

US Interventions Abroad

A Renaissance of the Powell Doctrine?

Alexander Wolf

THIS ARTICLE addresses the question of when and under what circumstances we may expect foreign interventions under the Obama administration. By chronicling the doctrinal premises of US intervention policy during the “interwar years” (1990–2001)¹ and the administration of George W. Bush (2001–2008), it will demonstrate that the “smart power” approach of the Obama administration suggests continuity over radical change. Despite a liberal humanitarian orientation that in principle should look favorably on intervention, Washington will consider employing its military forces—when necessary, unilaterally and preemptively—only to protect vital US interests and only when confronted by immediate security threats. A possible renaissance of the so-called Powell Doctrine should be considered in connection with this interest-based policy approach, since it generally offers a promising framework for military intervention.

American Intervention Policy during the Interwar Years (1990–2001)

The policies of the interwar years—that period between the end of the Cold War’s bipolar order and the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the war on terrorism that followed—were shaped during the presidencies of George H. W. Bush (1989–93) and Bill Clinton (1993–2001). Both presidents were faced with the task of determining at what point and

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for what purpose the use of US military forces would be justified in the post-Soviet era. These decisions about the direction of US policy were part of the adjustment in foreign policy by the “world’s only remaining superpower.” Precisely what form this adjustment was to take became the source of much debate and depended on each observer’s limited set of experiences and background as well as his or her ideological persuasion and outlook.² The only point of agreement was that the old paradigm had disappeared with the end of the East-West conflict.³

Bush Senior and the Powell Doctrine

The senior President Bush, a statesman and diplomat who thought in terms of *realpolitik*, viewed the military pragmatically as one tool among several to be used sparingly and prudently:

Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice. . . . But in every case involving the use of force, it will be essential to have a clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing U.S. forces once the mission is complete. Only if we keep these principles in mind will the potential sacrifice be one that can be explained and justified.⁴

This sensible set of criteria is perhaps best summed up in the Powell Doctrine. Peter Rudolf has correctly pointed out that the Powell Doctrine should not be considered identical with the Weinberger Doctrine.⁵ While the Weinberger Doctrine places emphasis on the “vital interests” that trigger state action, the Powell Doctrine begins with the interest-based decision to intervene and formulates an operational catalogue of criteria for the “proper” execution of military intervention.⁶ Accordingly, the military should only be put to use when (1) the national interest requires it; (2) the number of troops employed corresponds with the mission they are to execute; (3) the mission is clearly defined, both politically and militarily; (4) the size, composition, and disposition of the troops is constantly being reevaluated; (5) the operation has the support of both the Congress and the American people; and (6) there is a clear exit strategy.⁷

The operational criteria to be fulfilled according to the Powell Doctrine are meant to set up barriers to the ill-considered commitment of military forces in poorly planned operations and to help prevent “mission creep,” the unplanned escalation of a conflict.⁸ A prime example of a military

intervention carried out in accordance with the Powell Doctrine is the US-led Operation Desert Storm, conducted under UN auspices for the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.⁹

Clinton and a Difficult Reorientation

While Operation Desert Storm still involved American forces engaging in a classic state-to-state conflict aimed at deterring, or in this case, punishing another state actor, the objectives and general orientation of US military interventions changed markedly under President Clinton. Interventions were no longer instruments of *realpolitik* aimed at deterring a well-armed enemy but were seen instead as means for realizing political or conceptual or ideological goals.¹⁰ This shift first became evident at the beginning of Clinton's first term in office as formulated in the concept of "assertive multilateralism," which took as its goal the expansion of democracy and freedom—a pragmatic "neo-Wilsonianism."¹¹ As part of this, the United States would make increased use of multilateral UN missions to avoid having to act or bear responsibility alone. This approximate orientation around a system of collective security "was an attempt to bring into accord the interventionist orientation of liberal interventionism with the political reality of limited resources and domestic political restrictions."¹² The increased use of the American military for the general benefit of mankind was no longer consistent with the Powell Doctrine, however, which represented a foreign policy straightjacket to the liberal Clinton administration. And yet Hans Morgenthau was to be proven correct: Interventions "must be deduced not from abstract principles which are incapable of controlling the actions of governments, but from the interests of the nations concerned and from their practice of foreign policy reflecting those interests."¹³

With no "peace dividend" materializing and a recession and budget deficit to contend with at the start of the 1990s, majority sentiment in both the Republican-dominated Congress and among the American people in general coalesced around the notion of "a new nationalism, a new patriotism, a new foreign policy that puts America first and, not only first, but second and third as well."¹⁴

Following the "disaster in Mogadishu" in October 1993 involving the death and mutilation of 18 US soldiers engaged in a failed operation aimed at capturing the warlord, Aidid, as part of the larger campaign of Somali reconstruction, the concept of "assertive multilateralism" came under

such sharp criticism from the Congress and the general public that the Clinton administration was forced to quickly abandon it, replacing it with the “strategy of engagement and enlargement.”¹⁵ The core elements of this new foreign policy doctrine aimed at the proliferation of democratic and market-oriented systems along with a partial departure from unilateralism, a new selectivity with respect to foreign crisis management, and the effective use of positive developments in globalization for the restoration of American economic strength.¹⁶ Additionally, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) of May 1995 set such strict criteria for American participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations (both peace restoring and peace maintaining) that, as Rudolf and Daalder correctly point out, it effectively amounted to an unequivocal restatement of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.¹⁷

Foreign and Domestic Factors during the Interwar Years

The American presidents of the interwar period were unable to follow through on the example offered by Operation Desert Storm. Due to the fundamental changes in security policy connected to the end of the East-West conflict and the revolution in information technology (including the politicizing effect it had on an increasingly vocal civil society) as well as the further fragmentation of traditional international power structures, both George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton found themselves frequently prevented from achieving their presidential prerogatives in foreign policy. The diversity of post-Soviet opinion also shifted the lines of US domestic political debate and intensified the discussion over American intervention policy.¹⁸ “A generation was coming of age in the Congress who cared less about foreign affairs, elected by a generation of voters who cared less, and reported on by a media that paid less attention.”¹⁹

Between the end of the “idealistic experiment” in Somalia in May 1994 and the terrorist attacks of September 2001, military interventions were regularly a topic of domestic political debate—mainly along party lines but also on institutional grounds between the president and Congress. While public opinion and the Congress (principally the House of Representatives) disapproved of the vast majority of foreign interventions, it should be noted that members of Congress often rejected them for purely political reasons to gain a tactical advantage in an upcoming election, coming out publicly against them only after they had already been approved.²⁰ The decisions to intervene made between 1994 and 2001 must be viewed in light of the

strategy of engagement and enlargement and PDD-25 that established a strict delimitation of interests with respect to the objectives of any intervention and made the combat deployment of American ground forces practically impossible. This Clinton Doctrine “read more like a statement of when and why the United States would not intervene militarily than a delineation of when and why it would.”²¹

As a consequence, Washington categorically refused to get involved militarily to stop the genocide in Rwanda, and military pressure used in places like Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 was to be exerted solely through air attacks—which led critics to complain, correctly, that belated success at negotiated solutions came at the price of increased civilian casualties from war and genocide or that the administration failed to consider successfully prosecuted interventions like Operation Allied Force in 1999 as precedents for future operations.²²

“The advent of the modern media and . . . a change in generational attitudes . . . in a country in which foreign policy hardly mattered”²³ was an enormous influence on American intervention policy during the interwar years and led to an increased reluctance by the United States in committing its troops militarily. This pattern changed after the terror attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington, DC, when the American people were made painfully aware that “security is like oxygen: easy to take for granted until you begin to miss it.”²⁴

American Intervention Policy in the Era of George W. Bush

As previously shown, American intervention policy during the interwar years had several different goals. This changed following the attacks of 9/11. This “transformational moment”²⁵ had an immense effect on America’s collective consciousness. Not since the American Civil War had so many Americans been killed on a single day, and the nation’s capital had not come under attack since the War of 1812.²⁶ The targeting of civilians not only shattered the sense of territorial security, it also constituted a declaration of war on universally held values of pluralism and democracy.²⁷

The events of 9/11 changed American intervention policy suddenly and radically. The so-called Bush Doctrine, which left a definitive mark on the 2002 *National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States* (one might even say embodied it), was built on the following elements: First, the struggle against international terrorism became the predominant goal of American

foreign and security policy. Second, this struggle was not to be a short-term project but instead a task that would be pursued for years to come.²⁸ Third, due to the nature of the threat, it would be imperative that the United States bring to bear all the means at its disposal—which was only possible (and this is a central point of the 2002 *NSS*) if the United States is guaranteed the freedom to act preemptively.²⁹

The Principles of the Bush Administration: Preemption and Unilateralism

The Bush administration was convinced that Americans could feel secure only when global terrorism, as well as the danger of nuclear attack by “rogue states,” was completely eliminated. This gave preemptive interventions legitimacy, because “defending against terrorism and other emerging 21st century threats may well require that we take the war to the enemy. . . . The best, and in some cases the only defense, is a good offense.”³⁰

Additionally, “security will require all Americans . . . to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.”³¹ Preemption—the art of anticipatory self-defense in the face of direct and imminent threats—was largely uncontroversial with respect to attacks by terrorists. “Law enforcement, covert operations, and intelligence gathering have always sought to preempt terrorist attacks, and such preemptive activities are well-established in international law. . . . The debate in the United States has always been about whether the U.S. government is doing enough to stop terrorists preemptively, not whether it has to wait for them to attack before acting.”³²

With respect to rogue states, the core of the so-called new doctrine called preemption constituted a dangerous and radical change in the foreign policy course of the United States.³³ On the one hand, the 2003 *NSS* claimed for the United States the right to act preemptively whenever three factors coincided: (1) a rogue state (2) possesses weapons of mass destruction or is attempting to obtain them and (3) either supports or harbors international terrorist groups. Based on the United States’ hegemonic position in the international system, political science professor Werner Link accurately identifies preemptive/preventative self-defense as a new element of international relations, as follows:

The principle of sovereign equality and co-subordination of states, which, despite all attempts at relativization, has characterized the international state system since the Treaty of Westphalia and which expressly underlies the order established under the United Nations is to be superseded by a system of hierarchies in which

the United States (and it alone) can at its own discretion decide whether a state has forfeited its right of sovereignty and whether American military intervention aimed at overturning the existing regime and establishing an occupation for the purpose of reorganizing state authority is permissible.³⁴

Although only North Korea and Iraq were identified by name in the doctrine, the criteria it established could be interpreted to apply to other states as well. Even if one accepts the interpretation offered by Daalder and Lindsey that there is no specific criteria in the *NSS 2003* recognizing the freedom to act preemptively,³⁵ there is still another problem, addressed by Henry Kissinger: “It cannot be in either the American national interest or the world’s interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of threats to its security.”³⁶ Bruce Jentleson has added two more points to Kissinger’s criticism: the injury the doctrine inflicts on international law and norms as well as the questionable efficiency of preemptive interventions.³⁷ Central to criticism of the principle of preemption is the fact that it is dependent upon detailed and reliable information about the genuine seriousness of a threat. If a preemptive action cannot be legitimized *ex post facto* by proof of the existence of an imminent threat, then the action is not preemption but prevention taken in violation of international law.

The policies of preemption and unilateralism first became a significant international problem, however, with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 took place with the aid of a coalition of more than 170 countries convinced of the legitimacy of the action.³⁸ While it was clear from the outset that the mission determined the nature of the coalition and not vice versa,³⁹ President Bush’s statement, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,”⁴⁰ only developed its full effect as part of the manufactured justification for the Iraq war in 2002–03, dividing the transatlantic community and its institutions into proponents and opponents of regime change.

“Mission Accomplished:” Unlearning the Lessons of Mogadishu

The war against terror was not conducted solely out of an American desire for security but also as an expression of the United States’ interest in assisting the spread of freedom.⁴¹ Like their ideological kindred, the liberal humanists, the neoconservative circles in the Bush administration were concerned to establish a world order of a superior normative caliber in which the United States could fulfill its own sense of exceptionalism.⁴²

After the Taliban-led government and al-Qaeda fighters had been driven out of Afghanistan with the aid of Afghan warlords, or at the latest when President Bush landed on the USS *Abraham Lincoln* and declared combat operations in Iraq to be over, it then became apparent that there had been no, or least insufficient, planning for the occupation phase that followed.⁴³ Warnings like those from Gen Eric Shinseki that several hundred thousand troops would be necessary to stabilize and secure occupied Iraq, were publically dismissed as miscalculations.⁴⁴

Here it became apparent that although the “Bush Doctrine” carried out interventions to defend (neoconservative interpretations of) vital interests, in contrast to the Powell Doctrine it did not spell out any sort of exit strategy. Once violent opposition began against American occupation forces, thereby obstructing any effective process of reconstruction, it became clear that although the American military’s “shock and awe” tactic may have been effective in crippling and undermining the morale of an opponent from the start of combat operations through fast-paced and intense air attacks, it was not possible to effectively manage the occupied territory using these same means. As Carlo Masala has pointed out, for an externally imposed campaign of nation-building to function, it is imperative that the occupying troops have the support of the civilian population, that it take place against the backdrop of neighboring countries that are “kindly disposed” toward the operation, and that the occupation and loss of sovereignty be temporary.⁴⁵ The Bush administration gave little emphasis to these elements prior to its interventions, which is why the unilateral preemptive *NSS* of 2003 offered no way out of this dilemma.

As a consequence, the Bush administration had to find political and operational solutions to the precarious security situations that developed in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 2006 *NSS* revised the unilateral, preemptive character of American foreign policy, placing increased emphasis on diplomatic and multilateral initiatives—in part to obtain needed support from allied countries. The neoconservative sense of mission and the goals of spreading democracy, freedom, and human rights remained in effect, however. Accordingly, one must concur with Ivo Daalder when he notes that the 2006 *NSS* no longer differs significantly from the strategy of engagement and enlargement of the Clinton administration.⁴⁶

At the operational level, the first “counterinsurgency field manual” since the Vietnam War was drawn up under the direction of the current commander of Central Command, Gen David Petraeus. Nathaniel Fick and

John Nagl have summarized its main points as follows: “Focus on protecting civilians over killing the enemy. Assume greater risk. Use minimum, not maximum force.”⁴⁷ It is true that these new guidelines constituted a nearly complete and still controversial reformulation of American military doctrine responsible for the massive troop increases in Iraq as part of the “surge” aimed at stabilizing the security situation there. But it is also true that the same tactic will not necessarily lead to success in Afghanistan.⁴⁸

“Soft Power”—Continuity of Substance alongside a Change in Style?

During the election campaign, observers gained the impression that Barack Obama had no intention to limit “the use of military force . . . to the role of protecting the American people and the nation’s vital interests in the event of an actual or imminent attack.” Aside from self-defense, military power might also be used in the service of the “common security” on which global stability rests. “As a maxim for the use of armed forces beyond purely self-defense purposes, [Obama] says that in such instances, every effort should be made to win the support and participation of other countries.”⁴⁹

Through the consequences brought about by the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington has discovered the limits of what had been thought to be its boundless power and now realizes that “America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, but the world cannot meet them without America.”⁵⁰ This in no way implies that the United States will alter its underlying foreign policy goals. The promotion of the security, freedom, and prosperity of the American people will remain an end in itself, as well as the foundation for a just and stable international order⁵¹ and will continue to direct the foreign policy agenda of the United States into the future.

To realize these goals, the Obama administration will make greater use of “smart power,” a mixture of military “hard power” and diplomatic “soft power.” This approach could become the basis for a new doctrine and rests on these three principles:

1. America’s standing in the world is a condition for its security and prosperity;
2. current challenges can only be met with capable and willing partners; and

3. nonmilitary means can increase the legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability of American actions.⁵²

Barack Obama faces extraordinary domestic and foreign policy challenges. It seems unlikely that he can count on a persisting “rally-round-the-flag” effect from the American public regarding military interventions. For even though Americans still take a considerable interest in foreign policy matters, in particular the fight against terrorism, 71 percent say President Obama should concentrate on domestic concerns, in contrast to the 11 percent who feel that foreign policy issues should take precedence.⁵³ If the president wants to avoid endangering his domestic agenda early in his first term in office, he will need the broad support of public opinion. Above all, he will have to rely on maintaining a constructive relationship with the Democratic congressional majority, which is predominantly in favor of expanded use of diplomatic rather than military means in the struggle against terrorism.⁵⁴ In the event, however, that Washington is unable to accept a nuclear-armed Iran, for example, or the further destabilization and radicalization of a nuclear-armed state like Pakistan, then military interventions can no longer be ruled out on principle. Ivo Daalder is correct when he notes that “some situations will require the threat of or actual use of military force—and in those instances, the use of force early is likely to be more effective and less costly than waiting until it can only be employed as a last resort. Preemption, in other words, is here to stay.”⁵⁵

One may expect the intervention policy of the Obama administration to demonstrate continuity with both the liberal internationalism of the Clinton years as well as with the *NSS* of 2006. This may perhaps prove a disappointment to the overly idealistic expectations held by supporters of Barack Obama on both sides of the Atlantic.⁵⁶ To be effective at dealing with the numerous security policy challenges it confronts, caution in the use of its military on the part of the United States must fulfill two conditions. First, the “smart power” concept must be correlated with the conditions set down in the Powell Doctrine to secure the support of the American public and of Congress to both the commitment of interests and to an exit strategy, as well as to provide for the requisite materiel and personnel needs necessary to improve the chances of success for any potential intervention. Secondly—this point should be obvious by now—US allies, especially those participating in operations in Afghanistan, must expand their efforts, in particular through nonmilitary means,

to support Washington with a proper measure of “burden sharing.” This is not a matter of propriety, nor does it constitute raising multilateralism into an end in itself. The obligation to cooperate arises solely from the fact that in the twenty-first century, security must be sought by all countries working in concert and not by individual states acting alone. The potentially disastrous nature of some security risks present in the global nuclear age requires the acceptance and legal regulation of the still controversial principle of preemption.

One must concur with Richard Haas when he writes that the questions about “when,” “where,” and “how” military interventions are to be carried out relates to the question about America’s interests around the world and what the United States is prepared to do to preserve them.⁵⁷ The Powell Doctrine can offer persuasive answers to the questions about “when,” “where,” and “how” to intervene. The question of which interests might provoke intervention is a political one, however, that each society must decide for itself. In view of the global nature of the security challenges we face, the solutions we seek must be global in nature as well. **SSQ**

Notes

1. For a comprehensive description of this period, see Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars—From 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror* (New York: Public Affairs/Perseus, 2008).

2. The debate over future expectations for the post-Soviet period, greatly simplified, fell between the notion of the “end of history” (see Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *National Interest* 16 [Summer 1989]: 3–18) and the “back to the future” idea of power politics between nation-states (see John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security* 15, no. 1 [Summer 1990]: 5–56).

3. See Richard N. Haas, “Paradigm Lost,” *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 43–58.

4. George H. W. Bush, “Remarks at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York,” 5 January 1993, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=5156&year=1993&month=01.

5. The Powell Doctrine does, however, exhibit a similarity to the Weinberger Doctrine, which Colin Powell helped formulate, in terms of content and conceptual structure. See Peter Rudolf, “Friedenserhaltung und Friedenserzwingung: Militärinterventionen in der Amerikanischen Aussenpolitik” [“Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement: Military Intervention in American Foreign Policy”], in *Weltmacht ohne Gegner: Amerikanische Aussenpolitik zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts* [*World Power without Opponents: American Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the 21st Century*], eds. Peter Rudolf and Jürgen Wilzewski (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2000), 297–334, in particular 301.

6. Regarding a catalogue of criteria for military interventions, see also Reinhard C. Meier-Walser, “Wann soll der Westen in Krisen intervenieren? Globale Einsätze als mehrdimensionale

Projekte" ["When Do You Want the West to Intervene in Crises? Global Operations as Multi-dimensional Projects"], *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zürich), 20 November 2007.

7. See Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 5 (Winter 1992–93): 32–45.

8. The classic case of the politically undesired widening of a conflict—and one that shaped Colin Powell's own thinking on these issues—was the Vietnam War. With respect to mission creep and the problem of quick exit strategies, see Jeffrey Record, "Exit Strategy Delusions," *Parameters* 31, no. 4 (Winter 2001–02): 21–27.

9. See Powell, "U.S. Forces;" and Rudolf, "Friedenserhaltung und Friedenserzwingung," 302. Contrary to prevailing opinion, Operation Restore Hope (November 1993–March 1994) in Somalia, which Powell helped plan, can also be considered as another example of the Powell Doctrine in operation, since it was organized in terms of duration, scope, and objectives according to the criteria established by that doctrine. It was Pres. G. H. W. Bush's reading of American national interest (a prerequisite for intervention) that caused him to decide in favor of intervention in Somalia rather than in Bosnia. In addition to Powell's fear of an escalation of the conflict, the decision not to intervene in Bosnia was also motivated by a desire not to destabilize the fragile democratic government of Pres. Boris Yeltsin, who would have been weakened had the United States chosen to intervene in a region that Moscow (at least theoretically) still considered as part of its zone of influence. With both the newly elected President Clinton and the US media demanding intervention in Bosnia, Bush saw it in America's vital interest to obstruct or at least delay any intervention there. "Unable to control the spin on each crisis and in response to the election of Bill Clinton, Bush and Powell concluded that if the United States were going to intervene in response to a humanitarian crisis, it would be in Somalia and not in Bosnia." See John Western, "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia," *International Security* 26, no. 4 (Spring 2002): 112–42, especially 118.

10. See Rudolf, "Friedenserhaltung und Friedenserzwingung," 298.

11. See Jason DeParle, "The Man inside Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy," *New York Times Magazine*, 20 August 1995, 32–39, 46, 55–57, especially 35.

12. Rudolf, "Friedenserhaltung und Friedenserzwingung," 303.

13. Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 3 (April 1967): 425–36, especially 429.

14. Patrick Buchanan, "American First—and Second, and Third," *National Interest* (Spring 1990): 79–82.

15. See Douglas E. Delaney, "Cutting, Running, or Otherwise? The US Decision to Withdraw from Somalia," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 15, no. 3 (Winter 2004): 28–46.

16. See Patrick Keller, *Von der Eindämmung zur Erweiterung: Bill Clinton und die Neuorientierung amerikanischer Aussenpolitik* [The Mitigation of Extension: Bill Clinton and the Reorientation of American Foreign Policy] (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 2008), 92–95.

17. See Rudolf, "Friedenserhaltung und Friedenserzwingung," 305–6 and n. 29.

18. See Jerel Rosati and Stephen Twing, "The Presidency and U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War," in *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. James M. Scott (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 29–56.

19. David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals* (New York: Touchstone, 2002), 75.

20. See Rudolf, "Friedenserhaltung und Friedenserzwingung," 325, 329–30.

21. Bruce W. Jentleson, *American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century*, 1st ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 298.

22. See Ivo M. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo," *Foreign Policy* 116 (Fall 1999): 128–40.
23. Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 496.
24. Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflict: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 6th ed. (New York: Longman, 2007), 205.
25. Unnamed "senior official." Source established/quoted in Peter Rudolf, *Imperiale Illusionen: Amerikanische Aussenpolitik unter Präsident George W. Bush* [*Imperial Illusions: American Foreign Policy under President George W. Bush*] (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2007), 7.
26. See Bruce W. Jentleson, *American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century*, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 359.
27. For more, see Tilman Mayer, "Patriotismus und Nationalbewusstsein in den USA seit dem 11. September" ["Patriotism and National Consciousness in the USA since 9/11"], *Politische Studien* 406 (March/April 2006): 15–23.
28. The war against terror "will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." Pres. George W. Bush, "Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," 20 September 2001, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=64731&st=&st1>.
29. "For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the cold war doctrines of deterrence and containment, in some cases, those strategies still apply, but new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best." Pres. George W. Bush, "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York," 1 June 2002, www.dartmouth.edu/~govdocs/docs/iraq/060102.pdf.
30. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "21st Century Transformation of U.S. Armed Forces" (speech, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 31 January 2002), <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=183>.
31. Bush, "Commencement Address at the US Military Academy," (2002).
32. Ivo Daalder, James M. Lindsey, and James B. Steinberg, *The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation*, Policy Brief no. 108 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, October 2002), 6.
33. See Ivo Daalder and James M. Lindsey, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003), 122.
34. Werner Link, "Hegemonie und Gleichgewicht der Macht" ["Hegemony and Balance of Power"], in *Sicherheit und Frieden zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts* [*Security and Peace at the Beginning of the 21st Century*], ed. Mir A. Ferdowski (Munich: Bavarian Office of Political Education, 2004), 43–60, especially 59.
35. See Daalder et al., *Bush National Security Strategy*, 6.
36. Henry Kissinger, "Preemption and the End of Westphalia," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (Fall 2002), http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2002_fall/kissinger.html.
37. International law is violated through the disregard for Article 51 of the UN Charter—allowing for self-defense only "if an armed act occurs." Jentleson sees a lack of efficiency owing to the immensity of information required as well as reliable planning needed prior to any intervention. See Jentleson, *American Foreign Policy*, 371.
38. *Ibid.*, 365.

39. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "Annual Report to the President and Congress," 15 August 2002.

40. Bush, "Address before a Joint Session of the Congress," 20 September 2001.

41. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated in an interview on NBC's "Meet the Press," 27 June 2003, that "the battle to secure the peace in Iraq is now the central battle in the global war on terror, and those sacrifices are going to make not just the Middle East more stable, but our country safer. . We're pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime who will be held to account for their crimes. The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. And then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq." <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2909>.

42. See Tony Smith, "Wilsonianism after Iraq," in *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century*, G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Tony Smith, and Anne-Marie Slaughter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 53–88. On neoconservative policy, see the comprehensive analysis of Patrick Keller, *Neokonservatismus und Amerikanische Aussenpolitik: Ideen, Krieg und Strategie von Ronald Reagan bis George W. Bush* [*Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: Ideas, War and Strategy from Ronald Reagan to George Bush*] (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008).

43. "My belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators." Vice Pres. Dick Cheney, interview on "Meet the Press," 14 September 2003, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244>. "There's a basic point to make about planning that people need to understand. You can't write a plan for a military situation, and this is basically a military situation, that is like a railroad timetable. There are too many things that you learn as you go." Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, interview on "Meet the Press," 27 June 2003.

44. "[T]he notion that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq [is] wildly off the mark." Paul Wolfowitz, "Department of Defense Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2004 Hearing before the House Committee on the Budget," 8, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearing&docid=f:85421.pdf.

45. See Carlo Masala, "Managing Protektorate: Die vergessene Dimension" ["Managing Protectorates: The Forgotten Dimension"], *Politische Studien* 411 (2007): 49–55.

46. See Ivo Daalder, "Statement on the 2006 National Security Strategy," http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/0316diplomacy_daalder.aspx.

47. Nathaniel Fick and John A. Nagl, "Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition," *Foreign Policy* 170 (January/February 2009): 42–47, especially 43.

48. *Ibid.*, 43–44.

49. Peter Rudolf, "US-Aussenpolitik und transatlantische Sicherheitsbeziehungen nach den Wahlen" ["US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Security Relations after the Elections"], *SWP-Aktuell* (July 2008): 2.

50. Pres. Barack Obama, "Address to Joint Session of Congress, 24 February 2009," http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress; and Vice Pres. Joseph R. Biden, "America needs the world just as the world needs America" (speech at 45th Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2009), http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_20090&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=238&.

51. These goals are set forth in the paper entitled "Strategic Leadership," considered the "blueprint" for the Obama administration's national security strategy: "Our core goals today are the same ones envisaged by our founding fathers: the resolute pursuit of security, liberty and

prosperity both for our own people and as the basis for a just and stable international order.” See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Bruce W. Jentleson, Ivo H. Daalder, et al., *Strategic Leadership: Framework for a 21st Century National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security Publications, 2008).

52. See Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, “Implementing Smart Power: Setting an Agenda for National Security Reform” (statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 24 April 2008), 3, <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2008/NyeTestimony080424a.pdf>.

53. Pew Research Center, “On Obama’s Desk: Economy, Jobs Trump All Other Policy Priorities,” 22 January 2009, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1087/economy-jobs-top-public-priorities-2009>.

54. In a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in February 2009 asking whether military operations or diplomatic efforts were better suited to preventing terrorist attacks, 57 percent of Democrats opted for diplomatic efforts, 28 percent for military operations, 15 percent for both/neither. See Pew Research Center, “Obama faces Familiar Divisions over Anti-Terror Policies,” 18 February 2009, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1125/terrorism-guantanamo-torture-polling>.

55. Ivo Daalder, ed, *Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2007), 16.

56. See Christian Brose, “The Making of George W. Obama,” *Foreign Policy* 170 (January/February 2009): 53–55.

57. See Richard N. Haas, *Intervention: The Use of American Military in the Post-Cold War World*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999), 2.