce the government.

### **Pakistan as a Failed State? A Stability/Instability Paradox**

Many policy recommendations describing the politics of Pakistan rely on the label "failed state"<sup>35</sup> to explain the security concerns of the state. Yet this is not an accurate explanation of the causes of events in Pakistan. The November emergency tipped the state closer to failure, yet resulted in peaceful and fair elections by February 2008. Nawaz Sharif's removal from politics in March undermined the institutional capability of the current government until his reinstatement in April 2009. The Sharia agreement in Swat challenged the state's sovereignty in the region but was eventually controlled by the army's advance into Mingora. Recognizing the outcomes of the November emergency identifies the major shortcomings of failed-state explanations, as it has little to contribute to the ever-changing events in Pakistan's current crisis.

In analyzing the events of 2007, the *stability/instability paradox* serves as both an explanation of the Pakistan *problematique* and a critique of the failed-state concept. This paradox argues that state fragility and its potential failure come from the structural relationship between variables that undermine the stabilization efforts of one another. Because these variables are so interrelated, stabilizing gains in one area (e.g., military consolidation) are undermined by their resulting effect (e.g., a decrease in the viability of parliamentary governance). Conversely, state failure conceptualizes a linear model where inherently weak states decline in a linear fashion. Therefore, it is assumed these actors *dichotomously* either contribute or

detract from state stability, but not both. As shown in Pakistan, none of these assertions are necessarily true. It is because of this shortcoming that scholars are unable to generalize cause-and-effect relationships regarding state failure.

The case study presents three areas where this dichotomy is prevalent. First, the stability/instability paradox is prevalent in Pakistan's competing identities as a secular or Islamic state. Institutional failures, regional divisions, and ethnic conflict are not *causes* for state failure in themselves but effects of Pakistan's internal divisions between these identities.<sup>36</sup> Second, the institutional configuration of power within government is highly subject to the stability/instability paradox, where differing power centers have divided the stability of the state. Third—not mentioned in previous sections, yet an important part of Pakistan's political scene—the army has been a major exemplar of this dynamic.

### **Pakistan: An Islamic State?**

Divisions between Pakistan's secular and Islamic identities inevitably call into question which factors within Pakistan foster or detract from stability. Often presented as a dichotomy, there is an inherent association of militant groups with destabilization and secular actors with stability. In some ways, the facts support this association, as Pakistan has been at its most stable when its Islamic and secular identities have been mutually reinforcing. The conventional understanding of the Pakistan conflict underscores that until 2001, Pakistan's political relationship with its Islamist actors supported the state's overall foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. Yet, with the aftermath of 9/11 and Musharraf's subsequent support for the US-led war in Afghanistan, the state's Islamist actors turned inward, and Pakistan became a target in its own right.<sup>37</sup> A closer look at Pakistan through the framework of the stability/instability paradox shows that all Islamist actors in Pakistan do not solely contribute to instability.

Compounding the stability/instability paradox, the Islamic-secular divide within the current conflict has become increasingly complicated. There is an intuitive sense among Western commentators that Islamist groups are inherently divisive and destabilizing, reinforcing the tendency to group militants, insurgents, and terrorists under a single heading without taking into account the divisions that exist between these groups. At the organizational level, there are important distinctions between the Pakistan-based and Afghanistan-based Taliban, the tribal groups in Waziristan

and Balochistan, and terrorist organizations such as Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-Muhjadeen (HuM). One of the most relevant divisions between these groups includes their differing mandates vis-à-vis their vision of Pakistan. Pakistan-based terrorist groups and the Pakistan Taliban share “foreign policy” objectives such as violence against India, unification of Kashmir with Pakistan, and Islamicization of South Asia. Yet, their differences lie in their domestic objectives—terrorist organizations like LeT view Pakistan as a *platform* to conduct these objectives, and historically, their foreign objectives have been supported by the state as a tool to use against the Indian threat.<sup>38</sup> Conversely, the Taliban see the current state of Pakistan and its leadership as their main antagonist; their objective is to convert Pakistan into a Taliban-ruled Islamic state. The divisions between these groups have become so acute that in early 2009, members of the terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Toiba and Hizb-ul-Muhjadeen were placed on Taliban hit lists demanding that these terrorist groups leave Taliban-controlled areas in the Swat, Dir, and Mehsud districts.<sup>39</sup>

While the events of the November emergency revealed a close relationship between tribal leaders in Waziristan and the Lal Masjid, this does not necessarily describe all tribal–Taliban relationships. A significant backlash from tribal leaders has stalled Taliban advances against Pakistan by proscribing recruitment in their regions. In early June 2009, for example, tribal leaders organized a *lashkar* (Urdu: “army”) as a response to a Taliban-organized suicide bombing in a tribal mosque, which killed 40 people. In the Upper Dir district, villagers surrounded two Taliban strongholds and killed 14 militants. The army’s response to this countermovement has been supportive, going so far as to arm the ad hoc *lashkar* groups. Yet, the most significant element of this countermovement has been its grassroots support. A sudden rise in popularity for both the government and the army suggests that the locals have changed alliances when faced with the brutality of Taliban rule, particularly after the Swat agreement.

Similarly, there are important divisions between the leadership, organization, and objectives of the Pakistani Taliban (self-titled Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP) and their Afghan Taliban counterparts. The TTP, while conducting recruitment and small-scale operations in the tribal areas since 2004, did not exist until December 2007 when it was created as an umbrella group for several Islamist groups within the FATA and the NWFP under the leadership of Baitullah Mahmud. Until this most recent conflict, the

Afghan Taliban used Pakistan's refugee camps and training centers in the tribal areas as safe havens and were largely unconcerned with conflict in Pakistan.

Divisions between these organizations should not undermine their similarities and ties, as fragmentation has not completely negated the convergence of support for the Taliban. Many tribal leaders have found the strategic "branding" of a singular Taliban heading useful, as it allows them to maintain control over their specific regions; the most susceptible regions include Waziristan, the Taliban stronghold and organizational center.<sup>40</sup> Further, recent reports have noted a new consensus between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP in anticipation of the new surge in American troops; "the refortified alliance was forged after the reclusive Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, sent emissaries to persuade Pakistani Taliban leaders to join forces and turn their attention to Afghanistan."<sup>41</sup> While this suggests that attacks in Pakistan may let up as the Taliban seek to refocus their attention on Afghanistan, the more important message suggests a newly adopted coordination of efforts and a more unified message, objective, and strategy for the continued insurgency.

The mainstream perspective on Pakistan does not acknowledge these differences within the population, citing that largely, insurgent groups, independence movements, and terrorist organizations both stem from *and* cause state fragility. Yet, the divisions among Islamist groups in Pakistan indicate a more complex picture of their contribution to the stability of the state. The Taliban is not a unified or organized entity, nor are the terrorist groups within the state; each has its own objectives, leadership, and territorial claims. The most recent upsurge in anti-Taliban *lashkar* groups is an important clue in this direction, as these groups had been relatively supportive of the Taliban until violence turned the people against its growing influence.

### **Pakistan's Political Institutions**

Pakistan's Islamic and secular identities have been embedded in its institutional foundation. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's first leader, followed a secularist ideology but founded the country on the principle of protecting South Asian Muslims from the "tyranny" of Hindu-dominated India, framing a debate for all successive governments—was Pakistan a secular or Islamic state? The Islamist regime of Gen Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq oversaw the financing of new madrassas, ISI training for terrorists, and international terrorist deployments. Later, Nawaz Sharif used Islam as

an instrument to consolidate his political control over rogue parts of the population while also addressing the perceived threat from India. Regardless of the administration, Pakistan's historic divisions are largely determined by the confluence of individuals within the government, military, religious, ethnic, and tribal leaderships.<sup>42</sup>

The government's response to the insurgency issue illustrates the dichotomy described by the stability/instability paradox. President Musharraf's strategy to stabilize the state heightened perceptions of the Islamist threat despite the challenges this posed to the stability of the political institution. His support for the American-led coalition in Afghanistan, his crackdown on fundamentalist groups in the NWFP and the FATA, and his strict closures of illegal madrassas since 2001 have resulted in several assassination attempts, the growth of independence movements, and increased intra-state terrorist activity.

In comparison, Musharraf's parliamentary opposition, particularly those now in government, argue that this crisis is one of governance. They see the insurgency as a product of the regime's failure to protect the democratic process during the elections at the end of 2007. Focusing on parliamentary consolidation during his election campaign, President Zardari spoke of strong military measures to deal with the growing crisis. Since his election, his public comments have fluctuated towards both negotiations with terrorist entities and long-term solutions, including economic and civil society development, without committing to a short-term plan for the counterinsurgency. His international speaking engagements and interviews have been geared towards convincing the international community that Pakistan will not collapse. In reality, both perspectives oversimplified the needs of the Pakistani state in consolidating a stable governmental regime.

Government stability depends on three areas of power sharing. First, the governmental crisis is largely due to the weakness of the constitution compared to the practical precedent established over decades of power sharing in Pakistan, which has shifted power between the presidency and the prime minister's office since independence. Under the regimes of Zia and Musharraf, the bulk of powers shifted toward the presidency, while under the Bhutto and Sharif administrations, power was contained in the office of the prime minister. Since the current government comes from the same party as the president, there has been little issue of power sharing, but as evidenced by the actions during recent protests, concentration of political decision-making power in the PPP has been questioned by

Pakistanis at all levels.<sup>43</sup> Since the February elections in Pakistan and the resulting debates on power sharing and counterinsurgency tactics, attempts to solve the problem have widened this divide between secular and Islamic Pakistan.

A further division exists within the structure of decision-making power outside the government. The Stephen Cohen-labelled “Establishment” is an unofficial oligarchic network in Pakistan made up of military staff, ISI agents, jihadist civilians, and bureaucrats who control much of the politics of Pakistan. Their overstretch into Pakistan’s politics includes the support of various Islamic terror groups, a coalition of conservative political parties, and anti-India politics in the state. The Establishment contributes to the instability of Pakistan by undermining the legitimacy and control of the National Assembly and other policy-making bodies. Cohen has argued that Pakistan’s politicians spend more time attempting to gain influence within the Establishment than in exercising the duties of their offices, skewing the power structure within the state.<sup>44</sup>

Third, growing Islamicization has also had a major effect on the political circumstances of the state. Pakistan’s 2002 elections worried many observers because of a seeming increase in support for conservative and religious parties. While these parties, such as the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), only garnered 8 percent of total votes cast in the election, the bulk of votes came from conflict-ridden regions in the NWFP and the FATA, resulting in an immediate conservative shift in the politics of the region. For example, as soon as it came to power, the MMA movement in the NWFP dictated the closure of entertainment, music facilities, and girls’ schools and revised school curricula that were seen to be inconsistent with Islam.<sup>45</sup> The 2008 election has seen the reverse of this phenomenon, and election results have swung back to favor secular parties, particularly in the regions once taken over by the MMA. Analysts suggest that this is particularly important because discontent with policies associated with Islamic parties suggest that there is a secular, state-oriented civil society in Pakistan dedicated to the stability of the state.

### **Pakistan’s Army**

Intimate in its relations with the Establishment, Pakistan’s military also contributes significantly to the stability/instability paradox. The strength of the military as a stabilizing force in Pakistani politics is relatively undisputed. Even Indian scholars, such as C. Raja Mohan, argue that “the

extraordinary strength” of the army has been the “core” of Pakistani identity, providing a check and balance on the instability of both political and Islamist actors.<sup>46</sup> It has become particularly relevant since the military is the only institution with the ability to stem the rise in extremism and insurgent violence and, unsurprisingly so, since Pakistan historically commits nearly a quarter of its annual budget to the military.<sup>47</sup> There have even been two interpretations of Pakistan’s numerous coups d’état. While some argue that each coup has brought Pakistan to the brink of state failure, others argue they can be seen as a check and balance against Pakistan’s corruption-ridden and inconsistent civilian governments’ demands.<sup>48</sup>

In the post-Musharraf era, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, the new chief of army staff after the November emergency, has reversed a number of destabilizing policies within the military. For example, the military has traditionally involved itself in all areas of political control in the state and, under Musharraf, had infused more than a thousand of its own staff within the bureaucratic system. Educational facilities, specifically universities, had their governance structures stacked with military personnel, resulting in revisionist curricula and controlled access to information.<sup>49</sup> Under Kayani, the military has recalled all its personnel from civilian posts in the government and brought all communications between military personnel and politicians to a stop. His track record thus far has been impressive; in 2008, for the first time in Pakistan’s history, the military budget was presented to and negotiated in the National Assembly. Further, General Kayani has made a point to confirm his commitment to the democratically elected Zardari government, unequivocally communicating this sentiment within the media and to US counterparts, stemming speculation of another coup in Pakistan.

Yet, this stabilizing feature has been attained at the cost of Pakistan’s political system and civil society. Kayani’s unwillingness to involve himself in Pakistani politics has made the army complicit in a number of questionable decisions by the government, most recently with his support for the imposition of Sharia in the NWFP. While Kayani has been seen as a stabilizing force in Pakistan’s shaky politics, there have been questions as to how far his loyalties will remain with the government.

First, Kayani’s bold internal military reforms have not been as productive within the larger military and civilian establishment. In early 2009, Zardari was forced to replace the ISI chief with a civilian because of accusations that the ISI has continued to support and perpetuate terrorist groups in the



country despite the Islamist crisis. As this role is normally held by a military official, the proposition was rejected by the army, leaving this crucial position vacant.<sup>50</sup> While Kayani has made the assurance that the ISI has been purged of individuals “who might be undermining the entire anti-terror effort,” recent reports have suggested that the ISI continues to support militant groups fighting in Afghanistan and India.<sup>51</sup> Ironically, some have suggested that the ISI has attempted to continue its support of the Afghan Taliban while engaging in counterinsurgency activities against the Pakistani Taliban.

Further, there has been some speculation regarding Kayani's ability to control those troops directly engaged in the counterinsurgency missions, developing a general unwillingness to fight insurgents from within the army. The Frontier Corps is a division of the military which has 100,000 soldiers stationed within the NWFP and Balochistan, with the bulk of the corps derived from the local population. Because these soldiers are often intimately acquainted with insurgents and are ill-equipped and trained, there is a resistance to engage in counterinsurgent activities that come from within.

### **Failing or Failed? Pakistan's Future Trajectory**

The stability/instability paradox repudiates Pakistan's trajectory towards failed statehood. On one hand, Pakistan is overwhelmed by the growing insurgency and fundamentalism within its borders; on the other, it continues to show signs of an independent judiciary, self-restraint within its military, and growth of civil society. The case of Pakistan shows that there is an important interplay between several levels of analysis that lend to both its stability and instability, particularly in understanding Islamicism and insurgency in the state. An alternative view informed by analysis of Pakistan's complexities suggests that predictions of state failure in Pakistan may be premature. Its history of perseverance in the face of a persistent stability/instability paradox suggests a resilience that holds state failure at bay. While it is unlikely that Pakistan will progress further to state failure, there are three central areas that could determine the country's future trajectory.

## **The Fight for Public Support**

Anti-Americanism (extended to all Western states) in Pakistan has been one of the main pillars of recruitment for the Taliban movement. As argued above, by establishing the Zardari administration as an anti-Islam, pro-American government, the Islamist campaign has attempted to delegitimize the national government while increasing its own support. Therefore, the paradox for the current government is to continue pressure to reduce Islamist violence while simultaneously not reinforcing the public relations campaign that has undermined Zardari's support. An apt example of this paradox is a protest held at the beginning of June in Islamabad. Wearing signs with the words "Go Taliban Go" (read: Go away, Taliban), a few hundred protesters gathered to support the government's actions in Swat. At the same time, protesters also yelled the phrase "Go America Go," indicating that Western actions are perceived by the general population to be equally as negative as extremist violence.<sup>52</sup> In Pakistan, the balance of public opinion will be highly dependent on the army's success in the current battle and its distance from American influence.

As Taliban often target the most vulnerable and frustrated members of Pakistan's society, the state's ability to address the growing humanitarian crisis will largely be determined by recruitment campaigns in refugee camps. The latest refugee displacement has multiplied the humanitarian crisis that began with fighting earlier this year. Further, plight of the permanent refugees from the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan has also been worsened by the influx of new waves of refugees. The successful provision of aid is absolutely necessary, as its efficiency determines the success of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. In fact, Taliban-related groups have used humanitarian assistance to derive support from impoverished populations such as victims of the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, when militant groups were major providers of aid to the affected population. In a conflict sensitive to public opinion and radicalization, Pakistan's struggle will have to focus on improving public opinion of its humanitarian situation.

## **Stemming the Insurgency**

As of June 2009, Pakistan's forces had established control over the majority of the Swat valley from the Taliban insurgency. Yet there are a number of military issues that could destabilize the army's progress. First, the Obama administration has continued the Bush policy of drone attacks in the FATA region of Pakistan, killing over 500 people in the first few

months of 2009 alone. Zardari's government had repeatedly requested an end to these attacks, arguing that they undermine Pakistan's sovereignty and have the effect of inflaming the insurgency in the region.

Second, despite its successes, there have been complaints about the inefficiencies of the army's response to the Taliban. During the tribal uprising against the Taliban, the army initially supported the actions with helicopter gunships due to the lack of ground troops. With air strikes, the army was unable to identify its targets, shooting indiscriminately and making locals wary of further military contribution to their uprising. Overall, the measure of Pakistan's military success will not be its ability to kill numerous Taliban; rather, it will be based on its success to maintain grassroots support in its counterterrorism efforts. Third, the activities of the last few months have treaded the fine line of public support. On one hand, agreeing to the Sharia deal in Swat has challenged grassroots support for the government. Government negotiation with Taliban members has signaled to the population that resistance will not be supported from the center. On the other hand, the latest successes by the Pakistan army and increased awareness of Taliban atrocities in Swat have provided the government with new life, as locals have begun to denounce the religious extremism associated with Taliban rule.<sup>53</sup>

### **Engaging India**

Arguably, India has one of the largest stakes in maintaining a stable Pakistan and is acutely aware that state failure there will be counterproductive to stability in South Asia. Since the Soviet war in Afghanistan, India has recognized that the growth of extremism in Pakistan and Afghanistan has resulted in increased violence in Kashmir. Further, Pakistan's strengthened terrorist and insurgent groups have caused further attacks on the Indian mainland, such as the 26 November 2008 attacks in Mumbai.

From Pakistan's perspective, one of the largest destabilizing features is its dependency on the Indian threat as its military's *raison d'être*. There are two important reasons why an India-centric military is destabilizing to Pakistan. First, as long as Pakistan sees India as a threat, it will continue to prioritize spending on its conventional military over economic growth and social services. Pakistan consistently spends a quarter of its yearly budget on military expenses and half its budget on debt financing, which leaves very little money for internal development and state stability.<sup>54</sup> Many argue that the rise of the Taliban could have been slowed with investment in the

public education system, as more and more families became dependent on free education offered by radicalized mosques. Second, the army's preoccupation with India has led to some questionable decisions about the internal crisis. Even with a strengthened insurgency on Islamabad's doorstep, an estimated 70 percent of the military remains on the Indian border, resulting in an understaffed counterinsurgency fought by air strikes and inefficient ground raids.<sup>55</sup>

India's contribution to resolving the Pakistan crisis must be carefully engaged. Obviously, there is an anti-India bias within many sectors in Pakistan; however, there has been a series of positive movements in the relationship that would indicate India's involvement would be welcome. On a humanitarian level, India could offer a contribution to relieving the refugee crisis in the region. There is a precedent for these actions, such as the Kashmir earthquake of 2005. Following the earthquake, Pakistan accepted many offers for humanitarian aid from foreign powers, including NATO's offer for soldiers and airlift capabilities.<sup>56</sup> Then, a few days after, Pakistan accepted India's offer for humanitarian aid—taking into account its geographic proximity and the time it would take NATO contributions to arrive—allowing Indian helicopters to cross over the Line of Control to deliver food aid. India eventually donated the equivalent of \$25 million towards humanitarian aid for earthquake relief, the first monetary transfer between the two states since independence. Second, India could offer conditional guarantees to the Pakistan army that it will not take advantage of Pakistan's weakened political system by threatening its border areas. In a goodwill measure, brokered by NATO forces, India could make a gesture by pulling a number of soldiers from the border area. While there is inevitably hesitation in engaging India, these efforts can result in small victories for Pakistan's army against Islamists.

It is not an exaggeration or an understatement to argue that the internal security and stability of Pakistan will determine the security and stability of Afghanistan. To date commentators, analysts, and policy makers have looked at Pakistan not through the lens of its own stability but through its insurgent training camps, terrorist recruitment, and border and transmigration effects on the conflict in Afghanistan. While NATO policy makers have recognized that Pakistan and Afghanistan are not separate foreign policy issues, there continues to be a tendency to treat Pakistan as epiphenomenal to the Afghan conflict. Yet, the case of Pakistan shows that there is an important interplay between several levels of analysis that lend

to both its stability and instability, particularly in understanding Islamicism and insurgency in the state. There is more happening in Pakistan, and those who attempt to make a definitive conclusion about Pakistan's trajectory based on traditional theories of state failure ignore the obvious complexities of the case. ■■■

## Notes

1. Stephen Cohen, "The Nation and the State of Pakistan," *Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 109–22.
2. Pervez Musharraf, "Proclamation of emergency," *BBC News*, 3 November 2007, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/7077136.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7077136.stm).
3. Both before and after declaring the emergency, Musharraf had taken steps to stem any potential mass protests in Pakistan, which would have ended his control of the crisis. These steps included controlling the media, home arrest for Benazir Bhutto, and "negotiations" with other political parties. David Blair, "Pakistan—The Key Questions," *Telegraph*, 5 November 2007, <http://telegraph.co.uk>.
4. Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation and Disease are Threatening the Social Fabric of our Planet," *Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994), <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199402/anarchy>.
5. Pakistan's stability obviously has important repercussions for its neighbors, and in particular, nuclear-armed India. Of even larger concern is the movement of terrorist attacks further into the Indian mainland, including the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament and the 26 November 2008 attacks in Mumbai. Pakistan's successive governments have historically denied their ties to the attacks on India, but the current government—under both Indian and international pressure—has recently has admitted that the 2008 terror attacks were plotted and executed from Pakistan. For more information, see "Pakistan 'in fight for survival,'" *BBC News*, 15 February 2009, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/7890985.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7890985.stm); "Interview with External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee: A Stable Pakistan is in India's Interest," *Hindu*, 13 January 2008, <http://hindu.com>; and C. Raja Mohan. "What if Pakistan Fails?" *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (Winter 2004/5): 117. Other references for the India-Pakistan conflict are: Lowell Dittmer, ed., *South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China* (New York: M. E. Sharp, Ltd., 2005); Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); S. Paul Kapur, "India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia is not like Cold War Europe," *International Security* 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 127–52; and Reeta C. Tremblay, "Nation, Identity and the Intervening Role of the State: A Study of the Secessionist Movement in Kashmir," *Pacific Affairs* 69, no. 4. (Winter 1996/7): 471–97. As late as March 2009, India's army chief, Deepak Kapoor, has made public statements recognizing "continued support of the Pakistani establishment in the running of 40–50 terrorist camps still active in PoK." "Pakistan still running terror camps," *Times of India*, 26 March 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Pak-still-running-terror-camps-Army-chief/articleshow/4315822.cms>.
6. Some of the most drastic and important protests during the buildup to the emergency were conducted by lawyers in defense of Justice Chaudry's innocence.
7. Isaac Kfir, "The Crisis of Pakistan: A Dangerously Weak State," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11, no. 3 (September 2007): Article 8/9; and Khalid Qayum and Khaleeq Ahmed, "Pakistan Court to Rule on Musharraf's Election Bid," *Bloomberg News*, 28 September 2007.

8. In Pakistan, the parliament is elected in a general election, and the president is then elected by the legislature. This usually results in the presidency and government representing the same party. Nirupama Subramanian, "85 Pakistan parliamentarians quit in protest against Presidential poll," *Hindu International News Agency*, 3 October 2007, <http://www.hindu.com>.

9. Shahan Mufti, "Roiled Pakistan Prepares for Vote," *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 October 2007, <http://csmonitor.com>; Habibullah Khan, "Pakistan High Court Considers Musharraf Election Win," *ABC News*, 7 October 2007, <http://abcnews.go.com>; and Zeeshan Haider, "Musharraf steps down as army chief," *Reuters UK*, 28 November 2007, <http://uk.reuters.com>.

10. Incidentally, this group of students was also involved in kidnapping a brothel owner in Islamabad earlier in the year.

11. This particular standoff lasted a mere several hours. Once police released the teachers, the kidnapped policemen were released as well.

12. "Mass Exodus at Pakistan Mosque," *BBC News*, 5 July 2007, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/6271894.htm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6271894.htm).

13. This article uses the term *Islamicist* as a reference to actors that use Islam instrumentally to forward political goals.

14. "Musharraf makes his case for helping U.S.," *CNN*, 19 September 2001, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/09/19/pakistan.address/index.html>.

15. Another example is noted by Feisal Khan, who argues that the loss of sovereignty was also indicated by the patterns of humanitarian donations during the 2005 earthquake, the bulk of which went to Islamist and other charities rather than the government. Feisal Khan, "Corruption and the Decline of the State of Pakistan," *Asian Journal of Political Science* 15, no. 2 (2007): 219–47.

16. Syed Shoaib Hasan, "Profile: Islamabad's Red Mosque," *BBC News*, 27 July 2007, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/6503477.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6503477.stm).

17. Institute for Conflict Management (New Delhi), "Pakistan Assessment 2009," *South Asian Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/>.

18. Musharraf, "Proclamation of emergency;" and "Silencing the Opposition—Benazir Bhutto under house arrest," *Economist*, 9 November 2007, <http://economist.com>.

19. *Ibid.* It has been suggested that these peace treaties have failed because of events associated with the Lal Masjid incident.

20. Kanchan Lakshman, "The Sledgehammer in Swat," *South Asia Intelligence Review* 6, no. 21 (3 December 2007), <http://www.satp.org>; and "Militants in Pakistan Display 'Captured Soldiers,'" *VOA News*, 2 November 2007, <http://voanews.com>.

21. Lakshman, "The Sledgehammer in Swat;" and "Militants seize 120 Police, Soldiers in Pakistan," *AFP*, 3 November 2007, <http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5igDUu3QEalGnNov6MSBxB2C5UIMQ>.

22. *Ibid.*

23. "Pakistan emergency aiding Taliban," *Al Jazeera*, 10 November 2007, <http://english.aljazeera.net>.

24. "First woman suicide bomber strikes in Pakistan," *Reuters India*, 4 December 2007, <http://in.reuters.com>.

25. During the Red Mosque siege, female students stated that they were willing to become suicide terrorists in response to government aggression, sparking concern over the changing face of terrorism in Pakistan. "Female Suicide Bomber Dressed to Kill," *Daily Times*, 24 February 2007, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk>

26. The Sharif situation has recently been cleared by the Supreme Court, which turned down the initial ruling by the Lahore High Court. This decision allows Sharif to retain his federal legislative seat, and he is now allowed to run in upcoming elections.

27. Stephen Graham (AP Islamabad), "Pakistani troops on standby ahead of protests," *USA Today*, 15 March 2009, [http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-03-14-pakistan-protests\\_N.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-03-14-pakistan-protests_N.htm).
28. "Pakistan 'blocks' critical TV station," *CNN.com*, 14 March 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/03/14/pakistan.minister/index.html>.
29. The accord signed in Malakand amends the 1999 Nizam-e-Adl Resolution to allow the implementation of Sharia in several districts in the NWFP, including Malakand, Dir, and Swat.
30. "12 Taliban prisoners freed under peace accord," *International News* (Karachi), 8 March 2009, [http://www.thenews.com.pk/top\\_story\\_detail.asp?Id=20814](http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=20814).
31. Ben Arnoldy and Issam Ahmed, "Pakistan's tenuous gains on Taliban: Past cease-fires have allowed militants to regroup, but a recent deal in Bajaur may be more durable," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 March 2009, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0309/p01s02-wosc.html>.
32. Salman Masood, "Video of Taliban Flogging Rattles Pakistan," *New York Times*, 4 April 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/04/world/asia/04swat.html>.
33. "Pakistan 'in fight for survival'."
34. For example, in early June, tribal leaders responded to a mosque bombing by forming people's militias and attacking Taliban strongholds. "Villagers fight Taliban after Pakistan mosque blast," *Reuters India*, June 7 2009, <http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-40141420090607?sp=true>.
35. Economic explanations for state failure are beyond the scope of this article. For a good overview, see Iftikhar H. Malik, "The State and Civil Society in Pakistan: From Crisis to Crisis," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 7 (July 1996): 673–90.
36. Stephen Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005).
37. The various separatist movements within Pakistan have been active since before the "war on terror," but their relationship with groups like the Taliban has become increasingly close since 2001, as discussed later in the article.
38. Observers of the military's use of these actors have labeled the war fighting *low-intensity conflict*.
39. Some have suggested that the 26 November Mumbai attacks were executed by a number of organizations, but this does not discount their internal differences. "In Swat, Pakistan army faces 1971-like situation," *Rediff News*, 11 February 2009, <http://www.rediff.com/news/2009/feb/11in-swat-pakistan-army-faces-1971-like-situation.htm>. As reported by the Institute for Conflict Management, "Maulvi Nazir from South Waziristan, Hafiz Gul Bahadur from North Waziristan, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Maulana Farooq Kashmiri and Syed Salahuddin have been included in the hit lists of the Taliban." Institute for Conflict Management (New Delhi), "Punjab Time Line—2009," *South Asian Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Punjab/timeline/index.html>.
40. Hassan Abbas, "Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan's Seven Tribal Agencies," *Terrorism Monitor* 18 (27 September 2007): 1–5.
41. Carlotta Gall, "Pakistan and Afghan Taliban Close Ranks," *New York Times*, 23 March 2009, [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/world/asia/27taliban.html?\\_r=1&th&emc=th](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/world/asia/27taliban.html?_r=1&th&emc=th).
42. President Zia-ul-Haq pursued a policy of Islamicization across the country as a mechanism for nation-building. Therefore, his strategy to unite the state under Islam was total—it economically imposed a nationwide Zakat tax, judicially created a federal Sharia Court, politically supported rising Islamic parties, and socially imposed restrictions against women. Yet, this Islamicization process was not only a mechanism for domestic control; promoting Islamic groups was strategically effective in supporting insurgencies in Kashmir following the conventional military defeat by the Indian army in 1971.

43. The original 17th constitutional amendment gave the president the right to unilaterally dissolve the parliament. However, there has been a motion under the current government to annul this veto power.

44. Cohen, *Idea of Pakistan*, 68–73.

45. Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).

46. C. Raja Mohan is a former member of India's National Security Council. Mohan goes so far as to argue that the proliferation of insurgent violence is an indicator of state strength, because Pakistan's military establishment promoted the growth of these organizations. Mohan, "What if Pakistan Fails?"; Cohen, "Nation and the State of Pakistan;" and Cohen, *Idea of Pakistan*.

47. Cohen, *Idea of Pakistan*, 52–55.

48. For example, General Musharraf's coup d'état against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was conducted with the argument that the coup was necessary to stem the growing economic crisis, rising extremism, and corruption that had taken place under the Sharif government. During his tenure, Sharif was responsible for a number of attempts to neutralize the strength of the opposition by pushing forward corruption charges against Benazir Bhutto and the PPP. He undermined the capabilities of the judiciary, skirting his own corruption charges by threatening members of the Supreme Court and ransacking their houses. Finally, when Sharif attempted to fire Musharraf, owing to disagreement over the 1999 Kargil conflict against India, Musharraf was "forced" to conduct the coup.

49. Shaun Gregory and James Reville, "The role of the military in the cohesion and stability of Pakistan," *Contemporary South Asia* 16, no. 1 (March 2008): 39–61; and Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).

50. Fareed Zakaria, "This is Pakistan's War," *Newsweek* 151, no. 9 (3 March 2008): 33.

51. "US admiral cultivates Pakistani army chief," AFP, 5 April 2009, [http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iOfIPLX\\_pAbGByqm-we3efx4tjyg](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iOfIPLX_pAbGByqm-we3efx4tjyg).

52. "Gutsy Pakistan protesters march against the Taliban," *LATimes.com*, 31 May 2009.

53. For example, in early June, tribal leaders responded to a mosque bombing by forming people's militias and attacking Taliban strongholds. "Villagers fight Taliban after Pakistan mosque blast," *Reuters India*, 7 June 2009, <http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-40141420090607?sp=true>.

54. "Pakistan—Introduction," *GlobalSecurity.org*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/intro.htm>.

55. In fact, even within the context of a growing insurgency, after the 26 November attacks in India, Pakistan moved 80 percent of its air force to its eastern border, assuming an Indian attack was forthcoming.

56. NATO, "Pakistan Earthquake Relief Operation," updated 5 July 2007, [http://www.nato.int/issues/pakistan\\_earthquake/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/pakistan_earthquake/index.html).



# When Is Deterrence Necessary?

## Gauging Adversary Intent

*Gary Schaub Jr.*

HOW SHOULD policy makers approach divining the intentions of adversaries who may take actions that the United States wishes to deter? Although deterrence formed the core mission of the American military throughout the Cold War,<sup>1</sup> a great deal of deterrence theory and planning took place in a strategic and political vacuum, one based upon presumptions about the motives of the Soviets and other adversaries. Estimates of adversary intent were based upon capabilities analysis married to worst-case scenarios of what those adversaries could accomplish. Whether deterrence would succeed in general or in any particular case was likewise inferred to be a function of American capabilities and willingness to use them in the event that deterrence failed. What might happen if deterrence succeeded and the adversary's intent was frustrated was rarely considered.

From a theoretical standpoint, deterrence links a demand that the adversary refrain from undertaking a particular action to a threat to use force if the adversary does not comply. Deterrence places the adversary in a situation in which it has a choice of complying with what has been demanded of it—inaction—or defying those demands and risking the implementation of the deterrer's threatened sanction. How the adversary generates expectations about the consequences of its alternatives—what is considered, the relative importance of these considerations, and how these considerations are combined to yield an estimate of consequences—has been the subject of wide and varied speculation.<sup>2</sup> These expectations are distilled into expected value calculations. Expected value calculations require that the costs and benefits of an outcome be discounted by the probability of its occurrence (i.e., expected value = [benefits – costs] \* probability) and that the expected value

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of possible outcomes stemming from a single course of action be summed. In deterrence, the adversary compares the expected value of compliance and defiance. For a deterrence attempt to be successful, the threatened sanction must reduce the expected value of defiance to the degree that it is less than the expected value of compliance. The deterrer can achieve that by threatening to reduce the benefits of defiance or increase its costs. The former would constitute a denial threat, while the latter would be a threat of punishment. And because the adversary will discount these threats by its assessment of the likelihood that the deterrer will implement them, the deterrer must convey these threats credibly.<sup>3</sup>

The *Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO-JOC)*, a product of Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), adopts this framework and by doing so has improved the official conception of deterrence markedly.<sup>4</sup> It defines “deterrence operations [as those that] convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs [if the undesirable action is taken], while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome.”<sup>5</sup> The *DO-JOC* thus takes an active view of deterrence operations: achieving decisive influence over an adversary’s decision making requires deliberate action on the part of a joint force commander or other US policy makers. Such deterrence operations can include force projection, the deployment of active and passive defenses, global strike (nuclear, conventional, and nonkinetic), and strategic communication.<sup>6</sup>

But when should these actions be undertaken? The timing of immediate deterrent<sup>7</sup> actions depends upon divining an adversary’s intent. Does the adversary intend to “take actions that threaten US vital interests?” If so, then engaging in deterrence activities to decisively influence the adversary’s decision calculus is required. If not, then no such activities are warranted. If the deterring decision maker makes the wrong call, it could be costly. Such errors are of two types. If the deterrer concludes that the adversary is not inclined to act, absent an influence attempt, and refrains from engaging in deterrence, and the adversary acts, then more demanding activities will be required to rectify the situation. Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s decision to place the Republic of Korea outside of America’s defensive perimeter in his 12 February 1950 speech to the National Press Club and Amb. April Glaspie’s failure to convey the Bush administration’s intent to

preserve the sovereignty of Kuwait with military force if necessary in her 25 July 1990 meeting with Iraqi president Saddam Hussein are two examples of this sort of failure.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, if the deterrer believes that a deterrence attempt is warranted and the adversary is not inclined to act, the deterrer's actions can be for naught or even provocative. Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev's decision to emplace nuclear medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba to deter what he believed to be a pending American attempt at regime change was a costly error of this type.<sup>9</sup>

The key to knowing when to practice deterrence is determining an actor's intent. Patrick Morgan notes that "the intentions of opponents are notoriously difficult to fathom."<sup>10</sup> How do joint force commanders, those who populate the staffs of the United States government, and the elites upon whom they rely for subject matter expertise, determine adversary intent? Is there doctrinal guidance that military staffs rely upon to perform this key task? Are there certain patterns of thought or interpretive lenses that are commonly employed by officers, civilian policy makers, or scholars? How have these been applied in key episodes in the past? Finally, how can the process of intent determination be improved?

## **Doctrinal Guidance**

There is little doctrinal guidance for determining adversary intent. What exists is contained in Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*. This doctrine manual contains superficially useful sections, such as "Intelligence and the Levels of War," "Intelligence and the Range of Military Operations," "Prediction—(Accept the Risk of Predicting Adversary Intentions)," and "Intelligence Support during the Deterrence Phase." Unfortunately, most of these sections are unhelpful. For instance, the deterrence phase section suggests:

During the deterrence phase, the ongoing JIPOE [joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment] effort is accelerated to focus on monitoring the current situation while simultaneously assessing adversary capabilities to affect subsequent phases of the operation. *JIPOE analysts support I&W* [indicators and warnings analysis] *by looking for specific indications of imminent adversary activity* that may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision-making processes. JIPOE efforts also concentrate on confirming adversary COGs [centers of gravity] and *support the continuous refinement of estimates of adversary capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs* [courses of action] within the context of the current situation. At the same time however, JIPOE

analysts must look ahead and prepare threat assessments to support future operations planned for the seizing the initiative, dominance, and stabilization phases. (emphasis added)<sup>11</sup>

How is this to be done? JP 2-0 indicates that making assessments of adversary intent is difficult and that

the intelligence professional must base predictions on solid analysis using proven tools and methodologies. In conventional analysis, the analyst examines, assesses and compares bits and pieces of raw information, and synthesizes findings into an intelligence product that usually reflects enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. However, predictive analysis goes beyond the identification of capabilities by forecasting enemy intentions and future COAs. . . . Predictive intelligence is not an exact science and is vulnerable to incomplete information, adversary deception, and the paradox of warning.<sup>12</sup>

Beyond exhorting “intelligence professionals” to “go beyond the identification of capabilities” and take the risk of predicting adversary intent and basing such forecasts on “solid analysis,” JP 2-0 is not particularly helpful in guiding such analysis. Indeed, by indicating that such “an intelligence product . . . usually reflects enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities,” the authors of this doctrine indirectly encourage that capability analysis be substituted for intent analysis. While capabilities do suggest some general directions of intent—why invest in a particular capability if you are not going to use it?—it utterly fails to answer questions of the conditions under which such capabilities would be used. These are political issues that the military intelligence process, set as it is at the tactical or operational level of war, does not address.

### **Interpreting Intent: Two Frameworks**

If joint military doctrine is not a helpful guide in determining adversary intent, how can operators structure this problem so as to solve it? Intelligence analysts operate in a complex environment and, like human beings in general, are unable to process all of the innumerable stimuli they encounter. In this context, Roberta Wohlstetter usefully distinguished “between signals and noise. By the ‘signal’ of an action is meant a sign, a clue, a piece of evidence that points to the action or to an adversary’s intention to undertake it, and by ‘noise’ is meant the background of irrelevant or inconsistent signals, signs pointing in the wrong directions, that tend always to obscure the signs pointing in the right way.”<sup>13</sup> What Wohlstetter left unsaid is that noise and signals do not come clearly marked for the

analysts as they sift through mountains of information. Rather, it is the analysts who determine what is signal and what is noise.

This is a difficult task. Analysts suffer the same cognitive limits as everyone else and, therefore, necessarily deal with “a dramatically simplified model of the buzzing, blooming confusion that constitutes the real world.”<sup>14</sup> These simplified models of reality focus one’s attention toward certain pieces of information and away from most others and generally represent the “most significant chains of causes and consequences” as “short and simple.”<sup>15</sup> These models allow analysts to discriminate between signals and noise. In most cases, they satisfactorily explain reality—if they did not, humankind would not be able to cope with its environment as well as it has. However, many models may adequately fit the data, and it is up to the analysts to determine which one best explains the adversary’s intent.<sup>16</sup>

American scholars and policy makers have been apt to apply one of two models to comprehend the intentions of other international actors, be they states or nonstate organizations engaging in politics. The first is the Strategic Intent Model, and the second is the Internal Logic Model.

Each model posits that the actor of interest is rational and purposive. With regard to rationality, James March observed:

Rational theories of choice assume decision processes that are consequential and preference-based. They are consequential in the sense that action depends on anticipations of the future effects of current actions. Alternatives are evaluated in terms of their expected consequences. They are preference-based in the sense that consequences are evaluated in terms of personal preferences. Alternatives are compared in terms of the extent to which their expected consequences are thought to serve the preferences of the decision maker.<sup>17</sup>

Each model also posits that the actor is purposive: that it seeks to achieve a particular goal with each action. When working retrospectively, this presumption risks making either framework tautological, as “an imaginative analyst can construct an account of value-maximizing choice for any action or set of actions.”<sup>18</sup> Tautology can be escaped, however, if it is also presumed that the preferences against which alternatives are considered are relatively stable. This allows analysts to erect a set of principles that appear to guide the actor’s choices over time and across domains. These principles fill in generic references to preferences or utilities for particular actors and allow some degree of operationalization of the model. They can be derived from “(1) propensities or personality traits or psychological tendencies of the nation or government [or nonstate organization], (2) values shared

by the nation or government [or organization], or (3) special principles of action [that] change the 'goals' or narrow the 'alternatives' and 'consequences' considered."<sup>19</sup>

The Strategic Intent and Internal Logic Models differ with regard to the problems that they believe an actor is attempting to solve by taking actions in the interstate arena. The Strategic Intent Model presumes that the actor is solving an external problem, while the Internal Logic Model presumes that it is solving an internal one.

### **The Strategic Intent Model**

The Strategic Intent Model presumes that state and nonstate actors direct their behavior toward achieving political goals vis-à-vis external actors. It presumes that they desire to influence the decisions, behavior, and/or attitudes of these other actors and that they have chosen the most effective means available to them, as delimited by their capabilities and tendencies, to achieve this end. Whether they do so via coercion, inducement, or persuasion,<sup>20</sup> using whatever power resources they have available, matters not. What does matter is that the impact on the external actor is of paramount concern to the adversary.

Paul Huth has applied the Strategic Intent framework to deterrence situations in this way:

In this rational choice tradition, state leaders considering the use of military force compare the expected utility of using force with that of refraining from a military challenge to the status quo, and they select the option with the greater expected utility. A potential attacker considers the possible gains to be secured by the use of military force to change the status quo and evaluates the likelihood that force can be used successfully. The estimate of the expected utility for military conflict is then compared with the anticipated gains (or losses) associated with not using force and an estimate of how probable those gains/losses would be.<sup>21</sup>

Likewise, the *Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept* assumes that:

- Actions to be deterred result from deliberate and intentional adversary decisions to act (i.e., not from automatic responses or unintended/accidental events).
- Decisions to act are based on actors' calculations regarding alternative courses of action and actors' perceptions of the values and probabilities of alternative outcomes associated with those courses of action.<sup>22</sup>

Thus the key variables determining the adversary's intent to act are the costs of undertaking the action, the benefits that would accrue from successful action, and the costs and benefits of not acting. The Strategic Intent Model is vague with regard to what factors determine costs and benefits of these two courses of action. Lawrence Freedman has argued that the costs of undertaking the action can be bifurcated into those costs associated with implementing the choice and those associated with enforcing it after the fact.<sup>23</sup> The costs of implementing the choice can also be further distinguished between those that are entailed in accomplishing the action, those entailed in defending against counteraction by opponents and other parties, and those imposed by those opponents. These final two types of costs would be those incurred by attempting to overcome an opponent's efforts at denying the accomplishment of the goal and those imposed as punishment by the opponent in its attempt to deter further action (or compel cessation, depending upon the manner in which the adversary frames its action). Of course, these would be discounted by associated probabilities that the opponent would undertake such actions. The benefits of undertaking the action have not been given as much attention as the costs, but would be composed of material benefits accrued, intangible benefits (including prestige, reputation, etc.), and the new opportunities made possible by successful conclusion of the action. The costs of inaction—or “restraint,” in the parlance of the *DO-JOC*—can be broken down into the international and domestic costs of foregoing action, including suffering the unwanted reactions of opponents in the near and far term and the negative reactions of domestic audiences. The benefits of inaction or restraint have not been well thought out in the literature either, but would include desirable international and domestic reactions—such as praise for being reasonable or a de-escalation of tensions or tangible benefits provided by those who did not favor action. Despite the obvious utility of considering domestic reactions to the choice made by the adversary's leadership, the strategic intent model generally focuses upon externally generated costs and benefits.<sup>24</sup>

### **The Internal Logic Model**

The Internal Logic Model, on the other hand, presumes that actors are directing their activities inward, enhancing their support or cohesion of the group, and that actions directed toward other actors—be they states or otherwise—are judged primarily by their internal effects rather than

their external effects. Hence, international political behavior is primarily a consequence of domestic (or internal) politics and may be more incidental than intended. “The idea that political elites often embark on adventurous foreign policies or even resort to war in order to distract popular attention away from internal social or economic problems and consolidate their own domestic political support is an old theme in the literature on international politics,” argues Jack Levy.<sup>25</sup> “War most often promotes the internal unity of each state involved,” wrote Ken Waltz. “The state plagued by internal strife may then, instead of waiting for the accidental attack, seek the war that will bring internal peace.”<sup>26</sup> Ned Lebow argues that states with weakening political systems, weakening political leaders, or elites engaged in a competition for power may “resort to the time-honored technique of attempting to offset discontent at home by diplomatic success abroad.”<sup>27</sup> While success vis-à-vis external actors would certainly be welcomed, the cohesion within the group and support for the leadership generated by conflict abroad is the primary purpose of such actions.

The key variables within this framework are the internal or domestic groups whose support is required for the continued functioning of the state or nonstate organization. After these have been identified, the relative ability of these groups to influence the leadership by providing benefits, such as continued support, or imposing costs, such as removing the leadership from power; how these audiences view the merits of the action to be undertaken (or not); and the relative ability of the leadership to substitute the support of one group for another must be assessed.<sup>28</sup> Thus the Internal Logic framework requires substantial knowledge of the adversary beyond the leadership and its preferences. It requires detailed knowledge of the domestic political situation if the adversary is a state or the internal dynamics of a nonstate organization. A great deal of work has addressed the propensities of certain types of regimes to engage in external behavior to ameliorate internal dissension or promote internal cohesion—democratic states in particular.<sup>29</sup> The manner in which deterrent threats are interpreted and used when external behavior is driven by internal needs has received attention from scholars such as Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, but their insights have not been incorporated into the corpus of deterrence theory—to the detriment of our knowledge.<sup>30</sup>

This has been reflected in how analysts have inferred adversary intent. American policy makers, scholars, and analysts have relied upon these two frameworks of rational action to infer the intent of adversaries. They



clearly direct attention toward different aspects of the adversary's makeup, its capabilities, and particularly, the hierarchy of its goals. Unsurprisingly, they often provide contradictory prescriptions with regard to how to approach an adversary and what to do to influence its behavior. Two short examples of each model in action should make their differences clear.

### **Sources of Soviet Conduct**

During the Cold War, there was a grand debate between those who used the Strategic Intent Model to infer Soviet behavior and those who used the Internal Logic Model. Those who utilized the former can be divided into those who saw Soviet motivations as an attempt to obtain security in an insecure environment and those who saw the USSR as an opportunistic yet traditional great power.

The first group saw the Soviet Union operating in an environment in which it had real enemies and “a compulsion to overinsure against potential threats.”<sup>31</sup> Soviet leaders inherited traditional Russian insecurities, derived from the lack of geographic barriers to invasions and a history of many such invasions, married to “a politically xenophobic Communist ideology that interpreted the external world as implacable to the Socialist state.”<sup>32</sup> In this conception, the Soviets were seen as (over)reactive to the influences of their environment and the behavior of external actors. George Kennan put it thusly: “What is called ‘Soviet behavior’ is, in far higher degree than seems to be realized in Washington, a reaction by the leaders of that country to the manner in which we ourselves treat them.”<sup>33</sup> These analysts therefore argued that American actions should bear in mind Soviet sensitivities and that Washington should pursue policies that avoid unnecessary provocation. Indeed, they saw in this room for cooperation between the superpowers on the basis of overcoming common threats to their security, particularly those caused by the existence of nuclear weapons. Hence, they advocated arms control to enhance strategic stability, non-proliferation efforts to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons, and greater transparency in the form of cooperative security arrangements—all designed to reassure the Soviets that their environment was less dangerous than they perceived and therefore influence their behavior.<sup>34</sup>

A related strategic view accepted that the Soviet Union received an inheritance from tsarist Russia, particularly its self-image as a great power. According to Kissinger, “Soviet policy is also, of course, the inheritor of an ancient tradition of Russian nationalism. Over centuries the strange

Russian empire has seeped outward . . . across endless plains where no geographical obstacle except distance set a limit to human ambition, inundating what resisted, absorbing what yielded.”<sup>35</sup> Its continued outward drive manifested itself in the Cold War era in traditional great-power fashion as continued consolidation of the empire, control over the buffer states of Eastern Europe, preventing encirclement by hostile states, and reshaping the rules of the international system to its liking.<sup>36</sup> In essence, those who held this view saw the mellowing of Bolshevik ideological fervor and decreasingly reluctant acceptance of the Soviet Union’s role in the established international system. But they did not infer that Soviet intentions were benign.

This conception emphasized the opportunistic nature of Soviet forays abroad. In his famous article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” George Kennan argued that Soviet “political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power.”<sup>37</sup> Kissinger agreed that “Soviet strategy [is] essentially one of ruthless opportunism.”<sup>38</sup>

In both variants of the Strategic Intent conception of Soviet intent, the Soviet leadership was composed of clearheaded and rational statesmen operating in an environment where their behavior was determined by the expected value of available courses of action. They were therefore viewed as amenable to influence from external actors—amenable in the sense that they were not implacable or insensitive to the consequences of their actions deriving from the reactions of others. For this reason Kennan prescribed “that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”<sup>39</sup> Kissinger likewise counseled that “[t]o foreclose Soviet opportunities is thus the essence of the West’s responsibility. It is up to us to define the limits of Soviet aims.”<sup>40</sup>

This view became the basis for deterrence theory as it developed in the Cold War. The Soviet leaders might desire to take advantage of every opportunity to increase their security, material power, and/or political influence, but American strategists believed that they would not risk war with the United States to obtain these goals. They held this belief for two reasons. First, they knew that Soviet leaders—Stalin in particular—could count, and America’s military and economic preponderance was obvious to all. Therefore, the Soviets would ultimately content themselves with

consolidating that which they already had to avoid overt conflict with the United States. Second, communist ideology would reinforce this tendency. “[T]he Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry,” argued Kennan. “[I]t can be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future.”<sup>41</sup> The Soviets believed that time was on their side and that tactical withdrawals were not indicative of a strategic retreat. “Indeed,” Kennan continued, “the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force. . . . [I]f it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them.”<sup>42</sup> Successful deterrence would depend upon this peculiar Soviet trait. As Bernard Brodie noted, “The saving grace of the Soviet philosophy so far as international relations are concerned is that, unlike the Nazi ideology, it incorporates within itself no time schedule. . . . The Soviet attitude appears to be much more opportunistic. The Soviets may be unshakably convinced that ultimately there must be war. . . . What we can do, however, is to persuade them each time the question arises that ‘the time is not yet!’”<sup>43</sup>

Those who saw Soviet behavior through the prism of the Internal Logic Model also began their analyses with George Kennan but discounted the ability of external influences to affect Soviet calculations. In this view, dealing with internal solidarity was

one of the most basic of the compulsions which came to act upon the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be serious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad. . . . [T]he stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.<sup>44</sup>

Analysts such as Richard Pipes, Colin Gray, and William Odom continued this line of argument in the late 1970s and early 1980s.<sup>45</sup> Their analyses suggested that the Soviet system of governance was characterized by “endemic militarism” and that it was “as central to Soviet communism as the pursuit of profit is to societies with market-oriented economies.”<sup>46</sup> Thus the use of force abroad was seen as a good in itself, one that enhanced the identity of the Soviet state. “According to this view,” wrote Seay, “the Soviet iteration of an implacable foreign threat results not from

paranoia or from fear of invasion but rather from the regime's self-interest, a foreign threat being an indispensable element in the regimentation of Soviet society."<sup>47</sup> Indeed, this posture had "the additional benefit of helping to legitimize an otherwise illegitimate regime."<sup>48</sup>

The Internal Logic view of the Soviets' conduct implied that there was a fundamental impediment to changing their behavior. They could not be influenced on a case-by-case basis through coercive strategies, such as deterrence, or induced through acts of good will or persuaded through diplomacy. Given that the sources of Soviet conduct were internal and endemic, only physical barriers to Soviet action would affect them. Only if they were physically denied the ability to achieve their goals would they refrain from acting. Analysts who held this view argued strenuously for national missile defense as an alternative to an inherently unreliable deterrent, against strategic nuclear arms control, and were opposed to détente.<sup>49</sup>

These analysts did believe that it was possible for the United States to achieve its objectives vis-à-vis the Soviet Union—once it collapsed. Kennan had argued that the internal contradictions of the Soviet system and the unbearable strain that it placed on its population could result in collapse. "Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the most pitiable of national societies," he argued.<sup>50</sup> But those who emphasized the internal logic of the Soviet system as the motivator behind its policies saw such a collapse as perhaps the only way to ultimately affect Soviet behavior. Pipes, for instance, argued that "[t]he Soviet Union will be a partner in peace only when it makes peace with its own people. Only then will the danger of nuclear war recede."<sup>51</sup>

Clearly, there were substantial differences in the views and prescriptions of analysts who utilized the Strategic Intent Model to infer Soviet intentions and those who used the Internal Logic Model. These views helped shape the debates of US foreign policy, particularly after the Vietnam War, and continue to have echoes today. Some of these are evident in the way in which the intentions of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda or Hamas are debated.

### **Terrorist Objectives**

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there was a tendency on the part of the public, the media, and some policy makers to eschew either model of rational and purposive adversary behavior in favor of an instinctive

one. It posited that Islamic terrorists such as those in al-Qaeda “hate us for who we are rather than what we do.”<sup>52</sup> Similar language was included in the 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, which identified “rogue states” as those that “reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.”<sup>53</sup> When one posits that adversary intent derives from raw emotion, such as hatred, and such emotion permeates all members and aspects of an adversary’s organization—be it a state or a nonstate actor—strategic thought is likely to be bypassed in favor of brute force.

In the analytic community, however, affective models of adversary behavior have not been paramount. Indeed, the Strategic Intent Model has been primary.<sup>54</sup> Max Abrahms noted that

the strategic model assumes that terrorists are motivated by relatively stable and consistent political goals. . . . Second, the strategic model assumes that terrorism is a ‘calculated course of action’ and that . . . terrorist groups weigh their political options and resort to terrorism only after determining that alternative political avenues are blocked [or at least not as efficacious], . . . [and] they possess ‘reasonable expectations’ of the political consequences of using terrorism based on its prior record of coercive effectiveness.<sup>55</sup>

The Strategic Intent Model also applies to suicide terrorism, where motives have often been identified as religious fanaticism or insanity. Bob Pape argues that “what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.”<sup>56</sup>

This has been reflected in policy framing as well. Pres. George W. Bush opined in his address to Congress on 20 September 2001 that

al-Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money, its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere. . . . They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa. These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us because we stand in their way.<sup>57</sup>

Prescriptions derived from the Strategic Intent framework suggest that terrorists can be deterred by increasing the difficulty of their efforts to execute their strategy or by imposing costs on the groups involved through

sanctions or other forms of punishment. They also suggest that terrorists can be placated by concessions that allow them to achieve many of their objectives without the resort to violence.<sup>58</sup> As Abrahms explains, these “are designed to reduce terrorism by divesting it of its political utility.”<sup>59</sup> Over time, as their strategy of coercion is both frustrated tactically and successful strategically, it is argued that terrorists will moderate their behavior and be co-opted into the normal political processes of the state—be it their own, as happened with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, or that of their former adversary, as happened with the Irish Republican Army.

On the other hand, the Internal Logic Model has also been utilized to explain terrorism. Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins have argued that “Deterrence [of terrorist groups] is . . . difficult because for many of the people involved, terrorism is a way of life. . . . [T]errorism provides ‘positives’—notably status, power, recruits, and psychological rewards.”<sup>60</sup> Mia Bloom argues that “under conditions of mounting public support, [suicide] bombings have become a method of recruitment for militant Islamic organizations within the Palestinian community. They serve at one and the same time to attack the hated enemy (Israel) and to give legitimacy to outlier militant groups who compete with the Palestinian Authority for leadership of the community.”<sup>61</sup> Bloom further argues that as the Intifada continued and Arafat’s Palestinian Authority lost its monopoly over the legitimate use of force—legitimate in the eyes of the Palestinian people—“groups competed and outbid each other with more spectacular bombing operations and competition over claiming responsibility. At the same time, the operations whipped up nationalist fervor and swelled the ranks of Islamic Jihad and Hamas, who used the bombings, in conjunction with the provision of social services, to win the hearts and minds of the Palestinians.”<sup>62</sup>

The use of terror operations in the competition between these groups for leadership of the movement and recruitment and retention of members is to the detriment of their strategic cause, argues Bloom, and has left Palestinians worse off than they were before the suicide bombing campaigns began.<sup>63</sup> Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter argue, as does Abrahms, that Palestinian terrorists prefer to continue their activities in spite of the possibility of achieving their political goals through less violent means—or even as a result of successful coercion.<sup>64</sup> They therefore act as spoilers to any political settlement and perpetuate the conflict that provides their *raison d’être*. The violence is not a means to a political end vis-à-vis their adversary but, instead, a means to a sense of honor, group

worth, and identity.<sup>65</sup> Indeed, the effects of violence in these areas have even been termed a “public good” for the group by one terrorism analyst.<sup>66</sup>

The Internal Logic framework suggests that the internal dynamics of terrorist groups drive their activities, not the potential attainment of a strategic goal. This suggests that influencing their behavior will be difficult absent destruction of the terrorist groups and those that support them. Indeed, Abrahms argues that “strategies to dry up demand for terrorism by minimizing its political utility are misguided and hence unlikely to work.”<sup>67</sup> The October 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States argued that “traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy.”<sup>68</sup> And because of this, Pres. George W. Bush argued that “our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary.”<sup>69</sup> To many, this leaves brute force to eliminate the adversary as the only effective policy.<sup>70</sup> As Ralph Peters stated, “We shall hear no end of fatuous arguments to the effect that we can’t kill our way out of the problem. Well, until a better methodology is discovered, killing is a good interim solution.”<sup>71</sup>

## **Prescriptive Problems**

The Strategic Intent Model and the Internal Logic Model of adversary intent produce very different pictures of what motivates an adversary. Does the adversary desire to influence external actors to achieve a political outcome vis-à-vis those actors? Or does it desire to bolster the solidarity of the group in the face of centripetal forces? Is the outcome of the action that we wish to deter of primary or secondary importance to the adversary? Making this determination is important when deciding whether to attempt to deter the adversary’s actions or to take another approach, such as preemptive brute force or measures to increase or decrease its feelings of insecurity.

Deterrence is a strategy to pursue when one judges that the adversary’s resort to arms is motivated primarily by strategic goals. Given that it is directed toward external actors in such situations, identification of the adversary’s goal is a matter of routine. Focusing deterrent demands toward that objective—“don’t do *that*”—places the adversary in a decision situation in which it can either comply with what has been demanded of it or defy those demands and risk the implementation of the deterrer’s threatened sanction. As the *Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept* rightly

suggests, denying the adversary's leadership the potential benefits of the actions that it intends to take or imposing costs that reduce the net utility of those actions are the two ideal ways of reducing the likelihood that the adversary will choose to act.<sup>72</sup> The objective of this deterrent threat is to reduce the expected value of "doing that" to a point that the consequences of compliance are of greater value. As the *DO-JOC* explains, "Adversaries weigh the perceived benefits and costs of a given course of action *in the context of* their perceived consequences of restraint or inaction. Thus deterrence can fail even when the adversary perceives the costs of acting as outweighing the benefits of acting if [it] believes the costs of inaction are even higher still" (emphasis in original).<sup>73</sup> When the adversary is basing its choice upon these considerations, deterrence is correctly targeted and has a chance of success.

Deterrence may not be the strategy to pursue if the adversary's external behavior is directed toward enhancing internal cohesion or the power of the leadership. Providing overt signs of an external threat is precisely the outcome desired by the adversary's leadership. This external threat allows them to act to increase their support, silence moderates or critics, mobilize resources that might otherwise be unavailable, and provide the opportunity for common identities to be forged or reinforced. These goals can be achieved only if the deterrer provides the missing ingredient: its hostile reaction. If the deterrer falls into the trap, then the adversary has the means it needs to achieve its goal of increased cohesion. If the deterrer refrains from reacting, then the adversary may still capitalize on the lack of a reaction to motivate support for strong leadership. Yet this is less likely than action provoking hostility, as people are less motivated to act to seize opportunities than they are to avoid potential losses.<sup>74</sup>

### **Detering Adversaries Motivated by Internal Logic**

If the adversary is motivated by internal logic, is this really a no-win situation for the deterrer? Is deterrence a nonstarter? Are there alternatives to issuing an immediate deterrent threat directed against the adversary's intended external action or doing nothing and letting its provocation pass unanswered? There are a number of options.

First, one can still attempt to deter the adversary directly through passive measures that deny it the opportunity to carry out its aggressive intent and also deny it the visible indicators of hostility that it seeks to engender. There



are a number of means that can be used to do this. One denial measure is to harden soft targets—be they ICBM silos or police stations—through passive-point defenses. This makes it less likely that spectacular successes can be had against these targets, and given their passivity, defenses such as barriers, reinforced concrete, or even ballistic missile defenses (provided that they are well beyond the ability of the adversary to observe) deprive the deterrer of the ability to overreact and justify the adversary's actions.<sup>75</sup> Passive-area defenses can also be used to deny the adversary the interaction that it needs with the deterrer to achieve its internal goals. Possibilities in this realm include measures such as the fence that Israel has erected around Palestinian areas, which has decreased suicide attacks substantially since its completion,<sup>76</sup> or diplomatic isolation such as that imposed upon the People's Republic of China, Cuba, or Iran after their revolutions. A potential drawback to passive-area defenses is that they themselves might become symbols of implacable and unyielding hostility that the adversary can use repeatedly to rally its domestic constituents.<sup>77</sup>

Second, one can attempt to deter the adversary indirectly—by directing the deterrent threat toward members of the group that the leadership is attempting to bolster or recruit. The adversary's external challenge is designed to attract these followers, and a deterrent threat that is directed toward the group's members and potential members may cleave them away by highlighting personal over group interests.<sup>78</sup> All groups engaged in conflict that are attempting to recruit or retain members ask these people to put aside their personal interests for the benefit of the group cause, even though their individual contributions will be marginal (in most cases: suicide terrorism is designed to overcome this recruitment challenge). "Thus rebels confront the possibility of disastrous private costs and uncertain public benefits. . . . Unless the collective action problem is somehow overcome, rational people will never rebel—rebellions, that is, require irrationality."<sup>79</sup> Israel has pursued a policy of deterring group members by threatening to destroy the family homes of young Palestinians who were involved in attacks.<sup>80</sup> Aerial surveillance capabilities, such as that of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, have been key to operationalizing this strategy. Such an option would attempt to deny the adversary leadership the domestic benefits of its intended action by threatening to punish individual members of the group.

Third, one can pursue a similar goal through inducements to members of the adversary's constituency rather than through coercion. COIN

strategies, such as those discussed in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, work on this principle. “The real battle is for civilian support for, or acquiescence to, the counterinsurgents and host nation government. The population waits to be convinced. Who will help them more, hurt them less, stay the longest, earn their trust?”<sup>81</sup> Indeed, the “Anbar Awakening” in Iraq is quite a vivid example of using inducements to cleave potential supporters away from an adversary—in this case al-Qaeda in Iraq.<sup>82</sup> Abrahms suggests that a variant of this strategy worked well for the Italian government in its campaign against the Red Brigades, where captured members were offered reduced sentences in exchange for information about their fellows.<sup>83</sup>

Fourth, one can attempt to “encourage adversary restraint,” as the *DO-JOC* puts it, by “try[ing] to communicate . . . benign intentions . . . to reduce the fear, misunderstanding, and insecurity that are often responsible for unintended escalation to war.”<sup>84</sup> Engaging in such persuasion is an alternative to influence through coercion or inducement. It involves altering the considerations by which compliance and defiance are evaluated. The persuader does not promise or threaten action, but convinces the adversary to see the situation in such a way that it realizes it is in its own interest to act a certain way. This can be done by highlighting—without altering—costs or benefits related to complying with or defying the persuader’s demands or by offering new alternatives that allow the adversary to achieve its goals in ways that do not harm the persuader’s interests. These persuasion strategies treat the definition of the problem facing the adversary—in this case increasing cohesion, recruitment, or retention of members—as given or settled. Another avenue of persuasion requires understanding the basis upon which the target frames the issue and then shifting it.<sup>85</sup> Persuasion is generally seen as a fruitless option, particularly when dealing with an adversary whose primary concerns are internally generated. Indeed, Kennan argued that “the individuals who are components of this machine [the Soviet regime] are unamenable to argument or reason which comes to them from outside sources.”<sup>86</sup> Yet it remains a component of various strategies.

Fifth, one can forego influence altogether and use brute force against the adversary to prevent it from undertaking action.<sup>87</sup> This can take the form of disarming the adversary to deny it the capability to pursue the action that it intends or decapitating the adversary so as to disrupt its ability to act. Either action risks increasing the cohesion of the adversary by justifying its hostility toward the deterrer and/or creating a martyr of

the leadership. Decapitation of the leadership could also disrupt the internal cohesion of the adversary to some degree.<sup>88</sup>

Overall, if one determines that an adversary decision maker is motivated by the internal logic of the group's situation, deterrence may work—but not in the manner prescribed in the *DO-JOC*. Rather, deterrent demands and other influence attempts should be directed at the primary objectives of the adversary in these situations: the internal constituencies whose support the leadership hopes to rally by its external actions. Clearly, steps should also be taken to mitigate the impact of those actions as well, since nothing fails like failure. Bear in mind, however, that mere signals of hostility directed toward the group (or nation) as a whole in an attempt to deter the unwanted action could provide the adversary leadership precisely what it wants: an external enemy that its people can oppose in unity.

## Conclusion

Deterrence has formed the core mission of the US military since the Cold War era; however, a great deal of deterrence theory and planning derived from presumptions about adversary intent which were based on capabilities analysis with no consideration of what might happen if deterrence succeeded and the adversary's intent was frustrated. The *DO-JOC* rectified a basic problem in previous deterrence thinking by recognizing that an adversary has a choice between complying with a demand to refrain from action and defying that demand—and that the adversary will consider the expected value of each of these options. No longer is “restraint” considered an option that is outside of the deterrence calculus for the adversary or the deterrer. This has opened significant doors to making the deterrence planning and assessment processes used by the US military, from the Strategic Command to the regional combatant commands, much more sophisticated and, hopefully, effective.

Getting the basic framework correct has led to the next issue: determining how much the adversary desires to undertake particular actions—those that the United States would prefer that it not undertake and others that might provide less offensive alternatives. This requires assessing adversary intent. Regrettably, there is no set process or framework for undertaking this necessary analysis. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, merely exhorts intelligence analysts to “take risks” to “predict” adversary intent. Intelligence officers, uniformed and civilian, have indicated that producing such analyses is

considered more of an art than a science and that no processes have been established; rather, intelligence analysts are left to develop their own methods to produce their analytic products.<sup>89</sup> Hoping that particular analysts in key positions are another da Vinci or Michelangelo is simply unacceptable. Military staffs excel at planning and use set processes to yield acceptable and improvable products. Such a process needs to be established to infer adversary intent on a continuous basis so that a usable product is available to assist in routine planning or in the event of a crisis.

Such a process should begin with a skeleton framework that focuses on producing at least two narratives of adversary behavior: a Strategic Intent Model and an Internal Logic Model. The Strategic Intent narrative would build a case that the adversary was intending to act to achieve external goals. It should begin with an overview of the adversary's grand strategy: the goals that its leadership has traditionally sought, the goals sought by its current leadership, the environment in which it finds itself and how it facilitates or hinders pursuit of those goals, and the capabilities it possesses to overcome these obstacles and take advantage of situations as they arise. The narrative should also locate the adversary's potential actions in its strategic culture and operational procedures so that indicators and warnings can be identified to provide information about intent as events unfold.

The Internal Logic narrative would build a similar case to explain what the adversary might intend to do, but its focus would be on the internal or domestic imperatives and constraints facing the adversary's leadership. Such a narrative would begin by identifying the structure of the leadership, those who hold those positions, and their relations to one another. It would also identify various internal constituencies the leadership is dependent upon or responsible to, in particular those in a position to sanction or reward those leaders' behavior. Finally, it would attempt to identify the internal problem that the adversary leaders would attempt to solve by acting externally. As with the Strategic Intent Model, indicators and warnings keyed to the reactions of these domestic constituencies should be constructed to provide information that can confirm or invalidate hypotheses about the adversary's intent as events unfold.

As discussed in preceding sections, these two frameworks have provided the basis for rival interpretations of adversary behavior from that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War to terrorist organizations today. They have also provided alternative prescriptions for American behavior. Their explicit use would allow debate and discussion in the intent assessment

process that could inform commanders or political leaders about the issues, foreign and domestic, that are pressing on the adversary's leadership; provide planning staffs the basis for recommending whether deterrence or some other strategy is wise in the present circumstances; and also provide a basis upon which to assess the likelihood of success. Prescribing that at least two frameworks be used rather than a single consolidated one will assist in highlighting the biases inherent in each framework as well as those introduced by the analysts themselves and mitigate the dangers of groupthink.<sup>90</sup> This would greatly enhance the ability of commanders to determine when deterrence is wise, when it is necessary, and how best to implement it.

Developing an intent assessment process would also help to operationalize and institutionalize the Department of Defense's current concerns with cultural competency and provide the basis for the personnel system to reward those officers who excel in this particularly useful but heretofore neglected area of professional expertise. Thus many goods would follow from a more coherent and systematic process assessing adversary intent. ■■■

## Notes

1. Indeed, as Bernard Brodie famously put it, "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose," Bernard Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," in *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*, ed. Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), 76.

2. See, for example, William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," in *Military Policy and National Security*, ed. William W. Kaufmann (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1956); Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); and Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984).

3. See Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), for a discussion of the constituents of credibility.

4. Previous official conceptions of deterrence have been underdeveloped. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, as well as its predecessor, JCS Publication 1, *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage*, define deterrence as "the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction." This definition does not specify the relationship between "fear" and reasoned consideration of consequences, the nature of the "credible threat of unacceptable counter action," nor its origin. It also reflected and encouraged considering deterrence only in the nuclear context. As late as January 2007, the US Air Force, for example, subsumed deterrence under nuclear operations. Its *Air Force Glossary* only mentions deterrence in its definition of "mutual assured destruction." Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-2, *Air Force Glossary*, 11 January 2007, 58.

5. US Strategic Command, *Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept*, Version 2.0, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2006), 3. [Hereafter: STRATCOM, *DO-JOC*]

6. *Ibid.*, 6.

7. Patrick Morgan defines immediate deterrence situations as those “where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it,” Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence*, 2d ed. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983), 30.

8. On Acheson, see John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 70–75. On Glaspie, see Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 50–55; and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990–91: A Failed or Impossible Task?” *International Security* 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992). Of course, Glaspie could not convey such an American intent at that meeting as it was not clear that it existed.

9. See Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 27–32; and Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 260–66.

10. Morgan, *Deterrence*, 39.

11. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, 22 June 2007, IV-13.

12. *Ibid.*, II-9–10.

13. Roberta Wohlstetter, “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight,” *Foreign Affairs* 43, no. 4 (July 1965): 691.

14. Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations*, 3d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1976), xxix.

15. *Ibid.*, xxx.

16. Any framework that simplifies reality will not be neutral. It will bias the decision maker’s observations and inferences. It will therefore result in at least some misperceptions. See Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). Although Jervis and others make the case that misperceptions inherently undermine the quality of decision making, this is not necessarily the case, as argued by Jack S. Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems,” *World Politics* 36, no. 1 (October 1983); Gerd Grigerenzer and Daniel G. Goldstein, “Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality,” *Psychological Review* 103, no. 4 (1996); and J. M. Goldgeier and P. E. Tetlock, “Psychology and International Relations Theory,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001), 67–92.

17. James G. March with Chip Heath, *A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen* (New York: Free Press, 1994), 2–3.

18. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 35.

19. *Ibid.*, 36–37.

20. For the relations between these forms of influence, see the *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept*, Version 0.5, (25 April 2008), 101–3.

21. Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 28–29; and Huth, “Military Deterrence and Statecraft,” in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, vol. 2, ed. Lester Kurtz (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999), 465–66.

22. STRATCOM, *DO-JOC*, 11.

23. Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Lawrence Freedman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), xx.

24. The lack of domestic-level independent variables is considered in Gary Schaub Jr., "Deterrence, Compellence, and Rational Decision Making" (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2003).
25. Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in *The Handbook of War Studies*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 259.
26. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 81.
27. Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 66–69; quoted material on page 66.
28. For an overly abstract discussion of these variables, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).
29. For a recent study, see David J. Bulé, "Congress, Presidential Approval, and U.S. Dispute Initiation," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4, no. 4 (October 2008).
30. Rather, their work is seen as providing an alternative to deterrence theory. See Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," *Journal of Social Issues* 43, no. 4 (1987); Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (January 1989); Paul Huth and Bruce M. Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes A Difference," *World Politics* 42, no. 4 (July 1990); and Lebow and Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (April 1990).
31. Douglas Seay, "What are the Soviets' Objectives in their Foreign, Military, and Arms Control Policies?" in *Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates*, eds. Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 71.
32. *Ibid.*, 72.
33. George F. Kennan, "Toward Peace on Two Fronts," *Christianity and Crisis* (13 December 1982): 378.
34. Seay, "What are the Soviets' Objectives?" 76–87.
35. Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979), 118. "The result is a foreign policy free to fill every vacuum, to exploit every opportunity, to act out the implications of its doctrine. Policy is constrained principally by calculations of objective conditions." *Ibid.*, 117.
36. Dmitri K. Simes, "Assessing Soviet National Security Strategy," in *Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader*, ed. Terry L. Heynes (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983), 210–12.
37. George F. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 65, no. 4 (Spring 1987): 861.
38. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 119.
39. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 861.
40. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 119.
41. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 860–61.
42. *Ibid.*, 861. Here Kennan was elaborating on Lenin's dictum: "If one encounters steel, withdraw; but if one finds mush, push on."
43. Bernard Brodie, "The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker," *Foreign Affairs* 27, no. 1 (October 1948): 23. Also see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (New York: Free Press, 1953), 11; and William W. Kaufmann, "Limited Warfare," in *Military Policy and National Security*, 103.
44. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 856–57.

45. See Richard Pipes, "Militarism and the Soviet State," *Daedalus* 109 (Fall 1980); Pipes, *Survival is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America's Future* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Colin S. Gray, "SALT II: The Real Debate," *Policy Review* 10 (Fall 1979); Gray, *Missiles Against War: The ICBM Debate Today* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 1985); and William E. Odom, "Whither the Soviet Union?" *Washington Quarterly* 4 (Spring 1981).
46. Seay, "What are the Soviets' Objectives?" 54; and Pipes, "Militarism and the Soviet State," 1.
47. Seay, "What are the Soviets' Objectives?" 55.
48. Ibid.
49. "Both Nitze and Gray have in mind using the perceived advantages of SDI to push the Soviet Union toward a reformulation of deterrence, from an offense-based MAD to a deterrence based upon defensive systems." Seay, "What are the Soviets' Objectives?" 69–70.
50. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 868, 866.
51. Pipes, *Survival is not Enough*, 278.
52. Victor Davis Hanson, "Islamicists hate us for who we are, not what we do," *Jewish World Report*, 13 January 2005, [http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0105/hanson2005\\_01\\_13.php3](http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0105/hanson2005_01_13.php3).
53. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: White House, October 2002), 14.
54. Early work includes Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Thomas C. Schelling, "What Purpose Can 'International Terrorism' Serve?" in *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*, ed. R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
55. Max Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 80–81.
56. Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), 4.
57. "Transcript of President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, September 20, 2001," available at <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>.
58. See Daniel Byman, "The Decision to Begin Talks with Terrorists: Lessons for Policy-makers," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 6 (June 2006); and Peter R. Neumann, "Negotiating with Terrorists," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 1 (January/February 2007). Jones and Libicki found that 43 percent of terrorist groups that ceased to exist between 1968 and 2006 did so because their goals were accommodated by political authorities. See Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008).
59. Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want," 103.
60. Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 5.
61. Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing, Public Support, Market Share, and Out-bidding," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1 (2004): 61. More generally, see Joao Ricardo Faria and Daniel G. Arce M., "Terror Support and Recruitment," *Defense and Peace Economics* 16, no. 4 (August 2005).
62. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 71.
63. Ibid., 62; and Daniel Byman, "Do Targeted Killings Work?" *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 98.
64. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002); and Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want," 92–93.



65. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 74; and Jerrold M. Post, "Deterrence in an Age of Asymmetric Rivals," in *Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism*, eds. Stanley A. Renshon and Peter Suedfeld (New York: Routledge, 2007), 171.

66. Nichole Argo, "The Banality of Evil: Understanding Today's Human Bombs" (unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, 2003), 13; cited by Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 74.

67. Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want," 103.

68. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (2002), 15.

69. Press Release, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point," Office of the Press Secretary, 1 June 2002, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>.

70. Gerard Alexander, "International Relations Theory Meets World Politics: The Neo-conservative vs. Realism Debate," in *Understanding the Bush Doctrine*, 48–50.

71. Ralph Peters, "Thou Shalt Kill," *Harper's Magazine* (January 2005), <http://harpers.org/archive/2005/01/0080344>.

72. STRATCOM, *DO-JOC*, 26–27.

73. *Ibid.*, 21.

74. On the differential weighting of gains and losses generally, see Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, "Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5, no. 1 (Winter 1991). For an application to the domestic costs of conflict, see Miroslav Nincic, "Loss Aversion and the Domestic Context of Military Intervention," *Political Research Quarterly* 50, no. 1 (March 1997).

75. This is an application of Schelling's art of the commitment. See Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New Haven: Harvard University Press, 1960).

76. Byman, "Do Targeted Killings Work?" 96, 105–6.

77. Matthew Kalman, "Israeli fence puts 'cage' on villagers: More Palestinians scrambling to keep barrier from going up," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 9 March 2004, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/03/09/MNGIP5H0IL1.DTL>.

78. See Julian Tolbert, *Crony Attack: Strategic Attack's Silver Bullet?* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2003); and Mark Irving Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). On the other hand, Jerrold Post argues that "Once in the group, though, the power of group dynamics is immense, continually confirming the power of the group's organizing ideology and reinforcing the member's dedication to the cause." Post, "Deterrence in an Age of Asymmetric Rivals," 171.

79. Lichbach, *Rebel's Dilemma*, 7.

80. "Israeli officials said that the destruction of an Arab home with dynamite or bulldozers was a rare, deliberate, and highly publicized event, designed to serve as an effective deterrent to adults who might permit or encourage illegal acts by younger members of their families." Jimmy Carter, *Palestine: Peace, Not Apartheid* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 123. Israel stopped this policy in February 2005 after it was challenged domestically by human rights groups. "Israel to destroy attacker's home," *BBC News*, 7 April 2008, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle\\_east/7490212.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7490212.stm).

81. Sarah Sewall, "Introduction to the University of Chicago Press Edition: A Radical Field Manual," in *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), xxv.

82. A nice account can be found in Thomas Ricks, *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 61–72. For an analysis, see Andrew W. Koloski and John S. Kolasheski, "Thickening the Lines: Sons of Iraq, A Combat Multiplier," *Military Review* 89 (January/February 2009).

83. Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want," 105.

84. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," *Journal of Social Issues* 43, no. 4 (1987): 40.

85. There are generally three such bases: consequentialism, authority, or principles. Consequentialism is the easiest basis in which to operate, as the adversary is considering outcomes, and these are all potential as opposed to actual. They can therefore be altered by shifting the type of problem to be solved and, hence, the solution set from which it is appropriate to consider options. Authority-based frames are more difficult to affect because they are given to the adversary by another party, one to which it has previously ceded decision authority. Thus a better target for the influence attempt is that decision authority. Another approach here is to provide the adversary with another authority to which it has previously ceded the decision—one that conflicts with the current authority frame—and make the case that it should switch. Finally, frames based upon principle are likewise difficult to affect, although the mechanism is similar: find a principle to which the adversary adheres and make the case that it applies more than the principle that provided the basis for defiance.

86. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 860.

87. Jones and Libicki found that only 7 percent of terrorist groups that "ended" in their sample of 268 such groups were defeated by military force. "Militaries tended to be most effective when used against terrorist groups engaged in an insurgency in which the groups were large, well armed, and well organized. Insurgent groups have been among the most capable and lethal terrorist groups, and military force has usually been a necessary component in such cases. Against most terrorist groups, however, military force is usually too blunt an instrument." Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*, xiii–xiv.

88. Lisa Langdon, Alexander J. Sarapu, and Matthew Wells, "Targeting the Leadership of Terrorist and Insurgent Movements: Historical Lessons for Contemporary Policy Makers," *Journal of Public and International Affairs* 15 (Spring 2004), found that killing the leader of a nonstate movement led to the disbanding or moderation of the movement in 61 percent of the cases that they examined.

89. Personal interviews with author.

90. For more on motivated and unmotivated biases, see Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. On groupthink, see Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); and Marlene E. Turner and Anthony R. Pratkanis, "Theoretical Perspectives on Groupthink: A Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Appraisal," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 73, no. 2/3 (February/March 1998). Alexander L. George prescribes multiple assessments and other process fixes to this dilemma in "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review* 66, no. 3 (September 1972) as does Paul 't Hart, in "Preventing Groupthink Revisited: Evaluating and Reforming Groups in Government," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 73, no. 2/3 (February/March 1998).

## 正义与和谐社会

# “Harmonious Society”

## Rise of the New China

*John P. Geis II, Colonel, USAF*

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CHINA'S PRESIDENT Hu Jintao calls his vision for leading China into the twenty-first century *Harmonious Society* ((和谐社会, hè xié shè huì). From the recent dynastic periods to today, China's prolific history of lost global prominence, subjugation to colonial/imperial powers, civil war, the closed communist era, and the opening of China in 1978 must be understood through the lens of contemporary Chinese politics. President Hu has cast himself as China's champion. His ideals of checking Western power and mitigating foreign influences in a rising China resonate within China today. The question becomes whether China's ambitions will remain regional or will they extend to surpassing the United States as the de facto superpower to meet these ends in the 2030 time frame.

*Harmonious Society* is described by Hu as a “scientific development concept”<sup>1</sup> which shifts China's primary focus from a purely economic growth model to a more balanced, Confucian-style approach aimed at maintaining growth while addressing daunting social issues such as the wide gap between rich and poor, widespread environmental degradation, and government and corporate corruption.<sup>2</sup> The post-Mao Zedong China, beginning with Deng Xiaoping in 1978, remains authoritarian but has

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continued to build on policies promoting openness and integration with the international community. *Harmonious Society* is designed to foster more democratic and financial opportunity for citizens, allowing for some participation in government while maintaining firm, centralized control. The plan seeks to harness China's economic affluence, using it to increase influence on the world stage.

Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao—representing the second, third, and fourth generations of leaders after Mao Zedong in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—embarked on incremental reforms to maximize China's economic potential while retaining strict authoritarian control. Together these leaders, the Politburo Standing Committee, Politburo, and Central Committee represent modern Chinese politics. Their reforms have enabled China to experience explosive economic growth over the past 30 years, which in the eyes of many allows them to retain the “Mandate of Heaven.” Yet, as witnessed at Tiananmen Square in 1989, the leadership will react harshly to dissent from its people to retain that mandate.

As a result of the People's 17th Communist Party Congress (CPC) in late 2007, Hu's position is secure until 2012. He consolidated power by garnering seats for his allies on key committees, to include the Politburo Standing Committee, while retiring older government officials with strong loyalties to previous generations. However, the new leaders placed in politburo and central committee positions represent the rising fifth generation. This generation will be pivotal in executing Hu's strategy and in guiding China's path in the near and midterm. Issues such as the Taiwan question, corruption and rule of law, environmental protection, resource procurement, and internal dissent represent the challenges facing this rising class of leaders as underscored by President Hu's address at the 17th CPC.<sup>3</sup>

China is a rising power, and this must be considered as future policy is crafted. Although an unforeseen event, such as a natural disaster or internal discord, could slow China's rise, it is clear that its vibrant economic affluence will translate into regional and global influence in the future. It is reasonable to predict that China's globalization-fueled economic growth will continue, which in turn, will present future Chinese politicians with an array of options to move the country's strategic direction.<sup>4</sup> If the rhetoric emanating from the 17th CPC is to be believed, China will translate its affluence into peaceful regional leadership; however, the ongoing construction of a globally capable military whose capabilities extend beyond those of national defense can lead to a different postulation about actual intent. If Chinese

political intent is to match and eventually supplant the United States as the dominant global power, it will have the ability to do so. Hu’s vision of a “harmonious society” is a modern plan whose outcome subordinates foreign interests to its own, making it the “kingdom with no boundaries,” as was thought in the eighteenth-century Qing Dynasty. It is clear that the United States must place a high priority on its US-Sino strategy and be prepared for the challenge a rising China is sure to present.

## **Contemporary Politics in China**

After Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping emerged as China’s new leader and set out to craft a new Chinese strategy. Purged and forced to work in a labor camp during the Cultural Revolution before coming back into favor and rising as Mao’s successor, Deng understood firsthand the failure of the revolution with its isolationist posture and set a course to open China to the global market system. He concluded that while foreign encroachment was at the root of the “Bad Century,”<sup>5</sup> it was essential to open China up to economic opportunity. This belief was a major departure from Mao’s philosophy and set China on the path toward the political situation of today.

Although credited with leading China’s resurging wealth in the modern era through his “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” strategy, Deng was also responsible for giving orders that would enable the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to crack down on political dissidents at the massacre in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Publicly, Deng praised the PLA for responding to the crisis with decisiveness, but privately, he reshuffled several key leadership positions which would ultimately position Jiang Zemin as his successor in 1992.<sup>6</sup> China’s leaders demonstrated at Tiananmen that reforms which support China’s meteoric economic growth remain official policy, but the power elite will, in all cases, attempt to retain central control.

In a discussion with a Japanese delegation, Deng explained China’s Marxism and socialism in uniquely Chinese terms, making the linkage between the Bad Century and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: “To adhere to Marxism and to integrate it with Chinese realities—in other words, to seek truth from facts, as advocated by Comrade Mao Zedong—it is crucial for us to adhere to Marxism and socialism. For more than a century after the Opium War, China was subjected to aggression


and humiliation. It is because the Chinese people embraced Marxism and kept to the road leading from new-democracy to socialism that their revolution was victorious.”<sup>7</sup> Going forward, Socialism with Chinese Characteristics can thus be interpreted as firmly held power by the elite party members without the shackles of ideological definitions of Marxism and socialism. In this construct, challenges to the lack of congruency between China’s open market reforms and its failure to improve human rights and freedom are unsuccessful. Yet, for the West, it is hard to label China as fully communist, given its economic policies—this is where the phrase “with Chinese Characteristics” becomes useful to its leaders.

The party power structure solidified in the transition from Deng to Jiang. Deng ran the party and nation from the position of chairman of the central military commission and paramount leader. The presidency was reestablished as the leader of the party and the nation with Jiang’s installation in 1993. The premier is the secondary leadership role. The three top governmental or party bodies are the Politburo Standing Committee, Politburo, and Central Committee. Their members are selected every five years at the CPC in a closed process, not visible outside of the party’s elite.<sup>8</sup>

In the Jiang and Hu administrations, this process and the associated party structures, as shown in figure 1, have stabilized. It was common in Mao’s and Deng’s era for outgoing senior officials to be investigated and imprisoned to discredit criticism of incoming leaders. Constitutional reforms stabilizing government structures now allow for peaceful exits from government and logical successions with the party elite. For example, Hu gained 10 years of experience on the Politburo Standing Committee before rising to be president.<sup>9</sup>

Institutionalizing key positions and power structures enables party factions to compete in a stable system and supports long-term planning that has been a Chinese cultural characteristic. The recent 17th CPC reaffirmed this stability. Although President Hu was able to meet his goal of placing younger protégés on the Politburo Standing Committee, he was not allowed to trim the number of positions on the committee from nine to seven (see fig. 1)<sup>10</sup> for the purpose of retiring more members whose support came from the previous president Jiang.<sup>11</sup> Although the resultant personnel changes seem to indicate that Hu will have power limited by those with close ties to Jiang Zemin, the failure to select Jiang Mianheng,

son of Jiang Zemin, may well signal that Jiang’s influence is rapidly dissipating, leaving Hu with a consolidated position.<sup>12</sup>



**Figure 1. Organizational structure of China’s government**

President Hu made pledges to increase democratic opportunities for citizens. He said, “People’s democracy is the lifeblood of socialism.”<sup>13</sup> In the coming years the CCP will work to offer “socialist democracy” where urban and rural areas can have a role in electing deputies to the people’s congress.<sup>14</sup> It is also envisioned that the public will gain access to hearings that shape some facets of public policy.<sup>15</sup> Whether or not these reforms come into reality remains to be seen, but the tenor of Hu’s address is indicative that measured democratic participation will come into existence.

Dr. David Shambaugh, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, cites that the rationale for the CCP to expand participation may be found in the International Department of the CCP’s analysis of Eastern European implosions and collapses.<sup>16</sup> This analysis concluded these implosions were caused by:

- poorly developed economies, cut off from international markets and technologies,
- ruling parties that were divorced from their populaces—no grassroots level,

- collaboration between the Catholic Church and unions in the Polish case,
- external subversion by the United States and United Kingdom, and
- loss of control over security services which had overly repressive policies.<sup>17</sup>

According to Shambaugh, the Chinese also conducted in-depth analyses of the former Soviet Union, North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam.<sup>18</sup> They attribute the demise of many authoritarian systems, such as those in Central Asia, to the influence of American NGOs, assessing that they fomented revolution in these countries. The International Department of the CCP recognizes Singapore as a model worthy of close examination. It admires how Singapore's ruling People's Action Party (PAP) has been able to remain low key but maintain total control. In Singapore, the ruling body never relinquishes power, but the façade exists of a government that involves population participation coupled with an open-market, prosperous economy.<sup>19</sup> It may be a model for "Democracy with Chinese Characteristics," but its track record on human rights and freedom is far more liberal than China's current model, and the gap between rich and poor is not so profound. It is clear that the Chinese are interested in learning lessons from other governmental systems and in finding replicable models for adaptation in China to support Hu's call for socialist democracy.

In the global political environment, Dr. Nancy Tucker, professor of history at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, sees China's increasing involvement in world institutions as a trend that will continue into the foreseeable future.<sup>20</sup> China's experience with regional organizations, such as APEC and ASEAN, or on the global level at the United Nations and the UN Security Council is indicative of a strategy to influence regional and global issues. As China increases its engagement internationally, Dr. Tucker envisions an increase in conflicting priorities with other nation-states, but that China culturally would prefer not to have the top position in these organizations but rather would prefer to be the "number two."<sup>21</sup> This is reinforced by a 3,000-year-old term that Deng Xiaoping brought back in guiding future Chinese leaders. It is "tao guang yang hui," which translates to "hide brightness, nourish obscurity." Dr. Larry Wortzel, director of Asian Studies for The Heritage Foundation, explained the translation of Deng's meaning to congressional leaders as, "Put your brightness in your quiver behind your back and then nourish your capabilities secretly."<sup>22</sup> Deng's intent was to



bide time in bringing back China's prominence—create the impression of China's gradual awakening and opening; in essence, a gradient of reform—a political strategy that is still intact today.

### **Deng, Jiang, and Hu: Gradual Reform**

From 1978 to today, from Deng to Hu, China's strategic course has been additive, each leader's course building on the previous, each new evolution more ambitious. It reflects a gradient of incremental steps, beginning with the "24 Character Strategy" set in motion by Deng.

The 24 Character Strategy refers to 24 Chinese characters which are and translate to:

冷静观察，站稳脚跟，沉着应付，韬光养晦，善于守拙，绝不当头。

Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.<sup>23</sup>

It compliments his call to "hide brightness, nourish obscurity." Both ideas guide leaders to commit to the long-term outlook in charting China's course without invoking conflict among global actors.

Deng himself was responsible for the most significant deviation of the strategy to date: the massacre at Tiananmen Square. China came under the spotlight from the world community as well as the Chinese themselves, who to that point had revered his leadership in the transition from Mao. "Xiaoping," with different syllabic emphasis translates in English as "small bottles." The protest, made globally visible by Mike Chinoy of CNN reporting from the square, was thousands of Chinese smashing small bottles to the ground in solidarity for the victims—a practice which continued on college campuses for many anniversaries after the massacre.<sup>24</sup>

A major consequence of the massacre was altered political succession, with the reins of power being passed on to Jiang Zemin, mayor of Shanghai and party chief, rather than the disgraced Zhao Ziyang, general secretary. Although Deng followed through by cracking down on the protests, he held the inner circle responsible for letting the situation get out of control. In a larger sense, the lesson from Tiananmen for Deng and those who came after him was to articulate clearly to the populace not to confuse open markets with open (democratic) society.

President Jiang remained true to Deng's reforms and maxim "it is glorious to be rich" by introducing his vision called the "Three Represents," which calls for advancement in economic development, cultural development, and political consensus. The drive to pursue national wealth aggressively continued

while greatly increasing investment in the PLA and opening up very limited democratic opportunity at local levels to make the CCP attractive to more Chinese. Deng's vision was focused on the densely populated eastern coastal region. Although foreign investment soared, corruption and scandal followed, with the rural areas not benefiting as much from his strategy. The prosperity gap widened sharply. These were key challenges to be addressed when President Hu Jintao took office in 2002.

Hu's "scientific development concept," also known as *Harmonious Society*, calls for economic prosperity as in Deng's and Jiang's visions. However, Hu seeks to control growth while focusing on the social issues that have grown since China's opening of its markets. His approach runs congruent with Confucian analects. Confucian philosophy emphasized personal and governmental morality, justice, and social correctness.<sup>25</sup> At the 17th CPC, Hu reiterated in his address that democratic opportunities would expand, wealth and prosperity would increase in the rural and western regions, the rule of law would be supported, environmental issues would be addressed, and corruption would be controlled.<sup>26</sup> History, philosophy, Deng's foundation, and the lessons learned at Tiananmen, serve as linkages for Hu and the new ruling elite to make these pronouncements about China's strategic direction.

What remains unchanged from Jiang's administration is defense spending, which increased in March 2007 by 17.8 percent, making it the largest defense budget China has ever had on a per capita basis.<sup>27</sup> Rather than face the "too little, too late" plight of its original opening to the West over a century ago, China is working to build a world-class military which will present its leaders with options it has not had since the Ming Dynasty. The gradient from Deng to Hu discernibly follows a definite trend, or "trajectory"—a trajectory whose future path may be somewhat predictable.

### **What's next for China**

China's trajectory is a steep curve. In the key economic metric, exports, China surpassed the United States in 2007, becoming the second largest exporter and is forecast by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to pass Germany in the next few years.<sup>28</sup> China now ranks second behind the United States in oil consumption at 7.88 million barrels per day.<sup>29</sup> The Congressional Research Service (CRS) references Global Insight's estimate that China's economy will overtake the US economy by 2013.<sup>30</sup> Global Insight predicts that in 2025 the Chinese economy will be 59 percent

larger than the United States'.<sup>31</sup> Success in this area correlates with Chinese politics and the reform gradient established by Deng and expanded on by Jiang and Hu. Senior director for East Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, Dennis Wilder, plotted the trajectory and China's current position on the curve (fig. 2).<sup>32</sup> Continuing on this trajectory to the “Rising China” quadrant entails meeting challenges that could knock China off this curve and move it in a different direction.<sup>33</sup> Internal discord, natural disasters, world recession/depression, or a crisis in Taiwan are examples of “wildcard” events that could alter the course. Chinese leaders are sure to have prepared contingency plans for the setbacks that can be foreseen, but unforeseen events will test them. Depending on which wildcard or combination thereof, the effect could be as benign as China's 2030 expectations taking many more years or as volatile as internal power disintegration or engagement in global conflict. In any case, to maintain its current Rising China trajectory, Chinese politicians will have to meet all of the challenges, wildcard or not. Moving into the Rising China quadrant by 2030 may yield more growth and freedom in China, but it does



**Figure 2. China's trajectory toward free-market democracy**

not necessarily mean that the United States and other nations will not confront serious challenges in the Rising China environment in terms of commerce, defense, and global politics.

China's course also depends on the rising fifth generation of leaders continuing to advance Hu's *Harmonious Society* reforms. From the 17th CPC, the new selections to the Politburo Standing Committee include

two potential successors to Hu in 2012. They are his protégés, Xi Jinping (Shanghai party chief) and Li Keqiang (Liaoning party chief).<sup>34</sup> Apart from successors, it is clear that many of the new fifth-generation leaders have risen under Hu's mentoring. The fifth generation is also called the "lost generation," because many did not have formal schooling opportunities during the Cultural Revolution; yet, most of those rising in the political ranks recaptured college educations and postgraduate degrees when China opened in 1978.<sup>35</sup> They meet another Hu criterion for selecting emerging leaders in that they are all in their late forties to early fifties—very young by Chinese standards. Age is a factor for top-tier leaders. The turnover rate for the Politburo Standing Committee, Politburo, Central Committee, and the Central Military Commission will remain at 60 percent and higher per congress for the foreseeable future.<sup>36</sup> Dr. Li Cheng of the Brookings Institution conducted an analysis of the 103 highest-ranking, fifth-generation leaders. Common characteristics include:

- All had humble, hardship experiences during their formative years.
- A majority have postgraduate degrees (80 percent).
- Very few have technocratic governmental backgrounds (17 percent).<sup>37</sup>
- Many are lawyers with foreign study experience in social sciences.
- Almost half are *tuanpai* (Communist Youth League) members (48.5 percent).<sup>38</sup>

Both potential successors, Xi and Li, were *tuanpai* members. Although Xi has emerged from the 17th CPC as the frontrunner, their performance over the next five years will determine which will be selected at the 18th CPC as the new president. Dr. Li refers to this process as the new, "inner-Party democracy."<sup>39</sup> Promotion results from the 17th CPC make it clear that President Hu's influence and *Harmonious Society* or another parallel strategy will be China's path for at least the next two decades. The fifth generation of leaders from Hu's *tuanpai* students will form the leadership element in China for the foreseeable future.

The philosophy that these leaders will take forward is a broad form of the concept of *Harmonious Society*.<sup>40</sup> At the CPC, Hu took this Harmonious Society beyond the domestic and regional context in expanding the concept to "Harmonious World" for the purpose of shaping the world environment

in which China will operate. Hu’s overarching doctrine in foreign affairs is the 53-year-old *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*, which was the initial framework to reach a peace accord with India following the Chinese occupation of Tibet.<sup>41</sup> Today the principles as publicly stated to be China’s universal approach to foreign relations are:

- Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,
- Mutual nonaggression,
- Mutual noninterference with each other’s internal affairs,
- Equality and mutual benefit, and
- Peaceful coexistence.<sup>42</sup>

Hu said, “We will pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development and a win-win strategy of opening up. We will develop friendship and cooperation with all other countries on the basis of the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence* and push for the building of a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.”<sup>43</sup>

This platform is consistent with the current Chinese trajectory, the reforms of the past three generations of leaders, and Chinese culture. Taken at face value, the Harmonious World concept is congruent with China’s increasing interest in global institutions and politics. The principals of “peaceful coexistence” and “equality and mutual benefit” are welcome to the global community and tie to Deng’s and Hu’s strategies.

However, the unprecedented buildup of China’s military and activism in forums like the UN Security Council or, most recently, the Six-Party Talks on North Korea nuclear proliferation do not seem to correlate to the five principles, but these actions make sense culturally from Sun Tzu’s writings and the pursuit of outcome through indirect means.<sup>44</sup> China is globally engaged today, and there are reasons to suspect that it is pursuing some of its national objectives via indirect means. Thus, as China continues on its current trajectory toward increased military and economic power, the expectation that it will be satisfied as a regional power or merely as a peer to the United States should not be depended on for planning.

## The Road Ahead: Potential Disruptions to China's Current Path

What then is China's vector in a political sense for the future? The challenges on the horizon for China's leaders are complex and multifaceted. President Hu and his successors' decisions in building the *Harmonious Society*, and perhaps *Harmonious World*, will influence how China's leaders, structure, processes, and political system will evolve, both domestically and internationally. External entities—not just foreign powers but also influential bodies such as multigovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and multinational corporations (MNC)—will shape political activity and decisions and not always favorably to the party's power elite.

### Chinese Leadership Structure and Processes

From the selections to the Politburo Standing Committee and other key posts filled during the 17th CPC, President Hu has consolidated a strong base. Hu not only selected his successors, he had a large hand in developing them as leaders through the *tuanpai* program as well. The top fifth-generation leaders, with Xi and Li leading the class, are the products of Hu's investment in the *tuanpai* many years ago. The likelihood that this generation will remain devoted to and build on *Harmonious Society* is strong.

However, Hu's remarks at the 17th CPC could become a source of potential instability. If, from these statements, there is a sincere initiative undertaken to allow a small number of regionally elected candidates to participate on national-level committees or at the CPC itself, it could be a very small reform that evolves in the coming decades into a major shift in the composition of top Chinese officials. Depending on the voice from nontraditional players in the government and how they are received or tolerated, the concepts of *Harmonious Society* could be revised in the decades that follow. Deng was not able to envision the resulting unrest and social dissidence resulting from market reforms and economic openness. Hu recognizes a need to allow for a measured amount of voice and participation among the population; however, doing so could result in outcomes that no one can foresee.

## **Domestic Politics**

President Hu has discussed challenges such as widening prosperity gaps, rule of law, and corruption mitigation openly at many public forums, including the 17th CPC. His government and those that follow will seek to champion these to keep domestic politics stable. The economy seems to be the clock they are working against. The rural areas have expectations of increased prosperity as envisioned in *Harmonious Society*, and the developed urban areas have expectations of more wealth. The current economic downturn, however, may threaten both. In the first three months of 2009, China's growth rate has slipped to 6.1 percent.<sup>45</sup> Despite this decrease in growth and the concomitant dislocation of nearly 20 million workers, all indications are that unless the economy turns sharply worse, China will likely manage to economically muddle through.<sup>46</sup> Should the economy enter a sharper downturn or the global crisis deepen into a depression, some level of disenfranchisement is to be expected. Further, during this period of relative economic stagnation, China will be more vulnerable to the effects of major natural disasters, pandemics, and environmental crises. Any of these, on top of the extant economic challenges, may alter the ruling elite's ability to stay the course.

## **International Politics**

China is reinvesting a large part of its wealth into global influence, making international politics a priority. Its access in Africa now includes 44 of the continent's 53 states. The rationale for this may be driven by the need for resources, but the by-product from investing in African infrastructure, regardless of any ideological chasms, is improved global influence. Its efforts in establishing groups like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or participating in preexisting bodies such as the UN, APEC, or ASEAN will continue to be vehicles of choice for China to exert itself globally.

The United States is not the only variable for which China's politicians must plan. In addition to instability in Africa—a problem most imperial powers have contended with at one time or another—Russia, India, and Japan are neighbors that fit more into the competitor rather than partner category. Historically, China had regrettable experiences with all these countries, and its leaders will likely remain suspicious in any bilateral or multilateral effort.

The *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence* as Chinese ideals would be tested if China decides that Taiwan must be taken back with force or if it

should decide that it needs to garner natural resources by blocking other nations' access in areas such as the contested Spratly Islands. These are potential sources of conflict Chinese leaders will seek to avoid if they are to realize their global goals, but short-term crises could evolve in ways that force them to abandon long-term strategy temporarily.

### **External Entities**


An outgrowth of globalization and China's prosperity is the tremendous rise of per capita wealth and, therefore, the influence of external entities contributing to this success. To make their operating environments more stable and conducive to greater corporate success, multinational corporations have invested in social corporate responsibility (SCR) programs, boosting local communities' infrastructure, education, and environments in much the same way NGOs target their programs. NGOs operate similarly for their own objectives, but whether SCR or NGO money is being invested, the long-term effects are influences Chinese leaders will be cautious of due to the history of the "bad century." As stated earlier, the Chinese conclusion was that the Central Asian states fell due to subtle influences from the NGOs. Future leaders in China will be cautious as these efforts flourish but may find it impossible to reverse those that meet with widespread approval among the populace.

Guiding the *Harmonious Society* to 2030 will not be easy for Chinese leaders. The planning variable that will likely remain constant is that the ranking elite of the Communist Party will be in power well beyond the 2030 time frame. No other constants exist. Just like the surprise Tiananmen presented to Chinese leaders in 1989, they should be preparing today for how the Chinese political system will adjust to an environment that is certain to be dynamic and volatile. Instead of a smooth trajectory to the Rising China quadrant, these factors could alter the path to something more closely resembling figure 3.

### **Policy Implications**

There is a wide range of thought from experts focused on studying China. However, given reform progress and economic trends experienced by China since Deng Xiaoping, there is broad consensus that at a minimum, China will rise to peer status in the international political system over the next 20 years.<sup>47</sup> Knowledge of Chinese culture, its history of





**Figure 3: One potential Chinese trajectory toward 2030**

foreign relations, and its rapid rise through the Deng, Jiang, and Hu eras is essential in designing a vision from which policies can be crafted. China's political power is centralized, but the political elite's activities traverse every element of Chinese society whether diplomatic, informational, military, economic, or cultural. Early Chinese philosophy, still in practice today, espouses indirect action, meeting goals in quiet ways, or creating contradictions to confuse or deceive as methods in achieving objectives. In the political arena, US policy makers should consider the following strategies.

### **Invest in Regional Alliances and Access**

Chinese leaders may seek to weaken US influence in Asia, and globally, by eroding the strength of our partnerships. Therefore, we need to increase resources to enable our country teams to increase investment in relationships with traditional regional allies in addition to making inroads with countries where we have not had robust relations. US relations with India, Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam must improve between now and 2030. The United States would do well to strengthen its role and the roles of its allies in APEC and ASEAN. US engagement must be constructive and adaptive with regard to the wide range of cultural diversity perspectives in the region. It is also important to increase efforts in monitoring how China conducts diplomacy with the same actors, watching for opportunities that may arise.

### **Increase US-China Bilateral Opportunities**

Before China ascends to peer status, the United States should pursue actions to partner with the Chinese wherever mutual interests converge. The Six-Party Talks on North Korea are an ongoing example of constructive collaboration with the Chinese. Shaping the opinions of the fifth generation of leaders and beyond will be important as China passes critical growth milestones. China's major investments in Africa represent an opportunity for collaboration. Space programs may represent another area where relations could be enhanced or deepened. Dr. David Shambaugh recommends a "Track II" approach, promoting unofficial contacts among nongovernmental actors aimed at advancing diplomatic efforts to enhance the policy dialogue between nations.<sup>48</sup> He also advocates for a reorganized China effort in the executive branch at the NSC and State Department to ensure China policy is not contradictory with other efforts in the region.<sup>49</sup>

### **Provide More Options through Military Investment**

China's politicians are investing aggressively in disruptive technologies that have the potential to give it an asymmetric advantage if left unmatched. The space and cyber domains will become vulnerabilities in the near term, given recent demonstrations of an antisatellite (ASAT) and cyber-attack capability. The United States needs to pursue leadership in developing directed-energy, nano, and robotic weapons and the countering technologies for our forces that may face them. Covert weapons programs should also be pursued to ensure the United States maintains its military advantage. This strategy strengthens US credibility with regional alliances and commitments and ensures decision makers are never option limited, should conflict with China manifest itself. America should increase its engagement with China and regional partners and cultivate an understanding of China's culture and history but should always retain the capability to approach the relationship from a position of strength and leadership. Given that China's current and follow-on generations of political leaders are established and that Chinese policy with regard to these investments is unlikely to change, the United States must match the developmental timelines with acquiring the right weaponry.

## **Conclusions**

China and its political leaders have been managing change at a voracious pace since Deng Xiaoping led the nation on its new course of

economic growth and openness. Chinese leaders’ inclination to promote economic liberalization while retaining authoritarian control does not seem sustainable in the years ahead when accounting for information proliferation; a rising, expectant, middle class; and an increasing need for resources. Perhaps the political leadership’s best acknowledgement of this can be found in the 17th CPC statements by President Hu. He openly embraces democracy with tractable plans to open up the government, targets the rule of law and corruption as areas for action, and commits to focus on rural areas to halt the growing income disparity. This alone establishes direction for the Chinese government that can be anticipated and for which the United States should plan.

US policy makers must weigh Chinese history, culture, and experience before assessing its intent with regard to regional or global politics. The United States has insufficient power to halt China’s rise, nor should it necessarily seek to do so, but a comprehensive plan on how to pursue the US-Sino relationship must be designed, resourced, and executed with the China of 2030 in mind. The current *leaders*, ever mindful of China’s history with foreigners and a perspective aligned with Confucius and Sun Tzu, have defined their paths, and so we must now define our own. **SSQ**

## Notes

1. Hu Jintao, “Scientific Outlook Development” (lecture, Yale University, 24 April 2006). Hu’s definition is found in these quotes: “China will pursue a scientific outlook on development that makes economic and social development people-oriented, comprehensive, balanced and sustainable; We will work to strike a proper balance between urban and rural development, development among regions, economic and social development, development of man and nature, and domestic development and opening wider to the outside world; It is also rooted in the cultural heritages of the Chinese nation.”

2. Arthur Waley, trans. and ed., *The Analects of Confucius* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). Because of the teachings of Confucius, the population will generally defer to the authorities unless the legitimacy of the regime is called into question. To call this legitimacy into question requires rulers to show that they are manifestly unjust or demonstrate that they cannot paternally lead the society. Should the government fail to lead justly or fail in its ability to lead its people, then the “Mandate of Heaven” is lost, and it becomes not only the right but the duty of every Confucian to oppose the incumbent administration. The central government’s actions in these matters are in keeping with this cultural backdrop. Addressing issues of corruption and the environment are in keeping with just rule.

3. Ibid.

4. Even in the midst of the current economic downturn, China’s GDP is still growing at an impressive rate. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections, updated in January 2009, suggest that despite the global recession, China’s economy will still grow by 6.7 percent in 2009 and 8.0 percent in 2010. IMF, World Economic Outlook Update: An Update of the Key

WEO Projections, 28 January 2009, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/update/01/pdf/0109.pdf>.

5. The “Bad Century” is the roughly 100-year period between the colonial victories in the Opium Wars and the beginnings of the Communist Revolution in the 1940s. China still regards this period of subjugation to the rule of the rest of the world as a time of humiliation. The contrast of this period with a prosperous “Harmonious Society” resonates within the Chinese people.

6. It is important to note that the Confucian “Mandate of Heaven” remains intact should a government survive a rebellion. Deng Xiaoping’s actions in this situation are consistent with the cultural underpinnings of the Chinese government.

7. Deng Xiaoping, “Build Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (speech, Sino-Japanese Relations Conference, Beijing, 30 June 1984).

8. Carlos Pascual, “What Should We Expect of the 17th Party Congress?” *Transcript from Changes in China’s Political Landscape: The 17th Party Congress and Beyond Symposium, John L. Thornton China Center, 12–13 April 2007* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007), 6, <http://www.brookings.edu/events/2007/0412china.aspx>.

9. *Ibid.*, 27, 35.

10. Figure 1 indicates the numbers in each partition of the government and where the highest level of national power was centered. The “bull’s eye” indicates from where the leader ran the government with an arrow pointing to a dual-role chairmanship. In the case of Jiang, his presidency ended in 2002 but he remained chairman of the CMC until 2004.

11. Joseph Kahn, “Politburo Reshuffle is a Sign for China,” *International Herald Tribune Asia-Pacific*, 22 October 2007.

12. In fact, three days after the close of the 17th CPC, press reports circulated suggesting Jiang Mianheng had been arrested. For details, see “CCP’s Highest Hierarchy Possesses Tape of Jiang Mianheng Leaking Secrets to Zhou Zhengyi,” *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, 24 October 2007, <http://www.hkhkhk.com/engpro/messages/2346.html>. These reports appear to have been exaggerated, and Jiang Mianheng remains a vice president of the Chinese National Academy of Sciences. Nonetheless, his non-selection to the Politburo Standing Committee, as some had believed likely, suggests that Hu Jintao has sufficiently consolidated his grip on power that it can be said he is truly in charge of the Chinese governmental apparatus.

13. Hu, *Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All*, Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, 15 October 2007, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm>.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*

16. David Shambaugh, “Chinese Discourse about Democracy,” *Transcript from Changes in China’s Political Landscape*, 177–83.

17. *Ibid.* In each case, the Chinese conclusion is that the ruling body failed to take either direct or indirect action to counter the threat, whether that meant expanding economic opportunity, allowing limited democratic voices to counter subversion, or holding tight control on security services and their policies toward the populace.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, 183–84.

20. Dr. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC), interview by the author, 26 September 2007.

21. *Ibid.*

22. House, *China's Strategic Intentions and Goals: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services*, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 2000, 13.
23. *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2007* (Washington, DC: Office of Secretary of Defense, 2007), 6.
24. Mike Chinoy, *China Live: Two Decades in the Heart of the Dragon* (Atlanta: Turner Publishing, 1997), 306.
25. John Pomfret, *Chinese Lessons: Five Classmates and the Story of the New China* (New York: Henry Holt Publishing, 2006), 128.
26. Hu, *Hold High the Great Banner*.
27. *Annual Report to Congress*, 25.
28. “WTO: China Outpaces U.S. in Exports,” *China Daily* (Beijing), 16 April 2007, [www.chinadaily.com.cn/chinagate/doc/2007-04/16/content\\_851758.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/chinagate/doc/2007-04/16/content_851758.htm). While the *China Daily* predicted China would pass Germany in 2008, the WTO's 2008 report strongly suggests this did not happen, as exports and imports in the EU grew at nearly the same pace as China's. Nonetheless, the long-term trends still suggest China will pass Germany in the near future. WTO, *International Trade Statistics 2008* (Geneva: WTO, 2008).
29. CIA, *The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2174rank.html>. [URL cited no longer operable; also updated figure in text]
30. CRS, *Is China a Threat to the U.S. Economy?* (Washington, DC: CRS, 23 January 2007), 15. This prediction, however, is among the earliest crossing points the authors could find. A survey of several other sources, including interviews with various brokerage houses and projections by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, yielded a median projection of the crossing point between the Chinese and US economies in the early 2020s. Regardless, it appears China's economy will almost certainly pass the US economy within the next 20 years.
31. *Ibid.*
32. Dennis Wilder (senior director for East Asian Affairs, National Security Council, The White House, Washington, DC), interview by the author, 25 September 2007.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Jayshree Bajoria, “Unveiling China's Political Future,” *Council on Foreign Relations.org*, updated 22 October 2007, [http://www.cfr.org/publication/14477/deciding\\_chinas\\_political\\_future.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/14477/deciding_chinas_political_future.html).
35. Pascual, “What Should We Expect of the 17th Party Congress?” 15–21.
36. *Ibid.*, 14.
37. This attribute differs from the third and fourth generations, who are predominantly technocrats.
38. *Ibid.*, 17. Hu Jintao was head of this organization during their membership.
39. *Ibid.*, 21.
40. Hu, *Hold High the Great Banner*.
41. Nancy B. Tucker, ed., *China Confidential* (West Sussex, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001), 225–26, 519.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Xinhua, “Hu Jintao, Top CPC Leaders Meet the Press” *China Daily*, 22 October 2007, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/22/content\\_6196354.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/22/content_6196354.htm).
44. Ralph Sawyer, *The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China* (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 323–31, 354–55.
45. Keith Bradsher, “China's Economic Growth Slows in First Quarter,” *New York Times*, 16 April 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/business/global/16yuan.html?hpw>. As this article goes to press, recent estimates for second-quarter growth in China are hovering around

7.9 percent. See Joe McDonald, "China's Economic Growth Accelerates amid Stimulus," *Jakarta Post*, 19 August 2009, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/07/16/china039s-economic-growth-accelerates-amid-stimulus.html>. Mr. McDonald reports for the Associated Press, Beijing office.

46. Christer Ljungwall, *Perspectives on Economic Growth and Stability in China* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for International Affairs, 2009).

47. Statement is drawn from multiple interviews of a cross-section of China subject-matter experts, including senior representatives from the political, military, diplomatic, academia, corporate, NGO, and think tank areas; Washington, DC, and Singapore City, Singapore; 20–27 September 2007 and 6–7 October 2007.

48. David Shambaugh, "Facing Reality in China Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 60–62.

49. *Ibid.*, 63.

# France's New NATO Policy

## Leveraging a Realignment of the Alliance?

*Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet*

FRENCH PRESIDENT Nicolas Sarkozy entered office with the intention of fundamentally revitalizing his country following many years of stagnation—and in doing so he did not shrink from violating one of the long-standing taboos of French defense and security policy. Beginning in mid-2007, Sarkozy gave notice on several occasions that he intended to complete the process begun by his predecessors of reintegrating France into NATO's military structures and to normalize overall French relations with NATO. The move was officially announced on 11 March and consummated during the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of NATO's founding, held on 3–4 April 2009 in Strasbourg and Kehl,<sup>1</sup> thus bringing to an end the special status that France had held to in the alliance since 1966. The special character of France's relationship to NATO had been aimed primarily at guaranteeing French independence and influence internationally and was not only an integral element of the country's national identity but also placed France in the role of the alliance's *enfant terrible*—often the sole, unequivocal opponent of American dominance of Europe.

“Speedy Sarko,” as the unusually forceful and lively French president is often called, has broken with the conventions of French NATO policy in such a way as to divide the country's political establishment and place in doubt the Fifth Republic's broad political consensus on defense and

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security policy. The question is, Just what does Sarkozy hope to achieve through such a striking change in policy? Has he joined the Atlanticists? Or does he hope to improve his chances of pursuing long-established French objectives in the alliance? To answer these questions, we must examine the complex strategic thinking on which France's normalization of relations with NATO rests. This in turn requires that we first assess the special position France has held in NATO.

### **France's Rapprochement with NATO during the 1990s**

On 7 March 1966, France withdrew from NATO's integrated military structures and nuclear weapons program, though it remained a member of the Atlantic Pact. This was de Gaulle's reaction to Anglo-American dominance of the alliance as well as to the shift in US strategy to that of flexible nuclear response, which allowed for the possibility of conflict in Europe using nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> Since then, French security and defense policy has been guided by the Gaullist "principle that asserts: Whenever the West is under threat, France will stand in solidarity with the Western community of values; but in times of peace, it will seek to preserve its independence, in particular vis-à-vis the United States."<sup>3</sup>

The first noteworthy divergence from this course occurred under Socialist president François Mitterrand (1981–95). Mitterrand was decidedly more transatlantic in his views than were his predecessors. So much so, in fact, that at the time of the NATO Double-Track Decision, he offered the alliance his complete support, even urging approval of the rearmament effort during a speech before the German parliament in January 1983, which included the dictum, "Les pacifists sont à l'Ouest mais les missiles sont à l'Est" ["The pacifists are in the West but the missiles are in the East"]. But even though Mitterrand recognized the paramount role NATO played in Europe's (and France's) security, he chose to hold firm to France's special position in the alliance for the time being. It was only in response to the Gulf War of 1991 that he developed a new NATO policy. France, which had 14,500 troops involved in the operation, suffered the bitter experience of seeing just how inferior its own military capabilities were in comparison to those of the Americans. "France's experience of participating in a multinational force commanded by a US general under NATO procedures . . . was both humiliating and revealing—particularly for the military. Any illusion which might have remained about France's (and Europe's) capacity to



underwrite the collective security of the continent was shattered in the Saudi Arabian desert.”<sup>4</sup> The Gulf War, therefore, can be understood as the “turning point in French NATO policy.”<sup>5</sup> By 1993, as NATO involvement in a disintegrating Yugoslavia appeared in the offing, Paris came to the realization that rapprochement with NATO, perhaps even reintegration, could increase France’s influence in the alliance.

After Defense Minister Pierre Joxe declared that France “must be present in the relevant bodies . . . where . . . decisions about our security are made,”<sup>6</sup> Paris once again began participating in the work of the NATO military committee, starting in April of 1993. In 1996, Francois Léotard became the first French minister of defense to attend a—albeit informal—meeting of NATO defense ministers.<sup>7</sup> But while some observers at the time reckoned with France’s full reintegration into NATO structures, Mitterrand chose not to go beyond what were on the whole rather limited steps toward rapprochement.

Pres. Jacques Chirac (1995–2007) propelled this pro-Atlantic process a step further. During the war in Bosnia (1991–95), Europe was again confronted with its own military inferiority vis-à-vis America, whereupon Chirac announced in December 1995 that France would officially rejoin the Council of Defense Ministers as well as the military council, leaving one final hurdle to complete the process of reintegration: the return to the alliance’s military structures. Chirac saw an opportunity for France’s full reintegration in the adoption of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept in Berlin in January of 1996, which permitted Europeans to establish their own separate security and defense identity—a European pillar in NATO. The CJTF concept accorded with Chirac’s notion of a new NATO that allowed France “à prendre toute sa place” [to take her rightful place].<sup>8</sup> Before the CJTF concept could be implemented, however, the command positions within the European pillar first had to be defined. Since NATO’s commander in Europe, the SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander in Europe), is always an American, Chirac, with the support of Germany, called for the appointment of Europeans to the regional command posts, with selection based on a rotation system. Chirac was interested in particular in the post of Commander of Allied Forces, South Europe, based in Naples. But the United States refused to assign a European officer to this strategically important post on the European Southern Command, prompting France to decide to remain outside NATO’s military structures.

In retrospect, it seems strange that Chirac would commit the tactical mistake of announcing France's return without first negotiating its price.<sup>9</sup>

### **France's Unsatisfying Position in NATO**

Though America's intransigence in 1997 caused Chirac to suspend the process of formal reintegration into NATO, he did essentially move *de facto* rapprochement forward in the wake of 9/11. In 2002 he approved both France's massive participation in the NATO Response Force (NRF) and in the new ACT Command (Allied Command Transformation) in Norfolk, Virginia.<sup>10</sup> Since 2004, France has had a contingent of 100 officers at the integrated command structures (SHAPE in Mons and ACT in Norfolk). But the roughly 280 military personnel detailed to cooperation duties with NATO constitute "only about 10 percent of the German or British" personnel assigned to the same task.<sup>11</sup> In spite of France's *de facto* participation in the integrated structures of NATO, its peculiar position within the alliance means that it is not part of the standing chain of command—and consequently occupies none of the senior command posts. There are also two central NATO structures to which France still does not belong: the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Defense Planning Committee (DPC).

By contrast, French operational and financial contributions to NATO have been substantial. France, which has participated in all out-of-area NATO operations since 2003, contributed (as of 2007) the third largest contingent of troops and was the fourth largest financial contributor in the alliance.<sup>12</sup> This is not compensated, however, by a commensurate level of influence within the alliance, so that from the French perspective, the cost-benefit calculation is a negative one. As a result, Frédéric Bozo has referred to France's "unsatisfactory role" within the alliance, since "the involvement of France at decision-making levels is still proportionally much less than its operational participation."<sup>13</sup> In addition, the development of NATO during President Bush's eight years in office has been characterized by the operating principle in which the mission determines the coalition, muscling aside any approach grounded in greater partnership and cooperation. President Sarkozy has sufficient reason, therefore, to put an end to France's unsatisfactory, thankless, and untenable position in NATO.

## **Sarkozy's New NATO Policy: The Announcements**

Sarkozy first announced his new NATO policy in a speech delivered before a gathering of ambassadors in Paris on 27 August 2007. This came as a surprise, since the topic had not come up during the French election campaign. After appealing for a “new élan” in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), Sarkozy stressed that there was no rivalry between the EU and NATO, that they instead complemented one another. “I hope,” Sarkozy continued, “that in the coming months we can pursue both the strengthening of the Europe of defense and the renewal of NATO, as well as NATO’s relationship to France in general. Each is bound up together with the other: an autonomous Europe of defense and a transatlantic alliance in which we will be able to play our role to its fullest extent.”<sup>14</sup>

The second time Sarkozy spoke about his NATO plans was in an address before the US Congress on 7 November 2007. He began by first reminding his audience that, in light of global instability, the United States needed a strong and resolute Europe. “There are more crises than there are means of dealing with them. And since NATO cannot be everywhere at once, it is essential that Europe be capable of taking action itself.” After he had, rather pedagogically, emphasized the “legitimate strategic interest” on both sides of the Atlantic in a strong Europe, he went on to speak of his new NATO policy:

Standing here at this podium before Congress, I say to you: the more successful a Europe of defense is, the more likely it is that France’s decision to fully assume its place in NATO will become a reality. I hope that France, a founding member of the alliance and one of its most important troop contributors, will be able to assume an important role in renewing the alliance’s means and capabilities and that France will be able to further develop its relationship with the alliance in parallel with the further development and greater empowerment of the Europe of defense.

Sarkozy spoke in closing of a “credible and strong Europe within a newly structured alliance.”<sup>15</sup>

Sarkozy broached his new policy approach for the third time on 3 April 2008, during the NATO summit in Bucharest. Having announced prior to the meeting that France would increase the size of its contingent in Afghanistan by roughly 1,000 troops, he repeated to his colleagues his intention not to reduce defense expenditures, regardless of current budget problems. Following this dual commitment by France to stand together with its alliance partners in the fight against terrorism, Sarkozy then went on the offensive. He restated the need for both NATO and a strong Europe

of defense. Sarkozy's position found favor with President Bush, who on 2 April 2008 unexpectedly announced, "Building a strong NATO alliance also requires a strong European defense capacity." Sarkozy eagerly took up Bush's comment, thanking him twice in his Bucharest address for the remark. "This opens the possibility for France to fundamentally renew its relationship to NATO." And for the first time, he set forth a date for the implementation of the new policy; the process of normalization would be consummated at the NATO summit scheduled for 3–4 April 2009 to be held in both Kehl and Strasbourg on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the alliance's founding. "This act will serve as a symbol of Franco-German friendship, European reconciliation, and transatlantic partnership."<sup>16</sup>

### **The Dual Arrangement in Sarkozy's New NATO Policy**

A closer examination of Sarkozy's series of statements shows that it would be a mistake to conclude that his new approach is merely an expression of the new president's "Atlanticism" or that it can be interpreted as a desire to steal the title of Washington's most devoted ally from the British or Germans. While it is doubtless true that Sarkozy is the most pro-American of any president in the history of the Fifth Republic, his NATO initiative is not an example of that.

Sarkozy is instead attempting to resolve the dilemmas of France's existing status in NATO. Based on the foregoing account, these can be described as follows:<sup>17</sup> How can the discrepancy be resolved between France's limited influence in the alliance and its actual contributions? In view of the relative isolation arising from its peculiar status in the alliance, how can Paris obtain effective leverage over the long-term developments in the alliance? And how can France simultaneously place its decades-old efforts toward a Europe capable of acting on its own in defense and security policy, a *Europe Puissance*,<sup>18</sup> on a sustained road toward success?

The president's solution consists of a dual arrangement that ties France's full reentry into NATO to certain conditions. This in itself signals that Sarkozy has no intention of quietly joining the ranks of the Atlanticists. Instead, he expects that his decision to reenter NATO will lend ESDP—*l'Europe de la defense*, as he likes to refer to it—a new vitality. This constitutes the first part of the arrangement. A strengthened European Security and Defense Policy that operates in partnership with NATO, whose contribution to international security the United States expressly

welcomes, will inevitably increase Europe's standing in NATO. The second part of the arrangement is directly related to this: France will only rejoin a remodeled NATO—a remodeling, as France sees it, in which the asymmetry in favor of the United States that has existed since the alliance's founding should end and in which Europe is recognized as an equal partner in matters of defense and security policy. “A France that fully assumes its role in NATO presupposes an alliance in which Europe is given a greater part to play.”<sup>19</sup>

Thus, to make France's complete reintegration into NATO palatable to the French electorate, Sarkozy set forth a complex approach linked to a series of arrangements which argued that France would only rejoin a reformed NATO that accepts ESDP as an equal partner. But to make this approach credible, ESDP would have to make fundamental progress in moving beyond the rather modest status it had achieved by 1999. According to Sarkozy, a substantive strengthening of ESDP again presupposes that France relinquishes its special status and becomes a “normal” NATO member. The president takes the view—as all his statements indicate—that France can only advance the development of ESDP as a full member of NATO, since a France that insists on its special status in the alliance only provokes mistrust and a tendency to obstruction on both sides of the Atlantic, owing to persistent suspicions that France is trying to weaken the transatlantic alliance. For decades this was indeed a central reason why an integrated Europe accepted US dominance and explains why it practiced abstinence in defense and security policy matters through the end of the 1990s—and why development of ESDP has proceeded only sluggishly since then.<sup>20</sup> This mistrust is constantly being stoked as a consequence of EU expansion eastward, since—aside from a traditionally ESDP-skeptical Britain—the pronounced Atlanticism of the new members in Eastern Europe leads them to accuse France of seeking to weaken the alliance. Sarkozy's new NATO policy, therefore, serves to a great degree to build trust in the EU-27 as a prerequisite for strengthening ESDP.

While there is much that would in fact indicate that France's return to NATO should significantly spur the development of ESDP, it remains to be seen whether France's reintegration will lead to greater French influence in the alliance. This is related to—and thus forms another aspect of France's call for a reformed alliance—Paris' view that fundamental NATO reforms are essential and its search for the means to actively shape those reforms. France wants—for quite some time, actually—to scale down the outsized military apparatus of NATO and to adapt it to new strategic needs. Secondly,

Paris seeks—again, for years—to limit the growing politicization of the alliance to prevent it from becoming the cornerstone of international order—one dominated by the United States. This defensive action against a globally operating and politicized NATO was initiated under Mitterrand in light of the rapid expansion of the alliance following the end of the Cold War.<sup>21</sup> In view of American NATO policy during the Bush years—in which the mission determined the coalition and where Washington placed greatest value on the alliance’s role in legitimizing American actions—Paris renewed its effort against the “globalization” of NATO, for example by joining together with Germany in opposing quick membership for Georgia and the Ukraine. Included among the classic reform demands France seeks in NATO is the previously mentioned desire to see Europeans given greater influence in the alliance—including high-ranking command posts—to put an end to asymmetry (i.e., American dominance). In light of the far-reaching demands for reform that Paris has always directed at NATO, it seems doubtful that normalization will bring about a reorientation of the alliance in accordance with French designs.<sup>22</sup>

### **Strengthening ESDP as a Counterpart to French Reintegration—Mission Accomplished?**

When President Sarkozy presents his new NATO policy as primarily benefitting Europe, in concrete terms this means that he places highest priority on strengthening ESDP. France’s assumption of the EU presidency during the second half of 2008 presented him with the opportunity to take effective action in this regard. Sarkozy seized the opportunity and declared the goal of giving new momentum to ESDP as one of the four main elements of his agenda during France’s six-month term in the EU presidency. Specifically, France planned to formulate a new *European Security Strategy* (ESS) that would replace the document passed in 2007. As his first priority, however, Sarkozy sought to expand ESDP’s military and civilian capacities.<sup>23</sup> Intensified cooperation between the EU and NATO, also part of the presidential agenda, was supported by a paper containing far-ranging proposals for cooperation that France had presented to the NATO Council in October of 2003. As one commentator observed, with this step Paris set aside its traditional resistance to rapprochement between the EU and NATO, substantially accommodating the wishes of both Washington and London.<sup>24</sup>

Given French ambitions and prior concessions, one must ask whether Sarkozy, as EU president, has indeed given measurable new momentum to ESDP. Or have the turbulent events that occurred during France's EU presidency—Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty on 12 June 2008,<sup>25</sup> the war between Russia and Georgia in August of 2008, as well as the financial crisis beginning in the fall of that year—thrown Sarkozy off of his plans as Europe's senior crisis manager?

The answer is clearly no; for, largely unnoticed by the general public, the European Council on 11–12 December 2008 “reaffirmed its intention to take concrete steps to lend new momentum to European security and defense policy and thereby take into account the new responsibilities that have arisen with respect to Europe's security.”<sup>26</sup> The “Statement of the European Council on the Consolidation of the ESDP” contains everything France had proposed: a revision of the *ESS*; the pledge to remedy the “inadequacies in Europe's existing capabilities through the gradual improvement of its civilian and military capacities,” together with a detailed “Statement on Improving Capabilities”<sup>27</sup>; the commitment to be able to simultaneously conduct up to 19 military and civilian ESDP missions of differing dimensions; and an “Erasmus militaire” to promote cooperation in training efforts; as well as an explicit declaration “to improve cooperation between the EU and NATO . . . in full complementarity . . . within a framework of renewed transatlantic partnership.” For this purpose, “an informal high-level EU-NATO group” should be established, as per France's proposal. The single, albeit serious, deficiency remaining in ESDP resolutions relates to the highly sensitive question as to the development of an independent European central command and the European Council's inclination to merely endorse the efforts undertaken by Solana “toward the creation of a new integrated structure for civil-military planning” of ESDP operations. It was Great Britain, above all, that rebuffed French plans to add 20–30 additional personnel to the 90 already serving in the still embryonic EU Operations Center.<sup>28</sup> And yet, following the summit in December 2008, Defense Minister Hervé Morin declared nevertheless that “everything we put on the table a year ago is now in the works.”<sup>29</sup>

### **Will Reintegration Mean the End of the “Exception Française”?**

Sarkozy's new NATO policy is based on the recognition that France's special role in the alliance has become untenable and is no longer in keeping

with French interests. This view was shared by the team of experts who, in June of 2008, presented the new white book, *Defense and National Security*. “The report backs Sarkozy’s position in calling for France to return to the integrated structures of NATO.”<sup>30</sup>

This gives rise to the question as to exactly how this “complete reintegration” should occur. Will France become another NATO member like all the rest? Will Paris abandon its motto “Friends, allies, but not aligned” and obediently join the Atlanticist camp? In short, will this mean the end of the “exception française” in matters of defense and security policy?

The answer must surely be no, since full reintegration will not be as all-encompassing as it sounds. While France will rejoin the DPC—where central issues such as, currently, the US missile shield will be decided—the same does not apply to the NPG. This will allow France to retain an autonomous decision-making power over the Force de Frappe. As Sarkozy has stated, “France’s nuclear deterrent will remain a strictly national responsibility.”<sup>31</sup> Also, France will still not be placing any troops under NATO control during peacetime. Lastly, it is not expected that France will commit itself to a quantitatively complete reintegration in the alliance’s integrated structures, since to be represented in these structures at the same level as Britain or Germany, it would have to increase its presence there tenfold, from 120 to 1,200. Since this is beyond France’s capacity to accomplish over the short term, either financially or in terms of personnel, and since France considers this institution to be bloated even as it is, an “integration a minima” seems the more likely outcome, “representing greater symbolic and political than practical or military significance.”<sup>32</sup> At the NATO summit of 3–4 April 2009, France let it be known that it will send some 15 generals to the military structures.<sup>33</sup>

Also of great symbolic importance will be France’s future access to NATO command posts. “France can only take its place in NATO when it is granted a proper seat at the table”—was once Chirac’s, and now Sarkozy’s, mantra.<sup>34</sup> According to press reports, Sarkozy, or rather his chief advisor, Jean-David Levitte, has already gotten consent from James Jones, President Obama’s national security advisor, that France can assume the ACT command in Norfolk as well as the regional command in Lisbon, to which Paris has contributed significantly.<sup>35</sup>

Knowledge of these plans and the general prospect of reintegration sparked a lively debate within France, since resistance to Sarkozy’s assault against the Gaullist holy of holies extends beyond the military itself. The



general public is also concerned that Sarkozy's new NATO policy could undermine France's international clout and reduce its influence and the independence that has allowed it to say things that others only think. Former Socialist foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, put it in particularly stark terms: Were France to become a "normal ally," many countries would view this as its "re-subordination under the US;" it would lead to the "marginalization of French power internationally."<sup>36</sup> Others fear the surrender of an important element of French identity.<sup>37</sup> Still others demand that the link between reintegration and the Europeanization of NATO be strictly enforced. Especially widespread are the doubts that Sarkozy's new NATO policy will provide ESDP the critical momentum it needs. Is it not more likely that, through reintegration, France will sacrifice its traditional ambitions, wonders Laurent Zecchini, who concludes that "La messe atlantiste est dite" [the Atlanticism is only so-called].<sup>38</sup>

To politically neutralize accusations that the final result of this process would be France's unconditional reintegration into NATO, Prime Minister François Fillon coupled the parliamentary debate that took place 17 March 2009 to a confidence vote, so that representatives serving in the majority who were opposed to the move would be bound by parliamentary discipline.<sup>39</sup> In addition, Sarkozy sought to demonstrate his independence vis-à-vis the new US president during the summit marathon in early April (the G20 in London, the NATO anniversary in Strasbourg and Kehl, and the EU summit in Prague). Like other Europeans, for instance, he followed through only to a limited degree on Obama's appeal to demonstrate greater engagement in Afghanistan. And he openly opposed Obama's view that Turkey should be made a full member of the EU. A certain degree of competition between the two leaders became evident over the issue of future disarmament policy. As departing head of the EU Council, Sarkozy had, as early as 8 December 2008, gotten EU foreign ministers to agree to a statement devoted to nuclear disarmament. As part of preparations for the review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, set for 2010, the EU was thus making the first concrete proposals for nuclear disarmament.<sup>40</sup> Sarkozy wanted to signal the new US president that Europe has a right to have a say in the matter, too. Obama, on the other hand, considers the vision of a nuclear-free world—as he proposed to great effect on 5 April 2009 in Prague—to be an integral part of his claim to global leadership.<sup>41</sup> Sarkozy has downplayed the implications of Obama's scheme, indicating that the US president is merely drawing on existing measures and pro-

posals to camouflage the United States' previous policy of delaying such efforts.<sup>42</sup>

In summary, it can be said that despite having only just completed reintegration into NATO, a France that still reserves certain special privileges to itself while seeking to limit US claims to leadership cannot be said to have simply conformed, nor has it aligned itself as much as one may have thought. A complete end to the exception française is therefore not in the offing.

### **The Catalytic Potential of France's New NATO Policy: Future Prospects**

President Sarkozy carried through on France's full reintegration into NATO because of the significant catalytic potential he attaches to it. The backing he received from Germany at the Munich Security Conference in February 2009 offered the first indication that he was correct. On 4–5 February, he and Chancellor Angela Merkel jointly presented a paper regarding the future of the alliance and of EU-NATO relations, proffering Franco-German proposals that for the first time were set forth without prior consultation with the new US administration.<sup>43</sup> What is especially worth emphasizing about this remarkable, content-rich initiative is Merkel's and Sarkozy's call for joint decision making within the alliance—since “one-sided moves would be contrary to the spirit of partnership”—and their demand that strengthening European security policy be a premise of transatlantic equality, saying, “We Europeans must speak with one voice.” Most evident, however, is their shared opposition to the transformation of NATO into a global security agency of the sort the United States has long sought to establish. Paris and Berlin, by contrast, “do not want to reinvent” NATO fundamentals, and they recognize Article 5 of the NATO Treaty as the “core element” of what is an “essentially military alliance.” In this way, Merkel and Sarkozy have established a clearly outlined framework interwoven with Franco-German objectives for the debate over a new NATO strategy now set to begin. And they take the view of the new US administration at its word, as expressed by the new national security advisor, Gen James Jones, who has promised the allies increased cooperation and reciprocal coordination.<sup>44</sup> It appears that France's new NATO policy can act as a catalyst to the degree that Germany, with France as a full NATO member by its side, is prepared to substantially strengthen Europe's foreign and security policy.

On the other hand, the actual consummation of France's return to NATO has produced no direct vitalizing effects within the alliance. Reintegration became practically a non-event during NATO's anniversary celebration. The "Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration" states laconically: "We warmly welcome the French decision to fully participate in NATO structures; this will further contribute to a stronger alliance." Even Point 20 of the declaration, in which NATO "recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense and welcomes the EU's efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges," fails to offer much promise for a Europe of defense.<sup>45</sup>

For that reason, we will have to wait on a new alliance strategy (which was commissioned at the anniversary summit and will be out by 2010) to assess the actual catalytic effect of France's new NATO policy on Europe's role in the alliance. It is primarily up to Europeans to achieve substantive changes. Are France's 26 EU teammates at all ready and willing to credibly divide up power and the responsibilities of burden sharing in a reformed alliance? Only if they are will it be clear that Sarkozy's gambit has worked and his new NATO policy has produced a real reorientation of the alliance. **SSQ**

## Notes

1. Since Kehl did not offer a suitable backdrop for the ceremonies, the anniversary's evening events were held in Baden-Baden.

2. Jean-Pierre Maulny, "Frankreich und seine zukunftsige Stellung in der NATO—eine politische, keine militärische Debatte" ["France and its Future Role in NATO—a Political, not Military Debate"], in *Frankreich-Analysen der FES*, November 2007, 2, [http://library.fes.de/cgi-bin/populo/digbib.pl?f\\_SER=frankreich-analyse&t\\_listen=x&sortierung=jab](http://library.fes.de/cgi-bin/populo/digbib.pl?f_SER=frankreich-analyse&t_listen=x&sortierung=jab).

3. Winfried Veit, "Bruch oder Bluff? Französische Aussenpolitik unter Sarkozy" ["Broken or Bluff? French Foreign Policy under Sarkozy"], in *IPG*, 2/2008, 33, [http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/ipg/ipg-2008-2/04\\_a\\_veit\\_d.pdf](http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/ipg/ipg-2008-2/04_a_veit_d.pdf).

4. Jolyon Howorth, *European integration and defence: The ultimate challenge?* Chaillot Paper no. 43 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2000), 18.

5. Kai Burmester, "Atlantische Annäherung—Frankreichs Politik gegenüber der NATO und den USA," ["Atlantic Approach—France's Policy towards NATO and the USA"], in *Die verhinderte Grossmacht: Frankreichs Sicherheitspolitik nach dem Ende des Ost-West Konflikts* [*The Indisposed Great Power: France's Security Policy after the East-West Conflicts*], eds. Hanns W. Maull, Michael Meimeth, and Christoph Nesshöver (Opladen: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1997), 107. See also Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, *Frankreichs Europapolitik* [*French European Policy*] (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2004), 111ff, 133ff.

6. Joxe is quoted in Burmester, "Atlantische Annäherung," 101.

7. Wichard Woyke, *Deutsch-französische Beziehungen seit der Wiedervereinigung: Das Tandem fasst wieder Tritt* [German-French Relations since the Reunification] (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2004), 136.

8. Jolyon Howorth, "La France, l'OTAN et la sécurité européenne: statu quo ingérable, renouveau introuvable" ["France, NATO and European security: status quo unsustainable, new balance unobtainable"], *Politique Étrangère*, 4/2002, 1005. An English version is available on the IFRI Web site: [www.ifri.org](http://www.ifri.org).

9. Dominique David, "France/OTAN: la dernière marche" ["France/NATO: the latest march"], *Politique Étrangère*, 2/2008, 431.

10. Ibid.

11. Léo Michel, "Liaison dangereuse: Kehrt Frankreich tatsächlich zurück in die NATO-Strukturen?" ["Dangerous liaison: France actually returns into NATO structures?"], *Internationale Politik*, March 2008, 35.

12. Maulny, "Frankreich und seine zukünftige Stellung in der NATO," 2.

13. Frédéric Bozo, "France and NATO under Sarkozy: End of the French Exception?" working paper (Paris: Fondation pour l'innovation politique, 2008), 6.

14. Nicolas Sarkozy (speech, Conference of Ambassadors, Paris, 27 August 2007), <http://www.elysee.fr/download/?mode=press&filename=ambassadeur-27-08-07.pdf>.

15. Nicolas Sarkozy (speech, US Congress, 7 November 2007), <http://www.elysee.fr/edito/index.php?id=23>.

16. Nicolas Sarkozy (speech, NATO summit, Bucharest, 3 April 2008), [http://www.elysee.fr/documents/index.php?mode=view&lang=fr&cat\\_id=7&press\\_id=1243](http://www.elysee.fr/documents/index.php?mode=view&lang=fr&cat_id=7&press_id=1243).

17. Bozo, "France and NATO under Sarkozy," 5.

18. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, "The big Member States' influence on the shaping of the European Union's Foreign, Security and Defense Policy," in *The Future of the European Foreign, Security and Defense Policy after Enlargement*, ed. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2006), 25–53.

19. Sarkozy is quoted in *Le Monde*, 18 June 2008.

20. See Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, "Frankreichs Europapolitik" and "Big Member States' influence."

21. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, "Frankreichs Europapolitik," 133ff; and "Wie halten wir es mit Amerika? Die transatlantischen Beziehungen, die Konstruktion Europas und die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit in der Ära Kohl," ["How do we keep America? Transatlantic relations, the construction of Europe and the Franco-German cooperation in the Kohl era"], *Historisch-politische Mitteilungen: Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik* [Historical and political messages: Archive for Christian-democratic policy] 14/2007, 280ff.

22. Bozo is also skeptical; see his "France and NATO under Sarkozy," 9ff.

23. See Point 3.1 of the French presidential agenda, which contains numerous proposals for improvements in capabilities.

24. *Le Monde*, 10 October 2007; and Veit, "Bruch oder Bluff?" 45.

25. Ireland's challenge to the Lisbon Treaty has serious consequences with respect to the priority given to the ESDP, because it means that it will not be possible in the foreseeable future to make use of the means for structural cooperation that the treaty would establish and because it prevents the new office of the European foreign minister from properly developing.

26. European Council, "Conclusions of the Chair," Brussels, 12 December 2008, Doc. 17271/08.

27. European Council, "Declaration of 8 December 2008 on Strengthening ESDP Capabilities," Doc. 16840/08. Specific projects include, among others, the establishment of a European air-

transport fleet, improvements in reconnaissance, and increased cooperation in armaments production to implement the capabilities development plan of the European Defense Agency (EDA).

28. Ronja Kempin, "Frankreich und die Annäherung von NATO und EU" [France and the Approach of NATO and the EU], *SWP-Aktuell*, April 2008, 2. Regarding the European Command Center, see Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, "Deutsch-französische Beziehungen und das Projekt 'Friedensmacht Europa'" [German-French Relations and the Project 'Peace Power Europe'"], in *Berliner Friedenspolitik? Militärische Transformation—Zivile Impulse—Europäische Einbindung* [Berlin Peace Project? Military Transformation—Civilian Impulses—European Integration], eds. Peter Schlotter, Wilhelm Nolte, and Renate Grasse (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2008), 233–60.

29. *Le Monde*, 4 October 2008. For a critical view, see Ronja Kempin and Marco Overhaus, "Kein grosser Sprung in der Entwicklung der ESVP: Lehren aus der französischen Ratpräsidentschaft" ["No great leap in the development of the ESDP: Lessons from the French presidency"], *SWP-Aktuell*, January 2009.

30. Ronja Kempin, "Modernisierung der französischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik" ["Modernization of the French security and defense policy"], *SWP-Aktuell*, August 2008. The white book also makes the case for an increased Europeanization of French defense and security policy and calls for the expansion of autonomous EU planning and command capacities.

31. Sarkozy is quoted in *Le Monde*, 18 June 2008. See also Sarkozy's address of 11 March 2008, in which he officially announced his reintegration policy, *Le Monde*, 13 March 2009.

32. Bozo, "France and NATO under Sarkozy," 14. See also Kempin, "Frankreich und die Annäherung von NATO und EU," 2.

33. *Le Monde*, 4 April 2009.

34. Sarkozy is quoted in *Le Monde*, 5 February 2009.

35. *Le Monde*, 5 February 2009; *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 20 February 2009.

36. Védrine is quoted by Michel, "Liaison dangereuse," 35.

37. Modem-Chef F. Bayrou, *Le Monde*, 5 February 2009.

38. *Le Monde*, 11 March 2009.

39. The general public responded positively to the step, with 58 percent expressing support for the decision—70 percent of the UMP voters and 52 percent of the PS voters.

40. Urging, for example, a ban on the production of fissionable materials as well as a continuation of the START Treaty between the United States and Russia. See European Council, "Council Statement on Strengthening International Security of 8 December 2008," Doc. 16751/08.

41. With his vision, Obama is aligning himself with the "Global Zero" initiative currently being circulated by a portion of the American security policy establishment.

42. *Le Monde*, 11 April 2009.

43. Reprinted on 4 February 2009 in the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* and on 5 February 2009 in *Le Monde*.

44. See the interview with Jones in the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 9 February 2009.

45. See the "Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration" at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease). This passage appears verbatim in the "Declaration on Alliance Security," [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_52838.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm?mode=pressrelease).

# Asymmetric Interdependence

## Do America and Europe Need Each Other?

*Beate Neuss*

### **The End of the “Unipolar Moment”**

“America and Europe still look to one another before they look to anyone else. Our partnership has benefitted us all.”<sup>1</sup> Having been in office only a few days, Vice Pres. Joe Biden availed himself of the opportunity presented by his appearance at the Munich Security Conference in February of 2009 to spread his vision of transatlantic cooperation. The message behind the vice president’s charm offensive could hardly have been any clearer: “My dear Europeans,” he seemed to say, “of course we are still dependent on one another! Of course we still need each other! Cooperation is essential! And, yes, we still need Europe’s advice and support!”

America’s position with regard to the symmetry or asymmetry of the transatlantic relationship can be found, diplomatically formulated, between the lines of the vice president’s speech. In short: “We’re going to attempt to recapture the totality of America’s strength.” In other words, the United States retains its claim to the role of world’s leading power—as first among equals. Consequently, the sort of dialogue between equals that Europeans so eagerly desire with the United States will not be based solely on interdependence—that is to say, on mutual dependence—and instead presupposes to a degree a symmetric distribution of power.

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It has been a long time since Washington placed such strong emphasis on its partnership with Europe as a whole—not just with “new” Europe—and on the need for cooperation and support. In May of 1989, Pres. George H. W. Bush presented the idea of “partners in leadership”<sup>2</sup> to the Federal Republic of Germany as the United States searched for practical support in transforming political structures in post-revolutionary Europe. Europe’s inability, acting either as individual states or through the European Union, to deal effectively with the wars going on at its own front door, in the Balkans, and with other global challenges—together with the United States’ largely unchallenged preeminence from 1991 on—masked the fact that Washington needed to act in close cooperation with its allies to fulfill its global role. The experience of trying to fund and conduct two wars with an increasingly reluctant and ever-shrinking “coalition of the willing” proved to be too costly in every respect. The legitimacy of American leadership was weakened when the United States was not able to count on political support from even the principal European powers for its controversial war in Iraq.

Immediately after taking office, the new US administration, which had received considerable advance praise in Europe from both official circles and the general public, put in a high-profile appearance at the Munich Security Conference in February 2009, in order to press the “reset button” in transatlantic relations. It was the first time in the 45-year history of the convocation that a US vice president had appeared at the event, and Biden used that opportunity to demonstrate a resolve “to set a new tone.”<sup>3</sup> Prior to Barack Obama’s election victory, government officials and analysts in Europe had speculated with some concern about the elevated expectations and demands that the new president likely would direct at Europe. But even now that the first of those demands have been publicly articulated, there is nevertheless a great sense of relief at being able to work with a more cooperative administration on pressing world problems—such as the global financial and economic crisis, climate issues, securing energy supplies, international terrorism, and the continuing problems in the Middle East—none of which can be solved without the United States. Europe needs US support to pursue its interests and achieve its goals. Therefore, there is an increasing awareness on both sides that the enormous complexity of the tasks and problems we face demand cooperative action. This fundamental commonality of interest is useful in interdependent relationships, even when those relationships are not symmetrical in nature. The

degree of agreement that exists on implementation determines the extent of the actual willingness to cooperate.

### **Symmetry: Economic Interdependence**

“It’s not logical to talk about a risk of recession in Germany,” the EU commissioner for economics and finance, Joaquin Almunia, announced in January 2008. “The United States economy . . . has serious problems with fundamentals. We haven’t.”<sup>4</sup> And yet, by late summer of 2008, the collapse of Lehman Brothers dramatically demonstrated that America’s crisis was Europe’s crisis, too, as the viruses infecting the American financial system quickly spread to Europe. The progress of the financial crisis and the recession that followed revealed just how deeply interconnected the transatlantic economy is, and it was soon clear that the crisis would only be overcome through cooperative effort. And yet, despite public calls for cooperation, there are clear indications that protectionist impulses are proving difficult to suppress on both sides of the Atlantic. It remains to be seen whether the old adage still applies, which says that when America catches a cold, Europe gets the flu. Generally speaking, Europe has in recent years become more competitive and increasingly oriented toward the broader world market. The European Union, with its 480 million inhabitants, now possesses a larger domestic market than the United States, with its 303 million inhabitants; so it is possible that the EU may avoid becoming any more caught up in the swirl of recession than the United States. But it is also important to note that, in spite of its domestic market and existing legal structures, EU member states find it difficult to act in concert and instead tend to fall back on protectionist measures that work to the detriment of others in the EU.

Public discussion is currently focused on the negative side of interdependence, with the sale of Opel offering just one example of more general developments. It is important, therefore, not to forget that interdependence has an upside as well and that it is this which has provided for the high level of prosperity and global economic influence enjoyed on both sides of the Atlantic.

### **Interdependence and Global Influence**

The European Union and the United States are the strongest economic regions in the world. The EU is responsible for 38 percent of world trade,



if one includes internal trade.<sup>5</sup> But even when only taking into account trade with outside third parties, the EU is still the world's largest economic power, with 17.4 percent of world trade, followed by the United States at 11.9 percent—so that both together, accounting for nearly a third of world trade, can be considered the world's dominant economic powers.<sup>6</sup> This is especially true with regard to their influence on the structure of the world economic order, given that the United States and the EU account for 60 percent of global economic productivity. This is what has placed them in a position (thus far at least) to dominate those institutions responsible for shaping global economic policy—which in turn has provided them the ability to pursue American and European interests and put into place American and European policies.

No two economic regions are as closely intertwined as these. In terms of trade volume, each is the other's largest trading partner. Germany alone sells as many goods to the United States as it does to China and India combined. The United States is by far the largest consumer of EU-produced goods, with 21.9 percent of the EU's products going to the United States. And in terms of import goods, the United States is in second place, behind China, at 12.7 percent (as of 2007). European exports constitute 18.4 percent of total American imports, while the EU takes in 21.8 percent of America's exports. And trade in the service sector is similarly upbeat. Both sides are thus intimately bound together through trade and overall economic development.<sup>7</sup>

Trade between the two has grown steadily, producing consistent trade surpluses for Europe. The totality of exchange, including the rapidly growing service sector, is estimated at \$3.7 billion,<sup>8</sup> making the transatlantic region the cornerstone of the world's economy. Moreover, this trade consists principally of high-value finished goods, which in turn means it is linked on both sides of the Atlantic to well-paying jobs.

Trade by both regions with other parts of the world, especially with Asia, is growing rapidly, while transatlantic trade prior to the current economic crisis grew at only a modest average rate of 3 percent. But the liberal market economies of the United States and the EU, each operating within its respective context of legal and political protections, have seen to it that trade has been replaced by investment. European and American direct investments are now the primary drivers behind the transatlantic economy. Well over half of all trade is made up of the exchange of goods traded within companies. Americans have been responsible for 57 percent of

foreign investment in the EU since the beginning of the current decade. Nowhere else does the US economy invest more than it does in particular European countries. In 2007, US investments in the EU were three times the amount invested in all of Asia! American firms operating in Europe produce three times as many goods as the United States exports to the EU; and the ratio is similar for Europe.<sup>9</sup>

The effect of this investment on the job market is impressive: 3.6 million Europeans work for American companies—including 367,000 Germans employed in manufacturing, out of a total of some 600,000 jobs in Germany as a whole.<sup>10</sup> European companies and their subsidiaries employ even more Americans: roughly four million. This means far more jobs are produced in the United States than are exported to so-called low-wage countries in Eastern Europe or Asia. In all, more than eight million people living in the transatlantic economic region are employed by companies from the opposite side of the Atlantic. If one includes those jobs created indirectly through direct investments, then the estimated number comes to a total of 12–14 million jobs, almost all of which are in professional areas at average or above-average levels of pay.<sup>11</sup>

Tied together with direct investments is the substantial level of investment in research and development carried out by both sides. Here, too, there is no comparable activity going on between countries or regions anywhere else in the world.<sup>12</sup> This means job creation and net production occur not only as a result of intensive trade but also more often locally, within each respective market. The prosperity of the United States and EU member countries depends decisively on the intensive integration existing between the two sides.

Clearly, this degree of integration between sovereign states exists nowhere else. In contrast to the early postwar years, interdependence is now much more symmetric, as the distribution of power and dependency between economies has come into greater balance. European influence in shaping the structures of the world economy is now plainly evident: The expansion of the G7 into the G8; the inclusion of emerging market economies at the G8 meeting in Heiligendamm in 2007; and the crisis meeting of G-20 finance ministers in 2009—all can be traced to European initiatives. The current economic crisis has promoted the formation of a united front.<sup>13</sup>

During the conflict between several European countries and the United States over the Iraq war, when political relations were “poisoned” (according to Condoleezza Rice) and communication at senior levels seriously

encumbered, discussion, especially in Germany, focused on what effect this political conflict would have on economic relations and whether German or French jobs might be endangered by it as a result. And yet, despite the worst deterioration in political relations since 1945, the transatlantic economy was not detrimentally affected. What ill feeling that did arise remained largely limited to the temporary renaming of french fries to “freedom fries.” More importantly, economic integration served as the “glue” that provided a stable basis for ongoing relations; economic lines of communication remained strong, even when political relations were disrupted. A reading of bare facts and figures offers only a hint of the flourishing nature of the transatlantic economy and of the intense communication and lively exchange of people and ideas it encompasses. It is this exchange that has been able to at least partially substitute for the loss of understanding and affinity each side held for the other before the flow of GIs once stationed to Germany had ceased.

Differing rates of growth in the developing world and in other continents and the related shifts in economic power occurring in an already multipolar world demonstrate conclusively that neither side in the transatlantic economy can pursue its interests alone in shaping the world’s economic order.

### **Asymmetries in Power Structures**

Since 1990, the European Union has taken ever greater strides toward becoming an important global player. But even though Hillary Clinton placed Brussels high on her itinerary and declared during a visit there at the beginning of March 2009 that the EU is a “great power,”<sup>14</sup> there still exists an asymmetry of political clout in the transatlantic region stemming from the structural differences in political coherence between a properly constituted great power, such as the United States, and the European Union. While the EU speaks with one voice in international organizations and acts according to commonly held regulations and legal codes, in matters of foreign and security policy it still operates on an intergovernmental basis, which means all essential decisions must be reached through unanimous consent among all 27 member states.

This asymmetry is conspicuous in political matters, especially in foreign and security policy. The European Union’s international presence remains diffuse owing to its institutional and legal structures. So long as the Lisbon Treaty is not allowed to take effect, the EU must operate according to the

rules set down in the Amsterdam Treaty, which call for the EU presidency to rotate every six months. This means that EU member states have to constantly accustom themselves to new leadership, and policy continuity cannot be ensured. Since the EU's contours as a union of states *sui generis* can be difficult to discern and the strength of the EU presidency is largely dependent upon the relative power of the member state currently holding that office, the foreign policy significance of the EU is often easily underestimated by other global actors. There is a great temptation to speak with individual member states directly and to seek to divide them from one another. A dramatic example of this occurred during the run-up to the Iraq war when the EU15, and even the six founding members, were divided into two camps, each pursuing different policies with the United States and on Iraq.

In addition to the rotating EU presidency, there is also the anomalous position of "High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy." Javier Solana has occupied this office, created in 1987 by the Treaty of Amsterdam, since 1999, which means he at least has been able to provide a recognized constant in Europe's common foreign and security policy (CFSP). He is part of the CFSP troika made up of the current EU president and the currently presiding head of the EU Commission. But the end result of this confusion of political and institutional responsibility is that Henry Kissinger's old wisecrack—"Who do I dial up when I want to talk to Europe?"—still remains relevant today.

The Treaty of Lisbon could bring significant improvement in this regard by creating the office of "President of the European Council," who would serve a two-and-a-half-year term and could be reelected once, while being prohibited from simultaneously holding office in any member state. The "High Representative" would also serve as both chair of the EU foreign affairs council and vice president of the commission, responsible for foreign policy. His job would be to provide for a coherent European foreign policy, and he would be supported in his responsibilities by a European foreign service.<sup>15</sup> This structure promises greater continuity, unity, higher visibility, greater confidence, and, ultimately, improved efficiency in the EU in matters of global concern—and, it would also provide an answer to Kissinger's question about Europe's telephone number. The effect of such a reform should not be underestimated: certainty and consistency allow Europe's partners to feel more secure about the decisions they take and are therefore important prerequisites for achieving international goals. Putting the Treaty of Lisbon into force—a European "Yes, we can!" indispensable to European

self-assertion—would constitute a step, albeit a small one, toward the elimination of transatlantic asymmetry. But even so, the complex inter-governmental coordination processes would still remain.

The “first network-like governing system in history”<sup>16</sup> obviously would operate according to a different logic than the American federal system in the way it shapes political will on significant questions relating to foreign policy. Reaching quick decisions in times of crisis would prove difficult. This is especially true in matters involving the threat or actual use of military force. The process of creating political consensus in the multitiered European system requires that approval be obtained at the national level (often in [coalition] governments and in parliament), as well as between member states and at the EU level. Consequently, Europe will for the foreseeable future not be able to achieve the sort of efficient decision-making structures the United States possesses—nor will it wish to, since it would not accept the reduction of national sovereignty such a structure would entail. But some things can still be improved nonetheless: Europe lacks a counterpart to the US National Security Council, for example, where interests are defined, priorities set, and strategies developed. This constitutes a serious shortcoming.

### **Europe’s Growing Empowerment**

Despite all the deficiencies the European Union demonstrates in the areas of foreign and security policy, it has nevertheless managed to respond to all major crises—the wars in the Balkans, international terrorism, natural disasters, and the threats emanating from fragile states—with increasing foreign and security policy cooperation, a growing coherence, and burgeoning international presence. The war in Kosovo in 1999 in particular acted as a catalyst in consolidating a European military component. Consensus proved elusive on key points of some important questions; for example, on the EU’s position with respect to America’s Iraq policy in 2003. But the EU learned from its ensuing powerlessness, and in 2003 it was able to provide for greater clarity about its common interests, threats, and goals through the formulation of the *European Security Strategy (ESS)*.<sup>17</sup> Five years on, it has undertaken a review of both progress made and continued shortcomings.<sup>18</sup>

The EU was able to reach a common position on the war in Georgia in 2008—albeit with some difficulty, given its members’ differing views

about how to react to Russian actions there. The EU's involvement in a conflict that would have traditionally been considered America's responsibility to resolve demonstrated real progress toward a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Clearly, it is the overextension of American power that has forced the EU to expand its ability to act. France's return to NATO's military structures should prove a plus for ESDP as well, since it helps to still concerns in the United States and among the European members of the alliance over the prospect of the dissolution of NATO brought about by the development of an autonomous ESDP. Suspicions about French intentions blocked all progress on ESDP prior to the British-French meeting at St. Malo in 1994. With France's reintegration into NATO, however, the development of ESDP should proceed more easily, especially now that Washington has recognized the need for independent European capacities and no longer pursues efforts aimed at blocking them.

The EU sees itself first and foremost as a nonmilitary power. It is this self-perception that has contributed to a tendency to implement essential military reforms—both in ESDP and in NATO—only reluctantly, with great delay, if at all. Both the *ESS* and the Council report of 2008 on the implementation of the *European Security Strategy*,<sup>19</sup> as well as the reaction to the war in Georgia, demonstrate that the EU prefers a strategy that seeks to include all relevant actors in an “effective multilateralism”<sup>20</sup> and which endeavors to uphold the rule of international law through dialogue and economic and financial incentives.<sup>21</sup> Beyond a partiality for the policy of prevention, the transatlantic partners differ markedly from one another in other ways as well. In principle, the EU does not use its military as a means for issuing threats, though it clearly does see the military as an instrument of last resort. For the United States, on the other hand, it is taken for granted that the military is an instrument of global policy. The difference in political mentalities here is striking.<sup>22</sup>

Equally striking are the differences in the military capacities of the United States and Europe. Here lies the single most important root cause for the asymmetry of political power. Though Europe has two million troops under arms—about 450,000 more than the United States (as of 2007, only 5 percent of these can be sent on missions abroad)—American military expenditures are twice those of Europe, and Europe's expenditures, moreover, are not disbursed in a focused manner. More than half of Europe's military expenditures go to personnel costs, while far too little goes into new military technology.<sup>23</sup> The technology gap between

Europe and the United States has only grown larger in recent years, making interoperability more difficult. Above and beyond this, there are the numerous caveats by which EU members who are also NATO allies limit their military involvements. In addition, Europe's armies are organized at the national level, with little effort toward specialization or division of labor. Despite increasing cooperation by defense manufacturers, there still exists, on the one hand, a duplication of weapons systems and, on the other, equipment which is unneeded or ill suited to dealing with today's new challenges, as well as glaring shortfalls in equipping humanitarian missions, peacekeeping operations, and combat operations in asymmetric engagements (not least in terms of logistics).

With embarrassing regularity Europeans have failed to achieve the goals they set for themselves. In 1999, for example, a decision was made that envisioned sending 60,000 troops abroad, including to far-flung locations, within a 60-day time frame for a period of a year. The implementation of this policy should have been completed by 2003, but currently there is only a stated intention to implement the plan "in the coming years."<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, two EU battle groups have now been placed in readiness. These highly flexible, 1,500-strong units can be deployed within 10 to 15 days for missions of up to six months in duration. For more sweeping missions, the EU can draw on NATO capabilities, as provided for through the Berlin-Plus agreement.<sup>25</sup>

Europeans do not shy away from important, albeit less dangerous missions—80,000 soldiers are now serving in UN, NATO, and EU operations around the globe. The EU is participating in a broad array of assignments—more than 20 thus far—ranging from peacekeeping actions in Aceh following the tsunami there, to protecting refugees and engaging in institution building in Kosovo. The goal of acting as the EU can be seen in the way in which it has presented even in those missions that it is not leading as "EU" missions (e.g., UNFIL).<sup>26</sup> There is, however, no obvious strategic vision directing these operations, something which the EU itself acknowledges, as in December of 2008 when it determined that: "Despite all that has been achieved, implementation of *ESS* remains a work in progress. For our full potential to be realized, we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active."<sup>27</sup>

Europeans cannot measure themselves using the United States as their yardstick. The United States is a world power in a literal sense, with bases around the world that provide it with a global presence. Even so, the EU

must make efforts to become a credible military partner with a willingness to make its own contribution to burden sharing if it wants to have a voice in decisions shaping strategy and global order. Its security policy relevance has grown over the course of the decade. The EU has provided for regional stability for its neighbors to the east and south through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), and it is engaged in Africa, where the United States takes no active role. Both of these serve to relieve the United States from some of its traditional role as world power. The EU contributes to securing the world's trade routes around the Horn of Africa through NAVFOR Somalia ("Operation Atalanta"). This is in Europe's own best interest, yet it involves assuming a role on the high seas that has up to now been the purview of the US Navy. Recently, the EU also has found itself in the novel position of effectively mediating a classic conflict between states involving a resurgent world power, Russia, and America's partner, Georgia—and it did so without assistance from the United States, which conspicuously kept its distance. But Europe is also right to recognize that "to build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now."<sup>28</sup> And, this explicitly involves possessing the right instruments to deal with emerging global security policy challenges. In the areas of soft power and economics, Europe has much to offer—but this alone is not sufficient to create a relationship of symmetry or a partnership of equals.

### **Interdependence: Indispensable Partnership**

Practically all recent studies conclude that we are on the threshold of a multipolar world order and of radical changes of unique and historic proportions.<sup>29</sup> These studies all conclude that Europe's political and economic relevance will shrink, owing to demographic changes and the shifting of the economic center of gravity to Asia. By 2025 only 10 percent of the world population will live in the North Atlantic region. *Global Trends 2025*, a report of the US National Intelligence Council, considers Europe barely worth mentioning in its examination of the future development of the international order. The United States is also considered to be of declining importance, yet will remain the only world power with leadership qualities. Even so, no one questions the fact that Washington must act multilaterally to regain legitimacy, bring an end to the two wars in which it is involved, master the current economic crisis, and deal with



the other challenges ahead. The United States has learned that even its power is limited and that unipolarity, to the degree it ever really existed, lasted only for a brief moment in time.<sup>30</sup> It is now aware that the tremendous problems of global order cannot be resolved even by the mightiest country on Earth.

Under President Obama, the transatlantic allies are largely of one view about the tasks and threats that lie ahead in the twenty-first century. In the search for a correlation of interests—whether it be in combating terrorism, shaping the world’s financial systems, formulating climate policy, or dealing with matters of human rights, nonproliferation, or Middle East policy—it soon becomes evident that there exists a greater congruency of interests and goals with the United States than with any of the world’s other emerging or reemerging great powers. Emerging powers may profit from a stable international order, but they generally do not contribute to its stability. Since neither the United States nor the EU can successfully pursue global policies alone, where can they turn in the new multipolar constellation of powers but to each other? Each, therefore, is the other’s indispensable partner!


Europe’s interest lies in a democratic order coupled to a social-welfare, market-based economy, which it sees as the most secure foundation for providing “the greatest good to the greatest number” (Jeremy Bentham), because this best combines personal freedom with the greatest possible prosperity. EU member states have placed the effort against climate change at the top of their list of priorities. And, they see effective multilateralism as the foundation of a peaceful world order—a view to which President Obama also subscribes. For Europe, but also for the world as a whole, the United States remains the “indispensable nation” (Madeleine Albright), without which neither the battle against climate change nor the effort to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can succeed. At bottom, both the United States and the EU are striving toward the goal of world governance, which they see as the prerequisite for effectively securing global peace and prosperity. Precisely what form this should take remains to be discussed. But the more relevance Europe can secure for itself (including in matters relating to security policy), the greater will be its influence in that discussion.

Europe’s role has changed markedly over the course of the past decade—so much so that analysts view the EU as a hegemonic if not imperial power, able to successfully set European norms in both its own region and beyond.

The European periphery has come under the economic and political domination of Europe—while Europe's borders have been continuously shifting outwards through the admission of new members and as a consequence of new political instruments like the ENP or the Black Sea Synergy program. Zaki Laïdi has referred to this as a “normative empire.”<sup>31</sup> The European Union's influence has grown because it no longer seeks its fortunes through soft power alone.

Today, Europe may have more to offer the United States, but does Europe have what it takes to deal with the United States on an equal footing in discussions over matters of importance? First of all, just because both sides are dependent on each other does not mean that they are equally dependent on each other. The European Union is in many ways more vulnerable than the United States. It has too few natural resources of its own, and those countries that supply it with needed resources are often under the control of unstable, authoritarian regimes. Secondly, mutual dependence does not mean that there are no differences of opinion over strategy or how to approach a problem. These differences exist and provide the grist for conflict. They arise out of differing historical experiences, but they are also due to asymmetries of power, to America's insistence on having a dominant role in world affairs, and to European shortcomings in security policy.

While Europe's influence clearly came to bear in managing the global economic crisis—requiring that Washington follow up on demands for new regulations and structural reforms—controversies over burden sharing in security policy still continue. With France's reintegration into the military structures of NATO, the underlying controversy over a European military component—either independent in nature or linked with NATO (together with British suspicions of European initiatives in this matter)—should now be settled. This will allow for the further development of the ESDP—provided Europe can summon up the political self-assertiveness necessary to secure its position in an increasingly complex international system. For that, it will need the cooperation of the United States: “Europe must see to it that America remains committed to Europe.”<sup>32</sup> The United States is in need of a partner that is capable of taking action itself. This also entails the unpleasant demand of Europeans that they make a proper contribution to burden sharing and, above all, that the European Union be capable of making decisions and taking action. Only then will it be possible to give real meaning to the conclusion drawn in the *European Security Strategy* of 2003, where it was observed that “the transatlantic

relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.”<sup>33</sup> 

## Notes

1. Joseph R. Biden, “America needs the world just as the world needs America” (speech, 45th Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2009), <http://germany.usembassy/events2009/feb-biden-security>.

2. George H. W. Bush, “Remarks to the citizens in Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, 31 May 1989,” <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=17085>.

3. Biden, speech, 45th Munich Security Conference.

4. Quoted in the *International Herald Tribune*, 22 January 2008.

5. Stephan Bierling, *Die Huckepack-Strategie: Europa muss die USA einspannen [The Huckepack Strategy: Europe must Constrain the USA]* (Hamburg: Edition Koerber-Stiftung, 2007), 22.

6. EUROSTAT, “Warenhandel, nach den Weltweiten [*sic*] wichtigsten Händler [*sic*]” [“Commodity trading after the global main vendor”], <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=de&pcode=tet00018>.

7. Figures for 2007: EUROSTAT Comex, Statistical regime 4/IMF (Dots), DG Trade 10 September 2008. Trade volume for the EU consisted of €442.567 million and for the United States of €446.625 million. The EU’s trade surplus (including service sector) was €80 billion.

8. Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, *The Transatlantic Economy 2009: Annual Survey of Jobs, Trade and Investment between the United States and Europe* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2009), v. US exports in the service sector doubled between 1997 and 2007 to \$180 billion, while the EU’s exports to the United States rose from \$62 billion (1997) to \$154 billion (2007). *Ibid.*, ix, <http://www.brookings.edu/Press/Books/2009/thetransatlantic-economy2009.aspx>.

9. See “Trade: Increased Investment Stimulates Trade,” <http://germany.usembassy.gov/benchmarks/trade/index.html>; and “Investment: Underpinning the Relationship,” <http://germany.usembassy.gov/benchmarks/investment/index.html>.

10. Hamilton and Quinlan, *Transatlantic Economy*, 20f. The US Embassy places the figure for the same period (2006) at a total of 800,000 jobs in Germany, <http://germany.usembassy.gov/benchmarks/employment/>.

11. Hamilton and Quinlan, *Transatlantic Economy*, 21.

12. Almost \$19 billion in Europe and around \$30 billion in the United States. *Ibid.*, x.

13. Despite differing viewpoints, the spring summit of 20 March 2009 led to an agreement to take a common position at the G–20 meeting in April of that year.

14. “Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, bezeichnet in Brüssel die EU als grosse Macht” [“. . . called the EU in Brussels a great power”], *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7/8 March 2009.

15. Treaty of Lisbon, Art. 26 and 27.

16. Jeremy Rifkin, “The American Dream, der europäische Traum und die dritte europäische Revolution” [“The American Dream, the European Dream and the third European Revolution”], in *Die alte und die neue Welt: Transatlantische Gespräche [The Old and the New World: Transatlantic Discussions]*, eds. Bernd M. Scherer and Sven Arnold (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2008), 25.

17. European Council, *A Secure Europe in a better World: European Security Strategy* (Brussels: EU, 12 December 2003), <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

18. European Council, *Report on Implementation of the European Security Strategy—Providing Security in a Changing World* (Brussels, EU, 11 December 2008), <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/Search/searchMeta.aspx?lang=en&id=1&searchterm=Providing%20Security%202008&cid=292216291326024081xwpckxyjgojlacsqglxs&p=2>.
19. European Council, “Declaration by the European Council on the Enhancement of the European Security and Defence Policy,” Presidency Conclusions, Annex 2, Brussels European Council, 11 and 12 December 2008, Appendix 2, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cm\\_sData/docs/pressData/en/ec/104699.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cm_sData/docs/pressData/en/ec/104699.pdf).
20. *Ibid.*, 15.
21. Sven Biscop, Jolyon Howorth, and Bastion Giegerich, *Europe: A Time for Strategy*, Egmont Paper 27, Royal Institute for International Affairs (Ghent: Academia Press, January 2009), <http://www.irri-kiib.be/paperegmg/eg27.pdf>.
22. Robert Kagan, *Macht und Ohnmacht: Amerika und Europa in der neuen Weltordnung* [*Power and Powerlessness: America and Europe in the New World Order*] (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 2003).
23. European Defense Agency (EDA), *An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defense Capability and Capacity Needs* (Brussels: EDA, 3 October 2006), 29, <http://www.eda.europa.eu/genercitem.aspx?ares=organisation&id=146>.
24. European Council, “Declaration by the European Council on the Enhancement of the European Security and Defence Policy,” 16.
25. For example, during Operation EUFOR Althea.
26. Biscop et al., *Europe: A Time for Strategy*, 8.
27. European Council, *Report on Implementation*, 2.
28. *Ibid.*, 12.
29. See, for example, *US National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, NIC 2008-003 (Washington, DC: GPO, November 2008), [http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF\\_2025/2025\\_Global\\_Trends\\_Final\\_Report.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf); and *EU Institute for Security Studies, The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025* (Paris: EUISS, 2006), [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/NGP\\_01.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/NGP_01.pdf).
30. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (Winter 1990/91): 23–33.
31. Zaki Laidi, *The Normative Empire: The Unintended Consequences of European Power*, Garnet Policy Brief, 6 February 2008, [http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/policy\\_briefs/Garnet\\_Policy\\_Brief\\_No6.pdf](http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/policy_briefs/Garnet_Policy_Brief_No6.pdf). See also Jan Zielonka, “Europe as a Global Actor: Empire by Example?” *International Affairs* 84, no. 3 (May 2008): 471–84; and Hiski Haukkala, “The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighborhood Policy,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 9 (November 2008): 601–22.
32. Bierling: *Die Huckepack-Strategie*.
33. European Council, *A Secure Europe in a better World*, 13.

# US Interventions Abroad

## A Renaissance of the Powell Doctrine?

*Alexander Wolf*

THIS ARTICLE addresses the question of when and under what circumstances we may expect foreign interventions under the Obama administration. By chronicling the doctrinal premises of US intervention policy during the “interwar years” (1990–2001)<sup>1</sup> and the administration of George W. Bush (2001–2008), it will demonstrate that the “smart power” approach of the Obama administration suggests continuity over radical change. Despite a liberal humanitarian orientation that in principle should look favorably on intervention, Washington will consider employing its military forces—when necessary, unilaterally and preemptively—only to protect vital US interests and only when confronted by immediate security threats. A possible renaissance of the so-called Powell Doctrine should be considered in connection with this interest-based policy approach, since it generally offers a promising framework for military intervention.

### **American Intervention Policy during the Interwar Years (1990–2001)**

The policies of the interwar years—that period between the end of the Cold War’s bipolar order and the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the war on terrorism that followed—were shaped during the presidencies of George H. W. Bush (1989–93) and Bill Clinton (1993–2001). Both presidents were faced with the task of determining at what point and

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for what purpose the use of US military forces would be justified in the post-Soviet era. These decisions about the direction of US policy were part of the adjustment in foreign policy by the “world’s only remaining superpower.” Precisely what form this adjustment was to take became the source of much debate and depended on each observer’s limited set of experiences and background as well as his or her ideological persuasion and outlook.<sup>2</sup> The only point of agreement was that the old paradigm had disappeared with the end of the East-West conflict.<sup>3</sup>

### **Bush Senior and the Powell Doctrine**

The senior President Bush, a statesman and diplomat who thought in terms of *realpolitik*, viewed the military pragmatically as one tool among several to be used sparingly and prudently:

Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice. . . . But in every case involving the use of force, it will be essential to have a clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing U.S. forces once the mission is complete. Only if we keep these principles in mind will the potential sacrifice be one that can be explained and justified.<sup>4</sup>

This sensible set of criteria is perhaps best summed up in the Powell Doctrine. Peter Rudolf has correctly pointed out that the Powell Doctrine should not be considered identical with the Weinberger Doctrine.<sup>5</sup> While the Weinberger Doctrine places emphasis on the “vital interests” that trigger state action, the Powell Doctrine begins with the interest-based decision to intervene and formulates an operational catalogue of criteria for the “proper” execution of military intervention.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, the military should only be put to use when (1) the national interest requires it; (2) the number of troops employed corresponds with the mission they are to execute; (3) the mission is clearly defined, both politically and militarily; (4) the size, composition, and disposition of the troops is constantly being reevaluated; (5) the operation has the support of both the Congress and the American people; and (6) there is a clear exit strategy.<sup>7</sup>

The operational criteria to be fulfilled according to the Powell Doctrine are meant to set up barriers to the ill-considered commitment of military forces in poorly planned operations and to help prevent “mission creep,” the unplanned escalation of a conflict.<sup>8</sup> A prime example of a military

intervention carried out in accordance with the Powell Doctrine is the US-led Operation Desert Storm, conducted under UN auspices for the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.<sup>9</sup>

### **Clinton and a Difficult Reorientation**

While Operation Desert Storm still involved American forces engaging in a classic state-to-state conflict aimed at deterring, or in this case, punishing another state actor, the objectives and general orientation of US military interventions changed markedly under President Clinton. Interventions were no longer instruments of *realpolitik* aimed at deterring a well-armed enemy but were seen instead as means for realizing political or conceptual or ideological goals.<sup>10</sup> This shift first became evident at the beginning of Clinton's first term in office as formulated in the concept of "assertive multilateralism," which took as its goal the expansion of democracy and freedom—a pragmatic "neo-Wilsonianism."<sup>11</sup> As part of this, the United States would make increased use of multilateral UN missions to avoid having to act or bear responsibility alone. This approximate orientation around a system of collective security "was an attempt to bring into accord the interventionist orientation of liberal interventionism with the political reality of limited resources and domestic political restrictions."<sup>12</sup> The increased use of the American military for the general benefit of mankind was no longer consistent with the Powell Doctrine, however, which represented a foreign policy straightjacket to the liberal Clinton administration. And yet Hans Morgenthau was to be proven correct: Interventions "must be deduced not from abstract principles which are incapable of controlling the actions of governments, but from the interests of the nations concerned and from their practice of foreign policy reflecting those interests."<sup>13</sup>

With no "peace dividend" materializing and a recession and budget deficit to contend with at the start of the 1990s, majority sentiment in both the Republican-dominated Congress and among the American people in general coalesced around the notion of "a new nationalism, a new patriotism, a new foreign policy that puts America first and, not only first, but second and third as well."<sup>14</sup>

Following the "disaster in Mogadishu" in October 1993 involving the death and mutilation of 18 US soldiers engaged in a failed operation aimed at capturing the warlord, Aidid, as part of the larger campaign of Somali reconstruction, the concept of "assertive multilateralism" came under

such sharp criticism from the Congress and the general public that the Clinton administration was forced to quickly abandon it, replacing it with the “strategy of engagement and enlargement.”<sup>15</sup> The core elements of this new foreign policy doctrine aimed at the proliferation of democratic and market-oriented systems along with a partial departure from unilateralism, a new selectivity with respect to foreign crisis management, and the effective use of positive developments in globalization for the restoration of American economic strength.<sup>16</sup> Additionally, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) of May 1995 set such strict criteria for American participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations (both peace restoring and peace maintaining) that, as Rudolf and Daalder correctly point out, it effectively amounted to an unequivocal restatement of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.<sup>17</sup>

### **Foreign and Domestic Factors during the Interwar Years**

The American presidents of the interwar period were unable to follow through on the example offered by Operation Desert Storm. Due to the fundamental changes in security policy connected to the end of the East-West conflict and the revolution in information technology (including the politicizing effect it had on an increasingly vocal civil society) as well as the further fragmentation of traditional international power structures, both George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton found themselves frequently prevented from achieving their presidential prerogatives in foreign policy. The diversity of post-Soviet opinion also shifted the lines of US domestic political debate and intensified the discussion over American intervention policy.<sup>18</sup> “A generation was coming of age in the Congress who cared less about foreign affairs, elected by a generation of voters who cared less, and reported on by a media that paid less attention.”<sup>19</sup>

Between the end of the “idealistic experiment” in Somalia in May 1994 and the terrorist attacks of September 2001, military interventions were regularly a topic of domestic political debate—mainly along party lines but also on institutional grounds between the president and Congress. While public opinion and the Congress (principally the House of Representatives) disapproved of the vast majority of foreign interventions, it should be noted that members of Congress often rejected them for purely political reasons to gain a tactical advantage in an upcoming election, coming out publicly against them only after they had already been approved.<sup>20</sup> The decisions to intervene made between 1994 and 2001 must be viewed in light of the



strategy of engagement and enlargement and PDD-25 that established a strict delimitation of interests with respect to the objectives of any intervention and made the combat deployment of American ground forces practically impossible. This Clinton Doctrine “read more like a statement of when and why the United States would not intervene militarily than a delineation of when and why it would.”<sup>21</sup>

As a consequence, Washington categorically refused to get involved militarily to stop the genocide in Rwanda, and military pressure used in places like Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 was to be exerted solely through air attacks—which led critics to complain, correctly, that belated success at negotiated solutions came at the price of increased civilian casualties from war and genocide or that the administration failed to consider successfully prosecuted interventions like Operation Allied Force in 1999 as precedents for future operations.<sup>22</sup>

“The advent of the modern media and . . . a change in generational attitudes . . . in a country in which foreign policy hardly mattered”<sup>23</sup> was an enormous influence on American intervention policy during the interwar years and led to an increased reluctance by the United States in committing its troops militarily. This pattern changed after the terror attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington, DC, when the American people were made painfully aware that “security is like oxygen: easy to take for granted until you begin to miss it.”<sup>24</sup>

## **American Intervention Policy in the Era of George W. Bush**

As previously shown, American intervention policy during the interwar years had several different goals. This changed following the attacks of 9/11. This “transformational moment”<sup>25</sup> had an immense effect on America’s collective consciousness. Not since the American Civil War had so many Americans been killed on a single day, and the nation’s capital had not come under attack since the War of 1812.<sup>26</sup> The targeting of civilians not only shattered the sense of territorial security, it also constituted a declaration of war on universally held values of pluralism and democracy.<sup>27</sup>

The events of 9/11 changed American intervention policy suddenly and radically. The so-called Bush Doctrine, which left a definitive mark on the 2002 *National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States* (one might even say embodied it), was built on the following elements: First, the struggle against international terrorism became the predominant goal of American

foreign and security policy. Second, this struggle was not to be a short-term project but instead a task that would be pursued for years to come.<sup>28</sup> Third, due to the nature of the threat, it would be imperative that the United States bring to bear all the means at its disposal—which was only possible (and this is a central point of the 2002 *NSS*) if the United States is guaranteed the freedom to act preemptively.<sup>29</sup>

### **The Principles of the Bush Administration: Preemption and Unilateralism**

The Bush administration was convinced that Americans could feel secure only when global terrorism, as well as the danger of nuclear attack by “rogue states,” was completely eliminated. This gave preemptive interventions legitimacy, because “defending against terrorism and other emerging 21st century threats may well require that we take the war to the enemy. . . . The best, and in some cases the only defense, is a good offense.”<sup>30</sup>

Additionally, “security will require all Americans . . . to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.”<sup>31</sup> Preemption—the art of anticipatory self-defense in the face of direct and imminent threats—was largely uncontroversial with respect to attacks by terrorists. “Law enforcement, covert operations, and intelligence gathering have always sought to preempt terrorist attacks, and such preemptive activities are well-established in international law. . . . The debate in the United States has always been about whether the U.S. government is doing enough to stop terrorists preemptively, not whether it has to wait for them to attack before acting.”<sup>32</sup>

With respect to rogue states, the core of the so-called new doctrine called preemption constituted a dangerous and radical change in the foreign policy course of the United States.<sup>33</sup> On the one hand, the 2003 *NSS* claimed for the United States the right to act preemptively whenever three factors coincided: (1) a rogue state (2) possesses weapons of mass destruction or is attempting to obtain them and (3) either supports or harbors international terrorist groups. Based on the United States’ hegemonic position in the international system, political science professor Werner Link accurately identifies preemptive/preventative self-defense as a new element of international relations, as follows:

The principle of sovereign equality and co-subordination of states, which, despite all attempts at relativization, has characterized the international state system since the Treaty of Westphalia and which expressly underlies the order established under the United Nations is to be superseded by a system of hierarchies in which

the United States (and it alone) can at its own discretion decide whether a state has forfeited its right of sovereignty and whether American military intervention aimed at overturning the existing regime and establishing an occupation for the purpose of reorganizing state authority is permissible.<sup>34</sup>

Although only North Korea and Iraq were identified by name in the doctrine, the criteria it established could be interpreted to apply to other states as well. Even if one accepts the interpretation offered by Daalder and Lindsey that there is no specific criteria in the *NSS 2003* recognizing the freedom to act preemptively,<sup>35</sup> there is still another problem, addressed by Henry Kissinger: “It cannot be in either the American national interest or the world’s interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of threats to its security.”<sup>36</sup> Bruce Jentleson has added two more points to Kissinger’s criticism: the injury the doctrine inflicts on international law and norms as well as the questionable efficiency of preemptive interventions.<sup>37</sup> Central to criticism of the principle of preemption is the fact that it is dependent upon detailed and reliable information about the genuine seriousness of a threat. If a preemptive action cannot be legitimized *ex post facto* by proof of the existence of an imminent threat, then the action is not preemption but prevention taken in violation of international law.

The policies of preemption and unilateralism first became a significant international problem, however, with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 took place with the aid of a coalition of more than 170 countries convinced of the legitimacy of the action.<sup>38</sup> While it was clear from the outset that the mission determined the nature of the coalition and not vice versa,<sup>39</sup> President Bush’s statement, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,”<sup>40</sup> only developed its full effect as part of the manufactured justification for the Iraq war in 2002–03, dividing the transatlantic community and its institutions into proponents and opponents of regime change.

### **“Mission Accomplished:” Unlearning the Lessons of Mogadishu**

The war against terror was not conducted solely out of an American desire for security but also as an expression of the United States’ interest in assisting the spread of freedom.<sup>41</sup> Like their ideological kindred, the liberal humanists, the neoconservative circles in the Bush administration were concerned to establish a world order of a superior normative caliber in which the United States could fulfill its own sense of exceptionalism.<sup>42</sup>

After the Taliban-led government and al-Qaeda fighters had been driven out of Afghanistan with the aid of Afghan warlords, or at the latest when President Bush landed on the USS *Abraham Lincoln* and declared combat operations in Iraq to be over, it then became apparent that there had been no, or least insufficient, planning for the occupation phase that followed.<sup>43</sup> Warnings like those from Gen Eric Shinseki that several hundred thousand troops would be necessary to stabilize and secure occupied Iraq, were publically dismissed as miscalculations.<sup>44</sup>

Here it became apparent that although the “Bush Doctrine” carried out interventions to defend (neoconservative interpretations of) vital interests, in contrast to the Powell Doctrine it did not spell out any sort of exit strategy. Once violent opposition began against American occupation forces, thereby obstructing any effective process of reconstruction, it became clear that although the American military’s “shock and awe” tactic may have been effective in crippling and undermining the morale of an opponent from the start of combat operations through fast-paced and intense air attacks, it was not possible to effectively manage the occupied territory using these same means. As Carlo Masala has pointed out, for an externally imposed campaign of nation-building to function, it is imperative that the occupying troops have the support of the civilian population, that it take place against the backdrop of neighboring countries that are “kindly disposed” toward the operation, and that the occupation and loss of sovereignty be temporary.<sup>45</sup> The Bush administration gave little emphasis to these elements prior to its interventions, which is why the unilateral preemptive *NSS* of 2003 offered no way out of this dilemma.

As a consequence, the Bush administration had to find political and operational solutions to the precarious security situations that developed in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 2006 *NSS* revised the unilateral, preemptive character of American foreign policy, placing increased emphasis on diplomatic and multilateral initiatives—in part to obtain needed support from allied countries. The neoconservative sense of mission and the goals of spreading democracy, freedom, and human rights remained in effect, however. Accordingly, one must concur with Ivo Daalder when he notes that the 2006 *NSS* no longer differs significantly from the strategy of engagement and enlargement of the Clinton administration.<sup>46</sup>

At the operational level, the first “counterinsurgency field manual” since the Vietnam War was drawn up under the direction of the current commander of Central Command, Gen David Petraeus. Nathaniel Fick and

John Nagl have summarized its main points as follows: “Focus on protecting civilians over killing the enemy. Assume greater risk. Use minimum, not maximum force.”<sup>47</sup> It is true that these new guidelines constituted a nearly complete and still controversial reformulation of American military doctrine responsible for the massive troop increases in Iraq as part of the “surge” aimed at stabilizing the security situation there. But it is also true that the same tactic will not necessarily lead to success in Afghanistan.<sup>48</sup>

### **“Soft Power”—Continuity of Substance alongside a Change in Style?**

During the election campaign, observers gained the impression that Barack Obama had no intention to limit “the use of military force . . . to the role of protecting the American people and the nation’s vital interests in the event of an actual or imminent attack.” Aside from self-defense, military power might also be used in the service of the “common security” on which global stability rests. “As a maxim for the use of armed forces beyond purely self-defense purposes, [Obama] says that in such instances, every effort should be made to win the support and participation of other countries.”<sup>49</sup>

Through the consequences brought about by the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington has discovered the limits of what had been thought to be its boundless power and now realizes that “America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, but the world cannot meet them without America.”<sup>50</sup> This in no way implies that the United States will alter its underlying foreign policy goals. The promotion of the security, freedom, and prosperity of the American people will remain an end in itself, as well as the foundation for a just and stable international order<sup>51</sup> and will continue to direct the foreign policy agenda of the United States into the future.

To realize these goals, the Obama administration will make greater use of “smart power,” a mixture of military “hard power” and diplomatic “soft power.” This approach could become the basis for a new doctrine and rests on these three principles:

1. America’s standing in the world is a condition for its security and prosperity;
2. current challenges can only be met with capable and willing partners; and

3. nonmilitary means can increase the legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability of American actions.<sup>52</sup>

Barack Obama faces extraordinary domestic and foreign policy challenges. It seems unlikely that he can count on a persisting “rally-round-the-flag” effect from the American public regarding military interventions. For even though Americans still take a considerable interest in foreign policy matters, in particular the fight against terrorism, 71 percent say President Obama should concentrate on domestic concerns, in contrast to the 11 percent who feel that foreign policy issues should take precedence.<sup>53</sup> If the president wants to avoid endangering his domestic agenda early in his first term in office, he will need the broad support of public opinion. Above all, he will have to rely on maintaining a constructive relationship with the Democratic congressional majority, which is predominantly in favor of expanded use of diplomatic rather than military means in the struggle against terrorism.<sup>54</sup> In the event, however, that Washington is unable to accept a nuclear-armed Iran, for example, or the further destabilization and radicalization of a nuclear-armed state like Pakistan, then military interventions can no longer be ruled out on principle. Ivo Daalder is correct when he notes that “some situations will require the threat of or actual use of military force—and in those instances, the use of force early is likely to be more effective and less costly than waiting until it can only be employed as a last resort. Preemption, in other words, is here to stay.”<sup>55</sup>

One may expect the intervention policy of the Obama administration to demonstrate continuity with both the liberal internationalism of the Clinton years as well as with the *NSS* of 2006. This may perhaps prove a disappointment to the overly idealistic expectations held by supporters of Barack Obama on both sides of the Atlantic.<sup>56</sup> To be effective at dealing with the numerous security policy challenges it confronts, caution in the use of its military on the part of the United States must fulfill two conditions. First, the “smart power” concept must be correlated with the conditions set down in the Powell Doctrine to secure the support of the American public and of Congress to both the commitment of interests and to an exit strategy, as well as to provide for the requisite materiel and personnel needs necessary to improve the chances of success for any potential intervention. Secondly—this point should be obvious by now—US allies, especially those participating in operations in Afghanistan, must expand their efforts, in particular through nonmilitary means,

to support Washington with a proper measure of “burden sharing.” This is not a matter of propriety, nor does it constitute raising multilateralism into an end in itself. The obligation to cooperate arises solely from the fact that in the twenty-first century, security must be sought by all countries working in concert and not by individual states acting alone. The potentially disastrous nature of some security risks present in the global nuclear age requires the acceptance and legal regulation of the still controversial principle of preemption.

One must concur with Richard Haas when he writes that the questions about “when,” “where,” and “how” military interventions are to be carried out relates to the question about America’s interests around the world and what the United States is prepared to do to preserve them.<sup>57</sup> The Powell Doctrine can offer persuasive answers to the questions about “when,” “where,” and “how” to intervene. The question of which interests might provoke intervention is a political one, however, that each society must decide for itself. In view of the global nature of the security challenges we face, the solutions we seek must be global in nature as well. **SSQ**

#### Notes

1. For a comprehensive description of this period, see Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars—From 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror* (New York: Public Affairs/Perseus, 2008).

2. The debate over future expectations for the post-Soviet period, greatly simplified, fell between the notion of the “end of history” (see Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *National Interest* 16 [Summer 1989]: 3–18) and the “back to the future” idea of power politics between nation-states (see John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security* 15, no. 1 [Summer 1990]: 5–56).

3. See Richard N. Haas, “Paradigm Lost,” *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 43–58.

4. George H. W. Bush, “Remarks at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York,” 5 January 1993, [http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public\\_papers.php?id=5156&year=1993&month=01](http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=5156&year=1993&month=01).

5. The Powell Doctrine does, however, exhibit a similarity to the Weinberger Doctrine, which Colin Powell helped formulate, in terms of content and conceptual structure. See Peter Rudolf, “Friedenserhaltung und Friedenserzwingung: Militärinterventionen in der Amerikanischen Aussenpolitik” [“Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement: Military Intervention in American Foreign Policy”], in *Weltmacht ohne Gegner: Amerikanische Aussenpolitik zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts* [*World Power without Opponents: American Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the 21st Century*], eds. Peter Rudolf and Jürgen Wilzewski (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2000), 297–334, in particular 301.

6. Regarding a catalogue of criteria for military interventions, see also Reinhard C. Meier-Walser, “Wann soll der Westen in Krisen intervenieren? Globale Einsätze als mehrdimensionale

Projekte" ["When Do You Want the West to Intervene in Crises? Global Operations as Multi-dimensional Projects"], *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zürich), 20 November 2007.

7. See Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 5 (Winter 1992–93): 32–45.

8. The classic case of the politically undesired widening of a conflict—and one that shaped Colin Powell's own thinking on these issues—was the Vietnam War. With respect to mission creep and the problem of quick exit strategies, see Jeffrey Record, "Exit Strategy Delusions," *Parameters* 31, no. 4 (Winter 2001–02): 21–27.

9. See Powell, "U.S. Forces;" and Rudolf, "Friedenserhaltung und Friedenserzwingung," 302. Contrary to prevailing opinion, Operation Restore Hope (November 1993–March 1994) in Somalia, which Powell helped plan, can also be considered as another example of the Powell Doctrine in operation, since it was organized in terms of duration, scope, and objectives according to the criteria established by that doctrine. It was Pres. G. H. W. Bush's reading of American national interest (a prerequisite for intervention) that caused him to decide in favor of intervention in Somalia rather than in Bosnia. In addition to Powell's fear of an escalation of the conflict, the decision not to intervene in Bosnia was also motivated by a desire not to destabilize the fragile democratic government of Pres. Boris Yeltsin, who would have been weakened had the United States chosen to intervene in a region that Moscow (at least theoretically) still considered as part of its zone of influence. With both the newly elected President Clinton and the US media demanding intervention in Bosnia, Bush saw it in America's vital interest to obstruct or at least delay any intervention there. "Unable to control the spin on each crisis and in response to the election of Bill Clinton, Bush and Powell concluded that if the United States were going to intervene in response to a humanitarian crisis, it would be in Somalia and not in Bosnia." See John Western, "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia," *International Security* 26, no. 4 (Spring 2002): 112–42, especially 118.

10. See Rudolf, "Friedenserhaltung und Friedenserzwingung," 298.

11. See Jason DeParle, "The Man inside Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy," *New York Times Magazine*, 20 August 1995, 32–39, 46, 55–57, especially 35.

12. Rudolf, "Friedenserhaltung und Friedenserzwingung," 303.

13. Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 3 (April 1967): 425–36, especially 429.

14. Patrick Buchanan, "American First—and Second, and Third," *National Interest* (Spring 1990): 79–82.

15. See Douglas E. Delaney, "Cutting, Running, or Otherwise? The US Decision to Withdraw from Somalia," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 15, no. 3 (Winter 2004): 28–46.

16. See Patrick Keller, *Von der Eindämmung zur Erweiterung: Bill Clinton und die Neuorientierung amerikanischer Aussenpolitik* [The Mitigation of Extension: Bill Clinton and the Reorientation of American Foreign Policy] (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 2008), 92–95.

17. See Rudolf, "Friedenserhaltung und Friedenserzwingung," 305–6 and n. 29.

18. See Jerel Rosati and Stephen Twing, "The Presidency and U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War," in *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. James M. Scott (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 29–56.

19. David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals* (New York: Touchstone, 2002), 75.

20. See Rudolf, "Friedenserhaltung und Friedenserzwingung," 325, 329–30.

21. Bruce W. Jentleson, *American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century*, 1st ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 298.



22. See Ivo M. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo," *Foreign Policy* 116 (Fall 1999): 128–40.
23. Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 496.
24. Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflict: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 6th ed. (New York: Longman, 2007), 205.
25. Unnamed "senior official." Source established/quoted in Peter Rudolf, *Imperiale Illusionen: Amerikanische Aussenpolitik unter Präsident George W. Bush* [*Imperial Illusions: American Foreign Policy under President George W. Bush*] (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2007), 7.
26. See Bruce W. Jentleson, *American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century*, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 359.
27. For more, see Tilman Mayer, "Patriotismus und Nationalbewusstsein in den USA seit dem 11. September" ["Patriotism and National Consciousness in the USA since 9/11"], *Politische Studien* 406 (March/April 2006): 15–23.
28. The war against terror "will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." Pres. George W. Bush, "Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," 20 September 2001, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=64731&st=&st1>.
29. "For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the cold war doctrines of deterrence and containment, in some cases, those strategies still apply, but new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best." Pres. George W. Bush, "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York," 1 June 2002, [www.dartmouth.edu/~govdocs/docs/iraq/060102.pdf](http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govdocs/docs/iraq/060102.pdf).
30. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "21st Century Transformation of U.S. Armed Forces" (speech, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 31 January 2002), <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=183>.
31. Bush, "Commencement Address at the US Military Academy," (2002).
32. Ivo Daalder, James M. Lindsey, and James B. Steinberg, *The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation*, Policy Brief no. 108 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, October 2002), 6.
33. See Ivo Daalder and James M. Lindsey, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003), 122.
34. Werner Link, "Hegemonie und Gleichgewicht der Macht" ["Hegemony and Balance of Power"], in *Sicherheit und Frieden zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts* [*Security and Peace at the Beginning of the 21st Century*], ed. Mir A. Ferdowski (Munich: Bavarian Office of Political Education, 2004), 43–60, especially 59.
35. See Daalder et al., *Bush National Security Strategy*, 6.
36. Henry Kissinger, "Preemption and the End of Westphalia," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (Fall 2002), [http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2002\\_fall/kissinger.html](http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2002_fall/kissinger.html).
37. International law is violated through the disregard for Article 51 of the UN Charter—allowing for self-defense only "if an armed act occurs." Jentleson sees a lack of efficiency owing to the immensity of information required as well as reliable planning needed prior to any intervention. See Jentleson, *American Foreign Policy*, 371.
38. *Ibid.*, 365.

39. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "Annual Report to the President and Congress," 15 August 2002.

40. Bush, "Address before a Joint Session of the Congress," 20 September 2001.

41. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated in an interview on NBC's "Meet the Press," 27 June 2003, that "the battle to secure the peace in Iraq is now the central battle in the global war on terror, and those sacrifices are going to make not just the Middle East more stable, but our country safer. . We're pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime who will be held to account for their crimes. The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. And then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq." <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2909>.

42. See Tony Smith, "Wilsonianism after Iraq," in *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century*, G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Tony Smith, and Anne-Marie Slaughter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 53–88. On neoconservative policy, see the comprehensive analysis of Patrick Keller, *Neokonservatismus und Amerikanische Aussenpolitik: Ideen, Krieg und Strategie von Ronald Reagan bis George W. Bush* [*Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: Ideas, War and Strategy from Ronald Reagan to George Bush*] (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008).

43. "My belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators." Vice Pres. Dick Cheney, interview on "Meet the Press," 14 September 2003, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244>. "There's a basic point to make about planning that people need to understand. You can't write a plan for a military situation, and this is basically a military situation, that is like a railroad timetable. There are too many things that you learn as you go." Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, interview on "Meet the Press," 27 June 2003.

44. "[T]he notion that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq [is] wildly off the mark." Paul Wolfowitz, "Department of Defense Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2004 Hearing before the House Committee on the Budget," 8, [http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108\\_house\\_hearing&docid=f:85421.pdf](http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearing&docid=f:85421.pdf).

45. See Carlo Masala, "Managing Protektorate: Die vergessene Dimension" ["Managing Protectorates: The Forgotten Dimension"], *Politische Studien* 411 (2007): 49–55.

46. See Ivo Daalder, "Statement on the 2006 National Security Strategy," [http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/0316diplomacy\\_daalder.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/0316diplomacy_daalder.aspx).

47. Nathaniel Fick and John A. Nagl, "Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition," *Foreign Policy* 170 (January/February 2009): 42–47, especially 43.

48. *Ibid.*, 43–44.

49. Peter Rudolf, "US-Aussenpolitik und transatlantische Sicherheitsbeziehungen nach den Wahlen" ["US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Security Relations after the Elections"], *SWP-Aktuell* (July 2008): 2.

50. Pres. Barack Obama, "Address to Joint Session of Congress, 24 February 2009," [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress); and Vice Pres. Joseph R. Biden, "America needs the world just as the world needs America" (speech at 45th Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2009), [http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu\\_20090&menu\\_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=238&](http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_20090&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=238&).

51. These goals are set forth in the paper entitled "Strategic Leadership," considered the "blueprint" for the Obama administration's national security strategy: "Our core goals today are the same ones envisaged by our founding fathers: the resolute pursuit of security, liberty and

prosperity both for our own people and as the basis for a just and stable international order.” See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Bruce W. Jentleson, Ivo H. Daalder, et al., *Strategic Leadership: Framework for a 21st Century National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security Publications, 2008).

52. See Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, “Implementing Smart Power: Setting an Agenda for National Security Reform” (statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 24 April 2008), 3, <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2008/NyeTestimony080424a.pdf>.

53. Pew Research Center, “On Obama’s Desk: Economy, Jobs Trump All Other Policy Priorities,” 22 January 2009, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1087/economy-jobs-top-public-priorities-2009>.

54. In a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in February 2009 asking whether military operations or diplomatic efforts were better suited to preventing terrorist attacks, 57 percent of Democrats opted for diplomatic efforts, 28 percent for military operations, 15 percent for both/neither. See Pew Research Center, “Obama faces Familiar Divisions over Anti-Terror Policies,” 18 February 2009, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1125/terrorism-guantanamo-torture-polling>.

55. Ivo Daalder, ed, *Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2007), 16.

56. See Christian Brose, “The Making of George W. Obama,” *Foreign Policy* 170 (January/February 2009): 53–55.

57. See Richard N. Haas, *Intervention: The Use of American Military in the Post-Cold War World*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999), 2.

## Book Reviews

*Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies* by Brian A. Jackson et al. RAND Corporation, 2007, 182 pp., \$25.00.

This brief monograph, sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security, investigates government efforts to curb terrorism through technology, subsequent terrorist countermeasures, and the impact these have on the relative costs and benefits of defensive technology. The study is limited by the inability to include classified information in an open-source document and by focusing exclusively on technology and not the political and social implications. However, the conclusions made are valid and valuable for improving future threat assessment and security policy. The authors assert that although technology can be an aid to limiting terrorist effects, it cannot be relied upon in itself to defeat terrorism.

The authors organize an exhaustive record of relevant publications and personal interviews into a concise, comprehensive review of four cases: Palestinian terrorist groups, Jemaah Islamiyah and affiliated groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. They concentrate on five primary classes of defensive technology: information acquisition and management, preventive action, denial, response, and investigation. The report identifies four fundamental countertechnology strategies: altering operational practices, making technological changes, avoiding the technology, and attacking the technology. The authors emphasize that there is no technological “silver bullet” for defeating terrorism, but a flexible, multilayered defensive strategy uses technology to enhance a solid foundation of human intelligence and investigative efforts.

This book is an excellent real-world analysis of the somewhat discouraging history of attempting to combat improvised terrorism with innovative technology. Technology alone is inadequate because, “terrorist organizations will eventually develop counterstrategies that limit [its] value,” however, “the value of a defensive technology is not necessarily that it can exact a high enough ‘one-time price’ on a terrorist organization to overwhelm it, but that the technology is a drag on the terrorist group’s operations over time.” To make technology more effective, “a defensive model built of a variety of security measures that can be adjusted and re-deployed as their vulnerable points are discovered provides a superior approach.”

Individuals pressed for time can get the salient points from the nine-page summary in the beginning, but I encourage readers to at least peruse the tables in each chapter. They offer a succinct summary of actual government actions and terrorist countermeasures and provide insight into the reason why defeating a determined group with technology is impossible. Those who read the full report will find that

most of the figures do not add anything useful but that the chapters are well structured and remarkably parallel for such a collaborative effort.

I recommend this monograph to anyone tasked with planning and implementing a long-term strategy against terrorism. It demonstrates the importance of a multilayered defense and the vital need for “multistep” policy analysis to anticipate possible countermeasures *before* an expensive technology is deployed. At some point, however, the pursuit of the next technological breakthrough reaches a point of diminishing returns, and though the authors stress that cost-benefit analysis must be applied to defensive technology implementation, they do not suggest an escape from the endless countermeasure/counter-countermeasure loop that feeds the industrial-military machine. Unfortunately, the scope of the study is not broad enough to make the next logical step; attempting to fight terrorist acts at the tactical level does not solve the underlying socioeconomic problems that cause terrorism.

While confronting issues such as poverty, equality, and religious extremism is not the typical realm of military strategists, to truly win a global war on terrorism, one must begin to think and act in concert with other government agencies and nongovernmental organizations. Breaking out of the techno-centric, tactical view of war is the only way to wage a combined fight against the root causes of terrorism. Einstein reportedly said, “We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.” Eliminating terrorism will require plenty of inventive thought, and this report can help focus strategic policy efforts towards that goal. Readers can expand their knowledge on the insidious spread of terrorist technology in the RAND report, *Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies*.

Maj Glen Shilland, USAF

Air Force Institute of Technology, ENS2

***The Idea of Democracy in the Modern Era*** by Ralph Ketcham. University Press of Kansas, 2004, 302 pp., \$35.00.

Perhaps no concept is more enmeshed in the psyche of US culture and national policy than the primacy of democratic rule. But as generally accepted and highly valued as democracy may be in the United States, it is also greatly misunderstood—or at best only vaguely understood by US citizens who nevertheless agree that democracy is the best form of government. Ralph Ketcham (professor emeritus, political science and history, Syracuse University) does a masterful job of unraveling what democracy means, and has meant, in the American experience. He traces roots of the idea of democracy to its more ancient origins in Greece, but his investigation into democratic thought also leads to some surprising places—namely, Judaism, Islam, Japan, and (both pre- and post-1949) China. The resulting book challenges accepted understandings of what democratic forms of government stand for. I recommend this book for anyone involved in national security affairs, for graduate and senior undergraduate area studies, and for those charged with encouraging democracy throughout the world. It should serve as a cautionary

tale and mandatory reading for those seeking to plant and encourage democratic governments where no prior experiences with such institutions exist.

Ketcham frames his discussion by outlining “four episodes or configurations of ‘modernity’ ” (p. 1). The influences of Francis Bacon and John Locke laid the foundations for an articulation of democracy as “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” within a discourse and tradition of natural law that launched the revolt against British rule. To the degree that the consensus about democracy broke down among “first modernity” practitioners, it broke down along the lines of “how best to protect individual rights and how best to educe the public spirit and virtue essential to good government” (p. 47). Thomas Jefferson, according to Ketcham, forged a synthesis around agreement on foundational principles while leaving room for more debate and development in areas where consensus proved elusive.

It was specifically along the lines where consensus proved elusive that Ketcham’s “second modernity” emerged in the mid to late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Philosophers including Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Charles Darwin, and John Dewey recast the consensus on what democracy means for an age characterized by new science and industrialization. In this new form, democracy became inextricably linked with social and economic progress. According to Ketcham, “The first modernity in its political dimension had Newtonian guidelines of order, balance, and harmony, while the second followed Darwinian guidelines of struggle, competition, and indeterminacy” (p. 55). Thus, Bentham’s and Mill’s utilitarianism combined with Darwin’s competition for survival and Dewey’s rationalization of society to transform what democracy means from a social contract with readily identifiable boundaries grounded in natural law to a philosophy geared toward individualism, relativism, and majority rule.

Second modernity democracy continued to evolve after World War II, wherein democracy appeared to have withstood an attack from totalitarian forms of government—a battle that seemed to confirm the utility of vaguely accepted democratic ideals. The Western allies’ victory “resulted in a pervasive reconfiguring of democratic polity into what is perhaps best termed the *liberal corporate state*” (emphasis in original, p. 90). The imposition of state presence on society to provide for and to correct problems of social justice, racism, poverty, inequality, unemployment, health care, and a host of other issues gradually altered perceptions of what democracy means. Earlier interpretations gave way to beliefs that democracy meant preserving group and individual interests. Ketcham notes that the result was “an ideology and form of democracy ruling over increasingly large and diverse populations, intent on devices of majority rule, responsive to the felt needs of interests and groups within society, protective of civil rights, committed to market economies at home and abroad, pragmatic about the powers of government and the uses of bureaucracy, and convinced of the benefit of competitive/conflict/adversarial models in economics, politics, and intellectual life” (p. 110).

Perhaps the most innovative aspect of Ketcham’s analysis is his exploration of the transference of democratic thought to East Asia—particularly to Japan and

China. He characterizes this evolution of the democratic ideal as the “third modernity,” based on Confucian culture. One might expect that Asian interpretations of democracy would primarily reflect interaction with European and American proponents of the democratic ideal. But in addition to these influences, Ketcham shows that Asian scholars considered how to reconcile their cultural traditions that favored individual dignity over group benefits. At times, the scientific grounding of second modernity democracy appeared to point to ways to reconcile the cultural divide. But in the end, “East Asian thinkers have had grave, even profound reservations that have led, through a multitude of twentieth-century revolutions, reforms, trials, and transformations in half a dozen or more polities, to rationales and practices of democracy often different from those in the West” (p. 181). One has to wonder if those differences are so vast that they prevent any comparison to accepted definitions of democracy at all. For example, the relaxation of state control in China to make room for economic growth does not necessarily mean that centralized Communist Party rule has become a thing of the past.

The “fourth modernity,” according to the author, draws on the post-modern intellectual traditions of Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and Michel Foucault. The emphasis inherent in these philosophers’ ideas brings to the surface the modern world’s attack on groups and individuals. The rejection of scientific approaches in favor of instinct, combined with a recognition of communities and the effects (or abuses) of power on perceptions of social conditions, produces a recasting of what democracy means. Ketcham describes this meaning as one in which “the basic parts are understood, not as individuals, but as affinity groups oppressed, not just, as traditionally, by tyrants, but also by the very nature of contemporary society and liberal government. . . . Governments should do very little because almost anything that they might attempt will simply interfere with the (private, idiosyncratic) needs and fulfillments of the diverse parts of society” (p. 209).

Professor Ketcham has produced a complex narrative of how ideas and ideals evolve. He references the source documents behind the ideas to create a seamless description of what democracy means and how that meaning gets translated into governing systems. Throughout the book there is a cautionary tale (especially for those who seek to encourage democratic growth)—attempting to establish democracy apart from a sophisticated understanding of its meaning involves great risk. It is better to analyze the philosophical roots of the concept before launching the project.

**Anthony C. Cain, PhD**

Editor-in-Chief, *Strategic Studies Quarterly*

***China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia*** edited by William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007, 284 pp., \$27.95.

The unprecedented growth of China’s economy over the past 25 years, coupled with its ever-increasing regional, political, and aggressive military modernization plan, has many within the US government, military, and corporate leadership

wondering what it all means. Anecdotal evidence resonates everywhere, with no consensus on whether or not the United States should see China's rise as a threat or just a natural progression of any nation's growth—albeit with significantly greater acceleration than all nations before it. What the topic has obviously lacked until now has been a comprehensive, scholarly analysis on the aforementioned concerns, particularly one that is forward leaning in time.

In *China's Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia*, the coeditors and a group of distinguished researchers examine the issues utilizing an integrated multi-disciplinary approach. Their intent is “to determine the likelihood that China's economic and political rise will continue without conflict . . . [and] to test the hypothesis that China's peaceful rise represents a realistic outcome.” Their comprehensive research encompasses such issues as whether the Chinese political system and foreign policy present an obstacle to—or support for—continued economic growth and reform and discusses the associated pitfalls of economic growth, domestically and internationally.

Utilizing current relevant data, resources, and scholarly research, their collective analysis convincingly concludes that:

1. China has emerged as the new economic center of gravity in Asia.
2. The market forces driving China toward globalization will extend current patterns of integration and advocate foreign policy that further promotes trade liberalization (promoting free-trade agreements within the region) and investment flow. This will lead to a new political and economic realignment throughout Asia . . . the balance of influence in Asia will continue to shift decidedly in China's favor.
3. China's increasing reliance on the global market for its economic growth and development enhances the probability of its peaceful rise.
4. Economic growth within China will continue to generate pressure for political reforms, thus destabilizing the political environment within China—balancing the survival of the Communist Party with the aspirations of the Chinese people. While vigorously supporting economic reform, the China Communist Party still views market forces and Western thinking—including thinking on economics—as a threat to the party. What is remarkable is how well the party, believing that marketization is dangerous, has nevertheless been able to maintain its political position while riding the tiger of reform (p. 92).
5. China's economic, diplomatic, and technological transformation is emerging hand-in-hand with major upgrading of its military capabilities.
6. China's military ambitions are local in nature and not global force projection. . . . China cannot project military power and therefore is a minimal threat to its neighbors. Its military growth is designed to protect its borders and influence Taiwan's political future.
7. China's military rise does not conflict with a peaceful rise.



The authors emphasize the need for the United States to develop a more consistent, comprehensive, and constructive Asia policy—one that emphasizes key commercial and military objectives and China's emergence as a regional power and global economic partner.

Aside from the conclusions drawn, what makes this book such a valuable read is the wealth of scholarly based macro-level economic and geopolitical insight provided. One of the most intriguing insights is how Southeast Asian nations have embraced the economic opportunities associated with China's growth. For example, the three largest participants in global foreign direct investment (FDI)—the United States, the European Union, and Japan—now only account for one-quarter of China's FDI inflows. China now does significantly more trade with South Korea and Taiwan than does the United States. This economic reorientation has led to shifts in political alignments—alignments increasingly leaning more toward China and away from the United States. Manifestations of such shifts include Taiwan's business community opposing the independence-oriented policies of Taiwan's ruling party and South Korea's government restrictions on the use of South Korean-based installations from which possible US attacks could be launched against North Korea, as well as its acceptance of North Korean nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. Another response to China's ascent includes indirect consequences such as the strengthening of bilateral military relationships between the United States and Japan, India, Singapore, and Indonesia, as well as growing interest in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements between some of these same nations.

Other nuggets abound, such as the pitfalls of China's growth on its people and the associated social welfare issues that accompany them; the global impact of China's educational and industrial policy; China's entrance into the World Trade Organization; and the emergence of China-led bilateral and multilateral regional trade agreements, to name just a few.

The book's chapters are comprehensive and effectively interwoven, bringing clarity, persuasiveness, and credibility to its conclusions and recommendations. Furthermore, it is reader friendly and can be read as a complete body of work or as independent chapters.

The broadest of readership will find value in this book—from military officers and government officials seeking a better understanding of China for planning and policy consideration/formulation to academics and corporate leaders seeking greater situation awareness. I do, however, feel compelled to end with a word of caution to the readers of this fine book: as convincing as the book is in conveying the belief that China's emergence is merely a strategic balancing of the powers of others and/or of promoting the peaceful global integration of a transformed economy, we cannot separate strategy and capabilities from future intentions.

**David A. Anderson, PhD**

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*Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* by Elisabeth Jean Wood. Cambridge University Press, 2006, 310 pp., \$25.99.

The joint military community is in the last strides of developing a mutually agreed upon irregular warfare (IW) definition. Certain to make the doctrinal description are keywords such as “influence,” “relevant populations,” and “legitimacy.” Unfortunately for today’s warriors, IW operations to affect such influence, populations, and legitimacies to the adversary’s disadvantage vary greatly, as evidenced by historical counter-insurgency experiences. With no consensus approach to guide military planners as they attempt to counter budding or thriving insurgencies, an awareness and in-depth understanding of history’s array of revolutionary mobilizations is important. It is also paramount that planners realize that the answer to the question Why do the locals support the insurgents? is more often than not, “It depends.” With this in mind, one can only applaud Elisabeth Wood’s *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* as a successful analysis of what encouraged the noninsurgents, or “campesinos,” to support the insurgency or join its ranks.

Wood leverages impressive credentials—her experiences as a paralegal and translator in El Salvador in the 1980s for refugees seeking political asylum sparked her interest in its insurgency—as a foundation for her study. The eventual catalyst for her research most likely stemmed from multiple trips to El Salvador. In her first trip, she studied a refugee return and demilitarized zone agreement negotiated by officials of the Catholic Church, the El Salvador military, and insurgent forces. Later trips reinforced her familiarity, allowing her to trace the evolution of Salvadoran communities torn apart by the insurgency. This field experience, coupled with her publications in comparative politics and political economy, culminated in the production of a first-rate study of revolutionary mobilization and social history.

Wood’s thesis is obvious and well stated at the outset. She argues that although material injustices and other traditional revolutionary mobilization models played a small role in the 1979 birth of insurgent collective action in El Salvador, it was, in fact, emotional and moral motives that starred as the central source of the campesinos’ support of the guerilla organization, Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). Throughout her work, she keeps all supporting arguments, evidence, and dialogue tied closely to this assertion.

The success of the FMLN in eventually reshaping the Salvadoran oligarchy’s political and economic interests was paramount to the growth and sustainability of the FMLN itself. In no small part, the support of the local populace helped the FMLN influence Salvadoran governmental and military organizations. This premise is not groundbreaking to any scholar of insurgent movements. What is unique, however, is Wood’s findings on the campesinos’ motivations for collaborating with and providing for the FMLN movement—she takes a major break from the traditional models, such as selective and collective incentives, governmental protection, social networks, and political opportunities, as causes. Instead, through interviews conducted over a nine-year period, she construes the campesinos’ creeds of morality and emotional benefits as the fundamental cause for their support, despite the high risks associated with such

backing. Her final analysis is enlightening: the majority of peasants and campesinos supported the FMLN based on these fundamental causes, even though they would gain no more than the remaining rural populace who chose to remain neutral.

Wood adds validity to her research methodology by fully addressing required assumptions and possible shortcomings with grassroots accounts garnered through multiple interviews. Professionally placed in the early pages of *Insurgent Collective Action*, Wood fairly steers readers to consider the following social processes as having possible, and in some cases very probable, reshaping and altering effects on the individuals she interviewed: the recalled event's "intensity" affecting the accuracy of memory; social and cultural processes influencing which memories are retained, emphasized, or forgotten; and political loyalties and beliefs shaping the interviewees' understanding of the interview itself, and thus unconsciously shaping their eventual recollections out of concern for security and beliefs that their correspondence to the interviewer might have today. Wood presents these considerations in a manner that does not create animosity; they are not a defense of her research but, instead, an impartial contribution that informed readers will appreciate and use to evaluate her final analysis.

The only hitch is Wood's almost apologetic explanation of her research method, intermingled markedly throughout the book. She invests valuable time and space explaining the study group from which oral testimonies were collected—and she does this proficiently upfront in the first three chapters. Then, to much dismay, she continually restates possible shortcomings in her research throughout the remaining five chapters (often based on her ethnographical representations of her interview sampling). These "apologies" are not intrusive or distracting to the overall thrust of the book; however, the repetition will likely leave readers confused regarding why she continues to revisit something she expertly tackles early on.

Overall, for those concerned with the implications of "winning hearts and minds" in the current context of irregular warfare operations, Wood's *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* offers a finely researched analysis of collective action in the insurgency and civil war of El Salvador, 1979–92. Wood's innovative conclusion presents the strategic planner another option to consider when aiming to influence the population with a desired effect of eroding populace support to an insurgency.

Maj Kevin M. Virts, USAF

*Coalition and Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence*

***Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security*** by Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler. National Defense University Press/Potomac Books, Inc., 2006, 319 pp., \$60.00.

This book presents "an intellectual history of national security thinking since the end of the Cold War" (p. xi). The authors, each of whom possesses extensive experience in the US defense and foreign policy apparatus and now serves at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University, survey what leading scholars and observers have written over the pre-

vious 15 years about the nature of the world scene and America's role in it. By summarizing, critiquing, and synthesizing the arguments contained in more than 60 volumes representing "differing concepts and schools of thought concerning international relations since the end of the Cold War" (p. xii), the authors seek to provide a clearer picture of the challenges America faces in today's international security environment. Like the proverbial "blind men feeling the elephant," each of the works reviewed offers a glimpse of the beast we all confront.

To organize the materials chosen and lend a more structured intellectual framework, the works canvassed in chapters 2 and 3 are categorized according to their assessment of the character of the international context in which the United States must operate. Those that offer "a relatively optimistic view arguing that the future will be shaped by growing democratization and economic prosperity," the authors classify as "neo-Kantian." Those who, by contrast, "portray the future in more pessimistic terms, shaped primarily by stressful security affairs that often require military solutions," they identify as "neo-Hobbesian." Those whose works are classified as neo-Kantian include Francis Fukuyama, Thomas Friedman, Jeffrey Garten, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, while neo-Hobbesians include Zbigniew Brzezinski, William Pfaff, Robert Kaplan, Bernard Lewis, and Kenneth Pollack—though there are some, like Samuel Huntington, who occupy both camps, and most incorporate, to one degree or another, elements of both worldviews. While neo-Kantian interpretations predominated during the early post-Cold War years, neo-Hobbesian views of global developments proliferated as the 1990s progressed, and especially following the 11 September terrorist attacks. It is interesting to note how much attention was focused a mere 10 years ago on developments in Russia and China with comparatively little attention given to Islamic fundamentalism or terrorism, even by neo-Hobbesians. The authors do not propose to demonstrate that one camp has a better finger on the world pulse than the other, merely to characterize the contending views of the global security environment.

In chapter 4, Binnendijk and Kugler summarize writings focusing on the effects of new technologies on international relations. They point out that although new technologies do not alter the fundamental nature of the international context, they do magnify the means available to existing actors and expand the pool of actors overall. Bodies such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization, multinational companies, nongovernmental organizations, as well as terrorist groups and even individuals play increasingly important roles on the world stage, undermining to a degree the sovereignty of traditional nation-states and further complicating international affairs.

Chapters 5 and 6 take up a selection of works that examine US grand strategy, dividing them into four schools of thought: "traditional conservatives," like Henry Kissinger, who focus on big-power relations; "progressive multilateralists," such as Joseph Nye, who promote cooperation, consensus building, and greater use of "soft power" instruments; "assertive interventionists," like Walter Russell Mead, who argue for a more expansive use of US military and economic power, deployed uni-

laterally where necessary; and “offshore balancers,” like Fareed Zakaria, who point up the limits to American power and tend in some instances to neo-isolationism. The authors then take a look at how wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq shaped America’s military doctrines and technologies and the various proposals aimed at transforming the US military to deal with future threats and challenges.

Extrapolating from and blending together the analyses and proposals contained in their diverse readings, Binnendijk and Kugler conclude that “within the global democratic community,” especially among its “inner core” of North America, most of Europe, the more prosperous countries of Asia and parts of Latin America, “neo-Kantian dynamics predominate,” whereas the “Middle East and nearly the entire southern arc of instability, plus major parts of sub-Saharan Africa, are ensnared in neo-Hobbesian dynamics,” while “transitional regions,” especially Russia, China, and India, evidence both “hopeful dynamics and worrisome trends” (pp. 282–83). The thrust of US efforts, in their view, should be on creating a cooperative approach among the democratic “core” aimed at dealing with the problems and challenges issuing from the world’s less stable regions. In general terms, they favor a US security policy that moves “from assertive interventionism to a new mix of traditional conservatism and progressive multilateralism” (p. 288). With respect to American military doctrine and practice, they call for a second military transformation aimed at providing the United States the tools it needs to fight both “small, messy wars” as well as handling the increasingly important stabilization and reconstruction operations that follow in war’s aftermath.

*Seeing the Elephant* focuses narrowly on traditional national security concerns, leaving aside, as the authors readily admit, such matters as environmental threats, emerging demographic challenges, and the dangers posed by disease. Additionally, the volume directs its attention almost exclusively on American analyses of the global security environment, giving non-American views short shrift. These omissions, however, do not necessarily detract from the book’s overall usefulness, and the analysis provided is sufficient unto itself. Although the authors see their book mainly as a primer for students at America’s war colleges, its overview of contemporary American thinking about global affairs can and should provide a wider audience with an excellent source of orientation for dealing with an increasingly complex world.

**K. Michael Prince, PhD**

Author, *Rally Round the Flag, Boys!*  
*South Carolina and the Confederate Flag*

***Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America*** by Walid Phares. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 277 pp., \$24.95.

In *Future Jihad*, Walid Phares discusses the foreboding topic of terrorism in a popular writing style while avoiding exaggerated sensationalism or fear mongering. The historical background of jihad and the comprehensive analysis of the threats facing the United States based on the author’s knowledge of Arabic and his long study of arguments in the Arab press make this book worth reading.

*Future Jihad* flows through three general topics in the course of 17 chapters: (1) What is jihad, and how did this idea develop to the present day? (2) How and why has America become a target? and, (3) Knowing the plans our enemies have for us, what must we do now? This is not a book about Islam, but rather about a specific doctrine that evolved in the context of the geographical expansion of Islam and the history of conflict in the Muslim world. Defenders of Islam insist that jihad is a term of great purity and power signifying the inner struggle for self-control against corrupting passions and degrading desires. Phares acknowledges this briefly, but moves on to discuss jihad as a policy used by elites for political ends. In his view, “Jihad was to become the legitimate call for mobilization and action and ultimately war” (p. 23). He defines jihad as a military principle that makes all battles holy and transforms all encounters with the enemy into religious duty.

From his historical summary, he concludes that the caliphs used jihad as a tool for popular mobilization to achieve invasion, annexation, and conquest and as a policy governed by pragmatic conditions as well as legal restrictions. He does not discuss the nuances of legal application and authority, but rather describes jihad as an “intellectually sophisticated” doctrine justifying the expansion of the Islamic state as the protector and promoter of Islam. He calls jihad a state policy, an ideological tool, and an instrument for waging war, invasion, conquest, and resistance (p. 45).

Phares defines the enemy thusly: “In simple terms, the jihadists are twentieth-century terrorists who want to resume the wars unleashed by Islamic empires nearly fourteen centuries ago” (p. 48). The absence of a central structure of state authority in Islam forces militants to claim authority without support, “committing violence in the name of a whole community and an entire religion, yet without the mandate from the people” (p. 48). Phares discusses successive waves of combat as “jihadis”—plural—and argues that militants today seek three main objectives: (1) The liberation of all lands ever held by Muslims (*Tabrir*), (2) the unification of all Muslim lands (*Tawhed*), and (3) the establishment of political authority under strict Islamic law (*Khalifa*, or Caliphate). He also summarizes three political movements aimed at these objectives: Wahhabism, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamic revolution in Iran led by the Ayatollah Khomeini.

Phares expounds on the justifications asserted by terrorists in the central section of this book. However, he falls into an excessively monolithic consideration of ideas, using metaphorical allusions to hierarchy and centralization, contrary to the diverse and widely distributed character of global terrorism networks. For example, although he refers to a “world official body of jihad,” he makes no attempt to define it. He writes of Hamas and related groups as “connected to the international mother ship on a multitude of levels, they provide information, technical assistance, and financial contributions, and would send militants to battlefields if the international command so decided” (p. 97). Phares defines this “mother ship” as al-Qaeda (p. 128). He does not give Osama bin Laden credit as a creator of ideology, but rather calls him the inevitable product of ideological ferment. Here he draws an analogy to *The Lord of the Rings* to describe the influence of militant ideology as a mystical power to impel humans to commit terrorism.

There is a debate in the Muslim world: “Do Muslims have theological legitimacy to fight, even with the tactics of terror?” Phares concludes that Muslim attitudes toward this debate fall into three approaches:

1. Some Muslims recognize the importance of the debate—and consciously take sides. They reject jihad in favor of international law.
2. Some Muslims just ignore ideological conflict and participate in the international community.
3. Our enemies engage in jihad and continually reshape their justifications for fighting.

He goes too far in claiming that “no one is saying that the jihadists, by their actions and beliefs, have made themselves ‘heretics’ or ‘apostates’ who no longer belong to the Muslim religion” (p. 49). On the contrary, Fawas Gerges noted in a 21 September 2007 *International Herald Tribune* article that “one of bin Laden’s most prominent Saudi mentors, the preacher and scholar Salman al-Oadah, [has] publicly reproached bin Laden for causing widespread mayhem and killing.”

Phares becomes controversial in a beneficial way when he discusses strategies against the United States. He argues that we should not become fixated on Osama bin Laden, but rather direct our defenses against the vast network of enemies engaged in at least six strategies to destroy the United States. He argues that our enemies (1) use oil as a weapon (economic jihad), (2) penetrate our centers of culture and ideas (ideological jihad), (3) mollify the public to prevent self-defense (political jihad), (4) infiltrate our intelligence services (intelligence jihad), (5) use our laws to destroy our freedoms and protect the collection of money and soldiers for jihad (subversive jihad), and (6) seek to control our foreign policy (diplomatic jihad) (p. 137).

In the context of this whole argument, we see the importance of creating a legal framework to resist terrorism while preserving our civil liberties. Phares persuasively raises our perception of the threats confronting the United States, and readers will share the author’s apprehension that we might fail to develop a clear national policy of resistance to terrorism and thus fail to properly mobilize resources to promote effective counterterrorist efforts. This book provides a valuable service in identifying the rationale and justification for resistance against dispersed networks of terrorists. It provides the outline for a successful struggle that must engage all spheres of society.

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***Peace Be upon You: Fourteen Centuries of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish Coexistence in the Middle East*** by Zachary Karabell. Random House, 2007, 352 pp., \$26.95.

Zachary Karabell’s book, *Peace Be upon You: Fourteen Centuries of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish Coexistence in the Middle East*, is one of the latest in a recent

spate of Islamic apologetics whose basic thesis can be summarized as: “Muslims, Christians, and Jews can live together peacefully . . . provided it is the Muslims who rule.”

Looking primarily at Muslim history from the seventh century AD to the present, the author carefully selects periods when relations between the religions are relatively calm under Muslim rule and glosses over or ignores completely similar periods under Christian rule, such as the reign of Roger II in Sicily. This provides an inaccurate picture of the history between the religions and underscores the author’s bias toward Muslim rule. This bias is reinforced through several examples throughout the text. For example, in describing the Arab conquest of Egypt, he implies that the Christian Copts possibly helped in the attack, “having been promised by Amr that their churches would be undisturbed and their tax burden manageable. For the Copts and their bishops, it was a tolerable trade-off. They knew they had to pay taxes to someone, and at least the Muslims would allow them to practice their faith the way they wished, free from the repressive, arrogant authority of Constantinople” (p. 28). This example is amplified further: “Communities were left to organize themselves, with minimal intrusion from the state. While the Copts, for instance, were second-class citizens relative to the ruling Arab elite, they had also been second-class citizens relative to the ruling Byzantine elite. At least under the Arabs they did not face religious persecution” (p. 37).

To counter critics who would claim that Islam is a violent religion, the author often resorts to employing moral equivalency as a defense, as evidenced in his depiction of the violence between Muslims and Christians in Damascus in 1860: “But to indict Islam for this violence is the equivalent of condemning Anglicanism for the occasional depredations of the British army in its many wars of conquest in the nineteenth century, or to excoriate Catholicism because of French massacres of Algerians during the same period, or to charge American Protestantism for the slaughter of Native Americans at Wounded Knee in 1890” (p. 219). Arguing that Islam is no worse than other religions fails to bolster the author’s central premise that peace may come from Islam’s relative superiority.

Though reasonably researched and replete with ample endnotes and bibliography, certain statements in the text should raise eyebrows. For example, Karabell writes, “Scholars have long since disposed of the image of Islam being spread by the sword, but that has not altered popular imagination” (p. 31). Such rhetorical devices, provided with no supporting evidence to allow the reader to verify the claim or research it further, detract from the author’s argument as well as bring into question the validity of his thesis.

A book of this scope is no small undertaking and, understandably, certain restrictions must be imposed to keep it to a manageable length. Though this text provides a readable overview of the relations between three of the world’s great religions, the author’s bias keeps it from achieving its true potential, since it fails to analyze key questions thoroughly that spring from his thesis.

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